[Senate Hearing 119-130]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-130
NTSB PRELIMINARY REPORT:
THE DCA MIDAIR COLLISION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, SPACE, AND
INNOVATION
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 27, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-288 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
TODD YOUNG, Indiana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOHN CURTIS, Utah BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
BERNIE MORENO, Ohio JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
TIM SHEEHY, Montana JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ANDY KIM, New Jersey
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Liam McKenna, General Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
Jonathan Hale, General Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, SPACE, AND INNOVATION
JERRY MORAN, Kansas, Chairman TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois, Ranking
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
TED BUDD, North Carolina JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
TIM SHEEHY, Montana ANDY KIM, New Jersey
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 27, 2025................................... 1
Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 1
Statement of Senator Duckworth................................... 3
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 5
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 7
Letter dated July 10, 2023 to Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton from
Zephranie Buetow, Assistant Secretary for Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.............. 106
Statement of Senator Budd........................................ 108
Statement of Senator Schmitt..................................... 113
Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................ 115
Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 117
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 119
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 123
Witnesses
Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chairman, National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB)................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Chris Rocheleau, Acting Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration................................................. 92
Prepared statement........................................... 93
Brigadier General Matthew Braman, Director of Army Aviation,
Department of the Army......................................... 94
Prepared statement........................................... 96
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Jennifer Homendy
by:
Hon. Jerry Moran............................................. 133
Hon. Shelley Moore Capito.................................... 133
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 133
Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 134
Hon. Jacky Rosen............................................. 136
Response to written questions submitted to Chris Rocheleau by:
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 137
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 138
Hon. Jerry Moran............................................. 139
Hon. Shelley Moore Capito.................................... 140
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 143
Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 144
Hon. Jacky Rosen............................................. 145
Response to written questions submitted to Brigadier General
Matthew Braman by:
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 146
Hon. Jerry Moran............................................. 146
Hon. Shelley Moore Capito.................................... 148
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 148
NTSB PRELIMINARY REPORT:
THE DCA MIDAIR COLLISION
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 2025
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Aviation, Space, and Innovation,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jerry Moran,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Moran [presiding], Cruz, Sullivan, Budd,
Schmitt, Sheehy, Capito, Duckworth, Cantwell, Klobuchar,
Markey, and Hickenlooper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Moran. The Committee will come to order. The
Subcommittee on Aviation and Space of the United States
Senate's Committee on Commerce convenes today for what I
consider a very important hearing.
Fifty-seven days ago, our Nation witnessed the first major
U.S. commercial passenger flight crash in nearly 16 years.
Families had their loved ones taken from them in an instant.
Children lost their parents, husbands lost their wives, a
Kansas couple lost their daughter, and a rural community in our
state, called Kiowa, lost a husband and wife, a pillar of the
community, who were traveling to visit their daughter in
college.
I have taken that American flight before. There were many
Kansans on that flight and several of the members of this
Committee lost constituents on the American Airlines Flight
5342, and the Army's Black Hawk helicopter.
In addition to the families who are grieving, our first
responders made heroic efforts to find survivors and save
lives, and the investigators have spent nearly 2 months
searching the Potomac River and working to reconstruct wreckage
to find answers.
It has been a difficult 57 days.
Sixty-seven lives that were lost on January 29 were taken
prematurely in an accident that, by all indications, should
have been avoided. Now the families of these victims, the
Federal Aviation Administration, the National Transportation
Safety Board, the U.S. Army, and Congress are tasked with how
to best honor the memory and make certain accidents like this
never happen again.
I want to highlight NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy and NTSB
Board for their diligence and transparency throughout the
investigations. That job obviously is not an easy one, but it
has been done with professionalism and care. It is their work
that brings us here today to review.
NTSB's preliminary report into the midair collision
provides insight into the events of January 29, but many
questions, certainly in my view, many questions still need to
be answered, not only by the NTSB's investigation but by our
Nation's aviation safety regulator and by the Army.
The preliminary report provides alarming statistics in
using existing FAA data on the risks at DCA to aviation safety.
That data includes, and NTSB provides, these numbers. In a 13-
year period, not a single month went by without at least one,
quote, ``close call'' between a helicopter and a commercial jet
operating at DCA. Between October 21 and December 24, there
were 85 incidents where the lateral separation between a
commercial jet and a helicopter was less than 1,500 feet and
the vertical separation was less than 200 feet. And during that
same timeframe, there were more 15,000, quote, ``close
proximity events'' between a helicopter and a commercial
airplane, the NTSB findings that it is possible for a
helicopter on Route 4 to have as little as 75 feet of vertical
separation from airplanes on approach to Runway 33.
I commend the NTSB for issuing urgent safety
recommendations, and I commend the FAA in acting to implement
them, particularly the permanent restriction of nonessential
helicopter operations at DCA. However, I want to know how, with
these statistics in the FAA files, why prior to January 29 the
agency failed to improve safety protocols at Reagan National
Airport?
This Committee worked tirelessly to pass an FAA
reauthorization bill last Congress that prioritized safety,
enabling our industry to continue innovating and equipping the
FAA with the resources necessary to keep our skies safe. We
need a permanent, confirmed FAA administrator to implement this
important framework for the future of the industry. President
Trump recently nominated Bryan Bedford to lead the FAA, and I
look forward to his testimony before this Committee in the near
future.
I commend Secretary Duffy for his push to modernize
airspace, and I look forward to this Subcommittee working
together to keep America's traveling public safe and improve
public trust in our air travel system.
Demand for commercial aviation is expected to grow 4
percent each year over the next two decades, and along with new
technology and commercial spacecraft entering our airspace.
This will further place demands upon our airspace and require
the tools and guidelines to ensure a safe airspace.
American Airlines Flight 5342 and Priority Air Transport 25
carried innocent civilians, selfless servicemembers, talented
figure skaters, fathers and mothers, husbands and wives, sons
and daughters. And while Congress' response to January 29 ought
to be deliberate and not executed in a knee-jerk fashion,
Congress must make certain that this loss of life occurs never
again.
In this early investigation, we have many unresolved
questions. Among those for me is why was the ADS-B Out not
transmitting on the Black Hawk? Was it turned off or was there
equipment malfunction? Why had precautions not been taken to
mitigate the risks of collisions between commercial aircraft
and rotor wing near DCA, the statistics I just described? What
is the severity of this issue at other airports where combined
traffic is also high? What explains the discrepancy between the
altitude readings of the crew of the Black Hawk? Why did the
Black Hawk's invalid pressure altitude data influence other
systems that utilized this source? How the use if night vision
goggles may have impacted the Black Hawk helicopter pilots'
line of vision? And finally, how should the FAA evaluate
combining duties of air traffic controllers?
I am appreciative for our witnesses being here today. I
note they each take this circumstance seriously. I am anxious
to hear the discussion that they have with this Committee, and
the end result should be a better understanding as well as
working to identify and prevent tragedies today and into the
future.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of this Subcommittee,
Senator Duckworth, the Senator from Illinois, for her opening
remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Chairman Moran, and thank you
for your continued partnership on aviation safety issues. I
enjoy being your partner on this Subcommittee. And I want to
thank both the Chairman of the Commerce Committee and the
Ranking Member for your work with us, as well.
I do want to extend, first and foremost, my condolences to
the family members of the victims, some of whom are here with
us today, both on the commercial airliner as well as the family
members who lost the brave soldiers in the Black Hawk
helicopter. These are folks who put on the colors of this great
nation, committed themselves to defending this great nation,
and were at their duty station, training to protect and defend,
as they lost their lives.
I also want to thank the first responders and everyone at
NTSB for their tireless work to get us the answers that we all
are looking for.
There is a saying, and many of you have heard it, our
aviation regulations are written in blood. So we have an
obligation to the victims to learn what went wrong and prevent
a collision like this from ever happening again. As a former
Black Hawk pilot myself--and I have flown helicopters out of
very congested airspace at Midway Airport. In fact, I commanded
the Midway unit for a number of years--I know how challenging
this type of mixed-use airspace can be. But a challenging
airspace is no excuse. This should never have happened.
This collision was horrendous, and it is heartbreaking, but
it was not a surprise. Our alarm bells about potential
collisions have been ringing for years. Coming out of the
pandemic, we saw a frightening rise in close calls and an
erosion of our aviation system's margin of safety. We have
known for years that we need more air traffic controllers and
more safety technology. The warnings have been clear, and in
some cases right here within this Committee, and a bipartisan
consensus on the need to upgrade the equipment and the need to
train more air traffic controllers.
In November 2023, we held a hearing on close calls. NTSB
Chair Homendy testified, citing staffing shortages, fatigue,
distraction, deviation from FAA regulations, and a lack of
runway safety technology, and she warned, and I quote, ``The
concerning uptick in such incidents is a clear warning sign
that the U.S. aviation system is sharply strained. We cannot
wait until a fatal accident forces action. We must act before
there is a tragedy,'' end quote.
Chairwoman just sadly predicted what was going to happen,
and you said that in 2023.
At the same hearing, the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association's President told us that staffing shortages were so
bad that many air traffic controllers were working mandatory
overtime, 6-day work weeks, and 10-hour days. He warned, and I
quote, ``Over the long term, this will continue to introduce
unnecessary risks into the system,'' end quote.
So we passed, in a bipartisan way, FAA reauthorization bill
last year, to help rebuild our aviation workforce and make
critical investments in safety. The FAA is still implementing
that new law, but clearly Congress has more work to do to shore
up aviation safety in this great nation.
In December 2024, we held another hearing. The GAO told us
that more than 75 percent of our aging air traffic controller
systems are unsustainable, or potentially unsustainable.
The deadly collision at DCA is not the only aviation safety
incident so far this year. We have seen deadly crashes in
Philadelphia and Alaska, a crash landing in Toronto that
miraculously everyone survived, even after the aircraft flipped
upside down. Earlier this month we saw passengers standing on
the wing of a 737 aircraft in Denver to escape a fire. And near
misses keep happening. In February, a Southwest flight came
within 200 feet of colliding with a Flexjet plane at Midway
Airport.
At such a dangerous time for aviation safety, when we need
to bolster our workforce and invest in technology, the last
thing we should be doing is making cuts to the FAA. Yet two
weeks after the DCA crash, the Trump administration began
firing hundreds of FAA employees. I say all of this because it
is important context we need to keep in mind during today's
hearing. We need to understand what happened at DCA, but we
also need to understand how this fits into a much larger threat
to aviation safety.
According to the NTSB, DCA had many close calls in recent
years, between October 2021 and December 2024. As the Chairman
has said, there were more than 15,000 incidences of commercial
aircraft coming close to rotary-wing aircraft. Eighty-five of
those had a vertical separation of less than 200 feet. And last
year there were also two high-profile runway close calls at
DCA.
NTSB's preliminary report raises several questions, most
notably, how did FAA allow a helicopter route to come within 75
feet of a runway approach? FAA has deconflicted the airspace,
but DCA is not the only airport in the country where airplanes
and helicopters share congested airspace. Several of us raised
this at an earlier briefing, and thankfully FAA is now
evaluating eight cities where this may also be an issue,
including in Chicago.
We also need to know more about what helicopter pilots knew
about their altitude. Was their equipment working properly?
Voice recordings showed that the pilot and instructor pilot
indicated different altitudes as they approach the Key Bridge,
and NTSB determined that some of the altitude information on
the helicopter's data recorder was invalid.
There are also questions about ADS-B. Why was the
helicopter not transmitting ADS-B Out? Do commercial aircraft
need to be equipped with ADS-B In? How come so many helicopters
are allowed exemptions from the ADS-B Out requirement at DCA?
So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and I
yield back, Chairman.
Senator Moran. Ranking Member Duckworth, thank you very
much for your opening statement. She almost called me the
Ranking Member.
Senator Duckworth. I did.
Senator Moran. There is no reason to apologize. Senator
Duckworth was the previous Chairman of this Subcommittee, and I
had a great opportunity to work with her as the Ranking Member.
And I would indicate, certainly to Senator Duckworth but to
those in the audience, this is a Subcommittee that will set
partisanship aside, and we will continue to work closely
together to find the answers that we are looking for today, and
beyond finding the answers, making certain that changes are
made to prevent this tragedy.
We are joined by the Chairman of the full Committee,
Senator Cruz. I appreciate his presence here and his leadership
on this issue from the very beginning. And I now recognize him
for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Chairman Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the Ranking Member, as well. I want to thank each of our
witnesses for being here today and I want to extend a
particular welcome to the family members of the 67 crash
victims who are here today for this hearing. I have met with
many of you since the crash and each of you have my very
deepest condolences for your unimaginable loss.
This crash involving American Airlines Flight 5342 and the
Army Black Hawk helicopter was preventable. It did not have to
happen. And I want you to know I am committed to using the
power of this Committee to determine if any policy failures led
to this crash and making certain that Congress acts to correct
them.
This accident marks the first time a commercial crash in
the U.S. has led to mass fatalities in over 15 years. While
America's National Airspace System has kept Americans safe for
decades, this critical juncture shows that more action must
take place to enhance the safety of our system.
The hearing today will examine the factors leading up to
the midair collision 300 feet above the Potomac River, whether
the Army's practice of disabling ADS-B Out is a glaring safety
concern. Whether the FAA missed warning signs with thousands of
instances where helicopters and commercial aircraft at DCA came
too close to colliding. Whether the communications between the
air traffic controller and both the pilots of the American
Airlines flight and the Black Hawk helicopter was inadequate.
The families of the American Airlines Flight 5342 victims
deserve answers. Congress deserves answers. And the American
flying public deserves answers to these important questions.
The NTSB does terrific work. I am grateful to Chairman
Jennifer Homendy and her team for their thorough investigation
of this accident. The preliminary report being discussed today
is factual--it does not include analysis nor does it include
findings. It is just one step in what will be a lengthy and
ongoing investigation. This Committee will closely follow how
that investigation proceeds and look forward to the NTSB's full
findings.
Some actions, however, cannot wait.
Aviation safety is dependent on what is called the Swiss
cheese model. Each layer of cheese represents a defense against
an identified risk, building redundancy into the system to plug
holes and prevent accidents. After decades of advancements, the
U.S. aviation system has been held up worldwide as the gold
standard of safety. The FAA's Air Traffic Organization depends
on thousands of talented air traffic controllers, hundreds of
millions of dollars in annual investments to sustain
technologies used to operate the air system, and billions more
invested in technologies and facilities across the system.
Even with these significant investments, the air traffic
system is failing. Facilities, which are falling apart, are
short-staffed, and projections show the shortages will last for
years. Over the weekend, the NOTAM system broke down for a
third time in just two years. Congress has provided tens of
millions of dollars in the past two years to modernize the
NOTAM system, and it has broken down already twice in this
calendar year.
President Trump and Secretary Duffy have pledged to take
action to improve the air traffic control system. I plan to
lead this Committee in passing legislation to do the same. We
must provide resources for needed short-, medium-, and long-
term improvements that chart the path to success and
sustainment for the air traffic system.
Earlier this week, I issued a call to aviation stakeholders
for specific ideas to improve the air traffic system. I asked
for concrete proposals--taking nothing off the table
prematurely to make sure that whatever resources and
authorities Congress provides to the Administration will make a
lasting difference. My proposal will complement the Trump
administration's forthcoming plan.
What the tragedy of Flight 5342 shows us is it is never too
early to act to improve aviation safety. I want to thank the
families of the victims for taking your enormous grief and
channeling it into energy, channeling it into advocacy,
channeling it into standing up and speaking out for other
families, flying on other flights, fighting for them so they
don't have to endure the grief and loss that each of you is
enduring.
It is my hope we can spend the coming months in the wake of
this tragedy working seriously to plug safety gaps and to
ensure that an accident of this magnitude never happens again.
Thank you.
Senator Moran. Chairman Cruz, thank you for your opening
remarks, your leadership today, and your leadership into the
future.
We now recognize the Ranking Member of the full Committee,
the Senator from Washington State, Senator Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Chairman Moran. Thank you
Ranking Member Duckworth. Thank you full Committee Chairman
Cruz. We are here today to examine one of the most devastating
accidents in U.S. history. With 67 lives lost on January 29, we
have a responsibility to not only understand what happened, but
to fix it, so that it never happens again.
I want to recognize the families who are here with us today
and express my condolences, but also my appreciation for the
diligence that you now are demonstrating by being here today.
Too much of aviation safety in the last several years has been
left to the advocacies of families. We should not have to rely
on you. You should be able to mourn your losses. But we need
you to continue to advocate for these important policies.
I welcome NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy, FAA Acting
Administrator Chris Rocheleau, and Brigadier General Matt
Braman, who is the Director of Army Aviation. You are here to
provide us an update on this collision and why a Black Hawk
helicopter on a training flight collided with this American
Airlines flight.
As we seek answers, the NTSB's preliminary report has
alarming facts. First, in the 3-year period leading up to the
collision, commercial airplane and helicopters got within 400
feet of each other on 15,214 occasions, within 200 feet on 85
occasions. FAA's air traffic managers approve helicopter route
charts annually, so as the data raised questions about the
safety of these routes, the ball clearly falls into the FAA's
court as to whether to act on this data or make changes where
the helicopters can fly in DCA.
A helicopter at 200 feet would only have 75 vertical feet
separation from an airplane approaching on Runway 33. These
findings reveal a very systemic issue that demands answers from
our witnesses today. Acting Administrator Rocheleau, I want to
know: Why did the FAA not act on 15,000 reports of dangerous
proximity? How were these helicopter routes allowed to remain
when alarm bells were literally going off in the towers?
This lack of oversight must change. The Army Black Hawk
helicopter was not transmitting what is known as ADS-B Out
signal, although we do not know why. What we do know is that
the military told our colleague, House Delegate Eleanor Holmes
Norton, in 2023, that the military operates 100 percent of its
flights in the National Capital Region without this safety
technology--100 percent of the time. On March 7, I wrote
Secretary Hegseth about this issue, asking to respond by March
21. I have still heard nothing back. I do not like this
silence. It is deafening.
General Braman, I have questions about these policies,
especially given the FAA's 2019 rule stating that the
deactivation of the ADS-B Out technology, pursuant to an
exemption, was not to be routine. Well, the Holmes letter says
that not only was it far from routine, 100 percent of the time
they operated with this exemption.
Acting Administrator Rocheleau, your agency gave government
airspace users a loophole. What we want to know now is why this
was allowed to continue if we had this data and information and
are there any other agencies that are acting with ADS-B Out
that we have not addressed yet?
The FAA rule needs to change. Chair Homendy, I will be
asking you about ADS-B requirements. In 2010, the FAA said that
it was premature to require this kind of equipment on
operators. Yet, at the same time the FAA made that decision,
just two years earlier, you wrote a letter saying, disagreeing
with them, but saying that, quote, ``the equipage of aircraft
with ADS-B Out in capacity will provide for an immediate,
substantial contribution to safety, especially during
operations in and around airports.''
Why did we not listen? Fifteen years later, commercial
aircraft are still not operating with this. If the American
Airlines regional jet had been equipped with this ADS-B In, it
would have been able to receive the Black Hawk's transmission,
giving it better intelligence on positioning.
Tim Lilley, the father of the pilot from the commercial
aircraft, who he himself is also a Black Hawk helicopter pilot,
and his wife Sherri, spent many years working at Gulfstream.
They know a thing or two about aviation. They gave me a list of
actions they hope Congress can take to improve safety.
Mr. Chairman, we all need to work together on this critical
safety legislation, legislation to close the ADS-B Out
loophole, require more commercial jets to have ADS-B In
capacity when operating near our Nation's busiest airports, and
have stronger information sharing between our military and
civilian authorities.
This is not just about policy. It is about saving lives. To
my colleagues, I hope that we can work together in a bipartisan
fashion. Since the FAA Reauthorization Act did require NextGen
completion by 2025, we also directed the FAA to develop a plan
for accelerating airline equipage with NextGen technologies and
authorized $17 billion through 2028 to modernize and replace
the FAA ATC systems and infrastructure.
So, I do want to say, I do not believe in cutting the
services, the benefits, or the training of our air traffic
controllers. We need them, and we need them to do their job. I
supported Senator Cruz's efforts to continue to advance more
training centers to get more air traffic controllers trained.
But now we need to learn this painful lesson. We need to make
sure that we are preventing future accidents from happening. We
must be unwavering in this effort.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Senator Moran. Ranking Member Cantwell, thank you for your
opening statement. I will now introduce our panelists who are
here to testify.
Our first witness Jennifer--I am sorry. I should put a
title before you.
Our first witness is Chairman Jennifer Homendy of the
National Transportation Safety Board. The NTSB is an
independent Federal agency that investigates every civil
aviation accident in the United States and significant events
in other modes of transportation such as rail, transit,
roadway, and pipeline. She has served as the Chairwoman since
2021, and is a member of the NTSB Board since 2018.
Our second witness is Mr. Chris Rocheleau, Acting
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. Mr.
Rocheleau has served at the FAA for more than 20 years, in
multiple roles, including as Deputy Associate Administrator for
Aviation Safety.
And our third witness is Brigadier General Matthew Braman,
Director of Army Aviation for the Headquarters of the
Department of the Army. Throughout his service, General Braman
has deployed over 36 months, supporting overseas contingency
operations. And I thank you, General, for your service.
I now recognize Chairman Jennifer Homendy to deliver her
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JENNIFER HOMENDY, CHAIRMAN,
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD (NTSB)
Ms. Homendy. Thank you, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member
Duckworth, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and members
of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to provide you with an
update on our investigation of the midair collision that
occurred over the Potomac River near Reagan National Airport on
January 29.
The NTSB knows tragedy all too well. We experience it every
day, which is why we fight so hard for safety. Yesterday, we
remembered the six lives lost during the collapse of the Key
Bridge in Baltimore a year ago. Today, we once again mourn the
67 lives lost at DCA, the 7 in Philadelphia, 10 in Nome,
Alaska.
We often talk about safety in terms of numbers, did
accidents, fatalities go up or down. It is important that we
remember today that those who died at DCA and in other
accidents we investigate are not numbers. As you said, these
are mothers, fathers, sons, daughters, wives, husbands,
cousins, best friends, who won't be there with their loved ones
for Easter egg hunts, Passover seders, the end of Ramadan,
Mother's Day, Father's Day, graduation, all of life's
celebrations.
Their families and friends, whether in person or online,
are here today. I can only imagine what they are going through,
and I want to take a moment to again express our deepest
sympathies to each of them. Please know that we keep you in our
hearts as we diligently work to determine how this tragedy
happened so no one--no one--experiences the deeply significant
loss you must feel today.
