[Senate Hearing 119-129]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-129
NUUK AND CRANNY:
LOOKING AT THE ARCTIC AND GREENLAND'S GEOSTRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO U.S.
INTERESTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 12, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-273 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
TODD YOUNG, Indiana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOHN CURTIS, Utah BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
BERNIE MORENO, Ohio JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
TIM SHEEHY, Montana JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ANDY KIM, New Jersey
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Liam McKenna, General Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
Jonathan Hale, General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on February 12, 2025................................ 1
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 3
Statement of Senator Sheehy...................................... 23
Statement of Senator Kim......................................... 28
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 30
Statement of Senator Blunt Rochester............................. 32
Statement of Senator Moreno...................................... 34
Statement of Senator Peters...................................... 35
Statement of Senator Blackburn................................... 37
Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 39
Statement of Senator Schmitt..................................... 41
Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................ 42
Statement of Senator Young....................................... 44
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 46
Witnesses
Alexander B. Gray, Senior Fellow, American Foreign Policy Council 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Anthony Marchese, Chairman, Texas Mineral Resource............... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Dr. Jennifer Mercer, Section Head, Section for Arctic Sciences,
Office of Polar Programs, Directorate for Geosciences, U.S.
National Science Foundation.................................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Dr. Rebecca Pincus, Director, Polar Institute, Wilson Center..... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Appendix
Article dated February 4, 2025 from Reuters enitled, ``I'm a
Greenland expert--these 3 paths can make it America's next
frontier'' by Ronald Lauder.................................... 51
Response to written questions submitted to Alexander B. Gray by:
Hon. Roger Wicker............................................ 52
Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................ 54
Response to written questions submitted to Anthony Marchese by:
Hon. Jacky Rosen............................................. 55
Response to written questions submitted to Dr. Jennifer Mercer
by:
Hon. Roger Wicker............................................ 56
Response to written questions submitted to Dr. Rebecca Pincus by:
Hon. Roger Wicker............................................ 56
Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................ 57
Hon. Jacky Rosen............................................. 58
NUUK AND CRANNY: LOOKING AT THE
ARCTIC AND GREENLAND'S GEOSTRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO U.S. INTERESTS
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2025
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Cruz,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cruz [presiding], Thune, Wicker, Fischer,
Moran, Sullivan, Blackburn, Young, Budd, Schmitt, Curtis,
Moreno, Sheehy, Capito, Lummis, Cantwell, Klobuchar, Schatz,
Markey, Peters, Baldwin, Duckworth, Rosen, Lujan, Hickenlooper,
Fetterman, Kim, and Blunt Rochester.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
The Chairman. Good morning. The Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation will come to order.
It is fitting this Wednesday morning, as we convene a
hearing on Greenland, that we have snow on the ground and ice
surrounding us.
Today, we are here to talk about something that just a few
years ago was treated as far-fetched, but has long been worth
serious consideration, the potential of the United States
acquiring Greenland. Back in 2019, President Trump raised this
issue, the idea of purchasing Greenland, and at the time, it
was dismissed by some as outlandish. But given shifting global
dynamics, the geopolitical importance of Greenland makes this
conversation one we can no longer ignore.
It is a topic of interest to members on both sides of the
aisle. Indeed, the idea for this hearing was one the Ranking
Member suggested earlier this year. Greenland has never been
some remote island; it holds immense strategic and economic
importance. Its location and proximity to critical
transatlantic trade routes places it at the center of several
global debates.
The growing influence of China and Russia in the Arctic
region, where Russia has long maintained military assets, and
China has invested heavily with a clear strategic eye, is a
direct challenge to the United States and our allies. This
deserves serious consideration and response.
Greenland sits directly on the shortest flight path for
intercontinental ballistic missiles traveling from Russia or
the Middle East to the United States, making its positioning
critical to our security. We have maintained a military
presence in Greenland since World War II, particularly at
Pituffik Space Base, which serves as the northernmost U.S.
Military installation and provides critical missile warning and
space surveillance.
The Base, along with its deep-water port and airfield, is
an integral part of our national security infrastructure. Also
key to our operational presence and influence in the Arctic is
a healthy number of polar icebreakers.
The U.S. built its last heavy icebreaker nearly five
decades ago. Meanwhile, China has four, and Russia has over 40,
whose warships increasingly appear near Alaska. The only
operational United States heavy icebreaker, the POLAR STAR is
20 years beyond its service life. This is simply unacceptable.
President Trump has highlighted the urgent need for a new
fleet, and as Chairman, I am committed to ending Russian and
Chinese icebreaker dominance. Executing on this quickly--not
waiting for years and years on piecemeal annual appropriations,
it is vital for our national security, the economic
productivity of Alaska and the Arctic, and our national
shipbuilding capacity in American shipyards like Keppel AmFELS
and Bollinger.
But it is not just about defense. Greenland sits atop vast
reserves of rare earth elements, materials critical for
everything from technology to national defense. These elements
are vital in the production of smartphones, military equipment,
medical technologies, and much, much more. If the U.S. were to
gain access to Greenland's resources, it could significantly
reduce our dependence on foreign suppliers, particularly China,
which currently operates a virtual monopoly on the rare earth
market.
Now, some may argue that the U.S. purchasing territory is
out of the question, but it is not unusual for us to do so.
Indeed, much of the history of our Nation was formed by
acquiring territory. In 1803, President Thomas Jefferson
negotiated the Louisiana Purchase with Napoleon, spending $15
million to purchase 828,000 square miles of land, land that
ultimately became part of 14 states, many of which are
represented on this committee today.
From the Louisiana Purchase, we got portions of Arkansas,
Iowa, Missouri, Oklahoma, Nebraska, Minnesota, Louisiana, New
Mexico, the great state of Texas, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Wyoming, Montana, and Colorado. Without the Louisiana Purchase,
the United States would be a very, very different place than it
is today.
And then in 1867, the United States purchased Alaska from
Russia, spending $7.2 million for what became our 49th state,
and what ultimately gave this committee Senator Dan Sullivan.
And indeed, purchasing territory from Denmark is not unusual.
The United States purchased the Virgin Islands from the Danish
Crown in 1917 to secure a strategic military position in the
Caribbean, especially to protect the newly opened Panama Canal,
and safe time maritime routes from Germany at war with Western
powers.
The acquisition of Greenland is not about military force;
it is about diplomacy and shared interests, the same way we
acquired the territories that make us the Nation we are. And
let us not forget, friends and allies can have tough
conversations. The U.S. and Denmark have a strong relationship,
and discussions about Greenland's future do not have to be
adversarial.
If Greenland's future were to include joining the United
States that would almost surely require the approval of the
Greenlandic people, likely through a public referendum. This
would be a mutual decision, and it is one worth discussing. For
Greenlanders, there would be many benefits to becoming an
American territory, including American citizenship, including
billions of dollars of new American investment in Greenland
that would raise the standard of living of the 50,000
Greenlanders there today.
I look forward to hearing the testimony from our witnesses
about the national security and economic implications of
acquiring Greenland, and about the opportunities and challenges
we face.
And with that, I recognize the Ranking Member for her
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this important hearing on the Arctic and Greenland,
America's economy, and national security.
The United States is an Arctic Nation. My colleagues,
Senator Sullivan and Senator Murkowski, say that early and
often. Senator Murkowski and I took a trip to the Arctic and
Greenland in 2019 with several of our colleagues, and she has
been a strong voice calling for a more robust American
leadership in the High North. My state has longstanding ties to
the Arctic. When you talk about 125 years ago in the Klondike
Gold Rush and how everything sent to Alaska came through Puget
Sound, the 200 vessels home ported in Seattle that are part of
a multi-billion dollar fishing industry in Alaska.
There is a good reason that the Magnus and Stevenson Act
that is in place to protect U.S. fishermen, is named after two
senators who served as Chairman of this committee.
During the Cold War, America recognized that we had a vital
economic and national security interest in the Arctic, now as
climate change opens up new sea routes at the top of the world
we must do so again. New shipping channels could shorten
shipping times between Europe and Asia by two weeks or more,
tourism, developing infrastructure, could drive new economic
opportunities in remote communities and our Arctic allies could
help replace China as the beginning of a new critical mineral
supply chain for semiconductors, batteries, defense
technologies.
However, as the ice melts we also face growing competition
from our international competitors and adversaries. Russia and
China are both increasing their military presence in the
Arctic. I am sure we will hear about that today. Just last year
they conducted a joint military exercise in the Far East and
Arctic the reality is they want to be able to control the sea
lanes, block freedom of navigation of our commercial, and
shipping, and our military.
They want to be able to tap into and sabotage undersea
cables and they want to move their stealth submarines and
launch hypersonic missiles undetected. Russia is also engaging
in illegal fishing in Alaskan waters, and operating a shadow
dark fleet to evade oil sanctions. And following Russia's
invasion of Ukraine it became impossible to reach consensus on
the Arctic Council.
That is why I believe, Mr. Chairman, in partnership with
Canada, and Greenland, and NATO, the U.S. must renew and
recommit to an Arctic strategy that solidifies America's
leadership in the Arctic. Instead of starting a new trade war
America must reinvigorate and expand cooperation with our
allies, including Canada and other Nordic countries. We should
be pushing to expand NATO's mission in the High North, with
Finland and Sweden joining the Alliance, seven of the eight
Arctic nations are now NATO members.
Our good model is how NATO recently launched its Baltic
Century Operation where allies work together to monitor and
promote early warnings of threats from foreign adversaries and
protect shared subsea infrastructure.
I encourage that, and I have encouraged that in the recent
weeks. NATO's Secretary, General Rutte, has called for a more
proactive NATO engagement in the region to strengthen our
collective defenses.
The reality is the Arctic is too vast to police alone, it
will take time and investment by both the U.S., and our like-
minded allies to meet those threats from Russia and China.
Russia has already more than 40 icebreakers. I am so glad to
hear the Chairman's commitment to icebreakers, as I am sure
Senator Wicker is too, the place where many of these ice
breakers are built.
While the U.S. Coast Guard only has two, and the Navy has
zero. Thanks to the bipartisan support of this committee the
Coast Guard will soon operate a third icebreaker, but
additional investments are desperately needed, the Chairman
mentioned this, to make even this one additional ship
operational, Congress has authorized six more icebreakers, but
that is still only a fraction of what is required. So I commend
President Trump for saying that quote, ``We are going to order
about 40 Coast Guard icebreakers.'' We will need those
icebreakers. In fact I, 20 years ago, brought then Commandant
Thad Allen to meet with several of our colleagues who were
blocking these icebreakers.
The future of the U.S. leadership, commerce, and security
in the Arctic will require investments in these Coast Guard and
military capabilities. We need shoreside infrastructure,
including icebreaker homeports, new MH-60 helicopters, more C-
130s, and P-8s in the region, and other Navy and air assets.
That is the brawn, but we also need the brains to win the
High North. So I hope this committee can work together to
explain why massive NSF layoffs and budget short cuts--budget
cuts, because I believe they are shortsighted. For example, the
University of Washington had a $400,000 study on how glacier
breakups off the Coast of Greenland contributed to coastal
flooding, something I think we would all be interested in.
This seems particularly shortsighted when we need to
understand Greenland better than ever before. In World War II,
it served as an essential refueling for military aircraft
flying between North America and Europe, cryolite mined in
Greenland was used to make U.S. fighters and bombers, and
during cold war--during the Cold War Greenland served as a home
to the U.S. early warning network against Soviet missiles.
Once we had 10 military bases in the world's largest
island, today only the space base remains. The good news is if
we stop talking about buying Greenland and instead work quickly
to reestablish U.S. interests there have been, I think since
1951, many update agreements between Greenland and the United
States, the one most recently 2018 I think during the Trump--
during the first Trump administration.
These agreements are in place that authorized dual-use
investments, new port infrastructure, fiber optic cable, radar,
and power plants. Over time, Greenland can be a rich source for
critical minerals, but there are still high barriers to that
development, something I am sure we will hear about at today's
hearing, but we can also support the expansion of tourism and
infrastructure with airports, roads, and hotels.
And I am sure as our witness from the Wilson Center, Dr.
Pincus, will point out today, Greenland has a tremendous
untapped hydropower potential. Someday Greenland could become
home to data centers to give us the edge in the race for AI,
and I plan to introduce legislation that would authorize the
Department of Energy to provide feasibility studies on the
development of Greenland's hydropower potential.
I also believe that we should direct the EXIM Bank, and
other agencies to provide support for more us infrastructure
investments in Arctic Nations like Greenland.
And as I said at the last hearing, the United States needs
to do more to improve our strategic investments to counter our
adversaries. I believe cooperation is the best interest of the
United States, and the Arctic is too vast to just police alone.
Hopefully, these coalitions and collective defenses can
help expedite U.S. interests there, and support scientific
research and national security.
So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and
continuing to make sure that America, maybe this Greenland
incident, Mr. Chairman, will elevate this discussion that
Senator Murkowski, Senator Sullivan, myself, have been trying
to get so many people to realize we are an Arctic Nation, we
have interests there, and we need to continue to move forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. We now have four
expert witnesses before this committee.
The first witness is Alexander Gray, Senior Fellow in
National Security Affairs at the American Foreign Policy
Council. Mr. Gray served as the Chief of Staff to President
Trump's National Security Council from 2019 to 2021 and helped
form the administration's positions on elevating the U.S.-
Greenland relationship.
Our second witness is Mr. Anthony Marchese, Chairman of the
Texas Minerals Resource Corporation, a public company focused
on rare earth production, developing one of the biggest
deposits of rare earth elements in the United States. He has
over a decade of experience in the economics of mineral
exploration.
Our third witness is Dr. Jennifer Mercer, Section Head for
the National Science Foundation's Arctic Sciences Section. She
has more than 10 years of experience in Greenland and more in
Antarctica.
And our final witness will be Dr. Rebecca Pincus, who is
the Director of the Wilson Center Polar Institute. She has
focused her research on Arctic security and geopolitics.
Mr. Gray, we will start with you. You are recognized for
your testimony.
STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER B. GRAY,
SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL
Mr. Gray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Cantwell, and Members of the Committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today on an incredibly
important topic.
My name is Alex Gray. I am currently a Senior Fellow at the
American Foreign Policy Council. During President Trump's first
term, I served as Deputy Assistant to the President, and Chief
of Staff of the White House National Security Council. Earlier,
I had served at the NSC as Director for Oceania and Indo-
Pacific Security, in which capacity I spent a fair amount of
time working on China's relationship in the Polar Regions.
My comments today will focus on the strategic and military
importance of Greenland to the United States. Beginning in
2019, and continuing to today, President Trump has brought
critical public attention to the question of Greenland's
strategic significance in the Western Hemisphere and to
America's national security. But it is critical to acknowledge
that, while this topic has only recently gained widespread
public attention, Greenland has long been a focal point for
U.S. strategists looking to safeguard the periphery of our
hemisphere.
Before reviewing the history of U.S. interest in
Greenland's security and the threats that adversary influence
or control of Greenland can pose to the United States, I want
to make a general point about the ongoing dialogue concerning
potential U.S. acquisition of Greenland.
First, I do strongly support President Trump's stated
effort to bring Greenland closer to the United States. As I
will mention in this testimony, the administration has several
excellent options to do just that.
Second, and I think this is an important point that has
been overlooked, the current debate has unfortunately become
centered on the Kingdom of Denmark rather than on the people of
Greenland themselves. Denmark is a key ally of the United
States, both bilaterally and through NATO. Danish servicemen
have fought and died alongside their American friends for
decades, in World War II, Korea, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
This debate, though, must move beyond U.S.-Danish relations
because that is simply ancillary to the larger choice facing
the United States. Washington and Copenhagen are going to
continue to be close friends regardless of the ultimate status
of Greenland.
Put simply, and as embodied in Greenland's own Foreign
Security Defense Policy Strategy that was put out last year,
the ultimate goal of Nuuk is to obtain independence from
Denmark. When this will happen is subject to debate, including
in Greenland and Denmark itself, but for U.S. purposes, it is
vital that leaders in Washington take seriously what the
Greenlanders themselves are telling us, and what the last
several decades of increasing Greenlandic self-governance and
autonomy demonstrate.
Members of the Committee, the question facing American
policymakers comes down to the following, in my view: When
Greenland inevitably obtains independence from Denmark, as
their leaders again tell us that they will, who is going to
greet them on the other side? Will it be Russia and China, with
their history of predatory behavior in small developing states
and their unwillingness to respect such state sovereignty? Or
will it be the United States, with our commitment to
sovereignty, the rule of law, respect for the environment, and
for the rights and heritage of indigenous people?
Now is the time to begin laying the groundwork for what
arrangements can be put into place once Greenlandic
independence is imminent.
History tells us how critical this is. And I preview in my
testimony, going back to the 1860s, just how much the United
States has focused on Greenland as a potential strategic threat
if it is occupied or controlled by an adversary power.
I would just highlight a couple of things for these
purposes. The U.S. actually occupied Greenland during World War
II, because it was so essential that we keep the Nazis from
occupying it and being able to base U-boats from there, or
potentially to launch bombers against the East Coast of the
United States from Greenland.
The United States has attempted to purchase Greenland at
least four times, depending on how you count, starting in 1867,
and as recently as 1955. Administrations of both parties, Harry
Truman, Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, all seriously
considered bringing Greenland closer to the United States
because the strategic logic is so clear.
The Island has 27,000 miles of coastline. At its shortest
point, it is about 1,100 miles of flying time to the United
States. Over the past several decades, foreign vessels have
repeatedly arrived in Greenlandic waters without proper
authorization, or in violation of NATO protocols. In one
instance, a Russian submarine actually showed up in Greenlandic
waters and was discovered by accident.
Unfortunately, our friends in Copenhagen have not devoted
the defense resources necessary to ensure that Greenland, and
the coastline, and the airspace is protected the way they
should be. As during the Cold War, the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap
remains an area of considerable strategic concern for the
United States as an area for submarine passage going to the
East Coast of the United States.
Finally, the United States has significant interest in the
Space Base at Pituffik which, obviously, remains one of only
two U.S. Arctic facilities that--one of only two U.S. Military
bases in the Arctic at that altitude that would serve strategic
space interests, and there is no redundancy if we were to lose
one of them.
China and Russia have demonstrated their interest in
finding weak spots in the Arctic in recent years, dramatically
increasing their capabilities. China has preposterously called
itself a ``near-Arctic power''. It has launched a Polar Silk
Road initiative with the intention to do in the Arctic what it
has long done in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific,
undermine the sovereignty of developing states at the expense
of regional and global security.
Finally, I would just mention a couple of things on how the
United States could best bring Greenland closer to the United
States. We have a couple of options. One, we could make
Greenland a territory, an insular area. We have 14 insular
areas in the United States: Guam, American Samoa, U.S. Virgin
Islands, to name a few. That is certainly an option. They all
have various levels of self-government. They have various
levels--depending on Congress' intent, they have various levels
of day-to-day autonomy.
Alternatively, the United States could offer a Compact of
Free Association to Greenland, similar to what we have with the
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau.
This is, in my view, an excellent option whereby
sovereignty by Greenland would be maintained. At the same time,
the United States would have a defense obligation and defense
access to Greenland that would ensure our strategic interests
in the island are upheld. This would grant us also the right to
deny military access to an adversary power who sought to use
Greenland for its own purposes.
While both these options present opportunities and
challenges, the point I want to make is this, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member, the United States is running out of time to
develop a coherent strategic response to an independent
Greenland. The security stakes are too high to allow Greenland
to obtain independence without a plan in place for the U.S. to
ensure our core strategic interests are assured.
As stated above, excellent options do exist and can be
implemented, given appropriate attention, focus, and will from
the Administration and Congress.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gray follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alexander B. Gray, Senior Fellow,
American Foreign Policy Council
Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on
this important topic. My name is Alex Gray, and I am currently a Senior
Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington.
During President Trump's first term in office, I served as Deputy
Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff of the White House
National Security Council (NSC). Earlier, I had served as the first-
ever Director for Oceania & Indo-Pacific Security at the NSC.
My comments today will focus on the strategic and military
importance of Greenland to the United States. Beginning in 2018 and
continuing to today, President Trump has brought critical public
attention to the question of Greenland's strategic significance in the
Western Hemisphere and to American national security. But it is
critical to acknowledge that while this topic has only recently gained
widespread public attention, Greenland has long been a focal point for
U.S. strategists looking to safeguard the periphery of the Hemisphere.
