[Senate Hearing 119-140]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-140
SAFETY FIRST: RESTORING BOEING'S STATUS
AS A GREAT AMERICAN MANUFACTURER
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 2, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-334 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
TODD YOUNG, Indiana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOHN CURTIS, Utah BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
BERNIE MORENO, Ohio JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
TIM SHEEHY, Montana JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ANDY KIM, New Jersey
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Liam McKenna, General Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
Jonathan Hale, General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 2, 2025.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 4
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 13
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 15
Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 16
Statement of Senator Duckworth................................... 19
Statement of Senator Blackburn................................... 21
Statement of Senator Lujan....................................... 23
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 26
Statement of Senator Rosen....................................... 29
Statement of Senator Blunt Rochester............................. 30
Statement of Senator Young....................................... 32
Statement of Senator Schmitt..................................... 34
Witnesses
Kelly Ortberg, President and Chief Executive Officer, The Boeing
Company........................................................ 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Kelly Ortberg by:
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 39
Hon. Jerry Moran............................................. 39
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 42
Hon. Lisa Blunt Rochester.................................... 45
SAFETY FIRST: RESTORING BOEING'S STATUS AS A GREAT AMERICAN
MANUFACTURER
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2025
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Cruz,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cruz [presiding], Wicker, Fischer, Moran,
Sullivan, Blackburn, Young, Schmitt, Moreno, Sheehy, Cantwell,
Klobuchar, Markey, Baldwin, Duckworth, Rosen, Lujan,
Hickenlooper, and Blunt Rochester.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
The Chairman. Good Morning. The Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation will come to order.
Before we discuss today's hearing, I want to touch on a
separate aviation matter.
Last week, this committee held a hearing on the January
29th DCA mid-air collision. Brigadier General Matthew Braman,
the Director of the Office of Army Aviation, appeared on behalf
of the Army. At the hearing, both Ranking Member Cantwell and I
requested an Army memo outlining its standard operating
procedures for when Army helicopters could forego broadcasting
their locations and altitudes while flying near DCA airport.
The Army had earlier refused to provide the memo to my
staff despite being allowed to do so by the independent crash
investigator, the NTSB. Given the opportunity to be
transparent, the Army again refused to commit to providing the
memo, which is entitled, ``Automatic Dependent Broadcast
Surveillance, or ADS-B Out Off Operations in the National
Airspace''.
So Ranking Member Cantwell and I followed the hearing with
a joint letter explicitly requesting the unredacted memo. Now,
for the third time, we made clear to the General that he had 24
hours to provide that memo or there would be real consequences.
It has now been five days since the hearing, and the Army has
still not provided the memo.
It begs the question, what doesn't the Army want Congress
or the American people to know about why it was flying
partially blind to the other aircraft and to the air traffic
controllers near DCA? This is not acceptable. I fully expect
that, should the Army continue to refuse to provide the
internal memo, this committee will exercise its full
authorities to compel its production.
Events that have transpired since the January crash
underscore the precarious situation in the Nation's airspace.
Just last Friday, after the hearing, three flights were cleared
for takeoff at DCA while a military flyover was approaching
Arlington National Cemetery. The U.S. Air Force T-38 came
within just half of a nautical mile of lateral separation and
as close as 200 feet of vertical separation from a Delta
aircraft departing DCA for Minneapolis.
The Delta Flight's TCAS sounded a resolution advisory,
alerting the pilots to a traffic collision and directing them
to continue upwards to avoid a collision. This is far too
close--seconds away from yet another disaster. The air traffic
center that controls airspace around DC notified DCA about the
flyover. That should have led to halted traffic.
This serious communication breakdown is just the latest in
a string of missteps that signal that the air traffic
organization is under extreme stress. It is my expectation that
all Federal actors when involved in any incident in the
national airspace will be forthcoming when this committee
conducts its oversight to ensure flying remains the safest mode
of transportation.
And I want to be explicit to the Army. Every one of us here
supports a strong national defense, but the Army does not have
at its option ignoring the U.S. Senate. And if there is another
accident, if another Black Hawk helicopter strikes another
passenger jet and murders 67 people because the Army refused to
change its policy of turning off ADS-B Out, and rather than act
proactively to protect people's lives the Army chose to protect
its bureaucratic ass, those deaths will be on the Army's hands.
None of us want that to happen. The responsible decision for
the Army to make is to provide that memo to this committee
today. And again, if the Army continues to stonewall, they will
face a subpoena from this committee.
That brings us to today's hearing. It is essential for
members of this committee to hear directly from Boeing about
its manufacturing challenges. I am glad the CEO Kelly Ortberg
is here today and here voluntarily. Mr. Ortberg, welcome, and
thank you for testifying. For over a century, Boeing has been
building aircraft in America, beginning with the Boeing Model
1, C plane in 1916. William Boeing built a company that became
a household name. As the first World War broke out, the Boeing
Airplane Company began building aircraft for the U.S. Navy. By
1919, Boeing's first aircraft designed for commercial purposes
took flight. Throughout its storied history, Boeing aircraft
had been synonymous with excellence, quality, and safety in
flight.
That was until October 2018 when a 737 MAX 8 aircraft
operated by Lion Air crashed into the Java Sea killing 189
people. Five months later, Ethiopian Flight 302 would crash
just after takeoff, killing 157 passengers and crew--346 souls
gone in an instant. Family members of those killed have since
become tireless advocates for aviation safety. I welcome those
family members who are in attendance today, and convey my
continued condolences for your loss, and express my gratitude
for your leadership.
Thank you for turning your grief into advocacy. The MAX 8s
were grounded soon after the second crash for more than 18
months in the U.S., as Boeing worked with the FAA on a software
fix to prevent the technological breakdown that contributed to
both crashes. I was among the very first Senators to publicly
call for grounding the plane just days after the second crash.
When the MAX returned to the air in late 2020, many hoped the
worst was behind Boeing. But then on January 5, 2024, Alaska
Airlines Flight 1282 departed Portland International Airport on
route to Ontario, California.
Approximately 10 minutes into the flight, the mid cabin
exit door plug, a section of the fuselage built to seal off
unused emergency exits, fell off the plane, leading to rapid
depressurization of the cabin. Oxygen masks dropped and
belongings were sucked out of the gaping hole. The National
Transportation Safety Board's review found that Boeing failed
to include at least three of the four bolts needed to properly
secure the door plug to the fuselage.
Thankfully and miraculously, no lives were lost, but the
incident produced fresh doubt about Boeing's ability to safely
build planes. Repeated worries about production issues at
Boeing and its subcontractors has led many to question the
company's ability to design and manufacture a safe aircraft.
Efforts to cut corners in production or to move the next
production phase before necessary parts arrive have led to
unacceptable failures. Insufficient oversight of third party
suppliers and lack of sufficient internal auditing procedures
created an unsustainable lack of safety culture at Boeing.
Since the Alaska Airlines 1282 incident, Boeing says it is
working hard to address those concerns, including by developing
a plan under FAA oversight for renewed safety and quality in
production processes. It recently adapted its Speak Up Program
to allow employees to confidently and anonymously submit a
concern when something seems to be going wrong.
While the culture will not change overnight, Boeing must
continue its work with the FAA to bring safety and quality back
fully to its production processes. The FAA has been evaluating
key performance indicators, or KPIs, to track Boeing's progress
on key metrics.
From discussions with the FAA and Boeing, I am told the
company is progressing well and is on track to simplify
needlessly complex processes, identify points of weakness,
reduce deficiencies, and ultimately improve safety. But these
conversations alone will not be the proper reassurance.
This committee today wants to hear what specific and
concrete actions Boeing has taken to fix the problems. How is
Boeing progressing in its KPIs? What changes has it implemented
to ensure a strong safety culture? And how has Boeing adapted
its quality management system?
We want to hear these answers, not just from the company's
CEOs, but from the company's managers, engineers, and
machinists. I know the workers of Boeing desperately want their
company to succeed too. So to those at Boeing facilities who
are watching, consider my door open to hearing directly from
you how you believe Boeing is turning a corner and fixing what
went wrong.
President Trump is taking great strides to bring back
American manufacturing. I very much hope that Boeing is part of
that renaissance. I want Boeing to remain a beacon of American
excellence in manufacturing. Our country is better off
economically, our aviation system is safer, and our Nation is
stronger when Boeing is stronger.
I now turn to Ranking Member Cantwell for her opening
statement.
Voice. Mr. Chairman, can I have a moment please. Did you
receive----
The Chairman. The Committee will come to order. The
Committee will come to order, and you will be removed if you
disrupt the proceedings again.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Chairman, first before we begin the
point of today's hearing, I too want to join you in our request
to asking the Department of Defense to give us information
regarding the ADB-S issue and the near--the recent near
collision, but obviously the tragic accident that happened with
a CRJ and a Black Hawk helicopter.
The fact that the military asked for an exemption, and in
the granting of that exemption with the FAA, made it seem as if
that was going to be a rare exemption used only infrequently,
to later only find out that it had issued a statement to
Congresswoman from the D.C. area, Eleanor Holmes Norton, that
it was basically turning off ADB-S 100 percent of the time. And
I think that our FAA Acting Administrator shed some light on
this, but certainly not enough.
And I agree with you, we need to have the answers.
Information that has been presented to the National
Transportation Safety Board, that information has to inform us
as to this interaction between transportation corridors that
are vital to protect for the public safety, and what the
Department of Defense is using the D.C. airspace for today, and
what are those safeguards. So I will work with you to get the
answers that we need from the Air Force. Thank you for holding
this important hearing. Welcome, Mr. Ortberg. Thank you for
being here.
I also want to acknowledge the families that are here. As
the Chairman said, you have been playing a critical role in
aviation safety. People like Nadia Milleron, or Javier de Luis
who was an active member of the expert panel, have channeled
their unimaginable grief into very positive, purposeful actions
for the flying public. And I want to also acknowledge the brave
whistleblowers who come forward at great personal risk to
themselves to speak about the truth on quality and safety that
are so important and so instrumental.
I know, Mr. Ortberg, the families are very worried about
the company's renegotiation of a plea agreement and the
corporate monitoring, and maybe we will have a chance to talk
about that today. We are here today though, Mr. Ortberg, to see
if Boeing and your new leadership are making the fundamental
changes that we would like to see to return the trust in the
Boeing Company to that iconic manufacturer.
I think that for many decades, as the Chairman mentioned,
thank you for mentioning all of that history that includes much
success in the State of Washington, the company was the
pinnacle of manufacturing success. But we shouldn't forget that
that success is also critical to our national security, to our
economy.
The company employs over 67,000 people in the state of
Washington. I think the whole supply chain is well over 130,000
people. And contributes $79 billion to the American economy.
Boeing remains the largest exporter, and I can assure you I
believe in more exports, and I would like to see a brighter
future for Boeing.
And recently met with the University of Washington, and Mr.
Ortberg, in many parts of our aviation supply chain, to
understand how a tech hub could take us in a manufacturing
production to a higher rate of production. This I believe is so
important. I think that what we are trying to understand is
getting rid of safety inspectors is no tradeoff, when in
reality aviation innovation can help us with both quality and
safety.
However, the company must address these manufacturing
quality issues. As the Chairman mentioned, the two 737 MAX jet
crashes killing 346 people, and the Alaska door plug that
happened last year. We know the economic impacts of this.
Obviously the MAX, because of a shortcut in safety, cost $35
billion to the company. The door incident and the financial
costs to that are just not even good business.
But we owe it to the families today to make sure that we
are implementing the changes that are necessary to make sure
that we are the leaders in aviation safety. I believe that
starts with a robust safety management system, and that is what
our OD--that is what our expert panel found, a requirement from
our safety bill to listen to NASA and to other industry leaders
about what would help us in our safety culture. And they
basically said that these were the important elements of a
mandatory safety management system.
So today, Mr. Ortberg, I will be asking you about that. And
I know that the reputation of the company in the past has been
about instituting safety, but in 2020 when we passed the
aviation safety bill, the law put the FAA back in charge of
approving ODA unit members and restricting the FAA from
delegating critical tasks relating to critical design features.
And I will want to ask you about that today.
And how, if the company had a safety management system, yet
we still saw the problems of the door plug and other issues. So
these issues about inspector staffing models, service
difficulty reports, whistleblower retaliation are all issues I
hope we address today at this hearing.
This country needs a strong FAA to do its oversight job.
The Boeing organizational design authorization that is expiring
soon will need to be reauthorized--will need to be pushed
through by the FAA. The last Federal Aviation Administration,
Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office Leader, Ian Won,
decided to give an extension for 3 years hoping that Boeing
would make and show progress on that oversight authority before
issuing a longer ODA. So we would love to hear about that
today, whether the standards laid out in Ian Won's oversight
are being met at the Boeing company.
The FAA needs to continue to play that strong oversight
role, and the FAA needs to keep pace with technology. If the
FAA--and I think NASA could be playing a larger role here in
helping on technology. But the Inspector--the Department of
Transportation's Inspector General identified 16 weaknesses in
the FAA's oversight of Boeing's quality management. Concluding
that the FAA was, ``not effective at identifying and resolving
production issues.'' And this was despite conducting over 300
audits at Boeing in a three-year period of time. And yet the
FAA wasn't able to detect these critical manufacturing
deficits.
The issue of the Verification Optimization Program that was
to literally--basically replace quality inspectors with
mechanic self-inspection I think was the wrong approach. And
the airworthiness standards for both the MAX 7 and MAX 10,
instead of the design fixes, there were many issues that the
Inspector General found were shortcomings. So we as a nation
want to be the leader in aviation, we have to be the leader in
aviation safety. Mr. Ortberg, you need to channel Bill Boeing.
You need to change the safety culture at Boeing, and we are
glad you did that by starting your tenure in Seattle.
That matters, and that oversight matters in helping us
resume the leadership position in aviation. So I look forward
to your testimony this morning, those critical steps that the
company is taking to restore the safety culture and the
manufacturing excellence so our country can again be the leader
in aviation and aviation safety. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member Cantwell. Joining
us today now is Mr. Kelly Ortberg, the President and Chief
Executive Officer of the Boeing Company. Mr. Ortberg joined
Boeing in this role in August 2024, bringing with him over 35
years of experience in the aerospace industry. Mr. Ortberg, you
are recognized for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF KELLY ORTBERG, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, THE BOEING COMPANY
Mr. Ortberg. Thank you, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member
Cantwell, and members of the Committee for inviting me to
testify and your willingness to work with us as we make
fundamental changes to our company to restore trust and return
the Boeing Company to the American manufacturer it used to be.
Since joining Boeing over six months ago, I have appreciated
the opportunity to hear from many of you, and I am committed to
continue to work transparently with our regulators and with
Congress.
Last month, on March 10, marked the sixth anniversary of
the tragic loss of passengers and crew members on Ethiopian
Airlines Flight 302. I know many victims' family members, as
well as those from Lion Air Flight 610, are here today, and I
want to extend my personal condolences for the painful loss of
their loved ones on our aircraft and offer my pledge to make
the necessary changes so this never happens again.