NTSB was on scene that night within an hour of the
collision, and we remained there for over a month. Work
continues to this day, including diving operations to recover
personal effects and any remaining portions of the wreckage.
On March 11 we released our preliminary report, which
contains only factual information that we have gathered in the
first few weeks, all of which can change throughout the course
of the investigation. It does not include analysis or findings,
nor does it determine probable cause. Those will be in our
final report.
But we do not wait for a final report to take action if we
uncover critical safety issues that require immediate
attention, which is why, in conjunction with the release of our
preliminary report we also issued two urgent safety
recommendations to the FAA. In both reports, we cited FAA
surveillance data that showed between October 2021 and December
2024, there were over 15,000 close-proximity events between
commercial aircraft and helicopters at DCA.
In reviewing that and other data, including airport
operations and established helicopter routes, we determined
that the separation distances between helicopter traffic
operating on Route 4 and aircraft using runways 15 and 33 are
insufficient and pose an intolerable risk to aviation safety.
As a result, we have recommended that the FAA prohibit
operations on Helicopter Route 4 between Haines Point and
Wilson Bridge when those runways are being used for departures
and arrivals. We also recommended that the FAA designate an
alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate
travel between Haines Point and the Wilson Bridge when that
segment of Route 4 is closed.
I want to commend Secretary Duffy for his swift acceptance
of our recommendations. The Secretary and the Acting
Administrator and the General have been tremendous partners
throughout the course of this investigation, and I want to
thank them for their commitment to safety.
I know we are all searching for answers, the right safety
solutions. But the NTSB is the gold standard for accident
investigations for a reason. We are thorough, and we are fact-
based. We leave no stone unturned, and we let the evidence
guide us. Investigations take time. We have a lot of work to do
in this investigation, from interviews to analyses of large
volumes of documents and data to review. To air carrier
operations that we have to review, helicopter operations, air
traffic control, human performance, helicopter air worthiness,
flight recorders, and more. In total, we have about 40 NTSB
experts leading this investigation, in collaboration with the
parties and others, and we are aiming to complete this
investigation within one year, barring, of course, any
unforeseen circumstances.
I want to close by thanking you for your steadfast support
of the NTSB, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Homendy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chairwoman, National
Transportation Safety Board
Good morning, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, and members
of the subcommittee. My name is Jennifer Homendy, and I am honored to
serve as Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB).\1\ Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
provide an update regarding the NTSB's investigation the midair
collision involving a U.S. Army Sikorsky UH-60L (under the callsign
PAT25) and PSA Airlines dba American Airlines flight 5342, a Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries (MHI) RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2C10
(CRJ700) that occurred over the Potomac River in southwest Washington,
DC, about 2048 eastern standard time (EST) on January 29, 2025.
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\1\ The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress
with investigating and establishing the facts, circumstances, and cause
or probable cause of all civil aviation accidents and serious incidents
in the United States and defined accidents in all other modes of
transportation, including roadway accidents, grade crossing incidents,
railroad accidents, pipeline accidents, major marine casualties
occurring on or under the navigable waters, internal waters, or the
territorial sea of the United States, and other accidents related to
the transportation of individuals or property when the Board decides
the accident is catastrophic, the accident involves problems of a
recurring character, or the investigation of the accident would carry
out our statutory requirements. In addition, the NTSB carries out
special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinates the
resources of the Federal government and other organizations to aid
victims and their family members impacted by major transportation
disasters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers aboard the
airplane and all 3 crewmembers aboard the helicopter were fatally
injured. Both aircraft were destroyed as a result of the accident.
Flight 5342 was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a scheduled domestic passenger
flight from Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport (ICT),
Wichita, Kansas, to DCA, departing ICT at 1839 EST. PAT25 originated
from Davison Army Airfield (DAA), Fort Belvoir, Virginia, at 1845 EST
on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan for the pilot's annual
standardization evaluation with the use of night vision goggles. Night
visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of DCA at the
time of the accident.
Attached to this testimony are the following: Investigation
Preliminary Report and Urgent Recommendation Report.
Before I begin, I want to take a moment and recognize the families
and friends of those who lost loved ones in this tragedy. On behalf of
the NTSB, I want to express my deepest condolences and our sympathies
to each of you. Our mission is to determine what happened and why it
happened so no one else experiences the loss you feel today. We keep
you in mind every day, as we carry out our solemn mission to prevent
future tragedy.
NTSB launched to the accident site that night and investigators
remained at DCA for approximately four weeks. Work still continues on
site, including diving operations to recover personal effects and any
remaining portions of the wreckage.
As part of the investigative process, the NTSB invited qualified
parties to participate in the investigation. These included Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), the U.S. Army, PSA Airlines, GE
Aerospace, Sikorsky, National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Air
Line Pilots Association, Association of Flight Attendants,
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Collins
Aerospace, and the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority.
The parties were formed into specialized investigative groups led
by NTSB group chairs in the areas of Air Carrier Operations and Human
Performance, Airplane Structures, Airplane Systems, Powerplants,
Helicopter Operations and Human Performance, Air Traffic Control and
Human Performance, Helicopter Airworthiness, Survival Factors, and
Flight Recorders. This week, we formed another investigative group
focused on Data Analysis.
There was a whole of government response to this major event, and I
want to recognize some of the assistance we received in recovering the
victims and wreckage: Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, D.C.
Fire and EMS Department, and other first responders from Virginia and
Maryland, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigations,
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage
and Diving (SUPSALV).
On March 11, the NTSB released the preliminary report for this
investigation, attached in full. It should be emphasized that, as with
all preliminary reports, this document contains only factual
information pertinent to the investigation. This information is
preliminary and subject to change and does not include analysis or a
probable cause of the collision, all of which will be issued at a later
date as we continue to thoroughly investigate wherever the evidence may
lead. There is a lot of work left to be done.
However, as is always the case with our investigations, NTSB does
not need to wait until we determine a probable cause to take action if
our investigation uncovers facts that demonstrate an intolerable risk
to safety. In such cases, we do not hesitate to take urgent action, and
in this case that is exactly what we have done.
In conjunction with the release of our preliminary report, we also
issued two urgent safety recommendations (also attached) to the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) concerning the helicopter routes near
DCA. NTSB urgent recommendations require immediate action to prevent
similar accidents or incidents. When we issue them, we believe a
critical safety issue must be addressed, with no delay.
In the case of this investigation, while reviewing airport
operations and prior incidents, including near mid-air collision
events, and while reviewing the existing helicopter routes for
helicopter traffic near DCA, NTSB determined that the existing
separation distances between helicopter traffic operating on Route 4
and aircraft landing on runway 33 (the route and runway, respectively,
that were in use during the crash) are insufficient, and pose an
intolerable risk to aviation safety by increasing the chances of a
midair collision at DCA. We've therefore issued an urgent
recommendation to the FAA to prohibit operations on Helicopter Route 4
between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when runways 15 and 33 are
being used for departures and arrivals at DCA.
Recognizing that a total closure of this route when the stated
runways are in use would restrict a vital aviation corridor used for
law enforcement activity, Coast Guard patrols, and continuity of
government operations, and recognizing the potential for increased risk
by adding to air traffic controller workload, we also recommended that
the FAA designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to
facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that
segment of Route 4 is closed.
These recommendations were made because information gathered from
voluntary safety reporting programs and the FAA regarding encounters
between helicopters and commercial aircraft near DCA showed that, from
2011 through 2024, a vast majority of reported events occurred on
approach to landing. Initial analysis found that at least one traffic
alert and collision avoidance system, or TCAS, resolution advisory (RA)
was triggered per month at DCA due to proximity to a helicopter. The
response to TCAS RAs, unlike traffic advisories, or TAs, are
recommended escape maneuvers; for example, climb, descend, or level
off. While a TA is issued when the intruding aircraft is about 20
seconds from the closest point of approach, or 0.3 nautical miles,
whichever occurs first, RA's indicate a collision threat and require
immediate action.
In over half of the encounters we reviewed, again from 2011 through
2024, the helicopter may have been above the route altitude
restriction. Two-thirds of these events occurred at night.
We then reviewed commercial operations at DCA and found that,
between October 2021 and December 2024, there were a total of 944,179
commercial operations at DCA. These are instrument flight rules, or
IFR, departures or arrivals. During that time, there were 15,214
occurrences between commercial airplanes and helicopters in which there
was a lateral separation distance of less than 1 nautical mile and
vertical separation of less than 400 ft. There were 85 recorded events
that involved a lateral separation of less than 1500 ft (or less than
0.3 nautical miles) and vertical separation of less than 200 ft.
The chart below is a cross-section of the airspace that extends
from Runway 33's centerline, spanning from the runway to the east bank
of the Potomac River. The figure shows the separation distance that
would exist, according to FAA charts, with a helicopter on Route 4 and
an airplane descending on the glideslope to runway 33. At the maximum
altitude of just 200 ft, a helicopter operating over the eastern
shoreline of the Potomac River would have just 75 feet of vertical
separation from an airplane approaching runway 33, and that distance
decreases if the helicopter is operated farther from the shoreline.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 1. Cross section showing the notional separation between
Route 4 and a PAPI-guided visual approach to runway 33, according to
FAA charts and aerial photogrammetry analysis.
As a result of the accident, the FAA, under the leadership of U.S.
Department of Transportation Secretary Duffy took swift action to
ensure safety and restrict helicopter traffic from operating over the
Potomac River near DCA until March 31st, and we commend him for that.
However, as that deadline nears, NTSB remains concerned about the
significant potential for a future midair collision at DCA given the
facts we have uncovered. I am pleased to share with you that the
Secretary has taken our urgent recommendations very seriously, and I
look forward to working with him, Acting Administrator Rocheleau, and
Congress to see them implemented as we move forward with this
investigation.
Some investigations, understandably, get more public attention than
others, but all of our investigations are critical for improving
transportation safety. We know that we owe it to the families of those
involved, to the communities where events occurred, and to the
traveling public to find out what happened, why it happened, and to
make recommendations to help ensure it never happens again. Our current
investigative workload includes almost 1,250 active investigations in
all 50 states and Puerto Rico, in addition to supporting more than 160
foreign investigations in over 50 countries. Throughout a typical year,
we work on about 2,200 domestic and 450 foreign cases, and we expect
the number of cases annually to remain high and continue to increase in
complexity. Some of our significant ongoing investigations of events
that have occurred this year include:
The in-flight structural failure of a Boeing 737-9 MAX
The contact of a container ship with the Francis Scott Key
Bridge, and subsequent bridge collapse, in Baltimore, Maryland
A multivehicle work zone collision on Interstate 35 in
Austin, Texas.
A Boeing 737-800 engine fire in Denver, Colorado.
A medical transport helicopter crash in Canton, Mississippi.
A gas leak and pipeline explosion in Hutchinson, Kansas.
A multivehicle crash and postcrash fire on I-80 in Green
River, Wyoming.
A collision between two light rail trains with a derailment
in Somerville, Massachusetts.
A train fire and passenger evacuation in Ridley Park,
Pennsylvania.
A crash of a Bering Air Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in Nome,
Alaska.
A Learjet 55 Medevac crash in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
In addition, we continue to investigate other significant events,
including:
A multivehicle crash, including a motorcoach carrying
members of a high school band in Etna, Ohio.
A multivehicle crash on the Ohio Turnpike in Swanton, Ohio.
A multivehicle crash between a motorcoach and tractor-
trailers parked along a rest area ramp in Highland, Illinois.
A tanker truck rollover and rupture with anhydrous ammonia
release in Teutopolis, Illinois.
A grade-crossing collision in Pecos, Texas.
A collision involving a vehicle operating with partial
driving automation in San Antonio, Texas.
A collision between two vehicles resulting in a postcrash
fire in Carrizo Springs, Texas.
Rail employee fatalities and injuries in Illinois, New
Jersey, North Carolina, and Wisconsin.
Natural gas-fueled explosions in Youngstown, Ohio, South
Jordan, Utah, and Jackson, Mississippi.
A multivehicle work zone collision and postcrash fire on I-
95 in Kenly, North Carolina.
A train derailment and hazardous materials release in
Manuelito, New Mexico.
A school bus roadway departure and overturn in Millstone,
West Virginia.
A fire aboard a container ship at Port of Newark, New
Jersey.
A vehicle collision with a stopped school bus, fatally
injuring a student pedestrian, in Excelsior, Wisconsin.
We currently have over a thousand open safety recommendations
across all modes as a result of our investigations. In 2024, we issued
132 new safety recommendations and closed 86. Of those closed,
excluding those that were classified reconsidered, no longer
applicable, and superseded, 58 (77 percent) were closed acceptably,
meaning that the recommendation recipient took action to implement the
safety recommendation. This includes actions to enhance aviation safety
by requiring operators to implement safety management systems, to
increase focus on highway bridge maintenance, to help prevent damage to
underwater pipelines, and to help prevent train derailments due to
unexpected weather conditions. This success rate demonstrates the value
of our recommendations. Our recommendations are meaningful, and we
appreciate the efforts of recipients to address them.
The NTSB is a small agency that plays a vital role in ensuring
public safety and protection of life and property in all that we do. I
appreciate the need to right-size the Federal workforce; in fact, I
strongly agree with that goal. However, the NTSB runs lean; we always
have. We have just 430 employees to carry out our mission and are
authorized by Congress to go up to 450, though we would need
significantly more than that to truly be fully staffed. We punch far
above our weight. Everyone at the NTSB plays a role in achieving our
mission to make transportation safer. Their hard work, professionalism,
and dedication around the clock is the reason that the NTSB is regarded
as the world's preeminent safety agency. To complete our investigations
and develop recommendations that advance safety changes without delays,
we must meet the challenges that come with increasing growth and
innovation in transportation. Therefore, it is critical for the agency
to have additional resources to respond to events without affecting our
timeliness, the quality of our work, or our independence.
I want to thank the committee for your support in last year's NTSB
reauthorization bill to increase NTSB's funding for the next 4 years.
As a result of Congress' support, we have been able to make much needed
progress in hiring for the agency. The vast majority of that growth has
been in our investigative offices (Aviation Safety, Highway Safety,
Marine Safety, and Railroad, Pipeline, and Hazardous Materials
Investigations). Still, despite those efforts, we continue to need
additional investigative staff, as well as staff in the operational
offices where increases have not occurred to the same extent. This
includes staff in General Counsel to work through a backlog of
petitions for reconsideration of investigations and airman, mechanic or
mariner's certificate appeals, as well as party-related issues and
external legal disputes; staff in the Office of the Managing Director
to enhance the agency's overall use of data to improve the NTSB's
effectiveness and innovation; staff in the Office of the Chief
Information Officer to address mandated cybersecurity enhancements and
the backlog of Freedom of Information Act requests; and staff in Human
Capital and Training to support recruitment, hiring, and other actions
critical to developing and retaining a highly-productive workforce.
The fact is, our greatest asset is our workforce, which accounts
for over 70 percent of our costs. We rely on a staff of highly skilled
individuals with technical expertise in such areas as aerospace,
electrical, and mechanical engineering; chemistry; metallurgy; human
performance; and other specialized fields to conduct accident
investigations and identify life-saving safety improvements. We must
continue to attract and retain talent with expertise in emerging
technologies and the transportation systems of tomorrow. And without
our workforce, we will not be able to carry out our congressionally
mandated mission to protect public safety. Our workforce is highly
technical, and approximately 25 percent of the employees are retirement
eligible within 1 year; this number increases to approximately 40
percent over the next 5 years. We need to build a deeper bench now to
prepare for upcoming attrition.
For the NTSB to carry out its mission-critical work, we must have a
fully trained workforce ready to respond to more than 1300 new
accidents per year, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and deliver
comprehensive, timely, and concise investigation outcomes and safety
recommendations to protect life and property and prevent future
transportation-related accidents and injuries from occurring.
Before I close, I want to thank Senate and House leaders on both
sides of the aisle, as well as President Trump, Vice President Vance,
and Secretary Duffy for their tremendous support of the NTSB. As
examples, we were granted exemptions from the deferred resignation
program and the Federal hiring freeze, and we currently have 14
critical positions, nearly all investigative roles, posted on USA Jobs.
The Administration and each of you have been very supportive of our
work to ensure public safety, and we thank you all for your efforts.
I respectfully request that Congress continue to support our
ability to carry out our critical safety mission now and into the
future; to recruit, retain, and develop a highly qualified and
specialized workforce; and to prepare the agency for investigations
involving emerging transportation technologies and systems to improve
transportation safety.
______
Attachments
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Moran. Thank you, Chairwoman.
We now recognize Acting Administrator Rocheleau of the FAA
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHRIS ROCHELEAU, ACTING
ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Rocheleau. Thank you, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member
Duckworth, Chairman Cruz, and Ranking Member Cantwell, as well
as members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity
to be here today to discuss the NTSB's preliminary report on
the midair collision of PSA Airlines Flight 5342 and a U.S.
Army Black Hawk helicopter that occurred in January, near
Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, or DCA.
I would like to begin by offering my sincerest sympathies
to the families and loved ones of those who perished in recent
accidents, particularly the accident near DCA.
The FAA continues to support the ongoing NTSB
investigations. Our work with the NTSB will help us understand
the factors that contributed to these accidents, and we will
use the data to inform future FAA actions.
Aviation safety is the FAA's number one priority. Let me
repeat that--aviation safety is the FAA's number one priority.
While flying remains the safest mode of transportation,
aviation safety is not static. There is always room for
improvement. The professionals at the FAA take their jobs very
seriously and strive to ensure safety every day. But the fact
of the matter is that we have to do better. We have to identify
trends, we have to get smarter about how we use data, and when
we put corrective actions in place, we must implement them with
diligence.
I want to thank Chair Homendy and the entire NTSB team for
their dedication in their ongoing investigation.
Earlier this month, the NTSB issued an initial report and
two urgent safety recommendations. The recommendations align
with the actions the FAA took, under Secretary Duffy's
leadership, immediately following the accident, to restrict
helicopter operations around DCA, eliminating mixed helicopter
and fixed-wing traffic and carefully developing alternative
routes.
Following the NTSB recommendations, the FAA took action to
make these restrictions permanent. When essential helicopter
operations, such as lifesaving medical, active law enforcement,
active air defense, or Presidential transport, must operate in
the flight-restricted airspace, fixed-wing aircraft are not
allowed in that airspace.
We are also continuing to analyze other airports that have
both established helicopter routes and nearby airplane traffic.
The FAA also is also carefully reviewing offshore helicopter
operations. As part of this analysis, we are using machine
learning and language modeling to scan incident reports and
explore multiple data sources to find themes and areas of
concern. We will take immediate action if needed to mitigate
any identified safety risks. Additionally, I will establish a
Safety Risk Management Panel and engage with aviation
stakeholders to identify additional hazard areas involving
helicopter and fixed-wing interactions, and all aircraft
operating in DCA Class B airspace will be required to broadcast
their position and identification using ADS-B Out, with very
limited exceptions.
We are bolstering aviation safety in other ways, too. Air
traffic controller staffing is a top priority as air traffic
controllers play a critical role in keeping the American people
safe. Right now, we have over 10,750 controllers on the job,
with over 3,000 in training. We intend to hire another 2,000
controllers this year. We have streamlined the hiring process
and incentivized hiring with a 30 percent increase in the
salary of those who qualify to attend the FAA's Academy, and we
are already seeing positive results from these improvements.
During the hiring surge that closed last week, we received
over 10,000 applications, and more than 8,000 of those were
referred to testing.
We also continue to maintain rigorous oversight of Boeing
to ensure the safety and compliance of its aircraft designs and
operations. This oversight extends to ongoing monitoring of
Boeing's manufacturing practices, maintenance procedures, and
software updates. We are working closely with Boeing to address
any safety concerns and to ensure that all required
modifications and improvements are made to meet the highest
safety standards.
We have a strong foundation at the FAA, and we are going to
make our agency even stronger. We are refocusing our energy and
directing all of our resources to safety. And we will continue
to recruit, train, and retain the best and brightest for the
FAA team.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I also
thank President Trump and Secretary Duffy for putting their
faith in me to lead the FAA during this time. The work we do at
the FAA is not easy, but it is vitally important to the
American people. And I am proud to once again be part of the
FAA team.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rocheleau follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chris Rocheleau, Acting Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration
Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss
the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) preliminary report on
the midair collision of PSA Airlines flight 5342 and a U.S. Army Black
Hawk helicopter that occurred in January, near Ronald Reagan Washington
National Airport, or DCA.
I would like to begin by offering my sincerest sympathies to the
families and loved ones of those who perished in recent accidents,
including the accident near DCA. The Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) continues to support the ongoing NTSB investigations. Our work
with the NTSB will help us understand the factors that contributed to
these accidents, and we will use the data to inform future FAA actions.
Aviation safety is the FAA's number one priority. While flying
remains the safest mode of transportation, aviation safety is not
static. There is always room for improvement. The professionals at the
FAA take their jobs seriously and strive to ensure safety every day.
But the fact of the matter is that we have to do better. We have to
identify trends, we have to get smarter about how we use data, and when
we put corrective actions in place, we must execute them.
I want to thank Chairman Homendy and the entire NTSB team for their
diligence in the ongoing investigation. Earlier this month, the NTSB
issued a preliminary report and two urgent safety recommendations. The
recommendations align with the actions the FAA took, under Secretary
Duffy's leadership, to restrict helicopter operations around DCA
immediately following the accident, eliminating mixed helicopter and
fixed-wing traffic. Following the NTSB recommendations, the FAA took
action to make these restrictions permanent. When essential helicopter
operations, such as lifesaving medical, active law enforcement, active
air defense, or presidential transport, must operate in the flight-
restricted airspace, fixed-wing aircraft are not allowed in that
airspace.
We are continuing to analyze other airports that have both charted
helicopter routes and nearby airplane traffic. The FAA also is
assessing the Gulf of America, including offshore helicopter
operations. As part of this analysis, we are using machine learning and
language modeling to scan incident reports and mine multiple data
sources to find themes and areas of risk. We will take immediate action
if needed to mitigate any identified safety risks. In addition, I will
establish a Safety Risk Management Panel and engage with aviation
stakeholders to identify additional hazard areas involving helicopter
and fixed-wing interactions.
We're bolstering aviation safety in other ways, too. Air traffic
controller staffing is a top priority as air traffic controllers play a
critical role in keeping the American people safe. Right now, we have
more than 10,750 air traffic controllers on the job with more than
3,000 in training. We intend to hire another 2,000 controller trainees
this year. Consistent with Secretary Duffy's announcement on
supercharged air traffic controller hiring, we have streamlined the
hiring process to improve efficiency by changing the previous 8-step
process to a 5-step process, which will accelerate the time-to-hire for
these critical positions by five months or more, bringing new air
traffic controllers on the job much faster. We've also incentivized
hiring with a 30 percent increase in the salary of those who qualify to
attend the FAA's Academy. And we are already seeing positive results
from these improvements. During the hiring surge that closed last week,
we received more than 10,000 applications. More than 8,300 of those
were referred to testing.
