    [Senate Hearing 119-103]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 119-103

     SHARED THREATS: INDO	PACIFIC ALLIANCES AND BURDEN SHARING IN TODAY'S
                            GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 26, 2025

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

    [GRAPHIC(s) NOT AVAILANLE IN TIFF FORMAT

                      Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

            U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
     60-819PDF       WASHINGTON : 2025

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
    PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska                JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    DAVID MCCORMICK, Pennsylvania          CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
    STEVE DAINES, Montana                  CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
    BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee                TIM KAINE, Virginia
    JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming                 JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
    MIKE LEE, Utah                         CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
    RAND PAUL, Kentucky                    BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
    TED CRUZ, Texas                        CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
    RICK SCOTT, Florida                    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah                   JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas
           Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
                    Damian Murphy, Staff Director
                       John Dutton, Chief Clerk

                                  (ii)

                             C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

    Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     1

    Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire............     3

    Schriver, Hon. Randall, Chairman of the Board, Project 2049
      Institute,
      Arlington, VA..................................................     4
        Prepared Statement...........................................     6

    Statement of Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro, Center Fellow, Freeman
      Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford
      University, Non-Resident Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for
      International Peace, Stanford, CA..............................     8
        Prepared Statement...........................................    11

    Dr. Victor Cha, Distinguished University Professor, Georgetown
      University President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy
      Department, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
      Washington, DC.................................................    25
        Prepared Statement...........................................    27

                                     (iii)

     SHARED THREATS: INDO-PACIFIC ALLIANCES AND BURDEN SHARING IN TODAY'S
                            GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 2025

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in
    room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.
    Risch presiding.
        Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Ricketts, McCormick,
    Scott of Florida, Cornyn, Shaheen, Coons, Kaine, Duckworth, and
    Rosen.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

        The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Thank you
    all for attending today.
        We apologize--we are starting a little late. We had an
    important meeting before us and trying to get a handle on some
    things that are going on.
        I am going to give the usual statement. We welcome all of
    you here. This is a public hearing. We are doing the business
    of the United States of America, and this is just as important
    as a courtroom, and as a result of that there will be no
    audience participation.
        Audience participation includes anything that attempts to
    communicate with either witnesses or the committee. Whether you
    are standing up, whether you are talking, whether you are
    protesting, whether you are holding up signs, none of that is
    permitted here.
        We have zero tolerance for it. If you do that you are going
    to be arrested immediately, as the people yesterday did that
    were arrested, and then after you are arrested and go through
    the process you will be banned from the committee for a year.
        With that, we--again, we welcome your participation here as
    a spectator, but that is the limit of what you can do here.
        With that, we have an important hearing this morning on
    Indo-Pacific alliances and we have some good and important
    witnesses for that.
        I am going to make an opening statement and then I will
    recognize the ranking member to make an opening statement, and
    then we will hear from our witnesses and then we will open it
    up to a round of questions.
        With that, as an opening statement I would like to talk
    about this issue. Over the past several years we have seen
    China rapidly escalate its aggressive actions against Taiwan,
    Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and other countries in the
    Indo-Pacific.
        China has positioned itself as America's most significant
    long-term challenge and that means, in the short-term, China's
    military aggression in the Indo-Pacific should not go
    unchecked.
        China's actions destabilize global security and disrupt
    global trade, which could impact Americans' financial aspects.
        As demonstrated by China's spy balloon, which invaded our
    sovereign airspace in 2023, China's ambitions are not confined
    to Asia.
        China's military is rapidly modernizing its shipbuilding
    capacity, which is formidable, and its development of dual-use
    artificial intelligence is growing more advanced by the day.
        In this dangerous security environment, we and our allies
    need to help ourselves by increasing defense spending and
    building joint capabilities.
        China's aggression should be confronted, but America should
    not be the world's only watchdog. To counter Chinese
    aggression, we need our allies to work with us to ensure each
    of us is strong and capable of pushing back.
        Today's hearing will focus on how we can build alliances
    that are fit and up to this task.
        America is well-positioned because we have a Commander-in-
    Chief who understands the need for a strong relationship with
    our Indo-Pacific allies.
        President Trump's recent successful summit with the
    Japanese Prime Minister and his administration's early focus on
    the Philippines are proof of this.
        In his first term, President Trump deepened security
    cooperation with Taiwan, kept the U.S.-Japan-South Korea
    intelligence sharing initiative alive, and approved major arms
    transfers to Southeast Asian partners.
        We need to build on this work. Key to this is encouraging
    responsible and effective burden sharing from our partners.
    This has been a decades-long bipartisan initiative that has
    only become more pressing.
        South Korea has done great work here. Its defense spending
    grew consistently during the Cold War and beyond, always
    remaining well above 2 percent of its GDP.
        It now boasts a robust defense industry and is well-
    positioned to work with the U.S. on boosting our shipbuilding
    capacity.
        Japan's defense spending remains comparably low, but it has
    taken important steps like acquiring counter-strike
    capabilities, and in Taiwan, double-digit defense spending
    increases must continue, given the threat it faces across the
    Taiwan Strait.
        In addition to sharing the burden of defense, our allies
    need to expand U.S. basing and overflight access around the
    Indo-Pacific. The best way to show China that we stand together
    is if we are physically present in the region.
        The Philippines has shown itself to be a great partner in
    this regard since the signing of the Enhanced Defense
    Cooperation Agreement. We need far more of this around the
    region.
        I look forward to hearing the witnesses' thoughts on how to
    approach both burden-sharing and access basing and overflight
    in Asia, and more specifically what role the State Department
    should play on these issues.
        The issue in military aggression--the rise in military
    aggression from China is a threat to us all. If we do not use
    our alliances in the Indo-Pacific to a high standard, we do
    Americans and the people of the region a tremendous disservice.
        With that, thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
    We have a good panel. We are looking forward to hearing from
    them. With that, I recognize the ranking member.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Chairman Risch. Welcome to our
    witnesses. We so appreciate your being here this morning.
        From the South China Sea where China's Coast Guard harasses
    Philippine forces to Beijing's military exercises over the
    Taiwan Strait, there is bipartisan agreement that these
    aggressive actions threaten national security.
        As we know, the impacts of China's rise are not isolated to
    Asia. Debt trap diplomacy with infrastructure projects in
    Africa, the flow of fentanyl precursor chemicals into Latin
    America, economic coercion in Europe over Lithuania's support
    for Taiwan, China's influence can be felt across the globe.
        That is certainly the case in Ukraine where China and North
    Korea have been actively supporting Putin's war machine.
    Beijing is watching how we respond to Ukraine as it weighs its
    options in Taiwan.
        The presidents of both parties have recognized the
    challenge that China poses. President Trump took important
    steps by implementing export controls during his first term.
    President Biden not only kept those controls in place, his
    administration strengthened them.
        Our allies in Asia, as the chairman pointed out, also
    recognize the threat that China poses. In 2022, Japan committed
    to increasing its defense spending. Australia has made historic
    investments in AUKUS, our trilateral defense partnership with
    the U.K., and Taiwan is boosting its defense budget to over 3
    percent of its GDP.
        I agree that American allies should pay their fair share of
    defense spending, but we should also acknowledge that our Indo-
    Pacific partners are stepping up and U.S. support for these
    alliances is not charity--it is a strategic investment.
        America's alliances around the world are one of our
    greatest security assets. South Korea hosts eight U.S. military
    bases and 23,000 U.S. service members.
        Japan not only allows the U.S. to station 55,000 troops
    across 15 major bases, it also helps pay for them, contributing
    $2 billion a year.
        These partnerships are mutually beneficial and go beyond
    our military. Whether in Europe or Latin America, our allies
    help us to counter China's economic influence and
    disinformation.
        The combined power of American and European markets
    together expands our ability to set AI standards and our
    alliances support American companies and workers.
        Last week I attended a defense industry round table on
    AUKUS in New Hampshire. Strengthening our submarine industrial
    base like the work being done at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
    does more than give us a strategic edge over China. It creates
    high-quality American jobs and it supports our domestic
    industry.
        So instead of threatening or undermining friendly nations
    with tariffs, I think we should be strengthening our alliances.
    NATO has contained the Soviet Union and Russia for decades. I
    would be interested in hearing from our witnesses on what
    mutual defense arrangements for the Indo-Pacific might look
    like.
        We need to explore every advantage that we have. INDOPACOM,
    our military command in the region, has also led the way in
    implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Act. The commander
    recently told me that INDOPACOM has been more effective than
    any other U.S. regional command in ensuring women play key
    roles in decision-making.
        That is a strategic strength and we should build on it if
    we want to combat the growing link between security in Asia and
    security in Europe.
        As we know, the world is more connected than ever. I hope
    our witnesses this morning will speak not only to the
    challenges we face, but also to the opportunities that we can
    seize at this historic time.
        So I look forward to hearing your thoughts and I am
    delighted that you are joining us. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        We will now hear from our witnesses. We are going to start
    with Randall Schriver, Chairman of the Board at the Project
    2049 Institute.
        He previously served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Indo-Pacific Security Affairs in the first Trump
    administration, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
    East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He is one of our foremost
    experts on U.S. alliances in Asia.
        The floor is yours.

      STATEMENT OF HON. RANDALL SCHRIVER, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD,
                 PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE, ARLINGTON, VA

        Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Shaheen, and other distinguished members of the committee. I
    appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning to testify
    on this topic.
        So for the United States to realize our goal of a free and
    open Indo-Pacific, we are and will continue to be very heavily
    reliant on alliances and partnerships.
        We are a Pacific power, but we are not heavily resident in
    the Western Pacific. Hawaii is three time zones away from the
    continental U.S., but still west of the international--east of
    the international date line, and even our great territories--
    Guam, our state of Alaska--do not put us resident enough in the
    Western Pacific to fully affect security the way we would like.
        This geographic conundrum advantages our adversaries and
    competitors. For China, Russia, North Korea, they enjoy
    geographic proximity to the areas we seek to safeguard.
        So this means in a contingency, whether that be Taiwan
    Strait, West Philippine Sea, East China Sea, the United States
    will always be the away team, will always be playing on the
    road.
        Strong alliances and partnerships are the best way to
    combat this tyranny of time and distance. In the military and
    security domain, we rely on our allies and partnerships for at
    least three types of contributions.
        First, we need them to develop their own capabilities for
    their sufficient self-defense, but also to be contributors to
    other regional contingencies if need be.
        Second, we rely on them for access basing and overflight,
    as has been pointed out in the opening statements, as a distant
    power ourselves.
        And third, we rely on our partners and allies to also play
    a role in the shaping and the support for a free and open Indo-
    Pacific and all that that entails, as well as day-to-day
    activities that uphold deterrence.
        So these are the things that I think are the basis for
    evaluating burden-sharing. I think too often burden-sharing is
    scoped down to a single figure, which is how much is a country
    spending per GDP--percentage of GDP on defense.
        I think that does not always tell the whole story. It is
    revealing, but does not always tell the whole story. Just a few
    examples, Philippines spends 1.5 percent of GDP on defense, but
    yet they are making more and more sites available for U.S.
    forces through, as the chairman mentioned, the EFTA agreements,
    nine sites now.
        Japan, as was mentioned, has historically spent close to 1
    percent of GDP, but in fact we were advocates for actively
    suppressing that defense spending for many decades to now get
    to a point where people would like to see them do more.
        They are doing more, but they are also the host to the
    largest number of U.S. military forces forward deployed, and as
    ranking member Shaheen pointed out, they are contributors
    through host nation support.
        Taiwan is spending 2.5 percent of GDP, but they are also
    spending a lot that is not accounted for in defense when it
    comes to national resiliency on energy, on communications, on
    civil defense.
        So perhaps they should be getting more credit. History is
    very important, too. We have partners and allies that have
    fought alongside us in every conflict since World War I, and,
    of course, I am speaking most directly about Australia.
        So I believe it is a complicated formula and we should take
    a comprehensive view on burden-sharing and give credit where
    credit is due because these alliances are so important to us.
        This is further complicated by the changing nature of the
    threat. Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles put our forward
    deployed forces at risk so we are now more and more dependent
    on our allies for basing and access.
        So spending figures do not capture the entire picture, in
    my point of view. Our State Department will be extraordinarily
    important in addressing this.
        Our State Department, they are the lead negotiators for
    host nation support for access. They run our security
    assistance, foreign military sales, foreign military financing,
    international military education and training.
        They run programs that are adjacent to military and
    security like the INL programs that support Coast Guards
    through the prism of law enforcement, and I would argue even
    the education and cultural programs--the Fulbright, the
    International Visitors Program. That is investing in the
    alliance managers of the future and I think that should be
    supported.
        Let me close with four brief recommendations that address
    issues under the purview of this committee.
        I think, number one, this committee should ask for regular
    updates regarding our more advanced and mature alliances--Japan
    and Australia--to make sure initiatives are on track with
    respect to posture and C2 adjustments and both pillars of
    AUKUS.
        Two, I think the committee should insist State Department
    demonstrate FMS, FMF, and IMET are in fact in alignment with
    our strategic goals and should be actively shaping that.
        Third, I think the committee should insist on a speedy
    conclusion of U.S. assistance reviews and direct resumption of
    aid that aligns with our strategic priorities, things like EDCA
    and Coast Guard support and dioxin remediation in Vietnam.
        Finally, this committee should insist on a speedy
    conclusion of State Department review of education and cultural
    programs and direct resumption of programs that align with our
    strategic priorities.
        Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Randall G. Schriver

        Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and distinguished members
    of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify on the important
    issues related to our alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.
        To realize the Unites States' vision of securing a free and open
    Indo-Pacific region, we are heavily reliant on alliances and
    partnerships. The United States is a Pacific power, yet we are mostly
    resident in the Eastern Pacific and lack significant presence in the
    Western Pacific. Though Hawaii is three time zones west of the
    continental United States, and Alaska's Aleutian Island chain stretches
    beyond the international date line, we are still largely removed from
    many of the key areas of the Western Pacific that significantly impact
    America's vital interests.
        This geographic conundrum carries heavy implications for everything
    from supply chains to trade, but from a national security perspective
    our competitors and adversaries--that axis of China, Russia and North
    Korea--all are advantaged by their physical proximity to the areas we
    seek to safeguard. And in the event of a contingency, whether in the
    Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, or the West
    Philippines Sea, the United States will be playing on the road as the
    ``away team.'' Strong alliances and partnerships are the best way to
    combat ``the tyranny of time and distance.''
        In the military and security domain, we depend on alliances and
    partnerships for at least three types of contributions. First, we need
    our allies to build their own respective militaries for sufficient
    self-defense, as well as for having capabilities they can bring to bear
    on other regional contingencies. Second, we need allies and partners to
    provide access, basing, and overflight (ABO) for forward deployed U.S.
    military forces. And third we need allies and partners of like mind to
    help create and uphold the free and open order in the Indo-pacific
    characterized by protection of sovereignty, respect for international
    laws and norms, peaceful dispute resolution, and the ability of
    political leaders in all capitals to make decision free from coercion
    and undue influence. How well or how poorly an ally contributes across
    these three areas is the primary basis for evaluating their level of
    ``burden sharing.''
        Too often burden sharing is scoped down to a simple question of
    ``how much does the country spend on its defense as a percentage of
    GDP?'' And in the cases where we have permanent bases and presence,
    ``how much is the country contributing in host nation support?'' While
    those statics can be revealing, they often do not tell the entire
    story. How should we evaluate a country like the Philippines which only
    spends 1.5 percent of GDP on defense, but is offering expanded access
    for U.S. forces in proximity to a major known contingency through nine
    Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) locations? Taiwan is
    spending 2.5 percent of GDP on defense (and is committed to increasing
    that to 3 percent), but is also spending increasing amounts on
    ``national resilience'' to include resilient energy stockpiles,
    hardened and redundant communications, and civilian sheltering and
    civil defenses--all of which contribute to deterrence, but none of
    which counts in the defense budget. What do we say of Singapore who is
    not a treaty ally--but spends 3 percent of GDP on defense and has been
    extremely generous on access opportunities for U.S. forces (including
    paying to extend their major navy pier to accommodate aircraft
    carriers--which we have but they do not). How do we account for
    historical legacy? We spent decades actively encouraging Japan to
    suppress defense spending, but now many claim they are falling short.
    At the same time, we also have more forces stationed in Japan than any
    other country in Asia and enjoy approximately a billion and a half U.S.
    dollars a year in host nation support. Australia spends 2 percent of
    GDP on defense, but is increasing access opportunities for U.S. forces
    and has fought alongside the U.S. in every conflict since World War I.
        This evaluation is further complicated by the evolving nature of
    the threat, and the changing character of warfare. Given the threat
    from increasingly lethal and accurate Chinese ballistic and cruise
    missiles, U.S. war planners have determined we need to fight in a
    distributed, dispersed manner. This makes access and basing far more
    important than it was two decades ago. The key to sustained combat
    generation in a contested environment may very well come down to a
    handful of dispersal points with sufficient maintenance and logistics
    support, and forward positioning of critical munitions and fuel.
        Spending money on expensive legacy platforms might win favor with
    those who solely judge an ally based on the total amount of defense
    spending, but the keys to success in modern warfare may be acquiring
    cheaper, attritable, autonomous systems, combined with an AI-enabled
    comprehensive operating picture with optimized decision-making
    assistance. An ally with a modernized C5ISR system that is also
    interoperable with the U.S. military with real-time data sharing may
    prove able to carry much more of the burden in both peacetime and in
    conflict than a country with the largest quantity of legacy platforms.
        Beyond investing in one's own defense and beyond ABO, our allies
    are increasingly important in shaping the regional security environment
    and bolstering deterrence. Japan and Korea are more active in regional
    security assistance, capacity building and training which is additive
    to U.S. efforts. Australia and New Zealand's development assistance and
    capacity building in Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia help make
    countries in Oceana more resilient. And more allies and partners are
    willing to join the U.S. in a variety of presence operations that
    support freedom of navigation in the key maritime commons.
        It is therefore my judgement that we should take a far more
    comprehensive view of burden sharing rather than looking only at
    defense spending. In doing so, we will have a more accurate
    understanding of a particular ally's actual contributions to regional
    security and support of U.S. interests. A comprehensive account will
    not relieve pressure on our allies to improve. Quite to the contrary,
    it will help our diplomats become more focused on what the prioritized
    ``asks'' should be from our allies.
        The State Department will be absolutely crucial to our efforts
    moving forward to modernize our alliances and to enhance comprehensive
    burden sharing in at least four ways. First, the State Department is
    the lead agency for international negotiations. Our diplomats will thus
    be out front in negotiating host nation support agreements (e.g. Japan
    in 2027) and future access agreements. Second, our State Department
    runs security assistance programs. Critical programs such as Foreign
    Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and
    International Military Education and Training (IMET) are all run out of
    State. Our ``T'' Bureau at State will have a lot of influence on how
    efficiently the FMS and FMF process runs, as well as influence on what
    allies procure and how partner countries modernize. Third, the State
    Department runs programs that are military and security ``adjacent.''
    For example, the INL bureau of the State Department through the prism
    of law enforcement assistance has engaged in capacity building of
    regional Coast Guards. Arguably, in the current environment of grey
    zone incursions, assistance to the Philippine Coast Guard is as
    important to deterrence as assistance to the military. USAID
    (presumably now fully under State Department) also played a role in
    supplying the ECDA sites with humanitarian supplies for use in the
    event of natural disasters. In the case of partner country Vietnam,
    USAID has helped with Dioxin remediation at former U.S. military sites
    which has been a key enabler to building U.S.-Vietnam security ties.
    And fourth, State Department has responsibility over assistance
    programs that are non-military, but contribute greatly to alliance and
    partner building. Fulbright programs and education and cultural
    exchanges cultivate the next generation of talented and faithful
    alliance managers.
        Let me close with four specific recommendations to Congress on
    issues for which this committee has purview:

      (1)  This committee should request regular updates regarding the more
            advanced and mature alliances with Japan and Australia
            respectively, on alliance modernization initiatives such as
            posture realignment, C2 adjustments, and both pillars of AUKUS
            to ensure the initiatives are sustained and on track.

      (2)  This committee should insist State Department demonstrate FMS,
            FMF and IMET decisions are aligned with strategic priorities,
            and take into account lessons learned on the changing nature of
            warfare. Particular attention should be given to providing
            capabilities for advanced sensing, battlefield management and
            promoting a networked region of U.S. allies and partners.

      (3)  This committee should insist on a speedy conclusion of U.S.
            assistance reviews and direct resumption of aid that aligns
            with strategic priorities. Emphasis should be placed on aid
            programs that support our military posture initiatives (e.g.
            EDCA), military adjacent capabilities (e.g. Coast Guards), and
            alliance and partnership enabling programs (e.g. Dioxin
            remediation).

          And

      (4)  This committee should insist on a speedy conclusion of State
            Department review of education and cultural exchange programs
            and direct a resumption of programs that align with strategic
            priorities. Our future alliance managers should be the first
            beneficiaries of the reconstituted Fulbright fellowships and
            International Visitor Leaders Program.

        Thank you once again and I look forward to your questions.

        The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Schriver. That is a
    challenging list that you gave us, but we will talk about that
    when we get to the questions.
        Next we have Dr. Mastro is a Center Fellow at the Freeman
    Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford
    University. She is also a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie
    Endowment for International Peace.
        In addition, she continues to serve in the U.S. Air Force
    Reserve where she works as a strategic planner at the Pentagon.
    Her research focuses on the Chinese military, Asia Pacific
    security issues, and coercive diplomacy.
        Dr. Mastro, the floor is yours.

     STATEMENT OF DR. ORIANA SKYLAR MASTRO, CENTER FELLOW, FREEMAN
         SPOGLI INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, STANFORD
       UNIVERSITY, NON-RESIDENT SCHOLAR, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
                   INTERNATIONAL PEACE, STANFORD, CA

