[Senate Hearing 119-103]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-103
SHARED THREATS: INDO PACIFIC ALLIANCES AND BURDEN SHARING IN TODAY'S
GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 26, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(s) NOT AVAILANLE IN TIFF FORMAT
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-819PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DAVID MCCORMICK, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
STEVE DAINES, Montana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
MIKE LEE, Utah CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
RAND PAUL, Kentucky BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
TED CRUZ, Texas CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
RICK SCOTT, Florida TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 1
Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire............ 3
Schriver, Hon. Randall, Chairman of the Board, Project 2049
Institute,
Arlington, VA.................................................. 4
Prepared Statement........................................... 6
Statement of Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro, Center Fellow, Freeman
Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford
University, Non-Resident Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Stanford, CA.............................. 8
Prepared Statement........................................... 11
Dr. Victor Cha, Distinguished University Professor, Georgetown
University President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy
Department, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, DC................................................. 25
Prepared Statement........................................... 27
(iii)
SHARED THREATS: INDO-PACIFIC ALLIANCES AND BURDEN SHARING IN TODAY'S
GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 2025
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.
Risch presiding.
Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Ricketts, McCormick,
Scott of Florida, Cornyn, Shaheen, Coons, Kaine, Duckworth, and
Rosen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Thank you
all for attending today.
We apologize--we are starting a little late. We had an
important meeting before us and trying to get a handle on some
things that are going on.
I am going to give the usual statement. We welcome all of
you here. This is a public hearing. We are doing the business
of the United States of America, and this is just as important
as a courtroom, and as a result of that there will be no
audience participation.
Audience participation includes anything that attempts to
communicate with either witnesses or the committee. Whether you
are standing up, whether you are talking, whether you are
protesting, whether you are holding up signs, none of that is
permitted here.
We have zero tolerance for it. If you do that you are going
to be arrested immediately, as the people yesterday did that
were arrested, and then after you are arrested and go through
the process you will be banned from the committee for a year.
With that, we--again, we welcome your participation here as
a spectator, but that is the limit of what you can do here.
With that, we have an important hearing this morning on
Indo-Pacific alliances and we have some good and important
witnesses for that.
I am going to make an opening statement and then I will
recognize the ranking member to make an opening statement, and
then we will hear from our witnesses and then we will open it
up to a round of questions.
With that, as an opening statement I would like to talk
about this issue. Over the past several years we have seen
China rapidly escalate its aggressive actions against Taiwan,
Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and other countries in the
Indo-Pacific.
China has positioned itself as America's most significant
long-term challenge and that means, in the short-term, China's
military aggression in the Indo-Pacific should not go
unchecked.
China's actions destabilize global security and disrupt
global trade, which could impact Americans' financial aspects.
As demonstrated by China's spy balloon, which invaded our
sovereign airspace in 2023, China's ambitions are not confined
to Asia.
China's military is rapidly modernizing its shipbuilding
capacity, which is formidable, and its development of dual-use
artificial intelligence is growing more advanced by the day.
In this dangerous security environment, we and our allies
need to help ourselves by increasing defense spending and
building joint capabilities.
China's aggression should be confronted, but America should
not be the world's only watchdog. To counter Chinese
aggression, we need our allies to work with us to ensure each
of us is strong and capable of pushing back.
Today's hearing will focus on how we can build alliances
that are fit and up to this task.
America is well-positioned because we have a Commander-in-
Chief who understands the need for a strong relationship with
our Indo-Pacific allies.
President Trump's recent successful summit with the
Japanese Prime Minister and his administration's early focus on
the Philippines are proof of this.
In his first term, President Trump deepened security
cooperation with Taiwan, kept the U.S.-Japan-South Korea
intelligence sharing initiative alive, and approved major arms
transfers to Southeast Asian partners.
We need to build on this work. Key to this is encouraging
responsible and effective burden sharing from our partners.
This has been a decades-long bipartisan initiative that has
only become more pressing.
South Korea has done great work here. Its defense spending
grew consistently during the Cold War and beyond, always
remaining well above 2 percent of its GDP.
It now boasts a robust defense industry and is well-
positioned to work with the U.S. on boosting our shipbuilding
capacity.
Japan's defense spending remains comparably low, but it has
taken important steps like acquiring counter-strike
capabilities, and in Taiwan, double-digit defense spending
increases must continue, given the threat it faces across the
Taiwan Strait.
In addition to sharing the burden of defense, our allies
need to expand U.S. basing and overflight access around the
Indo-Pacific. The best way to show China that we stand together
is if we are physically present in the region.
The Philippines has shown itself to be a great partner in
this regard since the signing of the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement. We need far more of this around the
region.
I look forward to hearing the witnesses' thoughts on how to
approach both burden-sharing and access basing and overflight
in Asia, and more specifically what role the State Department
should play on these issues.
The issue in military aggression--the rise in military
aggression from China is a threat to us all. If we do not use
our alliances in the Indo-Pacific to a high standard, we do
Americans and the people of the region a tremendous disservice.
With that, thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
We have a good panel. We are looking forward to hearing from
them. With that, I recognize the ranking member.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Chairman Risch. Welcome to our
witnesses. We so appreciate your being here this morning.
From the South China Sea where China's Coast Guard harasses
Philippine forces to Beijing's military exercises over the
Taiwan Strait, there is bipartisan agreement that these
aggressive actions threaten national security.
As we know, the impacts of China's rise are not isolated to
Asia. Debt trap diplomacy with infrastructure projects in
Africa, the flow of fentanyl precursor chemicals into Latin
America, economic coercion in Europe over Lithuania's support
for Taiwan, China's influence can be felt across the globe.
That is certainly the case in Ukraine where China and North
Korea have been actively supporting Putin's war machine.
Beijing is watching how we respond to Ukraine as it weighs its
options in Taiwan.
The presidents of both parties have recognized the
challenge that China poses. President Trump took important
steps by implementing export controls during his first term.
President Biden not only kept those controls in place, his
administration strengthened them.
Our allies in Asia, as the chairman pointed out, also
recognize the threat that China poses. In 2022, Japan committed
to increasing its defense spending. Australia has made historic
investments in AUKUS, our trilateral defense partnership with
the U.K., and Taiwan is boosting its defense budget to over 3
percent of its GDP.
I agree that American allies should pay their fair share of
defense spending, but we should also acknowledge that our Indo-
Pacific partners are stepping up and U.S. support for these
alliances is not charity--it is a strategic investment.
America's alliances around the world are one of our
greatest security assets. South Korea hosts eight U.S. military
bases and 23,000 U.S. service members.
Japan not only allows the U.S. to station 55,000 troops
across 15 major bases, it also helps pay for them, contributing
$2 billion a year.
These partnerships are mutually beneficial and go beyond
our military. Whether in Europe or Latin America, our allies
help us to counter China's economic influence and
disinformation.
The combined power of American and European markets
together expands our ability to set AI standards and our
alliances support American companies and workers.
Last week I attended a defense industry round table on
AUKUS in New Hampshire. Strengthening our submarine industrial
base like the work being done at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
does more than give us a strategic edge over China. It creates
high-quality American jobs and it supports our domestic
industry.
So instead of threatening or undermining friendly nations
with tariffs, I think we should be strengthening our alliances.
NATO has contained the Soviet Union and Russia for decades. I
would be interested in hearing from our witnesses on what
mutual defense arrangements for the Indo-Pacific might look
like.
We need to explore every advantage that we have. INDOPACOM,
our military command in the region, has also led the way in
implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Act. The commander
recently told me that INDOPACOM has been more effective than
any other U.S. regional command in ensuring women play key
roles in decision-making.
That is a strategic strength and we should build on it if
we want to combat the growing link between security in Asia and
security in Europe.
As we know, the world is more connected than ever. I hope
our witnesses this morning will speak not only to the
challenges we face, but also to the opportunities that we can
seize at this historic time.
So I look forward to hearing your thoughts and I am
delighted that you are joining us. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
We will now hear from our witnesses. We are going to start
with Randall Schriver, Chairman of the Board at the Project
2049 Institute.
He previously served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Indo-Pacific Security Affairs in the first Trump
administration, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He is one of our foremost
experts on U.S. alliances in Asia.
The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. RANDALL SCHRIVER, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD,
PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE, ARLINGTON, VA
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Shaheen, and other distinguished members of the committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning to testify
on this topic.
So for the United States to realize our goal of a free and
open Indo-Pacific, we are and will continue to be very heavily
reliant on alliances and partnerships.
We are a Pacific power, but we are not heavily resident in
the Western Pacific. Hawaii is three time zones away from the
continental U.S., but still west of the international--east of
the international date line, and even our great territories--
Guam, our state of Alaska--do not put us resident enough in the
Western Pacific to fully affect security the way we would like.
This geographic conundrum advantages our adversaries and
competitors. For China, Russia, North Korea, they enjoy
geographic proximity to the areas we seek to safeguard.
So this means in a contingency, whether that be Taiwan
Strait, West Philippine Sea, East China Sea, the United States
will always be the away team, will always be playing on the
road.
Strong alliances and partnerships are the best way to
combat this tyranny of time and distance. In the military and
security domain, we rely on our allies and partnerships for at
least three types of contributions.
First, we need them to develop their own capabilities for
their sufficient self-defense, but also to be contributors to
other regional contingencies if need be.
Second, we rely on them for access basing and overflight,
as has been pointed out in the opening statements, as a distant
power ourselves.
And third, we rely on our partners and allies to also play
a role in the shaping and the support for a free and open Indo-
Pacific and all that that entails, as well as day-to-day
activities that uphold deterrence.
So these are the things that I think are the basis for
evaluating burden-sharing. I think too often burden-sharing is
scoped down to a single figure, which is how much is a country
spending per GDP--percentage of GDP on defense.
I think that does not always tell the whole story. It is
revealing, but does not always tell the whole story. Just a few
examples, Philippines spends 1.5 percent of GDP on defense, but
yet they are making more and more sites available for U.S.
forces through, as the chairman mentioned, the EFTA agreements,
nine sites now.
Japan, as was mentioned, has historically spent close to 1
percent of GDP, but in fact we were advocates for actively
suppressing that defense spending for many decades to now get
to a point where people would like to see them do more.
They are doing more, but they are also the host to the
largest number of U.S. military forces forward deployed, and as
ranking member Shaheen pointed out, they are contributors
through host nation support.
Taiwan is spending 2.5 percent of GDP, but they are also
spending a lot that is not accounted for in defense when it
comes to national resiliency on energy, on communications, on
civil defense.
So perhaps they should be getting more credit. History is
very important, too. We have partners and allies that have
fought alongside us in every conflict since World War I, and,
of course, I am speaking most directly about Australia.
So I believe it is a complicated formula and we should take
a comprehensive view on burden-sharing and give credit where
credit is due because these alliances are so important to us.
This is further complicated by the changing nature of the
threat. Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles put our forward
deployed forces at risk so we are now more and more dependent
on our allies for basing and access.
So spending figures do not capture the entire picture, in
my point of view. Our State Department will be extraordinarily
important in addressing this.
Our State Department, they are the lead negotiators for
host nation support for access. They run our security
assistance, foreign military sales, foreign military financing,
international military education and training.
