    [Senate Hearing 119-56]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                             S. Hrg. 119-56

                      UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND
                        UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               FEBRUARY 13, 2025

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via http: //www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    60-170 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

      			ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman

    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska			JACK REED, Rhode Island
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas			JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota		KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    JONI ERNST, Iowa			RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska			MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota		TIM KAINE, Virginia
    RICK SCOTT, Florida			ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
    TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama		ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma	        GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    TED BUDD, North Carolina		TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri			JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    JIM BANKS, INDIANA			MARK KELLY, Arizona
    TIM SHEEHY, MONTANA                  	ELISSA SLOTKIN, MICHIGAN

    		   John P. Keast, Staff Director
    		Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                             C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                               february 13, 2025

                                                                       Page

    United States Northern Command and United States Southern             1
      Command.

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker.............................     1

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................     3

                               Witness Statements

    Guillot, General Gregory M., USAF Commander, United States            5
      Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.

    Holsey, Admiral Alvin, USN Commander, United States Southern         15
      Command.

    Questions for the Record.........................................    69

                                     (iii)

       UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2025

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Roger Wicker
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Wicker, Fischer,
    Cotton, Sullivan, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Banks, Reed,
    Shaheen, Gillibrand, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
    Duckworth, Rosen, and Kelly.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

        Chairman Wicker. This hearing will come to order and I
    thank our witnesses for being here today. We're joined by
    General Gregory Guillot. Thank you for being here from Northern
    Command and Admiral Alvin Holsey from Southern Command.
        The United States faces the most dangerous security
    environment it has entered since World War II. We know about
    the threats in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, but we must
    not lose sight of threats in our own hemisphere. Both of these
    commanders face an increasingly complex set of actors who seek
    to harm Americans and undermine our interests.
        The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has exploited our poorest
    southern border to facilitate the trafficking of fentanyl and
    other deadly drugs. Beijing has brazenly violated United States
    airspace; it has burrowed its cyber payloads into core United
    States telecommunications infrastructure and spread its
    predatory economic practices to South America. China, Russia,
    and North Korea pose an increasing nuclear and conventional
    threat to key United States cities. Not to be outdone, Iran
    continues to try to kill Americans on our own soil.
        General Guillot, I would like to hear your updates in three
    key areas: first, border security is a priority for the
    President, and I agree with his decision to declare a national
    emergency at the southern border. President Trump has asked you
    to deliver an updated plan to ensure border security. He's also
    directed you to assist law enforcement in its security and
    deportation operations. Department of Defense (DOD) has a lot
    to offer to support law enforcement.
        The 2022 National Defense Strategy published by President
    Biden, listed Homeland Defense as the military's first
    priority, so this is bipartisan. It is clear that the American
    people do believe that border security is national security. I
    look forward to hearing from you on your work in this area.
        Second, President Trump has asked you to contribute to a
    new plan for Homeland Air and Missile Defense. I would welcome
    your insights in this effort. Please tell us where in your
    opinion, new investments should be targeted. Do they involve
    updating our ground-based radars and building out new missile
    warning satellites? Perhaps they involve developing the most
    cost-effective methods of intercepting incoming cruise and
    ballistic missiles.
        Third, you have led on the development of a new strategy
    for countering drones here in the Homeland. My friend and
    Ranking Member, Jack Reed, held a great classified briefing on
    the Langley Incursions. There have been numerous similar
    incidents since, all of them troubling. Senators Cotton and
    Gillibrand are working together on ways to counter drones. I
    would appreciate your comments on how we can be more effective
    in this space. Tell us what new authorities you need.
        Admiral Holsey, I would appreciate an update from you on
    how your adversaries are using economic coercion against key
    Latin American partners. The CCP aims to drive a wedge between
    the United States and our neighbors. China hopes to reverse
    longstanding policy recognizing Taiwan's independence, and it
    wants our allies to look the other way as it builds so-called
    ``Gray Zone'' dual use civil--military infrastructure.
        Beijing is also trying to force our friends to rely on
    Huawei for telecommunications. Even as numerous Latin American
    leaders have adopted this CCP controlled TikTok app. We need
    look no further than the Panama Canal. President Trump has
    rightly
    expressed concern about the People's Republic of China (PRC)
    state-owned port infrastructure on either end of this vital
    maritime artery.
        Those PRC facilities pose a risk to the free flow of United
    States flag merchant ships and U.S. naval vessels. This issue
    must be addressed. There are additional troubling PRC
    developments in the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)
    region. The PRC has leased a space port in the remote Patagonia
    region of Argentina. That perch provides the Communist Chinese
    with unprecedented surveillance capabilities in our own
    hemisphere.
        Since at least 2019, Beijing has operated a spy base out of
    Cuba and has done so with impunity. Just last year in Lima,
    Peru, a PRC State owned power company purchased the city's
    entire power grid. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping presided over the
    opening of a Chinese funded deep water port just north of Lima,
    which is capable of holding PRC warships.
        So, Admiral Holsey, I would like for you to update this
    Committee on how you are integrating military and non-military
    tools to fight against these predatory techniques. Despite the
    significant and growing security threats in the region,
    SOUTHCOM is consistently under-resourced to fulfill its many
    critical national security missions.
        I look forward to hearing from you about how these resource
    constraints are affecting SOUTHCOM. I would also like to learn
    how innovative solutions like the Office of Strategic Capital,
    can be leveraged to close this resource gap.
        Again, I thank our witnesses for being here and for their
    earlier meetings with Members of this Committee, and I now
    recognize my friend and the distinguished Ranking Member of the
    Committee, Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me
    join you in welcoming General Gregory Guillot, the Commander of
    United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and Admiral Holsey to
    today's posture hearing--the Commander of the U.S. SOUTHCOM.
        Gentlemen, over the past month, both of your commands have
    been ordered to conduct new missions in support of U.S. border
    of security and immigration enforcement. President Trump has
    deployed over 2,000 Active Duty soldiers and marines to
    supplement the 2,500 guard members and Reservists already
    deployed to the southern border and has directed NORTHCOM to
    seal the southern border.
        Additionally, last week, President Trump ordered the
    Defense Department to expand the Department of Homeland
    Securities Migrant Operations Center at Naval Station,
    Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to accommodate up to 30,000 migrants and
    to begin transporting migrants via military aircraft to that
    facility.
        Thus, I understand that around 100 migrants have been
    transported to Guantanamo, at least half of whom are being
    detained, not at the Migrant Operation Center, but at the
    detention center where alleged and convicted international war
    criminals are also housed.
        Border security and immigration enforcement is critical to
    our National Security, but Guantanamo Bay is a dubious location
    to detain immigrants. The detention center has only been used
    for war detainees, and it is unfortunate to equate immigrants
    with international war criminals. Further, the facilities at
    Guantanamo are in poor condition and are extremely
    understaffed.
        The U.S. military, which is already stretched for
    resources, is now spending millions of dollars to use military
    aircraft and burning thousands of dollars of military personnel
    time for these operations. While a naval station in Guantanamo
    does prepare for mass migration operations, these operations
    are for saving people, leaving dire situations in Cuba or Haiti
    on unsafe craft, not moving individuals already in the United
    States to a place where the status of their rights is
    ambiguous.
        I have questions about the legality of this operation, and
    I'm concerned that this is part of a broader effort by
    President Trump to militarize immigration enforcement. I hope
    the President and Secretary Hegseth will use common sense to
    follow the law and stop spending significant amounts of
    taxpayers' dollars on performative deportation activities.
        General Guillot, Admiral Holsey, I would like to know how
    these Immigration Force submissions are impacting the readiness
    of your forces. Physically, I would ask for your estimates of
    the course personnel and resources required thus far, and any
    concerns you have about the limitations you have to continue
    conducting such operations, particularly in light of your other
    critical missions.
        Indeed, U.S. Northern Command is key to our national
    security as the principal command for protecting the American
    Homeland. As we consider threats from China and other
    competitors, our very concept of Homeland defense must evolve.
    General Guillot, NORTHCOM publishes its Homeland defense policy
    guidance to address this challenge, and we're going to ask for
    an update on the status of its implementation and how it will
    transform the Homeland defense plans of the Department.
        The urgency of this mission has been made clear with the
    recent incursion of drones and unidentified aerial phenomenon
    in our airspace. America's skies and seas must be secured to
    protect our citizens, and the Department must pursue
    technologies that provide adequate detection.
        The Trump administration has proposed an Iron Dome program
    for North America and issued an executive order to develop
    additional defenses against cruise, ballistic and hypersonic
    missiles. I would note that many of these efforts have already
    been underway by the Missile Defense Agency for years, and that
    the concept of space-based interceptive that President Trump is
    interested in, has been debated, and tested at enormous
    financial course without significant promise.
        General Guillot, I would ask for an update on how the
    Homeland Missile Defense mission is proceeding and your view on
    how a space-based interceptive system could affect Russia's
    pursuit of a nuclear weapon in space.
        Turning to Southern Command, Admiral Holsey, your command
    faces growing challenges from China and Russia in Latin
    America. The political and economic instability in the region
    presents a situation that our adversaries are seeking to
    exploit, to increase their own influence.
        China in particular, is expanding its presence in the
    region, including through investments in strategic
    infrastructure, 5G telecommunications, and an expanding network
    of space tracking installations.
        Admiral, you testified last year that the PRC and Russia
    are strategic competitors who seek to undermine democracy while
    gaining power and influence in the region, and that
    partnerships are our best deterrent to countering shared
    security and economic concern. But that for now, the U.S.
    remains a trusted partner or the trusted partner.
        U.S. International Development Programs strengthen U.S.
    partnership in the region, which advance U.S. national security
    objectives. Now that USAID [United States Agency for
    International Development] has been dismantled, I'm interested
    in your assessment of whether the United States will remain the
    partner of choice in your AOR [area of responsibility] or
    whether China and Russia will use this as an opportunity to
    gain further inroads with our partners.
        I'm also interested in your assessment of how we might work
    strategically with our partners in the region to build
    resilience against these activities. SOUTHCOM, like NORTHCOM,
    continues to work closely with U.S. interagency to support
    counter-narcotics and counter transnational criminal
    organizations, or TCOs.
        I'm concerned about the threats from TCOs and synthetic
    opioid trafficking, including fentanyl, which are contributing
    to more than 100,000 overdose deaths each year in the United
    States.
        Admiral, I would ask for an update on SOUTHCOM's work with
    partner nations and other U.S. Government agencies to counter
    narcotic and counter TCO efforts given SOUTHCOM's limited force
    posture and resources.
        Finally, we know that insecurity throughout SOUTHCOM area
    is contributing to the flow of migrant North to the U.S.
    border. Economic instability, violence and corruption continue
    to be a major source of insecurity in much of the region,
    especially in the northern triangle countries of Honduras,
    Guatemala, and El Salvador. Admiral Holsey, I would like to
    know your views on what more can be done to help improve the
    situation and strengthen our broader securities throughout the
    region.
        Thank you, again, to our witnesses. I look forward to your
    testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, and we're now ready for
    testimony from our witnesses. Before we begin, as members know,
    there are votes, two votes beginning at 10:30 a.m., and we'll
    keep the hearing going. When the vote begins, I'll try to run
    over very quickly and come right back. In the meantime, a
    member of our committee will preside and we'll keep going.
        So, we are ready to begin testimony. General Guillot, you
    are recognized with the thanks of the Committee.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT, USAF COMMANDER, UNITED
     STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
                                COMMAND

        General Guillot. Thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member
    Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee. It's my honor
    to command the men and women of North American Aerospace
    Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command. I'm
    also pleased to appear alongside my U.S. SOUTHCOM shipmate,
    Admiral Alvin ``Bull'' Holsey.
        I'd like to highlight three trends of particular that NORAD
    and NORTHCOM face with direct implications for Homeland
    Defense. First, is the growing cooperation between China,
    Russia, North Korea, and Iran to challenge the United States.
    While their cooperation does not approach the level of complete
    integration demonstrated by the United States and Canada, their
    transfer of weapons, military technology and basing access has
    cause for significant concern.
        The associated risks to North America have also grown, as
    the number of Russian bomber incursions into the Alaska and
    Canadian Air Defense Identification Zones has returned to
    levels not seen since before the Russian invasion of Ukraine,
    and Russian Navy surface and subsurface vessels conducted out
    of area deployments off both U.S. coasts, including in the
    vicinity of Alaska.
        Second, evolving technologies demand that NORAD and
    NORTHCOM rapidly adjust our defense posture. Small uncrewed
    aircraft systems or UAS [unmanned aerial system], proliferate
    the open market and in the hands of malign actors pose a
    growing threat to safety and security. Likewise, as competitors
    continue to target U.S. networks and critical infrastructure in
    cyberspace, a whole-of-government effort is increasingly
    necessary to mitigate potential harm.
        Finally, non-State actors continue to target our Homeland.
    Radical Islamic terrorist groups have rejuvenated attack
    planning and anti-American rhetoric, intended to inspire lone
    wolf attacks. Like the daily New Year's Day attack in New
    Orleans, and transnational criminal cartels based in Mexico
    threatened United States territorial integrity and the safety
    of our citizens.
        With that strategic backdrop, Homeland defense is our
    command's top priority and essential task, and in mindset and
    action, nobody waits on NORAD or NORTHCOM. The mantra proved
    true over the last year as the command's planning and
    preparation generated swift and effective responses to
    competitor actions, major disasters, and emerging requirements.
        Over the past 12 months, NORAD and NORTHCOM: intercepted
    joint Russian and Chinese bombers off the Alaska coast, tracked
    Russian surface vessels off both coasts, detected and assessed
    numerous North Korean missile launches, tracked multiple
    Chinese dual use military and research vessels in the bearing
    sea and Arctic Ocean, supported Americans in need following
    hurricane Helene and wildfires in California, postured to
    support a hurricane Milton response.
        Deployed troops and unique military capabilities such as
    airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
    along the U.S. southern border, illuminated transnational
    criminal networks, deployed military personnel to assist U.S.
    Secret Service in securing 195 Presidential campaign events and
    improved defensive capabilities against all threats ranging
    from Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) to small
    drones.
        Looking forward, NORAD and NORTHCOM modernization is
    crucial to outpacing our competitors. Establishing a layered
    domain awareness network from seabed to space to detect and
    track threats approaching North America, is critical to
    immediate and future mission requirements because you can't
    defeat what you can't see.
        To that end, I appreciate the department and congressional
    support for fielding all domain capabilities such as Airborne
    Moving Target Indicator satellites, Over-The-Horizon Radars,
    the E-7 Wedgetail, and an Integrated Undersea Surveillance
    System.
        Defending our borders, establishing a continental missile
    shield, protecting critical infrastructure and force projection
    capability, and safeguarding our citizens will require the best
    our nations have to offer.
        I'm grateful to the committee for your ongoing support of
    NORAD and NORTHCOM's vital Missions. Thank you again for the
    opportunity to appear today, and I look forward to your
    questions. We have the watch.
        [The prepared statement of General Guillot follows:]

