[Senate Hearing 119-144]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-144
FAA REAUTHORIZATION ONE YEAR LATER:
AVIATION SAFETY, AIR TRAFFIC AND NEXT GENERATION TECHNOLOGY
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 14, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-427 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
TODD YOUNG, Indiana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOHN CURTIS, Utah BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
BERNIE MORENO, Ohio JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
TIM SHEEHY, Montana JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ANDY KIM, New Jersey
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Liam McKenna, General Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
Jonathan Hale, General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on May 14, 2025..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 1
Statement of Senator Duckworth................................... 2
Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 14
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 16
Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 18
Statement of Senator Kim......................................... 20
Statement of Senator Budd........................................ 22
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 24
Statement of Senator Schmitt..................................... 26
Statement of Senator Rosen....................................... 28
Statement of Senator Peters...................................... 30
Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................ 31
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 33
Statement of Senator Lujan....................................... 36
Statement of Senator Fetterman................................... 39
Statement of Senator Blunt Rochester............................. 41
Statement of Senator Sheehy...................................... 43
Witnesses
Jodi Baker, Deputy Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety;
Franklin McIntosh, Deputy Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic
Organization; and Wayne Heibeck, Deputy Associate Administrator
for Airports, Federal Aviation Administration.................. 4
Joint prepared statement..................................... 6
Appendix
Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI),
prepared statement............................................. 49
Response to written questions submitted to Jodi Baker, Wayne
Heibeck, and Franklin McIntosh by:
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 52
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 52
Hon. Jerry Moran............................................. 53
Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................ 55
Hon. Marsha Blackburn........................................ 56
Hon. Eric Schmitt............................................ 58
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 58
Hon. Gary Peters............................................. 64
Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 65
Hon. Jacky Rosen............................................. 69
Hon. Ben Ray Lujan........................................... 70
Hon. John Hickenlooper....................................... 71
Hon. Andy Kim................................................ 73
FAA REAUTHORIZATION ONE YEAR LATER: AVIATION SAFETY, AIR TRAFFIC AND
NEXT GENERATION TECHNOLOGY
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 14, 2025
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12 p.m., in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Cruz, Chairman
of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cruz [presiding], Wicker, Fischer, Moran,
Sullivan, Blackburn, Young, Budd, Schmitt, Moreno, Sheehy,
Lummis, Cantwell, Klobuchar, Markey, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen,
Lujan, Hickenlooper, Fetterman, Kim, and Blunt Rochester.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Chairman Cruz. Good morning. The Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation will come to order. The
clerk is directed in the previous vote to show Senator
Hickenlooper as voting in person rather than by proxy.
Good morning to each of our witnesses.
It has been nearly one year since the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2024 was signed into law. I was proud to co-lead that
effort in the Senate along with Ranking Member Cantwell.
As we are seeing today in the wake of a major aviation
tragedy, repeated staffing challenges, and technological
failures, the 2024 Act was unfortunately quite prescient. It
mandated an audit of all legacy pre-2000 air traffic control
systems to assess operational risk, functionality, security,
and compatibility with current and future technologies.
An additional requirement ensures the FAA notifies Congress
of unfunded priorities not in the budget request that are
integral to the operation of the national airspace. It also
directed the FAA and airports to adopt new runway technology to
cut down on the high number of near misses on airport runways.
It is clear that there is a dire need to fix our troubled
airspace. Last week, President Trump and Secretary Duffy
proposed a major plan to replace vast segments of the national
airspace system--radars, towers, telecommunications, and more.
Secretary Duffy previously announced new policies to
attract more air traffic controllers, improve their training,
and incentivize good controllers to stay in the workforce
longer. These upgrades are overdue, and I hope there will be
bipartisan support for them.
I am committed to helping Secretary Duffy get the resources
he needs to address acute problems like replacing existing,
unreliable copper lines with faster fiber at facilities
managing the Newark airspace and other areas, as well.
But the FAA's multi-year failure to keep pace with
technology and staffing needs underscores a larger problem when
a bureaucracy has to fund and manage multi-year projects on
behalf of private sector stakeholders like airlines and general
aviation, all while acting simultaneously as a safety
regulator. The challenge of quickly and properly implementing
new multibillion-dollar, mission-critical tech systems is about
to become even more daunting with the arrival of air taxis and
commercial drones.
If you think the FAA as currently constructed is ready for
this challenge, then you have not been paying attention over
the last two decades. Congress and the Administration must
think boldly about how we can set the FAA up for long-term
success. Both our economy's productive capacity and the safety
of the Nation's airspace depend on it.
Regarding the arrival of air taxis and commercial drones,
the 2024 law took meaningful steps to accelerate the safe
integration of these new entrants into the Nation's skies. Most
notably, the FAA bill required a rulemaking to enable drones to
operate beyond visual line of sight, a huge priority for the
growth of the drone industry. The Biden administration,
unfortunately, missed the bill's deadline of September.
The bill also directed the establishment of a new Center
for Advanced Aviation Technologies, a provision that I
authored, which was recently announced to be in the Dallas-Fort
Worth metroplex and will be headed up by the Texas A&M System.
The Center will play an extremely important role for the
advancement of new technologies, and I am thankful for the work
Secretary Duffy and the FAA has played in moving it forward.
Ensuring that the 2024 law is implemented in line with the
statutory timelines and consistent with congressional intent is
of paramount importance to this Committee, and I appreciate my
colleagues' commitment to maintaining robust oversight of the
process.
Finally, I want to express my continued condolences to the
families of American Airlines Flight 5342. Thank you for
turning your tragedy into tireless advocacy. I remain dedicated
to ensuring and doing everything possible, to make sure that
something like this never happens again, and it is precisely
why members of this Committee hear directly from the FAA about
the steps it is taking to create a safer and more efficient
airspace.
I look forward to hearing about the progress the
Administration is making on these critical issues.
I now turn to Ranking Member Duckworth.
STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Chairman Cruz, and thank you
to Ranking Member Cantwell, who we will be hearing from later.
Welcome to our witnesses. I am disappointed that the Acting
Administrator was unavailable, but I thank you each for being
here.
I look forward to hearing about FAA's efforts to implement
the FAA Reauthorization Law, but I must first address the
recent critical safety lapses that we have seen. Close calls, a
deadly crash, equipment outages, these are all terrible, but
unfortunately they are not a surprise. Alarm bells have been
ringing about near misses and aging equipment for years. We
have held hearings. We passed the FAA bipartisan
Reauthorization Bill, but there is still so much more work to
do. We need both a long- and a short-term plan, and that is
what I hope we will hear from the FAA today.
A large-scale overhaul of our air traffic controller system
will take years. In the meantime, we need to know what FAA is
doing now to prevent another tragedy. How is FAA ensuring that
other airports do not experience the type of radar and
communications failures impacting Newark? What is FAA's plan
for inspection, maintenance, and testing to ensure redundancy
and resiliency systemwide? FAA needs to be proactively looking
for risk and mitigating it.
Yet, FAA failed to spot a clear trend of helicopter-related
near misses near DCA. After 67 people died, FAA permanently
closed the risky helicopter route, but even that long-overdue
action failed to fully solve the problem. Coordination failures
between the FAA and the military has continued to put the
flying public at risk.
In March, after the deadly January 29th crash, a departing
flight came within 200 vertical feet of an Air Force jet
conducting a flyover of Arlington Cemetery. More recently,
another Army helicopter, from the same brigade involved in
January's deadly crash, came within 200 feet of a commercial
flight near the Pentagon. These are foreseeable risks.
And in the aftermath of the worst deadly aviation incident
on U.S. soil since the horrific Colgan air crash, the
Administration's lack of a more aggressive, proactive
mitigation approach is simply inexcusable. FAA and DoD must
coordinate better. We do not need to wait for the completion of
a lengthy investigation to know that.
Look, I know this is complicated. I have flown Black Hawk
helicopters in Chicago's Class B airspace. It is always among
the top three busiest airspaces in the nation, and it is not
easy in the best of circumstances.
But there are things that can be done to mitigate these
risks. Following the DCA crash, my colleagues and I asked FAA
to proactive review helicopter operations in other busy
commercial airspaces, and I appreciate FAA taking this urgently
needed action.
But let's be honest. That required a request from me, the
Ranking Member, and the Chairman of this Committee to spur this
kind of proactive risk analysis. The fact that it took those
requests to have that analysis done is hardly inspiring.
So I hope we will hear from FAA today about what it is
doing proactively in the near term to prevent more Newark-type
failures while Congress considers longer-term reforms. I also
hope to get an explanation from FAA about its staff cuts. How
do they think these are going to help FAA meet this safety-
critical moment? How do they think these cuts are going to help
them implement FAA Reauthorization Law on time?
Earlier this year, FAA fired hundreds of probationary
workers. In addition, 700 FAA employees reportedly accepted
FAA's first deferred resignation offer, and more than 2,000 are
now projected to accept it in a second round. Acting
Administrator Rocheleau has said FAA expects further reductions
in force. We have been told the Administration is not
terminating air traffic controllers or others who are critical
for safety. But FAA's entire mission is literally safety, and
everybody who works there is there to support that mission.
Implementation of the FAA Reauthorization Law is also
critical for safety. For example, the law requires FAA to
establish realistic airplane evacuation standards that take
into account the presence of carry-on bags, seniors, children,
and people with disabilities, none of which were included in
recent FAA in-person simulations. The law also sets hiring
targets for air traffic controllers, advances airport surface
surveillance, and expands the Aviation Workforce Development
Grant Program to help recruit and train future pilots,
mechanics, and aviation manufacturing technical workers. All of
these were supported in a bipartisan way out of this Committee.
Importantly, the law also makes long-overdue reforms to
improve accessibility and safety for passengers with
disabilities so they can travel with the dignity that all
Americans deserve. For example, it requires FAA to establish
minimum training standards for airline staff to assist
passengers using wheelchairs with boarding and deplaning and
training for how to handle wheelchairs and scooters so they
will be damaged less frequently.
I look forward to our discussion today, and I yield back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. I will now introduce each of the
witnesses. We have Mr. Franklin McIntosh, who is the Deputy
Chief Operating Officer for the Air Traffic Organization. We
have Ms. Jodi Baker, the Deputy Associate Administrator for
Aviation Safety. And we have Mr. Wayne Heiback, who is the
Deputy Associate Administrator for Airports.
Mr. McIntosh, you are recognized for five minutes.
Ms. Baker. I believe I am actually going to do our opening
five minutes, if that is OK.
Chairman Cruz. OK.
JOINT STATEMENT OF JODI BAKER,
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY;
FRANKLIN McINTOSH, DEPUTY CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER,
AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION; AND WAYNE HEIBECK,
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AIRPORTS,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Baker. Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, members
of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to share some
updates regarding the FAA's efforts to implement the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2024.
The FAA has made significant progress implementing the
Act's several hundred requirements over the past year, and
together with my colleagues from the Air Traffic Organization
and the Office of Airports I would like to highlight several of
these accomplishments.
Regarding direction to improve the FAA's communication and
timely decisionmaking on matters before the Agency, so far we
have reduced the aircraft registration backlog, and
applications are now processed within an average of 10 business
days or less. We have also shortened the time-frame for
determining acceptance or rejection of air carrier, air
operator, and air agency certificate applications.
We have improved guidance our aviation safety inspector
workforce uses when planning for production approval-holder
inspections. We are also enhancing and processing the analysis
of aviation safety data. Specifically, ASIAS, or the Aviation
Safety Information and Analysis System, has incorporated an
advanced tool to process safety data more rapidly and produce
actionable safety intelligence to identify trends and mitigate
risks.
As we enhance the safety of the national airspace system
for current users, we are also focused on integrating new and
emerging aviation technologies, including advanced air
mobility. Last month, Secretary Duffy announced the Center for
Advanced Aviation Technologies, to be operated by the Texas A&M
University System. The center will play a pivotal role
advancing aviation technologies, ensuring safe integration into
the NAS and drive innovation in aviation.
The FAA is ready for powered lift, the first brand-new
category of civil aircraft in almost a century. Last year, the
FAA issued the Special Federal Aviation Regulation on powered-
lift instructor and pilot certification, pilot training, and
operating rules.
President Trump and Secretary Duffy made clear their
priority to deliver an all-new, state-of-the-art air traffic
control system that makes air traffic safer and more efficient
for the American people. Last week, Secretary Duffy announced a
plan to replace core infrastructure, including radar, software,
hardware, telecommunication networks, and facilities. The FAA
has already accelerated the modernization of the Notice to
Airmen system. We expect delivery by July 2025, and are
targeting deployment by September 2025.
The FAA must recruit, train, and retain the best and
brightest. Consistent with congressional direction in the Act,
the FAA is laser-focused on air traffic controllers and
aviation safety inspectors. We are updating controller staffing
targets across facilities to reflect FAA-NATCA workgroup
negotiated levels. Under Secretary Duffy's leadership, we
accelerated the time to hire and streamlined the controller
hiring process through targeted automation and process
improvements. We are offering financial incentives to grow the
new controller pipeline and retain our most experienced
controllers, and we are using on-the-spot hiring authority for
experienced military controllers to join the workforce.
The FAA is leveraging partnerships with colleges and
universities to create another pipeline for controllers through
the Enhance Air Traffic Collegiate Training Initiative. We
expect these investments to assist staffing at critical Federal
contract towers as we grow the controller workforce.
Aviation safety inspectors are the front line in safety
oversight and are essential to execute our safety mission. The
use of direct hire authority, for example, on-the-spot hiring
authority, has enabled the FAA to continue targeted recruitment
for these mission-critical positions and accelerate the hiring
process.
For our Nation's airports we have updated airport
improvement plan guidance that will benefit airport operators,
and we are continuing to support the transition to fluorine-
free firefighting foam and updating guidance for vertiports,
which will support integration of AAM.
We have made substantial progress implementing the
requirements aimed at eliminating dangerous runway incidents.
Since November 2024, the FAA has added Surface Awareness
Initiative at 18 sites. We have more than 30 additional sites
planned to go operational by the end of calendar year 2025. And
we are rolling out new, enhanced safety technology at more than
70 airports.
The FAA is committed to implementing the FAA
Reauthorization Act. We are confident we are making substantial
and meaningful progress, and we intend to keep Congress
apprised of our progress. And we now look forward to answering
your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Baker, Mr. McIntosh,
and Mr. Heibeck follow:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Jodi Baker, Deputy Associate Administrator
for Aviation Safety; Franklin McIntosh, Deputy Chief Operating Officer,
Air Traffic Organization; and Wayne Heibeck, Deputy Associate
Administrator for Airports, Federal Aviation Administration
Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to share some updates on
behalf of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regarding the
agency's efforts to implement the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (the
Act) as we approach the first anniversary of its enactment.
The Act, which runs through Fiscal Year 2028, communicates
congressional priorities for the agency's mission to provide the
world's safest, most efficient aerospace system. It is broad in scope
and speaks to everything from FAA's staffing, ways to bolster many of
the agency's oversight processes, and where to invest resources to
support safety and efficiency for both conventional users and new
entrants. The Act has several hundred requirements, the bulk of which
fall primarily under the purview of the Aviation Safety Organization,
the Air Traffic Organization, and the Office of Airports.
The FAA made significant progress in implementing the Act's
requirements during the past year. We want to highlight some of those
accomplishments for you today.
Aviation Safety
Building on our commitment to continuous improvement of our
certification process and safety oversight, we updated guidance
applicable to our risk model for production approval holder inspections
and implemented enhancements to the processing and analysis of safety
data.
The Act requires the FAA to review and update its Production
Approval Holder (PAH) risk model to ensure it adequately accounts for
risk at facilities ``during periods of increased production.'' \1\ The
FAA policy applicable to Aviation Safety Inspectors (ASI) overseeing
PAH recognizes that changes in production rates--both increases and
decreases--can increase risk. An FAA team reviewed the policy and
determined that it would benefit from improved guidance on how to
respond when a PAH experiences a change in production rate. As a
result, in April, the FAA issued additional guidance to ASIs on
performing a risk assessment when a PAH's production rate changes; how
to use the risk assessment results; when to add audits; how to
customize an audit plan to focus on the areas of highest risk; and
which facilities and suppliers to audit.
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\1\ Pub. L. No. 118-63, Sec. 314 (2024).
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Regarding the Act's direction to improve the Aviation Safety
Information Analysis and Sharing program (ASIAS) concerning safety data
sharing and risk mitigation, the FAA accelerated the procurement of a
commercially available solution to modernize ASIAS. This includes using
commercial cloud-based solutions to store and process ASIAS data. More
than 30 million digital flight records voluntarily submitted by airline
stakeholders have moved to a cloud-based platform. ASIAS has also
initiated the implementation of a new advanced technology tool to
process safety data more rapidly and produce safety intelligence that
we can use to identify trends and mitigate risks.\2\
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\2\ Id., Sec. 348.
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As we implement the Act's requirements, we continually examine the
effectiveness of our oversight processes and make necessary
improvements to ensure accountability. We continue to maintain rigorous
oversight of Boeing's manufacturing, including implementation of its
safety management system. And we appreciate Congress's additional
support in extending several provisions of the Aircraft Certification,
Safety, and Accountability Act and adding annual training requirements
for Organization Designation Authorization unit members to include
ethics, professionalism, and safety concern reporting processes.\3\
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\3\ See Pub. L. No. 116-260, Div. V, Title I, Sec. Sec. 303-304,
306 (2020).
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Advanced Aviation Operations and Technologies
As we enhance the safety of the national airspace system (NAS) for
current users, we are also focused on integrating new and emerging
aviation technologies, including Advanced Air Mobility (AAM). AAM is an
umbrella term for aircraft that are typically highly automated,
electrically powered, and have vertical take-off and landing
capability. Last month, Secretary Duffy announced the establishment of
the Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies (CAAT), to be operated by
the Texas A&M University System.\4\ The CAAT will play a pivotal role
in advancing aviation technologies and ensuring their safe integration
into the NAS. The center will also represent a collaboration between
government, academia, and industry to drive innovation in aviation.
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\4\ Pub. L. No. 118-63, Sec. 961 (2024).
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The Act contains several sections focused on supporting U.S.
leadership in AAM.\5\ Many AAM aircraft fall into the powered-lift
category. We are pleased to report that the FAA is ready for powered-
lift, which will be the first brand-new category of civil aircraft in
almost a century. Late last year, the FAA met the Act's requirement for
publishing a Special Federal Aviation Regulation on powered-lift
instructor and pilot certification, pilot training, and operating
rules.\6\ The FAA will gather data and information through regulatory
requirements and the Aviation Rulemaking Committee required by the Act
to develop a permanent regulatory framework for powered-lift.
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\5\ See, e.g., id., Sec. 951, et seq.
\6\ Id., Sec. 955.
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The Act also expresses congressional priorities for continuing to
integrate unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or drones, into the NAS.
While the FAA provides regulatory relief to enable certain more complex
UAS operations, such as operations beyond the operator's visual line of
sight (BVLOS), normalizing BVLOS operations through rulemaking remains
a top priority for the FAA.\7\
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\7\ Id., Sec. 930.
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Modernization
As we work to integrate advanced aviation technologies and aircraft
into the NAS, we must prioritize NAS modernization for increased
capacity and efficiency. President Trump and Secretary Duffy made clear
their priority to deliver an all-new, state-of-the-art air traffic
control system that makes air travel safer and more efficient for the
American people. In line with the Administration's priorities and
congressional direction, the FAA's first step is accelerating the
modernization of the Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) system this year, much
earlier than originally planned. The system will be securely hosted in
the cloud and have a scalable and resilient architecture. We expect
delivery by July 2025 and are targeting operational deployment of the
modernized service by September 2025.
FAA Process Improvements
The Act directs the FAA to improve communication and timely
decision-making on matters before the agency, including applications
for aircraft registration and air carrier certification. We agree that
there is room for process improvements and increased accountability to
our stakeholders. Thus far, we have reduced the aircraft registration
backlog, and applications are now processed within an average of 10
business days or less.\8\
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\8\ Id., Sec. 817.
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We also shortened the time frame for determining acceptance or
rejection of air carrier, air operator, and air agency certificate
applications. Notably, while the target set by Congress is for the FAA
to maintain an average application or rejection time-frame of less than
60 days for part 135 air carrier certificates within one year of
enactment, the average acceptance or rejection time-frame for these
applications is now just 31 business days.\9\ We attribute the
resulting timeliness and backlog improvements to adjustments to
documentation requirements during the design assessment phase to
streamline single pilot air carrier certifications under 14 CFR part
135, the establishment of a Flight Standards certification team that
exclusively focuses on certification projects to assist with additional
certification capacity, and policy enhancements to foster applicant
accountability and readiness.
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\9\ Id., Sec. 818.
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FAA Staffing
As Congress recognized in the Act, the FAA must recruit, train, and
retain the best and brightest for our FAA team. The Act specifically
considers both Air Traffic Controller staffing\10\ and Aviation Safety
Inspector (ASI) staffing.\11\
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\10\ Id., Sec. 437.
\11\ See id., Sec. Sec. 428, 430.
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Controller staffing is a top priority as air traffic controllers
play an essential role in keeping the American people safe. As required
by the Act, we are updating controller staffing targets across
facilities to reflect FAA-NATCA workgroup negotiated levels until we
make adjustments to our controller staffing model.
We currently have over 10,750 air traffic controllers on the job,
with more than 3,000 in training. We are on track to hire another 2,000
controller trainees this year. We are reviewing our hiring, training,
and placement processes, as well as FAA Academy withdrawals and
failures, to ensure our selection methods effectively identify
candidates best suited for the controller profession.
Consistent with Secretary Duffy's announcement on supercharged air
traffic controller hiring and our commitment to enhancing efficiency,
we streamlined the hiring process through targeted automation and
process improvements, which will accelerate the time-to-hire for these
critical positions by five months or more, bringing new air traffic
controllers on the job much faster. We also incentivized hiring with a
30 percent increase in the salary of those who qualify to attend the
FAA's Academy. And we are already seeing positive results from these
improvements.
Under Secretary Duffy's leadership, we are also offering financial
incentives to new FAA controllers who complete initial qualification
training. Additional financial incentives are also available to retain
our most experienced controllers, and we are expanding opportunities
for experienced military controllers to join the workforce using on-
the-spot hiring authority to allow these veterans to bypass the normal
announcement process. Air Traffic managers will be able to directly
accept resumes from interested military controllers and help place them
at their preferred location.
In addition to financial incentives, we are also leveraging
partnerships with approved colleges and universities to create an
additional pipeline for controllers through the Enhanced Air Traffic
Collegiate Training Initiative (AT-CTI). The Enhanced AT-CTI authorizes
institutions to provide the same training provided by the FAA. After
passing the Air Traffic Skills Assessment, meeting the FAA's medical
and security requirements, passing performance evaluations, and
receiving an endorsement certificate, Enhanced AT-CTI graduates can
report directly to an FAA facility to begin their on-the-job training.
The benefits of the many investments in controller training and
hiring will not be limited to just FAA facilities. We also expect these
investments to assist staffing at critical Federal Contract Towers as
we grow the controller workforce.
ASI hiring is also essential to our ability to execute our safety
mission. ASIs are the frontline in safety oversight. Congressional
direction for the FAA to use direct-hire authority (e.g., on-the-spot
hiring authority) has enabled the FAA to continue targeted recruitment
for these mission-critical positions, and it allows the FAA to accept
resumes outside of the normal announcement process for all service
locations. Use of on-the-spot hiring authority is an effective tool in
hiring ASI positions. On-the-spot hiring authority will continue to
enable the FAA to accelerate the hiring process by extending offers of
employment to fully mission-qualified candidates faster in a highly
competitive labor market.
Airports
Our nation's airports are vital to connecting communities,
sustaining jobs, and moving people and goods where they need to go. The
FAA appreciates the increase in the Airport Improvement Program (AIP)
authorization to $4 billion for Fiscal Years 2025 through 2028 to
invest in airports across the country so that communities, large and
small, can continue to safely and efficiently connect with the rest of
the world.\12\ AIP grants support projects that improve safety and
efficiency and keep the pavement of our Nation's airports in good, safe
condition for pilots and the flying public; preserve and improve
critical airfield infrastructure at more than 3,200 public-use airports
nationwide to support a continued focus on safety-related development
projects; and facilitate the safe and efficient integration of new and
innovative technologies into airport operations.
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\12\ Id., Sec. 101.
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We're also working hard to implement other requirements, such as
updating AIP guidance that will benefit airport operators,\13\
continuing to support the transition to fluorine-free firefighting
foam,\14\ and updating guidance for vertiports,\15\ which will support
future integration of AAM.
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\13\ See id., Sec. Sec. 733 and 737.
\14\ See id., Sec. 767.
\15\ Id., Sec. 958.
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Runway Safety
Runway safety remains one of our highest priorities. We made
substantial progress in implementing section 347 of the Act, which
expresses our shared intent with Congress to eliminate all dangerous
runway incidents. In November 2024, the Air Traffic Organization
briefed the Runway Safety Council on airport surface safety
technologies. The council identified the Surface Awareness Initiative
as an additional tool that expands surface situational awareness for
controllers at 18 airports without existing surface surveillance
capabilities. Since the briefing in November 2024, all 18 sites are
operational, with more than 30 additional sites planned to go
operational by the end of calendar year 2025. In addition, we announced
that we are rolling out new enhanced safety technology at more than 70
airports. Runway Incursion Devices are memory aids for air traffic
controllers that indicate when a runway is occupied or closed. Runway
Incursion Devices are one of three situational-awareness solutions in
the FAA's fast-tracked surface safety portfolio.