We also continue to maintain rigorous oversight of Boeing to ensure
the safety and compliance of its aircraft designs and operations. This
oversight extends to ongoing monitoring of Boeing's manufacturing
practices, maintenance procedures, and software updates. We are working
closely with Boeing to address any safety concerns and to ensure that
all required modifications and improvements are made to meet the
highest safety standards.
We have a strong foundation at the FAA, and we're going to make our
agency even stronger. We are refocusing our energy and directing all of
our resources to safety. And we'll continue to recruit, train, and
retain the best and brightest for our FAA team.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I also thank
President Trump and Secretary Duffy for putting their faith in me to
lead the FAA during this time. The work we do at the FAA isn't easy,
but it's vitally important. And I'm proud to once again be part of the
FAA team.
Senator Moran. Thank you, sir.
I recognize Brigadier General Matthew Braman for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MATTHEW BRAMAN,
DIRECTOR OF ARMY AVIATION, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
General Braman. Thank you, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member
Duckworth, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and
distinguished members of the Committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to come here before you today to speak about the
midair collision that occurred between an Army Black Hawk
helicopter, with the call sign PAT 25, and American Airlines
Flight 5342.
First and foremost, on behalf of Army senior leaders, and
all of our soldiers, I want to pass my continued condolences to
all those affected by this tragedy. I want to thank the
professional work of the first responders and the Federal,
state, and local agencies that responded within minutes to the
crash site and aided in the recovery. I want to thank Chairman
Homendy and the NTSB for conducting a thorough investigation
and facilitating a close and transparent relationship with the
Army as we conduct our parallel investigations.
The NTSB remains lead in the investigation, so I can't
offer facts and recommendations at this time, but I can offer
the Army perspective on the preliminary report and provide
clarifying information on Army helicopter operations, and
certainly can do that here in the Washington, D.C., area.
For context, the PAT 25's unit, the 12th Aviation
Battalion, falls under the Army Aviation Brigade, or referred
to as the TAAB, and that unit has the mission to provide
continuous, responsive aviation support to senior military and
government leaders to enable continuity of government
operations and defense support to civil authorities.
The TAAB is one of dozens of organizations, both civilian
and military, that operates helicopters in the D.C. area. Our
aircraft continue to meet all requirements to operate in the
National Airspace, in Class B airspace, and in helicopter
routes in Washington, D.C., and they operate under positive
control of flight services when within 30 nautical miles of
DCA.
PAC 25 was operating out of Davidson Army Airfield, Fort
Belvoir. The crew of three were fully qualified to fly in the
local area. The Pilot-in-Command, CW2 Andrew Eaves, was an
instructor pilot. The Co-Pilot, Captain Rebecca Lobach, was a
qualified pilot-in-command, as well, and the Crew Chief, Staff
Sergeant Ryan O'Hara, was a standardization flight instructor.
The night of January 29, 2025, PAT 25 was conducting an
Annual Proficiency and Readiness Test, or APART. As part of
that flight was approved to operate at contingency locations
associated with their directed mission. This has led to
questions as to whether PAT 25 was transmitting Automatic
Dependent Surveillance Broadcasts out, or ADS-B Out. The
specific status of both its operation and functionality is
something that is under the investigation of the NTSB. The
crew, however, was approved to operate with that capability
off, in accordance with Army policy.
The aircraft transponder, however, was active, with Mode 3
A/C and Mode S when within the Class B airspace, and was
emitting all the required information to allow air traffic
services and traffic collision avoidance systems to detect and
track the aircraft. Army policy does not permit Transponder Off
operations in the National Airspace. They do not permit
Transponder Off operations.
There is certainly no shortage of speculation on potential
causes of the accident. I understand well the desire for
answers. As the Director of Army Aviation and a senior Army
aviator, there is nothing more important to me than the
capability, proficiency, and safety of our air crews and those
whom they transport and support in defense of this Nation. And
I am also personally invested in the safety of our commercial
aviation enterprise, as I live with an airline pilot, and her
safety and the safety of her passengers is paramount to me, as
well. Which is why it is essential that we see this
investigation through to its fruition so we can have well-
informed, facts-based conclusions to make desired change, when
needed.
But where prudent, the Army is not waiting to take action.
Immediately after the accident, the 12th Aviation Battalion
paused all operations. They have only recently resumed flights,
and only outside the 7 nautical mile radius of DCA, with the
exception of flights directly supporting the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and that remains
true today. The Army continues to fully comply with all FAA
restrictions on helicopter traffic over the Potomac River near
DCA.
The Army is actively participating, along with other
military services and agencies, with an FAA-led working group
to redesign the Route 4 helicopter corridor, as recommended by
the NTSB in its preliminary report.
We have also issued interim guidance to elevate the
approval authority to operate with ADS-B Off. The Army is fully
committed to a transparent and collaborative review of the
events of January 29 and of all operations in the vicinity of
DCA. We support any and all efforts to ensure a tragedy such as
this never occurs again.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
Committee, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Braman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brigadier General Matthew W. Braman
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the accident that occurred between an Army UH-60 Black
Hawk helicopter, call sign Priority Air Transport (PAT) 25, and
American Airlines Flight #5342, operated by PSA Airlines in the
vicinity of Reagan National Airport.
First and foremost, on behalf of Army leadership, and our fellow
Soldiers, we send our continued condolences to all those affected by
this tragedy. We thank the professional work of the first responders
and the countless Federal, State, and local agencies that responded to
the crash site and aided in the recovery effort. Specifically, I want
to thank the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) for continuing
to conduct a thorough investigation and facilitating a close and
transparent working relationship with the Army. I will defer to NTSB on
questions specific to the ongoing investigation, but I can offer the
Army perspective on the preliminary report and provide clarifying
information on Army helicopter operations in the National Capital
Region (NCR) in general.
TAAB HELICOPTER PROCEDURES
The Army Aviation Brigade (TAAB) operates at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia, and includes the 12th Aviation Battalion, which provides
continuous, responsive rotary wing aviation support to senior military
and government leaders in the NCR to enable continuity of government
operations and defense support of civil authorities. The unit has
operated in the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan area since 1957, flying
on average 5,800 hours annually, the bulk of which--80 percent--are
mission rehearsals, exercises, and individual crew flights to build
proficiency for their assigned mission.
The term ``training flight'' has been frequently used to describe
PAT 25's mission on January 29th and does appear to be a source of some
confusion. For clarity, a ``training flight'' in military vernacular is
a general term used to refer to any flight that is not performing
directed mission support. For TAAB aircrews, ``training flights'' refer
to unit-led mission practice, mission validation flights with external
agencies, and flights to build readiness and proficiency to execute
TAAB's mission. TAAB training flights may involve operating at
sensitive locations. New Army pilots learn to fly at Fort Novosel,
Alabama, where they complete an initial course in a trainer helicopter
before advancing to graduate level courses in the advanced airframes
they'll operate when they join their units. Pilots who join TAAB are
already qualified pilots prior to their arrival to the unit.
All TAAB aircrews receive unit-tailored academic and flight
training to ensure an understanding of routing and zone structure to
conduct flight duties within the NCR, as well as the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA)-required academic training to operate in the
Washington, D.C. Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA). The regulatory
requirements are routinely reviewed, and aircrews are tested annually
to maintain proficiency and currency. It is a mandatory Army
requirement for aircrews to conduct day, night, and night-vision goggle
(NVG) flights in the local area to ensure readiness to support TAAB's
24-hour mission. TAAB aircrews are also required to conduct an annual
proficiency and readiness test (APART) all Army aircrews must complete
in order to evaluate individual and crew proficiency.
All TAAB aircraft meet the requirements to operate within the Class
B airspace and helicopter routes in the Washington, D.C. SFRA and the
Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ). When operating in the D.C. area, all TAAB
operations are under positive control by designated FAA facilities
within the SFRA and FRZ.
The Army is one of dozens of organizations that fly helicopters in
the NCR. A 2021 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report on
Helicopter Noise Concerns (GAO-21-200) found between 2017 and 2019 over
50 helicopter operators conducted approximately 88,000 helicopter
flights within 30 miles of DCA. Of those, 32,890 (37.4 percent) were
conducted by the military.
PAT 25
PAT 25 was a UH-60L Black Hawk helicopter assigned to 12th
Battalion, TAAB, operating at Davidson Army Airfield, Fort Belvoir,
Virginia. The crew of three were fully qualified to fly in the local
area. The Pilot-In-Command, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Andrew Eaves, was a
unit Instructor Pilot. The Co-Pilot, Captain Rebecca Lobach, was also a
qualified Pilot-In-Command, and the Crew Chief, Staff Sergeant Ryan
O'Hara, was a Standardization Flight Instructor.
The night of January 29, 2025, PAT 25 was conducting an APART on
Captain Lobach. The flight included operations in and around the D.C.
Metropolitan area and the aircraft was transiting south to Fort Belvoir
via the FAA-established helicopter routes when the accident occurred.
During an APART, the evaluated crew member could expect to fly
under day, night unaided, and NVG modes of flight.
ARMY ADS-B POLICY
The use of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)-Out
transponders is an FAA requirement for operating in Class B airspace
and all TAAB aircraft are equipped with ADS-B-Out systems. However, due
to the proliferation over the past decade of flight tracking software
capable of collecting sensitive flight data available to the public,
the FAA published an exception, removing its ADS-B transmission
requirement for sensitive operations conducted by Federal, State, and
local government entities in matters of national defense, homeland
security, intelligence, and law enforcement when transmitting would
compromise the operations security of the mission or pose a safety risk
to the aircraft, crew, or people and property in the air or on the
ground.
At the time of the accident, Army policy was to restrict ADS-B Out-
Off operations to sensitive or classified missions and require
Commanders with moderate risk approval authority--which at the time
could be delegated to low-risk approval authority--to determine when
and whether ADS-B Out-Off operations are required. Army policy does not
authorize ADS-B Out-Off operations for routine, non-sensitive, or non-
classified missions and always requires aircrews conducting ADS-B Out-
Off operations to operate their transponder in Mode 3 A/C which emits
information required by air traffic services but with less identifying
information. Mode S transponders present similar operational security
concerns as ADS-B and its use is subject to the same Army policy.
Aircraft Operating with ADS-B Out-Off but with Mode 3 A/C On are
visible to Air Traffic Control (ATC) and other aircraft in the vicinity
that are equipped with Traffic Collision Awareness Systems (TCAS). NTSB
is still investigating whether PAT 25's ADS-B-Out system was operating
as designed, not programmed, or turned off at the time of the accident.
ARMY INTERIM RESPONSE
Immediately following the accident, the 12th Aviation Battalion
paused all operations to allow Army and unit leaders the time required
to adequately assess mission requirements. On February 10, the 12th
Aviation Battalion returned to flight operations with Army-emplaced
limitations on flights around the Pentagon and Reagan National Airport.
The Army is reviewing NTSB's preliminary report and is currently
reviewing all Army helicopter operations in the NCR, to include its
Department of Defense mission requirements.
The Army has also issued interim guidance to the force to elevate
the level of risk approval authority to operate with ADS-B Out-Off and
will formally update its policy as the NTSB-led investigation
continues. The Army is also investigating the utilization of the Army's
current policy by the TAAB to determine the frequency with which the
unit operated with ADS-B Out-Off and whether the policy was applied
correctly.
CLOSING
The Army is committed to a transparent and collaborative review of
the events of January 29th and of helicopter operations in the vicinity
of Reagan National Airport. I have reviewed NTSB's preliminary report,
and I assess that implementing its findings and recommendations would
not negatively affect Army helicopter operations. The Army along with
other military Services and other agencies that operate helicopters in
the NCR will participate in an FAA-led working group to develop a new
helicopter route that supports national security, law enforcement, and
medical helicopter flight operations. This new route will replace the
legacy Route 4, enhancing efficiency for critical missions while
maintaining the highest safety standards as recommended by NTSB in the
preliminary report.
We are working to ensure any actions we take in response to the
accident are fully informed by fact-based conclusions that come out of
the investigations which are ongoing. When the NTSB and Army
investigations are complete, the Army is prepared to evaluate and
comply where able with future recommendations to mitigate risk while
operating in the NCR and other areas with congested airspace. We fully
support all efforts to ensure a tragedy such as this is never repeated.
Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before the committee
and I look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Moran. Thank you, General.
Let me begin by asking witnesses questions, and then we
will rotate, alternate, between Republicans and Democrats,
based upon time of arrival after the leadership of the
Committee has their opportunity to ask their questions.
Chair Homendy, let me begin with you. First of all, I am
interested in learning about the occurrences that have been
described, I described in my opening statement, about near
misses and occurrences, TCAS advisories that occurred on
numerous occasions over a long period of time. And what I hope
you--and I will ask the Administrator of the FAA these
questions--but I would like to know what did people know, when
did they know it, and why didn't someone do something about it?
In asking you about this topic, is the information that is
collected by the FAA, that is where these statistics that we
have each mentioned, that is where they come from. Is that
true?
Ms. Homendy. There were different sources of information,
some which was FAA, some of which are voluntary safety
reporting programs.
Senator Moran. And those voluntary safety reporting
programs, it is voluntary reporting to the FAA?
Ms. Homendy. Yes.
Senator Moran. So I want to give you the chance.
Ms. Homendy. Yes.
Senator Moran. So the information that has been described
here about those events over a long period of time, is utilized
by you but housed at the FAA?
Ms. Homendy. I believe through a contractor, but yes.
Senator Moran. And do you know at this point whether that
information was reviewed in a regular manner? Have you
investigated why information that seems so important did not
result in changes in policy, rules, or regulations?
Ms. Homendy. I do not know why. What I will say is this was
a data request, came from a data request from the NTSB. We made
that with the FAA and received information from the Aviation
Safety Action Program, ASAP, from ATSAP, which is Air Traffic
Control, from Mandatory Occurrence Reports, and we also
received information from FAA surveillance data, from radar.
But this was a request from us, and that resulted in our
evaluation of that data and our urgent safety recommendations.
I do not know if the FAA pulled that data themselves at any
point, and I would have to defer to the Acting Administrator on
that.
Senator Moran. That information was so valuable, so
important, so critical, that that is the reason you asked for
the immediate changes in safety regulations. True?
Ms. Homendy. Yes. And, you know, there does seem to be an
issue with identifying emerging trends. There is a lot of data
going to FAA, and taking that data and looking at trends and
not specific issues I think is something not only the IG has
raised but others have raised, even the Acting Administrator
has raised, about having to do a better job with analyzing
those trends.
But it is key, because if we can get it after an accident
occurs, what is key is getting it before and preventing it.
Senator Moran. This is the wake-up call that suggests
whether changes need to be made. Correct?
Ms. Homendy. Correct.
Senator Moran. Administrator, I am interested in asking you
the same series of questions. What did the FAA know prior to
this accident, when did they know it, and why wasn't some
action taken to encourage and, in fact, increase the safety,
particularly at an airport like DCA, and maybe others, and the
proximity between helicopter and commercial air service
traffic.
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. So I am very concerned about what
we have learned in the subsequent investigation, both from the
NTSB as well as our own reviews that we immediately took.
Clearly, something was missed. I would say immediately after
the event we took the action--again, I referenced earlier,
under Secretary Duffy's leadership, to restrict air traffic in
that area, to ensure there was no helicopter traffic as well as
fixed-wing.
Senator Moran. My question is what did not happen at the
FAA that would have highlighted this problem earlier, at the
time in which this information is acquired by the FAA, but
apparently not looked at until the accident?
Mr. Rocheleau. So there is an ongoing review all the time
of the data that is available. As the Chair mentioned, there
are millions of pieces of data that come in, and I would tell
you that we have verified every single near-midair collision
was investigated. But there are certainly those instances where
the information itself was not identified. And that is why we
put artificial intelligence and machine learning in place now,
to ensure that we are able to go through tens of millions of
pieces of data to identify those trends and act quickly to
mitigate those risks.
Senator Moran. There is no question but had this
information been utilized by the FAA or others that steps could
have been taken to make certain that flying, particularly
again, in the circumstance of helicopters and commercial
aviation, at a place like Reagan National Airport, there would
have been an opportunity to do something had that information
actually been known and acted on. True?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. That is correct.
Senator Moran. Thank you. Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Following up on
the Chairman's questions, this is also my first question. Mr.
Rocheleau, can you tell me if this new methodology, using the
AI or whatever other methodology you are using to look at the
aggregate data, is being applied to other airports where there
is close helicopter traffic in proximity to commercial
aircraft?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, Senator, it is. We have 10 locations
around the United States, including Alaska, Anchorage, that we
are looking through right now, what we are referring to as
hotspots, to look at similar trends, similar activities, as it
relates to fixed-wing and helicopter operations.
Senator Duckworth. Is this methodology of reviewing
aggregate data going to be applied nationwide, not just in this
particular area, but to look at the overall trends of near
misses at other airports, not just between fixed-wing and
rotary-wing?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, ma'am. There are three activities going
on right now. First, the hotspots I referred to. Second is kind
of a nationwide use of this review and use of this new
capability that we have just admitted. And then, of course, the
ongoing analysis and how we are doing that with our industry
partners as well as the military.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. According to NTSB, between,
as you have said, between October 2021 and December 2024, there
were more than 15,000 instances of commercial aircraft coming
close to helicopters. Eighty-five of those had vertical
separation of less than 200 feet.
General Braman, do you know how many of those 85 close
calls involved Army helicopters?
General Braman. Ranking Member Duckworth, we do not.
Senator Duckworth. Can you tell me why that is?
General Braman. That data, in those databases, is currently
not shared, but certainly the Army is interested in becoming
part of an opportunity to share data, because that is relevant
to our safety, as well.
Senator Duckworth. Mr. Rocheleau, will the FAA commit to
sharing that data with the Army?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, ma'am, we will.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Ms. Homendy. We have also asked for that information, and
we are going to share it as part of our investigation with all
the parties.
Senator Duckworth. And I think this needs to be ongoing
into the future, so that especially the military aircraft that
are flying, rotary-wing, within close vicinity--these folks
should be getting this data, and we can do that, moving
forward.
General Braman, can you explain the Army's rationale for
its policy that gives commanders discretion to determine how
many crew chiefs are needed for a particular mission? I think
it is important. I do not think that the civilian population
understands the extent to which the Army does risk assessment
and risk mitigation and risk analysis and that process. I think
it would be important. And how are you going to be implementing
that process, moving forward?
General Braman. Thank you, Ranking Member Duckworth. I
realize that I have broad authority as the Army Aviation
Regulation proponent to direct how every aircraft and every
operator conducts their mission. And I am not afraid to take
that authority and use it, when appropriate. The reality is the
best individuals we have to assess the risk of every single
flight are our unit commanders, because we hold them
responsible. They have the authority, the responsibility, and
we hold them responsible to take any mission that they
authorize, look at the factors involved, understand the people
assigned to their organization, and adapt that crew to meet
those requirements. And certainly that is something that will
be looked at in this investigation--do we do that? And we will
hold commanders accountable if they fail to uphold that
responsibility.
Senator Duckworth. Can you speak to, if a risk assessment
for a particular mission comes in at medium or high risk, how
the approval authority of that changes? Because you mentioned
approval authority for the DCA area has been raised higher for
ADS-B Out. Correct?
General Braman. Yes, Senator. All missions go through an
initial approval process. So a commander has to authorize a
reason for an aircraft to fly. At the completion of that
authorization the crew then assesses all the known and expected
risks associated with the mission they have been tasked to do.
That discussion involves a third party, a senior officer, a
senior aviator within the organization, and then assesses that
risk and directs the crew to make any changes to mitigate
anything that either that briefing officer understands, based
on their experience. And then when those things are implemented
it goes back to a commander, who must authorize every single
flight.
So in the occurrence of things like ADS-B Out operations,
that authority resides with a medium-risk authority. So a
battalion commander must approve that mission, in particular,
and in this case the policy allowed that to be delegated down
to a company commander, and they must approve that it meets the
standards of the policy completely.
We have not elevated that risk to high risk. That requires
an O6 commander to approve any mission that has ADS-B Off.
Senator Duckworth. Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask your
indulgence for an extra 30 seconds, because my next question I
think applies to everybody here, and I think people will be
interested.
Senator Moran. Please proceed.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. This is for the FAA. I am
hearing that there is a backlog of air traffic controllers
waiting to get their FAA medicals approved so that they can
return to duty. And we have an air traffic controller shortage
right now. I think in the Chicagoland area there is about a
dozen air traffic controllers who are waiting for, you know,
they got new medication, whatever it is. But they are waiting
as long as 12 to 18 months to get an appointment or to get a
ruling from the FAA medical office so that they can actually
get back on the job. And they are just sitting there, not able
to do their job.
And I think this is problem at all of the major airports
around the country. I am sure every one of us has air traffic
controllers waiting to be put back onto duty, and they can't
because of the backlog with the FAA medical system. Can you
speak to that? And if I give you a list of my air traffic
controllers who have been waiting, will you take a look at
those folks and make sure that their medical issues are
addressed, so we can get them back on the job?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, Senator, I commit to that.
Senator Moran. Chairman Cruz.
Chairman Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On March 1,
multiple commercial aircraft landing at DCA reported receiving
a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, TCAS Resolution
Advisories, as they were preparing to land, advising pilots of
an impending threat from above, and in some cases directing the
crews to take evasive action by descending. I think we were all
alarmed that just a few weeks after the tragedy, commercial
pilots were being told they were at imminent risk of a deadly
midair collision.
It has now come to my attention that these warnings were
caused by the Secret Service and the U.S. Navy improperly
testing counter-drone technology at DCA. Apparently, the Navy
was using the same spectrum band as TCAS, causing the
interference and faulty resolution advisories, even though the
FAA had previously warned the Navy and the Secret Service
against using that specific spectrum band due to interference
risks.
Acting Administrator Rocheleau, is that correct?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Chairman Cruz. Let me just say this is deeply disturbing
that just a month after 67 people died while on approach to DCA
that the Secret Service and Pentagon would inadvertently cause
multiple flights to receive urgent cockpit alerts recommending
evasive action. It is inappropriate for such testing to occur
at DCA, given the facts of what occurred, and I expect this
Committee to investigate why precisely that happened.