                Prepared Statement by General Gregory M. Guillot
        Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee: I am honored to appear today and to represent the men
    and women of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North
    American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Both commands continue to
    defend North America through what is arguably the most complicated and
    rapidly evolving operational environment we have seen. The USNORTHCOM
    and NORAD operational environment remains diverse and dynamic, ranging
    from persistent competitor activity in the vicinity of North America to
    major natural disasters that have impacted millions of Americans. I am
    proud to report that the service members and civilian Federal employees
    at the heart of every USNORTHCOM and NORAD endeavor have risen to each
    challenge as they stand their unending watch over our Homelands.
        USNORTHCOM and NORAD are distinct commands linked by history,
    collaboration, and a shared commitment to defending North America.
    USNORTHCOM was established in 2002 as the U.S. geographic combatant
    command responsible for homeland defense, security cooperation with
    allies and partners in the command's area of responsibility, and
    Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in the continental United
    States and Alaska. USNORTHCOM is responsible for defending the United
    States--to include Hawaii and Alaska--from ballistic missile attacks,
    while the Commander of USNORTHCOM is also designated by the Unified
    Command Plan as the Department of Defense Advocate for Arctic
    Capabilities. Finally, in accordance with Presidential Executive Orders
    issued on 20 January, 2025, USNORTHCOM is rapidly integrating
    additional requested military personnel and assets to work with the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Customs & Border
    Protection (USCBP) along the southern border, employing unique military
    capabilities in all domains, and developing plans for establishing
    territorial integrity along the southern border. USNORTHCOM's current
    mission is to seal the borders and repel all forms of invasion
    including illegal migration, narcotics trafficking, migrant smuggling
    and human trafficking, and other criminal activities.
        Established in 1958 to counter the threat of Soviet long-range
    bombers, NORAD is the bi-national United States and Canadian command
    responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime
    warning for North America. For nearly 67 years, the United States and
    Canadian personnel assigned to NORAD have worked side-by-side in a
    shared commitment to continental defense. Forged through operational
    experience and a common vision, NORAD consistently demonstrates world-
    class professional standards while executing its critical defense
    mission 24 hours a day. Today, NORAD remains the world's only bi-
    national command, safeguarding the United States and Canada while
    routinely demonstrating seamless interoperability and operational
    excellence that our competitors can only hope to match.
        Together, USNORTHCOM and NORAD's experience, expertise, and
    dedication to homeland defense are more critical today than ever.
    Following years of steady investment, our strategic competitors have
    the means to overcome U.S. advantages provided by our favorable
    geography and advanced technology. Today, our competitors have the
    capability and capacity to threaten all of North America with a range
    of advanced nuclear, conventional, and non-kinetic systems while
    employing disruptive grey-zone, cyber, and information operations
    against the United States and our international partners. As part of
    that effort, competitors have formed strategic relationships that
    increase their collective ability to challenge U.S. and allied
    interests around the world with growing disregard of international
    norms or the sovereignty of nations that challenge their expansionist
    ambitions. Meanwhile, unprecedented flows of illicit drugs and migrant
    smuggling across the U.S. southern border have created a crisis that
    undermines national security and the safety of citizens and communities
    across the country.
        The dynamic operational environment and evolving threats to North
    America require USNORTHCOM and NORAD to execute new missions on a
    moment's notice without sacrificing ongoing operations and future
    planning. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are fortunate to draw upon decades of
    shared history and lessons learned to shape the commands' plans and
    operations, and defending the Homelands in the coming years will
    require forward thinking, advanced capabilities, and a professional
    workforce with the experience and technical knowledge necessary to
    plan, resource, and execute the commands' crucial missions in
    tremendously demanding conditions.
        The homeland defense enterprise will continue to rely on realistic
    planning, targeted investment, and forward-looking policies that ensure
    the Commands' ability to detect, track, and defeat potential threats in
    all domains. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are working in close synchronization
    with each of the commands' interagency, international, and DOD partners
    to improve shared all-domain awareness, interoperability, and the
    defeat mechanisms required for a layered all-domain defense capable of
    deterring and defeating a wide range of threats to critical
    infrastructure, force projection capability, and our citizens.
        As competitor ambitions and capabilities grow, USNORTHCOM and NORAD
    remain committed to improving all-domain awareness, reinforcing our
    vital network of allies and partners, and fostering a workforce of
    skilled and dedicated civilian and military professionals. Each of
    these focus areas are critical to ensuring the homeland defense
    enterprise remains ready to deter and defeat any threat to our nations
    today and well into the future, and both commands have made significant
    strides in building the capabilities, networks, and people needed to
    execute their vital missions.
                            threats to north america
        The global security environment is growing increasingly volatile,
    characterized by intensifying competition among major powers and
    mounting threats to the U.S. national interests. Among the myriad
    developments that are reshaping the strategic environment, three trends
    are of particular concern to NORAD and USNORTHCOM due to their
    immediate implications for our Homeland Defense mission.
        First, the likelihood of a direct conflict between the United
    States and one of its four principal adversaries is increasing. While
    the PRC, Russia, North Korea, and Iran each seek to avoid armed
    conflict with the United States, their misperception of a Western
    decline fosters a growing willingness to challenge the United States on
    the global stage and increases the risk of miscalculation in a crisis.
    As Russia's brutal and misguided invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth
    year, there remain several plausible pathways by which the war could
    escalate into a direct military conflict with the United States.
    Similarly, the conflict ignited by Hamas' October 2023 attack on Israel
    has expanded to encompass much of the Middle East and threatens to
    embroil the United States in a direct military conflict with Iran and
    its proxies.
        Meanwhile, simmering tensions in the Taiwan Strait and South China
    Sea carry a persistent risk of escalation into armed conflict between
    China and the United States, with consequences that could span a
    generation. Finally, Kim Jong Un's public abandonment of peaceful
    reunification as a national goal and growing assertiveness on the
    global stage risks sparking renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula
    after more than seven decades of uneasy Armistice.
        Second, strategic cooperation between and among our four principal
    adversaries has grown substantially since the beginning of the Ukraine
    War, increasing the risk that war with one adversary could quickly
    expand into war with an enemy coalition. To date, each of these
    relationships has remained mostly transactional, and none has advanced
    to the level of a formal military alliance. Nonetheless, these
    countries' shared perceptions of the West as a global destabilizing
    force could form the foundation of a wartime partnership. At the center
    of this concerning dynamic is a rapidly evolving relationship between
    the United States' two most capable adversaries.
        Despite decades of mutual mistrust, Beijing and Moscow seem
    determined to advance their strategic partnership and military
    cooperation to counter what they perceive as a persistent U.S. threat
    to their core security interests. Catalyzed by the onset of a major
    war, this nascent military cooperation could quickly expand into
    coordinated military operations that complicate U.S. and allied
    planning and advance each adversary's ability to threaten North
    America. We saw glimpses of this enhanced military cooperation last
    summer when Chinese bomber aircraft deployed to a Russian Arctic
    airbase and flew a combined patrol with Russian heavy bombers over the
    Bering Sea.
        Such ``access transfer'' accelerates and extends China's ability to
    threaten North America in the air domain and raises the specter of
    coordinated military operations in the event of a strategic conflict.
    Separately, North Korea's willingness to risk its own troops in support
    of Russia's war in Ukraine demonstrates the lengths to which these
    partners are willing to go to advance their strategic positions. It
    also raises concerning questions about the quid pro quo that Moscow may
    offer in return, potentially including expertise that could accelerate
    Pyongyang's development of advanced strategic weapons.
        Third, each of our adversaries is advancing its ability--and, in
    some cases, rehearsing its plans--to threaten North America in multiple
    domains and from multiple vectors, increasing the likelihood that an
    armed conflict would include direct strikes on the Homeland. The PRC is
    expanding its ability to hold portions of North America at risk with
    conventionally armed weapons, providing Beijing a strike option against
    our Homeland that is above its demonstrated robust cyberattack
    capabilities but below its threshold for nuclear use. Last July,
    Chinese surface combatants deployed to the Bering Sea for the fourth
    straight year and operated within cruise missile range of critical
    infrastructure throughout Alaska. Since 2023, China has launched two
    hulls of its new Shang III class of nuclear-powered guided-missile
    submarines (SSGN), which in the coming years could provide Beijing a
    clandestine land-attack option against critical infrastructure in
    Alaska and the U.S. West Coast.
        In November, China incorporated air-refuellable H-6N medium bombers
    into a Sino-Russian combined bomber patrol, marking the first long-
    range use of a platform that will extend the PLA Air Force's strike
    range to include portions of Alaska even without basing or overflight
    permissions from the Russians. Finally, China may be exploring the
    development of conventionally armed ICBMs that could allow Beijing to
    strike targets in Alaska and the continental United States without
    crossing the nuclear threshold.
        Meanwhile, China is advancing the quantity and sophistication of
    its North America-threatening nuclear delivery platforms. Chinese
    missile developers are probably developing nuclear-armed ICBMs equipped
    with hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) or the ability to fly a
    fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) trajectory that approaches
    North America from the south rather than the traditional northerly
    vector for which our legacy early warning radars were designed. Such
    systems, if fielded, would erode strategic stability by degrading our
    ability to provide granular and actionable warning of an inbound
    attack.
        Despite the degradation of its warfighting capabilities in Ukraine,
    Russia has enhanced its already formidable capability to threaten North
    America with conventionally armed air-and sea-based cruise missiles.
    Three years of strike operations into Ukraine have provided valuable
    operational experience to Russian aircrews and naval forces. In the
    last year, Russia's heavy bomber fleet has resumed its pre-war pace of
    strategic deterrence patrols--including multiple flights along the
    North American coastline--while simultaneously intensifying its strike
    operations into Ukraine. In the maritime domain, the Russian submarine
    force conducted its first port call in Cuba since the cold war and
    further integrated advanced Severodvinsk-class SSGNs into the Russian
    Pacific Fleet, portending regular--and potentially concurrent--patrols
    by cruise missile-capable submarines off North America's Atlantic and
    Pacific coasts.
        In the nuclear domain, Russia fielded the world's first HGV-
    equipped ICBM over 5 years ago and continues to develop and test other
    novel nuclear delivery systems, like the FOBS-capable Sarmat heavy
    ICBM, the Poseidon transoceanic torpedo, and the Burevestnik nuclear-
    propelled cruise missile. If fielded, these advanced weapons will
    severely challenge our ability to detect and characterize an inbound
    attack and determine an appropriate response during a conflict.
        North Korea continues to defy the international nonproliferation
    regime and advance its strategic weapons program. Kim Jong Un's newest
    ICBM--the Hwasong-19 he first tested last October--probably can deliver
    a nuclear payload to targets throughout North America while minimizing
    our ability to provide pre-launch warning due to the shortened launch
    preparation timelines afforded by its solid-propellant design. Regime
    rhetoric surrounding the new ICBM suggests Kim is eager to transition
    his strategic weapons program from research and development to serial
    production and fielding, a process that could rapidly expand North
    Korea's inventory and narrow my confidence in USNORTHCOM's existing
    ballistic missile defense capacity in the coming years.
        Finally, Iran retains the capability to strike the United States in
    the cyber domain and through its asymmetric and proxy operations.
    Meanwhile, Iran's burgeoning nuclear and space launch programs provide
    a viable pathway for developing a North America-threatening ICBM should
    its leaders determine that they need a more forceful means of
    challenging the United States.
        Separately, we face a variety of non-traditional threats that could
    disrupt critical services in the Homeland and degrade NORAD and
    USNORTHCOM's ability to carry out our no-fail missions. Key among these
    is a spate of activity over the past year involving small uncrewed
    aircraft systems (sUAS) operating over sensitive DOD installations and
    other Defense Critical Infrastructure. While much of this activity may
    be attributable to hobbyists, peer adversaries clearly have incentive
    to collect intelligence on these installations, and our law enforcement
    partners have uncovered evidence of a foreign intelligence nexus in
    some of these incidents.
        Meanwhile, our principal adversaries are concentrating their
    increasingly sophisticated offensive cyberoperations on U.S. defense
    and civilian infrastructure. Over the last year, Russian-affiliated
    cyber actors have conducted attacks on water supply, wastewater,
    hydroelectric, and energy facilities in the United States, while PRC-
    sponsored cyber actors have positioned themselves on IT networks in
    multiple U.S. sectors, potentially enabling them to rapidly transition
    to disruptive attacks in the event of a crisis or conflict.
        Finally, I remain highly concerned by threats presented by non-
    state actors. USNORTHCOM assesses the threat of a foreign terrorist
    attack in North America is at the highest level in at least 5 years, as
    the Israel-Hamas conflict has motivated foreign terrorist organizations
    to rejuvenate their attack planning against the United States. These
    groups have also redoubled their propaganda efforts in the last 18
    months to inspire lone-wolf terrorists to pursue attacks within the
    Homeland, as seen with the deadly January 1st 2025 attack in New
    Orleans.
        Separately, transnational criminal organizations based in Mexico
    continue to threaten U.S. sovereignty and territorial integrity through
    the production and trafficking of fentanyl and other illicit drugs and
    the facilitation of unlawful mass migration toward the U.S. southern
    border. Drug-related violence has escalated in recent years as rival
    cartels fight for control of lucrative drug and migrant smuggling
    routes and demonstrate a growing willingness to directly engage Mexican
    security forces, increasing the risk of spillover violence into the
    United States.
                             defending the homeland
        Homeland defense remains USNORTHCOM and NORAD's top priority and
    essential task. Strategic competitors continue their rapid testing and
    fielding of precision weapons systems capable of striking targets well
    into the U.S and Canadian interior. As those threats increase,
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are tasked with defending critical defense
    infrastructure in the Homeland from attack in order to preserve U.S.
    force projection capability and mitigating risks to vital
    transportation, energy, and manufacturing hubs. Addressing threats from
    long-range missiles, cyberattacks, and unmanned aerial systems requires
    close coordination and collaboration with a host of interagency,
    international, and DOD partners, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD are ideally
    situated to serve as the synchronizer and integrator for that crucial
    whole-of-government enterprise.
        Over the course of the last year, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have
    expanded on already robust efforts to improve the capability of the
    Joint Force and the interagency community to defend key sites--from
    military installations to civilian transportation and energy nodes--
    from attack. That effort is making significant progress thanks in large
    part to the expertise, cooperation, and commitment of our DOD and
    interagency partners. As this critical effort moves forward, success
    will depend on collaboration across the interagency community, as well
    as on developing the forward-looking capabilities and policies
    necessary to ensure a seamless and well-coordinated defensive
    enterprise that accounts for the unique requirements of conducting
    defensive operations inside the United States and Canada.
        In the event of combat operations or attacks against the United
    States, USNORTHCOM has a role in protecting DOD installations--along
    with airports, seaports, rail networks, and highway infrastructure
    necessary to project forces into overseas geographic combatant
    commands--from both kinetic and cyber threats. USNORTHCOM is actively
    engaged with the whole-of-government enterprise involved in this
    nationwide effort to refine the plans and deployable, low-collateral
    capabilities required to mitigate the wide range of threats to these
    key sites inside the United States.
    Protecting Territorial Integrity
        Following the January 20, 2025 Presidential declaration of a
    national emergency on the U.S. southern border, and executive order,
    Clarifying the Military's Role in Protecting the Territorial Integrity
    of the United States, USNORTHCOM was assigned the mission to seal the
    borders and maintain the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the
    United States. In accordance with Presidential Executive Orders and
    Department directives, USNORTHCOM immediately with Presidential
    Executive Orders and Department directives, USNORTHCOM immediately with
    Presidential Executive Orders and Department directives, USNORTHCOM
    immediately with Presidential Executive Orders and Department
    directives, USNORTHCOM immediately with Presidential Executive Orders
    and Department directives, USNORTHCOM immediately with Presidential
    Executive Orders and Department directives, USNORTHCOM immediately with
    Presidential Executive Orders and Department directives, USNORTHCOM
    immediately with Presidential Executive Orders and Department
    directives, USNORTHCOM immediately
    Defending Against Air and Missile Threats
        The DPRK continues to test increasingly capable ICBMs, while Russia
    and the PRC have steadily expanded their stockpiles of highly capable
    long-range land-attack cruise missiles and the fleets of the delivery
    platforms that launch them. The risks to the Homeland posed by nuclear-
    armed ICBMs are clear, while advanced PRC and Russian cruise missiles
