    [Senate Hearing 119-104]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 119-104

                  EAST AFRICA & THE HORN: AT A TURNING POINT
                               OR BREAKING POINT?

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION
                                   __________

                                  MAY 13, 2025
                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

                    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                      Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
                                    ______

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    60-820 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2025

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
    PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska                JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    DAVID MCCORMICK, Pennsylvania          CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
    STEVE DAINES, Montana                  CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
    BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee                TIM KAINE, Virginia
    JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming                 JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
    MIKE LEE, Utah                         CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
    RAND PAUL, Kentucky                    BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
    TED CRUZ, Texas                        CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
    RICK SCOTT, Florida                    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah                   JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas
           Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
                    Damian Murphy, Staff Director
                       John Dutton, Chief Clerk

                                  (ii)

                             C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                                   ----------
                                                                       Page

    Risch, Hon. James E. U.S. Senator From Idaho.....................     1

    Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire............     3

    Meservey, Joshua, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC     5
        Prepared Statement...........................................     6

    Gavin, Michelle, Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy
      Studies,
      Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY.....................    10
        Prepared Statement...........................................    12

                  Additional Material Submitted for the Record

    Responses of Mr. Joshua Meservey to Questions Submitted by
      Senator
      James E. Risch.................................................    36

    Speech Given at Peking University, Beijing, China by Dr. William
      Ruto, President of the Republic of Kenya, Dated April 23, 2025.    37

    Article From KBC Digital Regarding President William Ruto's Visit
      to China, Dated April 23, 2025.................................    49

                                     (iii)

                      EAST AFRICA & THE HORN: AT A TURNING
                            POINT OR BREAKING POINT?

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MAY 13, 2025

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
    room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.
    Risch presiding.
        Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Ricketts, McCormick,
    Cruz, Cornyn, Shaheen, Coons, Kaine, Booker, Van Hollen, and
    Rosen.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

        The Chairman. The United States Senate Foreign Relations
    Committee will come to order.
        Good morning, everyone. We welcome you all here this
    morning for what we believe to be--will be an important and
    informative hearing. We welcome all of you who are here in the
    audience.
        The rules are pretty clear here. We are glad to have you
    here. There will be no protesting in here other than--and will
    be subject to the usual rules and met with zero tolerance,
    arrest, and banning from the committee.
        There are people suffering from this right now who made
    that mistake early on, but have not been back since. We, like I
    said, enjoy having everybody here, but this is business in the
    United States that needs to be conducted uninterrupted.
        Today, what we bring to you, the distinguished ranking
    member and I have worked hard to identify areas that really
    need to be probed and today we are going to probe, arguably,
    one of the most difficult and frustrating places on the planet
    and that is Africa and specifically eastern Africa.
        All of us here know that the United States has a clear
    national security and economic interest in the east--in East
    Africa and the Horn of Africa region. The region borders key
    maritime trade routes through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and
    hosts a significant U.S. military presence at our base in
    Djibouti.
        The U.S. also conducts robust counterterrorism operations,
    largely, focused on Somalia in partnership with Kenya and
    others in the region, but in recent years, violent conflicts in
    Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia have destabilized the region.
    These conflicts provide fertile ground for violent extremist
    groups like Al-Shabaab, ISIS, and the Houthis.
        They enable malign actors like China, Iran, and Russia and
    devastate local populations and U.S. national security alike.
    Sudan, in particular, is a crisis.
        Too few Americans recognize that as the world's deadliest
    ongoing conflict. The Sudanese people are enduring atrocities
    on a staggering scale--genocide in Darfur, mass displacement,
    and famine across multiple regions.
        Sudan is a hotbed of instability and a direct threat to
    U.S. national security interests. There are no good options or
    easy outcomes, but that only heightens the need for U.S.
    attention and leadership.
        Over the last 4 years, the U.S. reactions to this crisis
    and many others on the continent were fragmented, reactive, and
    ineffective.
        President Trump and this administration have already acted
    to better protect U.S. national security in the region.
        In President Trump's first term, his administration engaged
    in talks with Kenya over a potential free trade agreement, a
    first for sub-Saharan Africa, and now Secretary Rubio and other
    senior officials have ramped up engagement and confronted
    threats from Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State head on.
        These efforts cannot be siloed. They must be part of a
    broad strategic effort to protect American interests in Africa
    while also protecting the U.S. taxpayer's pocketbook. That
    means being clear eyed about our potential and existing
    partners in the region.
        In many cases, these governments are not wholly legitimate,
    which raises the question of whether engagement is worth the
    cost.
        Take, for example, South Sudan. Its government exists based
    on a peace agreement that its signatories routinely violate.
    The U.S. played a central role in the country's creation, a
    legacy that has carried a financial cost well above $10 billion
    in assistance since independence in 2011.
        Yet, the returns on this investment in terms of securing
    sustainable peace and a functional state are marginal at best
    and, arguably, diminishing. Additionally, Ethiopia, Kenya, and
    Uganda each face serious domestic challenges that severely
    limit what U.S. investment can do.
        This fact, unfortunately, demands our restraint. Many
    African nations maintain troubling ties with China including
    key national security partners. Just last month, President Ruto
    declared that Kenya, a major non-NATO ally, and China are co-
    architects of a new world order.
        That is not just alignment to China; it is allegiance. I
    submit for the record the text of that speech. I am going to
    enter it in the record at the conclusion of the hearing that
    describes this.
        Relying on leaders who embrace Beijing so openly is an
    error. It is time to reassess our relationship with Kenya and
    others who forge tight bonds with China.
        It is not just an embracement of China, but also the ``new
    world order.'' Still, there are countries where meaningful
    engagement is possible, but only with sober judgment and clear-
    eyed realism.
        We must stop building U.S. policy in Africa around
    individual leaders and instead focus on strengthening
    institutions, expanding private sector ties, and empowering the
    region's young and dynamic populations.
        We hold this hearing at a moment of profound urgency, but
    also real opportunity. By tailoring our strategy and spending
    to align with the potential of our partners in the region, we
    can build stronger partnerships that serve both Africa and U.S.
    national interests, ultimately making America safer, stronger,
    and more prosperous.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. With
    that, I turn to our distinguished ranking member Senator
    Sheehan.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

        Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Like you, I am delighted that we are able to hold this
    hearing today.
        I want to welcome our witnesses, and I think there is a lot
    of agreement on both sides of the aisle about the importance of
    Africa to the United States and the need to engage more there.
        The United States does have a critical role to play on the
    continent. Just last month Rwanda and the Democratic Republic
    of Congo signed a declaration of principles on ending a brutal
    30-year war.
        It has not quite ended yet. However, it is a positive step
    and it is the result of deliberate diplomatic work that has
    been carried out over many years on a bipartisan basis.
        Unfortunately, this administration's cuts to foreign aid
    programs have been very damaging when we look at what we need
    to do on the continent of Africa.
        While reports from the State Department indicate that
    lifesaving aid continues to flow, what my staff that traveled
    to Africa 3 weeks ago saw on the ground was very different and
    we have some pictures that they took from that trip.
        [Photos shown.]
        Senator Shaheen. This is a clinic that was for an HIV/AIDS
    prevention site for girls in South Africa. Sadly, as you can
    see, it has been closed because all of the prevention
    activities around HIV/AIDS on the continent have been shut
    down.
        This is a photo, also in South Africa, of a clinic for
    vulnerable children, again, around addressing HIV/AIDS. It has
    also been shut down as the result of the stop in foreign
    assistance.
        This final picture is of a hospital in Angola where USAID
    used to provide ready-to-use therapeutic foods to address
    starvation and famine, and while there are still cans--those
    are formula. Those are not the ready-to-use therapeutic foods.
    They are totally out of those.
        I hope our witnesses today will talk about the impact that
    cuts to those lifesaving aid programs have on the security, not
    just of the people of Africa, but of the United States because,
    as we know, what happens there does not stay in Africa.
        We see the impact here in the United States. Rationing HIV
    drugs gives the virus a chance to mutate into drug-resistant
    strains. I also hope you will talk about the competition for
    influence in Africa between the United States and China.
        The chairman mentioned that in his remarks. I think it is
    something that we are seeing, and this is a map that was done
    in 2023 that shows the influence of China in Africa.
        I wish we had the one that we had in the Armed Services
    Committee several years ago that compares China's impact in
    Africa to the United States, because they are eating our lunch
    there and you can see the red is where the PRC has really put a
    focus on the countries in Africa.
        There is--you can see the Chinese base in Djibouti. They
    are--it shows the 2,000 military troops that are deployed in
    Africa by the Chinese and 1,775 peacekeepers that support four
    U.N. peacekeeping operations. Again, Chinese.
        It is significant that we are not competing either
    militarily or diplomatically in Africa and now on the foreign
    assistance front.
        One stark example of this is the Lobito Corridor Project.
    It is a U.S.-backed initiative that we have spent years
    developing and investing in. It would create a route for
    Central Africa's natural resources to flow east out to the
    Atlantic.
        Meanwhile, China has a competing railway project in
    Tanzania that would send these natural resources east out to
    the Indian Ocean. I think I said that wrong--it would send the
    resources west out to the Atlantic.
        It is in our interest and those of the people in the region
    for the United States to come out on top in these situations.
        One piece of legislation that has shown its value time and
    again is the Women, Peace, and Security Act. This is
    legislation that passed with bipartisan support in both houses.
    It was signed into law by President Trump during his first
    term.
        Our armed forces have made great use of it, especially in
    AFRICOM. It gives us a real advantage over our Chinese
    competitors and, sadly, this is a program that Secretary
    Hegseth has decided to discontinue because he claims it is a
    DEI program, which it is not, but where WPS authorities allow
    us to gather intelligence from women and families we can
    counter violent extremism and we can advance our interests and
    deepen economic investment in East Africa and the Horn.
        As you talk about the opportunities in the region, I hope
    you will lay out some of the economic and foreign policy tools
    we can use to achieve success. I look forward to hearing your
    thoughts.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. I appreciate
    that.
        We have two very distinguished witnesses with us today. We
    are going to start by hearing from Mr. Joshua Meservey, who is
    a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute where he focuses on
    great power competition in Africa, African geopolitics, and
    counterterrorism.
        He was previously a research fellow for Africa at the
    Heritage Foundation, worked at the Atlantic Council's Africa
    Center for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and for
    Church World Service in Nairobi, Kenya.
        He is a returned Peace Corps volunteer who served in Zambia
    and extended his service there to work for the U.S. Centers for
    Disease Control and Prevention.
        Mr. Meservey holds a master of arts in law and diplomacy
    from the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and the B.A. in
    history from the Templeton Honors College at Eastern
    University.
        Mr. Meservey, the floor is yours.