They run programs that are adjacent to military and
security like the INL programs that support Coast Guards
through the prism of law enforcement, and I would argue even
the education and cultural programs--the Fulbright, the
International Visitors Program. That is investing in the
alliance managers of the future and I think that should be
supported.
Let me close with four brief recommendations that address
issues under the purview of this committee.
I think, number one, this committee should ask for regular
updates regarding our more advanced and mature alliances--Japan
and Australia--to make sure initiatives are on track with
respect to posture and C2 adjustments and both pillars of
AUKUS.
Two, I think the committee should insist State Department
demonstrate FMS, FMF, and IMET are in fact in alignment with
our strategic goals and should be actively shaping that.
Third, I think the committee should insist on a speedy
conclusion of U.S. assistance reviews and direct resumption of
aid that aligns with our strategic priorities, things like EDCA
and Coast Guard support and dioxin remediation in Vietnam.
Finally, this committee should insist on a speedy
conclusion of State Department review of education and cultural
programs and direct resumption of programs that align with our
strategic priorities.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver follows:]
Prepared Statement of Randall G. Schriver
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and distinguished members
of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify on the important
issues related to our alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.
To realize the Unites States' vision of securing a free and open
Indo-Pacific region, we are heavily reliant on alliances and
partnerships. The United States is a Pacific power, yet we are mostly
resident in the Eastern Pacific and lack significant presence in the
Western Pacific. Though Hawaii is three time zones west of the
continental United States, and Alaska's Aleutian Island chain stretches
beyond the international date line, we are still largely removed from
many of the key areas of the Western Pacific that significantly impact
America's vital interests.
This geographic conundrum carries heavy implications for everything
from supply chains to trade, but from a national security perspective
our competitors and adversaries--that axis of China, Russia and North
Korea--all are advantaged by their physical proximity to the areas we
seek to safeguard. And in the event of a contingency, whether in the
Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, or the West
Philippines Sea, the United States will be playing on the road as the
``away team.'' Strong alliances and partnerships are the best way to
combat ``the tyranny of time and distance.''
In the military and security domain, we depend on alliances and
partnerships for at least three types of contributions. First, we need
our allies to build their own respective militaries for sufficient
self-defense, as well as for having capabilities they can bring to bear
on other regional contingencies. Second, we need allies and partners to
provide access, basing, and overflight (ABO) for forward deployed U.S.
military forces. And third we need allies and partners of like mind to
help create and uphold the free and open order in the Indo-pacific
characterized by protection of sovereignty, respect for international
laws and norms, peaceful dispute resolution, and the ability of
political leaders in all capitals to make decision free from coercion
and undue influence. How well or how poorly an ally contributes across
these three areas is the primary basis for evaluating their level of
``burden sharing.''
Too often burden sharing is scoped down to a simple question of
``how much does the country spend on its defense as a percentage of
GDP?'' And in the cases where we have permanent bases and presence,
``how much is the country contributing in host nation support?'' While
those statics can be revealing, they often do not tell the entire
story. How should we evaluate a country like the Philippines which only
spends 1.5 percent of GDP on defense, but is offering expanded access
for U.S. forces in proximity to a major known contingency through nine
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) locations? Taiwan is
spending 2.5 percent of GDP on defense (and is committed to increasing
that to 3 percent), but is also spending increasing amounts on
``national resilience'' to include resilient energy stockpiles,
hardened and redundant communications, and civilian sheltering and
civil defenses--all of which contribute to deterrence, but none of
which counts in the defense budget. What do we say of Singapore who is
not a treaty ally--but spends 3 percent of GDP on defense and has been
extremely generous on access opportunities for U.S. forces (including
paying to extend their major navy pier to accommodate aircraft
carriers--which we have but they do not). How do we account for
historical legacy? We spent decades actively encouraging Japan to
suppress defense spending, but now many claim they are falling short.
At the same time, we also have more forces stationed in Japan than any
other country in Asia and enjoy approximately a billion and a half U.S.
dollars a year in host nation support. Australia spends 2 percent of
GDP on defense, but is increasing access opportunities for U.S. forces
and has fought alongside the U.S. in every conflict since World War I.
This evaluation is further complicated by the evolving nature of
the threat, and the changing character of warfare. Given the threat
from increasingly lethal and accurate Chinese ballistic and cruise
missiles, U.S. war planners have determined we need to fight in a
distributed, dispersed manner. This makes access and basing far more
important than it was two decades ago. The key to sustained combat
generation in a contested environment may very well come down to a
handful of dispersal points with sufficient maintenance and logistics
support, and forward positioning of critical munitions and fuel.
Spending money on expensive legacy platforms might win favor with
those who solely judge an ally based on the total amount of defense
spending, but the keys to success in modern warfare may be acquiring
cheaper, attritable, autonomous systems, combined with an AI-enabled
comprehensive operating picture with optimized decision-making
assistance. An ally with a modernized C5ISR system that is also
interoperable with the U.S. military with real-time data sharing may
prove able to carry much more of the burden in both peacetime and in
conflict than a country with the largest quantity of legacy platforms.
Beyond investing in one's own defense and beyond ABO, our allies
are increasingly important in shaping the regional security environment
and bolstering deterrence. Japan and Korea are more active in regional
security assistance, capacity building and training which is additive
to U.S. efforts. Australia and New Zealand's development assistance and
capacity building in Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia help make
countries in Oceana more resilient. And more allies and partners are
willing to join the U.S. in a variety of presence operations that
support freedom of navigation in the key maritime commons.
It is therefore my judgement that we should take a far more
comprehensive view of burden sharing rather than looking only at
defense spending. In doing so, we will have a more accurate
understanding of a particular ally's actual contributions to regional
security and support of U.S. interests. A comprehensive account will
not relieve pressure on our allies to improve. Quite to the contrary,
it will help our diplomats become more focused on what the prioritized
``asks'' should be from our allies.
The State Department will be absolutely crucial to our efforts
moving forward to modernize our alliances and to enhance comprehensive
burden sharing in at least four ways. First, the State Department is
the lead agency for international negotiations. Our diplomats will thus
be out front in negotiating host nation support agreements (e.g. Japan
in 2027) and future access agreements. Second, our State Department
runs security assistance programs. Critical programs such as Foreign
Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and
International Military Education and Training (IMET) are all run out of
State. Our ``T'' Bureau at State will have a lot of influence on how
efficiently the FMS and FMF process runs, as well as influence on what
allies procure and how partner countries modernize. Third, the State
Department runs programs that are military and security ``adjacent.''
For example, the INL bureau of the State Department through the prism
of law enforcement assistance has engaged in capacity building of
regional Coast Guards. Arguably, in the current environment of grey
zone incursions, assistance to the Philippine Coast Guard is as
important to deterrence as assistance to the military. USAID
(presumably now fully under State Department) also played a role in
supplying the ECDA sites with humanitarian supplies for use in the
event of natural disasters. In the case of partner country Vietnam,
USAID has helped with Dioxin remediation at former U.S. military sites
which has been a key enabler to building U.S.-Vietnam security ties.
And fourth, State Department has responsibility over assistance
programs that are non-military, but contribute greatly to alliance and
partner building. Fulbright programs and education and cultural
exchanges cultivate the next generation of talented and faithful
alliance managers.
Let me close with four specific recommendations to Congress on
issues for which this committee has purview:
(1) This committee should request regular updates regarding the more
advanced and mature alliances with Japan and Australia
respectively, on alliance modernization initiatives such as
posture realignment, C2 adjustments, and both pillars of AUKUS
to ensure the initiatives are sustained and on track.
(2) This committee should insist State Department demonstrate FMS,
FMF and IMET decisions are aligned with strategic priorities,
and take into account lessons learned on the changing nature of
warfare. Particular attention should be given to providing
capabilities for advanced sensing, battlefield management and
promoting a networked region of U.S. allies and partners.
(3) This committee should insist on a speedy conclusion of U.S.
assistance reviews and direct resumption of aid that aligns
with strategic priorities. Emphasis should be placed on aid
programs that support our military posture initiatives (e.g.
EDCA), military adjacent capabilities (e.g. Coast Guards), and
alliance and partnership enabling programs (e.g. Dioxin
remediation).
And
(4) This committee should insist on a speedy conclusion of State
Department review of education and cultural exchange programs
and direct a resumption of programs that align with strategic
priorities. Our future alliance managers should be the first
beneficiaries of the reconstituted Fulbright fellowships and
International Visitor Leaders Program.
Thank you once again and I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Schriver. That is a
challenging list that you gave us, but we will talk about that
when we get to the questions.
Next we have Dr. Mastro is a Center Fellow at the Freeman
Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford
University. She is also a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
In addition, she continues to serve in the U.S. Air Force
Reserve where she works as a strategic planner at the Pentagon.
Her research focuses on the Chinese military, Asia Pacific
security issues, and coercive diplomacy.
Dr. Mastro, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. ORIANA SKYLAR MASTRO, CENTER FELLOW, FREEMAN
SPOGLI INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, STANFORD
UNIVERSITY, NON-RESIDENT SCHOLAR, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE, STANFORD, CA
Dr. Mastro. Thank you.
Chairman Risch, ranking member Shaheen, and esteemed
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thank you
for the opportunity to present my views today on how to best
approach alliance burden sharing in the Indo-Pacific.
I will present what types of allied support I believe will
be the most strategically consequential for the U.S. ability to
deter Chinese aggression and how the United States can better
encourage such support.
Burden sharing is often framed in financial terms, but if
we take a broader perspective, the contributions that our
allies can make goes much beyond defense spending.
Instead, I would argue that we need to prioritize three
other forms of contributions from our allies.
First, the United States needs to focus on getting more
expansive, flexible, and permanent access, basing, and
overflight in allied countries in the Indo-Pacific.
Second, the United States needs greater influence in what
allies invest in to include greater support for U.S. military
construction and the development of certain military
capabilities that complement rather than duplicate our forces.
As the previous witness already mentioned, our allies and
partners are doing a lot to support U.S. defense and deterrence
in the Indo-Pacific.
If we do require greater access basing and overflight, in
my written testimony I lay out some specifics on what I think
that could look like for our allies and partners.
As I have listed elsewhere, to deter China from using
force, especially over Taiwan, the United States needs to
implement a denial strategy--the ability to deny China from
achieving its goals through force.
Some examples of things that we could do with our allies
and partners in terms of ABO that could achieve this goal are
things such as getting submarine tenders in Japan, more
permanent basing in the Philippines, and prioritizing anti-ship
capabilities in the southwest islands of Japan.
I would also note that the United States should consider
renegotiating the relocation of our Marines from Okinawa to
Guam as that agreement was signed almost 20 years ago and does
not take into account the rise of China and the consequential
changing security environment.
In addition to greater access, basing, and overflight, it
is important that the United States works with allies and
partners so that they spend on the right things, not just spend
more.
The United States could encourage two types of spending in
particular--first, greater contributions to the cost of U.S.
military construction.
It is important to note that a lot of our allies and
partners already contribute significantly to this, in
particular Japan, but South Korea could contribute more to
these costs.
Philippine Government, however, is a bit more cash-
strapped, and given that the United States is trying to gain
access to basing there, this is one of the areas where the
United States should be able to make greater financial
contributions.
Allied defense investment decisions could also be geared to
better support U.S. defense industry. The chairman already
mentioned the improvements and the contributions of South
Korean shipbuilding, and in recent years there have been great
developments in research, development, licensing production
between the United States and Japan and, of course, a prime
example being the expanded defense cooperation found in AUKUS.