    are difficult to detect and can carry both nuclear and conventional
    payloads. All of these weapons can be launched against the United
    States and Canada in an effort to degrade the infrastructure enabling
    U.S. military force projection, inflict economic harm, and weaken
    public support for U.S. intervention in overseas conflicts.
        As air and missile threats to the Homeland will continue to mount,
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are actively engaged in ongoing DOD efforts to
    implement the January 27, 2025 Executive Order directing the building
    of a next-generation Missile Defense Shield for North America. Until
    the Secretary presents the Department's integrated plan forward to the
    White House, I would like to focus on some of USNORTHCOM's current
    activities that help protect the Homeland from air and missile threats.
        Domain awareness is a particularly important part of protection the
    Nation from air and missile threats. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are working
    closely with the U.S. Air Force, which has been tasked as the executive
    agent for air-and cruise-missile defense of the Homeland to identify
    potential solutions to domain awareness challenges. It is vital that
    the domain awareness network provide the ability to detect,
    discriminate, and deliver crucial real-time information and a single
    common operational picture to leaders at all appropriate levels.
    Command modernization initiatives, including the establishment of a
    layered system of sensors such as space-based Airborne Moving Target
    Indicator (AMTI), Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR), the E-7 Wedgetail, and
    Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), remain critical to
    continental defense in order to detect, track, and prosecute adversary
    submarines, aircraft and surface vessels, as well as inbound missiles.
        Beyond domain awareness, USNORTHCOM continues to defend the United
    States--to include Alaska and Hawaii--from attacks from ballistic
    missiles as well as emerging threat systems. The U.S. ground-based
    midcourse defense system has a long record of success and remains fully
    capable of defending against a potential DPRK missile attack.
    Additionally, the on-time fielding of the Next-Generation Interceptor
    (NGI) remains a major USNORTHCOM priority, and I am working closely
    with the Missile Defense Agency and the Department to ensure that
    program remains on track.
        NORAD and USNORTHCOM will also defend against air-breathing
    threats, to include unmanned aerial systems, threat aircraft, advanced
    land-attack cruise missiles, and hypersonic cruise missiles designed to
    challenge U.S. Homeland defense systems from lower altitudes. The
    commands will continue working with the Department to prioritize these
    efforts in the context of all of NORAD and USNORTHCOM missions.
                          operation noble eagle (one)
        While some of the capabilities required for comprehensive air and
    missile defense of the Homeland remain in development, Operation NOBLE
    Eagle (ONE) and NORAD's aerospace control mission have secured North
    American airspace for decades, adapting constantly to ever-evolving
    threats including Russian--and now PRC--bombers, violent extremist
    threats to civilian aviation, and advanced cruise missiles launched
    from the air and sea. NORAD's ability to adapt to and outpace emerging
    challenges is a cornerstone of the command's longstanding reputation as
    a pillar of continental defense.
        The threats to North American airspace have steadily grown more
    complex, and now include a spectrum of competitor capabilities that
    range from modernized long-range bombers and hypersonic cruise missiles
    down to small unmanned systems that can fit into a backpack. While two
    decades of whole-of-government response have reduced the threat of
    terrorist threats to civil aircraft, NORAD maintains the ability to
    deter and defeat nation-state threats from every avenue of approach to
    North America while safeguarding national leaders from aerial threats,
    both in the National Capital Region and around the country.
        NORAD will optimize protection of prioritized Defense Critical
    Infrastructure while maintaining adequate national response capability
    in support of civilian air traffic, and cooperate with the Air Force
    and the Air National Guard to generate greater readiness against high-
    end threats though enhanced campaigning and training while remaining
    available to NORAD when indications and warning triggers are met.
        I am grateful to the Committee for your support for these key
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD priorities, as we work to identify effective and
    affordable capabilities that will meet this important challenge now and
    well into the future. The same can be said of our Canadian partners, as
    the Government of Canada has committed to fielding long-range sensors
    and weapons system to deter and defeat potential air, sea, and missile
    threats in the approaches to North America. Integration and
    collaboration with Canada--through NORAD and in broader continental
    defense initiatives--will grow even more necessary as our competitor
    field greater numbers of increasingly advanced long-range cruise
    missiles.
    Countering Unmanned Aerial Systems
        There is perhaps no better example of the rapidly evolving
    strategic environment than the emergence of small unmanned aerial
    systems (sUAS) as a threat to infrastructure and personnel in the
    Homeland. The availability and utility of small drones has grown
    exponentially over the last decade, and some have repeatedly employed
    these systems for illicit purposes. While U.S. and coalition forces
    overseas have faced the threat of weaponized unmanned systems for
    years, small drones have emerged as a significant risk to
    infrastructure and safety in the United States in a relatively short
    period of time. The widespread availability of small drones, coupled
    with a complicated regulatory structure and limitations on UAS
    countermeasures based on concerns for flight safety and privacy, has
    created significant vulnerabilities that have been exploited by known
    and unknown actors.
        There have been multiple incursions by UAS over military
    installations in the United States over the past year. To mitigate the
    potential threats to safety and security presented by UAS overflight of
    DOD facilities, USNORTHCOM and NORAD, in close coordination with the
    military Services and DOD, resourced equipment and analytic tools to
    installation commanders to assist with detection, tracking, and
    mitigation of potential UAS threats. In November 2024, then-Secretary
    of Defense Austin directed USNORTHCOM to serve as the synchronizer,
    integrator, and/or coordinator of domestic counter-small UAS (C-sUAS)
    activities within the continental United States and Alaska for DOD and,
    when requested and approved, for the interagency. USNORTHCOM will play
    a critical role in an enduring whole-of-government effort to protect
    people, infrastructure, aircraft, and facilities from malign sUAS
    incursions. This effort will require investment in robust and evolving
    mitigation technologies suitable for use in the United States,
    alignment with interagency and industry partners, and policy and
    statutory changes that balance safety, privacy, and defensive
    requirements.
        In October 2024, USNORTHCOM and NORAD were proud to host
    Demonstration FALCON PEAK 25.1, which brought together DOD,
    interagency, and industry partners seeking to demonstrate counter-sUAS
    sensors and defeat mechanisms. Thanks to extraordinary support from the
    U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division, 10th Special Forces Group
    (Airborne), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Colorado
    National Guard, and many others, demonstration participants tracked and
    engaged live sUAS targets in complex, realistic scenarios over a number
    of days and nights within military Special Use Airspace. The
    demonstration provided important insights that the Commands and our
    partners will continue to build on, including during Falcon Peak 25.2,
    which will include a larger slate of vendors, participants, and systems
    in August 2025, meeting Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization
    Act direction.
        In recognition of the sUAS threat and the Commands' increased
    responsibilities, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have shifted resources and
    personnel to establish a C-UAS operations branch within our
    headquarters. This Committee has long been aware of the potential
    threat presented by sUAS, and I would like to extend my appreciation
    for your ongoing support for C-UAS research and acquisitions. That
    support will remain critical as success in the Homeland C-sUAS mission
    will depend on improved C-UAS technology, interagency collaboration,
    and corresponding authorities and resourcing for the mission to defend
    against this significant risk to safety and security.
    Cyber Domain Roles and Responses
        Threats to civil and military infrastructure are a direct and
    constant concern for USNORTHCOM and NORAD. While not directly
    responsible for the defense of non-USNORTHCOM networks, cyberattacks
    against U.S. and Canadian infrastructure carry the potential to
    negatively impact DOD force projection and could require significant
    defense support to civil authorities to mitigate the consequences of a
    damaging cyberattack against transportation, energy, or economic
    networks.
        Any direct action against the United States by a major competitor
    would almost certainly involve cyberattacks against strategic North
    American infrastructure, and USNORTHCOM collaborates daily with U.S.
    Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
    Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and
    any number of other intergovernmental partners to deter, defend, and--
    if necessary--respond to cyberattacks.
    Defense Operations in the Arctic
        Defending North America is inherently linked to the ability of the
    Joint Force to operate effectively across the entire USNORTHCOM area of
    responsibility--to include the Arctic. Russia is expanding its
    capability and capacity to conduct military operations in the Arctic,
    seeking to control access to northern sea lanes and threaten North
    America from the northern approaches. In 2024, Russian and PRC aircraft
    and surface vessels conducted joint patrols in the Bering Sea, while
    the PRC repeatedly deployed dual-purpose vessels into the Arctic as
    part of a longstanding effort to expand the ability of the People's
    Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to conduct multi-domain operations in the
    high north.
        Arctic responsibilities are shared across multiple geographic and
    functional combatant commands, and as competition in the region
    increases, safeguarding Arctic access and freedom of maneuver will
    depend on Joint Force Arctic operational capabilities and build on the
    already strong ties between Arctic partners. USNORTHCOM places enormous
    value on the ability to conduct operations and exercises in the high
    north and to execute assigned missions in coordination with fellow
    combatant commands.
        The annual ARCTIC EDGE exercise is a key example of a USNORTHCOM
    event that evaluates combatant command planning, communications, and
    operational oversight while simultaneously providing warfighters and
    enablers with valuable operational experience as they test the people,
    equipment, and logistics trains needed to execute their missions in
    remote and austere locations. Regular exercises and real-world
    operations in the Arctic remain critically important and generate
    valuable lessons learned for participants from the combatant command
    and components headquarters down to the operational and tactical
    levels. Effective operations in the Arctic require specialized training
    and equipment under the best of conditions, and there is no substitute
    for real-world experience in the region. USNORTHCOM and NORAD will
    continue to advocate for designated Arctic units that are specifically
    trained and equipped to execute their assigned missions in all
    conditions.
        As inter-reliance between allies and partners grows increasingly
    vital to ensuring a secure and open Arctic, USNORTHCOM and NORAD gain
    strength and capability from our military partnerships. In particular,
    the Canadian Armed Forces' expertise in Arctic operations and the
    government of Canada's longstanding commitment to Arctic security are
    of enormous value to continental defense. Canada's Arctic Foreign
    Policy (CAFP), announced in December 2024, clearly recognizes the
    significance of Russia-PRC collaboration in the Arctic as well as the
    vast importance of the North American Arctic to both the United States
    and Canada.
        This policy will directly support NORAD through international
    diplomatic engagement and a series of important Canadian defense
    investments that will strengthen shared continental defense
    capabilities. The extraordinary value of the U.S.-Canadian defense
    relationship has proven itself time and again over the course of six
    decades, and I have every confidence that the strategic vision and
    commitment to North American defense articulated in the CAFP, when
    resourced, will pay dividends for the defense of North America for many
    years to come.
                  security cooperation with regional partners
        USNORTHCOM's regional security cooperation relationships remain a
    critical element of the command's missions. USNORTHCOM's military
    partnerships with Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas enhance our own
    Homeland defense while building the capacity of those partners to
    operate and communicate with U.S. forces. Those relationships are vital
    to countering competitor influence and presence in the Western
    Hemisphere while improving intelligence sharing, border security, and
    domain awareness.
        Decades of information sharing, combined exercises, and routine
    direct engagement between USNORTHCOM senior leaders and our Canadian,
    Mexican, and Bahamian military counterparts has brought North American
    defense cooperation to a historic high point. The bilateral and
    multilateral ties between our militaries will be of critical importance
    over the next 18 months as the United States, Mexico, and Canada
    prepare to host the FIFA World Cup in the summer of 2026. USNORTHCOM's
    capacity to synchronize interagency and international partners will be
    crucial to ensuring the safety and security of this quadrennial global
    tournament. That work--which will involve dozens of military,
    intelligence community, and law-enforcement partners from all three
    host nations--is already well underway and will grow in scope and scale
    through the end of the competition.
        In the meantime, USNORTHCOM's routine engagements and exercises
    with our regional partners have produced operational capability with
    direct benefits for the defense of North America. In 2024, as a Russian
    Navy surface action group (SAG) transited the Atlantic Ocean,
    USNORTHCOM, NORAD, the Canadian Armed Forces, U.S. European Command,
    and U.S. Southern Command maintained constant common situational
    awareness of the SAG's location, while executing seamless operations
    across multiple international and combatant command boundaries. The
    execution of this mission was the direct result of the close ties
    between USNORTHCOM and our international and cross-command partners and
    demonstrated a degree of commonality and interoperability that our
    competitors are years from being able to match.
        Building our partners' ability to operate with U.S. forces has led
    directly to improved regional domain awareness, information sharing,
    and cooperation against shared security challenges, especially given
    the efforts of peer competitors to gain influence with the United
    States' nearest neighbors. USNORTHCOM's dedicated efforts to support
    our partners' defense requirements over the years have played an
    important role in maintaining the United States as the clear partner of
    choice while simultaneously improving our partners' capability and
    capacity for addressing internal security challenges. USNORTHCOM
    remains committed to these essential relationships.
                  defense support of civil authorities (dsca)
        USNORTHCOM's support to civilian Federal agencies in times of need
    stands as the command's most visible mission to American citizens.
    USNORTHCOM provides support by leveraging the command's expertise in
    planning, synchronization, and operations to prepare for, assess,
    respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. In 2024, USNORTHCOM
    provided air assets and ground forces to fight major wildfires in the
    western United States, to include the recent fires in Los Angeles;
    delivered relief to Americans in need following major hurricanes and
    flooding along the Atlantic coast; supported Federal law enforcement in
    securing National Special Security Events (NSSE); reinforced Federal
    counter-drug efforts; and augmented USCBP border operations.
        USNORTHCOM is proud to support each Federal partner, and delivering
    relief to American citizens exercises the same planning, operations,
    and communications mechanisms required to conduct homeland defense
    operations during periods of crisis and conflict. Drawing on the
    Command's expertise, specialized capabilities, and robust interagency
    networks, USNORTHCOM will lead and work alongside U.S. Federal law
    enforcement partners to safeguard U.S. borders and citizens by
    leveraging the command's specialized intelligence collection
    capabilities abroad.
        Those capabilities also allow USNORTHCOM to play an increasing role
    in illuminating the illicit networks used by criminal cartels to
    launder money, smuggle migrants, and traffic illicit drugs. The
    narcotics smuggled into the United States by transnational criminal
    organizations are directly responsible for tens of thousands of deaths
    each year, and USNORTHCOM will continue to work with partners in
    reducing the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.
        In the aftermath of the catastrophic flooding that struck eastern
    North Carolina in October 2024, USNORTHCOM supported the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with ground forces and aviation
    assets for search and rescue, delivery of relief supplies, route
    clearance, and other key missions that directly assisted residents of
    the affected areas. I want to specifically recognize the extraordinary
    response of leaders and Soldiers from the U.S. Army's XVIII Airborne
    Corps, to include units from the 101st Airborne Division and the 82d
    Airborne Division. Thanks to their readiness, skill, and devotion to
    their mission, every USNORTHCOM request for forces was executed well
    ahead of required timelines and enabled an extraordinary response to a
    historic disaster. While there were certainly lessons learned for an
    even more effective response in future contingencies, I am extremely
    proud of the work done by USNORTHCOM, U.S. Army North, and the deployed
    U.S. Army units whose incredible efforts helped so many Americans in
    need.
        A similar level of support from across the Department enabled
    USNORTHCOM to augment U.S. Secret Service (USSS) protection of the
    major Presidential and vice-Presidential candidates during the last
    several months of the 2024 Presidential campaign. In response to a USSS
    request for assistance following the attempted assassination of
    President Trump, USNORTHCOM, in concert with the Joint Staff and the
    military Services, provided explosive ordinance technicians, military
    working dog teams, and rotary-wing assets to ensure the safety and
    security of the candidates at nearly 200 locations. Successfully
    deploying dozens of highly specialized security teams to hundreds of
    event sites was a testament to the professional planners and operators
    involved with the mission, and I am proud of USNORTHCOM's support for
    this critical effort.
                                   conclusion
        I am honored and privileged to lead the men and women of USNORTHCOM
    and NORAD. I thank our service members and civilian employees for their
    efforts while executing our noble mission of defending the United
    States and Canada as both commands continue to expand our bi-national,
    whole-of-government, continental approach to homeland defense. I
    appreciate the critical role Congress plays in ensuring our service
    members remain ready to defend our Homeland now and in the future, and
    I look forward to continued collaboration with all of our critical
    partners in defending our great nations.
                                      We Have the Watch