        Dr. Mastro. Thank you.
        Chairman Risch, ranking member Shaheen, and esteemed
    members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thank you
    for the opportunity to present my views today on how to best
    approach alliance burden sharing in the Indo-Pacific.
        I will present what types of allied support I believe will
    be the most strategically consequential for the U.S. ability to
    deter Chinese aggression and how the United States can better
    encourage such support.
        Burden sharing is often framed in financial terms, but if
    we take a broader perspective, the contributions that our
    allies can make goes much beyond defense spending.
        Instead, I would argue that we need to prioritize three
    other forms of contributions from our allies.
        First, the United States needs to focus on getting more
    expansive, flexible, and permanent access, basing, and
    overflight in allied countries in the Indo-Pacific.
        Second, the United States needs greater influence in what
    allies invest in to include greater support for U.S. military
    construction and the development of certain military
    capabilities that complement rather than duplicate our forces.
        As the previous witness already mentioned, our allies and
    partners are doing a lot to support U.S. defense and deterrence
    in the Indo-Pacific.
        If we do require greater access basing and overflight, in
    my written testimony I lay out some specifics on what I think
    that could look like for our allies and partners.
        As I have listed elsewhere, to deter China from using
    force, especially over Taiwan, the United States needs to
    implement a denial strategy--the ability to deny China from
    achieving its goals through force.
        Some examples of things that we could do with our allies
    and partners in terms of ABO that could achieve this goal are
    things such as getting submarine tenders in Japan, more
    permanent basing in the Philippines, and prioritizing anti-ship
    capabilities in the southwest islands of Japan.
        I would also note that the United States should consider
    renegotiating the relocation of our Marines from Okinawa to
    Guam as that agreement was signed almost 20 years ago and does
    not take into account the rise of China and the consequential
    changing security environment.
        In addition to greater access, basing, and overflight, it
    is important that the United States works with allies and
    partners so that they spend on the right things, not just spend
    more.
        The United States could encourage two types of spending in
    particular--first, greater contributions to the cost of U.S.
    military construction.
        It is important to note that a lot of our allies and
    partners already contribute significantly to this, in
    particular Japan, but South Korea could contribute more to
    these costs.
        Philippine Government, however, is a bit more cash-
    strapped, and given that the United States is trying to gain
    access to basing there, this is one of the areas where the
    United States should be able to make greater financial
    contributions.
        Allied defense investment decisions could also be geared to
    better support U.S. defense industry. The chairman already
    mentioned the improvements and the contributions of South
    Korean shipbuilding, and in recent years there have been great
    developments in research, development, licensing production
    between the United States and Japan and, of course, a prime
    example being the expanded defense cooperation found in AUKUS.
        The United States could also encourage allies and partners
    to invest in capability that complement instead of duplicate
    U.S. capabilities.
        The third potential impactful area of burden sharing is
    mission burden sharing. The allies and partners are investing
    more in the capabilities to deter China and also take on a
    greater responsibility during crises.
        For example, the United States might need South Korea to be
    better positioned to take on responsibilities to counter North
    Korean hostility during potential conflicts. In this vein,
    South Korea should also agree to strategic flexibility for the
    United States, meaning that the U.S. can use our forces on the
    Peninsula for off-Peninsula contingencies, i.e., those that
    involve China.
        Japan needs to be better prepared to deter conflict in the
    East China Sea and Australia, through our cooperation, could
    have a greater burden of exercising military dominance over key
    Southeast Asian choke points.
        Recognizing the United States cannot do it all, we should
    also welcome coordination and cooperation among our allies and
    partners.
        Let me conclude by saying that the best way to encourage
    any sort of burden sharing is not to publicly criticize allies
    and demand it, but instead the United States needs to offer
    more than security protections.
        Development assistance, political support, technological
    cooperation, economic benefits, humanitarian aid and disaster
    relief--these are some of the most impactful.
        The public nature of U.S. demands makes it hard for U.S.
    allies, who are all democracies, to cooperate with the United
    States and to consider some of the requests that we might make.
        Some for alliance burden sharing it is very important for
    the United States to have access to all tools of national power
    in order to convince countries to be better aligned with our
    defense priorities.
        It goes without saying that that means the United States
    needs the full use of all aspects of national power. The recent
    dissolution of key agencies such as USAID or the U.S. Agency
    for Global Media, which oversees Voice of America, these were
    relatively important and inexpensive tools of U.S. power and
    influence, and it makes the job of projecting U.S. power
    overseas even much harder, and I hope, pending appropriate
    reviews, that the funding and support for these tools resume in
    the future.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Mastro follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro

        The Chairman. Thank you very much, Doctor.
        Now we will hear from Dr. Victor Cha. He is a distinguished
    university professor at Georgetown University, the president of
    the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy department at the Center for
    Strategic and International Studies, and a senior fellow at the
    George W. Bush Institute.
        He served on the NSC and as an advisor to the Secretary of
    Defense on the Defense Policy Board across different
    administrations. Dr. Cha is a leading expert on U.S. alliances
    and particularly the U.S.-Korea alliance.
        Dr. Cha, we would like to hear from you.

         STATEMENT OF DR. VICTOR CHA, DISTINGUISHED UNIVERSITY
      PROFESSOR, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT, GEOPOLITICS AND
          FOREIGN POLICY DEPARTMENT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
                 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

        Dr. Cha. Thank you, Chairman Risch, ranking member Shaheen,
    and members of the committee, for the opportunity to speak to
    you today about U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific.
        I am going to make five points that summarize the full
    statement and data that I have presented and would like to
    submit for the record.
        The Chairman. It will be submitted.
        Dr. Cha. Thank you, sir.
        My first point is historical, and that is that our alliance
    system in Asia, which was created over 70 years ago, has served
    us very well.
        It won the Cold War, stopped communist dominoes from
    falling, reduced poverty, created wealth and fostered
    democracy. Nobody could have imagined this outcome 70 years
    ago, and these alliances are a unique aspect of U.S. power.
        The second point is with regard to shared threats. As we
    all know, we face these shared threats--China, the nuclear
    buildup, missile buildup, assertive behavior in the Taiwan
    Strait, South China Sea, East China Sea.
        This is now complicated by this axis of Russia, Iran, North
    Korea and their conduits--Cuba, Iraq, Syria, Venezuela--all
    actively working in concert to undermine U.S. interests.
        As we all know, for example, in the Ukraine war, almost 100
    percent of the micro electronics behind Russian weaponry came
    from China--glide bombs, attack drones from Iran--and 50
    percent of the munitions today that Russia uses are sourced
    from North Korea.
        So the U.S. has to prevail against these threats, but we
    cannot do it alone. We need our alliances.
        In the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. has 24 persistent bases and
    access to 20 other sites. By contrast, China has one overseas
    base.
        These bases allow for rapid response and successful defense
    and deterrence, but at the same time these alliances are in
    need of reform and modernization.
        My third point is with regard to burden sharing, and the
    main point here is that allies are much more capable of bearing
    host nation costs than they were 50 years ago. Many of the
    algorithms we use are legacies of the past.
        At the same time, any changes should avoid surprises to
    give our allies in the region the domestic political space to
    sell new agreements to their publics, as these sorts of
    agreements need to be ratified by their legislatures, unlike
    the case in the United States.
        Burden sharing algorithms that exponentially increase
    allied payments will not be feasible unless they take into
    account allied contributions outside of the alliance on behalf
    of the alliance, such as the $18 billion that Japan has
    provided in support to Ukraine, and the $3 billion plus that
    South Korea has done as well.
        These burden sharing contributions need to be documented as
    per legislation like the Allied Burden Sharing Report Act.
        My fourth point is in regard to access basing and
    overflight. The United States increasingly operates in a
    contested basing environment to include cost constraints,
    adversary tactics, and the vagaries of domestic political
    leadership in these host countries.
        Gaining access to allied bases and civilian facilities for
    prepositioning of kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities is as
    much political as it is a military exercise.
        It requires socializing publics and governments not just at
    the national level, but also at the local level, to understand
    the role they play in national security.
        In the case of Japan, this means securing access to JSDF
    and civilian facilities in the dispersed positions in the
    southwest island chain. It also means the U.S. commitment to
    following through on the promise to create a joint force
    headquarters to coordinate with the newly established JJOC in
    Japan.
        In Korea, this means not just a military, but also a
    political discussion with the next South Korean Government
    about the role of the Korean military and the U.S. military in
    a Taiwan contingency.
        South Korea has made good statements with regard to
    Taiwan's defense in the previous two leaders' summits, but now
    comes the hard part; bringing political consensus to think
    about changes that include things like force presence on the
    Peninsula, rear area support, and South Korean capabilities to
    deter North Korea in the event of opportunistic aggression in a
    Taiwan contingency.
        The other point I wanted to make about ABO strategy is to
    complement our military access arrangements with a strategy to
    stop Chinese economic coercion. This is because our access
    could be compromised by Chinese commercial pressure on host
    economies with regard to our arrangements.
        In this regard, U.S. Indo-Pacific allies need to take a
    page from the EU's anti-coercion instrument and build a
    collective economic deterrence framework that is not just an
    economic strategy, but is also related to our military and ABO
    strategy.
        My last point is that the update of our alliances should
    include burden sharing in terms of allied participation in
    global governance institutions when our traditional
    institutions of global governance, like the U.N. Security
    Council, are underperforming.
        In this regard, the State Department should formalize the
    IP4--Indo-Pacific Four--grouping as regular participants in
    global governance institutions like the NATO leaders' summit
    and the G-7.
        These allies can help carry forward like minded agendas as
    the United States consolidates its power at home.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Cha follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Dr. Victor D. Cha

        Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen and distinguished members of
    the committee, it is an honor to appear before this committee on the
    topic of U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. The views
    represented in this testimony are my own and not those of any employer
    or institution with which I am affiliated.
        The Indo-Pacific is of terrible importance to U.S. economic and
    security interests, and our alliances help to preserve those interests
    and achieve our goals there. But these alliances are in need of reform
    and modernization given the challenges posed by the new geostrategic
    environment.
        I will speak briefly about the historical importance of these
    security institutions and ways to modernize them going forward. I
    request that my full written statement be submitted for the record.
                         origins of the alliance system
        When the United States created a network of bilateral alliances in
    Asia in the immediate postwar period, architects like John Foster
    Dulles acknowledged that this system was different from the
    multilateral structure built in Western Europe, but policymakers at the
    time probably had no inkling of how successful this alliance system
    would become and how well it would serve U.S. interests.
        Each of the bilateral alliances at that time with Japan, South
    Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand
    (ANZUS) afforded the United States an immense amount of power and
    influence, unlike anywhere else in the world. The alliance system
    created incredibly loyal allies like Japan, Australia, and South Korea,
    the latter two of which have fought with the United States in every war
    since World War I and the Korean War, respectively.
        Through this alliance system, the United States won the Cold War in
    Asia: It created prosperity and economic development in the region
    beyond anyone's imagination; it fostered growth and democracy. The
    importance of democratic values in the alliance system cannot be
    undervalued considering that at the outset of the alliance system's
    creation in 1951, it looked very much like communism would win the day.
    The CCP victory in China in 1949, the communist North Korea attack in
    1950, and communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia lent credence to the
    domino theory--that soon, all these distant, post-colonial states would
    be falling behind the iron curtain. But that did not happen. The U.S.
    alliance system in Asia prevailed.
                        today's geopolitical environment
        Today, the pacing threat from China crosses many dimensions,
    including security, economic, information, and technology. But it is
    complicated and enhanced by a growing group of illiberal actors
    operating in concert with one another to undermine the U.S. position.
    These actors are well known to you: Russia, Iran, and North Korea and
    their conduit states, Cuba, Iraq, Syria, and Venezuela. Table 1, for
    example, shows the range of support provided by these actors to
    Russia's war in Ukraine. China supplied almost 100 percent of the
    microelectronics for Russia's missiles, tanks, and aircraft. Iran
    contributed significantly to Russia's supply of attack drones, close-
    range ballistic missiles, and glide bombs among other weapons used in
    the war. North Korea has provided 11,000-12,000 troops, hundreds of
    ballistic missiles, and may account for as much as 50 percent of
    Russia's ammunition today. Outside of these actors, the supply of like-
    minded and capable partners dwindles in comparison with a growing
    number of ``hedge'' states like Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia,
    South Africa, and UAE who cannot be relied upon to side with the United
    States depending on the issue.

                      reforming the indo-pacific alliances
        The United States must meet these challenges and win, not by going
    it alone but with the support of our allies. There is no real
    alternative. The alliance system has proven to be a winning formula in
    the past, and it will do so again, but not without reform and
    modernization.
        For some in the current administration, the imperative to update
    and modernize these alliances stems from the judgment that they are
    costly economically to the United States. If we use trade and defense-
    spending as two metrics of allied burden-sharing, there are no Indo-
    Pacific allies that are judged to be carrying their fair share.