Before reviewing the history of U.S. interest in Greenland's
security and the threats that adversary influence or control of
Greenland can pose to the U.S., I would like to make a general point
about the ongoing dialogue concerning potential American acquisition of
Greenland. First, I strongly support President Trump's stated effort to
bring Greenland closer to the United States. As I will preview in this
testimony, the Administration has several excellent options to do just
that.
Second, the current debate has unfortunately become centered on the
Kingdom of Denmark, rather than on the people of Greenland themselves.
Denmark is a key ally of the United States, both bilaterally and
through NATO. Danish servicemen have fought and died alongside their
American friends for decades, in World War II, Korea, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere. This debate must move beyond U.S.-Danish
relations, because that is simply ancillary to the larger choice facing
the United States. Washington and Copenhagen will continue a warm
relationship regardless of the ultimate status of Greenland.
Put simply, and as embodied in Greenland's own ``Foreign, Security,
and Defense Policy: 2024-2033'', the ultimate goal of Nuuk is to obtain
independence from Denmark. When this will happen is subject to debate,
including in Greenland and Denmark, but for American purposes it is
vital that leaders in Washington take seriously what the Greenlanders
are themselves telling us, and what the last several decades of
increasing Greenlandic self-governance and autonomy demonstrate.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cantwell, Members of the Committee,
the question facing American policymakers comes down to the following:
when Greenland inevitably obtains independence from Denmark, as their
leaders tell us they will, who will be there to greet them on the other
side? Will it be Russia and China, with their history of predatory
behavior in small, developing states and unwillingness to respect such
states' sovereignty? Or will it be the United States, with our
commitment to sovereignty, the rule of law, respect for the
environment, and for the rights and heritage of indigenous peoples? Now
is the time to begin laying the groundwork for what arrangements can be
put into place once Greenlandic independence is imminent.
History tells us just how critical this work is. At least since
Secretary of State William Seward in 1867, American strategists of
various political and ideological persuasions have seen Greenland as a
key component of the holistic defense of the U.S. homeland, North
America, and the Hemisphere more broadly from potential adversaries. At
a little over 1,100 miles from the East Coast at its closest point and
controlling vital sea routes between the U.S. and Europe, Greenland has
always presented potential adversaries a tempting target for power
projection into North America.
One of the rare, conscious American exceptions to the Monroe
Doctrine of the last two centuries was the Wilson Administration's
acquiescence to Denmark's extension of political and economic control
over the whole of Greenland, in exchange for the purchase of the Danish
West Indies (now the U.S. Virgin Islands) during World War I. This
decision was later regretted by numerous U.S. strategists, including
the visionary Army Air Corps General Billy Mitchell, who saw the
potential threat of adversary air bases on Greenland as early as the
1920s.
By World War II, when Denmark was occupied by Nazi Germany, the
U.S. was faced with a possible German occupation of Greenland. The U.S.
in turn occupied Greenland for the duration of the war, establishing a
precedent of American military access to the island that continues
today. The Truman Administration, in 1946, and the Eisenhower
Administration, in 1955, put forward proposals for the acquisition of
Greenland. While neither came to fruition, they illustrate the
bipartisan understanding during the Cold War of the strategic necessity
of the world's largest island. It has only been in the post-Cold War
decades, and America's period of distraction in the Middle East and
South Asia, that core, hemispheric interests like Greenland have been
allowed to escape attention in Washington.
Greenland poses a number of potential security challenges for the
United States, should it fall under the control or influence of an
adversary power. The island's 27,000 miles of coastline are often
relatively unmonitored, and Denmark has consistently failed to provide
the military resources necessary to ensure surveillance of them. Over
the past several decades, foreign vessels have repeatedly arrived in
Greenlandic waters without proper authorization or in violation of NATO
protocols-or in the case of a Russian submarine, they were only
detected by chance.
As during the Cold War, the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap remains
an area of considerable strategic concern for the United States,
serving as a principal passage for Russian (formerly Soviet) submarines
to near the East Coast of the United States. Control of Greenland and
its approaches is essential for the United States to fully cover the
Gap, a motivating factor for the U.S. occupation of Greenland in the
1940s and for the continuing military presence there during the Cold
War. Increased Russian submarine activity in the Arctic and closer to
the U.S. in recent years has only heightened these longstanding
concerns.
Greenland also has numerous air and space vulnerabilities for the
United States. Its airspace, and visibility into it, is essential for
broader North American security. Given Denmark's lack of investment in
the military resources needed to uphold security near Greenland, the
island's airspace is a subject of some concern, particularly given
Russia's growing bomber presence in the Arctic.
And as is well known, the U.S. maintains Pituffik Space Base on
Greenland. Given the increasing use of polar or sun-synchronous orbit
for satellites in critical fields like communications and weather, and
the concomitant need for ground tracking stations in the polar regions,
maintaining such a site is essential. Unfortunately, it is one of only
two such Arctic facilities available to the U.S. In the event of an
unexpected event, or even if Greenlandic independence resulted in a
loss of U.S. access to Pituffik, the lack of redundancy in such
capabilities would be immensely harmful to U.S. interests.
China and Russia have demonstrated their interest in finding weak
spots in the Arctic in recent years, while dramatically increasing
their capabilities. Both countries are investing heavily in
icebreakers, including nuclear-powered ones. China's preposterous
declaration that it is a ``near-Arctic power'', along with the launch
of its ``Polar Silk Road'' initiative, bespeak an intention to do in
the Arctic what it has long practiced in Africa, Southeast Asia, and
the Pacific: undermine the sovereignty of developing states at the
expense of regional and global security.
Indeed, from the Faroe Islands (another Danish possession) to
Norwegian-administered Svalbard, Chinese and Russian malign activity in
the High North is only growing and offering indications of the
challenge facing the U.S. in securing our interests in an increasingly
volatile Arctic.
Preventing a post-independence Greenland from going the way of
other vulnerable, developing states who have succumbed to Chinese (or
Russian) malign activity must be a top national security priority for
the Administration and Congress. To that end, there are two options
that would most effectively protect a post-independence Greenland from
outside malign interference and uphold U.S. interests.
First, Greenland could agree to join the United States as one of
our currently fourteen ``insular areas,'' which include jurisdictions
as diverse as American Samoa, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and
Guam. Each are administered and organized differently, per Congress,
with differing levels of local control. I have argued that such an
approach, which would formally link Greenland to the United States in
perpetuity and solve permanently the security dilemma we are
discussing, is the ideal solution. It would also offer numerous
economic and other benefits to the Greenlanders, recognizing that the
details of such a territory would be subject to detailed and difficult
negotiations.
Second, the United States could offer an independent Greenland (or,
for the time being, indicate our intent to offer a to-be-independent
Greenland) a Compact of Free Association, or COFA. This concept is
currently in place with the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of
Micronesia, and Palau. As the Committee is aware, COFA signatory states
are sovereign, independent countries; they are United Nations members
with their own foreign policies and systems of governmental
organization. What they share is a legal commitment by the United
States to their defense; the grant of permanent military access to the
United States; and the right of the United States to deny such access
to any other power. Additionally, the U.S. provides the COFA signatory
states certain financial support and development assistance.
While both options present challenges and opportunities, the point
I seek to make is this: the United States is running out of time to
develop a coherent strategic response to an independent Greenland. The
security stakes are simply too high to allow Greenland to obtain
independence without a plan in place for the U.S. to ensure our core
strategic interests are assured. Fortunately, as stated above, such
options exist and can be implemented given appropriate attention,
focus, and will from the Administration and Congress.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cantwell, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to your
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Gray.
Mr. Marchese.
STATEMENT OF ANTHONY MARCHESE, CHAIRMAN,
TEXAS MINERAL RESOURCES
Mr. Marchese. Thank you very much, Chairman Cruz, Ranking
Member Cantwell, and honorable Members of the Committee. Thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today to address
Greenland's mineral riches, and more specifically--excuse me--
the potential development of a critical minerals industry.
I am Anthony Marchese, and for 12 years I have been
Chairman of Texas Mineral Resources, a publicly traded company
that, along with a partner, is developing the Round Top
Project, a world-class critical minerals deposit just outside
El Paso, in Senator Cruz's home state of Texas.
Round Top's diverse array of critical minerals, when
combined with my 30 years of experience in the capital markets,
I believe, gives me a unique perspective on the discussion of
Greenland's riches.
As the world's largest island, roughly one and a half times
the size of Alaska, Greenland presents a mining conundrum. On
one hand, it is a treasure chest of not only critical minerals,
but base metals, precious metals, and industrial minerals.
A map prepared by the Government of Greenland illustrates
the obvious. Greenland's entire coastline holds what is
indisputably one of the world's greatest collections of
minerals in one jurisdiction. Throw a dart at any portion of
the coastline, and you will undoubtedly hit a potential world-
class target.
Conversely, the sheer topography of Greenland presents a
potential--or presents significant challenges: One-mile-thick
ice in its interior, covering 85 percent of the country, winter
temperatures averaging 16 degrees Fahrenheit; and thick sea
ice, which potentially create clogged shipping lanes.
While geological maps of Greenland present a vast array of
critical mineral deposits along its coast, the presence of such
deposits is only a starting point for exploration. Critical
minerals vary in value significantly.
Rare earth minerals, such as cerium and lanthanum, although
considered critical by the U.S. Geological Survey because they
are part of the rare earth minerals basket, are not as valuable
as neodymium and praseodymium, which are essential for magnets
and batteries. Mineral characterization is essential in order
to, ``separate the wheat from the chaff'', to focus on
economically profitable deposits.
Such characterization requires significant amounts of
exploratory drilling. Drilling provides answers to questions
such as: What minerals do we have? What are the estimates of
the quantities we have? And what are the grades of the minerals
we have? Drilling is expensive, and such costs in Greenland are
magnified.
Once mineral characterization costs are addressed, capital
and operating costs of mining are encapsulated in a feasibility
study. After receiving the necessary approvals and permits, the
feasibility study requires drilling data, metallurgical data,
processing cost data, environmental data, and finally, the
downfall of many projects, commodity prices or accommodating
commodity prices.
Mining in Greenland dates back to the 1950s. In fact,
Greenland was at one time the world's largest producer of
cryolite, a mineral used in aluminum production. Outside of
cryolite, serious mining in Greenland commenced in the 1990s.
Unfortunately, there has not been significant critical mineral
mining in Greenland.
In 2021, the Government effectively ended a promising rare
earth project because uranium would be mined as a mineral
byproduct. As a result, Greenland banned uranium mining due to
local indigenous opposition. Interestingly, a study sponsored
by McGill University, in Canada, several years ago found that
over 85 percent of the population surveyed favored mining, with
the exception of radioactive materials.
Without characterization, we do not know if future mineral
deposits are accompanied by uranium, thereby potentially
limiting development unless there are policy changes.
An acquisition of Greenland by the United States could take
many forms. I believe Alex just mentioned those. There needs to
be a determination as to which regulatory authorities, if any,
would govern mining projects. In the United States, the Bureau
of Land Management and the U.S. Forestry Service govern mining
regulations on Federal lands, while states like Alaska also
give serious consideration to the desires of the indigenous
population.
At the present time, Greenland's 56,000 inhabitants are
predominantly Inuits, an indigenous population which has a
strong voice in environmental policy, along with the
Governments of Greenland and Denmark. Regulatory authorities
are critical to an examination of the economic incentives for
mining. Characterization of mineral deposits is time-consuming
and expensive, tantamount to venture capital investing.
The USGS could provide government funding for such
characterization to lessen the exploration risk for private
industry. In this regard, it is imperative to remember that
capital costs for Greenland projects are highly variable.
Frigid winters create many restrictions and significant hurdles
for timely project development.
Lack of infrastructure, such as roads, fuel, electricity,
and housing, exacerbate capital costs. Workforce needs would
require the import of foreign labor, given that skilled mining
labor is minimal in Greenland. Metallurgical expertise
necessary to process mineral material would present further
challenges as such expertise is generally available, primarily,
in Asia.
Greenland's mining challenges would likely require the U.S.
Government to provide significant financial assistance in order
to attract private capital, with funding needs required in both
upstream and downstream development.
Shortsightedly, current U.S. policy provides funding solely
for downstream development, which has been a severe impediment
to our own domestic production.
In conclusion, mining in Greenland can likely attract
capital by providing significant financial incentives, while
simultaneously aligning local politics and environmental
regulations in an effort to create a supportive investment in
climate for private industry.
Thank you for your attention and interest. And I am pleased
to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Marchese follows:]
Prepared Statement of Anthony Marchese, Chairman,
Texas Mineral Resources Corp.
Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Honorable Members of
the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to address
Greenland's mineral riches and more specifically the potential
development of a critical minerals industry.
I am Anthony Marchese and for twelve years, have been Chairman of
Texas Mineral Resources, a publicly traded company that, along with a
partner, is developing the Round Top Project, a world-class critical
minerals deposit just outside El Paso in Senator Cruz's home state of
Texas. Round Top's diverse array of critical minerals, when combined
with my thirty years' experience in the capital markets, gives me a
unique perspective on the discussion of Greenland's riches.
As the world's largest island, roughly 1.5 times the size of
Alaska, Greenland presents a mining conundrum. On one hand, it is a
treasure chest of not only critical minerals but base metals, precious
metals, and industrial minerals. A map prepared by the government of
Greenland illustrates the obvious. Greenland's entire coastline holds
what is indisputably one of the world's greatest collection of minerals
in one jurisdiction. Throw a dart at any portion of the coastline and
you will undoubtedly hit a potential world-class target.
Conversely, the sheer topography of Greenland presents potential
significant challenges: one-mile-thick ice in its interior covering 85
percent of the country, winter temperatures averaging 16ºF and
thick sea ice which create clogged shipping lanes.
While geological maps of Greenland present a vast array of critical
mineral deposits along its coast, the presence of such deposits is only
a starting point for exploration. Critical minerals vary in value. Rare
earth minerals such as cerium and lanthanum, although considered
critical by the United States Geological Survey (USGS), are not as
valuable as neodymium and praseodymium, which are essential for magnets
and batteries. Mineral characterization is essential in order to
``separate the wheat from the chaff'' to focus on economically
profitable deposits. Such characterization requires significant amounts
of exploratory drilling. Drilling provides answers to questions such
as: ``what minerals do we have?'' ``what are the estimates of the
quantities we have?'' and ``what are the grades of the minerals we
have?'' Drilling is expensive and such costs in Greenland are
magnified.
Once mineral characterization costs are addressed, capital and
operating costs of mining are encapsulated in a feasibility study.
After receiving the necessary approvals and permits, the feasibility
study requires drilling data, metallurgical data, processing cost data,
environmental data and finally, the downfall of many projects:
commodity prices.
Mining in Greenland dates back to the 1850s. In fact, Greenland was
at one time the world's largest producer of cryolite, a mineral used in
aluminum production. Outside of cryolite, serious mining in Greenland
commenced in the 1990s. Unfortunately, there has not been significant
critical mineral mining in Greenland. In 2021, the government
effectively ended a promising rare earth project because uranium would
be mined as a mineral byproduct. As a result, Greenland banned uranium
mining due to local Indigenous opposition.
Interestingly, a study sponsored by McGill University several years
ago found that over 85 percent of the population surveyed favored
mining with the exception of radioactive minerals. Without
characterization, we do not know if future mineral deposits are
accompanied by uranium, thereby potentially limiting development unless
there are policy changes.
An acquisition of Greenland by the United States could take many
forms. There needs to be a determination as to which regulatory
authorities, if any, would govern mining projects. In the United
States, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the U.S. Forestry
Service govern mining regulations on Federal lands while states like
Alaska also give serious consideration to the desires of the Indigenous
population. At the present time, Greenland's 56,000 inhabitants are
predominantly Inuits, an Indigenous population which has a strong voice
in environmental policy alongside the government of Greenland and
Denmark.
Regulatory authorities are critical to an examination of the
economic incentives for mining. Characterization of mineral deposits is
time consuming and expensive, tantamount to venture capital investing.
The USGS could provide government funding for such characterization, to
lessen the exploration risk for private industry. In this regard it is
imperative to remember that capital costs for Greenland projects are
highly variable. Frigid winters create many restrictions, significant
hurdles for timely project development. Lack of infrastructure such as
roads, fuel, electricity, and housing exacerbate capital costs.
Workforce needs would require the import of foreign labor given that
skilled mining labor is minimal in Greenland. Metallurgical expertise
necessary to process mining material would present further challenges,
as such expertise is available primarily in Asia.
Greenland's mining challenges would likely require the U.S.
government to provide significant financial assistance in order to
attract private capital, with funding needs required in both upstream
and downstream development.
Shortsightedly, current U.S. policy provides funding solely for
downstream development, which has been a severe impediment to our own
domestic production. In conclusion, mining in Greenland can likely
attract capital by providing significant financial incentives while
simultaneously aligning local politics and environmental regulations in
an effort to create a supportive investment climate for private
industry.
Thank you for your attention and interest. I am pleased to address
any questions you might have.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Marchese.
Dr. Mercer.
STATEMENT OF DR. JENNIFER MERCER, SECTION HEAD,
SECTION FOR ARCTIC SCIENCES, OFFICE OF POLAR
PROGRAMS, DIRECTORATE FOR GEOSCIENCES,
U.S. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
Dr. Mercer. Good morning, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member
Cantwell, and Members of the Committee.
My name is Dr. Jennifer Mercer, and I am the Head of Arctic
Sciences in the Office of Polar Programs at the U.S. National
Science Foundation.
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's
hearing to share the important research and collaboration that
NSF is facilitating in Greenland. NSF has an important mission
of supporting the U.S. research enterprise and fostering U.S.
STEM talent. NSF support of research facilities also
establishes a U.S. presence in the Arctic, demonstrates our
capabilities as a nation, and builds goodwill with other
nations.
This research is important in the Polar Regions where, as
you know, Russia and China are increasingly seeking to extend
their reach. I oversee both scientific research conducted in
Greenland and the research infrastructure that enables research
funded by NSF, other Federal agencies, and by international
partners that advances U.S. national interests.
I was born and raised in South Dakota and completed my
undergraduate studies there. After earning my Ph.D. in New
Hampshire, I was a researcher at the University of Wyoming
before joining the Federal Government, first in the Department
of Defense, and then at NSF.
The first time I deployed to Greenland was 15 years ago,
bringing with me a decade of experience as a researcher in
Antarctica, and I am excited to share with the Committee why
Greenland is so important to the U.S. science and engineering
research enterprise.
The Polar Regions have a long history with both U.S.
scientific research and defense operations. Greenland was
strategic during World War II and the Cold War for the U.S. and
its allies. It was the site of Camp Century, where the U.S.
Army established an operational base under the ice. Efforts
like this taught us a lot about ice sheets and snow mechanics,
and how to operate in these extreme environments, knowledge and
methods that we still use today in both the Arctic and
Antarctica.
NSF has an established relationship with the government of
Greenland, which has authority over research there. All of the
research activities that NSF supports in Greenland are
conducted consistent with Greenland law and regulations. NSF
collaborates across the U.S. Government with the Department of
State and several Department of Defense services. NSF funds the
research capabilities as well as research projects on the U.S.
Coast Guard's Icebreaker HEALEY, which visited Greenland last
summer.
NSF facilitates research logistics in the Arctic on a cost-
reimbursable basis for NASA, NOAA, and other agencies that are
supporting activities there. U.S. Scientific Research spans
from the marine environment to the coastal villages and towns,
to the top of the Greenland ice sheet. Today, about 80 percent
of Greenland is covered in ice, and at its thickest points, it
is nearly 2 miles deep. It is a massive feature that is
important for understanding variability in the earth's land ice
and is an ideal location to study atmospheric circulation.
Research in the coastal waters is important for
understanding marine ecosystems, ocean circulation, and the
submarine environments, which support fishing and vessel
navigation. NSF awards support upwards of 300 people at 15 to
20 research locations throughout Greenland each year.
NSF's main operational locations are the village of
Kangerlussuaq, and the United States' Pituffik Space Base on
the West Coast, and Summit Station and Raven Camp on the
Greenland ice sheet. Raven Camp serves as a training site for
the New York Air National Guard's 109th Airlift Wing that
operates the ski-equipped LC-130 aircraft fleet, the only fleet
of its kind capable of landing large loads of cargo and fuel on
ski ways.
