[Senate Hearing 119-117]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-117
INTERDICTING ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING:
A VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 26, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-202 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
TODD YOUNG, Indiana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOHN CURTIS, Utah BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
BERNIE MORENO, Ohio JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
TIM SHEEHY, Montana JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ANDY KIM, New Jersey
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Liam McKenna, General Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
Jonathan Hale, General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on February 26, 2025................................ 1
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 1
DHS Office of Inspector General report....................... 14
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 3
Statement of Senator Budd........................................ 39
Statement of Senator Baldwin..................................... 40
Statement of Senator Moreno...................................... 42
Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 44
Statement of Senator Sheehy...................................... 46
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 47
Statement of Senator Blackburn................................... 64
Statement of Senator Kim......................................... 69
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 71
Statement of Senator Lujan....................................... 73
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 75
Statement of Senator Rosen....................................... 76
Witnesses
Jena Ehlinger, Mother of Jake Ehlinger of Texas, A Victim of
Fentanyl Poisoning............................................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Kevin Hall, Chief of Spokane Police Department................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Shannon Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of National Drug
Control Policy, U.S. Interdiction Coordinator; and Director,
National High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Program.. 49
Prepared statement........................................... 51
Rear Admiral Adam Chamie, Assistant Commandant for Response
Policy, U.S. Coast Guard....................................... 55
Prepared statement........................................... 57
Jonathan Miller, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Air and Marine
Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)........... 60
Prepared statement........................................... 62
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Shannon Kelly by:
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 81
Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................ 83
Hon. Shelley Moore Capito.................................... 84
Response to written questions submitted to Rear Adm. Adam Chamie
by:............................................................
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 85
Hon. Roger Wicker............................................ 86
Hon. Shelley Moore Capito.................................... 87
Response to written questions submitted to Jonathan Miller by:
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 87
Hon. Roger Wicker............................................ 88
Hon. Shelley Moore Capito.................................... 89
INTERDICTING ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING: A VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2025
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:09 a.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Office Building, Hon. Ted Cruz, Chairman
of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cruz [presiding] Fischer, Blackburn,
Budd, Moreno, Sullivan, Sheehy, Cantwell, Klobuchar, Markey,
Baldwin, Kim, and Lujan.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
The Chairman. Good morning. The Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation will come to order.
Today we are here to talk about stopping deadly drugs from
crossing our maritime borders. But you cannot stop illegal
drugs from crossing a border if you do not believe in having
them.
The Biden administration and former DHS Secretary Mayorkas
deliberately ignored the painful connection between their open
border policies and the devastation wrought by illegally
trafficked drugs on families and communities in our country.
Trying to have a country without borders led to an influx
of illegal aliens, drug smuggling, sex trafficking, and,
tragically, far too many American lives lost.
That dereliction of basic sovereignty left the Coast Guard
in an impossible position. The Coast Guard has admitted it
missed opportunities to intercept drugs because it was
overwhelmed chasing and catching illegal immigrants.
Despite the Biden administration's lack of interest in
border security, Republicans were able to make some progress.
In the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2022 I secured funding
for a blimp-based radar system at South Padre Island to combat
drug runners, poachers, and human traffickers. Today, it is
still protecting south Texas.
Similarly, my provision requiring data sharing between CBP
and the Coast Guard is streamlining interdiction in the
southern maritime border, halting illegal incursions into the
United States.
In contrast to Democrat ambivalence about the border
crisis, President Trump and congressional Republicans are
making real gains in border security through the Coast Guard.
In the last month the Coast Guard interdicted an historic
amount of illegal drugs. Just last week it offloaded 37,000
pounds of seized cocaine worth $279 million. That is going to
make a real difference in keeping communities safe from
criminals and addiction.
But protecting Americans from deadly illicit narcotics
extends beyond our borders. We also need to reverse the Biden
administration's dangerous policies in the Middle East where
maritime drug running bankrolls Iran's malign activities.
Coast Guard cutters recently caught advanced weapons
originating in Iran and bound for the Houthis in Yemen, as well
as hundreds of kilograms of methamphetamines, heroin, and other
illegal drugs from dhows in the Arabian Sea.
The Coast Guard and other Federal agencies have been
catching and releasing Iranian drug runners, meaning there was
no consequence beyond losing cargo for financing terrorism.
Let me be clear. Catch and release is a disgrace and an
insult to those who have lost their lives to Iranian terrorism.
That is why I have included language in the Coast Guard
Reauthorization Act of 2025 to empower the Coast Guard and the
Navy to respond forcefully to dhows running drugs and weapons
when they have helped finance Iranian terror.
Under President Trump's leadership we need to pass the
Coast Guard Reauthorization Act and end the catch and release
approach to Middle East drug enforcement.
That legislation, which has broad bipartisan and bicameral
support, would also close a loophole in the ability to
prosecute cartels for drug smuggling on remotely operated drone
ships like the one in the hearing room today.
We also need to enact the Pay Our Coast Guard Act, which I
will reintroduce this week along with Senator Cantwell,
Sullivan, Baldwin, Wicker, and Blunt Rochester, to ensure that
the Coast Guard is no longer the only armed service that goes
unpaid during a government shutdown.
As I have said before, the Coast Guard deserves to be paid
without question and without delay.
Finally, today we will hear powerful testimony from the
unthinkable damage caused by illicit drugs like fentanyl to
American families.
Texan Jena Ehlinger will testify about the effects this
crisis had on her own family. I am grateful she is here today
as she works to turn tragedy into progress, and I look forward
to hearing from Ms. Ehlinger and the rest of our witnesses
about what law enforcement needs to protect our communities.
Another American lost to fentanyl is one too many. I know
that Ranking Member Cantwell agrees with me on this point and
that is why we are working together on legislation to stop
illicit fentanyl smuggling in the United States.
I am grateful for a partnership in this endeavor and now
turn to her for her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for having this very important hearing on fentanyl and what our
committee and committee jurisdiction can do to stop the scourge
of fentanyl.
I very much appreciate the witnesses being here: police
chief of Spokane, Chief Hall, and Ms. Ehlinger. So sorry for
your loss of your son Jake. You are such a brave advocate and
thank you.
There are many brave advocates, like Laura Lynch who talks
in Seattle about the loss of her daughter Brillion, and you are
making a difference so thank you for being here today.
And I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, as we
fight this scourge and work within our committee jurisdiction.
Of the 10 states with the highest number of drug-related
overdoses they all host major intermodal hubs. That is to say,
states like mine, Washington, and yours, Texas, are clear
nexuses to transportation networks.
I think we are going to hear from Chief Hall about how
those networks allow for the distribution of fentanyl once they
are across the border.
And overdose deaths continue to rise in most western
states, up 14 percent in Washington just last year. The supply
chain is clear. The Chinese triad sells precursor chemicals to
Mexican drug cartels, hidden on ships and in air cargos, and
cartels make fentanyl and smuggle it through the United States.
They hide fentanyl in personal vehicles, commercial trucks,
busses, trains, planes, and even on unmanned aerial vehicles.
So this is a danger to our national security and our
transportation security. It is very highly toxic.
So it is, Mr. Chairman, the jurisdiction of our committee
to have oversight over transportation security. Last year, I
fought for more nonintrusive inspection technologies at U.S.
Customs and Border--CBP--who I know we will hear from as well
about how a 370--it now has 370 large nonintrusive inspection
systems and more than 4,000 small systems across various ports
of entry.
I have seen firsthand how this helps us detect better the
next generation of technology, vapor technology, could be
developed by our Pacific Northwest Lab and the University of
Washington to increase even the speed and accuracy of this
analysis.
Our national labs' Vapor ID accurately detects and
identifies the vapors from illicit drugs and explosives in real
time and in extremely small amounts. Rather than using surface
swipes or the pulse of air for analysis the system sniffs the
vapors, much the way a trained canine can detect explosives.
So our borders are not our only problem but this fentanyl
detection at our borders is working. We need to do more.
Fentanyl smuggling happens every day within the borders of
our country on our interstates, on our Amtrak, at our bus
terminals, at our airports, and concealed U.S. mail and we must
track the activities of these transportation networks.
Recent interdiction efforts in the state of Washington
illustrates the importance of joint law enforcement efforts at
our transportation hubs and networks.
Just last October we had the largest coordinated drug
trafficking bust in Seattle--600 officers from 10 different
states, local law enforcement agencies, and they disrupted a
violent drug trafficking gang.
It resulted from a wiretap investigation of a shipment of
fentanyl into the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. A year-
long investigation was led by Homeland Security, the Seattle
police, involving a U.S. attorney, FBI, DEA, ATF, CBP,
Washington State Patrol, the King County Sheriff's Office, and
Bellevue, Everett, Renton police departments and Yakima
narcotics and gang task force members.
And in January 2023 law enforcement also conducted a bust
at Sea-Tac discovering more than 400,000 fentanyl pills in a
checked baggage of drug couriers. Traffickers were smuggling
millions of pills into Puget Sound.
The Port of Seattle Police Department, working with DEA and
canines, seized that fentanyl and the Phoenix Police Department
then arrested the suspects in Arizona.
In 2024 the Burien Police Department, King County Sheriff's
Office, and DEA seized more than 1 million fentanyl pills and
meth and heroin, and traffickers transported hundreds of pounds
of drugs in a semi truck on a regular trip from southern
California into Washington.
So we must give law enforcement more tools--more tools to
attack these transportation networks and stop the flow of these
drugs into our states.
Chief Kevin Hall of the Spokane Police Department with us
today has worked closely with Federal, state, and local law
enforcement for more than 30 years. He will be speaking to this
experience in eastern Washington and what he calls the super
highways for fentanyl distribution.
As an enrolled member of the Colville tribe he also knows
that tribal communities have been hard hit by fentanyl crisis
because it is another place to hide these drugs and these
rings, and that is why last year I introduced with Senators
Baldwin, Lujan, and Rosen the Stop Fentanyl Smuggling Act,
largely supported by law enforcement, transportation, and
forensic science groups including the National High-Intensity
Drug Area.
And so witness Shannon Kelly is a director of the National
High-Intensity Drug-Trafficking Area Program. She is also a
member of the interdiction coordinator at the Office of the
National Drug Control Policy.
So I look forward to asking her about this and the ways in
which we can all work together to stop the flow of fentanyl,
accelerate the development of next-generation nonintrusive
inspection technology and build state and local forensic
science capabilities.
So I hope that we all can work together collaboratively. I
think it shows that we can disrupt this trafficking.
So I am very pleased to work with you, Mr. Chairman, on
these issues and I appreciate your focus on the Coast Guard's
critical role in this area.
I know that the Coast Guard has been working but we need to
do more. I want to acknowledge that the crew of the Coast Guard
Waesche who interdicted more than 37,000 pounds of cocaine
worth $275 million earlier this month. I am also, though,
saddened to hear that a crew member was lost at sea. So our
thoughts and prayers are with their family and friends.
I think, Senator Cruz, you and I have introduced this
bipartisan Coast Guard Reauthorization Act which would increase
authorization levels and I hope that the Coast Guard's critical
counternarcotics mission and other missions will be bolstered
in our efforts.
We need to do everything. As you have displayed here, if
you leave a territory unaddressed that is where the drug will
flow.
So attacking this at all levels is the right idea and so I
look forward to working with you as we in this committee tackle
the transportation networks that are threatening the lives of
young individuals and many more Americans.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I will now introduce the first panel. Joining us on the
first panel today is Ms. Jena Ehlinger who was the mother of
Jake Ehlinger of Texas. Ms. Ehlinger is a mom who turned
unimaginable grief, the nightmare of every parent, into action
after losing her son Jake to fentanyl poisoning in 2021.
Since then she has fought tirelessly to raise awareness
about the dangers of fentanyl, to advocate for stronger drug
policies, and to work to ensure that no other family has to
endure the same devastating loss.
Our second witness is Mr. Kevin Hall, Chief of Police for
the City of Spokane, and he has been on the front lines of the
fight against the fentanyl crisis. Thank you, Chief, for your
service.
Thank you both for being here. Ms. Ehlinger, you are
recognized for five minutes, and I understand that you will be
starting your testimony with a brief video.
STATEMENT OF JENA EHLINGER, MOTHER OF JAKE EHLINGER OF TEXAS, A
VICTIM OF FENTANYL POISONING
[Video played.]
Ms. Ehlinger. Jake was just a bundle of love and joy and
happy from the day he was born. He loved sports. He loved being
outdoors.
He loved his friends. He had a very creative side. We all
say he gave the best hugs, like, in the entire world, just big
old bear hugs. He played football at the University of Texas.
Jake just had--he had a fire about him and it was a good
way to, like, release that fire. He was a finance major in the
school of McCombs when he passed away. His anxiety was pretty
high the last probably year of his life and I think it was just
the pressure of school and football.
We were in Mexico at a friend's daughter's wedding when I
got the news that Jake had died. I was just in complete, utter
shock. I mean, it is like an out of body experience because you
just are, like, no, not my child. That cannot be right.
The problem is the medical examiners are coming in and they
are finding someone dead. They know it is not suicide because
it is obviously not suicide and so the only other box they have
to check is accidental overdose.
And it is not an accidental overdose. It is poisoning.
These young adults are buying these pills thinking they are
getting one thing and they are getting something else.
I wish I could tell you that we found the person that sold
it to Jake but we did not. Basically, the DEA and the police
were, like, sorry, there is nothing we can do. We cannot help
you.
We were so confused. Like, how in the world are people
getting away with this, and, of course, my horror is if we do
not do anything more and more kids are going to be dying every
day.
And so what House Bill 6 does is anybody who is lacing
drugs with fentanyl can now be charged and prosecuted including
for murder. The facts that I wish the average parent knew about
the dangers of fentanyl is do not think it will not be your
kid.
I would have never in a million years dreamed that Jake
would die of fentanyl poisoning. Like, this is happening every
day to so many teenagers and young adults. Do not put your head
in the sand and think there is no way this will happen in my
family because it could.
[Video ends.]
Ms. Ehlinger. Good morning. My name is Jena Ehlinger. I
never imagined that I would be on the front lines of a war I
knew nothing about, and then I received the live-shattering
call that my 20-year-old son Jake had been poisoned with
fentanyl. This photo of Jake was taken 10 days before that
call.
Jake grew up in Austin, Texas. He was a gifted athlete who
also excelled in academics. With a score of 35 out of 36 on the
ACT exam combined with his stellar high school grades and
athleticism, Jake was recruited to play linebacker by a number
of top tier universities including Stanford, Yale, Brown, Penn,
and Dartmouth.
Jake passed on those incredible offers so that he could
play football at his dream school, the University of Texas. His
dad and I went to UT. His brother Sam was then UT's
quarterback.
Jake wanted to play football with his brother on the team
he had been an avid fan of his entire life. Jake was admitted
into the McCombs School of Business as a finance major, became
a member of the Texas Silver Spurs, and was a UT football
player and a straight A student.
In the spring of 2021 as a sophomore he was looking forward
to his upcoming summer internship at Dell, and his little
sister Morgan joining him at UT in the fall.
On May 6, 2021, I received that horrific call. Jake had
taken a counterfeit Xanax that had been laced with fentanyl. As
with many things, until you have lived it the reality of such
devastation is difficult to fully understand.
To our family's further devastation, when the death
certificate was issued the DEA and the Austin police informed
us that they were closing their investigation because the
manner of death on the death certificate was classified as an
accident.
Jake's death was not an accident. He was killed, literally
poisoned to death. Labeling the poisoning and murder of my son
as an accident resulted in the premature closing of Federal and
local law enforcement investigations, ensured that no one will
ever be arrested for poisoning and killing Jake, prevented the
case from ever reaching a prosecutor's desk.
I hope no other families have to live through the
additional nightmare that their child's killer will never be
arrested or prosecuted because a medical examiner labeled their
child's poisoning as an accident for statistical purposes.
Through my experience I learned that there were few to no
consequences for murdering someone by poisoning them with a
fentanyl-laced pill. Most laws address larger quantities of
drugs, not the mere two milligrams of fentanyl that is
considered a lethal dose.
As a result, those illegally manufacturing and distributing
fentanyl remained on the streets and continued killing our
children one pill at a time with little fear of prosecution.
Thankfully, with the help of friends we were able to pass a
law in Texas addressing this vacuum in the law. Our legislation
requires medical examiners to classify death from a fentanyl-
laced substance as what it is, poisoning, and created a murder
offense for the unlawful manufacture or distribution of
fentanyl resulting in death including from just one pill.
Now in the state of Texas on the death certificate it is
described as fentanyl poisoning, thereby keeping law
enforcement investigations from prematurely closing, and
illegally manufacturing or distributing a fentanyl-laced
substance that results in death, even from one pill, may be
prosecuted as murder and those poisoning Texans can no longer
kill one pill at a time without fear of arrest and prosecution
and are being taken off the streets. And other families may not
have to live with the fact that no one will ever be prosecuted
for killing their child or their loved one.
The law has been effective. Before this law there were no
Texas state murder charges for deaths from one fentanyl-laced
pill. In the first 8 months there were approximately 25 murder
charges. To date, there have been nearly 60 murder charges.
But we are just one state. We need Federal laws to
accomplish these goals and more nationwide including stopping
the distribution of fentanyl in our country.
Senators, our country is at war and we are losing the war
as evidenced by fentanyl becoming the number-one killer in the
United States for ages 18 to 45. It impacts all races,
religions, socioeconomic statuses, and political affiliations.
This lethal epidemic is killing young Americans and
destroying families. I am just one mom who lost her precious
son.
You are among the most powerful people in this country and
there is no higher use of that power than to save someone's
child and perhaps even your own.
Thank you for listening. God bless you all.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ehlinger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jena Ehlinger
My name is Jena Ehlinger.
I never imagined that I would be on the front lines of a war I knew
nothing about. And then I received the life-shattering call that my 20-
year-old son Jake had been poisoned with fentanyl. This photo of Jake
was taken 10 days before that call.
Jake grew up in Austin, Texas. He was a gifted athlete who also
excelled in academics. With a score of 35 out of 36 on the ACT exam
combined with his stellar high school grades and athleticism, Jake was
recruited to play linebacker by a number of top-tier universities,
including Stanford, Yale, Brown, Penn, and Dartmouth.
Jake passed on these incredible offers so he could play football at
his dream school, The University of Texas. His dad and I went to UT and
his brother, Sam, was then UT's quarterback. Jake wanted to play
football with his brother on the team he had been an avid fan of his
entire life.
Jake was admitted into the McCombs School of Business as a finance
major, became a member of the Texas Silver Spurs, was a UT football
player, and a straight A student. In the spring of 2021, as a
sophomore, he was looking forward to his upcoming summer internship at
Dell and his little sister Morgan joining him at UT in the fall.
On May 6, 2021, I received that horrific call. Jake had taken a
counterfeit Xanax that had been laced with fentanyl. As with many
things, until you have lived it, the reality of such devastation is
difficult to fully understand.
To our family's further devastation, when the death certificate was
issued, the DEA and the Austin Police informed us that they were
closing their investigations because the ``manner of death'' on the
death certificate was classified as an ``Accident''. Jake's death was
not an accident. He was killed--literally poisoned to death.
Labeling the poisoning and murder of my son as an ``Accident'':
(1) resulted in the premature closing of Federal and local law
enforcement investigations;
(2) ensured that no one will ever be arrested for poisoning and
killing Jake; and
(3) prevented the case from ever reaching a prosecutor's desk.
I hope no other families have to live through the additional
nightmare that their child's killers will never be arrested or
prosecuted because a medical examiner labeled their child's poisoning
an ``Accident'' for statistical purposes.
Through my experience, I learned that there were few to no
consequences for murdering someone by poisoning them with a fentanyl-
laced pill. Most laws address larger quantities of drugs, not the mere
2 milligrams of fentanyl that is considered a lethal dose. As a result,
those illegally manufacturing and distributing fentanyl remained on the
streets and continued killing our children--one pill at a time--with
little fear of prosecution.
Thankfully, with the help of friends, we were able to pass a law in
Texas addressing this vacuum in the law. Our legislation requires
medical examiners to classify death from a fentanyl-laced substance as
what it is--poisoning--and created a murder offense for the unlawful
manufacture or distribution of fentanyl resulting in death, including
from just one pill. Now, in Texas:
on the death certificate, it is described as ``fentanyl
poisoning'' thereby keeping law enforcement investigations from
prematurely closing;
illegally manufacturing or distributing a fentanyl-laced
substance that results in death--even from one pill--may be
prosecuted as murder;
those poisoning Texans can no longer kill one pill at a time
without fear of arrest and prosecution and are being taken off
the streets; and
other families may not have to live with the fact that no
one will ever be prosecuted for killing their child or loved
one.
The law has been effective. Before this law, there were no Texas
state murder charges for deaths from one fentanyl-laced pill. In the
first eight months, there were approximately 25 murder charges. To
date, there have been nearly 60 murder charges.
But we are just one state. We need Federal laws to accomplish these
goals and more nationwide, including stopping the distribution of
fentanyl in our country.
Senators, our country is at war and are losing the war, as
evidenced by fentanyl becoming the number one killer in the U.S. for
ages 18-45. It impacts all races, religions, socioeconomic statuses,
and political affiliations. This lethal epidemic is killing young
Americans and destroying families. I am just one mom who lost her
precious son. You are among the most powerful people in this country.
There is no higher use of that power than to save someone's child and
perhaps even your own.
Thank you for listening.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Ehlinger. Thank you for the
difference you are making in our home state of Texas and thank
you for speaking to the American people today, and I hope that
Congress hears your words today.
Ms. Ehlinger. Thank you.
The Chairman. Chief Hall.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN HALL,
CHIEF OF SPOKANE POLICE DEPARTMENT
Mr. Hall. Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and
members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify on the fentanyl crisis, an issue of national urgency
that devastates communities across the country including my own
in Spokane, Washington.
My name is Kevin Hall. I am honored to serve as Police
Chief for the City of Spokane, the second largest city in the
state of Washington.
I was appointed to the position in August 2024 after
previously serving more than 32 years in the Tucson Police
Department in Tucson, Arizona, the last nearly 8 years as
assistant chief.
My 33-year career in policing has focused on violent crime,
addressing the impacts of drugs and drug trafficking on public
safety at both local and national levels.
Since 2019 the annual number of opioid drug overdoses has
doubled in Washington State, and Spokane's opioid deaths have
surpassed the state's average.
Recent reports by the CDC and DEA illustrating national
declines in fatal drug overdoses are not the reality in
Washington State. The Spokane Fire Department's calls for
overdoses have increased 30 percent in 2024 over the previous
year.