    STATEMENT OF JOSHUA MESERVEY, SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE,
                             WASHINGTON, DC

        Mr. Meservey. Thank you.
        Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and members of the
    committee, thank you for the honor of testifying today and for
    your attention to an important region of the world.
        My name is Joshua Meservey. I am a senior fellow at Hudson
    Institute. My views are my own and do not represent an official
    position of Hudson.
        East Africa is important to the prosperity and safety of
    Americans. Because of its natural resources, large populations,
    and fast-growing economies, it has strong potential as a U.S.
    investment destination, a market for American goods, and for
    potential technological breakthroughs.
        The region's strategic importance is inescapable as well.
    It commands an important shipping choke point and lane through
    the Red Sea, which also has a dense concentration of submarine
    cables.
        It abuts Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and Djibouti hosts
    American, Chinese and other military bases. As difficult as it
    already is, the security situation could easily worsen
    including Sudan, a conflict that is sowing instability,
    extracting an immense human toll, and providing opportunities
    for American competitors.
        The region could soon host three devastating wars if
    Ethiopia and Eritrea start fighting and if South Sudan's
    leaders continue their brinksmanship.
        Meanwhile, Somalia's Islamist terrorist group Al-Shabaab is
    retaking territory as the government in Mogadishu remains mired
    in corruption and dysfunction.
        In a bit of good news, for which the Trump administration
    deserves credit, the DRC-Rwanda detente is proceeding, though
    the progress is incomplete and reversible.
        Further instability will heighten the cost to the U.S.
    economy and the dangers to Americans in the region, and make it
    very hard for Washington to seize the opportunities there.
        Additionally, the U.S.' primary geopolitical competitors,
    as well as friendlier but at times still challenging countries,
    are prioritizing the region.
        In Djibouti, China built a military base with a pier
    sufficient to host a Chinese aircraft carrier or nuclear
    submarine.
        By participating in anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of
    Aden, its vessels have gained experience that could be used
    against Taiwan or in the South China Sea.
        Its companies are involved in ports and have built
    important government buildings throughout the region, and
    senior Chinese officials have visited over 100 times since
    1963.
        Russia recently reached an agreement to put a logistics
    center in Port Sudan. This follows naval visits to Eritrea, a
    naval agreement with Ethiopia, and a flurry of high-level
    diplomatic visits between Moscow and East African countries.
        In 2023, Ebrahim Raisi became the first Iranian President
    to visit Africa in over a decade. He visited Uganda and Kenya.
    Tehran normalized relations with Sudan the same year and
    started the process with Somalia last year.
        Iranian weapons are currently helping the south and
    previously helped the Ethiopian Government prevail in the
    Tigray war.
        Other outside powers are important, as well. Qatar, Saudi
    Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE have invested heavily in East
    Africa, made large loans to various countries, and involved
    themselves in different ways in the various conflicts.
        UAE has funneled so much materiel to the Rapid Support
    Forces in Sudan that it is likely the only reason the RSF has
    been able to sustain the operational tempo it has.
        There are many ways for Washington to ensure Americans
    benefit from the opportunities in East Africa while protecting
    against the threats. These include the following.
        First, create an East Africa strategy that is integrated
    into a broader Africa and global strategy. Commercial
    engagement should be at the core of any such strategy. It is
    critical as well to quickly fill the senior Africa-focused
    positions at the State Department and NSC.
        Number two, conduct sober assessments of Washington's
    ability to positively influence democratic growth and proceed
    accordingly.
        For instance, state-building in Somalia is a failed
    experiment, yet Washington has not pivoted from over a decade
    of trying the same thing over and over.
        Three, upgrade Washington's abilities to support African
    government and civic institutions and avoid over-reliance on
    personalities.
        Fourth and finally, develop a country-focused framework.
    Washington should concentrate its finite resources in countries
    that have a baseline level of competence, strategic importance,
    and willingness to work with the U.S.
        The situation in East Africa is difficult, yet vigorous and
    sustained U.S. diplomacy could avert the worst consequences for
    the U.S. and reap demonstrable benefits for Americans.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and I
    look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Meservey follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Mr. Joshua Meservey

        Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and members of the
    committee, thank you for the honor of testifying today, and for your
    attention to an important region of the world.
        My name is Joshua Meservey, and I am a Senior Fellow at Hudson
    Institute. My views are my own and should not be construed as
    representing the official position of Hudson Institute.
             the importance of east africa \1\ to the united states
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ For the purposes of this testimony, the author considers East
    Africa to comprise Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
    Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and
    Uganda.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        East Africa is important to the prosperity and safety of Americans.
    The region has significant reserves of oil, gas, and critical minerals,
    the latter of which could lessen the U.S.'s serious minerals supply
    chain problem. Its economy is fast-expanding--the World Bank estimates
    nearly 6 percent growth this year and next \2\--and it has 6 of
    Africa's 10 most populous countries if including the DRC. Kenya is also
    one of Africa's emerging tech hubs. The region is rich with
    possibilities as a potential market for American goods, for U.S.
    investment, and for potential technological breakthroughs in key
    industries like biotechnology.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ ``The World Bank in Eastern and Southern Africa,'' The World
    Bank, October 21, 2024, https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/
    eastern-and-southern-africa [accessed May 10, 2025].
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The region's extensive coastline spans key shipping routes in the
    Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean. The Houthi attacks on these
    sensitive sea lanes have raised shipping costs globally, including for
    America.\3\ Djibouti has more foreign military bases per square mile
    than any other country, and hosts the U.S.'s and China's only permanent
    African bases. The Red Sea is dense with submarine cables that carry
    vital information around the globe.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ ``President Trump Is Standing Up to Terrorism and Protecting
    International Commerce,'' The White House, March 15, 2025, https://
    www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/03/president-trump-is-standing-up-to-
    terrorism-and-protecting-international-commerce/ [accessed May 10,
    2025].
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The region is also experiencing serious instability with the
    potential for far worse. If some of the grimmer scenarios materialize,
    there will be mass displacement throughout the region and potentially
    into Europe, the Middle East, and beyond, along with a severe human
    toll.
        The world's worst humanitarian crisis already rages in Sudan where
    the genocidal Rapid Support Forces (RSF) battles the Sudanese Armed
    Forces (SAF). The recent UAV attacks by the RSF on Port Sudan have
    escalated the conflict even higher. Buoyed by external actors, both
    sides appear to believe that they can still achieve their goals on the
    battlefield, suggesting there is no end in sight.
        Renewed political violence in South Sudan threatens a return to
    full-scale civil war. To its east, tensions between Eritrea and
    Ethiopia remain high and could trigger a disastrous conflict. None of
    the primary underlying tensions have been resolved. Until they are, the
    situation will remain on a hair trigger.
        In a piece of welcome news, the U.S. recently facilitated a detente
    between DRC and Rwanda on the conflict in eastern DRC. However, the
    progress is incomplete and reversible.
        In Somalia, the Islamist terrorist group al-Shabaab has retaken
    territory as the government in Mogadishu remains mired in corruption
    and dysfunction. Al-Shabaab killed Americans in the region previously
    and maintains the desire and capability to do so again.
        Additionally, the U.S.'s primary geopolitical competitors, as well
    friendlier but at times still challenging countries, are prioritizing
    the region. The following is a sample of the activities of some of the
    outside players active in East Africa:

       In Djibouti, China built its first overseas military base, a
            hardened enclave with a pier sufficient to host a Chinese
            aircraft carrier or nuclear submarine. Since 2008, its vessels
            have participated in anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden.
            After their deployments, the taskforces make port calls to
            countries up and down both coasts of the continent. The
            capabilities the PLA Navy is building will likely be useful in
            any future invasion of Taiwan or for enforcing Beijing's
            expansionist territorial claims in the South China Sea.

        Chinese companies built and/or operate terminals within Djibouti
            port and are involved in 17 ports total in East Africa,
            according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.\4\ Some
            of the largest Chinese-involved infrastructure projects in all
            of Africa are in this region, and Chinese companies have built
            sensitive African government buildings in the area.\5\ Between
            1963 and 2023, Chinese officials holding four of the most
            senior Chinese Government and Communist Party positions
            involved in foreign affairs visited East Africa 101 times.\6\
            All but two East African countries have signed letters
            circulated at the United Nations supporting China's ethnic
            cleansing policies in Xinjiang.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Paul Nantulya, ``Mapping China's Strategic Port Development in
    Africa,'' Africa Center for Strategic Studies, March 10, 2025, https://
    africacenter.org/spotlight/china-port-development-africa/ [accessed May
    10, 2025].
        \5\ Joshua Meservey, ``Government Buildings in Africa Are a Likely
    Vector for Chinese Spying,'' The Heritage Foundation, May 20, 2020,
    https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/government-buildings-africa-are-
    likely-vector-chinese-spying [accessed May 10, 2025].
        \6\ The four ranks are President, Premier, Director of the Office
    of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, and Foreign Minister. Data
    compiled by author from various sources.
        \7\ The two are Rwanda and Seychelles. Burundi, Comoros, Eritrea,
    and South Sudan have signed all 10 of the letters. Data compiled by
    author.

       Russia secured an agreement to build a ``logistical support
            point'' \8\ in Port Sudan after years of trying to secure a
            base in the region. Wagner mercenaries supported the Rapid
            Support Forces for a time in Sudan and were involved in gold
            mining in the country.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ ``Sudanese diplomat confirms commitment to Russian naval base
    on Red Sea,'' Sudan Tribune, June 1, 2024, https://sudantribune.com/
    article286475/ [accessed May 10, 2025].

        In the space of 2 months in 2023, Eritrean President Isaias
            Afewerki visited Moscow twice, and less than a year later a
            Russian Pacific fleet frigate made a 5-day port call in
            Massawa. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Eritrea in
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            2023, the first ever such visit by a Russian foreign minister.

        In March this year, the Russian deputy navy commander visited
            Ethiopia and signed with his counterpart a cooperation
            agreement on capacity building and training.

       Iran in the last several years has focused on East Africa to
            regain some of the influence it lost due primarily to the
            efforts of the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Ebrahim Raisi became the
            first Iranian President to visit Africa in over a decade when
            he toured Uganda and Kenya in 2023. Despite the Iranian-backed
            terror plots his country has suffered, Kenyan President William
            Ruto dubbed Iran a ``critical strategic partner.'' \9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ ``Iran's president in Kenya and Uganda to deepen ties,'' The
    Citizen, July 12, 2023, https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/
    east-africa-news/iran-s-president-in-kenya-and-uganda-to-deepen-ties-
    4301232 [accessed May 10, 2025].

        Somalia and Iran began normalizing diplomatic relations last year,
            and Sudan completed its own rapprochement with Iran in 2023.
            Iranian weapons, especially drones, appear to have helped the
            SAF to reclaim territory and assisted the Ethiopian Government
            to prevail in the recent Tigray war. Earlier this year,
            Ethiopia's and Iran's police services agreed to cooperate on
            intelligence sharing and other issues, notwithstanding the 2021
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            disruption of an Iranian terror plot in Addis Ababa.

        Other outside powers are important players as well. Qatar, Saudi
    Arabia, Turkiye, and the UAE have invested heavily in East African
    sectors ranging from agriculture to mining to renewable energy. In
    addition to its economic activities, Qatar mediated disputes including
    between Djibouti and Eritrea, in Sudan, and, currently, between DRC and
    Rwanda. It also bankrolled Somali politicians and distributed aid in
    the country through Islamist organizations.
        Saudi Arabia is backing the SAF in Sudan and was once interested in
    building a base in Djibouti.
        Turkiye built a military base and its largest embassy in the world
    in Mogadishu and recently sent advanced UAVs and hundreds of troops to
    fight al-Shabaab's advances. Turkish companies run Mogadishu seaport
    and airport, and Ankara recently struck a favorable deal for developing
    Somalia's oil reserves.
        The UAE, meanwhile, has trained troops in Somalia's Puntland
    region, operated a base in Eritrea during its military operations in
    Yemen, and expanded Somaliland's Berbera port via a state-owned
    company. It is also the RSF's primary backer in the Sudanese civil war
    and has made large loans throughout the region.
        This partial survey of outside powers' activities in East Africa
    demonstrates their understanding of the region's importance. Chinese,
    Iranian, and Russian actions in particular underscore the risks for the
    U.S. of not being energetically and wisely engaged.
                                recommendations
        There are many ways for Washington to ensure Americans benefit from
    the opportunities in East Africa while protecting against the threats
    emanating from the region, including the following:

       Create an East Africa strategy that is integrated into a
            broader Africa and global strategy. The Trump administration
            should urgently develop a pragmatic, reality-based strategy for
            the region. What happens there has too many implications for
            the U.S. to allow American policy to drift. Such a strategy can
            only be effective if it is plugged into a larger continental
            strategy, which in turn must be part of a global strategy. It
            also requires quickly filling the senior Africa-focused
            positions at the State Department and National Security
            Council.

        At the heart of a properly formulated East Africa strategy would be
            commercial engagement. Increased American investment and
            equitable trade would add to the U.S. economy, draw countries
            closer to Washington, and help address American critical
            minerals supply chain problems. Washington should upgrade its
            abilities to facilitate U.S. business operations in the region,
            including by streamlining the work of the Development Finance
            Corporation, the U.S. EXIM Bank, and related organizations.