        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, General. Admiral Holsey, you're
    recognized.

    STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ALVIN HOLSEY, USN COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
                            SOUTHERN COMMAND

        Admiral Holsey. Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished Members of the Committee, I'm humbled to appear
    before today as the 33d Commander of United States Southern
    Command.
        We're a war fighting organization, and I've moved forward
    to lead this command, servicemembers, surveillance contractors
    and their families, as we've foster democracy, security, shared
    prosperity throughout the Western hemisphere. I'm honored to
    testify alongside General Guillot as a relationship between
    NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM is vital to the safety and security of
    our Homeland.
        The United States and our partners in Latin America and the
    Korean are linked together, not simply by history and
    geography, but by family bonds, cultural traditions, security
    and economic cooperation, and a steadfast devotion to
    democratic values. This enduring commitment to these values is
    a cornerstone of our collective partnership. Together we seek
    to achieve lasting security, stability, and prosperity
    throughout the Americas.
        Today, this vision is imperiled by a host of threats. These
    threats include strategic competition from China and Russia,
    the impact of transnational criminal organizations and the
    complex transboundary challenges such as irregular migration,
    natural disasters, eroded democracies, food, and water
    insecurity. China is outpacing threat and continues its
    methodical encouragement into our shared neighborhood, welding
    diplomatic informational, military, and economic influence to
    export its authoritarian model to the region,
        Most focused to the east and west when they think of great
    power competition. A look to our south reveals that China has
    already established a strong presence. It's predatory and
    opaque investment practices, resource extraction, and potential
    dual use projects from ports to space, threaten the security
    and sovereignty of our partners while jeopardizing the United
    States National Security.
        Simultaneously, Russia supports like-minded regimes like
    Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, using disinformation military
    engagements, arms sales, force protection. Moscow is now
    attempting to undermine the United States leadership interest
    and influence in the region.
        Meanwhile, TCOs continue to fuel instability throughout the
    region. They exploit the permissive environment and engage in
    brutal violence, illicit trafficking, and other criminal
    activities to undermine the rule of law and disrupt the
    legitimate government functions. They're having devastating
    effects, which has spilled over into our Homeland, destroying
    lives.
        Border security is a concern for us all. SOUTHCOM recently
    stood up Joint Task force--guard in at Naval Station Guantanamo
    Bay (GTMO), in support of Department of Homeland Security to
    provide safe and humane care of illegal aliens until they're
    returned to their countries of origin. Our time is now.
    Deliberate and meaningful action to address these threats is
    required or this region, our neighborhood will continue to
    change.
        Partnerships are our most effective approach to countering
    shared security and economic concerns to enable our enduring
    trust in the region. However, we cannot take this for granted.
    To be a trusted partner, we must be credible, present, and
    engaged.
        During my tenure at SOUTHCOM, I've witnessed how enduring
    presence builds trust. As a result, partners prefer to work
    with us over China, Russia, and other nations to overcome their
    most pressing challenges. SOUTHCOM continue to stand shoulders
    to shoulder with our partners. We have and will continue to
    respond rapidly to crises in any form.
        Together with our partners, we're building their
    capability, capacity to mitigate, respond, and recover from our
    collective threats. Sustained investment and security
    operation, joint exercises, disaster assistance among other
    initiatives enable us to innovate and deliver at the point of
    need.
        As this Department sharpens its war fighting edge, I'm
    grateful for the continued support of Congress. Today, this
    vital support to defending the democratic principles and
    interests that underpins the stability of prosperity and the
    region and ultimately the security of our Nation.
        Thank you again, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and
    Members of the Committee for this opportunity. I look forward
    to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Alvin Holsey follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Admiral Alvin Holsey
        Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Committee
    Members, it is a distinct honor and privilege to serve as United States
    Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) 33d Combatant Commander. In assuming
    this role, I have leveraged 22 months of insight as the USSOUTHCOM
    Military Deputy Commander and have moved forward to lead this command's
    servicemembers, civilians, contractors, and their families, as we
    strengthen democracy, security, and stability throughout the Western
    Hemisphere.
        The United States of America and the many nations and territories
    that comprise Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are bound together
    by rich cultural traditions, family bonds, economic endeavors, and an
    enduring commitment to democratic principles. Upon this foundation,
    USSOUTHCOM builds lasting trust across the region through engaged and
    credible presence. Together, with our Allies and Partners, we seek to
    engender security, capability, democratic norms, and resilience that
    fuel regional peace, prosperity, and sovereignty.
        There are several threats to this vision. I assess the most
    concerning to be the actions of nations such as China and Russia. These
    authoritarian regimes continue their methodical incursion into the
    region using varying tools toward separate end states. While China's
    long-term global campaign to become the world's dominant geostrategic
    power is evident in the Western Hemisphere, ``Russia continues to
    support anti-American authoritarian regimes militarily and spread
    disinformation throughout the region to undermine [U.S.] interests.''
    The consequences not only run counter to U.S. national interests, but
    also threaten sovereignty, and advance our Strategic Competitors'
    economic, political, and military objectives. Their malign actions here
    in the Western Hemisphere have ``ramifications that stretch far beyond
    the region, posing a global risk.'' \1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Pettus, E. L. (2023). The Expanding Leverage of the People's
    Republic of China in Latin America: Implications for the Region.
    Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Retrieved from https://
    www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3540614/the-expanding-
    leverage-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-in-latin-america-implic/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Simultaneously, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and
    violent gangs, as well as Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), use
    enormous revenue from drug trafficking and other illicit activity to
    corrupt and co-opt portions of regional governments, degrading the
    region's democratic institutions. Criminal violence drives drugs,
    illegal migration, and lawlessness to our border and imperils citizen
    security. TCOs are linked to the deaths of thousands of Americans every
    year. Both threaten the safety, stability, security, and sovereignty of
    all nations in our shared neighborhood. Time is not on our side. The
    Western Hemisphere is suffering from an ``erosion of democratic
    capitalism, which in too many countries is being replaced by . . .
    authoritarianism.'' \2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ O'Grady, M. A. (2024). Brazil and Latin America's Decline. The
    Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/opinion/brazil-
    and-latin-americas-decline-president-lula- economy-policy-
    04585c64?mod=hp_opin_pos_3#cxrecs_s.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We can stem this tide by standing shoulder-to-shoulder with our
    Allies and Partners. Our Partners want to work with us, but to maintain
    their trust and confidence they must feel and see our presence and
    commitment before it is too late. USSOUTHCOM will continue to campaign
    along its three lines of effort: Strengthening Partnerships, Countering
    Threats, and Building our Team. Under this framework, we are taking
    swift action, rising to the occasion to bolster like-minded
    democracies, outmaneuver our Strategic Competitors, and thwart our
    adversaries.
        Success relies on taking a holistic approach to our operations,
    activities, and investments. To be effective, each must be nested with
    the contributions and capabilities of our Allies, Partners, U.S.
    Interagency, non-governmental organizations, academia, and the private
    sector. To this end, we have redoubled our efforts to nest military
    engagement with diplomatic, informational and economic initiatives
    across the whole-of-government. Together, we will build a safer and
    stronger Western Hemisphere while ensuring the national security of our
    Homeland.
                            challenges in the region
    Strategic Competition with the People's Republic of China
        The United States and China are locked in a fierce strategic
    competition, pitting democracy against authoritarianism. Over the
    course of the last decade, the United States has focused predominantly
    on the Indo-Pacific, while the China has taken a global approach. The
    LAC region is on the front lines of a decisive and urgent contest to
    define the future of our world. China is assailing United States
    interests from all directions, in all domains, and increasingly in the
    Caribbean archipelago--a potential offensive island chain. Failure to
    adequately compete here and now ``will leave the region under the
    influence of America's chief authoritarian rivals,''\3\ which directly
    threatens the ``U.S. shift to the Indo-Pacific . . . jeopardizing
    freedom of maneuver, access, and influence in our near-abroad.'' \4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Cimmino, J., Kroenig, M., & Marczak, J. (2024). A strategy to
    counter malign Chinese and Russian influence in Latin America and the
    Caribbean. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from https://
    www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-
    series/a-strategy-to-counter-malign-chinese-and-russian- influence-in-
    latin-america-and-the-caribbean/.
        \4\ (Pettus, 2023, p. 3).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        While the United States is looking to the Far East, China is
    plowing fertile ground to our south. The region is home to abundant
    natural resources, including 20 percent of the world's oil reserves, 25
    percent of its strategic metals, 30 percent of its forest area, 31
    percent of its fishing areas and 32 percent of its renewable freshwater
    resources.\5\ Economics plays a central role in China's interest in the
    region. Understanding this, China has used its Belt and Road Initiative
    (BRI) to become South America's largest trading partner and second
    largest in Central America and the Caribbean.\6\ \7\ A bold strategy
    governs its trade ``beyond raw materials and commodities to include
    traditional infrastructure (road, bridges, ports) and `new
    infrastructure': electric vehicles, telecommunication, and renewable
    energy.'' \8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the
    Caribbean. (2024). Natural resources outlook in Latin America and the
    Caribbean, 2023. Retrieved from https://repositorio.cepal.org/entities/
    publication/d42a8514-9145-4f2a-b46b-b0187bb913e0.
        \6\ Foreign Affairs Committee. (2022). China regional snapshot:
    South America. Retrieved from https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-
    regional-snapshot-south-america/#:8: text = China's % 20
    Influence%20in%20South%20America,South%20America's%20top%20trading%20par
    tner.
        \7\ Carr, E., & Lazarus, L. (2024). China's BRI and the U.S.
    response: Contest in the Caribbean. Hinrich Foundation. Retrieved from
    https://www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/wp/us-china/contest-in-the-
    caribbean/.
        \8\ Ellis, E., Lazarus, L., Piccone, T., & Wirtschafter, V. (2024).
    How are the United States and China Intersecting in Latin America?
    Brookings Institute. Retrieved from https://www. brookings.edu/
    articles/how-are-the-united-states-and-china-intersecting-in-latin-
    america/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        China has not broadened its reach into this hemisphere as a
    benevolent gesture. Rather, through the BRI, it is engaged in a
    ``global campaign to monopolize strategic natural resources'' and use
    them for political control.\9\ Under the guise of investment, China
    continues to displace Taiwan's recognition in the region. Seven of the
    12 countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, are
    found in LAC, four in the Caribbean. Having already successfully
    courted 21 of the 31 countries in USSOUTHCOM's area of responsibility
    (AOR) to join the BRI, Beijing has gained ground by offering our
    Partners short-term gains that leave them vulnerable to unsustainable
    debt, environmental degradation, and informational security risks.\10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ Gallagher, M. (2023). American Influence is Needed in Latin
    America Now Like Never Before--to Combat China. Newsweek. Retrieved
    from https: / / www.newsweek.com / american- influence-needed-latin-
    america-now-like-never-before-combat-china-opinion-1830950.
        \10\ (Ellis, Lazarus, Piccone, Wirtschafter, 2024).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        China claims to have ``always been a member of the Global South''
    \11\ and is using the BRI to set the theater and expand its access to
    rare earth metals and control of ports, space facilities, and
    telecommunications infrastructure for a potential dual civilian-
    military purpose.\12\ Fifty percent of the world's lithium reserves are
    found in Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile.\13\ Chinese State-Owned
    Entities (SOEs) have monopoly on rare earth mining and refining in the
    region.\14\ Between 2000 and 2018, China invested $73 billion in Latin
    American and Caribbean markets, leaving supply chains for advanced
    technology and everyday items in its control, and garnering influence
    that makes the United States and our Partners vulnerable to Beijing's
    malign agenda.\15\ \16\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ Baptista, E. (2024). China's Xi announces steps to support
    'global south' at G20 summit. Reuters. Retrieved from https://
    www.reuters.com/world/chinas-xi-announces-steps-support-global-south-
    g20-summit-2024-11-18/.
        \12\ (Gallagher, M., 2024).
        \13\ Vander Molen, I. (2022). Bolivia: Pursuing Sustainable Lithium
    Mining. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Retrieved from
    https: / / www.csis.org / blogs / development-dispatch /bolivia-
    pursuing-sustainable-lithium-mining.
        \14\ (Pettus, 2023, p. 4).
        \15\ (Cimmino, Kroenig, & Marczak, 2024).
        \16\ (Pettus, 2023, p. 4).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Chinese telecommunications SOEs continue to proliferate, with
    Huawei, ``expanding its presence as one of the main information and
    communications technology (ICT) enterprises in the region.'' \17\ Eight
    of our Partner Nations have installed Chinese 5G equipment to date, and
    24 others use Chinese 3G/4G infrastructure, perhaps making future 5G
    upgrades with Western companies cost-prohibitive.\18\ \19\ Multiple
    governments, organizations, and companies have accused Chinese SOEs,
    most notably, Huawei, of assisting in Chinese espionage campaigns,
    jeopardizing United States and Partner Nation security and
    sovereignty.\20\ \21\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ Alvarado, P. D. (2024). Huawei's Expansion in Latin America
    and the Caribbean: Views from the Region. United States Institute of
    Peace. Retrieved from https: / / www.usip.org /
    publications/2024/04/huaweis-expansion-latin-america-and-caribbean-
    views-region.
        \18\ Duarte, L. (2021). Latin America: China's Huawei Maintains its
    Foothold. AULA Blog. Retrieved from https://aulablog.net/2021/11/19/
    latin-america-chinas-huawei-maintains-itsfoothold/.
        \19\ Roy, D. (2023). China's Growing Influence in Latin America.
    Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/
    backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-
    security-energy-bri.
        \20\ U.S. Department of Justice. (2019). Huawei Charged with
    Conspiring to Steal Trade Secrets from T-Mobile United States.
    Retrieved from https: // www.justice.gov / opa / pr / chinese-
    telecommunications-device-manufacturer-and-its-us-affiliate-indicted-
    theft-trade.
        \21\ Barnes, J. E. (2023). Allied Spy Chiefs Warn of Chinese
    Espionage Targeting Tech Firms. The New York Times. Retrieved from
    https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/18/us/politics/china-spying-
    technology.html.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Winning the strategic competition with China in the Western
    Hemisphere is essential to securing the defense of our Homeland,
    maintaining regional stability, and advancing United States national
    interests. Increasing Chinese presence creates vulnerabilities and a
    potential ability to exploit global chokepoints--such as the Panama
    Canal, sea lines of communication, space, and supply chains--in future
    conflicts.\22\ Moreover, the malign activities, harmful influence, and
    autocratic philosophy of China are a direct threat to the democratic
    will of this region's people. The United States offers economic
    prosperity, sustainable development, and true partnership in our shared
    hemisphere. Broadening innovation efforts and attracting transparent
    foreign investment will assist in meeting the needs of our Partners,
    while reducing poverty and improving living standards. By amplifying
    these benefits and doubling down on our strategy of strengthening
    partnerships with engaged and credible presence, we will do more than
    manage this strategic competition, we will ``win it.'' \23\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \22\ (Pettus, 2023, p. 4).
        \23\ Gallagher, M., & Pottinger, M. (2024). No Substitute for
    Victory: America's Competition with China Must Be Won, Not Managed.
    Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://www. foreignaffairs.com/united-
    states/no-substitute-victory-pottinger-gallagher.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Russia's Strategy in the West
        Russia's malign activities in the Western Hemisphere have global
    security consequences as it seeks to ``position itself at the heart of
    a new world order.'' \24\ Moscow views strategic competition in the
    region as analogous to that in Europe and is engaged in a campaign to
    challenge United States leadership and influence.\25\ Consequently,
    Russia seeks to undermine the United States regional interests, support
    like-minded authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela,
    and foster stronger relations with other potentially receptive nations.
    To do so, Moscow leverages malign propaganda, military engagements,
    arms sales, and force projection, along with diplomatic and
    economically coercive practices to demonstrate its global reach.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ Russia's Strategy for Latin America: Strengthening Ties in the
    Light of the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan (Russia). (2024). European
    Parliament Think Tank. Retrieved from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/
    thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762473.
        \25\ Levaggi, A. G., & Rouvinski, V. (2024). The Kremlin's
    Caribbean Gambit: A Great Power Competition Spillover? Center for
    Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from https://
    www.csis.org/analysis/kremlins-caribbean-gambit-great-power-
    competition-spillover.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Russia uses state-controlled media to disseminate disinformation
    and propaganda widely through outlets such as RT and Sputnik Mundo in
    an attempt to destabilize Partner Nation governments,\26\ spread biased
    and false narratives that criticize the United States, and downplay
    Russian global malfeasance, especially as it relates to its war with
    Ukraine.\27\ These messages are communicated across other forms of
    traditional and social media, and with the assistance of Russian
    embassies, are now incorporated into regional academia through
    educational exchanges--creating conditions for the indoctrination of
    future regional leaders.\28\ \29\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \26\ United States Department of State. (2024). Alerting the World
    to RT's Global Covert Activities. Retrieved from https://www.State.gov/
    alerting-the-world-to-rts-global-covert-activities/.
        \27\ (European Parliament Think Tank, 2024).
        \28\ Douglas, F., & Roman D. Ortiz, R. (2024). Russian Influence
    Campaigns in Latin America. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved
    from https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/10/ russian-influence-
    campaigns-latin-america.
        \29\ Chaguaceda, A., & Rouvinski, V. (2024). Russia's Capture of