Like every other urban police agency in the country, the
Spokane Police Department continues to allocate more and more
resources to address open-air drug use, fatal drug overdoses,
and the overall harm caused to the community by fentanyl.
The Spokane County medical examiner reported at least 346
opioid related deaths last year, over 75 percent involving
fentanyl. The economic toll is staggering. The Senate's Joint
Economic Committee estimated the opioid crisis cost the U.S.
$1.5 trillion in 2020 alone.
Fentanyl's impact stems from its potency--40 to 50 times
more lethal than heroin--and its alarming accessibility. From
my experience in southern Arizona I know that most fentanyl
enters the U.S. through legal ports of entry, concealed in
commercial cargo trucks, passenger vehicles, trailers, and RVs.
Recent seizures highlight the scale of trafficking along
transportation routes. In Tucson law enforcement intercepted
1.7 million fentanyl pills in just two stops in late 2024.
Spokane's supply chain follows similar patterns, moving
drugs from Mexico along interstates I-19, I-10, and I-5 before
reaching eastern Washington via I-90. Spokane officers have
recently encountered bulk powder fentanyl, an emerging and
highly dangerous trend.
Fentanyl trafficking has direct and violent consequences. A
harrowing example of this occurred in Spokane when an
investigation where traffickers using I-90 transported bulk
fentanyl pill loads to Spokane from the Tri-Cities area.
Spokane PD and Federal partners, after an intensive
investigation, interdicted the trafficker, resulting in a
violent midday shootout with Spokane police officers that
endangered innocents including small children who were in the
area. Two thousand fentanyl pills were seized from the car that
the suspect was traveling in.
Elsewhere in Washington drug traffickers have used
commercial trucks, passenger rail and even commercial airlines,
as seen in a 2023 investigation at Seattle-Tacoma International
Airport where 400,000 fentanyl pills were found in checked
baggage.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security estimated that
drug traffickers were bringing millions of pills a month into
the Seattle region via drug couriers' checked luggage.
Another separate investigation in Seattle in the fall 2024
culminated in the arrest of 12 violent fentanyl traffickers,
the seizure of significant amounts of fentanyl, dozens of
weapons, and highlighted what effective Federal and local law
enforcement partnerships look like with the Department of
Homeland Security, Seattle Police Department, U.S. Attorney
General's Office, among the agencies involved.
This investigation directly stemmed from the previously
mentioned checked baggage investigation at Sea-Tac Airport.
Interdicting fentanyl requires strong partnerships between
local, state, Federal, and tribal agencies.
We must enhance these collaborations with improved
technology and resources. That is why I respectfully urge
Congress to pass the Stop Smuggling Illicit Synthetic Drugs on
U.S. Transportation Networks Act.
This legislation would expand nonintrusive inspection
technologies such as drive-through and mobile X-ray sensors,
specialized canine resources, vapor technology to strengthen
our ability to detect and disrupt fentanyl trafficking before
it reaches our streets.
The fight against fentanyl is urgent. It is real.
Strengthening our enforcement capabilities will save lives.
Thank you for your time and I welcome any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin Hall, Chief of Police, City of Spokane
Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the
Committee thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing
and for your attention to a topic that has impacted countless families
across the country and in the communities I serve. The fentanyl crisis
is one of national importance and national urgency.
My name is Kevin Hall, and I am honored to serve as Police Chief
for the City of Spokane, the second largest City in the State of
Washington. I was appointed to the position in August of 2024 after
previously serving more than 32 years in the Tucson Police Department
in patrol, investigations, SWAT, and nearly 8 years as Assistant Chief.
I also serve as Co-chair of the Research Advisory Committee for the
International Chiefs of Police; I'm a graduate of the Major Cities
Chief's Association Police Executive Leadership Institute, the Police
Executive Research Forum's Senior Management Institute for Police, the
Harvard Kennedy School of Government Senior Executives in State & Local
Government and I am proud to be an inductee in the Evidence-Based
Policing Hall of Fame.
Since 2019, the annual number of opioid drug overdoses has doubled
in Washington State, and Spokane's opioid deaths have surpassed the
state's average.\1\ Recent reports by the CDC and DEA illustrating
national declines in fatal drug overdoses are not the reality in
Washington state. The Spokane Fire Department's calls for overdoses
have increased 30 percent in 2024 over the previous year.\2\ Like every
other police agency in the country, the Spokane Police Department
continues to allocate more and more resources to address open-air drug
use, fatal drug overdoses, and the overall harm caused to the community
by fentanyl. A recent Spokane County Medical Examiner Report concluded
that at least 346 individuals died of an opioid-related overdose last
year, with fentanyl accounting for over 75 percent of those deaths.\3\
The cost of fentanyl is devastating both individually and collectively.
The Senate's Joint Economic Committee previously estimated that in 2020
alone, the opioid epidemic cost the country roughly 1.5 trillion
dollars.\4\
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\1\ See Opioid and Drug Overdose Data | Washington State Department
of Health.
\2\ 'Anecdotally, we're seeing more dead people.'--RANGE Media.
\3\ Most overdose deaths in Spokane County among housed, employed
adults, according to new report | News | kxly.com.
\4\ JEC Analysis Finds Opioid Epidemic Cost U.S. Nearly $1.5
Trillion in 2020--JEC Analysis Finds Opioid Epidemic Cost U.S. Nearly
$1.5 Trillion in 2020--United States Joint Economic Committee
(senate.gov).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The scale of fentanyl's impact is in part due to the potency of the
drug--40 to 50 times more lethal and addictive than heroin--as well as
its accessibility and street price.\5\ From my 32 years of policing in
southern Arizona, in a city 60 miles north of the international border
with Mexico, I know that the vast majority of fentanyl enters this
country through legal ports of entry, often concealed in commercial
cargo trucks, RVs, trailers, and cars. Let me be clear: this traffic
represents a mere fraction of the vehicles coming into the United
States from Mexico for legal purposes every day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See Fentanyl Facts | Stop Overdose | CDC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevertheless, the Tucson Police Department, in partnership with
their Federal partners, frequently seizes hundreds of pounds of
fentanyl. In November of 2024, Tucson PD, in conjunction with the
Southern Arizona HIDTA (High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area) group,
seized 1.1 million illicit fentanyl pills that were hidden in a Dodge
Charger.\6\ This car crossed the international border and traveled
north on I-19 and then I-10, where it was intercepted in Tucson. In a
similar example, in October of 2024, a stop on a vehicle that took the
same route resulted in a seizure of 600,000 fentanyl pills. 1.7 million
pills in two non-descript sedans traveling on America's highways,
nearly unimpeded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Tucson Police help recover over 1.1 million fentanyl pills in
traffic stop
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fentanyl not seized by law enforcement at or near the border
travels along transportation networks using passenger buses and rail,
but most commonly cars and trucks on major interstates throughout the
country, routes commonly policed by state, county, and local law
enforcement.
For instance, we know from collaborative investigations with state
and Federal partners that fentanyl in Spokane enters the U.S. from
Mexico, travels up along interstates I-10 and I-5, and makes its way to
Eastern Washington via the Tri-Cities. The major transportation artery
into eastern Washington and northern Idaho is I-90, which represents
the most significant pathway for fentanyl into Spokane and northern
Idaho.
Spokane area law enforcement have recently seized pounds of powder
fentanyl, a new phenomenon where pills are being replaced by bulk
powder fentanyl. A harrowing example of fentanyl trafficking in Spokane
involved an investigation where traffickers, utilizing I-90,
transported bulk fentanyl pill loads to Spokane from the Tri-Cities
area. Spokane PD, after an intensive investigation, interdicted the
trafficker, resulting in a violent, mid-day shootout with Spokane
Police officers that endangered innocents, including small children in
the area.\7\ Two thousand fentanyl pills were seized from the car the
suspect was traveling in. The spin-off investigation from this shooting
resulted in a seizure of over 60 pounds of methamphetamine and over
500,000 fentanyl pills.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Spokane drug agents seize press capable of making 17,000
fentanyl pills an hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2024, the Burien Police Department and King County Sheriff's
Office on the west side of Washington state seized more than 1 million
dollars in fentanyl, meth, and heroin that were smuggled in a
commercial truck.\8\ According to charging documents, the drug
traffickers transported hundreds of pounds of drugs in a semi-truck on
regular trips from southern California to Washington State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Drugs worth $2.49 million, $46K in cash and gun recovered in
Burien bust.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also know that drugs are smuggled in through commercial
airlines, requiring sophisticated collaboration between local, state,
and Federal law enforcement partners to track and intercept them
successfully. One such example occurred in January 2023, when federal,
state, and local law enforcement conducted a bust at Seattle-Tacoma
International Airport SEATAC airport and found more than 400,000
fentanyl pills in checked luggage of drug couriers.\9\ The U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimated that drug traffickers
were bringing millions of pills a month into the Seattle region via
drug couriers' checked luggage. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (SEA),
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Port of Seattle police, and
other local law enforcement agencies worked together to interdict these
drugs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See VIDEO: KIRO 7 Investigates packing drugs in checked
luggage--KIRO 7 News Seattle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I appreciate this Committee's support for the partnerships that are
critical to the work we do on the ground. Without the cooperation of
federal, tribal, state, and local agencies, and private sector
partners, the problem would be even worse. But I also know that we can
work together to strengthen these key partnerships and produce better
outcomes for the people we all serve.
To that end, I urge Congress to pass the Stop Smuggling Illicit
Synthetic Drugs on U.S. Transportation Networks Act. This legislation
would leverage precious Federal resources to develop and provide non-
intrusive technologies and canines to conduct inspections of cargo
transported via civil aircraft, passenger and freight rail, commercial
motor vehicles, and maritime vessels. By improving the detection and
interception of fentanyl at the border and along routes of interstate
commerce, this legislation will help choke supply and mitigate the
devastating downstream consumption of fentanyl. This is exactly the
kind of initiative that we need to strengthen the partnership between
local, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement in the fight against
fentanyl and the smuggling of illicit drugs into our communities.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy to
answer any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you, Chief.
Ms. Ehlinger, I am going to start with you. Thank you for
coming and telling us about your son Jake. As a father my heart
breaks for you.
You have gone through a nightmare that every parent, every
grandparent, is terrified of experiencing. You have done an
enormous amount in Texas to help prevent more tragic deaths.
What advice can you give to parents who might want to make
a difference preventing future fentanyl poisonings?
Ms. Ehlinger. The first thing I would say is that--talk to
your kids about drugs. Use the word fentanyl. Do not be afraid
to talk about it. Share statistics. Explain how dangerous it is
compared to when we were growing up, and also I would say for
kids that, you know, may have a lot of pressure on them.
Kids in our society have a higher rate of anxiety than ever
before and to take the stigma away of it is OK if you need
help.
Like, if you feel like you need some counseling or whatever
that is that it is OK to ask for some help and do not turn to a
counterfeit, you know, drug to try to make you feel better.
The Chairman. An illustration that a DEA agent told me in
Texas of just the potency of fentanyl is he took a Sweet & Low
packet. He said, tear it open and empty the contents out so
that there is nothing in it. And then he said, stick your
finger inside the packet and remove your finger, and you have a
couple of little tiny specks of Sweet & Low.
Ms. Ehlinger. Exactly.
The Chairman. That is enough fentanyl to kill you. I can
tell you I have done that with our girls and tried to convey
the point but you are terrified that a teenager, a young adult
at one party, somebody gives them some stupid pill and that is
their last moment on Earth.
Through your hard work the Texas penal code now
criminalizes the delivery or manufacture of fentanyl that
results in death, and the code requires medical examiners to
properly classify fentanyl poisoning deaths.
As you noted, over 60 drug peddlers have already been
charged in Texas with murder since the law went into effect.
Have you spoken with others in Texas about what these
changes have meant to them when the tragedy of fentanyl
poisoning occurs and what have they told you?
Ms. Ehlinger. Yes. I mean, unfortunately, I have made a lot
of new friends because of this tragedy. Pain is a really strong
motivator and there is--any time there is a fentanyl death, you
know, whatever the seven degrees of separation--I mean,
somebody will ask me, can you talk to this person--they just
lost their child to fentanyl and I am, like, absolutely.
Send me their phone number and I can literally pull up my
phone and just type in fentanyl and 30 names of people I never
knew before come up in my phone.
They are extremely thankful. It is a very motivated group
of people, as you can imagine--parents that have lost their
children, probably one of the most motivated group of people.
And there is also--just in Austin alone there is a group
called Angel Moms and there is probably 60 of these mothers who
have lost their children to fentanyl and that is in Austin,
Texas, only.
The Chairman. Wow. In the video you played you said that
you were unable to determine who sold the drugs to your son
Jake. In the last Congress I passed legislation called the
TRANQ Act to help improve the technology for detecting and
identifying fentanyl and other related drugs, and Senator
Cantwell and I are now working on new legislation in this
space.
How important is it for families to have the technology in
place to track the origins and pathways that these drugs travel
into the country?
Ms. Ehlinger. I think it is extremely important. I mean,
yes, shockingly, the DEA could not open Jake's phone to
retrieve any information to find anyone responsible. My
understanding is that these young adults are buying these
counterfeit pills, thinking they are getting one thing, and
getting killed through social media platforms like Snapchat and
things like that.
So I know that is how they are coming through, and then I
also know that they are also being delivered through rideshare
apps. So there is definitely a problem between all of the
different social media and technology applications that these
young adults use and have their hands on not understanding the
dangers of them.
The Chairman. The record illegal immigration flows during
the Biden administration have clearly taken a toll on the Coast
Guard's counterdrug mission and so I am going to submit to the
hearing record a DHS Office of Inspector General report
entitled ``The Coast Guard faces challenges interdicting
noncommercial vessels smuggling drugs into the United States.''
This report notes that the Coast Guard did not meet its
cocaine interdiction goals because it did not have enough
cutters available to perform the counterdrug mission. Those
cutters had been diverted to interdict illegal immigrants.
The DHS OIG estimated that the Coast Guard could have
interdicted up to an additional 89 metric tons of cocaine had
those cutters been performing the counterdrug mission.
And without objection, so ordered entered into the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. And with that, I recognize Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for
mentioning the TRANQ Act. I, too, supported that important
legislation, which is one of the tools, and I just want to say,
Ms. Ehlinger, again, you know, we have had I think 11 regional
meetings in my state and it is just--the story is the same. The
story is the same and the call is the same. We need more to
alert.
I will never forget a high school student in Yakima,
Washington telling me that, you know, having an assembly once a
year is not enough. You should be telling high schoolers every
day do not take anything given to you by anyone other than a
health care provider. Just do not.
And I think that we have to amplify on many different
fronts. We have to fight this scourge on many different fronts.
So, again, thank you for your willingness to continue to push
on this.
And, you know, the jurisdiction of this committee is a
little more on the transportation network and but your
illumination of the problem just shows you what distribution
does to destroy families.
I want to ask Chief Hall about those distribution networks
because we hear a lot about the border and we want more
security and detection at the border but it is clear that these
rings are so elaborate that by attacking the transportation
network we can discover and illuminate and catch these rings.
And what have we learned about these networks and
transportation system and why is interdiction like you have
experienced in Spokane or Tucson--why do we need to expand the
tools given to law enforcement to help with this?
Mr. Hall. Thank you, Ranking Member Cantwell, for the
question.
There are a number of different reasons on why we need to
do this, but primarily when I talk to my DEA-DHS partners it is
that we are catching a fraction of the illegal narcotics that
are entering the country.
Such a small amount it looks huge on the newspaper on the
front page when we--you know, when we post shots of it for the
media but that is just a fraction of what is actually entering
the country and we are missing so much more and we know we are
missing so much more.
The investigations, particularly the collaborative
investigations with our Federal partners are where we are the
most functional and we see the most success.
Bringing local, state, tribal, and Federal partners
together just enhances or scales up all of the skill sets and
brings in the--quite frankly, the resources of the Federal
Government that most of us do not have. Collaborating allows us
to locate more, to utilize the intelligence base from the
Federal Government on international--national transportation
routes and through, like we said, rail, sea, air, and the
interstates, which is where we are seeing most of this.
The investment by the cartels--and make no mistake, this is
all cartel driven--is such that they will completely
disassemble a vehicle--a brand new vehicle--put as much
narcotics into every single void inside that vehicle, and then
assemble it again.
They will go through that amount of energy, put the vehicle
back together, and put it on the road, and it is off on the
freeways. The 1.7 million pills that I referenced in my opening
statement that was in two vehicles--two sedans--two nondescript
sedans that were that had to be completely disassembled in
order to recover all of those narcotics.
Senator Cantwell. And how did you discover to check those?
Mr. Hall. Investigations.
Senator Cantwell. Something told you?
Mr. Hall. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. Yes. This is why I want us to have a more
collaborative effort here because when you look at the
technology that we have at the border that is doing some of
this detection but like you said they are tearing cars apart.
So what do you think a new vapor technology could help us
do?
Mr. Hall. Any tool will help us down this road whether it
is X-ray technology, vapor technology, even going to like I
call old school canine technology. They are all very effective
in different ways and having a layered approach and a cross-
sector approach, multifaceted, this is a very complex problem.
It requires complex solutions, and having all of those
technologies and all of those different approaches is just
going to enhance law enforcement's ability to detect and seize
these narcotics.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I am just going to be a little more
clear about--the challenges of getting a warrant on search and
seizure are complex but when you are at one of our ports or
transportation systems and you have a nondetected--you can
basically--a noninvasive way to detect the movement of
fentanyl.
That is what I want at every transportation hub and because
that will stop this flow. I mean, it is not going to stop all
but it will give us the tools that you are talking about.
And then how can we best help too on the labs and the
information? What is the gap there that we are seeing?
Mr. Hall. I am sorry. The labs?
Senator Cantwell. Locally how you have to do the work to
try to detect and figure out what you have acquired.
Mr. Hall. A lot of it is just the sheer number, the
backlog. So, say, we are working with the state lab in order to
process the narcotics that we seize and we have to wait for
that processing in order to charge for the most part.
So it is that kind of resource that is limited and I know
from my time in Arizona it was the same issue there. It is just
there is--it is a capacity issue. There is so much illegal
narcotics coming into the country and so few people doing this
work including lab personnel, law enforcement, even harm
reduction agencies that we work with.
You know, going to an earlier point is we inform them
everything that you see out on the street from marijuana to
what you think is cocaine to what you think is a prescribed
pill is going to have fentanyl in it.
What we are finding out is everything we test has fentanyl
in it. So we just tell everybody know what you are taking. It
is fentanyl.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED BUDD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Senator Budd [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
You know, there is, roughly, a thousand miles between my
home in North Carolina and the southern border but on average
nine North Carolinians lose their lives every day due to
fentanyl.
I just want to thank you personally both for being here.
When I talk to law enforcement officers in all 100 counties in
North Carolina I repeatedly hear that every single county in
North Carolina is a border county, largely, because of the
prior administration's policies. But I think that we are on
track to do much better.
The county next to where I live, the sheriff there he said,
we just had a traffic stop--it looked like some of the pictures
that were shown earlier--and there was enough in that trunk to
kill 250,000 people. Unbelievable.
Chief, while you are here, is there anything else Congress
can do to give local law enforcement the additional tools to go
after drug and human traffickers?
Mr. Hall. Resources are always scarce. Always scarce. You
know, I know currently the Department of Justice is holding up
grants.
I know that they will come out sooner or later, but those
types of grant funding helps us at the local level, helps us at
the state level, and it helps our collaborations with HIDTA and
different task forces that we have created with the DEA,
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland
Security investigations.
All those different agencies we are all facing the same
scarcity of resources.
Senator Budd. Thank you.
Ms. Ehlinger, thank you for sharing your story of Jake as
well. I would imagine that our children are about the same age,
and we do not sit up here, whether it is in this body or across
the hall or in the House of Representatives, as theorists.
We are all personally affected by this. So it means a lot.
I remember when I first ran in 2016 and right before the
election I was given the devastating news that the young
volunteer staffer that was driving me that day had just lost
his younger brother about the same age as Jake and it was from
something he thought was something innocent but it was not.
And that brother that survived and was volunteering for me
that day gave a speech 2 weeks ago regarding fentanyl except it
was not at--on that side of the dais. It was on this side
because he is now a Member of Congress in the U.S. House of
Representatives and he is in the fight in the other chamber.
So, again, we are not theorists. We are all personally
affected by this and, again, I thank you both for what you do.
Ms. Ehlinger. Thank you.
Senator Budd. Senator Baldwin.
STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY BALDWIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Baldwin. Thank you.
Ms. Ehlinger, thank you so much for being here to bravely
share your story about your family and your son, and I thank
you for your tireless work to bring attention to this tragedy.
I believe to my core that your efforts are saving lives and
I am heartbroken for your family's tremendous loss.
I have heard from and sat with mothers in Wisconsin who
have shared with me stories just like yours. Fentanyl is
devastating families and communities in my state and, we know,
throughout our country and I am committed to fighting this
deadly epidemic on all fronts.
And I know my colleagues, as you have already heard, are
hearing similar demands from their constituents. Congress has
taken a few important bipartisan steps in the right direction
but clearly there is so much more work for us to do.
So, Ms. Ehlinger, it is thanks to the brave advocacy of
people like you that this important issue remains really
forefront in our work and I thank you for that.
Chief Hall, I want to thank you for your work, both in
Tucson and now Spokane, in the front lines to protect Americans
and we have to make sure that we are putting every resource
possible toward protecting Americans and stopping the movement
of deadly fentanyl and illicit substances across our borders
but also throughout our communities.
For that reason I worked with Senator Cantwell to introduce
a bill that would stop smuggling of drugs through our domestic
transportation networks. We have already heard that bill
elevated during this hearing, and I am eager to collaborate
with both Senator Cantwell and Senator Cruz again this Congress
to continue that work.
I would love to hear your recommendations, Chief Hall,
about actions the Federal Government can take to improve the
coordination between local law enforcement and other levels of
law enforcement but also additional resources that would help
you and your colleagues detect and seize the illegal drugs
right on our own streets.
Like my colleagues I have held many first responder
roundtables throughout the state of Wisconsin, and sometimes
there are challenges in the various levels that are looking at
these distribution networks--these domestic cartels, if you
will--and tracking high-level cases versus the work you are
doing to find the individual perpetrator in a particular case.
Can you please share a little bit more about that?
Mr. Hall. Sure. Thank you, Senator Baldwin. I appreciate
the question, and I will try not to get myself in trouble here.
Senator Baldwin. It is a tough----
Mr. Hall. There is--there are so many different things the
Federal Government can do and have done in the past, quite
frankly. We have always had a good partnership with our Federal
law enforcement partners.