The United States could also encourage allies and partners
to invest in capability that complement instead of duplicate
U.S. capabilities.
The third potential impactful area of burden sharing is
mission burden sharing. The allies and partners are investing
more in the capabilities to deter China and also take on a
greater responsibility during crises.
For example, the United States might need South Korea to be
better positioned to take on responsibilities to counter North
Korean hostility during potential conflicts. In this vein,
South Korea should also agree to strategic flexibility for the
United States, meaning that the U.S. can use our forces on the
Peninsula for off-Peninsula contingencies, i.e., those that
involve China.
Japan needs to be better prepared to deter conflict in the
East China Sea and Australia, through our cooperation, could
have a greater burden of exercising military dominance over key
Southeast Asian choke points.
Recognizing the United States cannot do it all, we should
also welcome coordination and cooperation among our allies and
partners.
Let me conclude by saying that the best way to encourage
any sort of burden sharing is not to publicly criticize allies
and demand it, but instead the United States needs to offer
more than security protections.
Development assistance, political support, technological
cooperation, economic benefits, humanitarian aid and disaster
relief--these are some of the most impactful.
The public nature of U.S. demands makes it hard for U.S.
allies, who are all democracies, to cooperate with the United
States and to consider some of the requests that we might make.
Some for alliance burden sharing it is very important for
the United States to have access to all tools of national power
in order to convince countries to be better aligned with our
defense priorities.
It goes without saying that that means the United States
needs the full use of all aspects of national power. The recent
dissolution of key agencies such as USAID or the U.S. Agency
for Global Media, which oversees Voice of America, these were
relatively important and inexpensive tools of U.S. power and
influence, and it makes the job of projecting U.S. power
overseas even much harder, and I hope, pending appropriate
reviews, that the funding and support for these tools resume in
the future.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Mastro follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Doctor.
Now we will hear from Dr. Victor Cha. He is a distinguished
university professor at Georgetown University, the president of
the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy department at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, and a senior fellow at the
George W. Bush Institute.
He served on the NSC and as an advisor to the Secretary of
Defense on the Defense Policy Board across different
administrations. Dr. Cha is a leading expert on U.S. alliances
and particularly the U.S.-Korea alliance.
Dr. Cha, we would like to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF DR. VICTOR CHA, DISTINGUISHED UNIVERSITY
PROFESSOR, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT, GEOPOLITICS AND
FOREIGN POLICY DEPARTMENT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Cha. Thank you, Chairman Risch, ranking member Shaheen,
and members of the committee, for the opportunity to speak to
you today about U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific.
I am going to make five points that summarize the full
statement and data that I have presented and would like to
submit for the record.
The Chairman. It will be submitted.
Dr. Cha. Thank you, sir.
My first point is historical, and that is that our alliance
system in Asia, which was created over 70 years ago, has served
us very well.
It won the Cold War, stopped communist dominoes from
falling, reduced poverty, created wealth and fostered
democracy. Nobody could have imagined this outcome 70 years
ago, and these alliances are a unique aspect of U.S. power.
The second point is with regard to shared threats. As we
all know, we face these shared threats--China, the nuclear
buildup, missile buildup, assertive behavior in the Taiwan
Strait, South China Sea, East China Sea.
This is now complicated by this axis of Russia, Iran, North
Korea and their conduits--Cuba, Iraq, Syria, Venezuela--all
actively working in concert to undermine U.S. interests.
As we all know, for example, in the Ukraine war, almost 100
percent of the micro electronics behind Russian weaponry came
from China--glide bombs, attack drones from Iran--and 50
percent of the munitions today that Russia uses are sourced
from North Korea.
So the U.S. has to prevail against these threats, but we
cannot do it alone. We need our alliances.
In the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. has 24 persistent bases and
access to 20 other sites. By contrast, China has one overseas
base.
These bases allow for rapid response and successful defense
and deterrence, but at the same time these alliances are in
need of reform and modernization.
My third point is with regard to burden sharing, and the
main point here is that allies are much more capable of bearing
host nation costs than they were 50 years ago. Many of the
algorithms we use are legacies of the past.
At the same time, any changes should avoid surprises to
give our allies in the region the domestic political space to
sell new agreements to their publics, as these sorts of
agreements need to be ratified by their legislatures, unlike
the case in the United States.
Burden sharing algorithms that exponentially increase
allied payments will not be feasible unless they take into
account allied contributions outside of the alliance on behalf
of the alliance, such as the $18 billion that Japan has
provided in support to Ukraine, and the $3 billion plus that
South Korea has done as well.
These burden sharing contributions need to be documented as
per legislation like the Allied Burden Sharing Report Act.
My fourth point is in regard to access basing and
overflight. The United States increasingly operates in a
contested basing environment to include cost constraints,
adversary tactics, and the vagaries of domestic political
leadership in these host countries.
Gaining access to allied bases and civilian facilities for
prepositioning of kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities is as
much political as it is a military exercise.
It requires socializing publics and governments not just at
the national level, but also at the local level, to understand
the role they play in national security.
In the case of Japan, this means securing access to JSDF
and civilian facilities in the dispersed positions in the
southwest island chain. It also means the U.S. commitment to
following through on the promise to create a joint force
headquarters to coordinate with the newly established JJOC in
Japan.
In Korea, this means not just a military, but also a
political discussion with the next South Korean Government
about the role of the Korean military and the U.S. military in
a Taiwan contingency.
South Korea has made good statements with regard to
Taiwan's defense in the previous two leaders' summits, but now
comes the hard part; bringing political consensus to think
about changes that include things like force presence on the
Peninsula, rear area support, and South Korean capabilities to
deter North Korea in the event of opportunistic aggression in a
Taiwan contingency.
The other point I wanted to make about ABO strategy is to
complement our military access arrangements with a strategy to
stop Chinese economic coercion. This is because our access
could be compromised by Chinese commercial pressure on host
economies with regard to our arrangements.
In this regard, U.S. Indo-Pacific allies need to take a
page from the EU's anti-coercion instrument and build a
collective economic deterrence framework that is not just an
economic strategy, but is also related to our military and ABO
strategy.
My last point is that the update of our alliances should
include burden sharing in terms of allied participation in
global governance institutions when our traditional
institutions of global governance, like the U.N. Security
Council, are underperforming.
In this regard, the State Department should formalize the
IP4--Indo-Pacific Four--grouping as regular participants in
global governance institutions like the NATO leaders' summit
and the G-7.
These allies can help carry forward like minded agendas as
the United States consolidates its power at home.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cha follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Victor D. Cha
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen and distinguished members of
the committee, it is an honor to appear before this committee on the
topic of U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. The views
represented in this testimony are my own and not those of any employer
or institution with which I am affiliated.
The Indo-Pacific is of terrible importance to U.S. economic and
security interests, and our alliances help to preserve those interests
and achieve our goals there. But these alliances are in need of reform
and modernization given the challenges posed by the new geostrategic
environment.
I will speak briefly about the historical importance of these
security institutions and ways to modernize them going forward. I
request that my full written statement be submitted for the record.
origins of the alliance system
When the United States created a network of bilateral alliances in
Asia in the immediate postwar period, architects like John Foster
Dulles acknowledged that this system was different from the
multilateral structure built in Western Europe, but policymakers at the
time probably had no inkling of how successful this alliance system
would become and how well it would serve U.S. interests.
Each of the bilateral alliances at that time with Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand
(ANZUS) afforded the United States an immense amount of power and
influence, unlike anywhere else in the world. The alliance system
created incredibly loyal allies like Japan, Australia, and South Korea,
the latter two of which have fought with the United States in every war
since World War I and the Korean War, respectively.
Through this alliance system, the United States won the Cold War in
Asia: It created prosperity and economic development in the region
beyond anyone's imagination; it fostered growth and democracy. The
importance of democratic values in the alliance system cannot be
undervalued considering that at the outset of the alliance system's
creation in 1951, it looked very much like communism would win the day.
The CCP victory in China in 1949, the communist North Korea attack in
1950, and communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia lent credence to the
domino theory--that soon, all these distant, post-colonial states would
be falling behind the iron curtain. But that did not happen. The U.S.
alliance system in Asia prevailed.
today's geopolitical environment
Today, the pacing threat from China crosses many dimensions,
including security, economic, information, and technology. But it is
complicated and enhanced by a growing group of illiberal actors
operating in concert with one another to undermine the U.S. position.
These actors are well known to you: Russia, Iran, and North Korea and
their conduit states, Cuba, Iraq, Syria, and Venezuela. Table 1, for
example, shows the range of support provided by these actors to
Russia's war in Ukraine. China supplied almost 100 percent of the
microelectronics for Russia's missiles, tanks, and aircraft. Iran
contributed significantly to Russia's supply of attack drones, close-
range ballistic missiles, and glide bombs among other weapons used in
the war. North Korea has provided 11,000-12,000 troops, hundreds of
ballistic missiles, and may account for as much as 50 percent of
Russia's ammunition today. Outside of these actors, the supply of like-
minded and capable partners dwindles in comparison with a growing
number of ``hedge'' states like Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa, and UAE who cannot be relied upon to side with the United
States depending on the issue.
reforming the indo-pacific alliances
The United States must meet these challenges and win, not by going
it alone but with the support of our allies. There is no real
alternative. The alliance system has proven to be a winning formula in
the past, and it will do so again, but not without reform and
modernization.
For some in the current administration, the imperative to update
and modernize these alliances stems from the judgment that they are
costly economically to the United States. If we use trade and defense-
spending as two metrics of allied burden-sharing, there are no Indo-
Pacific allies that are judged to be carrying their fair share.
Four principles should drive the mindset of alliance modernization:
1) Indo-Pacific allies are capable and can contribute much more to
networked capabilities than in the past; 2) Change is difficult, but
Indo-Pacific allies must manage the domestic-political resistance to
doing things differently; 3) Allies need to accept increased burden-
sharing as a given in the modernization effort; and 4) Allied
contributions to successful deterrence with the United States are a
critical pre-requisite to their realizing commercial opportunity with
China--that is, without security, there is no commercial opportunity,
there is only commercial coercion by China.
In the Indo-Pacific region, the United States has 24 persistent
bases and access to 20 other military sites. By contrast, China has
only one overseas base in the world in Djibouti. These positions host
88,500 active-duty servicemembers, including about 60,000 in Japan and
about 28,500 in Korea.
This presence affords the United States rapid response capabilities
to military contingencies; contributes to successful deterrence against
adversarial threats to the homeland and to allies/partners; and
provides the physical assurance of the U.S. security umbrella that is
critical not just to peace, but also to profitable commerce and
investment that drives the region's growth.
Congress' role in maintaining this alliance network is critical in
its appropriation of funds for basing activities; its legislation of
policies and requirements related to basing; and its oversight of the
executive branch's policies related to basing and alliance relations.
burden-sharing
Four principles should undergird the reform of burden-sharing
arrangements with allies. One, allied governments must recognize that
traditional monetary burden-sharing algorithms are legacies of a time
one-half century ago when U.S. capabilities dwarfed those of smaller
partners. Host-nation support arrangements where the U.S. annual
contribution is larger than that of the partner no longer makes sense
given the partner's wealth.