        Four principles should drive the mindset of alliance modernization:
    1) Indo-Pacific allies are capable and can contribute much more to
    networked capabilities than in the past; 2) Change is difficult, but
    Indo-Pacific allies must manage the domestic-political resistance to
    doing things differently; 3) Allies need to accept increased burden-
    sharing as a given in the modernization effort; and 4) Allied
    contributions to successful deterrence with the United States are a
    critical pre-requisite to their realizing commercial opportunity with
    China--that is, without security, there is no commercial opportunity,
    there is only commercial coercion by China.
        In the Indo-Pacific region, the United States has 24 persistent
    bases and access to 20 other military sites. By contrast, China has
    only one overseas base in the world in Djibouti. These positions host
    88,500 active-duty servicemembers, including about 60,000 in Japan and
    about 28,500 in Korea.
        This presence affords the United States rapid response capabilities
    to military contingencies; contributes to successful deterrence against
    adversarial threats to the homeland and to allies/partners; and
    provides the physical assurance of the U.S. security umbrella that is
    critical not just to peace, but also to profitable commerce and
    investment that drives the region's growth.
        Congress' role in maintaining this alliance network is critical in
    its appropriation of funds for basing activities; its legislation of
    policies and requirements related to basing; and its oversight of the
    executive branch's policies related to basing and alliance relations.
                                 burden-sharing
        Four principles should undergird the reform of burden-sharing
    arrangements with allies. One, allied governments must recognize that
    traditional monetary burden-sharing algorithms are legacies of a time
    one-half century ago when U.S. capabilities dwarfed those of smaller
    partners. Host-nation support arrangements where the U.S. annual
    contribution is larger than that of the partner no longer makes sense
    given the partner's wealth.
        Two, host-nation support agreements probably can and should take
    account of allied contributions to defense and security outside of, but
    on behalf of, the bilateral security partnership.
        Three, aside from the monetary aspects, burden-sharing should be
    defined as the reorientation of costs and capabilities to the broader
    regional deterrence and defense mission in the Indo-Pacific. While this
    is already the case for some alliances, it is not the case for all and
    needs to be so.
        Four, a critical element of reform is to avoid surprises. It is
    imperative to create a suitable runway and plan that gives host nations
    the political space to make potentially paradigm-shifting adjustments
    to the alliance.
        Current SMA arrangements for Japan and South Korea adhere to a
    legacy algorithm of incremental annual increases of around 2 percent
    and 5-8 percent respectively. The newly concluded South Korea agreement
    ($1.05 billion in 2025 and $1.14 billion in 2026) expires in 2030; the
    Japan agreement (about $1.5 billion in 2025) expires in 2026 with each
    agreement covering about 40-50 percent (Korea) and 75 percent (Japan)
    of the non-personnel costs of stationing USFK and USFJ (covering labor,
    utilities, training, construction, purchase of local supplies).
        Negotiation of new agreements, following a ``cost-plus-50'' model
    for example, will be difficult for host nations to swallow given the
    need for legislative ratification (unlike in the United States). In
    devising a more equitable formula for cost-sharing that acknowledges
    the economic capacity of allied governments' substantial wealth, the
    United States and allied governments could agree to include other non-
    SMA contributions as part of the ledger of allied contributions in
    future agreements. Table 2 gives examples of past non-SMA costs borne
    by Japan and Korea.

        Greater burden-sharing by allies could also acknowledge the out-of-
    theater contributions by allies to security. But this would also
    require that current burden-sharing agreements be revised to
    reinstitute allied support for U.S. military assets outside of the host
    nation (e.g., South Korea). For example, Table 3 enumerates Australia,
    Japan and South Korea's contributions to Ukraine.

        This more comprehensive definition of burden-sharing by allies
    should be documented by the Administration through legislation like the
    Allied Burden Sharing Report Act and the NATO Burden Sharing Report
    Act.
                      access, basing and overflight (abo)
        The United States will increasingly operate in a contested basing
    environment. Some of the challenges are internal in terms of our own
    resource constraints. Some of them relate to the strategy of the
    adversary (i.e., A2/AD). And some of the challenges are political and
    internal to those particular host countries. Yet securing these
    privileges are critical to giving the U.S. military resilience in terms
    of staying power, resupply/repair, and storage, not to mention the
    critical physical presence that undergirds credible deterrence.
        Here I cannot offer recommendations that you have not already
    heard. In general, we need to push for U.S. use of allied bases in
    contingencies where the ally is not directly threatened. Given growing
    reach and capabilities of the adversary, the United States must do more
    to harden forward presence infrastructure as well as increase air and
    missile defense systems. There could be more burden-sharing of the
    latter with allies, including additional THAAD systems in the region.
        In the case of Japan, major advances in defense spending and the
    creation of the joint operational command (JJOC) are commendable, and
    have been supported by the public. There is an expectation that the
    United States would pre-consult with Japan on pre-positioning of
    additional capabilities, and that Tokyo would gain support of local
    communities. The Japanese Government could build on this momentum to
    improve access arrangements for the alliance to make deterrence more
    credible and defenses more capable in a Taiwan contingency. This
    requires an initiative from the top to engage in a whole-of-government
    dialogue internally and with the United States (in the 2+2 ministerial
    talks) on revisions to SOFA which govern limited use access to JSDF and
    civilian facilities other than permanent U.S. bases in Japan. The
    purpose would be to streamline the national and local approval process
    for U.S. access to dispersed positions in the Southwest (Nansei) island
    chain (Miyako, Ishigaki, Yonaguni) in advance of an armed-attack
    situation. Tokyo must also work with local governments to enhance their
    understanding of the role they play in national defense (something
    better understood in Tokyo). Such reforms should not be seen as a favor
    or concession to the United States, but as necessary to enhance Japan's
    national defense and security in the Nansei island chain closest to
    Taiwan.
        In the case of South Korea, U.S. access to bases, the addition of
    new non-kinetic capabilities, and the addition of kinetic capabilities
    would be generally uncontroversial. The key is that they are framed as
    directed toward the North Korean threat. The framing of capabilities as
    directed to a Taiwan contingency, however, becomes more problematic
    given the traditional South Korean reluctance to become entrapped in a
    U.S.-China conflict. Domestic political factors matter here to a degree
    in that conservative governments in Seoul tend to be a shade more open
    to discussions about Taiwan contingencies. It is also noteworthy that
    both progressive and conservative governments have broken new ground
    with summit-level statements equating freedom of navigation and
    stability of the Taiwan straits with Korea's security. Still, the
    resistance is real. The United States could engage the next Korean
    Government in a broad reorientation of U.S. forces in Korea moving from
    a peninsular mission to a regional one. The range of options here could
    span removing troops from the peninsula to elsewhere, or increasing the
    presence in Korea with a portion each committed to peninsular defense
    and regional defense.
        However, I would like to draw your attention to one important
    strategy to optimize U.S. ABO options. If the strategy for maintaining
    access rests on complementing and/or reforming large, main legacy
    operating base infrastructures, which are put at risk by the
    adversary's anti-access capabilities, with a network of smaller,
    dispersed, and concealed arrangements in the Indo-Pacific, then a major
    threat to this plan is not just China's ability to locate and
    militarily target such arrangements, but the political and commercial
    pressure that it can put on the hosts to withhold cooperation with the
    United States. Indeed, commercial pressure is probably the ideal tool
    for China to use given the nature of these small and dispersed ABO
    arrangements--that is, a host nation is more likely to succumb to
    intense Chinese economic pressure to withhold cooperation with the
    United States over a discrete access arrangement than over a large
    military base. China's use of economic coercion against U.S. allies is
    well-established. Since 2008, it has used economic coercion against 18
    governments and over 500 companies (including U.S. primes). The purpose
    of the coercion is expressly political, not trade-related. The most
    well-known case related to access capabilities is probably the 2016-
    2017 commercial assault on Korean companies for the emplacement of a
    THAAD battery in Seongju, South Korea, which did at least $7.5 billion
    dollars of damage.
        An important component of an ABO strategy must be to complement the
    military access arrangements with a counter-coercion strategy designed
    to deter Chinese economic coercion. This strategy, otherwise known as
    ``collective resilience'' would take the form of a multilateral
    economic deterrence mechanism that leverages the combined trade
    capabilities of like-minded partners to signal to China that they
    cannot economically coerce any one member of the group. Like-minded
    partners trade with China in 575 finished and intermediary goods valued
    at $59.61 billion upon which China is highly dependent, and for which
    China does not have alternative sources.\1\ A collective economic
    deterrence strategy has proven to work in Europe where the anti-
    coercion instrument (ACI) introduced in 2023 seems to have slowed
    China's coercive practices against other individual states as it had
    done to Lithuania. The United States should encourage Indo-Pacific
    allies to do the same expressly with the understanding that there is an
    important security rationale related to ABO.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Victor Cha, ``Collective Resilience: Deterring China's
    Weaponization of Economic Interdependence,'' International Security 48,
    no. 1 (2023): 91-124. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00465.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            opportunistic aggression
        The war in Ukraine has made Indo-Pacific allies realize that war is
    a real possibility in Asia and that the unthinkable is possible. There
    is more proactive thinking in the region about dual contingencies and
    opportunistic aggression than I have ever experienced before. For
    example, we have had inquiries in the last 3 years from both Taiwan and
    South Korea about gaming out dual contingencies at the Track II level.
    An updated alliance structure should capitalize on this new thinking to
    proactively consider new ways of deterring opportunistic aggression.
    These could include, but not be limited to:

       Reorienting of the U.S. military presence on the Korean
            peninsula to a regional deterrence and defense mission (either
            by drawdown or supplementing);

       Training of USFK both on and off the peninsula;

       Collective defense declaration among the U.S., Japan, and
            South Korea and a bilateral security declaration between Japan
            and South Korea (2025 marks the 60th anniversary of normalized
            relations);

       Increased South Korean defense spending and independent
            military capabilities to deter North Korean opportunistic
            aggression during a Taiwan contingency;

       Consideration of rear area support roles played by South
            Korea in a Taiwan contingency

       Use of the UNC contributing nations' framework on the Korean
            peninsula to enhance peacetime deterrence

        These are all politically sensitive issues in South Korea and would
    be topics to be taken up with the government once the political
    impeachment crisis in that country is resolved. Any reorientation of
    the U.S. presence on the peninsula, however, would require hard
    thinking about the retention of some ground troop presence to provide
    the traditional ``tripwire'' deterrent against North Korean
    adventurism; and would necessitate a planned, phased process that would
    minimize the negative political and economic externalities that would
    result from an abrupt change. Complete withdrawal of the troop presence
    would beg the question of cost (losing the South Korean subsidy), as
    well as alternative locations that would still be close enough to the
    fight to be effective. Increasing the troop presence (with a portion
    each trained for peninsular and regional defense) could mute potential
    South Korean self-help responses (e.g., proactive discussions of
    nuclearization), but would require a difficult Korean political choice
    to acknowledge its role in a Taiwan fight.
                        new areas of allied cooperation
        Updating of the alliances should include other new areas of
    cooperation outside of the military realm. A strong precedent has
    already been set by the previous two administrations for allied
    cooperation on economic security, export controls, and supply chains.
    Under the current administration, new opportunities have been unearthed
    in areas including shipbuilding and strategic energy cooperation with
    Japan and South Korea, in particular.
        In Secretary Rubio's confirmation hearing before this body, he
    observed that eight decades after the end of the second World War,
    America is being called upon again to create a free world out of chaos,
    but he also noted the voters elected President Trump because they want
    a strong America with a ``prudent'' foreign policy. In this regard, the
    State Department should encourage our allies in the Indo-Pacific and
    Europe to play more active political roles in sustaining global
    governance as traditional institutions like the UN Security Council
    have underperformed and groupings like BRICS aim to disrupt the current
    rules-based order. I have two specific recommendations here. First, the
    United States should encourage more direct security dialogue and
    military planning among European and Asian allies that builds on the
    Trump and Biden administrations' previous efforts to build multilateral
    coalitions on functional issues like export controls, sanctions, and
    pandemic preparedness. The war in Ukraine, China's assertiveness, and
    North Korea's supply of Russia have brought the two theaters together
    in unprecedented ways and I have been personally impressed by the level
    of interest and sophistication in the European discussions on security
    of the Indo-Pacific.
        Finally, the State Department would do well to promote and
    formalize the ``Indo-Pacific-4'' framework's (Japan, South Korea,
    Australia, New Zealand) participation in global governance
    institutions. Regular participation in the NATO leader's summits have
    led to greater cooperation across Europe and Asia in countering Chinese
    coercion. Moreover, the Group of Seven (G7) has become the de facto
    organization in which leading like-minded states coordinate policies,
    set sanctions, and define new rules and norms in the absence of
    functioning UN mandates. Indo-Pacific and European actors like
    Australia, South Korea and Spain are proven high performers in many of
    the pressing tasks identified in recent G7 leaders' summits like
    economic resilience and security, digital competitiveness, food
    security, climate change, labor security, and development, and
    therefore could contribute much to burden-sharing and global
    governance.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ John J. Hamre, Victor Cha, Emily Benson, Max Bergmann, Erin L.
    Murphy, and Caitlin Welsh, ```Bending' the Architecture: Reimagining
    the G7,'' CSIS, June 12, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/bending-
    architecture-reimagining-g7.