Conclusion
The FAA is committed to implementing the provisions of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2024. Our employees work hard to achieve the
goals and directives mandated by Congress in the Act. We are confident
that we are making substantial and meaningful progress, and we intend
to keep Congress apprised of that progress regularly. Thank you again
for the opportunity to address the Committee. We look forward to
answering your questions.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you, Ms. Baker. I appreciate that. All
right. I am going to start with questions for Mr. McIntosh.
On April 25, for the first time since the January 28 midair
collision, the Army resumed flying in the National Capital
region. Less than a week later, air traffic control had to
command two commercial aircraft on final approach to abort
their landing at DCA due to an Army Black Hawk on an apparent
training mission at the Pentagon, having wandered far too close
to the commercial aircraft flight path. Shortly thereafter, and
just 10 days after having resumed limited flight in the
National Capital region, the Army Aviation Brigade suspended
operations in the D.C. area.
Mr. McIntosh, I have been told that prior to the Army
Aviation Brigade's decision to suspend operations on May 5, the
FAA was preparing to suspend the Letter of Agreement between
the Army and the FAA that gives the Army the ability to operate
in the D.C. airspace without having to first ask for FAA
clearance for each flight.
Was the FAA prepared to suspend the Letter of Agreement and
if so, what was concerning enough to justify such a decision?
Mr. McIntosh. Thank you for the question, Senator Cruz.
Like yourself, we were extremely troubled by the incident that
occurred, especially in light of DCA and the events that led up
to the accident. To be quite honest with you, we were ready to
deploy any option available that we could use or that we felt
was necessary to bring safety measures and better behaviors
from the DoD in this instance.
To answer your question, we were ready to do any option
available, to include what you just spoke to, which was
removing the ability to fly.
Chairman Cruz. So just to be clear, does that mean the FAA
did actually draft an order suspending the Army's ability to
fly in the D.C. area?
Mr. McIntosh. I am not 100 percent aware if we drafted an
order, sir, but we did have discussions if that was an option
that we wanted to pursue. I do know that the DoD came back and
suspended operations on their own, based on that event, so we
are still working with DoD to improve that process.
Chairman Cruz. Well, I commend your vigilance in protecting
the flying public, particularly in and around DCA, given the
horrific accident that occurred earlier this year.
Is it true that the hotline, the direct line between the
Pentagon air traffic control and the DCA tower, has been
inoperable since March 2022?
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Chairman Cruz. Who maintains that hotline?
Mr. McIntosh. I believe the DoD maintains that hotline, but
I think the next question would be why were we not aware of it
and insist upon it being fixed.
Chairman Cruz. I did not have that written down but it is a
good one.
[Laughter.]
Mr. McIntosh. So we take safety responsibilities extremely
seriously in the FAA, and those were the questions we were
asking. And we were not aware, but we became aware after that
event. And now that we became aware after that event, we are
insisting upon that line to be fixed before we resume any
operations out of the Pentagon.
Chairman Cruz. Do you have a timeline for when that line
will be operational?
Mr. McIntosh. To be honest with you, Senator, I would
expect the DoD to expedite that timeline so they can begin our
operations.
Chairman Cruz. And while Army flights were ongoing, if the
hotline was not operational, how did controllers communicate?
Mr. McIntosh. That is a great question, Senator. We still
have landline abilities. We can make phone calls from the
helipad to the operation, where the supervisor or even the
controller in charge can answer. So we are aware of the
activity. And if there was a departure clearance needed we
would be able to relay it via that mechanism.
Chairman Cruz. Is it also true that the air traffic control
positions for local traffic and helicopters were combined
early, just as they were on the day of the midair collision?
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, sir, it was.
Chairman Cruz. Let me say, the developments at DCA and its
airspace are extremely concerning, and together with Senators
Cantwell, Duckworth, and Moran, this Committee remains laser-
focused on monitoring a safe return to operations at DCA and
making sure all users in the airspace are operating
responsibly.
Let's turn to Newark. Newark International Airport has been
beset by delays after the radar system malfunctioned, leaving
controllers unable to see or communicate with aircraft in their
sector for approximately 90 seconds. What broke down, and how
did the system become this deteriorated in the first place?
Mr. McIntosh. Thank you, Senator. To answer your question,
we were obviously very concerned about the disruptions that
occurred in Newark airspace, as well, for the 90 seconds that
it occurred. When we did our investigation, what we found out
was our telecommunications provider that provides network lines
into that area, there are two lines, Senator, that provide data
and transmission feeds. The primary line that came in failed.
We have a secondary, redundant line that provides the radar
transmissions and our voice capabilities, that redundant line
is supposed to assume that load, and it is supposed to be
instantaneous, where if we were to have a fiber cut of a line
or a copper cut of a line, something along those regards, then
that redundant line is supposed to kick in.
When we lost that first line, the second line did not kick
in like it was designed to do. That is what caused the
disruption. The disruption was for 90 seconds. I am an air
traffic controller by trade, so I am just going to talk like an
air traffic controller, if that is OK.
Chairman Cruz. Yes.
Mr. McIntosh. Air traffic controllers provide positive
separation between aircraft. That is what we do. And what I
mean by that is we never point aircraft head-on at the same
altitude. We ensure we have appropriate levels of separation.
In the event that we have something like a NORDO aircraft that
has a stuck mic, that could jam up the frequencies, or if we
have something like that.
So we did not have a loss of separation based on some of
our procedures that we have installed and the techniques that
we use as controllers. I do want to highlight that.
But 90 seconds is a long time for an air traffic
controller. So although we have contingencies in place that we
use to make sure that we keep aircraft safe, it is a long
disruption for a radar screen to go blank or not to be able to
talk to aircraft. That was something that we wanted to take a
look at, and we have put in corrective measures since that
happened, to ensure that those redundancies are better for that
airspace.
We have the system across the United States, feeding radar
data like this, where we have a line and a redundant line, and
we have not had a failure like this, to this degree, in my
memory. So we had to put together, along with the local vendor
that was responsible for the telecommunications, to provide a
more resistant or better contingency to ensure that if it ever
happened again that we feel good about those processes. We were
able to implement a new contingency, and we are working with
the telco provider, along with Secretary Duffy's leadership, to
actually bring in a third line of redundancy into that area, to
prevent this from happening again.
Chairman Cruz. So when the system was down, what was the
degree of danger the flying public faced?
Mr. McIntosh. The real danger to the flying public would be
if our techniques were not good, if our controllers did not put
aircraft on positive vectors, if we could not quick look or
talk to an aircraft via another way--because we have the
ability to go, via emergency frequencies. We can use PET-2000s
that are at our disposal at some of our remote towers. If all
those fail at the same time, then we would have to assure that
the aircraft follow what they are supposed to do, which is lost
com procedures, where they could go in a holding, or they could
go back to their return frequencies. But if all those start
failing all at one time, then all of a sudden the danger to the
flying public is, and all of a sudden you are going to have to
rely on the pilots to do what they do, which is rely on their
TCAS systems onboard, which is their traffic collision systems.
Chairman Cruz. So I guess what I am trying to get at is
during those 90 seconds was there a significantly heightened
danger to the flying public?
Mr. McIntosh. I do not believe there was a heightened
significant danger to the flying public. But with that being
said, from where I sit, we want to remove all risks to the
flying public, and that is what is concerning to me is how do
we remove any bit of that risk. And we need to make sure our
contingencies are better placed.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to
follow up on your line of questioning. Basically, unreliable
backup means there is no backup as far as I am concerned. In
aviation safety, critical systems need to be redundant and
resilient. I know FAA has since implemented a software update
to fix the works backup, but it never should have had a chance
to fail in the first place.
And there is absolutely no question that we need to fix our
antiquated air traffic control facilities and equipment. Each
one of you have been vocal voices for fixing the system across
multiple administrations.
We held a hearing examining that very issue last year, but
a technological overhaul would take years, and we need to know
what FAA is doing now to fix this.
Mr. McIntosh, how often does FAA inspect air traffic
control infrastructure at airports across the country to ensure
that the backup systems will immediately kick in, in the event
of a radar and/or communications failure? Basically, how often
do you simulate the main system going down and to make sure and
test the redundant system to make sure that it actually does
kick in?
Mr. McIntosh. There are required maintenance checks that
our technicians do, and they are very vigilant in doing that.
To answer your question, Senator Duckworth, I am not aware if
we have checks to make sure if we have two lines that go down
at the same time. I will have to do an IOU and follow up on
that to make sure I answer your question appropriately.
Senator Duckworth. If you could that would be helpful.
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Duckworth. And if not, I would highly encourage
that those checks happen. We all know that now.
Prior to the April radar and communications outages
affecting Newark, when was the last time FAA inspected the air
traffic control infrastructure in Philadelphia and Newark to
ensure that the backup system would kick in, in the event of
radar and/or communications failure? And you can add that too.
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. After the deadly crash near
Reagan National Airport, FAA closed the helicopter route
involved, but a lack of coordination between FAA and the
Department of Defense has continued to put the flying public at
risk, and we had this conversation already.
If, for some reason, a military aircraft could not land at
the Pentagon, I do not understand why it would circle around
the building, putting itself into the flight path of DCA
without being directed to do so by ATC. There are many
procedures that are not published procedures but are accepted
at an airport. I mean, I used to land to Midway Airport where
the procedure was circle around the tower, land to taxiway
alpha, blow over all of the small aircraft parked there. But
even though that was established and was something we did
routinely, I would never, ever have executed that procedure
without ATC directing me to do so. I could offer it to ATC,
like, ``Hey, how about, to avoid aircraft, can I just circle
around the tower, land to taxiway alpha?'' But then I would
never do it unless I was given permission to do so.
Mr. McIntosh, FAA is responsible for establishing those
routes. Has FAA established a helicopter route that circles the
Pentagon? Is that an established landing procedure? Circle to
land, is that a procedure around the Pentagon?
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, ma'am. To answer your question--and you
are a pilot and I am a controller so I will be very frank with
you--we have asked that question via our Letter of Agreement.
And I think the larger question here, to be honest with you and
to your point, what we need to make sure that we assure is that
everybody knows their responsibilities, which is as a pilot, or
even a heliport tower, you had an aircraft that you did not
give a landing clearance to or that aircraft aborted the
landing, whatever occurred. That aircraft went back and entered
Class Bravo airspace. That aircraft is not supposed to enter
Class Bravo airspace without permission of air traffic control.
That did not occur.
My question, and I think the larger question is, is why did
that not occur? Without compliance to our procedures and our
policies, this is where safety drift starts to happen, and that
is where my line of questioning is starting, is even if absent
a published go-around procedure, if we want to call it that,
pilots and controllers have shared responsibilities. You do not
enter Class Bravo airspace without authorization from air
traffic control, and that is the question that we are asking.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. So as we have established
today, there clearly continues to be a serious lack of
coordination between FAA and DoD on airspace near DCA. Will FAA
produce a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding to this
Committee. If portions of this Memorandum need to remain non-
public the Committee can make arrangements for that. Can FAA do
that?
Mr. McIntosh. Senator Duckworth, I will make sure that we
get the information that you are requesting.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. And how often are FAA air
traffic controllers trained on the policies and procedures
established in this MOU that governs the military's flight
operations near DCA?
Mr. McIntosh. I am sorry, ma'am. How often----
Senator Duckworth. Are they trained up on this particular
Memorandum? Are they aware of it? Is it something that gets
reviewed?
Mr. McIntosh. We train on our Letters of Agreement and
SOPs, our Standard Operating Procedures, through our training
process, and then it is the application of Letter of Agreement
that we do every day. So I would not say that this is something
new, but absent an aircraft entering Class Bravo airspace and a
pilot deviation, what the controllers would do is exactly what
you saw them do that night, which is shared situational
awareness of what is going. We have an aircraft or a pilot that
is doing something that they are not supposed to be doing, and
those controllers did exactly what they should have, which was
give two aircraft a go-around to ensure that we kept
separation, or safe separation, between those two aircraft,
versus letting that continue.
So while we had, in what is my opinion, as a pilot
deviation, I do want to comment the controller at the time for
their actions for ensuring they gave a timely go-around to
those two aircraft.
Senator Duckworth. I want to join you in commending those
air traffic controllers for their vigilance in that, and it was
timely and appropriate. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. Senator Moran.
STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you and
Senator Cantwell for having this hearing what is clearly
occurring at a critical time. I want to first indicate that
your Subcommittee on Aviation and Space intends to have a DoD,
FAA, and NTSB discussion, roundtable, once again. The date we
have zeroed in on June 11, in which we have another
understanding from the investigator and the FAA and the
Department of Defense what is transpiring since the incident
and tragedy of January 29.
I also want to indicate that I have introduced legislation
that may be of interest to others on the Committee to join, and
that would require all aircraft in Class B, high-volume
airspace to utilize ADS-B In and Out, something that was a
significant item of discussion and concern on the night of
January 29, in regard to the Black Hawk.
Let me ask a question, an issue that bothered me in the
past, and I highlighted this in our last hearing. NTSB's--and I
suppose this is for you. Well, let me leave it open to whoever
wants to answer it. NTSB's preliminary investigation
highlighted 15,214 events, October of 2021 to December of 2024,
of commercial planes and helicopters that were separated by
less than 1 nautical mile. That information that NTSB provided
came from the computer records of the FAA, and those numbers,
as well as other statistical facts that were told to us
demonstrated to me a continuing problem, a continuing
circumstance in which there is close proximity between aircraft
at DCA. That is troubling, in and of itself, but troubling to
me is if it is in the FAA's computer records, is that something
that the FAA monitors to know the trends so that actions can be
taken to reduce the risks?
I do not know whether that is--Mr. McIntosh, you seem to be
on the seat today.
Mr. McIntosh. Senator Moran, if it is OK, both myself and
myself, Ms. Baker, will tag-team this question to make sure we
give you an appropriate answer.
Reference FAA databases, we are required, any loss of
separation we are required to enter what is called a Mandatory
Occurrence Report for further review. Anything that is
considered to be a near mid-air collision must be investigated.
Any pilot reports of close proximity we investigate. And we do
keep records of that. We also keep records of our Voluntary
Safety Reporting Program, or our ATSAPs, that come from our
controllers, and analyze that.
I will say that I am concerned, and I acknowledge that we
missed something at DCA. Our mitigations failed because we do
have quality assurance and quality control processes, where
through the data analysis we are supposed to develop corrective
action plans.
I know that Acting Administrator Rocheleau talked about
what we would like to do to ensure that we have better analysis
of our data trends, and I am going to follow up with exactly
what he said, which is updating the Aviation Safety Information
Analysis and Sharing tool with artificial intelligence and
machine learning to do a better analysis of the trends
involving mixed aircraft types--helicopters and fixed wing.
When we look over 10 years of data, I think if you get a
report once per month or something like twice per month over
the year, of 10 years, I think some trends may escape someone,
and I think some of these tools that we have available to us
will help us spot these trends better, so we can be more
proactive in our mitigations versus reacting to an event,
because that is really what a safety organization is supposed
to do.
So I really want to make sure that we continue to quantify
the data and make surgical improvements to our safety processes
and those surgical having the biggest benefits on making sure
that we have better processes and better procedures in place to
ensure safety to the flying public.
Senator Moran. Are you saying--I want to make sure I
understand what you are saying--that that data is sufficiently
alarming that it should have raised more awareness and action
than it did?
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, sir.
Senator Moran. Thank you. Anything else, Ms. Baker?
Ms. Baker. I just wanted to add that holistically we are
looking at data across the FAA. Mr. McIntosh describes specific
datasets within the air traffic organizations. But what we want
to do is bring together datasets across the FAA. That requires
more computing power, because more datasets just require more
computing power to bring them all together. But we also need to
apply artificial intelligence-type tools and large language
models to help us spot emerging trends that may not be visible
to individuals on a one- or two-incident basis over a multitude
of years. As well as we have a lot of reports that are text-
based, and right now those have to be reviewed by analysis. So
the application of large language models helps us sort through
those things and bring together related information faster.
Senator Moran. Does the Secretary's announcement, is there
any consequence to the ability to do what you just described,
with the resources that are being talked about, or is that
going someplace else, to the absence of this need?
Ms. Baker. We are already committed to that, and this
announcement does not impact the resources there.
Senator Moran. Let me just finally say that if it is a
problem at DCA, and there are helicopters and fixed-wing
aircraft at many airports across the country, I assume that the
FAA is also doing the same kind of examination and soul
searching across the country, not just focused on DCA. Is that
true?
Mr. McIntosh. That is 100 percent accurate, Senator. We are
looking at right now 10 airports or 10 cities with airports
that have charted airport routes, and we have done, I feel, is
a very important body of work, to your point. And what we are
doing is we are assessing that data, and we are already having
actual items, case in point, Las Vegas. Las Vegas has got some
charted helicopter routes that are close to the International
Airport. Based on our analysis and what we saw we have already
established lateral and vertical boundaries for those
helicopter routes to keep them separated from aircraft landing
and departing the airport, as well as working with our labor
partners to work on making sure that traffic advisories are
well timed and well placed, so that the helicopter pilots and
that the commercial pilots know exactly where the helicopter
routes are and have situational awareness.
But the biggest thing is the lateral confines of those
helicopter routes, to make sure that they are separated from
our arriving and departing aircraft. That is big for us. And
that is an example of what I expect from our datasets, to lead
to the appropriate corrective action plans that we want to see
put in place, to actually mitigate any potential issues on the
front side. And that is where we need to be.
Senator Moran. Thank you.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, Ms. Duckworth, Senator Duckworth, for your leadership, as
well.
So we have been rightfully focused on the tragedy, the loss
of life with the American Airlines flight. But as has been
pointed out by my colleagues, so many problems at Newark, and
as we go into the summer season it is hard to believe that they
will not get worse. And then just across the country.
There was one incident, a near miss, recently. It was on
March 28, between a Delta flight and a military aircraft,
shortly after the tragedy, actually, where the military flight
was just 500 feet below the Delta flight, and the Delta pilot
said, ``Is this--,'' and I am paraphrasing, but it was picked
up from air traffic control, ``Is there actually a flight 500
feet below us?'' That flight was headed to Minneapolis and
contained a bunch of Minnesotans, families. One of my staff
members was on that flight. And I had asked, and I appreciated
that the DOT got back to me close after it, but I am still
waiting for a final answer about what happened.
Do you know? Could any of you give me a timeline on that?
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, ma'am, I believe I can. What occurred
was the military flight was doing a national flyover over
Arlington, and it was the opposite direction to departure
traffic at DCA. Potomac TRACON, which is the radar approach
control that feeds all the aircraft into DCA, was working the
military flight, and there was a communication exchange between
the supervisor at Potomac and the supervisor at DCA. And what I
mean is, the Potomac supervisor coordinated with DCA to stop
departures at a certain time. And that stop time, you stop
departures and let the flyover proceed. You sterilize the
airspace, essentially, to keep traffic safe.
The controller or the CIC that was at DCA misunderstood the
time or misunderstood the verbiage on what that stop time was,
so they let one more aircraft go, versus holding that aircraft
on the ground. In reviewing that we said we have to clean up
the phraseology in how we give times to ensure that we know
exactly which aircraft we are going to stop and keep that kind
of incident from occurring.
So what we did was we put both of those facilities
together, along with the management team, to ensure that we had
a better process in place to keep that from happening again.
That was, unfortunately, an event that happened, but we
improved the procedures to keep something like that from
happening again, ma'am.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. And then what about, as you look at
changing the processes and protocols, how about the number of
people that are working there? Just in general, what are the
FAA's hiring targets for the next 3 years when it comes to air
traffic control, for 2026, 2027, 2028?
Mr. McIntosh. Thank you for the question, ma'am. So this
year it is 2,000, next year it is 2,200, the following year it
is 2,300, and the following year after that it is 2,400. Those
are the FAA hiring goals. And it is quite robust, but with
Secretary Duffy's supercharged hiring I believe that is a
target that, quite honestly, we will achieve.
Senator Klobuchar. And so how many down will we be, even
with those targets?
Mr. McIntosh. So for the first time--are you asking me
about 100 percent staffing----
Senator Klobuchar. Mm-hmm.
Mr. McIntosh. --or do you think we are going to have
further attrition?
Senator Klobuchar. Yes, 100 percent staffing.
Mr. McIntosh. Right now I believe the number is that we are
3,000 short controllers, I believe is what the number was. And
right now we have 3,100 trainees that are in the pipeline. We
have to account for attrition, meaning we are going to see
controllers retire, controllers separate. With the numbers that
I am speaking to I think we will finally start gaining
tracking. This year we outpaced attribution, and we will start
seeing, over the next 18 to 24 months where we actually see a
positive gain in the controllers, and we start feeling better
about where our staffing targets are and how we are staffing
the facility.
Senator Klobuchar, I am sure you can appreciate that it
takes time to make a quality air traffic controller. It is a
high-skilled position. The average time to certify across the
country is approximately 2 years from when they graduate. So it
is going to take some time to get this process done----
Senator Klobuchar. I understand.
Mr. McIntosh.--and make sure we have----
Senator Klobuchar. It is one of the reasons, as we look at
the FAA reauthorization from a year ago, that we decided, on a
bipartisan basis, to add funding. And it is just one of the
things that bothers me, outside of the air traffic control
world, is just when the Administration engages in a tax on
government employees, just wholesale, or says, ``Hey, we want
everyone to be fired that has only been there 2 years,'' or
whatever it is, it does not exactly make it an enticing place
to work. So I hope you bring that back to the Administration,
in general, because it just keeps happening, and then people do
not want to work there. They do not think they have job
security. It does not seem like a great place to go. And then
we do not get people to work there, and then you do not get
medical devices approved, or you do not get planes to leave on
time, or worse. So that is just one of the things I want to
pass on.
I have one last question, Mr. Chair. It is very short. Mr.
Heibeck, I have been working to get Federal funding for the
third-oldest air traffic control tower in the country, that is
in Duluth, Minnesota. Representative Stauber, Republican from
the House, and I and Senator Smith have joined forces on this.
We have seen flooding, and there is an airbase up there. There
is a National Guard airbase. Cirrus is up there, that makes
jets. And then we, of course, have an airport. So just anything
you can do. We just got a grant, which was helpful, and got one
last year, as well. But we have only about 20 percent in and we
need more funding for that, because it really is the third-
oldest tower in the Nation.
Mr. Heibeck. I am glad that we could provide grant funding
to start that project, and we will see if we can continue to
support it.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. Senator Sullivan.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
the witnesses today.
By the way, I am a big fan of our military. I am on the
Armed Services Committee. But I will say, the Army needs to
really up its game on being more forthcoming on this latest
incident. I have actually requested, from my position on the
Armed Services Committee, a briefing. I certainly hope it is
not some big-shot general who thinks he needs a quick trip over
the Pentagon and will blow off the FAA safety requirements.
That better not be what happened. But they need to start giving
answers to this Committee and other committees, because what
happened was just unacceptable. So we will continue to press
them on that, but they really have not been that forthcoming.
I want to focus on the Alaska Safety Initiative that the
FAA has worked with me and this Committee on. This was the
outgrowth of a 10-year study by the NTSB. It showed we had
crash rates that were almost 2.5 times the rate of the rest of
the country. Fatality rates were much higher than the rest of
the country, as well.
So working with the FAA we instituted the Alaska Aviation
Safety Initiative, FAASI, and in last year's FAA
reauthorization we were able to get a whole bunch of things in
that bill that related to Alaska aviation safety. A goal of
reducing the rate of fatal aircraft accidents by 90 percent
through 2033, requires the FAA to improve maintenance of
weather equipment. And growing those weather equipment issues,
as you know, many of our rural airports do not have any weather
reporting, which in the Lower 48 nobody would accept that.
Dozens and dozens.
And I will say I want to compliment Secretary Duffy. He is
delivering on these promises. So is the President. The FAA
announced a $25 million investment in the FAASI initiative at
the beginning of April, and a significant expansion of the
FAA's use of satellites in Alaska to help support connectivity
and weather monitoring.
The President actually announced, with Secretary Duffy,
just on May 8 in their press conference, a dramatic increase in
the number of new weather observation stations in Alaska, so we
really, really appreciated that. Of course, Senator Cruz
mentioned all the other upgrades that they both announced at
this very important press conference last week that I am fully
supportive of. So I want to thank Secretary Duffy, the FAA, the
President, on really focusing on delivering on a number of
these issues.
Can I ask you, on the weather observation systems, in the
maintenance, you know, we do not have enough. The President and
Secretary Duffy acknowledge that with this dramatic
announcement. But where are we on the maintenance issues for
maintaining our weather systems? As you know, we will have a
weather reporting AWOS system that goes down in a small rural
community that has an airport, and it will take a long time to
get an FAA official out there to fix it.
So do we have an update on that? I think that was required
in the FAA bill for 60 days after an enactment.
Mr. McIntosh. Senator Sullivan, I am going to have to take
an IOU on that one. I am sorry, I do not have an answer. I do
know that we talk about this all the time. When we do have an
outage I often speak with my team, and usually the hardest
thing is the accessibility to get there, not via any of our
transportation mechanisms but sometimes it is the weather or
some of the terrain.
Senator Sullivan. A lot of these communities, we have over
230 communities in Alaska that are not connected by roads.
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. A lot of people do not know that. So the
only way to get in is through an airplane, or a boat if the
community is on a river. So that is why this is so important.
And if you do not have weather reporting, then you have no idea
what it is like to fly in there, and you know we have some
pretty nasty weather in my state.
Mr. McIntosh. We do recognize aviation is the primary form
of transportation for Alaska and that the need to provide
support for resources, food, and medical supplies is paramount.