    Intellectual Elites in Latin America. Wilson Center. Retrieved from
    https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russias-
    capture-intellectual-elites-latin-america.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Although Russia does not enjoy the same level of economic and
    military power as China, it continues to make its presence felt. Since
    2008, 15 of the 41 visits by the Russian Navy to the region have
    included warships. Last June, a Russian Surface Action Group, led by
    the frigate Admiral Gorshkov and cruise missile submarine Kazan docked
    in Havana, Cuba, passing within 30 miles of the Florida Keys.\30\ This
    follows visits by the Admiral Gorshkov to the western Atlantic Ocean in
    2023 and the Russian training ship Perekop to Cuba, Nicaragua, and
    Venezuela later that year.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \30\ Wilner, M., & Torres, N. G. (2024). Russia's Nuclear Submarine
    Tracks Back Up Florida's Coast as Warships Head to Caribbean. The Miami
    Herald. Retrieved from https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/
    world/americas/cuba/article289380600.html.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ``The Russian state and para-state cyber penetration of much of
    Latin America is far broader, deeper, and more successful than is
    general understood.'' \31\ The region also hosts Russian military/
    security infrastructure and personnel. In Nicaragua, Russia maintains
    its GLONASS navigation system--Russia's alternative to the United
    States global positioning system, as well as ``a multimillion-dollar
    vaccination plant that produces no vaccines, a police academy that does
    little of what it advertises, a cyber warfare and training center in
    the State telecommunications building, and a Russian Ministry of
    Interior building that enjoys the diplomatic status of an embassy.''
    \32\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \31\ Farah, D. (2024). How Russian Surveillance Tech is Reshaping
    Latin America. Digital Commons. Retrieved from https://
    digitalcommons.fiu.edu/jgi_research/67.
        \32\ Farah, D., & Richardson, M. (2022). Dangerous Alliances:
    Russia's Strategic Inroads in Latin America. National Defense
    University Press. Retrieved from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/
    Article/3252479/dangerous-alliances-russias-strategic-inroads-in-latin-
    america/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On the economic front, last year Russia sharply wielded its trade
    policy to suspend banana imports from five Ecuadorian companies,
    preventing the country from exchanging aging Russian military equipment
    for $200 million in reliable United States alternatives.\33\ Although
    Russia maintains a small trade presence and has no trade agreements in
    Latin America, this is a powerful example of the economic leverage and
    influence it deploys against our Partners to further its interests.\34\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \33\ Reuters. (2024). Russia Buys Bananas from India after Ecuador
    Military Hardware Spat. Retrieved from https: / / www.reuters.com /
    world / russia-buys-bananas-india-after-ecuadormilitary-hardware-spat-
    2024-02-06/.
        \34\ (European Parliament Think Tank, 2024).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Russia continues its attempts to solidify and strengthen diplomatic
    relationships across the region. In 2023, Moscow hosted more than 200
    delegates from Latin America at its Russia-Latin America International
    Parliamentary Conference. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has traveled
    to LAC three times since 2023 to advance Russia's malign agenda with
    leaders from ideological acolytes in Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and
    Venezuela. Diplomatic visits as well as participation in the BRICS and
    G20 Summits appear to be paying dividends, as official communiques from
    these gatherings diminish or fail to condemn Russia's culpability in
    Ukraine. \35\ \36\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \35\ Elgot, J., & Leyland Cecco, L. (2024). Ukraine Allies
    Criticize G20 Statement for not Naming Russia's Role in Conflict. The
    Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2024/nov/
    19/ukraine-russia-g20-communique.
        \36\ (European Parliament, 2024).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Transnational Criminal Organizations
        TCOs create and exploit regional instability throughout LAC. Their
    illicit actions threaten good governance and the economic,
    environmental, and citizen security of every society in the Western
    Hemisphere. There are 35 TCOs sanctioned by the United States based in
    the region. In 2023, they amassed an assessed revenue of $358 billion
    by engaging in the trafficking of humans, drugs, weapons, and wildlife,
    as well as the counterfeiting of goods and illegal logging, mining, and
    fishing. This staggering number is six times higher than the defense
    budgets of all countries in the region combined, including Mexico. TCO-
    driven corruption and instability open space for China, Russia, and
    other malign actors to achieve strategic ends and further their
    agendas.
        Meanwhile, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and
    Crime (UNODC), cocaine production is reaching record highs, with
    markets and TCO operations expanding in Europe, Africa, and Asia.\37\
    The global revolution in illicit synthetic drugs has direct
    implications in the region, with fentanyl increasingly trafficked
    throughout the Western Hemisphere. As Congress recognizes, China
    ``strategically and economically benefits'' from our Nation's fentanyl
    crisis, and we remain concerned that criminal actors will exploit the
    region's vulnerabilities to expand precursor smuggling or fentanyl
    production into other countries.\38\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \37\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2024). World drug
    report 2024: Key Findings and Conclusions. Retrieved from https://
    www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR_2024/
    WDR24_Key_findings_and_conclusions.pdf.
        \38\ Select Committee Unveils Findings on CCP's Role in American
    Fentanyl Epidemic--Report & Hearing. (2024). Select Committee on the
    CCP. Retrieved from https://select committee ontheccp.house.gov/media/
    press-releases/select-committee-unveils-findings-ccps-role-american-
    fentanyl-epidemic-report.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        According to the UNODC, the Americas have the highest regional
    homicide rates in the world, with high rates of violence related to
    organized crime.\39\ Illegal smuggling of weapons contributes to
    increasing violence and instability while providing TCOs or regional
    terrorist groups with an arsenal that often exceeds that of the
    legitimate state. Gang violence is becoming deadlier, especially in
    Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.\40\ One-third of the world's
    homicides occur in the Caribbean, with firearms used in more than half
    of these crimes.\41\ \42\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \39\ Global Study on Homicide 2023. (2024). United Nations Office
    on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/documents/
    data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/Global_study_ on_homicide_2023_web.pdf.
        \40\ Small Arms Survey. (2023). New Joint Report with CARICOM
    IMPACS--the Caribbean Firearms Study. Retrieved from https://
    www.smallarmssurvey.org/ highlight/new-joint-report- caricom-impacs-
    caribbean- firearms-study.
        \41\ Pistolesi, A., & Sacchi, M. (2024). Narcos, Gangs and Crisis
    in the Caribbean. Atlas of Wars. Retrieved from https://
    www.atlasofwars.com/ narcos-gangs-and-crisis-in-the-caribbean/.
        \42\ (Small Arms Survey, 2023).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Additionally, both regional and foreign terrorist actors are
    equally active in the region. Four United States-designated regional
    terrorist organizations (Regional Armed Forces of Colombia--People's
    Army, Segunda Marquetalia, the National Liberation Army, and Shining
    Path) routinely collaborate with TCOs to further destabilize the
    region. Over 10,000 members of these groups are found in Colombia and
    Peru undermining state sovereignty while waging war with security
    forces. Colombian terrorist groups are leveraging emerging technology,
    and in 2024, they conducted more than 140 Unmanned Systems aerial
    attacks. Members and supporters of four United States-designated
    foreign terrorist organizations (Lebanese Hizballah, Islamic
    Revolutionary Guard Corps--Qods Force, ISIS, and al Qaeda) continue to
    operate in the Western Hemisphere.
    Iran
        Iran seeks to build political, military, and economic clout in
    Latin America with the assistance of sympathetic authoritarian regimes
    and states where it believes cooperation is achievable. Tehran views
    United States engagement in the region as a ``foreign occupation'' and
    parallels it to its own strife with the West as a commonality and
    avenue for shared opposition to the United States influence. \43\ Iran
    has also increasingly developed criminal networks in Latin America in
    an attempt to kill or kidnap enemies of the regime, including Israeli
    citizens.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \43\ Citrinowicz, D. (2024). Iran in Latin America. Institute for
    National Strategic Studies. Retrieved from https://www.inss.org.il/
    publication/iran-south-america/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Although the theocratic regime works primarily with Venezuela on
    the diplomatic and military front to provide drones and warships to
    Caracas, it also has expanded security cooperation with Bolivia. Iran
    has provided drones and river boats to Bolivia, and it has assisted
    Bolivia with cybersecurity matters and participated in combined
    military training exercises. \44\ Iran has expanded overtures to
    Brazil, and in January 2024 joined BRICS. In 2023, Brazil was the only
    country in the region to permit Iran's 86th Surface Action Group to
    make a port call, allowing the vessels to stay for a week before
    continuing its 8-month mission to circumnavigate the globe.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \44\ (Citrinowicz, 2024).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Iranian partner Lebanese Hizballah (LH) has had a presence in Latin
    America since the 1980's. The group has plotted attacks against targets
    in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Panama, and Peru. LH launders
    money, extorts local populations, and profits from drug trafficking,
    primarily in the tri-border area between Argentina, Brazil, and
    Paraguay. These illicit activities threaten regional stability and
    raise millions of dollars for the terrorist organization to plan
    attacks worldwide.
    Regional Humanitarian Crises
        Irregular Migration. Regional instability has fueled unprecedented
    levels of irregular migration throughout LAC and placed significant
    political, economic, and social burdens on our Partners throughout the
    region. This humanitarian crisis is the result of numerous factors
    including TCO violence, lack of economic opportunity, extreme weather
    events, and food shortages. TCOs are taking advantage of migrants,
    engaging in migrant smuggling, human trafficking, extortion, and other
    criminal activities. The Venezuela-based Tren de Aragua organization is
    one such group and its abhorrent operations pose a significant threat
    to the region and have expanded its reach beyond the treacherous routes
    taken by migrants and into the United States.
        During fiscal year 2024, 374,409 migrants trekked through Panama's
    dangerous Darien region enroute to the United States in the same year,
    with over 247,000 originating from Venezuela. \45\ The large numbers of
    migrants transiting the region strains our Partner Nations' resources
    and creates new challenges for countries already grappling with
    economic development and security issues.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \45\ Online Data base; Panama National Migration Service; 2023;
    TRANSITO IRREGULAR POR DARIEN; https://www.migracion.gob.pa/
    estadisticas/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Haiti. Security underlies governance and is the foundation for the
    broad investment in the youth, education, and strategic economic
    development that Haiti desperately needs to achieve its potential. \46\
    Endemic corruption and violent criminal gangs have left the country at
    a ``dire crossroads.'' \47\ More than 700,000 Haitians have been
    displaced since at least 2021.\48\ Gangs control nearly 85 percent of
    Port-au-Prince, and their presence and influence is growing, as they
    are ``spreading terror and fear, committing murders, kidnappings and
    sexual violence of unprecedented brutality in the affected
    regions.''\49\ Children ``account for 30 to 50 percent of armed group
    members . . . [and are being] used as informants, cooks, and sex slaves
    . . . [in addition to being] forced to perpetrate armed violence
    themselves.'' \50\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \46\ Michon, X. (2024). Despite a Grim Today, Prosperity Is Still
    Possible in Haiti. Americas Quarterly. Retrieved from https://
    www.americasquarterly.org/article/despite-a-grim-todayprosperity-is-
    still-possible-in-haiti/.
        \47\ Amid Rising Violence in Haiti, Security Council Urges States
    to Bolster Funding for Security Support Mission. (2024). United
    Nations. Retrieved from https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15908.doc.htm.
        \48\ International Organization for Migration. (2024). Over 700,000
    Displaced in Haiti, Half Are Children, as Humanitarian Crisis Worsens.
    Retrieved from https://www.iom.int/news/over-700000-displaced-haiti-
    half-are-children-humanitarian-crisis-worsens.
        \49\ United Nations. Press Release. (2024). Rising Displacement,
    Criminal Gangs and Corruption Continue to Plague Haitian Life, Slowing
    Democratic Reform, Speakers Tell Security Council. Retrieved from
    https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15859.doc.htm.
        \50\ (United Nations, 2024).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The United Nations (UN) authorized Multinational Security Support
    (MSS) Mission, and a potential future UN Peacekeeping Operation (PKO),
    represent options for a continued role for the international community
    in seeking to bring stability to the island nation. While USSOUTHCOM is
    providing logistical support to the MSS, as of January, our Partner
    Nations in Kenya, the Bahamas, Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, and
    Jamaica have sourced a ground force of approximately 1,000 personnel to
    assist the Haitian National Police (HNP) in countering the pervasive
    gang violence. But more must be done. The HNP is ``outgunned and
    outnumbered.'' \51\ A transition to a UN PKO or UN support office are
    options that could enable the operation of a multinational force in a
    size and scale necessary to bring stability. \52\ Nevertheless, China
    and Russia have disregarded support from the Caribbean Community
    (CARICOM), the Organization of American States, and Haiti for the
    transition of the MSS into a UN PKO.\53\ \54\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \51\ Lederer, E. M. (2024). U.N. to Send Kenya Police Force to
    Haiti to Fight Gangs. AP News. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/
    article/un-haiti-gangs-kenya-force-peacekeeping-violence-d9
    ebed4a6a809d080511009b39b1b1ac.
        \52\ (Lederer, 2024).
        \53\ (Lederer, 2024).
        \54\ United Nations. Press Release. (2024). Amid Rising Violence in
    Haiti, Security Council Urges States to Bolster Funding for Security
    Support Mission, Transfer to U.N. Peacekeeping Mission, Meetings
    Coverage and Press Releases,'' November 20, 2024. https://press.un.org/
    en/2024/sc15908.doc.htm.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Our Strategic Competitors are capitalizing on instability in the
    Western Hemisphere and are using all tools at their disposal to do so.
    Security on the island must be restored to set conditions for vital
    governance and economic reforms, thus incentivizing educational,
    technological, and infrastructure investment. USSOUTHCOM continues to
    work with allies, partners, and the Department of State on related
    initiatives that aim to alleviate suffering, create sustainable
    development, and build toward a more resilient, democratic, and
    prosperous future.
        Venezuela. Venezuela exemplifies the devastating effects and
    consequences of authoritarian rule. The authoritarian Nicolas Maduro
    and his regime are engaged in narcoterrorism, corruption, drug
    trafficking, money laundering, human rights abuses, and other nefarious
    activities, which have contributed to the destabilization of
    Venezuela.\55\ Ruthless repression and widespread inability to access
    life-sustaining necessities have resulted in an exodus of more than 7.7
    million Venezuelan citizens. \56\ TCOs and gangs have taken advantage
    of this crisis to expand their operations, while Maduro's
    representatives increasingly embraces drug trafficking and other
    illicit activity for personal enrichment while the Venezuelan people
    suffer. Under Maduro, Venezuela has become a major cocaine and arms
    trafficking hub, ``transform[ing] the country into a destabilizing
    force in the Western Hemisphere.'' \57\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \55\ U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2020). 15 Current,
    Former Venezuelan Officials Charged with Narco-terrorism, Corruption,
    Drug Trafficking and Other Criminal Charges. Retrieved from https://
    www.ice.gov/news/releases/15-current-former-venezuelan-officials-
    charged-narco-terrorism-corruption-drug.
        \56\ Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and
    Migrants from Venezuela. (2024). Refugee and Migrant Response.
    Retrieved from https://www.r4v.info/en/refugee andmigrants.
        \57\ Young, B.R. (2024). It's Time to Designate Venezuela as a
    State Sponsor of Terrorism. Rand Corporation. Retrieved from https://
    www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/08/its-time-to-designate-venezuela-
    as-a-state-sponsor.html.
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        Maduro's fraudulent election in July 2024 and the subsequent
    detentions, disappearances, and reprisals against the Venezuelan
    population have been met with international condemnation. \58\ Anti-
    democratic practices and authoritarian ideology unite this illegitimate
    regime with our Strategic Competitors and like-minded states across the
    globe. The backing of malign State actors may embolden Maduro to
    escalate propaganda and saber rattling related to his claim to Guyana's
    Essequibo region. The United States, alongside our Allies and Partners
    in the region, remain vigilant. We maintain a united front in the face
    of these acts of unwarranted aggression and reject the oppressive and
    illegal tactics of the Maduro regime.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \58\ United States Department of State. (2025). Condemning Nicolas
    Maduro's Illegitimate Attempt to Seize Power in Venezuela and
    Announcing New Actions Against Maduro and his Representatives and to
    Support the Venezuelan People. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/
    office-of-the-spokesperson/releases/2025/01/condemning-nicolas-maduros-
    illegitimate-attempt-to-
    seize-power-in-venezuela-and-announcing-new-actions-against-maduro-and-
    his-representatives-and-to-support-the-venezuelan-people.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Cuba. Instead of addressing the ongoing humanitarian crises, the
    Diaz-Canel regime is strengthening ties with our Strategic Competitors
    and adversaries. Cuba's malign actions undercut democratic values,
    encourage irregular migration, and threaten the sovereignty and safety
    of our Allies, Partners, and the United States. By the Cuban regime's
    own statistics, more than one million Cubans fled the country between
    2022 and 2023, creating a further strain at the United States Southwest
    border. \59\ \60\ The long-suffering populace does not have sufficient
    access to medicine, food, and essential services such as fuel and
    electricity. \61\While the Cuban military-owned companies invest in
    empty high-rise hotels and retain billions of dollars in bank accounts,
    its antiquated energy infrastructure struggles to meet even half of
    Cubans energy demands, resulting in frequent electrical blackouts,
    especially outside the capital.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \59\ Torres, N.G. (2022). Cuba Protests Point to Growing Discontent
    with Communist Government. The Miami Herald. Retrieved from https://
    www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/
    article290249799.html.
        \60\ LeoGrande, W.M. (2024). Blackouts and Humanitarian Crisis in
    Cuba: Why the United States Should Help. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from
    https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/22/cuba-united-states-electrical-
    grid-outage-humanitarian-crisis-migration/.
        \61\ LeoGrande, W.M. (2024). Cuba's Humanitarian Crisis is a United
    States Problem Too. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://
    foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/22/cuba-united-states-electrical-grid-outage-
    humanitarian-crisis-migration/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        China is poised to capitalize upon its diplomatic, economic, and
    military initiatives with Cuba's support. Cuba has advocated at the UN
    ``in support of China's counter-terrorism and deradicalization measures
    in Xinjiang,'' served as an important trade partner by selling Cuban
    zinc and nickel to China, and signed on to the BRI, receiving Huawei,