But I think sometimes--I would submit one of the first
things we could do is draw back a little and look at a wider
perspective of what we are dealing with here and define it is
transportation networks and disrupting those networks in any
way, shape, or form will disrupt the marketplace--the business
model that these cartels operate under--and in that same
fashion I think we can spend a little bit more time providing
the training and resources for state and local and, quite
frankly, even Federal law enforcement to look at how they are
funneling money.
This is a for-profit business in this model and it is not
giant loads of cash anymore. It is Bitcoin and it is electronic
wallets, and local and state and a lot of Federal agencies do
not have the sophistication to track that money and seize that
money and, quite frankly, in a lot of cases it is completely
untrackable.
But those--while we are just now starting to dip our toe in
how to go after those funds--those illegal funds gained
through, quite frankly, the killing of our children--that would
be enormously helpful if we took a look at that as well as the
transportation networks.
And as I said before this is a very complex problem. It is
going to need a very complex solution that crosses sectors, is
multi-dimensional, and that is one of the ways I can think of.
We just had this discussion back where I am from is how do
we go after those wallets and those Bitcoins that are being
utilized to hide these illegal funds from the government.
Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Chief.
Senator Budd. Senator Moreno.
STATEMENT OF HON. BERNIE MORENO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator Moreno. So, first of all, Ms. Ehlinger, thank you
for being here. My youngest son is 26 which would be about, I
would guess, Jake's age today. I cannot imagine, honestly, how
you have been able to do that. So God bless you. God bless you
for your strength.
Because, quite frankly, there is probably a part of you
that is just really pissed off, and so pushing that and
suppressing that down has got to be really hard.
And I am really pissed off too because I have seen the
Federal Government do so little to attack this. I mean, you
said something in your testimony that really stuck with me
which is we are at war and we are losing that war. Would you
agree? Do you feel that way?
Ms. Ehlinger. One hundred percent and I am so thankful for
this administration and for being here today because it is--as
you said, it is so painful just to live with not having Jake
every day and then to just know that our amazing country is
just--it felt like to me was doing absolutely nothing, and more
and more and more and more children were dying every single day
and it just does not make sense.
Senator Moreno. Yes. In Ohio we probably lose about 4,000
people a month to fentanyl poisoning, and you look back and you
go, OK, like, if we are losing 4,000 American kids every year
just in Ohio--110,000 around the country--you would think that
would be, like, a 12-alarm fire in Washington, D.C., over the
last 4 years. Yet, what did we do?
Ms. Ehlinger. Exactly.
Senator Moreno. We did not do anything at the border, like,
nothing. In fact, sat here on their hands while they knew this
was going on.
And so I get the sentiment today from the other side but,
honestly, you know, to me it falls so short. Number one, what
did President Trump do? Declared the Mexican cartels a foreign
terrorist organizations.
We should wipe those animals off the face of the Earth and,
yet, the administration in the last 4 years did nothing about
that.
We should make anybody who distributes fentanyl an
accessory to first degree murder and if you are the ultimate
supplier of that then you are a first degree murder Federal
charge recipient.
Anybody who is involved in the banking of that, the
transportation of that, if you are a tech company and you are
allowing the sale of these products then you, the executives of
these companies, are an accessory to first degree murder.
We have to--we cannot have half measures. If it was my son
I would not be able to sit through this, honestly. How you do
it--like I said, I will repeat it again, God bless you for
doing what you are doing.
And to my Democrat colleagues, I hope this is not just
words about more government spending but, rather, actual
attacks on what we are seeing at our southern border that we
treat this as an existential threat to our country.
You know, you said, Chief--I will turn to you--you said
this is a for-profit business. This is not just a for-profit
business. This is a multi-billion dollar a year operation that
this country is enabling--this country and this administration
and the majority that had control of Congress over the last 4
years they made these drug cartel members so insanely wealthy.
Those are the billionaires that they should be talking about
when they rant on the Senate floor that they are going after.
And, Chief, you said something--and God bless you too for
the work that you do and all law enforcement does but I would
just push back a little bit on something you said.
You said that most fentanyl comes across legal ports of
entry. We do not know that. We have absolutely no idea how much
fentanyl comes across through nondesignated ports of entry
because by definition we have no idea, and when I have been on
the border you look at what the Border Patrol agents are doing
where you have this surge of human trafficking on one side,
these fake asylum claims that my colleagues will not even vote
on a bill to say, hey, you cannot claim asylum through a
nondesignated port of entry, they will not even agree to that
and say, hey, if you are going to claim asylum you got to do it
at a legal port of entry and you got to wait. No, they want to
parole these people into the country, which is insane.
So the Border Patrol agents have to go to those
nondesignated ports of entry. I was in Del Rio when the Haitian
surge happened. There were ports of entries that were wide
open.
These were streets that were available. So we have no idea
what comes across there, and we have to go right at the root
cause and make the punishment so severe.
So I am all for investing more money in the Coast Guard. We
have a big lake in Ohio. But I hope that what comes out of this
testimony from both of you and, hopefully, there is colleagues
on the other side of the aisle that have kids that are your
kids' age and realize what is really going on and that we take
this moment to say we are not going to allow a 9/11 plane to
crash every single day in America and do something about it.
Pass legislation to make this happen.
So I urge my colleagues on the other side of the aisle you
abdicated your duties for the last 4 years. Step up and work
with us to pass meaningful legislation to attack the
billionaires that you enabled on the other side of our border
to kill our kids.
Thank you. Thank you.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Senator Moreno.
Senator Sullivan, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
the witnesses very much.
Ms. Ehlinger, I want to extend my condolences, too. I just
read your testimony. Sounds like Jake was an incredible,
amazing, gifted young man. I am very sorry, really sorry for
your loss.
Ms. Ehlinger. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Is that his UT uniform on right there?
Ms. Ehlinger. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. My mom went to UT so----
Ms. Ehlinger. Awesome.
Senator Sullivan.--I have been a Longhorns fan for a long
time.
Let me ask a question. We have a--maybe you have met her.
If you have not it would be really great because you are very
similar to her. We have a very courageous woman in Alaska named
Sandy Snodgrass. She has kind of had the same experience that
you have.
Her son Bruce was killed by a fentanyl overdose like Jake.
It was laced with something. So she has done what you have
done, which has kind of taken this horrible grief that most
people cannot even imagine and used it in a way to push for
public policy changes in state law. She has done that in
Alaska.
And then she and I and our Governor we have teamed up on
this big campaign we launched about eight or 9 months ago in
Alaska called One Pill Can Kill, and I do not know if you are
familiar with that but what we are trying to do on that is to
get to prevention, to let the young people in Alaska know that,
hey, if you are taking a pill or smoking a joint you might have
no idea that this is laced with fentanyl.
Believe it or not, my state in the last few years has had
the highest overdose rates of fentanyl of any state in the
country--Alaska, 4,000 miles from the border.
So when people say, what do you guys care up in Alaska--you
are far away from the southern border, we care because it is
killing our kids just like it is killing kids in Texas.
So are you familiar with the One Pill Can Kill campaign and
have you guys done it in Texas? And I would really like to get
your sense of prevention.
We are trying to put--we put this big campaign together,
gotten all the high school kids and even junior high kids
involved to do PSA announcements so they can learn from each
other. I think it is most effective when it comes from peer to
peer, not senators and Governors telling them.
So what is your sense on that, and I would really--again, I
really appreciate your courage for being here. I know probably
every single day you are missing your really wonderful son.
Ms. Ehlinger. Yes. Thank you so much.
Actually, Governor Abbott and the state of Texas had a One
Pill Kills campaign.
Senator Sullivan. Oh, good.
Ms. Ehlinger. And if you drive in the state of Texas on any
highway you will see signs that say one pill kills, and many
people have also put up billboards with their children's
pictures on them saying fentanyl kills.
I think all of those things help. I 100 percent agree with
you that coming from the younger generation is more impactful.
Senator Sullivan. Yes. You know, part of the frustration
for me has been is anybody thinking about the fact that this is
our future. These young people that are dying, that are getting
wiped out in large numbers, that is the future of our country.
So what is going to happen in 10 years when we have this
horrific gap because we have lost so many of them? My son is in
the NFL and they do the Cause for Cleats.
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
Ms. Ehlinger. Cleats for a Cause--I am sorry--and he--and
then one of his friends also who he played with at UT wore
their One Pill Kills fentanyl awareness cleats and got a great
response from that. I think, like Senator Cantwell said
earlier, we have to come at this from every angle.
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
Ms. Ehlinger. It cannot be, you know, here, let us just go
here and let us look at this. It is a--like we were saying, it
is a war and we are losing. We are losing bad.
Senator Sullivan. Well, if you have ideas in--from what you
learned in Texas on the One Pill Can Kill campaign, prevention,
right? So young people are aware.
A lot of young people are not aware at all that this is a--
you know, taking a pill like that that is not a prescribed pill
that they got from a pharmacist can be a Russian roulette death
sentence.
Ms. Ehlinger. Exactly what I call it is Russian roulette. I
mean, it is in cocaine. It is in pot. It is in all of the
things that in our generation people could experiment with and
they had no fear of dying. They just were making a really
stupid mistake----
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
Ms. Ehlinger.--and a bad choice.
Senator Sullivan. Well, look, we might look at kind of
nationalizing some of these ideas of prevention.
Real quick--so thank you again--Chief, I just had a quick
question too for you. You know, you served up in kind of the
Pacific Northwest area and then down along the border.
Any major differences? And then this is probably for the
next panel but what always really frustrates me on this is that
Xi Jinping is a dictator, right?
I mean, nobody does anything in China without his
permission, and the flow that continues from China, you know,
he did a deal with President Trump. He did a deal with
President Biden to stop this flow and, you know, it is more
what we call promise fatigue with the Chinese. They make big
announcements and they never keep their promises even to our
leaders.
So what is your sense on kind of differences at the Pacific
Northwest level that you have seen--that is Alaska, of course--
and then any sense on the Chinese just ignoring it and wanting
to kill young Americans?
Mr. Hall. I will take the difference between Arizona and
Washington first. The biggest difference I see is we would
interdict massive loads in Tucson, Arizona.
Tucson is 60 miles north of the international port of
entry, and it was nonstop and it was not unusual to get
hundreds of thousands of pills or bulk powder form in the
pounds in Arizona.
That is much less likely up in Washington. It does happen,
as we have seen and as I have testified. It does happen but not
nearly as often and that is because, you know, when it comes
from the border then it gets distributed throughout the Nation.
So we are getting smaller amounts up there.
But the smaller amounts are just as deadly and we have just
as many fatal overdoses and we have just as many social
problems that come from fentanyl as every other city.
So when I look at downtown Tucson and I look at downtown
Spokane, if I did not know where I was at they would look very
similar and that is the impact that fentanyl has.
Senator Sullivan. OK. Maybe for the record--I know I am out
of time--if you could answer the China question. I know it is a
tough question but, you know, I just think they are flooding
the zone on purpose.
Mr. Hall. Respectfully, Senator, I am going to stay out of
the geopolitics. I know the precursor chemicals for the most
part are coming from China and how we stop those I am not sure
because they are not coming to the United States. They are
going to Mexico, so that would be the realm of you fine folks.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chief. Yes, thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Budd. Senator Sheehy, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. TIM SHEEHY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Sheehy. Thank you for coming today. Jena, thank you
for taking on this cause. I know you have survived a terrible
tragedy in your family so thank you for turning that into
productive advocacy because it is going to take, you know, a
whole country to come together to fix this.
Chief, a question for you on Montana so not too far from
you. I spend a lot of time up in your neck of the woods
fighting wildfires so familiar with Spokane and the surrounding
area.
You know, what is your feeling on the northern border as
far as impacting your communities with regard to fentanyl and
drug trafficking?
Mr. Hall. As far as the northern border what we are seeing
is very little coming south from Canada. Almost everything we
have seen that we have been able to track, once again, with our
Federal partners it is all coming up from Mexico along the
interstates--like I said, I-19 to I-5, our I-10 to I-5 and then
I-90 into Spokane and northern Idaho. We are the urban hub of
eastern Washington and it all spreads out from there.
Senator Sheehy. Yes, we see the same in Montana, coming up
I-15 to Butte and then over. So and, you know, what interface
are you seeing at all with the tribal communities in the region
as far as how they are being impacted by the fentanyl crisis?
Mr. Hall. In the tribal communities it is a little bit more
of an invisible epidemic because, quite frankly, the tribes for
historical reasons are far more isolated and have far less
trust in the government, and so it is harder to get inroads
into the tribes.
And I am speaking from my personal experience as a tribal
member, not--I do not enforce the law on the tribes. I have no
jurisdiction. But it is probably far more tragic because it is
far more isolated and it is not as well known on the tribes
just because of that.
Senator Sheehy. And what do you feel the way ahead is
there? Obviously, we feel those same issues in Montana. You
know, we have reservation land and travel communities all
across the state and they are dealing, you know, with this
crisis first and--I mean, the first thing I hear from our
tribal leaders is the fentanyl crisis is tearing apart their
communities and, you know, they fall into, as you well know, a
very unique law enforcement construct with their sovereignty.
But they still want their streets cleaned up. They still want
their kids to be healthy.
So given your experience in the region what do you think
are some ways ahead where we can start to thread that needle,
where we can still respect the sovereignty of our tribal
communities but help them battle this epidemic and win?
Mr. Hall. I think much stronger and closer relationships
with tribal authorities local and state and Federal
authorities. I think we are getting there, at least in my
region and the Spokane region with the Spokane tribe Kalispell,
Colville, all of those tribes.
We are getting to a point where our relationships are
getting stronger, where we understand this is a common issue
that is killing all of us.
It does not matter if you are Native or indigenous, if you
are from Spokane or if you are from Omak. It is still going to
kill you, and so we all need to come together and I am starting
to see that collaboration and that cooperation amongst the
tribal folks--state, local and Federal as well.
Senator Sheehy. Great. Thank you for making the trip out. I
yield back.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Senator Sheehy.
Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to begin just by expressing my deepest
condolences to Ms. Ehlinger for your great loss--tragic loss. I
am just so sorry.
And we want to do everything we can in order to in the
future do a better job. Because you are right, we are in a war
against fentanyl and that means we need every resource
possible.
We need to be tracking every overdose death. We need
everyone to have access to naloxone to reverse overdoses. We
need enough providers and access to medications like methadone
and Suboxone for people struggling with addiction.
We need communities and law enforcement to have funding to
prevent fentanyl from coming into their communities and respond
once it is there.
President Trump and I had lunch in September 2017 as he was
on a--heading for a trip to China. I was the Ranking Member on
that Committee on Foreign Relations, and I talked to him about
how important it was to tell President Xi to just stop those
precursor chemicals from coming from China because we were
losing 80,000 to 100,000 people a year.
And I also recommended to him that we work together on a
bill to have detection devices along the southern border and
that there were actually devices in place that could detect
that fentanyl from coming across the border.
And in February 2018 I stood with him and he gave me the
pen as he signed the bill to provide those tens of millions of
dollars for the devices along the border to detect fentanyl.
So I know it is just such a very important issue that we
have to deal with.
So, Chief Hall, does your police department have to balance
both stopping fentanyl smuggling and responding to the
overdoses from fentanyl? How do you handle that?
Mr. Hall. It is a balance, Senator, and thank you for the
question. Once again, it is how we prioritize the workload and,
as you know, we are understaffed. Washington State is severely
understaffed.
I think it is number 50 out of the 50 states on a ratio of
officers to population. So we struggle with that in allocating
the appropriate amount of resources to addressing this issue.
However, it is an issue of life or death so we take that on
seriously. We take that on----
Senator Markey. So how important is it for you, Chief, for
Spokane to continue to receive sustained and reliable funding
for all of the work that you are doing to take on the fentanyl
crisis?
Mr. Hall. It is incredibly important. It is incredibly
important. Funding is what we live on. It is how we pay my
officers. That is how we pay for the technology that we use.
It is how we pay for the programs that we use, some of
which that you just mentioned including naloxone, the
administration of buprenorphine, and our work in the harm
reduction area trying to keep people alive.
Senator Markey. And I am just so concerned this Trump
administration is too busy making drastic, unfocused cuts and
engaging in political stunts rather than actually focusing its
energy in addressing the fentanyl crisis because the reality is
that cuts to Federal research will slow down finding better
ways to test for fentanyl, to improve upon that.
And as you know a border wall is not going to stop all of
it no matter what. You are still going to need these additional
resources that you have in the community because it is going to
come through legal ports of entry still to some degree, no
matter what happens, and disrupting funding to organizations
dedicated to responding to the overdose crisis will just slow
down the lifesaving efforts that you engage in every single
day.
When we are talking about overdose and fentanyl epidemic
playing politics is just not going to solve the problem. You
need the resources to do it so and that is why I worked with
President Trump to have INTERDICT Act be signed. That was a
pragmatic, bipartisan--I did it with Senator Rubio in order to
put that in place.
But we need more equipment. We need more high-tech
equipment even at the local level. We just need more resources
in your hands, which is why I introduced the Stop Fentanyl
Overdoses Act to enhance information sharing between health
care providers and law enforcement and to educate communities.
So I thank you, Chief. I thank you, Ms. Ehlinger. You have
come here with serious efforts that you are recommending to us
and you deserve a serious response and that is what I am
committed to having Congress provide for you, not just chainsaw
the solutions to the problem. We have to focus in on where your
needs are the greatest.
I thank you.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Senator Markey. I appreciate that.
I want to thank you both for being here. This has been very
important, very insightful, very helpful, and whether it is law
enforcement or personal experience it matters a lot to us.
We want to conclude this panel and we want to welcome our
next panel. If they would please come forward to the witness
table now.
Thank you both so much.
[Pause.]
Senator Budd. Our second panel of witnesses today include
Ms. Shannon Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of National Drug
Control Policy, U.S. Interdiction Coordinator and Director,
National High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program.
Ms. Kelly has more than two decades of counterdrug
experience and worked previously for the U.S. Department of
Justice and the National Drug Intelligence Center. Thank you
for being here.
Rear Admiral Adam Chamie, U.S. Coast Guard Assistant
Commandant for Response Policy. In this capacity he is
responsible for developing strategic response doctrine and
policy guidance for all Coast Guard forces, including covering
law enforcement activities and border maritime security.
And last, Mr. Jonathan Miller, Executive Assistant
Commissioner, Air and Marine Operations with U.S. Customs and
Border Protection. His mission is to safeguard our Nation by
anticipating and confronting security threats through aviation
and maritime law enforcement.
Ms. Kelly, you are recognized for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF SHANNON KELLY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY,
U.S. INTERDICTION COORDINATOR, AND DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA
(HIDTA) PROGRAM
Ms. Kelly. Good afternoon.
First, I want to thank Ms. Ehlinger for sharing Jake's
story with us. She is an eloquent and courageous spokesperson
for the many Americans suffering from the illicit fentanyl
crisis.
Senator Budd and distinguished members of the Committee, I
am honored to speak with you today about the challenges and
opportunities facing our law enforcement partners as they
combat illicit drug trafficking.
I am here today representing the White House Office of
National Drug Control Policy where it is my privilege to serve
as both the U.S. interdiction coordinator and the director of
the National High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program.
As the U.S. interdiction coordinator I advise the ONDCP
director as we create policy and coordinate activities to
reduce the flow of illicit drugs across our borders and into
our communities.
Through its coordination function the USIC ensures a
comprehensive and cogent approach to securing the Nation's
borders, supporting the President's executive orders on
ensuring the territorial integrity of the United States and
addressing the national emergency at the southern and northern
borders.
To make this direction efficient and effective I draft the
applicable portions of the National Drug Control Strategy, the
National Interdiction Command and Control Plan, and border
interdiction strategies for the southern, northern and
Caribbean borders of the United States.
The centerpiece of my team's work is the HIDTA program
which provides Federal grant funds to areas determined to be
critical drug trafficking regions of the United States. HIDTA
allocates nearly $300 million in Federal funding to support the
strategies developed and implemented by coalitions of Federal,
state, local, tribal, and territorial partners.
I deeply appreciate Congress' strong bipartisan support of
the HIDTA program and want to personally thank you for your
support for the HIDTA program. This support is critical because
as we speak America is facing the deadliest drug threat in its
history.
Over the past 25 years the number of fatal overdoses
involving synthetic drugs including fentanyl have increased
nearly 100 times and the illicit drug threat continues to
transform.
We must dismantle the supply chains for illicit drugs and
the raw materials and attack the global criminal networks
fueling these American deaths. This includes the drug cartels
that have inundated the United States with deadly drugs,
violent criminals, and vicious gangs.
Our Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners
work tirelessly to interdict illicit drugs, weapons, and
proceeds and to dismantle criminal networks wherever they
reside. I look forward to telling you more about the
outstanding work of these tireless patriots.
As a result of the recent executive order designating
cartels and other organizations as foreign terrorist
organizations and specially designated global terrorists, we
expect to see additional authorities for law enforcement to
investigate and dismantle these networks and place new pressure
and threat of prosecution on entities that support and enable
the cartels.
Law enforcement working to disrupt drug trafficking
networks need access to telecommunications, automated license
plate readers, financial transactions and illicit firearms
data.
Developing and deploying these technologies is critical to
investigative success. It is equally important these tools are
used to maximize investigative efficacy while minimizing any
risks to the privacy of innocent Americans.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today and
to share the perspective from the Office of National Drug
Control Policy.
Protecting Americans from illicit drugs and the traffickers
who harm them is our mission. Our strong interagency partners,
as represented by my fellow panelists from the Coast Guard and
Customs and Border Protection today, are key to disrupting and
dismantling criminal networking organizations.
Collectively, our work is leading to real progress under
President Trump's leadership and with your support I am
confident we will continue to stop traffickers and save lives.
I am happy to respond to any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Kelly follows:]
Prepared Statement of Shannon Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of
Homeland Interdiction and Supply Disruption, Office of National Drug
Control Policy
Good morning, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and members
of this committee.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you about the challenges
and opportunities facing our law enforcement partners with respect to
illicit drug trafficking.
I'm here today representing the White House Office of National Drug
Control Policy.
ONDCP leads and coordinates the national drug control policy to
address drug trafficking, save lives, and improve the health and safety
of the American people.
We oversee the National Drug Control Program Budget, which
encompasses 19 Federal agencies and coordinates the Federal
government's efforts to address the illicit drug threat, which is
significant and growing.
I am here today as both the United States Interdiction Coordinator
and the Director of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas, or
HIDTA, Program. It is a privilege to serve in both roles.