       Conduct sober assessments of Washington's ability to
            positively influence issues of democracy and proceed
            accordingly. For instance, state-building in Somalia is a
            failed experiment. Clan remains the fundamental ordering
            principle of Somalia's society, making a strong central
            government unworkable. Yet Washington has spent over a decade
            trying to make just such a system work in Mogadishu. Instead,
            Washington should work directly with those federal member
            states and other sources of authority that are friendly and
            have enough legitimacy and competence to degrade al-Shabaab.
            The U.S. should coordinate with neighboring states that have
            strong national security interests in Somalia as well.

       Upgrade Washington's abilities to support African Government
            and civic institutions and avoid overreliance on personalities.
            Institutions are generally stabilizing forces and will often
            outlast even the longest-serving rulers. Washington should
            maintain working ties with regional leaders, but overreliance
            makes the U.S. vulnerable.

        Kenya, for instance, is an important country and there are
            opportunities to work with President Ruto. Yet, he was also
            recently in Beijing proclaiming his commitment to refashioning
            the global order, a project that is core to the Chinese
            Government's efforts to supplant the U.S. globally.

        Uganda is another such case. Its troops are helpfully fighting al-
            Shabaab, yet President Museveni's son, his heir apparent, is
            erratic and intemperate, and may have recently participated in
            the torture of an opposition leader's bodyguard.\10\ Washington
            should balance the risks inherent in working with especially
            long-term leaders and promote durable state-to-state relations
            by, for instance, offering more technical trainings for African
            judiciaries and commercial ministries.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ Bobi Wine (@HEBobiwine), ``THE STATE OF EDDIE MUTWE. We just
    returned from Masaka Main Prison, where we checked on our comrades
    Eddie Mutwe, Achileo Kivumbi, Mugumya Gaddafi, and Wakabi Grace. Eddie
    Mutwe is alive--that's the only good news . . . ,'' X, May 7, 2025,
    8:04 a.m., https://x.com/HEBobiwine/status/1920087242871112128
    [accessed May 10, 2025].

       Develop a focus country framework. Given that Washington
            perennially allocates relatively few resources to its Africa
            efforts, it should concentrate those resources in countries
            that have a baseline level of competence, strategic importance,
            and willingness to work with the U.S. Such countries should
            receive a full suite of U.S. engagements including high-level
            diplomatic visits, business delegations with access to U.S.
            Government support, and commercial officers stationed in the
            embassy.
                          tinderbox and turning point
        Africa seems to forever be at a turning point, yet the current
    situation in East Africa is undeniably as tense and delicate as it has
    been for decades. In addition to Sudan, it is plausible that there
    could soon be two other full-fledged wars in the region, either of
    which would likely be among the worst in the world.
        Yet despite these and other dangers, the region is also one of
    opportunity and importance for Americans. Seizing opportunity while
    minimizing risk demands vigorous and sustained U.S. diplomacy.
    Washington is still perfectly capable of mustering such an effort, but
    urgency is required.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I look
    forward to your questions.

        The Chairman. Thank you for those thoughtful comments, Mr.
    Meservey.
        We are going to turn now to Ambassador Michelle Gavin. She
    is the Ralph Bunche senior fellow for Africa Policy Studies at
    the Council on Foreign Relations.
        She served as U.S. Ambassador to Botswana and the U.S.
    Representative to the Southern African Development Community
    from 2011 to 2014.
        Part of that she was a special assistant to President Obama
    and the senior director for Africa at the National Security
    Council where she led major policy reviews of Sudan and
    Somalia.
        She also previously served as managing Director of the
    African Center in New York. Was an international affairs fellow
    and adjunct fellow for Africa at the Council on Foreign
    Relations.
        Earlier in her career she worked in the U.S. Senate where
    she was the staff director for the Senate Foreign Relations
    Committee's Subcommittee on African Affairs, certainly a
    distinguished position.
        She was director of international policy issues for Senator
    Russ Feingold and was legislative director for Senator Ken
    Salazar.
        Ms. Gavin received a masters in philosophy and
    international relations from Oxford University where she was a
    Rhodes Scholar and earned her B.A. from Georgetown University's
    School of Foreign Service.
        Ambassador Gavin, the floor is yours.

      STATEMENT OF MICHELLE GAVIN, RALPH BUNCHE SENIOR FELLOW FOR
    AFRICA POLICY STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK,
                                   NY

        Ms. Gavin. Thank you so much.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Shaheen, distinguished members
    of the committee, it is wonderful to have this opportunity to
    appear before you and discuss the very complex and challenging
    set of issues the U.S. confronts.
        I also really want to thank the staff. I do know from
    personal experience how much work goes into preparing for these
    hearings----
        The Chairman. I bet you do.
        [Laughter.]
        Ms. Gavin. ----and I am grateful for that as well.
        Obviously, the role of Congress in Africa policy has a
    really long history. It has often been an oasis of bipartisan
    cooperation.
        It is one reason I enjoyed working on it for so long, and
    there are sort of numerous historical examples of Congress
    really elevating issues that sometimes a busy executive branch
    is, perhaps, neglecting.
        Of course, as has been discussed, the forces pulling the
    Horn of Africa apart are gaining strength. There are very real,
    eminent threats to stability in several other East African
    countries.
        Nothing is more searing than Sudan's shockingly destructive
    war, which shows no sign of ending. The recent wave of drone
    attacks on Port Sudan, along with the RSF's sustained pressure
    on El-Fasher confirmed that it is, indeed, possible for this
    terrible situation, the worst humanitarian crisis in the world,
    to get even worse and famine on a scale the world has not seen
    in decades remains not just a possibility, but a likelihood.
        We have multiple civil conflicts persisting in Ethiopia,
    and Prime Minister Abiy's ambition to regain a presence on the
    Red Sea has raised tensions with Ethiopia's neighbors.
        Of course, my colleague is absolutely right. Somalia
    continues to struggle for a modicum of effective governance
    while battling al-Qaeda's largest global affiliate Al-Shabaab
    and dealing with a chapter of the Islamic State.
        China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Turkey, Iran--
    all of these states are active in the region. Many are very
    clearly thinking about their relationships in the Horn of
    Africa through a long-term strategic lens.
        They are investing in influence, and because their
    interests are not always aligned they are sometimes engaging in
    proxy conflict, and we see this very clearly in Sudan.
        It is, frankly, less clear that the United States has a
    strategic vision for its relationship with the region. Long-
    standing problems of understaffed embassies and insufficient
    prioritization of African issues have joined the immediate
    shock of these very abrupt changes in foreign assistance and
    international humanitarian aid delivery to make it very easy
    for adversaries to paint the United States as uninterested and
    unreliable.
        Other anti-American messages capitalize on the fact that
    U.S. has been the most powerful country in the world throughout
    the post-Cold War era and they tend to paint Washington as the
    enforcer of a painful, unjust status quo, which is one reason
    there is enthusiasm for BRICS in the region and one reason I am
    concerned about the cuts to Voice of America, which has
    provided some alternative perspectives on global issues.
        This widespread perception of disengagement exists despite
    the fact that the United States, as you rightly noted, has very
    clear vital interests in this part of the world, not least the
    free flow of commerce through the Red Sea and combating
    terrorist organizations with very well-documented intent, and
    in many cases experience, track records of doing so, of harming
    Americans.
        Part of the problem is uncertainty about just what the U.S.
    wishes to see in the region, what kind of East Africa is in the
    U.S. interest. We would certainly benefit from a region at
    peace, with capable governments that can be partners in
    addressing existing and emerging threats.
        We would benefit from a region with growing economies that
    can become trading partners, attractive investment
    destinations, potential collaborators in new enterprises, and
    we would benefit from a region, vitally, that is not beholden
    to U.S. adversaries or mortgaged to deep-pocketed external
    actors whose interests do not always align with ours.
        To pursue this vision, the United States needs to
    prioritize conflict resolution and conflict prevention. If
    these seem expensive, I think we have seen through this
    exercise with the Houthis in Yemen that it is far more
    expensive to actually have to turn to military action to
    protect our interests.
        The United States should avoid, I agree, an over-reliance
    on personal relationships with any specific regional leaders.
        Of course, the United States cannot simply impose its will
    on other states, but there can be no delegating responsibility
    for pursuing U.S. interests to any partner, not in East Africa
    and not in the Gulf.
        Finally, the United States needs to develop and pursue a
    Red Sea regional strategy, not a set of a la carte deals, that
    transcends our own bureaucratic divisions that put Africa in
    one basket and the Middle East in another.
        For several years I have served with other former U.S.
    officials on the U.S. Institute of Peace's Red Sea Study Group,
    which has advocated for this kind of more comprehensive
    approach to the region.
        A successful new security architecture would have to take
    all relevant equities into account.
        Thank you so much again for the opportunity. I look forward
    to the questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Gavin follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Ms. Michelle Gavin

        Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and distinguished members
    of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
    discuss the complex and challenging set of issues that U.S. policy
    confronts in the Horn of Africa and East Africa more broadly. I also
    want to thank the staff that work for the committee and its members; I
    know from personal experience how much work and thought goes into these
    hearings at the staff level.
        This hearing is certainly timely, as the forces pulling the Horn of
    Africa apart are gaining strength, and there are very real, imminent
    threats to stability in several other east African countries. Sudan's
    shockingly destructive war shows no signs of ending, and the recent
    wave of drone attacks on Port Sudan, along with the RSF's sustained
    pressure on El Fasher, confirm that it is indeed possible for this
    terrible situation--the worst humanitarian crisis in the world--to get
    even worse. Famine on a scale the world has not seen in decades remains
    not just a possibility, but a likelihood. In at least 10 parts of
    Sudan, famine is happening now. South Sudan is teetering on the brink
    of a return to all out war, multiple civil conflicts persist in
    Ethiopia, and Prime Minister's Abiy's ambition to regain a presence on
    the Red Sea has raised tensions with Ethiopia's neighbors. Somalia
    continues to struggle with the presence, and in much of the country,
    the dominance, of al-Qaeda's largest global affiliate, al-Shabaab.
        China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar,
    Turkey, and Iran--all of these states are active in the region, and
    many are clearly thinking about their relationships in the Horn of
    Africa through a long-term, strategic lens. They are investing in
    influence--and because their interests do not always align, sometimes
    engaging in proxy conflict. There is no better illustration of this
    dynamic than the crowded field of actors fueling Sudan's conflict.
    Russia is courting the Sudanese Armed Forces coalition in the hopes of
    security a Red Sea Port. The UAE funds and arms the genocidal Rapid
    Support Forces--presumably partly because of its concerns about the
    Islamist influences in the SAF coalition, which also gets support from
    Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran.
        It's less clear that the United States has a strategic vision for
    its relationship with the region. Today, the longstanding problems of
    understaffed embassies and insufficient prioritization of African
    issues have joined the immediate shock of abrupt changes in foreign
    assistance and international humanitarian aid delivery to make it very
    easy for adversaries to paint the United States as uninterested and
    unreliable. Other anti-American messages capitalize on the fact that
    the U.S. has been the most powerful country in the world throughout the
    post-Cold War era, and paint Washington as the enforcer of a painful,
    unjust status quo--one reason why there is real enthusiasm for the
    BRICS in the region.
        This widespread perception of U.S. disengagement exists despite the
    fact that it is clear that the United States has vital interests in
    this part of the world--not least the importance of the free flow of
    commerce through the Red Sea, including vital energy resources and food
    supplies. Terrorist organizations with the intent to harm Americans--
    and a track record of doing so--continue to operate in the region.
        Part of the problem is the uncertainly around what the U.S. wants
    in the region. So what kind of east African region is in U.S.
    interests? The U.S. would benefit from a region at peace, with capable
    governments that can be partners in addressing existing and emerging
    threats. The U.S. would benefit from a region with growing economies
    that can become trading partners, attractive investment destinations,
    and potential collaborators in new enterprises--and, crucially, give
    young people dignified work at home rather than pushing them into mass
    migration. The U.S. would benefit from a region that is not beholden to
    U.S. adversaries, or mortgaged to deep pocketed external actors whose
    interests do not always align with ours.
        To pursue this vision, first, the United States needs to prioritize
    conflict resolution and conflict prevention. In addition to the truly
    horrifying human cost, the Horn of Africa's conflicts create
    opportunities for terrorist organizations and international criminal
    groups, and we have ample evidence that these conflicts do not stay
    contained within national borders, but spill over to destabilize
    neighbors and exacerbate their own fragility. Sudan's conflict has
    worsened instability in South Sudan and Chad. Somalia's longstanding
    fragility has profoundly affected the security postures and priorities
    of its neighbors.
        Peacemaking and conflict prevention requires senior attention,
    diplomatic resources, and strategies that give actors on the ground a
    stake in maintaining peace, which is why job creation and governance
    matter so much. It requires awareness of the way that migratory flows
    and resource competition can ignite precarious situations, and timely,
    professional efforts to mitigate those types of crises. If all of that
    sounds costly and labor intensive, the truth is that letting these
    problems fester is even more expensive. Elsewhere in the Red Sea, we
    are seeing the cost of failing to address militancy and insecurity.
    Reports indicate that the current administration's military campaign
    targeting the Houthis has cost taxpayers over a billion dollars, and
    there is no reason to believe that the problem is definitively
    resolved.
        Conflict prevention also requires looking over the horizon, and I
    would be remiss if I did not flag for this committee the extremely
    troubling uptick in political violence in Uganda and Tanzania as those
    countries approach elections. Avoiding worst-case scenarios requires
    attention and deft engagement now.
        Second, the Unites States should avoid an overreliance on personal
    relationships with any specific regional leaders, both because this
    entire region is in the midst of a major geopolitical realignment, and
    because this young, urbanizing part of the world is politically
    volatile. Deals that benefit only small circle of leaders will cease to
    advance U.S. interests when that circle is no longer in power. It's
    absolutely the case that the United States cannot impose its will on
    other states, and that working closely with regional actors and
    institutions is necessary. But there can be no delegating
    responsibility for pursuing U.S. interests to any partner.
        This is also why it's important to keep a close eye on internal
    dynamics in the region's diverse countries, and for the United States
    to develop strong contacts and relationships with actors outside of
    government. Leadership changes don't have to upend U.S. strategy if we
    understand the aspirations and concerns that drive them. If getting
    things done and protecting our interests requires cooperative action,
    then it makes sense that we need to understand the priorities and
    interests of potential partners in full. U.S. relations with Kenya, or
    closest partner in the region, illustrate the point. The United States
    has worked closely with President Ruto to deepen commercial and
    security relations with Kenya, but missed opportunities to align with
    the Kenyan people, who have made it very clear since that fighting
    corruption is top priority of theirs. The result of the misalignment is
    a less appealing investment climate for the U.S., and a weakened Kenyan
    President assiduously seeking support from China and the Gulf.
        Finally, the United States must develop and pursue a Red Sea
    regional strategy--not a set of a la carte deals--that transcends
    bureaucratic divisions between the parts of our government that work on
    Africa and those that work on the Middle East. For several years, I
    have served with other former U.S. officials on the U.S. Institute of
    Peace's Red Sea Study Group, which has advocated for this kind of more
    comprehensive approach to the region. There can be no lasting peace in
    the Horn without addressing the security concerns and economic
    incentives that have prompted Gulf actors to fan the flames of
    conflict. Equally, no peace will be sustainable if it is perceived as a
    set of deals cooked up in Western and Middle Eastern capitals and
    imposed on Africans. A successful new security architecture for the
    region must take all relevant equities into account.

