    [Senate Hearing 119-130]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 119-130

                            NTSB PRELIMINARY REPORT:
                            THE DCA MIDAIR COLLISION

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                      SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, SPACE, AND
                                   INNOVATION

                                     of the

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION
                                   __________

                                 MARCH 27, 2025
                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                 Transportation

                   [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                    Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
                                    ______

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    61-288 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2025

           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                           TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman
    JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
    ROGER WICKER, Mississippi              Ranking
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
    JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          GARY PETERS, Michigan
    TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
    TED BUDD, North Carolina             TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri               JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    JOHN CURTIS, Utah                    BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
    BERNIE MORENO, Ohio                  JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
    TIM SHEEHY, Montana                  JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
    SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  ANDY KIM, New Jersey
    CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming              LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
                     Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
               Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
                         Liam McKenna, General Counsel
                       Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
                     Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
                         Jonathan Hale, General Counsel

                                     ------

                SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, SPACE, AND INNOVATION

    JERRY MORAN, Kansas, Chairman        TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois, Ranking
    JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    TED BUDD, North Carolina             JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
    ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri               JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
    TIM SHEEHY, Montana                  ANDY KIM, New Jersey
    SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on March 27, 2025...................................     1
    Statement of Senator Moran.......................................     1
    Statement of Senator Duckworth...................................     3
    Statement of Senator Cruz........................................     5
    Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................     7
        Letter dated July 10, 2023 to Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton from
          Zephranie Buetow, Assistant Secretary for Legislative
          Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security..............   106
    Statement of Senator Budd........................................   108
    Statement of Senator Schmitt.....................................   113
    Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................   115
    Statement of Senator Sullivan....................................   117
    Statement of Senator Klobuchar...................................   119
    Statement of Senator Markey......................................   123

                                   Witnesses

    Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chairman, National Transportation Safety
      Board (NTSB)...................................................     9
        Prepared statement...........................................    10
    Chris Rocheleau, Acting Administrator, Federal Aviation
      Administration.................................................    92
        Prepared statement...........................................    93
    Brigadier General Matthew Braman, Director of Army Aviation,
      Department of the Army.........................................    94
        Prepared statement...........................................    96

                                    Appendix

    Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Jennifer Homendy
      by:
        Hon. Jerry Moran.............................................   133
        Hon. Shelley Moore Capito....................................   133
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................   133
        Hon. Tammy Duckworth.........................................   134
        Hon. Jacky Rosen.............................................   136
    Response to written questions submitted to Chris Rocheleau by:
        Hon. Ted Cruz................................................   137
        Hon. John Thune..............................................   138
        Hon. Jerry Moran.............................................   139
        Hon. Shelley Moore Capito....................................   140
        Hon. Amy Klobuchar...........................................   143
        Hon. Tammy Duckworth.........................................   144
        Hon. Jacky Rosen.............................................   145
    Response to written questions submitted to Brigadier General
      Matthew Braman by:
        Hon. Ted Cruz................................................   146
        Hon. Jerry Moran.............................................   146
        Hon. Shelley Moore Capito....................................   148
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................   148

                            NTSB PRELIMINARY REPORT:
                            THE DCA MIDAIR COLLISION

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 2025

                                   U.S. Senate,
       Subcommittee on Aviation, Space, and Innovation,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
    room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jerry Moran,
    Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Moran [presiding], Cruz, Sullivan, Budd,
    Schmitt, Sheehy, Capito, Duckworth, Cantwell, Klobuchar,
    Markey, and Hickenlooper.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS

        Senator Moran. The Committee will come to order. The
    Subcommittee on Aviation and Space of the United States
    Senate's Committee on Commerce convenes today for what I
    consider a very important hearing.
        Fifty-seven days ago, our Nation witnessed the first major
    U.S. commercial passenger flight crash in nearly 16 years.
    Families had their loved ones taken from them in an instant.
    Children lost their parents, husbands lost their wives, a
    Kansas couple lost their daughter, and a rural community in our
    state, called Kiowa, lost a husband and wife, a pillar of the
    community, who were traveling to visit their daughter in
    college.
        I have taken that American flight before. There were many
    Kansans on that flight and several of the members of this
    Committee lost constituents on the American Airlines Flight
    5342, and the Army's Black Hawk helicopter.
        In addition to the families who are grieving, our first
    responders made heroic efforts to find survivors and save
    lives, and the investigators have spent nearly 2 months
    searching the Potomac River and working to reconstruct wreckage
    to find answers.
        It has been a difficult 57 days.
        Sixty-seven lives that were lost on January 29 were taken
    prematurely in an accident that, by all indications, should
    have been avoided. Now the families of these victims, the
    Federal Aviation Administration, the National Transportation
    Safety Board, the U.S. Army, and Congress are tasked with how
    to best honor the memory and make certain accidents like this
    never happen again.
        I want to highlight NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy and NTSB
    Board for their diligence and transparency throughout the
    investigations. That job obviously is not an easy one, but it
    has been done with professionalism and care. It is their work
    that brings us here today to review.
        NTSB's preliminary report into the midair collision
    provides insight into the events of January 29, but many
    questions, certainly in my view, many questions still need to
    be answered, not only by the NTSB's investigation but by our
    Nation's aviation safety regulator and by the Army.
        The preliminary report provides alarming statistics in
    using existing FAA data on the risks at DCA to aviation safety.
    That data includes, and NTSB provides, these numbers. In a 13-
    year period, not a single month went by without at least one,
    quote, ``close call'' between a helicopter and a commercial jet
    operating at DCA. Between October 21 and December 24, there
    were 85 incidents where the lateral separation between a
    commercial jet and a helicopter was less than 1,500 feet and
    the vertical separation was less than 200 feet. And during that
    same timeframe, there were more 15,000, quote, ``close
    proximity events'' between a helicopter and a commercial
    airplane, the NTSB findings that it is possible for a
    helicopter on Route 4 to have as little as 75 feet of vertical
    separation from airplanes on approach to Runway 33.
        I commend the NTSB for issuing urgent safety
    recommendations, and I commend the FAA in acting to implement
    them, particularly the permanent restriction of nonessential
    helicopter operations at DCA. However, I want to know how, with
    these statistics in the FAA files, why prior to January 29 the
    agency failed to improve safety protocols at Reagan National
    Airport?
        This Committee worked tirelessly to pass an FAA
    reauthorization bill last Congress that prioritized safety,
    enabling our industry to continue innovating and equipping the
    FAA with the resources necessary to keep our skies safe. We
    need a permanent, confirmed FAA administrator to implement this
    important framework for the future of the industry. President
    Trump recently nominated Bryan Bedford to lead the FAA, and I
    look forward to his testimony before this Committee in the near
    future.
        I commend Secretary Duffy for his push to modernize
    airspace, and I look forward to this Subcommittee working
    together to keep America's traveling public safe and improve
    public trust in our air travel system.
        Demand for commercial aviation is expected to grow 4
    percent each year over the next two decades, and along with new
    technology and commercial spacecraft entering our airspace.
    This will further place demands upon our airspace and require
    the tools and guidelines to ensure a safe airspace.
        American Airlines Flight 5342 and Priority Air Transport 25
    carried innocent civilians, selfless servicemembers, talented
    figure skaters, fathers and mothers, husbands and wives, sons
    and daughters. And while Congress' response to January 29 ought
    to be deliberate and not executed in a knee-jerk fashion,
    Congress must make certain that this loss of life occurs never
    again.
        In this early investigation, we have many unresolved
    questions. Among those for me is why was the ADS-B Out not
    transmitting on the Black Hawk? Was it turned off or was there
    equipment malfunction? Why had precautions not been taken to
    mitigate the risks of collisions between commercial aircraft
    and rotor wing near DCA, the statistics I just described? What
    is the severity of this issue at other airports where combined
    traffic is also high? What explains the discrepancy between the
    altitude readings of the crew of the Black Hawk? Why did the
    Black Hawk's invalid pressure altitude data influence other
    systems that utilized this source? How the use if night vision
    goggles may have impacted the Black Hawk helicopter pilots'
    line of vision? And finally, how should the FAA evaluate
    combining duties of air traffic controllers?
        I am appreciative for our witnesses being here today. I
    note they each take this circumstance seriously. I am anxious
    to hear the discussion that they have with this Committee, and
    the end result should be a better understanding as well as
    working to identify and prevent tragedies today and into the
    future.
        I now recognize the Ranking Member of this Subcommittee,
    Senator Duckworth, the Senator from Illinois, for her opening
    remarks.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Chairman Moran, and thank you
    for your continued partnership on aviation safety issues. I
    enjoy being your partner on this Subcommittee. And I want to
    thank both the Chairman of the Commerce Committee and the
    Ranking Member for your work with us, as well.
        I do want to extend, first and foremost, my condolences to
    the family members of the victims, some of whom are here with
    us today, both on the commercial airliner as well as the family
    members who lost the brave soldiers in the Black Hawk
    helicopter. These are folks who put on the colors of this great
    nation, committed themselves to defending this great nation,
    and were at their duty station, training to protect and defend,
    as they lost their lives.
        I also want to thank the first responders and everyone at
    NTSB for their tireless work to get us the answers that we all
    are looking for.
        There is a saying, and many of you have heard it, our
    aviation regulations are written in blood. So we have an
    obligation to the victims to learn what went wrong and prevent
    a collision like this from ever happening again. As a former
    Black Hawk pilot myself--and I have flown helicopters out of
    very congested airspace at Midway Airport. In fact, I commanded
    the Midway unit for a number of years--I know how challenging
    this type of mixed-use airspace can be. But a challenging
    airspace is no excuse. This should never have happened.
        This collision was horrendous, and it is heartbreaking, but
    it was not a surprise. Our alarm bells about potential
    collisions have been ringing for years. Coming out of the
    pandemic, we saw a frightening rise in close calls and an
    erosion of our aviation system's margin of safety. We have
    known for years that we need more air traffic controllers and
    more safety technology. The warnings have been clear, and in
    some cases right here within this Committee, and a bipartisan
    consensus on the need to upgrade the equipment and the need to
    train more air traffic controllers.
        In November 2023, we held a hearing on close calls. NTSB
    Chair Homendy testified, citing staffing shortages, fatigue,
    distraction, deviation from FAA regulations, and a lack of
    runway safety technology, and she warned, and I quote, ``The
    concerning uptick in such incidents is a clear warning sign
    that the U.S. aviation system is sharply strained. We cannot
    wait until a fatal accident forces action. We must act before
    there is a tragedy,'' end quote.
        Chairwoman just sadly predicted what was going to happen,
    and you said that in 2023.
        At the same hearing, the National Air Traffic Controllers
    Association's President told us that staffing shortages were so
    bad that many air traffic controllers were working mandatory
    overtime, 6-day work weeks, and 10-hour days. He warned, and I
    quote, ``Over the long term, this will continue to introduce
    unnecessary risks into the system,'' end quote.
        So we passed, in a bipartisan way, FAA reauthorization bill
    last year, to help rebuild our aviation workforce and make
    critical investments in safety. The FAA is still implementing
    that new law, but clearly Congress has more work to do to shore
    up aviation safety in this great nation.
        In December 2024, we held another hearing. The GAO told us
    that more than 75 percent of our aging air traffic controller
    systems are unsustainable, or potentially unsustainable.
        The deadly collision at DCA is not the only aviation safety
    incident so far this year. We have seen deadly crashes in
    Philadelphia and Alaska, a crash landing in Toronto that
    miraculously everyone survived, even after the aircraft flipped
    upside down. Earlier this month we saw passengers standing on
    the wing of a 737 aircraft in Denver to escape a fire. And near
    misses keep happening. In February, a Southwest flight came
    within 200 feet of colliding with a Flexjet plane at Midway
    Airport.
        At such a dangerous time for aviation safety, when we need
    to bolster our workforce and invest in technology, the last
    thing we should be doing is making cuts to the FAA. Yet two
    weeks after the DCA crash, the Trump administration began
    firing hundreds of FAA employees. I say all of this because it
    is important context we need to keep in mind during today's
    hearing. We need to understand what happened at DCA, but we
    also need to understand how this fits into a much larger threat
    to aviation safety.
        According to the NTSB, DCA had many close calls in recent
    years, between October 2021 and December 2024. As the Chairman
    has said, there were more than 15,000 incidences of commercial
    aircraft coming close to rotary-wing aircraft. Eighty-five of
    those had a vertical separation of less than 200 feet. And last
    year there were also two high-profile runway close calls at
    DCA.
        NTSB's preliminary report raises several questions, most
    notably, how did FAA allow a helicopter route to come within 75
    feet of a runway approach? FAA has deconflicted the airspace,
    but DCA is not the only airport in the country where airplanes
    and helicopters share congested airspace. Several of us raised
    this at an earlier briefing, and thankfully FAA is now
    evaluating eight cities where this may also be an issue,
    including in Chicago.
        We also need to know more about what helicopter pilots knew
    about their altitude. Was their equipment working properly?
    Voice recordings showed that the pilot and instructor pilot
    indicated different altitudes as they approach the Key Bridge,
    and NTSB determined that some of the altitude information on
    the helicopter's data recorder was invalid.
        There are also questions about ADS-B. Why was the
    helicopter not transmitting ADS-B Out? Do commercial aircraft
    need to be equipped with ADS-B In? How come so many helicopters
    are allowed exemptions from the ADS-B Out requirement at DCA?
        So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and I
    yield back, Chairman.
        Senator Moran. Ranking Member Duckworth, thank you very
    much for your opening statement. She almost called me the
    Ranking Member.
        Senator Duckworth. I did.
        Senator Moran. There is no reason to apologize. Senator
    Duckworth was the previous Chairman of this Subcommittee, and I
    had a great opportunity to work with her as the Ranking Member.
    And I would indicate, certainly to Senator Duckworth but to
    those in the audience, this is a Subcommittee that will set
    partisanship aside, and we will continue to work closely
    together to find the answers that we are looking for today, and
    beyond finding the answers, making certain that changes are
    made to prevent this tragedy.
        We are joined by the Chairman of the full Committee,
    Senator Cruz. I appreciate his presence here and his leadership
    on this issue from the very beginning. And I now recognize him
    for his opening statement.

                      STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

        Chairman Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    the Ranking Member, as well. I want to thank each of our
    witnesses for being here today and I want to extend a
    particular welcome to the family members of the 67 crash
    victims who are here today for this hearing. I have met with
    many of you since the crash and each of you have my very
    deepest condolences for your unimaginable loss.
        This crash involving American Airlines Flight 5342 and the
    Army Black Hawk helicopter was preventable. It did not have to
    happen. And I want you to know I am committed to using the
    power of this Committee to determine if any policy failures led
    to this crash and making certain that Congress acts to correct
    them.
        This accident marks the first time a commercial crash in
    the U.S. has led to mass fatalities in over 15 years. While
    America's National Airspace System has kept Americans safe for
    decades, this critical juncture shows that more action must
    take place to enhance the safety of our system.
        The hearing today will examine the factors leading up to
    the midair collision 300 feet above the Potomac River, whether
    the Army's practice of disabling ADS-B Out is a glaring safety
    concern. Whether the FAA missed warning signs with thousands of
    instances where helicopters and commercial aircraft at DCA came
    too close to colliding. Whether the communications between the
    air traffic controller and both the pilots of the American
    Airlines flight and the Black Hawk helicopter was inadequate.
        The families of the American Airlines Flight 5342 victims
    deserve answers. Congress deserves answers. And the American
    flying public deserves answers to these important questions.
        The NTSB does terrific work. I am grateful to Chairman
    Jennifer Homendy and her team for their thorough investigation
    of this accident. The preliminary report being discussed today
    is factual--it does not include analysis nor does it include
    findings. It is just one step in what will be a lengthy and
    ongoing investigation. This Committee will closely follow how
    that investigation proceeds and look forward to the NTSB's full
    findings.
        Some actions, however, cannot wait.
        Aviation safety is dependent on what is called the Swiss
    cheese model. Each layer of cheese represents a defense against
    an identified risk, building redundancy into the system to plug
    holes and prevent accidents. After decades of advancements, the
    U.S. aviation system has been held up worldwide as the gold
    standard of safety. The FAA's Air Traffic Organization depends
    on thousands of talented air traffic controllers, hundreds of
    millions of dollars in annual investments to sustain
    technologies used to operate the air system, and billions more
    invested in technologies and facilities across the system.
        Even with these significant investments, the air traffic
    system is failing. Facilities, which are falling apart, are
    short-staffed, and projections show the shortages will last for
    years. Over the weekend, the NOTAM system broke down for a
    third time in just two years. Congress has provided tens of
    millions of dollars in the past two years to modernize the
    NOTAM system, and it has broken down already twice in this
    calendar year.
        President Trump and Secretary Duffy have pledged to take
    action to improve the air traffic control system. I plan to
    lead this Committee in passing legislation to do the same. We
    must provide resources for needed short-, medium-, and long-
    term improvements that chart the path to success and
    sustainment for the air traffic system.
        Earlier this week, I issued a call to aviation stakeholders
    for specific ideas to improve the air traffic system. I asked
    for concrete proposals--taking nothing off the table
    prematurely to make sure that whatever resources and
    authorities Congress provides to the Administration will make a
    lasting difference. My proposal will complement the Trump
    administration's forthcoming plan.
        What the tragedy of Flight 5342 shows us is it is never too
    early to act to improve aviation safety. I want to thank the
    families of the victims for taking your enormous grief and
    channeling it into energy, channeling it into advocacy,
    channeling it into standing up and speaking out for other
    families, flying on other flights, fighting for them so they
    don't have to endure the grief and loss that each of you is
    enduring.
        It is my hope we can spend the coming months in the wake of
    this tragedy working seriously to plug safety gaps and to
    ensure that an accident of this magnitude never happens again.
    Thank you.
        Senator Moran. Chairman Cruz, thank you for your opening
    remarks, your leadership today, and your leadership into the
    future.
        We now recognize the Ranking Member of the full Committee,
    the Senator from Washington State, Senator Cantwell.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Chairman Moran. Thank you
    Ranking Member Duckworth. Thank you full Committee Chairman
    Cruz. We are here today to examine one of the most devastating
    accidents in U.S. history. With 67 lives lost on January 29, we
    have a responsibility to not only understand what happened, but
    to fix it, so that it never happens again.
        I want to recognize the families who are here with us today
    and express my condolences, but also my appreciation for the
    diligence that you now are demonstrating by being here today.
    Too much of aviation safety in the last several years has been
    left to the advocacies of families. We should not have to rely
    on you. You should be able to mourn your losses. But we need
    you to continue to advocate for these important policies.
        I welcome NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy, FAA Acting
    Administrator Chris Rocheleau, and Brigadier General Matt
    Braman, who is the Director of Army Aviation. You are here to
    provide us an update on this collision and why a Black Hawk
    helicopter on a training flight collided with this American
    Airlines flight.
        As we seek answers, the NTSB's preliminary report has
    alarming facts. First, in the 3-year period leading up to the
    collision, commercial airplane and helicopters got within 400
    feet of each other on 15,214 occasions, within 200 feet on 85
    occasions. FAA's air traffic managers approve helicopter route
    charts annually, so as the data raised questions about the
    safety of these routes, the ball clearly falls into the FAA's
    court as to whether to act on this data or make changes where
    the helicopters can fly in DCA.
        A helicopter at 200 feet would only have 75 vertical feet
    separation from an airplane approaching on Runway 33. These
    findings reveal a very systemic issue that demands answers from
    our witnesses today. Acting Administrator Rocheleau, I want to
    know: Why did the FAA not act on 15,000 reports of dangerous
    proximity? How were these helicopter routes allowed to remain
    when alarm bells were literally going off in the towers?
        This lack of oversight must change. The Army Black Hawk
    helicopter was not transmitting what is known as ADS-B Out
    signal, although we do not know why. What we do know is that
    the military told our colleague, House Delegate Eleanor Holmes
    Norton, in 2023, that the military operates 100 percent of its
    flights in the National Capital Region without this safety
    technology--100 percent of the time. On March 7, I wrote
    Secretary Hegseth about this issue, asking to respond by March
    21. I have still heard nothing back. I do not like this
    silence. It is deafening.
        General Braman, I have questions about these policies,
    especially given the FAA's 2019 rule stating that the
    deactivation of the ADS-B Out technology, pursuant to an
    exemption, was not to be routine. Well, the Holmes letter says
    that not only was it far from routine, 100 percent of the time
    they operated with this exemption.
        Acting Administrator Rocheleau, your agency gave government
    airspace users a loophole. What we want to know now is why this
    was allowed to continue if we had this data and information and
    are there any other agencies that are acting with ADS-B Out
    that we have not addressed yet?
        The FAA rule needs to change. Chair Homendy, I will be
    asking you about ADS-B requirements. In 2010, the FAA said that
    it was premature to require this kind of equipment on
    operators. Yet, at the same time the FAA made that decision,
    just two years earlier, you wrote a letter saying, disagreeing
    with them, but saying that, quote, ``the equipage of aircraft
    with ADS-B Out in capacity will provide for an immediate,
    substantial contribution to safety, especially during
    operations in and around airports.''
        Why did we not listen? Fifteen years later, commercial
    aircraft are still not operating with this. If the American
    Airlines regional jet had been equipped with this ADS-B In, it
    would have been able to receive the Black Hawk's transmission,
    giving it better intelligence on positioning.
        Tim Lilley, the father of the pilot from the commercial
    aircraft, who he himself is also a Black Hawk helicopter pilot,
    and his wife Sherri, spent many years working at Gulfstream.
    They know a thing or two about aviation. They gave me a list of
    actions they hope Congress can take to improve safety.
        Mr. Chairman, we all need to work together on this critical
    safety legislation, legislation to close the ADS-B Out
    loophole, require more commercial jets to have ADS-B In
    capacity when operating near our Nation's busiest airports, and
    have stronger information sharing between our military and
    civilian authorities.
        This is not just about policy. It is about saving lives. To
    my colleagues, I hope that we can work together in a bipartisan
    fashion. Since the FAA Reauthorization Act did require NextGen
    completion by 2025, we also directed the FAA to develop a plan
    for accelerating airline equipage with NextGen technologies and
    authorized $17 billion through 2028 to modernize and replace
    the FAA ATC systems and infrastructure.
        So, I do want to say, I do not believe in cutting the
    services, the benefits, or the training of our air traffic
    controllers. We need them, and we need them to do their job. I
    supported Senator Cruz's efforts to continue to advance more
    training centers to get more air traffic controllers trained.
    But now we need to learn this painful lesson. We need to make
    sure that we are preventing future accidents from happening. We
    must be unwavering in this effort.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
        Senator Moran. Ranking Member Cantwell, thank you for your
    opening statement. I will now introduce our panelists who are
    here to testify.
        Our first witness Jennifer--I am sorry. I should put a
    title before you.
        Our first witness is Chairman Jennifer Homendy of the
    National Transportation Safety Board. The NTSB is an
    independent Federal agency that investigates every civil
    aviation accident in the United States and significant events
    in other modes of transportation such as rail, transit,
    roadway, and pipeline. She has served as the Chairwoman since
    2021, and is a member of the NTSB Board since 2018.
        Our second witness is Mr. Chris Rocheleau, Acting
    Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. Mr.
    Rocheleau has served at the FAA for more than 20 years, in
    multiple roles, including as Deputy Associate Administrator for
    Aviation Safety.
        And our third witness is Brigadier General Matthew Braman,
    Director of Army Aviation for the Headquarters of the
    Department of the Army. Throughout his service, General Braman
    has deployed over 36 months, supporting overseas contingency
    operations. And I thank you, General, for your service.
        I now recognize Chairman Jennifer Homendy to deliver her
    opening statement.