USIC
As the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, or USIC, I provide the ONDCP
Director advice regarding policy and coordination of interdiction
activities to reduce the flow of illicit drugs into the United States,
and integration with domestic efforts to prevent illicit drugs from
crossing our borders and entering our communities. With coordination
among the 28 senior leaders from across the government who are members
of The Interdiction Committee, I am responsible for overseeing the
interdiction activities of the National Drug Control Program agencies
to ensure consistency with Presidential policy priorities.
The USIC's coordination function is vital to ensuring a
comprehensive, cogent approach to securing the Nation's borders, in
direct support of President Trump's Executive Orders on ensuring the
territorial integrity of the United States and addressing the national
emergency at the Southern and Northern Borders. To ensure this
direction is efficient and effective, I draft and issue the applicable
portions of the National Drug Control Strategy; the National
Interdiction Command and Control Plan; and border interdiction
strategies for the southern, northern, and Caribbean borders each year.
These documents focus on coordinated interdiction efforts by
federal, state, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement
agencies, and promote strengthened collaboration with our international
partners to maximize the impact of each interdiction event. Drug
interdictions are vital not only for removing dangerous drugs
immediately from the illicit supply chain, but also for providing
cooperating witnesses, physical and digital evidence, and intelligence.
These contributions are the foundation that the interagency community
builds on to dismantle transnational criminal networks (TCNs). This
coordination is becoming even more vital as we implement a strong
response to President Trump's executive order designating of
international cartels and other transnational criminal organizations,
as foreign terrorist organizations, and organize the interdiction
community to fully support national efforts to totally eliminate these
organizations.
HIDTA
The centerpiece of my team's work is the HIDTA Program, which
provides Federal grant funds to areas determined to be critical drug
trafficking regions of the United States.
HIDTA allocates nearly $300 million in Federal funding to support
the strategies developed and implemented by coalitions of federal,
state, local, Tribal, and territorial partners.
I greatly appreciate Congress's strong bipartisan support of the
HIDTA Program, and I want to personally thank you, Chairman Cruz and
Ranking Member Cantwell, for your support to the HIDTA program over the
years.
Through its 33 regional programs, HIDTA brings together more than
twenty thousand individual participants from 500 law enforcement
agencies, focusing and integrating their efforts against the drug
trafficking organizations that pose the greatest threat to our Nation.
Through HIDTA collaboration, we are able to fully engage partners from
across all levels of government to prioritize their investigations to
fully align with the President's designated list of the most dangerous
cartels.
To these ends, HIDTA-supported task forces annually disrupt or
dismantle more than three thousand drug trafficking or money laundering
organizations, and seize billions of dollars of illicit drugs.
Illicit Drug Threats
As we speak, America is facing the deadliest drug threat in its
history.
Over the past 25 years, the number of drug overdose deaths in the
United States involving synthetic opioids, including fentanyl, have
increased nearly 100 times.
During the same timeframe, the rate of fatal overdoses involving
other drugs, including cocaine and methamphetamine, also rose. Since
1999, the number of drug overdose deaths involving cocaine and
methamphetamine have increased nearly eight and 64 times, respectively.
While far too many lives are currently being lost due to drug
overdose, we are starting to see signs that progress is being made to
combat this crisis. The latest CDC provisional data predicts a 23.7
percent decrease i in drug overdose deaths for the 12-month
period ending in September 2024, compared to the same time period a
year prior. This is the largest recorded reduction in drug overdose
deaths, and these reductions are being observed across all major drug
classes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\i\ Per CDC data, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/drug-overdose-
data.htm. Accessed 21 Feb 2025.
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While this is important progress, we must recognize that the
illicit drug threat will continue to transform. This is not a challenge
for the United States alone. Illicit drugs are a global problem, and
the criminals who produce and traffic these drugs are determined and
resilient, driven by increased profits and an increased global customer
base. Illicit drugs produced outside the United States make their way
across our borders and into our communities by a variety of means.
Illicit fentanyl and methamphetamine often enter the United States
through ports of entry. On occasion, cocaine is loaded onto
semisubmersibles and go-fast boats that traverse the maritime
approaches to the United States.
We recognize that the illicit drug supply chain is a multinational,
complex network that spans public and private entities, utilizes
legitimate commerce pipelines to move raw materials and finished drugs,
and exploits our financial and banking systems to obtain profits and
fund illicit activity.
Addressing this crisis calls for decisive, coordinated action.
We must dismantle the supply chains for illicit drugs and their raw
materials, and attack the global criminal networks fueling American
deaths, including the drug cartels that have inundated the United
States with deadly drugs, violent criminals, and vicious gangs.
Seizing Drugs
While we face substantial challenges in keeping these drugs from
entering the United States, our Federal interdiction and law
enforcement have achieved some noteworthy success.
In Fiscal Year 2024, HIDTA-supported task forces seized more than
20,000 pounds of illicit fentanyl, more than 277,000 pounds of
methamphetamine, nearly 317,000 pounds of cocaine, and over 4,100
pounds of heroin.
My colleague from Customs and Border Protection (CBP) will provide
more details on its work, but I want to highlight that in FY 2024, CBP
seized almost 575,000 pounds of illicit drugs, approximately half of
which was seized at Southwest Land Border ports of entry. That number
includes nearly 22,000 pounds of fentanyl. There was also a nearly 25
percent increase in methamphetamine seizures in FY 2024 from the
previous Fiscal Year, with nearly 175,000 pounds seized, primarily at
the Southwest Border.
As we'll hear from the Coast Guard, maritime cocaine interdictions
are vital inroads to dismantling criminal networks, particularly those
in Mexico that both receive multi-ton loads of cocaine from South
America, and at the same time produce fentanyl for distribution in U.S.
markets. The Coast Guard has re-oriented its focus to lean in on drug
interdiction, and those efforts continue to be a vital tool for
removing drugs and illuminating high-level criminal networks.
It's impossible to overstate the impact of seizing drugs before
they slip across international borders, are broken down into smaller
loads, and make their way along our highways and through our mail and
package systems, and into our communities and homes.
Seized drugs represent lives saved--they are fatal overdoses that
never happened, and profits that drug traffickers never received.
Seizing dangerous and addictive substances, like fentanyl, cocaine,
methamphetamine, and heroin, also is a critical component of preventing
illicit drug use and substance use disorder in American citizens.
Disrupting Criminal Networks
The integration of federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial
efforts through task forces is critical to disrupting and dismantling
criminal networks. To meet this need, HIDTA and the Organized Crime
Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) play complementary roles. This
partnership enhances intelligence sharing, investigative capabilities,
and operational effectiveness, enabling task forces to dismantle entire
trafficking networks rather than just interdict individual shipments,
creating a sustained impact.
Additionally, our partners at the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) have led government-wide efforts to map the cartels responsible
for distributing deadly drugs like fentanyl. This entails combining DEA
data with external data, and employing innovative analytic techniques
to map and strategically target priority threat networks throughout the
cartels' supply chain. The network illumination will provide the
knowledge to develop cohesive and coordinated operations within DEA and
across government agencies to most effectively dismantle, degrade, and
defeat transnational drug cartels. These operations will target every
stage of the cartels' business cycle, support structure, and
facilitators.
Those teams are composed of special agents, intelligence analysts,
targeters, program analysts, data scientists, and digital specialists.
DEA's Special Operation Division (SOD), is home to over 30 Federal
and international partners, including Internal Revenue Service-Criminal
Investigations (IRS-CI), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), FBI,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Australian Federal Police, and members
of the Intelligence Community. SOD allows for the sharing, support, and
coordination of work across the government and the globe, to identify
and target drug trafficking networks. This includes the networks
responsible for the chemicals and pre-cursor chemicals shipped to
Mexico, the cartels who use those chemicals to produce fentanyl and
other deadly synthetic drugs, the networks who smuggle the drugs into
the United States, the local street distributors, and the global money
laundering networks who repatriate the illicit proceeds back to the
cartels.
Similarly, the HSI Innovation Lab is constantly developing new ways
to combat transnational criminal networks more effectively. The HSI
Innovation Lab brings together HSI investigators with data engineers
and scientists to develop and utilize new technology for cross-
referencing, analyzing, and triaging information to support some of the
most complex cases. This team provides technical solutions, rapidly
advanced analytical support, and priority access to HSI specialized
resources.
The HSI-led DHS Cyber Crimes Center (C3) supports HSI's mission by
providing investigative and operational support for complex
transnational cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent investigations that
have the highest potential impact against TCNs. C3's advanced support
to combat TCNs includes applying the necessary technical solutions,
advanced data and cryptocurrency analytical support, and priority
access to HSI specialized resources.
C3 is also at the forefront of interagency collaboration and is a
longstanding member of the FBI's Joint Criminal Opioid and Darknet
Enforcement (JCODE) Team, which is a DOJ-sponsored initiative
established in 2018, to combat the proliferation and distribution of
fentanyl and other opioids via illicit darknet marketplaces. C3
actively collaborates with JCODE members to develop and distribute
high-impact target packages to HSI and other JCODE member agency field
offices. C3's expertise and efforts significantly contribute to HSI's
seizure of $190 million in cryptocurrency from transnational criminal
organizations, many of which were associated with narcotics
investigations.
Also, HSI's Cross-Border Financial Crime Center (CBFCC) has been
designed to identify, target, and dismantle the financial networks that
are utilized by transnational criminal networks that seek to launder
their illicit proceeds from inside and outside of the United States.
The CBFCC employs a strategy of utilizing the expertise of federal,
state and local law enforcement agencies and their analytical
capabilities to infiltrate and dismantle these financial networks. The
CBFCC includes elements of HSI, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), and the Internal Revenue Service--Criminal Investigations (IRS-
CI). Also included is the support from the HSI-led El Dorado Task
Forces around the country which include HSI, DEA, United States Secret
Service, IRS-CI, and state/local law enforcement.
This effort is a concerted, HSI-wide response to combat the
transnational criminal networks that pose the greatest threats to the
security of the United States, particularly those engaged in the
production and distribution of illicit drugs like fentanyl.
Although DOD does not interdict or arrest drug traffickers, I would
be remiss to not mention the valuable enabling role DOD plays in this
area. In addition to leading the air and maritime detection and
monitoring of drug trafficking, the DoD Counterdrug program provides
the bulk of the U.S. government's intelligence collection and analysis
on foreign transnational criminal networks.
Protecting Mail and Package Systems
Drug traffickers exploit the mail and express consignment service
industry to obtain precursor chemicals and manufacturing equipment, and
ship illicit drugs to their customers.
To combat this activity, CBP officers and HSI Special Agents
assigned to Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs) have
increased their presence, coordination, and inspections at
international express consignment carrier (ECC) processing centers
operated by United Parcel Service (UPS), Federal Express (FedEx),
Dalsey, Hillblom, and Lynn (DHL), and others.
From 2021-2023, domestic task forces at ECC hubs seized nearly
59,000 pounds of illicit drugs from small parcels, including nearly 840
pounds of illicit fentanyl.
Also, the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) seized
over 3,800 pounds of fentanyl and 7,700 pounds of methamphetamine from
the domestic mail system in FY 2024, mostly originating from states
surrounding the Southwest Border. The Postal Inspection Service
continues to see a significant increase from FY 2023 in cocaine
seizures, with over 6,000 pounds in FY 2024.
Targeting Illicit Proceeds
Narcotics traffickers operating on a global scale require an
extensive support network, including procurement, logistics,
transportation, communications, security, money laundering, and other
facilitation.
Major drug operations create, corrupt, and misuse supposedly
legitimate enterprises to conduct criminal activity and launder vast
profits on an international scale.
These illicitly-funded ``corporate empires'' can be extensive,
complex, and can undermine the integrity of financial systems.
They are also one of transnational criminal organizations' greatest
vulnerabilities.
As a result, disrupting this illicit financial network is a
national priority to help disrupt the flow of illicit fentanyl, its
precursors, and related production equipment, such as pill presses.
In recent years, the Department of the Treasury received a new
sanctions authority for combating the illicit drug trade.
Specifically, it received authorization to target any foreign
person engaged in drug trafficking activities, regardless of whether
they are linked to a specific kingpin or cartel, which further enables
Treasury to sanction foreign persons who knowingly receive property
that constitutes, or is derived from, proceeds of illicit drug
trafficking activities.
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has since
designated 233 individuals and 167 entities under this new authority.
When OFAC designates an individual or entity, any assets within the
United States or the possession or control of a United States person
anywhere in the world must be frozen. Additionally, any money being
transferred through the United States financial system may be seized,
even if neither the sending nor receiving accounts are within the
system. Since the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (or SWIFT) network is based in the United States,
this limits any transfers within that network.
An OFAC designation also means trade with or through the United
States is cut off. Often, businesses and banks not based in the United
States voluntarily sever ties with individuals and entities that OFAC
has listed.
As a result, designated persons may lose access to their bank
accounts outside the United States, disrupting their operations and
freedom of access.
In addition, in many cases, partner nation authorities have taken
law enforcement actions against designated companies or properties
after OFAC has listed them.
In addition to sanctions, since 2021, the Department of State's
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has made
public up to $410 million in reward offers for information leading to
the arrest or conviction of 80 different wanted individuals. Some of
these, from both China and Mexico, are involved in the fentanyl supply
chain and have been captured through the Narcotics and Transnational
Organized Crime Rewards Programs.
As a result of the recent Executive Order Designating Cartels and
other organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and specially
designated Global Terrorists, we expect to see additional tools and
authorities for our law enforcement officers to investigate and
dismantle these organizations, placing new pressure and threat of
prosecution on entities that support and enable the cartels.
Protecting Investigative Tools
Directly or indirectly, a number of the approaches I've noted so
far depend upon the widespread availability of key investigative tools.
Law enforcement working to disrupt drug trafficking networks need
access to telecommunications, automated license plate readers,
financial transactions, and crime gun tracking data.
Developing and deploying these technologies is critical to
investigative success, but it is equally important that these tools are
used to maximize investigative efficacy while minimizing any risks to
the privacy of innocent Americans.
This is increasingly important as we contemplate the use of
groundbreaking technologies, such as artificial intelligence.
Trust is a pillar of law enforcement. It's integral to the multi-
agency, multi-jurisdictional efforts that have yielded great successes.
It's also critical to the relationships that all law enforcement
agencies maintain with the citizens they protect.
I'm grateful to all our law enforcement partners for their forward-
looking approach to the use of new technologies, and their commitment
to use these tools effectively and responsibly.
Conclusion
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you this morning and to
share the perspective from the Office of National Drug Control Policy.
Protecting Americans from illicit drugs and the traffickers who
harm them is a key mission for the Federal government. Our strong
interagency partnerships are working tirelessly to disrupt and
dismantle criminal trafficking organizations and it's leading to real
progress under President Trump's leadership. With your support, I am
confident we will continue to stop traffickers and save lives.
I am happy to respond to any questions you have.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Ms. Kelly.
Admiral Chamie, you are recognized for your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL ADAM CHAMIE, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR
RESPONSE POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD
Rear Admiral Chamie. Good afternoon, Senator Budd and
distinguished members of the Committee. I request that my
written testimony be submitted for the record.
Senator Budd. Without objection.
Rear Admiral Chamie. Thank you, sir.
Thank you for your continued support of the United States
Coast Guard and the young men and women who selflessly
volunteer to serve our Nation.
Throughout our 234-year career our workforce has always
been our greatest strength and I am incredibly proud to serve
alongside them.
I very much appreciate the title of this hearing, ``A View
From the Front Lines.'' It is a good reminder for me of why I
am here today to share with you the successes and challenges of
our crews who do the mission every day.
Throughout my time in uniform the best part of my job has
always been bragging about my crews, and now sitting before you
I am honored to share just two of their success stories over
the past month.
On February 2, Coast Guard Cutter Joseph Doyle and a Coast
Guard aircraft were patrolling south of the U.S. Virgin
Islands. The cutter stopped and boarded a go-fast vessel,
seizing 2,000 pounds of cocaine and detaining three Venezuelan
smugglers.
Thanks to the crew of that cutter and aircraft they kept
over $16 million of drugs off American streets.
On January 23, the crew of Coast Guard Cutter Waesche was
patrolling far off the coast of Mexico when the crew spotted a
go-fast vessel with three outboard engines.
The Coast Guard helicopter employed their precision
marksmen to shoot the outboards and the boarding team seized
six tons of cocaine valued at almost $100 million and they
detained 10 smugglers from Mexico and Ecuador.
In all of Fiscal Year 2024 the Coast Guard interdicted 106
tons of cocaine with a street value of $3.2 billion and
detained 213 smugglers. That sounds good, but I would call it
an average year.
This year our crews have interdicted 108 tons of cocaine
and they have already surpassed last year's total only 5 months
into the Fiscal Year.
This pace, however, is not sustainable. For every drug
interdiction each crew has countless stories of engine
casualties, electronics failures, and just last week one cutter
discovered a hole in the side of the ship with seawater pouring
in.
Making our crews' lives even tougher, when they order the
parts to make repairs sometimes we do not have them on the
shelf or they are not even available, and sometimes we take the
parts off a ship returning to port so another ship can go out
to sea. Our crews know we are the world's best Coast Guard but
we need to do a better job to make them feel that way.
I have talked a lot about cocaine because bulk cocaine is
smuggled at sea. The interdiction of cocaine matters because
the same cartels who smuggle cocaine produce and smuggle
fentanyl.
When we interdict the smugglers at sea we work with our
interagency partners in the intelligence community to determine
who these criminals are, which cartels employ them, and how and
where these cartels operate.
Cocaine is the cash crop for transnational criminal
organizations, the cartels. Their huge profits from cocaine
fund other nefarious activities like human smuggling, weapons
trafficking, and production of synthetic drugs like fentanyl.
Fentanyl is the leading cause of drug-related deaths in our
country but cocaine still kills upwards of 25,000 Americans
every year.
Although we rarely encounter fentanyl at sea the Coast
Guard is actively finding new ways to get after this problem.
We are working alongside Federal, state, local, tribal, and
international partners to protect the American people and
ensure our national security remains strong.
The Coast Guard does a lot of things but we do not do it
alone. Whether in the field, in a skiff, or in a courtroom we
count on each other every day to achieve mission success.
We proudly serve alongside the Department of Defense, our
many homeland components like Customs and Border Protection and
Homeland Security investigations, and with the Department of
State and Department of Justice, just to name a few.
On behalf of our acting commandant and our entire work
force--active duty, reserve, civilian, and auxiliary--thank you
for your enduring support of the United States Coast Guard.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Rear Admiral Chamie follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Adam A. Chamie,
Assistant Commandant for Response Policy, U.S. Coast Guard,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Introduction
Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and distinguished Members
of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify and for your
continued support of the United States Coast Guard and the Department
of Homeland Security generally. I look forward to discussing the Coast
Guard's maritime drug interdiction operations. We have a proud history
of protecting and defending our Nation by ensuring our economic
prosperity and national security in the maritime domain since the
founding of the Revenue Marine in 1790. Today, our efforts remain
focused on guarding our Nation against maritime border threats and
conducting all of the Coast Guard's 11 statutory missions.
As our Acting Commandant highlighted in recent Service-wide
guidance, controlling our maritime borders and approaches, including
conducting maritime drug interdiction, is a priority for the Trump
Administration and a critical function of the Coast Guard. We are
particularly qualified to answer the call to safeguard the homeland. In
Fiscal Year 2024, the Coast Guard removed over 106 metric tons of
cocaine, bringing our six-year total to 873.5 metric tons removed.
While a substantial amount, it would be much higher if we had more
available interdiction and detection assets--Coast Guard cutters and
aircraft, and Navy ships--to conduct these critical operations.
The multitude of Coast Guard missions necessarily create competing
demands for these limited assets, specifically on interdicting drugs in
the maritime transit zone. Assets that could otherwise be targeting
drug traffickers are also needed to maintain elevated cutter presence
in support of Homeland Security Task Force Southeast to counter illegal
maritime migration, provide support to Administration priorities in the
Indo-Pacific, assure presence in the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska to
deter Russia and People's Republic of China, and advance the global
effort to counter illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
The Coast Guard continuously assesses demands and strategically employs
assets to maximize effectiveness and mitigate risk to the Nation--we do
a lot, but we strive to do much more. The trafficking of illegal drugs
poses an exigent threat to the American people, and the men and women
of the Coast Guard continue to do everything in their power to remove
cocaine and other contraband before they reach our shores and our
citizens.
Of equal importance as cocaine removals in 2024 are the 288 drug
smugglers detained for U.S. or foreign prosecution as a result of Coast
Guard interdictions. Those individuals and associated evidence provided
critical information to advance Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations into smuggling networks
that present a larger threat to U.S. border security. The same
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) engaging in cocaine
smuggling are also responsible for trafficking people and other drugs,
including fentanyl and its precursors, into the U.S. while creating
instability in the source and transit zones in Latin America and the
Caribbean, at the Southern Border, and throughout our hemisphere. Coast
Guard interdictions of bulk quantity cocaine decrease TCO profit
margins, while also providing valuable information to aid our
investigative partners. The Coast Guard is postured to disrupt illegal
trafficking in the maritime environment to advance the broader United
States goals to secure the Nation's borders and help dismantle TCOs.
Drug Trafficking--Overview
Mexico-based TCOs transship much of the cocaine consumed in the
U.S. through Central America and the Caribbean using licit commercial
shipping companies and illicit drug trafficking shipping networks. The
Coast Guard's cutter fleet and versatile Tactical Law Enforcement Teams
(TACLETs) operating from U.S. Navy and allied warships target bulk
cocaine movements typically originating from Colombia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela, pushing the U.S. borders out hundreds of miles from land.
Two major drug transit corridors exist in the Western Hemisphere: the
Eastern Pacific and the Caribbean. In the Eastern Pacific, there are
multiple vectors used to move bulk cocaine; however, traffickers
generally land contraband between Costa Rica and Mexico for further
shipment to the U.S. In the western Caribbean Sea, bulk cocaine is
typically trafficked through Honduras or Nicaragua through Mexico and
moved across the Southwest Border into the U.S. In the central and
eastern Caribbean, the bulk smuggling destinations are typically the
Dominican Republic or Puerto Rico. Approximately 60 to 65 percent of
the cocaine destined for the U.S. flows through the Eastern Pacific
corridor, while 35 to 40 percent moves through the Caribbean Sea.
National Drug Control Strategy & the Coast Guard's Role
Since 1989, the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) has
emphasized the global reach of U.S. enforcement and interdiction
efforts to address both illicit drug supply and demand. The Trump
Administration's deliberate focus on combatting TCOs and securing our
borders reinforces the value of the Coast Guard's capabilities.