        The Chairman. Thank you very much, Doctor.
        We will now do a round of questions and if there is
    interest we will do a second round, and I am going to start
    first of all with you, Mr. Schriver.
        You talked about--and I do not mean this to sound
    critical--but you were questioning the use of a percent of GDP
    as a commitment to what a country thinks it should do to defend
    itself.
        I have always had the same thought myself. My problem is I
    cannot think of another thing that you can use to measure it.
    Do you have any other measuring devices that you have in mind
    that you think might be appropriate in that regard?
        We see this across government. A lot of times they will
    take a broad brush and try to measure something with something
    that is not exactly related, but your thoughts on that, please.
        Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What I meant to say
    is it is important, but many times insufficient, and in other
    instances there are factors that should be weighted more
    heavily like in the case of the Philippines--nine new active
    sites including those with geographic proximity to the Taiwan
    Strait is extremely valuable, even though they are only
    spending 1.5 percent of GDP from a relatively small economy.
        So I am afraid it comes down to more of a qualitative
    assessment of weighing these different baskets--what are they
    doing on ABO, what are they doing on their own defense.
        You get really sort of qualitative when you get to history.
    I think it counts that Australia has fought alongside us in
    every war since World War I.
        I think that gives us confidence they will be alongside us
    in the future, and to me that is a part of having confidence in
    them sharing a burden in the worst of times, but that gets very
    hard to chart on a graph and measure.
        The Chairman. Thank you, and I appreciate that,
    particularly with Australia. I never even think about what
    percent they spend on--it does not matter to me.
        These people are friends and have been with us through
    thick and thin and that counts for way more than anything that
    you could talk about statistically.
        I would like--I am going to give all three of you a short
    run at this.
        Something I have been very impressed with in recent times
    has been the Philippines' desire to have us as an ally and vice
    versa, and we all know they are making real effort in that
    regard.
        What are the Chinese doing about this? Their reaction,
    obviously, is going to be negative. How does that actually
    materialize in reality?
        Why do we not start with you, Mr. Schriver, and we will go
    across.
        Mr. Schriver. Well, they are certainly behaving
    aggressively toward the Philippines in the disputed
    territories. There is a lot of activity around Second Thomas
    Shoal that includes water cannons being fired from coast guard
    vessels, includes shouldering of Filipino vessels.
        I think also what is going on is a lot of attempts at elite
    capture and economic coercion. As Dr. Cha mentioned, they are
    very focused on upcoming elections in the Philippines and what
    they might be able to do to tip the balance.
        So they are playing a little bit of a long game, too, in
    addition to the points of coercion that are much more acute.
        So, clearly, they do not like it, but from our perspective
    we cannot have an ECTA site and have the Chinese go around and
    buy up everything around it in terms of the electrical grid, in
    terms of the communication systems, in terms of the local
    infrastructure.
        We have to be able to address it in a more comprehensive
    way.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Dr. Mastro.
        Dr. Mastro. Thank you, Chairman. In terms of the things
    that the Chinese are doing, if you look at Chinese writings and
    speeches about the U.S. alliance system generally speaking, I
    think it is very telling that they spend a lot of energy in
    their discourse and their behavior and their capabilities
    trying to undermine the U.S. alliance system.
        To me, the fact that they are leveraging some of these
    discussions right now in the United States--what the United
    States is doing vis-a-vis Ukraine, for example, and for
    example, the dissolution of some of our key agencies like
    USAID--they are using those to say that, one, the United States
    is not a reliable ally and, two, they are also increasing their
    military presence around a lot of key allies and partners like
    Japan, the Philippines, and their aggression towards Taiwan.
        When I speak to the Chinese military directly and I ask
    them about their military activities in these areas, they tell
    me that they are specifically designed to demonstrate to allies
    and partners that the United States cannot help them, that in
    the case of their defense even though the United States
    military is a significant force, given the fact that we are not
    forward deployed sufficiently that those countries would be on
    their own.
        So there is this implicit military coercion that is
    occurring. At the same time, they are offering a lot of
    positive inducements to some countries in the region.
        If we alienate certain partners in the Indo-Pacific, in
    particular in Southeast Asia, if we ask them to pick sides, I
    am not sure we will like what side Singapore or even the
    Philippines might pick in the end.
        For that reason the Chinese are leveraging both their
    economic coercion as well as positive inducements. The
    development assistance that the Chinese are giving to Southeast
    Asian countries in particular is significant, and for access,
    basing, and overflight the United States is trying to expand
    our relationships with countries in the Second Island Chain,
    for example Palau or the Federated States of Micronesia.
        These are not countries that are under direct military
    threat from Beijing and so it is really--some of the programs
    we mentioned such as development assistance, economic
    assistance, military training, that convinced these countries
    to allow U.S. access, and on the same hand, the other side of
    the ledger they have the Chinese coming in with elite capture
    and economic incentives.
        For that reason it is very important, I think, that we
    focus on the military side, but also the economic and political
    side as well.
        The Chairman. Appreciate that.
        Dr. Cha.
        Dr. Cha. Just quickly, to add to what has been said, it is
    not just elite capture. It is dominating the information space
    and the media partnerships with lots of essentially resource-
    poor, media in the Philippines.
        That needs to be combated in some way, and so things like
    RFA and VOA are actually quite important in that respect.
        Then I will go back to the point on commercial pressure. As
    Randy said, there are nine access sites.
        China knows how to put very targeted commercial pressure,
    perhaps on certain localities to try to complicate our ability
    to gain access to those sites.
        So having some sort of collective strategy among Asia
    Pacific partners, again, sort of like the EU has done with the
    ACI, is something that is important for ABO strategy.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Dr. Cha, you mentioned, and I think the other two panelists
    also suggested this, that the new cooperation between Russia
    and China and North Korea on the war in Ukraine is having an
    impact.
        Can you talk about the impact that that is having to our--
    throughout the Indo-Pacific and the concerns that that raises
    with our other allies in the region?
        Dr. Cha. I am happy to, Senator. I think it has had three
    effects.
        The first is it has clearly had an effect on the
    battlefield, in the sense that 12,000 North Korean troops are
    in Kursk to try to regain some territory before peace
    negotiations start--again, 50 percent of Russian munitions
    today are reportedly sourced from North Korea. These are having
    real impacts on the battlefield. That is the first point.
        The second is that it has really created a lot of concern
    among Indo-Pacific partners that anything is possible in Asia
    now.
        War in the middle of Europe that looks like a war from days
    past cause them to think not only is war in the Taiwan Straits
    possible, and not only is war on the Korean Peninsula possible,
    but that these things could happen at the same time through
    opportunistic aggression.
        For the first time we have started getting inquiries from
    both South Korean and Taiwan friends to think more trilaterally
    about those sorts of dual contingency scenarios.
        Then the third effect, I think, is that it has really
    closed the gap between the way our European friends and our
    Indo-Pacific friends think about security. There are no longer
    two theaters--it really is one theater.
        I have actually, I think, in the past year made more trips
    to Brussels than I have to the Indo-Pacific region because of
    all the interest in Asia, and the level of conversation--I
    think my colleagues would agree--in Europe on Indo-Pacific
    security now is at a much, much higher level than it was even a
    year ago.
        So those would be the three things I would say.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Do either of you want to add to
    that?
        Yes, Dr. Mastro.
        Dr. Mastro. Thank you, ma'am.
        I would add for the China-Russia relationship in particular
    there are four main things that they are complicating for the
    United States.
        First and foremost, their relationship is making it harder
    for the United States to deter the two countries independently,
    and then I think we can see with Ukraine--and I would predict
    it would be the same thing in the Indo-Pacific--it makes it
    harder for us to compel them to stop fighting and the reasons
    for that is, first, these two countries, while they might not
    fight together in the sort of interoperable alliance framework,
    they are serving and building the ability to serve as a
    strategic rear to one another.
        Senator Shaheen. So let me interrupt for a minute, because
    in some quarters there is a suggestion that we can actually
    pull Russia away from China and separate the two of them.
        Can you speak to that? Dr. Cha, you may want to speak to
    that as well as Mr. Schriver.
        Dr. Mastro. I would say, generally speaking, I have done a
    historical review of the relationship since 1949 and the idea
    that you could present positive inducements or try to convince
    Russia, for example, that China is a greater threat than the
    United States or vice versa is not going to work.
        The best strategy if we had any hope of pulling them apart
    is that for now while European countries are more concerned
    about the Indo-Pacific, it is not the case that they are
    reacting to China as if China is such a strong partner to
    Russia.
        They still have very strong economic relations with China
    and they are reluctant to punish China for that relationship.
    If the Chinese thought it would come at an economic cost--their
    relationship with Russia--I think they would be much better
    geared to pull apart.
        So NATO could play a greater role in that economic
    relationship with China to show them that they cannot just get
    all the military benefits from Russia without some diplomatic
    and economic costs.
        Senator Shaheen. Mr. Schriver, do you have any?
        Mr. Schriver. I would be highly suspicious of that
    endeavor, I think, particularly with Mr. Putin and Xi Jinping
    and the relationship that they have developed and the mutual
    reinforcing activities that have made them alliance like.
        I would also point out some people refer to this as the
    reverse Kissinger. Of course, when Kissinger courted China,
    China and Russia had already--then the Soviet Union--had
    already had a very significant falling out. So it was not
    creating a fissure. It was taking advantage of a fissure.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Dr. Cha, anything to add?
        Dr. Cha. I was actually going to make a similar point to
    Randy's. I think in international relations, that sort of
    diplomacy only works if you occupy the pivot position--where
    the other two sides are coming to you. That is what was
    happening with Kissinger and diplomacy between the Soviet Union
    and China.
        In this case, if we were to try a reverse Kissinger, it
    would be Russia that occupies the pivot position, and so for
    that reason, I think it would be suspect.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator Ricketts.
        Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
    you to our witnesses here today to talk about this very
    important topic.
        Since signing of the 1951 mutual defense treaty, the
    Philippines has been one of our key allies in the Pacific.
    However, in recent years, the alliance has grown both more
    important and even more key as far as our strategic alignment.
        Despite being outmatched militarily and economically the
    Philippines have demonstrated an incredible resolve in
    resisting Beijing's unlawful aggression in the South China Sea,
    certainly, more recently.
        It is also able to act as an important voice within the
    ASEAN against communist China's other pressure campaigns that
    you all have been talking about.
        The most important is what the alliance provides us
    militarily and, Mr. Schriver, you were talking about the
    expansion of the EDCA bases and the nine strategic sites that
    they have given us access to to enhance our ability to deter
    communist China in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea and
    other key theaters.
        It has also allowed us to deploy the Typhon missile system,
    which can hold land-based targets in China at risk as well as
    surface ships.
        How important is it for us to continue to work with Manila
    to expand U.S. access to these sites and further invest in the
    infrastructure and housing for U.S. troops, Mr. Schriver?
        Mr. Schriver. Thank you. I think it is extraordinarily
    important, and if you kind of racked and stacked in the region,
    I would put the Philippines right at the top of where we need
    to invest, given its geography and given a window of
    opportunity.
        The last administration in Manila under President Duterte
    was not exactly user-friendly, if you will. Marcos has been a
    sea change and really more of a return to the norm, but a sea
    change nonetheless, and I think we should take advantage of
    that.
        Frankly, the population, given Chinese aggression and
    coercion, is also very much in support of strengthening U.S.-
    Philippine ties and I think it is the time to make the
    investments that are needed.
        Senator Ricketts. Great. We were just talking about China's
    really aggressive position toward the Philippines, these gray
    zone attacks in the South China Sea. You mentioned some of the
    areas there. It is really, really valuable that Manila shows
    this defiance, is it not, Mr. Schriver?
        Mr. Schriver. It is. They are, of course, first and
    foremost responsible for their own defense and I think they
    have done a very admirable job on these resupply missions to
    Second Thomas Shoal, really resisting that Chinese pressure and
    coercion.
        Senator Ricketts. So what else can we or Japan or Australia