          STATEMENT OF HON. JENNIFER HOMENDY, CHAIRMAN,
           NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD (NTSB)

        Ms. Homendy. Thank you, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member
    Duckworth, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and members
    of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to provide you with an
    update on our investigation of the midair collision that
    occurred over the Potomac River near Reagan National Airport on
    January 29.
        The NTSB knows tragedy all too well. We experience it every
    day, which is why we fight so hard for safety. Yesterday, we
    remembered the six lives lost during the collapse of the Key
    Bridge in Baltimore a year ago. Today, we once again mourn the
    67 lives lost at DCA, the 7 in Philadelphia, 10 in Nome,
    Alaska.
        We often talk about safety in terms of numbers, did
    accidents, fatalities go up or down. It is important that we
    remember today that those who died at DCA and in other
    accidents we investigate are not numbers. As you said, these
    are mothers, fathers, sons, daughters, wives, husbands,
    cousins, best friends, who won't be there with their loved ones
    for Easter egg hunts, Passover seders, the end of Ramadan,
    Mother's Day, Father's Day, graduation, all of life's
    celebrations.
        Their families and friends, whether in person or online,
    are here today. I can only imagine what they are going through,
    and I want to take a moment to again express our deepest
    sympathies to each of them. Please know that we keep you in our
    hearts as we diligently work to determine how this tragedy
    happened so no one--no one--experiences the deeply significant
    loss you must feel today.
        NTSB was on scene that night within an hour of the
    collision, and we remained there for over a month. Work
    continues to this day, including diving operations to recover
    personal effects and any remaining portions of the wreckage.
        On March 11 we released our preliminary report, which
    contains only factual information that we have gathered in the
    first few weeks, all of which can change throughout the course
    of the investigation. It does not include analysis or findings,
    nor does it determine probable cause. Those will be in our
    final report.
        But we do not wait for a final report to take action if we
    uncover critical safety issues that require immediate
    attention, which is why, in conjunction with the release of our
    preliminary report we also issued two urgent safety
    recommendations to the FAA. In both reports, we cited FAA
    surveillance data that showed between October 2021 and December
    2024, there were over 15,000 close-proximity events between
    commercial aircraft and helicopters at DCA.
        In reviewing that and other data, including airport
    operations and established helicopter routes, we determined
    that the separation distances between helicopter traffic
    operating on Route 4 and aircraft using runways 15 and 33 are
    insufficient and pose an intolerable risk to aviation safety.
        As a result, we have recommended that the FAA prohibit
    operations on Helicopter Route 4 between Haines Point and
    Wilson Bridge when those runways are being used for departures
    and arrivals. We also recommended that the FAA designate an
    alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate
    travel between Haines Point and the Wilson Bridge when that
    segment of Route 4 is closed.
        I want to commend Secretary Duffy for his swift acceptance
    of our recommendations. The Secretary and the Acting
    Administrator and the General have been tremendous partners
    throughout the course of this investigation, and I want to
    thank them for their commitment to safety.
        I know we are all searching for answers, the right safety
    solutions. But the NTSB is the gold standard for accident
    investigations for a reason. We are thorough, and we are fact-
    based. We leave no stone unturned, and we let the evidence
    guide us. Investigations take time. We have a lot of work to do
    in this investigation, from interviews to analyses of large
    volumes of documents and data to review. To air carrier
    operations that we have to review, helicopter operations, air
    traffic control, human performance, helicopter air worthiness,
    flight recorders, and more. In total, we have about 40 NTSB
    experts leading this investigation, in collaboration with the
    parties and others, and we are aiming to complete this
    investigation within one year, barring, of course, any
    unforeseen circumstances.
        I want to close by thanking you for your steadfast support
    of the NTSB, and I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Homendy follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chairwoman, National
                          Transportation Safety Board

        Good morning, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, and members
    of the subcommittee. My name is Jennifer Homendy, and I am honored to
    serve as Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board
    (NTSB).\1\ Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
    provide an update regarding the NTSB's investigation the midair
    collision involving a U.S. Army Sikorsky UH-60L (under the callsign
    PAT25) and PSA Airlines dba American Airlines flight 5342, a Mitsubishi
    Heavy Industries (MHI) RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2C10
    (CRJ700) that occurred over the Potomac River in southwest Washington,
    DC, about 2048 eastern standard time (EST) on January 29, 2025.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress
    with investigating and establishing the facts, circumstances, and cause
    or probable cause of all civil aviation accidents and serious incidents
    in the United States and defined accidents in all other modes of
    transportation, including roadway accidents, grade crossing incidents,
    railroad accidents, pipeline accidents, major marine casualties
    occurring on or under the navigable waters, internal waters, or the
    territorial sea of the United States, and other accidents related to
    the transportation of individuals or property when the Board decides
    the accident is catastrophic, the accident involves problems of a
    recurring character, or the investigation of the accident would carry
    out our statutory requirements. In addition, the NTSB carries out
    special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinates the
    resources of the Federal government and other organizations to aid
    victims and their family members impacted by major transportation
    disasters.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers aboard the
    airplane and all 3 crewmembers aboard the helicopter were fatally
    injured. Both aircraft were destroyed as a result of the accident.
    Flight 5342 was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of
    Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a scheduled domestic passenger
    flight from Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport (ICT),
    Wichita, Kansas, to DCA, departing ICT at 1839 EST. PAT25 originated
    from Davison Army Airfield (DAA), Fort Belvoir, Virginia, at 1845 EST
    on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan for the pilot's annual
    standardization evaluation with the use of night vision goggles. Night
    visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of DCA at the
    time of the accident.
        Attached to this testimony are the following: Investigation
    Preliminary Report and Urgent Recommendation Report.
        Before I begin, I want to take a moment and recognize the families
    and friends of those who lost loved ones in this tragedy. On behalf of
    the NTSB, I want to express my deepest condolences and our sympathies
    to each of you. Our mission is to determine what happened and why it
    happened so no one else experiences the loss you feel today. We keep
    you in mind every day, as we carry out our solemn mission to prevent
    future tragedy.
        NTSB launched to the accident site that night and investigators
    remained at DCA for approximately four weeks. Work still continues on
    site, including diving operations to recover personal effects and any
    remaining portions of the wreckage.
        As part of the investigative process, the NTSB invited qualified
    parties to participate in the investigation. These included Federal
    Aviation Administration (FAA), the U.S. Army, PSA Airlines, GE
    Aerospace, Sikorsky, National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Air
    Line Pilots Association, Association of Flight Attendants,
    International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Collins
    Aerospace, and the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority.
        The parties were formed into specialized investigative groups led
    by NTSB group chairs in the areas of Air Carrier Operations and Human
    Performance, Airplane Structures, Airplane Systems, Powerplants,
    Helicopter Operations and Human Performance, Air Traffic Control and
    Human Performance, Helicopter Airworthiness, Survival Factors, and
    Flight Recorders. This week, we formed another investigative group
    focused on Data Analysis.
        There was a whole of government response to this major event, and I
    want to recognize some of the assistance we received in recovering the
    victims and wreckage: Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, D.C.
    Fire and EMS Department, and other first responders from Virginia and
    Maryland, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigations,
    the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage
    and Diving (SUPSALV).
        On March 11, the NTSB released the preliminary report for this
    investigation, attached in full. It should be emphasized that, as with
    all preliminary reports, this document contains only factual
    information pertinent to the investigation. This information is
    preliminary and subject to change and does not include analysis or a
    probable cause of the collision, all of which will be issued at a later
    date as we continue to thoroughly investigate wherever the evidence may
    lead. There is a lot of work left to be done.
        However, as is always the case with our investigations, NTSB does
    not need to wait until we determine a probable cause to take action if
    our investigation uncovers facts that demonstrate an intolerable risk
    to safety. In such cases, we do not hesitate to take urgent action, and
    in this case that is exactly what we have done.
        In conjunction with the release of our preliminary report, we also
    issued two urgent safety recommendations (also attached) to the Federal
    Aviation Administration (FAA) concerning the helicopter routes near
    DCA. NTSB urgent recommendations require immediate action to prevent
    similar accidents or incidents. When we issue them, we believe a
    critical safety issue must be addressed, with no delay.
        In the case of this investigation, while reviewing airport
    operations and prior incidents, including near mid-air collision
    events, and while reviewing the existing helicopter routes for
    helicopter traffic near DCA, NTSB determined that the existing
    separation distances between helicopter traffic operating on Route 4
    and aircraft landing on runway 33 (the route and runway, respectively,
    that were in use during the crash) are insufficient, and pose an
    intolerable risk to aviation safety by increasing the chances of a
    midair collision at DCA. We've therefore issued an urgent
    recommendation to the FAA to prohibit operations on Helicopter Route 4
    between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when runways 15 and 33 are
    being used for departures and arrivals at DCA.
        Recognizing that a total closure of this route when the stated
    runways are in use would restrict a vital aviation corridor used for
    law enforcement activity, Coast Guard patrols, and continuity of
    government operations, and recognizing the potential for increased risk
    by adding to air traffic controller workload, we also recommended that
    the FAA designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to
    facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that
    segment of Route 4 is closed.
        These recommendations were made because information gathered from
    voluntary safety reporting programs and the FAA regarding encounters
    between helicopters and commercial aircraft near DCA showed that, from
    2011 through 2024, a vast majority of reported events occurred on
    approach to landing. Initial analysis found that at least one traffic
    alert and collision avoidance system, or TCAS, resolution advisory (RA)
    was triggered per month at DCA due to proximity to a helicopter. The
    response to TCAS RAs, unlike traffic advisories, or TAs, are
    recommended escape maneuvers; for example, climb, descend, or level
    off. While a TA is issued when the intruding aircraft is about 20
    seconds from the closest point of approach, or 0.3 nautical miles,
    whichever occurs first, RA's indicate a collision threat and require
    immediate action.
        In over half of the encounters we reviewed, again from 2011 through
    2024, the helicopter may have been above the route altitude
    restriction. Two-thirds of these events occurred at night.
        We then reviewed commercial operations at DCA and found that,
    between October 2021 and December 2024, there were a total of 944,179
    commercial operations at DCA. These are instrument flight rules, or
    IFR, departures or arrivals. During that time, there were 15,214
    occurrences between commercial airplanes and helicopters in which there
    was a lateral separation distance of less than 1 nautical mile and
    vertical separation of less than 400 ft. There were 85 recorded events
    that involved a lateral separation of less than 1500 ft (or less than
    0.3 nautical miles) and vertical separation of less than 200 ft.
        The chart below is a cross-section of the airspace that extends
    from Runway 33's centerline, spanning from the runway to the east bank
    of the Potomac River. The figure shows the separation distance that
    would exist, according to FAA charts, with a helicopter on Route 4 and
    an airplane descending on the glideslope to runway 33. At the maximum
    altitude of just 200 ft, a helicopter operating over the eastern
    shoreline of the Potomac River would have just 75 feet of vertical
    separation from an airplane approaching runway 33, and that distance
    decreases if the helicopter is operated farther from the shoreline.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Figure 1. Cross section showing the notional separation between
    Route 4 and a PAPI-guided visual approach to runway 33, according to
    FAA charts and aerial photogrammetry analysis.

        As a result of the accident, the FAA, under the leadership of U.S.
    Department of Transportation Secretary Duffy took swift action to
    ensure safety and restrict helicopter traffic from operating over the
    Potomac River near DCA until March 31st, and we commend him for that.
    However, as that deadline nears, NTSB remains concerned about the
    significant potential for a future midair collision at DCA given the
    facts we have uncovered. I am pleased to share with you that the
    Secretary has taken our urgent recommendations very seriously, and I
    look forward to working with him, Acting Administrator Rocheleau, and
    Congress to see them implemented as we move forward with this
    investigation.
        Some investigations, understandably, get more public attention than
    others, but all of our investigations are critical for improving
    transportation safety. We know that we owe it to the families of those
    involved, to the communities where events occurred, and to the
    traveling public to find out what happened, why it happened, and to
    make recommendations to help ensure it never happens again. Our current
    investigative workload includes almost 1,250 active investigations in
    all 50 states and Puerto Rico, in addition to supporting more than 160
    foreign investigations in over 50 countries. Throughout a typical year,
    we work on about 2,200 domestic and 450 foreign cases, and we expect
    the number of cases annually to remain high and continue to increase in
    complexity. Some of our significant ongoing investigations of events
    that have occurred this year include:

       The in-flight structural failure of a Boeing 737-9 MAX

       The contact of a container ship with the Francis Scott Key
            Bridge, and subsequent bridge collapse, in Baltimore, Maryland

       A multivehicle work zone collision on Interstate 35 in
            Austin, Texas.

       A Boeing 737-800 engine fire in Denver, Colorado.

       A medical transport helicopter crash in Canton, Mississippi.

       A gas leak and pipeline explosion in Hutchinson, Kansas.

       A multivehicle crash and postcrash fire on I-80 in Green
            River, Wyoming.

       A collision between two light rail trains with a derailment
            in Somerville, Massachusetts.

       A train fire and passenger evacuation in Ridley Park,
            Pennsylvania.

       A crash of a Bering Air Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in Nome,
            Alaska.

       A Learjet 55 Medevac crash in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

        In addition, we continue to investigate other significant events,
    including:

       A multivehicle crash, including a motorcoach carrying
            members of a high school band in Etna, Ohio.

       A multivehicle crash on the Ohio Turnpike in Swanton, Ohio.

       A multivehicle crash between a motorcoach and tractor-
            trailers parked along a rest area ramp in Highland, Illinois.

       A tanker truck rollover and rupture with anhydrous ammonia
            release in Teutopolis, Illinois.

       A grade-crossing collision in Pecos, Texas.

       A collision involving a vehicle operating with partial
            driving automation in San Antonio, Texas.

       A collision between two vehicles resulting in a postcrash
            fire in Carrizo Springs, Texas.

       Rail employee fatalities and injuries in Illinois, New
            Jersey, North Carolina, and Wisconsin.

       Natural gas-fueled explosions in Youngstown, Ohio, South
            Jordan, Utah, and Jackson, Mississippi.

       A multivehicle work zone collision and postcrash fire on I-
            95 in Kenly, North Carolina.

       A train derailment and hazardous materials release in
            Manuelito, New Mexico.

       A school bus roadway departure and overturn in Millstone,
            West Virginia.

       A fire aboard a container ship at Port of Newark, New
            Jersey.

       A vehicle collision with a stopped school bus, fatally
            injuring a student pedestrian, in Excelsior, Wisconsin.

        We currently have over a thousand open safety recommendations
    across all modes as a result of our investigations. In 2024, we issued
    132 new safety recommendations and closed 86. Of those closed,
    excluding those that were classified reconsidered, no longer
    applicable, and superseded, 58 (77 percent) were closed acceptably,
    meaning that the recommendation recipient took action to implement the
    safety recommendation. This includes actions to enhance aviation safety
    by requiring operators to implement safety management systems, to
    increase focus on highway bridge maintenance, to help prevent damage to
    underwater pipelines, and to help prevent train derailments due to
    unexpected weather conditions. This success rate demonstrates the value
    of our recommendations. Our recommendations are meaningful, and we
    appreciate the efforts of recipients to address them.
        The NTSB is a small agency that plays a vital role in ensuring
    public safety and protection of life and property in all that we do. I
    appreciate the need to right-size the Federal workforce; in fact, I
    strongly agree with that goal. However, the NTSB runs lean; we always
    have. We have just 430 employees to carry out our mission and are
    authorized by Congress to go up to 450, though we would need
    significantly more than that to truly be fully staffed. We punch far
    above our weight. Everyone at the NTSB plays a role in achieving our
    mission to make transportation safer. Their hard work, professionalism,
    and dedication around the clock is the reason that the NTSB is regarded
    as the world's preeminent safety agency. To complete our investigations
    and develop recommendations that advance safety changes without delays,
    we must meet the challenges that come with increasing growth and
    innovation in transportation. Therefore, it is critical for the agency
    to have additional resources to respond to events without affecting our
    timeliness, the quality of our work, or our independence.
        I want to thank the committee for your support in last year's NTSB
    reauthorization bill to increase NTSB's funding for the next 4 years.
    As a result of Congress' support, we have been able to make much needed
    progress in hiring for the agency. The vast majority of that growth has
    been in our investigative offices (Aviation Safety, Highway Safety,
    Marine Safety, and Railroad, Pipeline, and Hazardous Materials
    Investigations). Still, despite those efforts, we continue to need
    additional investigative staff, as well as staff in the operational
    offices where increases have not occurred to the same extent. This
    includes staff in General Counsel to work through a backlog of
    petitions for reconsideration of investigations and airman, mechanic or
    mariner's certificate appeals, as well as party-related issues and
    external legal disputes; staff in the Office of the Managing Director
    to enhance the agency's overall use of data to improve the NTSB's
    effectiveness and innovation; staff in the Office of the Chief
    Information Officer to address mandated cybersecurity enhancements and
    the backlog of Freedom of Information Act requests; and staff in Human
    Capital and Training to support recruitment, hiring, and other actions
    critical to developing and retaining a highly-productive workforce.
        The fact is, our greatest asset is our workforce, which accounts
    for over 70 percent of our costs. We rely on a staff of highly skilled
    individuals with technical expertise in such areas as aerospace,
    electrical, and mechanical engineering; chemistry; metallurgy; human
    performance; and other specialized fields to conduct accident
    investigations and identify life-saving safety improvements. We must
    continue to attract and retain talent with expertise in emerging
    technologies and the transportation systems of tomorrow. And without
    our workforce, we will not be able to carry out our congressionally
    mandated mission to protect public safety. Our workforce is highly
    technical, and approximately 25 percent of the employees are retirement
    eligible within 1 year; this number increases to approximately 40
    percent over the next 5 years. We need to build a deeper bench now to
    prepare for upcoming attrition.
        For the NTSB to carry out its mission-critical work, we must have a
    fully trained workforce ready to respond to more than 1300 new
    accidents per year, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and deliver
    comprehensive, timely, and concise investigation outcomes and safety
    recommendations to protect life and property and prevent future
    transportation-related accidents and injuries from occurring.
        Before I close, I want to thank Senate and House leaders on both
    sides of the aisle, as well as President Trump, Vice President Vance,
    and Secretary Duffy for their tremendous support of the NTSB. As
    examples, we were granted exemptions from the deferred resignation
    program and the Federal hiring freeze, and we currently have 14
    critical positions, nearly all investigative roles, posted on USA Jobs.
    The Administration and each of you have been very supportive of our
    work to ensure public safety, and we thank you all for your efforts.
        I respectfully request that Congress continue to support our
    ability to carry out our critical safety mission now and into the
    future; to recruit, retain, and develop a highly qualified and
    specialized workforce; and to prepare the agency for investigations
    involving emerging transportation technologies and systems to improve
    transportation safety.
                                     ______

                                  Attachments

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Moran. Thank you, Chairwoman.
        We now recognize Acting Administrator Rocheleau of the FAA
    for 5 minutes.

                STATEMENT OF CHRIS ROCHELEAU, ACTING
           ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

        Mr. Rocheleau. Thank you, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member
    Duckworth, Chairman Cruz, and Ranking Member Cantwell, as well
    as members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity
    to be here today to discuss the NTSB's preliminary report on
    the midair collision of PSA Airlines Flight 5342 and a U.S.
    Army Black Hawk helicopter that occurred in January, near
    Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, or DCA.
        I would like to begin by offering my sincerest sympathies
    to the families and loved ones of those who perished in recent
    accidents, particularly the accident near DCA.
        The FAA continues to support the ongoing NTSB
    investigations. Our work with the NTSB will help us understand
    the factors that contributed to these accidents, and we will
    use the data to inform future FAA actions.
        Aviation safety is the FAA's number one priority. Let me
    repeat that--aviation safety is the FAA's number one priority.
    While flying remains the safest mode of transportation,
    aviation safety is not static. There is always room for
    improvement. The professionals at the FAA take their jobs very
    seriously and strive to ensure safety every day. But the fact
    of the matter is that we have to do better. We have to identify
    trends, we have to get smarter about how we use data, and when
    we put corrective actions in place, we must implement them with
    diligence.
        I want to thank Chair Homendy and the entire NTSB team for
    their dedication in their ongoing investigation.
        Earlier this month, the NTSB issued an initial report and
    two urgent safety recommendations. The recommendations align
    with the actions the FAA took, under Secretary Duffy's
    leadership, immediately following the accident, to restrict
    helicopter operations around DCA, eliminating mixed helicopter
    and fixed-wing traffic and carefully developing alternative
    routes.
        Following the NTSB recommendations, the FAA took action to
    make these restrictions permanent. When essential helicopter
    operations, such as lifesaving medical, active law enforcement,
    active air defense, or Presidential transport, must operate in
    the flight-restricted airspace, fixed-wing aircraft are not
    allowed in that airspace.
        We are also continuing to analyze other airports that have
    both established helicopter routes and nearby airplane traffic.
    The FAA also is also carefully reviewing offshore helicopter
    operations. As part of this analysis, we are using machine
    learning and language modeling to scan incident reports and
    explore multiple data sources to find themes and areas of
    concern. We will take immediate action if needed to mitigate
    any identified safety risks. Additionally, I will establish a
    Safety Risk Management Panel and engage with aviation
    stakeholders to identify additional hazard areas involving
    helicopter and fixed-wing interactions, and all aircraft
    operating in DCA Class B airspace will be required to broadcast
    their position and identification using ADS-B Out, with very
    limited exceptions.
        We are bolstering aviation safety in other ways, too. Air
    traffic controller staffing is a top priority as air traffic
    controllers play a critical role in keeping the American people
    safe. Right now, we have over 10,750 controllers on the job,
    with over 3,000 in training. We intend to hire another 2,000
    controllers this year. We have streamlined the hiring process
    and incentivized hiring with a 30 percent increase in the
    salary of those who qualify to attend the FAA's Academy, and we
    are already seeing positive results from these improvements.
        During the hiring surge that closed last week, we received
    over 10,000 applications, and more than 8,000 of those were
    referred to testing.
        We also continue to maintain rigorous oversight of Boeing
    to ensure the safety and compliance of its aircraft designs and
    operations. This oversight extends to ongoing monitoring of
    Boeing's manufacturing practices, maintenance procedures, and
    software updates. We are working closely with Boeing to address
    any safety concerns and to ensure that all required
    modifications and improvements are made to meet the highest
    safety standards.
        We have a strong foundation at the FAA, and we are going to
    make our agency even stronger. We are refocusing our energy and
    directing all of our resources to safety. And we will continue
    to recruit, train, and retain the best and brightest for the
    FAA team.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I also
    thank President Trump and Secretary Duffy for putting their
    faith in me to lead the FAA during this time. The work we do at
    the FAA is not easy, but it is vitally important to the
    American people. And I am proud to once again be part of the
    FAA team.
        I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rocheleau follows:]

         Prepared Statement of Chris Rocheleau, Acting Administrator,
                        Federal Aviation Administration

        Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss
    the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) preliminary report on
    the midair collision of PSA Airlines flight 5342 and a U.S. Army Black
    Hawk helicopter that occurred in January, near Ronald Reagan Washington
    National Airport, or DCA.
        I would like to begin by offering my sincerest sympathies to the
    families and loved ones of those who perished in recent accidents,
    including the accident near DCA. The Federal Aviation Administration
    (FAA) continues to support the ongoing NTSB investigations. Our work
    with the NTSB will help us understand the factors that contributed to
    these accidents, and we will use the data to inform future FAA actions.
        Aviation safety is the FAA's number one priority. While flying
    remains the safest mode of transportation, aviation safety is not
    static. There is always room for improvement. The professionals at the
    FAA take their jobs seriously and strive to ensure safety every day.
    But the fact of the matter is that we have to do better. We have to
    identify trends, we have to get smarter about how we use data, and when
    we put corrective actions in place, we must execute them.
        I want to thank Chairman Homendy and the entire NTSB team for their
    diligence in the ongoing investigation. Earlier this month, the NTSB
    issued a preliminary report and two urgent safety recommendations. The
    recommendations align with the actions the FAA took, under Secretary
    Duffy's leadership, to restrict helicopter operations around DCA
    immediately following the accident, eliminating mixed helicopter and
    fixed-wing traffic. Following the NTSB recommendations, the FAA took
    action to make these restrictions permanent. When essential helicopter
    operations, such as lifesaving medical, active law enforcement, active
    air defense, or presidential transport, must operate in the flight-
    restricted airspace, fixed-wing aircraft are not allowed in that
    airspace.
        We are continuing to analyze other airports that have both charted
    helicopter routes and nearby airplane traffic. The FAA also is
    assessing the Gulf of America, including offshore helicopter
    operations. As part of this analysis, we are using machine learning and
    language modeling to scan incident reports and mine multiple data
    sources to find themes and areas of risk. We will take immediate action
    if needed to mitigate any identified safety risks. In addition, I will
    establish a Safety Risk Management Panel and engage with aviation
    stakeholders to identify additional hazard areas involving helicopter
    and fixed-wing interactions.
        We're bolstering aviation safety in other ways, too. Air traffic
    controller staffing is a top priority as air traffic controllers play a
    critical role in keeping the American people safe. Right now, we have
    more than 10,750 air traffic controllers on the job with more than
    3,000 in training. We intend to hire another 2,000 controller trainees
    this year. Consistent with Secretary Duffy's announcement on
    supercharged air traffic controller hiring, we have streamlined the
    hiring process to improve efficiency by changing the previous 8-step
    process to a 5-step process, which will accelerate the time-to-hire for
    these critical positions by five months or more, bringing new air
    traffic controllers on the job much faster. We've also incentivized
    hiring with a 30 percent increase in the salary of those who qualify to
    attend the FAA's Academy. And we are already seeing positive results
    from these improvements. During the hiring surge that closed last week,
    we received more than 10,000 applications. More than 8,300 of those
    were referred to testing.
        We also continue to maintain rigorous oversight of Boeing to ensure
    the safety and compliance of its aircraft designs and operations. This
    oversight extends to ongoing monitoring of Boeing's manufacturing
    practices, maintenance procedures, and software updates. We are working
    closely with Boeing to address any safety concerns and to ensure that
    all required modifications and improvements are made to meet the
    highest safety standards.
        We have a strong foundation at the FAA, and we're going to make our
    agency even stronger. We are refocusing our energy and directing all of
    our resources to safety. And we'll continue to recruit, train, and
    retain the best and brightest for our FAA team.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I also thank
    President Trump and Secretary Duffy for putting their faith in me to
    lead the FAA during this time. The work we do at the FAA isn't easy,
    but it's vitally important. And I'm proud to once again be part of the
    FAA team.