Two, host-nation support agreements probably can and should take
account of allied contributions to defense and security outside of, but
on behalf of, the bilateral security partnership.
Three, aside from the monetary aspects, burden-sharing should be
defined as the reorientation of costs and capabilities to the broader
regional deterrence and defense mission in the Indo-Pacific. While this
is already the case for some alliances, it is not the case for all and
needs to be so.
Four, a critical element of reform is to avoid surprises. It is
imperative to create a suitable runway and plan that gives host nations
the political space to make potentially paradigm-shifting adjustments
to the alliance.
Current SMA arrangements for Japan and South Korea adhere to a
legacy algorithm of incremental annual increases of around 2 percent
and 5-8 percent respectively. The newly concluded South Korea agreement
($1.05 billion in 2025 and $1.14 billion in 2026) expires in 2030; the
Japan agreement (about $1.5 billion in 2025) expires in 2026 with each
agreement covering about 40-50 percent (Korea) and 75 percent (Japan)
of the non-personnel costs of stationing USFK and USFJ (covering labor,
utilities, training, construction, purchase of local supplies).
Negotiation of new agreements, following a ``cost-plus-50'' model
for example, will be difficult for host nations to swallow given the
need for legislative ratification (unlike in the United States). In
devising a more equitable formula for cost-sharing that acknowledges
the economic capacity of allied governments' substantial wealth, the
United States and allied governments could agree to include other non-
SMA contributions as part of the ledger of allied contributions in
future agreements. Table 2 gives examples of past non-SMA costs borne
by Japan and Korea.
Greater burden-sharing by allies could also acknowledge the out-of-
theater contributions by allies to security. But this would also
require that current burden-sharing agreements be revised to
reinstitute allied support for U.S. military assets outside of the host
nation (e.g., South Korea). For example, Table 3 enumerates Australia,
Japan and South Korea's contributions to Ukraine.
This more comprehensive definition of burden-sharing by allies
should be documented by the Administration through legislation like the
Allied Burden Sharing Report Act and the NATO Burden Sharing Report
Act.
access, basing and overflight (abo)
The United States will increasingly operate in a contested basing
environment. Some of the challenges are internal in terms of our own
resource constraints. Some of them relate to the strategy of the
adversary (i.e., A2/AD). And some of the challenges are political and
internal to those particular host countries. Yet securing these
privileges are critical to giving the U.S. military resilience in terms
of staying power, resupply/repair, and storage, not to mention the
critical physical presence that undergirds credible deterrence.
Here I cannot offer recommendations that you have not already
heard. In general, we need to push for U.S. use of allied bases in
contingencies where the ally is not directly threatened. Given growing
reach and capabilities of the adversary, the United States must do more
to harden forward presence infrastructure as well as increase air and
missile defense systems. There could be more burden-sharing of the
latter with allies, including additional THAAD systems in the region.
In the case of Japan, major advances in defense spending and the
creation of the joint operational command (JJOC) are commendable, and
have been supported by the public. There is an expectation that the
United States would pre-consult with Japan on pre-positioning of
additional capabilities, and that Tokyo would gain support of local
communities. The Japanese Government could build on this momentum to
improve access arrangements for the alliance to make deterrence more
credible and defenses more capable in a Taiwan contingency. This
requires an initiative from the top to engage in a whole-of-government
dialogue internally and with the United States (in the 2+2 ministerial
talks) on revisions to SOFA which govern limited use access to JSDF and
civilian facilities other than permanent U.S. bases in Japan. The
purpose would be to streamline the national and local approval process
for U.S. access to dispersed positions in the Southwest (Nansei) island
chain (Miyako, Ishigaki, Yonaguni) in advance of an armed-attack
situation. Tokyo must also work with local governments to enhance their
understanding of the role they play in national defense (something
better understood in Tokyo). Such reforms should not be seen as a favor
or concession to the United States, but as necessary to enhance Japan's
national defense and security in the Nansei island chain closest to
Taiwan.
In the case of South Korea, U.S. access to bases, the addition of
new non-kinetic capabilities, and the addition of kinetic capabilities
would be generally uncontroversial. The key is that they are framed as
directed toward the North Korean threat. The framing of capabilities as
directed to a Taiwan contingency, however, becomes more problematic
given the traditional South Korean reluctance to become entrapped in a
U.S.-China conflict. Domestic political factors matter here to a degree
in that conservative governments in Seoul tend to be a shade more open
to discussions about Taiwan contingencies. It is also noteworthy that
both progressive and conservative governments have broken new ground
with summit-level statements equating freedom of navigation and
stability of the Taiwan straits with Korea's security. Still, the
resistance is real. The United States could engage the next Korean
Government in a broad reorientation of U.S. forces in Korea moving from
a peninsular mission to a regional one. The range of options here could
span removing troops from the peninsula to elsewhere, or increasing the
presence in Korea with a portion each committed to peninsular defense
and regional defense.
However, I would like to draw your attention to one important
strategy to optimize U.S. ABO options. If the strategy for maintaining
access rests on complementing and/or reforming large, main legacy
operating base infrastructures, which are put at risk by the
adversary's anti-access capabilities, with a network of smaller,
dispersed, and concealed arrangements in the Indo-Pacific, then a major
threat to this plan is not just China's ability to locate and
militarily target such arrangements, but the political and commercial
pressure that it can put on the hosts to withhold cooperation with the
United States. Indeed, commercial pressure is probably the ideal tool
for China to use given the nature of these small and dispersed ABO
arrangements--that is, a host nation is more likely to succumb to
intense Chinese economic pressure to withhold cooperation with the
United States over a discrete access arrangement than over a large
military base. China's use of economic coercion against U.S. allies is
well-established. Since 2008, it has used economic coercion against 18
governments and over 500 companies (including U.S. primes). The purpose
of the coercion is expressly political, not trade-related. The most
well-known case related to access capabilities is probably the 2016-
2017 commercial assault on Korean companies for the emplacement of a
THAAD battery in Seongju, South Korea, which did at least $7.5 billion
dollars of damage.
An important component of an ABO strategy must be to complement the
military access arrangements with a counter-coercion strategy designed
to deter Chinese economic coercion. This strategy, otherwise known as
``collective resilience'' would take the form of a multilateral
economic deterrence mechanism that leverages the combined trade
capabilities of like-minded partners to signal to China that they
cannot economically coerce any one member of the group. Like-minded
partners trade with China in 575 finished and intermediary goods valued
at $59.61 billion upon which China is highly dependent, and for which
China does not have alternative sources.\1\ A collective economic
deterrence strategy has proven to work in Europe where the anti-
coercion instrument (ACI) introduced in 2023 seems to have slowed
China's coercive practices against other individual states as it had
done to Lithuania. The United States should encourage Indo-Pacific
allies to do the same expressly with the understanding that there is an
important security rationale related to ABO.
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\1\ Victor Cha, ``Collective Resilience: Deterring China's
Weaponization of Economic Interdependence,'' International Security 48,
no. 1 (2023): 91-124. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00465.
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opportunistic aggression
The war in Ukraine has made Indo-Pacific allies realize that war is
a real possibility in Asia and that the unthinkable is possible. There
is more proactive thinking in the region about dual contingencies and
opportunistic aggression than I have ever experienced before. For
example, we have had inquiries in the last 3 years from both Taiwan and
South Korea about gaming out dual contingencies at the Track II level.
An updated alliance structure should capitalize on this new thinking to
proactively consider new ways of deterring opportunistic aggression.
These could include, but not be limited to:
Reorienting of the U.S. military presence on the Korean
peninsula to a regional deterrence and defense mission (either
by drawdown or supplementing);
Training of USFK both on and off the peninsula;
Collective defense declaration among the U.S., Japan, and
South Korea and a bilateral security declaration between Japan
and South Korea (2025 marks the 60th anniversary of normalized
relations);
Increased South Korean defense spending and independent
military capabilities to deter North Korean opportunistic
aggression during a Taiwan contingency;
Consideration of rear area support roles played by South
Korea in a Taiwan contingency
Use of the UNC contributing nations' framework on the Korean
peninsula to enhance peacetime deterrence
These are all politically sensitive issues in South Korea and would
be topics to be taken up with the government once the political
impeachment crisis in that country is resolved. Any reorientation of
the U.S. presence on the peninsula, however, would require hard
thinking about the retention of some ground troop presence to provide
the traditional ``tripwire'' deterrent against North Korean
adventurism; and would necessitate a planned, phased process that would
minimize the negative political and economic externalities that would
result from an abrupt change. Complete withdrawal of the troop presence
would beg the question of cost (losing the South Korean subsidy), as
well as alternative locations that would still be close enough to the
fight to be effective. Increasing the troop presence (with a portion
each trained for peninsular and regional defense) could mute potential
South Korean self-help responses (e.g., proactive discussions of
nuclearization), but would require a difficult Korean political choice
to acknowledge its role in a Taiwan fight.
new areas of allied cooperation
Updating of the alliances should include other new areas of
cooperation outside of the military realm. A strong precedent has
already been set by the previous two administrations for allied
cooperation on economic security, export controls, and supply chains.
Under the current administration, new opportunities have been unearthed
in areas including shipbuilding and strategic energy cooperation with
Japan and South Korea, in particular.
In Secretary Rubio's confirmation hearing before this body, he
observed that eight decades after the end of the second World War,
America is being called upon again to create a free world out of chaos,
but he also noted the voters elected President Trump because they want
a strong America with a ``prudent'' foreign policy. In this regard, the
State Department should encourage our allies in the Indo-Pacific and
Europe to play more active political roles in sustaining global
governance as traditional institutions like the UN Security Council
have underperformed and groupings like BRICS aim to disrupt the current
rules-based order. I have two specific recommendations here. First, the
United States should encourage more direct security dialogue and
military planning among European and Asian allies that builds on the
Trump and Biden administrations' previous efforts to build multilateral
coalitions on functional issues like export controls, sanctions, and
pandemic preparedness. The war in Ukraine, China's assertiveness, and
North Korea's supply of Russia have brought the two theaters together
in unprecedented ways and I have been personally impressed by the level
of interest and sophistication in the European discussions on security
of the Indo-Pacific.
Finally, the State Department would do well to promote and
formalize the ``Indo-Pacific-4'' framework's (Japan, South Korea,
Australia, New Zealand) participation in global governance
institutions. Regular participation in the NATO leader's summits have
led to greater cooperation across Europe and Asia in countering Chinese
coercion. Moreover, the Group of Seven (G7) has become the de facto
organization in which leading like-minded states coordinate policies,
set sanctions, and define new rules and norms in the absence of
functioning UN mandates. Indo-Pacific and European actors like
Australia, South Korea and Spain are proven high performers in many of
the pressing tasks identified in recent G7 leaders' summits like
economic resilience and security, digital competitiveness, food
security, climate change, labor security, and development, and
therefore could contribute much to burden-sharing and global
governance.\2\
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\2\ John J. Hamre, Victor Cha, Emily Benson, Max Bergmann, Erin L.
Murphy, and Caitlin Welsh, ```Bending' the Architecture: Reimagining
the G7,'' CSIS, June 12, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/bending-
architecture-reimagining-g7.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Doctor.
We will now do a round of questions and if there is
interest we will do a second round, and I am going to start
first of all with you, Mr. Schriver.