Historically, drug interdiction missions sought to reduce supply, and
were supported by our cutters, boarding teams, and aircraft. However,
our role has advanced beyond mere presence and operations on and over
the water. As a member of the Intelligence Community, the Coast Guard
works across the government to collect, analyze and share critical
information to target TCOs and drug trafficking terrorists.
The Commandant of the Coast Guard serves as the Chair of The
Interdiction Committee (TIC), which is the Office of National Drug
Control Policy's (ONDCP) senior interagency forum attended by drug
interdiction officials from 26 departments and agencies. Last year, TIC
principals convened in San Juan, Puerto Rico to review issues related
to the coordination, oversight, and integration of international,
border, and domestic drug interdiction efforts. It highlighted the
unique counter-drug challenges from Panama north into the U.S. waters
and territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, which are
on the front lines of our southeast U.S. border, and the broader drug
interdiction concerns we face as Nation.
In addition to our role within TIC, Coast Guard Flag Officers lead
the U.S. Southern Command's Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-
S) and Indo-Pacific Command's Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-
W). These task forces are charged with executing the Department of
Defense's (DoD) Title 10 responsibility for the detection and
monitoring of illicit aerial and maritime drug trafficking, while
efficiently coordinating interdiction operations conducted by Coast
Guard, the interagency, allies, and partner nations.
Drug Interdiction Operations
The Coast Guard works closely with JIATF-S and JIATF-W to target
illicit narcotics and fentanyl precursor flows. While we strive for
U.S. interdictions to support investigations by our DHS and DOJ
partners, we look to coordinate a partner nation response when a U.S.
interdiction is not possible. In Fiscal Year 2024, partner nations
contributed to approximately 80 percent of documented JIATF-S cocaine
disruptions, while the Coast Guard provided actionable intelligence to
European law enforcement partners on trans-Atlantic cocaine movement,
accounting for an additional 76.6 metric tons disrupted. This was the
largest percentage of partner nation contributions on record; a
promising trend indicating the increased capability and willingness of
our partners to collaborate on this important mission. In a recent six-
week period from December 20, 2024, to January 31, 2025, the Coast
Guard positioned multiple assets in the Eastern Pacific to successfully
conduct 32 interdictions, seize over 43 metric tons of cocaine and
detain 85 smugglers for transfer to Department of Justice Organized
Crime Task Forces for prosecution and further investigation. On
February 13, 2025, in California, a Coast Guard cutter off-loaded over
16.9 metric tons of cocaine with an estimated street value of over
$275.7 million that will never be sold to poison the American people.
While a multitude of Coast Guard assets engage in counterdrug
operations, our National Security Cutters have proven to be our most
effective platform for this mission, especially when combined with a
force package consisting of an embarked helicopter and a small-unmanned
aircraft. Just last month, Coast Guard Cutter (CGC) James responded to
three suspected smuggling vessels in their operating area. The cutter
simultaneously launched three small boats and their airborne use-of-
force capable helicopter, successfully stopping all three suspect
vessels. With these suspected smuggling vessels being subject to U.S.
jurisdiction under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, the cutter's
crew conducted lawful boardings and seized over six metric tons of
cocaine and detained nine Ecuadorian smugglers. This successful
operation was part of an even more impressive week, with CGC James
interdicting a total of six cocaine-laden smuggling vessels.
Fentanyl
Fentanyl is a major U.S. counterdrug priority and has been the
leading cause of U.S. drug-related deaths since 2016, accounting for
approximately 70 percent of U.S. drug overdose deaths in 2023. Mexican
TCOs are the primary source of synthetic opioid flow into the U.S.,
predominantly across our Southwest Border. While bulk fentanyl has yet
to be encountered in the maritime domain, the Coast Guard is leveraging
all of our authorities, capabilities, and policies to seek out and
interdict both fentanyl and precursor chemicals. On January 31, 2025,
the Acting Commandant directed immediate action to bolster operations
to combat illegal fentanyl and the Service is seeking new ways to
leverage our broad authorities and partnerships with other agencies.
Coast Guard drug interdictions, while historically focused on
cocaine and marijuana, are critical to the whole-of-government effort
to combat TCOs. Cocaine interdictions at sea cut off a critical source
of funding for the same Mexican TCOs that produce and smuggle fentanyl,
impairing their efforts to produce and smuggle fentanyl into the United
States. Beyond our efforts on the water and in the ports, Coast Guard
intelligence personnel work closely with our Intelligence Community
partners to combat TCOs that threaten the U.S. by providing valuable
and actionable information targeting suspected smuggling terrorists.
Partnerships
As the United States' lead maritime law enforcement agency, the
Coast Guard has a broad range of authorities and a network of
interagency and international partnerships that enable us to conduct
law enforcement operations on the high seas to combat threats far from
U.S. borders. The Coast Guard conducts drug interdiction operations
over a six-million square mile transit zone, and the Service depends on
robust partnerships for mission success. Drug interdiction is a large-
scale operation, and a Service of our size relies on like-minded
partners to drive our whole-of-government effort to target TCOs that
threaten our Nation.
The Coast Guard relies on over 40 counterdrug bilateral and
multilateral international agreements and arrangements with stakeholder
nations to enable seamless, coordinated law enforcement efforts against
TCOs. These agreements and arrangements are critical to Coast Guard
drug interdiction successes, as they allow our law enforcement teams to
conduct boardings of foreign-flagged vessels and promote time-critical
partner nation coordination during high-seas drug interdiction
operations. The Coast Guard works closely with the Department of State
(DOS) to improve the effectiveness of partner nations' counterdrug
efforts by negotiating, securing, and managing those agreements.
In addition to exercising international agreements and
arrangements, the Coast Guard relies on allies and international
partners to provide assets, collaborate on operations, and share
intelligence to eradicate maritime trafficking. We coordinate
operations with, and regularly deploy Coast Guard law enforcement teams
aboard allied vessels (e.g., United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and
Canada), and work closely with partner nations throughout South and
Central America and the Caribbean to dismantle regional maritime
trafficking networks.
Force packages consisting of allied partner assets, augmented with
small Coast Guard TACLETs provide tremendously high operational return
on investment. In late January 2025, we deployed a team of 10 Coast
Guard law enforcement personnel aboard a Royal Netherlands Navy ship,
and, within 48 hours of operational certification, they interdicted a
boat 30 miles off the coast of Venezuela, seizing nearly three metric
tons of cocaine and detaining five Venezuelan and Colombian suspected
traffickers.
The DoD-Coast Guard partnership is also critical to the Nation's
drug interdiction mission and our collective ability to succeed. While
DoD is the lead Federal agency for the detection and monitoring of
aerial and maritime transits of illegal drugs into the United States,
the Coast Guard leverages unique law enforcement authorities to serve
as the lead agency for the interdiction and apprehension of vessels
suspected of engaging in maritime drug trafficking. The Coast Guard's
role as a law enforcement agency, an armed force, and a member of the
Intelligence Community allows us to leverage our vital suite of
authorities and capabilities in various ways throughout the
interdiction process, unique among cooperating agencies.
Similarly, the Coast Guard maintains close connections with DOJ to
prosecute cases and investigate TCO networks. In addition to engagement
on various DOJ-led interagency task forces, the Coast Guard assigns
judge advocates who serve as Special Assistant United States Attorneys
to work side-by-side with DOJ attorneys in the U.S. Attorney's Offices
who prosecute the majority of significant maritime drug cases. This
model is highly successful and allows the Coast Guard to bring its
maritime counterdrug expertise into the courtroom.
Within DHS, a Coast Guard flag officer leads Joint Task Force East
(JTF-EAST), which is responsible for coordinating activities and
operations across DHS components (i.e., Customs and Border Protection,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services) to protect the U.S. Southeast Border and maritime
approaches. In 2024, Caribbean coalition efforts across synchronized,
enduring operations resulted in the interdiction of 538 illegal Aliens,
71.4 metric tons of cocaine, 339 illegal firearms, and over 26,000
rounds of ammunition. Working with JIATF-S, allies, and international
partners, we have improved unified efforts to disrupt TCOs in the
Caribbean.
Conclusion
The Coast Guard continues to provide tremendous value to the United
States through our maritime drug interdiction operations. We strive to
control the maritime border in direct support of President's Trump's
recent Executive Orders and direction from Homeland Security Secretary
Noem. We will continue to address surface fleet challenges and
competing mission demands to ensure the Coast Guard remains well-
positioned to assist in dismantling TCOs, interdicting illegal
narcotics, and prosecuting those responsible. The continued success of
Coast Guard counterdrug operations hinges on continued investment in
the Service--recruiting motivated people, providing them with the
proper tools, and empowering them to serve the Nation. Congress'
continued support will help the world's best Coast Guard meet these
global demands.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and for your
continued support of the Coast Guard. I would be pleased to answer your
questions.
Senator Blackburn [presiding]. And, Mr. Miller, you are
recognized.
STATEMENT OF JONATHAN MILLER, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER, AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS,
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)
Mr. Miller. Senator Blackburn, Chairman Cruz, Ranking
Member Cantwell, and distinguished members of the Committee, it
is an honor to appear before you today on behalf of the men and
women of Air Marine Operations to discuss our critical role in
interdicting illicit drugs in U.S. territorial waters and
maritime approaches as part of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's comprehensive approach to border security.
While AMO has existed in its current form for less than 20
years its origins trace back to the legacy of U.S. Customs
Service and we continue to meet a longstanding need for
specialized air and maritime border security capabilities.
Our operators are sworn Federal law enforcement agents with
a broad range of authorities to conduct counter narcotic
operations across land, air, and sea domains.
Maritime domain presents unique national security
challenges. Unlike air and land environments, coastal waters
are vast, less restricted spaces.
Countless vessels enter or operate in U.S. territorial
waters every day, making detection of illegal activity and
apprehending associated smugglers challenging.
Many smuggling crafts hide in plain sight amongst
legitimate traffic while others transit remote areas far
offshore trying to elude detection altogether.
Smugglers also use a variety of vessels tailored to the
area and amount of contraband they are smuggling to best evade
detection including modified fishing boats, go-fast vessels,
pangas, low-profile vessels, and semi submersibles.
Vessels are also much faster than they were 20 years ago,
often leaving law enforcement little time to interdict them
before reaching our shores.
Drug smuggling activity in the maritime environment is a
perpetual and dangerous threat to U.S. border security. Of the
234 pounds of drugs AMO seized in Fiscal Year 2024
approximately 76 percent occurred in the maritime environment.
In addition to high maritime drug interdiction rates,
smuggler aggression and violence has also been on the rise.
Since 2006, AMO has used disabling fire on the engines of
fleeing smuggling vessels nearly 350 times with more than half
of those happening in the last 4 years.
In November 2022 three of our marine interdiction agents
were shot and one, Michel Maceda, was tragically killed during
a vessel stop with smugglers off the coast of Puerto Rico.
The threat of illicit maritime activity is persistent and
dynamic but AMO is dedicated and adaptable. We are continually
refining our capabilities and adjusting our tactics to stay
ahead of these ever evolving threats.
AMO deploys a fleet of what I believe to be some of the
most powerful law enforcement marine interceptors in the world.
Evolving to meet today's threats we have recently repowered
these vessels and made other modifications to this platform for
a perfect mix of speed, agility, and agent safety.
AMO also maintains a fleet of aircraft functionally
designed and outfitted for maritime detection and surveillance.
Our P-3s, DHC-8s, and MQ-9 UAS aircraft provide long-range,
high-endurance capabilities in remote source and transit zones
while the Super King Air 350 multi-role enforcement aircraft
further expands aerial surveillance, closing detection
enforcement gaps in the littorals of the United States and the
Caribbean.
AMO is heavily invested in a variety of tethered aero stats
and tactical systems, providing ground-based radar and sensor
capabilities that significantly increase our domain awareness
along our littoral borders and the maritime approaches around
Puerto Rico, south Texas into the Gulf, the Florida straits,
the U.S. Virgin Islands and the northern border.
The scale and complexity of countering drug trafficking in
the maritime environment requires partnerships and operational
collaboration.
In addition to the U.S. Coast Guard, AMO routinely works
with Federal, state, local, and foreign partners and is one of
the largest contributors of flight hours to Joint Interagency
Task Force South, supporting counternarcotics operations in the
vast 42 million square mile source and transit zones.
With a fleet designed for rapid interdiction, airborne and
ground assets that provide critical domain awareness and agents
with extensive law enforcement experience, AMO brings a unique
capability to detect and disrupt smuggling operations before
they reach our shores.
With few exceptions AMO's marine law enforcement authority
is limited to customs waters, or 12 nautical miles from the
coastline of the United States. CBP continues to work with
Congress on legislative changes to extend the Customs' waters
from 12 to 24 nautical miles.
This extension of law enforcement authorities would enable
AMO to more effectively enforce U.S. laws at sea, expand our
counternarcotics operations, support our partners, and carry
out our border security mission.
Senator Blackburn, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell,
and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jonathan P. Miller,
Executive Assistant Commissioner, Air and Marine Operations, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Introduction
Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and distinguished Members
of the Committee, it is a privilege to appear before you today to
discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Air and Marine
Operations' (AMO) unwavering commitment to enforcing U.S. laws,
interdicting illegal drugs, and securing our Nation's borders. As a
frontline law enforcement component of CBP, AMO actively detects,
deters, and disrupts illicit drug activity at the border and beyond.
Born out of the legacy U.S. Customs Service, AMO was established in
2006 as an integral part of CBP's comprehensive border security mission
and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) risk-based and multi-
layered approach to national security. AMO agents are credentialed
Federal law enforcement officers\1\ with a broad range of authorities
that enable them to operate in the land, air, and sea domains,
providing a critical layer of continuity in counternarcotics
operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 6 U.S.C. Sec. 211(f); 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1589a; 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1357
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AMO's unique positioning--its legal authorities, specialized
assets, and operational capabilities--allows it to detect and interdict
illicit drug activity beyond our Nation's border. Operating in source
and transit zones, between ports of entry, in coastal waters, and
interior waterways, AMO protects the United States against criminal
drug smuggling networks, including Mexican cartels, seeking to exploit
our maritime domain and approaches, among other threats.
State of the Maritime Border
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) continue to escalate
their efforts to infiltrate our borders and flooding American
communities with illegal and deadly drugs. These criminal organizations
operate with immense capability, capacity, and nearly unlimited
resources. Their illegal drug production operations are sophisticated,
and they continually adjust their tactics, techniques, and routes to
circumvent detection and interdiction by law enforcement.
Illicit activity in the maritime environment is a threat to U.S.
border security. The maritime domain is generally less restricted than
the air and land environments and connects to more than 95,000 miles of
U.S. shoreline. Thousands of vessels enter or operate in U.S.
territorial waters every day. While the vast majority operate for
recreation or legitimate commerce, some engage in smuggling and other
illegal activity. Detecting illegal activity and apprehending any
associated smuggling can be challenging, as many smuggling crafts hide
in plain sight amongst legitimate traffic, while others transit remote
areas far offshore to try to elude detection. Additionally, smugglers
use a variety of crafts tailored to the area and amount of contraband
they are smuggling to best evade detection, including modified fishing
boats, go-fast vessels, pangas, low profile vessels, and semi-
submersibles. Vessels are much faster than they were twenty years ago,
often leaving law enforcement little time to interdict them before
reaching our shores.
AMO continues to encounter increased risk and violence in the
course of its role in intercepting smugglers in the maritime
environment. Since its establishment, AMO has used disabling fire on
the engines of fleeing smuggler vessels nearly 350 times. Additionally,
in November 2022, three AMO Marine Interdiction Agents were shot, with
one tragically being killed during a vessel stop with smugglers off the
coast of Puerto Rico.\2\ Precise engagement and rapid neutralization of
risk is key to safely resolving water-based law enforcement actions.
AMO continually refines its maritime interdiction capabilities and
tactics to meet ever evolving threats.
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\2\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/speeches-and-statements/cbp-
marine-interdiction-agent-dies-line-duty-near-puerto-rico
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AMO's Maritime Counternarcotics Operations
AMO remains at the forefront of the Nation's efforts to combat
maritime drug smuggling and continues to intercept tons of dangerous
illicit drugs every year, keeping them from reaching our shores and
communities. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, AMO enforcement efforts led to
the seizure of 233,662 pounds of drugs.\3\ Approximately 76 percent of
these seizures occurred in the maritime environment, with AMO
enforcement actions leading to the seizure of 162,269 pounds of
cocaine, 15,113 pounds of marijuana, and 172 pounds of methamphetamine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics/
air-and-marine-operations-statistics
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Maritime Enforcement Authorities
Despite AMO's unique cross-domain law enforcement capabilities, in
the maritime environment, with few exceptions,\4\ AMO's maritime law
enforcement authority \5\ is generally limited to areas within the
historical ``customs waters'' \6\--or 12 nautical miles from the
coastline--of the United States. This geographic constraint challenges
AMO's ability to effectively counter current and evolving modern
threats and situations. Specifically, as modern technology continues to
change and expand rapidly, the performance and speed of maritime
vessels improves, including those used to violate U.S. law or evade
U.S. law enforcement, the 12 nautical mile limit no longer provides
responding law enforcement with sufficient time to interdict such
vessels. This affects our ability to decide how and where to conduct
engagement with suspect vessels, often preventing AMO's interdiction of
vessels in time to prevent their escape, placing our law enforcement
capability at a significant disadvantage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ In certain circumstances, AMO is authorized to operate on the
high seas, for instance when enforcing laws on U.S. registered vessels
(19 C.F.R. Sec. 162.3), hovering vessels (19 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(k); 19
U.S.C. Sec. 1587(a)), and vessels subject to hot pursuit (19 U.S.C.
Sec. 1581(d)). Additionally, beyond the customs waters, AMO may enforce
the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. Sec. 70501-70502),
where appropriate.
\5\ See, e.g. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1581, 1587, 1589a.
\6\ 19 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1401(j), 1709(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP continues to work with Congress on legislative changes to
extend the customs waters from 12 nautical miles to 24 nautical miles
consistent with Presidential Proclamation 7219. This extension of law
enforcement authorities would enable AMO to more effectively enforce
U.S. laws at sea as well as increasing presence further from shore
where we have saved lives at sea.
AMO is committed to its maritime security mission and continues to
make investments in its highly trained agents, vessels, aircraft, and
technological capabilities to advance the effectiveness of its
operations. These investments support AMO's ongoing ability to
effectively respond to illegal drug activity in the maritime
environment, but also contribute to other AMO enforcement actions,
including those that led to over 1,000 arrests and the seizure of 1,500
weapons and $12.6 million in U.S. currency in FY 2024.
Interdiction Assets, Capabilities, and Technology
In support of its maritime border security mission, AMO deploys a
fleet of high-speed Coastal Interceptor Vessels engineered for rapid
pursuit and interdiction of non-compliant vessels. These vessels are
crewed by highly trained agents authorized to use all necessary force,
including warning shots and disabling fire to stop fleeing vessels.
In addition to our maritime interdiction efforts with our marine
interceptors on the water, we also contribute a significant amount of
air assets to these operations. AMO's fleet of maritime patrol aircraft
are functionally designed and outfitted for maritime detection and
surveillance. The P-3s and DHC-8 aircraft provide long range, high-
endurance capabilities in remote source and transit zones while the
Super King Air 350 Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft (MEA) further expand
aerial surveillance, closing detection and enforcement gaps in the
Caribbean. Equipped with advanced sensors, communications, and radar
systems, these aircraft are credited with the interdiction of 150,380
pounds of cocaine and 11,670 flight hours within the Western Hemisphere
Transit Zones in FY 2024, which equated to 13 pounds of narcotics
interdicted per flight hour.
The use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in the maritime
environment has also increased AMO's ability to effectively identify,
detect, monitor, and track conveyances involved in illegal activity. In
partnership with DHS's Science and Technology Directorate, AMO modified
two MQ-9s to BigWing variants, significantly increasing fuel capacity
and flight endurance. In addition to the added operational reach, these
Big Wing aircraft have the added ability to surveil surface targets
much longer while awaiting interdiction surface forces to arrive. AMO
has been employing UAS in the maritime environment since 2020,
contributing to the seizure of over 81,000 pounds of cocaine and 46,000
pounds of marijuana.
AMO is heavily invested in a variety of ground-based radars and
sensors increasing maritime domain awareness along our littoral
borders. We've taken tethered aero stats traditionally used for air
detection only and integrated maritime surface radars. These have
illuminated maritime approaches around Puerto Rico, South Texas into
the Gulf, and the Florida Straits with future sites planned for
Southern California. Other tower and ground-based radar systems have
provided additional radar detection around Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin
Islands, South Florida, and the Great Lakes. Over the last three years,
these systems have contributed to the seizure of over 17,200 pounds of
cocaine, 15,600 pounds of fish from illicit fishing practices, and $2
million in U.S. currency.
Advanced technology, including the BigPipe real-time video system
and the Minotaur mission integration system, link AMO's tactical
assets, aircraft, and vessels, thereby providing AMO with a streamlined
and efficient information collecting and sharing capability. The Air
and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) simultaneously tracks, processes,
and integrates multiple sensor feeds and sources of information to
provide comprehensive domain awareness in support of CBP's border
security mission. Artificial intelligence and machine learning
initiatives at AMO are improving threat detection efforts by processing
vast amounts of surveillance data in real time. AMO will continue to
modernize its fleet and sensor systems to enhance its data analysis
capabilities and operational performance in diverse marine environments
and increase its ability to adapt to the challenges of securing the
maritime border and approaches to the United States.
Operational Coordination
AMO leverages its capabilities in the maritime environment by
forging effective operational partnerships with USCG, the United States
Navy, and a variety of federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign
partners. AMO works closely with DHS Joint Task Force East (JTF-E) and
is one of the largest contributors of flight hours to Joint Interagency
Task Force South (JIATF-S) supporting counternarcotics operations in
the vast 42 million square mile source and transit zones spanning the
Pacific, Atlantic, and Caribbean areas of operation. Frequent
cooperation with foreign partners is imperative, and over the last few
years we've increased focus on the Eastern Caribbean and strengthened
partnerships with the foreign countries and island nations throughout
the Lesser Antilles, thus creating a force multiplier of surveillance
and interdiction assets throughout the Southern approaches to Puerto
Rico.
Conclusion
AMO's efforts are a cornerstone of CBP's border security mission,
its capabilities crucial for intercepting contraband and disrupting
illicit activity before it reaches our shores.