The U.S. is the only country with this capability. The LC-
130 is the backbone of transportation within Antarctica and on
the Greenland ice sheet. Summit Station is the only high-
altitude, high-latitude inland year-round research station in
the Arctic.
Summit sits at a physical elevation of over 10,000 feet. It
was established in 1989 as an ice drilling camp; year-round
operations began in 1997, focusing on continuous atmospheric
sampling and measurements. NSF is currently in the process of
designing new station infrastructure for Summit, and this will
serve as a hallmark of U.S. scientific research in the Arctic.
NSF has approximately 75 active awards to U.S. institutions
for research in, around, and about Greenland. The Arctic
contains distinct physical features that allow for unique
research opportunities with practical impact, and these are
just some highlights of the important scientific study
happening in Greenland, where the U.S. is a leader and a
collaborator in research.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. And I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Mercer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Jennifer Mercer, Section Head, Section for
Arctic Sciences, Office of Polar Programs, Directorate for Geosciences,
U.S. National Science Foundation
Good morning, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and members
of the Committee. My name is Dr. Jennifer Mercer, and I am the Section
Head for the Arctic Sciences Section in the Office of Polar Programs at
the U.S. National Science Foundation. Thank you for the opportunity to
participate in today's hearing to share the important research and
collaboration the U.S. National Science Foundation, known as NSF, is
facilitating in Greenland.
Established by the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 (P.L.
81-507), NSF is charged with the mission ``to promote the progress of
science; to advance the national health, prosperity, and welfare; to
secure the national defense; and for other purposes.'' NSF is unique in
carrying out its mission by supporting research across all fields of
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics, STEM, through grants
to colleges, universities and other research organizations across the
U.S. To augment the U.S. research enterprise, NSF has established
research infrastructure that serves American interests in several
strategic locations around the globe, such as ground-based telescopes
and research vessels that transit the oceans, that enable discoveries
and make the U.S. a global leader in STEM. Most notable for today's
discussion are NSF's investments in research infrastructure and
operations in the polar regions, including in Greenland. NSF's support
of polar research facilities establishes a U.S. presence in the Arctic,
facilitates research related to U.S. critical interests, demonstrates
our capabilities as a nation, and builds good will with other nations.
This research is important in the polar regions where, as you know,
Russia and China are increasingly seeking to extend their reach.
In my role, I oversee both scientific research conducted in
Greenland, and the research infrastructure that enables research funded
by NSF, other Federal agencies, and by international partners that
advances U.S. national interests.
Let me tell you a bit more about myself. I was born and raised in
South Dakota and completed my undergraduate studies there. After
earning my PhD at Dartmouth College in New Hampshire, I was a
researcher at the University of Wyoming before joining the Federal
government, first in the Department of Defense and then at NSF. The
first time I deployed to Greenland was 15 years ago, bringing with me a
decade of experience as a researcher in Antarctica. When I told my
parents that I was going to Greenland, my dad, an Army veteran who
served over 50 years ago, said ``Greenland? The Army used to threaten
to send us there for disciplinary action. Why would you want to go to
Greenland?'' Keep in mind that was a long time ago. I'm excited to
share with the Committee today why Greenland is so important to the
U.S. science and engineering research enterprise. When I stepped off
the C-130 my first time in Greenland I was reminded of the vast open
spaces of my home state. The towns and villages of Greenland are
similar to the rural U.S. with small towns and wide open spaces, where
people have both a sense of independence and of looking out for one
another. The cold temperatures and biting winds might also be
reminiscent of winter in some of our home states.
The polar regions have a long history with both U.S. scientific
research and defense operations occurring there simultaneously and
together. Greenland was strategic during WWII for the U.S. and its
allies. It was again important during the Cold War. It was the site of
Camp Century, where the U.S. Army established an operational base under
the ice--right around the time my dad was serving. Efforts like this,
novel as they were at the time, taught us as a nation a lot about ice
sheet and snow mechanics, and how to operate in these extreme
environments, knowledge and methods that we still use today for
research and operations in both the Arctic and in Antarctica.
NSF has an established relationship with the Government of
Greenland, which has authority over research there. All of the research
activities that NSF supports in Greenland are conducted consistent with
Greenland law and regulations, including obtaining any necessary
permits from the Government of Greenland.
To make scientific research both successful and efficient in
Greenland and throughout the Arctic, we at NSF collaborate across the
U.S. government with the Department of State, several Department of
Defense services such as Space Force, Air Force, Air National Guard,
and Army research labs including the Cold Regions Research and
Engineering Laboratory and the Natick Soldier Systems Center. NSF funds
the research capabilities, as well as research projects, on the U.S.
Coast Guard's Icebreaker HEALY which just last summer visited
Greenland. NSF facilitates research logistics in the Arctic, on a cost
reimbursable basis, for NASA, NOAA, and other agencies that are
supporting activities there.
U.S. scientific research spans from the marine environment to the
coastal villages and towns, to the top of the Greenland Ice Sheet.
Today, about 80 percent of Greenland is covered in ice, and at its
thickest points it is nearly 2 miles deep. The Greenland Ice Sheet is a
massive feature that is important for understanding variability in the
earth's land ice, and the ice sheet is an ideal location to study
atmospheric circulation. Research in the coastal waters of Greenland is
important for understanding marine ecosystems, ocean circulation, and
the submarine environments which support fishing and vessel navigation.
NSF awards support research at 15-20 locations throughout Greenland
each year with upwards of 300 people per year to carry out the work.
NSF's main operational locations are the village of Kangerlussuaq, the
United States' Pituffik Space Base, formerly Thule Air Base, on the
west coast, and Summit Station and Raven Camp on the Greenland Ice
Sheet.
Until recently, Kangerlussuaq was the only airport capable of
accepting large intercontinental airplanes. In 2024, Greenland opened
their new international airport in Nuuk and plans to extend
capabilities at two other airports.
Pituffik Space Base is operated by the 821st Space Base Group with
a mission to enable force protection, space superiority, and scientific
research in the Arctic region for our Nation and allies. It is due to
the long history of NSF and the Air Force working together in Greenland
that supporting scientific research is part of the base mission.
NSF also operates Raven Camp on the Greenland Ice Sheet. This
seasonal camp serves as a backup landing site on the ice sheet and as a
training site for the NY Air National Guard's 109th Airlift Wing that
operates the ski-equipped LC-130 aircraft fleet--the only fleet of its
kind, capable of landing large loads of cargo and fuel on snow runways
known as skiways. The U.S. is the only country with this capability.
The LC-130 is the backbone of transportation within Antarctica and on
the Greenland Ice Sheet.
Summit Station, where NSF owns the infrastructure and operates with
permits from the Government of Greenland, is the only high altitude,
high latitude, inland year-round research station in the Arctic. Summit
sits at a physical elevation of 10,530 feet above sea level and at
times the pressure altitude can reach 13,000 feet--meaning that the air
pressure makes it feel higher than it is--13,000 feet is similar to the
top of Grand Teton in Wyoming. Temperatures range from -88 degrees F in
the winter to just below a freezing 32 F in the summer. Summit Station
was established initially in 1989 as an ice drilling camp and in 1993,
after drilling around the clock during the summer months, scientists
retrieved what was the deepest ice core in the world at that time.
Year-round operations began at the station in 1997 focusing on
continuous atmospheric sampling and measurements.
People and cargo are delivered to the station via the LC-130
aircraft fleet. Summer population tends to hover around 35 people and
in winter a small staff of 5 people maintain the station, its systems,
and the scientific research. Clean water for drinking, cooking, and
bathing is produced by melting snow. Food is kept frozen by storage in
underground snow trenches.
NSF is currently in the process of designing new station
infrastructure for Summit so that we can replace approximately 30
outdated buildings with five elevated buildings and two surface level
buildings which will allow for more efficient and flexible operations.
The wind and snowfall at Summit Station constantly threaten to bury
buildings through drifting. This new infrastructure will be easier to
maintain over time and will serve as a hallmark of U.S. scientific
research in the Arctic.
Greenland's capital City of Nuuk has a strong research community of
its own. It has several small research organizations such as Asiaq,
which is similar in concept, but not scale, to the U.S. geological
survey. It also has the larger Greenland Institute of Natural Resources
which houses departments for the study of fish, bird and mammals,
mineral resources, and climate. Greenland also has a national Research
Council which funds research and develops research priorities for the
country, including a national strategy for research in Greenland.
The U.S.-Denmark-Greenland Joint Committee was established in 2004
to broaden and deepen cooperation among the United States, the Kingdom
of Denmark, and Greenland. The Joint Committee is led by Department of
State, and NSF has long funded the U.S. component of the Joint Science
Education program which was originally established by the Joint
Committee. This program provides field science experiences for students
from Greenland, the U.S., and Denmark each summer.
Over a decade later, the Joint Committee created an Embassy Science
Fellowship opportunity through our U.S. Embassy in Denmark. In 2017, I
had the privilege to serve as that Embassy Science Fellow. But instead
of being stationed at our embassy, I was embedded with the Government
of Greenland in Nuuk, with the ministry that oversees research in
Greenland. This was an extraordinary opportunity to see and learn
first-hand about Greenland's priorities for scientific research and
STEM education, and to build relationships with its leaders.
Currently, NSF has approximately 75 active grant awards to U.S.
institutions for research in, around, and about Greenland. Several of
those awards are to institutions in your home states.
For example, the University of Texas at Austin is leading a study
of ecological dynamics in a fjord that is connected to a glacial
outlet. This has implications for the fishing industry which is rapidly
developing in the Arctic. This work also contributes to U.S.
understanding of emerging dynamics that may influence global food
security.
Another example is a long-standing project at Summit Station called
ICECAPS which refers to the integrated Characterization of Energy,
Clouds, Atmospheric state, and Precipitation at the top of the
Greenland Ice Sheet. This project is led by Washington State University
with collaborators from institutions in Colorado, New Hampshire,
Wisconsin, and Idaho as well as in the UK. It is aimed at understanding
atmospheric dynamics over the Greenland Ice Sheet and has implications
for daily weather forecasting in the northern hemisphere.
University of Kansas is developing sensor technology to add to
drones to improve mapping of glacial activity in Greenland, while the
Universities of Montana and Wyoming are working together to develop a
novel ice drilling capability to understand how meltwater affects ice
movement along the margin of the Greenland Ice Sheet.
And Penn State is working with institutions in Delaware, Nebraska,
Wisconsin, Kansas, Illinois, and a few other states to establish the
first ultra-high energy neutrino observatory in the northern sky.
These are just some highlights of the important scientific study
happening in Greenland where the U.S. is a leader and a collaborator in
research. The Arctic, including Greenland, contains distinct physical
features that allow for unique research opportunities with practical
impact. The ice sheets and sea ice affect ocean currents and our
weather patterns in the northern hemisphere. The extreme cold, and long
dark winters, prompt physiological adaptations in mammals that may have
applications to the human body, and the harsh conditions allow us to
evaluate infrastructure performance and advance materials science. In
addition, the high altitude of Summit Station offers a unique and
important platform in the high Arctic for the study of astrophysics.
In closing, I am honored and grateful for the opportunity to talk
about NSF's important work in Greenland with you. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Mercer.
Dr. Pincus.
STATEMENT OF DR. REBECCA PINCUS, DIRECTOR,
POLAR INSTITUTE, WILSON CENTER
Dr. Pincus. Thank you for convening this hearing on the
Arctic and Greenland. I am honored to appear before you today
as the Director of the Wilson Center's Polar Institute.
In keeping with the nonpartisan, policy-focused work of the
Wilson Center, I offer the following comments on U.S. strategic
interests in the Arctic and Greenland significance. My bottom
line up front is that the Arctic region, which has important
and enduring strategic significance to the United States, has
taken on an added measure of global importance due to its
natural resources, emerging shipping lanes, and relevance to
space issues.
Greenland's importance is best understood in this broader
Arctic context. The Arctic holds significant natural resources,
including minerals, hydrocarbons, and fish. Emerging shipping
lanes across the Arctic, including the Northern Sea Route
across Russia's Coast and the Northwest Passage, are drawing
increasing interest as ice coverage declines.
The Arctic is also important to the space domain since
polar and near-polar orbits provide unique and valuable
satellite views. Russia has core national security and economic
interests in the Arctic. It is a region of top importance to
Russia. China also has interests in the Arctic, including
natural resources and emerging shipping lanes. China has no
territory in the Arctic, and the region is outside core PRC
interests, however, the complex and emerging China-Russia
relationship plays out in part in the Arctic, and this makes
China an important and influential regional actor.
The U.S. established itself as the dominant polar power
through significant effort and investment at the peak of the
Cold War. Today, the effort that went into building U.S.
leadership in the poles is at risk. The investments made in the
1970s are rusting away, and the U.S. faces a new and more
complex global competition. Without a fresh wave of investment
and attention, the U.S. will face severe limitations on its
presence in the poles and could soon lose its dominant
position.
These weaknesses are apparent, and it is not surprising
that U.S. competitors are leveraging the symbolic value of
polar capabilities and operations to apply pressure on us. For
example, China has leveraged its world-leading shipbuilding
capacity to build a small fleet of research icebreakers, in
contrast to the degraded condition of the U.S. polar icebreaker
fleet.
The POLAR STAR and the HEALY were great ships in their day,
but the STAR is now 52 and the HEALY is 28. The U.S.'s ten ski-
equipped LC-130s, which Dr. Mercer has already discussed, were
built in the early 1970s, and they are all now 50 years old.
These unique capabilities are approaching the end of their
operational lives. Losing them would directly risk U.S.
presence in the polar regions.
When it comes to Greenland specifically, I would underscore
that Greenland has enduring national security significance to
the United States by virtue of its geographical position, and
that Greenland's mineral resources have the potential to affect
U.S. economic security.
I would note that Greenland has other economic strengths
that also merit consideration, and I will offer a couple of
comments on each of those points.
Greenland's long-standing importance to U.S. homeland
defense and securing northern approaches is heightened by
today's increasing activity by U.S. competitors, and the
prospect of increasing accessibility throughout the Arctic. The
Pituffik Space Base is a critical forward location to U.S.
missile defense. Greenland provides the westernmost location
for monitoring Russia's naval activities in the Arctic and
North Atlantic.
Other NATO allies are critical to this effort, and the U.S.
enjoys strong defense relationships in and adjacent to the
region. Denmark recently announced a $2 billion package of
defense investments for Greenland, with a second tranche of
investment to be announced this summer. Greenland has a rich
endowment of minerals, as Mr. Marchese has discussed. Most are
as yet undeveloped due to several significant complicating
factors.
The foremost challenge is the harsh climate and lack of
infrastructure, which significantly raise development costs.
Greenland's enormous energy potential is often overlooked. The
island has virtually unlimited hydropower around the ice sheet.
Its hydro potential is very high quality and offers the
potential to collocate energy-intensive industrial facilities
in the Icelandic model.
The cold climate in Greenland would make data centers an
obvious choice, although this would require a fast fiber
connection to the United States, possibly via the planned Far
North Fiber Project between Japan and Ireland, or through
Quintilian's planned expansion. A fiber connection to Greenland
would enhance regional security through a dual-use benefit to
communications capabilities, and it would tie Greenland closer
to the United States.
Tourism is another significant area for growth. Starting
this summer, United Airlines will offer direct flights, just
over 4 hours long, from Newark to Nuuk, with tourism arrivals
expected to double in the face of significant limitations on
hotel availability and other support infrastructure, there is
both a tremendous economic opportunity as well as a need for
strategic investment and development planning.
Many of the challenges and opportunities we see in
Greenland are echoed across the North American Arctic,
including in Alaska and the Canadian Arctic.
I welcome the Committee's attention to this problem set and
its strategic implications. The Polar Institute stands ready to
support Congress' efforts through our research and analysis.
Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Pincus follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Rebecca Pincus, Director, Polar Institute,
Wilson Center
Introduction
Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and distinguished members
of the Committee, thank you for convening this hearing on the Arctic
and Greenland's geostrategic significance to the U.S. I am Dr. Rebecca
Pincus and I am honored to appear before you today as the Director of
the Wilson Center's Polar Institute to discuss these issues.
Prior to directing the Polar Institute, I served on the faculty of
the U.S. Naval War College, in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.
From 2020-2022, I was detailed from the Naval War College to the Office
of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, first to the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development office and
later the newly established Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Arctic and Global Resilience. Before joining the Naval War College, I
served on the faculty of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, and led research
for the Coast Guard's Center for Arctic Study and Policy.
Woodrow Wilson Center's Polar Institute
The Polar Institute was established as a program within the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars in 2017. Since then, it has
become a premier forum for discussion and policy analysis of Arctic and
Antarctic issues. The Polar Institute studies the central policy issues
facing these regions, with an emphasis on foreign policy, economic
development, security and defense, and scientific research. Our
nonpartisan analysis and findings are communicated to policymakers and
other stakeholders.
We do this work within the administrative context of the Wilson
Center, which was chartered by Congress in 1968 as the official
memorial to President Wilson. The Wilson Center is Congress's only non-
partisan policy forum for tackling global issues through independent
research and open dialogue to inform actionable ideas for the policy
community.
The Arctic and Greenland's Importance to U.S. Interests
In keeping with the nonpartisan, policy-focused work of the Wilson
Center, I offer the following comments on U.S. strategic interests in
Greenland. By placing Greenland in the context of U.S. national
interests and objectives in the Arctic and beyond, I will underscore
the significance of Greenland and the Arctic region, and the importance
of its consideration by this Committee.
In brief, I offer three major points: first, that Greenland has
enduring national security and homeland defense significance to the
U.S. by virtue of its geographical position; second, that the
disposition of Greenland's mineral resources has the potential to
affect U.S. economic security, but that Greenland has other economic
strengths; and third, that Greenland's significance is best understood
in the context of the Arctic region, which is itself a growing zone for
geopolitical competition.
1. Greenland is important to U.S. national security
Greenland, an island roughly three times the size of Texas,
straddles the Arctic and North Atlantic Oceans. Its strategic position
on the North Atlantic sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) has given it
military significance since World War II.\1\
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\1\ For more information on Greenland in WWII, see ''Greenland and
the Strategic Advantage of Weather Reporting.'' Tom Laemlein, American
Rifleman, 2019. https://www.americanrifle
man.org/content/greenland-and-the-strategic-advantage-of-weather-
reporting/.
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The U.S. began building the Thule Air Base in northwest Greenland
in 1951: since then, this base has served as a vital node in U.S.
nuclear strategy.\2\ In its early years, the base was an important
location from which aircraft could be launched for both early warning/
reconnaissance missions against the Soviet Union, as well as nuclear
response. Thule also served as an important forward location for radar
defense systems that point northwards, across the Arctic, to provide
early warning of incoming missile launches against the U.S. In 2020,
Thule Air Base was transferred to the U.S. Space Force, and in 2023 it
was renamed Pituffik Space Base in recognition of its historic Inuit
name.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ For additional background, see ``From bilateral to trilateral
agreement: the case of Thule Air Base.'' Maria Ackren, Arctic Yearbook
2019.
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Today, Pituffik Space Base is critical to space domain awareness
and surveillance, missile defense, and early warning.\3\ The base
includes a satellite tracking station and a solid-state phased array
radar system, as well as a 10,000-foot runway and deepwater port. It
could support power projection and forward defense into and around the
Arctic if necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Pituffik Space Base, Greenland.'' Peterson and Schreiver
Space Base, U.S. Space Force. https://
www.petersonschriever.spaceforce.mil/Pituffik-SB-Greenland/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greenland is a critical forward location to U.S. missile defense.
While the overall nature of this threat is a function of geography, at
present it creates a vulnerability for the U.S. due to new missile
threats and a decline in relative U.S. military position. Across the
Arctic, the U.S. confronts two serious adversaries with significant
abilities to hold the U.S. homeland at risk from land and/or sea-based
attacks.
Greenland provides the westernmost location for monitoring Russia's
naval activities in the Arctic and North Atlantic, since it sits at one
end of the GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) Gap, a strategic corridor.
Greenland's longstanding importance to U.S. homeland defense and
securing northern approaches is heightened by today's increasing
activity by U.S. competitors, and the prospect of increasing
accessibility throughout the Arctic. The U.S. military has a
significant position in Alaska, including the world's largest
concentration of 5th-generation fighter aircraft and the 11th Airborne.