General Braman, I want to turn to your testimony. On March
11, Chairman Moran and I sent you a letter asking a series of
very specific questions. This week, the Army responded with a
one-page information paper. However, there were specific
questions in the letter that were not answered. I want to turn
to them now.
We asked you specifically how frequently does the Army turn
of ADS-B Out transmission?
General Braman. Chairman Cruz, as I stated in the
discussion about how we approve the missions, a mission would
have to fall into the category, as defined in the Federal
regulation and Army policy. It must have national security
implications and be sensitive in nature to be able to do that
mission.
Chairman Cruz. General, you are not answering my question.
My question is how frequently is ADS-B Out turned off? I wasn't
asking what the standard is. I was asking the frequency.
General Braman. I can take the number for record, Senator.
But I can tell you the types of missions and the majority of
the missions they fly are missions associated with that
national security mission.
Chairman Cruz. Is it accurate that ADS-B Out is turned off
for 100 percent of missions flown by the Army Air Brigade at
Fort Belvoir?
General Braman. Senator, I think you are referring to the
June 8th letter from the Joint Staff to Representative Norton.
In the context of missions, meaning the operations that the
12th Aviation supports in their mission requirements, I would
say that is an accurate statement. I would not say that is an
accurate statement of 100 percent of the flights being flown by
that organization.
Chairman Cruz. OK. So I want to understand what you mean by
``missions.'' Does ``missions'' capture training flights?
General Braman. Only training flights that would have been
operating in a location that is sensitive, as part of their
continuity of government operations.
Chairman Cruz. Well, that would be all of them around DCA.
Is that correct?
General Braman. Only specific sites that are part of that
continuity of government operation.
Chairman Cruz. In your one-pager you said 75 percent of the
flights are mission rehearsal readiness flights. Are those
operated with ADS-B Out?
General Braman. They are, Senator, yes.
Chairman Cruz. So right now, today, the Army is flying
helicopters in and around DCA airport with ADS-B Out turned
off. Is that correct?
General Braman. When conducting their NORTHCOM-directed
mission, that is correct.
Chairman Cruz. I have to say, I find that shocking and
deeply unacceptable. And I want to encourage the Army right now
to revisit that policy, and to revisit that policy today. And I
can tell you, if the Army chooses not to, I have a high level
of confidence that Congress will pass legislation mandating
that you revisit the policy. If today another accident occurs
over DCA, with another helicopter that has ADS-B Out turned
off, the Army will have very direct responsibility for that.
And I am at a loss to come up with any justification for
risking the lives of the traveling public with that decision.
You cannot change the decisions made yesterday, but you can
change decisions made forward.
It is my understanding the Army has a memo, August 9, 2024,
entitled, ``ADS-B Out Off operations in the National
Airspace.'' My staff requested that memo from you, and my
understanding is your team declined to provide it. That is also
unacceptable. I want to ask you at this hearing, will you
commit to providing that memo to this Committee?
General Braman. Senator, I will commit to reviewing the
information and getting what we can to you, absolutely.
Chairman Cruz. That answer needs to be a yes, that you will
provide that memo to this Committee.
General Braman. Senator, I will review that and we will
look at the ability to give it to the Committee, absolutely.
Chairman Cruz. If it is not provided to this Committee
within 24 hours, I am confident that you will have a senior
commanding officer give you a direct order to provide that memo
to this Committee.
And I just want to underscore there is no reason the Army
has to wait for the conclusion of the NTSB report to revisit
your policy on ADS-B Out. You can do so right now. And I have
got to tell you, I spent this morning looking in the eyes of
family members who lost family members. I do not know how I
would do it tomorrow, to another room of family members who
lost loved ones, because yet another helicopter was flying with
ADS-B Out. And so I cannot urge you more strongly, change that
policy right now.
Senator Moran. Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I too have
asked for the same memo, so I want to follow on in the same
line as Senator Cruz. I also want to associate myself with the
information you are requesting on spectrum interference. This
is one of the reasons why I think spectrum and spectrum fights
are so important is because I think the agencies with adjacency
and issues, we cannot leave this up to the flying public.
But I want to go back, because Brigadier General, you
mentioned in your testimony we now have the additive dialogue
that we just heard, but you said it is not allowed. You are
saying it is not allowed. ADS-B Out was not allowed. That is
what you said earlier. Is that in your testimony? In addition
to the Holmes letter, you basically stated that using ADS-B
Out, it was not allowed.
General Braman. Army policy is ADS-B Out is not to be used
for routine use.
Senator Cantwell. OK. So Acting Administrator, did you know
this? Did the FAA know this? Did the FAA know and understand
and absorb this? Did you know that you were allowing a flight
to go within 75 feet of each other and there was no signaling
message that we have already identified as a safety measure, is
something that we have had as a requirement?
Mr. Rocheleau. So I understand the FAA was aware of this.
We have an existing memorandum of agreement with the Department
of Defense----
Senator Cantwell. Did you know it was 100 percent, as the
Eleanor Holmes Norton and as--the Brigadier General is pretty
clear this morning, we don't allow it, even to the point of not
answering Senator Cruz when they are going to change it.
Because I am pretty sure their attitude is going to be, ``We
don't allow it.'' He is going to say he would rather have a
route somewhere where he can fly without it. That is what he is
going to say. And so, you know, that is a separate issue over
here.
Our job, though, is the FAA oversight, and you cannot give
exemptions to things that you do not understand. So he, in
their application, kind of made it sound like, well, it is not
going to be that routine. But he is very clear, they are never
turning it on if they do not have to. They are never turning it
on.
So what I do not understand is why the FAA did not
understand that? Why you would allow this design--this is the
wrong design. Whoever said you could fly in this airspace this
close together, without a safety feature that was already being
required by the FAA, and then giving them an exemption makes no
sense. So why did you allow it to happen?
Mr. Rocheleau. So I cannot speak to why the previous
administration may have allowed for that memorandum of
agreement, which is why we, effective today, will require, in
any DCA Class B airspace, ADS-B Out to be turned on, except in
very limited circumstances.
Senator Cantwell. What are those other limited
circumstances? Other agencies? Is there any other agency that
is doing this?
Mr. Rocheleau. So we have 46 different helicopter operators
within the National Capital Region, but again, DCA Class B
airspace will now require ADS-B On to be out.
Senator Cantwell. What other agencies are operating this
way?
Mr. Rocheleau. So we have certainly a number of military
units. We have local law enforcement. We certainly have the
Department of Justice and FBI. We have a number of different
agencies that fly, the Park Police, and those are the entities
that we are working with closely now, to make sure, first and
foremost, they understand the new restrictions that we have in
the airspace.
Senator Cantwell. Do they have exemptions?
Mr. Rocheleau. Some of them do.
Senator Cantwell. Are you concerned about this?
Mr. Rocheleau. Absolutely, which is why we immediately put
in place the requirement to have ADS-B Out on.
Senator Cantwell. And so you think they are operating that
way?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. You think that Homeland Security is
operating that way?
Mr. Rocheleau. Effective today, they will be operating with
ADS-B On.
Senator Cantwell. Effective today?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. So over the last month you have known, as
I am going to submit for the record, a letter from the
Department of Homeland Security, that basically says under the
Federal Aviation waiver, all U.S. Customs and Border Protection
air and marine operations in the Capital Region basically have
this exemption, as well.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Rocheleau. So they haven't had----
Senator Cantwell. So I want to understand if people were
still flying in this airspace, we all fly in and out of this
airspace. Do we now have to worry about other operators in this
airspace that may be doing the same thing as happened with the
military? And now you are telling me you are going to take
action today?
Mr. Rocheleau. I should clarify. Immediately after the
accident we put the restrictions in place so that no mixed
traffic could occur--no helicopters and fixed-wing in the same
airspace. Today, we are requiring the ADS-B Out to be on. So
previous to this day, the fixed-wing as well as helicopters
were not allowed in the airspace. So we cleared the complexity
of that area.
Senator Cantwell. Now today you are going to say to
Homeland Security you have to have ADS-B, basically the
Automatic Surveillance Broadcast System has to be on. You are
going to make that today?
Mr. Rocheleau. That is correct.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I would----
Mr. Rocheleau. Or any or the Class B airspace that you can
see in the graphic, in that red airspace, that is required.
Senator Cantwell. Acting Administrator, you are not
building faith in this system of oversight of the FAA if you
are telling me that we now have a bunch of other operators in
this airspace that you now said after the accident were
prohibited. But now you are going to turn it back on, and if
they meet this requirement. And we have letters from them,
thinking that they are exempted. I want to see this rule. This
would have been a great debate with Mr. Bradbury before the
Committee.
Because the American people, these poor families have lost
loved ones. This is not their day job. It is your day job. It
is the day job of the FAA not to allow these exemptions to
become prolific and everybody use them, and then us have to sit
here and figure out how to do our oversight job of you, to make
sure that these details are exposed, when we cannot even get a
memo from some of these agencies.
So, Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired, but I will
come for a second round with the witnesses, because I think it
is clear. The NTSB has been very clear on the requirements for
ADS-B In, and in this case if they would have listened to
them--it is $40,000 to equip--I am sorry, it is $20,000 to
equip one plane. You could probably equip the whole fleet of
aviation for $100 million. I guarantee you their lives, the
family lives are worth that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Moran. Before recognizing Senator Budd, does the
FAA, Mr. Rocheleau, does it have the authority to supersede the
operations of the Army and these other agencies in the airspace
around airports? We have not gotten the Army to say they are
going to do this with their own policy, but you say you are
mandating it. Do we know that the Army and others have to
follow your mandate?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir, they do.
Senator Moran. OK. Senator Budd.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED BUDD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Senator Budd. Thank you. First and foremost, I want to
offer my condolences and prayers to all the families that are
here today. I am saddened that so many North Carolinians were
lost in this accident, including Captain Rebecca Lobach and the
four members of 5342's Charlotte-based flight crew: Samuel
Lilly, Jonathan Campos, Danasia Elder, and Ian Epstein. Senator
Moran, I am sorry for the loss of so many Kansans, as well, in
this incident, and I want to thank you for organizing this
hearing.
Chair Homendy, thanks for your work so far. On page 9 of
the preliminary report it states that the MPFR, the
multifunction flight recorder's reading for pressure altitude
conflicted with other altitude's readings. Ultimately, this
conflict led your team to invalidate the pressure altitude
reading provided by the recorder.
Can you provide any details on the differing altitude
readings, and do you have any update on whether this
conflicting data was limited to the MPFR or if that was
provided to the flight crew and perhaps was a confusing factor?
Ms. Homendy. We are still looking into that and doing some
testing. What I will say is the pressure altitude was
determined invalid on the Black Hawk because we would expect
that to be somewhat similar to the CRJ. But it was much lower,
so we determined that that was invalid, and it could not be
used to calculate the barometric altitude. We would need two
sets of data, which was pressure altitude and barometric
pressure setting. We had the pressure setting. We do not have
the pressure altitude data for that. So we were not able to
determine from that what the barometric altitude was of the
Black Hawk. However, we are looking at other data.
Senator Budd. OK. Thank you. General Braman, PAT 25 was
operating out of Davidson Army Airfield on a pilot annual
standardization mission at the time of the collision. Given the
concentration of senior military and civilian officials
surrounding DCA, how vital are these missions to readiness for
continuity of government operations?
General Braman. Senator, they are extremely vital. To go
back to Senator Cruz's question about how many flights, 75
percent of the missions flown by the 12th Aviation Battalion
are in direct support of the continuity of government
rehearsals, exercises, and making sure crews are familiar with
how to get that mission accomplished. And they stand ready
every single day in a 15-minute alert stream to do that
mission.
Senator Budd. Thank you, General. Can the Army continue to
fulfill its priority air transport missions without access to
Route 1 and Route 4?
General Braman. The Army, the fact that we are in the
working groups will allow us to help influence routing, that
will allow us to continue to do that mission, and I am
confident we can do that.
Senator Budd. Thank you. Chair Homendy again, in your view,
is the permanent closure of Route 4 the only solution that
allows for continued operations of both rotary and fixed-wing
aircraft around DCA?
Ms. Homendy. And it is permanent closure when Runway 15 and
Runway 33 are in use. That was our recommendation to the FAA.
Senator Budd. Thank you. Administrator Rocheleau, the
aviation investigation report from the NTSB shows that the
separation between aircraft on approach to Runway 33 would have
a mere 75 feet of separation from a helicopter operating on
Route 4 and hugging the shoreline of the east bank of the
Potomac. Was the FAA aware of this conflict prior to January
29, and given the insufficient vertical separation that we are
talking about, was the FAA relying solely on controllers in the
DCA tower to deconflict the approach to Runway 33?
Mr. Rocheleau. So the FAA was aware of the design of that
airspace in advance of December [sic] 29th. I would say that is
one of the reasons why we immediately restricted that airspace
after the incident, to review the circumstances around the
airspace itself. In addition to that, it is one of the reasons
why we are looking at hotspots or mixed traffic areas around
the nation, whether that is Boston, Dallas, L.A., and
Anchorage.
Senator Budd. Thank you.
Ms. Homendy. Senator, can I----
Senator Budd. Please.
Ms. Homendy. There is a D.C. Helicopter Working Group that
we have been trying to figure out who is part of the working
group and get minutes and get documents from that working group
to see what information was shared and what was discussed over
the years. We have not been able to attain that yet, and I hope
we can, from FAA and others.
Senator Budd. Are you a part of that working group?
Ms. Homendy. We are not part of that working group.
Senator Budd. But you have access to it, and they are
willing to provide what they find.
Ms. Homendy. We have requested information. We have not
even been able to identify who is part of the working group
firmly and get documents as part of that working group. We have
requested all of that information because we do want to
evaluate what was discussed. We are also going to interview the
FAA cartographers on how this route was mapped, because that 75
feet is max. That is the maximum. It goes down from there as
commercial aircraft approach Runway 33.
Senator Budd. Thank you.
Senator Moran. So let me see if I can help Senator Homendy,
Chairman Homendy.
Ms. Homendy. That is a very hard job.
Senator Moran. You are very good at public relations with
Senators, but we recognize the challenges you face.
So do either one of you belong to this working group? Does
the Army or the FAA participate, and can you answer that so the
NTSB can pursue information?
Ms. Homendy. I mean, it is the FAA's working group.
Senator Moran. It is the FAA's working group. All right.
Mr. Rocheleau, what is the problem here?
Mr. Rocheleau. I am happy to work with the Chair. We have
been working extremely closely together on this investigation,
and I am happy to work with the Chair and understand why she
has not received that information, and make sure we follow up
on that.
Senator Moran. Can you think of any reason that the NTSB
should not be a part of that information, Mr. Rocheleau?
Mr. Rocheleau. Off the top of my head I cannot. I do not
know why they would be restricted in that, and I certainly will
talk to my folks when we get back.
Senator Moran. Thank you.
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir.
Senator Moran. Should we ask, is the Army part of this
working group, as well?
General Braman. The Army is part of the working group. Yes,
Senator.
Ms. Homendy. There are apparently 17 entities that are part
of the working group. We just have not been able to verify who
all the entities are.
Senator Moran. Surely the FAA is in charge and they can
help you.
Mr. Rocheleau. Surely I would have been happy to understand
that before today.
Senator Moran. General, do you know any reasons that the
working group's efforts cannot be known by NTSB?
General Braman. Absolutely not.
Senator Moran. Thank you. Let me follow up. Mr. Rocheleau
indicated that the FAA does have the authority to require ADS-B
Out. Do you agree with that assessment that the FAA can make
this decision, and if you do not follow the FAA policies then
you are precluded from the airspace?
General Braman. Chairman, the Army operates 100 percent
under FAA authority.
Senator Moran. Very good. Let me turn to perhaps the next
steps or new information, and to this I will go to Chair
Homendy. Since the report that we are discussing here today is
2 weeks old, what has transpired, if anything, in those 2
weeks? Have you discovered any new and relevant information
that you can share with us?
Ms. Homendy. Where would you like me to begin? One thing I
can say on ADS-B Out Off, that is policy of the Army. But we
are still looking at installation programming and potential for
equipment malfunction. And the reason I mention this is because
the accident helicopter, for this accident helicopter, no ADS-B
data had been received from an FAA ground station for 730 days
prior to the accident. And that was abnormal.
So we began looking at the fleet for the battalion. The
battalion had 25 helicopters, that includes this particular
helicopter. Nine of them were Mike models and all were
transmitting ADS-B Out when they were turned on, because we
have to verify that it is working.
There were 16 Limas, including the accident helicopter,
which we are still looking at. But 7 were transmitting when
ADS-B Out was turned on, 8 were not, and stopped doing so
sometime between May and November 2023. We do not know why.
Five of those started transmitting since the NTSB identified
the issue and began working with the Army to try to isolate the
reason.
So I just want to let you know that you can have ADS-B Out
on, but you also have to make sure that it is working.
Senator Moran. You indicated working with the Army, but
there are other participants in this arena. Were you narrowing
it to the Army as if something is necessarily wrong there, or
more broadly there is a problem in receiving the information?
Ms. Homendy. For this, for the ADS-B Out on, we wanted to
look at the helicopter fleet for the battalion, to see whether
ADS-B Out on, when turned on, was actually transmitting data.
Because we did think it was abnormal that for the helicopter
involved in the accident, it was not transmitting data for so
long.
Senator Moran. Any explanation, General?
General Braman. Chairman, this exactly is what the value of
the investigation is. There are things that you would not
normally look at that are being determined here, and that is
certainly going to help us drive policy and any changes that we
need to do as a result of the investigation, and certainly the
NTSB has the expertise to do that.
Senator Moran. So what we are hearing from Chair Homendy is
that it may be transmitting, it may be on, but there is no
receipt, there are, I don't know, technical problems in the
process by which it is--it is not providing the information it
is supposed to provide, right?
General Braman. Chairman, obviously the functionality of
any Army equipment, and certainly Army aviation equipment, is
important to me. So if we are discovering there is a challenge
there, we will take direct action, absolutely.
Senator Moran. This is not an inconsequential thing, right?
Ms. Homendy. It is not, and I think for the public
watching, because I think there are a lot of people watching,
is ADS-B Out broadcast latitude, longitude, altitude, and
velocity once per second. It updates once per second versus 4
to 6 seconds for radar, which is significant when you have
converging aircraft.
Senator Moran. Mr. Rocheleau, you indicated as of today
there is a change in policy at FAA. I would be interested in
knowing if that change in policy is only related to DCA
airspace, or you are putting those requirements in place for
other airports?
Mr. Rocheleau. Thank you, Senator. So the requirements that
I announced today are effective for the D.C. Class B airspace
immediately. Part of our ongoing work, as I related earlier,
with respect to hotspots and the mixed traffic that we have
seen that could be problematic are areas where we are looking
at kind of adding that requirement in. It seems premature
simply along the lines of the way airspace is structured in
different locations that we need to focus before acting too
quickly.
So we want to make sure that as we are looking at the
different airspaces and how they are constructed that we are
taking kind of intentional, careful action.
Senator Moran. And that intentional action is underway.
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir.
Senator Moran. You are doing that at other airports today.
Mr. Rocheleau. Absolutely. And wherever we find a risk, we
will mitigate that risk immediately.
Senator Moran. Chairman Homendy, I asked you a question and
I interrupted you, and it sounded like your answer would be
lengthy, of the things you have learned in the last 2 weeks. I
will come back to you after recognizing the two Senators to my
left.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
follow up on what Chairwoman Homendy is talking about, testing
the ADS-B Out, whether it is actually transmitting data because
the data was not received. Will we be able to check that with
all of the other rotary wing operators that are in this region
as well? Is that something that FAA should be mandating, that
they could do that? I mean, you are not looking at the other
operators because they are not part of this accident. Correct?
So then my question for Mr. Rocheleau is, will the FAA be
directing all of the other helicopter operators, whether it is
Homeland Security, local law enforcement, who have this
exemption to ADS-B Out? Will you be directing that they
actually test their equipment to make sure that it is actually
transmitting the data that can be received?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, Senator. I think that is part of our
ongoing work and the collaboration between those operators and
how we make sure they first and foremost understand the
requirement, and second, that their equipment is functional.
Senator Duckworth. OK. Thank you. I wanted to also follow
up on my earlier questioning about the FAA's air traffic
controller workforce. You had committed to looking at the list
of names I gave you, that I will be giving you, for the air
traffic controllers who are waiting for medical review. I would
like for you to commit to reporting back to me in writing about
how many controllers around the country are waiting for medical
clearances so that they can return to work, and what the FAA is
doing to make sure these medical reviews are happening in a
timely manner.
Mr. Rocheleau. I will commit to that.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. In the race to hire more air
traffic controllers--and the staffing was adequate on that
evening but we could have used more air traffic controllers,
obviously--and in the race to hire more air traffic
controllers, I want to make sure the FAA does not lower your
long-standing high standards for air traffic controllers. There
could be a temptation to sacrifice effectiveness for
efficiency, but the FAA must stick to its stringent standards
to protect safety.
Can you assure this Committee that as the administration
works to hire more air traffic controllers you will not, in any
way, lower the high standards that are currently required for
individuals to become certified air traffic controllers? And
there are plenty of places, a lot of them are in, actually,
Kansas, that have the expertise to help us train air traffic
controllers, as long as we keep those high standards.
Mr. Rocheleau. One hundred percent. Part of our ongoing
activity to surge in air traffic controller hiring is to look
for the best and the brightest, and that is exactly what we are
going to continue to do.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Senator Moran. To follow up on Senator Duckworth, you
should look to Kansas, and we welcome you.
I am going to turn to Senator Schmitt in just one second.
General, the Senator from Illinois was asking about routine
maintenance and determining whether equipment is working. Do
you have a standard in place? What Chairwoman Homendy said does
not make sense to me that you would not know there were
problems with the transmission or the equipment. Do you have a
protocol in place, and is that equipment inspected on a
continuing basis?
General Braman. Certainly, Chairman, generally the aviation
operations we have protocols for the status of aircraft. I will
have to get back to you, take it for the record, on what the
protocol is to ensure that ADS-B Out transmissions outside of
the aircraft are being received. It is something I will have to
look at, on how do we do that.
Senator Moran. And whether protocol is being followed?
General Braman. Absolutely.
Senator Moran. Thank you. Senator Schmitt.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC SCHMITT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And my
friend from Illinois would agree. I certainly do not want to
see us reduce standards. I guess in following in that same
spirit, with Mr. Rocheleau, can you commit that no hiring
decisions will be made based on race?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. Again, we are looking for the best
and the brightest, and we are prioritizing those who are best
qualified.