We recognize that, and we definitely want to make sure that we
are doing everything we can so the people that are relying on
us have the faith that we are doing what we need to do.
We are pursuing the large body of work that you are
speaking to, and at the Secretary's request we are doing
critical investments in the things that you are speaking to,
with deploying dozens of AWOSs, Automated Weather Observing
Systems, and also the VWOSs, the Visual Weather Observation
Systems, and numerous weather cameras to make sure that there
is better accessibility to the items that you are talking
about.
But I will take an IOU, if that is OK, sir, as far as what
the repair times look like.
Mr. Heibeck. Senator Sullivan, if I could add, I am happy
to report that we are in consultation for finalizing guidance
to our Alaska office regarding the expansion of airport
improvement program funding for the funding of AWOS for
airports across Alaska, as well as another provision, I believe
you championed, special justifications for runway projects in
Alaska----
Senator Sullivan. Great.
Mr. Heibeck.--to support community needs.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, and I appreciate that. And
again, I want to thank Secretary Duffy and the President. You
know, he is the one who made the announcement on the weather
observation systems in Alaska and the dramatic upgrade.
Very quick, Mr. Chairman, one final question. I have been
working with some of the controllers on legislation to create a
shot clock for updating the ATC system from copper wiring to
fiber optic technology. Would that kind of push from us help
you guys? I know you need the funding. But this issue of copper
wires, the Chairman just mentioned it, the Secretary has been
mentioning it. It is something about speed for data that we
need, and unfortunately our systems are really slow. What do
you think about something like that?
Mr. McIntosh. Senator Sullivan, I will say that we would
appreciate bipartisan support for our infrastructure. It is
sorely needed. And fiber is a large piece of the infrastructure
improvements that we are asking for to replace copper that is
currently there.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. Senator Kim.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDY KIM,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Kim. Thank you, Chair. I will just pick up where my
colleague left off. I mean, obviously, in my home state of New
Jersey a lot on the minds about safety, about infrastructure. I
was at the Philly TRACON and Newark Airport this past weekend,
and what I hear from the tech folks on the ground there is they
still have not heard a real diagnosis of specifics of what the
telcom problems are. They have not heard from FTI in terms of
that.
So Mr. McIntosh, it sounded like you are saying that there
has been an investigation, so do you feel like there is, on the
FAA side, a clear understanding of what the problem is?
Mr. McIntosh. From this outage, Senator Kim, yes, sir, I
do. And if that was relayed to you then that is something that
I need to address. And the reason why I am saying that is I
actually--we, the FAA--has sent senior leadership from
Technical Operations who help liaison between our vendor who
provides telecommunication----
Senator Kim. And who is that vendor again?
Mr. McIntosh. We have two vendors that provide
telecommunication efforts for Philadelphia Area C. That would
be Verizon and Crown Castle.
Senator Kim. OK. So yes, if you can close that loop with
those that are there on the ground. And what is the timeline of
the fixes that you were mentioning in terms of both the primary
and the secondary and then adding a potential tertiary?
Mr. McIntosh. Right now, in our conversations, the
Administrator and the Secretary have asked us to assemble a
task force to work with those vendors to improve those
redundancies. And that task force started meeting yesterday,
and we are expecting those redundancies to be put in place this
summer.
Senator Kim. This summer.
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, sir.
Senator Kim. What I was told when I was there at the TRACON
was that the main fix to be able to prevent blackouts--I mean,
if our goal is to prevent blackouts from happening--it is going
to require a switch and a realignment of the STAR system,
direct from Newark to Philly TRACON rather than routed through
N90. Is that correct?
Mr. McIntosh. There are going to be different levels that
are going to help increase our infrastructure there, and STARS
is one of the items that we plan on putting to harden that
area. And I know that Secretary Duffy actually announced that
in his press conference, as well. And we are, right now, having
discussions on putting that in place.
Senator Kim. Is there a timeline for that switch to STARS?
Mr. McIntosh. I was asked to do it as soon as possible, and
we are having that conversation now on how quickly we can get
it done. It is, right now, a piece of adaptation. What I mean
by adaptation is we have got to build the software to make sure
that Newark, the Philadelphia Area C TRACON can talk to the N90
TRACON. So that adaptation piece and software changes is really
what we need to get done.
Senator Kim. I wanted to make sure you were tracking it,
because I was told that theoretically you could do this in 6 to
8 weeks. But without the software enhancements, which is so
much needed, that could potentially be a 6-month to 12-month
timeline in terms of the testing as well as the development of
the software. Does that sound roughly right?
Mr. McIntosh. I think the 12-month timeline is very, very
conservative. When we take a look at adaptations we already
have a team that is going down to the Tech Center to work on
the adaptations next week.
Senator Kim. So I would like to stay in touch with you
about this, because we need to be able to tell the people in
New Jersey, and frankly around the country, just what we can
expect when it comes to the goal of zero blackouts, in terms of
being able to make sure that they could have assurances there.
Because I really do feel like this has become an issue that is
undermining confidence, not just in the Newark Airport but just
in our system writ large.
One other issue that is continuing to come up is about
staffing. I know we were talking about it nationally. But at
least at Philly TRACON what I was told is when it was at N90,
roughly 32 CPCs, down to about 22 now. But that the TDY, the
temporary duty that they are going to have ends July 28, 2026,
about 15, 16 of them could very well move out at that point.
The pipeline does not sound like it is keeping up. I was
told at least it is kind of in the single digits right now.
Does that track with your understanding? Do you have greater
confidence that this isn't going to be some cliff come July 28,
2026, when it comes to Area C of the Philly TRACON?
Mr. McIntosh. No, Senator, that does not track with my
information, actually. We moved the airspace to improve the
pipeline. I currently have 10 individuals that are in the
TRACON that are actively training. I have got another 6 that
are in the simulation lab, that are going to go to the floor in
June of this year. And every training class that I have signed
up through the middle of 2026 is filled with CPC ITs. So my
pipeline is actually robust, which is the whole reason why we
moved the airspace.
Senator Kim. Yes, look, that is what we want to make sure
we are hearing. So if you don't mind, if I can follow up with
you, just kind of deconflict our numbers. Because again, I just
think that is the kind of information that can hopefully put us
at greater ease that we are trying to deal with a short-term
problem right now, ensure there are zero blackouts, but also
make sure we are not falling over a cliff. So is that something
you can work with me on?
Mr. McIntosh. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Kim. OK, great. Thank you. And with that I yield
back, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. Senator Budd.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED BUDD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. First, I want to thank
President Trump, Secretary Duffy, and you, Chairman Cruz, for
your leadership on much-needed ATC modernization. It comes at a
particularly important time in the history of American
aviation, with so many new technologies coming to our airspace.
For example, today Wing Aviation and DoorDash are launching
a joint operation in Charlotte. This marks the first new market
for Wing after a successful year in Dallas-Ft. Worth.
Sadly, the drone industry continues to be stifled by
regulatory uncertainty from the FAA, which has failed to
publish a proposed rule on BVLOS, or beyond visual line-of-
sight operations.
Ms. Baker, why has it taken so long for the Agency to act,
given clear deadlines, and can you commit that the FAA will
advance a proposed rule by this summer?
Ms. Baker. We are very excited to get the BVLOS rule out,
as well. We are excited about this new industry segment and
what it can do. We are working very hard to get that rule out.
It is in review.
Senator Budd. Thank you. While the Chinese Communist Party
has been extremely forward looking, unfortunately I am
concerned that, as we are discussing today, the somewhat
outdated ATC system might be yet another challenge to the full
integration of these new technologies.
Mr. McIntosh, I have appreciated the clarity that you have
brought this morning to many areas. As we work to modernize
ATC, is the FAA thinking about how to future-proof the system
so that new technologies can be more smoothly integrated into
the national airspace?
Mr. McIntosh. Thank you for the question. Absolutely,
Senator. The ATO policy is get to yes but get to yes safely,
and when it comes to integration of these kinds of things that
you are speaking to, we will work tirelessly to make that
happen.
Senator Budd. Thank you. Companies like Boom Supersonic are
on the leading edge of civil supersonic revival. In January,
Boom's XB-1 aircraft demonstrated that it can fly faster than
the speed of sound, but without any audible sonic boom reaching
the ground.
Despite this innovation, current FAA regulations sets an
arbitrary speed limit in the skies. Companies trying to bring
back supersonic flight for the first time since the Concorde
have to ask for special permission from the FAA to operate
their aircraft above Mach 1, and they can only fly them in
specific flight testing areas, even if they do so quietly like
Boom.
Today, the U.S. has the only flying civil supersonic
aircraft, but China is already making clones of Western
airliners, and they recently announced its own supersonic
passenger plane. So unless we invent and build the next
generation of aircraft here in the U.S., our leadership will
pass from America to Asia.
Today, together with my colleagues, Senator Sheehy, Senator
Tillis, and Senator Lee, I am introducing the Supersonic
Aviation Modernization Act. This bill directs the Administrator
to issue or revise regulations to allow companies like Boom to
operate their aircraft above Mach 1 within the United States,
as long as no sonic boom reaches the ground.
The supersonic race has begun, and it is critical that
America wins. My bill will ensure that innovative companies
like Boom have the regulatory certainty that they need to
continue innovating, and I look forward to working with my
colleagues on this Committee to make sure the U.S. maintains
its leadership in civil supersonic flight.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
talk about the Trump administration's cuts to the Federal
Aviation Administration's workforce. Over the last few months,
the Department of Transportation has twice sent early
retirement offers to its employees and then attempted to fire
its probationary workers. In total, more than 1,000 FAA
employees either accepted the buyout or were probationary
employees that the Administration tried to fire. I understand
that the Department of Transportation exempted safety-related
positions from these personnel moves, but these reductions can
still severely impact FAA operations.
For each of the witnesses, how many employees in your
respective offices either accepted a buyout offer or were fired
probationary employees?
Ms. Baker. Right now the process of accepting the deferred
resignation program is still in process. We do not have our
final numbers at this point. As you mentioned correctly, our
safety-critical employees were excepted, so within aviation
safety that meant our inspectors, our engineers, doctors----
Senator Markey. So how many have accepted so far?
Ms. Baker. I do not have those numbers at this time.
Senator Markey. OK. Could you get me the numbers, please?
Ms. Baker. We will find out what we can get.
Senator Markey. OK. That is fine. Yes, Mr. McIntosh?
Mr. McIntosh. I was going to echo Ms. Baker's same
comments. We are still waiting for the DRPs to be exercised.
But again, our safety-critical positions----
Senator Markey. No, I appreciate that. What are the numbers
for the employees? Do you have that?
Mr. McIntosh. We will not have that number until after
everyone has time to either accept or decline the DRP process.
We have not yet hit that deadline yet, sir.
Senator Markey. OK. What is the deadline?
Mr. Heibeck. The deadline would depend on when each
individual received their agreement to sign. Most employees
have a 45-day period.
Senator Markey. So we are coming up pretty close to the end
of the deadline, huh?
Mr. Heibeck. Yes. As with any personnel----
Senator Markey. Excuse me?
Mr. Heibeck. As with any personnel matter, we will need to
take that back and see what data we can--to make a
determination of what data we can provide.
Senator Markey. Yes. Did your offices each conduct an
internal analysis or risk assessments of how these workforce
cuts will impact aviation safety or oversight? Did you do an
internal analysis?
Mr. Heibeck. I would say for the Office of Airports we are
watching that very closely.
Senator Markey. Did you do an internal analysis?
Mr. Heibeck. Yes. We have done an internal analysis, and we
are working across geographic boundaries, when we see a need,
to make sure that we are providing the same level of service to
our airport sponsors and to all of our----
Senator Markey. OK. Will you provide that analysis to the
Committee, please, the analysis that you have done in terms
of----
Mr. Heibeck. Again----
Senator Markey. Have you done that analysis? Do you have
it?
Mr. Heibeck. Yes, we have done that analysis. Again, with
any personnel matter I would----
Senator Markey. OK. Please provide that analysis in terms
of what the impact is, of any of those cuts on aviation safety,
just so we will have that. The same for you, Ms. Baker. Can you
do that for us, too?
Ms. Baker. We have had conversations around how we will
fill critical vacancies----
Senator Markey. Do have data, though. Do you have data that
you have developed----
Ms. Baker. At this point we do not have final data.
Senator Markey. OK. Please send that to the Committee. Mr.
McIntosh?
Mr. McIntosh. No, sir. We have not done an internal
analysis. The Air Traffic Organization has been fortunate, as
the largest number of our individuals are safety-exempt
employees, and the one that are not, the majority will be
needed for continuity of operations.
Senator Markey. Great. Well, again, send us the analysis in
terms of the support people, in terms of what your conclusion
is in terms of their role in safety. And I do support cutting
fraud and waste and ensuring that the Department is operating
efficiently. But the Trump administration is forcing agencies
to blindly cut their workforces without regard to merit or
experience. They are not targeting probationary employees
because they are the least efficient or effective. They are
targeting them because they are the easiest to fire. They
actually might have had a good role, important role, to play.
And given the tragic crash in Washington, D.C., in January, and
the recent air traffic control outages in Newark, now is not
the time to be taking chances with personnel levels. We can see
the chaos, confusion growing, and growing month by month, since
Trump has taken over.
And finally, earlier this year I asked Secretary Duffy a
written question about whether he would convene stakeholders to
discuss raising the wages and benefits of airport service
workers. These workers are the unsung heroes of our aviation
system, and I was pleased that the Secretary agreed to bring
together a group for such a discussion.
Mr. Heibeck, are you able to provide any update on the
Secretary's commitment to convene stakeholders on this issue?
Mr. Heibeck. No, I am not very familiar with that issue,
and I will need to circle back with you, if that is OK.
Senator Markey. OK. I need you to do that, if you could, as
promptly as you could. I appreciate that.
And in terms of my law last year, that included my
legislation with Senator Vance to ban family seating fees,
under our bill the Department of Transportation is required to
issue a rule prohibiting airlines from charging parents a fee
to sit with their children. Can any of the witnesses provide an
update on that rulemaking?
Ms. Baker. I am a mother. I have two kids. This one means a
lot to me. This is something that is being managed by the
Aviation Consumer Protection Division at the Department of
Transportation, and we are happy to facilitate any kind of
communication on that.
Senator Markey. Yes, I think it is very important for the
Agency to update the Committee. That is a very important issue.
And again, I did that issue with Vice President Vance, and so
would love to see those protections go into effect, and
hopefully hear from the Department of Commerce.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. Senator Schmitt.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC SCHMITT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McIntosh, I
will start with you, and maybe you have answered this question
for numerous Senators before. But I did want to get, given the
recent news and some of the concerns that are out there, about
how outdated some of our systems are, can you give an update on
where we are at with modernization and safety?
Mr. McIntosh. In regard to modernization, we continue to
have several surface safety portfolios that are going to help
us maintain some safety standards. I am going to speak strictly
for what we are doing for runway safety. Some of the things
that we are deploying now is a Surface Awareness Initiative
that has ADS-B technology, to give controllers situational
awareness of what is going on on the surface.
Runway Incursion Devices are now being deployed at several
of our facilities that alert controllers when a runway has been
closed or we have an aircraft on a runway for a prescribed
amount of time that could be concerning, and we want to make
sure we clear that aircraft.
And a third thing that we have actually deployed recently
is something called an Approach Runway Verification that alerts
controllers when we may have a misalignment to a closed taxiway
or an active taxiway or lining up for the wrong runway.
All three of these tools, if you were to stack them on top
of one another, actually gives us better awareness of what is
going on.
I think the larger question, though, is how are we going to
fix the current infrastructure and some of the older things
that we have in place. We have facilities that are more than 60
years old, and a lot of technologies in those facilities are
extremely antiquated. Our goal, or our hope, is that we get
bipartisan support to move Secretary Duffy's request forward so
we can start bringing controllers and managers the newest
equipment that we can bring in, from automation, from radar,
and from voice switching, where we are better at our jobs and
providing safety services.
Senator Schmitt. How long will that take to implement?
Let's say we did that in the next 2 months. How long would that
take to implement?
Mr. McIntosh. The Agency would have a goal of deploying
that within 4 years, sir. And what I mean by 4 years is putting
those items in place and----
Senator Schmitt. Does that mean it takes 4 years
everywhere, or it is staged so LaGuardia is updated before LAX,
or something like that? How does that work?
Mr. McIntosh. We would prioritize the facilities based on
needs. I do know one of the facilities that Secretary Duffy has
prioritized already is Philadelphia Area C and the Newark
airspace, based on some of the outages that we have seen.
Senator Schmitt. OK. Ms. Baker, I want to turn to you with
the time I have, and I do want to ask Mr. Heibeck a question
too, as it relates to the DCA tragedy. And we had a hearing.
The Chairman thankfully convened a hearing on that, and some of
the revelations were shocking about the number of near misses
that happen at DCA--I mean, across the country but specifically
at DCA.
Where do we stand with the grounding of helicopter traffic?
And I know this is an Army conversation too, but what is your
understanding of where we are at with that right now?
Ms. Baker. I think I am going to actually defer that to Mr.
McIntosh.
Senator Schmitt. OK. Sure.
Mr. McIntosh. In regard to just with the Army helicopters
in the Pentagon?
Senator Schmitt. At DCA.
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, sir. We are having communications with
DoD right now to ensure compliance. Right now they are not
flying out of the Pentagon until we have further conversations
and some of the equipment issues that we experienced the other
day are fixed.
As far as total grounding, that may be part of the
conversation, but right now we have not had to go and pursue
that, as right now the DoD is working with the FAA to make sure
that we have safety thresholds in place after the latest
outage, sir.
Senator Schmitt. OK. I know that is something, that a lot
of Committee members are very focused on, and I wanted to come
and get a lay of the land.
Mr. Heibeck, I wanted to ask you specifically about, you
know, Kansas City just had a new airport completed. I think it
has been very well received. I fly in and out of there
occasionally, but I live in the St. Louis area so Lambert is
top of mind always. This is a little bit more closer to home, a
little bit more parochial.
The FAA approved a master plan in 2023. Could you just give
me an update on the FAA's engagement in St. Louis? It is a
pretty unique opportunity. St. Louis has a rich history. I grew
up in the shadow of that airport. There are a lot of great
opportunities for modernization and for the consolidation
there. But can you just give me an idea of your engagement,
where things stand?
Mr. Heibeck. Yes, absolutely. A lot of exciting things
happening in St. Louis, including the construction of the new
fighter jet there by Boeing.
Senator Schmitt. Yes.
Mr. Heibeck. Our Central Regional Office has a great
working relationship with the city. We are currently working
with them closely to finalize their application under the
Airport Terminal Program for the $7 million that they have
applied for. We are working with them to get bids, and I know
that will facilitate the consolidation of their two terminals,
as is called for in the master plan. Lots of other programs
that we are participating in, as well, including the deicing
pad there, some taxiway reconstruction, and I also believe we
are also participating in a snow removal equipment building.
And on the horizon they have an airfield maintenance facility.
I know that is in their capital airport plan.
So we are tracking very closely the many needs at St. Louis
Lambert International Airport and have a great working
relationship with them.
Senator Schmitt. It is pretty unique. I mean, it is a
pretty unique asset, and it is right in the middle of the
metro. They have got a billion-dollar runway that let's just
say is underutilized. It was built right before TWA left the
building. So there are a lot of opportunities for growth there.
I know my office will be working with you and working with the
airport on that to make sure that that is a world-class
facility. So thanks for the update.
Mr. Heibeck. We look forward to working with your office
and the airport.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. Senator Rosen.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chair Cruz, for holding this
hearing today. I want to thank the witnesses for testifying.
I am going to talk a little bit about airspace obstruction.
In response to the unique airspace challenges over Harry Reid
International Airport in Las Vegas, I authored a section,
Section 744, of last year's FAA's Reauthorization, to improve
the Agency's airspace obstruction analysis. The law now
requires the FAA to undertake a robust analysis of potential
airspace hazards near certain airports due to factors like
building and hotel construction near the runways. However,
nearly a year after the reauthorization bill was signed into
law, there seems to be little progress in implementing this
statutory requirement.
So Mr. Heibeck, can you please provide the Committee with
an update about where the FAA is on enforcement of Section 44,
and will you commit to ensuring that the FAA follows the law
and implements this critical aspect of FAA reauthorization and
continue to keep us informed?
Mr. Heibeck. Yes, Senator. The Office of Airports is
responsible for on-airport evaluations, and I am going to defer
to my colleague, Frank McIntosh----
Senator Rosen. Thank you.
Mr. Heibeck.--on this particular provision.
Mr. McIntosh. Thank you, Wayne. I do know that it has been
slow, ma'am, but I have checked in with the team. I have looked
at the obstruction clearances and making sure this is done. And
I will say that while it is slow going, they are incorporating
the two statutes that were in the authorization bill, and in
regard to Las Vegas, that is moving forward.
Senator Rosen. And so, can we reach out to your office for
a status update on that, please?
Mr. McIntosh. We would love to.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I am also going to talk a little
bit about capacity at Harry Reid Airport, because Las Vegas has
long been the world's leading entertainment destination. We are
quickly becoming a global destination for sports as well, and
the city is hosting nearly 40 significant sporting events. We
hosted them just last year. These major events bring tourists
and participants from all over the world who travel on the
larger jet planes, as well as private jets, to our airports.
Harry Reid International, we were proud to welcome over 58
million visitors in 2024, the most in our history.
While we still want more visitors to the Silver State, at
this rate experts expect Las Vegas airport to reach capacity
within 5 years, at which point the airport will not be able to
handle any additional flights.
So Mr. Heibeck, I assume you are aware that officials from
Clark County, Nevada, where Harry Reid International Airport is
located, have been working with the FAA for years to build a
new supplemental airport in Southern Nevada, which the local
economy greatly needs. I know FAA has made great progress on
the issue. I would really like your commitment to keeping
officials at Harry Reid International Airport, my team,
directly informed. Do I have your commitment to do this?
Mr. Heibeck. Yes. We will continue to work with the airport
sponsor. I have been engaging directly with this with our
regional director, and we are preparing to issue a Notice of
Intent to conduct the Environmental Impact Statement on the
Southern Nevada supplemental airport, and I will keep your
office informed.
Senator Rosen. That is fantastic. We need it sooner rather
than later. And in my minute left, I am going to talk about
what is a lot of topic today, aging infrastructure, at all of
our airports. So the average FAA air traffic control facility
we all know is about 60 years old, more than half of terminal
facilities over 40 years old. These facilities regularly
operate with degraded technology systems. It results in lack of
accurate wind speed, direction calculations, the failure of
radio frequencies. We have seen this within congested airspace,
the malfunctioning of runway lights; terrible at night. And
many airports, they lack functioning radar systems to track
airborne and taxiing planes, meaning that some controllers have
no visual awareness of the aircraft they are directing,
especially in poor weather conditions.
Last year's FAA reauthorization requires the FAA to deploy
the latest airport surface situational awareness technologies
that track runway and aircraft vehicle movements in order to
prevent collisions. We have been seeing them in the news. We
want increased deployment of surface surveillance technology at
all large and medium hub airports.
So again, Mr. Heibeck or whoever else think they can answer
this in a proper way, can you provide us with an update about
how the deployment and implementation of this is going?
Mr. McIntosh. I believe you are referring to the Service
Awareness Initiative, ma'am?
Senator Rosen. Yes.
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, it is going very well. I know that we
have already deployed it at over 30 sites so far, and we are on
target to, I believe it is another 70. Is that right, Jody?
Ms. Baker. [Inaudible.]
Mr. McIntosh. I will get you the numbers.
Senator Rosen. Thank you.
Mr. McIntosh. But I will tell you this. We are very excited
about this new technology. It uses the newest technology
available to us, which is ADS-B, so it allows us to deploy this
new capability much more economically, but also much more
efficiently, and it gets it in the hands of the controllers
that really, really need it. So we are excited about this
technology and we want to get it deployed as quickly as you do.
But we are on target, yes, ma'am.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate it. I yield back.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. Senator Peters.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will thank
our witnesses for being here today.
Before I get into my questions, there are two issues that
are critical to Michigan I just want to highlight, despite the
fact we do not have DOT leadership responsible for them present
at today's hearing. The first is the implementation of key
workforce provisions that I championed in the FAA
reauthorization, like the Promoting Women in Aviation Act and
the expansion of the FAA Workforce Development Grant program,
both of which I believe must be implemented to address the
aviation workforce shortages that we have.
The second is the Essential Air Service program, or EAS.
Michigan has nine rural airports served by EAS. It is the most
in the lower 48 states. Last year's FAA bill included strong
bipartisan reauthorization of this program, which guarantees
air service to rural communities. Despite this, President
Trump's budget calls for a $308 million cut to EAS. This could
rob hundreds of rural communities from access to air service. I
do not think you should have to live in a big city in order to
get on an airplane, and so I am going to continue to fight for
rural air service and against these harmful cuts to the
program.
Mr. McIntosh, Gerald Ford International Airport in Grand
Rapids, in Michigan, is the second-largest airport in my state.
It sees well over 200 aircraft operations per day, and it
serves as a growing part of our state, rapidly growing western
area. However, even as Grand Rapids serves a record number of
passengers, it has been stymied in its efforts to expand and
modernize its 62-year-old FAA air traffic control tower that
the Agency has not acted to replace.
As you well know, Grand Rapids is not alone. Towers across
the country are awaiting replacement. FAA's efforts to address
this backlog have only been further restricted by budgetary
constraints.
So my question for you, sir, Secretary Duffy put out a plan
to address a facilities backlog at FAA, but he failed to
include how much that will cost. So my question is, do you have
an estimate of what level of funding it would take to address
the air traffic control tower modernization backlog
specifically? And additionally, can you discuss how aging
facilities are complicating the job of air traffic control?