Boeing made serious missteps in recent years, and it is
unacceptable. In response, we have made sweeping changes to the
people, processes, and overall structure of our company. While
there is still work ahead, these profound changes are
underpinned by deep commitment from all of us to the safety of
our products and services. This commitment to aviation goes
well beyond Boeing. We play a crucial role in the U.S. economy
and the national security, as evidenced by the U.S. Air Force's
recent selection of Boeing to build the world's first sixth
generation fighter jet, the F-47. As the Nation's largest
exporter, Boeing has helped support nearly 1.8 million American
jobs and contribute $84 billion annually to the U.S. economy.
It all depends on us getting this right.
I appreciate the opportunity today to provide the Committee
with an update on the actions we are taking to strengthen our
commitment to safety focused, quality driven culture, the
results we are seeing, and ongoing work we are doing, which is
fundamental to our leadership in aerospace.
For over a year, we have been working with the FAA on
implementing recommendations from the ACSA Section 103 Expert
Review Panel, which this committee was instrumental in
creating. Boeing is implementing a robust safety management
system, a framework built on proven aviation industry best
practices, to proactively identify and manage safety risks that
may impact our commercial and defense products.
We submitted our plan to the FAA ahead of schedule, and we
have a strategy to fully implement well ahead of the required
deadline. Under the close oversight of the Department of
Transportation and FAA leadership, we are implementing our
safety and control--and quality plans, and directly addressing
the findings from the FAA's special audit with a focus on four
major work areas, including reducing defects, enhancing
employee training, simplifying processes and procedures, and
elevating our safety and quality culture.
Many aspects of this plan came from our employees, who
generated over 26,000 improvement ideas, which we continue to
evaluate and implement in support of strengthening our safety
and quality. The impact of our efforts are already evident to
our airline customers, based on their feedback about the
improved quality of our aircraft.
Culture is perhaps the most predominant change we are
making as a company. We are aligning our culture and our
incentives with the values everyone expects from Boeing,
safety, quality, and integrity. This starts with our
leadership, including me spending more time listening and
learning from our employees, working to restore trust, and
holding leadership accountable.
I moved to Seattle because I believe our leadership needs
to get closer to the people designing and building the
aircraft. As part of Boeing's future, we took actions in recent
months to improve our financial position and completed contract
negotiations with our union production workforce in Washington
and Oregon.
We also expect to finalize the acquisition of Spirit
AeroSystems later this year, which is key to delivering for our
commercial and defense customers and will help improve our
overall quality and performance. I have confidence in our plan
because I believe in the dedication of more than 160,000
employees, 85 percent of whom are based in the U.S., and our
nearly 10,000 suppliers across the country.
No one is more committed to our company turnaround than our
team. Working together, we are focused on connecting the world,
protecting our freedoms, and supporting our economy. And in
closing, I want to reiterate my thanks to Chairman Cruz,
Ranking Member Cantwell, and members of the Committee, and I
look forward to taking your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert K. Ortberg, President and Chief Executive
Officer, The Boeing Company
Thank you, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of
the Committee, for inviting me to testify and for your willingness to
work with us as we make fundamental changes to our company to restore
trust and return The Boeing Company to the iconic American manufacturer
it used to be.
Since joining Boeing over six months ago, I have appreciated the
opportunity to hear from many of you, and I am committed to continuing
to work transparently with our regulators and Congress.
Last month, on March 10, marked the six-year anniversary of the
tragic loss of passengers and crew members on Ethiopian Airlines Flight
302. I know many victims' family members, as well as those from Lion
Air Flight 610, are here today. I want to extend my condolences for the
painful loss of their loved ones on our aircraft and offer my pledge to
make the necessary changes so this never happens again.
Boeing has made serious missteps in recent years--and it is
unacceptable. In response, we have made sweeping changes to the people,
processes, and overall structure of our company. While there is still
work ahead of us, these profound changes are underpinned by the deep
commitment from all of us to the safety of our products and services.
This commitment to aviation safety goes well beyond Boeing. We play
a crucial role in the U.S. economy and national security, as evidenced
by the U.S. Air Force's recent selection of Boeing to build the world's
first sixth-generation fighter jet--the F-47. As the Nation's largest
exporter, Boeing has helped support 1.8 million American jobs and
contributes $84 billion annually to the U.S. economy. It all depends on
us getting this right.
I appreciate the opportunity today to provide the Committee with an
update on the actions we have taken, the results we are seeing, and the
ongoing work we are doing to strengthen our safety and quality, which
are fundamental to our leadership in aerospace.
For over a year, we have been working with the FAA on implementing
recommendations from the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act of 2020 Section 103 expert review panel, which this
Committee was instrumental in creating.
Boeing is implementing a robust Safety Management System, a
framework built on proven aviation industry best practices, to
proactively identify and manage safety risks that may impact our
commercial and defense products. We submitted our plan to the FAA ahead
of schedule and have a strategy to fully implement well ahead of the
required deadline.
Under the close oversight of the Department of Transportation and
FAA leadership, we are implementing our Safety and Quality plan and
directly addressing the findings from the FAA's special audit with a
focus on four major work areas, including reduction of defects,
enhancing employee training, simplifying processes and procedures, and
elevating our safety and quality culture. Many aspects of this plan
came from our employees, who generated over 26,000 improvement ideas,
which we continue to evaluate and implement in support of strengthening
safety and quality. The impact of our efforts is already evident to our
airline customers based on their feedback about the improved quality of
our aircraft.
Culture is perhaps the most predominant change we are making as a
company. We are aligning our culture and our incentives with the values
everyone expects from Boeing--safety, quality and integrity. That
starts with our leadership--me included--spending more time listening
and learning from our employees, working to restore trust, and holding
leadership accountable. I moved to Seattle because I believe our
leadership needs to get closer to the people designing and building our
aircraft.
As part of securing Boeing's future, we took actions in recent
months to improve our financial position and completed contract
negotiations with our unionized production workforce in Washington and
Oregon. We also expect to finalize the acquisition of Spirit
AeroSystems later this year, which is key to delivering for our
commercial and defense customers and will help improve overall
performance and quality.
Looking forward, Boeing continues to invest in innovation and
manufacturing to remain competitive globally. This includes investments
in advanced combat aircraft manufacturing, maintenance facilities and
parts, commercial manufacturing, and new product development, all of
which will power the Nation's economy.
I have confidence in our plan because I believe in the dedication
of our more than 160,000 employees--85 percent of whom are based in the
U.S.--and our nearly 10,000 suppliers across the country. From Texas to
Washington, Missouri to California, Arizona to South Carolina, and
Kansas to Pennsylvania, these are hardworking men and women building
our products.
No one is more committed to turning our company around than our
team. Working together, we are focused on connecting the world,
protecting our freedoms, and supporting our economy.
In closing, I want to reiterate my thanks to Chairman Cruz, Ranking
Member Cantwell, and Members of the Committee. I look forward to taking
your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ortberg. Let me start with
just a simple question, which is, can travelers trust Boeing?
346 people died in the two 737 MAX 8 crashes. We are extremely
fortunate that no one died in the door plug incident. Since
2018, Boeing's mistakes have caused many people to question
whether Boeing is still capable of making safe aircraft.
Mr. Ortberg, what can you say here to the millions who will
board a Boeing plane this year, to the millions who will put
their children on the plane? I and I suspect every member of
this panel fly Boeing planes every single week. What can you
say to the flying public as to why they should trust that a
Boeing plane is safe?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, the Boeing aircraft 737 MAX
airplanes, you know, take off and land every 2 seconds of the
day--safely take off and land every 2 seconds of the day. I am
not denying the horrible incidents that you have outlined. We
need to take immediate action, and we are taking action to make
sure those accidents never happen again.
My family flies on those aircraft as well, and it is
critically important that we rebuild trust. And the only way we
are going to do that is by building high quality airplanes,
having the metrics out of our quality system that show that we
are making improvements. And I want everybody to know the
entire Boeing team is absolutely committed to building the
highest quality aircraft in the world.
Air traffic is the safest mode of transportation, and we
need to continue that and continue to find and learn if there
is incidences so that these don't turn into tragic accidents in
the future.
The Chairman. As I mentioned, the NTSB's investigation of
the Alaska Airlines door plug incident revealed that it was
caused by manufacturing errors at Boeing. Mr. Ortberg, you
joined Boeing more than 7 months after the door plug incident.
What went wrong with the door plug, and what specifically has
Boeing done to correct this safety lapse?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, first of all, it is unacceptable that
an aircraft left our factory without that door plug properly
installed. And let me just make that perfectly clear, that can
never--never happen again. One of the things that is currently
in NTSB investigation, as you are aware on that. We are not
waiting for the NTSB to finish their investigation. We have
taken immediate action. One of the first actions was to work
with our airline customers and the FAA to go inspect all the
aircraft out in the field.
And we have done that and ensured that there are no other
incidences of a door plug not being installed properly in the
field. The second thing that we did is we found that the proper
paperwork was not completed when the door plug was removed in
our factory. We have gone through extensive retraining of our
workforce to make sure they understand that that violated our
policy and that they have to complete the proper paperwork.
We have got--we have eliminated, reduced the number of
people who can actually do the modifications for the door plug,
so that in the future we have fewer people that are allowed to
even touch and remove the door plugs. In addition, one of the
contributing factors is we identified that the door plug needed
to be removed in order to do some repairs on the aircraft that
were a result of defects in the fuselage.
Those defects come from our fuselage supplier from Spirit
AeroSystems in Wichita. The airplane moved down our factory
line too far after we identified those defects, which
contributed to the risk that we--the risk of the door plug not
being properly installed. So we have made changes to our
process, pushed all those defects back up to Spirit AeroSystems
so we are not bringing those into our factories.
And so far, sir, we have seen a 56 percent reduction in
defects coming out of Spirit. So that is going to help us
significantly. We have also implemented a move ready safety
process so the airplane cannot move down the production floor
if equipment is not installed, or rework has not been
accomplished.
If the aircraft has equipment not installed, we go through
a safety risk assessment and look at the risk of moving the
aircraft. And we have done that 800 times. And I can tell you,
of the 800 times, 200 times we have not moved the aircraft. We
have held the aircraft because moving it would incur risk to
the production system.
And we have also seen a 50 percent reduction in work that
has traveled down the factory floor. We continue to work in
improving those numbers. Those are one of the KPI indicators
that we are using with the FAA. So we have made drastic changes
to our internal process to ensure that this will never happen
again.
The Chairman. OK. Final question. I am sure you are aware
that whistleblowers and others, including Ethiopian
authorities, have suggested manufacturing errors, particularly
with electrical wiring, contributed to the MAX crashes.
Mr. Ortberg, is this an issue you have discussed with
Boeing employees since joining the company? And if so, what is
your opinion on whether there were also manufacturing defects
that may have led to the sensor defect?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator Cruz, obviously that happened before I
joined the Boeing Company. My understanding was that the cause
of the crash was the MCAS design, and those designs changed--
the MCAS has been redesigned and design changes have been
incorporated in all aircraft. I am not aware of any electrical
wiring issues associated with that, but I would be glad to look
into that and get back with you.
The Chairman. So, just to be clear, your testimony as you
have not had conversations with Boeing employees about whether
there were electrical issues that also contributed to that
crash?
Mr. Ortberg. Not specifically, no.
The Chairman. OK. Thank you. Ranking Member Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ortberg,
thank you for the change in tone from the top at Boeing about
the safety culture and the focus that you outlined in your
testimony, those four principles. I wanted to drill down on the
safety management system.
It has been a voluntary compliance but our law--well,
really actually in the implementation of the 2015 settlement
agreement, it was required to implement a safety management
system, and then since we have passed legislation for a
mandatory safety management system. You mentioned the expert
panel.
I think they were very critical of the SMS structure that
existed at Boeing under that voluntary structure. So how is it
that this is going to change, and will you commit today to a
fully functioning safety management system that meets the FAA
standards?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, you are right, we have been operating
under a voluntary SMS for approximately the last 4 years. And I
think the Alaska door accident was a cathartic moment for all
of us to step back and look at what happened and how could this
happen within the safety management system.
We had the expert panel. We also brought in outside
consultants. The FAA did a comprehensive audit of our systems,
and we found significant gaps in many of the processes that we
used to implement our safety management system. Those gaps are
all a part of our safety and quality plan that we are working
with the FAA to improve the overall performance.
I am absolutely committed to a mandatory safety management
system. I appreciate your leadership there. And we are working
to get that done. Actually, I would like to have that in place
by October of this year. We have submitted our draft to the
FAA, and we are absolutely committed to moving to a mandatory
SMS.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Thank you for that commitment.
The expert panel couldn't be--have been more specific about
this particular recommendation, and I think the industry writ
large also thinks it is the gold standard. So certainly
appreciate that. Now, when it comes to the ODA, FAA oversight
and the delegation of authority, this is not--I think the
person in charge of this at Boeing has recently been let go or
put on leave.
So you can tell me how you plan to bolster this position
within the company. But when you look at the issues like the
MAX anti-icing system issue and the 737 rudder actuator, and
these are issues that have been, you know, the subject of, you
know, much investigation. In one instance with my colleague who
is not here yet, she and I joined a letter asking, you know,
for this issue to be addressed and not delayed.
So, I think the Committee is getting a big sense that the
NTSB makes recommendations, the FAA kind of ignores them, and
then it takes a long time for them to be addressed.
And what we are trying to understand is in the ODA process,
what structure and oversight--before we hear from the FAA on
this point, what do you think about these incidents not being
addressed in the oversight process, you know, like the anti-
icing system and the rudder issue?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, we have taken a look at the IG report
which has several recommendations, a series of recommendations
to the FAA. Many of those recommendations require support from
the Boeing Company to provide information and data. So I can
assure you they will get full support to ensure that they have
access to all the information they need.
Now, on a higher level, the ODA, as you know, is a
delegation that the FAA provides to us to do some work that a
typical FAA inspector would do. The--I think the ODA is an
important element of the success of the aerospace industry.
We--the people that are ODAs in our organization operate
independently. They operate on behalf of the FAA. They have
direct line of communication with the FAA. And we have made--as
a part of the feedback, we have made changes to our ODA
organization structure to ensure that they are not feeling
pressure from management to do things that are not proper, and
I think that has been effective.
We put an ombudsman in place for the ODAs so they have
someone to go to if they see something that they don't like, or
they are feeling any kind of pressure, they can go to the
ombudsman. I think that is helping. And we also survey them to
look--to continue to ask them do they feel undue pressure from
management or undue oversight from management to do their jobs.
Senator Cantwell. I see that my time is expiring but I just
want to get in this point. You are committing to fix those
flaws that I just mentioned. And you--we can come back to this
maybe in a second round, but what are you doing to fix the
design and manufacturing defects so that they are not submitted
to begin with to the FAA?
And so, I think as we have to think about our oversight of
FAA and the role they play. We are trying to understand what
isn't working in this process. That both at the manufacturing
level, we have these defects, and then yet they get, you know,
checked off on a list, oh yes, that is in compliance. And so,
we are--I don't know if you have a quick answer to that but.
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, we are working, I mentioned the
fuselage improvements. We have got over a thousand applications
where we are working with our supply chain to improve the
number of defects. I think a main component of that is we have
to get to root cause. We can't just fix the defects. We have to
get to root cause and make sure the defects go away.