        Senator Moran. Thank you, sir.
        I recognize Brigadier General Matthew Braman for his
    testimony.

           STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MATTHEW BRAMAN,
         DIRECTOR OF ARMY AVIATION, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

        General Braman. Thank you, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member
    Duckworth, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and
    distinguished members of the Committee. I appreciate the
    opportunity to come here before you today to speak about the
    midair collision that occurred between an Army Black Hawk
    helicopter, with the call sign PAT 25, and American Airlines
    Flight 5342.
        First and foremost, on behalf of Army senior leaders, and
    all of our soldiers, I want to pass my continued condolences to
    all those affected by this tragedy. I want to thank the
    professional work of the first responders and the Federal,
    state, and local agencies that responded within minutes to the
    crash site and aided in the recovery. I want to thank Chairman
    Homendy and the NTSB for conducting a thorough investigation
    and facilitating a close and transparent relationship with the
    Army as we conduct our parallel investigations.
        The NTSB remains lead in the investigation, so I can't
    offer facts and recommendations at this time, but I can offer
    the Army perspective on the preliminary report and provide
    clarifying information on Army helicopter operations, and
    certainly can do that here in the Washington, D.C., area.
        For context, the PAT 25's unit, the 12th Aviation
    Battalion, falls under the Army Aviation Brigade, or referred
    to as the TAAB, and that unit has the mission to provide
    continuous, responsive aviation support to senior military and
    government leaders to enable continuity of government
    operations and defense support to civil authorities.
        The TAAB is one of dozens of organizations, both civilian
    and military, that operates helicopters in the D.C. area. Our
    aircraft continue to meet all requirements to operate in the
    National Airspace, in Class B airspace, and in helicopter
    routes in Washington, D.C., and they operate under positive
    control of flight services when within 30 nautical miles of
    DCA.
        PAC 25 was operating out of Davidson Army Airfield, Fort
    Belvoir. The crew of three were fully qualified to fly in the
    local area. The Pilot-in-Command, CW2 Andrew Eaves, was an
    instructor pilot. The Co-Pilot, Captain Rebecca Lobach, was a
    qualified pilot-in-command, as well, and the Crew Chief, Staff
    Sergeant Ryan O'Hara, was a standardization flight instructor.
        The night of January 29, 2025, PAT 25 was conducting an
    Annual Proficiency and Readiness Test, or APART. As part of
    that flight was approved to operate at contingency locations
    associated with their directed mission. This has led to
    questions as to whether PAT 25 was transmitting Automatic
    Dependent Surveillance Broadcasts out, or ADS-B Out. The
    specific status of both its operation and functionality is
    something that is under the investigation of the NTSB. The
    crew, however, was approved to operate with that capability
    off, in accordance with Army policy.
        The aircraft transponder, however, was active, with Mode 3
    A/C and Mode S when within the Class B airspace, and was
    emitting all the required information to allow air traffic
    services and traffic collision avoidance systems to detect and
    track the aircraft. Army policy does not permit Transponder Off
    operations in the National Airspace. They do not permit
    Transponder Off operations.
        There is certainly no shortage of speculation on potential
    causes of the accident. I understand well the desire for
    answers. As the Director of Army Aviation and a senior Army
    aviator, there is nothing more important to me than the
    capability, proficiency, and safety of our air crews and those
    whom they transport and support in defense of this Nation. And
    I am also personally invested in the safety of our commercial
    aviation enterprise, as I live with an airline pilot, and her
    safety and the safety of her passengers is paramount to me, as
    well. Which is why it is essential that we see this
    investigation through to its fruition so we can have well-
    informed, facts-based conclusions to make desired change, when
    needed.
        But where prudent, the Army is not waiting to take action.
    Immediately after the accident, the 12th Aviation Battalion
    paused all operations. They have only recently resumed flights,
    and only outside the 7 nautical mile radius of DCA, with the
    exception of flights directly supporting the Secretary of
    Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and that remains
    true today. The Army continues to fully comply with all FAA
    restrictions on helicopter traffic over the Potomac River near
    DCA.
        The Army is actively participating, along with other
    military services and agencies, with an FAA-led working group
    to redesign the Route 4 helicopter corridor, as recommended by
    the NTSB in its preliminary report.
        We have also issued interim guidance to elevate the
    approval authority to operate with ADS-B Off. The Army is fully
    committed to a transparent and collaborative review of the
    events of January 29 and of all operations in the vicinity of
    DCA. We support any and all efforts to ensure a tragedy such as
    this never occurs again.
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
    Committee, and I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Braman follows:]

           Prepared Statement of Brigadier General Matthew W. Braman

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, distinguished members of
    the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today to discuss the accident that occurred between an Army UH-60 Black
    Hawk helicopter, call sign Priority Air Transport (PAT) 25, and
    American Airlines Flight #5342, operated by PSA Airlines in the
    vicinity of Reagan National Airport.
        First and foremost, on behalf of Army leadership, and our fellow
    Soldiers, we send our continued condolences to all those affected by
    this tragedy. We thank the professional work of the first responders
    and the countless Federal, State, and local agencies that responded to
    the crash site and aided in the recovery effort. Specifically, I want
    to thank the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) for continuing
    to conduct a thorough investigation and facilitating a close and
    transparent working relationship with the Army. I will defer to NTSB on
    questions specific to the ongoing investigation, but I can offer the
    Army perspective on the preliminary report and provide clarifying
    information on Army helicopter operations in the National Capital
    Region (NCR) in general.

                           TAAB HELICOPTER PROCEDURES

        The Army Aviation Brigade (TAAB) operates at Fort Belvoir,
    Virginia, and includes the 12th Aviation Battalion, which provides
    continuous, responsive rotary wing aviation support to senior military
    and government leaders in the NCR to enable continuity of government
    operations and defense support of civil authorities. The unit has
    operated in the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan area since 1957, flying
    on average 5,800 hours annually, the bulk of which--80 percent--are
    mission rehearsals, exercises, and individual crew flights to build
    proficiency for their assigned mission.
        The term ``training flight'' has been frequently used to describe
    PAT 25's mission on January 29th and does appear to be a source of some
    confusion. For clarity, a ``training flight'' in military vernacular is
    a general term used to refer to any flight that is not performing
    directed mission support. For TAAB aircrews, ``training flights'' refer
    to unit-led mission practice, mission validation flights with external
    agencies, and flights to build readiness and proficiency to execute
    TAAB's mission. TAAB training flights may involve operating at
    sensitive locations. New Army pilots learn to fly at Fort Novosel,
    Alabama, where they complete an initial course in a trainer helicopter
    before advancing to graduate level courses in the advanced airframes
    they'll operate when they join their units. Pilots who join TAAB are
    already qualified pilots prior to their arrival to the unit.
        All TAAB aircrews receive unit-tailored academic and flight
    training to ensure an understanding of routing and zone structure to
    conduct flight duties within the NCR, as well as the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA)-required academic training to operate in the
    Washington, D.C. Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA). The regulatory
    requirements are routinely reviewed, and aircrews are tested annually
    to maintain proficiency and currency. It is a mandatory Army
    requirement for aircrews to conduct day, night, and night-vision goggle
    (NVG) flights in the local area to ensure readiness to support TAAB's
    24-hour mission. TAAB aircrews are also required to conduct an annual
    proficiency and readiness test (APART) all Army aircrews must complete
    in order to evaluate individual and crew proficiency.
        All TAAB aircraft meet the requirements to operate within the Class
    B airspace and helicopter routes in the Washington, D.C. SFRA and the
    Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ). When operating in the D.C. area, all TAAB
    operations are under positive control by designated FAA facilities
    within the SFRA and FRZ.
        The Army is one of dozens of organizations that fly helicopters in
    the NCR. A 2021 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report on
    Helicopter Noise Concerns (GAO-21-200) found between 2017 and 2019 over
    50 helicopter operators conducted approximately 88,000 helicopter
    flights within 30 miles of DCA. Of those, 32,890 (37.4 percent) were
    conducted by the military.

                                     PAT 25

        PAT 25 was a UH-60L Black Hawk helicopter assigned to 12th
    Battalion, TAAB, operating at Davidson Army Airfield, Fort Belvoir,
    Virginia. The crew of three were fully qualified to fly in the local
    area. The Pilot-In-Command, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Andrew Eaves, was a
    unit Instructor Pilot. The Co-Pilot, Captain Rebecca Lobach, was also a
    qualified Pilot-In-Command, and the Crew Chief, Staff Sergeant Ryan
    O'Hara, was a Standardization Flight Instructor.
        The night of January 29, 2025, PAT 25 was conducting an APART on
    Captain Lobach. The flight included operations in and around the D.C.
    Metropolitan area and the aircraft was transiting south to Fort Belvoir
    via the FAA-established helicopter routes when the accident occurred.
        During an APART, the evaluated crew member could expect to fly
    under day, night unaided, and NVG modes of flight.

                               ARMY ADS-B POLICY

        The use of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)-Out
    transponders is an FAA requirement for operating in Class B airspace
    and all TAAB aircraft are equipped with ADS-B-Out systems. However, due
    to the proliferation over the past decade of flight tracking software
    capable of collecting sensitive flight data available to the public,
    the FAA published an exception, removing its ADS-B transmission
    requirement for sensitive operations conducted by Federal, State, and
    local government entities in matters of national defense, homeland
    security, intelligence, and law enforcement when transmitting would
    compromise the operations security of the mission or pose a safety risk
    to the aircraft, crew, or people and property in the air or on the
    ground.
        At the time of the accident, Army policy was to restrict ADS-B Out-
    Off operations to sensitive or classified missions and require
    Commanders with moderate risk approval authority--which at the time
    could be delegated to low-risk approval authority--to determine when
    and whether ADS-B Out-Off operations are required. Army policy does not
    authorize ADS-B Out-Off operations for routine, non-sensitive, or non-
    classified missions and always requires aircrews conducting ADS-B Out-
    Off operations to operate their transponder in Mode 3 A/C which emits
    information required by air traffic services but with less identifying
    information. Mode S transponders present similar operational security
    concerns as ADS-B and its use is subject to the same Army policy.
        Aircraft Operating with ADS-B Out-Off but with Mode 3 A/C On are
    visible to Air Traffic Control (ATC) and other aircraft in the vicinity
    that are equipped with Traffic Collision Awareness Systems (TCAS). NTSB
    is still investigating whether PAT 25's ADS-B-Out system was operating
    as designed, not programmed, or turned off at the time of the accident.

                             ARMY INTERIM RESPONSE

        Immediately following the accident, the 12th Aviation Battalion
    paused all operations to allow Army and unit leaders the time required
    to adequately assess mission requirements. On February 10, the 12th
    Aviation Battalion returned to flight operations with Army-emplaced
    limitations on flights around the Pentagon and Reagan National Airport.
    The Army is reviewing NTSB's preliminary report and is currently
    reviewing all Army helicopter operations in the NCR, to include its
    Department of Defense mission requirements.
        The Army has also issued interim guidance to the force to elevate
    the level of risk approval authority to operate with ADS-B Out-Off and
    will formally update its policy as the NTSB-led investigation
    continues. The Army is also investigating the utilization of the Army's
    current policy by the TAAB to determine the frequency with which the
    unit operated with ADS-B Out-Off and whether the policy was applied
    correctly.

                                    CLOSING

        The Army is committed to a transparent and collaborative review of
    the events of January 29th and of helicopter operations in the vicinity
    of Reagan National Airport. I have reviewed NTSB's preliminary report,
    and I assess that implementing its findings and recommendations would
    not negatively affect Army helicopter operations. The Army along with
    other military Services and other agencies that operate helicopters in
    the NCR will participate in an FAA-led working group to develop a new
    helicopter route that supports national security, law enforcement, and
    medical helicopter flight operations. This new route will replace the
    legacy Route 4, enhancing efficiency for critical missions while
    maintaining the highest safety standards as recommended by NTSB in the
    preliminary report.
        We are working to ensure any actions we take in response to the
    accident are fully informed by fact-based conclusions that come out of
    the investigations which are ongoing. When the NTSB and Army
    investigations are complete, the Army is prepared to evaluate and
    comply where able with future recommendations to mitigate risk while
    operating in the NCR and other areas with congested airspace. We fully
    support all efforts to ensure a tragedy such as this is never repeated.
        Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before the committee
    and I look forward to answering your questions.