Mr. McIntosh. I apologize, Senator Peters, but I do not
have that information for you. If it is OK, can I circle back
with your staff and get you the information exactly what you
are looking for?
Senator Peters. Yes, happy to have that. Thank you.
Mr. McIntosh. Thank you, sir.
Senator Peters. Good, thank you.
Mr. Heibeck, I have long advocated for the FAA to
transition away from the use of toxic PFAS-containing
firefighting foams. The FAA Reauthorization Act includes a
provision that I championed to ensure a quick transition to new
non-PFAS firefighting foam, alongside financial resources for
the airports necessary to make that transition.
Michigan airports continue to lead the way on this issue,
but they need a strong partner at the FAA to support the
transition away from the use of PFAS and protect our
communities from further contamination. In order for the FAA to
be that partner, it must have the appropriate funding,
obviously, to implement that transition.
So my question to you is, could you speak to the importance
of providing the necessary resources for airports to make this
transition? And additionally, what is the timeline for
implementation of the PFAS replacement program for airports
currently?
Mr. Heibeck. Yes, Senator, and I appreciate your support on
this important reauthorization provision. We have made great
progress in implementing the requirements of reauthorization.
We have met the requirement in the bill to develop and publish
a transition plan to fluorine-free foams. That is up on our
website, along with a lot of guidance to airport sponsors and
forums and YouTubes and other pieces of guidance that could
help them transition.
We have established the framework for the transition grant
program, the non-PFAS foam transition grant program, including
consultation with the EPA. The only thing that we would need
there to start awarding grants in that area would be the
appropriation. Those are more operational costs, not capital
costs, eligible under the Airport Improvement Program, so we
need a special appropriation to do things like clean equipment
to dispose of PFAS foams and to acquire non-PFAS foams.
Senator Peters. Great, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. Senator Hickenlooper.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for
calling this. I thank each of you for all your hard work.
Let me start with Mr. McIntosh, and I know we have talked
already. You have been asked questions about the two copper
wires and the issues around Newark. I want to just take a
moment and just lay out what I recognize. It seems to me, I fly
a lot, too much, back and forth every week. It is not uncommon
that we would get diverted and circle a couple of times. The
last time I checked, we are still using TCAS, the Traffic
Collision Avoidance Systems, that some of my constituents have
been calling and saying, ``Are we less safe?'' And to me, in a
funny way, what we are dealing with when we have what happened
in Newark, is people, they circle. It is not like they almost
landed on somebody. They lost connection, and their TCAS is
still working, so as they circle in space, they know exactly
where everyone else is and the Collision Avoidance System is
still working.
Am I correct in communicating that confidence that everyone
should continue flying, feel that they are absolutely safe when
they are flying?
Mr. McIntosh. Senator Hickenlooper, absolutely, people are
safe when they fly. I fly like you do every single--I fly every
week. I go back and forth, and I have utmost confidence in our
air traffic controllers and our managers and how the system
works with the redundancies put in place.
Senator Hickenlooper. I agree. I think it seems there are
redundancies everywhere. Obviously, the point of this hearing
is we have got a lot of infrastructure that needs to be
upgraded and we have got a lot of work to do. You guys should
maybe see psychoanalysts about whether you really want these
jobs or not, given the restrictions on funding these days.
There is a lot to be done. But I want to emphasize that the
system is safe, that people should get on planes. It is such a
crucial part of our economy. When people suddenly decide they
are not going to fly, they feel uncertain about flying, the
entire economy slows down.
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, sir, it does. And from an air traffic
controller perspective, we love the job. What we really want is
better equipment to go along with it, and that is really what
it comes down to. A lot of our equipment, it is antiquated, and
the FAA has been known as having the safest and most efficient
airspace in the world, but we need to advance our systems to
ensure we keep that standard.
Senator Hickenlooper. I agree. Perfect. Now, I want to get
specific with you. We have got some rural communities, like
Northern Colorado Regional Airport in Fort Collins, are working
to be able to do their traffic control without a controller.
The State of Colorado, the Northern Colorado Regional Airport,
have made investments in remote tower technology, and these
investments are waiting to be realized because of ongoing
testing at the FAA's Technology Center in New Jersey. So can we
get an update on that and where are we and how quickly can we
get that stuff approved?
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, sir. I am very excited about the remote
towers. I think the technology is incredible. We do have a
vendor at Atlantic City at the Tech Venter. They are doing the
safety case and the business case now, and the FAA is ready to
validate that safety case, credential that system, and as soon
as that occurs, then the airports will be able to go and
purchase that system.
I got an update just yesterday and I believe they plan on
doing an Industry Day sometime this summer for people to come
and take a look at the new technology that is out there with
how this works, and it really is incredible.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, that is great, and that is
promotional. I am just trying to urge a sense of urgency.
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. I find a lot of my time is spent
urging a sense of urgency around here.
Mr. Heibeck, as you know, many regional airports are the
single most important connectivity hub to the rest of their
state or the rest of the country, and we worked closely with
Senator Fischer to enact the Sustainable Regional Air Travel
Act as part of FAA reauthorization in 2024. That was an
obviously bipartisan bill that commissioned a Federal study
that will be published next month to examine those factors that
impact air service to regional airports, including pilot
availability, air traffic control systems, as we have talked
about, and other issues.
Can you describe what you think are the most pressing
issues that regional airports are facing today? Because they
are such a huge part, of not just Colorado, but pretty much
every western state and really almost every state.
Mr. Heibeck. Yes, Senator. I think the Reauthorization Act
seeks to provide or expand the types of funding under the
Airport Improvement Program, to fund critical safety
infrastructure development projects at the small rural
airports, and I think the funding challenges continue to
persist there. But the Reauthorization Act does a really good
job making some changes to the Small Airport Fund and in other
areas to focus on non-hub airports and non-primary airports.
One particular example is the state apportionment is expanded
there, and I think that will help meet some of the funding
challenges at the smaller airports in the system.
Senator Hickenlooper. Great. Well, thank you again. Ms.
Baker, I am out of time, but I will submit--I have got a couple
of questions for you too. I will submit them in written form.
Thank you. I yield back to the Chair.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. Ranking Member Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
mention I heard that you said that there is great bipartisan
support on working on DCA and the problems around DCA, and that
is very true, and we remain committed to understanding what has
transpired and continuing to get answers. I think Senator Moran
might have mentioned that he thinks we are going to do a
roundtable to get further information.
But Mr. McIntosh, on this point--well, first of all, I wish
Acting Administrator Rocheleau was here. I am not sure why he
is not here. I think having somebody who is in charge of the
operations and answering to that is very important.
The NTSB report obviously was quite damning, with a lot of
information about close calls beyond the accident that
happened. And so it begs the question about the ATO process
that is in place, the safety risk management system that is
supposed to be there. And now, post the accident, we have had
this other incident.
So why is your system not working? Why is the FAA's
oversight of this not working?
Mr. McIntosh. Thank you for the question, Senator Cantwell.
The SMS process the ATO utilizes is quite robust. We have
independent reviews from different levels of the organization
to ensure that we do not have any human biases. And what I mean
by that is, we are required to review all events, at all of our
FAA facilities, so any significant event is required to be
entered into a mandatory occurrence report and then a
subsequent investigation.
Senator Cantwell. OK, so are you saying nobody is
investigating this? Because we, I have to get through about
five issues here. So, all I am saying is, if you had all those
alarms going off, if you had all of that oversight, and you had
a safety risk management system, but nobody read the data and
nobody said anything. We have already asked this of the FAA, so
now I want an answer from the Acting Administrator--I am pretty
sure he already promised me an answer which I still do not
have, which is, what is your process for then saying this is a
problem and we are going to put a stop to it? I think the
answer right now is, ``Oh no, no, no, I'm going to call air
traffic controllers.''
That is not the answer. The answer is, this is too big of a
risk, and we are not going to continue to do this, and we are
going to set up better separations and more standards. And you
have not done that. And so that is question number one.
OK, Newark. There have been reports in the press that maybe
there were only three people in the tower. Isn't there a
requirement that there should be seven people in the tower?
Isn't DCA here similarly--isn't it about seven air traffic
controllers to staff a tower like either of these towers? Is
that right?
Mr. McIntosh. Are you speaking to Newark tower or to
Philadelphia Area C TRACON?
Senator Cantwell. Either.
Mr. McIntosh. We have basic watch schedule guidelines. This
is a number that we try to get to.
Senator Cantwell. Which is what?
Mr. McIntosh. Depends on by facility and how many positions
we open. Now, I believe you are well aware that we do have some
critical staffing shortfalls.
Senator Cantwell. I cannot tell you how hard I worked to
get the 3,000 increase, and I would have gotten more. But back
to this question.
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, ma'am. Well, we----
Senator Cantwell. What I am pinpointing is, if the New York
Post is wrong, I do not know whether they are. Maybe there were
three people there. But if your number is seven and you do not
have seven, what is the FAA doing every day to monitor that
situation and say, ``This is a problem''? This is not, ``I'm
going to call the head of the air traffic controllers union.''
This is, what is the FAA going to do to fix the system?
You are going to hear a rejoining theme through all of my
questions. This is about this agency playing the aggressive
role that we need you to play.
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, ma'am, and thank you for that question.
I wish to address it.
Senator Cantwell. OK.
Mr. McIntosh. When we have a staffing shortage and we
cannot open enough positions, we put in traffic management
initiatives to slow the aircraft down. That is exactly what we
did that night at Philadelphia Area C. We put in a ground delay
program to keep traffic manageable. We do the same thing at
DCA. When we have too much volume, we put in a ground delay
program. We do this on a daily basis.
Senator Cantwell. Did you think you only had three people
in that tower, controlling that airspace?
Mr. McIntosh. In that TRACON, for one hour, we did go down
to that number, and we put in the appropriate traffic
management initiative to keep things safe.
Senator Cantwell. OK. Why did we go from seven, which is a
requirement, down to three? I am for safety first, for sure,
but then at the same time, I am trying to understand why is it
that we are now down from seven, which is basically what you
think you need, down to three?
Mr. McIntosh. It comes down to a staffing shortage, ma'am.
We did lose some controllers in that area due to either some
sick leave that was unscheduled or some other leave that was
not scheduled. When those things happen, ma'am, we have to
essentially keep things safe, and we will put in the
appropriate traffic management initiatives to keep the flying
public safe and make sure that we put controllers in the
position to be successful.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I definitely would not have been
firing the safety oversight team that we had as part of our FAA
safety bill that we implemented. These are people who help us
at a very big-picture level. And I certainly would not have cut
back on staffing, in general, at the FAA. I think it is a time
when we need people to be doing their job.
I need to turn to the ODA. So I sent you a letter. I
finally got a response last night. I do not really think it is
satisfactory, but what is it that--this process of the FAA and
the manufacturer working together, what is the criteria that
you are going to look for in an ODA Agreement related to
aviation manufacturing?
Ms. Baker. Thank you for the question and thank you for
your patience in the response. We are looking for criteria that
the ODA is performing its functions. So, how is it performing?
Is it meeting the requirements that we would hold--ODA unit
members are performing work that the FAA would perform, so we
want to make sure that they are performing to that same high
standard. And we want to ensure that incidents of undue
influence or undue pressure are minimized, and when they do
occur, that they are properly researched and corrective actions
are put in place.
We are also looking for Boeing to continue their
implementation of the safety management system.
Senator Cantwell. A mandatory.
Ms. Baker. Excuse me?
Senator Cantwell. A mandatory.
Ms. Baker. It is mandatory for them, but----
Senator Cantwell. No, no. A mandatory safety management
system, not, it is mandatory, you get one, and then you decide
to make it voluntary. There is a difference.
Ms. Baker. Correct. They will meet the standards.
Senator Cantwell. I am a little concerned your General
Counsel is confused by this, because he was confused before and
let them off the hook. And now, I want to make sure we are not
confused. It is a mandatory----
Ms. Baker. A Part 5 SMS.
Senator Cantwell. OK. So what is it on the employee input?
What are you looking for? Because part of the issue here was
intimidation of employees speaking up and the FAA not backing
them up. And so what are you recommending? What is it you want
to see in the ODA that would say, ``Yes, I understand now that
the company is listening to the input from the employees.''
When we asked former Administrator Whitaker if, in fact, the
FAA should have some foresight into that, he said yes. So we
want to see an employee feedback system that the FAA has some
access to.
Ms. Baker. Administrator Whitaker did invite the Boeing
employees to leverage the FAA hotline, and so we did see an
uptick in that. We did have employees directly communicating
with the FAA. In addition, we have inspectors on the floor
every day in the factories, having direct interaction with the
workforce and inviting the workforce to interact with them, as
well as what I mentioned, with the undue pressure and the ODAs,
we have assigned direct advisors, so the ODA members have
someone within FAA that they can reach out to directly. And
again, we monitor any reports of undue pressure in the
associated investigations.
Senator Cantwell. I would like it if you could address this
in a written response: What is it that you think the FAA
believes makes for the right ODA Agreement related to the
employee feedback? This Committee receives lots of
whistleblower testimony. This Committee receives lots of input
about how the employees were bringing up issues and the FAA was
not supporting them. So we want a clear process with the FAA
that the FAA is knowledgeable, not after the fact, or not
hoodwinked. Basically when it comes to, like the MCAS system we
want, there were people raising the questions about MCAS all
the way along. I mean, very senior people. And I think it would
have been an interesting point if somehow that had surfaced to
the FAA at that point in time. At least an alarm bell would
have gone on at the FAA, ``Oh. MCAS, better pay attention to
this. This is a bigger sea change than we think.'' Correct?
Ms. Baker. Part of the bill itself talked about how we are
going to improve communication during the certification
process, not just during the production process. And some of
those provisions that we are putting in place are going to
facilitate that, as well.
Senator Cantwell. Please provide to me what is it you are
going to expect in a process for certifying a new ODA? What is
it you are looking for to make sure that there is employee
input when, you know, they are identifying problems that they
are concerned about? How the FAA knows about that and basically
gets it on your radar screen that this is something the
engineering staff believes you should pay attention to.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry for going over.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. Senator Lujan.
STATEMENT OF HON. BEN RAY LUJAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Lujan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Recently, we are
seeing almost daily reports about issues at Newark Liberty
International Airport, whether it is radar, air traffic control
issues due to outages or short staffing, or the most recent
ground delay due to construction. These reports are deeply
troubling and require immediate attention.
As you know right now, there are shortages in staffing, not
just at Newark, but across the country, forcing air traffic
controllers to work intense schedules, longer and longer hours.
That should raise a concern to everyone for what is happening
in our skies.
When we do not take care of our air traffic controllers, it
puts the efficiency and safety of aviation at risk.
Fortunately, the most recent FAA reauthorization included
important provisions to improve the health of our air traffic
control systems. I was proud to be a part of such pieces, two
specifically, in the final reauthorization package. The Air
Traffic Controllers Hiring Act and Air Traffic Control
Workforce Transparency Act now both seek to improve the safety
and staffing standards to ensure adequate numbers of fully
qualified controllers.
While Secretary Duffy has said he is committed to fixing
these issues, I would like to hear from you all as well. Mr.
McIntosh, do you support efforts to ensure the FAA is hiring
and training as many controllers as are needed each year to
address existing shortages?
Mr. McIntosh. Senator Lujan, I appreciate that question. As
a former controller that was in the military and in the FAA,
and a manager who had to oversee having enough staffing to
ensure that we are able to do our job, I 100 percent support
Secretary Duffy's supercharged hiring to maximize not just our
hiring of FAA controllers over the next 4 or 5 years, but also
ensuring that they come through the academy at a quick pace,
that they are incentivized to recruit, meaning there is a 30
percent pay bump for our academy graduates, as well as some of
the retention efforts that he has put forward there, as well. I
think he has put the plan forward. It is now the FAA and the
air traffic organization's job to move that forward. But to
answer your question, yes, I whole-heartedly support this
initiative.
Senator Lujan. Resounding yes. I appreciate that, sir. What
is the status of the collaborative resources work group that
seeks to determine the number of air traffic controllers needed
at each tower and center?
Mr. McIntosh. It has been implemented according to the
reauthorization bill.
Senator Lujan. What else can the FAA do to improve the
recruitment hiring retention of air traffic controllers?
Mr. McIntosh. I think Secretary Duffy has already laid
forth that plan in his efforts of what he has done. Now it is
up for the FAA to execute that plan.
Senator Lujan. So with your expertise, I hope you would be
advising the Secretary. You are the one that has done this. I
served with the Secretary. I know him. But is there anything
lacking or is that plan a hundred percent complete and that is
all that is needed?
Mr. McIntosh. What we are committed to do or what I need
from my vantage point, as long as we hire to those numbers,
which he is committed to, and we continue to put through that
throughput--he has already invested in our tower simulator
systems. We have already ensured that that is going to be in
place according to the reauthorization bill as well. We just
need to ensure that we execute at the facility level to make
sure that we have certifications so we have enough people to
work. That is going to be the number one cure to what is our
fatigue issues that we see, and also ensuring that we have
enough people to work the sectors.
Senator Lujan. I appreciate that, sir.
Ms. Baker, another provision I championed in the FAA
reauthorization required the FAA to initiate a call to action
to address ramp worker safety and publish training educational
materials. Can you tell me what progress the FAA has made to
initiate this call to action?
Ms. Baker. Yes, absolutely. Aviation Safety is working in
partnership actually with the Office of Airports. We are having
a ramp safety call to action safety summit tomorrow as a matter
of fact, where we are going to bring together air carriers,
employees of ramp workers, along with FAA employees to identify
best practices, areas of improvement and what we can make
suggestions about what we can do to improve ramp worker safety.
Senator Lujan. And when do you expect to complete your
review and submit your findings and safety recommendations for
ramp workers to Congress?
Ms. Baker. Shortly thereafter.
Senator Lujan. A week, two weeks, a month, a year?
Ms. Baker. It will probably take more than a couple of
weeks. We want to make sure we give a due diligence, but we
will circle back with you when we get our plan.
Senator Lujan. Before August?
Ms. Baker. We will work on it over the summer.
Senator Lujan. Before December?
Ms. Baker. We will work on it over the summer.
Senator Lujan. Is it going to be a year then? Because you
said shortly thereafter. So I am just trying to understand what
shortly thereafter means.
Ms. Baker. How big shortly is?
Senator Lujan. Is that a year? Is that by the end of
Trump's term? What are we talking about?
Ms. Baker. Without knowing what is going to be discussed
tomorrow, it is hard to estimate how long it will take to make
a complete report. But we are happy to get back with you about
the findings of tomorrow's ramp?
Senator Lujan. I am sorry to push you, Ms. Baker, but dates
matter. Is it fair to say no more than two years?
Ms. Baker. Yes, absolutely.
Senator Lujan. I appreciate that. That is a timeline that
we could work with.
Under the FAA reauthorization, the FAA was directed to
collaborate with the National Academies of Science, Engineering
and Medicine on a 12-month-long study focused on unsafe cabin
temperatures and conditions. On January 7th of this year, the
FAA gave an update saying that they have met the NASEM and,
quote, ``will finalize an agreement and funding for the project
after defining the scope.'' Ms. Baker, what is the status of
this research effort?
Ms. Baker. We are working with NASEM right now.
Senator Lujan. Do you believe that more should be done to
prevent unsafe temperatures in cabins?
Ms. Baker. I believe that unsafe temperatures in cabins are
definitely unpleasant. I think it is very challenging on the
ground because aircraft are made basically to heat and cool in
the air. I am looking forward to the recommendations we get
from NASEM so we can identify what the next steps are.
Senator Lujan. Is it fair to say that they can be more than
unpleasant and can actually cause someone a health problem or a
health condition?
Ms. Baker. I think what we get from NASEM will identify
what those potential health challenges could be.
Senator Lujan. I do not know if you have ever been on a
flight when it gets uncomfortable like that, but I have seen
people that react uncomfortably and sometimes they have to call
physicians or ask for volunteers that may be on the fight that
have medical expertise. I would say it is more than
uncomfortable, would be my response.
Ms. Baker. I was a crew member for four years, so I
understand.
Senator Lujan. Would you agree with me then?
Ms. Baker. It can be very uncomfortable.
Senator Lujan. OK, then we do not agree. I think it can be
deadly, not more just that it is uncomfortable, I can put a
jacket on. I can fan myself with one of the pamphlets. It can
be outright dangerous and cost someone their life.
Ms. Baker. We are looking forward to the report from the
National Academies.
Senator Lujan. Do we agree then Ms. Baker, that it could be
more than just uncomfortable?
Ms. Baker. I am looking forward to the report from the
National Academies.
Senator Lujan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
time today.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. Senator Fetterman.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FETTERMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Fetterman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Hi. So hi.
Hello everybody. And now I think it really needs to be said
more, flying in America is incredibly safe. It is incredibly
safe. I mean, I, and I think most of my colleagues, many of
them, I spend maybe 46, 47 weeks out of 52 flying in that. My
plane was in that airspace about half an hour or so earlier
before that tragedy in DCA. And that was really the first
accident in, I guess, quite a while. So I really want to remind
people that it is still incredibly safe and I refuse to play in
the blame, it is his guy, that is his problem. It is this, that
other thing. So I just really want to make sure we can agree
that it is very bipartisan, we want to have make flying safer,
but not turning it into a finger pointing thing.
So for me now, we have constantly heard there is a lot of
shortage of air traffic controllers, and we know sometimes it
might be difficult for the FAA to meet their staffing goals.
Now we have what I would describe the Harvard of air traffic
control schools in Beaver County in my state, which plays a
huge role in training the next generation of the air traffic
controllers.
So Mr. McIntosh, can you speak to the importance of
training schools like the ones that I addressed in the air
traffic controller shortage?
Mr. McIntosh. I believe to your question, Senator--and
thank you for the affirmation that it is still safe to fly. It
is extremely safe to fly. Thank you for that.
In regard to schools that offer programs to be an air
traffic controller, I 100 percent agree that these schools are
essential for our continued pipeline. So whether it is a
collegiate training initiative that you are speaking to or the
enhanced collegiate training initiative, if this offers
additional people into our training pipeline, that is pivotal
for us to increase our candidate pool as well as ensuring that
we have enough controllers.
Senator Fetterman. So are you able to commit to--again, you
are going to support these kinds of programs. It makes a lot of
sense, right? Obviously.
Mr. McIntosh. We support the collegiate training initiative
and the enhanced one as well. Yes, Senator.
Senator Fetterman. OK. So essential air service is a
lifeline in Pennsylvania, and it brings smaller communities
that otherwise would not have those kinds of things. Now, in my
state we have places like Altoona, Johnstown, or Lancaster, and
I am not sure why we would have any kind of budget cuts that
might impact these kinds of program or maybe up to 50 percent.
Mr. Heibeck, are we able to just make that point to the
Administration just how important that is to make these very
smart investments, in my opinion, into these small airports?
Because again, ironically, it is not about politics, but all of
those three communities that I referenced, they are all in red
counties. So that to me, flying should be safer and it is
bipartisan. So it is honestly, I think these kinds of
investments are just smart and that is economic development and
that. So if you can address, but that might be possible for
those cuts.
Mr. Heibeck. Yes, Senator Fetterman, as a fellow in
Pennsylvania, I share your interest in the small rural airports
in Pennsylvania. We in Airports do invest or make significant
investments in small airports through our Small Airport Fund
and other grant programs. The Essential Air Service Program is
administered by the Department of Transportation, and I am
happy to take your message back to our colleagues.
Senator Fetterman. Oh, yes, yes, no, I mean, I had the
pleasure of meeting with the head of the Lancaster Airport and
now it is like they really want to make these kinds of
upgrades, and I fully support that. I grew up in York, so I
know how close that area. That is an incredible amenity. So for
me, again, it is really just about serving all the
Pennsylvanians and have access to air travel.
But otherwise, no, thank you. And I cede that back to the
Chair. Thank you all, both of you.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. Senator Blunt Rochester.
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Blunt Rochester. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you so much to the witnesses. I have to say most of my
colleagues have noted that we are at a critical juncture for
aviation safety, for the sake of our families, our
constituents, the flying public, and we must ensure that the
FAA is equipped with every tool necessary to meet the mission,
to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the
world. We know that we have seen some recent catastrophic
incidents and near misses, and they have only underscored the
urgency of strengthening oversight, improving coordination, and
updating equipment including the FAA's IT systems.
But we cannot lose sight of the fact that there are other
significant variables that drive this crisis, like the lack of
a robust and well-supported aviation workforce. I just left
another hearing where one of the nominees said that their son
is now an air traffic controller, and that was some good news
to hear. And as the former Secretary of Labor in the state of
Delaware, I also was head of state personnel and I know that a
well-prepared workforce is really the lifeblood of any
organization. So I was pleased to see the inclusion of the
aviation workforce development provisions in the
reauthorization.
And I wanted to just ask some questions about workforce
planning. We know that we have an issue beyond air traffic
controllers and aviation safety inspectors, and I was curious
if you could talk a little bit about your workforce planning. I
know in your testimony it says, ``We are reviewing our hiring,
training, and placement processes as well as the FAA Academy
withdrawals and failures to ensure our selection methods
effectively identified candidates best suited for the
controller profession.''
So could you talk to me about what you're seeing in terms
of people who are retiring, resigning? Where are your
shortfalls? Where are those areas where you really need the
help?
Mr. McIntosh. Thank you for the question. If you are all
right, can I take this one? OK. So as far as recruitment for
our best and our brightest, right now, our academy success rate
is not where we would like it to be. We would like it to be
much, much higher because quite honestly, if we are washing out
35 percent or 30 percent, we need to do better because we need
more of those people in the field facilities to do that.