Senator Schmitt. Because as you know, there is a lawsuit by
about a thousand folks who are claiming that they did not get a
job because of their race, at the FAA.
Mr. Rocheleau. We are all about making sure the best and
the brightest are there, and we do that through a grading
mechanism.
Senator Schmitt. That is great to hear. I did want to ask,
General--and again, I apologize if this has been asked before.
They are running us in and out of here, different committee
hearings, Armed Services. I did want to ask, this was a very
strong crew in the Black Hawk. Is it typical, I guess, is it a
problem--is it typical and is it a problem to have someone who
is a lower rank as the--and this is my understanding, that the
evaluator was a lower rank than the pilot. Is that a typical
situation? Is that problematic? Is that not a problem? Do you
think it contributed in any way? I just wanted to get your
assessment.
General Braman. Thank you, Senator, for the question. It is
extremely typical in Army aviation because the preponderance of
our force is our warrant officers, and they are our
professional aviators. That is what they do for their entire
career. So they are instructor pilots, they are maintenance
test pilots, safety officers, and our commissioned officers
fill roles of leadership within the organization. So it is very
routine to have a senior member being evaluated by a junior
member.
Senator Schmitt. OK. And I am sure you have gone through
this analysis. I just feel like in the spirit of making sure we
are getting this right, moving forward, that you do not think
there is a systemic problem associated with maybe somebody with
a lower rank saying something to somebody of a higher rank in
those kinds of situations. You have gone through that analysis,
I am assuming?
General Braman. Absolutely. And the personalities of crew
members and capabilities is something that is considered in
that risk brief process for every single flight. Is it the
right crew? Is the crew mixed properly? Commanders would know
if there are issues with, as simple as they do not get along,
and commanders will take that into account before approving any
fight.
Senator Schmitt. And I guess for the FAA--and again, maybe
you have been asked this before--clearly in the Chairman's
opening statement and a number of the Committee members, just
the report, the statistics of the number of near misses between
helicopters and aircraft landing at DCA, that, you know, those
operations now have been halted. Can you just explain to the
American people why that did not happen before?
Mr. Rocheleau. So, again, I will say that the reports that
came in previously were certainly analyzed, but something was
missed. And since that time, we have been using new tools
available to us, artificial intelligence, machine learning, to
be able to scan the tens of millions of data points, to be able
to do that analysis in a more proactive and ideally at some
point here, predictive way, to identify risks earlier and to
mitigate that risk.
Senator Schmitt. But this was not a new issue at DCA,
right? This is an issue that had been a longstanding concern.
Is that accurate?
Mr. Rocheleau. It is accurate. There were a number of
reports that came in, and I would say that we, as I mentioned
earlier, we investigate every single near-midair collision, and
even as we talk about spectrum issues, Chairman Cruz mentioned,
we have teams that go out and assess the airspace itself,
making sure that we are working with partners, whether it is on
counter-UAS technology, to make sure that airspace is as clean
as possible from interference.
Senator Schmitt. And so moving forward, obviously as a
response to the tragedy that happened--and I would be remiss
not to express my condolences to the families who are here. I
know everyone has, and it is devastating for each and every one
of you, including some folks from back home. So your advocacy
does matter, and it will carry beyond today. This is important.
So I ask in the spirit of that. Moving forward then, is
that how you see things, that the state of play as it is
currently now will continue?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. We will continue to use the latest
tools we have to be able to assess that data and work with the
industry, with the aviation ecosystem, if you will, to identify
that risk early and to mitigate that risk immediately.
Senator Schmitt. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Mr. Rocheleau,
at the moment, whether it is on or off is irrelevant because
there are no flights--you are announcing something that does
not, at the moment matter because you have not lifted the ban
on the flights. Is that true?
Mr. Rocheleau. So it is helpful if I can just point to the
graphic. In the graphic I can explain that in the yellow-
sectioned area, the graphic there, that is where there is no
mixed traffic--no helicopters, no fixed-wing--except for those
very few circumstances where we have emergency, national
security type of traffic.
In the red section, in that red airspace, is where ADS-B
Out--so DCA Class B airspace is now required.
You will also notice where, based on the NTSB
recommendations, where we have eliminated Route 4, going north
to south on the Potomac, as well as Route 6, that formerly, you
can see on the left side of the graphic, was in effect from the
west to the east, where Bolling Air Force Base is.
Senator Moran. I will have to think about that. Yes, sir.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Chairman, if I could, just for the
record, because I see we have several colleagues----
Senator Moran. Senator Cantwell, you are recognized.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to clarify
on your point, Acting Administrator, we still have a rule that
says they have an exemption, all sensitive. So I know you are
making a declaration today, but I do not think that supersedes
the rule. Now, maybe President Trump is going to call all these
agencies and tell them to stand down, but legally, whatever the
FAA is doing today, does not take precedent over that rule. So
when I come back for a second round----
Senator Duckworth. I believe the FAA has control over that
airspace and they can say----
Senator Cantwell. They can definitely shut it down. But as
it relates to the rule, his decision just to say that you now
have this requirement, that a rule gave them an exemption to.
Senator Duckworth. I think you can issue an emergency
directive. Is that correct?
Mr. Rocheleau. So the agreement we have in place with the
helicopter operations that fly without ADS-B Out is an actual
memorandum of agreement. It is not a formal rule. So it is an
agreement we have with the Department of Defense and the other
helicopter operators in the D.C. area.
Senator Cantwell. And we can get a copy of that, the MOU?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
Senator Moran. Senator Hickenlooper.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Rocheleau,
you earlier testified that you have looked at the airports with
higher volumes of mixed traffic. I think you mentioned Boston,
Dallas, Anchorage. Is that assessment--have you gone through
all the airports? I mean, does that mean that other airports in
other large cities, or where we have a fair amount of mixed
traffic, are OK?
Mr. Rocheleau. So we have 10 locations, a total of 21
airports. So we are doing this hotspot review, this mixed
traffic review across the nation, including in the Anchorage
area. So we are reviewing all the airspace designs to see where
we may have this indicator of risk with mixed traffic, so
helicopter operations as well as fixed wing.
Senator Hickenlooper. And so you mentioned Boston, Dallas,
and Anchorage. That is not the full list, I assume.
Mr. Rocheleau. That is correct, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. And so when will this be done?
Mr. Rocheleau. So obviously 21 locations, I am receiving
regular updates. I anticipate that activity being concluded in
the next couple of weeks. I will tell you that our teams, they
are being very intentional about how they go through that
airspace, because it has been built over time as it relates to
helicopter routes and other approaches and departure routes.
So we are being very intentional, very careful. We do not
want to move quickly, with inducing additional risk.
Senator Hickenlooper. I understand that. But obviously time
is of the essence in a situation like this, making sure that
even a preliminary warning as part of that assessment would be
pretty valuable.
Mr. Rocheleau. And any indicator that there is an emerging
risk, we would take immediate action.
Senator Hickenlooper. Ms. Homendy, you have, in the past
talked about workforce and making sure that you are fully
staffed, and I think this is a direct follow up on that. Are we
fully staffed? I mean, you are going to look at this entire
incident, and it is going to take the typical year and a half
or two years, which, again, drives a lot of my constituents
crazy. Do you have a timeline for when you will finish the full
incident report, or whatever the legal description is, when
that will happen?
Ms. Homendy. We have committed to 1 year, barring any
unforeseen circumstances, but one year.
Senator Hickenlooper. And you have enough staffing on that?
Ms. Homendy. We have 40 experts at the NTSB that are
currently leading this investigation. It is a high workload
because it is not their only investigation that they are
focused on. But they are very committed to this one. And then
we have an entire agency that supports them.
Senator Hickenlooper. All right. We had an array of past
reports. It varies dramatically. But I appreciate the fact that
you are trying to accelerate this. I think it frustrates a lot
of people that it takes so long--I mean, how long does it take
to gather the facts?
Ms. Homendy. I mean, it is a complex investigation, and our
investigations are very broad, and there is a lot of
information that can change over time, and we are very fact-
based, following the evidence. So that is our credibility, so
we want to be exact when we issue something.
I will say I do have to congratulate our workforce because
when I came on as Chair we had well over 400, close to 500
reports that were 2, 3, 4 years old, and they are now below 2.
So that is significant.
But the complexity of investigations, and then the fact
that some things we do not have control over, like if we cannot
get access to evidence because a district attorney or law
enforcement is prohibiting us in a certain situation, with a
highway crash. That can extend the timeline.
Senator Hickenlooper. Sure. No, no, I have seen that. But I
think on something like this, where time is of the essence, I
appreciate you guys making the effort, and glad to hear that
you have the workforce.
Mr. Rocheleau, in your testimony you highlighted some of
the recent changes in hiring, and also especially in the
training processes, to make sure we have more qualified air
traffic controllers but full workforce. I know you are working
with local colleges all over the country on that.
Is that effective? Is that working? I mean, I think if we
can accelerate that--Metro State in Denver is a place where
they are turning out some of these members. Is that something
you can ramp up?
Mr. Rocheleau. I am very interested, and the Secretary has
been very clear, with the public as well as with me, that we
need to surge this hiring and do it well, again, back to the
testing, the surge, bringing people in. As it relates to
additional college initiatives, we have an Enhanced College
Training Initiative, ECTIs, that we are using in I believe four
universities right now. We are working with them, with respect
to advanced simulators and the like, to make sure that we can
get more what we will call throughput, but more controllers
through those schools, and get them out to the local
facilities, centers, towers, TRACONs.
Senator Hickenlooper. Great. I am out of time. I yield back
to the Chair. Thank you all.
Senator Moran. Senator Sullivan.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me start
by saying that my heart goes out to the families and loved ones
of the victims lost in the American Airlines Flight 5342
disaster at DCA, and not long after that, unfortunately, as
well, the Bering Air crash near Unalakleet and Nome, Alaska,
flying over the Norton Sound area. And I am thankful for the
Chairman for holding this hearing and appreciate the NTSB, and
FAA, and DoD focusing on the after actions, so this does not
happen again, either here in D.C. or in my state.
And I do want to focus a little bit on my state, the great
state of Alaska, because as I think all three of you know, we
have very high rates of airplane crashes, highest in the
country, and airplane crash fatalities, which is why we
launched, with the NTSB's good work in 2020, and the FAA's good
work in 2020, the FAA Alaska Safety Initiative, called FAASI.
And in last year's FAA reauthorization I was able to include a
number of provisions with the goal of reducing the rate of
fatal aircraft accidents by 90 percent--that is a very
ambitious goal--and require the FAA to improve maintenance of
weather equipment.
So, Mr. Administrator, I want to get into that topic a
little bit. I was just home. It came up a lot, how there might
be cancellations of weather operations and infrastructure and
reporting, which makes zero sense to me. I hope our Federal
Government is not doing that. But one of the things in the FAA
bill, I was able to include requirements for systematic
improvements to the maintenance of our weather systems and
advancing new technologies, and this includes a mandate for the
FAA to take necessary actions to restore full connectivity of
weather systems that are unable to disseminate information due
to a telecommunications failure. We have telecommunications
challenges in a state the size of mine.
So you can you talk to that, Administrator Rocheleau? And
then I would like to get an update from your perspective on
where we are on the FAASI initiative. As you know, the
Secretary of Transportation, in our press conference that we
all did together--and again, I appreciate everybody
participating in that--has made this a very top priority of
his, and yet as we saw in Alaska we had a fatal crash that
hopefully we are going to learn from.
Can I ask you on the data link, telecoms, weather
reporting, which is a big deal for my state?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. I appreciate that. And I
appreciate the opportunity to talk a little bit more, based on
our previous conversation, your leadership. As a result of that
and your request I did travel recently to Alaska to go and
understand more. I met with the NTSB lead investigator along
with my investigators as it related to the Bering Air tragedy.
Senator Sullivan. By the way, thank you both for coming up
to Alaska. I know it is not the easiest, closest state to get
to from Washington, D.C., but it is important that you are
showing my constituents that it matters.
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir, and I agree. It is very important,
I understand having been there a number of times, the unique
nature of Alaska, certainly its topography as well as the need
for safe aviation operations.
So related to, again, reauthorization and the commitment to
work to have better communications throughout Alaska, one of
the initiatives, one of the reasons I went to Anchorage was to
understand more about how the maintenance issues, the
connectivity issues, whether that is on the telco side or
satellite. And one of the things we are doing right now, and I
met with our own technical operations people in the area, to
test Starlink, so satellite. Because of the unique nature of
it, and the difficulty with telco, we needed another solution.
And one of the ways we believe we can do that is using
satellite-based technology. So that is what we are
experimenting with right now.
Senator Sullivan. Well, by the way, I really appreciate--
you know, the press here kind of went crazy, and oh, Starlink.
I mean, that is actually really helpful for us. And we
appreciated the Secretary called me and said, ``Hey, we are
going to connect some of these terminals through Starlink,
because that is the most effective way to do it.'' So I
appreciated that you guys were working it.
Can you give me an update, or Madam Chair, an update on the
FAASI Initiative, and then any preliminary findings you are
seeing from the NTSB preliminary report on the Bering Air
crash?
Senator Moran. Senator Sullivan, this needs to be your last
question.
Senator Sullivan. It is, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Homendy. We are still working on that investigation, of
course. The preliminary report was issued and did find that the
aircraft was over 1,000 pounds overweight. But we also are
going to look at the center of gravity on that airplane and see
how that factored in. And then we are really focused in on
weather that day, as well. As you noted, weather infrastructure
is critical for Alaska, and we have a number of recommendations
on weather observing stations and also the importance of pilot
reports and having air traffic control when a pilot reports
weather conditions, to pass that information along to other
pilots in the area. And that is something we are looking at as
part of this investigation, in particular.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Moran. Senator Sullivan, thank you. I do not want
to diminish the circumstances that Alaskans faced and the
circumstance you, as their Senator, represent. We are trying to
get everybody's questions in before the vote closes, and I
recognize Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Chairman. Thank
you. And to the families, such a tragedy, and I know there are
those watching at home as well, including the family of Wendy
Jo Schaffer, a Minnesotan, mom, two little kids, and husband,
and we lost her.
So, Chair, I want to thank you for your work. I know how
complicated these investigations are. And could you just
briefly talk about any open recommendations on communications
that do not come out of this, that the NTSB--I know you have
over 1,000 open safety recommendations. And while this
investigation is ongoing, just open recommendations related to
technology and anything that would improve communication?
Ms. Homendy. Related to this investigation?
Senator Klobuchar. Not related.
Ms. Homendy. Oh, not related. We have a number of
recommendations that remain open, including a number of
recommendations issued to the FAA. On communications, in
particular, I mean one thing I will mention, that we have not
talked about, that we are looking at as part of this
investigation, is our long-standing belief that ADS-B In also
needs to be mandated by the FAA. We do not know what relevance
that has to this investigation yet. However, it is a long-
standing position of the NTSB. It will provide key information
to pilots. And in 2008, in our comments for Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to FAA, where they decided not to require it, we
said equipage of aircraft with ADS-B In capability will provide
an immediate and substantial contribution to safety.
Just a couple of years ago, and we just talked about
Alaska, we investigated a midair collision in Ketchikan, and we
reiterated--and this is the statement--that NTSB remains
concerned that without a requirement to install and use ADS-B
supported airborne traffic advisory systems, midair collisions
will continue to occur. And that was in 2019. So we will look
at that as part of this investigation.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you. We all know full funding
of the FAA could not be more important. Last year, we passed
the bipartisan FAA Bill to improve aviation, workforce
training. And actually Senator Braun, then-Senator Braun, now
Governor, and I had the bill to require the FAA to conduct
maximum hiring of air traffic controllers at the FAA Academy.
And I guess I would ask you, Acting Director Rocheleau, you
discussed in your testimony the efforts that Secretary Duffy
and the FAA have taken to bolster the air traffic workforce. I
think 91 percent of the air traffic control facilities operate
below recommended staffing levels. I think they are 3,000-some
short. This I got from some of the people who do this work.
Can you talk to the current state of staffing and how do
you plan to maintain recruiting levels? We did have an
increase, I believe, last year.
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, Senator, and thank you for the
question. This is a very important issue for the Secretary and
myself, as we look at the safety of the national airspace
system, in general, but certainly as we are looking to bring
the best and brightest controllers into the airspace system, to
make sure that we are providing that safety for Americans as
they travel through the air.
I would say that as a result of this surge we had over
10,000 applications. Over 8,000 of those have now been referred
to testing. We have streamlined the process, cut roughly 5
months off that process. So going forward we intend to have no
empty seat at any upcoming Academy classes.
I would also say that we expect our partnerships with other
schools, universities, to be able to bring more people into the
career field itself. It is an exciting career. And even
incentivizing students to come to Oklahoma City, with an
additional 30 percent. We have kind of put all our focus on
this effort in addition to the many other things we have got
going on. But controller hiring is of paramount importance.
Senator Klobuchar. Very good. As you know, we have very
active airports in Minnesota, a major hub. I would ask you to
look at the Duluth air traffic control tower, just because it
is the third-oldest in the Nation. And Secretary Duffy is aware
of it. It has had flooding, and it is a major air base up
there, as well, for the Guard.
Mr. Rocheleau. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Klobuchar. Yes. And Representative Stauber and I
have been working together on that.
Anyway, last question is just the importance of fully
funding the FAA. Quickly for both of you, or all three of you--
--
Ms. Homendy. I can talk about fully funding the NTSB.
Senator Klobuchar. Yes, please do.
Ms. Homendy. I mean, you are important, but we did get an
increase in funding that I do want to thank you for, to 145 in
the CR. It was an anomaly. But for fully staffing the NTSB,
right now we are at 427. We went down in the last couple of
months because people left. We will be able to go up to 450.
But fully staffing the NTSB to accomplish our mission would
require hiring between 485 and 500 personnel, which requires
resources. So as you consider Fiscal Year 2026, it would be
helpful.
Senator Klobuchar. That is very helpful.
Mr. Rocheleau. And I certainly echo those sentiments. Fully
funding the FAA is critical, not just for the workforce but for
our facilities and equipment. The situation is quite concerning
to me, as I review over 30 percent of our facilities being
unsustainable going forward. We have to invest in that
infrastructure going forward.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. I know that is no solace to
the families, but knowing that you are stepping back and
looking at all of this right now, so other tragedies can be
avoided. It could not be more important. So thank you very
much.
Senator Moran. It gives me an opportunity to editorialize.
We need to pass appropriation bills and not continue to utilize
continuing resolutions. That is directed at not necessarily at
my colleagues here, but my colleagues generally.
Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with
your last statement. I just have two quick questions. General
Braman, I have never had a warrant officer be afraid to tell me
when I was doing something wrong in the aircraft, and I prefer
to have them as a pilot-in-command to myself. Speak a little
bit to crew resource management and how it works in an air
crew, and speaking to Senator Schmitt's question, not just
about between the two pilots but also the role of the crew
chief, and do they have the ability to speak up, as well?
General Braman. Thank you, Ranking Member Duckworth. There
is nothing more important in the air crew than crew resource
management, and that is taught from day one, and everyone has
an equal voice. Obviously, the pilot-in-command is the one that
is designated with the authority to command that aircraft, but
I have never been in an aircraft that was ever in an
environment where all members were not a valued member of the
team, and we rely on all those members to accomplish the
missions we are doing.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I am just going to wrap up by
saying how important it is to fund and resource the NTSB. You
guys do amazing work. You, yourself, Chairwoman, oftentimes I
will call you when something happens, whether it was a door
plug incident or something, and you were already on the ground
or in the air, on your way there. And you need the resources to
do your work. And as we are seeing from this investigation, how
critically important that is, not just to find out what
happened, but to prevent future accidents. So I could not agree
with you more that we should be funding you.
Mr. Rocheleau, I think we also need to look at the
facilities at FAA, and we need to talk to that. I would love to
get your commitment to come out and tour the facilities in the
Chicagoland area and see the condition of this repair that they
are in.
Mr. Rocheleau. I commit to that. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. And with that I am going to
turn it back over to the Chairman, who has been very generous.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Senator Duckworth. I am going to
ask just a couple of tidbits--I hope they are important
questions more than tidbits--but I hope they will be short so I
can go vote, and I think that Senator Duckworth will close out
the hearing in my absence.
First of all, the fact that ADS-B Out, there is evidence
that transmissions were not received. And apparently the Army
does not know that they were not received. Why doesn't the FAA
know they are not received?
Mr. Rocheleau. I am not aware of that. I know it is part of
the ongoing investigation. I do not believe that we receive any
helicopter information from the Army.
Senator Moran. But somebody has to be reporting that they
were sent but not received. Who do they report that to?
Mr. Rocheleau. Again, I think that is part of the
investigation. My assumption would be the Army.
Senator Moran. OK.
Senator Duckworth. Well, no. The Army could have it turned
on but I think what the Chairwoman is saying is that the
receiving stations got no data, so the Army has got it turned
on and they do not know that it is not receiving. So this is,
again, this communication issue between the different agencies.
Senator Moran. Senator Duckworth was speaking on my behalf.
She said it exactly right.
Senator Duckworth. I said you were generous.
Senator Moran. I think this is my concluding question, and
then I recognize Senator Markey. This is to you, Mr. Rocheleau.
What is the current state of operations at DCA? How are they
different today than they were on January 29?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. Again, I appreciate the
opportunity to explain. So immediately after January 29, we
restricted the airspace in the yellow boxes I showed in the
previous graphic for mixed traffic. So no helicopters or fixed-
wing will be in that box, if you will.
Senator Moran. The yellow.
Mr. Rocheleau. The yellow box, going forward. In the red
section----
Senator Moran. That is still true today.
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir, and that is permanent. We have
made that permanent. We have also eliminated Route 4 and Route
6, the crossing that goes over to Bolling Air Force Base from
DCA.
Senator Moran. Any other changes? I would ask about number
of flights. It appears to me, and my understanding is there are
fewer flights utilizing Reagan National Airport?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. Thank you. So in the aftermath we
reduced the arrival rate. A lot of that was to support the NTSB
ongoing investigation and the emergency response work. Today we
are running at what we call a 30 rate, so 30 arrivals an hour.
And we are doing that largely in partnership--I mean, we have
received great information from the NTSB regarding some
feedback they were receiving during their preliminary
investigation, regarding the workload on the controllers
themselves. Obviously, a tragic event has an effect. I mean,
these people come to work every day. They care about what they
do. And so we reduced the rate down to 26. Slowly we moved back
to now we are at 30 rate.
Senator Moran. And will stay constant or change in the
future?
Mr. Rocheleau. Right now that is constant. That is staying.