You talked about--and I do not mean this to sound
critical--but you were questioning the use of a percent of GDP
as a commitment to what a country thinks it should do to defend
itself.
I have always had the same thought myself. My problem is I
cannot think of another thing that you can use to measure it.
Do you have any other measuring devices that you have in mind
that you think might be appropriate in that regard?
We see this across government. A lot of times they will
take a broad brush and try to measure something with something
that is not exactly related, but your thoughts on that, please.
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What I meant to say
is it is important, but many times insufficient, and in other
instances there are factors that should be weighted more
heavily like in the case of the Philippines--nine new active
sites including those with geographic proximity to the Taiwan
Strait is extremely valuable, even though they are only
spending 1.5 percent of GDP from a relatively small economy.
So I am afraid it comes down to more of a qualitative
assessment of weighing these different baskets--what are they
doing on ABO, what are they doing on their own defense.
You get really sort of qualitative when you get to history.
I think it counts that Australia has fought alongside us in
every war since World War I.
I think that gives us confidence they will be alongside us
in the future, and to me that is a part of having confidence in
them sharing a burden in the worst of times, but that gets very
hard to chart on a graph and measure.
The Chairman. Thank you, and I appreciate that,
particularly with Australia. I never even think about what
percent they spend on--it does not matter to me.
These people are friends and have been with us through
thick and thin and that counts for way more than anything that
you could talk about statistically.
I would like--I am going to give all three of you a short
run at this.
Something I have been very impressed with in recent times
has been the Philippines' desire to have us as an ally and vice
versa, and we all know they are making real effort in that
regard.
What are the Chinese doing about this? Their reaction,
obviously, is going to be negative. How does that actually
materialize in reality?
Why do we not start with you, Mr. Schriver, and we will go
across.
Mr. Schriver. Well, they are certainly behaving
aggressively toward the Philippines in the disputed
territories. There is a lot of activity around Second Thomas
Shoal that includes water cannons being fired from coast guard
vessels, includes shouldering of Filipino vessels.
I think also what is going on is a lot of attempts at elite
capture and economic coercion. As Dr. Cha mentioned, they are
very focused on upcoming elections in the Philippines and what
they might be able to do to tip the balance.
So they are playing a little bit of a long game, too, in
addition to the points of coercion that are much more acute.
So, clearly, they do not like it, but from our perspective
we cannot have an ECTA site and have the Chinese go around and
buy up everything around it in terms of the electrical grid, in
terms of the communication systems, in terms of the local
infrastructure.
We have to be able to address it in a more comprehensive
way.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Mastro.
Dr. Mastro. Thank you, Chairman. In terms of the things
that the Chinese are doing, if you look at Chinese writings and
speeches about the U.S. alliance system generally speaking, I
think it is very telling that they spend a lot of energy in
their discourse and their behavior and their capabilities
trying to undermine the U.S. alliance system.
To me, the fact that they are leveraging some of these
discussions right now in the United States--what the United
States is doing vis-a-vis Ukraine, for example, and for
example, the dissolution of some of our key agencies like
USAID--they are using those to say that, one, the United States
is not a reliable ally and, two, they are also increasing their
military presence around a lot of key allies and partners like
Japan, the Philippines, and their aggression towards Taiwan.
When I speak to the Chinese military directly and I ask
them about their military activities in these areas, they tell
me that they are specifically designed to demonstrate to allies
and partners that the United States cannot help them, that in
the case of their defense even though the United States
military is a significant force, given the fact that we are not
forward deployed sufficiently that those countries would be on
their own.
So there is this implicit military coercion that is
occurring. At the same time, they are offering a lot of
positive inducements to some countries in the region.
If we alienate certain partners in the Indo-Pacific, in
particular in Southeast Asia, if we ask them to pick sides, I
am not sure we will like what side Singapore or even the
Philippines might pick in the end.
For that reason the Chinese are leveraging both their
economic coercion as well as positive inducements. The
development assistance that the Chinese are giving to Southeast
Asian countries in particular is significant, and for access,
basing, and overflight the United States is trying to expand
our relationships with countries in the Second Island Chain,
for example Palau or the Federated States of Micronesia.
These are not countries that are under direct military
threat from Beijing and so it is really--some of the programs
we mentioned such as development assistance, economic
assistance, military training, that convinced these countries
to allow U.S. access, and on the same hand, the other side of
the ledger they have the Chinese coming in with elite capture
and economic incentives.
For that reason it is very important, I think, that we
focus on the military side, but also the economic and political
side as well.
The Chairman. Appreciate that.
Dr. Cha.
Dr. Cha. Just quickly, to add to what has been said, it is
not just elite capture. It is dominating the information space
and the media partnerships with lots of essentially resource-
poor, media in the Philippines.
That needs to be combated in some way, and so things like
RFA and VOA are actually quite important in that respect.
Then I will go back to the point on commercial pressure. As
Randy said, there are nine access sites.
China knows how to put very targeted commercial pressure,
perhaps on certain localities to try to complicate our ability
to gain access to those sites.
So having some sort of collective strategy among Asia
Pacific partners, again, sort of like the EU has done with the
ACI, is something that is important for ABO strategy.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Dr. Cha, you mentioned, and I think the other two panelists
also suggested this, that the new cooperation between Russia
and China and North Korea on the war in Ukraine is having an
impact.
Can you talk about the impact that that is having to our--
throughout the Indo-Pacific and the concerns that that raises
with our other allies in the region?
Dr. Cha. I am happy to, Senator. I think it has had three
effects.
The first is it has clearly had an effect on the
battlefield, in the sense that 12,000 North Korean troops are
in Kursk to try to regain some territory before peace
negotiations start--again, 50 percent of Russian munitions
today are reportedly sourced from North Korea. These are having
real impacts on the battlefield. That is the first point.
The second is that it has really created a lot of concern
among Indo-Pacific partners that anything is possible in Asia
now.
War in the middle of Europe that looks like a war from days
past cause them to think not only is war in the Taiwan Straits
possible, and not only is war on the Korean Peninsula possible,
but that these things could happen at the same time through
opportunistic aggression.
For the first time we have started getting inquiries from
both South Korean and Taiwan friends to think more trilaterally
about those sorts of dual contingency scenarios.
Then the third effect, I think, is that it has really
closed the gap between the way our European friends and our
Indo-Pacific friends think about security. There are no longer
two theaters--it really is one theater.
I have actually, I think, in the past year made more trips
to Brussels than I have to the Indo-Pacific region because of
all the interest in Asia, and the level of conversation--I
think my colleagues would agree--in Europe on Indo-Pacific
security now is at a much, much higher level than it was even a
year ago.
So those would be the three things I would say.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Do either of you want to add to
that?
Yes, Dr. Mastro.
Dr. Mastro. Thank you, ma'am.
I would add for the China-Russia relationship in particular
there are four main things that they are complicating for the
United States.
First and foremost, their relationship is making it harder
for the United States to deter the two countries independently,
and then I think we can see with Ukraine--and I would predict
it would be the same thing in the Indo-Pacific--it makes it
harder for us to compel them to stop fighting and the reasons
for that is, first, these two countries, while they might not
fight together in the sort of interoperable alliance framework,
they are serving and building the ability to serve as a
strategic rear to one another.
Senator Shaheen. So let me interrupt for a minute, because
in some quarters there is a suggestion that we can actually
pull Russia away from China and separate the two of them.
Can you speak to that? Dr. Cha, you may want to speak to
that as well as Mr. Schriver.
Dr. Mastro. I would say, generally speaking, I have done a
historical review of the relationship since 1949 and the idea
that you could present positive inducements or try to convince
Russia, for example, that China is a greater threat than the
United States or vice versa is not going to work.
The best strategy if we had any hope of pulling them apart
is that for now while European countries are more concerned
about the Indo-Pacific, it is not the case that they are
reacting to China as if China is such a strong partner to
Russia.
They still have very strong economic relations with China
and they are reluctant to punish China for that relationship.
If the Chinese thought it would come at an economic cost--their
relationship with Russia--I think they would be much better
geared to pull apart.
So NATO could play a greater role in that economic
relationship with China to show them that they cannot just get
all the military benefits from Russia without some diplomatic
and economic costs.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Schriver, do you have any?
Mr. Schriver. I would be highly suspicious of that
endeavor, I think, particularly with Mr. Putin and Xi Jinping
and the relationship that they have developed and the mutual
reinforcing activities that have made them alliance like.
I would also point out some people refer to this as the
reverse Kissinger. Of course, when Kissinger courted China,
China and Russia had already--then the Soviet Union--had
already had a very significant falling out. So it was not
creating a fissure. It was taking advantage of a fissure.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Dr. Cha, anything to add?
Dr. Cha. I was actually going to make a similar point to
Randy's. I think in international relations, that sort of
diplomacy only works if you occupy the pivot position--where
the other two sides are coming to you. That is what was
happening with Kissinger and diplomacy between the Soviet Union
and China.
In this case, if we were to try a reverse Kissinger, it
would be Russia that occupies the pivot position, and so for
that reason, I think it would be suspect.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Ricketts.
Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you to our witnesses here today to talk about this very
important topic.
Since signing of the 1951 mutual defense treaty, the
Philippines has been one of our key allies in the Pacific.
However, in recent years, the alliance has grown both more
important and even more key as far as our strategic alignment.
Despite being outmatched militarily and economically the
Philippines have demonstrated an incredible resolve in
resisting Beijing's unlawful aggression in the South China Sea,
certainly, more recently.
It is also able to act as an important voice within the
ASEAN against communist China's other pressure campaigns that
you all have been talking about.
The most important is what the alliance provides us
militarily and, Mr. Schriver, you were talking about the
expansion of the EDCA bases and the nine strategic sites that
they have given us access to to enhance our ability to deter
communist China in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea and
other key theaters.
It has also allowed us to deploy the Typhon missile system,
which can hold land-based targets in China at risk as well as
surface ships.
How important is it for us to continue to work with Manila
to expand U.S. access to these sites and further invest in the
infrastructure and housing for U.S. troops, Mr. Schriver?
Mr. Schriver. Thank you. I think it is extraordinarily
important, and if you kind of racked and stacked in the region,
I would put the Philippines right at the top of where we need
to invest, given its geography and given a window of
opportunity.
The last administration in Manila under President Duterte
was not exactly user-friendly, if you will. Marcos has been a
sea change and really more of a return to the norm, but a sea
change nonetheless, and I think we should take advantage of
that.
Frankly, the population, given Chinese aggression and
coercion, is also very much in support of strengthening U.S.-
Philippine ties and I think it is the time to make the
investments that are needed.
Senator Ricketts. Great. We were just talking about China's
really aggressive position toward the Philippines, these gray
zone attacks in the South China Sea. You mentioned some of the
areas there. It is really, really valuable that Manila shows
this defiance, is it not, Mr. Schriver?
Mr. Schriver. It is. They are, of course, first and
foremost responsible for their own defense and I think they
have done a very admirable job on these resupply missions to
Second Thomas Shoal, really resisting that Chinese pressure and
coercion.
Senator Ricketts. So what else can we or Japan or Australia
do to be able to support the Philippines as it resists this
gray zone activity here in the South China Sea?
Mr. Schriver. I think Chinese coercion is not limited to
South China Sea so I think pushback in the East China Sea,
pushback in areas closer to Vietnam.