    TP-Link, and ZTE-built telecommunications infrastructure used to spy on
    its population and discourage political dissent.\62\ Cuba also serves
    as a proximate location for intelligence gathering and force projection
    by our adversaries. USSOUTHCOM prioritizes monitoring and assessing the
    malign activities of this regime just 90 miles from our Homeland.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \62\ MacDonald, Scott B. (2024). Cuba Emerges as Flashpoint Amid
    United States-China Rivalry. East Asia Forum. Retrieved from https://
    eastasiaforum.org/2024/08/24/cuba-emerges-as-flashpoint-amid-us-china-
    rivalry/.
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        Nicaragua. Democratic, political, religious, and personal freedoms
    are all under attack from the repressive Ortega-Murillo regime. Human
    rights violations, crack downs on dissent, property seizure from, and
    incarceration of, political opponents are all hallmarks of President
    Daniel Ortega's and Co-President and First Lady Rosario Murillo's
    governance. \63\ Initiated in November 2024 and ratified in January
    2025, the Ortega-Murillo regime ushered in 100 constitutional
    amendments to hasten the demise of the Nicaraguan democratic republic,
    including naming the two leaders co-presidents and extending their term
    to 6 years.\64\ Nicaragua is expanding ties with authoritarian regimes
    such as China, Russia, and Iran. A signatory to the BRI and a new free
    trade agreement, Nicaragua is developing plans with a Chinse SOE to
    build a massive solar power plant in El Hato, further cementing their
    ``strategic partnership.'' \65\ Nicaragua also hosts Russian troops and
    aims to strengthen military cooperation with Iran.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \63\ Selser, G. (2024). Nicaragua Strips Citizenship from 135
    Prisoners Released to Guatemala. Associated Press. Retrieved from
    https://apnews.com/article/nicaragua-daniel-ortega-citizenship-
    political-prisoners-expropriation-c37c6e65cc4c6c97596d37d77709de68.
        \64\ United Nations. (2024). Nicaragua: U.N. Group of Experts
    Alarmed by Far-reaching Change to the Constitution. Retrieved from
    https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/11/
    nicaragua-un-group-experts-alarmed-far-reaching-change-constitution.
        \65\ The Tico Times. (2024). China to Build Massive Solar Power
    Plant in Nicaragua. Retrieved from https://ticotimes.net/2024/04/30/
    china-to-build-massive-solar-power-plant-in-nicaragua.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              levers: overcoming threats and challenges in the aor
        The threats and challenges within the Western Hemisphere have
    global implications. For instance, Chinese access, presence, and
    influence across the region and at strategic chokepoints such as the
    Panama Canal imperil the United States's ability to rapidly respond in
    the Indo-Pacific should a crisis unfold. The key to overcoming the
    challenges of our Strategic Competitors and host of adversaries is
    partnership.
        Partnership goes beyond traditional bilateral relations. It means
    leveraging the talents and equities of our broad coalition of allies,
    partners, and U.S. Interagency, as well as non-governmental, private
    sector, and academic organizations, to meet our Partner's needs and
    create the conditions for enduring prosperity in the Americas. SOUTHCOM
    will continue to collaborate across the whole-of-government in the use
    of all instruments of national power--diplomacy, information sharing,
    military engagement, and economic cooperation--in all domains, to
    maintain and strengthen the partnerships which form an advantage
    unmatched by our Strategic Competitors.
        Each day USSOUTHCOM is taking action to strengthen partnerships and
    counter threats by being engaged, credible, and present in the region.
    We devote precious resources to Security Cooperation and Department of
    State Security Assistance to build interoperability and the
    capabilities of our Partners. Additionally, initiatives like the
    Framework for Western Hemisphere Allied Collaboration (F-WHAC) are
    synchronizing and coordinating Allied efforts to improve regional
    stability and align strategic goals. These initiatives, among many
    others, highlight USSOUTHCOM's relentless effort to forge trust, the
    foundation of partnership.
    Strengthening Partnership and Countering Threats
        Security Cooperation and Security Assistance. Security Cooperation
    and Department of State Security Assistance are USSOUTHCOM's main
    levers that enable us to strengthen partnerships. We stand shoulder-to-
    shoulder with our Partners to build their capacity and capability.
    Congress plays a vital role in providing the funding for Partner Nation
    military equipment, training, and professionalization efforts that
    cultivate interoperability and enhance combined operations to
    outcompete Strategic Competitors and defeat our common threats.
        In fiscal year 2024, we executed 1,125 Security Cooperation
    activities and another 1,171 are planned for fiscal year 2025. Our
    commitment to hemispheric security is highlighted by fiscal year 2024
    efforts to meet our partner nation equipping needs. Our $35 million
    program to enhance Peru's maritime domain awareness is on track and we
    are currently building Peruvian capacity to receive the delivery of one
    of two maritime patrol aircraft in 2025. This investment will greatly
    enhance their maritime domain awareness to help protect the Global
    Commons in the region.
        Additionally, we coordinated with the United States Interagency to
    train and equip the Costa Rican Ministry of Public Security with a
    critical shipping container scanner capability to counter illicit
    trafficking. This $16 million investment is projected to be operational
    by early 2025. Additionally, we have invested $13 million in the
    modernization of Ecuadorian Air Force surveillance radars to enhance
    their air domain awareness and expand their capacity to feed raw data
    to our regional operational picture through Joint Interagency Task
    Force--South (JIATF-S).
        Likewise, Security Assistance is imperative to meet the needs of
    our Partners at the speed of relevance. Through Foreign Military
    Financing, Foreign Military Sales, and Excess Defense Articles programs
    we are better posturing our Partners to combat the malign activities of
    those who seek to destabilize region, while also providing United
    States and western alternatives to China. This past year, Security
    Assistance played a vital role in Argentina's acquisition of 24 F-16s
    from Denmark, with the approval of a $941 million sustainment package
    from the United States. This investment not only ensures the
    procurement is properly maintained and equipped, but also proved
    essential in preventing China from further embedding itself in the
    military apparatus of a key Partner. Similarly, in November 2024,
    Brazil announced the acquisition of 12 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters.
    This $950 million deal provides our Brazilian partners with a proven
    system to counter TCOs and deliver disaster assistance to their people.
    Security Cooperation and Security Assistance funding provides ongoing
    opportunities for lasting United States' presence and demonstrates the
    benefits of western alignment. Ongoing congressional support for these
    programs is indispensable to creating conditions for long-term
    stability in the Western Hemisphere that makes the United States safer,
    stronger, and more prosperous.
        Additionally, USSOUTHCOM' International Military Education and
    Training (IMET) program spans 27 countries and serves as a catalyst for
    fostering strategic relationships that promote U.S. security interests,
    enhance Partner Nations' self-defense capabilities, and facilitate
    seamless collaboration in multinational operations. Fiscal year 2024
    saw investment in the professional development of 630 international
    military leaders and another 600 projected in fiscal year 2025. IMET
    enables the growth of a global network of like-minded partners,
    ultimately contributing to increased access and cooperation during
    peacetime and contingency operations. The outcomes of IMET also
    facilitate higher levels of interoperability with U.S. forces, as
    evidenced by enhanced performance during joint training exercises, key
    leader engagements, and other collaborative activities. As a result,
    participating nations and the United States achieve a heightened state
    of strategic readiness, better equipping them to address shared
    security challenges and respond to emerging threats.
        Joint Exercise Program. USSOUTHCOM is building robust
    interoperability, capacity, and readiness with Allies and Partners
    under our Joint Exercise Program. During fiscal year 2024, USSOUTHCOM
    successfully executed eight joint exercises in seven different
    countries touching the Southern Cone, Andean Ridge, Central America,
    and the Caribbean. With over 10,000 participants from 38 countries,
    these joint exercises enhanced our collective resolve to counter malign
    influence, protect the global commons, and promote stability across all
    domains.
        The $54 million that support our Joint Exercise Program are
    critical to building our readiness and strengthening the partnerships
    that enable USSOUTHCOM to achieve our Campaign Plan Objectives. Over
    the course of 2024 we executed four exercises in support of the United
    States European Command-led Large Scale Global Exercise. These events
    included CENTAM GUARDIAN in Honduras and Costa Rica, TRADEWINDS in
    Barbados, RESOLUTE SENTINEL in Peru, and FUERZAS COMANDO in Panama.
    These four exercises showcased our ability to work with 29 Partner
    Nations from South America, Central America, and the Caribbean and
    included the United States Interagency and Allies from North America
    and Europe. These opportunities to exercise as a team demonstrated a
    comprehensive approach to training that reinforced our unrivaled
    commitment to this region.
        Our remaining exercises included FUSED RESPONSE in Colombia,
    PANAMAX at the USSOUTHCOM headquarters, PANAMAX ALPHA Phase II in
    Panama, and UNITAS hosted in Chile. These exercises were a combination
    of staff crisis response training and field training exercises that not
    only prepared the USSOUTHCOM Enterprise for contingency response, but
    also enabled U.S. access, presence, and influence across the entire
    region.
        UNITAS enabled over 4,300 participants from 24 Allied and Partner
    Nations to train in a complex multi-domain environment and was a
    fitting culminating event for fiscal year 2024. The operations
    conducted in the Southern Cone demonstrated that the United States, our
    allies, and partners can rapidly deploy, integrate, and sustain combat
    operations against peer and near peer competitors.
        Humanitarian Assistance. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster
    Response (HA/DR) operations, activities, and investments are a critical
    component of USSOUTHCOM's strategy to assist our partners during both
    steady-state and crisis. We meet the needs of civilian populations,
    increase governmental legitimacy, strengthen partnerships, and
    cultivate trust across a network of Allies, Partners, U.S. Interagency,
    and non-governmental and private organizations.
        Since 2021, USSOUTHCOM has delivered $985 million-worth of top-
    quality humanitarian assistance projects to address the basic needs of
    the civil populace while simultaneously building Partner Nation
    capacity. This includes an investment of $4.8 million in building
    partner health through the donation of 27 containerized clinics with
    general practice, surgical, maternity, and dental capabilities to six
    countries in LAC. Last year, USSOUTHCOM enhanced Colombia's ability to
    meet humanitarian needs and responded in the aftermath of natural
    disasters by donating 10 mobile bridges representing a value of $11.9
    million--the largest humanitarian assistance project in USSOUTHCOM's
    history.
        Additionally, our commitment to humanitarian assistance extends to
    planned and executed operations such as CONTINUING PROMISE and the
    Lesser Antilles Medical Assistance Team (LAMAT). During the 59-day
    Continuing Promise mission this past year, the USNS Burlington sailed
    to Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Jamaica, and Panama, where the team
    aboard supported the delivery of vital healthcare services to 21,222
    medical patients, repaired $1.6 million of medical equipment, and
    treated 1,925 animals. The mission also conducted numerous HA/DR
    seminars, and in the aftermath of Hurricane Beryl, delivered 35 pallets
    of medical and disaster supplies donated by non-Federal entities to the
    Jamaican Ministry of Health and Jamaica's Office of Disaster
    Preparedness and Emergency Management.
        Likewise, LAMAT 2024 deployed to four locations in the Caribbean
    (Suriname, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and St. Kitts and Nevis) during the
    43-day mission that brought $3.57 million of health services support by
    treating 3,573 patients and conducting 6,126 procedures. Today,
    planning for Continuing Promise 2025 and LAMAT 2025 are underway.
        Humanitarian Assistance is an essential soft power tool that
    engenders goodwill. In future conflict or crisis, the goodwill and
    trust of our Partners will be of paramount importance. We recognize
    that similar advances by our Strategic Competitors aim to displace our
    standing as the most trusted partner. Accordingly, we must continue to
    invest in building regional capability and capacity to reduce,
    mitigate, and overcome the inherent risks encountered in our shared
    neighborhood. Doing so will enhance the security, stability, and
    resiliency of us all.
        Theater Maintenance Partnership Initiative. USSOUTHCOM's Theater
    Maintenance Partnership Initiative (TMPI) has sustained momentum
    teaching and building a culture of maintenance readiness with our
    Partners. This 7-year program fortifies existing Partner Nation
    tactical and operational level maintenance programs through educational
    exchanges and the development of nine TMPI Centers of Excellence
    throughout the region. TMPI is a paradigm shift in maintenance culture
    and is significantly enhancing the readiness, interoperability, and
    professionalism of our Partners, while paving the way for future export
    of logistics maintenance capability. In fiscal year 2025, we are moving
    toward initial operating capability in both Colombia and Jamaica.
    Colombia will host a Rotary Aviation and Communications Electronics
    Center of Excellence as well as a Multinational Logistics Officers
    Course at its war college. Jamaica will host an all-domain Anglophone
    Center of Excellence with initial focus on air and maritime challenges
    common to Caribbean states. Jamaica will also hold a Multinational
    Logistics Officer Course. These Centers of Excellence are being
    outfitted with the tools, kits, training aids, and the formation of
    Technical Assistance Field Teams which will further their capability,
    readiness, and professionalization.
        As we look forward to fiscal year 2026, Chile will focus on the air
    domain with C-130 cargo aircraft, Ecuador's attention on the ground
    domain, Paraguay with Riverine vessels, and Panama centering on
    maritime domain and surface patrol craft such as the Near Coastal
    Patrol Vessel and interceptor vessels that are critical to patrol and
    interdiction. Assessment and socialization visits have already been
    completed with our final two planned partners, Argentina and Peru.
        U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The efforts of the dedicated men and
    women of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) are facilitating
    partnership, building key infrastructure, and increasing the capacity
    of our Partners throughout the hemisphere. USACE activities remain
    constant in 17 of our Partner Nations. In addition to larger
    construction projects at Fort Tolemaida in Colombia and the Port of
    Callao in Peru, their agreement with the Panama Canal Authority is
    contributing to a tremendous effort that is developing the preliminary
    designs to ensure the canal operates openly and successfully for the
    next 50 years. Ongoing humanitarian assistance projects in Belize and
    Guatemala, military construction in Honduras, projects in support of
    exercises in Guyana, and the Corps' growing technical support in
    Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Dominica, all illustrate examples
    of their contributions to building the team and partner capacity.
    However, their efforts in water security may yield the largest effects
    long-term, as they contribute directly to community wellness and local
    economies. Overall, in a financially transparent manner, USACE is
    executing projects with partners having complex engineering challenges
    and providing an environmentally conscious and more technically sound
    alternative to China. Our projects regularly incorporate allies and the
    U.S. Interagency, while working to select contractors internal to that
    country or region. These efforts increase our regional competitiveness
    and actively increase the momentum of USSOUTHCOM's theater strategy.
        National Guard State Partnership Program. USSOUTHCOM and our
    Partner Nations continue to succeed together through the National Guard
    State Partnership Program (SPP). These 24 State Partnerships with 30
    Partner Nations are critical to increasing Partner Nation security
    capacity and developing the resilient teams required to take on the
    threats and challenges in our shared neighborhood. Teamwork made the
    316 events completed in fiscal year 2024 a reality with SPP delivering
    an engaged and credible presence throughout the region. Approximately
    30 percent of USSOUTHCOM's fiscal year 2024 operations, activities, and
    investments were supported by the SPP. With another 311 engagements
    planned thus far for fiscal year 2025, SPP is building interoperability
    and serving as a vital link to the region's security forces and civil
    entities. Our continued investment and participation in the SPP sustain
    these long-term relationships and creates enduring opportunities for
    cooperation and collaboration with our Partners. By doing so, we
    demonstrate our commitment to meeting their needs and build the trust
    that is essential to outcompeting our adversaries.
        Countering TCOs. Drug trafficking and the illicit activities of
    TCOs in the region remain a complex threat, not only to our Partners,
    but to our Homeland. In coordination with our Allies, Partners, and the
    U.S. Interagency, USSOUTHCOM is confronting this menace head-on. JIATF-
    S continues to lead the way in disrupting illicit drug flow with our
    Allies and Partners, who participated in 80 percent of interdiction
    efforts. Last year, they successfully disrupted 302 narcotics
    shipments, including the interdiction of over 328 metric tons of
    cocaine and 67 metric tons of marijuana with a wholesale value at $8.4
    billion.
        In the Caribbean, Operation BUFALO NK, a collaborative effort
    between USSOUTHCOM, JIATF-S, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and
    the Dominican Republic, exemplified the benefits of cooperation in
    combatting drug trafficking and money laundering. The operation, which
    targeted a criminal organization with extensive international
    connections to Colombia, Venezuela, the United States, and Europe,
    resulted in the seizure of over two metric tons of cocaine headed to
    the United States with 28 persons arrested, including TCO leadership.
        While JIATF-S will continue to maximize the CN resources received,
    CN surge operations in 2020 demonstrated that with more, we can do
    more, and help secure our seas and borders, dismantle the drug cartels
    responsible for the death of thousands of Americans, and send a clear
    message to our adversaries and our partners. Fiscal year 2020 saw 3,584
    U.S. Ship Days resulting in 572 persons detained for U.S. prosecution,
    while in fiscal year 2024, U.S. Ship Days reduced to 1,542 and only 252
    persons were detained for U.S. prosecution. Increased resourcing
    directly increases our ability to advance investigations, support
    indictments, dismantle networks, and recharge the intelligence cycle.
    Should resources become available, we will seek to replicate the
    successes of 2020's CN operations. We are also examining the long-term
    sustainment of our Pale Ale aircraft and identifying non-traditional
    ISR capabilities that could help mitigate shortfalls in the D&M
    mission.
        Thanks to the support from Congress, the Ship Special Mission (SSM)
    is a significant asset in the fight against TCOs. During Operation
    PULPO from 21 May to 9 June 2024, the SSM enabled Ecuadorian surface
    assets to conduct combined counter drug operations off their west coast
    and disrupt narco-traffickers transiting the area. Over 9.168 metric
    tons of cocaine was disrupted, along with the interdiction of four
    vessels, and detainment of 12 individuals.
        Additionally, our Partners are taking a leading role in addressing
    the illicit synthetic drug threat. Argentina is working to establish a
    regional center for information sharing and cooperation to counter
    illicit synthetic drugs and to divert precursor chemicals. Likewise,
    the Dominican Republic has committed to leading the Caribbean in
    formulating coordinated strategies to counter the production and
    trafficking of illicit synthetic drugs, including fentanyl.
        Counternarcotics (CN) assets are the principal way USSOUTHCOM
    projects force and maintains a visible presence to assure our Partners
    and deter our adversaries. Since 2020, we have seen a steady decline in
    available resources to support the CN mission because of competing