        The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador.
        We are now going to go through 5-minute questions around 5
    minutes each to each of the senators who wish to participate,
    and I am going to start.
        I have to tell you that watching President Ruto with the
    Chinese holding hands and talking about a new world order is
    just stunning.
        After all the work and effort we have put in there and see
    him talking about a new world order, the new world order was
    constructed by the United States and democracies, capitalist
    countries that are human rights-loving countries, and the new,
    new world order that these countries are talking about is being
    constructed by the autocracies, the outright communists,
    socialists, people who have no respect for human rights.
        It is stunning to hear countries talk about wanting to join
    or promote that world order when the world order that was
    constructed after World War II has served us so really well.
        Certainly, not perfectly but, then again, the world is not
    a perfect place, but so much better than what you would see if
    the autocrats took over.
        It is discouraging to hear that and part of it, I think, is
    tied to the fact that when we do things in Africa they seem to
    be individual centric instead of country centric.
        We do not focus on institutions--we focus on individuals,
    and I do not know why it seems to be more prevalent in this
    part of the world than others.
        If each of you could take a quick run at a very complex
    question. Why do you not start?
        Mr. Meservey. Thank you, Chairman.
        I agree, President Ruto's comments were discouraging. They
    are not also out of the ordinary for the types of comments that
    African leaders make, especially when they travel to Beijing,
    unfortunately.
        This is a challenge for the United States. I would suggest
    that African leaders have not always thoroughly thought through
    the consequences of this different type of world order,
    especially smaller countries that are smaller military or
    economic powers.
        The type of world order that China, Russia, Iran are
    advocating for would mean that they would be victimized
    probably in many ways.
        The grievances that African leaders often express are
    focused on a few key issues, and then I think these larger
    powers like China, like Russia, like Iran, have co-opted those
    issues into their broader agenda to confront the United States.
        I think the U.S. should make it clear to African leaders
    that while, of course, they are welcome to have normal
    relations with these countries, especially if you are a major
    non-NATO ally, there are certain responsibilities associated
    with that, and I think the U.S. needs to be much more
    aggressive in its messaging, frankly, to African publics and to
    African leadership about the benefits that you laid out of the
    world order that the United States has underpinned for decades
    now.
        The Chairman. I appreciate that, and I think you hit on
    something that probably deserves more thought and more
    attention, and that is the fact that this is the kind of thing
    that they are used to and the reason they are used to it is
    they see it all over the continent, and they do not have the
    cadre of people that study in the United States like most other
    continents do, really.
        China, for example, has got hundreds of thousands of
    students studying here and the Europeans are notorious for
    having lots of people here, so they are exposed to a different
    type of government, I think.
        Ambassador, your thoughts?
        Ms. Gavin. Thank you. That is such an interesting last
    point. I could not agree more that bringing more African
    students to the U.S. would absolutely be in U.S. interest.
        We have seen time and again how it can pay dividends down
    the line, although it is very difficult actually for a lot of
    Africans to come do university and graduate studies here right
    now.
        The Chairman. The thing that strikes me, too, is when we
    deal with leaders, as all of us do from all over the planet, it
    always amazes me how well--how good their English is, most of
    them.
        You ask them why, and they studied here in the United
    States. People who are coming up through those other countries
    are sent by their parents or their government or something to
    study here, and the result is they take home the view of how
    important human rights are, how important democracy is.
        I am sorry. I interrupted. Go ahead.
        Ms. Gavin. No, no, I agree with you completely. I do think
    there is kind of an inflection point in many parts of the
    continent right now because you have these very young
    populations that are now urbanizing, digitally connected.
        There is a lot more political volatility and so part of
    what I think is happening is a demand-driven desire for an
    international order that takes African equities into account,
    the sort of awareness that the Bretton Woods institutions were
    created right before most African countries were independent.
        Then that is capitalized on by U.S. adversaries, right, to
    distort the message to the U.S. wishes to keep African
    populations in poverty or that is more or less the thrust of
    it.
        There is also the fact that money talks and for a lot of
    these African leaders they are dealing with tremendously
    constrained fiscal space.
        They have big debt burdens, and the way the U.S. provides
    assistance, in ways that we can be accountable to the American
    taxpayers, it is a little bit different dealing with the
    Chinese or with some of these Gulf actors who have been gaining
    influence.
        The last thing I would say is that I could not agree more
    that it is really important to keep an eye on the internal
    dynamics in these countries and for the U.S. to understand and
    have strong contacts and relationships with actors outside of
    government because leadership changes are going to happen and
    these investments and these one-to-one personal elite
    relationships will not serve our interests. They will have a
    sell-by date and will be left in the cold.
        The Chairman. I appreciate that and I appreciate the remark
    you made about the fact that money talks and we wind up with
    that all over.
        It is hard to explain to people that there is a real
    difference between capitalism and socialism. Where the
    government owns the capital and owns all the money, it is easy
    for them to spread it out in other countries as they deem
    appropriate, whereas in capitalism you need the profit motive
    and the free market system to back you up.
        With that, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. You both mentioned messaging
    and, Ms. Gavin, you mentioned concerns that we are shutting
    down Voice of America and other information, ways that we can
    message into places like the Horn of Africa.
        Can you talk about what we lose when we do that? I am going
    to ask both of you this question because we had a hearing in
    this committee at the beginning of the year and one of the
    things that one of the witnesses told us is that the PRC is
    spending over a billion dollars a year just on misinformation
    and disinformation campaigns.
        Much of that, obviously, is going into Africa. What is the
    impact of that and what is our alternative if we shut down all
    of our organizations that allow us to correct inaccurate facts,
    to correct the misinformation campaigns that the PRC and Russia
    and other adversaries are doing?
        Do you want to begin?
        Ms. Gavin. Sure. I think it is actually incredibly
    important because it is not just the PRC. You are absolutely
    right, they have made massive investments in media on the
    continent including hiring local reporters who then are
    delivering state-approved messages and slants on the news.
        I think that the U.S. has a role to play both in supporting
    independent media in this part of the world, investigative
    journalism.
        This is how one has accountability and more connectivity,
    right, between populations and their leadership, and I think
    when we are absent it is, again, just incredibly easy to
    caricature the U.S. as uninterested or, worse, having some kind
    of malign interest in the region.
        I have been looking at African social media discussions
    pretty intently for several years as part of a book project and
    the Russians, they too have their own influence campaigns that
    are very, very popular and the messages are--you can see why
    the messages would be appealing.
        The messages are about respect for African lives and
    sovereignty. They are about addressing the frustration that
    African countries are rich in resources and, yet, people cannot
    find jobs.
        Having an absence of both straight reporting and clear
    messaging about what the U.S. is trying to achieve it just--
    there has been just a vacuum and there we are with adversaries
    quite busily filling in.
        Senator Shaheen. Mr. Meservey.
        Mr. Meservey. Yes, thank you for that question.
        I would like to see American embassies be more proactive in
    this space coordinating their messaging or maybe receiving
    messaging from Washington. I do not know exactly how it would
    look.
        There are moments in the geopolitical calendar where there
    are real opportunities for the U.S. to push out a message that
    is positive about the United States.
        There has traditionally been a reticence or even in some
    cases I would describe it as almost an embarrassment in some
    cases to take a really vigorous pro-American unapologetic
    stance on the U.S. whereas the Russians and Irans and Chinas of
    the world have no problems at all doing that type of thing.
        They do not spend their time worried about injustices from
    the past that they might have been involved in.
        I think that is one area. Another area that always
    frustrated me was we had these extraordinary programs, PEPFAR
    being one of them, that literally saved tens of millions of
    African lives.
        Senator Shaheen. Did. Past tense.
        Mr. Meservey. I am hopeful that there will be elements of
    that continuing, but I understand that is an ongoing process.
        We--as far as I could tell, we got very little credit for
    that and--now, that is not the only reason to do something, but
    as--because this program was funded by American taxpayers it
    should have redounded to American taxpayer credit.
        The U.S. was just very bad about reminding people of the
    extraordinary benefits that came from American public health
    interventions. It was very bad about tooting its own horn, let
    us say.
        I think we need to move away from that reticence and,
    again, be much more coordinated and even aggressive in touting
    the American model and demonstrating our track record.
        Senator Shaheen. I certainly agree with that in terms of
    being very clear about what we are providing to help in
    countries. I think the sad thing at this point is we do not
    have those programs anymore because they are gone. They just
    got eliminated.
        How do we do that and how do we do that--I agree with you
    on the embassies. I think our embassies ought to be very
    positive about the United States and what we offer to
    countries, but without an apparatus to get that messaging out
    it is going to be really hard to do that, especially when we
    are up against over a billion dollars from the PRC and
    providing that kind of information.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        A good point, both of you, on the fact that we did not get
    any credit for PEPFAR. I think probably the reason for that was
    we did not do this to get credit.
        We did this to actually make a difference and we made a
    difference, and I think we will continue to do so as we go
    through these programs, but I think that is probably a lesson
    for us that when you do good you ought to at least give
    yourself credit for doing good, and we just did the good and
    did not take any credit for it.
        Senator Ricketts.
        Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        A lot of attention has been given to the Houthi attacks in
    the Red Sea and its impact on global shipping. However, there
    is a deeper, more strategic, critical problem developing here
    with regard to the Houthis' funding from Iran and they are
    moving into Somalia and establishing relationship ties with Al-
    Shabaab and the Islamic State's Somalia, and this is something
    that I think is very challenging for the United States.
        During the first Trump administration Trump's maximum
    pressure effort brought Iran's foreign reserves down from over
    $122.5 billion dollars under $14 billion, and I am pleased to
    see that the Trump administration is again putting maximum
    pressure on Iran to cut off the flow of money from Iran to
    terrorist groups like the Houthis.
        I think that needs to happen to be able to make sure we are
    putting pressure on them. We also need to get the snapback
    sanctions on Iran as well, but this growing pipeline of drones,
    munitions, and military expertise risks turning the Horn of
    Africa into an extension of Iran's proxy network.
        If left unchecked this could destabilize the region, the
    shipping lanes, embolden the Islamic insurgents and create a
    multi-front threat to the U.S. and our interests in the Horn of
    Africa.
        Mr. Meservey, how urgent is this risk that the Houthis are
    moving into Somalia? Is this a long-term problem? Can you talk
    a little bit about what you see right now and how urgent that
    is?
        Mr. Meservey. Yes. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
        As you laid out, it is a very real problem. The Kenyans
    would say it is, it is, maybe their primary national security
    threat is the prospect of Al-Shabaab getting advanced drones,
    for instance, from the Houthis or just getting more advanced
    capabilities.
        There is a long history of Al-Shabaab receiving help from
    AQAP, which was al-Qaeda's affiliate in Yemen. Those routes are
    well-established and there is also people constantly moving
    back and forth.
        It is highly plausible. Even though the Houthis are a Shi'a
    operation and Al-Shabaab is a Sunni one, they can be quite
    ecumenical when they are focused on attacking the United States
    or other adversaries.
        Yes, it is a very serious concern. I have not seen in the
    open source any sort of definitive account of exactly what the
    exchanges look like, but, certainly, if it starts to include
    things like drones or even capabilities around IEDs then that
    would be a massive problem both within Somalia, but also
    including neighboring states like Kenya, like Ethiopia,
    potentially even Djibouti.
        Senator Ricketts. What should the U.S. Congress do to help
    you prevent it to make sure that the Horn of Africa does not
    become the next step in Iran's proxy network against us?
        Mr. Meservey. I think you referenced this maximum pressure
    campaign. I think Congress should do all that it can to assist
    such a campaign and remind the Administration that the problem
    extends far beyond Iran, far beyond the Middle East.
        It also extends into places like Africa. The Houthi-Al-
    Shabaab links are not the only Iranian presence on the
    continent. There is a long history of Hezbollah receiving
    funding, especially from West Africa, but actually all across
    the continent, Shi'a proselytization, and other Iranian
    activity.
        I referenced some of the increased recent Iranian activity
    in my remarks. Africa should absolutely be part of this maximum
    pressure campaign and I think Congress can help the
    Administration do that.