It is a comprehensive approach that is led by the U.S. but
joined with allies and partners will, I think, demonstrate to
the Chinese that they have got a broader problem, that the
country that signed UNCLOS and ratified it, but does not honor
it and acts outside it is going to face broad pushback.
Then on point in the Philippines, I do think we need to
resume our cooperation with the Philippine Coast Guard which is
now on pause because it is a state INL program and it is a law
enforcement program.
The Coast Guard is really on the front lines, not
necessarily the Navy in every case, so I think there is a
number of things we can do and, again, it is extraordinarily
important.
Senator Ricketts. What about the cooperation between Japan
and the Philippines? They have recently, you know, gotten some
agreements together. What do you think about that?
Mr. Schriver. Very encouraging. If you looked at a map:
Japan, Philippines, what is in the middle--it is Taiwan--and I
think a lot of the security cooperation is oriented toward that
major known contingency.
Japan is also stepping up with security assistance so we
are no longer the sole provider or only provider of military
equipment and other training and other types of services. Japan
is a very professional military and they are lending that
expertise to the Philippines in very helpful ways.
Senator Ricketts. I think we provided about $500 million
last year in FMS to the Philippines and, obviously, it is
encouraging to see Japan do that as well.
You were also talking about the percent of GDP that the
Philippines is spending and evaluating the bases and so forth.
Is it fair for us to ask the Philippines to get to 2
percent of GDP spending on their own defense? They are trying
to modernize here.
Mr. Schriver. I am for being aspirational and I think given
the threat they are facing it is reasonable to ask. I think
those discussions--that is why we need skilled diplomats. That
is why we need capable alliance managers with years of
experience.
I agree there are some approaches, as Dr. Mastro pointed
out, that can have negative effects and so I think we need to
do it with a degree of deftness, but it is important.
Senator Ricketts. Do the Philippines have that kind of
capability? Can they economically support 2 percent of GDP, do
you think?
Mr. Schriver. The short answer, I would say, is yes, but it
is a very robust democracy. They have a lot of other priorities
when it comes to development of the economy.
So this would be grinding it out through the legislature,
but I think they could get there, given the threat and the very
real requirements they have for defense.
Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you, Mr. Schriver.
The Chairman. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
witnesses.
Dr. Cha, you have spoken extensively about the alignment of
some of our core adversaries and, as you just referenced in
your opening statement, support from China, Iran, North Korea
is absolutely critical to Russia's war effort against Ukraine.
Many, I think, are now underestimating what these three
countries are getting in return for that partnership. Could you
just speak briefly to what North Korea is or could be gaining
from their munitions support, their now active troop support,
and the negative impacts this might be having in the Indo-
Pacific region and how our allies are viewing it, and how they
might step up?
Dr. Cha. Sure, Senator.
I think your question really points to the fact that what
is happening in the war in Ukraine has serious impact on what
is happening in Indo-Pacific security as well.
Initially, I think that when the Biden administration
publicized the first arms transfer to the Wagner Group, we
became very worried that this was the start of a relationship
between these two that would only grow as Russia's need for
munitions and troops also grew.
Initially, we thought that what was being provided was,
largely, a lot of food, fuel and energy--things that were
really stocked out in North Korea after a 3\1/2\-year lockdown
from COVID.
For North Korea, this opportunity with Russia emerged just
as they were coming out of a 3\1/2\-year COVID lockdown. This
was like a Christmas present for them.
The concern now is that it has moved beyond food, fuel,
energy and medicines to higher end military technology, and I
think if we track the U.S. Government's statements about this,
they have moved from statements about the theoretical or
hypothetical to statements of fact.
We have seen this, I think, also in North Korea's own
actions and demonstrations. Successful military satellite
launches after successive failures--they became more successful
after Kim Jong-un's first visit to----
Senator Coons. So it is your view that North Korea is
almost certainly receiving sophisticated missile satellite
military assistance from Russia in exchange for their support?
Dr. Cha. Yes, and the one I would particularly point to is
potential nuclear-propelled submarine technology, because the
North Koreans put the leader in front of a new submarine and
said this is a nuclear powered submarine.
So this is the one that I think has gotten the most
attention recently, but, yes, all those things that you
mentioned.
Senator Coons. I have limited time. You also spoke about
the critical role that Radio Free Asia provides. It has a $60
million budget, but reaches 60 million people a week.
Given upcoming elections in the Philippines, given our
concern about soft power and influence in the region, Pacific
Island nations, how wise or foolish is it that the
Administration just canceled Radio Free Asia?
Dr. Cha. So, again, I think our access basing and
overflight strategy is directly related to competition in the
information space where China is creating these media
partnerships all over the Global South and creating a narrative
of the United States that is clearly counter to our interests.
We need to be able to push back on that with real, accurate
information, and that comes from places like VOA and RFA.
Senator Coons. Dr. Mastro, you spoke to the fact that the
PRC is taking advantage of our abrupt withdrawal from hundreds
of different development partnerships throughout the Indo-
Pacific.
Just speak, if you would, briefly to what kind of challenge
you think it is creating for us and our strategic interests for
us to have abruptly canceled and shut down economic development
partnerships, public health partnerships, things like providing
reliable energy to our new basing opportunities in the
Philippines, providing partnerships in terms of intel and
communication, security in the Philippines.
What is the strategic impact to our abrupt withdrawal as
partners for dozens and dozens of programs across these key
countries?
Dr. Mastro. So, sir, I think the first thing to mention is
if we are having a hard time assessing what is impactful for
the competition with China or not, it is always useful to look
at what the Chinese are spending on and what they are saying.
So they spend eight times more than we do on public
diplomacy, and as Dr. Cha already mentioned, with all of their
information centers, with Xinhua and others, they are obviously
extremely focused in this area.
What is important for the Indo-Pacific is that a lot of
these countries are not--it is very different than NATO allies
and partners in that many of these countries have a lot of
incentives not to support the United States militarily.
What we have on offer--if they are not threatened with
direct invasion from China, which even allies like Australia
are not, what we have on offer are other things besides just
that security cooperation.
When we build infrastructure, for example, in the
Philippines there is this understanding that with that foreign
development and assistance that type of infrastructure can be
used by the Philippines when U.S. forces are not there.
Without those types of commitments there are a lot of
countries that they put themselves at risk, that the threat
from China becomes greater the more they cooperate with us, and
so the only way to outbalance that is with the economic
incentives--offering humanitarian aid, disaster relief, foreign
development assistance, and that is why the Chinese are so
focused on those tools of power.
Senator Coons. Thank you. I think we are making an enormous
mistake in unilaterally and abruptly shutting down long-
standing humanitarian, economic development, infrastructure,
and relief programs throughout the Indo-Pacific.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator McCormick.
Senator McCormick. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you,
and thank you to our panelists.
A free and open Indo-Pacific is critical to our nation's
security. I think we all agree on that. To paraphrase General
MacArthur, the Pacific acts as a protective shield for all of
the Americas with the Western Pacific as its linchpin.
I am excited to have this great group to talk about the
alliances that are so central to that shield because they are
on the front lines of defending against China--the Chinese
Communist Party's aggression and escalating efforts and
expansionist ambitions in the First Island Chain.
We must stand with those allies and ensure those
partnerships deliver on matched value to both sides including
burden sharing.
So Dr. Cha, good to see you again, and I would like to
start with you. Japan has been one of the allies where we have
seen the most progress in increasing defense investment and
interoperability with U.S. forces.
We recently had Ambassador Designate Glass testify before
this committee. What priorities should be top of mind for him
and for this administration to make that deterrence from the
U.S.-Japan alliance most credible?
Dr. Cha. Thank you, Senator.
I would say that there are three things. The first is, as I
mentioned in my testimony, the Japanese stood up the JJOC--the
Japan Joint Operational Command. It was a big step in the
alliance to try to create a much more militarily capable,
interoperable, integrated relationship with the United States.
It is incumbent on our side to really fulfill our
commitment to create a joint force headquarters. I think that
is one. Even though that is not necessarily a diplomatic
matter, it is an important message to send.
The second is that I would like to see is a continuation of
the bilateral and trilateral relationship among the U.S.,
Japan, and South Korea. This was something that both the first
Trump administration as well as the Biden administration worked
on.
Major steps were made since August of 2023. I know we have
a little bit of a political situation in South Korea, waiting
for a new government to come into place, but in terms of
defense and deterrence, and making more credible the U.S.
position in Asia and giving confidence to allies in the Indo-
Pacific as well as in Europe about U.S. sustained commitment, I
think that is extremely important as well.
Then, the third are the things that my colleagues have
mentioned in terms of Japan's role in places like the
Philippines and in other parts of Asia, as well as Taiwan,
where they can play a very important role in helping to
complement what the United States is doing in terms of access,
basing and overflight.
Senator McCormick. Very good. Thank you.
Mr. Schriver, Secretary Rubio recently reiterated U.S.
policy with regard to Taiwan--any forced, compelled, coercive
change in the status of Taiwan.
Where would you see the United States falling short in its
role in deterring a war in the Taiwan Strait?
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Senator.
I think I would point to a few things, and it is not
necessarily falling short, but there has been an evolutionary
process where we have been more direct in our language and
rhetoric. We have been moving into areas that were previously
too sensitive like training of Taiwanese military forces.
I think we need to continue the posture initiatives. We
really need to develop the Philippines, particularly northern
Luzon, which has that geographic proximity to the Taiwan
Strait.
We need to strengthen our training of Taiwan military
forces. That was a taboo for decades and now we are getting
them to a point where they are more professional, more
proficient, as they are placing a greater emphasis on training.
I think, as Dr. Mastro implied in her opening statement, it
is not only what they spend. They have got to 2.5. They pledged
to get to 3 percent and they say that is a floor, not a
ceiling, but it is what they spend it in and what they invest
on, and I think given the changing nature of warfare they need
to look at modernized command and control that will help
optimize battlefield decisions.
They need to look at a lot more unmanned autonomous in
every domain including underwater. I think we need to help lead
them in this investment strategy as really key to upholding
deterrence.
Senator McCormick. Very good. Thank you. I will yield the
rest of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all
for being here today.
My office has been hearing about how vital initiatives
aimed at advancing American interests in the Indo-Pacific have
been stalled over the last several weeks, and this is following
up on my colleagues' interest in the Indo-Pacific as well.
This includes not only critical programs, but also
essential funding that supports intelligence efforts on
pressing regional issues.
I am deeply concerned that the current administration is
pursuing a path that directly contradicts strengthening Indo-
Pacific alliances, a move that could have far-reaching
implications for our security.
Like my colleagues have mentioned, I am deeply concerned
about the PRC's activities in the region. Before this
administration the United States led with a clear strategy--
invest, align, compete--in response to the PRC's growing
geopolitical influence in the Indo-Pacific, and we demonstrated
that strength by consistently following through on our
commitments, proving to our allies that the U.S. is a reliable
partner, a leader in defending democracy and a defender of
international norms.
This strategy was central to our global leadership in
maintaining peace and stability in the region, and,
unfortunately, we are walking backwards as the Trump Asia
policy of today seems to be neglecting our well-established
alliances, institutions, the rule of law, and rules.
I am a co-founder of the bipartisan Quad Caucus and I made
it a priority to send a clear and powerful message to our
allies, partners, and even competitors that the United States
is committed to the Indo-Pacific region in the long term, and I
wholeheartedly believe that defense, diplomacy, and cooperation
are crucial.