        Senator Moran. Thank you, General.
        Let me begin by asking witnesses questions, and then we
    will rotate, alternate, between Republicans and Democrats,
    based upon time of arrival after the leadership of the
    Committee has their opportunity to ask their questions.
        Chair Homendy, let me begin with you. First of all, I am
    interested in learning about the occurrences that have been
    described, I described in my opening statement, about near
    misses and occurrences, TCAS advisories that occurred on
    numerous occasions over a long period of time. And what I hope
    you--and I will ask the Administrator of the FAA these
    questions--but I would like to know what did people know, when
    did they know it, and why didn't someone do something about it?
        In asking you about this topic, is the information that is
    collected by the FAA, that is where these statistics that we
    have each mentioned, that is where they come from. Is that
    true?
        Ms. Homendy. There were different sources of information,
    some which was FAA, some of which are voluntary safety
    reporting programs.
        Senator Moran. And those voluntary safety reporting
    programs, it is voluntary reporting to the FAA?
        Ms. Homendy. Yes.
        Senator Moran. So I want to give you the chance.
        Ms. Homendy. Yes.
        Senator Moran. So the information that has been described
    here about those events over a long period of time, is utilized
    by you but housed at the FAA?
        Ms. Homendy. I believe through a contractor, but yes.
        Senator Moran. And do you know at this point whether that
    information was reviewed in a regular manner? Have you
    investigated why information that seems so important did not
    result in changes in policy, rules, or regulations?
        Ms. Homendy. I do not know why. What I will say is this was
    a data request, came from a data request from the NTSB. We made
    that with the FAA and received information from the Aviation
    Safety Action Program, ASAP, from ATSAP, which is Air Traffic
    Control, from Mandatory Occurrence Reports, and we also
    received information from FAA surveillance data, from radar.
        But this was a request from us, and that resulted in our
    evaluation of that data and our urgent safety recommendations.
    I do not know if the FAA pulled that data themselves at any
    point, and I would have to defer to the Acting Administrator on
    that.
        Senator Moran. That information was so valuable, so
    important, so critical, that that is the reason you asked for
    the immediate changes in safety regulations. True?
        Ms. Homendy. Yes. And, you know, there does seem to be an
    issue with identifying emerging trends. There is a lot of data
    going to FAA, and taking that data and looking at trends and
    not specific issues I think is something not only the IG has
    raised but others have raised, even the Acting Administrator
    has raised, about having to do a better job with analyzing
    those trends.
        But it is key, because if we can get it after an accident
    occurs, what is key is getting it before and preventing it.
        Senator Moran. This is the wake-up call that suggests
    whether changes need to be made. Correct?
        Ms. Homendy. Correct.
        Senator Moran. Administrator, I am interested in asking you
    the same series of questions. What did the FAA know prior to
    this accident, when did they know it, and why wasn't some
    action taken to encourage and, in fact, increase the safety,
    particularly at an airport like DCA, and maybe others, and the
    proximity between helicopter and commercial air service
    traffic.
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. So I am very concerned about what
    we have learned in the subsequent investigation, both from the
    NTSB as well as our own reviews that we immediately took.
    Clearly, something was missed. I would say immediately after
    the event we took the action--again, I referenced earlier,
    under Secretary Duffy's leadership, to restrict air traffic in
    that area, to ensure there was no helicopter traffic as well as
    fixed-wing.
        Senator Moran. My question is what did not happen at the
    FAA that would have highlighted this problem earlier, at the
    time in which this information is acquired by the FAA, but
    apparently not looked at until the accident?
        Mr. Rocheleau. So there is an ongoing review all the time
    of the data that is available. As the Chair mentioned, there
    are millions of pieces of data that come in, and I would tell
    you that we have verified every single near-midair collision
    was investigated. But there are certainly those instances where
    the information itself was not identified. And that is why we
    put artificial intelligence and machine learning in place now,
    to ensure that we are able to go through tens of millions of
    pieces of data to identify those trends and act quickly to
    mitigate those risks.
        Senator Moran. There is no question but had this
    information been utilized by the FAA or others that steps could
    have been taken to make certain that flying, particularly
    again, in the circumstance of helicopters and commercial
    aviation, at a place like Reagan National Airport, there would
    have been an opportunity to do something had that information
    actually been known and acted on. True?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. That is correct.
        Senator Moran. Thank you. Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Following up on
    the Chairman's questions, this is also my first question. Mr.
    Rocheleau, can you tell me if this new methodology, using the
    AI or whatever other methodology you are using to look at the
    aggregate data, is being applied to other airports where there
    is close helicopter traffic in proximity to commercial
    aircraft?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, Senator, it is. We have 10 locations
    around the United States, including Alaska, Anchorage, that we
    are looking through right now, what we are referring to as
    hotspots, to look at similar trends, similar activities, as it
    relates to fixed-wing and helicopter operations.
        Senator Duckworth. Is this methodology of reviewing
    aggregate data going to be applied nationwide, not just in this
    particular area, but to look at the overall trends of near
    misses at other airports, not just between fixed-wing and
    rotary-wing?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, ma'am. There are three activities going
    on right now. First, the hotspots I referred to. Second is kind
    of a nationwide use of this review and use of this new
    capability that we have just admitted. And then, of course, the
    ongoing analysis and how we are doing that with our industry
    partners as well as the military.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. According to NTSB, between,
    as you have said, between October 2021 and December 2024, there
    were more than 15,000 instances of commercial aircraft coming
    close to helicopters. Eighty-five of those had vertical
    separation of less than 200 feet.
        General Braman, do you know how many of those 85 close
    calls involved Army helicopters?
        General Braman. Ranking Member Duckworth, we do not.
        Senator Duckworth. Can you tell me why that is?
        General Braman. That data, in those databases, is currently
    not shared, but certainly the Army is interested in becoming
    part of an opportunity to share data, because that is relevant
    to our safety, as well.
        Senator Duckworth. Mr. Rocheleau, will the FAA commit to
    sharing that data with the Army?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, ma'am, we will.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        Ms. Homendy. We have also asked for that information, and
    we are going to share it as part of our investigation with all
    the parties.
        Senator Duckworth. And I think this needs to be ongoing
    into the future, so that especially the military aircraft that
    are flying, rotary-wing, within close vicinity--these folks
    should be getting this data, and we can do that, moving
    forward.
        General Braman, can you explain the Army's rationale for
    its policy that gives commanders discretion to determine how
    many crew chiefs are needed for a particular mission? I think
    it is important. I do not think that the civilian population
    understands the extent to which the Army does risk assessment
    and risk mitigation and risk analysis and that process. I think
    it would be important. And how are you going to be implementing
    that process, moving forward?
        General Braman. Thank you, Ranking Member Duckworth. I
    realize that I have broad authority as the Army Aviation
    Regulation proponent to direct how every aircraft and every
    operator conducts their mission. And I am not afraid to take
    that authority and use it, when appropriate. The reality is the
    best individuals we have to assess the risk of every single
    flight are our unit commanders, because we hold them
    responsible. They have the authority, the responsibility, and
    we hold them responsible to take any mission that they
    authorize, look at the factors involved, understand the people
    assigned to their organization, and adapt that crew to meet
    those requirements. And certainly that is something that will
    be looked at in this investigation--do we do that? And we will
    hold commanders accountable if they fail to uphold that
    responsibility.
        Senator Duckworth. Can you speak to, if a risk assessment
    for a particular mission comes in at medium or high risk, how
    the approval authority of that changes? Because you mentioned
    approval authority for the DCA area has been raised higher for
    ADS-B Out. Correct?
        General Braman. Yes, Senator. All missions go through an
    initial approval process. So a commander has to authorize a
    reason for an aircraft to fly. At the completion of that
    authorization the crew then assesses all the known and expected
    risks associated with the mission they have been tasked to do.
    That discussion involves a third party, a senior officer, a
    senior aviator within the organization, and then assesses that
    risk and directs the crew to make any changes to mitigate
    anything that either that briefing officer understands, based
    on their experience. And then when those things are implemented
    it goes back to a commander, who must authorize every single
    flight.
        So in the occurrence of things like ADS-B Out operations,
    that authority resides with a medium-risk authority. So a
    battalion commander must approve that mission, in particular,
    and in this case the policy allowed that to be delegated down
    to a company commander, and they must approve that it meets the
    standards of the policy completely.
        We have not elevated that risk to high risk. That requires
    an O6 commander to approve any mission that has ADS-B Off.
        Senator Duckworth. Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask your
    indulgence for an extra 30 seconds, because my next question I
    think applies to everybody here, and I think people will be
    interested.
        Senator Moran. Please proceed.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. This is for the FAA. I am
    hearing that there is a backlog of air traffic controllers
    waiting to get their FAA medicals approved so that they can
    return to duty. And we have an air traffic controller shortage
    right now. I think in the Chicagoland area there is about a
    dozen air traffic controllers who are waiting for, you know,
    they got new medication, whatever it is. But they are waiting
    as long as 12 to 18 months to get an appointment or to get a
    ruling from the FAA medical office so that they can actually
    get back on the job. And they are just sitting there, not able
    to do their job.
        And I think this is problem at all of the major airports
    around the country. I am sure every one of us has air traffic
    controllers waiting to be put back onto duty, and they can't
    because of the backlog with the FAA medical system. Can you
    speak to that? And if I give you a list of my air traffic
    controllers who have been waiting, will you take a look at
    those folks and make sure that their medical issues are
    addressed, so we can get them back on the job?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, Senator, I commit to that.
        Senator Moran. Chairman Cruz.
        Chairman Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On March 1,
    multiple commercial aircraft landing at DCA reported receiving
    a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, TCAS Resolution
    Advisories, as they were preparing to land, advising pilots of
    an impending threat from above, and in some cases directing the
    crews to take evasive action by descending. I think we were all
    alarmed that just a few weeks after the tragedy, commercial
    pilots were being told they were at imminent risk of a deadly
    midair collision.
        It has now come to my attention that these warnings were
    caused by the Secret Service and the U.S. Navy improperly
    testing counter-drone technology at DCA. Apparently, the Navy
    was using the same spectrum band as TCAS, causing the
    interference and faulty resolution advisories, even though the
    FAA had previously warned the Navy and the Secret Service
    against using that specific spectrum band due to interference
    risks.
        Acting Administrator Rocheleau, is that correct?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir, that is correct.
        Chairman Cruz. Let me just say this is deeply disturbing
    that just a month after 67 people died while on approach to DCA
    that the Secret Service and Pentagon would inadvertently cause
    multiple flights to receive urgent cockpit alerts recommending
    evasive action. It is inappropriate for such testing to occur
    at DCA, given the facts of what occurred, and I expect this
    Committee to investigate why precisely that happened.
        General Braman, I want to turn to your testimony. On March
    11, Chairman Moran and I sent you a letter asking a series of
    very specific questions. This week, the Army responded with a
    one-page information paper. However, there were specific
    questions in the letter that were not answered. I want to turn
    to them now.
        We asked you specifically how frequently does the Army turn
    of ADS-B Out transmission?
        General Braman. Chairman Cruz, as I stated in the
    discussion about how we approve the missions, a mission would
    have to fall into the category, as defined in the Federal
    regulation and Army policy. It must have national security
    implications and be sensitive in nature to be able to do that
    mission.
        Chairman Cruz. General, you are not answering my question.
    My question is how frequently is ADS-B Out turned off? I wasn't
    asking what the standard is. I was asking the frequency.
        General Braman. I can take the number for record, Senator.
    But I can tell you the types of missions and the majority of
    the missions they fly are missions associated with that
    national security mission.
        Chairman Cruz. Is it accurate that ADS-B Out is turned off
    for 100 percent of missions flown by the Army Air Brigade at
    Fort Belvoir?
        General Braman. Senator, I think you are referring to the
    June 8th letter from the Joint Staff to Representative Norton.
    In the context of missions, meaning the operations that the
    12th Aviation supports in their mission requirements, I would
    say that is an accurate statement. I would not say that is an
    accurate statement of 100 percent of the flights being flown by
    that organization.
        Chairman Cruz. OK. So I want to understand what you mean by
    ``missions.'' Does ``missions'' capture training flights?
        General Braman. Only training flights that would have been
    operating in a location that is sensitive, as part of their
    continuity of government operations.
        Chairman Cruz. Well, that would be all of them around DCA.
    Is that correct?
        General Braman. Only specific sites that are part of that
    continuity of government operation.
        Chairman Cruz. In your one-pager you said 75 percent of the
    flights are mission rehearsal readiness flights. Are those
    operated with ADS-B Out?
        General Braman. They are, Senator, yes.
        Chairman Cruz. So right now, today, the Army is flying
    helicopters in and around DCA airport with ADS-B Out turned
    off. Is that correct?
        General Braman. When conducting their NORTHCOM-directed
    mission, that is correct.
        Chairman Cruz. I have to say, I find that shocking and
    deeply unacceptable. And I want to encourage the Army right now
    to revisit that policy, and to revisit that policy today. And I
    can tell you, if the Army chooses not to, I have a high level
    of confidence that Congress will pass legislation mandating
    that you revisit the policy. If today another accident occurs
    over DCA, with another helicopter that has ADS-B Out turned
    off, the Army will have very direct responsibility for that.
    And I am at a loss to come up with any justification for
    risking the lives of the traveling public with that decision.
    You cannot change the decisions made yesterday, but you can
    change decisions made forward.
        It is my understanding the Army has a memo, August 9, 2024,
    entitled, ``ADS-B Out Off operations in the National
    Airspace.'' My staff requested that memo from you, and my
    understanding is your team declined to provide it. That is also
    unacceptable. I want to ask you at this hearing, will you
    commit to providing that memo to this Committee?
        General Braman. Senator, I will commit to reviewing the
    information and getting what we can to you, absolutely.
        Chairman Cruz. That answer needs to be a yes, that you will
    provide that memo to this Committee.
        General Braman. Senator, I will review that and we will
    look at the ability to give it to the Committee, absolutely.
        Chairman Cruz. If it is not provided to this Committee
    within 24 hours, I am confident that you will have a senior
    commanding officer give you a direct order to provide that memo
    to this Committee.
        And I just want to underscore there is no reason the Army
    has to wait for the conclusion of the NTSB report to revisit
    your policy on ADS-B Out. You can do so right now. And I have
    got to tell you, I spent this morning looking in the eyes of
    family members who lost family members. I do not know how I
    would do it tomorrow, to another room of family members who
    lost loved ones, because yet another helicopter was flying with
    ADS-B Out. And so I cannot urge you more strongly, change that
    policy right now.
        Senator Moran. Senator Cantwell.
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I too have
    asked for the same memo, so I want to follow on in the same
    line as Senator Cruz. I also want to associate myself with the
    information you are requesting on spectrum interference. This
    is one of the reasons why I think spectrum and spectrum fights
    are so important is because I think the agencies with adjacency
    and issues, we cannot leave this up to the flying public.
        But I want to go back, because Brigadier General, you
    mentioned in your testimony we now have the additive dialogue
    that we just heard, but you said it is not allowed. You are
    saying it is not allowed. ADS-B Out was not allowed. That is
    what you said earlier. Is that in your testimony? In addition
    to the Holmes letter, you basically stated that using ADS-B
    Out, it was not allowed.
        General Braman. Army policy is ADS-B Out is not to be used
    for routine use.
        Senator Cantwell. OK. So Acting Administrator, did you know
    this? Did the FAA know this? Did the FAA know and understand
    and absorb this? Did you know that you were allowing a flight
    to go within 75 feet of each other and there was no signaling
    message that we have already identified as a safety measure, is
    something that we have had as a requirement?
        Mr. Rocheleau. So I understand the FAA was aware of this.
    We have an existing memorandum of agreement with the Department
    of Defense----
        Senator Cantwell. Did you know it was 100 percent, as the
    Eleanor Holmes Norton and as--the Brigadier General is pretty
    clear this morning, we don't allow it, even to the point of not
    answering Senator Cruz when they are going to change it.
    Because I am pretty sure their attitude is going to be, ``We
    don't allow it.'' He is going to say he would rather have a
    route somewhere where he can fly without it. That is what he is
    going to say. And so, you know, that is a separate issue over
    here.
        Our job, though, is the FAA oversight, and you cannot give
    exemptions to things that you do not understand. So he, in
    their application, kind of made it sound like, well, it is not
    going to be that routine. But he is very clear, they are never
    turning it on if they do not have to. They are never turning it
    on.
        So what I do not understand is why the FAA did not
    understand that? Why you would allow this design--this is the
    wrong design. Whoever said you could fly in this airspace this
    close together, without a safety feature that was already being
    required by the FAA, and then giving them an exemption makes no
    sense. So why did you allow it to happen?
        Mr. Rocheleau. So I cannot speak to why the previous
    administration may have allowed for that memorandum of
    agreement, which is why we, effective today, will require, in
    any DCA Class B airspace, ADS-B Out to be turned on, except in
    very limited circumstances.
        Senator Cantwell. What are those other limited
    circumstances? Other agencies? Is there any other agency that
    is doing this?
        Mr. Rocheleau. So we have 46 different helicopter operators
    within the National Capital Region, but again, DCA Class B
    airspace will now require ADS-B On to be out.
        Senator Cantwell. What other agencies are operating this
    way?
        Mr. Rocheleau. So we have certainly a number of military
    units. We have local law enforcement. We certainly have the
    Department of Justice and FBI. We have a number of different
    agencies that fly, the Park Police, and those are the entities
    that we are working with closely now, to make sure, first and
    foremost, they understand the new restrictions that we have in
    the airspace.
        Senator Cantwell. Do they have exemptions?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Some of them do.
        Senator Cantwell. Are you concerned about this?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Absolutely, which is why we immediately put
    in place the requirement to have ADS-B Out on.
        Senator Cantwell. And so you think they are operating that
    way?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Cantwell. You think that Homeland Security is
    operating that way?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Effective today, they will be operating with
    ADS-B On.
        Senator Cantwell. Effective today?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Cantwell. So over the last month you have known, as
    I am going to submit for the record, a letter from the
    Department of Homeland Security, that basically says under the
    Federal Aviation waiver, all U.S. Customs and Border Protection
    air and marine operations in the Capital Region basically have
    this exemption, as well.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Rocheleau. So they haven't had----
        Senator Cantwell. So I want to understand if people were
    still flying in this airspace, we all fly in and out of this
    airspace. Do we now have to worry about other operators in this
    airspace that may be doing the same thing as happened with the
    military? And now you are telling me you are going to take
    action today?
        Mr. Rocheleau. I should clarify. Immediately after the
    accident we put the restrictions in place so that no mixed
    traffic could occur--no helicopters and fixed-wing in the same
    airspace. Today, we are requiring the ADS-B Out to be on. So
    previous to this day, the fixed-wing as well as helicopters
    were not allowed in the airspace. So we cleared the complexity
    of that area.
        Senator Cantwell. Now today you are going to say to
    Homeland Security you have to have ADS-B, basically the
    Automatic Surveillance Broadcast System has to be on. You are
    going to make that today?
        Mr. Rocheleau. That is correct.
        Senator Cantwell. Well, I would----
        Mr. Rocheleau. Or any or the Class B airspace that you can
    see in the graphic, in that red airspace, that is required.
        Senator Cantwell. Acting Administrator, you are not
    building faith in this system of oversight of the FAA if you
    are telling me that we now have a bunch of other operators in
    this airspace that you now said after the accident were
    prohibited. But now you are going to turn it back on, and if
    they meet this requirement. And we have letters from them,
    thinking that they are exempted. I want to see this rule. This
    would have been a great debate with Mr. Bradbury before the
    Committee.
        Because the American people, these poor families have lost
    loved ones. This is not their day job. It is your day job. It
    is the day job of the FAA not to allow these exemptions to
    become prolific and everybody use them, and then us have to sit
    here and figure out how to do our oversight job of you, to make
    sure that these details are exposed, when we cannot even get a
    memo from some of these agencies.
        So, Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired, but I will
    come for a second round with the witnesses, because I think it
    is clear. The NTSB has been very clear on the requirements for
    ADS-B In, and in this case if they would have listened to
    them--it is $40,000 to equip--I am sorry, it is $20,000 to
    equip one plane. You could probably equip the whole fleet of
    aviation for $100 million. I guarantee you their lives, the
    family lives are worth that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Moran. Before recognizing Senator Budd, does the
    FAA, Mr. Rocheleau, does it have the authority to supersede the
    operations of the Army and these other agencies in the airspace
    around airports? We have not gotten the Army to say they are
    going to do this with their own policy, but you say you are
    mandating it. Do we know that the Army and others have to
    follow your mandate?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir, they do.
        Senator Moran. OK. Senator Budd.

                       STATEMENT OF HON. TED BUDD,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA

        Senator Budd. Thank you. First and foremost, I want to
    offer my condolences and prayers to all the families that are
    here today. I am saddened that so many North Carolinians were
    lost in this accident, including Captain Rebecca Lobach and the
    four members of 5342's Charlotte-based flight crew: Samuel
    Lilly, Jonathan Campos, Danasia Elder, and Ian Epstein. Senator
    Moran, I am sorry for the loss of so many Kansans, as well, in
    this incident, and I want to thank you for organizing this
    hearing.
        Chair Homendy, thanks for your work so far. On page 9 of
    the preliminary report it states that the MPFR, the
    multifunction flight recorder's reading for pressure altitude
    conflicted with other altitude's readings. Ultimately, this
    conflict led your team to invalidate the pressure altitude
    reading provided by the recorder.
        Can you provide any details on the differing altitude
    readings, and do you have any update on whether this
    conflicting data was limited to the MPFR or if that was
    provided to the flight crew and perhaps was a confusing factor?
        Ms. Homendy. We are still looking into that and doing some
    testing. What I will say is the pressure altitude was
    determined invalid on the Black Hawk because we would expect
    that to be somewhat similar to the CRJ. But it was much lower,
    so we determined that that was invalid, and it could not be
    used to calculate the barometric altitude. We would need two
    sets of data, which was pressure altitude and barometric
    pressure setting. We had the pressure setting. We do not have
    the pressure altitude data for that. So we were not able to
    determine from that what the barometric altitude was of the
    Black Hawk. However, we are looking at other data.
        Senator Budd. OK. Thank you. General Braman, PAT 25 was
    operating out of Davidson Army Airfield on a pilot annual
    standardization mission at the time of the collision. Given the
    concentration of senior military and civilian officials
    surrounding DCA, how vital are these missions to readiness for
    continuity of government operations?
        General Braman. Senator, they are extremely vital. To go
    back to Senator Cruz's question about how many flights, 75
    percent of the missions flown by the 12th Aviation Battalion
    are in direct support of the continuity of government
    rehearsals, exercises, and making sure crews are familiar with
    how to get that mission accomplished. And they stand ready
    every single day in a 15-minute alert stream to do that
    mission.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, General. Can the Army continue to
    fulfill its priority air transport missions without access to
    Route 1 and Route 4?
        General Braman. The Army, the fact that we are in the
    working groups will allow us to help influence routing, that
    will allow us to continue to do that mission, and I am
    confident we can do that.
        Senator Budd. Thank you. Chair Homendy again, in your view,
    is the permanent closure of Route 4 the only solution that
    allows for continued operations of both rotary and fixed-wing
    aircraft around DCA?
        Ms. Homendy. And it is permanent closure when Runway 15 and
    Runway 33 are in use. That was our recommendation to the FAA.
        Senator Budd. Thank you. Administrator Rocheleau, the
    aviation investigation report from the NTSB shows that the
    separation between aircraft on approach to Runway 33 would have
    a mere 75 feet of separation from a helicopter operating on
    Route 4 and hugging the shoreline of the east bank of the
    Potomac. Was the FAA aware of this conflict prior to January
    29, and given the insufficient vertical separation that we are
    talking about, was the FAA relying solely on controllers in the
    DCA tower to deconflict the approach to Runway 33?
        Mr. Rocheleau. So the FAA was aware of the design of that
    airspace in advance of December [sic] 29th. I would say that is
    one of the reasons why we immediately restricted that airspace
    after the incident, to review the circumstances around the
    airspace itself. In addition to that, it is one of the reasons
    why we are looking at hotspots or mixed traffic areas around
    the nation, whether that is Boston, Dallas, L.A., and
    Anchorage.
        Senator Budd. Thank you.
        Ms. Homendy. Senator, can I----
        Senator Budd. Please.
        Ms. Homendy. There is a D.C. Helicopter Working Group that
    we have been trying to figure out who is part of the working
    group and get minutes and get documents from that working group
    to see what information was shared and what was discussed over
    the years. We have not been able to attain that yet, and I hope
    we can, from FAA and others.
        Senator Budd. Are you a part of that working group?
        Ms. Homendy. We are not part of that working group.
        Senator Budd. But you have access to it, and they are
    willing to provide what they find.
        Ms. Homendy. We have requested information. We have not
    even been able to identify who is part of the working group
    firmly and get documents as part of that working group. We have
    requested all of that information because we do want to
    evaluate what was discussed. We are also going to interview the
    FAA cartographers on how this route was mapped, because that 75
    feet is max. That is the maximum. It goes down from there as
    commercial aircraft approach Runway 33.
        Senator Budd. Thank you.
        Senator Moran. So let me see if I can help Senator Homendy,
    Chairman Homendy.
        Ms. Homendy. That is a very hard job.
        Senator Moran. You are very good at public relations with
    Senators, but we recognize the challenges you face.
        So do either one of you belong to this working group? Does
    the Army or the FAA participate, and can you answer that so the
    NTSB can pursue information?
        Ms. Homendy. I mean, it is the FAA's working group.
        Senator Moran. It is the FAA's working group. All right.
    Mr. Rocheleau, what is the problem here?
        Mr. Rocheleau. I am happy to work with the Chair. We have
    been working extremely closely together on this investigation,
    and I am happy to work with the Chair and understand why she
    has not received that information, and make sure we follow up
    on that.
        Senator Moran. Can you think of any reason that the NTSB
    should not be a part of that information, Mr. Rocheleau?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Off the top of my head I cannot. I do not
    know why they would be restricted in that, and I certainly will
    talk to my folks when we get back.
        Senator Moran. Thank you.
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir.
        Senator Moran. Should we ask, is the Army part of this
    working group, as well?
        General Braman. The Army is part of the working group. Yes,
    Senator.
        Ms. Homendy. There are apparently 17 entities that are part
    of the working group. We just have not been able to verify who
    all the entities are.
        Senator Moran. Surely the FAA is in charge and they can
    help you.
        Mr. Rocheleau. Surely I would have been happy to understand
    that before today.
        Senator Moran. General, do you know any reasons that the
    working group's efforts cannot be known by NTSB?
        General Braman. Absolutely not.
        Senator Moran. Thank you. Let me follow up. Mr. Rocheleau
    indicated that the FAA does have the authority to require ADS-B
    Out. Do you agree with that assessment that the FAA can make
    this decision, and if you do not follow the FAA policies then
    you are precluded from the airspace?
        General Braman. Chairman, the Army operates 100 percent
    under FAA authority.
        Senator Moran. Very good. Let me turn to perhaps the next
    steps or new information, and to this I will go to Chair
    Homendy. Since the report that we are discussing here today is
    2 weeks old, what has transpired, if anything, in those 2
    weeks? Have you discovered any new and relevant information
    that you can share with us?
        Ms. Homendy. Where would you like me to begin? One thing I
    can say on ADS-B Out Off, that is policy of the Army. But we
    are still looking at installation programming and potential for
    equipment malfunction. And the reason I mention this is because
    the accident helicopter, for this accident helicopter, no ADS-B
    data had been received from an FAA ground station for 730 days
    prior to the accident. And that was abnormal.
        So we began looking at the fleet for the battalion. The
    battalion had 25 helicopters, that includes this particular
    helicopter. Nine of them were Mike models and all were
    transmitting ADS-B Out when they were turned on, because we
    have to verify that it is working.
        There were 16 Limas, including the accident helicopter,
    which we are still looking at. But 7 were transmitting when
    ADS-B Out was turned on, 8 were not, and stopped doing so
    sometime between May and November 2023. We do not know why.
    Five of those started transmitting since the NTSB identified
    the issue and began working with the Army to try to isolate the
    reason.
        So I just want to let you know that you can have ADS-B Out
    on, but you also have to make sure that it is working.
        Senator Moran. You indicated working with the Army, but
    there are other participants in this arena. Were you narrowing
    it to the Army as if something is necessarily wrong there, or
    more broadly there is a problem in receiving the information?
        Ms. Homendy. For this, for the ADS-B Out on, we wanted to
    look at the helicopter fleet for the battalion, to see whether
    ADS-B Out on, when turned on, was actually transmitting data.
    Because we did think it was abnormal that for the helicopter
    involved in the accident, it was not transmitting data for so
    long.
        Senator Moran. Any explanation, General?
        General Braman. Chairman, this exactly is what the value of
    the investigation is. There are things that you would not
    normally look at that are being determined here, and that is
    certainly going to help us drive policy and any changes that we
    need to do as a result of the investigation, and certainly the
    NTSB has the expertise to do that.
        Senator Moran. So what we are hearing from Chair Homendy is
    that it may be transmitting, it may be on, but there is no
    receipt, there are, I don't know, technical problems in the
    process by which it is--it is not providing the information it
    is supposed to provide, right?
        General Braman. Chairman, obviously the functionality of
    any Army equipment, and certainly Army aviation equipment, is
    important to me. So if we are discovering there is a challenge
    there, we will take direct action, absolutely.
        Senator Moran. This is not an inconsequential thing, right?
        Ms. Homendy. It is not, and I think for the public
    watching, because I think there are a lot of people watching,
    is ADS-B Out broadcast latitude, longitude, altitude, and
    velocity once per second. It updates once per second versus 4
    to 6 seconds for radar, which is significant when you have
    converging aircraft.
        Senator Moran. Mr. Rocheleau, you indicated as of today
    there is a change in policy at FAA. I would be interested in
    knowing if that change in policy is only related to DCA
    airspace, or you are putting those requirements in place for
    other airports?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Thank you, Senator. So the requirements that
    I announced today are effective for the D.C. Class B airspace
    immediately. Part of our ongoing work, as I related earlier,
    with respect to hotspots and the mixed traffic that we have
    seen that could be problematic are areas where we are looking
    at kind of adding that requirement in. It seems premature
    simply along the lines of the way airspace is structured in
    different locations that we need to focus before acting too
    quickly.
        So we want to make sure that as we are looking at the
    different airspaces and how they are constructed that we are
    taking kind of intentional, careful action.
        Senator Moran. And that intentional action is underway.
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir.
        Senator Moran. You are doing that at other airports today.
        Mr. Rocheleau. Absolutely. And wherever we find a risk, we
    will mitigate that risk immediately.
        Senator Moran. Chairman Homendy, I asked you a question and
    I interrupted you, and it sounded like your answer would be
    lengthy, of the things you have learned in the last 2 weeks. I
    will come back to you after recognizing the two Senators to my
    left.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    follow up on what Chairwoman Homendy is talking about, testing
    the ADS-B Out, whether it is actually transmitting data because
    the data was not received. Will we be able to check that with
    all of the other rotary wing operators that are in this region
    as well? Is that something that FAA should be mandating, that
    they could do that? I mean, you are not looking at the other
    operators because they are not part of this accident. Correct?
    So then my question for Mr. Rocheleau is, will the FAA be
    directing all of the other helicopter operators, whether it is
    Homeland Security, local law enforcement, who have this
    exemption to ADS-B Out? Will you be directing that they
    actually test their equipment to make sure that it is actually
    transmitting the data that can be received?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, Senator. I think that is part of our
    ongoing work and the collaboration between those operators and
    how we make sure they first and foremost understand the
    requirement, and second, that their equipment is functional.
        Senator Duckworth. OK. Thank you. I wanted to also follow
    up on my earlier questioning about the FAA's air traffic
    controller workforce. You had committed to looking at the list
    of names I gave you, that I will be giving you, for the air
    traffic controllers who are waiting for medical review. I would
    like for you to commit to reporting back to me in writing about
    how many controllers around the country are waiting for medical
    clearances so that they can return to work, and what the FAA is
    doing to make sure these medical reviews are happening in a
    timely manner.
        Mr. Rocheleau. I will commit to that.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. In the race to hire more air
    traffic controllers--and the staffing was adequate on that
    evening but we could have used more air traffic controllers,
    obviously--and in the race to hire more air traffic
    controllers, I want to make sure the FAA does not lower your
    long-standing high standards for air traffic controllers. There
    could be a temptation to sacrifice effectiveness for
    efficiency, but the FAA must stick to its stringent standards
    to protect safety.
        Can you assure this Committee that as the administration
    works to hire more air traffic controllers you will not, in any
    way, lower the high standards that are currently required for
    individuals to become certified air traffic controllers? And
    there are plenty of places, a lot of them are in, actually,
    Kansas, that have the expertise to help us train air traffic
    controllers, as long as we keep those high standards.
        Mr. Rocheleau. One hundred percent. Part of our ongoing
    activity to surge in air traffic controller hiring is to look
    for the best and the brightest, and that is exactly what we are
    going to continue to do.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        Senator Moran. To follow up on Senator Duckworth, you
    should look to Kansas, and we welcome you.
        I am going to turn to Senator Schmitt in just one second.
    General, the Senator from Illinois was asking about routine
    maintenance and determining whether equipment is working. Do
    you have a standard in place? What Chairwoman Homendy said does
    not make sense to me that you would not know there were
    problems with the transmission or the equipment. Do you have a
    protocol in place, and is that equipment inspected on a
    continuing basis?
        General Braman. Certainly, Chairman, generally the aviation
    operations we have protocols for the status of aircraft. I will
    have to get back to you, take it for the record, on what the
    protocol is to ensure that ADS-B Out transmissions outside of
    the aircraft are being received. It is something I will have to
    look at, on how do we do that.
        Senator Moran. And whether protocol is being followed?
        General Braman. Absolutely.
        Senator Moran. Thank you. Senator Schmitt.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC SCHMITT,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI

        Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And my
    friend from Illinois would agree. I certainly do not want to
    see us reduce standards. I guess in following in that same
    spirit, with Mr. Rocheleau, can you commit that no hiring
    decisions will be made based on race?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. Again, we are looking for the best
    and the brightest, and we are prioritizing those who are best
    qualified.
        Senator Schmitt. Because as you know, there is a lawsuit by
    about a thousand folks who are claiming that they did not get a
    job because of their race, at the FAA.
        Mr. Rocheleau. We are all about making sure the best and
    the brightest are there, and we do that through a grading
    mechanism.
        Senator Schmitt. That is great to hear. I did want to ask,
    General--and again, I apologize if this has been asked before.
    They are running us in and out of here, different committee
    hearings, Armed Services. I did want to ask, this was a very
    strong crew in the Black Hawk. Is it typical, I guess, is it a
    problem--is it typical and is it a problem to have someone who
    is a lower rank as the--and this is my understanding, that the
    evaluator was a lower rank than the pilot. Is that a typical
    situation? Is that problematic? Is that not a problem? Do you
    think it contributed in any way? I just wanted to get your
    assessment.
        General Braman. Thank you, Senator, for the question. It is
    extremely typical in Army aviation because the preponderance of
    our force is our warrant officers, and they are our
    professional aviators. That is what they do for their entire
    career. So they are instructor pilots, they are maintenance
    test pilots, safety officers, and our commissioned officers
    fill roles of leadership within the organization. So it is very
    routine to have a senior member being evaluated by a junior
    member.
        Senator Schmitt. OK. And I am sure you have gone through
    this analysis. I just feel like in the spirit of making sure we
    are getting this right, moving forward, that you do not think
    there is a systemic problem associated with maybe somebody with
    a lower rank saying something to somebody of a higher rank in
    those kinds of situations. You have gone through that analysis,
    I am assuming?
        General Braman. Absolutely. And the personalities of crew
    members and capabilities is something that is considered in
    that risk brief process for every single flight. Is it the
    right crew? Is the crew mixed properly? Commanders would know
    if there are issues with, as simple as they do not get along,
    and commanders will take that into account before approving any
    fight.
        Senator Schmitt. And I guess for the FAA--and again, maybe
    you have been asked this before--clearly in the Chairman's
    opening statement and a number of the Committee members, just
    the report, the statistics of the number of near misses between
    helicopters and aircraft landing at DCA, that, you know, those
    operations now have been halted. Can you just explain to the
    American people why that did not happen before?
        Mr. Rocheleau. So, again, I will say that the reports that
    came in previously were certainly analyzed, but something was
    missed. And since that time, we have been using new tools
    available to us, artificial intelligence, machine learning, to
    be able to scan the tens of millions of data points, to be able
    to do that analysis in a more proactive and ideally at some
    point here, predictive way, to identify risks earlier and to
    mitigate that risk.
        Senator Schmitt. But this was not a new issue at DCA,
    right? This is an issue that had been a longstanding concern.
    Is that accurate?
        Mr. Rocheleau. It is accurate. There were a number of
    reports that came in, and I would say that we, as I mentioned
    earlier, we investigate every single near-midair collision, and
    even as we talk about spectrum issues, Chairman Cruz mentioned,
    we have teams that go out and assess the airspace itself,
    making sure that we are working with partners, whether it is on
    counter-UAS technology, to make sure that airspace is as clean
    as possible from interference.
        Senator Schmitt. And so moving forward, obviously as a
    response to the tragedy that happened--and I would be remiss
    not to express my condolences to the families who are here. I
    know everyone has, and it is devastating for each and every one
    of you, including some folks from back home. So your advocacy
    does matter, and it will carry beyond today. This is important.
        So I ask in the spirit of that. Moving forward then, is
    that how you see things, that the state of play as it is
    currently now will continue?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. We will continue to use the latest
    tools we have to be able to assess that data and work with the
    industry, with the aviation ecosystem, if you will, to identify
    that risk early and to mitigate that risk immediately.
        Senator Schmitt. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Moran. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Mr. Rocheleau,
    at the moment, whether it is on or off is irrelevant because
    there are no flights--you are announcing something that does
    not, at the moment matter because you have not lifted the ban
    on the flights. Is that true?
        Mr. Rocheleau. So it is helpful if I can just point to the
    graphic. In the graphic I can explain that in the yellow-
    sectioned area, the graphic there, that is where there is no
    mixed traffic--no helicopters, no fixed-wing--except for those
    very few circumstances where we have emergency, national
    security type of traffic.
        In the red section, in that red airspace, is where ADS-B
    Out--so DCA Class B airspace is now required.
        You will also notice where, based on the NTSB
    recommendations, where we have eliminated Route 4, going north
    to south on the Potomac, as well as Route 6, that formerly, you
    can see on the left side of the graphic, was in effect from the
    west to the east, where Bolling Air Force Base is.
        Senator Moran. I will have to think about that. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cantwell. Mr. Chairman, if I could, just for the
    record, because I see we have several colleagues----
        Senator Moran. Senator Cantwell, you are recognized.
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to clarify
    on your point, Acting Administrator, we still have a rule that
    says they have an exemption, all sensitive. So I know you are
    making a declaration today, but I do not think that supersedes
    the rule. Now, maybe President Trump is going to call all these
    agencies and tell them to stand down, but legally, whatever the
    FAA is doing today, does not take precedent over that rule. So
    when I come back for a second round----
        Senator Duckworth. I believe the FAA has control over that
    airspace and they can say----
        Senator Cantwell. They can definitely shut it down. But as
    it relates to the rule, his decision just to say that you now
    have this requirement, that a rule gave them an exemption to.
        Senator Duckworth. I think you can issue an emergency
    directive. Is that correct?
        Mr. Rocheleau. So the agreement we have in place with the
    helicopter operations that fly without ADS-B Out is an actual
    memorandum of agreement. It is not a formal rule. So it is an
    agreement we have with the Department of Defense and the other
    helicopter operators in the D.C. area.
        Senator Cantwell. And we can get a copy of that, the MOU?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes.
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
        Senator Moran. Senator Hickenlooper.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO

        Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Rocheleau,
    you earlier testified that you have looked at the airports with
    higher volumes of mixed traffic. I think you mentioned Boston,
    Dallas, Anchorage. Is that assessment--have you gone through
    all the airports? I mean, does that mean that other airports in
    other large cities, or where we have a fair amount of mixed
    traffic, are OK?
        Mr. Rocheleau. So we have 10 locations, a total of 21
    airports. So we are doing this hotspot review, this mixed
    traffic review across the nation, including in the Anchorage
    area. So we are reviewing all the airspace designs to see where
    we may have this indicator of risk with mixed traffic, so
    helicopter operations as well as fixed wing.
        Senator Hickenlooper. And so you mentioned Boston, Dallas,
    and Anchorage. That is not the full list, I assume.
        Mr. Rocheleau. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Hickenlooper. And so when will this be done?
        Mr. Rocheleau. So obviously 21 locations, I am receiving
    regular updates. I anticipate that activity being concluded in
    the next couple of weeks. I will tell you that our teams, they
    are being very intentional about how they go through that
    airspace, because it has been built over time as it relates to
    helicopter routes and other approaches and departure routes.
        So we are being very intentional, very careful. We do not
    want to move quickly, with inducing additional risk.
        Senator Hickenlooper. I understand that. But obviously time
    is of the essence in a situation like this, making sure that
    even a preliminary warning as part of that assessment would be
    pretty valuable.
        Mr. Rocheleau. And any indicator that there is an emerging
    risk, we would take immediate action.
        Senator Hickenlooper. Ms. Homendy, you have, in the past
    talked about workforce and making sure that you are fully
    staffed, and I think this is a direct follow up on that. Are we
    fully staffed? I mean, you are going to look at this entire
    incident, and it is going to take the typical year and a half
    or two years, which, again, drives a lot of my constituents
    crazy. Do you have a timeline for when you will finish the full
    incident report, or whatever the legal description is, when
    that will happen?
        Ms. Homendy. We have committed to 1 year, barring any
    unforeseen circumstances, but one year.
        Senator Hickenlooper. And you have enough staffing on that?
        Ms. Homendy. We have 40 experts at the NTSB that are
    currently leading this investigation. It is a high workload
    because it is not their only investigation that they are
    focused on. But they are very committed to this one. And then
    we have an entire agency that supports them.
        Senator Hickenlooper. All right. We had an array of past
    reports. It varies dramatically. But I appreciate the fact that
    you are trying to accelerate this. I think it frustrates a lot
    of people that it takes so long--I mean, how long does it take
    to gather the facts?
        Ms. Homendy. I mean, it is a complex investigation, and our
    investigations are very broad, and there is a lot of
    information that can change over time, and we are very fact-
    based, following the evidence. So that is our credibility, so
    we want to be exact when we issue something.
        I will say I do have to congratulate our workforce because
    when I came on as Chair we had well over 400, close to 500
    reports that were 2, 3, 4 years old, and they are now below 2.
    So that is significant.
        But the complexity of investigations, and then the fact
    that some things we do not have control over, like if we cannot
    get access to evidence because a district attorney or law
    enforcement is prohibiting us in a certain situation, with a
    highway crash. That can extend the timeline.
        Senator Hickenlooper. Sure. No, no, I have seen that. But I
    think on something like this, where time is of the essence, I
    appreciate you guys making the effort, and glad to hear that
    you have the workforce.
        Mr. Rocheleau, in your testimony you highlighted some of
    the recent changes in hiring, and also especially in the
    training processes, to make sure we have more qualified air
    traffic controllers but full workforce. I know you are working
    with local colleges all over the country on that.
        Is that effective? Is that working? I mean, I think if we
    can accelerate that--Metro State in Denver is a place where
    they are turning out some of these members. Is that something
    you can ramp up?
        Mr. Rocheleau. I am very interested, and the Secretary has
    been very clear, with the public as well as with me, that we
    need to surge this hiring and do it well, again, back to the
    testing, the surge, bringing people in. As it relates to
    additional college initiatives, we have an Enhanced College
    Training Initiative, ECTIs, that we are using in I believe four
    universities right now. We are working with them, with respect
    to advanced simulators and the like, to make sure that we can
    get more what we will call throughput, but more controllers
    through those schools, and get them out to the local
    facilities, centers, towers, TRACONs.
        Senator Hickenlooper. Great. I am out of time. I yield back
    to the Chair. Thank you all.
        Senator Moran. Senator Sullivan.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me start
    by saying that my heart goes out to the families and loved ones
    of the victims lost in the American Airlines Flight 5342
    disaster at DCA, and not long after that, unfortunately, as
    well, the Bering Air crash near Unalakleet and Nome, Alaska,
    flying over the Norton Sound area. And I am thankful for the
    Chairman for holding this hearing and appreciate the NTSB, and
    FAA, and DoD focusing on the after actions, so this does not
    happen again, either here in D.C. or in my state.
        And I do want to focus a little bit on my state, the great
    state of Alaska, because as I think all three of you know, we
    have very high rates of airplane crashes, highest in the
    country, and airplane crash fatalities, which is why we
    launched, with the NTSB's good work in 2020, and the FAA's good
    work in 2020, the FAA Alaska Safety Initiative, called FAASI.
    And in last year's FAA reauthorization I was able to include a
    number of provisions with the goal of reducing the rate of
    fatal aircraft accidents by 90 percent--that is a very
    ambitious goal--and require the FAA to improve maintenance of
    weather equipment.
        So, Mr. Administrator, I want to get into that topic a
    little bit. I was just home. It came up a lot, how there might
    be cancellations of weather operations and infrastructure and
    reporting, which makes zero sense to me. I hope our Federal
    Government is not doing that. But one of the things in the FAA
    bill, I was able to include requirements for systematic
    improvements to the maintenance of our weather systems and
    advancing new technologies, and this includes a mandate for the
    FAA to take necessary actions to restore full connectivity of
    weather systems that are unable to disseminate information due
    to a telecommunications failure. We have telecommunications
    challenges in a state the size of mine.
        So you can you talk to that, Administrator Rocheleau? And
    then I would like to get an update from your perspective on
    where we are on the FAASI initiative. As you know, the
    Secretary of Transportation, in our press conference that we
    all did together--and again, I appreciate everybody
    participating in that--has made this a very top priority of
    his, and yet as we saw in Alaska we had a fatal crash that
    hopefully we are going to learn from.
        Can I ask you on the data link, telecoms, weather
    reporting, which is a big deal for my state?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. I appreciate that. And I
    appreciate the opportunity to talk a little bit more, based on
    our previous conversation, your leadership. As a result of that
    and your request I did travel recently to Alaska to go and
    understand more. I met with the NTSB lead investigator along
    with my investigators as it related to the Bering Air tragedy.
        Senator Sullivan. By the way, thank you both for coming up
    to Alaska. I know it is not the easiest, closest state to get
    to from Washington, D.C., but it is important that you are
    showing my constituents that it matters.
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir, and I agree. It is very important,
    I understand having been there a number of times, the unique
    nature of Alaska, certainly its topography as well as the need
    for safe aviation operations.
        So related to, again, reauthorization and the commitment to
    work to have better communications throughout Alaska, one of
    the initiatives, one of the reasons I went to Anchorage was to
    understand more about how the maintenance issues, the
    connectivity issues, whether that is on the telco side or
    satellite. And one of the things we are doing right now, and I
    met with our own technical operations people in the area, to
    test Starlink, so satellite. Because of the unique nature of
    it, and the difficulty with telco, we needed another solution.
    And one of the ways we believe we can do that is using
    satellite-based technology. So that is what we are
    experimenting with right now.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, by the way, I really appreciate--
    you know, the press here kind of went crazy, and oh, Starlink.
    I mean, that is actually really helpful for us. And we
    appreciated the Secretary called me and said, ``Hey, we are
    going to connect some of these terminals through Starlink,
    because that is the most effective way to do it.'' So I
    appreciated that you guys were working it.
        Can you give me an update, or Madam Chair, an update on the
    FAASI Initiative, and then any preliminary findings you are
    seeing from the NTSB preliminary report on the Bering Air
    crash?
        Senator Moran. Senator Sullivan, this needs to be your last
    question.
        Senator Sullivan. It is, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Homendy. We are still working on that investigation, of
    course. The preliminary report was issued and did find that the
    aircraft was over 1,000 pounds overweight. But we also are
    going to look at the center of gravity on that airplane and see
    how that factored in. And then we are really focused in on
    weather that day, as well. As you noted, weather infrastructure
    is critical for Alaska, and we have a number of recommendations
    on weather observing stations and also the importance of pilot
    reports and having air traffic control when a pilot reports
    weather conditions, to pass that information along to other
    pilots in the area. And that is something we are looking at as
    part of this investigation, in particular.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator Moran. Senator Sullivan, thank you. I do not want
    to diminish the circumstances that Alaskans faced and the
    circumstance you, as their Senator, represent. We are trying to
    get everybody's questions in before the vote closes, and I
    recognize Senator Klobuchar.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

        Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Chairman. Thank
    you. And to the families, such a tragedy, and I know there are
    those watching at home as well, including the family of Wendy
    Jo Schaffer, a Minnesotan, mom, two little kids, and husband,
    and we lost her.
        So, Chair, I want to thank you for your work. I know how
    complicated these investigations are. And could you just
    briefly talk about any open recommendations on communications
    that do not come out of this, that the NTSB--I know you have
    over 1,000 open safety recommendations. And while this
    investigation is ongoing, just open recommendations related to
    technology and anything that would improve communication?
        Ms. Homendy. Related to this investigation?
        Senator Klobuchar. Not related.
        Ms. Homendy. Oh, not related. We have a number of
    recommendations that remain open, including a number of
    recommendations issued to the FAA. On communications, in
    particular, I mean one thing I will mention, that we have not
    talked about, that we are looking at as part of this
    investigation, is our long-standing belief that ADS-B In also
    needs to be mandated by the FAA. We do not know what relevance
    that has to this investigation yet. However, it is a long-
    standing position of the NTSB. It will provide key information
    to pilots. And in 2008, in our comments for Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking to FAA, where they decided not to require it, we
    said equipage of aircraft with ADS-B In capability will provide
    an immediate and substantial contribution to safety.
        Just a couple of years ago, and we just talked about
    Alaska, we investigated a midair collision in Ketchikan, and we
    reiterated--and this is the statement--that NTSB remains
    concerned that without a requirement to install and use ADS-B
    supported airborne traffic advisory systems, midair collisions
    will continue to occur. And that was in 2019. So we will look
    at that as part of this investigation.
        Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you. We all know full funding
    of the FAA could not be more important. Last year, we passed
    the bipartisan FAA Bill to improve aviation, workforce
    training. And actually Senator Braun, then-Senator Braun, now
    Governor, and I had the bill to require the FAA to conduct
    maximum hiring of air traffic controllers at the FAA Academy.
    And I guess I would ask you, Acting Director Rocheleau, you
    discussed in your testimony the efforts that Secretary Duffy
    and the FAA have taken to bolster the air traffic workforce. I
    think 91 percent of the air traffic control facilities operate
    below recommended staffing levels. I think they are 3,000-some
    short. This I got from some of the people who do this work.
        Can you talk to the current state of staffing and how do
    you plan to maintain recruiting levels? We did have an
    increase, I believe, last year.
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, Senator, and thank you for the
    question. This is a very important issue for the Secretary and
    myself, as we look at the safety of the national airspace
    system, in general, but certainly as we are looking to bring
    the best and brightest controllers into the airspace system, to
    make sure that we are providing that safety for Americans as
    they travel through the air.
        I would say that as a result of this surge we had over
    10,000 applications. Over 8,000 of those have now been referred
    to testing. We have streamlined the process, cut roughly 5
    months off that process. So going forward we intend to have no
    empty seat at any upcoming Academy classes.
        I would also say that we expect our partnerships with other
    schools, universities, to be able to bring more people into the
    career field itself. It is an exciting career. And even
    incentivizing students to come to Oklahoma City, with an
    additional 30 percent. We have kind of put all our focus on
    this effort in addition to the many other things we have got
    going on. But controller hiring is of paramount importance.
        Senator Klobuchar. Very good. As you know, we have very
    active airports in Minnesota, a major hub. I would ask you to
    look at the Duluth air traffic control tower, just because it
    is the third-oldest in the Nation. And Secretary Duffy is aware
    of it. It has had flooding, and it is a major air base up
    there, as well, for the Guard.
        Mr. Rocheleau. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Klobuchar. Yes. And Representative Stauber and I
    have been working together on that.
        Anyway, last question is just the importance of fully
    funding the FAA. Quickly for both of you, or all three of you--
    --
        Ms. Homendy. I can talk about fully funding the NTSB.
        Senator Klobuchar. Yes, please do.
        Ms. Homendy. I mean, you are important, but we did get an
    increase in funding that I do want to thank you for, to 145 in
    the CR. It was an anomaly. But for fully staffing the NTSB,
    right now we are at 427. We went down in the last couple of
    months because people left. We will be able to go up to 450.
    But fully staffing the NTSB to accomplish our mission would
    require hiring between 485 and 500 personnel, which requires
    resources. So as you consider Fiscal Year 2026, it would be
    helpful.
        Senator Klobuchar. That is very helpful.
        Mr. Rocheleau. And I certainly echo those sentiments. Fully
    funding the FAA is critical, not just for the workforce but for
    our facilities and equipment. The situation is quite concerning
    to me, as I review over 30 percent of our facilities being
    unsustainable going forward. We have to invest in that
    infrastructure going forward.
        Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. I know that is no solace to
    the families, but knowing that you are stepping back and
    looking at all of this right now, so other tragedies can be
    avoided. It could not be more important. So thank you very
    much.
        Senator Moran. It gives me an opportunity to editorialize.
    We need to pass appropriation bills and not continue to utilize
    continuing resolutions. That is directed at not necessarily at
    my colleagues here, but my colleagues generally.
        Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with
    your last statement. I just have two quick questions. General
    Braman, I have never had a warrant officer be afraid to tell me
    when I was doing something wrong in the aircraft, and I prefer
    to have them as a pilot-in-command to myself. Speak a little
    bit to crew resource management and how it works in an air
    crew, and speaking to Senator Schmitt's question, not just
    about between the two pilots but also the role of the crew
    chief, and do they have the ability to speak up, as well?
        General Braman. Thank you, Ranking Member Duckworth. There
    is nothing more important in the air crew than crew resource
    management, and that is taught from day one, and everyone has
    an equal voice. Obviously, the pilot-in-command is the one that
    is designated with the authority to command that aircraft, but
    I have never been in an aircraft that was ever in an
    environment where all members were not a valued member of the
    team, and we rely on all those members to accomplish the
    missions we are doing.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I am just going to wrap up by
    saying how important it is to fund and resource the NTSB. You
    guys do amazing work. You, yourself, Chairwoman, oftentimes I
    will call you when something happens, whether it was a door
    plug incident or something, and you were already on the ground
    or in the air, on your way there. And you need the resources to
    do your work. And as we are seeing from this investigation, how
    critically important that is, not just to find out what
    happened, but to prevent future accidents. So I could not agree
    with you more that we should be funding you.
        Mr. Rocheleau, I think we also need to look at the
    facilities at FAA, and we need to talk to that. I would love to
    get your commitment to come out and tour the facilities in the
    Chicagoland area and see the condition of this repair that they
    are in.
        Mr. Rocheleau. I commit to that. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. And with that I am going to
    turn it back over to the Chairman, who has been very generous.
        Senator Moran. Thank you, Senator Duckworth. I am going to
    ask just a couple of tidbits--I hope they are important
    questions more than tidbits--but I hope they will be short so I
    can go vote, and I think that Senator Duckworth will close out
    the hearing in my absence.
        First of all, the fact that ADS-B Out, there is evidence
    that transmissions were not received. And apparently the Army
    does not know that they were not received. Why doesn't the FAA
    know they are not received?
        Mr. Rocheleau. I am not aware of that. I know it is part of
    the ongoing investigation. I do not believe that we receive any
    helicopter information from the Army.
        Senator Moran. But somebody has to be reporting that they
    were sent but not received. Who do they report that to?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Again, I think that is part of the
    investigation. My assumption would be the Army.
        Senator Moran. OK.
        Senator Duckworth. Well, no. The Army could have it turned
    on but I think what the Chairwoman is saying is that the
    receiving stations got no data, so the Army has got it turned
    on and they do not know that it is not receiving. So this is,
    again, this communication issue between the different agencies.
        Senator Moran. Senator Duckworth was speaking on my behalf.
    She said it exactly right.
        Senator Duckworth. I said you were generous.
        Senator Moran. I think this is my concluding question, and
    then I recognize Senator Markey. This is to you, Mr. Rocheleau.
    What is the current state of operations at DCA? How are they
    different today than they were on January 29?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. Again, I appreciate the
    opportunity to explain. So immediately after January 29, we
    restricted the airspace in the yellow boxes I showed in the
    previous graphic for mixed traffic. So no helicopters or fixed-
    wing will be in that box, if you will.
        Senator Moran. The yellow.
        Mr. Rocheleau. The yellow box, going forward. In the red
    section----
        Senator Moran. That is still true today.
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir, and that is permanent. We have
    made that permanent. We have also eliminated Route 4 and Route
    6, the crossing that goes over to Bolling Air Force Base from
    DCA.
        Senator Moran. Any other changes? I would ask about number
    of flights. It appears to me, and my understanding is there are
    fewer flights utilizing Reagan National Airport?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. Thank you. So in the aftermath we
    reduced the arrival rate. A lot of that was to support the NTSB
    ongoing investigation and the emergency response work. Today we
    are running at what we call a 30 rate, so 30 arrivals an hour.
    And we are doing that largely in partnership--I mean, we have
    received great information from the NTSB regarding some
    feedback they were receiving during their preliminary
    investigation, regarding the workload on the controllers
    themselves. Obviously, a tragic event has an effect. I mean,
    these people come to work every day. They care about what they
    do. And so we reduced the rate down to 26. Slowly we moved back
    to now we are at 30 rate.
        Senator Moran. And will stay constant or change in the
    future?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Right now that is constant. That is staying.
    We are continuing to monitor that.
        Senator Moran. For the foreseeable future, the 30--is it
    32?--30?
        Mr. Rocheleau. It can go to 32, but right now we are at 30,
    and we plan to maintain that until such time as we assess the
    safety and being able to go to a higher rate.
        Senator Moran. Senator Markey, are you OK if I continue
    just a moment? I often, almost without exception, when I am
    chairing a hearing, ask the witnesses at the end, at the
    conclusion of the hearing, is there anything that you want to
    correct that you did not say, as you wish to say it, something
    you want to make sure we hear. And then I will turn the
    conducting this hearing over to Senator Duckworth. Ms. Homendy?
        Ms. Homendy. That is when all my staff cringe when I chime
    in. On this one, I would say I know there is a lot of focus on
    the FAA right now. I do think they are very focused on safety.
    We have an excellent relationship and have been in
    communication constantly since this accident.
        I would say one area we are really looking at also is how
    the Army evaluates when there is reporting of close calls. Do
    they get those reports, the Army I am talking about, and how do
    they communicate? At the battalion level, how do they
    communicate and talk about safety? How do they evaluate safety?
    Are they getting reports? Are they monitoring their own
    helicopters that might exceed altitude levels?
        We have found so far that a lot of the conversation and
    safety discussion at the battalion level is really focused on
    OSHA's slips, trips, and falls. There is a disconnect on some
    of the discussion around safety and safety assurance from the
    Army as a whole versus the battalion level. So we are really
    looking at that.
        Senator Moran. Please answer this question, but just in my
    absence.
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir, and I appreciate the opportunity.
    I just want to make it crystal clear that something was missed
    at the DCA crash. I take that seriously. I take that upon
    myself. I returned to the FAA just two months ago because I
    care about the National Airspace system and the safety and the
    workforce, and I am dedicated to continuing that work. And I
    will continue to review what I mentioned before with respect to
    the hotspots, working closely with NTSB, to learn what happened
    here, and to make sure it never happens again.
        Senator Duckworth [presiding]. General, I am going to ask
    you to suspend so Mr. Markey can ask his questions, because he
    is going to miss a roll call vote if he doesn't get to. I
    recognize Senator Markey.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