We are continuing to monitor that.
Senator Moran. For the foreseeable future, the 30--is it
32?--30?
Mr. Rocheleau. It can go to 32, but right now we are at 30,
and we plan to maintain that until such time as we assess the
safety and being able to go to a higher rate.
Senator Moran. Senator Markey, are you OK if I continue
just a moment? I often, almost without exception, when I am
chairing a hearing, ask the witnesses at the end, at the
conclusion of the hearing, is there anything that you want to
correct that you did not say, as you wish to say it, something
you want to make sure we hear. And then I will turn the
conducting this hearing over to Senator Duckworth. Ms. Homendy?
Ms. Homendy. That is when all my staff cringe when I chime
in. On this one, I would say I know there is a lot of focus on
the FAA right now. I do think they are very focused on safety.
We have an excellent relationship and have been in
communication constantly since this accident.
I would say one area we are really looking at also is how
the Army evaluates when there is reporting of close calls. Do
they get those reports, the Army I am talking about, and how do
they communicate? At the battalion level, how do they
communicate and talk about safety? How do they evaluate safety?
Are they getting reports? Are they monitoring their own
helicopters that might exceed altitude levels?
We have found so far that a lot of the conversation and
safety discussion at the battalion level is really focused on
OSHA's slips, trips, and falls. There is a disconnect on some
of the discussion around safety and safety assurance from the
Army as a whole versus the battalion level. So we are really
looking at that.
Senator Moran. Please answer this question, but just in my
absence.
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir, and I appreciate the opportunity.
I just want to make it crystal clear that something was missed
at the DCA crash. I take that seriously. I take that upon
myself. I returned to the FAA just two months ago because I
care about the National Airspace system and the safety and the
workforce, and I am dedicated to continuing that work. And I
will continue to review what I mentioned before with respect to
the hotspots, working closely with NTSB, to learn what happened
here, and to make sure it never happens again.
Senator Duckworth [presiding]. General, I am going to ask
you to suspend so Mr. Markey can ask his questions, because he
is going to miss a roll call vote if he doesn't get to. I
recognize Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you so much, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman, Ranking Member. I want to take a moment to express my
deepest condolences to the families who lost loved ones in the
tragic crash in January. Your pain is unimaginable, and your
presence here today is a powerful reminder of the lives that
were so suddenly and unfairly taken.
I want to specifically note the individuals from the
Skating Club of Boston who passed away in this crash: Spencer
Lane, Christine Lane, Jinna Han, Jin Han, Evgenia Shishkova,
Vadim Naumov.
We had a similar plane crash in 1961 that devastated the
Skating Club of Boston. The trauma for the City of Boston and
for your families is great. So please know that we grieve with
you, and we are committed to finding answers and accountability
in honor of those who you have lost.
Chair Homendy, thank you and the entire NTSB team for your
work to investigate this crash. I want to discuss the altitude
of the Black Hawk helicopter. NTSB's preliminary report notes
that a few minutes before the crash the pilot indicated that
the helicopter was flying at an altitude of 300 feet, while the
instructor pilot said it was at 400 feet. The report also found
that helicopters may have been above the altitude restriction
in over half of near misses that triggered an advisory on the
plane's traffic alert and collision avoidance system.
In your experience, are altitude discrepancies like this
common, and are you concerned that Black Hawk altimeters may
have a systemic problem?
Ms. Homendy. This barometric altimeter, we have done
substantial examination on it. We do not think we are going to
get much from this altimeter because there was such damage. We
are going to have to look at other data.
But I think it is too early to really say what the
discrepancy was or whether it was a discrepancy. There was no
information other than 1.1 nautical miles west of the Key
Bridge when the pilot flying said, ``I'm at 300,'' and the
pilot instructor said, ``I have you at 4.'' There was no
further discussion of why. So there is a lot of work that still
has to be done.
Senator Markey. OK. Administrator Rocheleau, on a related
issue, Elon Musk recently made alarmist claims about the FAA's
air traffic control communications system. He said, ``The FAA
assessment is single-digit months to catastrophic failure,
putting air traffic safety at serious risk. The situation is
extremely dire.'' Elon Musk is in charge of all the
investigations into every single Federal agency. That is scary.
This is at the same time that he may be pushing for
Starlink, his own company, to take over the contract to upgrade
the communication system. And one month ago, the FAA announced
it was deploying multiple Starlink terminals across the
country.
Given these systems critical importance to our aviation
system, these developments raise serious questions about
aviation safety. So I would like you to set the record straight
on this issue of he said basically we have single-digit months
to catastrophic failure, putting air traffic safety at serious
risk. Is that tweet accurate?
Mr. Rocheleau. I would say that the circumstances around
our air traffic system are in great need of renewal. We need to
modernize----
Senator Markey. I did not ask you that. The public needs to
hear this. Are we within single-digit months to catastrophic
failure, putting air traffic safety at serious risk?
Mr. Rocheleau. I know we need new air traffic control
facilities. I know we need that. I know----
Senator Markey. So you are saying we are at risk. Is that
what you are saying? Are you agreeing with him that we are?
Mr. Rocheleau. I am saying our air traffic system needs
modernization as soon as possible.
Senator Markey. You understand, we cannot have people
heading for airports all across the country right now with Elon
Musk, the ear of the President, saying that we are within
single-digit months of catastrophic failure. Can you assure
people that that is not the case right now?
Mr. Rocheleau. I can assure you, to the flying public, to
fly is safe. We have the safest, most complex system in the
world, and it is safe to fly. I would also say the air traffic
system is in dire need of upgrade, and it is something the
Secretary and I have been working on intensely.
Senator Markey. Well, so you are saying that this is not
right, we are not within months of a catastrophic failure.
Because I do not think anyone wants to put a family member on a
plane right now with this kind of assessment. Have you made the
assessment that we are within single-digit months of
catastrophic failure? Have you made that assessment?
Mr. Rocheleau. I have reviewed assessments in the last two
months and understand that our equipment needs to be upgraded.
Senator Markey. I did not ask you that. Is the existing
equipment safe?
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes.
Senator Markey. Is the existing equipment putting traveler
safety at serious risk? Yes or no.
Mr. Rocheleau. The existing system is safe.
Senator Markey. Is safe. All right. We need to know that.
Are any SpaceX employees serving as special government
employees at the FAA right now?
Mr. Rocheleau. We had three special government employees
from SpaceX. We are only in contact with one at this point. I
would make it very clear they did not do any air traffic--they
did not plug into any of the equipment. They came in to observe
our operations and provided expertise along the lines of
software and computer systems.
Senator Markey. Did any employee have any involvement in
the FAA's decision to deploy Starlink terminals in February?
Mr. Rocheleau. I am sorry, if you could just repeat that
question.
Senator Markey. Did any of those DOGE employees have any
involvement in the FAA's decision to deploy Starlink terminals
in February?
Mr. Rocheleau. There were no DOGE employees in that
decision. Starlink is being tested at a number of our
facilities, only tested and not plugged into any air traffic
systems.
Senator Markey. Are any of these employees involved in the
decisionmaking process around the deployment of additional
Starlink terminals?
Mr. Rocheleau. No, sir.
Senator Markey. OK. So I recognize that Starlink terminals
may be an effective communications tool in remote areas, and I
am sure Starlink engineers think highly of their potential. We
just need to be extremely careful----
Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir.
Senator Markey.--in making these life-and-death decisions
that they are not based on any pre-existing professional biases
or financial conflicts. That is your job. You have got to make
sure this is the way we operate, because we are going to have
hearings on this as this year and next year unfold.
So I thank you, and I thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I want to return to General
Braman so he can conclude his remarks.
General Braman. Thank you, Senator. I do want to clarify
two quick points, one on the memo requested by the Chairman,
both Chairmen. It can be made available. However, it is part of
the investigation. That is the unit's memo that discusses how
they utilize ADS-B Out Off. It is their policy letter. It is in
the purview of the investigation. That is why it is not
currently releasable. But certainly when the NTSB and the other
investigations have done their due diligence we can look to
make that available to the Committee.
Senator Duckworth. Ms. Homendy?
Ms. Homendy. For the NTSB, if the policy existed prior to
the collision, you can provide it. That can be provided.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. What is your second point,
General?
General Braman. And the second one, talking about whether
we are willing to change the policy, the Army's policy. The
Army is always willing to review its policy. Am I prepared to
make a decision on ADS-B Out right now. No, Senator, but I want
to do that informed by the facts that we have and this
investigation, and those will drive policy changes. And that is
not the Army policy. That is DOD policy, and the Army certainly
has a vested interest in getting it right.
At the end of the day, what I am most concerned about is
the rigid application of that policy, that it is being done
correctly, and not being abused. And that is part of this
investigation, as well.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chair. I wanted to just
go back to this process, how it is set up in the FAA, and how
we rectify these issues in the future. But, Chairwoman Homendy,
I think you are saying, in your earlier testimony, that even if
the Black Hawk helicopter had hugged the shoreline as
originally described, that even that route that is outlined is
insufficient, your investigation showed that even that is
insufficient.
Ms. Homendy. Intolerable risk to aviation safety.
Senator Cantwell. OK. Intolerable risk to aviation safety.
So Acting Administrator, how did we get to a point where we
have a route, that is allowed and mapped, that the military is
flying, that is interfacing with commercial aviation, that as
by the very definition the NTSB is saying, even if they flew
the correct path, was an intolerable risk. I think you are
saying that because the difference in separation was just too
small. Too small.
Ms. Homendy. There was virtually no margin of error.
Senator Cantwell. No margin of error. How are you defining
margin of error?
Ms. Homendy. I mean, just looking at this--and I think you
have the printout in front of you, hopefully, or staff has it,
that we provided. This is not for the public. This is in our
preliminary report and for those behind me. But the charts,
when we mapped the glide slope and we looked at the helicopter
route, which has no lateral boundaries, it is 75 feet max if
you are hugging the shoreline.
The collision actually occurred to the right and slightly
above the dashed line, right here. And just so you know, pilots
landing on Runway 33 do not have to be on this dashed line.
They can be above or below. But it occurred about to the right.
Senator Cantwell. You are saying----
Ms. Homendy. They were not on this route. They were
slightly over.
Senator Cantwell. You are saying under this route. They
could have been below or above this line. But you are now
saying that 75 feet is not enough separation.
Ms. Homendy. Seventy-five feet is the max. Because there
are no lateral boundaries on this route it goes down as you
come over. So helicopters are not always on that eastern
shoreline, which is where the 75 feet is marked, and they were
not in this situation. They were actually to the right of this
gray-shaded area, which indicates the route that has no
boundaries.
Senator Cantwell. But I thought your analysis, even if they
were on that route, it is still an intolerable risk----
Ms. Homendy. Correct.
Senator Cantwell.--because there is not enough separation.
Ms. Homendy. Seventy-five feet is very small.
Senator Cantwell. Right. So how did we get to this point,
is my question? How did we get to this point? It is like it is
a series of errors here, a series of errors. And so I am just
trying to understand, Acting Administrator, what office is
responsible for this? What office is responsible for the
exemption to the rule, which just made it worse? But what
office said this is a safe pathway, in agreement, when the NTSB
is telling us today it never really was safe? It was not. It
was an intolerable risk.
Mr. Rocheleau. And certainly I understand today, and even
after the preliminary report that was the assessment. I can
tell you that--and I am sure we will learn more over time as to
how the airspace was redesigned. I know that as a result of
previous incidents that we have talked about earlier today
there were changes over time with respect to that airspace. But
it is one of the reasons why we immediately terminated those
types of operations after the event. So Route 4, Route 6, no
mixed traffic into the airspace. Those are the things that we
put in place immediately.
I think when you talk about how did we get there, I think
we are going to learn more of that through the investigation.
Again, I can confidently say, without knowing specifically what
is in the investigation, that over time those routes, that
airspace, was designed--it is one of the reasons why we have
gone back to the hotspots now throughout the Nation to
understand the circumstances by which we move traffic safely
and efficiently.
Senator Cantwell. What office of the FAA has oversight of
this issue, as it relates to this area?
Mr. Rocheleau. So the Air Traffic Organization builds out
the airspace, and there is an Aviation Safety Office that
reports directly to me, that oversees the Air Traffic
Organization.
Senator Cantwell. And did that office ever bring up any of
this data or information or have input from anybody that said,
``We don't like this scenario. There are too many close calls,
too much interface, too complex, too hard to deal with''?
Mr. Rocheleau. On this specific route I am not aware of
that. I know that when we are presented with those, and we have
been--that is how airspace changes--when we are presented with
those circumstances, situations, near midair collisions, we
investigate them and we put mitigations in place.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I am questioning whether anybody
was investigating? I mean, that is the issue. You had an alarm
going off once a month. You had the data. You are saying maybe
people were not looking at it. And while I get that AI is this
very new and interesting technology, it is no substitute for
the FAA having an oversight over this level of traffic.
So as my colleague, the Chair of this hearing, mentioned,
now we want to know, do we have other problems in other
airspaces? I mean, we are very focused on DCA, but now we want
to know, we have big military complexes, 10 military
installations in the state of Washington. I am sure Chicago has
a lot. We want to know, do we have to worry about this
somewhere else because the FAA is not looking, and does not
have an organization that is overseeing this information?
Mr. Rocheleau. I agree 100 percent with you. This is of
utmost concern to me, not just in the DCA area, which again, we
have put measures in place to reduce the risk and to make the
airspace less complex. This is one of the reasons why we have a
task force working on what we are calling hotspots, to ensure
that we are looking at airspace design wherever we have mixed
traffic, in 10 locations, I believe it is a total of 20, 21
airports specifically, to see where similar traffic like this
needs mitigation.
Senator Cantwell. So you say this office reports directly
to you, and you say they oversee these areas and the interface.
Mr. Rocheleau. Let me be clear about that. The office that
oversees air traffic reports directly to me. The task force,
the group of people that are looking at these hotspots
specifically are multiple parts of the agency--air traffic,
aviation safety, airports. So we have a number of people as
part of that effort to make sure that we are looking at the
airspace design, and if we find risk, we react.
Senator Cantwell. Well, there was risk, for sure. There was
risk. It was being sounded in an alarm, and it was not being
addressed. So now we have to figure out why that was not being
addressed. There is a lot of information here that says very
high risk, very high risk. So why was that ignored, or was no
one looking at it? So we need an answer.
I think this Committee did very good work, in my opinion,
after the Columbia accident, and set up more safety offices to
make sure that we never miss something like that again. And I
feel like that is the issue we are asking you today. So we need
to understand what you think is in place, and why, if it was in
place, did we miss this, because little pieces of the
responsibility were delegated to various parts of the
organization and nobody had a holistic approach, or data, lots
of data, and it is being ignored.
But this is clear--clear--that this was an unacceptable
design. It is just unacceptable, and I do not know how we got
there.
I do want to ask you, are you now supportive of ADS-B In as
a requirement, making sure that carriers, like this regional
jet--again, I mentioned earlier it is $20,000 or so per plane--
why can't we just say we are going to do this?
Mr. Rocheleau. I did understand from the Chair earlier that
it has been an ongoing recommendation. I have not personally
looked into that in the last two months as to what the
expectations are on ADS-B In. I know that equipage on aircraft
throughout the system can be challenging, but I certainly will
take that back and look into it, to figure out what
specifically ADS-B In, what would be required to mandate that.
Certainly if Congress passes a law we would, as we did with----
Senator Cantwell. Well, we already did, by the way. We
already did. It was called the Reauthorization Bill. And as I
said in my opening statement, we basically authorized spending
for this through the equipage program. And you can discuss how
this actually gets deployed, but I am pretty sure the consumer
ends up paying for it, regardless, in some way.
So the point is, NTSB has been recommending this. Is that
right, Chairwoman?
Ms. Homendy. That is correct.
Senator Cantwell. You have recommended this since 2008?
Ms. Homendy. And I have to look, but I think we actually
have recommendations on ADS-B In that precedes that. Those were
comments, and if I may, may I add our 2008 comments to the
hearing record.
Senator Duckworth. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Cantwell. So I think, Acting Administrator, I think
we need to hear from the Department of Transportation and the
FAA that they understand that these recommendations have been
on the table, and you need to respond to them.
We do not want to keep doing this, which is having one
organization, who has to investigate all the accidents, deal
with all the families, deal with the grief and emotion, and
then have an FAA that gets too cozy with industry and gives
them exemptions. We do not want that.
So what we want is you to listen to the NTSB. And I know
this is historic. I am not blaming any administration. It is
historic. It is historic. It has been there since the beginning
of the big crashes that we have had, way before the Max, where
the FAA makes safety recommendations, and then they are ignored
for like, oh, I don't know, sometimes a decade, and then people
finally say, ``Oh, OK.'' But we owe it to these families. We
owe it to them now. It is not that hard to get this done.
So I hope that you will take this back to the Secretary,
have an internal discussion, and basically agree it is time to
get this done.
Ms. Homendy. And if I may add, and we are going to look at
this as part of our investigation to see how it could have
factored in, but the CRJ had ADS-B Out. It did not have ADS-B
In. So we are going to look at what that information could have
provided to that flight crew and how it could have made a
difference. We have seen that in other investigations, which is
why we have these recommendations.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I do think that a nationwide
look is important, and I am glad that FAA is looking at the
hotspots. I understand that many of these routes, it is not
just the military that is flying them. It is local law
enforcement. It is Federal law enforcement. It is hospitals
that are all flying them, as well. But I do think beyond a very
local, hyper-local look, a national look is really important.
Thank you all for coming. Again, my condolences to the
family members. And I just want to say again, thank you again
to Chairwoman Homendy, thank you, Mr. Rocheleau. I know you
have only been the Acting for a couple of months. We have been
without an FAA Administrator for three years prior to your
immediate predecessor. And again, General Braman, thank you for
being here.
Thank you to all the witnesses for their important
testimony today. Senators will have until the close of business
on Thursday, April 3, to submit questions for the record. The
witnesses will have until the close of business on Thursday,
April 17, to respond to those questions.
And this concludes today's hearing. The Committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
Hon. Jennifer Homendy
Question. You described the findings of your investigation related
to the ADS-B Out transmissions of the battalion, indicating that of the
16 Lima model Blackhawks, seven were transmitting ADS-B Out when turned
on, and eight were not. Five of those eight began transmitting since
the NTSB identified the issue. Since you shared this with the
Subcommittee, has your investigation been able to isolate the reason as
to why those aircraft ADS-B Out equipment were not transmitting?
Answer. Our initial review of the transponders' configuration on
the helicopters that were not transmitting ADS-B Out revealed that a
setting not normally manipulated by the crew was set incorrectly after
the ADS-B equipment was installed.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to
Hon. Jennifer Homendy
Question 1. Chair Homendy, I appreciate all of your and the NTSB's
dedication to finding the answers. The aircraft pilot gets the T-CAS
warning of ``traffic! Traffic! traffic!'' then hears the tower say go
for visual separation and then the helicopter possibly mixes up the
aircraft with one by the Wilson bridge and 19 seconds later the
collision happens.
Is visual separation typically requested at such a huge distance or
would the chopper have known that that ATC request should mean a plane
only a few hundred feet away?
Answer. It is common at DCA for helicopters to request visual
separation at varied distances when operating throughout the DCA class
B airspace.
The first time the helicopter crew reported having traffic in sight
and asked to maintain visual separation occurred when the distance
between the two aircraft was about 6.5 nautical miles.
About a minute and a half later, the tower asked the helicopter
crew if the CRJ was in sight. The crew indicated that traffic was
visible and again requested visual separation. This is when the crew of
flight 5342 received the TCAS advisory. At this time, the aircraft were
about 0.95 nautical miles apart.
Question 2. I know that the tower was able to communicate to both
the helicopter and the plane and that they could both hear the message
about visual separation after the ``Traffic! Traffic! Traffic!'' T-CAS
warning went off in the plane. I know there are plenty of reasons why
aircraft should not be able to communicate directly with one another
such as talking over each other but in an instance where the
``Traffic!'' warning is blaring in the flight deck would it make sense
for there to be a communication channel between those two flights?
Answer. It is certainly preferable for pilots to be on the same
frequency as ATC and able to hear all transmissions from other aircraft
as well as from ATC. However, aural alerts that are internal to the
flight deck, such as a TCAS advisory, would not be audible to other
aircraft or to ATC.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. Jennifer Homendy
Question 1. Surface Awareness Initiative. As part of FAA's response
to preventing close calls, the FAA took it upon itself to fast-track
the deployment of certain technologies at airports to improve air and
ground traffic visibility, such as the Surface Awareness Initiative
(SAI) system at airports. Notably, FAA is deploying the cheaper SAI
system at airports that do not have airport surface surveillance
systems such as Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X) or
a similar tool known as ADS-B Airport Surface Surveillance Capability
(ASSC).
What key capabilities does the Surface Awareness Initiative system
lack compared to systems like ASDE-X or ASSC?
Answer. SAI does not have an associated active ground radar, so it
relies solely on ADS-B for its aircraft and vehicle tracking. In
addition, unlike ASDE-X and ASSC, it does not currently alert
controllers of potential conflicts and provide conflict resolution
instructions.
Does the deployment of the SAI system satisfy NTSB recommendations
for installing airport surface surveillance systems at more airports
across the U.S.? Why or why not?
Answer. In our report for the February 4, 2023, Austin, Texas,
runway incursion, we stated that we believe the SAI system could
potentially satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation A-24-10, but,
because the system has not been deployed at any airports, we cannot
accurately assess if it would address all elements of the
recommendation.
The FAA has not yet responded to this recommendation, which was
issued on June 18, 2024; however, our recommendation was that the
equipment should alert controllers of potential conflicts, which is not
currently the case with SAI.
Question 2. Is FAA's installation of the cheaper SAI system over
more advanced systems like ASDE-X or ASSC enhancing visibility of
airport surface environments for air traffic controllers?
Answer. For those towers that previously did not have surface
detection capability, SAI provides greater awareness of aircraft and
vehicles operating on the airport surface.
In NTSB's view, is FAA making the right choice by prioritizing the
installation of the cheaper SAI system at airports that do not already
have airport surface surveillance systems over installing ASDE-X or
ASSC?
Answer. With SAI's reduced cost of installation, the FAA can
provide more airports with some level of surface detection capability.