Since its creation in 2006, AMO has evolved into a key component of
the Homeland Security enterprise and one of the largest civilian
aviation and maritime law enforcement aviation and maritime forces in
the world. As a critical component of CBP, AMO remains fully engaged in
safeguarding the Nation by anticipating and confronting security
threats through aviation and maritime law enforcement, innovative
capabilities, and partnerships at the border and beyond. This mission
is achieved by monitoring thousands of miles of air, maritime, and land
borders around the clock; defending the United States against terrorist
threats; detecting and deterring illicit trafficking of persons, drugs,
weapons, money, and other goods; and disrupting criminal networks.
Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
I look forward to answering your questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Miller.
Ms. Kelly, I want to come to you with my first question. I
am looking forward to introducing a bill that would reauthorize
HIDTA at an increased funding level, and in Tennessee I have
heard from so many of our law enforcement personnel how
important this is.
I want you just to speak for about 30 seconds what would
happen if we did not have this?
Ms. Kelly. Thank you so much, Senator Blackburn, for your
support and for the question.
I think what we have heard persistently from in particular
our state and local partners is that the HIDTA program is
essential for the coordination of Federal, state, local task
forces.
We heard from the first panel how important it is for the
Federal Government to engage with the partners, the 18,000
sheriff's departments, and police departments across the Nation
who otherwise, without the framework and the structure of the
HIDTA program may not be equipped to share information freely
to coordinate on these cases and to make sure that we have a
holistic whole scope of government response to dismantling the
criminal networks that are trafficking fentanyl from the
Southwest border all the way through the interior of the United
States into every state and territory across the country.
Senator Blackburn. I appreciate that you all talked about
our borders and what is coming in in shipping containers from
China and the--what we are seeing in our ports but in Tennessee
we have got the Mississippi River and the port in Memphis.
And what I would like to hear from you is what we can do,
how your agencies are working on these inland rivers, and I
know the FBI put a memo out warning of increased China
influence on the Mississippi River.
So, Mr. Miller, I am going to start with you and just go
down the line. I would like to hear what you all are doing when
it comes to our inland waterways.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator.
So AMO has marine units in the Gulf. I would say the
biggest impact in terms of our inland waterways is the support
that we provide to state and local agencies in the area to
include task forces.
We provide aerial surveillance with flight enforcement
helicopters with specific capabilities to track narcotics
smugglers or any kind of trafficking that state and local
agencies are working and we provide greater officer safety
during buy bust operations or high-risk warrant operations.
Senator Blackburn. OK. Admiral?
Rear Admiral Chamie. Good afternoon, Senator.
Ma'am, we work across the interagency with all our partners
throughout Homeland, also state, local, Federal and tribal to
get after a lot of these problems. The Coast Guard is a multi-
mission service, so many of the same crew members who might be
doing a search and rescue case one moment could be boarding a
vessel that is coming in potentially with illegal narcotics.
The ability to shift between missions is a critical
capability of the Coast Guard and that is fed by intelligence.
The Coast Guard is a member of the intelligence community
and we work across the IC to help put our cutters and crews in
places where we know the worst problems will be so that we can
effectively respond.
Senator Blackburn. Ms. Kelly?
Ms. Kelly. I appreciate that my co-panelists have both
mentioned information sharing. HIDTA, as you know, is a key
framework for sharing information from our Federal partners
down through our state and locals who, in many instances, are
the ones actually enforcing the drug laws, particularly in some
of our more rural and remote areas.
Senator Blackburn. Rear Admiral, I would like to come to
you on this. I think it is helpful that President Trump has
identified the cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, and
so as we look at dealing with these cartels is there any
further authority that the Coast Guard needs in order to
apprehend and to work in this process with the IC?
Rear Admiral Chamie. Good afternoon, Senator.
I am very appreciative that the President has designated
these cartels as terrorist organizations. I think that sends a
message that we as a government are deadly serious and are
bringing all of our assets and resources to bear to get after
this problem.
I would be happy to answer the question for the record with
a list of additional authorities that we might be able to use
to get at that.
Senator Blackburn. That would be very helpful. That is the
kind of information we need.
My time has expired. Senator Cantwell, you are recognized.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to
the second group of panel witnesses who have been on the front
lines of fighting this. Very much appreciate your being here
today.
I wanted to start with you, Director Kelly, just in
comments about the legislation that we introduced last year you
were supportive of that, which I appreciate.
But this whole area of how to build capacity at attacking
the transportation networks we heard from Spokane Chief Hall
about why this worked and why it does work, right, in the sense
of the transportation networks beyond the border.
What do you think? You think that you can easily grow that
capacity within your organization. Is that right? The support
for our legislation, which requires a stop fentanyl smuggling
transportation network strategy?
Ms. Kelly. Thank you so much for the question, Ranking
Member Cantwell.
And we share your keen interest in ensuring that all
modalities of our transportation network are secure. That has
been a particular challenge in the past and we have focused
increasing efforts on ensuring that we are hitting all points
through our partners at the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and
securing our parcel systems, also attacking transportation on
rail, via air, both passenger and cargo.
We share your interest as well in a fentanyl strategy.
Certainly at the Office of National Drug Control Policy
biannually we prepare the National Drug Control Strategy and
our next one will be due in 2026.
But we certainly appreciate the focus that a fentanyl
strategy would bring and we are happy to engage with our
partners at the National Security Council and lead that effort.
Senator Cantwell. But once we had that in your authority
you could plug this into the current system and then just
leverage this extra local law enforcement effort to go after
these transportation networks?
Ms. Kelly. I think we would have to build out a complete
plan for this, but certainly that--using the existing framework
would make great sense.
Senator Cantwell. Great. I just wanted to clarify that
because I feel like you were already somewhat there. But this
is about growing the capacity to target these transportation
modes.
And did you want to comment anything about the technology--
the vapor, how important a breakthrough that could be?
Ms. Kelly. Absolutely. I think we are very interested in
ensuring that we are using leading-edge technology when and
where possible.
I would also mention, though, that we want to make sure
that we maintain robust support for all dimensions of
interdiction, which would include ensuring that we have
manpower who are trained appropriately, who are good, well
equipped at detecting suspicious behavior when they pull
someone over as part of a roadside interdiction, making sure
that we are also funding canines.
This is a much more basic, foundational effort but in some
places we are still hearing from state and local agencies that
they do not have resources like that.
So I think we do want to hit it on all fronts with both the
high-tech solutions but also the more nuts and bolts solutions
as well.
Senator Cantwell. Yes. You are not going to find a bigger
supporter of the canines than myself. I just--talking to Sea-
Tac they were, like, people walk in, they see the canines, and
they turn around and leave. It is a deterrent in and of itself.
But the noninvasive technology issue is just a way to say
to the bus stations, to the airports, to everybody, we are
going to catch you and hopefully, you know, help us in that
effort.
I wanted to ask Mr. Miller about CBP's use of safe boats,
their organization in our state, but apparently those--that
structure works well.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Ranking Member Cantwell.
Yes, absolutely. The safe boats that we have, and I have
visited the--where they make them for us in Bremerton multiple
times.
So we have two varieties. We have a center console version
that we refer to as our coastal interceptor vessel. It is 40
feet. It is custom designed specifically for our needs. And
then we have a closed cabin version called the all-weather
interceptor that is--that we use in more of our cold weather
locations.
Both of them have been game changers in our fleet. We used
to--you know, legacy customs we used go-fast vessels that we
basically turned into law enforcement vessels.
But these are the first ones that are custom tailored for
law enforcement.
Senator Cantwell. But these are helping us on our waterways
detect the smuggling on our waterways?
Mr. Miller. Absolutely. Absolutely.
They are--we have recently repowered them. We are doing
other modifications to make them safer for our agents during
high-risk pursuits and boardings.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
And I will have something for the record for the Rear
Admiral to talk about on that, but very much support the Coast
Guard, increasing capacity for them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Budd [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Admiral, you mentioned in your testimony that the Coast
Guard is using small unmanned aircraft as part of the combined
force package for drug interdiction.
Could you tell me what sort of unmanned vehicles the Coast
Guard is deploying in its drug interdiction mission and are
there any other UAS platforms that the Coast Guard is looking
to deploy but not currently using?
Rear Admiral Chamie. Good afternoon, Senator.
So I do not use the term game changer a lot but when we
started employing the ScanEagle unmanned aircraft on the
national security cutters it did change the game for us.
The way that we pursue drug smugglers on the high seas is
with a package of a cutter with a helicopter that can shoot out
the engines and then a maritime patrol aircraft that is
overhead to find them and then cue the cutter to get after that
with its small boat.
When you have an unmanned aircraft and you can launch that
from the flight deck of the cutter and put that up there then
you do not have to rely on scarce, long-range aircraft from
either CBP or Coast Guard or other agencies. So it is, indeed,
a game changer.
Senator Budd. Is that fuel or is that electric or what type
of propulsion?
Rear Admiral Chamie. Sir, I would have to get to the actual
specs on it.
Senator Budd. Yes. No worries.
I will continue with you, Admiral. The Aviation Logistics
Center at Elizabeth City, North Carolina, my home state, is the
central hub of the Coast Guard's aviation program.
In addition to conducting heavy maintenance on the existing
fleet the ALC is also instrumental in the fleet's transition to
both the C-130J and the MH-60. As the Coast Guard expands its
drug and alien migrant interdiction measures, are there
additional needs in the Coast Guard aviation fleet or at the
ALC specifically that this committee should be thinking of?
Rear Admiral Chamie. Yes, Senator, and thank you for your
support of the Aviation Logistics Center. The work that they
are doing there to missionize new aircraft and then to do the
depot maintenance on our 60 aircraft to get them up and flying
for longer as part of their service life extension program is
absolutely critical to the organization.
Sir, the bigger answer is we need more aircraft. We are
constrained by the resources that we have, both the fixed wing
like the C-130Js and, moving forward, we are going to need to
figure out a way to get more rotary aircraft to deploy on both
our cutters to get after drug smugglers and also for shore-
based missions.
We need to raise our top line. Sir, we have been saying for
a while now that we are a $20 billion Coast Guard on a $12
billion budget, and those sort of top line increases will help
us get after aviation and everything else that we need.
Senator Budd. Thank you very much.
Mr. Miller, your testimony mentions a November 2022
incident in which three Air and Marine Operations--marine were
interdiction agents were shot, one tragically being killed.
You also reported that AMO enforcement resulted in the
seizure of more than 1,500 weapons in Fiscal Year 2024. Does
your office have any record as to how often AMO agents are
subjected to incoming fire while carrying out their missions?
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator.
Yes, the event in 2022 when Mike was killed was tragic and
a game changer for Air Marine Operations. We have seen an
increase in violence in noncompliant boardings and we have
changed our training significantly.
We have outfitted--I mentioned we have outfitted our
vessels differently with different safety equipment and
armament. We have also equipped our agents differently as well.
So I think you will see the most capable air marine agents
to date.
Senator Budd. Thank you very much.
Continue on. Mr. Kelly [sic], your testimony mentions your
work with the interdiction committee to continue drug
interdiction efforts across the Federal Government.
The DOD has several members on the interdiction committee
but do you think more direct engagement from the DOD along the
southern border would be helpful in stopping the flow of
illegal immigration and illicit drugs, particularly now that
President Trump has designated many of the cartels as foreign
terrorist organizations?
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator.
We work very closely with DOD right now, NORTHCOM, JTF-
North, and we are coordinating with them currently on any kind
of additional force lay down that may come to the Southwest
border, and we welcome any assistance in that effort.
Senator Budd. Thank you very much.
Senator Kim, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDY KIM,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Kim. Thank you.
I appreciate all of you coming on out and talking with us.
Director Kelly, I think I would like to start with you. You
know, I think all of us here recognize we want to have a
comprehensive approach to this. You know, that includes some of
these efforts, go after the cartels on immigration.
But there was also a statistic that I come across, and I
guess I just wanted to ask you if this was correct. I saw a
statistic that came across saying that U.S. citizens made up 80
percent of individuals with fentanyl seized at ports of entry
and I wanted to just ask you, does that sound correct to you,
roughly?
Ms. Kelly. I would certainly defer to our partners at DHS
which would be the source of that statistic. But yes, it sounds
generally correct.
Senator Kim. I guess I wanted to ask and, you know, to
whatever extent you know, Mr. Miller, you want to jump in as
well. But do we have an understanding of who these Americans
are, you know, in terms of affiliation with, you know, criminal
operations or other things of that nature?
Mr. Miller, I want to just check with you if you have
thoughts here.
Mr. Miller. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
So I would definitely say that the cartels are running all
the narcotics operations on the Southwest border and then they
will utilize anyone that they can support.
Senator Kim. So they are recruiting Americans to help this
get across the border. Is that what you believe is happening?
Mr. Miller. I have no doubt of that, Senator.
Senator Kim. OK. I am just thinking through this in terms
of just what are the different ways we can sort of disrupt this
operation and kind of engage and understand, you know, how that
recruitment might be occurring--you know, other types of ways
in which we can engage.
Director Kelly, you know, you talked about the leading edge
tech that is a component of that and you also mentioned a
number of other aspects that are important when it comes to
interdiction.
But on the leading edge tech, I guess I wanted to just ask
you, you know, as I am trying to explain to, you know, the
people in New Jersey what way we should be putting our
priorities.
You know, I have certainly heard a lot about scanning
technologies but what are the other types of technology that is
proven to be best practices and where are we at in terms of
scaling that to the level that we would need?
Ms. Kelly. Thank you so much, Senator Kim, for the
question.
I think we have two dimensions that we have to consider in
responding to that. Part of it is developing the technology and
the other part is making sure that it can be deployed to all of
the partners that we need.
We recognize that we are relying in large part here on the
work of our 18,000 sheriffs' offices and police departments
across the country, and so for them this leading edge tech even
if we have it may never be within reach.
So we have to be thinking about what makes sense in terms
of broad scale investment and then how much of that can be
actually in the hands of state and local officers.
So on the first point, I think I would defer to our experts
here from the actual border--from CBP, who I know leads a lot
of the technological development for the Southwest border and
also for the maritime space.
What I think we might want to be thinking about when we are
talking about state and local deployment, though, may be sort
of second generation technology where we are thinking about
handheld scanners, we are thinking about ensuring that they are
trained so that they can properly question drivers in roadside
stops so that they are not taking the personal risk--you know,
if you are thinking about state patrol officers, about pulling
over a tractor trailer with a hidden compartment and thinking
about delaying the schedule of commerce in the United States.
So I think it is a broad range, depending on whether you
are talking about the Federal investment directly or whether we
are talking about something that is deployable to state and
locals.
Senator Kim. And I appreciated earlier that you also just
raised the importance of just ensuring that we have enough
canine investment as well.
So, you know, I think so often here in Congress we get
caught up on just the tech but remembering that it is the
manpower as well as, you know, some of these other types of
tools.
Mr. Miller, I just wanted to turn it over to you if you
have anything further here. Just help us understand, like, you
know, where should we be when it comes to this leading edge
tech and where do you think we are at right now? I want to just
understand your understanding of the delta.
Mr. Miller. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
As the assistant director mentioned, at the ports of entry
technology is vital for sure. I would say in between the ports
of entry I think any kind of technology that assists in domain
awareness is critical, whether that is our use of radars,
aerostats, cameras, our use of artificial intelligence or
machine learning.
Another critical gap that CBP has that we are working
through and trying to catch up with is the counter UAS threat.
So, you know, there is--that is a threat along the border.
That is a threat to our agents, whether it is surveillance of
our operations from the south side of the border, flying
contraband in small loads across the border.
We have seen what the cartels do to each other using small
drones, dropping explosives, and then, of course, with AMO
collision of risk with aircraft.
So, you know, legacy Customs radars along the border were
historically meant to detect general aviation aircraft and
ultra lights, and not a meter or less size targets operating
extremely low or slow.
So we are catching up with that technology, deploying tools
that can detect and mitigate this new emerging threat.
Senator Kim. Thank you. I yield back.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Senator Kim.
Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Budd.
Ms. Kelly, I think a key step in addressing the illicit
drug threat is ensuring the existing programs within the
government are working.
As you know, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas
program known as HIDTA is a cornerstone of how we combat
regional drug trafficking throughout the United States, and I
have seen firsthand in my state of Nebraska, especially for law
enforcement in rural areas with fewer local resources, how
important this is.
For example, HIDTA is the primary resource for the winged
task force that covers 11 of our Panhandle counties. Through
HIDTA the task force has developed a uniquely cooperative
investigative program which is helping western Nebraska law
enforcement more actively manage narcotic and criminal
investigations.
In your view, how would you evaluate HIDTA's effectiveness
nationwide?
Ms. Kelly. Thank you so much, Senator Fischer, for your
support and for the question.
Nationwide we are extremely proud of the work that HIDTAs
are doing. One of the things that we often tout is that for
every dollar invested in the HIDTA program the rate of return
is $63 which is a pretty phenomenal testament to the success of
the program overall.
In 2023 HIDTAs collectively disrupted or dismantled more
than 3,000 drug trafficking organizations or money laundering
organizations, and collectively they seized more than 2,000
metric tons of drugs, which I think also completes the
narrative here.
Often when we are talking about drug interdiction we have a
tendency to focus on the ports of entry and at the borders,
which is critical to our overall success.
But we often like to point to the work of the HIDTAs
interdicting drugs within the interior of the United States and
I think the success rate there is phenomenal as well.
Senator Fischer. What challenges do you see or that you
possibly anticipate in the future in meeting your goals that
you have out there?
Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Senator, for asking that question.
We do face myriad challenges. In some communities the focus
on drug trafficking is often subordinate to other threats,
which is certainly a challenge in terms of making sure that
there are state and local resources to put on HIDTA task
forces.
I would also say fatigue is a huge element for us and I
think it is why the focus on border security and interdiction
at the ports of entry and at the borders is key because I think
we are asking an awful lot of our state and local task force
officers when they are being asked to interdict drugs that did
evade the borders and when they are being asked to investigate
the types of networks that are directly linked to cartels.
That is a huge challenge. It is a training challenge and it
is a resource challenge for all of our task forces.
Senator Fischer. You know, you brought up the border and,
obviously, that southern border is a major disruption zone. In
years past we have struggled with all the different agencies
out there using different intel, using different maps, whether
it is DEA or FBI or CBP or the Department of Defense as well.
I think we have to have a shared map government wide, a
shared map to identify the threats that we have. In your
testimony you noted efforts by the Drug Enforcement
Administration to map out this data comprehensively.
Can you speak about that further, please?
Ms. Kelly. Thank you so much for that question, Senator
Fischer.
I agree. I think we all agree that a common operating
picture is imperative, and a big challenge for us too is making
sure that we are in a place where we can share information
freely from the IC all the way down to our state and local
partners.
This is where we really rely on the work of our Federal
agencies to be the bridge so that, as you say, the map--the
common operating picture can be not just conceived but then
communicated from top to bottom.
Senator Fischer. And how do we achieve that?
Ms. Kelly. How we achieve that is a work in progress. It
is--I will not lie, it is a challenge. It is a challenge both
in terms of the security levels but it is also a challenge in
terms of culture and promoting information sharing.
We are talking about people who are accustomed to building
trust with each other as people to share information and
sometimes when we are working cross-community like that we have
to figure out not just one bridge but multiple ways to bridge
that gap.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Senator Budd.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Lujan.
STATEMENT OF HON. BEN RAY LUJAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Lujan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Fentanyl is devastating communities across the country and
stopping it at the border is critical. Advanced technology is
one of our strongest tools in this fight.
Most fentanyl enters land--the United States through land
ports of entry, which is why I have advocated for getting 100
percent screening using nonintrusive inspection technology,
NII.
Now, NII has helped CBP intercept massive amounts of
fentanyl in cargo and vehicles, over 200,000 pounds in the last
3 years.
While I know it is outside the jurisdiction of this
committee we need to further invest in these technologies to
save lives, strengthen border security and ensure law
enforcement has the tools they need to fight the fentanyl
crisis.
Now, Mr. Miller, your testimony states that the Air and
Maritime Operations, AMO, has integrated artificial
intelligence into its systems to help detect illicit activity
but that cartels appear to still be exploiting gaps in our
enforcement capabilities to evade detection and find ways to
move fentanyl through our waters.
AI has the potential to revolutionize interdiction by
identifying smuggling patterns and improving real-time threat
detection.
What is AMO doing to fully leverage AI and next-generation
technology to stop traffickers before drugs reach our
communities?
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator.
Yes. So AI has changed the game when you are--for example,
if you are--some of our radars when they are tracking targets
in the maritime approaches some of the areas that are more
remote just a mere presence in an area is suspicious.
Other areas such as the Florida straits, especially
approaches going into Miami or Fort Lauderdale where you have
such a high concentration of recreational vessels you need to
have something else to assist in filtering nefarious from
recreational, and that is where we use AI machine learning,
building algorithms that can identify patterns to point out or
at least lessen the clutter of the sheer volumes of targets on
the radar.
Senator Lujan. And what partnerships exist between CBP and
entities like DEA, FBI, and DOD to enhance intelligence sharing
and leverage advanced detection to technologies already
deployed?
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator.
Yes. Like Assistant Director Kelly mentioned, I think--I do
not think we have ever had a better common operational picture
with the partners with the capabilities that we have.
We have our Air Marine Operations center, for example, in
Riverside, California that can ingest all of the radar feeds or
individual camera feeds or even pictures that agents are taking
on their cameras, and then share that with a community where
you literally have a single pane of glass of partners working
together.
Senator Lujan. Just last year the commander for the U.S.
Northern Command told another Senate committee that as many as
1,000 unmanned drones cross the U.S. southern border every
month.
As I mentioned earlier, DEA data also indicates that most
shipments of fentanyl come across the border through land ports
of entry.
Yes or no, is the threat coming from the air and our land
ports of entry?
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator.
You know, as was mentioned earlier, we really do not know
because we are catching such a small percentage. I will tell
you that the vast majority of seizures are coming through the
land ports. We have not seen fentanyl being smuggled in drone
crossings along the border but that certainly does not mean
that it is not happening.
Senator Lujan. Do you know what percentage of vehicles--
passenger vehicles are screened that enter the United States
through the southern border?
Mr. Miller. Senator, I do not. I would defer to my partners
with the office field operations.
Senator Lujan. I appreciate that.
I can submit that a little bit later. I know that it is not
100 percent and I do not even think it is 50 percent. Back in
2008-2009 it was, like, 5 percent or something, some
ridiculously small number.
So if 90 percent of the fentanyl that the U.S. is
interdicting at the southern border is being done in passenger
vehicles entering the United States and we still randomly look
at cars and we are still screening a very small percentage of
them, again, 100 percent screening of inbound and outbound
passenger vehicles and, I would argue, cargo.