    do to be able to support the Philippines as it resists this
    gray zone activity here in the South China Sea?
        Mr. Schriver. I think Chinese coercion is not limited to
    South China Sea so I think pushback in the East China Sea,
    pushback in areas closer to Vietnam.
        It is a comprehensive approach that is led by the U.S. but
    joined with allies and partners will, I think, demonstrate to
    the Chinese that they have got a broader problem, that the
    country that signed UNCLOS and ratified it, but does not honor
    it and acts outside it is going to face broad pushback.
        Then on point in the Philippines, I do think we need to
    resume our cooperation with the Philippine Coast Guard which is
    now on pause because it is a state INL program and it is a law
    enforcement program.
        The Coast Guard is really on the front lines, not
    necessarily the Navy in every case, so I think there is a
    number of things we can do and, again, it is extraordinarily
    important.
        Senator Ricketts. What about the cooperation between Japan
    and the Philippines? They have recently, you know, gotten some
    agreements together. What do you think about that?
        Mr. Schriver. Very encouraging. If you looked at a map:
    Japan, Philippines, what is in the middle--it is Taiwan--and I
    think a lot of the security cooperation is oriented toward that
    major known contingency.
        Japan is also stepping up with security assistance so we
    are no longer the sole provider or only provider of military
    equipment and other training and other types of services. Japan
    is a very professional military and they are lending that
    expertise to the Philippines in very helpful ways.
        Senator Ricketts. I think we provided about $500 million
    last year in FMS to the Philippines and, obviously, it is
    encouraging to see Japan do that as well.
        You were also talking about the percent of GDP that the
    Philippines is spending and evaluating the bases and so forth.
        Is it fair for us to ask the Philippines to get to 2
    percent of GDP spending on their own defense? They are trying
    to modernize here.
        Mr. Schriver. I am for being aspirational and I think given
    the threat they are facing it is reasonable to ask. I think
    those discussions--that is why we need skilled diplomats. That
    is why we need capable alliance managers with years of
    experience.
        I agree there are some approaches, as Dr. Mastro pointed
    out, that can have negative effects and so I think we need to
    do it with a degree of deftness, but it is important.
        Senator Ricketts. Do the Philippines have that kind of
    capability? Can they economically support 2 percent of GDP, do
    you think?
        Mr. Schriver. The short answer, I would say, is yes, but it
    is a very robust democracy. They have a lot of other priorities
    when it comes to development of the economy.
        So this would be grinding it out through the legislature,
    but I think they could get there, given the threat and the very
    real requirements they have for defense.
        Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you, Mr. Schriver.
        The Chairman. Senator Coons.
        Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
    witnesses.
        Dr. Cha, you have spoken extensively about the alignment of
    some of our core adversaries and, as you just referenced in
    your opening statement, support from China, Iran, North Korea
    is absolutely critical to Russia's war effort against Ukraine.
        Many, I think, are now underestimating what these three
    countries are getting in return for that partnership. Could you
    just speak briefly to what North Korea is or could be gaining
    from their munitions support, their now active troop support,
    and the negative impacts this might be having in the Indo-
    Pacific region and how our allies are viewing it, and how they
    might step up?
        Dr. Cha. Sure, Senator.
        I think your question really points to the fact that what
    is happening in the war in Ukraine has serious impact on what
    is happening in Indo-Pacific security as well.
        Initially, I think that when the Biden administration
    publicized the first arms transfer to the Wagner Group, we
    became very worried that this was the start of a relationship
    between these two that would only grow as Russia's need for
    munitions and troops also grew.
        Initially, we thought that what was being provided was,
    largely, a lot of food, fuel and energy--things that were
    really stocked out in North Korea after a 3\1/2\-year lockdown
    from COVID.
        For North Korea, this opportunity with Russia emerged just
    as they were coming out of a 3\1/2\-year COVID lockdown. This
    was like a Christmas present for them.
        The concern now is that it has moved beyond food, fuel,
    energy and medicines to higher end military technology, and I
    think if we track the U.S. Government's statements about this,
    they have moved from statements about the theoretical or
    hypothetical to statements of fact.
        We have seen this, I think, also in North Korea's own
    actions and demonstrations. Successful military satellite
    launches after successive failures--they became more successful
    after Kim Jong-un's first visit to----
        Senator Coons. So it is your view that North Korea is
    almost certainly receiving sophisticated missile satellite
    military assistance from Russia in exchange for their support?
        Dr. Cha. Yes, and the one I would particularly point to is
    potential nuclear-propelled submarine technology, because the
    North Koreans put the leader in front of a new submarine and
    said this is a nuclear powered submarine.
        So this is the one that I think has gotten the most
    attention recently, but, yes, all those things that you
    mentioned.
        Senator Coons. I have limited time. You also spoke about
    the critical role that Radio Free Asia provides. It has a $60
    million budget, but reaches 60 million people a week.
        Given upcoming elections in the Philippines, given our
    concern about soft power and influence in the region, Pacific
    Island nations, how wise or foolish is it that the
    Administration just canceled Radio Free Asia?
        Dr. Cha. So, again, I think our access basing and
    overflight strategy is directly related to competition in the
    information space where China is creating these media
    partnerships all over the Global South and creating a narrative
    of the United States that is clearly counter to our interests.
        We need to be able to push back on that with real, accurate
    information, and that comes from places like VOA and RFA.
        Senator Coons. Dr. Mastro, you spoke to the fact that the
    PRC is taking advantage of our abrupt withdrawal from hundreds
    of different development partnerships throughout the Indo-
    Pacific.
        Just speak, if you would, briefly to what kind of challenge
    you think it is creating for us and our strategic interests for
    us to have abruptly canceled and shut down economic development
    partnerships, public health partnerships, things like providing
    reliable energy to our new basing opportunities in the
    Philippines, providing partnerships in terms of intel and
    communication, security in the Philippines.
        What is the strategic impact to our abrupt withdrawal as
    partners for dozens and dozens of programs across these key
    countries?
        Dr. Mastro. So, sir, I think the first thing to mention is
    if we are having a hard time assessing what is impactful for
    the competition with China or not, it is always useful to look
    at what the Chinese are spending on and what they are saying.
        So they spend eight times more than we do on public
    diplomacy, and as Dr. Cha already mentioned, with all of their
    information centers, with Xinhua and others, they are obviously
    extremely focused in this area.
        What is important for the Indo-Pacific is that a lot of
    these countries are not--it is very different than NATO allies
    and partners in that many of these countries have a lot of
    incentives not to support the United States militarily.
        What we have on offer--if they are not threatened with
    direct invasion from China, which even allies like Australia
    are not, what we have on offer are other things besides just
    that security cooperation.
        When we build infrastructure, for example, in the
    Philippines there is this understanding that with that foreign
    development and assistance that type of infrastructure can be
    used by the Philippines when U.S. forces are not there.
        Without those types of commitments there are a lot of
    countries that they put themselves at risk, that the threat
    from China becomes greater the more they cooperate with us, and
    so the only way to outbalance that is with the economic
    incentives--offering humanitarian aid, disaster relief, foreign
    development assistance, and that is why the Chinese are so
    focused on those tools of power.
        Senator Coons. Thank you. I think we are making an enormous
    mistake in unilaterally and abruptly shutting down long-
    standing humanitarian, economic development, infrastructure,
    and relief programs throughout the Indo-Pacific.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator McCormick.
        Senator McCormick. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you,
    and thank you to our panelists.
        A free and open Indo-Pacific is critical to our nation's
    security. I think we all agree on that. To paraphrase General
    MacArthur, the Pacific acts as a protective shield for all of
    the Americas with the Western Pacific as its linchpin.
        I am excited to have this great group to talk about the
    alliances that are so central to that shield because they are
    on the front lines of defending against China--the Chinese
    Communist Party's aggression and escalating efforts and
    expansionist ambitions in the First Island Chain.
        We must stand with those allies and ensure those
    partnerships deliver on matched value to both sides including
    burden sharing.
        So Dr. Cha, good to see you again, and I would like to
    start with you. Japan has been one of the allies where we have
    seen the most progress in increasing defense investment and
    interoperability with U.S. forces.
        We recently had Ambassador Designate Glass testify before
    this committee. What priorities should be top of mind for him
    and for this administration to make that deterrence from the
    U.S.-Japan alliance most credible?
        Dr. Cha. Thank you, Senator.
        I would say that there are three things. The first is, as I
    mentioned in my testimony, the Japanese stood up the JJOC--the
    Japan Joint Operational Command. It was a big step in the
    alliance to try to create a much more militarily capable,
    interoperable, integrated relationship with the United States.
        It is incumbent on our side to really fulfill our
    commitment to create a joint force headquarters. I think that
    is one. Even though that is not necessarily a diplomatic
    matter, it is an important message to send.
        The second is that I would like to see is a continuation of
    the bilateral and trilateral relationship among the U.S.,
    Japan, and South Korea. This was something that both the first
    Trump administration as well as the Biden administration worked
    on.
        Major steps were made since August of 2023. I know we have
    a little bit of a political situation in South Korea, waiting
    for a new government to come into place, but in terms of
    defense and deterrence, and making more credible the U.S.
    position in Asia and giving confidence to allies in the Indo-
    Pacific as well as in Europe about U.S. sustained commitment, I
    think that is extremely important as well.
        Then, the third are the things that my colleagues have
    mentioned in terms of Japan's role in places like the
    Philippines and in other parts of Asia, as well as Taiwan,
    where they can play a very important role in helping to
    complement what the United States is doing in terms of access,
    basing and overflight.
        Senator McCormick. Very good. Thank you.
        Mr. Schriver, Secretary Rubio recently reiterated U.S.
    policy with regard to Taiwan--any forced, compelled, coercive
    change in the status of Taiwan.
        Where would you see the United States falling short in its
    role in deterring a war in the Taiwan Strait?
        Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Senator.
        I think I would point to a few things, and it is not
    necessarily falling short, but there has been an evolutionary
    process where we have been more direct in our language and
    rhetoric. We have been moving into areas that were previously
    too sensitive like training of Taiwanese military forces.
        I think we need to continue the posture initiatives. We
    really need to develop the Philippines, particularly northern
    Luzon, which has that geographic proximity to the Taiwan
    Strait.
        We need to strengthen our training of Taiwan military
    forces. That was a taboo for decades and now we are getting
    them to a point where they are more professional, more
    proficient, as they are placing a greater emphasis on training.
        I think, as Dr. Mastro implied in her opening statement, it
    is not only what they spend. They have got to 2.5. They pledged
    to get to 3 percent and they say that is a floor, not a
    ceiling, but it is what they spend it in and what they invest
    on, and I think given the changing nature of warfare they need
    to look at modernized command and control that will help
    optimize battlefield decisions.
        They need to look at a lot more unmanned autonomous in
    every domain including underwater. I think we need to help lead
    them in this investment strategy as really key to upholding
    deterrence.
        Senator McCormick. Very good. Thank you. I will yield the
    rest of my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all
    for being here today.
        My office has been hearing about how vital initiatives
    aimed at advancing American interests in the Indo-Pacific have
    been stalled over the last several weeks, and this is following
    up on my colleagues' interest in the Indo-Pacific as well.
        This includes not only critical programs, but also
    essential funding that supports intelligence efforts on
    pressing regional issues.
        I am deeply concerned that the current administration is
    pursuing a path that directly contradicts strengthening Indo-
    Pacific alliances, a move that could have far-reaching
    implications for our security.
        Like my colleagues have mentioned, I am deeply concerned
    about the PRC's activities in the region. Before this
    administration the United States led with a clear strategy--
    invest, align, compete--in response to the PRC's growing
    geopolitical influence in the Indo-Pacific, and we demonstrated
    that strength by consistently following through on our
    commitments, proving to our allies that the U.S. is a reliable
    partner, a leader in defending democracy and a defender of
    international norms.
        This strategy was central to our global leadership in
    maintaining peace and stability in the region, and,
    unfortunately, we are walking backwards as the Trump Asia
    policy of today seems to be neglecting our well-established
    alliances, institutions, the rule of law, and rules.
        I am a co-founder of the bipartisan Quad Caucus and I made