So I believe what you are referring to is what we call an
air traffic skills assessment, and that basically judges
somebody's cognitive skills and ability to multitask being an
air traffic controller. And we want to review that asset test
to make sure that it is identifying the right candidates that
would have a high probability of success to be an air traffic
controller. It does take some time to hire, select, and go
through the medical process and the security process. Even
though Secretary Duffy has done some things to speed that
along, we still want to make sure that those selections have a
higher rate of success.
If we were able to gain another 200 or 300 of those
candidates and put them in the air traffic system, that would
help with some of our staffing shortfalls.
And speaking with a lot of my friends who are my age, we
actually went through training together at field facilities and
they still love the job. They love being an air traffic
controller. Their big thing right now is we need more staffing
because they are getting tired, and I think we owe them a
better quality of life.
I do feel that the new CRWG numbers that, with the help or
our partnership with NACA, that we have implemented is
definitely going to help that. And we are also waiting for the
Transportation Research Board to provide their recommendations
for our staffing model. And when that is implemented, we will
be in a better place.
But the good news is with the new CRWG numbers, that is
going to bridge that shortfall and we are putting enough people
in the pipeline to actually give those controllers and those
managers that better quality of life than I am speaking to.
Senator Blunt Rochester. Thank you. Also, in your
testimony, you talked about leveraging partnerships with
approved colleges and universities. Delaware State University
has an incredible aviation program. Can you talk to us a little
bit about who you are leveraging these partnerships with?
Mr. McIntosh. Right now, we are willing to leverage and
partner with any university that has interest in the Collegiate
Training Initiative. And if they want to take it one step
further and do what we call the Enhanced Collegiate Training
Initiative, that is where they have simulation training and
enough of the training that would essentially equal to what
they would get at our FAA Academy.
If colleges are wishing to do that, we will go assess, and
if they do pass those standards, we will actually accredit
them. And students who go through this program will no longer
have to go through the academy. If they go through the program
and successfully complete it and pass an ATSA test and, of
course, receive the necessary medical clearance and the
necessary security clearance, then they bypass the academy and
they are placed at an FAA facility.
Senator Blunt Rochester. So for the record, questions for
the record will be, number one, would love to understand what
are the partnerships, would love to see the list of the
partnerships. Second, would love to follow up with the program
that we have at Delaware State University. Again, it is an
aviation program, which I think is really, really important.
And last, understand a little bit more how are you getting them
in the door? What are the things that are getting them? I know
you have mentioned financial incentives, but also mentioned
that there are more creative things that you are doing here. So
would love to follow up with you on the workforce aspect of it
as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your patience, and I yield
back.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you. One final question and we are
going to wrap up. Airspace around Austin-Bergstrom
International Airport has been impacted by a shortage of air
traffic controllers assigned to that facility. The FAA bill
included several provisions intended to improve air traffic
controller staffing, and yet my staff recently received a
report that Austin-Bergstrom Airport has only 33 air traffic
controllers while the FAA recommends that it have a total of 60
controllers. I am concerned about the impact that this will
have on Texas airspace.
Mr. McIntosh, how is the FAA Air Traffic Organization
working to fix air traffic control staffing issues across the
country, including specifically at Austin-Bergstrom Airport?
Mr. McIntosh. Thank you for the question, Senator Cruz. And
as you can probably tell, Austin is near and dear to my heart.
I know that I spoke a lot about how we are fixing the broader
issue of fixing the controller staffing that we have through
supercharged hiring that Mr. Duffy has started.
To answer your question, the FAA along with our NACA
partners, were proactive in increasing the numbers at Austin.
The CPC numbers at Austin was 42, and to your point, we
realized that the traffic was growing. So we proactively raised
their numbers to 60, which is their new CRWG numbers, well
ahead the implementation. So when you say 33 out of 42, that
does not sound so bad. Thirty-three out of 60 sounds terrible.
And that is something where I want to gauge our growth in CPCs
versus percentages, because I think that is where we have to
bridge that gap.
But by proactively increasing that number, Senator, what
that allowed us to do was drive more trainees into that
facility, and that was the goal.
Chairman Cruz. We have actually got a vote closing on the
floor. So sir, I thank you for that answer, sir, but I want to
ask you to make it a priority to make sure that the air traffic
controllers are there in Austin.
Mr. McIntosh. It is a priority, sir.
Chairman Cruz. I want to thank each of the witnesses for
your testimony. Senators will have until the close of business
on Wednesday, May 21, to submit questions for the record.
And actually, I am not going to close it out. I am going to
hand it over to Senator Sheehy to ask as many questions as he
likes and then to close it out. But I am going to run and go
vote. So congratulations, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. TIM SHEEHY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Sheehy [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are
both junior Senators from our state, so when we are Chairman,
it is a special event.
Thanks, witnesses, for being here today. Thank you for the
work you are doing at the FAA. I am a lifelong pilot, aviation
business owner, commercial pilot instructor, and I have long
told folks that the FAA is one of the beacons of light in the
Federal Government. Sometimes dealing with the Federal
Government can be highly frustrating, but I have always felt
the FAA was a very competent organization and also very
customer-friendly for the most part.
But we all know that, frankly, largely through no fault of
your own, largely through the fault of this great legislative
body for decades on end, we have not really addressed these
sclerotic issues that we have been talking about for decades,
as many of you alluded to in your statements. So unfortunately,
events like the Colgan crash in 2009, and our D.C. disaster
just a couple of months ago, that is what the public sees and
that is what the public feels.
But most of us knows those events, although the final
seconds are caused by something, a mechanical failure or human
error, normally it is organizational failures that have built
up over years and years that start that accident chain in the
beginning. And no one knows that better than career FAA folks
like yourself and of course our friends at the NTSB.
But many of these stressors that we are all feeling every
day, whether it is outdated air traffic control systems,
whether it is not enough controllers, not enough pilots, not
enough maintainers, not enough FAA designated pile examiners or
air worthiness representatives, I mean you name it. There is
basically a shortage in every key manpower category that we
need to stay innovative in aviation. And one of my biggest
concerns as the mother and father for aviation, as America's
the birthplace for aviation aerospace, these challenges that we
are facing across the board are driving aviation innovation to
other parts of the world.
Part 23, for example, which I understand does not fall
necessarily under your purview directly, but Part 23 has been a
challenge to certify a new clean-sheet aircraft for so long
that we are seeing places like Brazil and Asia and Europe
actually become now the hotbeds for next-generation aviation
development. And that should concern us all, because if we are
not the leaders of aviation anymore, that means somebody else
is, and that is bad for all of us.
But specifically here, I do not have a whole lot of local
questions, although I do have a couple of Montana-specific
questions. But every time there has been the attempt to do the
vast reorientation of the FAA, which of course does involve
some private sector partnership, the term privatization is
plastered over every billboard and in every hearing, and the
effort is very quickly mobbed and killed by various different
constituencies who do not want privatization to ever happen.
And of course there is a role for the government to always
play in this, but how can we leverage private industry to
hasten our ATC upgrades, which we have known have been coming
for decades, that should have happened years ago? How do we use
private industry to make sure our local airports, be they
regional or large commercial facilities, are being upgraded and
managed properly? And how do we leverage private partners to
fix our dire staffing shortages, like taking the controller
population we have in the military and helping them more
quickly transition to civilian controllers? So no particular
individual, but I would like to hear your ideas specifically on
how we can leverage private industry to help us hasten the
solutions to those problems.
Mr. McIntosh. I will speak to partnering with our military
partners and having air traffic controllers. It is something
that we a hundred percent agree with and it is something we
have already signed up to do. Senator, I was a former military
controller and I was actually a benefactor of being hired
directly by the FAA. I did not have to go to the FAA Academy
based on my credentials and I was able to go straight to an FAA
facility. We are partnering with the military as well as
looking at possibly using some of their simulations over at
Keesler Air Force Base to kind of improve some of our
throughput at the academy. That is one of the things that we
are looking at to help increase some of those staffing
shortages and get people through. I definitely feel partnering
with some of our DoD partners is something that we can
leverage.
Ms. Baker. And likewise in aviation safety, we definitely
have relationships with military and try to facilitate paths to
bring folks who have learned their skills in the military over
to commercial aviation, whether it is through a restricted ATP
with the military credit, whether it is through programs we are
exploring right now about how do we transition military
mechanics to get into the civilian system more easily. So there
is definitely a role there.
I think around private partnerships, the fact that there is
so much innovation happening in aviation, the opportunity for
us to partner with the aviation innovators on training, we do
what we call aviation skills enhancement with our engineering,
where our engineers can go and go to these new manufacturers
and new aircraft designers so that we can see and learn from
them what they are doing and how they are doing it. I think
that is a great opportunity for us.
And also as we are developing the new regulatory structure,
new standards, new guidance, working with the industry via
either formalized structure like aviation rulemaking committees
or informal structure like Industry Days helps us learn more
rapidly and helps us understand both where the system is going
and how to manage the risks that are presenting themselves in
the system. So I think there is a great role for partnership
with the industry.
Senator Sheehy. Well, and safety always has to be
paramount, but safety has to work hand in hand with the ability
to operate effectively. You can safety anything to death. You
can find a reason not to fly. If you want to be safe you just
don't fly.
Ms. Baker. Don't fly.
Senator Sheehy. Exactly. So ultimately, we are always told
safety will always rule the day, but ultimately we have to get
to where we are going. We have to move the cargo, have to
complete the mission. So if we want to be ultimately safe, then
we do not fly and we have to fly. That is the point of our
National Airspace System, which I will add is the most
advanced, safest in the history of the world. We should be
very, very proud of what we have. I do not want to pile on and
speak ill of what we have built because it is an incredible
system, but it is straining under itself. We have to make sure
we are evolving it.
And to that end, after the Colgan crash in 2009, this body,
I was not a part of it then, of course, but passed a law for
the 1,500-hour pilot rule. And if you know what the pilot hours
were for both the pilots in the cockpit that day of that
terrible event, it was about 3,000 and 2,500.
Ms. Baker. I do not remember. I knew it was not 1,500.
Senator Sheehy. Yes. So 1,500 had nothing to do with that
accident and nothing to do with those pilots and their
experience. The fact that they had, it was one case over double
the amount of hours that the new law instituted really had
nothing to do with that accident. So I think it is very
important for you all to make very clear, candid responses to
us so we do not make new laws that actually do not help the
problem; it makes it worse. And I think within the agency, for
example, recently the ability to do experimental aircraft
operations used to be delegated to DARs. And recently that was
changed to where now a FSDO has to directly sign off on an
experimental certificate being hung on an aircraft. On the
surface that seems logical, we are adding another safety
barrier. But the truth is that is just adding more bureaucracy
to a process.
That is a perfect example of why folks want to innovate
elsewhere now is because we are making that application process
to experiment with new aviation technologies harder to do here.
And that is a small example, but I think it is an indicator of,
at times, the bureaucracy getting in the way of some common
sense, specifically for ATC systems.
We hear a lot about radars and copper wire. How do we
quickly evaluate and implement the more advanced and modern, in
many cases, more accurate satellite-based, ADS-B capability,
automated flight following, where we can open our ForeFlight
apps and see aircraft moving in real time with pretty great
precision and start injecting that technology in addition to
real-time data sharing with the aircraft?
So we see that a lot in Europe now where instead of voice
communications, which as we saw with DCA can be stepped on,
they can be garbled, they can be misheard, they can be misread
back. When the data is actually sent to the aircraft with their
flight path instructions, it is much harder to have an error
based on that. How do we start adopting those things quickly in
American airspace, and is more private sector involvement the
answer for that?
Mr. McIntosh. In regard to issuing a command to an aircraft
versus a pilot and accepting that, we call that datacom part of
the next-gen technology. And that has been implemented in all
of our 20 centers that are within the CONUS. And we are
expecting full IOC, meaning full operations capability here
within the year, and that is a very conservative estimate. I
expect it to be much more aggressive than that. So the good
news is that has been used, and we are getting some very good
feedback on how that is using.
We also have our ability to upload clearances to aircraft
at the gates without having to do a verbal transmission. We
call that CPDLC. We are getting very positive feedback on that,
as well.
So I do believe a lot of these technologies that you are
seeing, while it has taken a long time to actually get it
implemented, it is actually coming to fruition now.
Senator Sheehy. Great. Any other comments on those points
or questions?
And then finally what I would say is some of our rural
airports, which you hear a lot about here, obviously Senator
Sullivan from Alaska has a very unique position, but it is true
also in places like Montana where I am from, where we do have
airports where the most critical service they provide to some
of these rural and Tribal communities is medevac, where they
could be in multiple hours' drive from a hospital. Our ability
to get aircraft in there and get them to a facility quickly is
dependent on their access to air. And implementing some of our
newer GPS approaches to some of these airfields that are not
going to be able to afford an ILS system, but that also depends
on radar capability and ADC capability from some of our
regional airports like Helena, which is only one of two
regional airports in the country that does not have radar
service.
So as part of this modernization effort, I agree we have to
prioritize incredibly congested areas like DCA and, of course,
Newark and others, but for many of our rural communities, this
is key. So I would ask for your commitment to look into that.
And I would also ask just for general open-mindedness.
Sometimes open-mindedness and non-conventional thinking do not
go hand in hand with safety in the traditional sense. But the
truth is we have to start re-imagining how the FAA can operate
in the 21st century, and that means looking at our FARs,
thinking how they fit better around the more broader envelope
of aviation we are seeing now from UAS to now new types of
aerial vehicles that are going to start challenging our
existing systems in different ways.
So thanks for your testimony today. I appreciate you taking
the time to speak to us, and thanks for all the work you are
doing.
Mr. McIntosh. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sheehy. All right, we will close out the hearing.
Thanks to the witnesses for the testimony today. Senators will
have until close the business on Wednesday, May 21, to submit
questions for the record. Witnesses will be allowed until close
of business on Wednesday, June 4, to respond to those
questions.
This concludes today's hearing. The Committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement from the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems
International (AUVSI)
On behalf of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems
International (AUVSI), thank you for the opportunity to submit this
testimony as you evaluate the implementation of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Act of 2024 (P.L. 118-63). Swift
implementation of this legislation is critical to ensuring the
meaningful integration of safe, secure, and scalable uncrewed and
advanced aviation technologies into American skies.
AUVSI is the world's largest non-profit organization dedicated to
advancing uncrewed systems, autonomy, and robotics. AUVSI represents
over four hundred corporations and eight thousand professionals across
more than sixty countries in industry, government, and academia.
AUVSI's members span the defense, civil, and commercial sectors and
multiple transportation domains, inclusive of hardware and software
companies. Our member companies design, build, and operate uncrewed
aircraft systems (UAS, or drones) as well as counter-UAS systems for
detecting and mitigating drones. We also represent leaders in advanced
air mobility (AAM), including manufacturers, aircraft autonomy
providers, component suppliers, and infrastructure developers.
P.L 116-83 was a landmark step forward for the entire aviation and
aerospace industry. It contained critical provisions intended to
accelerate the integration of drones and AAM technologies into the
national airspace system (NAS). AUVSI commends Congress for its
leadership in crafting a future-ready aviation framework. However,
significant portions of P.L. 118-63 implementation remain off track,
and delayed action by the FAA on several mandates risks undermining
U.S. leadership in global aerospace innovation as our competitors, and
adversaries, race ahead.
We are at a pivotal moment in aviation history, with drones and AAM
aircraft (which include both regional and urban passenger and cargo
carrying applications) offering the potential to unlock significant
benefits in both safety and technological leadership. With those
benefits will come tremendous economic activity and workforce
opportunities. Drones offer a cost-effective solution for critical
operations including public safety, package delivery, precision
agriculture, utilities maintenance, infrastructure inspections, and
much more. AAM is revolutionizing propulsion systems, battery
technology, and flight controls, unlocking new opportunities in both
metropolitan and rural areas not served by traditional aviation, and
enhancing workforce productivity and safety. Companies are opening
high-rate production facilities and creating thousands of high-quality
manufacturing jobs at an increasing rate.
The UAS and AAM industries require enabling rules and regulations
given the new technologies entering service. Safety, not bureaucracy
must drive this process--new regulations in this space will enable
rather than restrict U.S. innovation and leadership. We encourage
Congress and the FAA to streamline the rulemaking process generally,
and specifically across UAS and AAM initiatives. The current regulatory
structure for UAS and AAM is overly burdensome because it was created
with traditional aircraft in mind. Updated enabling rules and
regulations will act as a means of deregulation that enables these
innovative technologies to flourish.
A critical step toward streamlining the FAA's rulemaking process is
the swift implementation of Section 202 of P.L. 118-63, which requires
the FAA Administrator to create an Office of Rulemaking and Regulatory
Improvement headed by an appointed Assistant Administrator. The
creation of the office and the elevation of rulemaking within FAA will
help to ensure accountability and responsibility for rulemaking
timeliness, which are often presently lacking.
Without timely regulatory clarity, the promise both UAS and AAM
technologies will remain unrealized, and we will continue to see
nations like China win the global aviation competitiveness race. The
FAA must move swiftly to implement new rules for beyond visual line of
sight (BVLOS) drone operations, aircraft certification, and airspace
integration technologies such as UAS traffic management (UTM). It must
also ensure that operational approvals for emerging AAM aircraft are
efficient, transparent, and based on performance rather than legacy
prescriptive frameworks.
While AUVSI's diverse membership is deeply invested in the
implementation of several P.L. 118-63 provisions, we want to take a
moment to focus on the BVLOS draft safety rule/final rule and how the
associated costly delays.
The drone industry is standing on the precipice of a new era.
With the right regulatory framework, the U.S. can lead the
world in drone innovation and integration. The timely issuance
of BVLOS safety rules will unlock the scalability of high-value
operations. According to various studies, the drone industry is
projected to contribute billions of dollars to the U.S. economy
over the next decade. But, without the BVLOS rule in place,
much of this potential will remain untapped.
Unfortunately, the BVLOS draft safety rule, and therefore the
BVLOS final rule, has languished, plagued by bureaucratic
delays. The deadline for the FAA to release the BVLOS draft
safety rule no later than four months after the enactment of
P.L. 118-63 has come and gone, and the industry is feeling
those impacts. Importantly, this means that unless the FAA
issues the BVLOS draft safety rule in the very near term, the
FAA's issuance of the final rule will undoubtedly slide to the
right in the calendar, which will ensure the U.S. falls further
behind other nations in the deployment of advanced aviation
technologies.
It is important to note that the notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) has already been written and began undergoing the White
House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
interagency review process last year, and AUVSI conducted
multiple meetings with OIRA and various segments of the UAS
industry to make the case for the issuance of the NPRM.
Unfortunately, the draft safety rule was not issued for public
comment before the January 20 change in administrations and the
associated moratorium on rulemaking activities.
Releasing the NPRM and final rule in a timely manner is a
requirement of Section 930 of P.L 118-63, which was enacted
into law almost exactly one year ago. The expeditious release
of the BVLOS NPRM and subsequent final rule, pursuant to
Section 930 referenced above, would build on the drone policy
agenda of the first Trump Administration, which was the last
time that enabling drone regulations were promulgated. In the
meantime, the FAA needs to maintain the current process for
authorizing the limited drone operations that are in the
pipeline before the BVLOS rule is final, so operators can
continue to effectively plan and make informed business
decisions.
Today, drone operations BVLOS require costly, lengthy, case-by-
case FAA approval processes which inhibit companies from
scaling in the United States and can make beneficial operations
cost-prohibitive. The rapid expansion of drone technology in
sectors such as public safety, agriculture, infrastructure
inspection, and delivery services have the potential to
transform key areas of the economy and provide significant
societal benefit, as we have witnessed most recently in the
hurricane response efforts.
This expansion is also necessary to buttress domestic
manufacturing efforts while supporting our national security.
Drones can be used for ongoing surveillance of large areas
during events like natural disasters, potentially reducing the
need for extensive ground patrols. They can enter buildings and
disaster zones where it would be unsafe to send in a human.
Drones can monitor fires and wildfires, enabling more effective
decision-making and resource allocation. Drones are deployed to
assess damage, monitor hazards, survey affected areas, and
deliver aid following disasters such as tornadoes, hurricanes,
earthquakes, wildfires, and infrastructure collapses. They
provide valuable situational awareness to emergency responders
and help them coordinate relief efforts.
Further delays to the BVLOS rules will continue to hamper the
drone industry from scaling to new heights. We encourage
Congress to work hand-in-hand with the Trump Administration to
issue the draft safety rule as soon as possible for public
comment--the vitality of this industry depends on it.
Moreover, we urge Congress to conduct robust oversight of FAA
leadership to ensure they are fully activating the tools Congress
provided in this legislation to expand real-world testing environments,
strengthen industry-academic research partnerships, and fund state and
local planning for UAS and AAM infrastructure. Equally vital is
investment in workforce development. The FAA has been entrusted with
meaningful resources to prepare our current and future workforce for
careers in uncrewed systems. It is imperative these funds be deployed
strategically and promptly, in collaboration with community colleges,
universities, and training organizations.
AUVSI supports the FAA's safety mission and recognizes the
challenge of keeping pace with transformative technologies while
maintaining rigorous standards. However, innovation cannot be deferred
indefinitely in the name of caution. Industry is not seeking
shortcuts--we are seeking certainty. The rules, processes, and systems
that enable growth must be defined, tested, and deployed.
As the Committee continues its oversight of P.L. 118-63
implementation, we respectfully urge you to press for transparency,
stakeholder engagement, and measurable progress. The next generation of
aviation is not on the horizon--it is here. The decisions we make today
will shape the United States' competitiveness, resilience, and global
leadership for decades to come.
In conclusion, AUVSI urges the Committee to prioritize oversight of
Title IX, Subtitles A and B of P.L. 118-63, to ensure the FAA is
keeping up with mandate timelines, with a keen focus on the following
specific provisions throughout the legislation:
General
Establishing the Unmanned and Autonomous Flight Advisory
Committee--Section 916
Make maximum use of the recently announced Center for
Advanced Aviation Technologies to support emerging aviation
technologies--Section 961
Center of Excellence for UAS--Section 1006
FAA UAS and AAM research and development--Section 1044
UAS
Electronic conspicuity study--Section 906
Remote identification alternative means of compliance--
Section 907
Improving the Part 107 waiver process--Section 908
Pilot program for UAS inspections of FAA infrastructure--
Section 911
Drone Infrastructure Inspection Grant Program--Section 912
Drone Education and Workforce Training Grant Program--
Section 913
Extension of the Know Before You Fly initiative--Section 922
Extension and expansion of UAS test ranges--Section 925
Extension of authorities under Section 44807 and
transferring those authorities to FAA--Section 927
Directing the FAA to issue a BVLOS NPRM and final rule
expeditiously--Section 930
Expeditious approvals of third-party service providers--
Section 932
Operations Over the High Seas--Section 934
Prohibiting Department of Transportation (DOT) funds from
being used on contracts/grants for covered UAS--Section 936
AAM
Establishing the Advanced Aviation Technology/Innovation
Steering Committee--Section 229
Shifting AAM regulatory functions from the FAA NextGen
Office to the Office of Aviation Safety--Section 206
Allowing airport energy assessments to include power demands
for airside and landside operations, with funding support for
related projects--Section 742
Establishing program guidance for the AIP Pilot Program for
AAM ground support equipment--Section 745
Streamlining environmental approvals for vertiports by
applying or establishing categorical exclusions under the
National Environmental Policy Act--Section 953
Expanding and extending the AAM Infrastructure Pilot Program
through 2026--Section 960
Thank you for your commitment to innovation, safety, and a strong
U.S. aviation ecosystem. AUVSI and our members stand ready to work with
Congress, the FAA, DOT, and all partners to realize this vision.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Jodi Baker, Wayne Heibeck, and Franklin McIntosh
Integration with Safety Risk Management Panels
Question 1. How will the new advanced analytics tools within
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) be integrated
into FAA's Safety Risk Management (SRM) panels, particularly those
addressing mixed traffic operations, airspace redesign, or commercial
spaceflight interactions?
Answer. ASIAS is one of the data sources the FAA uses to both
identify and analyze potential safety issues as part of safety risk
management and its risk identification and mitigation tools, including
SRM panels. When ASIAS has information pertinent to a potential safety
issue, including in relation to planned changes, analysts use that data
to identify trends and anomalies that may indicate a vulnerability in
the aerospace system.
Consistent with the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, we are making
a host of improvements to ASIAS. Such improvements include integrating
rotorcraft community data, Artificial Intelligence or machine learning,
air traffic control voice data, and additional FAA Enterprise
Information Management data into ASIAS. Not only will these
improvements expand the data sources available to ASIAS but also
enhance the quality and speed of data, therefore increasing the
benefits of ASIAS data to support safety risk management.
General Aviation and Non-Airline Participation
Question 2. Does the FAA have plans to expand the scope of ASIAS
participation beyond commercial airlines--for example, to general
aviation, rotorcraft, or UAS operators--and what technical or policy
challenges would need to be addressed to do so?
Answer. Expansion of ASIAS beyond commercial operations began over
a decade ago. Currently, ASIAS partners with general aviation and
rotorcraft operators, in addition to commercial air carriers. We are
always looking to improve and, consistent with the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2024, we are making a host of improvements to ASIAS. Such
improvements include integrating rotorcraft community data, Artificial
Intelligence or machine learning, air traffic control voice data, and
additional FAA Enterprise Information Management data into ASIAS. We
are actively integrating rotorcraft safety data into ASIAS, with key
milestones planned throughout FY26. This includes initiating rotorcraft
onboarding, such as establishing agreements, data pipelines, and portal
features, in Q1 FY26, and finalizing tools for benchmarking and
visualization in Q2. The FAA also is actively working to expand ASIAS'
reach within the UAS community. The FAA is working to build a drone
data analyses capability in FY2025 and to integrate UAS safety data
into ASIAS to conduct aggregate safety risk analysis beginning in
FY2026. Planning for UAS onboarding is targeted for Q3 FY26, followed
by expansion of the study pipeline and integration of advanced tools
and UAS data in Q4.