Mr. Schriver, as someone who has held a key in shaping U.S.
defense policy in the Indo-Pacific what specific steps should
the United States takes to demonstrate its long-term commitment
to the Indo-Pacific and its allies within the context of the
Quad?
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Senator Duckworth, and thank you
for your leadership on the Quad. It is very important.
I am the only one up here who is not a professor, but if I
were to give this administration a grade it would not be
failing.
It would be incomplete, because I think they have done some
very positive things--the Prime Minister Kishida visit, Prime
Minister Modi's meeting with President Trump--and I would point
to Secretary Rubio's decision on the very first day in office
to hold a Quad meeting as part of that positive agenda
notwithstanding some of the other issues that you mentioned,
and I share some of your concerns I am sure.
I think what we understand took place in that Quad meeting
at the foreign minister level is there was a very kind of
nascent discussion about moving into the security issues and
that is significant that Foreign Minister Jaishankar would go
along with that and actually introduce some of that, as I
understand it, which indicates India is sufficiently concerned
that they are willing to take this format and move it into
military and security issues.
I would like to see that nurtured and matured and even,
perhaps, go operational. We have got a lot of PLA activity in
the Indian Ocean now. Anti-submarine warfare cooperation could
happen quietly, but it could involve the four countries doing
real-world things that would be very significant.
Senator Duckworth. Do you not think that that is also a
place where we can strengthen our relationship with Quad, but
also not alienate important regional partners like ASEAN?
I do think that there is a need to strengthen economic
relations with the Quad, but in a way that complements our
relationship with ASEAN and their leadership role both--so I am
asking both economic cooperation, but also cooperation,
especially when it comes to strategies where the Chinese are
really infiltrating into the region. Go ahead.
Mr. Schriver. Thank you. I do agree with that. I think you
are the expert on ASEAN, but it is a region of very mixed
stages of development, different types of government, and so I
think disaggregating and looking at where the Quad can be
helpful as a donor, as an economic partner, I think that kind
of sophisticated approach would really help counter what China
is doing.
China is gaining ground in Southeast Asia--there is no
doubt about it, and we are seeing a lot of--particularly since
the tariffs, we are seeing a lot of Chinese investment going
into Southeast Asia, some of which is helpful to them, but some
of which is also over capacity, crowding out some of their
indigenous manufacturing and aspects of their economy.
So I would like to see the Quad do more in this area.
Senator Duckworth. Yes, because I think Quad investment
into ASEAN maybe as part of the supply chain manufacturing
issues for the United States is an opportunity and, frankly, we
have come off a very strong year in ASEAN of Indonesian
leadership.
The Malaysians are doing a great job there now. Philippines
are next. I think there are some real opportunities there for
some partnerships and I would like to see the United States
continue to pursue those economic relationships, in addition to
their strategic partnerships, but making those linkages between
Quad and ASEAN.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you all for being here.
Mr. Schriver, I like your characterization of the tyranny
of time and distance when it comes to the Taiwan contingency.
We like to talk about very euphemistic terms, which could be a
bloody and very destructive military conflict.
First, let me ask you about supply chains. The reason why
Senator Warner and I and all--and many of our colleagues joined
together and passed the CHIPS and Science Act starting back in
2020, but then finally, I guess, in 2022 was because we were
worried about the supply chains of advanced semiconductors and
the fact that the United States only made about 12 percent of
those, and the fact that in this world we live in we are
extraordinarily dependent on that sort of technology for
everything from our iPhones to the avionics and the Joint
Strike Fighter.
Are there other supply chains that we need to be concerned
about in the event of another pandemic, natural disaster, or
military conflict in the Indo-Pacific? I would invite anybody
to offer any advice now and if you want to get back to us with
a more comprehensive list I would welcome that.
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Senator.
I think when you look at something like CHIPS you got to
understand the component parts, which gets down to critical
minerals and the mining and the processing, and so it is a very
complex supply chain, and where I think we can do better now to
better position us for resiliency in the event of a conflict is
to really look at alternate sources of critical minerals and
that processing and that whole sort of chain of production.
Right now we are heavily relying on China.
Senator Cornyn. Yes. China processes 90 percent.
Mr. Schriver. Yes.
Senator Cornyn. Ninety percent, as I recall.
Any other thoughts on supply chains from the other
panelists?
Dr. Mastro. I just want to add that there is no entity that
is in a better position to protect U.S. interests than the
United States itself, and when we pull out of the Indo-Pacific
we are basically outsourcing that to another country like
China.
China itself has a ``Made in China 2025'' standards--2035.
They have identified 15 areas where not only do they want to be
self-sufficient so that we have less power to shape their
decisions, but they have been very explicit that they want the
world to be reliant on them precisely so they have this type of
leverage that you are talking about.
In any scenario involving Taiwan, the Chinese are hoping
this is going to be a quick war--3-4 weeks, and even in those
types of scenarios the disruption economically is going to be
significant, but the United States needs to be in the position
that we could intervene in that time frame so that what we
threaten is much more of a global disruption to the Chinese
themselves.
Senator Cornyn. Because time is so short, let me start with
Dr. Cha on this question.
You talk about how long the Taiwan contingency conflict
will last. My impression from traveling in the region is that
we have a lot of wonderful allies that have capabilities and
they vary a lot depending on the nation, but we have seen in
Ukraine there is a difference between capability and will, and
one of the things that I am very concerned about is we are
overestimating our--what our allies might be willing to do.
I think, Dr. Mastro, you mentioned they are reluctant to
take sides. That seemed to be the typical response we got as we
were talking to folks in the Indo-Pacific, but in terms of--and
I know this is a hard question and maybe one we do not want to
confront, but I do not think we have any choice but to
confront--if there was a shooting war in the South China Sea
where, according to President Xi's instructions to the PLA,
they needed to be ready by 2027 to essentially take Taiwan who
can we depend on? What countries?
If you could list those in terms of our--of who would be
the most likely and who would be the most effective, that would
be very useful.
Dr. Mastro. Well, sir, if I can just say we can depend on
Japan to allow us access to their two U.S. bases, at the very
least. Japanese logistical support will be critical, but that
will only come into play in a more protracted conflict if the
United States does intervene in time.
The northern Philippines and southwest Japan are the only
areas in combat radius of Taiwan, and so the immediate support
of use of U.S. bases and in the Philippines in particular, we
are not investing right now in the types of air and naval
capabilities that we need to be able to respond in a timely
manner in the Taiwan Strait.
If we did, that it would basically be the almost immediate
permission to use those bases in the northern Philippines and
southwest Japan for direct kinetic action against the ships
making their way across the strait that would be by far the
most critical.
Then in a more protracted conflict, other basing options
like in Australia and in the Second Island Chain become more
important, but immediate approval from Japan to use those
bases, like, within hours is the most important thing.
Senator Cornyn. Dr. Cha.
Dr. Cha. Yes, I would not disagree with that at all. The
only thing I would add is the point about the duration of the
conflict and the scope of it.
If the duration of the conflict and the scope extends
beyond the First Island Chain, Second Island Chain, or even the
Indian Ocean, then that necessarily will bring other players
in. If it gets to that level, I think we would be able to count
on some of those players, even potentially the Europeans, to
help as well.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Rosen, you are next.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, chair Risch, ranking member
Shaheen. Thank you for being here today, for holding this
hearing.
I want to talk about countering the PRC influence. Of
course, in the South Pacific is what we are talking about today
because our economic security--our security relationships with
Pacific Island nations play a significant role in our ability
to counter expanding PRC influence.
It is particularly true for members of the Compacts of Free
Association, or COFA, an agreement that serves as a bedrock of
U.S. engagement with Palau, the Marshall Islands, and
Micronesia.
COFA is a mutually beneficial arrangement affording our
military access to areas of immense strategic importance in
exchange for U.S. assistance.
Under COFA, USAID is tasked with leading disaster response
efforts to all three island countries, but with USAID gutted,
no other agency has the authority, the technical expertise, the
capacity, or the resources to respond to a natural disaster in
the Pacific.
Disregarding our obligations under COFA potentially puts us
in violation of our own agreement and will only cede ground to
the PRC, which has been actively using, as we know,
humanitarian assistance to expand its sphere of influence in
the Pacific.
So, Dr. Cha, can you speak to the importance of the COFA
agreement and USAID's presence in the region to U.S. national
security and can you expand on some of the consequences if the
PRC were to displace us in the region?
Dr. Cha. Thank you, Senator.
I do not disagree with the way you have characterized the
importance of the Pacific Island nations and also the vacuum
that could be filled by China or is already being filled by
China when U.S. assistance is not there--U.S. commercial
support, all these things.
I think the Biden administration deserves credit for
responding to this, but at the same time, unfortunately, it was
too little too late because the Chinese had already made
security agreements of that nature.
Again, I will go back to one of the points that I talked
about in my testimony, which is that in addition to the
importance of things like RFA and VOA to compete in the
information space so that there is a fair narrative of the
United States and our interest in the region, the commercial
support is also important.
Again, China has used economic coercion against 18
governments and over 500 companies since 2008, heightened
during Xi Jinping's terms, of course.
These Pacific Island nations are just easy prey for Chinese
influence in that way, so we need to be able to combat that as
well.
Senator Rosen. I want to expand a little bit upon that
because it is also one of the only three Pacific Island nations
to recognize Palau--excuse me, recognize Taiwan's independence.
So it is something I discussed with Palau's President when
he and I met back in 2021, and so as a result Palau is
increasingly becoming a victim of PRC harassment.
To increase Palau's resilience, the USAID was supporting
the development of an undersea cable system, which is vital for
global communications, facilitating financial transactions, for
national security. This program is now halted as a part of the
overall foreign assistance freeze.
I am going to stick with you, Dr. Cha. Can you talk about
the importance of infrastructure development, undersea cable
systems in the Pacific Islands, and what signal do you think we
are sending if we are stopping this support to Palau and to
others?
Dr. Cha. As we often say in government, you cannot fight
something with nothing, and so if we are moving away from--we
can, of course, look to allies and partners like Australia and
others to help, but if the United States is not supporting
that, then it is just going to be a vacuum that is going to be
filled by China or other actors that seek to undermine our
interests there.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to talk a little bit, Dr.
Mastro, quickly about economic coercion by the PRC. We know
that they are really spending a lot of money by supporting
Philippines on energy security, infrastructure spending,
prepositioning near key military installations, economic
development programs.
I am going fast because my time is running out.
Humanitarian assistance to demonstrate the value of what they
are doing. Much of the work we have been doing is stopped. They
are stepping in.
So, Dr. Mastro, can you expand on some of the more
prominent coercive tactics the PRC employs in the Indo-Pacific
region?
Dr. Mastro. To the discussion, ma'am, that we were just
having it is--they have a three-prong strategy and one key part
is exploitation or exploiting gaps where the United States is
not present.
They have more consulates and embassies in the region than
we do. They have more elite visits than we do and, obviously,
we have talked about the foreign aid and development
assistance. So part of it, of course, are these positive
inducements.
When it comes to the coercion, the Chinese, when they have
leverage, they use it every single time and so we can expect
that if we step away so we are no longer in a position to
ensure freedom of navigation.