        Senator Ricketts. I am running out of time here so I am
    just--I want to just switch a little bit to talk about
    communist China and their influence on Africa, which we have
    already discussed a little bit.
        One of the things that communist China is doing is
    establish a training school in Tanzania and essentially what
    they are doing is training the people who are interested in
    politics about authoritarianism, as the chairman was pointing
    out, and really working against multiparty democracy.
        What, again, should we, as the U.S. Congress be doing to
    help push back on what communist China is doing in East Africa
    with regard to how they are trying to undermine the democracies
    there?
        Mr. Meservey. Yes. Yes, it is--China has a whole-of-
    government, to use that cliche, approach to undermining
    democratic norms on the continent. They are very pragmatic;
    they will work with any type of government.
        They are quite explicitly pushing their own model and
    saying, look, you can enjoy economic prosperity as well as
    centralized power, even authoritarian power.
        Regarding the training school that you referenced, this
    is--the CCP has long links to the liberation movements in
    southern Africa especially, and there are constant trainings
    ongoing between CCP and liberation movement cadres in ANC. In
    South Africa, their entire NEC--their governing council--has
    been trained in China.
        I think the U.S. needs to try a variety of approaches. One,
    again, it needs to unabashedly make the case for democracy,
    free markets, et cetera.
        I think it should hearken back to the history the United
    States has of partnering with countries like Japan, like South
    Korea, for instance, Germany after World War II, and
    demonstrate that with strong American partnership you can
    really achieve significant gains.
        I think it should focus heavily on supporting civil society
    organizations which are oftentimes the best check on
    overweening government power, et cetera.
        Senator Ricketts. Mr. Chairman, if I may just have a--can I
    allow Ambassador Gavin to maybe weigh in on that last question
    real briefly? Is that okay?
        The Chairman. Generous as the chairman is----
        Senator Ricketts. You are so generous. Thank you.
        Ambassador Gavin, could you just quickly, again, just kind
    of--and do not repeat what Mr. Meservey said, but anything else
    you observed?
        Ms. Gavin. Yes. I think that this relationship between the
    CCP and these dominant ruling parties on the continent is
    actually ultimately going to be a disadvantage for China
    because the sort of discourse about why these ruling parties
    should be in charge tends to link back to liberation, and most
    African societies skew very young.
        These are populations that do not remember pre-liberation
    days and are wondering what their government has done for them
    lately.
        I think continuing to hold--it would be nice to restore
    some of the democracy and governance work that the U.S. did--
    NDI and IRI--that help really draw a clear line between party
    and state, which is also important for combating corruption
    which if you look at Afrobarometer polling is at the very top
    of African priority list, so we can align ourselves with these
    populations that way.
        Senator Ricketts. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Coons.
        Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Chairman Risch and
    Ranking Member Shaheen, for this important full committee
    hearing. To the ambassador and to Mr. Meservey, thank you for
    your testimony.
        What I hear from both of you is more engagement; not less.
    More of what we have done that works and that the abrupt and
    chaotic closure of a very wide range of our most effective
    tools for engaging with Africa, from the MCC to YALI to the
    PEPFAR program, puts all of this at risk.
        Mr. Chairman, if I might, given your opening comments and
    the exchange I would love to work with you on clarifying the
    U.S.-Kenya relationship.
        Their foreign minister and national security advisor were
    just here last week meeting with the President and folks at the
    White House, and I agree with you that some of those statements
    with the PRC are very concerning, given the deep and long
    relationship and the security relationship we have with regards
    to Al-Shabaab and Somalia.
        The Chairman. It is disappointing, to say the least.
        Senator Coons. You referenced how important it is that
    there be more students from Africa coming to the United States.
        Well, I got a solution for you. It is a 15-year-old program
    called the Young African Leaders Initiative that has sent
    20,000 vetted, promising African students to the United
    States--the University of Delaware happens to be one of the 20
    hosting universities--at a very modest cost that is about to be
    shut down. Not a good idea.
        It brings promising, young African leaders to the United
    States for a summer to meet with businesses and entrepreneurs,
    to meet with civil society, to convene in Washington and then
    go to 20 different states all over the country--one of many
    things I do not think we should shut down.
        To the point you just made, Ambassador Gavin, the
    Millennium Challenge Corporation--MCC--launched under President
    Bush explicitly used corruption and combating corruption,
    reducing corruption, as one of the key indicators for whether
    or not a country would get a long-term development partnership
    with the United States.
        It is all but closed. Most of its staff have been laid off.
    Many of its compacts have been shut down. PEPFAR, Mr. Meservey,
    is all but closed. It has been trimmed dramatically from its
    scope, a 25-year-old program long deserving of bipartisan
    support.
        I would just be interested in both of you briefly saying
    what does it do to our reputation on a continent of 54
    countries, a continent with enormous human potential and
    natural resources, a country that China and Russia sees as the
    continent of the 21st century.
        What does it do to our place in East Africa and across the
    continent if we abruptly shut down these longstanding
    demonstrated and effective programs?
        Madam Ambassador, then Mr. Meservey.
        Ms. Gavin. Thank you, Senator.
        It is incredibly self-defeating, is my view. I just do not
    understand why we are taking a bunch of tools in our foreign
    policy toolbox and tossing them into a dumpster.
        Senator Coons. I think the term is a wood chipper.
        Ms. Gavin. Okay. I think--I suppose so.
        Senator Coons. It is tougher to reassemble things that have
    been put through a wood chipper than things that have gone
    through a reasoned, considerable review which is the process
    that we should have gone through----
        Ms. Gavin. Oh, sure. No, reforms make----
        Senator Coons. --is to have this body, Congress, work with
    the new administration to say, okay, trim this, reform this,
    change this, shutter this, expand this. That is not what
    happened.
        Ms. Gavin. No. No, it has not, and not only have we lit our
    credibility on fire and you see particularly China making hay
    of this.
        The favorite phrase now is reliable partner. China is a
    reliable partner. They are not going to abruptly pull the rug
    out from under you.
        I think that some of the kind of knock-on effects, consider
    the tens of thousands of health workers in Kenya who are out of
    work now.
        These are educated, engaged citizens and the messaging we
    want to do about this long relationship with Kenya, it is at
    odds with their lived experience now and----
        Senator Coons. I am about out of time. I have got less than
    a minute.
        Ms. Gavin. Sorry.
        Senator Coons. Mr. Meservey, if I might.
        I do agree that a bright spot is the hard work done under
    the previous administration by Avril Haines in DRC Rwanda and
    it is continuing under Special Advisor Boulos.
        There is a real chance of peace there. I cannot think of a
    more concentrated example of the PRC-U.S. competition than the
    two adjacent bases in Djibouti.
        I have just introduced with Senator Ricketts a bill to try
    and prioritize focusing on denying the PRC more basing
    opportunities on the continent.
        What do you think we ought to make a priority in doing that
    important work?
        Mr. Meservey. Yes. Thank you, Senator, and I am very
    pleased to hear about the bill and your attention to this
    problem.
        I would especially highlight the danger of an Atlantic
    Ocean base. We know quite reliably that China has been pursuing
    such a base for years. It is not hard to see how problematic
    that would be for security of the American homeland.
        I think the--I mentioned in my original remarks that
    commercial engagement should be at the heart of a strategy, and
    I think we need to start giving African countries more of what
    they want and less of what they do not.
        That seems like an obvious proposition, but frequently our
    Africa strategy does not seem to be guided by that principle.
        The existential crisis that every African government faces
    is youth unemployment, and our development assistance and
    humanitarian assistance, as useful as that is in some contexts,
    is not going to address those problems.
        I think----
        Senator Coons. I do think that the Development Finance
    Corporation and the MCC really focused on private sector
    partnerships that fuel growth from the bottom up.
        I think to the extent we can focus our messaging, our
    investments, and our partnerships on combating corruption, on
    being a secure and reliable partner, and on helping create
    reliable, high-growth jobs, this continent of 4 billion people
    by the end of this century is a place where we can win in the
    competition with China, and if we do not--if we continue our
    retreat, we will not.
        Thank you both.
        Mr. Meservey. I agree.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coons.
        Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you for being here. I think we all
    agree that Africa is an important place and that we are not
    doing everything that we should do or might do in order to
    influence the direction of that continent.
        I do take exception to some of my colleagues' statements
    about the previous, I will say, the status quo ante with a lot
    of money being spent in disjointed, wasteful, and unfocused
    ways by the Federal Government and, obviously, changing that is
    disruptive, and there is a lot of programs that I think,
    particularly PEPFAR, which have been particularly important in
    Africa in terms of our soft power and saving lives.
        I continue, obviously, to support that, but it seems to me
    we lack a coherent strategy, and I am not sure that--I know the
    Administration is working on some targeted projects--for
    example, the DRC on the critical minerals front and others, but
    my visit to Kenya, Angola, and the DRC last August just--I was
    struck just by not only the magnitude of the challenge, but how
    we seem to lack any particular strategy to deal with making it
    any different than it is now.
        Maybe both of you--take it in turn, please--what would a
    successful regional strategy in East Africa look like for the
    United States?
        That does not necessarily have to all emanate from the
    White House. Congress can begin that conversation. What would
    that look like?
        Mr. Meservey. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
        I think it is important, first, to ensure that any regional
    strategy is integrated into a broader continental strategy and
    then global strategy.
        As far as the region specifically, the U.S. needs to
    determine exactly what its interests are, what its goals are,
    and how it can get there. That all seems obvious.
        Senator Cornyn. That seems pretty fundamental.
        Mr. Meservey. Yes, but sometimes----
        Senator Cornyn. One of the things where our goal would be
    to stop the Russians and the Chinese from essentially
    preempting us and pushing us out in terms of our influence. Go
    ahead.
        Mr. Meservey. Yes, absolutely. I referenced the potential
    Russian base, really, in Port Sudan. That would be massively
    problematic. We already have the Chinese base in Djibouti, as
    we have discussed.
        I think--again, I am a big believer in commercial
    engagement. I think the U.S. Government and the U.S. Congress
    can help streamline the work of organizations like the DFC and
    EXIM Bank, make them more fit for purpose.
        They are too slow. They are too bureaucratic, and then make
    that really a--this commercial engagement the centerpiece of
    the value proposition that the United States brings to these
    countries.
        I also think it should determine which countries it can
    actually achieve things with. There are just some country or
    some governments on the continent that are so hostile and so,
    frankly, inept that it is very hard to determine how the U.S.
    could ever actually achieve much of anything with them.
        I would--some specific areas you could talk about critical
    minerals. EAC does have such things. I know that critical
    minerals is already a cliche to talk about, but it is a reality
    for the United States and Africa.
        Senator Cornyn. Yes, it is not just a cliche.
        Mr. Meservey. Yes, it is a real thing. There is a reason
    everybody talks about it. It will--Africa will have to be part
    of the solution for the United States.
        The U.S. needs to figure out how to support its companies.
    It should work with the companies of allied countries because
    we have very few mining companies anymore in this country.
        The Australians, the Canadians, they have huge mining
    companies and look for possibilities there. They should also
    work closely with other allied countries on financing
    arrangements and take a much more systematic and harmonized
    approach with allies to these regions to focus on the core
    interests of the United States which, again, would be security
    and then some of these economic issues.
        Senator Cornyn. Ambassador.
        Ms. Gavin. Thank you.
        I think, particularly for the Horn, it is really important
    to integrate what we are trying to accomplish in Africa with a
    strategy that looks at the other side of the Red Sea.
        This is--broadly, what we need to do is stop treating
    Africa like an extra credit project in foreign policy and make
    it part of the core curriculum and integrate it into the way we
    think about achieving U.S. interests globally.
        I think that more engagement, as Senator Coons said, a
    focus on peace and conflict prevention because the conflicts in
    Africa provide opportunities, particularly to Russia and to
    various criminal networks--terrorist and otherwise.
        This is not in our interest. Commercial deals, yes, but
    making sure that deals do not just benefit a set of elites at
    the top, but are deals that we can talk about benefiting both
    sides of the Atlantic in a way that addresses some of these job
    creation issues.
        Senator Cornyn. I see my time is up.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to the
    witnesses for your helpful testimony.
        I want to return to the chairman's opening comments where
    he introduced an article into the record and talked about the
    recent discussion of the Kenyan President in China about this
    new world order.
        Let me read from an article that I would like introduced in
    the record. Kenya calls for new world order that reflects
    Global South realities, and this is from KBC Digital, the Kenya
    Broadcasting Company.
        If I could introduce it into the record.
        The Chairman. So entered.