Key technical and policy challenges include ensuring secure data
exchange mechanisms, protecting proprietary and sensitive data,
developing onboarding strategies for diverse stakeholder communities,
and aligning new data sources with ASIAS' existing governance
frameworks.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Jodi Baker, Wayne Heibeck, and Franklin McIntosh
Question 1. Section 372 of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) Reauthorization Act of 2024 requires the FAA Administrator to
establish requirements for an Enhanced Qualification Program (EQP) for
prospective pilots within six months of enactment. EQP is a structured
program meant to integrate several benchmarks prospective pilots must
meet--including receiving their multiengine and type ratings--into one
comprehensive curriculum that prepares them for entry into air carrier
new hire training. This thorough, detailed course of instruction,
paired with advanced simulator training from seasoned airline pilots,
would expose trainees to the cockpits of the jets they would actually
be flying and, importantly, allow them to experience what it is like to
handle challenging and dangerous situations in those cockpits,
including those which lead to the close calls we have seen recently.
The swift implementation of this program is critical to ensuring we
have an adequate supply of highly trained, qualified pilots especially
in rural areas.
Please detail your plan to ensure that this important program is
implemented and provide an expected timeline for implementation.
Answer. We are focused on establishing the requirements for
airlines to implement the Enhanced Qualification Program (EQP), which
we plan to publish in an Advisory Circular (AC) later this year. As
part of our process, we will seek public comment on the AC, after which
it will be finalized.
Question 2a. As you know, Section 930 of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Act of 2024 requires the FAA to
establish regulations governing beyond visual line-of-sight (BVLOS)
operations for certain unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), a crucial step
in unleashing the commercial potential of these aircraft. Under the
law, the FAA must issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) within
four months and a final rule within 20 months of the date of enactment.
While we appreciate the FAA's continued work in advancing the
integration of UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS), with the
statutory NPRM deadline having passed, we write today to request an
update on the publication of this proposed rule.
What timeline can we expect for a publication of a BVLOS NPRM?
After publication, when can we expect a final rule?
Answer. The BVLOS NPRM was published on August 5, 2025. As
highlighted in President Trump's Executive Order (EO) 14307, Unleashing
American Drone Dominance, this rule is a Trump Administration priority.
The FAA will expeditiously address public comments on the NPRM and
intends to meet the 240-day timeline in the EO for publication of a
final BVLOS rule.
Question 2(b). It is my understanding that the FAA has been in the
process of developing the BVLOS rule for some time, well before the
enactment of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. Can you provide an
explanation for the continued delay in developing this rule?
Answer. Developing rules and policies that balance the needs and
concerns of stakeholder groups, transitioning to the normalization of
beyond visual line of sight operations, and creating reliable pathways
for technology as risk mitigation has been complex and challenging.
Under the direction of President Trump and Secretary Duffy's
leadership, the FAA was able to issue the NPRM on August 5, 2025,
notwithstanding previous delays.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
Jodi Baker, Wayne Heibeck, and Franklin McIntosh
Question 1. FAA's Contract Tower Program is one of the most
successful government/industry partnerships for the agency, continually
receiving high marks from the DOT Inspector General. What assurance can
you offer that contract towers will remain a high priority for FAA?
Answer. Federal Contract Towers (FCT) play a vital role in our
national airspace system, and we are committed to continuously
strengthening the program. Secretary Duffy's initiative to accelerate
the hiring and training of air traffic controllers is important, not
just for FAA-operated facilities but also for FCTs, which rely on a
robust, well-trained workforce. One major step we are taking is
expanding the Enhanced CTI program. By broadening the pipeline of
qualified candidates, this initiative not only supports FAA staffing
but also opens new recruitment opportunities for contract towers.
Additionally, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 includes a
requirement that FCTs serving small and medium hub airports be staffed
to support at least two controllers per tower operating shift. We made
the necessary adjustments, and that change will go into effect on
schedule, in full alignment with the legislation.
Question 2. A few years ago, the FAA moved the administration of
the Federal Contract Tower program to the Program Management Office,
separating from air traffic services. What was the justification for
moving to the PMO?
Answer. The FAA shifted administration of the FCT Program to the
Program Management Office (PMO) to enhance program oversight,
streamline operations, and better align with broader agency
modernization efforts.
Question 3. Please describe where the FAA is in implementing
Sections 440 and 441 (Aviation Workforce Development Grants) of the FAA
Reauthorization.
Answer. Regarding section 440 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of
2024, the FY 2025 Aviation Workforce Development NOFOs have been
updated to align with the Trump Administration's priorities, and we
anticipate that they will be announced in the near future. The Office
of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing the implementation of
section 441 of the Act.
Question 4. The FAA Reauthorization focused on the importance of
sufficient resources and training for FAA's certification workforce.
What efforts have been undertaken to bolster certification personnel in
their critical safety oversight responsibilities?
Answer. Aviation Safety Inspectors (ASI) are the frontline in
safety oversight. Congressional direction for the FAA to use direct-
hire authority (e.g., on-the-spot hiring authority) has enabled the FAA
to continue targeted recruitment for these mission-critical positions,
and it allows the FAA to accept resumes outside of the normal
announcement process for all service locations. Use of on-the-spot
hiring authority is an effective tool in hiring ASI positions. On-the-
spot hiring authority will continue to enable the FAA to accelerate the
hiring process by extending offers of employment to fully mission-
qualified candidates faster in a highly competitive labor market.
Flight Standards (FS) and Aircraft Certification Service (AIR)
manage all technical training courses that safety inspectors need to
attend to ensure they have the proper training based on their job
responsibilities. FS and AIR continuously review changes in policies,
processes, and technologies to identify any gaps or changes that impact
inspector training. Where necessary, FS and AIR develop or update
existing training to provide the necessary training needed to support
the critical safety oversight responsibilities of the Aviation Safety
Inspector workforce. Topics include Organization Designation
Authorization, expansion of safety management systems, and training in
new aviation technologies.
In January 2025, FS completed a major redesign of the On-the-Job
Training Program, transitioning to a streamlined, task-based approach
that aligns with real field requirements, strengthens safety oversight
through robust lesson plans, and accelerates ASI qualification. The
updated structure improves consistency across the workforce,
accelerates ASI readiness, and enhances FS' ability to meet its safety
oversight responsibilities. Subsequent phases will focus on policy
alignment, performance metrics, and integration with national tracking
systems to ensure long-term sustainability and accountability.
Question 5. The FAA Reauthorization Act requires the agency to
conduct a study on the future state of the type certification process.
What is the progress of this study? What steps are being taken to
leverage modern tools and technology systems to improve safety through
a more effective and efficient certification process?
Answer. Section 310 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 requires
the agency to enter into an agreement with a federally funded research
and development center or other independent nonprofit organization to
study and make recommendations regarding the agency's approach to type
certification processes. In January of 2025, the FAA awarded a contract
to MITRE, consistent with this requirement. In accordance with section
310, the report containing the results of the study and recommendations
is due to the FAA by November 2025.
Question 6. When will the framework from my Advanced Air Mobility
Coordination and Leadership Act be released?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of this requirement.
Question 7. I have heard some concerns about drone activity at
public venues that fall below FAA's 30,000-seat threshold and sporting
event requirement for flight restrictions. How can FAA and my office
find a reasonable path forward that improves safety at smaller public
venues?
Answer. Section 935 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 provides
a framework for the FAA to issue temporary flight restrictions over
eligible large public gatherings. The FAA is currently implementing the
requirements of Sec. 935 and will continue to do so. We further note
that existing FAA regulations provide requirements for safe drone
operations. And if there is an emergent safety issue, the FAA has the
tools to address it.
Question 8. Prior to the Army Aviation Brigade resuming helicopters
operations in the National Capital Region in late April, how was the
FAA coordinating with DOD to review and approve these operations?
Answer. Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) is in a
Class B surface area. All entry into the area by helicopters must be
requested and granted based on current traffic demands. Other than
those requests, there was no additional coordination with DOD.
a. Why did the FAA not notify the Aviation Subcommittee of these
resumed operations, as requested by my February 4th letter to FAA?
Answer. The FAA did not resume simultaneous operation of fixed-wing
and helicopter operations in certain areas in the vicinity of DCA;
those operations remain restricted. The operation of Priority Air
Transport flights around DCA were not restricted by the FAA other than
in areas described above or based on workload allowing for Class B
airspace clearances to be issued.
Question 9. Is there an approved helicopter route for around the
Pentagon? Would this route be part of an MOU between FAA and DOD?
Answer. Yes, there are approved helicopter routes/transitions for
and around the Pentagon. These routes/transitions would be part of a
Letter of Agreement between FAA and DOD.
Question 10. The results from the audit of legacy systems
authorized in section 622 are due in three months. Please provide the
Committee an update on the outreach to industry as required by Section
622.
Answer. Section 622 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 directs
the FAA to conduct an audit of legacy systems within the National
Airspace System (NAS), specifically targeting systems installed before
2000. To fulfill this mandate, the FAA contracted with MITRE, a
federally funded research and development center, to carry out the
audit. MITRE completed the audit in August 2025, in accordance with the
statutory deadline. FAA leadership met monthly with MITRE to monitor
progress and ensure the audit remained aligned with congressional
intent and safety priorities. MITRE leveraged data from the NAS
Operations Risk Assessment (NORA) Dashboard to identify legacy NAS
systems (FAA-owned systems deployed before 2000) to analyze system
operational safety and efficiency risks. The team also used data from
NAS Performance Analysis System (NASPAS), Sustain, Enhance, Replace
Initiative (SERI), and Resource Planning Documents (RPDs). MITRE also
reviewed the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report.
Industry consultation is a component of the development of a plan
to accelerate drawdown, replacement, or enhancement of legacy systems
identified in the audit as outdated, insufficient, unsafe, or unstable.
The development of this plan follows the completion of the audit and a
report on the findings and recommendations of the audit.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to
Jodi Baker, Wayne Heibeck, and Franklin McIntosh
Section 627 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 requires the FAA
to initiate a rulemaking process, no later than 3 years from enactment,
to establish or update low-altitude IFR routes and procedures for
rotorcraft and powered-lift aircraft, leveraging performance-based
navigation.
Following the tragic midair collision over Washington, D.C., and
the FAA's recent Rotorcraft Safety Roundtable--which identified clear
deficiencies in low-altitude route structure, vertical/lateral
definitions, and traffic deconfliction--how is the FAA ensuring that
current efforts to improve low-altitude safety are integrated with the
implementation of Section 627?
Specifically:
Has the FAA initiated internal planning or pre-rulemaking
activities toward fulfilling the Section 627 mandate? If so, what is
the timeline for stakeholder consultation and formal rulemaking
initiation?
Answer. Section 627 requires the FAA to initiate a rulemaking
process to establish or update, as appropriate, low altitude routes and
flight procedures to ensure safe rotorcraft and powered-lift aircraft
operations in the NAS no later than May 2027. The FAA currently has a
process administered under 14 C.F.R. Sec. 71.13(b)(3), which classifies
Air Traffic Service (ATS) routes, including low-altitude routes, as
either VOR Federal airways or Area navigation (RNAV) routes that the
Agency determined address the requirements of section 627. The FAA is
in the process of setting up discussions with stakeholders including
the United States Helicopter Safety Team, and NATCA to consult on these
processes in accordance with the requirements in section 627.
How is the agency prioritizing congested airspace for early action
under Section 627?
Answer. In addition to the actions for section 627, the FAA is
reviewing active low altitude routes and flight procedures to ensure
safe rotorcraft and powered-lift aircraft operations.
Following the DCA accident, the FAA is conducting a comprehensive
review of all helicopter visual flight rules (VFR) charts. Currently,
the FAA is working with aviation partners to update the DCA helicopter
chart by addressing safety concerns and recommendations from the
National Transportation Safety Board. This includes developing,
modifying, or canceling routes and transitions, updating police
operating zones, and adding new advisory notes and information to the
chart. Once these updates to the DCA chart are completed, the FAA will
apply similar updates to the other helicopter charts, as needed.
To what extent will implementation of Section 627 focus on
modernizing and improving the FAA's Helicopter Route Chart Program,
including revisions to existing routes and publication practices to
reflect performance-based navigation capabilities?
Answer. Section 627(b) specifically addresses the utilization of
existing processes to establish or update low-altitude instrument
flight rules (IFR) routes (generally helicopter RNAV/TK routes) for
rotorcraft and powered-lift aircraft as depicted on IFR low-altitude
charts. Helicopter route charts and VFR routes are separate and
primarily support visual navigation unless those IFR routes are
contained within the charted area where both VFR and IFR routes will be
depicted to provide specific deconfliction and supporting information.
This initiative integrates IFR operations into the low-altitude
environment using performance-based navigation infrastructure, with a
focus on developing new IFR routes supported by advanced Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) which includes the U.S. Global
Positioning System (GPS). The goal is to provide safe and efficient
navigation for rotorcraft while maintaining proper separation from
higher-altitude fixed-wing aircraft.
How is this work being aligned with the DOT's recently announced
effort to modernize the U.S. air traffic control system, particularly
with respect to enabling digital separation and route optimization in
low-altitude corridors?
Answer. The FAA's initiatives under section 627 align with DOT's
broader air traffic control modernization by updating supporting
infrastructure and airspace constructs to include the development of
low-altitude IFR routes for helicopters and powered-lift. These routes
could benefit from evolving digital separation concepts and
technologies under development. By implementing performance-based
navigation, the FAA improves safety and operational efficiency, while
supporting multiple aircraft types within the airspace.
Does the FAA currently have the technical, budgetary, and staffing
resources required to carry out the mandates of Section 627 on
schedule? If not, what specific support would be required to accelerate
implementation--particularly in high-density, mixed-use airspace
environments?
Answer. Currently, yes. However, the FAA must ensure it has
sufficient technical, budgetary, and staffing resources as the scope
and scale increase and to accelerate the development of these IFR
routes, especially in high-density airspace and across multiple
geographic locations simultaneously to ensure safety and prepare for
future demands. The route development process requires collaboration
across multiple stakeholders to include manufacturers, operators, air
traffic controllers, and communities to minimize operational conflicts
and community impacts.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Marsha Blackburn to
Jodi Baker, Wayne Heibeck, and Franklin McIntosh
Question 1. In 2023, Senator Lujan and I sent a letter to the FAA
Administrator raising concerns that some airlines would not be able to
retrofit airplane altimeters in time to allow 5G operations near and on
airplanes. The wireless industry paused 5G operations for a significant
period of time to resolve this issue with the FAA. Since that letter,
industry has come together with government to ensure that we can have
both wireless service and flight safety. I was pleased that our
provision establishing an R&D program to assist with the development
and testing of next-gen radio altimeters for aircraft was included in
the FAA Reauthorization. What is the status of this R&D program? What
hurdles might still exist for airlines to meet the January 2028
deadline?
Answer.
``January 2028 deadline''
Current safe coexistence between radio altimeters (RAs) and
wireless transmissions in the lower C-Band (3.7-3.98 GHz) is dependent
upon the voluntary agreements entered into by the wireless industry and
the aviation industry's response to the requirements in airworthiness
directives issued by the FAA. This safe environment was achieved due to
extensive work by the aviation and wireless industries to identify the
transmission characteristics necessary to define wireless service
limits voluntarily agreed to by the wireless licensees. The aviation
industry has already completed extraordinary efforts to develop,
produce, certify, and install thousands of modified RA with filtering
that are tolerant to interference from current 5G C-Band emissions with
the voluntary wireless service limits in place.
Work is underway to develop RAs with suitable performance and
interference tolerance to support long-term safe coexistence with
commercial wireless transmitters in the neighboring spectrum.
Currently, RTCA is developing minimum operational performance standards
(MOPS) for an RA system that is an efficient user of its assigned
spectrum and achieves the best possible performance that is currently
technologically attainable.
Once the MOPS are completed, the FAA will need to mandate these new
RA systems on thousands of U.S. registered aircraft as well as other
aircraft operating in the National Airspace System. However, the FAA
does not anticipate these RA systems to be available before January 1,
2028.
Ultimately, the current voluntary agreement will need to be
extended beyond January 1, 2028 to protect current aviation operations
to ensure near-term operational and economic stability and provide
aviation stakeholders with sufficient time to design, produce, certify,
and install tens of thousands of necessary RAs. In addition, some of
these voluntary operating conditions may continue to be necessary for
future RA systems that meet the MOPS.
Research and Development Program
Regarding the research and development program, the FAA entered
into an agreement with the University of Oklahoma to conduct research
that supports the validation of the minimum operational performance
standards (MOPS). The University is partnering with various avionics
companies to conduct testing and provide results to validate or improve
the MOPS. This activity reduces the risk for any potential issues
identified that could affect the standard or its schedule for
completion.
Question 2. By law, air traffic controllers must retire at age 56.
The Secretary of Transportation has the authority to extend that
mandatory retirement age to 61 and this could help make up for the
shortage of 3,000 air traffic controllers. I believe Congress should
give the Secretary the authority to exempt air traffic controllers from
the mandatory retirement age for as long as they are able-bodied and
mentally fit. In your opinion, will using this exemption authority help
solve the air traffic controller shortage in this country?
Answer. The FAA is using every tool available to hire and retain
qualified people to serve as air traffic controllers and exemptions
from the mandatory retirement age is just one element of the current
process. We are incentivizing hiring with a 30 percent salary increase
for candidates going to the FAA Academy, as well as offering incentives
to controllers willing to go to hard-to-staff facilities and to retain
experienced controllers.
Question 3. Tennessee is home to countless large-scale outdoor
events, Titans' football and the Bonnaroo Music Festival for example.
Americans deserve to feel safe when they attend an event with their
loved ones. When drones interrupt events and performances, it can be
incredibly frustrating for fans. I was pleased that the FAA
Reauthorization Act enhanced the FAA's authority to issue temporary
flight restrictions for drones flying over large events. Can you commit
that the FAA will do everything in its power to protect these large-
scale outdoor events and implement this provision of the FAA
Reauthorization Act?
Answer. Yes. Section 935 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024
provides a clear framework for the FAA to issue temporary flight
restrictions over eligible large public gatherings. The FAA is actively
implementing the requirements of section 935.
Question 4. Last year, Congress passed the Federal Aviation
Administration Reauthorization Act of 2024 which included a number of
provisions aimed at UAS. One of these provisions, sec. 935, expanded
FAA's authority to create temporary flight restrictions (TFR) around
large public gatherings such as outdoor sporting events, concerts, and
festivals. With the rise of domestic drone usage, expanding such TFR
authority is more important than ever. How will you work with local law
enforcement and the organizers of these public events to ensure that
there is a streamlined way for them to apply and receive a TFR in a
timely fashion?
Answer. Section 935 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 provides
an important framework for issuing temporary flight restrictions over
large public gatherings, such as outdoor sporting events and concerts.
The FAA is actively implementing this provision and is committed to
ensuring the process is efficient, accessible, and responsive to
stakeholder needs. The FAA is working to streamline the TFR application
process. We are evaluating ways to simplify and expedite requests,
including improving communication channels and developing clearer
guidance for applicants. The FAA welcomes continued feedback from users
and remains focused on ensuring that TFRs can be issued in a timely
manner.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Eric Schmitt to
Jodi Baker, Wayne Heibeck, and Franklin McIntosh
Question 1. During the hearing, you discussed various ways that the
FAA intends to modernize the national airspace system. In doing so, it
is highly critical that smaller airports like those in Missouri are not
left behind. It's precisely these airports that do not have 24/7 ATC
staffing that rely the most on critical automated systems such as the
Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS) and ASOS (Automated Surface
Observing System). These weather reporting systems ensure that
operations can be carried out safely at all hours. With this in mind,
can you provide some more detail as to how you plan to ensure that
smaller airports that rely on these systems the most--those outside of
the core 30 largest--are prioritized in any system modernization
efforts moving forward.
Answer. Modernization is a priority across the NAS, and we look
forward to working with you on this effort. The FAA also recognizes the
criticality of tools such as Automated Weather Observing Systems (AWOS)
and Automated Surface Observing Systems (ASOS) for smaller airports.
Accordingly, we are working to implement the requirements of section
332 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, which requires the FAA to
publish on a website, real-time service status for all AWOS/ASOS. In
addition, consistent with section 419 of the Act, the FAA plans to
provide non-federal weather observer training for airport personnel who
will be available to backstop AWOS/ASOS in the event of an outage or
error.
Question 2. In order to combat the continued shortage of pilots and
the inconsistencies in the training/supply pipeline, Sec. 372 of the
2024 FAA Reauthorization bill mandated that the FAA establish
requirements for an ``Enhanced Qualification Program for Restricted
Airline Transport Pilot Certificate'' or EQP. This program would, among
other things, allow for a modernized training approach by potentially
allowing advanced simulator time to play a more direct role in training
and allow airlines to sponsor and train potential pilots specific to
their aircraft type earlier in the pipeline. Can you please provide an
update on the status and timeline for final guidance pertaining to the
EQP program, as this is an essential step forward for establishing a
robust and well-trained pilot pipeline?
Answer. We are focused on establishing the requirements for
airlines to implement the Enhanced Qualification Program (EQP), which
we plan to publish in an Advisory Circular (AC) later this year. As
part of our process, we will seek public comment on the AC, after which
it will be finalized.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Jodi Baker, Wayne Heibeck, and Franklin McIntosh
FAA Workforce Reductions. The FAA's ability to carry out this law
is seriously hindered by the current Administration's attacks on the
Federal workforce. Both the FAA Reauthorization Law of 2024 and the
2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA)
call for more safety staff, not less. In this law, we required the FAA
to set maximum hiring targets to increase air traffic controller
staffing, and while I recognize the administration's efforts in this
area, there are other safety critical and safety technical staffing
shortages addressed in the law that also deserve concerted
implementation efforts.
Acting Administrator Rocheleau has told the FAA workforce to expect
a Reduction in Force announcement at the end of May saying quote: ``We
will be leaner in a year, two years. It's the fact.'' As required by
the law, we must constantly invest in training and recruiting a highly
skilled workforce at FAA including maintenance technicians, aircraft
certification experts, safety specialists, and more that maintain our
gold standard in aviation safety.
Question 1. In light of staffing cuts, and reductions from the
deferred resignation program, please explain how FAA staffing levels in
your line of business are meeting requisite agency targets for safety
critical positions.
Answer. Aviation Safety: President Trump has continuously indicated
his support for aviation safety and, with Secretary Duffy, secured an
unprecedented investment in the safety of America's aviation
infrastructure. President Trump also issued an Executive order on
January 20, 2025, directing an immediate assessment of aviation safety
and, on January 21, directed FAA to refocus from non-safety related DEI
to safety and merit-based hiring. The FAA under President Trump is
focused exclusively on safety.
FAA staff in critical safety-related positions, including aviation
safety inspectors (ASI) and aerospace engineers (ASE), were not
eligible to participate in the deferred resignation program.
Congressional direction for the FAA to use direct-hire authority (e.g.,
on-the-spot hiring authority) has enabled the FAA to continue targeted
recruitment for these mission-critical positions, and it allows the FAA
to accept resumes outside of the normal announcement process for all
service locations. Use of on-the-spot hiring authority is an effective
tool in hiring for these positions. On-the-spot hiring authority will
continue to enable the FAA to accelerate the hiring process by
extending offers of employment to fully mission-qualified candidates
faster in a highly competitive labor market.
Airports: FAA staff in critical safety-related positions, including
Airport Certification Safety Inspectors (ACSIs) and airport engineers,
were not eligible to participate in the deferred resignation program.
The Office of Airports continues to ensure that ACSIs responsible for
airport safety compliance at our Part 139 airports are properly trained
and we continue to hire ACSIs and airport engineers.
Air Traffic Organization: Controller staffing is a top priority for
this Administration. The FAA is in the midst of a multi-year hiring and
training surge to ensure the level of certified air traffic controllers
needed to meet current and future traffic demands. We are filling every
seat at the Academy, bolstering the Enhanced Air Traffic Collegiate
Training Initiative (AT-CTI), and offering more opportunities for
experienced military controllers to join the workforce. By addressing
the ongoing air traffic controller shortage through this multi-pronged
approach, the FAA is working to improve staffing levels and increase
the safety of the NAS. FAA staff in critical safety-related positions,
including air traffic controllers and NAS technicians, were not
eligible to participate in the deferred resignation program.
FAA Workforce Reductions. The FAA's ability to carry out this law
is seriously hindered by the current Administration's attacks on the
Federal workforce. Both the FAA Reauthorization Law of 2024 and the
2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA)
call for more safety staff, not less. In this law, we required the FAA
to set maximum hiring targets to increase air traffic controller
staffing, and while I recognize the administration's efforts in this
area, there are other safety critical and safety technical staffing
shortages addressed in the law that also deserve concerted
implementation efforts.
Acting Administrator Rocheleau has told the FAA workforce to expect
a Reduction in Force announcement at the end of May saying quote: ``We
will be leaner in a year, two years. It's the fact.'' As required by
the law, we must constantly invest in training and recruiting a highly
skilled workforce at FAA including maintenance technicians, aircraft
certification experts, safety specialists, and more that maintain our
gold standard in aviation safety.