However, in its current state, we do not feel SAI is a direct
replacement for aging ASDE-X or ASSC systems that are already
installed, and it would actually reduce capabilities at those airports
if it were used as a direct replacement for those systems.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to
Hon. Jennifer Homendy
Question 1. Close calls and runway incursions keep happening,
including a particularly scary one in February at Chicago Midway where
a landing Southwest flight came within 200 feet of striking a Flexjet
that had mistakenly entered the runway that the Southwest flight was
using to land. The Department of Transportation's Inspector General
recently reviewed FAA's work to mitigate runway incursions and
concluded that FAA's efforts to analyze runway incursion data and
develop broader mitigation strategies was hindered by FAA not sharing
data between organizations--and FAA's tendency to focus on issues at
particular airports rather than looking for system-wide causes.
What would NTSB like to see FAA do to better address runway
incursions?
Answer. In 2024, the NTSB issued 15 new recommendations to the FAA
to address safety issues identified in our investigations of runway
incursions in New York and Austin, Texas. They are provided below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation Overall Status Recommendation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-24-2 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Encourage Title
14 Code of Federal Regulations
Part 91K, 135, and 121 operators
to incorporate into their
standard operating procedures a
procedural crosscheck that
requires flight crews to
verbalize the number of a runway
they are about to cross, as
indicated by runway signs, unless
an installed automated system
already provides an aural
advisory.
A-24-3 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Encourage Title
14 Code of Federal Regulations
Part 121 operators to use their
safety management system to
identify flight crew surface
navigation errors resulting from
the performance of concurrent
tasks during taxi and develop and
implement effective risk
mitigation strategies considering
human factors principles.
A-24-4 Open--Unacceptable TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION: Collaborate with
aircraft and avionics
manufacturers and software
designers to develop the
technology for a flight deck
system that would provide visual
and aural alerts to flight crews
of traffic on a runway or taxiway
and traffic on approach to land.
(Supersedes A-00-66)
A-24-5 Open--Unacceptable TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION: Require that the
technology developed in response
to Safety Recommendation A-24-4
be installed in all newly
certificated transport-category
airplanes. (Supersedes A-00-66)
A-24-6 Open--Unacceptable TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION: Require that
existing transport-category
airplanes be retrofitted with the
technology developed in response
to Safety Recommendation A-24-4.
(Supersedes A-00-66)
A-24-7 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Evaluate the
effectiveness of the activation
logic for the runway status light
system considering the
circumstances of this incident.
A-24-8 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Using the
findings of the evaluation
conducted in response to Safety
Recommendation A-24-7, update the
runway status light system
activation logic as necessary to
improve system effectiveness.
A-24-9 Open--Unacceptable TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION: Require retrofit
of all cockpit voice recorders
(CVR) on all airplanes required
to carry both a CVR and a flight
data recorder with a CVR capable
of recording the last 25 hours of
audio. (Supersedes A-18-31)
A-24-10 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
Response Received ADMINISTRATION: For airports that
are certificated under Title 14
Code of Federal Regulations Part
139 and are currently not
equipped with airport surface
detection equipment, model X or
airport surface surveillance
capability, implement surface
detection equipment that
tracks the movement of
arriving and departing aircraft,
determines the proximity
between those aircraft, and
provides air traffic
controllers with visual and aural
cues of surface movements to aid
in their decision making
processes.
A-24-11 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Require air
traffic controllers to
advise pilots, through
direct communication and
automatic terminal information
system broadcasts, when visual
contact with aircraft operating
on taxiways and runways cannot be
established or maintained and
instruct pilots to
provide accurate position reports
to aid the controller in
determining an aircraft's
location in such conditions.
A-24-12 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Brief all air
traffic controllers about the
circumstances of this incident,
emphasizing the effect that
certain conditions might have on
a pilot's ability to begin a
takeoff in a timely manner,
including
low-visibility weather
conditions, such as fog;
ambient conditions, such
as temperature; and
surface conditions, such
as ice, snow, and other
precipitation, as noted in Order
7110.65, Air Traffic Control,
paragraph 5-8-4, Departure and
Arrival.
A-24-13 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Amend the
Aeronautical Information Manual
so that it instructs pilots to
inform controllers, before
entering an active runway with
the intent to depart, when they
need time on the runway for any
reason before beginning the
takeoff roll.
A-24-14 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Require all
airports with a Surface Movement
Guidance and Control System plan
to ensure that their plans and
the associated letters of
agreement correspond with each
other and the stakeholder duties
and responsibilities described in
Advisory Circular 120-57, Surface
Movement Guidance and Control
System.
A-24-15 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Direct training
administrators at airports with a
Surface Movement Guidance and
Control System plan to require
initial and annual refresher
training for all stakeholders,
including air traffic controllers
and airport operations personnel,
on the information in the
airport's plan.
A-24-16 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
Response Received ADMINISTRATION:
Require training administrators at
all operating air traffic control
towers to conduct annual
refresher training on low-
visibility operations.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2. NTSB's preliminary report documented some inconsistent
information about the helicopter's altitude readings and determined
that some of the altitude information on the helicopter's data recorder
was invalid.
As NTSB continues its investigation, what will it do to learn what
the helicopter pilots knew about their altitude and whether their
equipment was working properly?
Answer. Numerous components from the Black Hawk will be examined,
including the barometric altimeters, air data/pitot static system,
radio altimeters and their antennas, transponder, and electronic
standby instrument system. The examinations will look for any anomalies
with the instruments/components, witness marks, and nonvolatile memory.
In addition, flight data recorder (FDR) information will continue to be
reviewed and compared with any additional data obtained from follow-up
examinations in an effort to better understand the invalid pressure
altitude recorded on the FDR.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jacky Rosen to
Hon. Jennifer Homendy
Question 1. Aviation professionals are only as effective as the
infrastructure and technology they rely on. According to the FY24
President's Budget, the average age of an FAA Air Traffic Control
facility is 61 years old, and more than 50 percent of terminal
facilities are more than 40 years old. These facilities regularly
operate with degraded technology systems, resulting in a lack of
accurate wind speed and direction calculations, the failure of radio
frequencies within congested airspace, and the malfunctioning of runway
lights, just to name a few. Many airports also lack functioning radar
systems used to track airborne and taxiing planes, meaning that some
controllers have no visual awareness of the aircraft they are
directing, especially in poor weather conditions.
In lieu of functioning radar systems in Air Traffic Control
facilities, many controllers are resorting to using public flight-
tracking websites that aren't approved by the FAA to fill the gaps.
Perhaps most alarming are the reports that the FAA lacks the
funding to install runway warning systems to help prevent runway
collisions. Only 43 of the Nation's more than 500 airports serving
commercial flights have runway collision-avoidance systems. This is
simply not good enough.
Chair Homendy how can we improve the existing technology and
infrastructure utilized by air traffic controllers and aviation
professionals to reduce potential risk and manage congested airports
and complicated airspace at our Nation's airports?
Answer. In 2024, we recommended that, for major airports that do
not have runway surveillance systems such as ASDE-X or ASSC, the FAA
should implement surface detection equipment that:
tracks the movement of arriving and departing aircraft,
determines the proximity between those aircraft, and
provides air traffic controllers with visual and aural cues
of surface movements to aid in their decision-making processes.
The FAA's Surface Safety Portfolio, which includes SAI, Approach
Runway Verification (ARV), and Runway Incursion Devices (RID), has the
potential to improve safety--particularly the SAI, which is providing
enhanced situational awareness for controllers at those airports that
previously had no surface detection capability. However, efforts should
be made to incorporate aural and visual alerting and conflict
resolution to be more on par with what ASDE-X/ASSC systems deliver
today.
In addition, the NTSB has long believed in the safety benefits of
ADS-B Out and In. ADS-B Out enables an aircraft to broadcast its three-
dimensional position (latitude, longitude, and altitude) to other ADS-
B-equipped aircraft and to ADS-B ground stations. ADS-B In enables an
aircraft to receive traffic messages from ADS-B Out-equipped aircraft
and from ADS-B ground stations. Although the FAA requires ADS-B Out for
aircraft operating in certain classes of airspace, with certain
exceptions for national security reasons, it does not require ADS-B In.
The NTSB believes that equipping aircraft with ADS-B In capability
would immediately and substantially contribute to safety, especially
during operations in and around airports.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Chris Rocheleau
Question 1. On March 27, 2025, you sent letters to the Department
of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the
Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security,
clarifying the FAA's ADS-B Out requirements and the exceptions for
missions critical to national security. Section 829 of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2024 prohibits enforcement action based
exclusively on ADS-B data. What authorities does the FAA have to
enforce the ADS-B Out equipage and transmission requirements?
Answer. The FAA has retained its authority to enforce ADS-B Out
equipage and transmission requirements. However, the FAA's practical
ability to enforce those requirements has been significantly impeded by
the limitation in section 829 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024.
Pub. L. No. 118-63, Sec. 829 (2024). Section 829 prohibits the FAA from
initiating an investigation (other than a criminal investigation) based
exclusively on ADS-B data. Prior to the enactment of section 829, the
FAA's primary method of identifying noncompliance with ADS-B Out
equipage and transmission requirements was reviewing ADS-B data, which,
when combined with radar data, can allow for the identification of
aircraft operating without properly functioning ADS-B Out equipment.
The FAA could then investigate those operations, communicating with
aircraft owners to ensure that their ADS-B Out equipment was returned
to a functional state or, less commonly, taking enforcement action
where appropriate (e.g., where an investigation determined that an
operator was intentionally operating without ADS-B Out equipment turned
on). Under section 829, these investigations are no longer possible.
Nor are the enforcement actions that could result from those
investigations.
Subject to the significant restrictions imposed by section 829, the
FAA does retain the authority to enforce ADS-B Out requirements. For
example, if a hotline complaint is submitted to the FAA about an
illegal charter operation or an FAA inspector personally observes a low
flight, ADS-B data may be consulted in the course of those
investigations, which could reveal that the aircraft did not meet ADS-B
Out equipage and transmission requirements. Or a report might be
submitted to the FAA specifically about an ADS-B Out violation, which
the FAA could then use ADS-B Out data to confirm. In these uncommon
scenarios, the FAA would be able to take an enforcement action against
an operator using its authority under 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 44709 or
46301.
Question 2. During the hearing on March 27, 2025, questions were
raised regarding the FAA's ability to override the exemption in the
NDAA which allowed for exceptions to the FAA's ADS-B Out transmission
requirements. Does the FAA have the authority to rescind any exemption
from the ADS-B mandate for the U.S. military?
Answer. The FAA has full authority ``to operate air traffic control
services to ensure the safe minimum separation of aircraft in flight
and the efficient use of airspace,'' to include terminating any
authorization to deviate from regulatory requirements concerning ADS-B
Out transmission and equipage or revising the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) it has with DOD concerning the provision of air traffic services
to DOD aircraft that are not transmitting or equipped with ADS-B. See
Pub. L. No. 115-232, div. A, title X, Sec. 1046(c) (2018) (providing
that nothing in section 1046 limits the FAA's authority to operate air
traffic control services to ensure the safe minimum separation of
aircraft in flight and the efficient use of airspace).
Under section 1046(a) of division A, title X, of the John S. McCain
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, the Secretary
of Transportation may not require DOD to equip certain aircraft with
ADS-B, deny air traffic control services for such aircraft on the basis
that they are not equipped, or restrict or limit access to airspace
based upon equipage. Pub. L. No. 115-232, div. A, title X, Sec. 1046(a)
(2018). FAA and DOD have an MOA, which sets out the process for
accommodating aircraft that are not equipped with ADS-B and providing
necessary air traffic control services to such aircraft to maintain
safety in the NAS. Accordingly, the prohibitive language in section
1046(a) is no longer effective, as provided in section 1046(b).
Even if section 1046(a) were effective, the FAA retains full
authority to revise the MOA as required to operate air traffic control
services to ensure the safe minimum separation of aircraft in flight
and the efficient use of airspace under section 1046(c), and the FAA is
currently working with DOD to revise the MOA following the DCA
accident.
As for the ADS-B Out transmission requirement, 14 CFR
Sec. 91.225(f)(1) allows the FAA to authorize a deviation from the
transmission requirement for aircraft ``performing a sensitive
government mission for national defense, homeland security,
intelligence or law enforcement purposes and transmitting would
compromise the operations security of the mission or pose a safety risk
to the aircraft, crew, or people and property in the air or on the
ground'' when authorized by the FAA. The FAA retains discretion to
terminate an authorization to deviate from the ADS-B Out transmission
requirement. Section 1046(a) of Pub. L. No. 115-232, div. A, title X
only addressed the equipage requirement. As mentioned above, we are
working with DOD to revise the MOA as it concerns authorization to
deviate from the ADS-B transmission requirement.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Chris Rocheleau
Question 1. Consistent with the mandate in the 2024 FAA
reauthorization, can you describe what steps the FAA is taking to
address air traffic controller hiring shortfalls?
Answer. The FAA is reviewing our hiring, training, and placement
processes, as well as FAA Academy withdrawals and failures, to ensure
our selection methods effectively identify candidates best suited for
the Air Traffic Control Specialist profession. To ensure we meet or
exceed our hiring goals, we have:
Supercharged hiring--Streamlined the hiring process and
built in efficiencies that will reduce the time to complete the
process by as much as five months.
Increased the starting salary rate of Track 1 entry-level
hires by 30 percent while attending the FAA Academy.
Offered financial incentives to retain our most experienced
controllers who are eligible to retire. Certified professional
controllers in this group will receive a lump sum payment of 20
percent of their basic pay for each year they continue to work.
Established the Enhanced Collegiate Training Initiative (E-
CTI), which gives qualifying colleges the opportunity to teach
the same curriculum provided by the FAA Academy. Upon
graduation, with a successful result on the Air Traffic Skills
Assessment (ATSA), students who clear all pre-employment
requirements (medical, security) are placed directly at a field
tower facility.
Increased the frequency of Track 1 entry-level (no aviation
experience required) job announcements. Typically, the FAA
publishes the Track 1 announcement once per year, and this year
we have advertised the position three times in the past 12
months. This effort has increased the pipeline by approximately
30 percent, placing us on track to meet the FY25 goal of hiring
2,000 ATCs.
Authorized on-the-spot hiring (similar to direct hire
authority for most other government agencies) for Track 2
entry-level positions (ATC experience required) and utilized an
open continuous announcement to garner applicants year-round.
Previously, the FAA only announced these positions twice per
year--once in the Spring and once in the Fall.
Implemented Pre-Employment Processing Centers (PEPC) to
expedite clearances, providing a ``one-stop-shop'' for pre-
employment requirements. The FAA established PEPCs in New York,
Georgia, Texas, and California to reach the largest applicant
geographical locations across the Nation.
Question 2. Can you describe what actions the FAA is taking to
streamline the implementation of new technologies and improve safety of
the Nation's ATC system?
Answer. Recognizing the need for advanced technologies to keep pace
with innovation and modernize the air traffic control system, the ATO
has begun to replace or deploy new infrastructure to maintain the
safety and efficiency of the national airspace system (NAS):
Implementation of the Surface Safety Portfolio:
Expands surface situational awareness for air traffic
controllers at airports without existing surface
surveillance capabilities.
Improvement of telecommunications reliability--including
fiber, wireless, and satellite.
Implementation of cloud services to transition the NAS to a
secure, scalable, and centrally managed enterprise cloud
environment.
NOTAM modernization efforts to replace the U.S. NOTAM System
and Federal NOTAM System.
Modernizing this system is crucial to enhance its
reliability, accessibility, and user-friendliness. The
system will be securely hosted in the cloud and have a
scalable and resilient architecture. We expect delivery by
July 2025 and are targeting operational deployment of the
modernized system by September 2025.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
Chris Rocheleau
Question 1. According to the NTSB, between October 2021 and
December 2024, there were more than 15,000 instances of commercial
aircraft coming in close proximity to helicopters. Of those events, 85
had vertical separation of less than 200 feet. How many of those 85
events involved military helicopters? How many of those close call
events involved U.S. Army helicopters?
Answer. We understand the NTSB likely was referring to narrative
reports that pilots may voluntarily submit. We do not have granular
information on the dataset the NTSB was referring to, but we
acknowledge that changes were necessary related to procedures and
helicopter routes that would have allowed helicopters and fixed-wing
aircraft to be in close proximity. To that end, the FAA has eliminated
mixed traffic immediately around DCA, eliminated a portion of
Helicopter Route 4, and eliminated the use of visual separation within
5 miles of the airport.
Question 1a. What factors contributed to the FAA's dilatory
identification of these alarming data and lack of action to mitigate
dangerous conditions in the airspace prior to the January 29th
collision?
Answer. Successful safety assurance and hazard identification
require analyzing large amounts of data from various sources to
understand the presence of risk within the system. We are making
improvements both in data sharing across the agency and through the use
of advanced technological tools, including advanced models for the
analysis of safety reports, capabilities that enable the automated
identification and ranking of high potential risk encounters,
capabilities that fuse contextual datasets to translate information on
potential risk to actual risk, and collision risk models that use
simulations and artificial intelligence (AI) to identify specific
operations that do not meet collision risk targets.
Question 1b. Please describe the process by which the FAA shares
information--including the data recalled above--with entities
conducting aviation operations in the National Capital Region airspace.
Is this information-sharing regime consistent across the NAS?
Answer. Any agency may request data specific to its fleet from the
FAA, and we process those requests as described in FAA Orders JO1030.3B
and JO7200.20B. We also provide information to industry via the
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system (ASIAS).
Question 2. Please describe the ``D.C. Helicopter Working Group''.
Answer. The DC Helicopter Working Group is a mixture of FAA and
users of the airspace around DCA who convened for the purpose of
development of a new helicopter route or corridor that supports
national security, law enforcement, and medical helicopter flight
operations. This published route or corridor will replace the legacy
Route 4 (on the Baltimore Washington Helicopter Route Chart), enhancing
efficiency for critical missions while maintaining the highest safety
standards.
Question 2a. Who are the entities participating in this working
group? Chairwoman Homendy described there to be 17 entities taking part
in this working group.
Answer. The following entities participated in the working group:
1. Prince George's County Police
2. Fairfax County Police
3. Metro Police
4. US Army
5. US Air Force
6. MD State Police
7. US Coast Guard
8. US Marine Corps
9. Medstar
Question 2b. Describe the parameters for which this working group
is studying.
Answer. As noted in response to question 2 above, the parameters
are the development of a new helicopter route or corridor that supports
national security, law enforcement, and medical helicopter flight
operations. This published route or corridor will replace the legacy
Route 4 (on the Baltimore-Washington Helicopter Route Chart), enhancing
efficiency for critical missions while maintaining the highest safety
standards.
Question 2c. Is this working group analyzing the other 46
helicopter operators in the National Capital Region?
Answer. The task the group is focused on is meant to support how
national security, law enforcement, and medical helicopter flight
operations occur within the National Capital Region.
Question 3. Is a flyover of Arlington National Cemetery considered
an essential operation?
Answer. Flyovers are operations that we normally coordinate with
the Department of Defense (DOD). We are refining our coordination
procedures with DOD for military operations in the Washington, D.C.
area.
Question 4. Do you think the FAA's tolerance for risk was too high
prior to January 29th?
Answer. Aviation safety is the FAA's number one priority. While
flying remains the safest mode of transportation, aviation safety is
not static. There is always room for improvement. The professionals at
the FAA take their jobs seriously and strive to maintain safety every
day. But the fact of the matter is that we have to do better. We have
to identify trends, we have to get smarter about how we use data, and
when we put corrective actions in place, we must execute them.
Question 5. Please describe the advanced technological tools the
FAA is utilizing to aggregate data to better analyze the airspace
operations at the high mixed-traffic airports.
Answer. The FAA's ASIAS program is utilizing advanced technological
tools, including advanced models for the analysis of safety reports,
capabilities that enable the automated identification and ranking of
high potential risk encounters, capabilities that fuse contextual
datasets to translate information on potential risk to actual risk, and
collision risk models that use simulations and AI to identify specific
operations that do not meet collision risk targets.
Predictive software, coupled with AI textual data large language
modeling applications, will provide a clearer holistic picture of the
collision risk by fusing both voluntarily submitted information with
Flight Operational Quality Assurance data.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to
Chris Rocheleau
Question 1. Acting Administrator Rocheleau, there has been a focus
on how many pilots voluntarily reported close calls to the FAA's safety
reporting system--these calls averaged at least one per month for more
than a decade. Were these reports by pilots investigated?
Answer. The FAA thoroughly investigates all voluntary safety
reports submitted by a pilot and shared with the FAA. If a potential
safety risk is identified, whether to the operation or the national
airspace system, the FAA implements corrective actions, as appropriate.
Question 1a. What changes can be expected to be made when a
considerable number of reports like these are made?
Answer. If the FAA identifies an increase in the number of reports
involving close calls, we conduct an analysis to determine whether the
increase in reports equates to an identification of new or increased
risk. If a risk is identified, appropriate mitigations will be
developed and implemented, to include ensuring that the performance and
effectiveness of the safety risk controls meet or exceed the safety
objective of driving down the risk to an acceptable level in accordance
with FAA's safety risk management processes.
The FAA implements specific corrective actions based on the safety
issue or event to mitigate the identified safety risk. In addition,
when a significant event occurs or a substantial number of reports are
received, the FAA conducts a thorough review of current controller
training programs. This evaluation not only helps to derive insights
from the reports but also ensures that future controller training
initiatives are aligned with the goal of continuing to equip
controllers with the skills necessary to prevent similar situations.
The aim is to continually enhance training effectiveness.
Question 1b. Have these pilot reports not only for DCA but for
other airports been thoroughly reviewed?
Answer. Yes, the FAA thoroughly investigates all voluntary safety
reports submitted by a pilot and shared with the FAA. If a potential
safety risk is identified, whether to the operation or the national
airspace system, the FAA implements corrective actions, as appropriate.
Question 1c. Can you provide the number for how many reports have
been made relating to West Virginia airports in the last 5 years?
Answer. The ASIAS database contains active reporting for the
primary commercial service airports in West Virginia: Charleson-CRW,
Clarksburg-CKB, Huntington-HTS, and Lewisburg-LWB. There are no Near
Mid Air Collisions (NMAC) reports in the last 5 years at these
airports.
Question 2. Please tell us more about the voluntary safety
reporting system. Does the system account for specific NTSB style data
points or is it a pilot saying I came within approximately this many
feet of a helicopter?
Answer. The primary objective of voluntary safety programs is to
identify hazards and unsafe conditions in the NAS so that corrective
action can be taken to eliminate or reduce the hazards or unsafe
conditions. The FAA reviews the data from these reports to identify
causal or contributing factors, which support event categorization,
risk analysis, and data trending. This information can provide context
to understand a problem or emerging risk in the system.
For example, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) captures
specific data points concerning the pilot, the aircraft, the airspace,
location, and weather conditions, but also allows the pilot to provide
a narrative to clarify and provide additional details about the event.