    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found
    in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section
    at the end of this document.]

        Senator Kaine. From April 23, just recently.
        Speaking during a public lecture at Peking University in
    Beijing, President William Ruto emphasized the need to fashion
    a new world order which takes cognizance of present realities.
        The President was in China for a state visit. Okay. China
    is welcoming the Kenyan President for a state visit. Said this,
    the ongoing trade tariff wars could signal the end of the old
    world order as it has existed since the end of World War II.
        Further, regarding the relationship between Kenya, China,
    and the rest of the world, Ruto remarked that Kenya and China
    are not just trade partners, but ``co-architects of a new world
    order.''
        His comments are putting the U.S. and the old world order
    that has not helped the Global South--this is what he is
    asserting, whether or not it is true, how true it is. He is
    suggesting that the trade wars might be the destruction of the
    old world order and the creation of a new world order where
    China and Kenya and other nations focus more attention on the
    Global South.
        How do we get to a place where the President of Kenya,
    where we have had this long relationship, just 2 weeks ago is
    making those assertions in the middle of a state visit to
    China?
        I do think comments that have been made by my colleagues--
    the recent apparent abandonment of PEPFAR, the defunding of
    USAID, NED, the DFC, the MCC, the YALI program, which also has
    a presence at the University of Virginia.
        AFRICOM is not based in Africa and has perennially been
    under-resourced. It is based in Germany. Picking a fight with
    South Africa, a pretty important nation, and labeling them as
    committing genocide against Afrikaan farmers, accepting
    Afrikaaner refugees while we are shutting off other refugees
    from Africa.
        Mr. Meservey, you used to work with Church World Service.
    Church World Service work on refugee issues has been
    dramatically curtailed. The church I go to is heavily Congolese
    refugees who have been resettled in Richmond by Catholic
    Refugee Service. Their work has been curtailed.
        We do not get the benefit of the doubt necessarily, and
    people look at evidence and they interpret it as to what it
    means and what they are interpreting the evidence that I have
    cited and other bits of evidence is that the U.S. is, to put it
    charitably, uninterested, and to put it not so charitably,
    affirmatively disinterested, and that leads a President like
    President Ruto to make those kinds of comments, almost
    gleefully, hoping that Donald Trump's tariff war will destroy
    the world order that the U.S. created in the aftermath of World
    War II to the benefit not only of the United States, but other
    nations all over the world.
        We have got to reverse this. We have to reverse it. I hear
    this all over Latin America as I travel there, we would rather
    deal with you than with China.
        I think in the Americas there is even a closer cultural
    connection because of migration patterns and family ties, but
    there are with Africa as well. We would rather deal with you
    than China.
        You got to have something on the table, and China does and
    they are not going anywhere and, yes, the conditions may be bad
    and, yes, there are strings attached and, yes, they may not
    perform, but they got something on the table. What do you have
    on the table? The things we have on the table are being
    hollowed out.
        We can wring our hands about this all we want in this
    committee, but if we keep bringing out the architecture of the
    relationships with Africa or other parts of the world, China
    has got stuff on the table.
        They are going to continue to--I do not know so much about
    Russia or Iran--their staying power. China is going to have
    staying power.
        I wanted to ask you, Ambassador Gavin, one question, and
    you were getting to it sort of at the end of the Q&A with
    Senator Cornyn.
        I thought it was intriguing in your comments--your opening
    comments about, hey, let us look at East Africa in connection
    with Yemen. We divide CENTCOM from AFRICOM. We divide in this
    committee, Africa from the MENA region.
        Talk a little bit about what a coordinated Red Sea strategy
    might look like.
        Ms. Gavin. Sure. I think that it would require convening
    both the African side of the Red Sea and the powers there with
    these Gulf actors who are clearly intervening to try and stake
    out influence and territory and trying to tease out what
    exactly are the core security concerns that these actors are
    worried about and what is a more opportunistic approach.
        Ultimately, these two regions are going to need to build an
    institutional security architecture. We can assist with that,
    but our own thinking about U.S. security in the Red Sea, in the
    Bal el-Mandeb, in the Gulf of Aden, we need to be thinking much
    more holistically and bringing the expertise from our different
    communities to bear.
        I do really recommend USIP's work on this. They have been
    doing incredibly important work on this issue for a long time.
        Senator Kaine. I yield back. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
        The Chairman. Thank you. There is nothing to yield back,
    Senator.
        Senator Kaine. I guess you are right.
        The Chairman. I will be delighted----
        Senator Kaine. I will yield some back next time.
        The Chairman. I will put that on the record for next time.
        Senator McCormick.
        Senator McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member.
    Thank you both for being here today.
        Mr. Meservey, I understand you are a Pennsylvanian so it is
    good to have you here today.
        I want to start with just a word on PEPFAR. I have been a
    long supporter of the President's Emergency Plan For AIDS
    Relief, which was created when I served during the Bush
    administration.
        By some estimates that program has saved 26 million lives
    in just over 20 years, so my question to you is really two
    fold.
        Number one, how does that program advance U.S. national
    security interest. Second, some countries in Africa have
    started to move to their own versions of that program. What is
    the path to self-reliance and self-sufficiency for that
    program?
        Mr. Meservey. Yes, thank you, Senator, and greetings from
    your home state.
        Yes, I will take the last one first. One of the problems
    that we had with PEPFAR, even though it was tremendously
    successful, was that some host governments were not taking the
    ownership that they needed to. It was never supposed to be an
    open-ended program.
        I think that--I hope that elements of this are
    reconstituted. I genuinely do. Public health interventions have
    been successful on their own merits.
        If it is reconstituted, I think there needs to be a very
    clear road map for receiving countries to take ownership.
        It needs to be thoughtful and reasonable, of course, but
    one of the dangers of long-running aid programs is that
    eventually they just become an entitlement that countries just
    receive as a matter-of-fact and do not take ownership for.
        That would be one thing. Regarding--and then I think
    probably with some countries you need to do an assessment of do
    they all need PEPFAR anymore? Which ones really need it? Which
    ones are at greatest risk?
        I lived in Zambia at the height of the HIV pandemic and
    that was an obvious--it was a focused country for very good
    reasons. We need to continue those types of assessments.
        Then, how does PEPFAR help national security interests?
    One, it does contribute to soft power. It is very hard to
    quantify and I think we were not good enough about getting as
    much soft power as we should have from PEPFAR, but I think it
    is also undeniable that it did help us in that respect.
        Also, mass death in a society is fundamentally
    destabilizing and it prevented mass death in some cases, and it
    allowed for a much higher quality of life for many--for
    millions of people, even beyond the lives----
        Senator McCormick. Destabilizing, yes.
        Mr. Meservey. Yes.
        Senator McCormick. Thank you.
        I just want to reiterate as someone who is a big supporter
    of the program, the initial vision at creation was never that
    it was perpetual. There was a transition to self-sufficiency.
        Thank you for that and, Ambassador, thank you for being
    here. We read and hear a lot about the Belt and Road Initiative
    and growing influence of China in Africa and expanding security
    assistance.
        What challenge do those activities pose to U.S.
    counterterrorism efforts and in particular what would you
    suggest the United States be doing to ensure that in light of
    that investment on the part of the Chinese that we are evolving
    our counterterrorism efforts to be as effective as possible?
        Ms. Gavin. Thank you. I think the Belt and Road
    investments--certainly some of the digital Belt and Road
    investments raise questions, make it difficult for us to engage
    in intelligence cooperation with some of these partners because
    of concerns about Chinese access, but some of the
    infrastructure investments, quite frankly, redound to our
    benefit too, right? We are driving on the same road that they
    built and that can help us get some things done.
        I do--I just want to flag that China is not going to leave
    Africa, not ever, and so learning how to compete effectively
    will require recognition that African governments are not going
    to reject all Chinese investment and trade.
        It is their largest trading partner, et cetera, but on
    counterterrorism I think that it is really about influence,
    trust, the kind of relationships with security establishments
    that enable meaningful cooperation in any security space and
    China is working very hard on establishing those kinds of
    relationships.
        Again, I think that the U.S. potentially has an advantage
    if we can work more institutionally rather than personally
    because of turnover.
        Senator McCormick. To the chairman's point, yes.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield as well.
        [Laughter.]
        The Chairman. I will take it. Thank you so much.
        I have on this side in order of appearance Senator Rosen,
    Senator Van Hollen, Senator Booker. I know it seems like you
    were here, but they actually were here before you, left, and
    came back, so under the rules--sorry about that--Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Risch, Ranking Member
    Shaheen. Thank you to the witnesses for your work and for your
    willingness to serve.
        I am going to talk a little bit about Somalia first. There
    is a lot of extremist problems there because over the past year
    ISIS Somalia has emerged as a key player in the Islamic State
    global financial and operational network that is facilitating
    the movement of money, foreign fighters, and military trainers
    to Islamic State affiliates throughout Africa and beyond.
        ISIS Somalia just does not pose a threat to U.S. forces and
    our partners in the region, their aggressive efforts to plan
    and conduct external operations are a threat to U.S. citizens
    everywhere.
        U.S. forces have taken action to degrade ISIS Somalia's
    capability, but there is more that must be done. Ambassador,
    during the last Trump administration the President withdrew
    almost all the U.S. troops from Somalia. What would be the
    consequences of the Administration doing that again now?
        Ms. Gavin. I think the consequences would be incredibly
    dangerous. The situation has evolved even from that period of
    the first Trump administration and we do have two different
    terrorist organizations that wish us harm and have a track
    record of being able to carry out attacks at some distance.
        I am sympathetic to the argument that I know my colleague
    will make that it is very frustrating to have been continuing
    to try to build Somali capacity to combat these threats
    themselves year after year after year only to have these
    efforts essentially undermined by poor governance in Somalia.
        The question is what is the alternative? Being frustrated
    and sort of washing our hands of it does not address these
    very, very real threats.
        Senator Rosen. Let me ask you this then. Research has shown
    that violent extremism surges during humanitarian crises and
    you talk about both not good governance and those things.
        How are the Islamic insurgents in Somalia taking advantage
    of these issues to recruit and what does the Administration's--
    our cuts to humanitarian aid compound this to what you were
    just mentioning?
        Ms. Gavin. Certainly, it does feed right into the messaging
    about who the enemy is, but it also creates the kind of
    resource scarcity that leads to desperation, people seizing--
    who might not really be ideologically aligned, but are looking
    to survive.
        There is a--you have to sift through these groups in
    Somalia. Some are--some of it is survival. Some of it is sort
    of hardcore believers. Some of it is Somali nationalism.
        It is certainly not helping. It is hurting.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to stay on Africa for a
    minute because, Ambassador Gavin, again, this is a difficult
    period for everyone residing in East Africa and the Horn. I
    want to talk about women's role there.
        We know it is particularly hard for women and for girls.
    The war in Sudan, extremism in Somalia, the post-conflict
    reconstruction in Ethiopia--they have left thousands of women
    survivors of conflict-related sexual violence struggling for
    justice.
        Across the region women continue to battle forced
    marriages, child labor, lack of social protections, and murder
    just for being a woman. They struggle to break through
    economically, politically, and through any social norms to gain
    equality.
        Ambassador, could you talk about how the U.S. has supported
    women's and girls' advancements in East Africa and the Horn
    and, really, the importance of doing so and, again, the impact
    of the U.S. terminating these kinds of programs on the region
    and success of the region.
        I think women can--support of the family. It is really
    critical to family structure and stability in some ways, right?
        Ms. Gavin. It is--of course, it is essential and in many
    African societies women are a backbone, of course, of what
    creates peace and stability. You are right about the really
    jaw-dropping and appalling level of sexual violence that we are
    seeing associated with the conflicts in the Horn right now.
        This happened in Tigray during that crisis. It is happening
    in the Amhara and Oromo areas right now and, of course, Sudan's
    plight is heartbreaking and when the U.S. is not there to try
    and provide assistance, medical assistance, and support, and,
    critically, a voice speaking out about some international
    norms, I think we all are invested.
        Senator Rosen. Violence against women, right?
        Ms. Gavin. Yes. Then we are missing a chance to strengthen
    these societies that we would like to have as peaceful
    partners, going forward.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I, too, will follow the norm and
    yield back.
        [Laughter.]
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
        I do not mean this disrespectfully, but your criticism
    about pulling troops out of that area, I think it is important
    for the record to note that when you have troops there, the
    question always is, is who are you going to train and who are
    you going to fight with, and when you have Somalia, Puntland,
    Somaliland, all of whom have disputed borders and incredibly
    entangled tribal issues there, who do you stand with?
        Now, obviously, we fight ISIS there and we fight Houthis
    there. If we can identify them, okay, but boy, the rest of this
    stuff, this is really a tough question.
        I appreciate the criticism, but there is a lot more to this
    than just here are the good guys and here are the bad guys.
    Finding good guys is really, really difficult there.
        Anyway, thank you for your thoughts.
        With that, we will turn to Senator Van Hollen.
        Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank both
    of you for your testimony today.
        I am actually going to pick up where Senator Rosen left off
    with respect to Sudan. We are now in the third year of a brutal
    civil war in Sudan.
        When Secretary Rubio was here for his confirmation hearing,
    he testified that helping resolve that conflict would be a top
    priority of the Administration.
        Clearly, that has not happened. In fact, the cuts to U.S.
    humanitarian assistance have made a desperate situation in
    Sudan even worse.
        Ambassador Gavin, you wrote a piece for the Council for
    Foreign Relations I think back in February entitled, ``The
    Abandonment of Sudan.''
        Obviously, we need to look for ways to put pressure on some
    of the outside parties. I have proposed actually stopping U.S.
    military assistance to the UAE so long as it continues to
    support the murderous RSF, and I think I heard you say, Mr.
    Meservey, that the RSF could not continue its military
    operations without that outside help from the UAE.
        Let me--if I could start with you, Ambassador Gavin. What
    should we do and should we be using more of our leverage to put
    pressure on some of the outside parties that are fueling this
    murderous conflict, including the UAE's support for the RSF?
        Ms. Gavin. Yes, I absolutely think we should be using more
    of our leverage with the UAE and having real conversations. I
    think Emirati officials are aware that the RSF is never going
    to govern all of Sudan.
        They have concerns about what the other side of the coin
    looks like and so do we, frankly, or we should, and what we
    have called the SAF for a long time is a coalition of entities
    and actors, some of which are highly problematic in terms of
    U.S. interests, and I do not think that that is likely to hold