Greenland's location on the eastern side of the Arctic complements
Alaska--they are the ``10 o'clock and 2 o'clock'' of the North American
continent--and together, homeland defense and domain awareness from
these positions offers critical protection to the U.S. Robust
capabilities and shored-up presence on both sides of the continent are
important to protect the U.S. from threats across the northern
hemisphere, from space to the sea floor. This includes a robust layered
missile defense and space-based missile sensor capability.
The U.S. military presence in Greenland is accomplished via the
1951 Defense of Greenland agreement signed by Denmark and the U.S.,
which was subsequently refined in 2004 with the Igaliku Declaration.\4\
U.S. presence is also covered by the NATO Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``Agreement between the United States of America and Denmark
Amending and Supplementing the Agreement of April 27, 1951.'' U.S.
Department of State (2004). Treaties and Other International Acts
Series 04-806.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Greenland is an important part of the global competition over
minerals
Greenland has a rich endowment of minerals, including rare earths,
platinum metals, uranium, and more.\5\ Most of these resources are as
yet undeveloped due to several significant complicating factors: the
foremost challenge is the harsh Greenlandic climate and lack of
infrastructure, which significantly raise development costs.
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\5\ For more information, see ``Review of the critical raw material
resource potential in Greenland.'' Geological Survey of Denmark and
Greenland (2023). https://doi.org/10.22008/gpub/32049.
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One plausible pathway to Greenland's independence lies through
development of its natural resources, revenue from which could replace
the current Danish block grant. Since Greenland's minerals do not
compete well on the open market, given the extra costs discussed above,
this pathway may require some nonmarket intervention.
In addition to minerals and metals, Greenland may have valuable
hydrocarbon deposits on and offshore, although thorough mapping is not
yet complete.
Greenland's enormous energy potential is often overlooked: the
island has virtually unlimited hydropower around the ice sheet.\6\ Its
hydro potential is very high quality, and offers the potential to co-
locate energy-intensive industrial facilities in the Icelandic model.
The cold climate in Greenland would make data centers another efficient
choice, although this would require a fast-fiber connection to the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ For more information, see ``Data and Reports'' on Greenland
Hydropower Resources, Government of Greenland. https://hydropower.gl/
emner/data-and-reports?sc_lang=en.
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Tourism is another significant area for growth: with direct flight
connections to the U.S. beginning in 2025, Greenland is becoming
significantly more accessible. Starting this summer, United Airlines
will offer direct flights just over 4 hours long from Newark to
Nuuk.\7\ With tourism arrivals expected to double, in the face of
significant limitations on hotel availability and other support
infrastructure, there is both a tremendous economic opportunity as well
as need for strategic investment and development planning.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See United, ``Flights from New York to Greenland.'' https://
www.united.com/en-us/flights-from-new-york-to-greenland.
\8\ ``Air Greenland's CEO on Expansion in a Changing World.''
Aviation Week (2025). https://aviationweek.com/podcasts/window-seat-
podcast/podcast-air-greenlands-ceo-expansion-changing-world.
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In summary, while Greenland's minerals receive the most global
attention, its most likely economic development pathway would parallel
the Icelandic model, with revenue streams from tourism, energy-
intensive industry, and fisheries as primary economic drivers. Iceland
does not have a military, relying instead on the NATO alliance, and a
similar arrangement could be expected in Greenland.
3. Greenland is a part of geopolitical competition in the Arctic
In addition to a better understanding of Greenland and its
significance to the U.S., I welcome this Committee's attention to the
growing importance of the Arctic region. The Arctic region is about 5
and a half million square miles, including one of the world's oceans,
and includes the territory of 8 sovereign nations, including the U.S.
It is home to 4 million people. The U.S. has vital interests in the
Arctic region, across all dimensions of national interest: we have
lands and waters in the Arctic; we have citizens living there; we have
critical national security and defense interests, compelling economic
interests, and important interests relating to science.
The Arctic region is of global importance, and therefore is
increasingly subject to global competition. The region holds
significant natural resources, including minerals, hydrocarbons, and
fish. Potential emerging shipping lanes across the Arctic, including
the Northern Sea Route across Russia's coast and the Northwest Passage,
are drawing increasing interest as ice coverage declines. Russia has
enormous security and economic interests in the region. China also has
interests in the Arctic.
The Arctic is also important to the space domain. Polar and near-
polar orbits provide unique and valuable satellite views.\9\ For
example, sun-synchronous orbits allow a satellite to pass over the same
location at the same time each day, providing valuable imagery. The
importance of polar and near-polar orbits can be seen in the number of
high-latitude satellite ground stations operated by the U.S., China,
Russia, and others in the Arctic. In addition, harsh Arctic conditions
are being used to help us prepare for Mars exploration--Canada's Devon
Island, lying across Baffin Bay from Greenland, hosts two major Mars-
analogue sites, including NASA's Haughton Mars Project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ ``Ever Forward: The Unique Relationship between the Arctic and
Space.'' David Marsh, Polar Institute, Wilson Center (2024). https://
www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ever-forward-unique-relationship-
between-arctic-and-space.
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Put more simply, the Arctic has both intrinsic and strategic
economic importance: specific resources with economic value, and also
scientific/information value to the space domain. Both polar regions
are critical to earth sciences, as well as space exploration. The
Arctic and Antarctica hold symbolic value as well: not many states are
present, much less powerful, at the very ends of the earth.
The U.S. established itself as the dominant polar power through
significant effort and investment at the peak of the Cold War. By
asserting itself as the leading presence and superpower in the polar
regions, the U.S. deterred the Soviet Union. Large bases and research
stations anchored U.S. leadership. Presence and influence were enabled
by polar icebreakers, ski-equipped C-130s, and other key platforms and
capabilities. In 1970, President Nixon underlined the importance of the
U.S. ``maintaining an active and influential presence in the
Antarctic,'' in support of scientific, economic, and political
objectives.\10\ Nixon's actions reflected the clear connection between
presence and influence. In the 1970s, investment in polar presence and
capabilities was recognized to be a wise use of resources to wage the
global war against Communism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ National Security Decision Memo 71: United States Antarctic
Policy and Program. (1970). Richard Nixon Presidential Library and
Museum. https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/national-security-decision-
memoranda-nsdm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, the effort that went into building U.S. leadership in the
poles is at risk. The U.S. is at a weak point in the Arctic:
investments made in the 1970s are rusting away, and the U.S. faces a
new and more complex global competition. Without a fresh wave of
investment, the U.S. will face severe limitations on its presence in
the poles, and could soon lose its influence and dominant position.
In particular, the POLAR STAR and HEALY were great ships in their
day, but the STAR is now 52 and the HEALY 28. The U.S.'s 10 ski-
equipped LC-130s were built in the early 1970s, and are all now 50
years or older. These capabilities are approaching the end of their
operational lives.
These weaknesses are apparent, and it is not surprising that U.S.
competitors are leveraging the symbolic value of polar capabilities and
operations to apply pressure at a U.S. weak point in the region. For
example, China has leveraged its world-leading shipbuilding capacity to
build a small fleet of research icebreakers, including the XUE LONG 2,
the JI DI, and the TAN SOU SAN HAO.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ For more, see ``China Delivers Arctic-Capable Research Vessel,
Expanding Polar Presence.'' by Mike Schuler and ``China Deploys Three
Icebreakers to Arctic as U.S. Presence Suffers After `Healy' Fire.'' by
Malte Humpert, both in gCaptain, (2024).
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In conclusion, I thank the Chair and Committee for your attention
to this important and timely issue set, and welcome your engagement.
Greenland and the Arctic are important to a broad array of U.S.
national interests. The Polar Institute stands ready to support
Congress's efforts through our research and analysis.
The Chairman. Thank you to each of the witnesses for your
very informative testimony.
Senator Sheehy is going to be presiding over the Senate in
a few minutes, so he has asked if he can go first. So I am
going to yield my time initially to him, and recognize Senator
Sheehy.
STATEMENT OF HON. TIM SHEEHY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Sheehy. Thank you, Chairman. Thanks to all of you
for your testimony, very enlightening.
For Dr. Pincus, a question directed your way, it seems like
you have a pretty informed policy view on this. You know, the
only constant is change, and right now we are seeing aggressive
territorial expansion efforts from Russia, obviously through
force, and China is literally building islands to expand its
sphere of influence, not just in the South China Sea, but as
you correctly pointed out, using every tool at its disposal to
grow its influence elsewhere.
I think the discussion we are having here is a commonsense
discussion about how we can maneuver ourselves to ensure that
extremely important piece of real estate, which at the end of
the day is what we are discussing, whether it is data centers,
whether it is critical minerals, whether it is shipping lanes,
does not fall into the wrong hands.
And from your policy perspective, what is the best
approach? And I think then I will move to Mr. Gray as a
secondary: What do you think is the best outcome? What is the
best approach to achieve what we think the best outcome can be,
so that we do not allow Greenland to become a territory of our
adversaries in the very near future?
Dr. Pincus. Thank you so much for that question, sir. I
would say that from a policy and analysis perspective, which is
my background, the U.S. has a range of policy options in
Greenland. The choice among them entails a consideration of
priority, risk, and cost, and the President and Congress will
make those determinations and set policy.
I do think that a thorough review of various scenarios and
contingencies would be a worthwhile exercise to carefully
review the range of possible scenarios for Greenland's futures
and evaluate a set of options for the United States, again,
along those parameters of priority, risk, and cost.
We have heard that Greenland is in a global context in
which we have options that span across the Pacific in terms of
different approaches to our relationship with Greenland. So we
have both a geographical span to consider here, as well as, I
would say, an evolution over time. Greenland has been very
important to the United States' missile defense for decades,
and so we have an enduring significance there as well.
So I think thinking about sort of geographical span, risk
over time, and then those questions of priority, risk, and cost
would merit a very thorough review.
I welcome this discussion here today, but I think a more
in-depth analysis of various options would give you better
grounds for making those determinations. Thank you.
Mr. Gray. Senator, I agree with you completely that the
threat is very real, and the threat of both Russian and Chinese
penetration in Greenland, and not just in Greenland, but in the
High North more generally, is something we have to be very
attuned to. We have seen it not just in Greenland, but in the
Faroe Islands, we have seen it in Svalbard, we have seen it all
over that High North region.
To me, the number one objective of the United States in
Greenland has to be the same that it has been since the 1860s,
which is to prevent, deny access, and control to an adversary
power who would use that space to threaten our homeland and our
hemisphere. To me, the best way to do that, ideally, would be
as an insular area of the United States, one of the 15th
insular areas that we have.
Alternatively, if that was not feasible for whatever
political or other reason, I think the alternative of a Compact
of Free Association, whereby critically we would have military
access, but I think even more significantly, similar to our
Pacific friends in Palau, RMI, and Micronesia, we would have
the right of denial, to deny formally and through a legal
mechanism the right of a foreign adversary to use that space. I
think that would be the ideal American solution.
Senator Sheehy. What do you think the--that is not going to
come for free, so what is that going to cost?
Mr. Gray. Well, I can tell you, sir, in the instance of
Palau, Micronesia, and Marshall Islands it does cost
development assistance, it costs--you know, in Palau, we have a
trust fund that we fund, that we funded for decades. You know,
it is on the order of hundreds of billions of dollars.
But I think, one, it solves a security dilemma that we have
had for decades or centuries; and two, you know, Mr. Marchese
is much more eloquent on the natural resources side of this,
but there are tremendous economic opportunities that I think
can offset some of these costs if we do this strategically and
thoughtfully. So I think it is a--I think there are ways to
offset the cost, in short, Senator.
Senator Sheehy. Great. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again,
thanks for holding the hearing.
And Dr. Pincus, so Greenland is a NATO ally, correct? We,
we have military relationships now that allows us to be there,
and we have all these other relationships that we could take
advantage of, both on minerals. It is, to me, there is just a
cheering section in Congress that wants us to understand the
Arctic, and we have been yelling about it, I guess, or
cheerleading for icebreakers for a long time because it starts
way over on our side of the country.
Before you get to Greenland we are seeing the intimidation,
the activities of Russia and China as it relates to our fish,
intimidation in our waters, and so for us, it does not start
and end in Greenland, it is this issue you and others
articulated of a melting ice that gives a Northwest Passage,
that gives a whole--a whole new trend of interest.
But when you think about what you mentioned, everything
from, you know, space to natural resources, what do you think
is the most important thing we could do now to bolster that
alliance? Is it a more broadened NATO agreement? Because with
this Baltic Century Operation, where they were trying to stop
what Russia is doing is it--you know, is it some other
capability, right now on this communication issue?
And then, while I am not against the mineral agreement or
enhanced mineral agreement, it seems to me that the hydro
relationship, given what Mr. Marchese has said about the ice
being this challenge. Here, ice is our friend, and ice is
creating a ton of hydro, and if you do the sea cable, it seems
to me like this is that, that getting a stronger NATO
relationship, getting our expansive view of how this fits into
the larger Arctic picture and taking advantage of the easy
layups, would be things that we should do?
Dr. Pincus. Thank you for that question, Senator. You know,
again, I will go back to my earlier point that the U.S. has a
range of policy options. And the first step is to define the
problems that we are focused on really carefully because it is
hard to talk about answers if you do not know--if we are not
all in agreement on what the problem is. But I think----
Senator Cantwell. I call that the correct environmental
assessment.
Dr. Pincus. But in terms of policy options, you know, I
think--you know, the acquisition of Greenland is a really
interesting option that deserves very careful scrutiny and
weighing. I do think that it is a challenging option. I think
there are some practical hurdles that would have to be
overcome, and we can have a discussion about what those would
be. I do think cost is an issue, but I think there are a range
of options that, again, can be weighed against the problem, the
risk we face, and our relative prioritization of it.
And so if we put territorial expansion sort of at one end
of the spectrum here, and then we can think about what might be
smaller scale policy options that would be a less total
solution but might be----
Senator Cantwell. Let me ask you something differently.
Dr. Pincus. All right.
Senator Cantwell. If this--we were not discussing Greenland
and what the President said, would you be arguing for a larger
NATO relationship, and a larger Arctic agreement between the
United States and NATO allies?
Dr. Pincus. I think the NATO alliance is becoming more
active in the Arctic region without that agreement, and NATO is
a large alliance that moves fairly slowly. So it has taken some
significant steps to be more active in the Arctic in the last
few years, and that process has been balanced against the
ongoing demands of the war in Ukraine.
Senator Cantwell. Well, you could say we were slow on
icebreakers too, so, so this is--again, this is this awareness
issue of we are trying to get the whole country to understand
this challenge.
Dr. Pincus. I will say that the U.S. and Denmark have a
Bilateral Defense Agreement, for the defense of Greenland from
1951, one that did not include Greenland. That agreement was
expanded in 2004, the Igaliku Agreement to better include
Greenland's voice. But 2004 is 20 years ago, and Greenland has
taken many steps toward independence since then.
So a new, perhaps trilateral defense agreement that is
responsive to U.S. security concerns, as well as the new
political powers that have devolved to the Greenlandic
Government, I think is something that in the short term
certainly could also deserve some attention.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Mr. Gray, if the United States were to go forward with
attempting to acquire Greenland, it would likely require the
active agreement of Denmark, and also the vote of the people of
Greenland that this was a mutually beneficial step. Let us
focus initially on the first part. From the perspective of
Denmark, what are the benefits to Denmark of considering this
negotiation?
Mr. Gray. Well, Senator, I would say Denmark has failed,
unfortunately, to provide the type of security that the
alliance, that NATO, that we all need in the Greenland region,
in the Arctic, for a long time. So having a U.S. commitment to
take on some of that security burden would be beneficial to
Denmark, based on their behavior to date. I know they have
recently increased some defense spending relative to Greenland,
that is great, but we have a pattern of decades of neglect. So
I would think that would be to their benefit.
Look, I think the larger question here, Senator, is Denmark
is not going to have, as a constituent part, Greenland over the
long term, and so to their--that Greenlanders have made that
clear. So the question is, what is the security architecture
that is going to be in place at that ultimate point of
independence?
And it is not in Denmark's interest, just as it is not in
our interest to have a vacuum that is filled by China and
Russia, and that is why having some sort of discussion about
what comes next is so critical.
The Chairman. So if I am understanding your testimony
correctly, there are three principal benefits to Denmark of
considering selling Greenland's territory to the United States.
The first is that their existing defense obligations put
significant costs on Denmark, costs that are a real burden to
the Government of Denmark and the people of Denmark.
The second, is if the United States were to shoulder the
cost of providing that defense, defense of Denmark would also
significantly increase the defense--the defense of Greenland,
rather, would also significantly increase the defense and
security of Denmark, and limiting the role of Russia and China
in the Arctic also enters into the defense benefits of Denmark.
But number three, and this is an important point you made,
we are seeing a growing independence movement in Greenland. If
Denmark were to negotiate today with the Trump Administration
to sell the territory of Greenland to the United States, it
would presumably be able to negotiate some substantial sum of
money. That is how we purchased the Louisiana Purchase. That is
how we purchased the Virgin Islands. That is how we purchased
Alaska.
If Denmark does nothing and Greenland declares
independence, then rather than getting some substantial sum of
money, Denmark gets nothing. Is that a fair summary?
Mr. Gray. I think over the ultimate timeframe, we are
talking about, Senator, that is true, because I believe we
should take the Greenlanders at their word that they will be an
independent country at some point, and ultimately, sir, it is
not in Denmark's interest to leave a security vacuum in the
High North.
In addition to your point about the costs, they will suffer
as much as anyone from having what I think is the 100 percent
predictable outcome of China and Russia stepping into that
vacuum if we do not have some sort of clear security
architecture in place.
The Chairman. So I think that is very powerful. Let us turn
to the benefit--to the Greenlanders. And Mr. Marchese, I think
if this were to proceed, it would, in all likelihood, require a
referendum of the people of Greenland making a choice: Do you
want to become an American? Do you want to join the United
States as a territory or in some other legal structure?
And there has been some chatter online about an early
public poll that was done that suggested that currently
Greenlanders did not want to do that. That does not strike me
as terribly probative, given that this is the very beginning of
a discussion, and any referendum would be made with the
Greenlanders assessing: What do we get for it? What is our
benefit? How are our lives better off?
So in your judgment, how would the lives of Greenlanders be
better off were they to become part of America?
Mr. Marchese. Senator, I mentioned in my testimony that
McGill University had done a survey of the population, and they
were for mining. So I believe part of it is the recognition
that were the United States to come in, more than likely, they
would provide some form of financial assistance to allow
private companies to come in and mine, and the vast majority, I
think they said about 85 percent, of the Inuits wanted mining,
with the exception of uranium. That is a separate topic.
The point is, I believe once the Greenlanders recognize
that the United States would come in and provide a lot of
assistance, that mining jobs would be there, and that is very
important for the population. There is just--there just is not
that much mining right now, and I think that if there were the
prospect of financial assistance to jumpstart the mining
industry, I think you would see more Greenlanders interested in
becoming part of the United States.
The Chairman. We see significant discussion. I sat down
this past week with the Ambassador from Denmark and with the
Ambassador Representative from Greenland, and one of the things
discussed is the very significant benefits that come with
American citizenship. I think, for example, of Puerto Rico,
where the people of Puerto Rico enjoy a considerable upside
from their current status as an American territory.
And were Greenland to agree to this acquisition, the
Greenlanders would get the invaluable asset of American
citizenship, but also would benefit from billions of dollars of
additional investment in Greenland to develop those rare earth
minerals, the vast resources they have that are not currently
being developed.
Tell us, how would the investment increase, and how would
that benefit Greenland and America if Greenland's status were
to change such that it were part of the United States?
Mr. Marchese. Senator, the first step, as I mentioned in my
testimony, would be to actually provide--I believe the USGS
would be the best forum or the best agency to do this. But with
the USGS's assistance, undertake a massive mineral
characterization in the country. Well, first of all, that in of
itself, it is not a short-term process. That is probably a few
years to do that in and of itself would provide jobs for
people.
Remember, there are only 56,000 people there, so you do not
need that many to have the entire country be happy. So the USGS
comes in, provides some assistance to map, in essence, map the
area to figure out which deposits are real, which deposits are
not real.