    global requirements. Thanks to support from Congress, assets like SSM
    and PALE ALE aircraft are essential detection and monitoring assets
    that keep illicit drugs far from our shores. However, the fact remains
    that JIATF-S suspects more than 3,200 maritime movements of illicit
    narcotics were bound for the United States last year but was only able
    to act on a fraction--9 percent--of that number.
        USSOUTHCOM as an Innovation Hub. As strategic competition within
    our AOR creates global challenges, innovative solutions are essential
    to address these threats. USSOUTHCOM continues to position the region
    as a hub for innovation, supported by the favorable environment
    fostered through our partnerships with the nations and territories of
    LAC. The region's proximity to the United States, coupled with its
    geography, provides an ideal setting for demonstrating new technologies
    through experimentation, evaluation, operational adaptation, and the
    refinement of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Additionally, joint
    exercises and military utility assignments further enhance our
    capabilities in this dynamic landscape.
        Following the initial success of integrating air, surface, and
    subsurface robotic systems into the international exercise UNITAS 24,
    U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (USNAVSOUTH/4th Fleet) has continued
    to explore these technologies through both short, targeted tests and
    extended operational trials. USNAVSOUTH/U.S. 4th Fleet is
    operationalizing robotic autonomous systems in support of the United
    States Navy. During 2024's Hybrid Fleet Campaign Event, USNAVSOUTH/U.S.
    4th Fleet combined manned and unmanned systems and Artificial
    Intelligence tools to bolster maritime domain awareness, counter
    narcotics flow, and counter illegal, unregulated, and unreported
    fishing (IUU Fishing), while demonstrating these capabilities to our
    Chilean, Colombian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian partners.
        We are assessing the integration of robotic systems into JIATF-S'
    detection & monitoring (D&M) operations out of Cooperative Security
    Location Comalapa. As the Navy seeks to inform its hybrid fleet of the
    2030's, USSOUTHCOM will seek ``win-win'' opportunities that support
    this effort while enabling D&M and interdiction operations.
        Operationalizing Data to Enhance Decision-Making and Partnerships.
    Data is a strategic asset. Decisions should be augmented with rigorous
    analysis based on high-quality data. USSOUTHCOM is working diligently
    to harness the power of our data to drive operations, planning, and
    engagements. Our ability to operationalize data is critical to our
    success, and we are committed to leveraging cutting-edge techniques to
    enable us, our allies and partners to rapidly respond to challenges and
    actively counter threats posed by our adversaries.
        Our Enhanced Domain Awareness (EDA) initiative is a prime example
    of how we are applying data analytics and artificial intelligence to
    better understand our operating environment. By integrating data from
    various sources, we are able to gain a more complete picture of the
    situation and make more informed decisions. By leveraging our EDA
    system, we are facilitating coordination between partner nations on a
    common platform. This enables the secure sharing and collaboration of
    information in near real-time, which is critical to enabling multi-
    domain operations.\66\
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        \66\ Reed-Cox, S. (2023). U.S. Army South, U.S. Southern Command
    Spearhead Intelligence Subject Matter Expert Exchange in El Salvador.
    DVIDS. Retrieved from https://www.dvidshub.net/news/477097/us-army-
    south-us-southern-command-spearhead-intelligence-subject-matter-
    expert-exchange-el-salvador.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        However, operationalizing data is not without its challenges. It
    requires a unique blend of talent, skills, and experience, as well as
    access to cutting-edge computing capabilities. It also requires support
    from our Allies and Partners, and a commitment to investing in the
    right people, processes, and technologies. As we move forward, we will
    continue to push the boundaries of what is possible with data. We will
    work to attract and retain the best talent, invest in the latest
    technologies, and build partnerships that will help us stay ahead of
    the curve. By operationalizing our data and enhancing our partnerships,
    we are not only enhancing our own operations, but also contributing to
    a broader effort to build a more secure, stable, and prosperous region.
        Space Domain Awareness: A Critical Component of Global Security.
    Space domain awareness is critical to maintaining global security and
    advancing the capabilities of Partner Nations. The establishment of
    United States Space Forces--Southern at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in
    Arizona, this year, is a testament to our commitment to this principle.
    Moreover, we continue to integrate the space domain throughout or Joint
    Exercise Program, exemplified by Exercise RESOLUTE SENTINEL 2024, where
    we gathered with our Allies to conduct space domain awareness training
    and collaborate on space operations. \67\ The exercise demonstrated the
    importance of space domain awareness in providing essential near real-
    time information to troops on the ground.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \67\ Sebastianelli, C. (2024). RS24 Enhances Global Space Domain
    Awareness with Partner Nations. SOUTHCOM Press Release. Retrieved from
    https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/3802887/rs24-
    enhances-global-space-domain-awareness-with-partnernations/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Our teams worked tirelessly to track satellite launches,
    operations, and maneuvers, and to understand the overall space picture.
    This awareness is critical to responding to nefarious actions that may
    impact satellites and missions. By leveraging commercial capabilities
    and fostering open communication, we are enhancing interoperability and
    strengthening partnerships among emerging space powers.
        Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing. IUU Fishing is a
    pervasive menace which poses a threat beyond simply destroying the
    diverse ecosystems of our Partners. Aside from threatening food
    security, harming legitimate commercial fishers, and undermining
    fisheries management, it contributes to migrant smuggling, labor
    exploitation, and facilitates the illegal proliferation of drugs,
    weapons, and wildlife.\68\ Distant-water fishing fleets, primarily from
    China, travel to the pristine waters of LAC to extract precious
    resources. However, this practice is becoming more localized and
    constant.\69\ Our Partner Nation Coast Guards and Navies are
    increasingly monitoring and interdicting domestic vessels engaged in
    IUU Fishing, as was the case in January 2024 when a Colombian vessel
    was stopped for its illegal taking of 1.2 tons of clams from the
    Magdalena River.\70\ IUU Fishing results in the annual loss of
    approximately $6 billion in the region and $36 billion globally.\71\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \68\ Keating-Bitonti, C., & Marshak, A. R. (2024). Latin America
    and the Caribbean: Facts and Figures. Congressional Research Service.
    Retrieved from https://crsreports.Congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R48215.
        \69\ Sanchez, W.A. (2024). How Latin America Navies Combat Illegal,
    Unreported, or Unregulated Fishing. Center for Strategic Studies.
    Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-latin-american-navies-
    combat-illegal-unreported-or-unregulated-fishing.
        \70\ (Sanchez, 2024).
        \71\ The Economist. (2023). South American Governments Are Trying
    to Curb Illegal Fishing''. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/
    the-americas/2023/10/05/south-american-governments-are-trying-to-curb-
    illegal-fishing.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        IUU Fishing's lucrative nature and operational limitations to
    combat it means that it is likely to expand. This provides the United
    States with an opportunity to lead and demonstrate our commitment to
    democratic values and supporting the territorial sovereignty of our
    Partners. We can do so by assisting our Partners in the acquisition and
    maintenance of offshore patrol vessels and working side-by-side to
    develop and implement innovative technology such as unmanned aerial
    vessels, unmanned surface vessels, and the Enhanced Domain Awareness
    program to better understand the size and location of these fleets.
    \72\ Moreover, we can augment our Partner Nations' efforts by expanding
    ``shiprider'' agreements and supporting United States Coast Guard
    counter IUU Fishing operations in concert with Partners, as we
    successfully did off the coast of Peru during last year's Operation
    Southern Shield. \73\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \72\ (Sanchez, 2024).
        \73\ U.S. Coast Guard District 11. (2023). Coast Guard Cutter Crews
    Conduct First High Seas Boardings Off the Coast of Peru, Under New
    SPRFMO Measure. Retrieved from https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-
    ARTICLES/Article/3562470/coast-guard-cutter-crews-
    conduct-first-high-seas-boardings-off-the-coast-of-per/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Competing in the Information Space: In the face of adversarial
    attacks that inundate the information domain with falsehoods and
    disinformation, USSOUTHCOM takes a proactive approach to disseminating
    and promoting facts. We are committed to expanding coordination with
    Allies, Partners, and the U.S. Interagency to showcase the positive
    impacts of U.S.-led initiatives in the region, while countering the
    malign narratives and exposing the nefarious activities of our
    Strategic Competitors and other adversaries. USSOUTHCOM's media
    platform, Dialogo Americas, exposes the predatory economic practices,
    environmental degradation, and political and military interference of
    China, Russia, and Iran, while promoting transparency and the benefits
    of regional cooperation to reinforce common interests and counter
    common threats.
        Cyber. The cyber domain continues to grow in importance to modern
    life. It has reshaped how individuals, organizations, and governments
    interact with one another. Communication, economics, healthcare,
    technology, governance, and national security are just a few of the
    areas vulnerable to and being disrupted by malicious cyber activities.
    Its consequences endanger the democratic values and freedoms that form
    the foundation of our societies. In LAC, China, Russia, and Iran and
    their proxies deploy cyber espionage and information operations to
    gather intelligence and persuade audiences to support their interests.
    Cyber threat intelligence demonstrates that financially motivated
    actors are pursuing various schemes throughout the region, including
    the rising use of ransomware to incorporate data theft and extortion
    into their operations.
        USSOUTHCOM is committed to assisting our Allies and Partners to
    counter the growing threat and build resiliency in the face of
    cybercrime. Our Joint Combatant Command Cyber Assistance Teams and
    Defend Forward Operations are making a difference by providing our
    Partners with the capability and equipment necessary to prepare,
    defend, mitigate, and recover from malicious cyberattacks. Another
    notable example is our joint cyber security review with the government
    of Paraguay, which identified a Chinese-based cyber espionage group,
    Flax Typhoon, infiltrating Paraguayan government systems. This
    successful collaboration demonstrates the importance of working
    together to strengthen our cyber defenses and protect critical
    infrastructure. We continue to invest in developing strategies and best
    practices with our Partners through successive engagements and
    symposiums, including last December's Caribbean Nations Security
    Conference in Trinidad and Tobago.
        Economic Cooperation. Economic cooperation plays a crucial role in
    supporting state sovereignty and democracy in Latin America by creating
    opportunity for prosperity. To that end, we must double-down on a
    collaborative approach that improves the region's access to economic
    development, foreign direct investment, and access to international
    financing.\74\ Our Partners are asking for our help and if we truly
    wish to compete, we must deliver. USSOUTHCOM is not the lead Federal
    agency for economic engagement, but by furthering our communication and
    collaboration with institutions and agencies like the International
    Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, the U.S. Export-
    Import Bank (EXIM), and the Development Finance Corporation, we can
    attract Western-based private investment and provide financing
    solutions for our Partners' critical infrastructure projects and other
    initiatives that are untethered from expectations of quid-pro-quo
    support of anti-democratic measures or political fealty. One such
    example of this wider coordination is EXIM's recent memorandum of
    understanding to loan up to $500 million to Trinidad and Tobago,
    financing priority projects, beginning with the enhancement of its
    maritime domain capability. This is the type of economic-based solution
    our Partners are looking for to enable economic opportunity, security,
    and stability in the region.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \74\ Alvarado, P. D. (2024). Huawei's Expansion in Latin America
    and the Caribbean: Views from the Region. United States Institute of
    Peace, 17. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/04/
    huaweis-expansion-latin-america-and-caribbean-views-region.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Moreover, it is incumbent upon us to better emphasize and advocate
    for the presence and investment of U.S. and western companies in LAC.
    These companies bring the benefits of transparency, fair labor
    practices, and the hiring and training of local residents, that our
    adversaries choose not to offer. By adhering to the rule of law and
    respect for human rights, U.S. and Western presence empower, rather
    than erode, our common democratic values.
                               building our team
        Every day is an opportunity to achieve greatness. At USSOUTHCOM, we
    achieve excellence in all we do through preparation and an ongoing
    investment to build our team. Alongside our Allies and Partners, each
    service member, civilian, and contractor is an integral link to our
    collective success. With empathy and compassion at the forefront, this
    command works tirelessly to develop talent, address challenges, and
    realize the promise of each team member. Together we are stronger and
    united in our common cause, to deliver upon our Enduring Promise to the
    Americas.
        Housing and Cost of Living. Miami rose one spot since last year and
    is now the third most expensive place to live in the United States.\75\
    We appreciate the support of Congress for our privatized housing
    project, located across the street from the Headquarters, which will
    alleviate some of this stress by lodging more than 200 service members
    and their families. It remains on schedule, with completion anticipated
    between the summers of 2026 and 2027. Additionally, the increasingly
    high costs associated with local living negatively impacts USSOUTHCOM's
    ability to attract and retain top civilian talent. USSOUTHCOM continues
    collaboration with our local, State, and Federal leaders and agencies
    to address the difficult financial realities of working and residing in
    our South Florida community.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \75\  U.S. News & World Report. (n.d.). Most Expensive Places to
    Live. Retrieved from https://realestate.usnews.com/places/rankings/
    most-expensive-places-to-live.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Total Force. USSOUTHCOM's investment in and utilization of Active
    Duty, Reserve, and the National Guard service members enables an
    enduring presence throughout the region that our competitors struggle
    to match. Reservists and National Guardsmen comprise 28 percent of the
    manpower at USSOUTHCOM's headquarters, making them integral to
    headquarters operations. In theater they are having an outsized impact,
    illustrated by USSOUTHCOM's Civil Affairs Persistent Engagement
    initiative. Composed of seven U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs elements
    and four Liaison Officers, they currently work hand-in-hand with United
    States Country Teams and our Partner Nations in Central America--with
    planned expansion in the Caribbean to build capacity and deliver
    Humanitarian Assistance at the point of need. Reserve and National
    Guard forces extend USSOUTHCOM's operational reach through its robust
    SPP and significant integration in the command's Joint Exercise
    Program. USSOUTHCOM's assigned Reservists also ensure critical surge
    capacity for largescale contingency operations should the need arise.
                      what resources does ussouthcom need?
        USSOUTHCOM is on the frontlines of significant threats in our
    hemisphere that directly impact our safety at home. The Command
    leverages military capabilities and expertise in our region to provide
    the United States a strategic advantage in countering threats from
    wherever they arise, in whatever form they take. This region is one
    where a little goes a long way. This high return on investment presents
    an opportunity: while USSOUTHCOM has been executing the mission
    effectively in a resource-constrained environment for a number of
    years, with more we can do more. There are some key gaps that would
    help USSOUTHCOM be more effective in addressing these key threats in
    our hemisphere and in enabling like-minded partners to do the same.
        Assets--Presence with Presence. TCOs create widespread instability
    and violence throughout the region that have forced millions to leave
    their home countries for the United States while costing American lives
    with their illicit drugs that flood our country. Over the past several
    years, USSOUTHCOM has seen a decline in available resources for the
    counterdrug mission due to competing global requirements. For example,
    there are zero Navy P-8 aircraft available due to being pulled to other
    theaters, and ships available in the Eastern Pacific and the Caribbean
    are far below optimal presence to interdict most of the illicit drugs
    that endanger our citizens and enrich the TCOs. USSOUTHCOM has utilized
    innovative solutions to fill these gaps, from contracting maritime
    patrol aircraft and vessels to utilizing U.S. Navy ships transiting the
    area to provide presence. Providing more assets toward the fight
    against TCOs will keep this threat further from our Homeland:
    preventing more illicit drugs from reaching our shores, targeting a
    major source of TCO revenue, and increasing gathered intelligence
    necessary to dismantle these organizations.
        These efforts have produced results, but one thing is clear: with
    more we can do more. We must meet presence with presence. China,
    Russia, Iran, TCOs, and our Allies and Partners all recognize the value
    and power of presence. Simply put, we are better able to compete,
    foster diplomatic engagement, strengthen partnerships, and enable
    effective interdiction through robust and persistent presence.
        Able Partners--Security Cooperation. Security Cooperation continues
    to be one of the primary means USSOUTHCOM uses to execute its mission.
    Through increasing our partner militaries' proficiency, we support our
    Partner Nations' efforts to provide for their own security, addressing
    potential threats further away from our borders. While Security
    Cooperation has been incredibly effective in building partner capacity,
    with more we can do more. Partner Nations have been participating in an
    increasing percentage of illicit drug interdictions--currently over 80
    percent--serving as a key force multiplier. With more Security
    Cooperation resources, we can develop more lethal, more effective
    partners, build interoperability and provide for our collective
    regional security.
        Advocacy--Sustained congressional Support. We appreciate Congress'
    continued support of USSOUTHCOM, our missions and our efforts.
    Congress' recognition of such requirements and support of our programs,
    particularly those that expand cooperation, share operational
    information, advance interoperability, and improve the capabilities of
    our Allies and Partners, has been a key ally to our efforts. Notably,
    the recent increase of congressional visits to the region has been an
    important signal to our partner nations. We welcome more delegation
    visits which provide important first-hand context to policy decisions
    while maintaining high-level American presence. With congressional
    delegations and support, USSOUTHCOM can more effectively execute the
    vital missions critical to keeping the United States safe.
                                   conclusion
        The time is now. The decisions we make today will impact the future
    of the Western Hemisphere for generations. The current threats and
    challenges will not subside on their own; they demand collective
    attention and action. With our Allies and Partners by our side,
    USSOUTHCOM is ready to rise to the challenge. The Americas is a rich
    tapestry of opportunity, poised for growth and prosperity, but it is
    the power of partnership that will unlock the region's full potential.
    Bound by shared ground, shared values, and commitment to a shared
    purpose, we will achieve far more together than we could alone. United,
    we will achieve a freer and more secure future for all.