    together in a scenario where there could be a military
    solution.
        The reality is there is no military solution. What needs to
    happen is a set of talks that involve Sudanese actors, pressure
    on these external actors who continue to arm and fuel both
    antagonists, but most importantly, really, a greater effort to
    elevate the civilian voices in Sudan who have never given up.
        They continue to be in many, many parts of the country the
    only source of medical care, of food, which is quite scarce,
    and they have been organizing to try to come up with some clear
    principles they would like all parties to agree to. That needs
    to be raised up and given validation and credibility from the
    U.S.
        Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
        Given the time I am going to turn briefly now to Ethiopia
    and Eritrea. I think we all know that Ethiopia stands at a
    pretty critical juncture as it grapples with the aftermath of
    the conflict in Tigray, and as we speak we see Eritrea.
        I think the leader there called up the troops--at least
    there are reports to that effect. I guess my question for each
    of you is if you were in charge right now of U.S. policy, what
    practical steps would you take today to try to address the
    bubbling, really, almost boiling situation with respect to
    Ethiopia and Eritrea?
        Why do we not start with you, Mr. Meservey?
        Mr. Meservey. Yes, thank you. I think the there is a few
    key issues here. One is that the Eritreans are still inside of
    Ethiopian territory in western Tigray in violation of the
    Pretoria Agreement, which is what ended the Tigray war
    ostensibly.
        There has to be a process for having them leave, but, of
    course, their presence is also tied into the internal divisions
    where the Amhara claim that area. The Tigrayans also claim it.
    It is a major flash point.
        I think right now what the U.S. can do, and I believe what
    it did do along with other partner countries, was to
    unequivocally demonstrate to both sides that we are watching
    and that a conflict would be unacceptable, and then it should
    offer its good offices for either convening discussions or
    trying to mediate around some of these issues, but they are
    intensely difficult and I am not, frankly, terribly positive
    about the immediate prospects for resolving them.
        Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
        Ambassador Gavin.
        Ms. Gavin. I would just quickly agree and add that
    mobilizing more of the AU member states to insist on actual
    implementation of the Pretoria Agreement would be a helpful
    focal point. This is something everybody has already agreed to,
    but it has not been fully implemented. It is in this strange
    limbo.
        I think that getting that kind of regional engagement would
    be helpful.
        Senator Van Hollen. Thank you both.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Cruz.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you.
        Mr. Meservey, as we have been discussing, I believe the
    Chinese Communist Party presents the most significant long-term
    strategic threat to the United States. I also believe that
    China is a global threat that has to be confronted globally,
    including in Africa.
        We have a vast range of interests in Africa and a
    complicated security architecture. Our interests there are
    counterterrorism, trade and critical mineral supply lines,
    global biosecurity, preventing illegal immigration that
    threatens allies in other parts of the world, blocking illicit
    finance of hostile actors, and even, importantly, space
    development.
        Across Africa again and again, the Chinese have exploited
    local political, economic, and sometimes even cultural
    conditions to undermine American national security interests.
        Sometimes they do it by securing bilateral and multilateral
    agreements that block American goals. Other times they do it by
    creating instability, but they are actively doing it.
        Talk a little bit about the specific tactics that China is
    using in East Africa and the Horn and what are the specific
    conditions they are exploiting?
        Mr. Meservey. Yes. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
        China, first of all, has a long-standing strategy for the
    continent that has been a topic of this conversation as the
    U.S. does not have anything comparable, and they are highly
    disciplined about implementing it.
        That is sort of the foundation of what they are doing. As
    far as specific tactics, they like to engage at a very senior
    level--the highest possible senior level. They do that in a
    variety of ways.
        Some of it is as open as bribery, but a lot of it is
    helping leaders, for instance, with key infrastructure projects
    that helps them politically in the domestic space or just
    expressing solidarity. That rhetoric is important.
        Even the diplomatic exchanges they engage, as I said, at a
    very high level, but they do it constantly as well. I
    referenced in my opening remarks over a hundred visits from
    senior Chinese officials to this area.
        They engage at a much higher tempo and at a much more
    senior level than U.S. diplomats do. Those are some of the
    specific tactics that they use, but they are not unique to East
    Africa.
        They use them across the continent to great effects, and
    then easy money loans, very important to their strategy.
    Investment trade agreements--we are seeing more and more free
    trade agreements where the so-called green lanes with their
    preferential access to the Chinese market for agricultural
    goods.
        It is genuinely a wide array of tactics that are grounded
    in a long-term strategy.
        Senator Cruz. How has Chinese involvement impacted the
    ongoing conflicts in the region?
        Mr. Meservey. Yes. I think in--usually China actually
    prefers stability because that facilitates what they are trying
    to do in other areas. They generally try to stay out of these
    types of things.
        We have seen some sort of, I would argue, weak diplomatic
    efforts from the Chinese. They do have a special envoy for the
    region who occasionally goes and talks to the various leaders,
    but I do not think anything substantive comes of it.
        They do contribute to peacekeeping operations, but that is
    much more, I would argue, about them building both diplomatic
    heft, but also capabilities for and experience for the troops
    in these types of austere environments where they are often
    put.
        I think they are not nearly as helpful as they could be. I
    think where they actively are negative are the Chinese weapons
    that flow through the area.
        Back in the original Sudan civil war they armed the Omar
    Al-Bashir regime, which was genociding Darfuris at the time.
    They armed both Ethiopia and Eritrea during their border war in
    the late 1990s and Chinese weapons continue to flood the area.
        We are seeing Chinese bombs and other things probably
    reexported from UAE show up in Sudan.
        Senator Cruz. Many of the agreements China has been locking
    in are explicitly military agreements. Since 2017 China has
    operated a military base in Djibouti. The CCP Beijing is
    actively working to deepen ties across the region to secure
    greater access to the Red Sea and key maritime routes.
        Describe the nature of China's specifically military
    cooperation in the Horn.
        Mr. Meservey. Yes. You referenced the flagship, which is
    the Djibouti base, but we have seen a very real uptick in
    military trainings.
        I think it was 2 or 3 years ago they inaugurated--the
    Chinese inaugurated an annual meeting for African defense
    chiefs. They convened in Beijing, and that has been ongoing, I
    believe, for 3 years, if I remember correctly.
        I also referenced in my written testimony the fact that PLA
    Navy vessels participate in these anti-piracy task forces in
    the Gulf of Aden.
        They then will go all around the continent doing port calls
    both on the Indian Ocean, but also the Atlantic Ocean side and
    the--that is clearly an effort to build blue water naval
    capabilities that they covet so they can project power into the
    South China Sea and probably for an eventual invasion of
    Taiwan.
        Again, the weapons, so weapons training deployments, and I
    already referenced the peacekeeping operations. I would say
    those are the primary elements.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
        Senator Booker.
        Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just want to start by adding to, I think, some of the
    sentiments expressed that we have a colossal problem right now
    by our failing to understand that if you look at all of
    humanity, the future is in so many ways Africa.
        We have one out of every four people on the planet Earth
    and by 2050 are going to be on the continent one out of every
    three working-age people.
        The continent is indispensable when it comes to the future
    strength, opportunities, prosperity, health of Americans. It is
    stunning to me that we are lacking a vision for engagement with
    the continent and are making such colossal mistakes.
        What the Trump administration is doing right now is not
    only unacceptable, but it is a series of self-inflicted wounds
    when we cut the kind of programs that have created economic
    stability and opportunity for American companies, that have
    gutted public health and our response to public health because
    a public health crisis anywhere now is a threat to public
    health everywhere.
        We are stopping, especially as we see the Tanzania
    elections and the Uganda elections and the instabilities
    there--we are cutting back our resources helping with
    democratic stability at a time that democracies are under
    retreat all across the globe, and the democratic freedoms and
    ideals that we preach are being undermined by forces that do
    not share our values.
        We are in a state of crisis right now when it comes to our
    relations with the continent and other competitors of ours,
    from Iranians to Russians to Chinese to people that do not
    always align with us, from the Emiratis and others, are
    flooding the zone where we are retreating in a stunning way.
        We are seeing our retreat on public health, on economic
    empowerment, on national security and creating a more volatile
    and dangerous environment where there are forces there that
    want to see the destruction of America, and there is no place
    that to me that this is more obvious in just this retreat we
    have, even in--where our embassies and consulates that are--
    that this administration is slating to close.
        China has embassies in every single country and we now see
    a list that consulates and embassies all over the world, but
    six embassies and two consulates in Africa, including around
    the Horn, are being shut down.
        When I travel through Africa, the power of our presence
    there, our ability to combat misinformation and propaganda, our
    ability to create deep partnerships and connection, we are
    truly pursuing a set of policies that are going to undermine
    America's safety, security, and economic strength in the future
    and make us be more targeted by forces from the Red Sea all the
    way to terrorist attacks here at home based upon the
    instability and folks who are focusing and targeting and trying
    to undermine America.
        Again, I am stunned. I have already been upset in past
    administrations with our failure to prioritize, but what is
    happening right now is just utterly stunning and generations of
    Americans will pay a price for it unless we find a way, in a
    bipartisan way to focus and do more.
        In my scarce remaining time I just want to focus in on
    Sudan. You call it, Ambassador, rightfully the worst
    humanitarian crisis on the globe, and if you want to talk about
    ethnic cleansing as the Administration rolls out the red carpet
    for some South Africans recently, the horrors of what is going
    on there, the instability it is causing to South Sudan, to
    Chad, the threat to the Horn in general, it cannot be
    overstated.
        If you--in the time that you have before me can you please
    help us as a committee understand that the failure of American
    focus--there was a bipartisan letter we just put forward to get
    a special envoy--just the failure of Americans to focus on this
    is not only contributing to greater humanitarian crises, but
    creating a level of instability and crisis that advantages
    forces that we are opposing like the Chinese and the Russians
    and more.
        Ms. Gavin. I can take a stab at it.
        You are absolutely right. Russia thrives in environments of
    chaos where they can cut a deal to do regime security whether
    the regime is legitimate or not, and get access to resources.
        Sudan's problem is bigger than Sudan. My concern is that we
    are going to end up with this belt of metastasizing instability
    all the way across the continent from the Atlantic to the Red
    Sea.
        You have the crisis in the Sahel. Things are not looking
    great in Central Africa, although I am hopeful that some
    advances will bear fruit, and then you have what is happening
    in the Horn.
        As these conflicts spill over, they relate to each other
    and it gets harder and harder to disentangle the threads,
    right?
        It is hard enough to make peace with two or three parties.
    Trying to do it with 16 is a very, very tall order.
        So I agree with you. I think that a de facto partition does
    not mean stability. These are fractious armed entities on
    either side and it is, I think, important always to remember
    that Osama bin Laden used to operate from Sudan. The Islamist
    forces that are a part of that Port Sudan coalition have a long
    history of wishing America harm.
        Senator Booker. Mr. Chairman, before I yield, there is a
    staggering moral failure here in our ability to exercise
    American influence--greater American influence on this crisis,
    but what is worse than this is I fear that if we do not--are
    not successful in addressing the abject lack of attention,
    focus, and energy from a diplomatic perspective that this
    crisis will grow worse and have implications on our own
    national security, as our witness indicated, and I am hoping
    that we as a committee can take even more actions to try to get
    the Trump administration to give a higher priority to solving
    this crisis and showing some true American leadership.
        The Chairman. Senator, we--my partner here and I made the
    decision to hold this hearing for the reasons you have
    indicated. There are serious problems here, and as you
    indicated or as has been suggested, everything has to be
    prioritized, and the difficulty is, as always, it is a question
    of money.
        Going into debt a trillion dollars every 150 days is
    unsustainable, so where do you put the money?
        There are things here that absolutely cry out for our
    attention, and the other fact that I think has been underscored
    here again and again and again is that Africa has such a
    galloping influence on the planet that it really does need our
    attention, particularly when it is getting such close attention
    by people who have values that are very different than ours
    other than democracy and respect for human rights. That was the
    purpose of the hearing.
        Senator Booker. Mr. Chairman, the one thing that I would
    request, and I have a feeling that the Trump administration
    will listen to you more than me, this does not cost any money
    to simply nominate ambassadors to key countries in Africa.
        The Chairman. Senator----
        Senator Booker. There is a scarce lack of even them coming
    forward with putting up leaders as we see them filling posts
    from European nations and others, but in critical areas we are
    not even getting ambassadorial nominees.
        The Chairman. A fair point. We get that, but, again, this
    comes back to there is only so many hours in a day and, as you
    know, moving ambassadors through here is a--without regard to
    the politics, moving ambassadors through here is a very
    cumbersome job that the Founding Fathers handed us with the
    system we go through, but thank you for your thoughts.
        Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. I know we are out of time, but I would
    like to just make two points. One is apropos the earlier
    conversation about PEPFAR and it not being an entitlement.
        I would like to point out that multiple African countries
    have, in fact, increased their financing to help pay for PEPFAR
    and to address HIV/AIDS.
        I would hope that we would continue to help work in
    partnership with them on that issue. The other thing I would
    point out with respect to Sudan, one of the things that we know
    from the data is that when women are at the table in
    negotiations that those negotiations are more likely to last
    longer term and more likely to be successful.
        It is a mistake we made in Afghanistan when we totally left
    women out of those negotiations for conflict and it is the
    reason why I have been so supportive of the Women, Peace and
    Security legislation that we passed, that President Trump
    signed in his first term and that now has decided to get rid of
    because he thinks it is a DEI program.
        It is not a DEI program. It is a program that recognizes
    that women make up half of the world and they need to be part
    of negotiations and part of ongoing efforts that we make and
    that we get a benefit from doing that.
        I just want to put that on the record, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.
        That will conclude the hearing, and I want to sincerely
    thank both of you for what I think has been an eye-opening
    experience for people who really are not exposed to this as we
    all are every day on this committee and in the lane you work
    in.
        For information of the members, the record will remain open
    until close of business tomorrow, May 14. We ask the witnesses
    if they do get such a question that you respond as promptly as
    possible and your response will be included in the record.
        Also, I am going to enter in the record the speech that has
    been referred to regarding Dr. William Ruto given April 23,
    2025, in Beijing, China.