So we have enhanced our focus on root cause analysis and
ensuring that we are understanding where these defects are
being generated and that we are stopping the defect generation
so that we are not dealing with them. That is the fundamental
improvement that I think we will see.
Senator Cantwell. And then making sure that the attention
is focused not by a business person who is saying we have to go
fast.
Mr. Ortberg. Yes. Look, I have--I want to be clear. I have
not provided financial guidance to Wall Street for the
performance of the company. I have not provided guidance on how
many aircraft we are going to deliver. We--I have gone and
gotten financial coverage so that we can allow our production
system to heal. I am not pressuring the team to go fast. I am
pressuring the team to do it right.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
Mr. Ortberg. That is the most important thing we can do at
this point.
Senator Cantwell. I agree. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to
thank the family members who are here today representing and
advocating for their loved ones who lost their lives on
Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and Lion Air Flight 610.
And I want to offer you all my condolences. This committee
has a responsibility to work with the airline industry and FAA
to ensure tragedies like these do not happen again. Mr.
Ortberg, I appreciated the opportunity to connect with you
earlier this week and to discuss your ongoing efforts to enact
much needed reforms at Boeing.
In our prior conversation, we discussed some of the more
challenging aspects of implementing Boeing's safety and quality
plan. Specifically, you acknowledged the company's culture as
being the most difficult. While I can appreciate the difficulty
in reforming longstanding cultural challenges to a corporation
as large as yours, and while I agree that it needs to be
addressed, that is a long-term change, and it does not
necessarily produce immediate results.
So in the interim, as you look to instill confidence with
the flying public, what challenges and success has Boeing had
in enacting that safety and quality plan and meeting the six
key performance indicators that are outlined in that plan?
Mr. Ortberg. Yes, so as you mentioned Senator, the safety
and quality plan has a series of tasks to improve our safety
and quality, but we also have metrics that we are using to
actually measure the--are those tasks actually generating the
results that we want. We have--those six metrics have control
limits with them, what is acceptable, what is unacceptable. We
monitor those on a regular basis. These are metrics that we
share with the FAA.
It is on a digital dashboard. They can look at it at any
time, and they do. And we look at both trends, how are the--how
are those metrics performing day on, day on, day on, and what
does the trend look like, but also what does the absolute
number look like. So far--and it is early, admittedly early in
our production recovery system.
So far, we are seeing the results that we expect. The key
metrics are trending in the right direction. They are not all
exactly where we want them to be, and we didn't expect that. So
we continued to measure that. We do that actually across our
fleet of aircraft, not just on the 737 MAX program. Those
metrics will be the basis that we will use for determining are
we able to go to a higher production rate.
And if those metrics are not showing production stability,
then we won't request moving to a higher production rate. We
monitor them regularly and we talk with the FAA monthly about
how are we doing with the key performance indicators.
Senator Fischer. And I appreciate and--the focus on safety.
We have to have that. But in our call, I also brought up to you
the concern with the production rate, with the timeliness of
it. And you told me that Boeing is currently delivering planes
2 years behind schedule, about 2 years behind schedule.
My concern with those delays are the potential for negative
consequences for both national security and for commercial
operations. How, when you are looking ahead at production
rates, how long do you think--and I know it is early in your
tenure, but Boeing should be able to deliver planes in a timely
fashion while also meeting the high safety and quality
assurance expectations from the FAA, from your customers, and
from this committee--that this committee expects.
So what steps do you see Boeing taking to reduce the
production delays while still adhering to the plans?
Mr. Ortberg. Well, Senator----
Senator Fischer. So are those the metrics, the six steps,
the metrics that you are seeing, and when do you anticipate--in
a good setting, when do you anticipate to be able to offer some
confidence to the public on that?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, just to be very clear, we won't ramp
up production if the performance isn't indicating a stable
production system. We will continue to work on getting to a
stable system.
So I have not provided a date as to when we are going to
get up to a 38 a month rate. I suspect it will be sometime this
year. I am hopeful that that is where the production rates or
the production stability allows us to go. I will tell you, I
have talked to almost all of our airline customers and they
know--they are frustrated with us because we are late, as you
point out, on aircraft delivery, but they also know that we
have got to do this right.
And I can tell you, I have got 100 percent support from
them to do it right. I am not going to push to get the aircraft
and end up in having additional issues. Get it right. We will
be patient with you. And, you know, the good news is, is that
our customers have stuck with us, and I expect that they will.
And once we get the production system stable, we will move
up in production rate. I don't think we will ever get to where
we recover to all those deliveries. I don't think we will ever
get to a rate where we are--where people have their airplanes
all when they originally ordered them. But I think our
customers understand that and they are working with us.
Senator Fischer. And we want you to be successful. Thank
you.
Mr. Ortberg. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you much, Chairman. I just want to
start by expressing my deepest sympathies and appreciation to
those who are here today who lost loved ones. We just lost a
Minnesotan, Wendy Joe Schafer, in the tragic mid-air collision
in Washington, D.C., and my thoughts are with all of you, and I
hope we can make this better.
As Chair Cruz noted in his opening statement, there was a
recent close call unrelated to Boeing involving a Delta jet
that was filled with Minnesotans, including a member of my
staff, that came within 500 feet of a military plane. I
actually talked to the DOD over the weekend, Mr. Chairman, and
they have assured me this is going to be an immediate FAA
investigation. From what I understand, this was not about the
airline, and we have to figure out what went wrong here.
So, my questions of you, Mr. Ortberg--thank you for being
here. In your testimony, you discussed the efforts to elevate
Boeing safety and quality culture and how you have engaged
workers in the process, generating 26,000 improvement ideas
from employees.
Could you talk about how you have--what work you have done
on open communications and how are you ensuring that employees
continue to speak out on issues when they see them?
Mr. Ortberg. Thank you, Senator. The culture change and
allowing people to speak up is critically important to me and I
think to the success in the long term of the Boeing Company. We
have made significant changes in our business processes to get
people--as I mentioned, closer to the people building and
designing the aircraft.
We have initiated a culture change process within the
company, which, again, I believe culture starts with the values
and behaviors at the top, the leadership. We need to walk the
talk and people need to see that in the organization.
We are putting those values and behaviors into our
performance management system so that people are evaluated, and
their annual performance is determined based on how they be--
how they exhibit those values and behaviors.
We are putting it into our training program so that we are
training our leaders. We are also making leadership selection
decisions based on how do these people exhibit the behaviors in
the company.
Senator Klobuchar. OK, thanks. Go ahead. You have one more
thing.
Mr. Ortberg. My experience is that once people understand
what behaviors are acceptable, they tend to align to them. It
is when we have a leadership that maybe is not exhibiting
those--the behaviors that are on the poster, on the wall, but
not exhibiting those--people are smart. They figure out how to
understand what they are really being rewarded on.
So we are really working to change that culture, and I
think get to a culture where people feel free to speak about
issues and communicate across their team so that we can get
issues resolved quickly before they turn into bigger issues.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. We also have the issue of
pipeline of workers. And the Wall Street Journal did a report
on this just last year. Senator Moran and I got included in the
FAA reauthorization, our bill that created a new grant program
to train aircraft manufacturing technical workers. Could you
talk about what you have done to make sure that we are getting
in more workers, and what we should be doing better on that
front?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, we spend a lot of activity in early
STEM education and supporting STEM related activities to try to
get more young students into STEM fields to support the work
that we need.
Our workforce is relatively stable right now, which is
good. I think we came out of COVID and had significant
workforce demand. We have been through that. Our focus right
now is on training and ensuring the people that we have brought
in are effective and efficient in what they are doing.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. Just one last question
following the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282, the door blowout,
can you walk through what the enhanced oversight, because since
then you have been under this enhanced oversight--walk through
it very quickly compared to the previous oversight, FAA
oversight.
Mr. Ortberg. So, there is additional formal inspections
being done at Boeing. There is more formal inspections being
done at Wichita. Every door, whether it is a door plug or an
active door, is going through additional inspection to make
sure there is no workmanship errors that would require rework
at a later date in our production facility.
And as I said, we are seeing very good improvement in the
overall quality of the fuselages, and particularly around any
door related issues. We have added significant amount of
inspection.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Moran.
STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Moran. Chairman, thank you. I am told that, with
your consent, I get to make an opening statement, and I am
grateful for that because I want to follow up on the point that
you made in your earlier indication of a failure to hear a
return from the Army. And just to highlight the issue and its
broad magnitude and consequence, the NTSB report in regard to
Flight 5342 originating in Wichita, Kansas, and having its
fatal conclusion at Reagan National, now 63 days ago.
NTSB's preliminary report indicates that within the files
of the FAA, there were--the indication is that there were
15,000 near misses between a helicopter and a commercial
airplane at Reagan National between October 21 and December
24--15,000 near misses.
NTSB also found in the records of the FAA it is possible
for a helicopter on Route 4 to have as little as 75 feet of
vertical separation from airplanes on approach to Runway 33.
That suggests to me there are significant challenges and
potential tragedies that take place at Reagan on a consistent
basis known but not responded to over a long period of time.
And one of those issues, because of the potential for those
near misses and the fact that they are happening on such a
frequency--with such a frequency, is the issue of ADS-B Out for
which the Chairman and the Ranking Member are seeking
information from the Army as to why at potentially on all
occasions ADS-B Out is turned off.
And so, Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for your efforts and
your indications of how seriously you take this circumstance
and your demand for information. In today's hearing, now to my
opportunity to ask questions, this accident that occurred 63
days ago reminds me of the fragility of life and it makes me
even more compassionate and concerned for the victims of those
who died in previous crashes.
It is a wakeup call and an opportunity to reassess things
that are really important in life, and we need to do
everything, as we know we need to do, to make certain that
those who fly know they are safe because they are safe.
I am going to ask you, Mr. Ortberg, about a number of
things related to Wichita and manufacturing there, but I want
to highlight my view that before we talk about the economic and
job opportunities that occur with your company, that the most
important thing for a future of the aviation industry is the
public knows they can fly safely because they can.
In the absence of that, there really is no future for the
aviation--for the commercial aviation industry. And so, safety
undergirds everything that you need to do and that we need to
do for a future for your company and a future for the aviation
industry in our country. So, I want to ask you specifically
about some things in Wichita. You were kind enough, you were
gracious enough on your third day on the job to visit Wichita.
You have indicated in your testimony the role of Spirit
AeroSystems to the Boeing Company. And I don't know that you
said this in your testimony. If you did, I will repeat you, but
otherwise, Boeing is in the process of acquiring Spirit
AeroSystems.
That is a hugely important company in Kansas, our largest
private employer, employing about 12,000 people. And I want to
use this opportunity because it will be rare for folks back in
Kansas to have the opportunity to ask you about what the future
of their jobs are and what the future of many businesses who
rely upon work at Spirit. We have hundreds of small businesses
who do work for Spirit--I am sorry, who do work for Spirit, but
also do work for Boeing.
And so it is not just one company, it is not just Spirit
AeroSystems, it is the whole system by which Kansas aerospace
and aviation, the air capital of the world, operates. When I
first had a conversation with Boeing officials about the
potential acquisition of Spirit AeroSystems, one of the things
I think that was said to encourage me to be supportive, and
this is me putting my own motives into this sentence, but the
point was made that--it was indicated that without the
acquisition of Spirit AeroSystems, the new generation of any
aircraft developed by Boeing would not be--would not involve
work in Wichita or work in Kansas. With the acquisition, the
statement was made, that the work could be more likely occur.
So you are going to build a new aircraft one of these days, and
what is the plan for where that work will take place?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, we will. We are an airplane company.
We will do a new airplane. That is not in the near future given
the financial performance and the challenges that we have.
Obviously we are studying that, and we have to determine
what the final design of that aircraft would be to determine
where we are going to manufacture certain components. Let me
just assure you that Spirit AeroSystems and the work we do in
Kansas is critically important.
We are spending a significant amount of our capital to
acquire that company, and we are not going to do that and move
work out of Kansas. The work that we are doing there is going
to stay there. In fact, I am very hopeful that once we get the
acquisition closed, we will find opportunities to do actually
even more work.
And again, it is critical that we return--ramp up our
production because as you know, all those fuselages are built
by Spirit AeroSystems. So every time we can move to a higher
production rate, it is going to create jobs and opportunities
for us in Wichita.
Senator Moran. What is the reason that the acquisition of
Spirit, makes sense, is necessary for the purposes of Boeing
building a safer aircraft and having a process in place that
works better than what we saw with the door plugs?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, we really believe that focus--that
being able to focus the organization and integrate it within
our commercial production system as one integrated organization
will help us be more efficient and will help improve the
overall quality and performance of the fuselages that we are
getting from Spirit.
Now, as you know, it is not just 737 fuselages. We also
have defense related activity, and I am also excited about the
opportunities to couple that with our defense business to grow
the work that we are doing there.
There is great people in Wichita. You and I had an
opportunity to go meet with them. There is a great development
of the workforce going on for future employees in Wichita. It
is a great opportunity for us to exploit that workforce and
build more products in Wichita.
Senator Moran. Mr. Ortberg, you surprised me by bringing up
the topic of defense work. I was going to forego that this
morning because on every occasion you and I have had that
conversation because I insisted on it.
You have voluntarily brought it up, and I am appreciative
of that. It causes me to then ask this question. First of all,
congratulations to Boeing on its successful Air Force contract
with the F-47 NGAD. What can I expect in regard to work in
Kansas that would help fulfill that contract?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, I can't answer that right now. I am
headed to--after this hearing, I am headed to St. Louis to talk
with my team. There is clear security classifications that I
need to understand exactly what that answer is. I will get back
with you on that if you will.
Senator Moran. I look forward to having that conversation
again. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ortberg. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Duckworth.
STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank
you, Mr. Ortberg, for a meeting with me a couple weeks ago.
On a January earnings call--and this is to touch on some of
the questions you have been asked, but I think it is important
to clarify. On a January earnings call, you told investors that
you wanted to get through the production cap of 38 jets per
month and ultimately reach a production of 42 per month by some
time this year.
When I asked you about this, and as I have listened to you
answer some of my colleagues here this morning, I am
encouraged. When you told me that this was not an expectation
that you were setting for Wall Street and that your priority
was to ensure production quality, not a particular increase in
a production rate.
Can you assure this committee that you have not set a 737
MAX production goal for this year, and that neither Boeing's
directors nor its other senior management are under pressure to
reach a particular production rate by the end of this year?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, we have an internal plan. We have to
have an internal plan to allocate our financial resources. So
we have an internal plan that has an assumption on the number
of aircraft, but we have not committed that plan externally.
Normally airplane manufacturers put out a number of aircraft
that they will deliver, and then they march to that throughout
the year. We are not doing that.
We are not putting out the--either the financial component
or the number of aircraft we will produce. I have said what I
have said here today, which is I do hope that we move from 38--
move above 38 per month this year, sometime later this year.
When that happens is when these KPIs indicate we are ready
to do that. And obviously we have to have the FAA oversight,
and the FAA essentially makes the decision as to whether they
approve our ability to move beyond that rate.
Senator Duckworth. In light of that internal plan, can you
assure this committee that neither you, yourself, nor any other
Board member or senior manager at Boeing has a financial
incentive tied to an increase in production rate?