Once you do that, then you start getting into convincing
companies to put money in, and that provides even more jobs. So
I think even before you start putting a shovel in the ground to
create a mine, you have, in my opinion, the potential for
thousands of new jobs in a mining industry. I mean, at the end
of the day, Greenland, in my opinion, can become a--with other
obviously environmental oversight--can become a major
international producer of all types of minerals. Not to
mention, as Senator Cantwell said, a potentially large hydro
industry. And that in of itself requires, forget about rare
earth minerals, but as an example, the hydro industry would
require a tremendous amount of jobs. But remember, the
expertise has to be developed also.
The Chairman. So there are potentially massive economic
benefits.
Mr. Marchese. I believe massive potential.
The Chairman. Senator Kim.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDY KIM,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Kim. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Gray, I would like to start with you. You talked about
two different ways in which this might proceed about Greenland
becoming an insular area or a COFA Agreement. I just want to
ask, does that mean it is safe to assume that you do not think
the U.S. should consider the use of force or economic coercion
to take control over Greenland?
Mr. Gray. Sir, I do not think the United States should use
any sort of coercive behavior toward a NATO ally, meaning
Denmark.
Senator Kim. And because this has implications even beyond
just Greenland, beyond just our conversations with Denmark, do
you think that the U.S. talking about potential use of force,
or not taking use of force off the table in places like
Greenland and Panama, that that weakens our arguments when we
are criticizing or going against Russia and China for their
infringements upon sovereignty in Ukraine, and/or maritime
boundaries in the Indo-Pacific?
Mr. Gray. Sir, I think what is critical is that the United
States--the comments I think you are referring to, had to do,
in my view, with making sure that nothing was off the table in
terms of if an adversary were to gain access to key parts of
the Western Hemisphere. And I do not think we can take anything
off the table to prevent an adversary from gaining control of
key choke points.
I think, obviously, in terms of allies and partners, we
would never want to use military force or coercive means.
Senator Kim. When it comes to--when it comes to this
decision that you are saying, you know, that we benefit from
having a COFA, when we would benefit from having, you know,
insular partnerships here on this front with insular areas. I
guess I wanted to just understand, why does it have to be that
route? So for instance, you talked about the Faroe Islands.
Iceland is also up in that area. Would you recommend to us that
we consider making offers to those places for those same offers
of insular areas or COFA?
Mr. Gray. I would not, sir, mainly because they are not
part of the Western Hemisphere. And I think this, if you look
at the history of our relationship with Greenland, the history
of our strategic concerns with Greenland, it is unique.
And it really is, if you go back and look at the history of
the United States in the World War I period, when we were
negotiating with Denmark to retain--to purchase the Virgin
Islands, one of the things that we did at that same period was
we actually waived the Monroe Doctrine, one of the few times we
have ever done this, and told the Danes that we had no
objection to them gaining additional political control over
Greenland, which was not fully established at the time, as part
of our larger negotiations over the purchase of the Virgin
Islands.
So this is clearly within the framework of the Monroe
Doctrine, of hemispheric defense, of kind of traditional U.S.
strategic conceptions of the outer perimeter of our hemisphere.
I think this is very different from some of the examples you
mentioned.
Senator Kim. Well, I think the Faroe Islands and Iceland
are closer to the United States than Micronesia, Palau, or
other places where you said that we have COFA Agreements. I do
not understand the difference.
Mr. Gray. Well, those, sir, I think are uniquely important
because of their strategic location relative to the Indo-
Pacific and relative to some of the scenarios that might be
important for us in a military contingency. And you know, I am
sure, the history of how we acquired those.
Senator Kim. Yes.
Mr. Gray. And why they continue to be so critical.
Senator Kim. I guess what I am just trying to get across
here, and you know, I also had conversations with Greenlanders
over the course of the last week, is everything that we are
saying here in this room, we are all in agreement that there is
strategic value in Greenland, and we should be pushing forward
on the icebreakers, and so many other things that we should be
doing.
But I feel like we are getting in our own way by having
this conversation about acquisition at a time when that is not
even needed. I mean, I will be honest with you, the
Greenlanders I talked to were insulted that we were talking in
this way about their own land, as if they are not even there,
as if we can just purchase this and buy this, as if they are
just an object.
And that is what they said to me. That it feels like we are
saying they are an object that we can just take because we are
the richest, most powerful country in the world.
So I just want to push back here, because there is so much
that we can be doing without having to own Greenland, so much
more scientific partnerships, so much more that we can offer
when it comes to minerals and mining. We should just be pushing
forward in that, regardless of what happens with a potential
referendum going forward, so that if they do get to that place,
we are already positioned ourselves as a strong partner.
No doubt more we can do right now, but I just think that
this is getting in our own way. And when you look at the
polling, 85 percent of Greenlanders say they are opposed to
becoming part of the U.S., 46 percent view President Trump's
interest as a threat.
If we are trying to solidify our relationship with them,
especially in some post-independence position, we are burning
those bridges. We are sowing a sense of distrust right now that
I think would make it even harder for us to be able to achieve
that later. And with that, I will yield back.
Senator Moreno [presiding]. Thank you. Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Senator Moreno.
Dr. Pincus, there has been much discussion of late on
Greenland, but I think what is underappreciated is something
that you were trying to focus on, and that is the importance of
Greenland to a whole host of U.S. strategic interests that are
there. And obviously, yes, we need to develop a good working
relationship, a good partnership with Greenland.
You mentioned the Space Force Base that is in Greenland. It
is a critical forward operating location. It is the
Department's northernmost installation. It hosts radar systems
that are essential, essential to our missile defense.
You know, the comment was made that there could be flight
paths of ICBMs over Greenland. Well, that may or may not
happen, but what is key there, is though--that no matter where
in the Arctic ICBMs are flying, what we have to have is radars
to be on Greenland so that not only can they track, but they
can also detect any incoming threats.
I would also like to consider the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap,
and Mr. Gray, maybe you would want to add Summit into this
discussion as well. As we look at the increased Russian
submarine activity there in recent years, and you couple that
with the growing Chinese and Russian presence in the Arctic, I
think it is hard to understate that gap is importance.
So both of you, do you assess that increasing U.S. presence
in the GIUK Gap would be beneficial? I will start with Dr.
Pincus, then Mr. Gray, if you would like to add.
Dr. Pincus. Thank you very much, Senator, for that terrific
question. You know, I think it is very helpful to talk in terms
of specifics, and in Greenland, we have long had radar
installations to give us early warning of incoming ICBMs coming
from Eurasia. And in the current era of hypersonics, new
missiles, and new missile delivery systems, it is very
important that those radars remain in place and that we
recapitalize and modernize them to give us as much advanced
notice as possible.
So there is a big radar system at Pituffik Base, there is a
big airfield, there is a deep-water port, on the east coast of
Greenland that is the westernmost point of the GIUK Gap, so it
is a key point for monitoring Russian naval activity. And you
know, I think we are looking at a set of challenges in the GIUK
Gap related to Russian activity, undersea activity that is a
real problem set for us.
The gap between Greenland, Iceland, the UK, and also I
would add Norway, provides us with some really important points
from which to support monitoring and activity. It would be best
to talk to the Department of Defense in a classified setting
about what specific capabilities and access they may need. But
I will say that the 1951 Defense Agreement gives us very wide
access to Greenland.
We have never had a problem asking for access and
permissions and not getting it. And both Greenland and Denmark
have made it clear that they stand ready to have that
conversation again. I think the Danish defense investments that
have been announced include domain awareness capabilities and
presence that will help us. There is certainly more that can be
done, but I think being very specific about what the problem
is, is helpful in terms of thinking about our appropriate
response, and also recognizing that in the event of
contingency, fixed installations, whether it is a radar asset
or an airfield, they would be taken out with long-range missile
strikes.
So you know, I would say that Russia does not have the
capability to seize and hold Greenland, nor would there be a
strong military argument for it to do so, given that it's most
likely response in the event of a contingency would be to
strike those assets and then keep moving on.
Senator Fischer. Which would also make it extremely
important that DOD maintains that spectrum use to be able to
identify what is coming in, not just for the Homeland, but also
for Greenland.
Dr. Pincus. Absolutely, and I think having a conversation
about air defense, and you know, missile defense options we
have--we do not have interceptors in Greenland. We do not have
interceptors in Canada. We have them in Alaska. So I think
there is a conversation to be had about that specific
capability.
Senator Fischer. Yes. Thank you. Mr. Gray, before I get
called out, please?
Mr. Gray. Thank you, Senator. So many of our concerns
strategically about Greenland going back to the 1940s have been
about the GIUK Gap, and it has been a concern across multiple
great power competitors. It is a concern today. To me the
question is less--Dr. Pincus made the comment about, you know,
militarily, it would probably not be taken out. I am more
concerned about a future political arrangement in Greenland
that could be influenced or controlled adversely by an
adversary power in a way that would prevent us from being able
to exercise the type of control or the type of domain awareness
over the Gap that we have had in recent years.
That is why I think these proposals that I have mentioned,
and others put forward, for what is the long-term political
arrangement in connection with Greenland. It is so important,
because we have to have the ability to maintain some sort of
control and some sort of awareness over that Gap.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator Moreno. Senator Blunt Rochester.
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Blunt Rochester. Thank you for the recognition, Mr.
Chair, and Ranking Member Cantwell, and for convening this
hearing about our partnership with Greenland.
Greenland is positioned near the next vital strategic
region for the United States and our adversaries: the Arctic.
As we all have discussed here today, Russia and China know well
that the Arctic is important to controlling the flow of trade
and global security, and they are increasing their economic and
military activities in the region. That is why we must
simultaneously strengthen our relationship with Denmark and
Greenland while addressing the growing international threats to
the region.
Our alliance with Denmark and Greenland is critically
important to our shared economic and national security. I would
like to focus my questions on our critical mineral supply
chains. Greenland's strong natural resources offer economic
opportunities for Greenland itself, for the United States,
Denmark, and our allies.
As Greenland's own Minister of Business has noted in a
January 16th op-ed, Greenland has 39 of the 50 minerals we have
classified as critical to national security. This is why supply
chain resiliency is one of my top priorities. Ensuring the
innovative industries in the U.S., and in the allied nations
have the resources they need is critical for the expansion of
good-paying jobs for Greenlanders and for a strong economy.
And we really need to make sure that we put a fine point on
the fact that we desperately need--we need a national strategy
for our supply chains, which is why I am happy to be working,
in a bipartisan way, with Senators Cantwell and Blackburn.
Dr. Pincus, how would you say we can strategically leverage
and work with Greenland on their abundant critical materials to
enhance the resiliency of domestic industries--our domestic
industries?
Dr. Pincus. Thank you, ma'am, for that question. Greenland
has abundant minerals. They have been discussed extensively by
Mr. Marchese. I appreciate those facts. There are significant
challenges bringing those minerals to market, and there are--as
he has also discussed, there are conditions that increase the
price. It is a harsh climate, there is very little
infrastructure, and so companies operating in a market context
are generally going to look elsewhere. And this is amplified by
a global context in which mineral prices are volatile, and a
mine is a long-term bet.
We are talking a 20-, 30-, 40-, 50-year bet. And under that
current set of conditions, where you have to spend a lot of
money upfront to develop a mine in Greenland, and you do not
know what the prices are going to be in 20 years when your ores
spit out, it is hard to justify that. That would require non-
market interventions to overcome, whether it is government
funding, roads and infrastructure, providing grants, or special
investment vehicles to provide capital that is not available in
the marketplace.
That problem set exists in Alaska and also in the Canadian
Arctic as well. The North American Arctic has abundant natural
resources. They are in the United States' backyard. It is very
tempting to construct those short supply chains, but the price
challenges remain. And I think if we can find solutions to help
overcome some of those challenges, our domestic supply lines
would be much stronger.
The environmental standards across North America are the
highest in the world. The problem is solving for these non-
market interventions that are required. And you know, I think
that is going to be an ongoing challenge, and we can think
creatively about some new technological tools that could be
brought to bear about joint partnerships. Our allies are also
interested in breaking China's stranglehold on critical
minerals, so the extent to which we can find common solutions,
I think that is terrific.
Senator Blunt Rochester. Are there any new initiatives that
we should know about or consider?
Dr. Pincus. You know, I think we have agreements on
minerals with a lot of our close allies, and that is something
that can continue to be advanced. The U.S. Government has taken
important steps to identify novel tools and make funding
available. And I think it is--if it was easy, we would have
done it a long time ago.
Senator Blunt Rochester. Mm-hmm.
Dr. Pincus. It is also important to remember that
processing remains China's key stranglehold. There are critical
minerals around the world, but China controls almost all of the
processing chain. We cannot just secure access to minerals; we
need to break their grip on processing.
Senator Blunt Rochester. You know, just to follow up on
Senator Kim's points, I am curious, in your opinion; in what
ways can we build on our strong historic partnership with
Greenland while respecting sovereignty and our commitment to
our NATO allies?
Dr. Pincus. I would echo what Mr. Gray has said about
making this, you know, putting Greenlanders at the center of
this conversation and listening to them carefully. They very
clearly want independence. They are interested in developing
their minerals, but also are very concerned about environmental
standards.
Greenland, the Greenlandic government was--took on the
authority over natural resource decisionmaking in the 2009
Self-Government Act. So Greenlanders fought for the right to
control their natural resources, and I think it is unlikely
that they would be willing to cede that control. As we move
forward with this conversation about potential acquisition, I
think, as Mr. Marchese mentioned, the importance of the
regulatory authorities will continue to be at the center there.
Senator Blunt Rochester. Thank you so much. I yield back.
STATEMENT OF HON. BERNIE MORENO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator Moreno. Well, thank you. Now, I recognize myself.
So a question for all of you, just a quick hit here.
So starting with you, Mr. Gray, some of my colleagues on
the other side of the aisle have called President Trump's
desire to purchase Greenland a ``clickbait distraction''. Yes
or no, do you characterize this conversation as a ``clickbait
distraction''?
Mr. Gray. No, and it was not when Harry Truman, or Andrew
Johnson, or Dwight Eisenhower did it either.
Senator Moreno. OK, Mr. Marchese?
Mr. Marchese. No, sir. We have a lot of mineral potential
there, and it is certainly one of the options we have moving
forward.
Senator Moreno. Dr. Mercer?
Dr. Mercer. Thank you for that question. But I apologize,
that is outside the purview of my agency.
Senator Moreno. OK. Dr. Pincus?
Dr. Pincus. Not at all. And I would note that President
Trump's expressed interest in Greenland during his first
administration yielded very significant steps forward in the
U.S.-Greenland relationship. I would point to the reopening of
our consulate in Nuuk as a landmark accomplishment that has
done tremendous good for the U.S.-Greenland relationship. That
was a direct result of his intervention in his first term.
Thank you.
Senator Moreno. Perfect. So not a ``clickbait
distraction'', in fact, actually a very worthy conversation, so
let me ask you again the same--from the perspective of the
56,000 people who live in Greenland--let me just point out that
is basically the size of Westlake, Ohio, where I live, as the
entire population of a country that is, sorry to say it to my
colleague from Alaska, 50 percent bigger than Alaska. He likes
to always point out how big Alaska is versus the rest of us.
So Mr. Gray, if you were a Greenlander, would you rather
have America--be part of America, a $27 trillion economy, or
part of Denmark that is a $407 billion economy, given the
strategic imperative, the cost of investment, the ability to
yield money from the international markets, and the ability to
defend yourself against Russia, and China, where this is going
to become a strategic imperative; who would you rather be on
the side of there?
Mr. Gray. Well, Senator, I think the answer is obvious--
that it is the United States. But the question for me is not
between Denmark and the United States; it is between the United
States and China and Russia. And I think that answer is even
more obvious. And your colleagues had mentioned something about
sovereignty. To me, this is about preserving the sovereignty of
the Greenlanders from countries--from adversary nations, who
have a long history of undermining just that type of
sovereignty, when our tradition has been to uphold and protect
it.
Senator Moreno. And Mr. Marchese, if you think about, let
us say, Greenland became a sovereign, independent country--
56,000 people-- how would it possibly be able to afford the
kind of infrastructure improvements, mining operations, and the
ability to provide for its own people as an island, literally
and figuratively, financially?
Mr. Marchese. Senator, by itself--first of all, it is
obvious now that there is not any, again according to my
purview, mining there, so clearly something needs to be done. I
believe that part of the problem is the way this is being, you
know, I hate to use the word ``sold'', sold to the public. I do
not think we are emphasizing enough of the benefits that the
Greenlanders would get, specifically jobs.
I mean, people--I believe when people say 85 percent are
against it, I think part of the perception is, it is a land
grab and we are just going to impose our will upon them, versus
trying to soften the image by saying: Guys, or and women, we
are going to be giving you high-quality jobs, mining jobs pay
significantly more than average wages across the board.
So I would be trying to emphasize the economic benefits to
the population, because I do not believe that message has
gotten through. But it is clear that without some form of U.S.
intervention that the Greenlanders, by themselves, just cannot
make it. It is a $3.5 billion GDP, that is smaller than some of
the mines in the world. So they need help.
Senator Moreno. Yes, and I mean, I will close, close with
this. It strikes me that to my colleagues on the Democrat side,
and look, I have had an entire almost six-week term in the U.S.
Senate, so as the new guy on the block, it strikes me that the
knee-jerk reaction of anything that President Trump says has to
be met with a complete irrational response that it is bad
before ever even processing it, is what prevents us from
getting great things done.
I mean, at the end of the day, what we should do is
recognize that we have a Commander-in-Chief that knows the
difference between Greenland and Greenville, and that is
actually capable of putting a deal together--that is his actual
forte. And if we can put a deal together where the United
States of America can acquire Greenland and the people of
Greenland are happy, it should be an absolutely bipartisan
attitude. And I hope that my colleagues will get there.
I yield my time. And then recognize our Senator from
Michigan who did not win the National Football Championship
this year.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN
Senator Peters. Thank you, Senator Moreno. That is true,
but the University of Michigan is always very excited to beat
Ohio State. That is really the only game that matters every
year for Michigan.
Before getting to my questions, I want to first share that
I recently had the pleasure of speaking with the Ambassador of
Denmark and the head of representation from Greenland to
discuss our long history of military and economic cooperation.
Greenland and Denmark are steadfast in their commitment to
prioritizing collaboration with allies, like the United States,
whether that is through increased coordination related to
critical minerals, partnering on scientific research, or
navigating the security concerns that are very real in the
Arctic.
And certainly, that is why I find it troubling that while
our ally is aggressively and actively seeking increased
partnership with the United States, we have President Trump
insist on purchasing land that is, let us be very clear, it is
not for sale. It is just simply not for sale.
The President suggesting that the United States needs to
own Greenland to defend our national security is wrong. In
fact, threatening our NATO allies really in this fashion
undermines our shared mission to work together as allies to
counter both Russia and Chinese footholds in the Arctic as well
as around the world.
Our strength as a country is economic, it is military, but
it is also our friends and allies, which are incredibly
important for national security.
Despite his emphasis on the strategic importance of the
Arctic, President Trump has already threatened to upend our
economy and our relationship with another Arctic ally with
tariffs against Canada. And in recent events with the proposed
tariffs, Canada did give commitments that they had already
agreed to. Let us be clear, the Canadians already agreed to do
the things that Donald Trump threatened and then said, ``I will
release the tariffs'', even though we just got what Canada had
already done in terms of investing in enhanced border security,
something I feel passionate about.
So I am concerned we are seeing the same thing here:
reckless foreign policy, and economic policy ideas that really
have no benefits for Americans, and distract us from what we
really need to be focused on. I am disappointed that today we
have to address another ill-advised Trump administration move
against an ally instead of focusing on improving our strategic
coordination against those who do not share our values or our
goals.
So with that, I have a few questions. First off, Dr.
Pincus, Michigan certainly knows the importance of maintaining
our Coast Guard's icebreaking fleet. Great Lakes icebreakers
are designed to extend the operating season in Great Lakes
ports, and they keep our shipping lanes open throughout a
longer season than would otherwise happen. As we have discussed
today, the rapidly changing Arctic landscape, marked by melting
ice and increased accessibility, means that icebreakers are
going to play an even more pivotal role to maintain shipping in
the Arctic.
So my question for you is, given the growing competition
from our adversaries--not our allies--our adversaries in the
Arctic, what challenges do you believe we need to overcome to
increase our icebreaker fleet?