    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found
    in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section
    at the end of this document.]

        The Chairman. With that and the thanks of the committee,
    the hearing is now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                                  ----------

                  Additional Material Submitted for the Record

                 Responses of Mr. Joshua Meservey to Questions
                      Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

        Question. What went wrong with the U.S.' Mogadishu-focused strategy
    in Somalia?

        Answer. The key flaw in the U.S.' Mogadishu-focused strategy is
    that it ignored the reality that a strong centralized government cannot
    work in the current Somali context. Most Somalis' preeminent loyalty is
    to clan--or, more precisely, to even smaller sub-clan formations--and
    not to any government. That is likely one reason why Somalia has scant
    historical practice of strong centralized government. The exception is
    the tenure of dictator Mohamed Siad Barre who ruled so disastrously
    that Somalia eventually plunged into failed state status.
        There is also a long history in Somalia of clan competition,
    including violence, that has bred distrust among the clans. Barre's
    two-decade rule likely exacerbated clannism in the country. As just one
    example, a core Somaliland grievance today against southern Somalia is
    the extreme anti-Isaaq violence Barre's government unleashed that was
    often perpetrated by Isaaq clan rivals.
        Despite these realities, U.S. policy for over a decade has focused
    on supporting a centralized government in Somalia often at the expense
    of engagement with sub-national entities that better map the
    distribution of clans. Such impracticality cannot succeed, and it has
    crippled American policy in the region.
        Furthermore, Washington has too frequently ignored, or been too
    blase about, the widespread corruption in Somalia's government and
    military. Policymakers must sometimes make unpalatable decisions for
    the sake of a higher national interest, yet the U.S. has responded so
    weakly to corruption for so long that Mogadishu's elites likely
    calculate they have little to fear from Washington on this score.
    Corruption undermines the scant legitimacy the central government has
    as well as the fight against al-Shabaab.

        Question. Can we work with the federal government and member states
    without picking sides?

        Answer. One driver of political instability in Somalia since the
    advent of the federal government system has been the contest for power
    between the states and the central government. Both sides seem to
    believe they are fighting a zero-sum contest for power. That would make
    it difficult for the U.S. to appear to not be choosing sides if it
    engaged unilaterally with the states.
        Nonetheless, the U.S. is obliged to pursue the good of its own
    people first. Engaging unilaterally with Somalia's states has a greater
    likelihood of protecting American interests in the country and region
    than continuing the demonstrably failed approach of granting the
    Mogadishu government a virtual veto over what Washington can and cannot
    do with the states.

        Question. What would more thoughtful engagement with Somaliland
    look like?

        Answer. The U.S. should unilaterally engage with Somaliland as its
    interests dictate and as other countries like the UAE already do. Given
    its pro-American orientation, diplomatic relations with Taiwan,
    strategic location, recently renovated and expanded Berbera port and
    airport, relative stability, and its decades' long practice of
    democracy, Somaliland is an obvious American partner in a difficult but
    important region.
        Before ramping up engagement with Somaliland, Washington should
    create a workable and clear roadmap for building the relationship.
    Unless U.S. national interests demand otherwise, engagement should
    begin with basic and relatively easy to achieve measures. Those could
    include agreeing a bilateral trade and investment framework; arranging
    an American commercial delegation visit; deploying technical experts
    from the relevant U.S. agencies to help Somaliland write a mining code
    and improve its economic regulatory environment; and a U.S. Geological
    Survey project to map Somaliland's natural resources.
        In tandem or in succession, the U.S. and Somaliland could intensify
    the relationship through security cooperation activities, including
    bolstering the Somaliland Coast Guard's capabilities and including
    Somaliland in the U.S. National Guard's State Partnership Program.
    Further measures should include establishing a military base in Berbera
    and a consulate office in Hargeisa, and, ultimately, recognition by the
    U.S. of Somaliland's independence. As part of that effort, the U.S.
    should coordinate with other countries that are willing to recognize
    Somaliland.
        Wherever practicable, the U.S. should partner with Taiwan in these
    efforts to enhance the trilateral relationship.

             Speech Given at Peking University, Beijing, China By
     Dr. William Ruto, President of the Republic of Kenya, Dated April 23,
                                      2025

                                    Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                    ------

     Article From KBC Digital Regarding President William Ruto's Visit to
                          China, Dated April 23, 2025

                                         Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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