Mr. Ortberg. We have--Senator, we have an incentive plan
that is based on the overall performance of the company. If we
produce higher airplanes, that will result in higher
performance. So it is indirectly, but we don't have a specific
number tied to that. And nor have I communicated a specific
number to the employees in the company. So, the employees are
not marching to a particular airplane production rate.
Senator Duckworth. But if the production rate increases,
there is financial incentives for yourself and other Board
members and senior managers?
Mr. Ortberg. Our annual incentive plan has sales, profit,
the normal financial measures, and obviously the more airplanes
we deliver, the higher those numbers would be.
Senator Duckworth. OK. I want to go to the Delegation Of
Inspection Authority, a discussion that has already happened
already today. In October, the DOT's Inspector General found
FAA's oversight of Boeing production was not effective.
The FAA's oversight was so bad that the IG issued six
separate recommendations to the FAA to fix its process. There
were many terrible findings in the report, but one of the most
shocking was that shortly before the door plug blowout,
individuals within the FAA wanted to delegate airplane
airworthiness inspection authority back to Boeing.
Even worse, these individuals at FAA wanted to do this
without any criteria by which to assess whether Boeing could be
trusted to properly carry out these inspections. It isn't just
unacceptable, it is a total dereliction of duty on the part of
the FAA.
Prior to the 737 MAX crashes and production problems with
the 787, FAA allowed Boeing to self-inspect their aircraft to
ensure they conform to the FAA approved type design. However,
in the wake of the MAX crashes, we learned that Boeing had
abused its authority. Boeing had knowingly and repeatedly
produced 737 MAX aircraft with non-functioning angle of attack
disagree alerts in blatant violation of the plane's approved
type design.
And I believe strongly that FAA must not delegate
inspection authority back to Boeing until at a minimum FAA
fixes its own ineffective oversight of Boeing's productions.
Mr. Ortberg, will you commit to not seeking and not accepting
delegation of airworthiness inspection authority from the FAA
until the FAA has implemented all 16 recommendations from the
October Inspector General report?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator Duckworth, what I can commit to is
that we are working transparently with the FAA, and we will
support by providing them whatever information they need from
the Boeing Company to address the IG report. Those
recommendations were specific to the FAA, so I would have to
defer to them in terms of their plans relative to implementing
those recommendations.
Senator Duckworth. That is not what I am asking you. It is
up to the FAA to determine if the delegation is permissible,
but it will be up to Boeing to decide whether to accept that
delegation of that responsibility.
You are trying to restore Boeing's reputation. I don't see
how it would help that effort for Boeing to return to
inspecting its own airplanes for Federal compliance while the
FAA's oversight process is still broken. That would just look
like Boeing is taking advantage of a hobbled regulator.
Will you commit to not seeking and not accepting re-
delegation until FAA fixes its oversight by implementing all of
the IG inspector's recommendations?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, again, we have to work very closely
with the FAA. They are our regulator. They provide the
oversight and direction. And so, I can't commit to that. We----
Senator Duckworth. Why not? If they came to you right now
and say, we want to give you inspection authority back today,
would you accept it?
Mr. Ortberg. Only if that made sense relative to--in
performing the task and the overall safety of the aircraft. We
would not sacrifice safety of the aircraft by asking for
delegation.
Senator Duckworth. I am asking you to not--to commit to not
accepting it until the process has been fixed. So you would
accept it back?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, we--delegation is a very important
part of our business process and how we interact with the FAA.
So, we have to continue to go forward with delegation. We are
committed to make improvements where improvements--needs have
been identified.
Senator Duckworth. But you have a track record of abusing
that self-inspecting authority. And you have already said that
you and senior managers and Board members would make more money
if you can put more aircraft out.
I think that it is not appropriate at this time for you to
accept that delegation of authority should it be offered to you
by the FAA, before the FAA has met all 16 of the IG's
recommendations on how to fix the inspection system.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Blackburn.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ortberg,
thank you for being with us today. I think that listening to
this today, it made me think of Secretary Duffy's remarks that
it was time for you all to have some tough love.
And I agree with that, and I appreciate the conversation
around how dedicated you are to addressing a comprehensive
safety plan. That is important. And I want to talk with you
about what you are doing to improve your company's culture and
that work culture.
This is a very important part of any business. It appears
that your company's work culture has been frayed. So very
quickly, what are you personally doing to change this work
culture at Boeing?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, the first thing I am doing is leading
by example and getting our people closer to the people doing
the design and the production of the airplane. So, tomorrow I
will be in St. Louis with the people that are manufacturing
military airplanes on the floor.
Next week I will be in Everett, Washington with our wide
body team talking to union members about the difficulties that
they are having in manufacturing the aircraft and what we need
to do to help them be successful.
So that is the first step in changing the culture, is
getting people to recognize that leadership's role is to help
the organization be successful, not to make themselves
successful. So, we have got a lot of activity underway to do
that. We have made----
Senator Blackburn. How are your employees responding to
that?
Mr. Ortberg. Very positively, very positively. We just did
an all employee survey, which is a means that I am going to use
to measure the culture change, and we have that survey
structured so I can look at any place in the organization----
Senator Blackburn. OK. Then let me do this. I want to ask
you about whistleblowers.
Mr. Ortberg. OK.
Senator Blackburn. Because we have heard from some of the
Boeing whistleblowers. And I know you are familiar with their
names, but you don't have a good record of protecting and
supporting whistleblowers.
And some of the stories around these whistleblowers has
been very upsetting to people like me who have worked through
my public service to protect whistleblowers. I think that they
are essential. So talk to me about what you are doing to change
that policy to support and not to ostracize or isolate
whistleblowers?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, the company has an anti-retaliation
policy. It is unacceptable for anybody to retaliate against
whether it is a whistleblower or anybody bringing up a quality
issue. And I have made that perfectly clear in all of our--all
employee meetings, all employee sessions.
In fact, I have told employees if they have an issue, send
me a note. I will address it. And some have sent me a note. I
have met with the whistleblower--one of the whistleblowers.
My door is open to discuss with any of the whistleblowers
what they are seeing and make sure that there is no retaliation
in the organization. But this is a part of the culture change
within the company, is we need------
Senator Blackburn. Not to interrupt, but I want to ask you,
are you stepping back to some of those whistleblowers who have
experienced a less than positive relationship? Are you righting
those wrongs?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, in many cases, the whistleblowers
that I am aware of, those activities happened a long time ago.
Senator Blackburn. Know that.
Mr. Ortberg. Some of those are still with the company and I
have met with one of the whistleblowers with the company. So, I
know that in the past all the retaliation claims have been
thoroughly investigated. And if there is retaliation, there has
been corrective action taken.
Senator Blackburn. OK. Let me move on, COMAC. I think we
are all concerned about COMAC and the Chinese Communist Party.
And the CEO of Ryanair recently said they were opening--opened
to buying planes from COMAC.
We are all concerned about competition that would come from
China and the Chinese Communist Party. So what steps are you
taking to innovate and to make certain that you are competing
and outcompeting our foreign competitors?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, COMAC is a competitor. We also have a
much bigger competitor in Europe that we compete with on a
regular basis in all of our markets. We have to stay
competitive.
We have to invest in the future of our company. We are
investing in new versions of the MAX aircraft. We are investing
in the new largest wide body airplane, dual engine airplane in
the history with our 777X program.
And all those airplane investments are about staying ahead
of the competition and making sure that we can compete in a
global market.
Senator Blackburn. Got it. Thank you.
Senator Moran. Senator Lujan is recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. BEN RAY LUJAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Lujan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this
hearing as well. Mr. Ortberg, thank you for being here today. I
am going to follow up with something that Senator Blackburn
asked. What specific steps has Boeing taken to strengthen
whistleblower protections that ensure employees feel safe
reporting potential safety issues?
Mr. Ortberg. So, we have a speak up system, which is an
anonymous ability to speak up about something that is going on.
We have a Chief Compliance Officer who is independent from
the organization, reviews those speak ups, and I have a monthly
meeting with that Chief Compliance Officer to make sure that
we--if people are bringing things up anonymously, that their
anonymity is retained.
Look, our policy, as I said, we have a clear anti-
retaliation policy and if we see any retaliation, then we
address that immediately with disciplinary action up to
including dismissal.
Senator Lujan. Appreciate that. Representatives from
Boeing's Machinist Union, SPEEA, the Society of Professional
Engineering Employees in Aerospace, have emphasized the
importance of employees feeling empowered to speak openly about
those safety concerns. Mr. Ortberg, will you commit to having
union representatives directly involved in Boeing safety
discussions and decisionmaking processes going forward?
Mr. Ortberg. Yes, Senator, we have made actually some new
changes in that regard. As a part of our recent IAM
negotiation, we set up to where the IAM, the union actually has
an annual meeting with our safety committee of our Board so
that they can actually go completely around the management and
talk directly to our Board of Directors about any safety issues
that they see.
I also have a regular meeting with the union leadership on
all sorts of issues, including any safety related issues. And
of course, this speak up system I have talked about is
certainly open to all of our union members, as well as non-
union employees.
Senator Lujan. So it sounds like that is something you will
commit to, and you already have.
Mr. Ortberg. Yes, yes. We are doing that, and I certainly
want to have an environment where if there is a safety--I don't
care who it is in the organization, if there is a safety
related issue, that that is communicated and acted upon
immediately. And that is the environment we are trying to make.
Senator Lujan. I appreciate that. Later today, President
Trump plans to announce reciprocal tariffs against a number of
countries. Few details are known beyond this. If the Trump
Administration moves forward with proposed tariffs, what impact
would this have on Boeing's operations, particularly your
suppliers and workforce in states like New Mexico?
Mr. Ortberg. Well, Senator, a little bit of the answer to
that is it depends on what the tariffs are. And I obviously
don't know that, so I will be watching this afternoon as that
is announced. That is important to us.
But I will say that 80 percent of the airplanes we deliver,
the commercial airplanes we deliver, are outside of the United
States. So free trade is very important to us. And 80 percent
of the content of those airplanes, it comes out of the United
States.
So we really are the ideal kind of an export company where
we are outselling internationally, it is creating U.S. jobs,
long term, high value U.S. jobs. So it is important that we
continue to have access to that market and that we don't get in
a situation where certain markets become closed to us.
Senator Lujan. Appreciate that. Where does Boeing see the
most significant growth opportunities over the next decade? And
how will Boeing ensure that its safety and quality management
practices keep pace with your ambitions?
Mr. Ortberg. The--we have nearly half a trillion dollars in
current backlog. That is airplanes that have been ordered. Our
biggest opportunity in the next 5 years is perform--is to
deliver high quality. Get our safety quality plan in place.
We do have a couple new variants that as I talked about,
that we need to get through certification and into the market.
But I am confident that the Boeing Company can thrive if we get
our safety and quality plan done right, and we will.
Senator Lujan. I appreciate that, sir. I am not going to
ask you who named the F-47. I will leave that to someone else.
Mr. Ortberg. OK.
Senator Lujan. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Senator Lujan. We will begin a
second round of questions, and I recognize the Ranking Member,
Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you so much. That is a trivia
question if we are--oh, he was a test pilot from your state. Is
that what you are saying? OK.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cantwell. OK. Well, we want to return to, ``if it
ain't Boeing, we ain't going''. That is where we want to go.
That is where we want to go. This question is on ODA and
compliance. I just want to point out that in the 2020 Act that
we passed in the aftermath of the MAX crashes, we mandated that
you cannot delegate certification tasks related to critical
functions.
So we basically have said you can't delegate. And so, the--
I understand my colleague's question, but and it is an
important one, but in reality, we decided as a committee, we
are not allowing the delegation of critical functions anymore
because the MCAS system was a critical change and it was
something the FAA missed, in addition to the company mentioning
it missing it.
The FAA didn't understand. And we don't think that we--we
believe in redundancy in a lot of different areas and
redundancy in this case of the FAA doing its job and
understanding what is being proposed. So those critical
features can't be delegated--can't be delegated. And so, the
FAA has to do its job.
And so, I think in the next--the next time we get--well, we
have a nominee now for an FAA Administrator. These will be very
relevant questions for them on their strategy. But we will be
asking them how they are going to have the workforce, the
technological expertise, and all of that to stay at pace and
then to make an ODA system work, but we are not allowing them
to take critical features, critical safety features, we are not
allowing them to delegate that.
So, anyway, that will be an interesting point. Now, I do
think the question I have on the compliance administrator, you
guys have a Boeing problem solving method. I know that the
person who was in charge of that has just been recently either
laid off or changed. What are you doing to make sure that that
position--why the change? What are you doing to make sure that
who you have in this job is standing up for these root cause
analysis issues that you mentioned?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, we will go through an elaborate
interview process and ensure that we select the best talent to
do that job. That is critical--a critical component of that job
is to be able to provide that overall independence. And we
recognize that, and we will fill it with the appropriate person
when--after we get through the interview process.
Senator Cantwell. And do you think that you are in
alignment with SPEEA and machinists on what the feedback
process is in the company? I asked the former FAA Administrator
whether he believed that the FAA should have oversight into
those issues being brought up. So you have mentioned speak up a
couple of times.
Mr. Ortberg. Yes----
Senator Cantwell. And I am just not familiar where you are
in your conversations with SPEEA and machinists. Whether they
are satisfied--what do we have to do to make sure that they
feel like they--that they have a voice without intimidation?
Mr. Ortberg. Yes. I think we are making progress, Senator,
in that area. We do survey to make sure we understand what is
the current situation. We have seen three times the number of
speak ups in the last year over the prior year. So that gives
you an indication that people are feeling comfortable to use
the system.
We still have culture work to do. I think that there is--
there probably are people in the organization who say I am not
sure I feel comfortable about utilizing the system, and we
continue to work on that to make sure that everybody feels
comfortable utilizing it. But we are seeing improvements. We
also have improved the system, so it is easier to use, and I
think that is helping as well.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I think--going back to the expert
panel report, they were saying that ``the processes on SMS are
not,'' I am quoting now, ``structured in a way that ensure all
employees understand their role. And the procedures and
training are complex and in a constant state of change,
creating employee confusion especially among different work
sites and employee groups.''
So I think this--getting this employee input, and then what
would you say about the FAA having some insight into that?
Listen, this committee is--you know, we have--we were having a
very big discussion with both FAA and NTSB on trend reports.
The NTSB is identifying a lot of trends, and we are saying,
well, why FAA aren't you paying attention to the trend reports?
In fact, we also mandated a requirement that they publish a
trend report every year so that we can see what the NTSB thinks
are those trend reports.
So, are you committed to the FAA having some insight into
that process, whatever it becomes, where the machinists and
SPEEA members can speak up and the FAA can have some insight
into that?
Mr. Ortberg. Yes, Senator. We are absolutely committed to
that. And I have talked to the FAA. I have talked to Chairman
Homendy from the NTSB, to make sure they know that we will be
transparent and provide them the information to allow them to
do that. I think Chair Homendy has publicly said she believes
the next accident is lying in the data and that we need to do a
better job of analyzing the data.
We have stepped up our in-service data collection process
for our airplanes in service so we can do just that. Start
doing more data analytics on what we are seeing, identify
trends before they become incidences. And I think what she says
is absolutely right, and we need to be transparent, the
industry needs to be transparent on this data.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you for that. I see my time is
expired to go to the next round, but I just--that is a change.