Question 1. How are staff cuts and the deferred resignation program
affecting the Aircraft Certification service's ability to evaluate and
safely certify aircraft? How is this affecting FAA's ability to ensure
strong oversight of aviation manufacturers?
Answer. FAA staff in critical safety-related positions, including
ASIs and ASEs, were not eligible to participate in the deferred
resignation program. And, as safety remains the FAA's top priority, we
continue to closely monitor onboard staffing levels.
Boeing Quality Inspection Process Changes. The FAA approved changes
to Boeing's quality inspection process--known as Verification
Optimization--to allow Boeing to avoid regular inspections by trained
quality inspectors based on a risk assessment process. Instead of
having quality personnel determine whether a job on the assembly line
complies with FAA regulations, manufacturing personnel--such as
mechanics--are now responsible for making this decision.
This means mechanics have to inspect and sign off on their own
work. And an additional inspection performed by a quality inspector--to
add one more layer of redundancy--is not happening as much as it should
on the production line. Despite knowing of quality lapses throughout
Boeing's production system, the FAA still approved this reduction in
quality inspections.
Question 1. How is FAA ensuring that Boeing is meeting inspection
requirements if a mechanic is not trained in the same manner as quality
assurance personnel to perform the quality inspection?
Answer. The FAA received this allegation previously, conducted a
formal investigation, and required Boeing to implement corrective
actions that effectively addressed the FAA's findings.
In July 2020, the FAA received allegations that Boeing removed
quality inspections without the required approvals, assigned
inspections to manufacturing personnel without the appropriate
training, and used process surveillance in lieu of direct inspections
to make conformance decisions. Based on the findings of the
investigation, the FAA identified that Boeing had not removed
inspections, but that Boeing's quality organization had authorized
manufacturing to make the verification.
In response to the FAA's investigation, Boeing committed to a set
of corrective actions that the FAA closely monitored for
implementation. As part of the corrective actions, the FAA required
Boeing to assess the training provided to maintenance technicians and
quality technicians. Boeing's assessment found the training to be
equivalent.
In May 2023, the FAA completed verification of Boeing's
implementation of the corrective actions, including verifying Boeing's
assessment of their training. As a result of the investigation and
implemented corrective actions, quality technician required inspection
points have increased across all models. Furthermore, as part of the
Boeing Safety and Quality Plan, Boeing continues to enhance their
manufacturing technician and quality technician classroom and on-the-
job training requirements.
Question 2. In FAA's view, does reducing inspections align with
FAA's requirements for Boeing associated with the company's Safety and
Quality Plan?
Answer. Quality Technician required inspection points have
increased across all models. Additionally, as part of Boeing's Safety
and Quality plan, Boeing is executing work instruction adherence checks
and design build audits to ensure product conformity.
Question 3. Given reduced quality inspections at Boeing, how is FAA
ensuring that Boeing airplanes conform to their approved designs?
Answer. Quality technician required inspection points have
increased across all models. Furthermore, the FAA has made improvements
to our oversight model since the January 5, 2024, Alaska Airlines
accident. We have increased our on-site presence, adding more ASIs at
Boeing facilities. Our oversight activities include more direct
engagement with company employees, additional inspections at critical
points in the production process including ``no-notice'' inspections,
and increased auditing of Boeing's quality system processes and
procedures.
FAA Oversight of Boeing ODA Regarding Manufacturing and Design
Defects. Boeing's Organization Designation Authorization (ODA), which
enables certain Boeing employees to make compliance findings on behalf
of FAA, is set to expire at the end of May. In 2022, the FAA granted
Boeing a three-year ODA extension instead of the typical five years,
reflecting concerns about the ODA and Boeing's implementation of its
SMS following the 737 MAX crashes. FAA required a series of
improvements from Boeing in exchange for extending its ODA.
The DOT Inspector General has raised serious red flags about FAA's
oversight. In August 2023--the same month the defective Alaska Airlines
flight 1282 fuselage with faulty rivets was being shipped to Seattle--
FAA officials were already trying to delegate final safety inspections
of aircraft coming off the production line to Boeing, despite ongoing
manufacturing quality issues.
I sent a letter on this issue to FAA to make sure FAA is exercising
strong oversight to closely analyze and verify Boeing's progress in
meeting these requirements.
The entire purpose of an ODA is to ensure compliance with FAA
safety regulations. Yet we keep learning about instances where Boeing
designs and manufacturing do not meet the requirements.
Question 1. The 737 MAX's Engine Anti-Ice System, which overheats,
can result in the engine cowl failing and possibly causing the airplane
to crash. Boeing tried to get an exemption to allow this defect on the
MAX-7 and MAX-10.
What is FAA doing now to make sure this issue gets fixed and when
will it be fixed?
Answer. Boeing expects to finalize the configuration for the Engine
Anti-Ice (EAI) system type design change by the end of summer 2025. The
FAA will be directly involved in reviewing the proposed type design
changes and substantiating data necessary for addressing the EAI issue
per the type certification process before the design change will be
implemented. The EAI design change will be incorporated first into 737
MAX production model airplanes in 2025, followed by 737-7 and 737-10
models as part of their amended type certification projects.
Question 2. The 737 MAX's Engine Load Reduction Device, which can
allow dense smoke to enter the cabin and flight deck when there is a
fan blade failure. This was the subject of urgent recommendations by
FAA's Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention.
What is FAA doing now to make sure this issue gets fixed and when
will it be fixed?
Answer. On November 26, 2024, the FAA held a Corrective Action
Review Board (CARB) and determined the issue to be an unsafe condition
that will require a mandated airworthiness action. Boeing and CFM are
developing a software change that will significantly minimize the flow
of engine oil into the cabin air conditioning system during a Load
Reduction Device (LRD) activation event. Boeing and CFM have agreed to
complete the software update by March 2027. As determined by the CARB,
the FAA will mandate the incorporation of this design change into the
fleet through airworthiness directives.
To mitigate issues while the software is under development, Boeing
updated operational checklists for engine out procedures and updated
the Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM) and Quick Reference Handbook
(QRH) to include a description of the LRD and provide clarification to
the Engine Fire and Engine Severe Damage checklists. Air carriers have
incorporated the FCOM updates into their procedures so that an engine
is manually shutdown sooner when accompanied by the presence of smoke
in the cockpit or cabin.
The FAA will continue to support the NTSB in its investigation and
review any new information that may warrant additional assessments.
Question 3. The 737's Rudder Actuator, which is susceptible to
freezing and makes it impossible for the pilots to move the rudder.
NTSB issued an urgent safety recommendation in September 2024 to
address this.
What is FAA doing now to make sure this issue gets fixed and when
will it be fixed?
Answer. The FAA held a Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) on
September 26, 2024. The CARB reviewed the available technical data,
safety risk analysis, and the interim safety recommendations issued by
the NTSB, and concluded that further investigation was necessary and
that no interim action was needed.
On October 10, 2024, Boeing conducted a simulator evaluation with
participation from the FAA and the NTSB. The FAA held a second CARB on
October 30, 2024, with additional information from the safety
investigation, including the simulator evaluation. The CARB determined
that there was no safety issue.
The FAA will continue to support the NTSB in its investigation and
review any new information that may warrant additional assessments.
Whistleblower Protections. FAA Administrators have repeatedly
testified before this Committee that retaliation against whistleblowers
in the aviation industry who report safety concerns will not be
tolerated. But FAA has had legal authority to impose civil penalties
against companies that retaliate against those who report safety
concerns since 2000 but has rarely used it. That's why we took action
in our 2024 FAA law and gave FAA additional authority to impose civil
penalties through its administrative enforcement program. However, FAA
counsel recently took the position that it had no such authority.
Congress also gave FAA more enforcement power in the FAA law to
provide a stronger deterrent against future violations of whistleblower
rights.
Question 1. Do you commit to ensuring that FAA uses and leverages
this enforcement authority to pursue violations against individuals who
report safety concerns?
Answer. The FAA is committed to whistleblower protections. We take
allegations of whistleblower retaliation seriously, as a strong
reporting culture is critical to aviation safety. The FAA investigates
the underlying safety concerns raised by whistleblowers, while the
Department of Labor investigates allegations of retaliation. In the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2024, Congress provided the Administrator with
additional civil penalty authority. Specifically, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 46301
now authorizes the Administrator to impose civil penalties when an
aviation employer fails to comply with a final order issued by the
Department of Labor under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 42121, following a
determination that an employer unlawfully retaliated against an
employee for reporting aviation safety concerns.
Question 2. How is the FAA communicating to the entities it
regulates its expectations and consequences related to violations of
FAA's AIR21 whistleblower protection statute?
Answer. The agency shares information regarding the whistleblower
protections under the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform
Act for the 21st Century (AIR21) on the FAA website (https://
www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/whistleblower). In addition, the
Administrator and agency leadership have emphasized the importance of a
strong safety reporting culture through public outreach, industry
engagement, and direct communication with regulated entities.
PFAS Replacement Program. In the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024,
we directed the FAA to establish the PFAS Replacement Program to
provide airports with resources to switch away from firefighting foam
containing PFAS chemicals to fluorine-free alternatives. While PFAS
firefighting foams have been used for decades, we now know the severe
hazard they pose to our Nation's firefighters, communities, and the
environment, leaving no justification for their continued use. We
created this $350 million program to help airports across the Nation
accelerate their transition to safer firefighting foams including
through grants and cost reimbursement for equipment replacement. This
includes providing critical help to Washington state communities that
have been particularly affected by PFAS use at airports including
Spokane International Airport and the area surrounding Seattle-Tacoma
International Airport.
Question 1. In your view, how will the PFAS Replacement Program
help accelerate the use of PFAS-free firefighting alternatives at our
Nation's airports?
Answer. The PFAS Replacement Program, authorized by section 767 of
the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, would accelerate the transition
from PFAS-containing aqueous film forming foam to fluorine-free foam by
supporting covered transition costs at eligible airports.
Authorized at $350 million over 5 years, the program would help
airports cover costs that are generally not AIP-eligible, including
purchasing new foam, disposing of old foam, cleaning existing
equipment, acquiring new required equipment, and other related costs.
Question 2. Please explain why the program has not been established
yet. What are the reasons for the delay? Will you commit to pushing the
Office of Airports to establish this important program as soon as
possible?
Answer. The FAA has developed a programmatic framework. However,
the $350 million authorized over 5 years for this program has not been
appropriated yet.
Question 3. To what degree is FAA offering assistance to airports
right now as they look to transition away from PFAS firefighting foams
to fluorine-free alternatives?
Answer. The FAA has not mandated that airports transition to
fluorine-free foam (F3), but we have provided references and training
for airports to use in deciding how and when to transition to F3 foam.
FAA Transition Plan: This plan was developed in coordination
with other Federal agencies, airport environmental
professionals, firefighters, and industry representatives. The
document addresses items for airports to consider prior to
transitioning, including, but not limited to, types of F3,
renting/borrowing Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF)
vehicles during transition, training, EPA guidelines, etc.
FAA-sponsored Webinar: The FAA held three webinars with over
800 participants describing F3 transition considerations,
suggested training, and updated firefighting tactics to use
with F3. These webinars were recorded and are available to view
on the FAA ARFF webpage linked below.
Training Handout: The FAA developed a training PowerPoint
presentation and a video depicting tactics and techniques for
utilizing F3 to assist ARFF personnel.
The FAA has extended the funding program for airports to
acquire input-based foam proportioner testing systems, which
test an ARFF vehicle without the need to discharge foam into
the environment.
The FAA will continue to provide 100 percent Federal
funding to civilian airports for the purchase of this
testing equipment to eliminate the financial strain on
airports.
The FAA transition plan can be found on the FAA ARFF
webpage: Fluorine-Free Foam (F3) Transition for Aircraft
Firefighting | Federal Aviation Administration
ATO Technical Operations Workforce Shortage. According to the
Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO (PASS), FAA's Air
Traffic Organization (ATO) Technical Operations unit is short about 800
technicians. But we know the Technical Operations unit is made up of
personnel with many other job codes that perform important functions to
support, maintain, and fix critical air traffic control equipment and
systems.
Question 1. How are staff cuts and the deferred resignation program
affecting the ATO's Technical Operations workforce and ATO's ability to
address and fix systems and equipment outages in the air traffic
control system?
Answer. FAA staff in critical safety-related positions, including
NAS technicians, were not eligible to participate in the deferred
resignation program.
Newark Airport Disruptions and ATC Infrastructure Modernization.
The crisis at Newark Airport following the Philadelphia TRACON outages
on April 28 and May 9, 2025, dramatically illustrate the consequences
of our aging ATC infrastructure. These outages, caused by outdated
copper wiring and radar systems, led to controllers temporarily losing
all radar and communications with aircraft, resulted in thousands of
flight delays, and prompted at least five controllers to take trauma
leave.
A 2019 GAO report identified FAA critical systems in need of
replacement but noted FAA had ``no documented plans to modernize''
them. Five years later, GAO's 2024 report found that FAA still lacked
near-term modernization plans in place for certain at-risk systems.
This prompted our mandate in section 622 of the FAA law requiring an
outside audit of legacy systems installed before 2000, followed by
prioritized replacement based on safety risks. Secretary Duffy recently
announced plans for a three-to four-year ATC modernization plan that
builds upon the foundation we put in the FAA law.
Question 1. What is the specific status and timeline for completing
this audit, and what actions are you taking to address the most
critical systems identified by the GAO?
Answer. Section 622 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 directs
the FAA to conduct an audit of legacy systems within the NAS,
specifically targeting systems installed before 2000. To fulfill this
mandate, the FAA contracted with MITRE, a federally funded research and
development center, to carry out the audit. MITRE completed the audit
in August 2025, in accordance with the statutory deadline. FAA
leadership met monthly with MITRE to monitor progress and ensure the
audit remained aligned with congressional intent and safety priorities.
Meanwhile, the FAA is on track to meet the statutory timeline for
the remaining provisions of this section. The FAA has been taking steps
to proactively assess and mitigate risks in systems already identified
as critical. We are coordinating with operational staff and technical
experts to triage systems that pose the highest safety or operational
risks and identify immediate stabilization or upgrade actions where
feasible. In parallel, Secretary Duffy's brand-new air traffic control
initiative provides an essential framework for accelerating long-
overdue investments. This effort builds directly upon the foundation
laid by Congress in the FAA Reauthorization Act and is intended to
create a more resilient, technology-forward air traffic system. While
the full transition to a brand-new air traffic system will take time,
we are committed to prioritizing safety-driven modernization and
leveraging both the audit findings and congressional direction to guide
our next steps.
Question 2. What short-term and long-term actions is FAA taking to
address the specific vulnerabilities at the Philadelphia TRACON and
Newark to prevent further system and equipment outages and ensure
fulsome Certified Professional Controller (CPC) staffing, especially
given reports that staffing has fallen to concerning levels?
Answer. The FAA is prioritizing infrastructure upgrades at critical
facilities like Philadelphia TRACON by addressing legacy systems,
improving telecommunications reliability, and ensuring adequate
staffing through targeted hiring and retention efforts. To address
concerns, the FAA established a taskforce with Verizon and L3Harris.
The taskforce meets regularly to ensure the airport is a safe,
efficient, and functional gateway for passengers and air carriers. As
part of ongoing progress at Newark, FAA has limited the rate of
arrivals and departures through December 31, 2025, following productive
discussions with airlines and the conclusion of a public comment
period. The confirmed reduced rates will maintain safety while
alleviating excessive flight delays at the airport due to staffing and
equipment challenges. The early completion of runway construction at
the airport (that added to the delays) will also contribute to a more
efficient operation. The FAA improved Newark operations by adding three
new, high-bandwidth telecommunications connections between the New
York-based hubs and the Philadelphia TRACON. This provides more speed,
reliability and redundancy. The agency is also establishing a Standard
Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) hub at the Philadelphia
TRACON so that the facility does not depend on a telecommunications
feed from the New York STARS hub. The FAA also is increasing controller
staffing. Philadelphia TRACON Area C, which directs aircraft in and out
of Newark, has 20 fully certified controllers and 5 fully certified
supervisors at this time. We have a healthy pipeline of controllers
ready to work at Philadelphia TRACON, with an additional 29 controllers
and supervisors currently in training.
Question 3. How is the FAA incorporating redundancies into legacy
systems during this transition period between upgrades, and what
lessons from the Newark crisis are informing your approach to ensuring
aging critical systems don't experience similar failures?
Answer. The FAA is committed to modernizing technology and
continuously evaluates resource allocation based on evolving
priorities, safety considerations, and stakeholder input. We continue
to make excellent progress toward upgrading the communications network
to create more resilient and redundant communication links to the
Philadelphia TRACON, which directs aircraft into and out of Newark.
Earlier this summer, we activated a temporary mobile satellite
communications system at the Philadelphia TRACON to provide
communications redundancy for the TRACON while we complete the
infrastructure work.
Question 4. How does Secretary Duffy's air traffic control system
modernization announcement align with the Sec. 622 audit requirements
in the FAA Reauthorization Act, and what specific steps are you taking
to ensure the billions already allocated by Congress address the most
pressing safety concerns?
Answer. Section 622 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 directs
the FAA to conduct an audit of legacy systems within the NAS,
specifically targeting systems installed before 2000. To fulfill this
mandate, the FAA contracted with MITRE, a federally funded research and
development center, to carry out the audit. MITRE completed the audit
in August 2025, in accordance with the statutory deadline. In parallel,
Secretary Duffy's brand-new air traffic control initiative provides an
essential framework for accelerating long-overdue investments. This
effort builds directly upon the foundation laid by Congress in the FAA
Reauthorization Act and is intended to create a more resilient,
technology-forward air traffic system. While the full transition to a
brand-new air traffic system will take time, we are committed to
prioritizing safety-driven modernization and leveraging both the audit
findings and congressional direction to guide our next steps.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Gary Peters to
Jodi Baker, Wayne Heibeck, and Franklin McIntosh
Question 1. Designated Mechanic Examiners play a critical role in
ensuring that there are enough mechanics to address aviation
maintenance backlogs. Ensuring that there are enough DMEs to
accommodate the needs of communities across the country is critical in
sustaining the aviation workforce.
a. Ms. Baker how is the FAA is ensuring that there are enough DMEs
to certify maintenance workers, especially in rural areas?
Answer. The FAA assesses capacity and coverage needs based on
regional demand. FAA data shows that for Fiscal Year 2024, 268 DMEs
completed approximately 17,896 activities. This averages 67 activities
conducted per designee per year or 5.6 activities per month. As noted
in our Designee Management Policy (FAA Order 8000.95), the FAA expects
Designees to perform a sufficient number of their functions within the
bounds of their managing office's area of responsibility to support
required oversight. We recognize that applicants in some regions may
face longer travel or scheduling times. To provide flexibility, FAA
policy allows applicants up to 24 months to complete the testing
sequence once it begins, and it authorizes DMEs to perform testing at
multiple locations (up to five) to allow better testing coverage for
these areas.
Question 2. In December 2024, the U.S. Office of Special Counsel
completed an investigation into a controversial, and potentially
dangerous, landing approach being used at the Detroit Metropolitan
Airport (DTW). The Special Counsel found that the approach ``may create
a danger for landing aircraft and the flying public'' and directed FAA
``to further review the safety issues associated with this approach,
including the location of offset localizers at DTW, and take steps
necessary to resolve them.''
a. Can you provide my office with an update on FAA's review of this
issue and next steps?
Answer. The FAA conducted multiple safety assessments of the ILS-Y
approach at DTW, including Safety Risk Management Panels (SRMPs) in
2015 and 2018, which included participation from industry stakeholders
and technical experts.
Both panels concluded that, with existing mitigations and controls
in place, the use of the ILS-Y approach at DTW can be safely managed
within the National Airspace System (NAS). In response to OSC's
concerns, the FAA provided supplemental reports and responses, most
recently in November 2023, incorporating input from relevant
stakeholders and further validating the safety measures in place. The
FAA remains committed to the safety of the flying public at DTW and
across the NAS. We continue to review all safety data, engage with
stakeholders, and implement mitigations as needed. Should further
safety enhancements be identified, we will take prompt action.
Air Traffic Organization
Question 1. Mr. McIntosh, Secretary Duffy put out a plan to address
a broad facilities and technology modernization backlog at FAA, but did
not include how much that will cost.
a. Do you have an estimate of what level of funding it would take
to address the FAA-owned Air Traffic Control tower modernization
backlog specifically?
Answer. The agency has nearly 200 FAA-owned terminal facilities
over forty years old that require modernization. The projected average
cost to replace a terminal facility, which includes air traffic control
towers (ATCT) and terminal radar approach control facilities (TRACON),
ranges from $74 million to $189 million depending on size and
complexity.
Question 2. Mr. McIntosh as I mentioned during the hearing
Michigan's second largest airport, Gerald R. Ford Airport in Grand
Rapids, has been stymied in its efforts to expand and modernize because
of a 62-year-old FAA air traffic control tower that the agency has not
acted to replace.
a. Will you commit to working with my office to better understand
the timeline for Grand Rapids' Tower replacement?
Answer. I understand the frustration that comes with operating in
an aging facility and the concerns you have for your constituents in
Grand Rapids. I will ensure that you receive a comprehensive briefing
on the FAA methodology for identifying and selecting ATCT facilities
for replacement, as well as the criteria used in the evaluation
process. At this time, Grand Rapids is not slated for replacement in
the near future, and I want to ensure that you have a better
understanding of how decisions are made to prioritize facilities for
modernization or replacement.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to
Jodi Baker, Wayne Heibeck, and Franklin McIntosh
Question Topic: FAA Staffing Cuts
Question 1. The Secretary of Transportation has been clear that FAA
needs more air traffic controllers and better facilities and equipment.
I agree. But I can't see how slashing the FAA workforce is going to
help.
FAA has said it won't cut employees who are performing safety
critical functions. Yet, it's been reported that terminated
probationary workers included personnel responsible for FAA radar,
landing and navigational maintenance.
Aviation safety relies on redundancy, not an Elon Musk-style
``efficiency is everything'' approach, where you break things to see
what happens. Redundancy is the point, not the problem. Redundancy
saves lives.
Aviation Safety
A. Your organization's mission is literally ``Aviation Safety.''
What jobs in your organization do not help ensure the safety of the
flying public?
Answer. Maintaining a highly qualified workforce is key to the
FAA's safety mission. We have a deep reserve of experienced talent and
we are confident in our ability to continue to implement the FAA's
mission of providing the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the
world. Additionally, the FAA closely monitors staffing levels and
continues hiring for critical safety roles, such as air traffic
controllers, aviation safety inspectors, and aerospace engineers.
B. Can you guarantee to this committee that FAA will meet all FAA
Reauthorization implementation deadlines regardless of a reduction in
force?
Answer. The FAA intends to meet the implementation deadlines in the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024.
Airports
A. We keep seeing runway incursions and other surface incidents at
airports. What jobs in your organization do not help ensure the safety
of the flying public?
Answer. The mission of the Office of Airports is to support a safe
and efficient national airport system and every role in the
organization supports this mission, in which safety is paramount.
Notably, the Office of Airports works collaboratively across the FAA to
mitigate runway incursions and surface events on airports. Our
employees continue to actively conduct inspections at airports across
the country to ensure applicable FAA safety standards are met. The
Runway Incursion Mitigation (RIM) Program is a key initiative by the
Office of Airports to reduce runway incursions at runway/taxiway
intersections where at least three incursions have occurred in a single
calendar year, or that average at least one incursion a year over the
last 10 years, at towered airports throughout the country. The FAA is
in the process of mitigating incursions at more than 130 locations and
has completed mitigation activities at more than 108 RIM locations. The
program has a proven track record of success. At the locations
considered mitigated, runway incursions are down 80 percent on average.
Our employees are also working to provide critical funding to our
airports to improve airfield safety with important infrastructure
projects in marking, lighting, signage and pavement reconfigurations.
We recently issued guidance to provide funding to airports to equip
ground vehicles with Vehicle Movement Area Transmitters to support the
Surface Awareness Initiative as well as Runway Incursion Warning
Systems.
B. Can you guarantee this committee that FAA will meet all FAA
Reauthorization implementation deadlines?
Answer. The FAA intends to meet the implementation deadlines in the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024.
Air Traffic Organization
I would think the Air Traffic Organization would need more
resources at this point not less.
A. What jobs in the Air Traffic Organization do not help ensure the
safety of the flying public?
Answer. Maintaining a highly qualified workforce is key to the
FAA's safety mission. We have a deep reserve of experienced talent and
we are confident in our ability to continue to implement the FAA's
mission of providing the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the
world. Additionally, the FAA closely monitors staffing levels and
continues hiring for critical safety roles, such as air traffic
controllers and NAS technicians.
B. Can you guarantee to this committee that FAA will meet all FAA
Reauthorization implementation deadlines regardless of a reduction in
force?
Answer. The FAA intends to meet the implementation deadlines in the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024.
Question Topic: Aircraft Evacuations
Question 1. The FAA Reauthorization Act requires FAA to update
aircraft evacuation standards to account for real world conditions--
like the presence of carry-on bags and passengers who may be seniors,
children or people with disabilities.
In March, an engine on a Boeing 737 caught fire as it was taxing to
a gate in Denver. We saw evacuated passengers standing on the wing
waiting for help.
In April, an engine fire on an Airbus A330 with nearly 300 people
onboard required an evacuation on the tarmac in Orlando.
A. When can we expect FAA to complete implementation of Section 365
of the FAA Reauthorization Act, which requires updated evacuation
standards?