ASRS reports are confidential. ASRS analyzes the safety data, de-
identifies it, and disseminates vital information to the aviation
community.
Question 3. In your testimony you mentioned the Safety Panel you
have put together in response to the collision and how the FAA is using
AI to see if other safety concerns have been overlooked. Does that
extend only to fixed-wing and rotorcraft incidents or other types of
safety incidents?
Answer. The effort included a review of operations (not incidents)
between fixed-wing to helicopters and fixed-wing to fixed-wing to
determine if there were any safety concerns.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question 4. In the preliminary report there is a map of all the
helicopter routes in the area (see above). Route 6 goes across the
airport and the runways East and West. Has that route had close calls
reported to it as well or was Route 4 the only one?
Answer. For Route 6, there were four (4) reported operations (1/1/
2021-1/31/2025) in which fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters had a
closest proximity of less than the required 500' vertical separation.
The portion of Route 6 in the vicinity of DCA has been closed and
removed from the published helicopter charts to mitigate any potential
risk.
Question 5. We have heard that there are not specific lateral
boundaries to any of these helicopter routes, but there are vertical
boundaries. My fear is that with such loose designations for these
routes it would be easy for a helicopter to easily go wide and deviate.
DC has the most sensitive airspace in the country but what recourse or
discipline is there if a chopper deviates and ends up in the ultra-
restricted air space above the National Mall or takes one of these
routes wide or at too high of an altitude?
Answer. Helicopters, like other aircraft, are required to comply
with the FAA's safety regulations, including 14 C.F.R. Sec. 91.123,
which requires compliance with ATC clearances and instructions. For a
civilian aircraft, the FAA may address deviations from ATC clearances
or instructions with compliance action, including remedial training, or
enforcement action, including the suspension of an individual's pilot
certificate, as authorized under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44709(b)(1)(A). For any
violation of the DC Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA) and DC Flight
Restricted Zone (FRZ), as described in Part 93, subpart V, the FAA may
similarly suspend or revoke a pilot's airman certificates or impose
civil penalties. 14 CFR Sec. 93.333. For violations committed by
members of the armed forces while performing official duties for the
Department of Defense, the FAA refers the violation to the appropriate
branch of the military pursuant to the military referral process
required under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 46101(b).
Additionally, if a pilot knowingly or willfully violates national
defense airspace established pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3),
including the DC SFRA and DC FRZ, the pilot may be subject to criminal
prosecution, including a fine under title 18, or imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 46307. The FAA refers such
criminal conduct to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) or to the
Department of Justice, if appropriate, for criminal investigation under
5 U.S.C. app. 3.
Question 6. In your testimony you mentioned that only some
emergency and special helicopter traffic will continue in the vicinity
of DCA and only when that air space is closed to planes. Can you
quantify how many of these operations are still occurring? Is it twice
a day or more frequently on average?
Answer. For the period February 19, 2025 through April 30, 2025 (71
days), there were 45 special helicopter operations, averaging a little
more than half of 1 (0.63) special helicopter operation per day, within
this airspace operating at or below 1500 feet.
Regarding the number of operations that are still occurring,
between May 1, 2025 and May 20, 2025 (20 days), there have been 23
special helicopter operations, averaging a little more than 1 (1.15)
special helicopter operation per day.
Question 6a. How much of a boundary between that airspace is there
and how long is the fixed-wing traffic halted?
Answer. On average, presidential-related operations may pause
traffic for 9 to 12 minutes, while lifesaving medical-related
operations may cause a 5-to-7-minute pause to fixed-wing traffic.
Active law enforcement and/or air defense missions are more fluid.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Chris Rocheleau
Question 1. On Friday, March 28, 2025, a U.S. Air Force jet flew
within 500 feet of a Delta Airlines passenger jet departing Reagan
National Airport to Minnesota. What is the status of investigations
into this incident?
Answer. The FAA has completed its preliminary investigation into
the March 28 event at Reagan National Airport. Through our Safety
Management System, we continue to identify hazards and implement safety
measures at the airport and across the National Airspace System.
Question 1a. How is the FAA and Department of Defense working to
ensure similar incidents do not happen in the future?
Answer. The FAA is working on refining coordination procedures
between air traffic facilities, and internal to air traffic facilities,
for military operations in the Washington D.C. area. This includes
specific, clear communication for stopping arriving and departing
traffic from Reagan Washington National (DCA) to accommodate those
operations when necessary. The FAA is also taking steps to ensure
controllers are briefed and have required, specific information prior
to scheduled aerial flyovers, including routes of flight and timing.
Collaboratively, the FAA and military partners are addressing pertinent
Letters of Agreement (LOA) and communication surrounding aerial
flyovers to ensure all entities have the same expectations and
operations can be conducted safely in the area.
Question 2. There has been an alarming number of close calls on
runways in the past couple of years. Just last month, there were close
calls involving landing aircraft at Chicago Midway Airport and DCA. I
led a provision in the FAA reauthorization bill to ensure planes are
equipped with technology that alerts pilots of nearby planes on the
runway to help them avoid collisions.
Can you provide an update on the implementation of this provision
and adoption of this technology?
Answer. Section 347 in the 2024 FAA Reauthorization required the
FAA to establish the Runway Safety Council and identify both surface
surveillance equipment and equipment on aircraft that ``may improve
onboard situational awareness for flight crewmembers, including
technologies for use in an aircraft.'' The section then directs
deployment of surface surveillance technologies over 5 years.
Regarding technologies on aircraft, while the section does not
establish equipage requirements or direct the FAA to establish equipage
requirements, it does note that the FAA should identify technologies
and systems that would enhance safety and onboard situational
awareness. Consistent with that direction, we have tasked the
Investigative Technologies Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to seek
recommendations on cockpit alerting technologies designed to reduce
runway safety events.
That ARC, comprised of government and industry stakeholders, has
been meeting, and we will review recommendations when that work is
complete.
Question 3. The primary NOTAM system experienced outages on
February 1 and March 22 that each lasted multiple hours. Last year, I
worked with Senators Moran and Capito to pass the NOTAM Improvement Act
directing the FAA to immediately upgrade this system. While the backup
system is now in place and was activated to respond to recent outages,
more work must be done to make all necessary upgrades.
Can you provide any information on this outage and where things
stand with the NOTAM Task Force?
Answer. The recent Notice to Airman (NOTAM) outages were caused by
hardware failures on the motherboards of the United States NOTAM System
(USNS) servers. The system's architecture is over 30 years old, with
the current hardware having been in continuous operation for
approximately 15 years. On February 1, 2025, the hardware failure
rendered the USNS system unrecoverable. Within an hour, the technical
team determined that equipment recovery was not possible and initiated
failover procedures. Due to the age and design of the system, the
failover process takes a minimum of four hours, and the full
restoration of the system took approximately 12 hours. To mitigate
future outages, the team took immediate steps following the February 1,
2025, event by staging spare servers and developing a rapid hardware
swap process. As a result, when a similar motherboard failure occurred
on March 22, 2025, the team was able to return the system to full
functionality in less than four hours, without needing to activate the
Candidate NOTAM Contingency System (CNCS). USNS resumed processing
NOTAMs within two hours.
In August 2024, the FAA pivoted to complete NOTAM Modernization
utilizing a Challenge-Based Acquisition strategy to develop an
innovative solution that leverages advancements in technology, high-
availability architecture, and resilient infrastructure. The FAA
selected the vendor to work on this modernization in April 2025, and
the new NOTAM service is on track for delivery in July 2025 and
deployment by September 2025. The FAA is also looking to accelerate
user transition. This enables the FAA to implement our digitalization
strategy by transitioning from the current legacy NOTAM system to an
integrated NOTAM Management Service (NMS).
The NOTAM Task Force submitted recommendations, now under review,
in accordance with Pub. L. 118-4 (NOTAM Improvement Act) and NTSB
Safety Recommendation A-18-024.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to
Chris Rocheleau
Question 1. There is no question that there is an air traffic
controller shortage and that we need to do more to address it. As we
discussed in the hearing, there may be certified air traffic
controllers are ready and able to return to work--but are just waiting
on medical clearances. How many controllers around the country are
waiting for medical clearances to return to work?
Answer. As of May 8, 103 air traffic controllers are awaiting
medical clearance to return to work. Of those 103 controllers,
approximately 80 percent have a medical condition that requires further
evaluation from their own physician, which they must provide to us
before we can make a determination concerning their medical clearance.
Question 1a. What is FAA doing to make sure these medical reviews
are happening in a timely manner?
Answer. FAA Order 3930.3C requires the Office of Aerospace Medicine
to complete a medical clearance within 20 days of receiving of all
medical documents. Over the last year, the national average has been
9.9 calendar days. We have identified efficiencies and engaged in
effective management oversight to ensure our review is completed in a
timely manner.
Question 2. In October, the Department of Transportation Inspector
General reported that shortly before the 737 MAX 9 door plug blowout,
individuals within FAA wanted to delegate airplane airworthiness
inspection authority back to Boeing without any criteria by which to
assess whether Boeing could be trusted to properly carry out these
inspections. When Boeing last had this authority for the 737 MAX,
Boeing abused it. Boeing knowingly and repeatedly produced 737 MAX
aircraft with nonfunctioning Angle of Attack Disagree alerts--in
blatant violation of the plane's approved type design.
Will FAA commit to NOT delegating airworthiness inspection
authority back to Boeing until FAA has implemented all 16 Department of
Transportation Inspector General Recommendations in its October 9, 2024
report, ``FAA's Oversight Processes for Identifying and Resolving
Boeing Production Issues Are Not Effective''?
Answer. The FAA will utilize all relevant safety data when making a
determination regarding airworthiness inspection authority. Safety has
no timeline, and the FAA will continue to hold Boeing accountable.
Question 3. Following the 737 MAX 9 door plug blowout, FAA imposed
a cap of 38 airplanes per month on Boeing's 737 MAX production. Will
FAA commit to NOT raising the monthly cap on 737 MAX aircraft
production until FAA has implemented all 16 Department of
Transportation Inspector General Recommendations in its October 9, 2024
report, ``FAA's Oversight Processes for Identifying and Resolving
Boeing Production Issues Are Not Effective''?
Answer. The FAA will utilize all relevant safety data when making a
determination regarding Boeing's production rates. Safety has no
timeline, and the FAA will continue to hold Boeing accountable.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jacky Rosen to
Chris Rocheleau
Question 1. In response to this crash, Secretary Duffy announced a
plan to boost air traffic control hiring with 30 percent salary
increases for newly hired controller trainees entering FAA's Air
Traffic Control Academy.
Mr. Rocheleau, my team has heard from our air traffic controllers
that these increases are only temporary, and compensation resets to the
lower level once training for new controllers is complete. Is this
correct? And could you provide an update on the progress of this effort
and any promising data you have seen on this front?
Answer. Effective March 9, 2025, all current trainees enrolled in
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Academy's Air Traffic Control
(ATC) entry-level training program, along with individuals enrolled on
or after that date, received a 30 percent salary increase. This
adjustment applies specifically to newly hired and existing ATC
trainees during their time at the FAA Academy and raises their annual
salary--including locality pay--to $47,763.
Upon successful completion of academy training, these trainees--who
are initially appointed under temporary status--are converted to
permanent positions and assigned to an en-route or terminal facility.
At that point, their base compensation is determined in accordance with
the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under the Air Traffic Specialized Pay Plan
(ATSPP).
In all cases, upon graduation, these trainees become academy
graduates and are paid in accordance with the CBA. The salary of an
academy graduate is higher than what they are paid as students, though
the exact amount varies according to locality.
Question 2. Can you discuss the challenges in hiring process for
air traffic controllers, any other recent changes that have been made
to the process, and any ways you are planning to improve the process to
hire more controllers?
Answer. The FAA is reviewing our hiring, training, and placement
processes, as well as academy withdrawals and failures, to ensure our
selection methods effectively identify candidates best suited for the
Air Traffic Control Specialist profession.
We have identified certain challenges in the controller hiring
process including:
Identifying candidates who possess the necessary aptitude
for the position and can meet the medical requirements. In
recent years, over 50 percent of our ATC applicants have
encountered health issues, with conditions more commonly
associated with older adults than with the targeted age
demographic of 18-30 years.
A growing number of applicants with issues that can affect
the processing of security clearances. For example, they may
not understand that Federal law is different from state law
regarding the use of marijuana or be unaware that financial
difficulties may hinder eligibility for employment or security
clearances.
To enhance efficiency, we have streamlined hiring by automating
qualification assessments, enabling applicants to progress at their own
pace while medical and security evaluations are conducted concurrently.
These improvements are designed to accelerate the hiring process while
effectively identifying candidates best suited for the Air Traffic
Control profession.
Enhanced Air Traffic-Collegiate Training Initiative (Enhanced AT-
CTI): In April 2024, the FAA introduced Enhanced AT-CTI to create an
additional pipeline for air traffic controllers by authorizing
institutions to provide the same comprehensive curriculum offered at
the FAA Academy.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Brigadier General Matthew Braman
Question 1. Prior to our hearing where you testified, my staff was
made aware of a memo which I understand outlines the policies and
procedures for the Army's use of ADS-B in the National Capital Region.
This memo was previously denied to my staff. On the day of the hearing,
you promised to review the information and look at providing it to the
Commerce Committee. Will you commit to immediately produce an
unredacted copy of the memo ``ADS-B Out Off Operations in the National
Airspace'' for the Commerce Committee staff?
Answer. On April 2nd, 2025 the memo along with applicable
background material was released to the HASC and SASC.
Question 2. During the hearing, you were asked how frequently ADS-B
Out is turned off. You committed to answering this in questions for the
record. How frequently does the U.S. Army disable ADS-B Out during
flights? Please specifically include data to justify your answer. If
you choose to use a term of art to describe differing categories of
missions or flights, please give data for those categories of flights
as both a numerator and denominator.
Answer. The Army's policy on utilization of Automatic Dependent
Surveillance--Broadcast (ADS-B) Out is in accordance with the
Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The U.S. Army Aviation Brigade's
(TAAB) previous adherence to Army policy regarding ADS-B is part of the
Army's ongoing investigation of the January 29 accident near Reagan
National Airport (DCA). At the conclusion of the investigation,
releasable information will be made available to the Committee.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
Brigadier General Matthew Braman
Question 1.According to the NTSB, between October 2021 and December
2024, there were more than 15,000 instances of commercial aircraft
coming in close proximity to helicopters. Of those events, 85 had
vertical separation of less than 200 feet. How many of those 85 events
involved military helicopters?
Answer. The data used to inform the National Transportation Safety
Board's (NTSB) preliminary report resides with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and subsequently the NTSB. The Army has requested
to examine the data.
Question 1a. Please describe the process by which the Army shares
information regarding aviation safety with the FAA. Is this
information-sharing regime consistent across the NAS?
Answer. The entry point for the Army is the OSD led Policy Board on
Federal Aviation (PBFA) to address multi-Service aviation related
issues with the FAA. Department of the Army Representatives (DAR)
interact daily with FAA officials on a wide spectrum of aviation topics
including: Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) airspace access; airspace
proposals; environmental impacts; 5G impacts to aviation; and
adjudicating pilot deviations among many other functions.
The Army Safety Management Information System (ASMIS) database is
the database of record for mishap, near miss, hazards, inspections, and
safety and occupational health (SOH) management. The Army has no formal
mechanism to share data from ASMIS with the FAA. DARs receive Mandatory
Occurrence Reports (MOR) from the FAA's Air Traffic Organization. MORs
record reportable events that occur in the national airspace. DARs
process and ensure Army adjudications of any pilot deviation reported
in the MOR. MORs are captured in FAA databases that the Army does not
have access to. The Army is committed to supporting any effort to
mitigate risk in the national airspace to include improving data
sharing between the Department of Defense (DOD) and FAA.
Question 2. The NTSB's report indicates that the PAT25 pilots
reported discrepant altitude readings on repeated occasions in the
leadup to the crash, but based on the NTSB's preliminary report, at no
point were those discrepant readings reconciled. How do Army Aviation
crews typically reconcile discrepant altitude readings? Are discrepant
altitude readings internal to a crew standard for Army Aviation
missions? What would typically account for discrepant altitude readings
internal to an Army Aviation crew?
Answer. Discrepant altitude readings internal to a crew are
atypical for Army Aviation missions. Crews utilize the coordination
elements, basic qualities, and objectives found in the Army Aircrew
Coordination Training Program to effectively share tasks and
information to resolve an unforeseen event such as diagnosing a
potential discrepant altitude reading. The NTSB investigation has not
yet determined the reason for the crewmembers of PAT25 stating
different altitudes, their subsequent actions, or the actual instrument
readings at that time.
Discrepant altitude readings could potentially result from
crewmembers looking at different altimeters (barometric versus radar),
incorrect or different altimeter settings dialed into the Kollsman
window on the two independent barometric altimeter systems in the UH-
60L, or actual maintenance faults. In addition, each barometric
altimeter has an allowable margin of error of plus or minus 75 feet
which is consistent with the FAA standard.
Question 3. Do you have a standard in place for The Army Aviation
Brigade to conduct routine maintenance and testing to determine whether
equipment, i.e., ADS-B Out, is working?
Answer. At the time of the hearing, there was no scheduled
maintenance or formal inspection ADS-B Out operations. Since that time,
the Army established testing and maintenance tracking procedures to
ensure the functionality and use of ADS-B Out. The maintenance actions
are codified in an Aviation Safety Action Memo (ASAM) and will be
directed for use in a Department of the Army order.
Monthly, the FAA sends the Program Executive Office Aviation (PEO
AVN) a spreadsheet identifying Army aircraft with ADS-B Out
transmission issues. PEO AVN alerts the unit of the aircraft issues for
resolution. The process was not formalized and as a result of the
information the NTSB and Army investigators have identified in their
preliminary findings has driven the Army to formalize this process.
Question 3a. Please describe that protocol.
Answer. Scheduled maintenance takes place anytime an aircraft
phase, preventive maintenance service, or scheduled component
replacement is conducted.
An unscheduled maintenance requirement occurs when an aircraft
experiences an unexpected malfunction, premature component breakdown,
or battle damage.
Regarding the ASAM, units will be required to train personnel on
the testing, functionality, and repair criteria. Units will document
the testing and validate the serviceability of the equipment.
Question 3b. How often does that routine maintenance testing occur?
Answer. The ASAM release re-baselines the functionality of all ADS-
B systems. The Army is codifying a policy to validate use and function
of the system before each flight to include internal test procedures
and FAA ATC stations to validate transmissions.
Question 3c. What occurs following the routine maintenance should a
piece of equipment not be operating correctly? How is that documented
and reported up the chain of command?
Answer. If a piece of equipment is found to be inoperable, the
flight crew or maintenance personnel will enter the fault into the
Aircraft Inspection and Maintenance Record. Aircraft maintenance
personnel will conduct troubleshooting procedures in accordance with
the aircraft Electronic Technical Manual. Once the corrective
maintenance is complete, the equipment will receive a Maintenance
Operational Check or Maintenance Test Flight to confirm proper
function.
When aircraft equipment repair or malfunction is cause for an
aircraft to be non-flyable, this is reported through the Daily Status
Report to the command.
Question 3d. Is that information reported to the Federal Aviation
Administration?
Answer. The Army does not report maintenance status of aircraft or
systems to the FAA. However, Army aircraft must meet communications
requirements to operate in the National Airspace. Army crews are not
authorized to operate in FAA airspace if they are unable to meet the
equipment requirements. Adherence to this requirement is within the
scope of the concurrent NTSB and AR 15-6 investigations.
Note: BG Braman indicated he would reply to this in the QFRs during
the hearing.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to
Brigadier General Matthew Braman
Question 1. Brigadier General Braman, in your testimony you
mentioned that Night Vision goggle training is required for readiness
in the area. By most accounts operating with these goggles in an urban
environment means a limited sight range and washed out vision due to
all the light.
What are the benefits to training in a congested urban environment
with night vision goggles?
Answer. The Army Aviation Brigade's (TAAB) mission to provide 24-
hour responsive rotary wing support to senior government and military
officials for continuity of government operations requires its aircrews
to operate and train in the National Capital Region (NCR) during day
and night hours. Flying at night at low altitudes under NVGs is the
standard for Army Aircrews and has been validated as the principle
method for flight operations in the National Airspace and in combat in
urban, rural and overwater environments. All Army aviators are trained
to operate utilizing night vision goggles for nighttime flying because
of the exponential increase in situational awareness. Army aviators
have the authority to remove their goggles if they deem it advantageous
due to very high light levels or other factors when normal scanning
techniques are not sufficient. However normal scanning techniques using
peripheral vision with googles on is still the most effective means for
optimal vision at night in all environments especially urban.
Question 1a. Are night vision goggles still being used on the
limited number of Army flights in the region?
Answer. Yes, night vision goggles provide pilots with an unmatched
capability to improve situational awareness for nighttime flying as
stated above.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Brigadier General Matthew Braman
Question 1. Black Hawk crewmember requirements. Army Regulation
(AR) 95-1 requires two-pilot operations as the standard for night
vision goggle (NVG) flights, with at least one pilot being NVG-
qualified and current. In addition, a non-pilot crewmember, such as a
crew chief, is required to be onboard to help with maintaining
situational awareness.
Would a requirement for a 4th crewmember have made a difference in
promoting situational awareness for the Black Hawk's flight crew? Why
or why not?
Answer. Army Regulation 95-1 does not mandate minimum crewmember
requirements specific to night vision goggle flights. The minimum
aircrew requirement by the UH-60L Black Hawk operator manual is two
pilots. In this instance there were three crewmembers.
The specific circumstances that led to the accident will be
determined by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) during
its ongoing investigation. However, the Army has determined in the
course of its safety investigation into the accident that PAT25's crew
chief was seated on the left side of the aircraft, which was the same
side American Airlines Flight 5342 approached from.
Question 2. Should the Army consider revising its minimum crew
requirements for Black Hawk helicopter operations like that performed
by the 12th Army Aviation Brigade?
Answer. The Army will review all regulations and policies and will
take appropriate action based on the facts and recommendations of the
ongoing investigations when complete. The minimum aircrew requirement
by the UH-60L Black Hawk operator manual is two pilots. The unit
commander and pilot in command determine the size of the crew based on
factors associated with each mission, the environment, and an
assessment of the crew. Should the NTSB determine the number of
aircrews assigned to PAT25 to be a causal factor in the accident, the
Army will review its minimum crew requirements for Black Hawk
helicopter operations and take appropriate action.
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