Dr. Pincus. Thank you, Senator, for that question. We have
significant challenges with U.S. icebreaking. Our fleet is at
perhaps its lowest historical point, and that is a weakness
that is being exploited by our adversaries. We see Chinese
icebreakers in the Arctic every year now, and I do not think
that is a surprise. I will say that the challenges we face with
regards to icebreaking are not unique to icebreakers. They are
symptomatic of the broader problems plaguing U.S. shipbuilding
as a whole.
The Wilson Center has undertaken extensive stakeholder
consultation on these issues. What we have heard is basically
this: Government is a bad partner to do business with. The
industry in the U.S. and beyond faces a list of challenges,
availability and stability of funding for shipbuilding,
competition for skilled labor, it is hard to build an
icebreaker; it takes unique welding expertise, for example, and
inefficient trade barriers.
Government clients are risk-avoidant and let perfection be
the enemy of progress. I think while we have some major
comparative advantages over China, particularly in our strong
network of alliances, we can leverage those more effectively to
improve icebreaker construction. I would flag the ICE Pact,
which is a trilateral agreement between the U.S., Canada, and
Finland, to cooperate on the production of Polar icebreakers,
and potentially also Great Lakes icebreakers, as having
potential to leverage allied expertise, and this may have
carry-on effects across shipbuilding more broadly.
Senator Peters. Great. Great. Dr. Mercer, I know that both
Arctic and Antarctic research requires collaboration across a
number of government agencies; and that this research is
absolutely key to our understanding of how to operate in those
regions. So my question to you is, in addition to the economic
and security importance of the Coast Guard's role in overseeing
our icebreaker fleet, which we just talked about, could you
discuss the role that the Coast Guard plays in supporting NSF
work, and how important that is to support?
Dr. Mercer. Absolutely. We have a very strong working
relationship with the Coast Guard both in the North and the
South. In the North, NSF actually funds all the science
capability on the HEALY as well as the technicians that operate
the science capability on the HEALY. We also fund a lot of
research that happens aboard the HEALY. For example, when it
was transiting from Alaska over to Greenland, north of Russia,
we had active research on that cruise last year.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
to each of you for being here.
Mr. Gray, I want to come to you. Many of us have seen what
China has done in Africa around Djibouti with the port that is
there, and also in Latin America, and we have listened to Xi
Jinping and the CCP leadership talk about the Polar Silk Road,
and putting this as a part of their Belt and Road Initiative.
So I would like for you to talk about why it is important that
we strengthen this bond with Greenland and pay more attention
to this because of the impact of the CCP?
Mr. Gray. Senator, it is a great question. This is a
playbook that the Chinese Communist Party wrote. They do it all
over the world. I have seen it personally in the South Pacific,
they do it in Latin America, they do it in Southeast Asia, in
Sub-Saharan Africa. They start by, you can call it the Belt and
Road Initiative, you can call it the Polar Silk Road, whatever
terminology they want to use, but what it is, is predatory
lending, primarily usurious interest rates for what we often
call ``white elephant'' projects, projects that very often
serve no economic purpose----
Senator Blackburn. And do not last. And then they are stuck
with debt diplomacy.
Mr. Gray. Exactly. And once they have the debt diplomacy,
ma'am, the Chinese come in and use that as a--for coercive
political control over small, developing states that cannot
push back, and do not have the ability to counter the CCP's
maligned influence.
And what I am so concerned about, and why I think this
topic is so critical, is that something very similar, we are
beginning to see bits and pieces of this in the High North, in
the Faroe Islands, in Greenland, to some extent in recent
years, we have seen it in Svalbard, we have seen it in Iceland.
This is beginning to happen. The Chinese are signaling their
intention to pursue this more actively, and that is why we
have--because we know the playbook, we need to be prepared to
push back proactively.
Senator Blackburn. Dr. Pincus, I want to come to you
because I had seen a quote from Biden's NSC Council Director
Brennan, and he made a comment at a Wilson Center event in
2022, that the U.S. has accepted that China has a--and I am
quoting him--``Vested interest in the Arctic''. I completely
disagree with that because China, just because they are calling
themselves a near-Arctic neighbor, does not give them a vested
interest.
And I want you to talk a little bit about that type of
attitude, with that perspective that China is using this for
their security and endangering our national security?
Dr. Pincus. Thank you, Senator, for that question. China
has expressed its interests in the Arctic with an Arctic Policy
Statement that came out in 2018, and they mention a host of
interests that they have in the region. They talk about the
emergent shipping lanes, they talk about natural resources,
they talk about scientific data. And so those are their
articulated interests in the region. And I think it is--you
know, in terms of their economic interests, China is a
resource-importing country. There are a lot of resources in the
Arctic region. It is not surprising that they would pursue
those resources.
Their pursuit of those resources is adverse to the
interests of the United States.
Senator Blackburn. OK. Let me--Mr. Gray, I want to pivot to
you on this, because China focuses on dual-use technologies,
and of course, we do not know where the China Economic
Development Department, MOFCOM, ends-- pardon me--and their
military begins. And this is what they couch as dual use. And I
would like for you to give what you see as specific steps that
we can take against the CCP in this regard to stop them from
using this as a research and test site?
Mr. Gray. It is an incredibly important question, Senator.
I think this is where my concerns about the current trajectory
of the political relationship between Denmark and Greenland are
so acute. We have to have a plan for this--the reason you
outlined and for reasons of even more conventional military
purposes. We have to have a plan for what comes next.
And if we do not know what the 56,000 people in Nuuk, what
their political organization looks like post-Copenhagen, which
they say will happen, what you are describing is going to
become even more prevalent. And we have seen this happen in
places in the South Pacific that are similarly sized. We have
to have a plan for what comes next.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. And I would now like to recognize
Mr. Sullivan, who also is going to preside while I run down to
the floor and vote.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Sullivan [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you very much for holding this very important hearing.
You know, the Arctic issues are something that, as the senator
representing the only Arctic state in the country, I care
deeply about. So I appreciate the Chairman focusing on this.
You know, I want to first mention, I think the idea of the
President looking to purchase Greenland has already been
mentioned by a number of the panelists. Other presidents have
thought about this. I think it is a wonderful idea if we can
pull it off. Truman, Andrew Johnson, others did. But I also
think it is important to remember--this is an op-ed I wrote in
The Wall Street Journal a couple weeks ago, saying: Hey,
Greenland is nice, good to go if we can get it, but remember
our Arctic state, Alaska. Because everything that people talk
about with regard to Greenland, we have in spades already in
America, it is called ``Alaska''. Arctic location, strategic
and critical minerals, oil and gas, cornerstone of America's
missile defense, it is all there.
The problem is, as the panelists know, when Democrats get
in power, Biden was the latest example, they want to turn
Alaska into a national park, not recognizing our state for what
it is, which is a strategic crown jewel for America. The Father
of the U.S. Air Force, General Billy Mitchell, in testimony
before Congress in the mid-1930s, called Alaska the most
strategic place on the planet. And it is.
So that is what we are focused on, do not forget Alaska.
Fortunately, unlike President Biden, President Trump has
already made it very clear that he is not going to forget
Alaska. On day one, the President signed an executive order
called ``Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource
Potential'', and I want to thank President Trump and his team
for doing that.
It goes into everything that this hearing has talked about,
strategic minerals, oil and gas, natural gas, getting the
Military involved. We just introduced my legislation called the
IRON DOME Act, which is all about missile defense. Alaska is
the cornerstone of our country's missile defense, and we can
build that out even better. So I appreciate what President
Trump is already doing on Alaska.
But it is not as if our adversaries do not recognize the
strategic importance of Alaska or the Arctic.
Next slide: This is what does not make a lot of news in the
Lower 48. In the last 3 years, we have had an enormous amount
of Russian incursions into our airspace, America's airspace,
Alaska is, yes, it is, naval incursions into our EEZ, and just
in the past year, these are some depictions of this, this is
another slide we have. This gives you all the Russian, Chinese
joint strategic bomber incursions into our ADIZ, and very
disturbingly, joint naval task force in our EEZ. So our
adversaries clearly understand the Arctic.
Can we put that alongside of there, just so--the one you
had before this one? Yes. Perfect.
So that is a wind up to a question I want to ask the
panelists. Mr. Gray, why don't we start with you? Given this,
right, how important is America's Arctic, I have been talking
to Secretary Hegseth, the President, others, and Alaska not
just for missile defense, but to push back on what is clearly
happening.
We had a meeting on uh what we are going to be doing on the
border, a lot of discussion with the President's team on the
northern border. This is the northern border and our
adversaries are all over it, and in my view what we need is a
lot more infrastructure, a lot more military, a lot more
missile defense, a lot more unleashing Alaska's critical
minerals, oil and gas, and we could not have a better partner
right now with President Trump, and the contrast between him
and President Biden who wanted to make my state a national
park.
He issued 70 executive orders, 70, singularly focused on
Alaska to shut us down. President Trump has wiped that out, but
what is your sense on how we need to respond to this, in
America's Arctic, which is Alaska and the potential that
Greenland could add to this, because that is the other part of
the Arctic, not the Alaska part of the Arctic?
Mr. Gray. Senator it is incredibly important, I think we
have to look at our hemisphere holistically, from the Aleutians
to Greenland, from pole to pole, and have a--and President
Trump began this process in his first term----
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
Mr. Gray. This holistic Arctic strategy that I was pleased
to be involved in. We have to, from a military standpoint, we
have talked about icebreakers but we have to have----
Senator Sullivan. All right. Just real quick on
icebreakers, Russia has 54, some of which are nuclear, many of
which are weaponized, we have two and one is broken. Do you
think that is peace through strength when it comes to
icebreakers?
Mr. Gray. It is not.
Senator Sullivan. Continue. Sorry to interrupt you.
Mr. Gray. It is, obviously, the icebreakers are key
particularly when we think about what the adversaries are doing
with nuclear powered icebreakers, growing their fleet, when we
think about the limited--the Limited C-130 capacity that we
have now for Arctic takeoff and landings, when we think about
just the general attrition of Arctic War Fighting capabilities
since the end of the Cold War and the lack of investment in
them.
I know DOD will likely have its own Arctic strategy. We
have to have Arctic warfighting capacity and deterrence as a
much higher level priority. And I think your chart and what
your state is dealing with is a perfect example of why.
Senator Sullivan. Great. I am going to turn to Senator
Schmitt here. I know cares about these issues as well. And then
I will have some follow up questions if there are no other
senators coming back.
So Senator Schmitt.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC SCHMITT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Senator. For 80 years, nearly
80 years, the United States has provided the security blanket
that has kept NATO allies safe, yet when President Trump raised
valid concerns about Greenland's security NATO talked about
protecting Greenland, not against Russia, not against China,
but against the United States. That is totally absurd.
The reality is that President Trump's messaging is about
defending not just America, but also our NATO allies against
Russian and Chinese aggression. The reality is the real threat
in the Arctic is Russia and China and it is growing.
Russia has reactivated Soviet Air bases, expanded its
nuclear icebreaker fleet, and sent submarines into Greenlandic
waters, one of which was only detected by chance. China,
despite being 900 miles away, calls itself a near-Arctic state,
and is issuing, or is using its Polar Silk Road to expand its
influence over Greenland's infrastructure.
Despite these mounting threats, Denmark has failed to
provide adequate security for Greenland. The Island's 27,000
miles of coastline remain largely unmonitored, and foreign
vessels repeatedly enter its waters unchecked. The U.S. cannot
afford to sit back while others neglect these responsibilities.
The Arctic is a key frontier in global competition, and
Greenland is central to U.S. security. Whether we acquire
Greenland, increase military presence, economic investment, or
formalize security arrangements, we must ensure Greenland's
future aligns with U.S. interests, not Beijing's, and not
Moscow's. Whether through increased military presence, economic
investment, or formalized security arrangements, we must act
now to secure the Arctic for ourselves and our allies.
So with that, I do want to ask Mr. Gray, I mentioned the
Polar Silk Road, how would you compare that to the One Belt One
Road Initiative?
Mr. Gray. Senator, I think of it as just the Arctic polar
adjunct of Belt and Road. I think it is just--we know the
playbook, as I said to Senator Blackburn, this is what the
Chinese do to gain economic and then coercive political
influence. It is the same playbook with a different name.
Senator Schmitt. And, as we have seen in other places
around the world, when they build a grid, they can turn it on
or they can turn it off. They build an airport, and you are
critical of the CCP, and all of a sudden you do not have
flights anymore. I mean, this is incredibly dangerous in a
place like Greenland, which, by the way, is also part of the
discussion about Panama, in the Panama Canal, right? This,
having China control both ports on either end of that canal, is
incredibly dangerous for us, from a military perspective and an
economic perspective.
Mr. Marchese, did I pronounce that right?
Mr. Marchese. Close enough.
Senator Schmitt. Close enough, sorry. I apologize. I do
want to ask you about, you may have mentioned this before, the
potential economic value of that mineral wealth. And in this
broader discussion we have about supply chains and having them,
you know, not be relying on China, how valuable is that to the
United States and the freedom-loving world?
Mr. Marchese. Well, Senator, it is extremely valuable. But
as I mentioned, sir, it will take, in my opinion, significant
capital from the United States in order to get private
industry. The United States should not be in the business of
operating critical mineral resources. So it should, in my
opinion, be the private sector. But it will take, in my
opinion, significant incentives for the private center--the
private sector, not necessarily--well, the significance of the
upfront money would be to derisk or somewhat help derisk these
projects. It is all about risk and reward.
That is why, if you look at the map today, there are very
few projects that are in existence. It is just the uncertainty
of what is really there.
Senator Schmitt. So in the half a minute I have left, what
specifically--I mean, you started to sort of outline that. What
is it, if we wanted to endeavor and we had a sort of working
with them, what steps would we take to move forward on that?
Mr. Marchese. Well, Senator, the first thing we have to do
is actually, like anything, identify what is there. We have, at
this point, just literally scratched the surface of what is
there. The sampling that has been done just indicates this is
there. What we do not know is how much of it is there, the
grade of what is there, and how difficult it is to--when I say
``difficult'', the level of difficulty it is to process these
materials.
So there are a lot of unanswered questions, which the
average private company just is not in a position to undertake.
And the very largest mining companies, they are risk-averse.
These are not individuals that are accustomed to what I would
call high-risk investments. So it takes a different mindset
when you go into a country like Greenland than, for example,
staying in the United States.
Senator Schmitt. Well, one of the things I think has been
the hallmark of President Trump's foreign policy, and certainly
what I believe in, is identifying what are our core national
interests. I think this era of adventurism is over. What are
the core interests of the United States of America? And I think
Greenland sits sort of front and center with that. So I
appreciate the conversation and the hearing today. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Senator Hickenlooper.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you. Mr. Chair, thank you all
for being here.
Dr. Pincus, several Colorado institutions are actively
conducting research to advance the Department of Defense's 24
Arctic strategy, the Center for National Security Initiatives
at CU Boulder, Washington, to sensing technology, energy,
cybersecurity, the Center for Combat Medicine and Battlefield
Research at the Medical Center at CU Anschutz has taken a
leadership looking at Arctic casualty care, for war fighters
there.
Dr. Pincus, how can we continue to foster partnerships
between the Department of Defense, and the academic and
research community on these--to support these national security
efforts in the Arctic?
Dr. Pincus. Thank you, Senator, for that question. And, and
I appreciate you flagging the strong connections and support
between the Department of Defense and our research and academic
institutions, which has played out particularly in the polar
regions, both the Arctic and Antarctica have long been places
where there is been close cooperation between U.S. science
institutes and the U.S. Military, and that has redounded to the
benefit of the United States.
We have world-leading scientific capacities. We have a
technology-based economy, and that comes out of decades of
support for basic science and research, and also, you know, all
of the tech spinoffs that come out of that.
And so I think, you know, you have listed a couple of
examples of research efforts that are likely to provide
economic benefits as well as military advantages. I think that
is always been very important, militaries must constantly
innovate to dominate, and you know, the polar regions are
places where that is especially true given their unique
challenges. Thank you.
Senator Hickenlooper. Great. And I appreciate that. And
certainly, I remember 30-something years ago, some of the
scientific research into the Arctic was derided as being
useless; and the scope of history requires us to keep looking
and being curious. I had a friend who was a geologist who
cross-country skied across Greenland in 1985. It is pretty
flat, at least until you get to the coast.
Dr. Marchese, obviously, we talked about the critical and
rare earth minerals that are in Greenland. However, as you have
mentioned, they are mostly locked in the ice, the cold weather
and winter mining. I mean, you really cannot do too much in the
winter there, so-called.
The U.S., one of our great advantages against China and
Russia has always been our allies, our network of alliances and
partners, many of whom have extensive mining experience.
Canada--excuse me--Canada obviously has a lot of experience in
coal mining, Japan, seafloor mining. How might the new critical
mining--the critical mineral mining ventures in Greenland
benefit from that shared expertise?
Mr. Marchese. Good question, Senator. Unfortunately, most
of the downstream, which is the processing capabilities in the
world, are located in Southeast Asia, and specifically China.
China prohibits their researchers and professionals from doing
this in other countries. So even if Greenland--you know, in an
alternative universe, if the United States said: Hey, we want
your help, they would not give it to us just because it is
prohibited.
There is expertise in Africa. There is expertise in, in
South America. But again, it depends on the type of mining you
are referring to. So for example, there is significant
expertise around the world in base metals, so copper, aluminum,
things like that, no problem finding expertise anywhere.
Senator Hickenlooper. Right.
Mr. Marchese. When you start getting into the critical
mineral area, as I said, most in Southeast Asia, but
specifically some in Europe. So they, in my opinion, would have
the expertise available, but in----
Senator Hickenlooper. I understand what you are saying. It
is complex. It is not easily accessible.
Mr. Marchese. Yes.
Senator Hickenlooper. Got it. Dr. Mercer, as you know
Arctic research in remote, austere environments, through the
National Science Foundation, through NOAA requires again, close
collaboration with our partners, our allies. The funding freeze
issued by the Office of Management and Budget could really
disrupt some of these research efforts, from the Bipartisan
CHIPS Act, CHIPS and Science Act, Congress directed the NSF to
create an Office of Research Security and Policy, you know,
responsible for identifying and addressing security risks that
impact research integrity of the U.S. projects.
In your view, does the increasing presence of China and
Russia in the Arctic region show or create any new research
security risks that Congress should be especially vigilant
about?
Dr. Mercer. Thank you for your question. The Office of
Polar Programs in NSF works in close partnership with our
Office of the Chief of Research Security Strategy and Policy.
We are also--NSF is also a member of the National
Counterintelligence Task Force, to work with the intelligence
community and law enforcement partners on research security
issues, something we take very seriously.
But as far as the rest of your question, I would be happy
to take that back to NSF and, potentially, arrange a
conversation in a different setting.
Senator Hickenlooper. Perfect. Thank you very much. I yield
back to the Chair.
Senator Sullivan. Senator Young.
STATEMENT OF HON. TODD YOUNG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, witnesses,
for being here. I would like to begin with critical minerals
and trade, building on some of my colleague, Mr. Hickenlooper's
questions.
The headlines have recently been focused on acquisition of
Greenland under different scenarios. But what I actually find
more plausible, and therefore more interesting is some sort of
trade relationship that might be deepened. Greenland holds vast
reserves, as we know, of critical minerals and sits outside of
China's supply chain dominance. And I think a trade partnership
with Greenland could strengthen our mineral security in the
fairly near term. Let me know if I am wrong on that predicate.
But I also think that without investment in processing, we risk
repeating some past mistakes that we have made in terms of
these trade relations.
A smarter approach might be to go beyond extraction and
ensure that trade agreements support investment in refining,
processing, and manufacturing to work together with our
counterparties and build a resilient supply chain, rather than
shifting dependencies. We know that trade deals alone will not
solve our problems, but they will certainly make great strides
toward reducing our dependencies.
Without addressing permitting delays, and infrastructure
gaps at home, even the best agreements could take years to
deliver real results. So Mr. Marchese, [Mar-kee-se], Mr.
Marchese, so I am close?
Mr. Marchese. [Mar-kay-se].
Senator Young. OK. I am sorry, sir. If a trade agreement
were to be considered with Greenland, what specific policy
incentives should be included to ensure that rare earth
elements are not just extracted, but also processed and refined
in a way that strengthens U.S. supply chains?