And I would point to the water ports as well--that there is
much more we could be doing with modernizing water ports of
entry. I am reminded of a report that came out from the
Department of Homeland Security, I believe, under both
President Trump's first term and President Biden's term as well
that suggested that there were precursor chemicals that were
being intercepted--stolen--after they would get on land--off
the ship, on land, and then they would be taken to the
screening facility.
Between the water port and the screening facility they were
getting stolen and then they were being driven to Mexico and
they were coming back to the United States with fentanyl. How
in the world is that happening?
Hundred percent screening. Stopping what is happening in
these cargo containers I believe will make a big difference.
Now, I have several other questions. My time has already
run out here. I will submit them into the record. I appreciate
this important hearing and I certainly hope that there is some
ways that we can get some of this adopted into good policy and
get it funded and make sure you have the tools you need.
Thank you for the time, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you, and thank you, all of you,
for your work. I have been going back and forth between
Agriculture and Judiciary but I wanted to be here at least for
the tail end of this because we have had a lot of issues with
fentanyl in our state.
I have worked a lot on the social media side of it with a
number of other senators to try to cut down on that. As we
know, a lot of kids especially are purchasing pills that way
but we also stop--need to stop these illicit drugs and fake
pills from entering our borders in the first place. I thank you
for your work.
Director Kelly, your written testimony referenced the
government's efforts to combat fentanyl trafficking through the
mail including the 3,800 pounds of fentanyl seized by the
Postal Inspection Service.
I lead bipartisan legislation known as the STOP Act 2.0
which builds on the original STOP Act that Senator Portman and
I did that was enacted by President Trump in 2018.
Can I count on ONDCP's support as we work to build on
legislation to crack down on fentanyl through the mail?
Ms. Kelly. Senator Klobuchar, thank you so much for the
question.
We absolutely agree that stopping the flow of fentanyl
through the U.S. mail is key and we rely heavily on our
partners from the U.S. Postal Inspection Service to do that
work.
And we would also add that fentanyl flow through express
consignment carriers, private industry partners like UPS,
FedEx, and DHL is equally key.
Senator Klobuchar. Very good. Also, I just want to note I
know that Senator Blackburn asked you about the HIDTA program
and it is very important in our state to our counter narcotics
efforts. So I appreciate that.
I used to be a prosecutor and know--coordination how
important it is. So I wanted to add to that.
Rear Admiral, I know that Coast Guard plays a major role
here and we love the Coast Guard in Minnesota. We especially
love ice breakers up on Lake Superior.
But could you talk about what you would need in terms of
Coast Guard cutters to bring down the cocaine that we are
getting in?
Rear Admiral Chamie. Good afternoon, Senator.
Yes, ma'am. In short, we need more of them. We are
currently building new offshore patrol cutters. We are
finishing up the program for the fast response cutters. We are
still running our older ships.
Ten years ago I was a commanding officer of a cutter that
was almost 50 years old then and we are still operating it
today.
We have trouble getting parts for those ships and when we
have a scheduled maintenance period like a dry dock we do not
even have the funding to be able to take that ship and make
sure it can continue to operate.
I mentioned in my opener we had a ship with a hole in the
side of it with water rushing in last week and that ship was
built in the 1980s. So we are running these old ships----
Senator Klobuchar. You mean, like, when Cabbage Patch dolls
and Walkmen were popular with everyone?
Rear Admiral Chamie. Yes, ma'am. I remember that.
And yes, ma'am, those are the ships that we are using and
we need new ships and new aircraft to replace those so we can
get after today's threats.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you.
Could you talk about how working cooperatively with our
allies strengthens American law enforcement and national
security interests?
I just always think I am not going to go out to some of the
issues we are having right now with our allies but I think
people do not realize sometimes the law enforcement
coordination that goes on. Could you talk about that?
Rear Admiral Chamie. Yes, Senator.
I think people probably do not realize that right now we
have a Dutch ship patrolling in the Caribbean with a U.S. Coast
Guard law enforcement detachment on board and just in the last
2 weeks they have had two drug interdictions of cocaine, and we
are able to prosecute those cases because we had a U.S. law
enforcement detachment make that interdiction.
So the U.S. attorney will take the case. We can hold those
people accountable but more importantly we can get the
intelligence from that case, use that to feed the intel cycle,
and then figure out how to dismantle the cartels because of it.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Very good. I am going to end a
little early in deference to my colleagues.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Klobuchar. So thank you.
Senator Budd. Senator Rosen, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chair Budd, and thank you,
Senator Klobuchar, for giving me a little bit more of your
time.
Anyway, thank you to our witnesses for being here today. It
is a really important hearing, and I want to talk about the
impact of the current administration's actions on your ability
to do your job.
So, Ms. Kelly, I do not need to tell you or any other
members of this committee how vital the work that you do at
HIDTA, or I am going to just say what we usually call it,
HIDTA--how important that program is.
In Nevada, we have two High Intensity Drug Trafficking
Areas, and according to the Southern Nevada Health District
between 2022--2020 excuse me--and 2023 the number of fentanyl
overdoses among residents of Clark County, our state's largest
county, increased by 97 percent. That is why programs like
HIDTA are needed now more than ever, and I have strongly
supported their annual appropriation.
Unfortunately, according to several reports and lawsuits
filed by state attorneys generals, both the OMB hiring freeze
and the subsequent pausing and reallocation of resources have
impacted funding for the HIDTA program.
So, Ms. Kelly, can you talk about how these actions have
impacted the work that you do, your ability to stop the drugs
from coming?
Are you currently receiving the necessary support and
funding to carry out your crucial work?
Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Senator Rosen, for the question, and
especially for your support for the HIDTA program. We deeply
appreciate it.
Happily for us, the funding freeze that our grant program
was subject to was fairly short lived. It was rescinded within
about 4 hours. So we were in a position that we had to pause
but it was a very brief pause and we are happy that the HIDTAs
are back and running as usual.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I am going to move on.
I know Senator Klobuchar talked a little bit about
international cooperation--of course, Minnesota on the Canadian
border there.
But I want to talk about SOUTHCOM because I sit on Armed
Services Committee and in our hearing with SOUTHCOM Commander
Richardson the general spoke about our Armed Forces' success in
detecting and seizing maritime drug shipments, including the
importance of working with partner nations to increase our drug
seizures.
So, Admiral Chamie, how can we work together and leverage
our international partners, not just with Canada, but to
improve the detection of precursor chemicals and allowing us to
shift our interdiction efforts earlier in the fentanyl
production process? How can we best equip the Coast Guard to do
that?
Rear Admiral Chamie. Good afternoon, Senator.
So with SOUTHCOM they have a component command in Florida
and Key West called the Joint Interagency Task Force South and
it performs the DOD's detection and monitoring function.
Basically, helps get the intel and tells Coast Guard and
other allied partners where we should be patrolling and where
we can focus.
Under the Indo-Pacific region the INDOPACOM has a component
for the Joint Interagency Task Force West. They do similar
functions over there to focus on the larger ships that might be
bringing fentanyl precursors into the United States and in fact
just not too long ago they worked and had an interdiction of a
commercial vessel bringing precursors--fentanyl precursors--
into Mexico and they were able to work with Mexico to seize
those precursors when they entered port.
Those type of international relationships and working with
both components for INDOPACOM and SOUTHCOM are critical to us.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate your work there.
In the last minute or so I have left I want to talk a
little bit about our borders and the nonintrusive scanners that
we can use because last year during a hearing on DHS Fiscal
Year 2025 budget it was mentioned how critical it was for
funding to be included for the installation of the new
nonintrusive scanner technologies like the low energy portal,
LEP, scanning systems that stop the flow of fentanyl into the
United States through land ports of entries, which is, of
course, I think some of the most common ways that fentanyl are
smuggled across the border into our country.
It was also discussed at the time that a number of high-
tech scanners that have been provided to CBP officers to
identify and stop fentanyl were sitting unused in warehouses.
So, Mr. Miller, are similar scanners being used at maritime
ports of entry? If so, are they operational? If not, is there a
way for us to adapt this technology and use every tool in the
toolbox to stop these deadly drugs from coming in, and tell us
what you might need, please.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator.
I would defer that to the experts that use that technology
in Customs and Border Protection and the Office of Field
Operations.
I will tell you that is--that nonintrusive inspection
technology is part of the multi-layered enforcement strategy at
our borders and to include our ports.
The X-ray, gamma ray, and other kind of sensing
technologies is invaluable in discovering smuggled items. They
also have mobile systems as well that they will bring along to
some of the MSSEs that we participate and provide security with
as well--Super Bowls, events in the NCR, et cetera.
Senator Rosen. Thank you.
I think it is really important that we use all of these,
and then I would just want to add that when we do think about
adding these new technologies we need to add improved Wi-Fi,
different kinds of space. Make sure that all the surrounding
infrastructure is there for these capabilities.
So thank you for allowing me to go over my time, Senator.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
And, again, I thank each of you all as part of the panel
today.
You know, Mr. Miller in our dialog earlier we used acronyms
like AMO and incidents, and you referred to Mike having lost
his life. So, again, we are thankful for him, for his service,
and we are thankful to his family as well.
This is a dangerous business you all are in and we are
grateful for each and every one of you.
Senators will have until close of business on Wednesday,
March 5 to submit questions for the record. The witnesses will
have until the end of the day on Wednesday, March 19 to respond
to those questions.
This concludes today's hearing. The Committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:18 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Shannon Kelly
Question 1. As the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, you are
responsible for coordinating interagency efforts to interdict illicit
drugs from entering the United States. What are some of the ways you
work with the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and
other ``boots on the ground'' enforcement agencies to combat illicit
drug trafficking?
Answer. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) U.S.
Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) plays a crucial role in synchronizing
efforts among agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) to combat illicit drug trafficking. The
USIC's collaborative efforts include the following:
Expert Policy Advisor for the President: As designated by
the Director of Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP),
the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) advises the White
House on executive policy that facilitates communication and
cooperation among Federal agencies involved in drug
interdiction, including the Coast Guard and CBP. This ensures
that resources and intelligence are shared effectively to
maximize both interdictions and criminal investigations that
degrade drug trafficking organizations.
Strategic Planning: The USIC authors applicable portions of
the National Drug Control Strategy; national border strategies
for the Southwest, Northern, and Caribbean Borders; and the
National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP). These
documents guide the operational activities of the interdiction
community, including the Coast Guard and CBP.
Interagency Coordination: Working within the framework of
The Interdiction Committee (TIC), the U.S. Interdiction
Coordinator (USIC) oversees government-wide efforts to
integrate intelligence, detection, monitoring, and law
enforcement to maximize the impact of U.S. and partner
interdiction efforts. Consisting of the senior executive
leadership from its 28 member organizations, The Interdiction
Committee (TIC) serves as an empowered and collaborative
interagency problem-solving body that resolves issues related
to the coordination, oversight, and integration of
international, border, and domestic drug interdiction efforts.
Budget oversight: The U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC)
helps align the drug enforcement agencies' efforts with overall
national interdiction priorities. The U.S. Interdiction
Coordinator (USIC) reviews the National Drug Control Budget for
19 Federal departments and agencies to ensure that they have
the necessary resources and support to carry out their
interdiction functions efficiently and effectively, and in
accordance with the President's priorities. When needed, the
U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) works to help resolve
issues that arise during the coordination of interdiction
efforts.
Question 2. What is the impact of the interagency working together
to address drug trafficking? What results are we seeing from this
``whole-of-government'' approach?
Answer. The ``whole-of-government'' approach to combating drug
trafficking has a significant impact on drug supply. This collaborative
approach among federal, state, local, Tribal, territorial, and
international partners create a multi-layered defense against drug
trafficking, addressing it from multiple angles. Data regarding
seizures of drugs like fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine highlight
the results of these interagency efforts. Beyond drug interdiction, the
investigative successes of task forces that integrate federal, state,
local, Tribal and territorial law enforcement are key to dismantling
criminal networks that produce and traffic illegal drugs. While
progress is being made, drug production and trafficking remain a
complex and evolving challenge as new drug types and smuggling methods
continuously evolve. Regular adaptation and uninterrupted collaboration
are essential to maintaining and improving the effectiveness of the
whole-of-government approach. Impacts and results of the whole of
government approach include the following:
Enhanced Intelligence Sharing: Interagency collaboration
facilitates the pooling of intelligence from various sources,
leading to a more comprehensive understanding of drug
trafficking networks. This allows for more targeted and
effective interdiction efforts. Information sharing is vital at
all levels of interagency cooperation, with two examples being
the Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
Special Operations Division, and the High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) Investigative Support Centers.
Increased Interdiction Effectiveness: By coordinating
resources and operations, agencies like the Coast Guard, CBP,
DEA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Homeland
Security Investigations (HSI) can disrupt drug trafficking at
multiple points, from source to distribution. This results in
significant seizures of illicit drugs. An example of this is
the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South), which
synthesizes intelligence and operational assets to maximize the
ability to interdict United States-bound drugs in international
waters.
Dismantling Criminal Networks: Task forces like the
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) and HIDTA
initiatives focus on dismantling entire drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs), rather than just seizing individual drug
shipments. This has a more long-term impact on reducing the
flow of drugs.
Financial Disruption: Agencies like the Treasury Department
work to disrupt the financial networks that support drug
trafficking, targeting money laundering, and other financial
crimes.
Improved International Cooperation: Interagency
collaboration extends to international partnerships, allowing
for coordinated efforts to combat drug trafficking across
borders.
Question 3. A critical aspect of the High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas Program is assistance to federal, state, local, and
tribal law enforcement entities. What work is the HIDTA program doing
in the West Texas, South Texas, Houston and Texoma HIDTAs to disrupt
the market for illegal drugs?
Answer. The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Programs
in West Texas, South Texas, Houston, and Texoma play a critical role in
disrupting the illegal drug market by leveraging multi-agency task
forces, intelligence-driven operations, and robust information sharing.
Each High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) tailors its approach
to regional threats, focusing on interdiction, financial disruption,
training, and overdose prevention to dismantle DTOs and disrupt the
market for illicit drugs. All of these regional High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) HIDTAs employ data-driven investigations,
enforcement, and interagency collaboration to combat drug trafficking,
removing billions of dollars in illegal drugs and assets from criminal
organizations.
West Texas HIDTA: West Texas HIDTA encompasses 520 miles of the
United States' border with Mexico and combats drug trafficking along
major smuggling corridors. It collaborates with 13 federal, four state,
15 local, and one Tribal agency to target DTOs transporting fentanyl,
methamphetamine, and cocaine into, and throughout the United States.
Examples of success include the following:\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Accomplishments for each of the HIDTAs are from program year
2023, the most complete dataset currently available. Data for program
year 2024 will be available later this Spring.
disrupted/dismantled 50 drug trafficking/money laundering
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
organizations, 29 of which were international;
seized 74 kilograms of fentanyl, 1,717 kilograms of
methamphetamine, and 971 kilograms of cocaine; and
seized cash and other assets valued at $2.3 million.
South Texas HIDTA: South Texas HIDTA addresses cross-border
smuggling networks, leveraging 244 agency partnerships to combat DTOs
and money laundering organizations (MLOs). It also leverages
intelligence sharing, local prevention efforts, and training to aid
collaboration and address the needs of partner agencies and local
communities. Examples of success include the following:
disrupted/dismantled 108 drug trafficking/money laundering
organizations, 64 of which were international;
seized 82 kilograms of fentanyl, 7,936.8 kilograms of
methamphetamine, and 5,306.2 kilograms of cocaine; and
seized cash and other assets valued at $30.9 million.
Houston HIDTA: Situated in a national trafficking hub, the Houston
HIDTA targets DTOs involved in drug distribution, weapons trafficking,
and gang-related violence. The HIDTA supports a range of enforcement
initiatives, including the HIDTA License Plate Reader (LPR) Platform.
Examples of success include the following:
disrupted/dismantled 127 drug trafficking/money laundering
organizations, 60 of which were international;
seized 86.5 kilograms of fentanyl, 8,512 kilograms of
methamphetamine, and 2,519 kilograms of cocaine; and
seized cash and other assets valued at $39.5 million.
Texoma HIDTA: Texoma HIDTA spans North Texas and Oklahoma,
combating DTOs and MLOs through 28 task forces and financial crime
investigations. The HIDTA plays a key role in inland seizures, overdose
reductions, and training. Examples of success include the following:
disrupted/dismantled 74 drug trafficking/money laundering
organizations, 21 of which were international;
seized 147.1 kilograms of fentanyl, 2,221.5 kilograms of
methamphetamine, and 432.5 kilograms of cocaine; and
seized cash and other assets valued at $16.2 million.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to
Shannon Kelly
Question 1. Alaska's lack of infrastructure and remote communities
make interdiction efforts more challenging. What specific steps is
HIDTA taking to disrupt drug trafficking in isolated areas where law
enforcement presence is limited?
Answer. The Alaska HIDTA is addressing the state's remote geography
and limited infrastructure by employing intelligence-driven operations,
targeted interdiction, and enhanced coordination. Through these
efforts, HIDTA is effectively disrupting DTOs despite Alaska's
logistical challenges, reducing drug flow into the state's most
vulnerable areas. Key initiatives include the following:
Targeted Task Forces in Remote Areas: HIDTA supports
multiple task forces, including Southeast Alaska Cities Against
Drugs Task Force (SEACAD) in Juneau, Fairbanks Area-wide
Narcotics Task Force (FANT) in Fairbanks, and Southcentral
Area-wide Narcotics Task Force (SCAN) covering Anchorage,
Wasilla, Kenai, and Kodiak, which focus on trafficking routes
in isolated regions.
Intelligence-Driven Enforcement: The Alaska HIDTA
Intelligence Support Center (ISC), co-located with the state's
fusion center, provides real-time analysis and deconfliction,
allowing law enforcement to effectively track and dismantle
DTOs, even in remote areas.
Air and Marine Interdiction: HIDTA partners with Federal and
local agencies to monitor trafficking via air travel and marine
routes, increasing surveillance and investigations at the Ted
Stevens Anchorage International Airport and addressing
vulnerabilities in the Alaska Marine Highway System (to include
maritime traffic).
Disrupting Financial Networks: Given Alaska's high drug
prices, DTOs profit significantly from trafficking. HIDTA
targets their money laundering operations to disrupt financial
incentives.
Fentanyl-Specific Efforts: With fentanyl as Alaska's primary
drug threat, HIDTA-supported task forces seized 18 kilograms of
fentanyl and nearly 600,000 fentanyl pills in 2023, focusing on
stopping synthetic opioids from reaching rural areas.
Local Law Enforcement Support: HIDTA funds training and
intelligence-sharing for law enforcement in isolated
communities, strengthening their ability to detect and
intercept illicit shipments.
Question 2. What more needs to be done to help combat this issue?
Specifically, how can HIDTA better bring together local law enforcement
agencies and non-governmental organizations to deter, detect, and
interdict the movement of illegal narcotics in Alaska through the air
and postal systems?
Answer. The Alaska HIDTA serves as a primary coordinator of
federal, state, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies
in the state of Alaska to deter, detect, and interdict illicit
narcotics. Because interstate and local drug trafficking organizations
(DTOs) primarily transport illicit drugs into the region through
parcels and commercial air carriers, the HIDTA has targeted
initiatives, such as Southcentral Areawide Narcotics (SCAN) Task Force,
to conduct passenger and parcel interdiction operations at the Ted
Stevens Anchorage International Airport. The Alaska HIDTA also ensures
information is shared across all levels of law enforcement through its
multiagency Investigative Support Center (ISC). The HIDTA has
identified a need for continued monitoring and intelligence gather to
identify connections between DTOs operating in the region and
international criminal organizations, including Mexican cartels. This
will require continuing close collaboration with law enforcement
partners at all levels in Alaska and the contiguous United States as
well as ensuring Federal partners, such as the U.S. Postal Inspection
Service, are equipped with the necessary investigative tools to address
the unique challenges related to illicit smuggling via international
and domestic parcels.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to
Shannon Kelly
Question 1. Ms. Kelly, you mentioned in your opening statement that
while we are facing the worst narcotics crisis in our history there is
a silver lining in the C-D-C's latest data showing a provisional
decrease of 23.7 percent in overdose deaths from September 2023 to
September 2024. What detection and seizure factors do you think are
responsible for this positive development?
Answer. The United States protects its borders through a
combination of intelligence, law enforcement, technology, and
infrastructure. This multi-layered system includes diplomatic work with
countries that produce or act as transshipment points for illegal
drugs, detection of traffickers approaching the borders, infrastructure
along the borders and at ports of entry, and through a robust system of
cooperating law enforcement agencies within the United States. All of
this is underpinned by intelligence capabilities and professionals who
support all phases of border protection. Key to our investment is the
United States' incredible workforce of selfless men and women who put
their lives on the line to keep America safe. The United States'
interdiction forces reduce the drug supply, having multiple impacts to
the country's citizens. First, drug interdiction removes dangerous
drugs from the supply chain, preventing countless lethal doses of these
drugs from being available for Americans to use. Moreover,
interdictions provide the basis of investigations of dangerous criminal
gangs and international drug producers, allowing the United States to
degrade and eliminate the networks that threaten the general public.
At the border, CBP employs a layered approach that includes
sophisticated targeting based on advance cargo and traveler data,
canine units, x-ray and other detection devices, including frontline
officers and agents. ONDCP defers to CBP on the specifics of their
programs, on non-invasive or intrusive scanners at ports of entry, to
increase scanning capabilities. CBP collaborates with industry and
other government components on enhanced technologies and is continually
scouting new technologies based on the capability gaps identified in
the respective environments.
In addition, within the United States, there are more than 18,000
police departments that enforce infractions of drug laws. Programs such
as HIDTA and OCDETF bring these entities together to work across
jurisdictions so law enforcement can organize their efforts to degrade
and destroy the most dangerous criminal networks.
Question 2. Ms. Kelly, technology plays a major role in our efforts
to effectively intercept narcotics. You mentioned that AI could be a
useful tool going forward. Is the Office of National Drug Control
Policy using AI already or is it actively looking into ways to use AI?
Answer. Development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools is
imperative to overcome the challenges in disrupting the supply chain
and interdiction of narcotics like fentanyl and other synthetic
opioids. Not only will AI assist our laboratories and scientists in
predicting the next chemical formulations of synthetics, which
facilitates awareness of precursor chemicals to watch out for, it will
significantly advance targeting analytics for high-risk cargo and
travelers and create efficiencies in supply chains by reducing
unnecessary inspections. While ONDCP defers to CBP on the specifics of
their program, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2023, CBP initiated efforts to test
AI with non-intrusive inspections production data to determine its
effectiveness with NII image adjudication at the border, and testing of
the AI algorithms is on-going.