So countries like the Philippines will have to trust that
the Chinese will allow them to trade with the rest of the
world, and while some might say, ``oh, the Chinese would never
cut off that access,'' I think it has been pretty clear that
when they are upset about something, and we are not even
talking about foreign policy--military strategy.
If you say or believe anything different about what happens
domestically in China then you are a target. Our allies and
partners, I think, have learned and are learning more and more.
If your strategy is to not upset Beijing--if that is your
defense strategy, it is not going to work.
Senator Rosen. Right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Scott.
Senator Scott of Florida. Thank you, Chairman Risch and
Ranking Member Shaheen.
Thank you for your testimony today. So first off, do you
think that as China builds up their economy, there is a greater
chance that they are going to use their military to invade
Taiwan?
Dr. Mastro. Well, sir, I would focus on their military
capabilities. We are not deterring China right now from taking
Taiwan by force.
What is deterring them is they have not finalized their
military modernization. In particular, they have not honed
command and control logistics.
Senator Scott of Florida. So if they have a crappy economy,
if their economy falls apart, will they have less military
assets?
Dr. Mastro. So far, sir, the size of their economy they do
not have to choose between guns and butter and so it would
really have to be such a decrease that you have widespread
social instability.
In that case, I think they turn inward, but otherwise, I
think they have the resources to continue the modernization.
Senator Scott of Florida. What percentage of their economy
is tied to the American consumer?
Dr. Mastro. I would have to get back to you on the
specifics, but they are an export driven economy and their
connection to the global economy is number one. If they
believed trade with U.S. allies and partners would stop if they
attacked Taiwan, they would never do it.
Senator Scott of Florida. So do you think it would be
logical for any democracy, including in the United States, for
the people in these countries to stop buying Chinese products?
Dr. Mastro. Well, sir----
Senator Scott of Florida. Not whether it would be easy.
Should we?
Dr. Mastro. So the way I think about it is if in times of
peace before we have this type of conflict, if we get rid of
all of our leverage against the PRC, we do not have that
economic deterrent in place.
The Chinese are trying to diversify and to be less reliant
on us for a reason.
So I think those measures should be considered and should
be in place in times of crisis, but potentially not something
implemented in peacetime.
Senator Scott of Florida. They are using their economy
right now to build up their military. Would we not be better
off to stop buying anything from them today so they will have
less resources to modernize their military?
After the fact, it is too late. Once they have the military
that they have--like, I personally do not understand why
anybody buys an American--a Chinese product.
I have never understood it. When I came up here 6 years
ago, 85 percent of the drones bought by the Federal Government
were Chinese made. That seems like stupidity.
It only took 6 years to get that passed through the NDA. I
do not know why we want to continue to build the Chinese
economy. So do you guys intentionally go buy Chinese products?
Dr. Mastro. Sir, just I would add that the technology, I
think, something that you highlighted is vitally important. If
there is any U.S. product, technology, know-how that
contributes to the lethality of the Chinese military, those
absolutely need to be prevented from being exported.
Senator Scott of Florida. So you do not think it matters
what their economy is doing? They did not seem to have a very
good economy back when their big military--when their economy
was one-tenth the size and they clearly could not threaten
Taiwan when their economy was one-tenth the size. So I do not
get why we help them build up their economy.
Does anybody else----
Mr. Schriver. I think it is an extremely valid point. I
think for often--for many years we thought that our economic
engagement would help shape and change China politically.
It did not. I think there are constituencies in the United
States that do profit from the trade relationship with China
and they continue to be advocates for it, but I think we should
look at things like revoking PNTR.
I think we should look at strengthening export controls and
outbound investment. It makes no sense to me that we would
restrict the Chinese from investing in an entity in the United
States that is engaged in developing some technology with
military applications, but yet outbound investment can go
invest in a Chinese entity that does the exact same research.
Makes no sense at all.
Senator Scott of Florida. Dr. Cha, what do you think?
Dr. Cha. The only thing I will add to that is that the
other effect of the world's economic interaction with China is
that it has caused many countries and allies of ours to self-
censor.
They stay away from saying things or taking actions that
are in favor of the United States because they are worried they
are going to get whacked by China with some sort of trade
sanction, or all of a sudden they are going to stop sending
tourists, or they are going to stop importing bananas from the
Philippines. There is a whole list of things that China does,
basically weaponizing trade and interdependence.
Senator Scott of Florida. I know my time is up. I just do
not get why we buy one product. Our military is dependent on
Chinese drugs.
How are you going to change on a dime once they decide to
invade Taiwan? Why we would ever rely on Chinese technology for
anything like drones it seems pretty foolish.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I have a few more questions
before we close the panel out.
First, I would like to go back, Mr. Schriver, I think, to
Senator Ricketts' question about the foreign military sales in
the Philippines and I would just like to point out for the
record that $164 million of the $500 million in FMF for the
Philippines is frozen under the cuts and the freezing of
programs with the State Department. So that is troubling when
we think about what we are hoping from the Philippines.
I wanted to--staying on the Philippines, the ICC has
arrested former President Duterte on a warrant for extra
judicial killings.
Do you all have any views on how that is going to affect
the upcoming presidential election in the Philippines and what
that might mean for the U.S. relationship with the Philippines?
Anybody have any thoughts about that?
Mr. Schriver. It is an excellent question and it is
probably too soon to tell. There is a segment of the population
that does not like to see a former president carted off in
handcuffs, notwithstanding the actual things he authorized as
President and, of course, this is a family affair. His daughter
is the Vice President and presumably leader of the Duterte
faction in the next set of elections.
Senator Shaheen. So maybe I should ask it this way. How do
we think--if she wins the next presidential election, how do we
think that will affect the relationship with the U.S.?
Mr. Schriver. We have got about as good a partner as we
could ever want in Marcos. So, inevitably, it probably goes
down. She is in many ways her father's daughter and thinks
similarly about some of these issues like the alliance.
She has also shown streaks of independence and, of course,
she has a complicated relationship with her father in other
ways.
I think it is difficult to say, but I think we have a
window of opportunity now given Marcos, which is why as you
point out the things that are frozen--I think we should be
moving with all due urgency while this window is open.
Senator Shaheen. Do you all agree with that assessment?
Dr. Mastro. Yes, ma'am, and if you would indulge me. Given
your question, I think it highlights the importance of having a
really nuanced understanding of the domestic politics in the
Philippines.
We have already mentioned the seizure of some--the
dissolution of some programs under this current administration,
but also besides the Fulbright's research funding under Minerva
grants, for example, have all been ceased, and as a professor
at a university, you know, having people study these types of
issues--we do not have Ph.D. students anymore that we are
encouraging to learn languages, to do these sorts of things,
because the funding has stopped.
Senator Shaheen. I agree. I think it is totally
shortsighted and does not recognize how important soft power is
to deterring conflict and aggression.
Dr. Cha, did you want to add anything?
Dr. Cha. I agree with that. It is not just a military
alliance. It is a relationship.
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Dr. Cha. It is a political and social relationship that
crosses generations. In all of these countries, all of these
Indo-Pacific allies, as I mentioned in my testimony, it is
about political engagement, not just military engagement.
In the case of the Vice President, it is a very important
role for the State Department and others in terms of
diplomacy's early engagement and socializing not just the
elite, but also the public about why these nine ECTA sites are
important.
Senator Shaheen. I want to go back to the information space
because you have mentioned--several of you have mentioned RFA
and VOA, and we had a hearing here on China--I think it was our
first hearing--and one of the people testifying pointed out
that China spends over a billion dollars, that we know of, a
year in the information space trying to influence information
in countries in the Indo-Pacific and much of it is
disinformation and misinformation.
So can you talk about what that means for us when we are
not playing in this space at all?
Dr. Cha. Sure, Senator.
So recently, I was asked--this was before the cuts--to
speak to a group of Fulbright scholars who were going out to
countries in Southeast Asia and Central Asia, places where
there is a lot of Chinese media partnerships, and I told them
that they should expect to go into an information environment
in which everybody believes that the war in Ukraine was started
by NATO.
They could not--they were Americans--believe that people
would think that, but this is what happens when you try to
fight something with nothing.
I think Oriana said it great when she said they spend eight
times more on public diplomacy than we do. That about tells you
who is dominating the information space and that, again,
directly relates to the military.
That is not sort of two or three steps removed from the
military. That directly relates to political consensus on
access, basing and overflight.
Senator Shaheen. Yes, I do not--anybody else want to add?
Go ahead.
Dr. Mastro. Ma'am, if I can just add, Xi Jinping himself
has been very clear that his top priority is to be the leader
of the developing world.
Before this administration came in, when I was providing
recommendations and advice, I would say the United States has
not really had a strategy towards the developing world in a
long time and that should be our number one priority is
enhancing and increasing spending in some of these areas.
We look at some of this propaganda coming out of the CCP
and we think it is so heavy handed--who can possibly believe
this, but after you spend time in a lot of these places and
spend time in Beijing--I have been there for some of their top
meetings of defense ministers with developing countries and the
rhetoric about the imperial United States, the colonial United
States.
I often have to remind everyone that the United States has
never been a colonial power. It really resonates with a lot of
these countries and these are places in some cases no U.S.
president has ever visited. Xi Jinping has gone to 70 percent
of the poorest countries in places like Africa, Central Asia,
where our leaders just do not go.
It used to be the case that the Foreign Service could fit
on one aircraft carrier. I wonder what it is going to look like
in future years, but expanding our reach through those types of
programs and departments is not only effective, as the other
witnesses have highlighted, but it is actually relatively
cheaper than trying to do it through military means.
Senator Shaheen. I am out of time and we have to go vote,
but I just have a final question because I visited the Indo-
Pacific last year and one of the countries we visited was
Vietnam, and I was amazed at how positive all the leaders we
met within Vietnam were about their strategic partnership with
the United States, how they wanted to expand on that, the plans
they had to grow the economy and their willingness to stand up
to China in ways that many of the other countries in the region
were not.
Does anybody want to speak to what opportunity we have with
Vietnam?
Mr. Schriver.
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Senator. We poll as a country--not
political leaders or parties, but as a country--94 percent
favorable in Vietnam, which is just stunning given how recent
our conflict was.
Senator Shaheen. Very stunning, yes.
Mr. Schriver. Now, the Chinese poll in single digits and
those two figures might be related, but that, to me, suggests
there are definitely opportunities.
When I was at the Pentagon we did try to open things up. We
had three aircraft carrier visits to Vietnam in about 3\1/2\
years.
There are ways we are expanding the relationship. We are
helping them with the maritime domain awareness issues related
to the Chinese incursions, but here is what I will come back
one more time to things that we have suspended.
The dioxin remediation is absolutely critical. The war of--
legacy of war issues are absolutely critical enablers to the
broader military and defense cooperation that we want.
I have been to those sites, been to Bien Hoa. I have seen
the local population how much they appreciate it because they
have been concerned at the effects of Agent Orange. If we step
away from that, these opportunities will close.
Senator Shaheen. I could not agree more and thank you all
very much for your testimony today.
The Chairman. Thank you. Been a very interesting panel and
we really appreciate all of your views on these matters,
critically important to people of the United States.
We are--I am going to keep the record open for questions
until tomorrow at the close of business and I would ask if you
get a question if you would respond promptly.
I know you are volunteering to this, but, nonetheless, if
you would help us in that regard, we really appreciate that.
Again, thank you for your testimony.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]