        Senator Markey. Thank you so much, and thank you, Mr.
    Chairman, Ranking Member. I want to take a moment to express my
    deepest condolences to the families who lost loved ones in the
    tragic crash in January. Your pain is unimaginable, and your
    presence here today is a powerful reminder of the lives that
    were so suddenly and unfairly taken.
        I want to specifically note the individuals from the
    Skating Club of Boston who passed away in this crash: Spencer
    Lane, Christine Lane, Jinna Han, Jin Han, Evgenia Shishkova,
    Vadim Naumov.
        We had a similar plane crash in 1961 that devastated the
    Skating Club of Boston. The trauma for the City of Boston and
    for your families is great. So please know that we grieve with
    you, and we are committed to finding answers and accountability
    in honor of those who you have lost.
        Chair Homendy, thank you and the entire NTSB team for your
    work to investigate this crash. I want to discuss the altitude
    of the Black Hawk helicopter. NTSB's preliminary report notes
    that a few minutes before the crash the pilot indicated that
    the helicopter was flying at an altitude of 300 feet, while the
    instructor pilot said it was at 400 feet. The report also found
    that helicopters may have been above the altitude restriction
    in over half of near misses that triggered an advisory on the
    plane's traffic alert and collision avoidance system.
        In your experience, are altitude discrepancies like this
    common, and are you concerned that Black Hawk altimeters may
    have a systemic problem?
        Ms. Homendy. This barometric altimeter, we have done
    substantial examination on it. We do not think we are going to
    get much from this altimeter because there was such damage. We
    are going to have to look at other data.
        But I think it is too early to really say what the
    discrepancy was or whether it was a discrepancy. There was no
    information other than 1.1 nautical miles west of the Key
    Bridge when the pilot flying said, ``I'm at 300,'' and the
    pilot instructor said, ``I have you at 4.'' There was no
    further discussion of why. So there is a lot of work that still
    has to be done.
        Senator Markey. OK. Administrator Rocheleau, on a related
    issue, Elon Musk recently made alarmist claims about the FAA's
    air traffic control communications system. He said, ``The FAA
    assessment is single-digit months to catastrophic failure,
    putting air traffic safety at serious risk. The situation is
    extremely dire.'' Elon Musk is in charge of all the
    investigations into every single Federal agency. That is scary.
        This is at the same time that he may be pushing for
    Starlink, his own company, to take over the contract to upgrade
    the communication system. And one month ago, the FAA announced
    it was deploying multiple Starlink terminals across the
    country.
        Given these systems critical importance to our aviation
    system, these developments raise serious questions about
    aviation safety. So I would like you to set the record straight
    on this issue of he said basically we have single-digit months
    to catastrophic failure, putting air traffic safety at serious
    risk. Is that tweet accurate?
        Mr. Rocheleau. I would say that the circumstances around
    our air traffic system are in great need of renewal. We need to
    modernize----
        Senator Markey. I did not ask you that. The public needs to
    hear this. Are we within single-digit months to catastrophic
    failure, putting air traffic safety at serious risk?
        Mr. Rocheleau. I know we need new air traffic control
    facilities. I know we need that. I know----
        Senator Markey. So you are saying we are at risk. Is that
    what you are saying? Are you agreeing with him that we are?
        Mr. Rocheleau. I am saying our air traffic system needs
    modernization as soon as possible.
        Senator Markey. You understand, we cannot have people
    heading for airports all across the country right now with Elon
    Musk, the ear of the President, saying that we are within
    single-digit months of catastrophic failure. Can you assure
    people that that is not the case right now?
        Mr. Rocheleau. I can assure you, to the flying public, to
    fly is safe. We have the safest, most complex system in the
    world, and it is safe to fly. I would also say the air traffic
    system is in dire need of upgrade, and it is something the
    Secretary and I have been working on intensely.
        Senator Markey. Well, so you are saying that this is not
    right, we are not within months of a catastrophic failure.
    Because I do not think anyone wants to put a family member on a
    plane right now with this kind of assessment. Have you made the
    assessment that we are within single-digit months of
    catastrophic failure? Have you made that assessment?
        Mr. Rocheleau. I have reviewed assessments in the last two
    months and understand that our equipment needs to be upgraded.
        Senator Markey. I did not ask you that. Is the existing
    equipment safe?
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes.
        Senator Markey. Is the existing equipment putting traveler
    safety at serious risk? Yes or no.
        Mr. Rocheleau. The existing system is safe.
        Senator Markey. Is safe. All right. We need to know that.
    Are any SpaceX employees serving as special government
    employees at the FAA right now?
        Mr. Rocheleau. We had three special government employees
    from SpaceX. We are only in contact with one at this point. I
    would make it very clear they did not do any air traffic--they
    did not plug into any of the equipment. They came in to observe
    our operations and provided expertise along the lines of
    software and computer systems.
        Senator Markey. Did any employee have any involvement in
    the FAA's decision to deploy Starlink terminals in February?
        Mr. Rocheleau. I am sorry, if you could just repeat that
    question.
        Senator Markey. Did any of those DOGE employees have any
    involvement in the FAA's decision to deploy Starlink terminals
    in February?
        Mr. Rocheleau. There were no DOGE employees in that
    decision. Starlink is being tested at a number of our
    facilities, only tested and not plugged into any air traffic
    systems.
        Senator Markey. Are any of these employees involved in the
    decisionmaking process around the deployment of additional
    Starlink terminals?
        Mr. Rocheleau. No, sir.
        Senator Markey. OK. So I recognize that Starlink terminals
    may be an effective communications tool in remote areas, and I
    am sure Starlink engineers think highly of their potential. We
    just need to be extremely careful----
        Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir.
        Senator Markey.--in making these life-and-death decisions
    that they are not based on any pre-existing professional biases
    or financial conflicts. That is your job. You have got to make
    sure this is the way we operate, because we are going to have
    hearings on this as this year and next year unfold.
        So I thank you, and I thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I want to return to General
    Braman so he can conclude his remarks.
        General Braman. Thank you, Senator. I do want to clarify
    two quick points, one on the memo requested by the Chairman,
    both Chairmen. It can be made available. However, it is part of
    the investigation. That is the unit's memo that discusses how
    they utilize ADS-B Out Off. It is their policy letter. It is in
    the purview of the investigation. That is why it is not
    currently releasable. But certainly when the NTSB and the other
    investigations have done their due diligence we can look to
    make that available to the Committee.
        Senator Duckworth. Ms. Homendy?
        Ms. Homendy. For the NTSB, if the policy existed prior to
    the collision, you can provide it. That can be provided.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. What is your second point,
    General?
        General Braman. And the second one, talking about whether
    we are willing to change the policy, the Army's policy. The
    Army is always willing to review its policy. Am I prepared to
    make a decision on ADS-B Out right now. No, Senator, but I want
    to do that informed by the facts that we have and this
    investigation, and those will drive policy changes. And that is
    not the Army policy. That is DOD policy, and the Army certainly
    has a vested interest in getting it right.
        At the end of the day, what I am most concerned about is
    the rigid application of that policy, that it is being done
    correctly, and not being abused. And that is part of this
    investigation, as well.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Senator Cantwell.
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chair. I wanted to just
    go back to this process, how it is set up in the FAA, and how
    we rectify these issues in the future. But, Chairwoman Homendy,
    I think you are saying, in your earlier testimony, that even if
    the Black Hawk helicopter had hugged the shoreline as
    originally described, that even that route that is outlined is
    insufficient, your investigation showed that even that is
    insufficient.
        Ms. Homendy. Intolerable risk to aviation safety.
        Senator Cantwell. OK. Intolerable risk to aviation safety.
    So Acting Administrator, how did we get to a point where we
    have a route, that is allowed and mapped, that the military is
    flying, that is interfacing with commercial aviation, that as
    by the very definition the NTSB is saying, even if they flew
    the correct path, was an intolerable risk. I think you are
    saying that because the difference in separation was just too
    small. Too small.
        Ms. Homendy. There was virtually no margin of error.
        Senator Cantwell. No margin of error. How are you defining
    margin of error?
        Ms. Homendy. I mean, just looking at this--and I think you
    have the printout in front of you, hopefully, or staff has it,
    that we provided. This is not for the public. This is in our
    preliminary report and for those behind me. But the charts,
    when we mapped the glide slope and we looked at the helicopter
    route, which has no lateral boundaries, it is 75 feet max if
    you are hugging the shoreline.
        The collision actually occurred to the right and slightly
    above the dashed line, right here. And just so you know, pilots
    landing on Runway 33 do not have to be on this dashed line.
    They can be above or below. But it occurred about to the right.
        Senator Cantwell. You are saying----
        Ms. Homendy. They were not on this route. They were
    slightly over.
        Senator Cantwell. You are saying under this route. They
    could have been below or above this line. But you are now
    saying that 75 feet is not enough separation.
        Ms. Homendy. Seventy-five feet is the max. Because there
    are no lateral boundaries on this route it goes down as you
    come over. So helicopters are not always on that eastern
    shoreline, which is where the 75 feet is marked, and they were
    not in this situation. They were actually to the right of this
    gray-shaded area, which indicates the route that has no
    boundaries.
        Senator Cantwell. But I thought your analysis, even if they
    were on that route, it is still an intolerable risk----
        Ms. Homendy. Correct.
        Senator Cantwell.--because there is not enough separation.
        Ms. Homendy. Seventy-five feet is very small.
        Senator Cantwell. Right. So how did we get to this point,
    is my question? How did we get to this point? It is like it is
    a series of errors here, a series of errors. And so I am just
    trying to understand, Acting Administrator, what office is
    responsible for this? What office is responsible for the
    exemption to the rule, which just made it worse? But what
    office said this is a safe pathway, in agreement, when the NTSB
    is telling us today it never really was safe? It was not. It
    was an intolerable risk.
        Mr. Rocheleau. And certainly I understand today, and even
    after the preliminary report that was the assessment. I can
    tell you that--and I am sure we will learn more over time as to
    how the airspace was redesigned. I know that as a result of
    previous incidents that we have talked about earlier today
    there were changes over time with respect to that airspace. But
    it is one of the reasons why we immediately terminated those
    types of operations after the event. So Route 4, Route 6, no
    mixed traffic into the airspace. Those are the things that we
    put in place immediately.
        I think when you talk about how did we get there, I think
    we are going to learn more of that through the investigation.
    Again, I can confidently say, without knowing specifically what
    is in the investigation, that over time those routes, that
    airspace, was designed--it is one of the reasons why we have
    gone back to the hotspots now throughout the Nation to
    understand the circumstances by which we move traffic safely
    and efficiently.
        Senator Cantwell. What office of the FAA has oversight of
    this issue, as it relates to this area?
        Mr. Rocheleau. So the Air Traffic Organization builds out
    the airspace, and there is an Aviation Safety Office that
    reports directly to me, that oversees the Air Traffic
    Organization.
        Senator Cantwell. And did that office ever bring up any of
    this data or information or have input from anybody that said,
    ``We don't like this scenario. There are too many close calls,
    too much interface, too complex, too hard to deal with''?
        Mr. Rocheleau. On this specific route I am not aware of
    that. I know that when we are presented with those, and we have
    been--that is how airspace changes--when we are presented with
    those circumstances, situations, near midair collisions, we
    investigate them and we put mitigations in place.
        Senator Cantwell. Well, I am questioning whether anybody
    was investigating? I mean, that is the issue. You had an alarm
    going off once a month. You had the data. You are saying maybe
    people were not looking at it. And while I get that AI is this
    very new and interesting technology, it is no substitute for
    the FAA having an oversight over this level of traffic.
        So as my colleague, the Chair of this hearing, mentioned,
    now we want to know, do we have other problems in other
    airspaces? I mean, we are very focused on DCA, but now we want
    to know, we have big military complexes, 10 military
    installations in the state of Washington. I am sure Chicago has
    a lot. We want to know, do we have to worry about this
    somewhere else because the FAA is not looking, and does not
    have an organization that is overseeing this information?
        Mr. Rocheleau. I agree 100 percent with you. This is of
    utmost concern to me, not just in the DCA area, which again, we
    have put measures in place to reduce the risk and to make the
    airspace less complex. This is one of the reasons why we have a
    task force working on what we are calling hotspots, to ensure
    that we are looking at airspace design wherever we have mixed
    traffic, in 10 locations, I believe it is a total of 20, 21
    airports specifically, to see where similar traffic like this
    needs mitigation.
        Senator Cantwell. So you say this office reports directly
    to you, and you say they oversee these areas and the interface.
        Mr. Rocheleau. Let me be clear about that. The office that
    oversees air traffic reports directly to me. The task force,
    the group of people that are looking at these hotspots
    specifically are multiple parts of the agency--air traffic,
    aviation safety, airports. So we have a number of people as
    part of that effort to make sure that we are looking at the
    airspace design, and if we find risk, we react.
        Senator Cantwell. Well, there was risk, for sure. There was
    risk. It was being sounded in an alarm, and it was not being
    addressed. So now we have to figure out why that was not being
    addressed. There is a lot of information here that says very
    high risk, very high risk. So why was that ignored, or was no
    one looking at it? So we need an answer.
        I think this Committee did very good work, in my opinion,
    after the Columbia accident, and set up more safety offices to
    make sure that we never miss something like that again. And I
    feel like that is the issue we are asking you today. So we need
    to understand what you think is in place, and why, if it was in
    place, did we miss this, because little pieces of the
    responsibility were delegated to various parts of the
    organization and nobody had a holistic approach, or data, lots
    of data, and it is being ignored.
        But this is clear--clear--that this was an unacceptable
    design. It is just unacceptable, and I do not know how we got
    there.
        I do want to ask you, are you now supportive of ADS-B In as
    a requirement, making sure that carriers, like this regional
    jet--again, I mentioned earlier it is $20,000 or so per plane--
    why can't we just say we are going to do this?
        Mr. Rocheleau. I did understand from the Chair earlier that
    it has been an ongoing recommendation. I have not personally
    looked into that in the last two months as to what the
    expectations are on ADS-B In. I know that equipage on aircraft
    throughout the system can be challenging, but I certainly will
    take that back and look into it, to figure out what
    specifically ADS-B In, what would be required to mandate that.
    Certainly if Congress passes a law we would, as we did with----
        Senator Cantwell. Well, we already did, by the way. We
    already did. It was called the Reauthorization Bill. And as I
    said in my opening statement, we basically authorized spending
    for this through the equipage program. And you can discuss how
    this actually gets deployed, but I am pretty sure the consumer
    ends up paying for it, regardless, in some way.
        So the point is, NTSB has been recommending this. Is that
    right, Chairwoman?
        Ms. Homendy. That is correct.
        Senator Cantwell. You have recommended this since 2008?
        Ms. Homendy. And I have to look, but I think we actually
    have recommendations on ADS-B In that precedes that. Those were
    comments, and if I may, may I add our 2008 comments to the
    hearing record.
        Senator Duckworth. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Cantwell. So I think, Acting Administrator, I think
    we need to hear from the Department of Transportation and the
    FAA that they understand that these recommendations have been
    on the table, and you need to respond to them.
        We do not want to keep doing this, which is having one
    organization, who has to investigate all the accidents, deal
    with all the families, deal with the grief and emotion, and
    then have an FAA that gets too cozy with industry and gives
    them exemptions. We do not want that.
        So what we want is you to listen to the NTSB. And I know
    this is historic. I am not blaming any administration. It is
    historic. It is historic. It has been there since the beginning
    of the big crashes that we have had, way before the Max, where
    the FAA makes safety recommendations, and then they are ignored
    for like, oh, I don't know, sometimes a decade, and then people
    finally say, ``Oh, OK.'' But we owe it to these families. We
    owe it to them now. It is not that hard to get this done.
        So I hope that you will take this back to the Secretary,
    have an internal discussion, and basically agree it is time to
    get this done.
        Ms. Homendy. And if I may add, and we are going to look at
    this as part of our investigation to see how it could have
    factored in, but the CRJ had ADS-B Out. It did not have ADS-B
    In. So we are going to look at what that information could have
    provided to that flight crew and how it could have made a
    difference. We have seen that in other investigations, which is
    why we have these recommendations.
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I do think that a nationwide
    look is important, and I am glad that FAA is looking at the
    hotspots. I understand that many of these routes, it is not
    just the military that is flying them. It is local law
    enforcement. It is Federal law enforcement. It is hospitals
    that are all flying them, as well. But I do think beyond a very
    local, hyper-local look, a national look is really important.
        Thank you all for coming. Again, my condolences to the
    family members. And I just want to say again, thank you again
    to Chairwoman Homendy, thank you, Mr. Rocheleau. I know you
    have only been the Acting for a couple of months. We have been
    without an FAA Administrator for three years prior to your
    immediate predecessor. And again, General Braman, thank you for
    being here.
        Thank you to all the witnesses for their important
    testimony today. Senators will have until the close of business
    on Thursday, April 3, to submit questions for the record. The
    witnesses will have until the close of business on Thursday,
    April 17, to respond to those questions.
        And this concludes today's hearing. The Committee stands
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

         Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
                             Hon. Jennifer Homendy

        Question. You described the findings of your investigation related
    to the ADS-B Out transmissions of the battalion, indicating that of the
    16 Lima model Blackhawks, seven were transmitting ADS-B Out when turned
    on, and eight were not. Five of those eight began transmitting since
    the NTSB identified the issue. Since you shared this with the
    Subcommittee, has your investigation been able to isolate the reason as
    to why those aircraft ADS-B Out equipment were not transmitting?
        Answer. Our initial review of the transponders' configuration on
    the helicopters that were not transmitting ADS-B Out revealed that a
    setting not normally manipulated by the crew was set incorrectly after
    the ADS-B equipment was installed.
                                     ______

    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to
                             Hon. Jennifer Homendy

        Question 1. Chair Homendy, I appreciate all of your and the NTSB's
    dedication to finding the answers. The aircraft pilot gets the T-CAS
    warning of ``traffic! Traffic! traffic!'' then hears the tower say go
    for visual separation and then the helicopter possibly mixes up the
    aircraft with one by the Wilson bridge and 19 seconds later the
    collision happens.
        Is visual separation typically requested at such a huge distance or
    would the chopper have known that that ATC request should mean a plane
    only a few hundred feet away?
        Answer. It is common at DCA for helicopters to request visual
    separation at varied distances when operating throughout the DCA class
    B airspace.
        The first time the helicopter crew reported having traffic in sight
    and asked to maintain visual separation occurred when the distance
    between the two aircraft was about 6.5 nautical miles.
        About a minute and a half later, the tower asked the helicopter
    crew if the CRJ was in sight. The crew indicated that traffic was
    visible and again requested visual separation. This is when the crew of
    flight 5342 received the TCAS advisory. At this time, the aircraft were
    about 0.95 nautical miles apart.

        Question 2. I know that the tower was able to communicate to both
    the helicopter and the plane and that they could both hear the message
    about visual separation after the ``Traffic! Traffic! Traffic!'' T-CAS
    warning went off in the plane. I know there are plenty of reasons why
    aircraft should not be able to communicate directly with one another
    such as talking over each other but in an instance where the
    ``Traffic!'' warning is blaring in the flight deck would it make sense
    for there to be a communication channel between those two flights?
        Answer. It is certainly preferable for pilots to be on the same
    frequency as ATC and able to hear all transmissions from other aircraft
    as well as from ATC. However, aural alerts that are internal to the
    flight deck, such as a TCAS advisory, would not be audible to other
    aircraft or to ATC.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                             Hon. Jennifer Homendy

        Question 1. Surface Awareness Initiative. As part of FAA's response
    to preventing close calls, the FAA took it upon itself to fast-track
    the deployment of certain technologies at airports to improve air and
    ground traffic visibility, such as the Surface Awareness Initiative
    (SAI) system at airports. Notably, FAA is deploying the cheaper SAI
    system at airports that do not have airport surface surveillance
    systems such as Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X) or
    a similar tool known as ADS-B Airport Surface Surveillance Capability
    (ASSC).
        What key capabilities does the Surface Awareness Initiative system
    lack compared to systems like ASDE-X or ASSC?
        Answer. SAI does not have an associated active ground radar, so it
    relies solely on ADS-B for its aircraft and vehicle tracking. In
    addition, unlike ASDE-X and ASSC, it does not currently alert
    controllers of potential conflicts and provide conflict resolution
    instructions.

        Does the deployment of the SAI system satisfy NTSB recommendations
    for installing airport surface surveillance systems at more airports
    across the U.S.? Why or why not?
        Answer. In our report for the February 4, 2023, Austin, Texas,
    runway incursion, we stated that we believe the SAI system could
    potentially satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation A-24-10, but,
    because the system has not been deployed at any airports, we cannot
    accurately assess if it would address all elements of the
    recommendation.
        The FAA has not yet responded to this recommendation, which was
    issued on June 18, 2024; however, our recommendation was that the
    equipment should alert controllers of potential conflicts, which is not
    currently the case with SAI.

        Question 2. Is FAA's installation of the cheaper SAI system over
    more advanced systems like ASDE-X or ASSC enhancing visibility of
    airport surface environments for air traffic controllers?
        Answer. For those towers that previously did not have surface
    detection capability, SAI provides greater awareness of aircraft and
    vehicles operating on the airport surface.