What you just said is a big change. Is it not? The in-service--
the in-service data analytics.
Mr. Ortberg. Yes. Senator, it is a massive change that we
have been making in the company. We have talked a lot about
manufacturing changes, how we build the airplane, how we design
the airplane, but it is also super important that we pay
attention to how the airplane is being operated, how it is
being maintained.
And we have the ability to collect a lot of that
information from our customers and look for trends, use
artificial intelligence algorithms to help us sort through that
data, and find trends, and then go address those trends. And
those trends could result in changes to the airplane or changes
to the training or changes to the maintenance processes.
Whatever the corrective action, it is important that we do
that.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I actually believe that you could
do a better job at analyzing that information faster and in
getting that to your engineers that give them data to think
about things.
And so, I think that is an important--that is a very
important change. And I also--just as my colleague was asking
about trade, I am not going to ask you about that, but I would
just point out that the world demand for airplanes is 40,000
planes over, I think, the next 10 years. So the race is on.
Mr. Ortberg. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. So I really appreciate you getting the
safety right. Thank you.
Senator Moran. Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I first
want to offer my deepest condolences to the families of the
victims of the Boeing crashes who are here today. Thank you for
being here, and we are going to remember your family members
every day that we are working on these issues.
Your courage in fighting for a safer aviation system is
inspiring and it is going to make our committee accountable to
you to make sure that we do the work that you want to see put
in place for every family that flies in our country and around
the globe. So I am very grateful for your incredible work on
these issues and thank you for being here.
Mr. Ortberg, thank you for being here today and your work
over the past several months to improve Boeing's safety culture
and improve lines of communication with workers. I want to
discuss that safety culture and the importance of labor
representation in key engineering decisions.
So, I want to get straight to the point. Mr. Ortberg, does
Boeing currently have a single representative of workers on its
Board of Directors?
Mr. Ortberg. No, sir.
Senator Markey. Do you agree that it is a problem that the
engineers and aerospace professionals responsible for designing
and manufacturing the planes are excluded from Boardroom
decisionmaking?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, as I mentioned, we have a process
where we do have the union membership come and meet with our
aerospace safety committee of our Board of Directors on an
annual basis to discuss with the Board any issues that they
see, whether it is safety related or any other related issues.
They also have access to me and the management of the
organization.
Senator Markey. Yes. Well, again, I think that all of the
communication should be much more frequent and direct. And that
is why the Board of Directors is such a focal point because
obviously you and the other executives have to deal with the
Board of Directors on an ongoing basis.
In Boeing's 2025 proxy statement, it identifies seven
directors with expertise in safety. So let's take a closer look
at those directors with suppose safety expertise. One Board
member with ``safety expertise'' was up until her retirement
yesterday the CEO of Duke Energy and was previously a senior
partner at Arthur Anderson, the accounting firm indicted
following the Enron scandal.
And another Board member with ``safety expertise'' is the
CEO of a biopharma company who previously served on the Board
of Directors of Norfolk Southern and spent nearly two decades
at Morgan Stanley. Mr. Ortberg, in your view, do those Board
members have ``safety expertise''?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, those Board members provide a very,
very good input on safety. Now, the safety is not aerospace
safety, I grant it, but for us to be able to learn on how
pharma treats safety, it is very interesting to have Board
members who can provide different perspectives on how they
treat safety in their different industries.
Clearly, the energy industry, how they treat safety is very
important to their business. And so, we view having a diverse
set of inputs into that. It helps us think through and
benchmark what are other people doing in this area to see if
there is better ways for us to do it.
Senator Markey. In my opinion, using that as the criteria,
Duke Energy or biopharma, makes every person in America a
safety expert. They could bring the perspective of their
industry into your Boardroom. And I just think that that is
absolutely not accurate. That there has to be a particular
expertise about the aerodynamics that are at the heart of your
industry, and that is a very, very specialized kind of safety
knowledge.
So there is no way that these Board members should qualify
as safety experts any more than any other industry should. And
I recognize that Boeing has added a couple of individuals with
real expertise and experience flying planes and overseeing
important organizations over the past few years, but Boeing's
Board still includes numerous financial professionals and no
representatives from its workforce.
You know, financial engineering and real engineering, never
the twain shall meet. Just two different concepts altogether.
So let me address this from a different perspective. The FAA
has delegated authority to Boeing to conduct certain safety and
compliance oversight on its design and manufacturing processes.
In return for that delegation, the public should be confident
that Boeing is prioritizing safety at all levels of the
organization.
But without representation of workers on its Board of
Directors, Boeing is still flying blind because you don't have
the workers there, on the Board, giving the insights that the
Board should hear about whatever safety defects are potentially
going to rise. And again, the Board should not be shielded from
hearing this directly.
So, Mr. Ortberg, do you agree that companies like Boeing
that have been delegated, you have been delegated the oversight
authority by the FAA--you are given essentially a take home
exam. That you shouldn't include representatives of the workers
on the Board of Directors to make sure that you are hearing
their voices on an ongoing basis?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, at every Board meeting we have an
aerospace safety committee meeting that goes through all safety
related issues. That input comes from anywhere in the company,
including our labor workforce. So I do believe that the message
is coming through. I think the message is analyzed, and the
Board takes it very, very seriously.
Senator Markey. Well, from my perspective, that is not
enough. That the Board members themselves should be hearing
from a worker with expertise in safety issues so they are
hearing it directly in every Board meeting what the concern is
that workers may have. And I think it is a fair trade to be
honest with you.
Boeing receives some authority to self-regulate while
creating structures on its Board to ensure that it is
prioritizing safety and not profits. And that is why today I am
introducing the Safety Stocks at the Top Act, which will
require major aerospace manufacturers that have been delegated
regulatory oversight from the FAA to include multiple labor
representatives and safety experts on their Board of Directors.
Safety must start at the top, and the top is Boeing's Board
of Directors. Safety must be in the room, expertise must be in
the room, and I am looking forward to working with my
colleagues to ensure that that kind of representation is on the
Board. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for your indulgence.
Senator Moran. Senator Markey, thank you. Senator Rosen.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I really appreciate that. And I
want to thank the Chair and Ranking Member for holding this
really important hearing today. And last year, this committee
held a hearing to discuss the findings and recommendations
issued by the Organization Designation Authorization, ODA--the
expert review panel.
In that hearing, I asked a question about how the ODA
report found that input from Boeing's pilots were neither
consistently nor directly delivered to the highest levels of
decisionmakers in the organization. I believe it is essential
to make sure that pilots have a seat, not just in the cockpit,
but at the table so that we ensure their expertise guides and
enhances airline safety.
It is why I am glad to see that in the summary of its new
safety and quality plan, Boeing has committed to elevating
human factors and strengthening the role of pilots in the
design process. So, Mr. Ortberg, how has the role of pilots in
the Boeing design process changed since the ODA review?
What are you doing differently now, and what will Boeing
ensure, and how will you, excuse me, ensure that there is
meaningful and consistent input from pilots integrated and
prioritized into the design process?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, first of all, I agree with the
premise of your discussion. We really do need to have very
strong input from the pilots in both the design and the
operation of the aircraft. And we have changed our
organization.
We have added a human factors chief engineer, which is a
pilot who spends time understanding the interaction between the
pilot and the aircraft in all the design aspects of the
airplane but also the operational aspects, looking at our
manuals, looking at our fault trees to make sure that from a
pilot perspective how will that be--how will that interaction
with the aircraft happen. And I think this is an area that will
help improve our overall safety going forward.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I do agree because at the end of
the day, the pilot, that crew--that emergency might happen. It
happens like this, and there has to be a way that that
integration works. So, thank you.
I want to talk also a little bit about retaliation and its
impact on safety because the ODA expert panel report we
reviewed last year found instances where Boeing supervisors
worked on annual assessments and self-audits or investigative
processes which could present conflicts of interest. It could
erode independence or even compromise Boeing's commitment to a
non-retaliatory and impartial environment for its workforce.
Throughout the report, those folks interviewed gave
examples of the consequences of raising concerns about
potential interference and retaliation for managers and
supervisors. It is not acceptable. Not acceptable.
So again, do you have confidence that Boeing is now taking
the necessary steps to implement systems that provide workers
with multiple channels for raising concerns? Because this is
really important that they are addressed without fear of
retaliation.
As well as creating a culture of encouraging and
incentivizing safety at every level. And it is just so
important that each piece of the puzzle, if somebody has a
concern, that they are able to raise it without fear of
retaliation. I can't stress this enough because as you know,
lives are on the line--many people sit in your planes.
Mr. Ortberg. Yes, Senator. First of all, I agree with what
you said. I think it is absolutely critical that we have an
environment--we did take the feedback from the report, and we
have changed our organization structure to address that
specific issue. So we provided more independence for the ODAs
so they don't have a situation where someone's providing a
performance review that could provide--apply pressure to them.
So I think we have sincerely addressed the concerns that
were outlined in the report. And as I said before, we have
added an ombudsman as well to the ODA and that gives them
someone to go talk to if they see something or if they are
concerned about bringing up an issue.
And we think that has been having a good effect as well.
So, I believe we are addressing those issues, but we will
continue to monitor it. And if we have to make more changes, we
will do that because I absolutely agree with you. People need
to be free to make the right decisions without any kind of
overpressure from management.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I have one--I have just one
question. It is very brief. If you could be brief about it. You
talk about your rebuilding your human factors expertise. Not
everything can be done by AI and artificial intelligence, or
machines and all of that. We still need to be engaged. So how
is the process of rebuilding this capability, the human
factors, going at Boeing?
Mr. Ortberg. So, we just stood up this organization, and it
is an organization that is filled with pilots. We have also
developed what we call ECAPs, which are actually cockpits that
they can go fly. They fly designs.
We have potential design implementation. They go fly those
to look and understand what the pilot implication is early in
the design phase so that they can drive human factors related
requirements into the design and we don't have to deal with it
later on after the design is done.
So I do think we are making really good changes to get more
of that upfront in the design development process. And we are
filling this with world class people who are very expert at
flying aircraft.
Senator Rosen. Yes. Thank you. I yield back.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Senator. Senator Blunt Rochester.
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Blunt Rochester. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And
really appreciate the convening of this hearing. On behalf of
the families who are before us, as a Senator who represents
individuals who perished in the most recent flight in
Washington, D.C., this hearing about aviation safety is
critical to all Americans and in our ability to have confidence
in flying.
And so, Mr. Ortberg, thank you so much for taking the time
to speak with me prior to the hearing as well. I want to focus
my questions on workforce. And I served in the state of
Delaware as Head of State Personnel, and so, I understand the
challenges and the importance of hiring, firing, and retention
culture, as you have talked about. The fact that we have an
aging population in this country and that really impacts
retirements and our workforce planning and succession planning.
Boeing's workforce, its engineers, its machinists, safety
inspectors are the backbone of the company's ability to
manufacture safe and reliable aircraft. However, recent safety
concerns and production delays, coupled with over 4,000 layoffs
in November and December 2024, suggest that Boeing's workforce
may not be adequately supported, trained, or staffed to meet
the company's own quality and safety commitments. And from my
understanding, if I were to order an airplane today, it could
take more than a decade for it to be delivered, which suggests
major challenges in the production pipeline.
Challenges that might stem from workforce shortages or
training gaps. Can you talk to me a little bit about workforce
planning? Describe how current or projected workforce shortages
are affecting the company's ability to safe--to maintain its
safety and production standards.
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, one great thing we have is that our
mission is awesome, and people want to work for the Boeing
Company. So we really don't have a challenge attracting people
who want to work for the Boeing Company. I think where our
challenge is more making sure that we can train them.
You know, the kids of today are more digital than
mechanical. And so, that means a different set of training
curriculum for when we bring them into the company. Our
retention is quite high. For all the challenges we have had,
that has been--that is actually good. So, you know, my focus
right now on our employees is engagement, better communication,
and you know, helping train them to do their jobs more
effectively.
And I think if we continue to do that, our mission will
remain awesome. We will be able to recruit who we need to, to
make the company successful.
Senator Blunt Rochester. So just to be clear, there are no
areas where you are seeing workforce shortages or challenges?
As a State Personnel Director, we were challenged with, again,
people leaving, that talent, that brain drain. You don't see
that in any area, particularly in safety positions?
Mr. Ortberg. You know, I saw that much more five or so
years ago than what I see today. I mean, I am sure there is a
pocket within the company where we need some additional
resources, but in the main, I don't see any major resource gaps
for us to execute our plans.
Senator Blunt Rochester. It would be helpful as a follow
up, if you could go back and just share with us if there are
any particular areas, especially since I am also on the
Committee that works on labor. And so, looking at education and
labor, and making sure that there is a real pipeline, is really
important to us.
The FAA and the NTSB rely on Boeing to maintain strict,
internal safety reviews. However, every company has employees
that make difficult workforce decisions such as retiring and
seeking other employment.
So again, just ensuring that your new hires are even
trained. Can you talk a little bit about how you are adequately
training new hires to prepare them to uphold your safety
commitments?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, this has been a big part of our
safety and quality plan with the FAA is additional training. We
have added additional 550 hours of curriculum to our training
because--we found some gaps in what we were training. On
average, we have--increased the training program by about 20
hours, from say around 120 hours to 140 hours. So we are
increasing the training.
We are also adding competency evaluations for our employees
before they get onto an airplane and start doing work to make
sure they are competent in the work that they have to do. If
they aren't--if they don't pass the competency, they go back
through additional training to make sure that they are trained
to do the actual work that they are doing. We have also kind of
changed how we are training.
We found that in a lot of cases we were training people in
a lab and that didn't replicate the actual environment that
they--once they go out and build the airplane. So we have
brought actual airplane parts, tried to replicate much more of
the actual work they are going to eventually do, in their
training program.
Senator Blunt Rochester. I would just close with, as I
shared with you, we have some of my constituents that work at
Ridley Park. They take great pride in their work. They have
been fortunate to have good leadership, union leadership as
well that have advocated for fair wages and safe working
conditions.
And I would love to follow up on your relationship with
labor unions, and particularly with increased automation and
global competition. Just the concrete steps that you have taken
to protect and sustain union jobs for the long term.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Senator. Senator Young.
STATEMENT OF HON. TODD YOUNG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ortberg, great
to have you here today. I appreciated the phone call we had
just days ago, and want to learn more, in coming days, weeks,
and months as it relates to your new strategy for improvement.
But you have done a good job answering questions today.
There is, as we discussed, there has been a public loss of
trust due to systemic issues that have put lives at risk at
your company. I get the sense from our conversation and also
your answers to questions today that you realize this, you are
committed to changing this, and we are here to the extent we
can be constructive in that effort, either critically or
supportively in making sure you succeed.
Relatedly, AI automation and data analytics, I keep hearing
have the potential to revolutionize production not just in the
aerospace industry but also seemingly every other facet of life
and certainly manufacturing.