Mr. Marchese. Senator, great question. I will disagree with
you somewhat, though.
Senator Young. Yes.
Mr. Marchese. I believe the--I believe we risk making the
same mistakes in Greenland as we have in the United States,
which is that the Federal Government provides a lot of
potential financial assistance for downstream processing. So
process to your heart's content; we will help you, but finding
sources, which is, as I mentioned in my testimony, upstream,
zero money available.
Senator Young. Yes.
Mr. Marchese. In my opinion, it is significantly easier to
get funding once you have the upstream part solved. Finding the
mine, developing the mine----
Senator Young. Right.
Mr. Marchese.--in my mind is significantly more important
than processing it. You have get lots of money. There are lots
of people who would give you capital to process something, but
you have to have the supply to begin with. And in this country,
we do not provide money for exploration and discovery. You
know, in our alternate universe, we would love to have every
other country deliver material so we can process it.
Senator Young. Yes. So, I am learning, Mr. Marchese. I am
learning from you. You are familiar with some of the solutions
that are offered here on the Hill. One has been to--and this
has been spearheaded by Senator Cornyn, to work with our
friends around the world and our U.S. Geological Service to
identify where all the mineral reserves are, and then do our
best to project out into the future demands for those various
minerals, and processing capacity, and just kind of map all the
stuff out, as one would do when you are managing a project.
Is that the sort of assistance that might help take some
risk out of the markets and unlock more private capital?
Mr. Marchese. Senator, absolutely. As I mentioned earlier,
it is called ``mineral characterization''. We absolutely need
to do that first in order to allow a private company--and
mostly smaller companies. As I said, larger companies are risk-
averse.
Senator Young. Yes.
Mr. Marchese. They will pay you handsomely to buy something
from you once you have developed it for them. We are not at
that point. So we need smaller--typically the smaller companies
are going to be coming in to do this type of exploration, they
just do not have the capital to undertake these. So yes, in my
opinion----
Senator Young. Maybe that paired with something I was
alluding to, again not to--I am not suggesting that all would
be sufficient, but collectively, would that be constructive
toward reducing our dependencies?
Mr. Marchese. Yes. Senator, yes, as long as we have
upstream as well as downstream funding, I think we are on the
right track.
Senator Young. Very helpful. Thank you. If I could just ask
one more question related to icebreaking. Mr. Gray, can you
describe how our lack of multiple functional icebreakers
affects our influence in the Arctic region? Just for my
constituents, if yes?
Mr. Gray. Well, Senator, it just limits our capacity to go
where we need to go, when we need to go. It limits deterrence,
it limits presence, it limits our ability to have domain
awareness of critical sea lanes, and it cedes the--it cedes the
key seaways to adversaries who are making those investments
who, China and Russia, who are building the world's largest
icebreaker fleets, including nuclear icebreakers.
Senator Young. And not just military, it does not just cede
the military playing field to them; it cedes the commercial; is
that accurate?
Mr. Gray. It does. And what I would say, though, on the
Chinese particularly, I think the commercial is oftentimes a
predicate for future military activity, and that they are
intricately linked in the Chinese context.
Senator Young. As Mr. Mahan said they would be.
Mr. Gray. Sure.
Senator Young. Absolutely, right. OK, Mr. Chairman, thank
you.
Senator Sullivan. Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you, all of you for being here. I
just want to point out again that Denmark and Greenland have
made clear that Greenland is not for sale, and I am--hearing
thus on the acquisition of Greenland and the problems it is
causing with our allies, seems strange to me when we just got
the report that inflation is going up, and I think we should be
more focused on those things. But I am happy to dive in. Being
from a state that has a lot of snow and having been to
Greenland, I would love to talk about this.
As my Republican colleague, Senator Murkowski of Alaska,
said in a joint statement with a member of the Danish
Parliament, the future does not require us to redraw the
borders on the map, but to work harder than ever to cross them.
Dr. Pincus, do you agree that strengthening our alliances
advances our strategic objectives in the region?
Dr. Pincus. Thank you, Senator, for that question. I would
say that from a policy analytic perspective, the U.S. has
clearly defined national interests in Greenland and across the
Arctic, and we have identified some challenges and some
problems that we are turning our attention to. We have a range
of policy options, and I think it is the job of the President
and the Congress, of policymakers, to make those policy
determinations, balancing relative priority, risk, and cost.
So again, with regards to Greenland, we have a range of
options, and there is a spectrum in there, and I think at the
lower-cost, a sort of lower-hurdle part of that spectrum, I
would put diplomatic arrangements, treaties, defense
agreements.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you. I am concerned about the
freezing, since we are talking about freezing lands, freezing
of Federal grants and assistance. That can seriously harm our
global competitive advantage, including in the Arctic. For
instance, the National Science Foundation's Office of Polar
Programs guides critical research on Arctic issues. For
example, the University of Minnesota's Polar Geospatial Center
has been working on digital mapping with support, which is
going to be really important as we look at what is happening
with Russia and other countries that are not our friends,
China, that are heading there.
What role, Dr. Mercer, can the University research
community play in preparing the U.S. for future civilian and
military operations in the Arctic region?
Dr. Mercer. Thank you for that question. America is the
world's leader in scientific research, and our work--NSF's
work, or the work that we support in the Arctic, including that
of the University of Minnesota and the Polar Geospatial Center,
is really important to the U.S. As I noted before, we are
strong collaborators with other U.S. Government agencies,
including various Department of Defense services, and as well
as the Government of Greenland.
So I think that that relationship--those relationships
between academia and the various government institutes that
further research in the Arctic, are really important.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Dr. Pincus, different topic,
icebreakers, a big deal for the Great Lakes, and as you can
imagine, last November, Canada, Finland, and the U.S.
formalized the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort Pact, known as
the ICE Pact, very creative, to build more icebreaker ships'
essential tools to open trade routes. I have talked to
representatives of both countries outside of the U.S., Canada,
and Finland about this. How can we maximize our collaboration
with Canada and Finland in the Arctic? And I know you share my
concerns about slow momentum for building in the U.S. What more
can be done to boost the domestic manufacturing?
So first question on Finland and Canada, the second one is
what we can do here besides getting more icebreakers in
conjunction with them, and maybe that is the answer, so?
Dr. Pincus. Thank you, ma'am. I appreciate that. The Wilson
Center has been consulting extensively on the ICE Pact and on
icebreaker construction, and there are a number of hurdles
here, and they include labor and workforce challenges. There is
a shrinking talent pool, and shipyards are competing for
skilled labor. We do not have a national shipbuilding strategy
or unified shipbuilding plan to help align yards and ships for
best fit. Our contracting practices are often adverse for
business interests.
For example, we often use firm fixed-price contracts on
first-in-class ships and vessels, and that places all of the
risk on a shipyard. Our specifications and requirements are
often--often permit perfection to be the enemy of the good. And
so I think there is a lot of things that we could do, and
lessons that we could learn from our foreign counterparts in
terms of leveraging their expertise and speeding up our
acquisitions.
But one point I do want to make is that the Coast Guard
cannot just get more hulls. Yes, we need a lot more
icebreakers, but they also need people, and they need funding
to run those hulls. We see the recent acquisition of the
Estoris, that is going to be years before it comes into
operational capacity because of the refits that is going to
need, and the Coast Guard is under strain now with demand for
its mission set.
We are seeing challenges meeting all of those demands.
There is strain placed on people and families. This is true for
the Navy as well. The world wants the Coast Guard to be in a
lot of places, and the Navy to be in a lot of places. And so I
think we definitely need hulls, but we also need people.
Senator Klobuchar. And how do you see--the last question--
the ICE Pact working with Canada and Finland in helping?
Dr. Pincus. I think it is a little too soon to say there is
tremendous potential there, but the implementation is going to
be the real challenge right now. We have plans in place, but
there have not been resources appropriated to support the
implementation of ICE Pact. So I think DHS and Coast Guard are
working through some of those challenges, and it will be
interesting to see if we can make some creative solutions
around relaxing trade restrictions, perhaps permitting in
skilled labor that could help us build icebreakers faster,
perhaps relaxing some ITAR restrictions on tech sharing.
So I think there are a lot of ways for innovation, but we
have to pick our targets. And again, apply that sort of range
of analysis. What is the top priority? Where are we willing to
accept some risk and pay some cost? Thank you.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. I am going
to just wrap up with a few more questions for the panel here.
First, going back to this chart, I want to get a sense of why
do you think this has been a pretty dramatic increase from
Russia and China in joint--unprecedented joint naval and
strategic bomber task forces into our airspace, into our
waters, our EEZ.
And related to that, you know, Mr. Gray, you talked about
presence. You cannot have presence without infrastructure. I
think it is high time that we start looking at more
infrastructure to be able to address this. We are going to have
a hearing with the NORTHCOM Commander on the Armed Services
Committee tomorrow, and I am going to talk a lot about looking
at potential bases.
There is an incredible Navy base out here, the Adak Naval
Base, was closed during BRAC. It could be a great sub-base,
Naval Air Station base, surface warship ship base, huge
refueling capacity right there flanking the Russians and
Chinese, very strategic. We are trying to get a strategic port
built in Nome, Alaska, but otherwise, we have very little
infrastructure from which to launch military, economic, and
icebreaker capabilities.
So maybe just a quick question for all the panelists: Do we
need more infrastructures in America's Arctic? And now, I am
not talking Greenland. This hearing is about strategic
interests in the Arctic. We are an Arctic nation solely because
of that great state, Alaska. So what is your sense? For all the
panelists on infrastructure in the Arctic to combat what is a
very, very aggressive move by our adversaries? And, by the way,
just talking to the NORTHCOM Commander, we had one of the
busiest times ever in terms of aggressive incursions, joint
Chinese-Russian operations.
That is unprecedented. He thinks this year it is going to
be even more. So we have got to be ready for America,
protecting America right now. What is the sense of the panel on
infrastructure in America's Arctic?
Mr. Gray. Senator, I could not agree more. We have to have
more infrastructure not just from a defensive presence
standpoint to protect our homeland, but also from a power
projection standpoint.
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
Mr. Gray. You know, we have allowed our Arctic
infrastructure, in addition to a lot of our general defense
industrial infrastructure, to atrophy. I think this would be a
huge way to boost our capacity to deter in the Arctic.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Mr. Marchese, do you have a view
on that, sir?
Mr. Marchese. Senator, I could not agree with you more. You
are preaching to the converted. We, in my opinion, need
significantly more infrastructure spending, not only in Alaska
but in the United States. You know, there is no--there is
nothing wrong with fishing at your feet. I mean, we have
everything we need here. It is great that we are going to
Greenland, but let us concentrate on what we can control, which
is United States' investment.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you. Dr. Mercer.
Dr. Mercer. Thank you for the question, sir. As I said
before, America is the world's leader in scientific research,
and that is certainly true in the Polar Regions, we rely on
heavily, in order to be the leader in research in the Polar
Regions, on the Coast Guard icebreaker, the LC-130 aircraft,
the C-17 aircraft, the Space Base Pituffik in Greenland.
And as I noted in my opening testimony, we are in the
process of designing--in the design process, to recapitalize
and modernize Summit Station at the center of the Greenland Ice
Sheet.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
And Dr. Pincus.
Dr. Pincus. Thank you, Senator. I agree that we are seeing
increased adversary presence in the region because they
perceive weakness on their part, and so they are pressing us.
Senator Sullivan. Yes. And by the way, it is not on this
chart. I have another one that shows they are--I think some of
the witnesses said this earlier--they are building up their
infrastructure, particularly military, but also energy and
critical mineral infrastructure in a huge way in the Arctic,
and we are still kind of, I agree, kind of exuding weakness.
Dr. Pincus. But I would also note that we face multiple
challenges in Alaska. In addition to extending and expanding
our presence there, we have challenges with coastal erosion and
some of the permafrost issues.
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
Dr. Pincus. So there is money that needs to be put into
current DOD installations to harden them. We are also seeing
the expansion of wild land fires and other novel challenges. So
I think efficient spending decisions to get as much bang for
our buck is important, so we can meet the full range of
national security through economic and community concerns
related to that really wide range of challenges.
Senator Sullivan. Right.
Dr. Pincus. So you know, I would put the Coast Guard at the
top of the list because it has got a broad mission set, and its
assets can be utilized for a lot of different purposes.
Obviously, DOD assets can be applied to civil disasters as
well. And then new technology that can help us respond
effectively and juggle competing demands, whether it is from a
massive wildfire, a big coastal storm like some of the storms
we have seen in Western Alaska, or military challenges. We have
to do all of those at the same time. So it is a real big
problem set, and I appreciate you flagging it.
Senator Sullivan. Good.
Dr. Pincus. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Well, listen, we are going to be working
on this. Our budget reconciliation plan here on the Senate side
is going to have a lot of resources for our military, for the
border, by the way, the northern border, as well as the
southern border, and the Coast Guard, and I think that is going
to be welcome, hopefully, in a bipartisan way.
But listen, I want to thank the witnesses. This has been a
great hearing. The issue of the Arctic is a really important
one. I appreciate the Chairman putting this on the agenda
really early in his tenure.
Senators will have until close of business on Wednesday,
February 19, to submit additional questions for the record from
our witnesses. We respectfully request the witnesses to try to
get those back by Wednesday, March 5, to respond to questions
for the record. Again, thank you. Great panel today, a lot of
interests, as you can see, in a bipartisan way, on Greenland,
on the Arctic. We have got a lot more work to do.
This Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
I'm a Greenland expert--these 3 paths can make it America's next
frontier
By Ronald Lauder
Published Feb. 4, 2025, 6:54 p.m. ET
REUTERS
When President Trump in 2020 first raised the idea of acquiring
Greenland, he was met with universal derision.
The Danish prime minister dismissed the notion as ``absurd,'' while
a former Danish leader called it an ``April Fool's Day joke.'' The
establishment media treated it as a punch line.
Once again, the critics were wrong, and their narrow-minded
thinking has been revealed. Trump's Greenland concept was never
absurd--it was strategic.
Top reason to grab Greenland:
On the grand chessboard of global power, geography is destiny.
The Arctic, once a frozen afterthought, is now the front line
of strategic competition and cooperation.
At its heart lies Greenland--the world's largest island, with
immense untapped potential and irreplaceable geopolitical
significance.
But for Greenland to achieve its dream of independence, it must
secure its economy and defenses. The United States can help.
I have worked closely with Greenland's business and government
leaders for years to develop strategic investments there, even as the
Biden administration, unsurprisingly, ignored and underestimated its
vast opportunity.
Beneath its ice and rock lies a treasure trove of rare earth
elements essential for AI, advanced weaponry and modern technology.
As ice recedes, new maritime routes are emerging, reshaping global
trade and security.
Moreover, Greenland, an epicenter of great-power competition and
human and natural potential, offers a strategic partnership waiting to
be forged.
Since the 2009 Self-Government Act, Greenland has exercised
increasing autonomy from Denmark's century-old sovereignty, including
the ability to lease land without Danish approval.
A referendum on full independence could happen at any time, so the
United States has a narrow window to strengthen ties before other
powers move in.
By all available evidence, the Trump administration can
successfully negotiate a deal with the Greenlandic government to
bolster both our economic and national security and theirs.
Multiple viable paths can advance this vision--each securing
America's interests while honoring the aspirations of the Greenlandic
Inuit people.
One option is to fully activate the 1951 Defense of Greenland
Agreement, which granted the U.S. exclusive jurisdiction over defense
installations and personnel in Greenland under NATO. In exchange, the
United States committed to Greenland's protection during the Cold War--
given Denmark's limited capacity to do so--and delivered on that
imperative.
This agreement allows the U.S. to negotiate long-term leases for
key areas, including sites rich in rare-earth deposits, deep-water
ports or suited for military bases.
Expanding such leases, like the one now in effect for the US-
operated Pituffik Space Base, could drive immediate economic growth
through infrastructure investment and job creation. Over time, as trust
deepens, this framework could ultimately bring Greenland into sovereign
alignment with America.
Another option is a Compact of Free Association (or COFA), modeled
after U.S. agreements with the Pacific island nations of Palau,
Micronesia and the Marshall Islands.
A COFA with Greenland would preserve its self-governance while
providing U.S. defense guarantees, economic aid, expanded trade and
other benefits. It would strengthen Greenland's autonomy while securing
America's strategic foothold in the Arctic, anchored by Alaska.
As another option, the United States could form a new trilateral
agreement with Greenland and Denmark to formalize Arctic cooperation.
That would allow Denmark, too, to benefit, collaborating with the
United States on vital energy and rare-earth processing projects and
enhancing regional stability.
For Greenland, a deeper partnership with the United States promises
transformative benefits.
American investment could diversify its economy, create jobs and
modernize infrastructure, raising living standards across the island.
Education and technology exchanges would let Greenlanders shape
their own future--one rooted in both independence and prosperity.
Crucially, a strong alliance with the United States would safeguard
Greenland's sovereignty, shielding it from undue influence by China and
other foreign powers.
For the United States, the stakes are equally high.
A stronger U.S. presence in Greenland would counter adversarial
militarization of the Arctic, block economic encroachment by
competitors and secure control over vital rare-earth resources--
reducing American dependence on vulnerable supply chains now dominated
by China.
Militarily, Greenland is a perfect twin to Alaska. Their locations
on either side of the continent join into a strategic linchpin,
offering forward bases essential for Arctic, North Atlantic and North
Pacific security.
When President Harry Truman proposed purchasing Greenland in 1946,
the idea was dismissed as unrealistic. Today the stakes are even
higher, and the opportunity even greater.
To know Greenland is to understand that it is not just another
strategic asset: It is America's next frontier.
By acting now with vision and resolve, Trump can secure America's
leadership in the Arctic for generations to come--while helping
Greenland achieve its aspirations as a partner, an ally and perhaps,
one day, part of the American family.
Ronald S. Lauder is president of the World Jewish Congress and
former U.S. Ambassador to Austria.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger Wicker to
Alexander B. Gray
Question 1. Ship traffic in the Arctic has increased 37 percent in
the past decade. China and Russia have decided to work together to
develop shipping avenues in the Arctic. Greenland is interested in U.S.
investments in their infrastructure, including building more airports
and expanding their deepwater port to be dual use between domestic
maritime search and rescue needs and supporting U.S. national security
interests. The U.S. once maintained a large footprint in Greenland
during World War II and the Cold War, operating 17 bases in Greenland
in World War II and the Cold War, which protected U.S. national
security and ensured security to our NATO ally.
What investments in transportation infrastructure and technology
would increase our defense capabilities in the region and could drive
U.S. economic development in a growing strategic area?
Answer. On transportation infrastructure, expanding Greenland's
deepwater port capacity is would provide important benefits for U.S.
defense capabilities in the region. The existing port at Nuuk, while
functional, lacks the depth and scale to handle large naval or
commercial vessels efficiently. Upgrading it to a dual-use facility--
supporting maritime search and rescue for Greenland while doubling as a
U.S. military staging point--would enhance rapid response to Arctic
incidents and provide a logistical hub for naval operations. Coupled
with a new deepwater port in northwest Greenland, near Pituffik, where
the U.S. already has a presence. A modern port there, capable of
docking icebreakers and frigates, would extend operational reach across
the GIUK Gap (Greenland-Iceland-UK), a chokepoint critical for
countering Russian submarine activity. The Army Corps of Engineers has
studied Arctic port feasibility before--Nome, Alaska, was a candidate--
but Greenland's proximity to transatlantic routes gives it additional
strategic benefits for countering our adversaries' activities near
Greenland.
Airports are also critical. Greenland's current trio--Nuuk,
Kangerlussuaq, and Narsarsuaq--handles limited traffic, with runways
too short for heavy military transports like C-17s. Extending runways
and adding all-weather capabilities, which are important to function in
the Arctic's extreme climate, would allow U.S. Air Force deployments
and surveillance flights, bolstering domain awareness against Sino-
Russian moves. A 2024 Danish plan to upgrade these airports with $2
billion offers a cost-sharing opportunity--U.S. investment could
prioritize military specs, like hangars for F-35s or P-8 Poseidons,
while supporting Greenland's civilian needs. A new airfield in the
east, facing Iceland, could also monitor the Transpolar Sea Route, a
potential future shipping lane as ice melts.