        In NTSB's view, is FAA making the right choice by prioritizing the
    installation of the cheaper SAI system at airports that do not already
    have airport surface surveillance systems over installing ASDE-X or
    ASSC?
        Answer. With SAI's reduced cost of installation, the FAA can
    provide more airports with some level of surface detection capability.
    However, in its current state, we do not feel SAI is a direct
    replacement for aging ASDE-X or ASSC systems that are already
    installed, and it would actually reduce capabilities at those airports
    if it were used as a direct replacement for those systems.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to
                             Hon. Jennifer Homendy

        Question 1. Close calls and runway incursions keep happening,
    including a particularly scary one in February at Chicago Midway where
    a landing Southwest flight came within 200 feet of striking a Flexjet
    that had mistakenly entered the runway that the Southwest flight was
    using to land. The Department of Transportation's Inspector General
    recently reviewed FAA's work to mitigate runway incursions and
    concluded that FAA's efforts to analyze runway incursion data and
    develop broader mitigation strategies was hindered by FAA not sharing
    data between organizations--and FAA's tendency to focus on issues at
    particular airports rather than looking for system-wide causes.
        What would NTSB like to see FAA do to better address runway
    incursions?
        Answer. In 2024, the NTSB issued 15 new recommendations to the FAA
    to address safety issues identified in our investigations of runway
    incursions in New York and Austin, Texas. They are provided below.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Recommendation     Overall Status              Recommendation
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A-24-2            Open--Initial       TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
                      Response Received    ADMINISTRATION: Encourage Title
                                           14 Code of Federal Regulations
                                           Part 91K, 135, and 121 operators
                                           to incorporate into their
                                           standard operating procedures a
                                           procedural crosscheck that
                                           requires flight crews to
                                           verbalize the number of a runway
                                           they are about to cross, as
                                           indicated by runway signs, unless
                                           an installed automated system
                                           already provides an aural
                                           advisory.
    A-24-3            Open--Initial       TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
                      Response Received    ADMINISTRATION: Encourage Title
                                           14 Code of Federal Regulations
                                           Part 121 operators to use their
                                           safety management system to
                                           identify flight crew surface
                                           navigation errors resulting from
                                           the performance of concurrent
                                           tasks during taxi and develop and
                                           implement effective risk
                                           mitigation strategies considering
                                           human factors principles.
    A-24-4            Open--Unacceptable  TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
                      Response             ADMINISTRATION: Collaborate with
                                           aircraft and avionics
                                           manufacturers and software
                                           designers to develop the
                                           technology for a flight deck
                                           system that would provide visual
                                           and aural alerts to flight crews
                                           of traffic on a runway or taxiway
                                           and traffic on approach to land.
                                           (Supersedes A-00-66)
    A-24-5            Open--Unacceptable  TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
                      Response             ADMINISTRATION: Require that the
                                           technology developed in response
                                           to Safety Recommendation A-24-4
                                           be installed in all newly
                                           certificated transport-category
                                           airplanes. (Supersedes A-00-66)
    A-24-6            Open--Unacceptable  TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
                      Response             ADMINISTRATION: Require that
                                           existing transport-category
                                           airplanes be retrofitted with the
                                           technology developed in response
                                           to Safety Recommendation A-24-4.
                                           (Supersedes A-00-66)
    A-24-7            Open--Initial       TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
                      Response Received    ADMINISTRATION: Evaluate the
                                           effectiveness of the activation
                                           logic for the runway status light
                                           system considering the
                                           circumstances of this incident.
    A-24-8            Open--Initial       TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
                      Response Received    ADMINISTRATION: Using the
                                           findings of the evaluation
                                           conducted in response to Safety
                                           Recommendation A-24-7, update the
                                           runway status light system
                                           activation logic as necessary to
                                           improve system effectiveness.
    A-24-9            Open--Unacceptable  TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
                      Response             ADMINISTRATION: Require retrofit
                                           of all cockpit voice recorders
                                           (CVR) on all airplanes required
                                           to carry both a CVR and a flight
                                           data recorder with a CVR capable
                                           of recording the last 25 hours of
                                           audio. (Supersedes A-18-31)
    A-24-10           Open--Initial       TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
                      Response Received    ADMINISTRATION: For airports that
                                           are certificated under Title 14
                                           Code of Federal Regulations Part
                                           139 and are currently not
                                           equipped with airport surface
                                           detection equipment, model X or
                                           airport surface surveillance
                                           capability, implement surface
                                           detection equipment that
                                           tracks the movement of
                                           arriving and departing aircraft,
                                           determines the proximity
                                           between those aircraft, and
                                           provides air traffic
                                           controllers with visual and aural
                                           cues of surface movements to aid
                                           in their decision making
                                           processes.
    A-24-11           Open--Initial       TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
                      Response Received    ADMINISTRATION: Require air
                                           traffic controllers to
                                           advise pilots, through
                                           direct communication and
                                           automatic terminal information
                                           system broadcasts, when visual
                                           contact with aircraft operating
                                           on taxiways and runways cannot be
                                           established or maintained and
                                           instruct pilots to
                                           provide accurate position reports
                                           to aid the controller in
                                           determining an aircraft's
                                           location in such conditions.
    A-24-12           Open--Initial       TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
                      Response Received    ADMINISTRATION: Brief all air
                                           traffic controllers about the
                                           circumstances of this incident,
                                           emphasizing the effect that
                                           certain conditions might have on
                                           a pilot's ability to begin a
                                           takeoff in a timely manner,
                                           including
                                           low-visibility weather
                                           conditions, such as fog;
                                           ambient conditions, such
                                           as temperature; and
                                           surface conditions, such
                                           as ice, snow, and other
                                           precipitation, as noted in Order
                                           7110.65, Air Traffic Control,
                                           paragraph 5-8-4, Departure and
                                           Arrival.
    A-24-13           Open--Initial       TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
                      Response Received    ADMINISTRATION: Amend the
                                           Aeronautical Information Manual
                                           so that it instructs pilots to
                                           inform controllers, before
                                           entering an active runway with
                                           the intent to depart, when they
                                           need time on the runway for any
                                           reason before beginning the
                                           takeoff roll.
    A-24-14           Open--Initial       TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
                      Response Received    ADMINISTRATION: Require all
                                           airports with a Surface Movement
                                           Guidance and Control System plan
                                           to ensure that their plans and
                                           the associated letters of
                                           agreement correspond with each
                                           other and the stakeholder duties
                                           and responsibilities described in
                                           Advisory Circular 120-57, Surface
                                           Movement Guidance and Control
                                           System.
    A-24-15           Open--Initial       TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
                      Response Received    ADMINISTRATION: Direct training
                                           administrators at airports with a
                                           Surface Movement Guidance and
                                           Control System plan to require
                                           initial and annual refresher
                                           training for all stakeholders,
                                           including air traffic controllers
                                           and airport operations personnel,
                                           on the information in the
                                           airport's plan.
    A-24-16           Open--Initial       TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION
                      Response Received    ADMINISTRATION:
                                          Require training administrators at
                                           all operating air traffic control
                                           towers to conduct annual
                                           refresher training on low-
                                           visibility operations.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question 2. NTSB's preliminary report documented some inconsistent
    information about the helicopter's altitude readings and determined
    that some of the altitude information on the helicopter's data recorder
    was invalid.
        As NTSB continues its investigation, what will it do to learn what
    the helicopter pilots knew about their altitude and whether their
    equipment was working properly?
        Answer. Numerous components from the Black Hawk will be examined,
    including the barometric altimeters, air data/pitot static system,
    radio altimeters and their antennas, transponder, and electronic
    standby instrument system. The examinations will look for any anomalies
    with the instruments/components, witness marks, and nonvolatile memory.
    In addition, flight data recorder (FDR) information will continue to be
    reviewed and compared with any additional data obtained from follow-up
    examinations in an effort to better understand the invalid pressure
    altitude recorded on the FDR.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jacky Rosen to
                             Hon. Jennifer Homendy

        Question 1. Aviation professionals are only as effective as the
    infrastructure and technology they rely on. According to the FY24
    President's Budget, the average age of an FAA Air Traffic Control
    facility is 61 years old, and more than 50 percent of terminal
    facilities are more than 40 years old. These facilities regularly
    operate with degraded technology systems, resulting in a lack of
    accurate wind speed and direction calculations, the failure of radio
    frequencies within congested airspace, and the malfunctioning of runway
    lights, just to name a few. Many airports also lack functioning radar
    systems used to track airborne and taxiing planes, meaning that some
    controllers have no visual awareness of the aircraft they are
    directing, especially in poor weather conditions.
        In lieu of functioning radar systems in Air Traffic Control
    facilities, many controllers are resorting to using public flight-
    tracking websites that aren't approved by the FAA to fill the gaps.
        Perhaps most alarming are the reports that the FAA lacks the
    funding to install runway warning systems to help prevent runway
    collisions. Only 43 of the Nation's more than 500 airports serving
    commercial flights have runway collision-avoidance systems. This is
    simply not good enough.
        Chair Homendy how can we improve the existing technology and
    infrastructure utilized by air traffic controllers and aviation
    professionals to reduce potential risk and manage congested airports
    and complicated airspace at our Nation's airports?
        Answer. In 2024, we recommended that, for major airports that do
    not have runway surveillance systems such as ASDE-X or ASSC, the FAA
    should implement surface detection equipment that:

       tracks the movement of arriving and departing aircraft,

       determines the proximity between those aircraft, and

       provides air traffic controllers with visual and aural cues
            of surface movements to aid in their decision-making processes.

        The FAA's Surface Safety Portfolio, which includes SAI, Approach
    Runway Verification (ARV), and Runway Incursion Devices (RID), has the
    potential to improve safety--particularly the SAI, which is providing
    enhanced situational awareness for controllers at those airports that
    previously had no surface detection capability. However, efforts should
    be made to incorporate aural and visual alerting and conflict
    resolution to be more on par with what ASDE-X/ASSC systems deliver
    today.
        In addition, the NTSB has long believed in the safety benefits of
    ADS-B Out and In. ADS-B Out enables an aircraft to broadcast its three-
    dimensional position (latitude, longitude, and altitude) to other ADS-
    B-equipped aircraft and to ADS-B ground stations. ADS-B In enables an
    aircraft to receive traffic messages from ADS-B Out-equipped aircraft
    and from ADS-B ground stations. Although the FAA requires ADS-B Out for
    aircraft operating in certain classes of airspace, with certain
    exceptions for national security reasons, it does not require ADS-B In.
    The NTSB believes that equipping aircraft with ADS-B In capability
    would immediately and substantially contribute to safety, especially
    during operations in and around airports.
                                     ______

          Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
                                Chris Rocheleau

        Question 1. On March 27, 2025, you sent letters to the Department
    of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the
    Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security,
    clarifying the FAA's ADS-B Out requirements and the exceptions for
    missions critical to national security. Section 829 of the FAA
    Reauthorization Act of 2024 prohibits enforcement action based
    exclusively on ADS-B data. What authorities does the FAA have to
    enforce the ADS-B Out equipage and transmission requirements?
        Answer. The FAA has retained its authority to enforce ADS-B Out
    equipage and transmission requirements. However, the FAA's practical
    ability to enforce those requirements has been significantly impeded by
    the limitation in section 829 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024.
    Pub. L. No. 118-63, Sec. 829 (2024). Section 829 prohibits the FAA from
    initiating an investigation (other than a criminal investigation) based
    exclusively on ADS-B data. Prior to the enactment of section 829, the
    FAA's primary method of identifying noncompliance with ADS-B Out
    equipage and transmission requirements was reviewing ADS-B data, which,
    when combined with radar data, can allow for the identification of
    aircraft operating without properly functioning ADS-B Out equipment.
    The FAA could then investigate those operations, communicating with
    aircraft owners to ensure that their ADS-B Out equipment was returned
    to a functional state or, less commonly, taking enforcement action
    where appropriate (e.g., where an investigation determined that an
    operator was intentionally operating without ADS-B Out equipment turned
    on). Under section 829, these investigations are no longer possible.
    Nor are the enforcement actions that could result from those
    investigations.
        Subject to the significant restrictions imposed by section 829, the
    FAA does retain the authority to enforce ADS-B Out requirements. For
    example, if a hotline complaint is submitted to the FAA about an
    illegal charter operation or an FAA inspector personally observes a low
    flight, ADS-B data may be consulted in the course of those
    investigations, which could reveal that the aircraft did not meet ADS-B
    Out equipage and transmission requirements. Or a report might be
    submitted to the FAA specifically about an ADS-B Out violation, which
    the FAA could then use ADS-B Out data to confirm. In these uncommon
    scenarios, the FAA would be able to take an enforcement action against
    an operator using its authority under 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 44709 or
    46301.

        Question 2. During the hearing on March 27, 2025, questions were
    raised regarding the FAA's ability to override the exemption in the
    NDAA which allowed for exceptions to the FAA's ADS-B Out transmission
    requirements. Does the FAA have the authority to rescind any exemption
    from the ADS-B mandate for the U.S. military?
        Answer. The FAA has full authority ``to operate air traffic control
    services to ensure the safe minimum separation of aircraft in flight
    and the efficient use of airspace,'' to include terminating any
    authorization to deviate from regulatory requirements concerning ADS-B
    Out transmission and equipage or revising the Memorandum of Agreement
    (MOA) it has with DOD concerning the provision of air traffic services
    to DOD aircraft that are not transmitting or equipped with ADS-B. See
    Pub. L. No. 115-232, div. A, title X, Sec. 1046(c) (2018) (providing
    that nothing in section 1046 limits the FAA's authority to operate air
    traffic control services to ensure the safe minimum separation of
    aircraft in flight and the efficient use of airspace).
        Under section 1046(a) of division A, title X, of the John S. McCain
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, the Secretary
    of Transportation may not require DOD to equip certain aircraft with
    ADS-B, deny air traffic control services for such aircraft on the basis
    that they are not equipped, or restrict or limit access to airspace
    based upon equipage. Pub. L. No. 115-232, div. A, title X, Sec. 1046(a)
    (2018). FAA and DOD have an MOA, which sets out the process for
    accommodating aircraft that are not equipped with ADS-B and providing
    necessary air traffic control services to such aircraft to maintain
    safety in the NAS. Accordingly, the prohibitive language in section
    1046(a) is no longer effective, as provided in section 1046(b).
        Even if section 1046(a) were effective, the FAA retains full
    authority to revise the MOA as required to operate air traffic control
    services to ensure the safe minimum separation of aircraft in flight
    and the efficient use of airspace under section 1046(c), and the FAA is
    currently working with DOD to revise the MOA following the DCA
    accident.
        As for the ADS-B Out transmission requirement, 14 CFR
    Sec. 91.225(f)(1) allows the FAA to authorize a deviation from the
    transmission requirement for aircraft ``performing a sensitive
    government mission for national defense, homeland security,
    intelligence or law enforcement purposes and transmitting would
    compromise the operations security of the mission or pose a safety risk
    to the aircraft, crew, or people and property in the air or on the
    ground'' when authorized by the FAA. The FAA retains discretion to
    terminate an authorization to deviate from the ADS-B Out transmission
    requirement. Section 1046(a) of Pub. L. No. 115-232, div. A, title X
    only addressed the equipage requirement. As mentioned above, we are
    working with DOD to revise the MOA as it concerns authorization to
    deviate from the ADS-B transmission requirement.
                                     ______

         Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
                                Chris Rocheleau

        Question 1. Consistent with the mandate in the 2024 FAA
    reauthorization, can you describe what steps the FAA is taking to
    address air traffic controller hiring shortfalls?
        Answer. The FAA is reviewing our hiring, training, and placement
    processes, as well as FAA Academy withdrawals and failures, to ensure
    our selection methods effectively identify candidates best suited for
    the Air Traffic Control Specialist profession. To ensure we meet or
    exceed our hiring goals, we have:

       Supercharged hiring--Streamlined the hiring process and
            built in efficiencies that will reduce the time to complete the
            process by as much as five months.

       Increased the starting salary rate of Track 1 entry-level
            hires by 30 percent while attending the FAA Academy.

       Offered financial incentives to retain our most experienced
            controllers who are eligible to retire. Certified professional
            controllers in this group will receive a lump sum payment of 20
            percent of their basic pay for each year they continue to work.

       Established the Enhanced Collegiate Training Initiative (E-
            CTI), which gives qualifying colleges the opportunity to teach
            the same curriculum provided by the FAA Academy. Upon
            graduation, with a successful result on the Air Traffic Skills
            Assessment (ATSA), students who clear all pre-employment
            requirements (medical, security) are placed directly at a field
            tower facility.

       Increased the frequency of Track 1 entry-level (no aviation
            experience required) job announcements. Typically, the FAA
            publishes the Track 1 announcement once per year, and this year
            we have advertised the position three times in the past 12
            months. This effort has increased the pipeline by approximately
            30 percent, placing us on track to meet the FY25 goal of hiring
            2,000 ATCs.

       Authorized on-the-spot hiring (similar to direct hire
            authority for most other government agencies) for Track 2
            entry-level positions (ATC experience required) and utilized an
            open continuous announcement to garner applicants year-round.
            Previously, the FAA only announced these positions twice per
            year--once in the Spring and once in the Fall.

       Implemented Pre-Employment Processing Centers (PEPC) to
            expedite clearances, providing a ``one-stop-shop'' for pre-
            employment requirements. The FAA established PEPCs in New York,
            Georgia, Texas, and California to reach the largest applicant
            geographical locations across the Nation.

        Question 2. Can you describe what actions the FAA is taking to
    streamline the implementation of new technologies and improve safety of
    the Nation's ATC system?
        Answer. Recognizing the need for advanced technologies to keep pace
    with innovation and modernize the air traffic control system, the ATO
    has begun to replace or deploy new infrastructure to maintain the
    safety and efficiency of the national airspace system (NAS):

       Implementation of the Surface Safety Portfolio:
         Expands surface situational awareness for air traffic
                controllers at airports without existing surface
                surveillance capabilities.

       Improvement of telecommunications reliability--including
            fiber, wireless, and satellite.

       Implementation of cloud services to transition the NAS to a
            secure, scalable, and centrally managed enterprise cloud
            environment.

       NOTAM modernization efforts to replace the U.S. NOTAM System
            and Federal NOTAM System.

         Modernizing this system is crucial to enhance its
                reliability, accessibility, and user-friendliness. The
                system will be securely hosted in the cloud and have a
                scalable and resilient architecture. We expect delivery by
                July 2025 and are targeting operational deployment of the
                modernized system by September 2025.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
                                Chris Rocheleau

        Question 1. According to the NTSB, between October 2021 and
    December 2024, there were more than 15,000 instances of commercial
    aircraft coming in close proximity to helicopters. Of those events, 85
    had vertical separation of less than 200 feet. How many of those 85
    events involved military helicopters? How many of those close call
    events involved U.S. Army helicopters?
        Answer. We understand the NTSB likely was referring to narrative
    reports that pilots may voluntarily submit. We do not have granular
    information on the dataset the NTSB was referring to, but we
    acknowledge that changes were necessary related to procedures and
    helicopter routes that would have allowed helicopters and fixed-wing
    aircraft to be in close proximity. To that end, the FAA has eliminated
    mixed traffic immediately around DCA, eliminated a portion of
    Helicopter Route 4, and eliminated the use of visual separation within
    5 miles of the airport.

        Question 1a. What factors contributed to the FAA's dilatory
    identification of these alarming data and lack of action to mitigate
    dangerous conditions in the airspace prior to the January 29th
    collision?
        Answer. Successful safety assurance and hazard identification
    require analyzing large amounts of data from various sources to
    understand the presence of risk within the system. We are making
    improvements both in data sharing across the agency and through the use
    of advanced technological tools, including advanced models for the
    analysis of safety reports, capabilities that enable the automated
    identification and ranking of high potential risk encounters,
    capabilities that fuse contextual datasets to translate information on
    potential risk to actual risk, and collision risk models that use
    simulations and artificial intelligence (AI) to identify specific
    operations that do not meet collision risk targets.

        Question 1b. Please describe the process by which the FAA shares
    information--including the data recalled above--with entities
    conducting aviation operations in the National Capital Region airspace.
    Is this information-sharing regime consistent across the NAS?
        Answer. Any agency may request data specific to its fleet from the
    FAA, and we process those requests as described in FAA Orders JO1030.3B
    and JO7200.20B. We also provide information to industry via the
    Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system (ASIAS).

        Question 2. Please describe the ``D.C. Helicopter Working Group''.
        Answer. The DC Helicopter Working Group is a mixture of FAA and
    users of the airspace around DCA who convened for the purpose of
    development of a new helicopter route or corridor that supports
    national security, law enforcement, and medical helicopter flight
    operations. This published route or corridor will replace the legacy
    Route 4 (on the Baltimore Washington Helicopter Route Chart), enhancing
    efficiency for critical missions while maintaining the highest safety
    standards.

        Question 2a. Who are the entities participating in this working
    group? Chairwoman Homendy described there to be 17 entities taking part
    in this working group.
        Answer. The following entities participated in the working group:

      1.  Prince George's County Police

      2.  Fairfax County Police

      3.  Metro Police

      4.  US Army

      5.  US Air Force

      6.  MD State Police

      7.  US Coast Guard

      8.  US Marine Corps

      9.  Medstar

        Question 2b. Describe the parameters for which this working group
    is studying.
        Answer. As noted in response to question 2 above, the parameters
    are the development of a new helicopter route or corridor that supports
    national security, law enforcement, and medical helicopter flight
    operations. This published route or corridor will replace the legacy
    Route 4 (on the Baltimore-Washington Helicopter Route Chart), enhancing
    efficiency for critical missions while maintaining the highest safety
    standards.

        Question 2c. Is this working group analyzing the other 46
    helicopter operators in the National Capital Region?
        Answer. The task the group is focused on is meant to support how
    national security, law enforcement, and medical helicopter flight
    operations occur within the National Capital Region.

        Question 3. Is a flyover of Arlington National Cemetery considered
    an essential operation?
        Answer. Flyovers are operations that we normally coordinate with
    the Department of Defense (DOD). We are refining our coordination
    procedures with DOD for military operations in the Washington, D.C.
    area.

        Question 4. Do you think the FAA's tolerance for risk was too high
    prior to January 29th?
        Answer. Aviation safety is the FAA's number one priority. While
    flying remains the safest mode of transportation, aviation safety is
    not static. There is always room for improvement. The professionals at
    the FAA take their jobs seriously and strive to maintain safety every
    day. But the fact of the matter is that we have to do better. We have
    to identify trends, we have to get smarter about how we use data, and
    when we put corrective actions in place, we must execute them.

        Question 5. Please describe the advanced technological tools the
    FAA is utilizing to aggregate data to better analyze the airspace
    operations at the high mixed-traffic airports.
        Answer. The FAA's ASIAS program is utilizing advanced technological
    tools, including advanced models for the analysis of safety reports,
    capabilities that enable the automated identification and ranking of
    high potential risk encounters, capabilities that fuse contextual
    datasets to translate information on potential risk to actual risk, and
    collision risk models that use simulations and AI to identify specific
    operations that do not meet collision risk targets.
        Predictive software, coupled with AI textual data large language
    modeling applications, will provide a clearer holistic picture of the
    collision risk by fusing both voluntarily submitted information with
    Flight Operational Quality Assurance data.
                                     ______

    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to
                                Chris Rocheleau

        Question 1. Acting Administrator Rocheleau, there has been a focus
    on how many pilots voluntarily reported close calls to the FAA's safety
    reporting system--these calls averaged at least one per month for more
    than a decade. Were these reports by pilots investigated?
        Answer. The FAA thoroughly investigates all voluntary safety
    reports submitted by a pilot and shared with the FAA. If a potential
    safety risk is identified, whether to the operation or the national
    airspace system, the FAA implements corrective actions, as appropriate.

        Question 1a. What changes can be expected to be made when a
    considerable number of reports like these are made?
        Answer. If the FAA identifies an increase in the number of reports
    involving close calls, we conduct an analysis to determine whether the
    increase in reports equates to an identification of new or increased
    risk. If a risk is identified, appropriate mitigations will be
    developed and implemented, to include ensuring that the performance and
    effectiveness of the safety risk controls meet or exceed the safety
    objective of driving down the risk to an acceptable level in accordance
    with FAA's safety risk management processes.
        The FAA implements specific corrective actions based on the safety
    issue or event to mitigate the identified safety risk. In addition,
    when a significant event occurs or a substantial number of reports are
    received, the FAA conducts a thorough review of current controller
    training programs. This evaluation not only helps to derive insights
    from the reports but also ensures that future controller training
    initiatives are aligned with the goal of continuing to equip
    controllers with the skills necessary to prevent similar situations.
    The aim is to continually enhance training effectiveness.

        Question 1b. Have these pilot reports not only for DCA but for
    other airports been thoroughly reviewed?
        Answer. Yes, the FAA thoroughly investigates all voluntary safety
    reports submitted by a pilot and shared with the FAA. If a potential
    safety risk is identified, whether to the operation or the national
    airspace system, the FAA implements corrective actions, as appropriate.

        Question 1c. Can you provide the number for how many reports have
    been made relating to West Virginia airports in the last 5 years?
        Answer. The ASIAS database contains active reporting for the
    primary commercial service airports in West Virginia: Charleson-CRW,
    Clarksburg-CKB, Huntington-HTS, and Lewisburg-LWB. There are no Near
    Mid Air Collisions (NMAC) reports in the last 5 years at these
    airports.