I would like to understand what concrete steps Boeing is
taking to ensure that these tools, of the digital economy,
aren't just in place, but are going to make a measurable
difference in preventing defects, predicting failures,
restoring public confidence in your aircraft? Has Boeing
integrated AI or automation to detect defects before planes are
delivered to customers? And if so, how effective has it been so
far?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, we use generally large language
models. We are using those large language models right now to
enhance our assembly instructions and our documentation, to
make sure that it is clear, it is more concise, and that will
help with the overall safety and quality of the aircraft.
I know we are doing data analytics as well using AI
algorithms. I am not an expert on that, so I can't give you too
much details, but certainly can look into that and get back
with you. But I assure you our team is looking at how to
utilize AI to do the data analytics to find trends, and predict
trends, and improve the overall performance of the aircraft.
Senator Young. That is great. I know it will be important
to your customers, to the broader public, and to your employees
moving forward. You have 8,000 direct and indirect jobs that
your company supports just in the state of Indiana alone.
I want to thank you for that. Almost a, you know, half
billion dollars of economic impact on our state. In light of
these new tools like AI and automation, can you speak to steps
that Boeing is taking to ensure that the employees are
adequately trained and prepared for this future of aerospace,
which we all anticipate bringing more safety to the operations
and things we manufacture as well?
Mr. Ortberg. Yes, so within our engineering organization in
the company sits expertise in AI, and we have our own internal
AI algorithms. So we are not using external algorithms and
data. And we have a training program where we train new
engineers on how to utilize--how to utilize these AI tools in
their everyday tasks.
So, you know, it is almost like how do you design a circuit
card? You have to have training--and people have these tools,
and they are available to our engineers, and they utilize them
on a day in, day out basis.
Senator Young. If there are things that we can be doing
here at the Federal level of Government to change existing
workforce training programs, to better prepare even our young
people for these jobs of tomorrow, which increasingly seem here
today, so that the changes in the technology and therefore the
workforce skill needs are changing so quickly.
But we want to keep up the best we can, so please don't
hesitate to work with members of this committee on optimizing
those programs or replacing them if necessary. How is Boeing
leveraging data analytics to track patterns and maintenance
issues to prevent future failures? Is that something you could
speak to?
Mr. Ortberg. Yes. We have a program we call our cost
program, which is a program with our airline customers where
they report data to us. And we have a large base of airline
customers. Not everyone reports, but most of them do. And that
allows us to analyze events, look for trends, follow up on
safety issues with the airlines.
It has been very effective on--I mentioned earlier, we are
stepping up our efforts in those analytics to look for more
trends, using AI tools to sort through the data to see if there
are trends or things that we can't see with the human eye, and
ensure that we are identifying those before they turn into an
incident.
Senator Young. Thank you, sir. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC SCHMITT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Schmitt. Thank you. I will now call on myself.
Thank you, Senator. Good to see you, Mr. Ortberg and really
enjoyed our visit. And we had certainly something to celebrate
when we were able to talk. We can talk a little bit more about
that, but I did--one of the things I found fascinating about
our conversation as it relates to this hearing probably more
specifically is the culture shift, right.
That the transition from different divisions and maybe some
different silos to sort of more of a team oriented spirit.
Could you just talk a little bit more about what that looks
like practically, as you guys have made some internal decisions
about that?
Mr. Ortberg. Yes. So culture is very important, and I think
in some cases we are too isolated. Our people stay in their
swim lanes or their organizational lanes, and everything we do
is team-based in the Boeing Company, large teams. And so, to be
most effective, we need people working across the
organizational boundaries and feeling comfortable to do that.
And so, we are off on a big effort to change the culture of
the company. And that starts with values and behaviors, and how
we reward people, and how we evaluate people, and how we select
people. And we are implementing those. This is going to be a
big year for us in the overall culture change.
I will tell you one thing that excites me is that the
employees of the company are the ones who really want to see
the company culture change. They recognize that we need to be
better in how we work together.
So I think we have got the case for change really nailed.
We are just going to have to go do the hard work of making sure
we walk the talk and get the right people in the right
positions.
Senator Schmitt. And you guys work with--obviously you work
with a lot of vendors and suppliers across the country. So, in
light of this hearing, what are some of the things that you are
doing to ensure the highest quality, and safety, and all of
those sorts of things?
Mr. Ortberg. Yes. So as a part of our safety and quality
plan, that also includes our supply chain. And one of the major
efforts is reducing the number of defects we are bringing into
our factory from our supply chain and reducing the number of
notice of escapes that we get.
This is where a vendor would call us up and say, hey, I
sent you something, but now I found something wrong with it. It
escaped their factory. And major activities to reduce those.
One is stronger first article inspection and doing first
article inspection when we actually move a product even within
a company. So if it moves from one location to another, one
factory to another, reevaluating the first article to make sure
that something didn't happen in that transition.
We have 1,000 activities underway, or 1,000 vendor
engagements underway right now, to improve the overall
performance and safety, and the quality of the deliveries from
our supply chain. And we are seeing better performance. I
mentioned earlier the fuselages that we get from Spirit
AeroSystems.
We have seen a 56 percent reduction in the number of
defects that we are having to do repair on, in our factory
facilities. And we got more work to do there, but I do think
getting to root cause and getting these defects out of our
supply chain is just as important as getting them out of our
Boeing production system.
Senator Schmitt. Well, switching gears just a little bit to
something that obviously hits home. I also serve on the Armed
Services committee, and you know, the next generation air
defense or dominance, the program was--you know, whether or not
the Administration was going to move forward, was paused in the
previous Administration, and then the selection of what that
next-gen fighter was going to look like.
We got some very--we got some clarity about 10 days ago,
and I just, I couldn't be more thrilled. You know, of course,
St. Louis is the sort of the hub of the operations on the
military side and we are building the F-47.
There are thousands of jobs. I know everyone is very
excited about that, not just for our country, but in Missouri.
Could you just talk a little bit about that program and how you
see that playing into this architecture of our national
defense?
Mr. Ortberg. Well, first of all, this contract award was
very, very important to the Boeing Company. In fact, I am going
to St. Louis tonight to go congratulate the team on this very
large win. And we are honored to be given this opportunity. Our
fighter business in St. Louis is historically legacy fighters,
the F-15, F-18.
As you know, the F-18 is reaching toward the end of its
life. So this is an important program for us to continue our
fighter franchise in St. Louis. And we will, you know, create
jobs and opportunities for a long time coming. So we are very
pleased to have that.
Senator Schmitt. It is generational. We are happy about
that as well and look forward to working with you on that and
so many other issues. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Mr. Ortberg, the
FAA has played an integral role in solidifying a safe approach
to production adjustments at Boeing, following the Alaska
Airlines Flight 1282 incident.
As Boeing continues to monitor its KPIs and begins to
increase production as appropriate, it will likely grow more
autonomous in its internal oversight. As Boeing regains
autonomy and eventually increases production caps, how will
Boeing guarantee safety without enhanced FAA oversight?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, I am not aware of increased autonomy
that will come as we increase production rates. We are going to
continue to provide transparency to the FAA on all the key
performance indicators. We will go through a series of
production increases. So the first one cap is at 38, but we
will go through the same process for every subsequent rate
increase. And if the KPIs aren't showing that we are meeting
the performance, then we won't move forward with a rate
increase.
So, I think this is a good practice. I think what we have
in place--it is data-driven. It is not subjective. We have
agreed with our regulator on what things we need to be
measuring. If we find we need to adjust that, we will, do that.
But I think getting to a data-driven process I think helps them
also have insight and prioritize where they should focus.
If our key indicators in one area are not good, that allows
them to say, OK, we need to put more oversight in that
particular area because there is instability in the production
system. So, again, I think the--I think the system we have in
place, the plan we have in place will be effective, not just in
the near term but for the long term.
The Chairman. Since you have become the Chief Executive
Officer at Boeing, there have been significant changes on the
Board and in the leadership. As the leadership changes, this
affects the culture at Boeing. What personnel changes have been
made at Boeing and how have these impacted the safety culture
of the company?
Mr. Ortberg. Well, in my opening remarks, Senator, I made
the comment, we have made massive organizational, and people
changes. And if you go back to the door plug timeframe, just to
time-frame of the changes, we have got a new Chairman of our
Board. We have got a new CEO. We have got a new head of our
Boeing commercial airplanes. We have new people in many of the
program management roles.
And so, we are changing. As we are changing the culture, we
are also changing people to make sure they are focused on
safety and quality as the foundation of the company. And so
far, I would say the results are showing good results.
We will continue to have to refine either promoting
different people or bringing some additional people from the
outside to help us on our journey, but I think the progress we
have made so far looks like we are getting the results we want.
The Chairman. Ranking Member Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to
ask a couple of follow ups on the--just the broader subjects.
But one, is the company concerned about a corporate monitor in
the DOJ discussions of the settlement with the families of the
victims? Are you concerned about that? Do you have a problem
with that?
Mr. Ortberg. No, Senator. As you--I am sure you are very
aware, we had an agreement with the DOJ. We reached an
agreement, which did include a corporate monitor. That
agreement was not accepted by the courts.
And so, we are in the process right now of going back with
the DOJ and coming up with an alternate agreement. Look, I want
this resolved as fast as anybody. We are still in those
discussions and hopefully, you know, hopefully we will have new
agreement here soon.
Senator Cantwell. Do you have a problem with the corporate
monitor?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, I don't want to prejudge what the
outcome of those discussions is going to be. I don't personally
have a problem, no.
Senator Cantwell. OK. On the, I mentioned in my statement,
thermoplastics. Do you see this thermoplastics as a really--a
game changing manufacturing technology focus? Is it really what
people are saying? Is it really something that we as a nation
have to get focused on? By that, I mean our skilling of a
workforce, test bedding technology, being ready for the next
big aviation change?
Mr. Ortberg. Yes, Senator. First of all, I appreciate your
leadership in this particular area and the hub work that you
have done in Washington is very helpful------
Senator Cantwell. For the supply chain. We just lifted that
up a little bit, yes.
Mr. Ortberg. Yes. No, I think thermoplastics offer a huge
advantage for the future, and probably more to streamline the
production of the aircraft. And so, I think it is an
important--one of those major important technology areas we
should be investing in, and I think that it is going to find
its way into many applications in the future aircraft
environment.
Senator Cantwell. But do you see it as something that we,
if we neglect, that we could fall behind in as a nation
juxtaposed to other countries? And I mentioned earlier the
demand for 40,000 planes worldwide. I mean, that is an
unbelievable--if we are somewhere--in the Nation it is about 2
million. I think we have come up with this number, 2 million
impacted workers in aviation in general.
But if you think about what 40 million--I mean, 40,000
plane represents, it is a huge demand increase. But if getting
a big part of that means doing the right investments and
innovation, and we have always looked at this and said get the
safety right. Focus on the innovation. Don't cut the safety
person who. is just doing this inspection on these critical
parts. Go get the innovation right.
So, is it really that big of an innovation sea change, I
guess is the question, juxtaposed to that demand? Or could we
wake up in 5 years and find ourselves way behind?
Mr. Ortberg. Senator, I think in general we are a little
behind. I think Europe has invested probably more than we have
general in this particular area. I don't think we are behind in
a way that we can't recover.
I do think it is an area that we need to continue to have
overall focus, not just as the Boeing Company, but you know, in
terms of new technology evolution within the country. And I
think thermoplastics isn't an area that--is an area that can
differentiate in a lot of different product applications. So, I
support your efforts for sure.
Senator Cantwell. Yes. Well, and I am just, again, on the
workforce side, this is a big opportunity for a lot of jobs in
the United States. Is it not?
Mr. Ortberg. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. Are you continuing to grow?
Mr. Ortberg. Yes, I think so. I think what you will see is
thermoplastics will replace typical metal applications. And as
you know, how to do that is a totally different manufacturing
process. So, we will have to learn how to do that.
We will have to train a whole different kind of
application, a different workforce to utilize thermoplastics.
And so, you know, I think we are on that journey, but we have
got a lot of work to do.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ortberg. Thank you for your
testimony here today. Senators will have until the close of
business on Wednesday, April 9 to submit questions for the
record.
The witness will have until the close of business
Wednesday, April 23 to respond to those questions. This
concludes today's hearing. The Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Kelly Ortberg
Question. Former Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Administrator Michael Whitaker capped production of 737 MAX planes at
38 aircraft per month after the Alaska Airlines door plug incident in
January of 2024. Boeing is currently producing under that production
cap rate of 38 737 MAX planes per month. The FAA's cap was justifiably
intended to reorient the company toward a focus on quality and safety.
However, Boeing's failure to meet the FAA-imposed production cap and
subsequent delay in delivering aircraft to major airlines impacts
flight safety and availability across the country, including in my home
state of South Dakota.
Please detail the specific steps Boeing is taking get back on
schedule and safely increase production of the 737 MAX.
Answer. To meet our commitments to our customers, Boeing is working
to ensure stability across our production system and within our supply
chain so that we can safely increase 737 production. A critical step to
ensuring this stability is Boeing's implementation of its safety and
quality plan, under the close oversight of the FAA. Boeing developed
this plan based on feedback from the FAA, employees, customers, and
independent experts. The plan focuses on four major work areas:
reducing defects, enhancing employee training, simplifying processes
and procedures, and elevating our safety and quality culture.
The plan also sets forth measures--known as key performance
indicators (``KPIs'')--to continuously monitor and manage the health of
our production system. Each KPI has defined criteria that help identify
areas of potential risk to our operations and trigger corrective action
through our Safety Management System (``SMS''). These metrics have
helped Boeing conduct more targeted safety risk assessments in priority
areas and maintain production health.
The KPIs are important criteria that we use to measure the
stability of our production system, which is necessary to increase the
737 production rate beyond 38 airplanes per month. If the KPIs are not
showing production stability, then we will not request to move to a
higher production rate. Boeing closely monitors the KPIs, shares them
with the FAA, and regularly discusses them with the FAA. It is
important that we do this right rather than fast to ensure that we are
not increasing the production rate before the production system is
ready. That said, the KPIs are generally trending in the right
direction, and we are encouraged with the progress we are making.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
Kelly Ortberg
Question 1. It's clear Boeing has taken steps individually, and at
the direction of the FAA, to conduct safety audits, identify Key
Performance Indicators (KPIs), minimize traveled work, and employ other
process changes to address systemic issues.
a. How are you measuring sustained progress on the production line
in Wichita and in Renton, Everett, and other Boeing facilities?
Answer. Boeing is implementing a comprehensive plan to improve
safety and quality across our production system and within our supply
chain, under the close oversight of the FAA. Boeing developed this plan
based on feedback from the FAA, employees, customers, and independent
experts. The plan focuses on four major work areas: reducing defects,
enhancing employee training, simplifying processes and procedures, and
elevating our safety and quality culture.
The plan also sets forth six measures--known as key performance
indicators (``KPIs'')--to continuously monitor and manage the health of
our production system. These KPIs, which are listed below, are
important criteria that we use to measure the sustained progress of our
production system, including our supply chain. The KPIs are:
Employee proficiency, which measures the share of employees
currently staffed who are deemed proficient in core skills.
Notice of Escape (NoE) rework hours, which measures time
performing rework due to non-conforming work from Boeing
Fabrication and suppliers.
Supplier shortages, which measures shortages per day from
Boeing Fabrication and suppliers.
Rework hours per airplane, which measures time spent
performing rework in Final Assembly.