On technology, icebreakers are vital. Fast-tracking the Polar
Security Cutter program--already budgeted at $11.6 billion for three
heavy icebreakers--would ensure year-round access to Arctic waters,
escorting naval assets and securing shipping lanes. These could also be
equipped with anti-submarine warfare tech, like towed sonar arrays, to
counter Russian subs in the region. Meanwhile, deploying long-range
drones adapted for cold weather--off Greenland's upgraded airfields
would extend surveillance over the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea
Route, where China and Russia are staking claims.
Dual-use tech can drive economic gains too. Satellite networks,
like Starlink, already being considered for Arctic use, could provide
broadband to Greenland's 56,000 residents while feeding real-time data
to U.S. forces. A fiber-optic cable linking Greenland to Alaska or
Iceland, hardened against cyber threats, would boost local connectivity
and secure military comms. These investments create jobs--construction,
maintenance, tech support--while tapping Greenland's rare earth
deposits (lithium, niobium) for U.S. supply chains, reducing reliance
on China.
Question 2. The Navy and Coast Guard created an Integrated Program
Office to build a new fleet of icebreakers, the first of which was
supposed to be delivered in 2024. We still don't have a contract
agreement and have yet to fully begin construction on the first ship in
the class. The President has recently called for 40 icebreakers to be
built.
What is the strategic value to the United States of having more
icebreakers when our competitors have a combined 60 icebreakers?
Answer. The strategic value of the U.S. expanding its icebreaker
fleet lies in countering their military dominance, securing economic
opportunities, and reinforcing geopolitical clout in the Arctic, where
ship traffic has spiked 37 percent in a decade. Russia's 40+
icebreakers (including nuclear-powered giants) and China's growing
fleet enable year-round naval operations, resource extraction (like
Yamal LNG), and control over routes like the Northern Sea Route, while
the U.S. struggles with the aging Polar Star and Healy. More
icebreakers, including heavy ones like the planned Polar Security
Cutters would ensure naval access, protect American stakes in oil, gas,
and rare earths, and signal resolve to NATO allies, offsetting rivals'
numbers with quality deployment despite high costs.
Question 2a. Based on the recent exercises of the People's
Liberation Army Navy and China Coast Guard operating with the Russian
Federation Navy and Border Guard in the polar regions, what are the
risks of the U.S. not meeting presence with presence in the Arctic
regions?
Answer. The recent joint exercises between the China and Russia in
the Arctic highlight a growing Sino-Russian alignment that threatens
U.S. interests if not countered with a robust presence. Without
matching this activity, the U.S. risks losing strategic influence over
critical shipping lanes like the Northern Sea Route and access to
resources. Failing to deploy an adequate U.S. presence in the region
would embolden Moscow and Beijing to dominate the region, sidelining
NATO allies and exposing the U.S. homeland to unchecked northern
threats, as seen with joint bomber patrols near Alaska in July 2024.
Question 3. In recent years, China has declared themselves a
``near-Arctic power'' and begun increasing their capabilities for
operating in the high latitudes. China's Polar Silk Road, the Arctic
arm of the Belt and Road Initiative, aims to build shipping routes
through the Arctic Ocean to connect Europe, Asia, and North America.
China currently operates four icebreakers, with a fifth expected to be
completed in 2025.
China's stated goal in the Arctic as a ``near-Arctic power'' is to
create a Polar Silk Road and exploit the region's resources. How will
this goal increase Chinese influence in the Arctic regions?
Answer. China's ambition to establish a Polar Silk Road as a self-
proclaimed ``near-Arctic power'' aims to integrate the Arctic into its
Belt and Road Initiative, leveraging the region's thawing shipping
lanes--like the Northern Sea Route, which slashes Asia-Europe transit
time by 40 percent--to boost trade and secure resource access. By
deploying icebreakers like the Xuelong 2 and investing in
infrastructure (e.g., failed bids for Greenland airports in 2018),
China seeks to lock in economic footholds, partnering with Russia to
escort LNG tankers and develop ports like Zarubino, near Vladivostok,
for Arctic transshipment. This logistical edge amplifies Beijing's
influence, letting it shape trade flows and potentially set de facto
standards for navigation, sidelining Western powers like the U.S.
Paired with joint naval exercises--such as the 2024 Bering Sea
patrols--China's presence signals reliability to Arctic states, eroding
U.S. and NATO sway over the region.
Resource exploitation further cements China's clout, targeting the
Arctic's 13 percent of undiscovered oil, 30 percent of natural gas, and
rare earths vital for tech dominance. Beijing's stakes in Russia's
Yamal LNG (29.9 percent via state firms) and stalled $500 million
investment in Greenland's Kvanefjeld mine show its intent to control
supply chains, reducing reliance on Western sources while binding
resource-rich states to its orbit. Scientific missions, like 14
expeditions since 1999, double as strategic mapping, enhancing China's
leverage in forums like the Arctic Council, where it's an observer but
pushes for more say. If unchecked, this economic penetration--backed by
Russia's military muscle--could shift the Arctic's balance, leaving the
U.S. scrambling to counter a entrenched Sino-Russian bloc in a region
critical to global security and commerce.
Question 3a. How can the U.S. counter increasing Chinese influence
in the Arctic regions?
Answer. The U.S. can countering Chinese influence in the region by
seeking to align Greenland's self-stated objective of independence with
U.S. interests. This could take several forms including the U.S.
acquiring Greenland as a territory or negotiating a Compact of Free
Association Agreement with Greenland which would allow the U.S.
military unfettered access to the region as well as the right to deny
foreign military transits or activity.
Question 4. Pituffik Space base was built in 1951 and provides
installation support for vital space-based missions. It is home to the
Department of Defense's northernmost deep-water port and has a 10,000-
foot runway.
Considering the growing strategic threats to North America and the
U.S. homeland, do you believe Pituffik, and the early warning
capabilities located there, continue to remain critical to our national
defense?
Answer. Yes, Pituffik Space Base remains critical to U.S. national
defense, especially as strategic threats to North America escalate from
Russia and China's Arctic ambitions. Its early warning systems,
including the Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) tied to the Missile
Defense Agency, provide unmatched detection of ballistic missile
launches and space threats across the polar region--vital against
Russia's hypersonic missile tests (e.g., Zircon in 2023) and joint
Sino-Russian bomber patrols near Alaska in July 2024. Positioned 750
miles above the Arctic Circle, Pituffik's line-of-sight advantage over
the northern approaches fills a gap no CONUS-based radar can, while its
proximity to the GIUK Gap aids tracking Russian subs. As China's Polar
Silk Road and Russia's militarization intensify competition, Pituffik's
role in domain awareness and deterrence--backed by its Cold War legacy
of 17 U.S. bases in Greenland--ensures it's a linchpin for homeland
security, especially with Arctic traffic up.
Question 4a. Do you believe the U.S. has made sufficient
investments in these capabilities to pace rapidly evolving strategic
missile threats?
Answer. The U.S. has not made sufficient investments in Pituffik's
early warning capabilities to keep pace with rapidly evolving strategic
missile threats, particularly from Russia's hypersonic arsenal and
China's expanding missile tech. While the Upgraded Early Warning Radar
(UEWR) at Pituffik, part of a $1.5 billion modernization from 2005-
2017, can detect ballistic missiles, it continues to struggle against
hypersonics like Russia's Zircon or Avangard, which travel at Mach 10+
with unpredictable trajectories--capabilities the GAO warned in 2022
outstrip legacy radar sensitivity. Funding for next-gen sensors, like
the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), has prioritized Alaska over
Greenland, leaving Pituffik's upgrades incremental rather than
transformative, despite a 2024 Pentagon budget of $9.1 billion for
missile defense. The lack of robust investment for hypersonic-specific
radar and space-based tracking risks blinding the U.S. to threats over
the polar cap, where Pituffik's strategic perch remains underutilized.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to
Alexander B. Gray
Question. Both Alaska and Greenland are strategic gateways to the
Central Arctic Ocean, a high seas area beyond national jurisdiction. In
the 110th Congress, Senator Stevens, through Senate Joint Resolution
17, led national efforts to negotiate the Central Arctic Ocean
fisheries agreement, which was taken up by the President George W. Bush
Administration and signed by the first Trump Administration. Can you
reflect on additional, innovative ways for the U.S. to project its
national interests in the Central Arctic Ocean?
Answer. The U.S. could explore a forward-leaning security posture
through non-military means, such as expanding Coast Guard-led joint
exercises in the CAO. Equipping polar security cutters with modular
research and rescue capabilities would project presence without
provocation, enhancing safety for emerging shipping routes while subtly
reinforcing U.S. sovereignty interests tied to Alaska and proximity to
Greenland. Partnering with NATO allies like Canada and Denmark for
these missions could amplify their impact, fostering a rules-based
order amid growing transpolar route speculation.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jacky Rosen to
Anthony Marchese
Since the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law, and CHIPS and Science Act, demand for critical
minerals and rare earth elements has only continued to grow. However,
our reliance on foreign adversaries for these key materials is a
significant threat to our national security. Mining right here at home
can secure our supply chains; support U.S. manufacturing, energy,
infrastructure, and national security needs; and create good-paying
jobs. Before we look abroad, we need to prioritize and build on the
investments we've already made in the mining supply chain and in
communities across the U.S., including in Nevada.
Question 1. Do you agree that the U.S. is rich with untapped
natural resources that are waiting to be unlocked?
Answer. The United States most definitely has untapped resources
with respect to critical minerals. Even if the currently planned
projects were to come to fruition, that would only satisfy a tiny
portion of the world demand. Let's also remember that we have domestic
content laws in the USA that date back to the 1930s which would insure
that anything we produce domestically would be absorbed by products
that would go the Federal government and would therefore be subject to
domestic content requirements.
Question 2. Do you agree that there are barriers to mining here at
home that we need to address?
Answer. There are several barriers domestically that need to be
addressed. Fortunately capital is not one of them. If certain barriers
are addressed there would be no lack of capital to fund economic
projects. The first barrier is the permitting process, which
unfortunately can be quite burdensome and lengthy, hence the
astronomical costs. Remember that time=money. Having both the U.S.
Forestry Service and Bureau of Land Management govern the licensing
pathway on Federal lands can often times result in licensing timetables
often approaching ten years. Add to that the various environmental
regulations of the EPA and you have many projects that die simply
because people lose patience (and money). The USA has some of the
strictest mining regulations in the world and unfortunately the
domestic NGO's are able to delay or kill projects by intentionally
extending things like public comment periods and frivolous lawsuits. An
additional barrier is the lack of financial incentives for upstream
development. The U.S. Government at the present time will not provide
any incentives for companies to discover and begin to develop
greenfield projects. Money is only available for downstream mineral
processing.
Question 3. We have robust reserves in the U.S. and concurrently,
have barriers that prevent companies from accessing them. If we shift
our focus to Greenland--a territory expected to have smaller reserves
and additional barriers--I'm concerned that we're going to eliminate
jobs here at home and shrink this critical domestic industry, rather
than help it grow. How do we address the real challenges we have within
our domestic supply chain?
Answer. It will take a significant amount of time to identify,
explore and fund projects in Greenland. At least 10-20 years given the
physical and potential environmental barriers in the region. Focusing
on Greenland actually may have the effect of focusing attention on
domestic opportunities in the United States.
Question 4. What can we be doing to bolster our domestic mining
industry, including its workforce, to support companies here at home?
Answer. The United States should move to a central licensing
authority for the mining industry, as they successfully do in
Australia. Having multiple licensing authorities and environmental
agencies review different projects in different parts of the country is
highly inefficient and leads to the potential for politically based
decisions by region. Secondly, the USA needs to provide financial
incentives for upstream mine development. It does no good to incentive
mineral processing without simultaneously incentivizing mining
discovery. The USA could also incentive project development by
providing tax incentives for the early stages of production in order
for companies to recoup project costs faster. As an example, create a
Federal tax moratorium for the first 5 years of production.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger Wicker to
Dr. Jennifer Mercer
The Navy and Coast Guard created an Integrated Program Office to
build a new fleet of icebreakers, the first of which was supposed to be
delivered in 2024. We still don't have a contract agreement and have
yet to fully begin construction on the first ship in the class. The
President has recently called for 40 icebreakers to be built.
Question 1. What is the strategic value to the United States of
having more icebreakers when our competitors have a combined 60
icebreakers?
Answer. The strategic value of having more icebreakers provides
flexibility and redundancy to still pursue U.S. Arctic interests
(national security, homeland security, economic security, and
scientific) when the Nation's sole icebreaker is unavailable to meet
operational requirements. Given the vast expanse of the Arctic, not all
of the Nation's strategic Arctic imperatives can be attained, realized,
and sustained by having only one Arctic icebreaker. From a scientific
perspective, icebreakers are critical for maintaining research aimed at
understanding the new more accessible Arctic--one that supports much
more human activity than it did previously. Scientific research that
takes place aboard U.S. icebreakers in the Arctic is made possible by
close collaboration between NSF and the USCG where NSF funds and
facilitates both the scientific personnel and instrumentation aboard
the USCGC Healy. USCGC Healy operates primarily in the Arctic to
support scientific research, enhance maritime domain awareness, and
counter adversary presence. Following a 2024 fire on board USCGC Healy
that interrupted a patrol, temporary repairs were completed. Full
repairs are expected to be completed in May and the cutter will
continue to support all missions, including science missions, beginning
in summer 2025. Research will include assessments of the newly
accessible seabed to understand navigability and support of exploration
of the U.S. continental shelf for natural resources including minerals.
Icebreakers support seafloor mapping and characterization with onboard
instrumentation and through deployment and recovery of autonomous
vehicles and observing systems. Another critical research need is the
development of robust U.S. produced scientific research on which to
base fisheries decisions related to the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries
Agreement. More medium icebreakers, such as the Healy, are needed to
provide more presence in the Arctic and carry out these important
scientific missions.
Question 2. Based on the recent exercises of the People's
Liberation Army Navy and China Coast Guard operating with the Russian
Federation Navy and Border Guard in the polar regions, what are the
risks of the U.S. not meeting presence with presence in the Arctic
regions?
Answer. NSF provides the research infrastructure and funds the
research in the Arctic region for U.S. researchers to continue to
maintain U.S. scientific leadership globally. In addition to global
scientific leadership, this provides U.S. presence throughout the
Arctic and ensures that our knowledge of the Arctic does not lag behind
that of other nations. Science in the polar regions is often referred
to as ``soft security,'' an important component of national security.
The risk is that any void left by NSF and other U.S. government
presence will likely be filled by our adversaries. Our retreat from the
Arctic region would lead not only to their presence but to the greater
scientific dominance of China and other countries of concern. As the
Chinese government compels its researchers to subvert the scientific
norms of transparency and fair competition, the results of the China-
funded research are often not available to U.S. scientists, further
eroding U.S. capability to advance knowledge, innovation, and benefit.
Constant presence provided by more U.S. icebreakers is needed to
conduct our own research and maintain scientific dominance.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger Wicker to
Dr. Rebecca Pincus
The Navy and Coast Guard created an Integrated Program Office to
build a new fleet of icebreakers, the first of which was supposed to be
delivered in 2024. We still don't have a contract agreement and have
yet to fully begin construction on the first ship in the class. The
President has recently called for 40 icebreakers to be built.
Question 1. What is the strategic value to the United States of
having more icebreakers when our competitors have a combined 60
icebreakers?
Answer. The U.S. icebreaker fleet is at a low point in its history.
The POLAR STAR is 52, well past its planned operational lifespan, and
the HEALY is 28. The recently acquired STORIS will require significant
overhauls to reach full operational capacity, and questions about its
suitability for mission continue to percolate \1\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For example, see Pro Publica's recent investigation: McKenzie
Funk, ``This Icebreaker has design problems and a history of failure.
It's America's latest military vessel.'' Pro Publica, Jan. 23, 2025.
How a Troubled Icebreaker Became America's Newest Military Vessel--
ProPublica.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The diminishment of the U.S. icebreaker fleet is apparent, and it
is not surprising that U.S. competitors are taking advantage of this
situation to apply pressure at a U.S. weak point. For example, China
has leveraged its world-leading shipbuilding capacity to build a small
fleet of research icebreakers, including the XUE LONG 2, the JI DI, and
the TAN SOU SAN HAO11, which it regularly sends into the Arctic Ocean
on scientific research missions that are very likely also intelligence
collection opportunities.
In terms of policy, the U.S. has clearly articulated an intent to
``assert a more active and influential presence to protect its Arctic
interests and to project sea power throughout the region.'' \2\ This
language, from the 2009 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)
66, signed by President Bush, has been largely carried forward by
successive presidential administrations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 25 on Arctic Region Policy. Jan. 9. 2009. NSPD-
66 on Arctic Region Policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Icebreakers are a means to the end of greater presence. Their value
to the U.S. is in their ability to help accomplish strategic
objectives. Without an icebreaker fleet that is fit to purpose, the
U.S. will fail to accomplish its Arctic strategy. Over the longer and
broader term, this strategic failure may have second-order effects in
other theaters and/or strategic domains.
Question 2. Based on the recent exercises of the People's
Liberation Army Navy and China Coast Guard operating with the Russian
Federation Navy and Border Guard in the polar regions, what are the
risks of the U.S. not meeting presence with presence in the Arctic
regions?
Answer. It is not surprising that U.S. competitors are exploiting
what they perceive as a weak point. While the operational value of
these exercises is limited, they send an unmistakable signal and carry
symbolic effect. By conducting joint exercises in and adjacent to the
Arctic, China and Russia signal their close military relationship, and
regional presence and proficiency. Unless and until U.S. surface
presence in the Bering Sea is strengthened, it is likely that these
signals and exercises will continue.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to
Dr. Rebecca Pincus
Question. Both Alaska and Greenland are strategic gateways to the
Central Arctic Ocean, a high seas area beyond national jurisdiction. In
the 110th Congress, Senator Stevens, through Senate Joint Resolution
17, led national efforts to negotiate the Central Arctic Ocean
fisheries agreement, which was taken up by the President George W. Bush
Administration and signed by the first Trump Administration. Can you
reflect on additional, innovative ways for the U.S. to project its
national interests in the Central Arctic Ocean?
Answer. The Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) comprises approximately 1.1
million square miles of high seas area, adjacent to Alaska's coastal
seas: the Beaufort, Chukchi, and Bering, as well as coastal seas of the
other Arctic coastal states. Historically characterized by the presence
of sea ice, the CAO in recent years has seen significant declines in
ice coverage across three measures: temporal duration of ice coverage,
geographic extent of ice, and volume or thickness of ice. While the CAO
remains under ice in the winter, late summer observations have found up
to 40 percent open water.
The CAO fisheries agreement stands as a successful example of an
international instrument tailored by the U.S. to project our interests
into international waters just beyond our borders. Its proactive
initiation and ultimate acceptance by ten countries, including China,
Russia, and the EU, reflect an efficient and pragmatic approach to an
emerging problem. Given ongoing limitations for the U.S. in terms of
domain awareness and operational presence in the Arctic and CAO, such a
proactive approach appears well-aligned to capabilities and resources.
The CAO fisheries agreement model could potentially be applied to
protect other U.S. national interests in the CAO, including complex
emerging issues around seabed mining and transpolar shipping. Proactive
engagement at this early stage may help ensure U.S. interests are part
of both problem definition and policy solution stages.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jacky Rosen to
Dr. Rebecca Pincus
The Arctic's strategic environment is rapidly undergoing profound
changes. Foremost among those is the People's Republic of China's (PRC)
increasing involvement in the region. In recent years, the PRC has
ramped up scientific and research projects in the Arctic. The PRC is
also looking to establish economic ties within the region, and perhaps
most concerning is the PRC's deepening of its Arctic collaboration with
Russia--both in the commercial and military domains.
Question 1. Dr. Pincus, this new threat environment requires close
collaboration with our allies and partners in the region, who are
critical to preserving the Arctic as a region of stability and
security. How do you think our Arctic partners would perceive the
unilateral acquisition of Greenland by the U.S.? And in that same vein,
how do you think the U.S. would view the unilateral acquisition of
Greenland by one of our allies or partners?
Answer. NATO Allies and partners have long preferred to work
through and via multilateral modalities. For 200 years, since the
enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. has opposed any
intervention in the western hemisphere by outside states.
Question 2. How might the PRC take advantage of any rifts
unilateral action by the U.S. would cause?
Answer. I would defer to experts in China's foreign relations on
this potential scenario.
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