Answer. The initial step under section 365 was to study
improvements to the safety and efficiency of aircraft evacuation
standards for transport category airplanes. The FAA has completed the
initial portion of this study. The FAA sought the assistance of the
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) to
conduct an external review of the CAMI research on seat pitch and width
before completion. NASEM made several recommendations, and the FAA is
working to address them. FAA will finalize the study portion of this
section with the completion of that work. If appropriate, rulemaking to
revise existing evacuation standards would follow several additional
mandates to the Administrator in section 365 including convening an
aviation rulemaking committee (ARC), evaluating ARC analysis and
recommendations, and determining ARC recommendations to implement and
reporting to Congress on such determinations.
Question Topic: Workforce Development Grant Program
Question 1. With broad bipartisan support, the FAA Reauthorization
law includes a major expansion of FAA's Aviation Workforce Development
Program. This program is critical to recruit, educate and train future
pilots, mechanics and manufacturing technical workers.
Yet, the Trump administration chose to waste time revising the
notice of funding opportunity and delay the start of the aviation
manufacturing technical worker grants.
This is not the way to fix our aviation manufacturing problems.
A. When will FAA complete FY25 and FY26 grant disbursements from
the Aviation Workforce Development Grant Program?
Answer. Regarding section 440 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of
2024, the FY 2025 Aviation Workforce Development Notices Of Funding
Opportunities (NOFO) have been updated to align with the
Administration's priorities, and we anticipate that they will be
announced in the near future. For FY 2026, we are in the process of
developing a NOFO, which is intended to include the expanded areas of
the Aviation Workforce Development Program from the Reauthorization Act
of 2024.
Question Topic: Boeing Oversight
Question 1. In October, the Department of Transportation's
Inspector General (DOT OIG) found FAA's oversight of Boeing production
was not effective. FAA's oversight was so bad, the Inspector General
issued 16 separate recommendations to FAA to fix its process.
There were many terrible findings in the report, but one of the
most shocking was that shortly before the door plug blowout,
individuals within FAA wanted to delegate airplane airworthiness
inspection authority back to Boeing. Even worse, these individuals at
FAA wanted to do this without any criteria by which to assess whether
Boeing could be trusted to properly carry out these inspections.
This isn't just unacceptable. It is a dereliction of duty.
Prior to the 737 MAX crashes, and production problems with the 787,
FAA allowed Boeing to self-inspect their aircraft for conformity with
their FAA-approved type design.
However, in the wake of the MAX crashes, we learned that Boeing had
abused this authority. Boeing had knowingly and repeatedly produced 737
MAX aircraft with nonfunctioning Angle of Attack Disagree alerts--in
blatant violation of the plane's approved type design.
FAA should not delegate airworthiness inspection authority back to
Boeing until FAA fixes its ineffective oversight of Boeing's
production.
DOT OIG currently lists all 16 of its recommendations to FAA as
``open.''
A. Will FAA commit to not delegating airworthiness inspection
authority back to Boeing until FAA has implemented all 16 of DOT OIG's
recommendations and DOT OIG considers them closed?
Answer. The FAA takes the recommendations from the DOT Office of
Inspector General (OIG) and is actively working to address all 16
recommendations. The FAA is committed to thoroughly evaluating and
implementing appropriate measures to enhance oversight and ensure
aviation safety. The FAA continuously monitors Boeing's performance
closely, alongside evaluating the allocation and capacity of its own
airworthiness inspectors.
Regarding delegating airworthiness inspection authority back to
Boeing, the FAA operates under a risk-based, data-driven approach to
oversight. Any decisions about delegation involve careful consideration
of the agency's confidence in Boeing's compliance and the effectiveness
of FAA's continued direct oversight.
Question Topic: FAA Review of Helicopter Routes
Question 1. Following the crash near Reagan National Airport, my
colleagues and I asked FAA to review helicopter traffic in other areas
of congested airspace across the country.
A. When will FAA complete its review of helicopter traffic in
congested airspace around the country?
Answer. FAA's review of helicopter traffic in congested airspaces
around the country is ongoing.
B. Has the FAA identified any potential trouble spots, so far, as
it has been conducting this review?
Answer. The FAA continues to assess airports located near charted
helicopter routes in 10 cities and the Gulf of America. This is an
important body of work, and we have taken actions to improve safety as
a result. For example, in Las Vegas we are adding vertical and lateral
boundaries to routes and mandating more traffic advisories from
controllers to helicopter pilots.
Question Topic: FAA Reauthorization Act Implementation Status
Question 1. For each of the following sections of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2024, please provide a status update on
implementation, and indicate what impact a reduction in the FAA
workforce will have on the timing and full completion of
implementation.
A, Section 365--Improved Aircraft Evacuation Standards
Answer. The initial step under section 365 was to study
improvements to the safety and efficiency of aircraft evacuation
standards for transport category airplanes. The FAA has completed the
initial portion of this study. The FAA sought the assistance of the
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) to
conduct an external review of the CAMI research on seat pitch and width
before completion. NASEM made several recommendations, and the FAA is
working to address those. FAA will finalize the study portion of this
section with the completion of that work. If appropriate, rulemaking to
revise existing evacuation standards would follow several additional
mandates to the Administrator in section 365 including convening an
aviation rulemaking committee (ARC), evaluating ARC analysis and
recommendations, and determining ARC recommendations to implement and
reporting to Congress on such determinations.
B. Section 368--Passenger aircraft first aid and emergency medical
kit equipment and training
Answer. The initial work of forming an expert panel to review the
Emergency Medical Kits and Training was completed and the report sent
to the Federal Air Surgeon on April 30, 2025. The FAA intends to meet
the requirements of this section.
C. Section 440--Expanded Aviation Workforce Development Grants
Answer. The FY 2025 Aviation Workforce Development NOFOs have been
updated to align with the Administration's priorities, and we
anticipate that they will be announced in the near future.
D. Section 426--Streamlining transition from military to civilian
aviation mechanical careers
Answer. In response to section 426 of the FAA Reauthorization of
2024 (P.L. 118-63), the FAA tasked ARAC to address the knowledge and
skill differences between military aircraft maintenance versus civilian
aircraft maintenance for the purpose of recommending airman
certification standards and testing requirements.
E. Section 541--Extending Air Carrier Access Act Advisory Committee
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of this section.
F. Section 542--Training standards to prevent wheelchair damage
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of this section.
G. Section 543--Training standards for stowage of wheelchairs and
scooters
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of this section.
H. Section 544--Mobility aids on board improve lives and empower
all
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of this section. However, the FAA maintains a role
with respect to research regarding the safety and feasibility of
securing personal wheelchairs in the passenger seating area of the
cabin.
I. Section 545--Prioritizing accountability and accessibility for
aviation consumers
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of this section.
J. Section 546--Accommodations for qualified individuals with
disabilities
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of this section.
K. Section 547--Equal accessibility to passenger portals
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of this section.
L. Section 548--Aircraft access standards
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of the mandates in this section. However, the FAA
maintains a role with respect to the safety and feasibility of securing
personal wheelchairs in the passenger seating area of the cabin and the
associated rulemaking requirement in this provision.
M. Section 549--Investigation of complaints of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of this section.
N. Section 550--Removal of outdated references to passengers with
disabilities
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of this section.
O. Section 551--Onboard wheelchairs in aircraft cabins
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of this section.
P. Section 552--Aircraft Accessibility
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of this section.
Q. Section 725--Pilot grant program to for airport upgrades to
improve accessibility for passengers with disabilities
Answer. The FAA published a program guidance letter addressing the
pilot program established under section 725 on May 14, 2025 (2025-R-PGL
25-07: Civil Rights).
Question 2. Section 546 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024
requires that the Department establish a Known Service Animal Travel
Pilot Program:
A. When does the Department anticipate reconvening the Air Carrier
Access Act Advisory Committee (also referred to as the Air Access
Committee) to support the program's rollout?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of this section.
B. Is there a timeline for implementation of the pilot program?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of this section.
Question 3.
A. As part of the implementation of Section 546 of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2024, is the FAA considering the use of a
digital ID--such as those currently issued by Assistance Dogs
International (ADI) and the International Guide Dog Federation (IGDF)--
as a recognized method of verifying service animals for air travel?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of this section.
B. In developing the program, is the FAA considering the
administrative burden, cost to airlines, and accessibility challenges
and additional time required for passengers with disabilities to go
through a third-party verification process?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is overseeing
the implementation of this section.
Question Topic: Wheelchair Rule
According to data from the Department of Transportation, airlines
mishandled 11,527 wheelchairs and scooters in 2023, leading to health
and safety concerns for passengers with disabilities. In 2024, the
Department finalized a rule, which set new, rigorous standards for
assistance for passengers with disabilities--particularly those who use
wheelchairs, mandated hands-on training for airline employees and
contractors who physically assist passengers with disabilities and
handle passengers' wheelchairs and specified actions that airlines must
take to protect passengers when a wheelchair is damaged or delayed
during transport. Notably, some of these requirements were included in
the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. In February 2025, Airlines for
America and its member companies filed a lawsuit with the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 5th Circuit, arguing that parts of the final regulation
are ``unlawful.''
A. Does the Department of Transportation plan to defend the final
rule, in part or in full?
Answer. The rulemaking that is subject to this litigation was
issued under the authority of the Office of the Secretary of
Transportation, which is overseeing this rulemaking and matters subject
to litigation.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jacky Rosen to
Jodi Baker, Wayne Heibeck, and Franklin McIntosh
Question Topic: Updates for the Airport Improvement Program (AIP)
Question 1. Mr. Heibeck, when does the FAA anticipate that the AIP
handbook will be updated? In the meantime, when can airports expect
Program Guidance Letters (PGLs) regarding AIP eligibility?
Answer. The FAA has published all PGLs required by the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2024, which can be found at https://www.faa.gov/
airports/aip/guidance_letters. The FAA is on track and intends to
comply with the requirements in section 733 of the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2024 to publish a draft AIP Handbook for public review and
comment by May 16, 2026, and publish a final AIP Handbook by May 16,
2027.
Question Topic: PFAS Replacement Grant Program
Question 1. Mr. Heibeck, what is the status of the PFAS Replacement
Program?
Answer. Section 767 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024
authorized $350 million over 5 years to help airports cover certain
costs related to transitioning to fluorine-free foam, including
purchasing new foam, disposing of old foam, cleaning existing
equipment, and acquiring new required equipment, including new ARFF
trucks when necessary. While the program has been authorized, funds
have not yet been appropriated for this program. The FAA has developed
a programmatic framework and will be able to implement the program
after it is appropriated.
Question Topic: Air Traffic Policies Regarding UAS
Question 1. Mr. McIntosh, can you provide an update on air traffic
policies regarding advanced air mobility (AAM) and unmanned aerial
systems (UAS) operations in and around controlled airspace?
Answer. The FAA is actively preparing for the safe integration of
advanced air mobility (AAM) operations, including powered-lift
aircraft, into the NAS. We are ready to accommodate powered-lift
operations once these aircraft begin entering into service, and the
FAA's Powered-Lift Final Rule establishes the regulatory framework for
pilot certification and operating rules. This rule also outlines how
powered-lift operations will be managed in and around controlled
airspace, using existing air traffic procedures and infrastructure as a
foundation while incorporating new capabilities as needed. Section 957
of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 directs the FAA to continue
developing performance-based regulations and certification pathways for
AAM operating in complex airspace. As we implement this provision, we
are working closely with industry, air traffic stakeholders, and other
Federal partners to ensure these emerging technologies are integrated
safely and efficiently without compromising current airspace
operations.
For unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), current operations in
controlled airspace are governed by 14 C.F.R. part 107, which requires
UAS operators to obtain airspace authorizations through the Low
Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC) or the FAA
DroneZone portal. In addition, recreational drone operators must follow
specific statutory requirements under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44809, including
airspace restrictions and coordination.
Question Topic: Runway Safety Council
Section 347 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 provides for
greater investment in airport surface safety initiatives including the
creation of a Runway Safety Council within 6 months of enactment and
the deployment of an airport surface detection and surveillance system
at all medium and large hub airports within 5 years.
Question 1. Mr. McIntosh, what is the status of the Runway Safety
Council? What is the status of implementation of FAA's Surface
Awareness Initiative? At how many airports has it been implemented thus
far? How many airports are scheduled to have the Surface Awareness
Initiative implemented during the remainder of 2025? How many FAA
airports have no surface awareness technology and when do you expect it
to be deployed to all FAA air traffic control towers?
Answer. Runway safety remains one of our highest priorities. The
Runway Safety Council was briefed on airport surface safety
technologies. The council identified the Surface Awareness Initiative
as an additional tool that expands surface situational awareness for
controllers at 18 airports without existing surface surveillance
capabilities. Since the briefing in November 2024, all 18 sites are
operational, with more than 30 additional sites planned to go
operational by the end of calendar year 2025.
Question 2. Are there funding or regulatory barriers to getting a
system like the Surface Awareness Initiative deployed and operational
sooner than the 5 year timeline?
Answer. At this time, there are no funding or regulatory barriers.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ben Ray Lujan to
Jodi Baker, Wayne Heibeck, and Franklin McIntosh
Question 1. The law requires the FAA to establishes a working group
to review medical processes, policies and procedures to ensure timely
and efficient certification of pilots. My understanding is that this
working group was established in November of 2024.
a. Can you confirm that the Mental Health Task Group--a working
group intended to support the mental health of the aviation workforce
been established?
Answer. The Aviation Mental Health Task Group to oversee, monitor,
and evaluate efforts of the administrator related to supporting the
mental health of the aviation workforce was established in April 2025.
b. Can you explain why these working groups are crucial to keeping
our airways safe?
Answer. Working groups provide a forum for the agency to obtain
information and recommendations for consideration as the agency
determines the policies relating to aviation safety.
c. When can we expect a report to Congress? Please be as specific
as possible with your timeline, providing a month and year.
Answer. We anticipate that Congress and the FAA will receive the
recommendations from the working group by the end of this calendar
year.
Question 2. When do you expect to complete the review of a Call to
Action to address ramp worker safety that was included in the FAA
Reauthorization? At what point do you believe you will be able to
submit your findings and safety recommendations for ramp workers to
Congress? Please be as specific as possible with your timeline,
providing a month and year.
Answer. We anticipate a two-year period, starting from this Fiscal
Year (FY), to be necessary to complete the Call-to-Action safety
review. Consistent with section 353 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of
2024, we expect to submit the report to Congress with our findings and
safety recommendations 180 days after the conclusion of the safety
review (within FY2027).
Question 3. How many times have individuals needed medical
attention due to unsafe cabin temperatures in the last year? How many
times in the last two years? How many times in the last 3 years?
How many times in the last four years?
Answer. Consistent with section 323 of the FAA Reauthorization Act
of 2024, we are working with the National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine to conduct a study on the health and safety
impacts of cabin temperature. We note that the FAA investigates
incidents and occurrences reported to the agency by air carriers
operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;
however, if a part 121 air carrier does not report a cabin temperature
issue, then we would be unaware, or have incomplete data to share.
Question 4. You stated that the FAA began its collaboration with
the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM)
to study unsafe cabin temperatures, what else is the FAA doing to
address unsafe cabin temperatures? When can Congress expect a report
with findings and recommendations to prevent unsafe cabin temperatures?
Answer. Consistent with the requirements in Sec. 323, the FAA
entered into an agreement to work with NASEM to conduct a study on the
health and safety impacts of cabin temperature. We expect a final
report by May 2026.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Hickenlooper to
Jodi Baker, Wayne Heibeck, and Franklin McIntosh
Air Traffic Control Communications Outage--Colorado
Safety must always be prioritized across all elements of the
National Airspace System (NAS). Last week, reports indicated that
commercial pilots flying into Denver International Airport (DIA)
temporarily lost communications with air traffic control (ATC) at the
Denver Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) in Longmont, CO. While
local news outlets report the communications outage lasted up to six
minutes, you recently testified to the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure that the communications lapse only
lasted approximately two minutes. While reports indicate backup
communications frequencies were used between roughly 20 commercial
aircraft approaching DIA and controllers at the Denver ARTCC during the
outage, allegedly up to four layers of communications frequency
channels failed or were offline. This forced Denver ARTCC to eventually
contact one pilot on a guard line-used in situations of distress-to
notify pilots about the correct communications frequency channel. To be
clear, any disruption to critical aviation safety communications is
unacceptable and should be swiftly investigated and addressed.
Following the passage of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and
the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024-both of which were bipartisan
efforts-it is clear the FAA must continue its work with Congress to
upgrade communications infrastructure and grow the air traffic control
workforce across the NAS.
Question. Mr. McIntosh, please provide specific details about your
understanding of the timeline of events, and impact, from the
communications outage at the Denver ARTCC. What training do ATC
personnel receive for these kinds of communications outages, and what
contingency procedures are performed during such outages? What
assurances can you provide to assure the traveling public regarding
appropriate redundancies across the ATC system?
Answer. On Monday, May 12, 2025, at approximately 1955 Zulu Time,
Denver Center (ZDV) Sector 16 reported a brief loss of radio contact on
frequency 120.57 via the backup emergency communication frequencies. In
our review, we determined that the outage was approximately 90 seconds.
During the outage, the controller was able to rapidly recall aircraft
using an alternate frequency, called guard frequency, 121.5. This is a
common, readily available frequency that every aircraft is required to
monitor, and every facility has immediate access to broadcast on.
This is a standard contingency that adds an additional layer of
safety, which worked as designed during this incident. There were no
impacts on the operation, and safety was not compromised.
Air Traffic Control Outages-FAA Reporting
While the National Airspace System (NAS) has dedicated
communication, operational, and technological redundancies to maintain
aviation safety, communications outages can impact local air traffic
control towers, Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facilities,
and national Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) facilities.
Recent communications failures across the NAS have highlighted the
need to modernize our infrastructure (for example, replacing copper
wire with fiber optic cable) to ensure that our systems are resilient
and robust.
Question. Mr. McIntosh, does the FAA require controllers, airports,
pilots, or other personnel to report communications outages when they
occur? If so, does such reporting include time, date, and duration of
any communications failure? What is the reporting structure? Where
within the FAA is this communications outage information collected and
analyzed?
Answer. The Joint Air Traffic Operations Command (JATOC) helps the
Air Traffic Organization (ATO) effectively prepare for, respond to, and
recover from, significant incidents in the National Airspace System
(NAS). During an incident, the JATOC gathers details, including time,
date, and duration, and provides a single source of integrated
information and reliable communications to ATO leadership to make
critical, informed, and responsible decisions.
The ATO adopts a systemic approach to safety within the NAS,
focusing on understanding the underlying causes of safety events and
identifying systemic risks rather than assigning blame. All ATO
personnel involved in or supporting air traffic services or technical
operations are responsible for reporting any suspected unsafe
occurrences in these areas. Sharing this information is essential for
the ATO to manage operations within the NAS safely and effectively, and
it plays a critical role in the successful implementation of the ATO
Safety Management System (SMS). Under FAA Order 7210.632A, Air Traffic
Organization Occurrence Reporting, controllers are required to report
``any instance in which communication with an aircraft was not
established or not maintained as expected/intended.'' Employees must
complete a Mandatory Occurrence Report, including the event date and
time, by the end of their duty shift via an electronic submission that
is maintained and analyzed by the ATO. The ATO monitors the corrective
actions and conducts trend analysis as part of the ATO SMS.
In accordance with 14 C.F.R. Sec. 91.123, a pilot is required to
comply with air traffic control instructions and clearance and ``[w]hen
a pilot is uncertain of an ATC clearance, that pilot shall immediately
request clarification from ATC.'' All of the different classes of
airspace have a requirement to maintain two-way radio communications
with ATC. The Airman's Information Manual also has guidance on radio
techniques, including loss of contact with ATC, and pilots are trained
to report any deviations to regulations to the nearest FAA facility as
soon as practical after they land.
Redundancies--FAA Review
During communications outages impacting ATC, the FAA has
communications, operations, and technology redundancies in place to
maintain aviation safety. For example, communications redundancies
include direct pilot-controller communications on backup frequencies,
and Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) and nearby ATC facilities
can assist during outages. Operational redundancies include ATC and
pilots maintaining logs of last assigned altitudes and flight routes to
preserve situational awareness in the airspace. Technological
redundancies include each aircraft bearing traffic collision avoidance
systems (TCAS) to notify pilots of nearby aircraft to avoid collisions
and Automated Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) systems to share
an aircraft's speed, altitude, and location with air traffic
controllers and aircraft. While these redundancies have been proven to
serve their purpose, lessons learned and technological advancements
provide windows into ways they can be improved.
Question. Mr. McIntosh, with each safety redundancy built into the
ATC system, how often does the FAA conduct a review to identify
possible communication, operational, or technological improvements?
Answer. The FAA takes a layered, proactive approach to reviewing
and enhancing safety across the ATC system. While there isn't a single
fixed schedule for all reviews, the agency conducts continuous safety
assessments through multiple channels. Throughout daily operations, ATO
personnel regularly conduct preventative maintenance checks for the
early identification of safety issues, and the agency also conducts
regular facility compliance audits, investigations, and safety
assessments to implement corrective actions and to identify any
systemic NAS issues. In addition, prior to implementing a fully tested
and modeled new system or change to the NAS, safety risk management,
independent operational, and operational risk management assessments
are conducted to mitigate any effect that system or change could have
on interfacing systems and the NAS as a whole. The robust processes
ensure the new system/change is ready for the NAS, and the NAS is ready
for the new system/change.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Andy Kim to
Jodi Baker, Wayne Heibeck, and Franklin McIntosh
Question 1. In the FAA Reauthorization hearing, Mr. McIntosh
identified that maintenance on the primary and secondary
telecommunications lines, and a potential addition of a tertiary line
was one of the first steps necessary to resolve the outages at PHL
TRACON. It is my understanding that controllers in the PHL TRACON did
not yet receive a timeline for a completion date. What is the expected
timeline to provide maintenance on the first and second lines and add a
tertiary line? To what extent are you working with the controllers in
the PHL TRACON to establish an effective timeline?
Answer. The FAA continues to make strong progress in upgrading the
communications network supporting the Philadelphia TRACON, which is
critical to operations at Newark and other major Northeast airports.
Our priority has been to improve redundancy and resilience of
communication links to prevent future outages like those experienced
earlier this year. Most recently, we deployed a temporary mobile
satellite communications system at Philadelphia TRACON to provide added
redundancy. Longer-term upgrades are well underway. The physical
infrastructure for the permanent solution is now in place, including
three new fiber-optic connections linking the New York hubs with local
access points serving Philadelphia TRACON. We transitioned services to
a new protected Ethernet solution, which will provide resilient,
redundant communications between New York TRACON (N90) and Philadelphia
TRACON Area C, ensuring continued operations even if one line fails. We
are also actively engaging with the controllers at Philadelphia TRACON
to keep them informed and ensure the implementation aligns with
operational needs.
Question 2. The PHL TRACON needs an urgent switch to the STARS
system. This software provides the necessary enhancements for these
systems to function at its highest level. In the hearing, Mr. McIntosh
identified the 12-month timeline was a conservative estimate. It is my
understanding that controllers in the PHL TRACON have not yet receive a
timeline for a completion date. Can you identify an exact timeline for
completion of this change to the STARS system?
Answer. We are actively working to establish a standalone Standard
Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) hub at Philadelphia
TRACON Area C. This upgrade will allow the facility to operate
independently of the New York STARS hub, reducing vulnerability to
future telecommunications disruptions like those that occurred earlier
this year. While the previously cited 12-month timeline remains a
conservative estimate, work on the transition is ongoing and will
continue throughout the summer. Earlier this summer, we implemented an
important interim enhancement to the current STARS configuration. This
change allows controllers to select the Direct Service Feed (DSF) in
the event of simultaneous failure of both primary and backup radar
feeds. While the DSF does not enable full-service operations such as
landings and departures, it does provide raw radar data and limited
flight information, which helps controllers maintain situational
awareness and aircraft separation during system outages. As we continue
to develop the independent STARS hub at Philadelphia TRACON, we are
also coordinating closely with NATCA and operational staff. This
engagement is essential to ensuring a safe and effective transition but
may impact the final implementation timeline. We remain focused on
advancing this work as quickly and safely as possible and will keep
stakeholders, including controllers, informed as the schedule becomes
more defined.
Question 3. In the hearing, Mr. McIntosh identified that the FAA
sent senior officials to work with telecommunications professionals at
the PHL TRACON to form a task force to address these issues. Could you
identify how many engagements the task force has held so far at/with
the telecommunications professionals managing the PHL TRACON? What
steps has the task force established thus far to resolve the
telecommunications issues?
Answer. To address urgent telecommunications concerns at the
Philadelphia TRACON, Secretary Duffy established a joint task force
composed of senior officials from the FAA, Verizon, and L3Harris. The
task force functions as a central coordination body to streamline
communication across agencies and vendors, prioritize maintenance
events, and oversee implementation of corrective measures. Since its
formation in May, the task force has met daily to monitor progress,
troubleshoot emerging issues, and ensure alignment across technical
teams.
Key outcomes overseen by the task force so far include:
Activation of a temporary mobile satellite communications
system at Philadelphia TRACON to provide interim redundancy.
Deployment of three new fiber-optic connections between the
New York hubs and the Philadelphia TRACON, forming the backbone
of a more resilient network.
Ongoing transition to a new protected Ethernet solution,
expected to be operational by the end of the month, which will
enable continued services in the event of a line failure.
Coordination of efforts to establish an independent STARS
hub at Philadelphia TRACON Area C, which will reduce dependency
on the New York STARS hub and enhance overall system
reliability.
These steps are being tracked and prioritized under the task
force's direction to ensure the facility remains a safe and reliable
hub for the region's air traffic operations.
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