Across CBP the operational use of AI is transforming the agency
into a data-driven organization. CBP recognizes the importance of
leveraging cutting-edge technologies, such as AI and Machine Learning
(ML) to impact multiple mission areas, including the following:
combing through data to find anomalies/items of interest in
all data types;
creating efficiencies and reducing redundancies in multiple
work areas; and
automating routine tasks performed by our personnel which
allows them to focus their critical thinking skills on the
important enforcement aspects of our mission.
Currently CBP's Office of Information and Technology (OIT) has
implemented the enterprise AI Machine Learning Center of Excellence to
lead strategic transformation, tactical mission operations excellence
and innovation with data for CBP's daily mission in multiple use cases,
while seeking to establish commensurate governance and ethical
oversight approaches in this new, powerful technology.
Another example of AI implementation is the HSI Innovation Lab,
which combines innovative technology, agile development, and industry
leading design principles to reimagine HSI's current process and
enhance investigative capabilities across the agency. One such
capability developed by the Innovation Lab is the Repository of
Analytics in a Virtualized Environment (RAVEN). RAVEN is a cloud-based
tool that facilitates large, complex analytical projects to support
HSI's mission including counter-TCO and counterdrug investigations. At
its core, RAVEN enables HSI to analyze trends and isolate criminal
patterns. HSI's use of AI through the RAVEN platform significantly
enhances its ability to process, analyze, and act on vast amounts of
data, thereby improving the efficiency and effectiveness of its
criminal investigations, including those targeting narcotics
trafficking.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Rear Adm. Adam Chamie
Question 1. Senators Cantwell, Sullivan, Baldwin, and I worked hard
on the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025, which would fix the gaps
in the Coast Guard's authority to prosecute smugglers using remotely
operated drug subs like the one we had in the hearing room. Please
provide a summary view, from the Coast Guard's perspective, of the
importance of the referenced 2025 CGAA provision for degrading
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and for holding drug
smugglers accountable?
Answer. This provision would make an important change to enable the
prosecution of smugglers attempting to smuggle drugs on vessels subject
to United States jurisdiction regardless of whether the vessels are
manned. This change supports the increased targeting of transnational
criminal organizations and their evolving employment of new
technologies to circumvent existing laws and is critical to the Coast
Guard's ability to control the U.S. borders and maritime approaches and
enforcing Federal laws.
Question 2. Is there anything else that is limiting your ability to
catch and prosecute drug smuggling criminals?
Answer. The Coast Guard thanks the Committee for its support and
inclusion of section 241 ``Controlled Substances Onboard Vessels'' in
the Senate's ``Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025.'' The Coast Guard
will continue to evaluate additional authorities to enhance its drug
interdiction mission and will provide any such proposals as part of its
annual authorization request.
Question 3. Maritime drug trafficking in the Middle East, including
drugs trafficked on fishing dhows, has been used to finance Iran's
malign activities. If the Coast Guard discovers illegal narcotics
aboard a vessel in this region, what happens to the narcotics and the
crew attempting to traffic them?
Answer. The Coast Guard conducts maritime operations across the
Middle East for U.S. Naval Forces Central Command under Department of
Defense Title 10 authorities. When illegal narcotics are discovered by
Coast Guard units in this region, the drugs are seized and destroyed at
sea. The crew attempting to traffic these drugs are typically released.
Due to the lack of bilateral agreements with the claimed Flag state or
lack of communication with certain nations, establishing jurisdiction
over the people and vessels require lengthy diplomatic engagement that
would hinder other U.S. Department of Defense-directed operations.
Question 4. Is it fair to say these would-be drug traffickers face
no other punishment than having their drugs seized?
Answer. There have been instances when drug traffickers in this
region have been detained by the Coast Guard for further transfer to
U.S. authorities ashore. However, it is accurate to state that
traffickers encountered in this region generally do not face punishment
or prosecution from the United States other than the seizure of their
illicit cargo.
Question 5. The Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2025 Congressional
Justification states failure to achieve counterdrug performance
measures was due in part to the Coast Guard's major cutters, patrol
boats, and aircraft providing ``primary support to Migrant Interdiction
Operations (MIO),'' rather than the counterdrug (CD) mission. How did
the increase in illegal immigration in the last few years impact your
ability to stop the drug flows elsewhere?
Answer. Coast Guard surface asset reassignment to the alien
interdiction mission in District Seven to support Operation Vigilant
Sentry detracted 133 major cutter days from Joint Interagency Task
Force South during Fiscal Year 2024. In Fiscal Year 2023, Coast Guard
surface asset and maritime patrol aircraft reassignment to Operation
Vigilant Sentry detracted 432 major cutter days, 772 patrol boat days,
and 404 maritime patrol aircraft hours from Joint Interagency Task
Force South.
Question 6. In 2024, the Coast Guard interdicted over 300 thousand
pounds of cocaine and other controlled substances, taking over 3
billion dollars' worth of drugs off our streets. What are the Coast
Guard's drug interdiction results so far in 2025, and how does that
pace compare to historical interdiction rates?
Answer. As of March 12, 2025, the Coast Guard has removed 114.5
metric tons of cocaine. The Coast Guard is on pace to remove
approximately 150 metric tons of cocaine, pending resource availability
and competing mission demands for the remainder of the Fiscal Year.
While the Coast Guard's estimate is significantly higher than cocaine
removals in Fiscal Year 2023 and Fiscal Year 2024, 150 metric tons of
cocaine removed would be considered an average year when comparing
historical drug interdiction rates over the last decade.
Question 7. President Trump has issued several Executive Orders
related to securing our borders, taking on cartels, and protecting the
American people. What actions has the Coast Guard taken in response to
President Trump's directives?
Answer. In response to President Trump's Executive Orders, the
Coast Guard took immediate action to increase its presence along the
southern border, where the President declared a national emergency, to
bolster its ability to control, secure, and defend the U.S. border and
its maritime approaches. Working in close coordination with the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Defense,
Coast Guard assets and law enforcement personnel are conducting regular
patrols of the U.S. border and maritime approaches, focusing on the
interdiction of illegal aliens and illicit narcotics attempting to be
smuggled into the U.S. via the maritime domain. Additionally, the Coast
Guard swiftly repatriates illegal aliens interdicted at sea to their
country of origin and provides dedicated aircraft to assist other
Departments and components in the removal of aliens who have entered or
remained in the U.S. in violation of Federal law.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger Wicker to
Rear Adm. Adam Chamie
Question 1. The Coast Guard has suffered from a continuous lack of
resources for infrastructure and equipment sustainment and
modernization. This forces the Coast Guard to make investment trades
that fail to provide the service adequate capabilities to conduct its
critical drug interdiction missions. The Coast Guard had to reduce the
safe operational limit of the MH-60 helicopter fleet, resulting in the
grounding of eight of its helicopters; the service intends to divest
its C-27J airplanes due to structural fatigue; and its MH-65 helicopter
fleet is now more than 40 years old, well beyond its intended
operational life.
With the Coast Guard's drug interdiction mission becoming ever more
critical and readiness declines in both the fixed-wing and rotary-wing
aviation fleets, does the Coast Guard have the aviation assets required
to fulfill its drug interdiction missions?
Answer. The Coast Guard does not have the requisite aviation assets
to fulfill the drug and alien migrant interdiction mission and needs
congressional support for continued recapitalization of both the MH-60
and the HC-130 fleets. The Service requires an increase in the number
and availability of these multi-mission air assets to execute
counterdrug operations more effectively while also meeting other
mission demands. More assets in the Transit Zone would allow the
Service to target and interdict more traffickers.
Question 2. Given the decades old, and depleted rotary-wing fleet
shortages, and an unscheduled reduction in fixed-wing assets, how does
the Coast Guard plan to recapitalize its aviation fleets to meet the
critical needs of its missions?
Answer. With the unprecedented support of the President and the
continued support of this Committee, the Coast Guard will accelerate
aviation recapitalization with annual appropriations and any resources
provided through reconciliation. This includes extending the service
life of the existing MH-60 fleet, growing both our rotary and fixed
wing fleets, and investing in new capabilities like Unmanned Aerial
Systems.
Question 3. Congress has continually highlighted the Coast Guard
needs a comprehensive strategy to address aviation fleet challenges and
recapitalization. To that end, Congress required a GAO study and a
follow-on Coast Guard aviation strategy in the FY23 Coast Guard
reauthorization.
When should we expect to see a Coast Guard aviation strategy?
Answer. As required by the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2022,
the Service is planning to brief Congress in April 2025.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to
Rear Adm. Adam Chamie
Question 1. Stopping drugs while they are moving in bulk is much
easier than intercepting them at or between ports of entry. How do you
work with partners to stop drugs while they are bound for the United
States in vessels?
Answer. The Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for maritime law
enforcement, including drug interdiction on the high seas; we share the
lead for drug interdiction in U.S. territorial seas with U.S. Customs
and Border Protection. A global threat such as illicit narcotics
trafficking requires the collaboration of a network of like-minded
partners. The Coast Guard works closely with domestic and international
partners to detect, interdict, and disrupt drug shipments before they
reach the U.S. As a key member of the Joint Interagency Task Force
South, the Coast Guard works in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement
Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of
Defense, and other Federal agencies to share intelligence, monitor drug
trafficking routes, and coordinate interdictions. The Coast Guard also
deploys our Tactical Law Enforcement Teams to U.S. Navy and allied
naval forces, including the UK Royal Navy, Royal Canadian Navy, and
Dutch Navy, to conduct boardings from these naval forces onto suspected
drug smuggling vessels. The Coast Guard coordinates with the Department
of Justice and foreign legal authorities to prosecute criminals and
dismantle transnational drug networks. As of March 12, 2025, the Coast
Guard has removed 114.4 metric tons of cocaine in Fiscal Year 2025 and
has supported the efforts of our domestic and international partners,
resulting in the removal of much more. We are proud to lead maritime
counterdrug efforts around the world and with Congressional support to
accelerate the acquisition of new capabilities we will do so even more
effectively.
Question 2. Are there additional tools we could give you so that
operations in the source and transit zones would be more effective?
Answer. The best way to bolster the Coast Guard's counter-drug
capacity is to support the growth of our Service and our ongoing fleet
recapitalization and modernization efforts. This includes increasing
our military workforce by at least 15,000 members, recapitalizing our
surface and aviation assets, increasing unmanned systems capabilities,
and investing in advanced sensors and technologies that provide our
boarding teams with a tactical edge against our adversaries.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Jonathan Miller
Question 1. (U) In the Don Young Coast Guard Authorization Act of
2022, I secured a Tactical Maritime Surveillance System at Coast Guard
Station South Padre Island. During my last visit to South Padre Island,
I saw firsthand how this tool is being used to help secure our borders.
How is CBP employing Tactical Maritime Surveillance Systems to combat
drug runners, fish poachers, and human traffickers?
Answer. (FOUO//LES) The Tactical Maritime Surveillance System,
callsign ``Argos,'' is an aerostat-borne surveillance system deployed
at priority U.S. maritime border locations where high numbers of drug
runners, fish poachers, and migrant smugglers (some of whom may be
human traffickers) are observed. While the Argos system can carry a
variety of sensors, the Texas site, specifically, incorporates a
maritime surface search radar, a long-range day-night camera, and an
encrypted Automatic Identification System receiver. The radar can
detect typical illicit vessels at ranges of 50-60 nautical miles and
the camera provides visual identification out to 25 miles.
(FOUO//LES) U.S Customs and Border Protection Air and Marine
Operations, sends all Argos sensor information from the aerostat to the
Air and Marine Operations Center in Riverside, California. Two major
activities occur at the Air and Marine Operations Center: 1) Detection
Enforcement Officers ``sort'' through the identified maritime and land-
based traffic in real-time, identify suspicious or illicit activity
underway, alert local Federal partners of the activity, and provide
updated target information (location, speed, heading, etc.) to
responding law enforcement units, as requested; and 2) all Argos sensor
information is processed and transported through the Minotaur mission
management system, where the information is merged and correlated with
other local domain awareness feeds and returned to U.S. Customs and
Border Protection and U.S. Coast Guard Minotaur users, providing an
unprecedented operational display of nearly all law enforcement assets
and suspect threats in the region. This information is shared with all
designated Federal command and control centers. As illicit activities
and actors change in the region, Air and Marine Operations intends to
modify technologies on the Argos platform to combat future threats.
Question 2. (U) CBP and the Coast Guard work closely to detect and
interdict drug trafficking in the Eastern Pacific Ocean and the
Caribbean. What role do CBP maritime patrol aircraft play in those
counter-drug missions, and how do these aviation assets increase the
Coast Guard's ability to detect and interdict vessels?
Answer. (FOUO//LES) U.S. Customs and Border Protection maritime
patrol aircraft provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities that detect, track, and identify targets of interest
throughout the maritime environment. Targets of interest range from go-
fast vessels to self-propelled semi-submersible vessels to aircraft.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's maritime patrol aircraft are
equipped with technologically advanced sensors operated by highly
trained and experienced agents and officers. The role of U.S. Customs
and Border Protection's maritime patrol aircraft's in drug interdiction
operations with our Coast Guard partners is to provide them with
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and real
time information to increase the Coast Guard's domain awareness while
on patrol so that their law enforcement teams can interdict vessels
suspected of trafficking drugs and increase the situational awareness
of the law enforcement teams during interdiction events.
Question 3. (U) The cartels use a wide range of methods to smuggle
illicit drugs into the United States, such as drug submarines. What
tactics is CBP AMO using to address these new threat vectors for drug
smuggling?
Answer. (FOUO//LES) U.S. Customs and Border Protection Air and
Marine Operations manned and unmanned aircraft systems maritime patrol
aircraft utilize different patrol patterns and specific sensor settings
to maximize the detection of semi-submersible and surface narcotics-
trafficking vessels. U.S. Customs and Border Protection manned and
unmanned assets have sensor upgrades planned that will improve
detection of maritime targets. Additionally, the future integration of
proliferated low-earth orbit satellite connectivity will allow for
greater unmanned aircraft systems maritime patrol area as well as
improved information sharing capabilities in critical sections of the
Eastern Pacific Ocean transit zone that are not covered by traditional
geostationary satellite communications networks. This change has the
potential to significantly increase the range and flexibility of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Coast Guard interdiction assets.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger Wicker to
Jonathan Miller
Question 1. (U) To conduct counter-drug operations and border
patrol missions, CBP currently flies a fleet of around 100 helicopters
as part of its Light Enforcement Platform (LEP) program. Over the past
eight years, CBP has replaced about a third of the aging LEP fleet with
new, modern, and technologically enhanced helicopters, however, the
replacement progress has not come quickly enough for the scale of the
border crisis and CBP's needs.
Please outline how continuing this investment is critical to CBP's
drug interdiction mission.
Answer. (FOUO//LES) U.S. Customs and Border Protection Air and
Marine Operations relies on its Light Enforcement Platform as its
primary workhorse in its mission to secure the Homeland while executing
counter-drug operations across the United States and border enforcement
missions on our borders with Canada and Mexico. As such, these aircraft
are based at nearly every Air and Marine Operations facility and over
half of Air and Marine Operation's 95,000 annual flight hours are flown
by crews in the Light Enforcement Platform which is comprised of 91
aircraft with 5 variants of the Airbus Helicopters ASTAR model. The
aging portion of this platform in our fleet has been hampering the full
potential of Air and Marine Operations to more effectively execute
missions, as compared to a revitalized fleet comprised with newer more
technologically advanced platforms by a very large margin. Over two-
thirds of the Light Enforcement Platform fleet has become outmoded both
in mission technologies and in reliability. Air and Marine Operations
has had to remove six Light Enforcement Platform aircraft from service
over the last Fiscal Year due to component availability and increased
cost of parts. The oldest platforms have accumulated high flight times
and, due to scheduled and unscheduled maintenance requirements, have
limited operational availability (e.g., the B2 model (oldest) is
operationally functional 40 percent of the time,\1\ the B3 model (next
oldest) is operationally functional 52 percent of the time,\2\ and the
2B1 and B3E models are is operationally functional 54 percent of the
time.\3\) This is in direct contrast to the new H125 model delivering
about 74 percent readiness rates.\4\ Because of their chronic
unavailability, these aging platforms, some of which are the oldest in
operation worldwide, do not meet the needs or expectations of our
Nation and proves the need for a long-overdue Light Enforcement
Platform fleet revitalization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Average of Material Availability for AS350 B2 in Fiscal Year
2023, Fiscal Year 2024, and Fiscal Year 2025
\2\ Average of Material Availability for AS350 B3 in Fiscal Year
2023, Fiscal Year 2024, and Fiscal Year 2025
\3\ Average of Material Availability for AS350 2B1 and B3E in
Fiscal Year 2023, Fiscal Year 2024, and Fiscal Year 2025
\4\ Average of Material Availability for H125 in Fiscal Year 2023,
Fiscal Year 2024, and Fiscal Year 2025
Question 1a. (U) Given the mission requirements, will CBP budget
for a faster fleet replacement in its FY26 budget and beyond?
Answer. (FOUO//LES) The Fiscal Year 2024 Consolidated
Appropriations Act funded three Light Enforcement Platform aircraft,
while the Fiscal Year 2025 President's Budget requested two and a
flight training device. Fiscal constraints limit U.S. Customs and
Border Protection's ability to replace these aircraft at a faster rate
due to competing operational requirements.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to
Jonathan Miller
Question 1. (U) Mr. Miller, I understand that at our maritime ports
Customs and Border Patrol is only able to inspect less than 5 percent
of containers coming in on cargo vessels. This percentage is alarmingly
low given the amount of drugs being smuggled into our country.
(U) How are containers selected for screening, and do we need to
inspect more containers?
Answer. (FOUO//LES) The National Threat Analysis Division within
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Trade utilizes both
automated, computer-based targeting and manual targeting. Automated
targeting leverages specialized computer programs that are integrated
with relevant trade enforcement data and sophisticated algorithms built
for identifying container risks. Additionally, data and algorithms help
generate enforcement profiles to support computer targeting that can
place automatic holds on suspect containers. Manual targeting leverages
a variety of methods to identify risk indicators of suspect cargo,
which include but are not limited to reviews of entry documents and
physical examinations based on local shipment data. Knowledge and
experience of the reviewer are critical when identifying shipments to
review, and officers have discretion determining when to carry out a
container inspection. Among other U.S. Customs and Border Protection
programs, the Container Security Initiative serves a notable role in
increasing resilience of the global supply chain. The Container
Security Initiative is a customs-to-customs partnership that addresses
the threat to border security and to global trade posed by the
potential for terrorist use of maritime containers to deliver a weapon.
The Container Security Initiative coordinates targeting and information
sharing regimens to ensure that containers that pose a potential risk
for terrorism are identified and inspected at participating foreign
ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United Sates.
The Container Security Initiative is currently operational at 68
participating seaports in 36 countries, which collectively account for
approximately 67 percent of the containers destined for the United
States. U.S. Customs and Border Protection has foreign-deployed teams
of officers working with their host foreign government counterparts
daily. While their mission is to target and to prescreen containers and
to develop additional investigative leads related to the terrorist
threat of cargo destined for the United States, the program has evolved
to address threats of mutual concern in maritime cargo as well as in
other modes of transportation. These efforts have resulted in seizure
of narcotics, weapons and ammunition, stolen vehicles, Intellectual
Property Rights, cigarette smuggling, Antidumping and Countervailing
Duties, and other violations.
Question 2. (U) Mr. Miller, in the past several years, Congress has
provided sufficient funding for non-intrusive inspection equipment
needed to detect the movement of opioids, methamphetamines, and other
substances moving illicitly through our ports of entry.
(U) Can you tell us why this equipment, when placed in a pre-
primary position, is considered a ``game changer'' for ports-of-entry?
Answer. (FOUO//LES) Screening higher volumes of conveyances at the
Nation's border is critical to the safety of the American public, as
passenger and commercial vehicles remain the primary and secondary
modes Drug Trafficking Organizations use to smuggle narcotics into the
United States, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection continues to see
increases in volumes of narcotics being seized.
(FOUO//LES) U.S. Customs and Border Protection's implementation of
pre-primary Non-Intrusive Inspection allows officers to examine a
greater portion of traffic without impact to primary inspection times.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection has implemented this by placing Non-
Intrusive Inspection systems in lanes before conveyances reach the
primary inspection booths, referred to as pre-primary operations. This
allows a conveyance to be scanned prior to arrival at primary and
transmits the image to a U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer to
review the Non-Intrusive Inspection image. If an anomaly is identified,
the vehicle is directed to secondary inspection for further Non-
Intrusive Inspection or physical examination. This model represents a
change, as historically, Large-Scale systems were primarily utilized in
secondary inspection, which took much longer to complete a scan.
(FOUO//LES) The Non-Intrusive Inspection program will allow U.S.
Customs and Border Protection to establish mechanisms that further
automate the inspection. Automation consists of enabling
interoperability between Non-Intrusive Inspection systems and other
enforcement tools and integration with other inspection technology.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection will also employ artificial
intelligence/machine learning capabilities to aid officers with timely
image analysis which will further streamline the process. Ultimately,
this will provide frontline personnel with tools and information that
enable them to quicky and efficiently identify threats without impeding
traffic flows, ensuring national security while supporting economic
prosperity.
Question 2a. (U) Can you describe the year-by-year plan to put the
recent investment in this technology to use in a smart, efficient way?
When can we expect the technology to be fully deployed?
Answer. (FOUO//LES) U.S. Customs and Border Protection is currently
deploying the new technology procured with appropriated funding in
Fiscal Year 2018 and Fiscal Year 2019, which includes 88 Low-Energy
Portals, 35 Multi-Energy Portals, and 12 High-Energy Rail systems. In
addition to the 135 systems, there are 11 systems that were deployed
through the DHS Science & Technology Directorate in the pilot phase. To
date, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has deployed 64 systems to 27
locations.
Fiscal Year 2021 to Fiscal Year 2022: Deployed 11 systems
Fiscal Year 2023: Deployed 11 systems
Fiscal Year 2024: Deployed 29 systems
Fiscal Year 2025: Deployed 13 systems
In Fiscal Year 2025 and 2026, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection will deploy 51 systems which are currently under
construction or in active construction planning phase
An additional 31 systems require civil works funding to
finalize construction plans
(FOUO//LES) U.S. Customs and Border Protection anticipates that all
procured systems will be deployed by December 2026.
[all]