Travelers at factory rollout, which measures unfinished jobs
traveling from Final Assembly.
Ticketing performance, which measures quality escapes per
ticketed airplane prior to delivery.
Each KPI has defined criteria that help identify areas of potential
risk to our operations and trigger corrective action through our Safety
Management System (``SMS''). These metrics have helped Boeing conduct
more targeted safety risk assessments in priority areas and maintain
production health. The KPIs are geared to monitoring three main areas
essential to production system health: employee staffing and
proficiency (KPI #1 in the list below), the performance and stability
of Boeing's and its suppliers' production systems (KPIs #2, 3, and 4);
and the quality of Boeing's production system output (KPIs #5 and 6).
Question 2. You indicate six metrics outlining your Safety and
Quality Plan with the FAA.
a. Are you anticipating shifts in the parameters for these metrics
as you receive feedback from the FAA, your airline customers, but also
Boeing employees?
Answer. Boeing worked with the FAA to select the six KPIs
identified in our comprehensive safety and quality plan. The KPIs have
been established and operationalized across Boeing Commercial Airplane
(``BCA'') programs and will be continuously assessed for potential
modification based on implementation experience.
b. What gives you confidence that the issues that predicated the
door-plug incident--fuselage defects upon arrival, improper
reinstallation, lack of documentation of the process, etc.--have been
resolved and result in safe airplanes to operate and fly in?
Answer. In the wake of the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 accident,
Boeing took action to ensure the safety of our fleet and production
operations for all of our airplanes. The NTSB has reported that a door
plug was removed from the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 accident airplane
for rework and was improperly reinstalled, and that required records
for the rework were not created, which is contrary to Boeing's policy.
Following the accident, in Boeing factories, we revised build plans to
ensure the security of all door plugs and added inspections to validate
proper installation. More broadly, to ensure compliance with removal
requirements, we mandated new removal training, tightened restrictions
on who can initiate a removal, and clarified our policy. We have also
taken broader actions to significantly reduce defects at our fuselage
supplier. Boeing has confidence in the actions it has taken--and
continues to take--based on the results we are seeing. For example, as
of March 2025, we have seen a 58 percent reduction in defects per 737
fuselage from Spirit. We also have confidence in our actions because we
believe in the dedication of our employees and suppliers.
c. How has communication changed between supervisors and scheduled
assembly and maintenance employees?
Answer. Boeing is committed to effectively engaging and
communicating with all employees to strengthen our culture of safety,
quality, and compliance. As part of our comprehensive safety and
quality plan, we have taken actions to enhance manager communication
with front-line personnel, since it is critical that we listen to and
learn from our employees.
Following the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 accident, we held quality
stand downs across every major BCA facility. More than 70,000 employees
participated in these events, which paused operations for a full
workday to focus on safety, quality, and compliance issues. The quality
stand downs generated over 26,000 improvement ideas from our employees.
The centerpiece of the events were breakout sessions at which front-
line personnel and managers participated in structured conversations
and activities to identify underlying quality challenges and reinforce
the importance of core values. We have transitioned from these stand
down events to holding quarterly manager-led safety and quality events
across BCA to maintain focus on these issues and facilitate
communication between managers and front-line personnel.
In addition, based on employee feedback, we have implemented
Employee Involvement Teams (``EITs'') across BCA, to bring teammates
from different work disciplines together to raise and solve issues, ask
questions, and offer assistance. EITs convene manufacturing personnel,
front-line leaders, and supporting personnel for weekly problem-solving
sessions, during which members review, track, and resolve employee-
generated ideas for improving the production system. We are continuing
to enhance EITs to further facilitate manager communication with front-
line personnel.
More broadly, Boeing is actively working to change our culture to,
among other things, improve communications between managers and their
employees. To help facilitate this culture change, we recently used
extensive employee feedback from an all-employee survey and a culture
working group of employees to redefine Boeing's values and behaviors.
These values and behaviors will be core to our culture change, as they
will redefine how we work with one another every day, how we manage
performance, and how we develop our people. These values include having
a focus on our people. For our managers, that involves effectively
communicating with their teams, listening to them, and making
improvements for them. Success will mean creating a cohesive culture
where the new values and behaviors are deeply embedded in our daily
operations and everyone is held accountable to living them every day.
This includes making measurable improvements in manager engagement with
employees and employee sentiment.
Question 3. Last fall, Boeing machinists voted to approve a
contract offer that ended a bruising eight-week strike in Washington-
state and California.
a. Can you speak to how Spirit's continued operations and
nimbleness during that eight-week period allowed for a stronger ramp in
production following the conclusion of the strike?
b. Will the surplus of 737 MAX fuselages coming from Wichita during
the strike and Spirit's current readiness assist Boeing's ability to
meet its production goals for the year?
Answer. Spirit is Boeing's largest supplier, building significant
structures and components for all Boeing commercial airplane models,
including fuselages for the 737. We are excited about the plan to
reintegrate Spirit into Boeing. As one company, our world-class
engineers and mechanics can work more seamlessly together to design,
build, and deliver safe, high-quality airplanes to our customers.
Boeing's planned acquisition of Spirit will enable us to further
strengthen safety, quality, and stability. During the International
Association of Machinists (``IAM'') 751 strike last year, we were
fortunate that Spirit was able to build up an inventory of 737
fuselages. In addition, the Spirit team did a great job of improving
the overall quality and production flow of 737 fuselages, which they
have continued to do. As a result, 737 fuselages were not a constraint
on Boeing's ability to re-start production after we completed our
contract negotiations with the IAM. And, currently, Boeing does not
view fuselages as a constraint on 737 production.
Question 4. Steady competition in the aviation and aerospace
industry results in a healthy supply chain.
a. How are you utilizing the changes you have outlined this morning
to influence your ability to compete for next-generation aircraft
design?
Answer. Boeing is an airplane company and at the right time in the
future we need to develop a new airplane. We have a lot of work to do
before then. But the changes we are making now to address the
challenges of today will help set the foundation to enable Boeing to
develop a new airplane. These changes include stabilizing our business,
improving execution on our airplane development programs, evaluating
our product portfolio to ensure we are focused on what will keep us
growing and competitive in the long term, and restoring our balance
sheet so that we do have a path to the next commercial aircraft.
Question 5. On March 6th, a Seattle Times report highlighted a
then-recent dialogue you held with employees in St. Louis and joined by
employees virtually. Some quoted in the article indicate, ``The only
thing that matters to us is what we see on the factory floor''. During
the hearing, we discussed some changes that have been made on the
factory floor.
a. Though, are there particular actions you are taking to make
certain you meet the expectations set by your workforce?
b. We have also discussed what sustained progress looks like on the
factory floor for strong production numbers, but what does sustained
progress mean to your employees?
Answer. Boeing is taking action to meet our workforce's
expectations by, among other things, changing our culture. Working
together to fix Boeing's culture will take time, but it is perhaps the
most important change we need to make as a company. Restoring the
values that were foundational to Boeing's storied history and setting
expectations for behavior will move us forward. Change must start at
the top and includes getting Boeing's leaders back to the factory
floor, into our engineering labs, and connected to other places where
our people work every day. Boeing's leaders must understand and remove
the challenges our teams face to make it easier for them to do their
jobs. For our teammates, we need to restore our trust in one another
and break down the barriers that prevent us from working together
across the company.
To help facilitate this culture change, we launched a culture
working group of Boeing employees focused on sharing ideas and
perspectives from across the company. In addition, we conducted a
confidential all-employee survey focused on improving our workplace and
culture, which the vast majority of Boeing employees took. Employee
feedback from this survey and culture working group were recently used
to redefine Boeing's values and behaviors. The redefined values and
behaviors will be used to help guide Boeing's culture change efforts
and will provide a baseline for measuring progress over the years. They
will be built into every step of the employee experience, including
performance management and leadership development. Success will mean
creating a cohesive culture where the new values and behaviors are
deeply embedded in our daily operations and everyone is held
accountable to living them every day. This includes making measurable
improvements in manager engagement with employees and employee
sentiment. There is nothing more important than creating a culture
where we're all working together. While it will take time and a
concerted effort, when we get it right, our culture will lead to our
future success.
Question 6. You recently hosted Secretary Duffy and FAA Acting
Administrator Rocheleau at Boeing's 737 and 777 production facilities
in Washington state. After their visit, they committed to maintaining
the FAA cap on 737 MAX production--leaving it to Boeing to provide the
confidence that lifting the cap will not negatively impact safety or
quality.
a. What do you need to see in Boeing's MAX production to deliver to
Secretary Duffy, Acting Administrator Rocheleau, and the American
people the confidence needed to consider any changes in the current
production cap?
Answer. Boeing is working to ensure stability across our production
system and within our supply chain so that we can safely increase 737
production. A critical step to ensuring this stability is Boeing's
implementation of its safety and quality plan, under the close
oversight of the FAA. As discussed above, the plan also sets forth KPIs
to continuously monitor and manage the health of our production system.
The KPIs are important criteria that we use to measure the stability of
our production system, which is necessary to increase the 737
production rate beyond 38 airplanes per month. If the KPIs are not
showing production stability, then we will not request to move to a
higher production rate. Boeing closely monitors the KPIs, shares them
with the FAA, and regularly discusses them with the FAA. It is
important that we do this right rather than fast to ensure that we are
not increasing the production rate before the production system is
ready. That said, the KPIs are generally trending in the right
direction, and we are encouraged with the progress we are making.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Kelly Ortberg
Quality Inspection Changes--Verification Optimization
The FAA approved changes to Boeing's quality inspection process--
known as Verification Optimization--to allow Boeing to forgo regular
inspections by trained quality inspectors based on a risk assessment
process.
Instead of keeping quality personnel responsible for determining
whether or not a job performed on the assembly line or a part complies
with FAA regulations, mechanics are now responsible for making this
decision, which means they have to inspect and sign off on their own
work.
Question 1. How are these changes to quality inspections ensuring
that your airplanes comply with FAA-approved designs?
Answer. Boeing is committed to quality, and inspections are an
important part of checking our work to ensure that we produce and
deliver conforming aircraft to our customers. To that end, we have
increased the number of quality inspections on the 737 program in
recent years. These inspections are conducted throughout every
airplane's build process, including during final assembly, in wings,
and during pre-flight. Although the number of inspectors fluctuates
with production rate, we have also increased the number of quality
inspectors on the 737 program in recent years.
Beginning in 2018 and concluding in 2021, Boeing implemented an
initiative called Verification Optimization to reduce visual
inspections by relying more heavily on technology and precision
manufacturing to maintain quality. While some inspectors were
redeployed elsewhere in the factory, we entered into an agreement with
the International Association of Machinists (``IAM'') that no union
jobs would be lost. Boeing discontinued Verification Optimization in
2021 and added inspections back into the process. Some of the added
inspections were ones that had been removed, and some were new--the net
result is that there are now more inspections than there were before
Verification Optimization began.
Boeing's inspection processes are conducted by properly trained
personnel under appropriate controls and oversight.
Question 2. How are inspection requirements being met on the
production line if mechanics are not trained in quality assurance as
much as quality inspectors, but yet still have to inspect and sign off
on their own work?
Answer. Please see the response to Question 1.
ADS-B In Equipage
In 2008, the NTSB told FAA that it should mandate ADS-B In, not
just ADS-B Out, in aircraft operating in controlled airspace. NTSB said
at the time that ``equipage of aircraft with ADS-B In capability will
provide an immediate and substantial contribution to safety, especially
during operations in and around airports.'' But fifteen years later,
commercial aircraft are still not required to have ADS-B In.
Question 1. Do you believe that ADS-B In would strengthen safety
for commercial airlines operating in complex airspace near busy
airports?
Answer. There are certain Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (``ADS-B'') In applications that can help enhance safety for
aircraft operating in high-density or complex airspace. ADS-B Out
generally refers to the automatic broadcast by an aircraft of its GPS
location, altitude, velocities, and other data to ground stations and
other aircraft. ADS-B In generally refers to applications that leverage
ADS-B Out data to provide capabilities and benefits for flight crews
and/or air traffic control. There is no single ADS-B In application.
Instead, there are multiple ADS-B In applications--some developed and
others being researched. The capabilities and benefits of ADS-B In
applications vary from application to application. The benefits of ADS-
B In applications can include safety enhancements, improved situational
awareness, and/or increased operational efficiency.
Question 2. What are the options that Boeing can provide to help
airline customers ensure ADS-B In can be easily installed on Boeing
aircraft?
Answer. The research, development, and deployment of ADS-B In
applications depends on the efforts and coordination of multiple
aviation stakeholders, including the FAA, avionics suppliers, and
aircraft manufacturers. Through the years, Boeing has played an active
role in the research, development, and deployment of ADS-B In
applications. Currently, certain ADS-B In applications are available
for some of our aircraft. We continue to research additional ADS-B In
applications, work with avionics suppliers to mature requirements for
ADS-B In applications, and study the potential deployment of ADS-B In
applications on additional aircraft.
Regulatory Compliance--Aircraft Certification
Since the certification of the 737 MAX, FAA and others have
identified numerous safety issues with the airplane's design that do
not meet FAA's airworthiness standards. One example is the engine anti-
ice system for which Boeing sought an exemption. I joined Sen.
Duckworth in stating that it wasn't the time to talk about exemptions--
it was time to fix this safety problem as soon as possible.
Question 1. The FAA Reauthorization Law, enacted last May, requires
aviation manufacturers to certify that their aviation product designs
are compliant when they submit data to FAA for approval. What is Boeing
doing to comply with this requirement?
Answer. The FAA's regulations require an applicant for a type
certificate or for approval of a major change in type design to show
compliance with all applicable requirements, provide the FAA the means
by which such compliance has been shown, and certify it has complied
with the applicable requirements.
To comply with these regulations, under the authority of the Boeing
Chief Program Engineer for each airplane model, Boeing certifies to the
FAA that each product design requiring the submittal of data to the FAA
for approval has complied with the applicable airworthiness standards.
For each individual data submittal, Boeing also requires the engineer
responsible for the design data to attest that the submitted data is
complete, accurate, and demonstrates compliance to the applicable
airworthiness standards. Further, the Boeing Organization Designation
Authorization (``ODA'') Procedures manual, which the FAA approves,
emphasizes that Boeing, as the applicant, is responsible for a complete
and accurate showing of compliance for every change to type design.
Boeing is currently working with the FAA as it implements all of
the new requirements created by the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. We
will continue to follow the lead of the FAA as they work through the
law's statutory changes.
Question 2. What systematic changes are you making to improve
Boeing's compliance with FAA airworthiness and certification standards?
Answer. Boeing has implemented important measures to improve the
compliance of engineering data with FAA airworthiness and certification
standards. These improvements have focused on raising engineering
knowledge of key design and regulatory requirements, clarifying and
standardizing procedures for developing design data submitted to the
FAA, and ensuring ODA unit members maintain independence in the
performance of their FAA authorized functions. The improvement measures
include:
Enhancing our engineering workforce training curriculum
covering the FAA's type certification procedures and
airworthiness standards, since knowledge of this information is
foundational to ensuring product design compliance.