    it a priority to send a clear and powerful message to our
    allies, partners, and even competitors that the United States
    is committed to the Indo-Pacific region in the long term, and I
    wholeheartedly believe that defense, diplomacy, and cooperation
    are crucial.
        Mr. Schriver, as someone who has held a key in shaping U.S.
    defense policy in the Indo-Pacific what specific steps should
    the United States takes to demonstrate its long-term commitment
    to the Indo-Pacific and its allies within the context of the
    Quad?
        Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Senator Duckworth, and thank you
    for your leadership on the Quad. It is very important.
        I am the only one up here who is not a professor, but if I
    were to give this administration a grade it would not be
    failing.
        It would be incomplete, because I think they have done some
    very positive things--the Prime Minister Kishida visit, Prime
    Minister Modi's meeting with President Trump--and I would point
    to Secretary Rubio's decision on the very first day in office
    to hold a Quad meeting as part of that positive agenda
    notwithstanding some of the other issues that you mentioned,
    and I share some of your concerns I am sure.
        I think what we understand took place in that Quad meeting
    at the foreign minister level is there was a very kind of
    nascent discussion about moving into the security issues and
    that is significant that Foreign Minister Jaishankar would go
    along with that and actually introduce some of that, as I
    understand it, which indicates India is sufficiently concerned
    that they are willing to take this format and move it into
    military and security issues.
        I would like to see that nurtured and matured and even,
    perhaps, go operational. We have got a lot of PLA activity in
    the Indian Ocean now. Anti-submarine warfare cooperation could
    happen quietly, but it could involve the four countries doing
    real-world things that would be very significant.
        Senator Duckworth. Do you not think that that is also a
    place where we can strengthen our relationship with Quad, but
    also not alienate important regional partners like ASEAN?
        I do think that there is a need to strengthen economic
    relations with the Quad, but in a way that complements our
    relationship with ASEAN and their leadership role both--so I am
    asking both economic cooperation, but also cooperation,
    especially when it comes to strategies where the Chinese are
    really infiltrating into the region. Go ahead.
        Mr. Schriver. Thank you. I do agree with that. I think you
    are the expert on ASEAN, but it is a region of very mixed
    stages of development, different types of government, and so I
    think disaggregating and looking at where the Quad can be
    helpful as a donor, as an economic partner, I think that kind
    of sophisticated approach would really help counter what China
    is doing.
        China is gaining ground in Southeast Asia--there is no
    doubt about it, and we are seeing a lot of--particularly since
    the tariffs, we are seeing a lot of Chinese investment going
    into Southeast Asia, some of which is helpful to them, but some
    of which is also over capacity, crowding out some of their
    indigenous manufacturing and aspects of their economy.
        So I would like to see the Quad do more in this area.
        Senator Duckworth. Yes, because I think Quad investment
    into ASEAN maybe as part of the supply chain manufacturing
    issues for the United States is an opportunity and, frankly, we
    have come off a very strong year in ASEAN of Indonesian
    leadership.
        The Malaysians are doing a great job there now. Philippines
    are next. I think there are some real opportunities there for
    some partnerships and I would like to see the United States
    continue to pursue those economic relationships, in addition to
    their strategic partnerships, but making those linkages between
    Quad and ASEAN.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you all for being here.
        Mr. Schriver, I like your characterization of the tyranny
    of time and distance when it comes to the Taiwan contingency.
    We like to talk about very euphemistic terms, which could be a
    bloody and very destructive military conflict.
        First, let me ask you about supply chains. The reason why
    Senator Warner and I and all--and many of our colleagues joined
    together and passed the CHIPS and Science Act starting back in
    2020, but then finally, I guess, in 2022 was because we were
    worried about the supply chains of advanced semiconductors and
    the fact that the United States only made about 12 percent of
    those, and the fact that in this world we live in we are
    extraordinarily dependent on that sort of technology for
    everything from our iPhones to the avionics and the Joint
    Strike Fighter.
        Are there other supply chains that we need to be concerned
    about in the event of another pandemic, natural disaster, or
    military conflict in the Indo-Pacific? I would invite anybody
    to offer any advice now and if you want to get back to us with
    a more comprehensive list I would welcome that.
        Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Senator.
        I think when you look at something like CHIPS you got to
    understand the component parts, which gets down to critical
    minerals and the mining and the processing, and so it is a very
    complex supply chain, and where I think we can do better now to
    better position us for resiliency in the event of a conflict is
    to really look at alternate sources of critical minerals and
    that processing and that whole sort of chain of production.
    Right now we are heavily relying on China.
        Senator Cornyn. Yes. China processes 90 percent.
        Mr. Schriver. Yes.
        Senator Cornyn. Ninety percent, as I recall.
        Any other thoughts on supply chains from the other
    panelists?
        Dr. Mastro. I just want to add that there is no entity that
    is in a better position to protect U.S. interests than the
    United States itself, and when we pull out of the Indo-Pacific
    we are basically outsourcing that to another country like
    China.
        China itself has a ``Made in China 2025'' standards--2035.
    They have identified 15 areas where not only do they want to be
    self-sufficient so that we have less power to shape their
    decisions, but they have been very explicit that they want the
    world to be reliant on them precisely so they have this type of
    leverage that you are talking about.
        In any scenario involving Taiwan, the Chinese are hoping
    this is going to be a quick war--3-4 weeks, and even in those
    types of scenarios the disruption economically is going to be
    significant, but the United States needs to be in the position
    that we could intervene in that time frame so that what we
    threaten is much more of a global disruption to the Chinese
    themselves.
        Senator Cornyn. Because time is so short, let me start with
    Dr. Cha on this question.
        You talk about how long the Taiwan contingency conflict
    will last. My impression from traveling in the region is that
    we have a lot of wonderful allies that have capabilities and
    they vary a lot depending on the nation, but we have seen in
    Ukraine there is a difference between capability and will, and
    one of the things that I am very concerned about is we are
    overestimating our--what our allies might be willing to do.
        I think, Dr. Mastro, you mentioned they are reluctant to
    take sides. That seemed to be the typical response we got as we
    were talking to folks in the Indo-Pacific, but in terms of--and
    I know this is a hard question and maybe one we do not want to
    confront, but I do not think we have any choice but to
    confront--if there was a shooting war in the South China Sea
    where, according to President Xi's instructions to the PLA,
    they needed to be ready by 2027 to essentially take Taiwan who
    can we depend on? What countries?
        If you could list those in terms of our--of who would be
    the most likely and who would be the most effective, that would
    be very useful.
        Dr. Mastro. Well, sir, if I can just say we can depend on
    Japan to allow us access to their two U.S. bases, at the very
    least. Japanese logistical support will be critical, but that
    will only come into play in a more protracted conflict if the
    United States does intervene in time.
        The northern Philippines and southwest Japan are the only
    areas in combat radius of Taiwan, and so the immediate support
    of use of U.S. bases and in the Philippines in particular, we
    are not investing right now in the types of air and naval
    capabilities that we need to be able to respond in a timely
    manner in the Taiwan Strait.
        If we did, that it would basically be the almost immediate
    permission to use those bases in the northern Philippines and
    southwest Japan for direct kinetic action against the ships
    making their way across the strait that would be by far the
    most critical.
        Then in a more protracted conflict, other basing options
    like in Australia and in the Second Island Chain become more
    important, but immediate approval from Japan to use those
    bases, like, within hours is the most important thing.
        Senator Cornyn. Dr. Cha.
        Dr. Cha. Yes, I would not disagree with that at all. The
    only thing I would add is the point about the duration of the
    conflict and the scope of it.
        If the duration of the conflict and the scope extends
    beyond the First Island Chain, Second Island Chain, or even the
    Indian Ocean, then that necessarily will bring other players
    in. If it gets to that level, I think we would be able to count
    on some of those players, even potentially the Europeans, to
    help as well.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Rosen, you are next.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, chair Risch, ranking member
    Shaheen. Thank you for being here today, for holding this
    hearing.
        I want to talk about countering the PRC influence. Of
    course, in the South Pacific is what we are talking about today
    because our economic security--our security relationships with
    Pacific Island nations play a significant role in our ability
    to counter expanding PRC influence.
        It is particularly true for members of the Compacts of Free
    Association, or COFA, an agreement that serves as a bedrock of
    U.S. engagement with Palau, the Marshall Islands, and
    Micronesia.
        COFA is a mutually beneficial arrangement affording our
    military access to areas of immense strategic importance in
    exchange for U.S. assistance.
        Under COFA, USAID is tasked with leading disaster response
    efforts to all three island countries, but with USAID gutted,
    no other agency has the authority, the technical expertise, the
    capacity, or the resources to respond to a natural disaster in
    the Pacific.
        Disregarding our obligations under COFA potentially puts us
    in violation of our own agreement and will only cede ground to
    the PRC, which has been actively using, as we know,
    humanitarian assistance to expand its sphere of influence in
    the Pacific.
        So, Dr. Cha, can you speak to the importance of the COFA
    agreement and USAID's presence in the region to U.S. national
    security and can you expand on some of the consequences if the
    PRC were to displace us in the region?
        Dr. Cha. Thank you, Senator.
        I do not disagree with the way you have characterized the
    importance of the Pacific Island nations and also the vacuum
    that could be filled by China or is already being filled by
    China when U.S. assistance is not there--U.S. commercial
    support, all these things.
        I think the Biden administration deserves credit for
    responding to this, but at the same time, unfortunately, it was
    too little too late because the Chinese had already made
    security agreements of that nature.
        Again, I will go back to one of the points that I talked
    about in my testimony, which is that in addition to the
    importance of things like RFA and VOA to compete in the
    information space so that there is a fair narrative of the
    United States and our interest in the region, the commercial
    support is also important.
        Again, China has used economic coercion against 18
    governments and over 500 companies since 2008, heightened
    during Xi Jinping's terms, of course.
        These Pacific Island nations are just easy prey for Chinese
    influence in that way, so we need to be able to combat that as
    well.
        Senator Rosen. I want to expand a little bit upon that
    because it is also one of the only three Pacific Island nations
    to recognize Palau--excuse me, recognize Taiwan's independence.
        So it is something I discussed with Palau's President when
    he and I met back in 2021, and so as a result Palau is
    increasingly becoming a victim of PRC harassment.
        To increase Palau's resilience, the USAID was supporting
    the development of an undersea cable system, which is vital for
    global communications, facilitating financial transactions, for
    national security. This program is now halted as a part of the
    overall foreign assistance freeze.
        I am going to stick with you, Dr. Cha. Can you talk about
    the importance of infrastructure development, undersea cable
    systems in the Pacific Islands, and what signal do you think we
    are sending if we are stopping this support to Palau and to
    others?
        Dr. Cha. As we often say in government, you cannot fight
    something with nothing, and so if we are moving away from--we
    can, of course, look to allies and partners like Australia and
    others to help, but if the United States is not supporting
    that, then it is just going to be a vacuum that is going to be
    filled by China or other actors that seek to undermine our
    interests there.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to talk a little bit, Dr.
    Mastro, quickly about economic coercion by the PRC. We know
    that they are really spending a lot of money by supporting
    Philippines on energy security, infrastructure spending,
    prepositioning near key military installations, economic
    development programs.
        I am going fast because my time is running out.
    Humanitarian assistance to demonstrate the value of what they
    are doing. Much of the work we have been doing is stopped. They
    are stepping in.
        So, Dr. Mastro, can you expand on some of the more
    prominent coercive tactics the PRC employs in the Indo-Pacific
    region?
        Dr. Mastro. To the discussion, ma'am, that we were just
    having it is--they have a three-prong strategy and one key part
    is exploitation or exploiting gaps where the United States is
    not present.
        They have more consulates and embassies in the region than
    we do. They have more elite visits than we do and, obviously,
    we have talked about the foreign aid and development
    assistance. So part of it, of course, are these positive
    inducements.
        When it comes to the coercion, the Chinese, when they have
    leverage, they use it every single time and so we can expect
    that if we step away so we are no longer in a position to
    ensure freedom of navigation.
        So countries like the Philippines will have to trust that
    the Chinese will allow them to trade with the rest of the
    world, and while some might say, ``oh, the Chinese would never