        Question 2. Please tell us more about the voluntary safety
    reporting system. Does the system account for specific NTSB style data
    points or is it a pilot saying I came within approximately this many
    feet of a helicopter?
        Answer. The primary objective of voluntary safety programs is to
    identify hazards and unsafe conditions in the NAS so that corrective
    action can be taken to eliminate or reduce the hazards or unsafe
    conditions. The FAA reviews the data from these reports to identify
    causal or contributing factors, which support event categorization,
    risk analysis, and data trending. This information can provide context
    to understand a problem or emerging risk in the system.
        For example, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) captures
    specific data points concerning the pilot, the aircraft, the airspace,
    location, and weather conditions, but also allows the pilot to provide
    a narrative to clarify and provide additional details about the event.
    ASRS reports are confidential. ASRS analyzes the safety data, de-
    identifies it, and disseminates vital information to the aviation
    community.

        Question 3. In your testimony you mentioned the Safety Panel you
    have put together in response to the collision and how the FAA is using
    AI to see if other safety concerns have been overlooked. Does that
    extend only to fixed-wing and rotorcraft incidents or other types of
    safety incidents?
        Answer. The effort included a review of operations (not incidents)
    between fixed-wing to helicopters and fixed-wing to fixed-wing to
    determine if there were any safety concerns.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Question 4. In the preliminary report there is a map of all the
    helicopter routes in the area (see above). Route 6 goes across the
    airport and the runways East and West. Has that route had close calls
    reported to it as well or was Route 4 the only one?
        Answer. For Route 6, there were four (4) reported operations (1/1/
    2021-1/31/2025) in which fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters had a
    closest proximity of less than the required 500' vertical separation.
    The portion of Route 6 in the vicinity of DCA has been closed and
    removed from the published helicopter charts to mitigate any potential
    risk.

        Question 5. We have heard that there are not specific lateral
    boundaries to any of these helicopter routes, but there are vertical
    boundaries. My fear is that with such loose designations for these
    routes it would be easy for a helicopter to easily go wide and deviate.
    DC has the most sensitive airspace in the country but what recourse or
    discipline is there if a chopper deviates and ends up in the ultra-
    restricted air space above the National Mall or takes one of these
    routes wide or at too high of an altitude?
        Answer. Helicopters, like other aircraft, are required to comply
    with the FAA's safety regulations, including 14 C.F.R. Sec. 91.123,
    which requires compliance with ATC clearances and instructions. For a
    civilian aircraft, the FAA may address deviations from ATC clearances
    or instructions with compliance action, including remedial training, or
    enforcement action, including the suspension of an individual's pilot
    certificate, as authorized under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44709(b)(1)(A). For any
    violation of the DC Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA) and DC Flight
    Restricted Zone (FRZ), as described in Part 93, subpart V, the FAA may
    similarly suspend or revoke a pilot's airman certificates or impose
    civil penalties. 14 CFR Sec. 93.333. For violations committed by
    members of the armed forces while performing official duties for the
    Department of Defense, the FAA refers the violation to the appropriate
    branch of the military pursuant to the military referral process
    required under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 46101(b).
        Additionally, if a pilot knowingly or willfully violates national
    defense airspace established pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3),
    including the DC SFRA and DC FRZ, the pilot may be subject to criminal
    prosecution, including a fine under title 18, or imprisonment for not
    more than one year, or both. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 46307. The FAA refers such
    criminal conduct to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) or to the
    Department of Justice, if appropriate, for criminal investigation under
    5 U.S.C. app. 3.

        Question 6. In your testimony you mentioned that only some
    emergency and special helicopter traffic will continue in the vicinity
    of DCA and only when that air space is closed to planes. Can you
    quantify how many of these operations are still occurring? Is it twice
    a day or more frequently on average?
        Answer. For the period February 19, 2025 through April 30, 2025 (71
    days), there were 45 special helicopter operations, averaging a little
    more than half of 1 (0.63) special helicopter operation per day, within
    this airspace operating at or below 1500 feet.
        Regarding the number of operations that are still occurring,
    between May 1, 2025 and May 20, 2025 (20 days), there have been 23
    special helicopter operations, averaging a little more than 1 (1.15)
    special helicopter operation per day.

        Question 6a. How much of a boundary between that airspace is there
    and how long is the fixed-wing traffic halted?
        Answer. On average, presidential-related operations may pause
    traffic for 9 to 12 minutes, while lifesaving medical-related
    operations may cause a 5-to-7-minute pause to fixed-wing traffic.
    Active law enforcement and/or air defense missions are more fluid.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
                                Chris Rocheleau

        Question 1. On Friday, March 28, 2025, a U.S. Air Force jet flew
    within 500 feet of a Delta Airlines passenger jet departing Reagan
    National Airport to Minnesota. What is the status of investigations
    into this incident?
        Answer. The FAA has completed its preliminary investigation into
    the March 28 event at Reagan National Airport. Through our Safety
    Management System, we continue to identify hazards and implement safety
    measures at the airport and across the National Airspace System.

        Question 1a. How is the FAA and Department of Defense working to
    ensure similar incidents do not happen in the future?
        Answer. The FAA is working on refining coordination procedures
    between air traffic facilities, and internal to air traffic facilities,
    for military operations in the Washington D.C. area. This includes
    specific, clear communication for stopping arriving and departing
    traffic from Reagan Washington National (DCA) to accommodate those
    operations when necessary. The FAA is also taking steps to ensure
    controllers are briefed and have required, specific information prior
    to scheduled aerial flyovers, including routes of flight and timing.
    Collaboratively, the FAA and military partners are addressing pertinent
    Letters of Agreement (LOA) and communication surrounding aerial
    flyovers to ensure all entities have the same expectations and
    operations can be conducted safely in the area.

        Question 2. There has been an alarming number of close calls on
    runways in the past couple of years. Just last month, there were close
    calls involving landing aircraft at Chicago Midway Airport and DCA. I
    led a provision in the FAA reauthorization bill to ensure planes are
    equipped with technology that alerts pilots of nearby planes on the
    runway to help them avoid collisions.
        Can you provide an update on the implementation of this provision
    and adoption of this technology?
        Answer. Section 347 in the 2024 FAA Reauthorization required the
    FAA to establish the Runway Safety Council and identify both surface
    surveillance equipment and equipment on aircraft that ``may improve
    onboard situational awareness for flight crewmembers, including
    technologies for use in an aircraft.'' The section then directs
    deployment of surface surveillance technologies over 5 years.
        Regarding technologies on aircraft, while the section does not
    establish equipage requirements or direct the FAA to establish equipage
    requirements, it does note that the FAA should identify technologies
    and systems that would enhance safety and onboard situational
        awareness. Consistent with that direction, we have tasked the
    Investigative Technologies Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to seek
    recommendations on cockpit alerting technologies designed to reduce
    runway safety events.
        That ARC, comprised of government and industry stakeholders, has
    been meeting, and we will review recommendations when that work is
    complete.

        Question 3. The primary NOTAM system experienced outages on
    February 1 and March 22 that each lasted multiple hours. Last year, I
    worked with Senators Moran and Capito to pass the NOTAM Improvement Act
    directing the FAA to immediately upgrade this system. While the backup
    system is now in place and was activated to respond to recent outages,
    more work must be done to make all necessary upgrades.
        Can you provide any information on this outage and where things
    stand with the NOTAM Task Force?
        Answer. The recent Notice to Airman (NOTAM) outages were caused by
    hardware failures on the motherboards of the United States NOTAM System
    (USNS) servers. The system's architecture is over 30 years old, with
    the current hardware having been in continuous operation for
    approximately 15 years. On February 1, 2025, the hardware failure
    rendered the USNS system unrecoverable. Within an hour, the technical
    team determined that equipment recovery was not possible and initiated
    failover procedures. Due to the age and design of the system, the
    failover process takes a minimum of four hours, and the full
    restoration of the system took approximately 12 hours. To mitigate
    future outages, the team took immediate steps following the February 1,
    2025, event by staging spare servers and developing a rapid hardware
    swap process. As a result, when a similar motherboard failure occurred
    on March 22, 2025, the team was able to return the system to full
    functionality in less than four hours, without needing to activate the
    Candidate NOTAM Contingency System (CNCS). USNS resumed processing
    NOTAMs within two hours.
        In August 2024, the FAA pivoted to complete NOTAM Modernization
    utilizing a Challenge-Based Acquisition strategy to develop an
    innovative solution that leverages advancements in technology, high-
    availability architecture, and resilient infrastructure. The FAA
    selected the vendor to work on this modernization in April 2025, and
    the new NOTAM service is on track for delivery in July 2025 and
    deployment by September 2025. The FAA is also looking to accelerate
    user transition. This enables the FAA to implement our digitalization
    strategy by transitioning from the current legacy NOTAM system to an
    integrated NOTAM Management Service (NMS).
        The NOTAM Task Force submitted recommendations, now under review,
    in accordance with Pub. L. 118-4 (NOTAM Improvement Act) and NTSB
    Safety Recommendation A-18-024.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to
                                Chris Rocheleau

        Question 1. There is no question that there is an air traffic
    controller shortage and that we need to do more to address it. As we
    discussed in the hearing, there may be certified air traffic
    controllers are ready and able to return to work--but are just waiting
    on medical clearances. How many controllers around the country are
    waiting for medical clearances to return to work?
        Answer. As of May 8, 103 air traffic controllers are awaiting
    medical clearance to return to work. Of those 103 controllers,
    approximately 80 percent have a medical condition that requires further
    evaluation from their own physician, which they must provide to us
    before we can make a determination concerning their medical clearance.

        Question 1a. What is FAA doing to make sure these medical reviews
    are happening in a timely manner?
        Answer. FAA Order 3930.3C requires the Office of Aerospace Medicine
    to complete a medical clearance within 20 days of receiving of all
    medical documents. Over the last year, the national average has been
    9.9 calendar days. We have identified efficiencies and engaged in
    effective management oversight to ensure our review is completed in a
    timely manner.

        Question 2. In October, the Department of Transportation Inspector
    General reported that shortly before the 737 MAX 9 door plug blowout,
    individuals within FAA wanted to delegate airplane airworthiness
    inspection authority back to Boeing without any criteria by which to
    assess whether Boeing could be trusted to properly carry out these
    inspections. When Boeing last had this authority for the 737 MAX,
    Boeing abused it. Boeing knowingly and repeatedly produced 737 MAX
    aircraft with nonfunctioning Angle of Attack Disagree alerts--in
    blatant violation of the plane's approved type design.
        Will FAA commit to NOT delegating airworthiness inspection
    authority back to Boeing until FAA has implemented all 16 Department of
    Transportation Inspector General Recommendations in its October 9, 2024
    report, ``FAA's Oversight Processes for Identifying and Resolving
    Boeing Production Issues Are Not Effective''?
        Answer. The FAA will utilize all relevant safety data when making a
    determination regarding airworthiness inspection authority. Safety has
    no timeline, and the FAA will continue to hold Boeing accountable.

        Question 3. Following the 737 MAX 9 door plug blowout, FAA imposed
    a cap of 38 airplanes per month on Boeing's 737 MAX production. Will
    FAA commit to NOT raising the monthly cap on 737 MAX aircraft
    production until FAA has implemented all 16 Department of
    Transportation Inspector General Recommendations in its October 9, 2024
    report, ``FAA's Oversight Processes for Identifying and Resolving
    Boeing Production Issues Are Not Effective''?
        Answer. The FAA will utilize all relevant safety data when making a
    determination regarding Boeing's production rates. Safety has no
    timeline, and the FAA will continue to hold Boeing accountable.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jacky Rosen to
                                Chris Rocheleau

        Question 1. In response to this crash, Secretary Duffy announced a
    plan to boost air traffic control hiring with 30 percent salary
    increases for newly hired controller trainees entering FAA's Air
    Traffic Control Academy.
        Mr. Rocheleau, my team has heard from our air traffic controllers
    that these increases are only temporary, and compensation resets to the
    lower level once training for new controllers is complete. Is this
    correct? And could you provide an update on the progress of this effort
    and any promising data you have seen on this front?
        Answer. Effective March 9, 2025, all current trainees enrolled in
    the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Academy's Air Traffic Control
    (ATC) entry-level training program, along with individuals enrolled on
    or after that date, received a 30 percent salary increase. This
    adjustment applies specifically to newly hired and existing ATC
    trainees during their time at the FAA Academy and raises their annual
    salary--including locality pay--to $47,763.
        Upon successful completion of academy training, these trainees--who
    are initially appointed under temporary status--are converted to
    permanent positions and assigned to an en-route or terminal facility.
    At that point, their base compensation is determined in accordance with
    the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) Collective
    Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under the Air Traffic Specialized Pay Plan
    (ATSPP).
        In all cases, upon graduation, these trainees become academy
    graduates and are paid in accordance with the CBA. The salary of an
    academy graduate is higher than what they are paid as students, though
    the exact amount varies according to locality.

        Question 2. Can you discuss the challenges in hiring process for
    air traffic controllers, any other recent changes that have been made
    to the process, and any ways you are planning to improve the process to
    hire more controllers?
        Answer. The FAA is reviewing our hiring, training, and placement
    processes, as well as academy withdrawals and failures, to ensure our
    selection methods effectively identify candidates best suited for the
    Air Traffic Control Specialist profession.
        We have identified certain challenges in the controller hiring
    process including:

       Identifying candidates who possess the necessary aptitude
            for the position and can meet the medical requirements. In
            recent years, over 50 percent of our ATC applicants have
            encountered health issues, with conditions more commonly
            associated with older adults than with the targeted age
            demographic of 18-30 years.

       A growing number of applicants with issues that can affect
            the processing of security clearances. For example, they may
            not understand that Federal law is different from state law
            regarding the use of marijuana or be unaware that financial
            difficulties may hinder eligibility for employment or security
            clearances.

        To enhance efficiency, we have streamlined hiring by automating
    qualification assessments, enabling applicants to progress at their own
    pace while medical and security evaluations are conducted concurrently.
    These improvements are designed to accelerate the hiring process while
    effectively identifying candidates best suited for the Air Traffic
    Control profession.
        Enhanced Air Traffic-Collegiate Training Initiative (Enhanced AT-
    CTI): In April 2024, the FAA introduced Enhanced AT-CTI to create an
    additional pipeline for air traffic controllers by authorizing
    institutions to provide the same comprehensive curriculum offered at
    the FAA Academy.
                                     ______

          Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
                        Brigadier General Matthew Braman

        Question 1. Prior to our hearing where you testified, my staff was
    made aware of a memo which I understand outlines the policies and
    procedures for the Army's use of ADS-B in the National Capital Region.
    This memo was previously denied to my staff. On the day of the hearing,
    you promised to review the information and look at providing it to the
    Commerce Committee. Will you commit to immediately produce an
    unredacted copy of the memo ``ADS-B Out Off Operations in the National
    Airspace'' for the Commerce Committee staff?
        Answer. On April 2nd, 2025 the memo along with applicable
    background material was released to the HASC and SASC.

        Question 2. During the hearing, you were asked how frequently ADS-B
    Out is turned off. You committed to answering this in questions for the
    record. How frequently does the U.S. Army disable ADS-B Out during
    flights? Please specifically include data to justify your answer. If
    you choose to use a term of art to describe differing categories of
    missions or flights, please give data for those categories of flights
    as both a numerator and denominator.
        Answer. The Army's policy on utilization of Automatic Dependent
    Surveillance--Broadcast (ADS-B) Out is in accordance with the
    Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
    Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The U.S. Army Aviation Brigade's
    (TAAB) previous adherence to Army policy regarding ADS-B is part of the
    Army's ongoing investigation of the January 29 accident near Reagan
    National Airport (DCA). At the conclusion of the investigation,
    releasable information will be made available to the Committee.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
                        Brigadier General Matthew Braman

        Question 1.According to the NTSB, between October 2021 and December
    2024, there were more than 15,000 instances of commercial aircraft
    coming in close proximity to helicopters. Of those events, 85 had
    vertical separation of less than 200 feet. How many of those 85 events
    involved military helicopters?
        Answer. The data used to inform the National Transportation Safety
    Board's (NTSB) preliminary report resides with the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) and subsequently the NTSB. The Army has requested
    to examine the data.

        Question 1a. Please describe the process by which the Army shares
    information regarding aviation safety with the FAA. Is this
    information-sharing regime consistent across the NAS?
        Answer. The entry point for the Army is the OSD led Policy Board on
    Federal Aviation (PBFA) to address multi-Service aviation related
    issues with the FAA. Department of the Army Representatives (DAR)
    interact daily with FAA officials on a wide spectrum of aviation topics
    including: Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) airspace access; airspace
    proposals; environmental impacts; 5G impacts to aviation; and
    adjudicating pilot deviations among many other functions.
        The Army Safety Management Information System (ASMIS) database is
    the database of record for mishap, near miss, hazards, inspections, and
    safety and occupational health (SOH) management. The Army has no formal
    mechanism to share data from ASMIS with the FAA. DARs receive Mandatory
    Occurrence Reports (MOR) from the FAA's Air Traffic Organization. MORs
    record reportable events that occur in the national airspace. DARs
    process and ensure Army adjudications of any pilot deviation reported
    in the MOR. MORs are captured in FAA databases that the Army does not
    have access to. The Army is committed to supporting any effort to
    mitigate risk in the national airspace to include improving data
    sharing between the Department of Defense (DOD) and FAA.

        Question 2. The NTSB's report indicates that the PAT25 pilots
    reported discrepant altitude readings on repeated occasions in the
    leadup to the crash, but based on the NTSB's preliminary report, at no
    point were those discrepant readings reconciled. How do Army Aviation
    crews typically reconcile discrepant altitude readings? Are discrepant
    altitude readings internal to a crew standard for Army Aviation
    missions? What would typically account for discrepant altitude readings
    internal to an Army Aviation crew?
        Answer. Discrepant altitude readings internal to a crew are
    atypical for Army Aviation missions. Crews utilize the coordination
    elements, basic qualities, and objectives found in the Army Aircrew
    Coordination Training Program to effectively share tasks and
    information to resolve an unforeseen event such as diagnosing a
    potential discrepant altitude reading. The NTSB investigation has not
    yet determined the reason for the crewmembers of PAT25 stating
    different altitudes, their subsequent actions, or the actual instrument
    readings at that time.
        Discrepant altitude readings could potentially result from
    crewmembers looking at different altimeters (barometric versus radar),
    incorrect or different altimeter settings dialed into the Kollsman
    window on the two independent barometric altimeter systems in the UH-
    60L, or actual maintenance faults. In addition, each barometric
    altimeter has an allowable margin of error of plus or minus 75 feet
    which is consistent with the FAA standard.

        Question 3. Do you have a standard in place for The Army Aviation
    Brigade to conduct routine maintenance and testing to determine whether
    equipment, i.e., ADS-B Out, is working?
        Answer. At the time of the hearing, there was no scheduled
    maintenance or formal inspection ADS-B Out operations. Since that time,
    the Army established testing and maintenance tracking procedures to
    ensure the functionality and use of ADS-B Out. The maintenance actions
    are codified in an Aviation Safety Action Memo (ASAM) and will be
    directed for use in a Department of the Army order.
        Monthly, the FAA sends the Program Executive Office Aviation (PEO
    AVN) a spreadsheet identifying Army aircraft with ADS-B Out
    transmission issues. PEO AVN alerts the unit of the aircraft issues for
    resolution. The process was not formalized and as a result of the
    information the NTSB and Army investigators have identified in their
    preliminary findings has driven the Army to formalize this process.

        Question 3a. Please describe that protocol.
        Answer. Scheduled maintenance takes place anytime an aircraft
    phase, preventive maintenance service, or scheduled component
    replacement is conducted.
        An unscheduled maintenance requirement occurs when an aircraft
    experiences an unexpected malfunction, premature component breakdown,
    or battle damage.
        Regarding the ASAM, units will be required to train personnel on
    the testing, functionality, and repair criteria. Units will document
    the testing and validate the serviceability of the equipment.

        Question 3b. How often does that routine maintenance testing occur?
        Answer. The ASAM release re-baselines the functionality of all ADS-
    B systems. The Army is codifying a policy to validate use and function
    of the system before each flight to include internal test procedures
    and FAA ATC stations to validate transmissions.

        Question 3c. What occurs following the routine maintenance should a
    piece of equipment not be operating correctly? How is that documented
    and reported up the chain of command?
        Answer. If a piece of equipment is found to be inoperable, the
    flight crew or maintenance personnel will enter the fault into the
    Aircraft Inspection and Maintenance Record. Aircraft maintenance
    personnel will conduct troubleshooting procedures in accordance with
    the aircraft Electronic Technical Manual. Once the corrective
    maintenance is complete, the equipment will receive a Maintenance
    Operational Check or Maintenance Test Flight to confirm proper
    function.
        When aircraft equipment repair or malfunction is cause for an
    aircraft to be non-flyable, this is reported through the Daily Status
    Report to the command.

        Question 3d. Is that information reported to the Federal Aviation
    Administration?
        Answer. The Army does not report maintenance status of aircraft or
    systems to the FAA. However, Army aircraft must meet communications
    requirements to operate in the National Airspace. Army crews are not
    authorized to operate in FAA airspace if they are unable to meet the
    equipment requirements. Adherence to this requirement is within the
    scope of the concurrent NTSB and AR 15-6 investigations.
        Note: BG Braman indicated he would reply to this in the QFRs during
    the hearing.
                                     ______

    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to
                        Brigadier General Matthew Braman

        Question 1. Brigadier General Braman, in your testimony you
    mentioned that Night Vision goggle training is required for readiness
    in the area. By most accounts operating with these goggles in an urban
    environment means a limited sight range and washed out vision due to
    all the light.
        What are the benefits to training in a congested urban environment
    with night vision goggles?
        Answer. The Army Aviation Brigade's (TAAB) mission to provide 24-
    hour responsive rotary wing support to senior government and military
    officials for continuity of government operations requires its aircrews
    to operate and train in the National Capital Region (NCR) during day
    and night hours. Flying at night at low altitudes under NVGs is the
    standard for Army Aircrews and has been validated as the principle
    method for flight operations in the National Airspace and in combat in
    urban, rural and overwater environments. All Army aviators are trained
    to operate utilizing night vision goggles for nighttime flying because
    of the exponential increase in situational awareness. Army aviators
    have the authority to remove their goggles if they deem it advantageous
    due to very high light levels or other factors when normal scanning
    techniques are not sufficient. However normal scanning techniques using
    peripheral vision with googles on is still the most effective means for
    optimal vision at night in all environments especially urban.

        Question 1a. Are night vision goggles still being used on the
    limited number of Army flights in the region?
        Answer. Yes, night vision goggles provide pilots with an unmatched
    capability to improve situational awareness for nighttime flying as
    stated above.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                        Brigadier General Matthew Braman

        Question 1. Black Hawk crewmember requirements. Army Regulation
    (AR) 95-1 requires two-pilot operations as the standard for night
    vision goggle (NVG) flights, with at least one pilot being NVG-
    qualified and current. In addition, a non-pilot crewmember, such as a
    crew chief, is required to be onboard to help with maintaining
    situational awareness.
        Would a requirement for a 4th crewmember have made a difference in
    promoting situational awareness for the Black Hawk's flight crew? Why
    or why not?
        Answer. Army Regulation 95-1 does not mandate minimum crewmember
    requirements specific to night vision goggle flights. The minimum
    aircrew requirement by the UH-60L Black Hawk operator manual is two
    pilots. In this instance there were three crewmembers.
        The specific circumstances that led to the accident will be
    determined by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) during
    its ongoing investigation. However, the Army has determined in the
    course of its safety investigation into the accident that PAT25's crew
    chief was seated on the left side of the aircraft, which was the same
    side American Airlines Flight 5342 approached from.

        Question 2. Should the Army consider revising its minimum crew
    requirements for Black Hawk helicopter operations like that performed
    by the 12th Army Aviation Brigade?
        Answer. The Army will review all regulations and policies and will
    take appropriate action based on the facts and recommendations of the
    ongoing investigations when complete. The minimum aircrew requirement
    by the UH-60L Black Hawk operator manual is two pilots. The unit
    commander and pilot in command determine the size of the crew based on
    factors associated with each mission, the environment, and an
    assessment of the crew. Should the NTSB determine the number of
    aircrews assigned to PAT25 to be a causal factor in the accident, the
    Army will review its minimum crew requirements for Black Hawk
    helicopter operations and take appropriate action.

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