Increasing technical excellence in our engineering designs
and compliance with certification requirements through
documentation and use of curated design practices that capture
key engineering knowledge, lessons learned, and best practices
drawn from Boeing's long history of aerospace design
innovation.
Using independent Technical Design Reviews led by domain
experts to identify risks and issues earlier in the design
process and help ensure first-pass engineering quality.
Clarifying and strengthening procedures to create and
validate design safety assessments, and standardizing and
documenting engineering guidance for applying robust system
engineering principles, such as development assurance.
Establishing enterprise-wide Functional Chief Engineers
dedicated to ensuring technical excellence. Most recently this
includes the appointment of a Human Factors Functional Chief
Engineer, who is a senior engineering leader dedicated to
ensuring excellence within the practice of human factors across
Boeing.
Strengthening the ODA system by completing the re-
organization of ODA engineering unit members to give them an
independent reporting structure aligned with their functional
engineering organizations.
Safety Reporting Systems and ASAP Reporting
A key component of an effective SMS is an effective employee safety
reporting system and voluntary reporting culture, in which frontline
workers feel that their safety concerns will be heard and meaningfully
addressed, without fear of retaliation.
The ODA Expert Review Panel recommended that Boeing implement an
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) at all production sites. ASAP is
a tri-party agreement for the FAA, Boeing, and a union representing
Boeing employees to jointly review filed safety reports and address
problems early.
ASAPs would leverage Boeing's current employee reporting system--
known as Speak Up--while providing important transparency for FAA on
what concerns are raised.
While the Machinists, Boeing, and the FAA have a tri-party
agreement for the Everett and Renton production lines, modeled after
ASAP, it took years of advocacy by the Machinists to get there. And
now, public reporting highlights that, in trying to reach an ASAP
agreement for Puget Sound facilities with the engineering union SPEEA,
Boeing would like to control the flow of information that reaches the
FAA.
Question 1. Is controlling the flow of information part of an
effective reporting system? Is it part of a healthy safety culture? Why
or why not?
Answer. Boeing is focused on fostering a healthy safety culture by
empowering and encouraging all employees to speak up if they have
safety or quality concerns. We have a reporting system called Speak Up
that provides every employee with the opportunity to anonymously or
confidentially report safety and quality concerns related to Boeing
products and services. Retaliation against those who do is strictly
prohibited and Boeing has strong policies against such conduct that we
consistently communicate to our employees.
In 2024, the FAA issued a 14 C.F.R. Part 5 Safety Management System
(``SMS'') rule that requires Boeing to have ``[a] confidential employee
reporting system in which employees can report hazards, issues,
concerns, occurrences, incidents, as well as propose solutions and
safety improvements, without concern of reprisal for reporting.'' 14
C.F.R. Sec. 5.71(a)(7). Boeing has implemented this requirement through
Speak Up. With respect to the flow of information, the FAA's SMS rule
requires Boeing to submit an anonymized summary of its confidential
employee reports to the FAA once every six months. 14 C.F.R.
Sec. 5.71(c). Boeing is working on implementing this requirement.
Question 2. Do you consider it to be important for FAA to have
visibility into a filed ASAP report? If yes, why? If no, why not?
Answer. As described above, through the implementation of the FAA's
SMS rule, the FAA will have visibility into anonymized Speak Up
reports. In addition, the FAA currently has visibility into certain
Speak Up reports under a tri-party agreement between Boeing, the FAA,
and the International Association of Machinists (``IAM'') 751 in
Washington state. Under this agreement, which is modeled after the
Aviation Safety Action Program (``ASAP''), the FAA sits on an event
review committee (``ERC'') that jointly reviews certain product safety-
related issues reported through Speak Up by IAM 751-represented
employees.
Question 3. What are you doing to implement the ODA Expert Review
Panel's recommendation to set up an ASAP at all Boeing production
sites?
Answer. Boeing supported the Aircraft Certification, Safety &
Accountability Act Section 103 Organization Designation Authorization
(``ODA'') Expert Panel's review and acknowledges the importance of its
work. Under the FAA's oversight, we have been working to make changes
in response to the panel's recommendations and we will continue that
critical work. As described above, Boeing, the FAA, and IAM 751 in
Washington state currently have a tri-party agreement, which is modeled
after ASAP. Like the expert panel, we recognize the value of this
program. We are evaluating its progress and considering deploying
similar programs more broadly. For example, we have had discussions
with the Society of Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace
(``SPEEA'') about adopting an ASAP-like tri-party agreement that would
continue to strengthen safety, quality, and compliance.
Question 4, What steps have you taken since the Alaska 1282
accident to ensure Boeing's Speak Up system does not filter out
legitimate complaints and concerns?
Answer. As described above, Boeing empowers and encourages all
employees to speak up if they have safety or quality concerns. Boeing
understands the importance of carefully reviewing the reports submitted
to our Speak Up system. Accordingly, once a report is received in Speak
Up, a cross-functional enterprise triage team reviews the report to
determine the nature of the issue raised and the appropriate
investigative path for its disposition. Since the Alaska Airlines
Flight 1282 accident, Boeing has taken important steps to simplify and
enhance the Speak Up system process. Boeing increased promotion of how
to report, the benefits of reporting, and the confidentiality
protections for those who report, resulting in a substantial increase
in the number of reports to Speak Up. Increased reporting is a sign of
progress toward a robust reporting culture. In addition, Boeing
improved the Speak Up reporting interface to make it more user-friendly
and increased transparency about the status and resolution of reports.
As a result, employees who confidentially submit Speak Up reports
receive e-mail notifications about the status of their reports and can
check the status of their reports on a personalized dashboard.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Lisa Blunt Rochester to
Kelly Ortberg
Safety Inspectors
Question 1. Given the concerns raised about Boeing's Organization
Designation Authorization (ODA) program contributing to past safety
incidents, what specific measures has Boeing implemented to ensure its
self-inspection processes are rigorous and transparent?
Answer. Organization Designation Authorization (``ODA'') is an FAA
program that authorizes certain approved Boeing personnel to act as
representatives of the FAA for certain purposes. These ODA personnel
only act on behalf of the FAA when delegated by the FAA to do so.
Boeing employees selected as ODA unit members perform a critical role
on behalf of the FAA in aircraft certification and safety assurance. In
recent years, under FAA oversight, Boeing has implemented important
measures to strengthen our ODA program and improve independence so that
ODA unit members can perform their delegated duties free from
interference. These measures include:
Restructuring the management and reporting structure of our
ODA engineering unit members to give them greater independence.
Adding ODA unit member capacity and improving the future ODA
pipeline to address retirements and to meet current needs.
Establishing a dedicated ODA ombudsperson, who serves as a
neutral third party to advise and assist ODA unit members with
concerns, including related to independence.
Implementing an annual assessment of the effectiveness of
the Boeing ODA Administration team's oversight of the ODA
program with the goal of improving support to the ODA unit.
Updating the ODA unit member interference reporting process
and associated training.
Creating and disseminating design practices and
participating in technical design reviews to ensure that our
historical best practices are applied to design changes through
detailed technical reviews by engineers and independent expert
reviewers.
Safety Culture and Employee Reporting
Question 1. Reports have indicated that Boeing's safety management
system (SMS) may confuse employees, potentially hindering effective
safety reporting. What steps is Boeing taking to simplify and clarify
safety protocols to encourage proactive reporting and address safety
concerns raised by employees?
Answer. Over the last year, simplification has been a focus area
for Boeing and has resulted in changes to both our reporting system
processes and other important Safety Management System (``SMS'')
processes. Boeing is focused on fostering a healthy safety culture by
empowering and encouraging all employees to speak up if they have
safety or quality concerns. We have a reporting system called Speak Up
that provides every employee with the opportunity to anonymously or
confidentially report safety and quality concerns related to Boeing
products and services. Retaliation against those who do is strictly
prohibited and Boeing has strong policies against such conduct that we
consistently communicate to our employees.
Since the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 accident, Boeing has taken
important steps to simplify and enhance the Speak Up system process.
Boeing increased promotion of how to report, the benefits of reporting,
and the confidentiality protections for those who report, resulting in
a substantial increase in the number of reports to Speak Up. Increased
reporting is a sign of progress toward a robust reporting culture. In
addition, Boeing improved the Speak Up reporting interface to make it
more user-friendly and increased transparency about the status and
resolution of reports. As a result, employees who confidentially submit
Speak Up reports receive e-mail notifications about the status of their
reports and can check the status of their reports on a personalized
dashboard.
Workforce Challenges/Inspectors
Question 1. Boeing has faced notable challenges in recruiting and
retaining qualified safety inspectors, particularly following
significant workforce reductions during the COVID-19 pandemic. This
loss of experienced personnel has been linked to subsequent quality
control issues. Additionally, the FAA has encountered difficulties in
maintaining adequate staffing for effective oversight of Boeing's
operations. Given these challenges, what specific strategies is Boeing
implementing to attract, train, and retain a skilled safety inspector
workforce to uphold the highest safety standards in manufacturing and
quality control?
Answer. Boeing is committed to attracting, training, and retaining
a talented workforce, including quality inspectors and mechanics, to
produce safe, high-quality airplanes. Boeing offers employees a wide
range of competitive benefits, including market-leading health and
retirement plans, paid time off, and programs that support employees,
their families, and communities. For example, in November 2024, we
completed union contract negotiations with the International
Association of Machinists (``IAM'') in Washington state and Oregon that
included a thirty-eight percent general wage increase over four years.
Boeing also supports the performance, development, and professional
growth of our workforce, including by providing meaningful work
assignments, generous tuition assistance, leadership development
opportunities, and virtual and in-person learning resources.
As part of Boeing's comprehensive safety and quality plan, we are
enhancing training and development of our quality inspectors and
mechanics. Often new employees join us with varying experience levels.
As a result, we are investing in comprehensive training programs to
improve their baseline expertise. Our goal is to ensure all employees
have the necessary knowledge and skills to perform their roles
effectively. For example:
We have overhauled our foundational training, lengthening
its duration to better equip new employees, and enhanced on-
the-job training.
We have added hundreds of hours of new curriculum to
training programs.
We have deployed workplace coaches and peer trainers and
established skills enhancement centers on the production floor.
We have implemented proficiency assessments for many quality
inspectors and mechanics, ensuring their understanding of
drawings and specifications.
In addition, as part of our safety and quality plan, we are
simplifying the plans and processes that our quality inspectors and
mechanics use to perform their jobs. For example, we are consolidating
and clarifying procedures and eliminating overlaps and confusion in
build plans and work instructions to make them more accessible and
understandable to our employees, particularly those with less
experience.
Question 2. How is Boeing collaborating with the FAA to ensure that
both organizations have the necessary personnel to maintain rigorous
safety oversight now and in the future? Can you also provide general
projections on the number of safety inspectors required to meet future
needs?
Answer. Under the FAA's close oversight, Boeing is implementing our
comprehensive safety and quality plan. One of the plan's major work
areas is enhancing employee training, which will help ensure that
Boeing has the necessary personnel to maintain safety and quality in
our production system now and in the future. To that end, Boeing worked
with the FAA to select a KPI that focuses on employee proficiency. This
KPI measures the share of employees currently staffed who are deemed
proficient in core skills. Each KPI, including the employee proficiency
KPI, has defined criteria that help identify areas of potential risk to
our operations and trigger corrective action through our Safety
Management System (``SMS''). Boeing closely monitors these KPIs, shares
them with the FAA, and regularly discusses them with the FAA.
With respect to FAA Aviation Safety Inspectors, in September 2025,
then-FAA Administrator Michael Whitaker told Congress the following
about the number of FAA Aviation Safety Inspectors at Boeing production
and supplier facilities: ``The total target to answer your direct
question is 55 by the end of the year. We're at 46 right now, and we
expect to hit the 55. Basically, it's 13 in any of the three big Boeing
facilities and 16 in various supplier facilities.'' Our understanding
is that there are currently more than 50 FAA Aviation Safety Inspectors
resident in Boeing production and supplier facilities. However, the FAA
would be the best source for a definitive answer on current FAA
Aviation Safety Inspector staffing levels and future needs.
Long-Term Safety Improvement Plans
Question 1. Beyond immediate corrective actions, what long-term
strategies does Boeing have in place to institutionalize a culture of
safety, ensure continuous improvement in safety practices, and prevent
future lapses in safety oversight?
Answer. In the wake of the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 accident,
Boeing took immediate corrective actions to ensure the safety of our
fleet and production operations for all of our airplanes. Then, we
gathered feedback from the FAA, employees, customers, and independent
experts to develop a comprehensive plan to improve safety and quality
across our production system and within our supply chain. The plan
contains both short-term and long-term strategies. It focuses on four
major work areas: reducing defects, enhancing employee training,
simplifying processes and procedures, and elevating our safety and
quality culture. We are implementing this plan under the close
oversight of the FAA. Boeing is committed to this plan and to
continuous improvement.
Among other things, the plan sets forth six measures--known as key
performance indicators (``KPIs'')--to continuously monitor and manage
the health of our production system. These KPIs are part of our long-
term strategy to strengthen safety and quality. Each KPI has defined
criteria that help identify areas of potential risk to our operations
and trigger corrective action through our Safety Management System
(``SMS''). These metrics have helped Boeing conduct more targeted
safety risk assessments in priority areas and maintain production
health.
As part of the plan, we are also focused on elevating our safety
and quality culture. This includes providing our workforce with the
long-term infrastructure and support needed for continuous improvement,
reporting issues, and solving problems. For example:
We have enhanced and further promoted the use of our
confidential employee reporting system--Speak Up--to report
safety and quality concerns.
We have implemented Employee Involvement Teams across Boeing
Commercial Airplanes (``BCA'') to bring teammates from
different work disciplines together on a weekly basis to raise
and solve issues, ask questions, and offer assistance.
We have conducted mandatory product safety and quality
training for all employees.
We are conducting quarterly manager-led safety and quality
events across BCA to maintain our long-term focus on safety and
quality.
Working together to fix Boeing's culture will take time, but it is
perhaps the most important change we need to make as a company.
Restoring the values that were foundational to Boeing's storied history
and setting expectations for behavior will move us forward. Change must
start at the top and includes getting Boeing's leaders back to the
factory floor, into our engineering labs, and connected to other places
where our people work every day. Boeing's leaders must understand and
remove the challenges our teams face to make it easier for them to do
their jobs. For our teammates, we need to restore our trust in one
another and break down the barriers that prevent us from working
together across the company.
To help facilitate this culture change, we launched a culture
working group of Boeing employees focused on sharing ideas and
perspectives from across the company. In addition, we conducted a
confidential all-employee survey focused on improving our workplace and
culture, which the vast majority of Boeing employees took. Employee
feedback from this survey and culture working group were recently used
to redefine Boeing's values and behaviors. The redefined values and
behaviors will be used to help guide Boeing's culture change efforts
and will provide a baseline for measuring progress over the years. They
will be built into every step of the employee experience, including
performance management and leadership development. Success will mean
creating a cohesive culture where the new values and behaviors are
deeply embedded in our daily operations and everyone is held
accountable to living them every day. This includes making measurable
improvements in manager engagement with employees and employee
sentiment. There is nothing more important than creating a culture
where we're all working together. While it will take time and a
concerted effort, when we get it right, our culture will lead to our
future success.
[all]