    cut off that access,'' I think it has been pretty clear that
    when they are upset about something, and we are not even
    talking about foreign policy--military strategy.
        If you say or believe anything different about what happens
    domestically in China then you are a target. Our allies and
    partners, I think, have learned and are learning more and more.
    If your strategy is to not upset Beijing--if that is your
    defense strategy, it is not going to work.
        Senator Rosen. Right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Scott.
        Senator Scott of Florida. Thank you, Chairman Risch and
    Ranking Member Shaheen.
        Thank you for your testimony today. So first off, do you
    think that as China builds up their economy, there is a greater
    chance that they are going to use their military to invade
    Taiwan?
        Dr. Mastro. Well, sir, I would focus on their military
    capabilities. We are not deterring China right now from taking
    Taiwan by force.
        What is deterring them is they have not finalized their
    military modernization. In particular, they have not honed
    command and control logistics.
        Senator Scott of Florida. So if they have a crappy economy,
    if their economy falls apart, will they have less military
    assets?
        Dr. Mastro. So far, sir, the size of their economy they do
    not have to choose between guns and butter and so it would
    really have to be such a decrease that you have widespread
    social instability.
        In that case, I think they turn inward, but otherwise, I
    think they have the resources to continue the modernization.
        Senator Scott of Florida. What percentage of their economy
    is tied to the American consumer?
        Dr. Mastro. I would have to get back to you on the
    specifics, but they are an export driven economy and their
    connection to the global economy is number one. If they
    believed trade with U.S. allies and partners would stop if they
    attacked Taiwan, they would never do it.
        Senator Scott of Florida. So do you think it would be
    logical for any democracy, including in the United States, for
    the people in these countries to stop buying Chinese products?
        Dr. Mastro. Well, sir----
        Senator Scott of Florida. Not whether it would be easy.
    Should we?
        Dr. Mastro. So the way I think about it is if in times of
    peace before we have this type of conflict, if we get rid of
    all of our leverage against the PRC, we do not have that
    economic deterrent in place.
        The Chinese are trying to diversify and to be less reliant
    on us for a reason.
        So I think those measures should be considered and should
    be in place in times of crisis, but potentially not something
    implemented in peacetime.
        Senator Scott of Florida. They are using their economy
    right now to build up their military. Would we not be better
    off to stop buying anything from them today so they will have
    less resources to modernize their military?
        After the fact, it is too late. Once they have the military
    that they have--like, I personally do not understand why
    anybody buys an American--a Chinese product.
        I have never understood it. When I came up here 6 years
    ago, 85 percent of the drones bought by the Federal Government
    were Chinese made. That seems like stupidity.
        It only took 6 years to get that passed through the NDA. I
    do not know why we want to continue to build the Chinese
    economy. So do you guys intentionally go buy Chinese products?
        Dr. Mastro. Sir, just I would add that the technology, I
    think, something that you highlighted is vitally important. If
    there is any U.S. product, technology, know-how that
    contributes to the lethality of the Chinese military, those
    absolutely need to be prevented from being exported.
        Senator Scott of Florida. So you do not think it matters
    what their economy is doing? They did not seem to have a very
    good economy back when their big military--when their economy
    was one-tenth the size and they clearly could not threaten
    Taiwan when their economy was one-tenth the size. So I do not
    get why we help them build up their economy.
        Does anybody else----
        Mr. Schriver. I think it is an extremely valid point. I
    think for often--for many years we thought that our economic
    engagement would help shape and change China politically.
        It did not. I think there are constituencies in the United
    States that do profit from the trade relationship with China
    and they continue to be advocates for it, but I think we should
    look at things like revoking PNTR.
        I think we should look at strengthening export controls and
    outbound investment. It makes no sense to me that we would
    restrict the Chinese from investing in an entity in the United
    States that is engaged in developing some technology with
    military applications, but yet outbound investment can go
    invest in a Chinese entity that does the exact same research.
    Makes no sense at all.
        Senator Scott of Florida. Dr. Cha, what do you think?
        Dr. Cha. The only thing I will add to that is that the
    other effect of the world's economic interaction with China is
    that it has caused many countries and allies of ours to self-
    censor.
        They stay away from saying things or taking actions that
    are in favor of the United States because they are worried they
    are going to get whacked by China with some sort of trade
    sanction, or all of a sudden they are going to stop sending
    tourists, or they are going to stop importing bananas from the
    Philippines. There is a whole list of things that China does,
    basically weaponizing trade and interdependence.
        Senator Scott of Florida. I know my time is up. I just do
    not get why we buy one product. Our military is dependent on
    Chinese drugs.
        How are you going to change on a dime once they decide to
    invade Taiwan? Why we would ever rely on Chinese technology for
    anything like drones it seems pretty foolish.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Scott.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I have a few more questions
    before we close the panel out.
        First, I would like to go back, Mr. Schriver, I think, to
    Senator Ricketts' question about the foreign military sales in
    the Philippines and I would just like to point out for the
    record that $164 million of the $500 million in FMF for the
    Philippines is frozen under the cuts and the freezing of
    programs with the State Department. So that is troubling when
    we think about what we are hoping from the Philippines.
        I wanted to--staying on the Philippines, the ICC has
    arrested former President Duterte on a warrant for extra
    judicial killings.
        Do you all have any views on how that is going to affect
    the upcoming presidential election in the Philippines and what
    that might mean for the U.S. relationship with the Philippines?
    Anybody have any thoughts about that?
        Mr. Schriver. It is an excellent question and it is
    probably too soon to tell. There is a segment of the population
    that does not like to see a former president carted off in
    handcuffs, notwithstanding the actual things he authorized as
    President and, of course, this is a family affair. His daughter
    is the Vice President and presumably leader of the Duterte
    faction in the next set of elections.
        Senator Shaheen. So maybe I should ask it this way. How do
    we think--if she wins the next presidential election, how do we
    think that will affect the relationship with the U.S.?
        Mr. Schriver. We have got about as good a partner as we
    could ever want in Marcos. So, inevitably, it probably goes
    down. She is in many ways her father's daughter and thinks
    similarly about some of these issues like the alliance.
        She has also shown streaks of independence and, of course,
    she has a complicated relationship with her father in other
    ways.
        I think it is difficult to say, but I think we have a
    window of opportunity now given Marcos, which is why as you
    point out the things that are frozen--I think we should be
    moving with all due urgency while this window is open.
        Senator Shaheen. Do you all agree with that assessment?
        Dr. Mastro. Yes, ma'am, and if you would indulge me. Given
    your question, I think it highlights the importance of having a
    really nuanced understanding of the domestic politics in the
    Philippines.
        We have already mentioned the seizure of some--the
    dissolution of some programs under this current administration,
    but also besides the Fulbright's research funding under Minerva
    grants, for example, have all been ceased, and as a professor
    at a university, you know, having people study these types of
    issues--we do not have Ph.D. students anymore that we are
    encouraging to learn languages, to do these sorts of things,
    because the funding has stopped.
        Senator Shaheen. I agree. I think it is totally
    shortsighted and does not recognize how important soft power is
    to deterring conflict and aggression.
        Dr. Cha, did you want to add anything?
        Dr. Cha. I agree with that. It is not just a military
    alliance. It is a relationship.
        Senator Shaheen. Right.
        Dr. Cha. It is a political and social relationship that
    crosses generations. In all of these countries, all of these
    Indo-Pacific allies, as I mentioned in my testimony, it is
    about political engagement, not just military engagement.
        In the case of the Vice President, it is a very important
    role for the State Department and others in terms of
    diplomacy's early engagement and socializing not just the
    elite, but also the public about why these nine ECTA sites are
    important.
        Senator Shaheen. I want to go back to the information space
    because you have mentioned--several of you have mentioned RFA
    and VOA, and we had a hearing here on China--I think it was our
    first hearing--and one of the people testifying pointed out
    that China spends over a billion dollars, that we know of, a
    year in the information space trying to influence information
    in countries in the Indo-Pacific and much of it is
    disinformation and misinformation.
        So can you talk about what that means for us when we are
    not playing in this space at all?
        Dr. Cha. Sure, Senator.
        So recently, I was asked--this was before the cuts--to
    speak to a group of Fulbright scholars who were going out to
    countries in Southeast Asia and Central Asia, places where
    there is a lot of Chinese media partnerships, and I told them
    that they should expect to go into an information environment
    in which everybody believes that the war in Ukraine was started
    by NATO.
        They could not--they were Americans--believe that people
    would think that, but this is what happens when you try to
    fight something with nothing.
        I think Oriana said it great when she said they spend eight
    times more on public diplomacy than we do. That about tells you
    who is dominating the information space and that, again,
    directly relates to the military.
        That is not sort of two or three steps removed from the
    military. That directly relates to political consensus on
    access, basing and overflight.
        Senator Shaheen. Yes, I do not--anybody else want to add?
        Go ahead.
        Dr. Mastro. Ma'am, if I can just add, Xi Jinping himself
    has been very clear that his top priority is to be the leader
    of the developing world.
        Before this administration came in, when I was providing
    recommendations and advice, I would say the United States has
    not really had a strategy towards the developing world in a
    long time and that should be our number one priority is
    enhancing and increasing spending in some of these areas.
        We look at some of this propaganda coming out of the CCP
    and we think it is so heavy handed--who can possibly believe
    this, but after you spend time in a lot of these places and
    spend time in Beijing--I have been there for some of their top
    meetings of defense ministers with developing countries and the
    rhetoric about the imperial United States, the colonial United
    States.
        I often have to remind everyone that the United States has
    never been a colonial power. It really resonates with a lot of
    these countries and these are places in some cases no U.S.
    president has ever visited. Xi Jinping has gone to 70 percent
    of the poorest countries in places like Africa, Central Asia,
    where our leaders just do not go.
        It used to be the case that the Foreign Service could fit
    on one aircraft carrier. I wonder what it is going to look like
    in future years, but expanding our reach through those types of
    programs and departments is not only effective, as the other
    witnesses have highlighted, but it is actually relatively
    cheaper than trying to do it through military means.
        Senator Shaheen. I am out of time and we have to go vote,
    but I just have a final question because I visited the Indo-
    Pacific last year and one of the countries we visited was
    Vietnam, and I was amazed at how positive all the leaders we
    met within Vietnam were about their strategic partnership with
    the United States, how they wanted to expand on that, the plans
    they had to grow the economy and their willingness to stand up
    to China in ways that many of the other countries in the region
    were not.
        Does anybody want to speak to what opportunity we have with
    Vietnam?
        Mr. Schriver.
        Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Senator. We poll as a country--not
    political leaders or parties, but as a country--94 percent
    favorable in Vietnam, which is just stunning given how recent
    our conflict was.
        Senator Shaheen. Very stunning, yes.
        Mr. Schriver. Now, the Chinese poll in single digits and
    those two figures might be related, but that, to me, suggests
    there are definitely opportunities.
        When I was at the Pentagon we did try to open things up. We
    had three aircraft carrier visits to Vietnam in about 3\1/2\
    years.
        There are ways we are expanding the relationship. We are
    helping them with the maritime domain awareness issues related
    to the Chinese incursions, but here is what I will come back
    one more time to things that we have suspended.
        The dioxin remediation is absolutely critical. The war of--
    legacy of war issues are absolutely critical enablers to the
    broader military and defense cooperation that we want.
        I have been to those sites, been to Bien Hoa. I have seen
    the local population how much they appreciate it because they
    have been concerned at the effects of Agent Orange. If we step
    away from that, these opportunities will close.
        Senator Shaheen. I could not agree more and thank you all
    very much for your testimony today.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Been a very interesting panel and
    we really appreciate all of your views on these matters,
    critically important to people of the United States.
        We are--I am going to keep the record open for questions
    until tomorrow at the close of business and I would ask if you
    get a question if you would respond promptly.
        I know you are volunteering to this, but, nonetheless, if
    you would help us in that regard, we really appreciate that.
    Again, thank you for your testimony.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]