        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much for your testimony.
    Let's get restarted quickly. General Guillot, you can see from
    Senator Reed and me we're interested in the executive order to
    renew America's aging missile Defense architecture. So, I'll
    jump right in there.
        So, how are we going to do this? What are the options? What
    are your top priorities with respect to upgrading our air and
    missile defenses? What role do you see space-based capabilities
    in this effort? And is our industrial base primed to execute
    this mission? So, what are your top priorities?
        General Guillot. Chairman, the top priority in our efforts
    to meet the direction of the executive order is first and
    foremost, to establish increased domain awareness. As I
    mentioned in the opening comments, you can't defeat what you
    can't see, and the adversaries have an increasing capability of
    reaching us and threatening us from ranges beyond what some of
    our current systems can detect and track.
        So, the first layer of any approach to defending the, the
    United States or North America from the NORAD perspective would
    be a sensor layer from seabed to space, of systems that can
    detect threats from a further distance. Those are seabed,
    ground-based, air base, such as the E-7 and then space-based
    systems for detecting tracking and warning.
        Inside of that, I think we build on our existing GBI
    [ground-based interceptors] and NGI [next generation
    interceptors] capabilities via ground-based interceptors and
    next generation interceptors to defeat intercontinental
    ballistic missiles.
        Chairman Wicker. Let me interject on the sensor layer. How
    soon can we get there?
        General Guillot. Chairman, some of those capabilities are
    right on the edge. Others are probably three to 5 years out,
    but I think within inside of a year, we could have a
    significant capability that could network those into a single
    sensor grid.
        Chairman Wicker. All right, well then go ahead if you've
    got anything to say about space-based or our industrial base
    capabilities.
        General Guillot. Chairman, cooperation with the industrial
    base is critical, so they can keep pace with not only our
    requirements, but those requirements are based on the
    capabilities of the adversaries, which are rapidly increasing.
    So, I can't emphasize enough the need to develop systems and
    move them left on the timeline to field them more quickly to
    achieve our goal.
        Chairman Wicker. Okay, and again, the Ranking Member and I
    spoke about fentanyl deaths. The estimate I have is more than
    225,000 Americans are estimated to have been killed because of
    fentanyl overdoses from 2021 to 2023. So, what progress are we
    making there? Who's to blame? I understand that we've been told
    in the past there are more Russian ``Chief Intelligence
    Office'' (GRU) spies operating in Mexico City than anywhere in
    the world. Is that true? What's NORTHCOM doing and needing to
    do?
        General Guillot. Chairman, the fentanyl crisis is a
    significant concern to our command. We have a number of Intel
    analysts that work with the interagency and lead Federal
    agencies to provide intelligence that gets after the cartel
    networks that drive the production and distribution of fentanyl
    and pushes it across the border. Recently we've been permitted
    to increase our ISR, our intelligence surveillance and
    reconnaissance (ISR) to----
        Chairman Wicker. Permitted by Mexico?
        General Guillot. No, by the Department, sir. But we do have
    intelligence sharing with Mexico to show them what we see. We
    have increased cooperation with Mexico to go address the cartel
    violence in terms of sending more troops----
        Chairman Wicker. Because time is limited, we had 2022-2025
    a 3-year space, are we making any progress now? Now it's 2025.
        General Guillot. From our perspective----
        Chairman Wicker. Has it gotten better?
        General Guillot. No, I wouldn't say it's better, but I do
    think Chairman, that we have a better foundation now that we've
    increased the intelligence to make rapid progress against this
    threat.
        Chairman Wicker. It definitely needs to get better. And so,
    tell us what you need and thank you for your efforts. You got 8
    seconds.
        [Laughter.]
        General Guillot. More ISR is the first, and then expanded
    authorities would be required for more advise and assist types
    of operations between our forces and the tier one Mexican
    forces.
        Chairman Wicker. We want to be your teammate there. Senator
    Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and General
    Guillot, following along in the questioning of the chairman
    with respect to the space-based systems and use, both for
    acquisition of targets and perhaps for contact with targets,
    you need to unfettered access to be expanded. Is that fair to
    say?
        General Guillot. Senator, to properly employ all those
    systems, we would have to have uninterrupted and complete
    access to the entire spectrum.
        Senator Reed. As a result, the proposed spectrum options
    would complicate significantly your ability to carry out that
    mission?
        General Guillot. Senator, compromising that part of the
    spectrum is a significant concern to me and the systems
    necessary for Homeland Defense.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, General, and General, also there's
    approximately 2,000 Active Duty personnel now down at the
    border, and there's always an opportunity cost, whatever you
    do. One of the opportunity costs obviously, is the readiness
    and training of these troops. Are you aware of what training is
    being missed, deferred or ignored because of this deployment?
        General Guillot. Senator, first, all of the forces that
    come to us from the services are extremely well-trained,
    disciplined, and highly qualified. If they are conducting
    missions that are outside their normal specialty, we have a
    series of five work days, one training day, and then 1 day off
    each week.
        In that training day we prescribe our leadership to make
    sure that the forces that are operating outside of their
    standard specialty have the opportunity to train and maintain
    some of those skills.
        Some of the others, such as helicopter pilots, and some of
    the infantries are doing work that is already in line with
    theirs, and I think they maintain their readiness.
        Senator Reed. So, you know, in a rough metric, one out of 5
    days, it's my math is terrible, I went to West Point. If so,
    now they're doing 20 percent of the training they would've done
    at home base.
        General Guillot. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. I didn't have the privilege of
    going to Navy or the Air Force, so I forgive my math. Admiral
    Holsey, can you give us a concise but detailed description of
    your role, SOUTHCOM's role at Guantanamo's Migrant Detention
    Center and the Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)?
        Admiral Holsey. Yes, Senator. So, SOUTHCOM plans and
    postures has always over the years, to conduct migrant
    operations. In fact, one of our enduring missions is to plan
    for a mass migration scenario. Under the current situation,
    what we're doing is modifying our existing plan to be able to
    support the migrant ops at GTMO, the Naval station, and to
    provide safe and humane care in support of Department of
    Homeland Security.
        Now, to be clear, there are two different sides of the
    base. One is the Naval station, both is Naval Station GTMO, but
    you have one which is the MOC, Migrant Operation Center where
    we're actually setting up tents and have JTF-GTMO on the other
    side of the island, which we have the war detainees.
        Senator Reed. Now have you estimated that you're going to
    incur DOD SOUTHCOM for your operations? You have to construct
    facilities for 30,000 individuals, which would include mess
    halls, which would include healthcare centers, sanitation
    provisions, et cetera. How much money is that going to cost us?
        Admiral Holsey. So, right now, sir, we're in the initial
    phase of this process. It's a tailored approach to get to
    30,000, if that is desired. Right now, where we stand, we're in
    initial phases, I guess some numbers to you, but right now
    we're still building out, we have forces on the ground and that
    process still in place, sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. Going back General Guillot to the
    concept of Iron Dome, unlike the Israelis, this is not a
    missile defense system. This is a system of systems and one of
    the most important aspects of the system; I think you've
    already alluded to is detection rather than interception. Is
    that fair?
        General Guillot. Senator, I agree with you. The first and
    most critical part is the detection capability.
        Senator Reed. I met recently with the defense minister from
    Canada. They're very much interested in participating. They
    have legal obstacles, but they assume they can jump over them
    very much participating in the missile defense system, and
    their best contribution could come in what way, sir?
        General Guillot. Senator, I welcome their participation. I
    think the first would be to buy into our domain awareness
    expansion, whether ground-based or space-based, and then
    further down the line, if they get defeat mechanisms, see how
    they would mesh with our existing defense mechanisms in a
    similar way that we employ fighter aircraft with NORAD. Perhaps
    we could do the same with missile defeat systems from the
    ground.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you,
    Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Ranking Member, perhaps that
    would be one way that Canada could begin to meet its North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) requirement is as far as
    defense spending as a portion of their Gross Domestic Product
    (GDP). Let me ask both witnesses to move the microphones a
    little closer, and then I recognize Senator Fischer and then
    Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    Admiral, thank you General for your service to this country.
    The work you do is extremely important. Thank you.
        General, you're going to hear I think a lot about spectrum
    because here in the Senate we're discussing that and General,
    you were talking about, that many think that the Iron Dome for
    America is similar to what we see in Israel. It is not. What
    we're looking at, as you said, we can't defeat what we can't
    see, so we have to be able to increase domain awareness, and
    increasing domain awareness means that we need additional
    radars, terrestrial, airborne space base, underwater.
        You hit that in your opening comments, I'm trying to hit it
    more here to make a point not just with the media, but with my
    colleagues as well. All of those systems depend on spectrum,
    the spectrum that the Department of Defense has. Is that true?
        General Guillot. Yes, Senator. That's exactly correct.
        Senator Fischer. Can those systems function if there's a
    lot of noise, which means additional users close by in creating
    a lot of noise?
        General Guillot. No, Senator, we have to have complete
    control of the spectrum to operate our systems effectively.
        Senator Fischer. Operating those systems effectively means
    protecting the Homeland. Correct?
        General Guillot. Yes, ma'am. That's the purpose for, for
    all of our systems, it all centers on Homeland Defense.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. To move to a different topic
    General, you predicted during the posture hearing last year
    that Chinese and Russian aircraft, you said that they flew a
    mission into Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone. Do you
    assess that the United States will see more of this from China,
    whether it's aircraft or ships or submarines?
        General Guillot. Senator, I do think that they'll increase
    their presence both independently as well as increase
    cooperation with the Russians in the air, in the maritime and
    under sea.
        Senator Fischer. In that cooperation with the Russians,
    what do you worry about the most?
        General Guillot. What I worry about the most is that
    instead of just weapons and technology, that they will trade
    access, which would shorten our timelines to react to either
    country military capabilities.
        Senator Fischer. Are there any authorities or capabilities
    that NORTHCOM and NORAD would need in order to protect your
    AOR?
        General Guillot. Senator, the most important capability we
    would need is the improved domain awareness to allow us to see
    at further ranges, as the military capabilities improve by the
    adversaries, we have to match that with our detection
    capability. At this time, I do not lack any authorities.
        Senator Fischer. Admiral, since you took over command late
    last year, what is your assessment of China's long-term
    strategic objectives in your AOR?
        Admiral Holsey. Thank you, Senator. The PRC's has continued
    to do their, expanding their economic engagement to having more
    influence and diplomatic and political influence in the region.
    They're continuing with their Belt and Road initiative
    throughout. Currently, 22 countries are members of the Belt and
    Road Initiative, and so they continue to go down this path,
    they stayed on enterprises, the Huawei hold, the whole nine
    yards. So that's just one aspect of it.
        The aspect that is more critical to me as a military
    officer is the military view, right? So, right now, when I
    think about deep water ports, dual use sites facilities, so
    deep water ports, like the port of Chancay in Peru. I think
    about the space enabling infrastructure throughout the AOR, at
    least 10 PRC's-linked space sites across five countries in the
    region.
        Then you get into the 5G, the Huawei, right? You get into
    the safe city technology. So, they continue to do this, and
    when our partners use Huawei and Safe City Technology, now
    they're having threat of having Chinese technology on their
    critical infrastructure.
        So, again, we have to continue to block them out and find
    ways to deliver for our partners. I do that by engaging
    security cooperation as well as trying to make sure, from an
    economic standpoint, working throughout the region and working
    with the Office of Security strategic Capital--Bank and others
    to find ways to block out the PRC.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you. Thank you both.
        Chairman Wicker. Senator Shaheen and then Cotton.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you both for being here and for your
    service to the country. General Guillot, I'm not sure if any
    resources are coming from the operations in your area of
    responsibility to address some of the flights that have been
    transporting migrants out of the country, but I understand that
    last week, an Air Force C-17 transported 104 migrants from the
    United States to India.
        That flight cost the American taxpayers $2.5 million, and I
    understand that we're currently spending nearly $30,000 an hour
    for every deportation flight that's being run by the military,
    when Homeland Security used to charter flights like these at
    less than one-third the cost or $8,500 an hour.
        Doesn't seem to me like a very effective use of our
    dollars, given the needs that you and Admiral Holsey talked
    about in terms of what you require for additional resources to
    address the threats facing the country.
        So, can I ask, are you seeing any of the impacts of those
    costs yet on NORTHCOM's budget? Do you know how those costs are
    being paid?
        General Guillot. Senator, I have not seen any impact at
    this point, but I'll remain transparent with the committee if I
    do feel strained in that area. As you alluded to at the
    beginning, those flights are flown by United States
    Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), so we coordinate with the
    border patrol to have the migrants available but we do not
    operate those flights.
        Senator Shaheen. Do you know if those flights are coming
    out of TRANSCOM's budget?
        General Guillot. Ma'am, I can't say for sure, but I assume
    they are.
        Senator Shaheen. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that this
    committee would request information about the cost of those
    flights and why the military is doing them, as opposed to doing
    them the way we used to at one third, the cost.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you for that suggestion. Senator.
        Senator Shaheen. Admiral Holsey, over the last year, we've
    actually seen an almost 15 percent decrease in drug overdose
    deaths. Illegal drugs, however, as you pointed out, and General
    Guillot pointed out, are still killing nearly 90,000 Americans
    every year.
        Both of your commands rely on partnerships with governments
    and militaries in the region to help stop the flow of illegal
    drugs. So, can you talk, Admiral Holsey, in particular, about
    whether you're seeing any impact of the stop on our foreign
    assistance in countries in Latin America on the willingness of
    those countries to cooperate?
        Then are you seeing, or do you see the concern that China
    may move in some of those areas where our presence is being
    discontinued?
        Admiral Holsey. Senator, thank you for that. China
    continues to look incredibly hard at every opportunity to come
    in and engage, so we can't take that for granted.
        With regard to our partners in engaging in the counter drug
    piece, they're very resilient. Some of our training that do the
    security operation, the exercises specifically focus on the
    counter drug flight fight. If you look into the Eastern Pacific
    right now in the first 90 days, I'm sorry, since the 1st of
    January, we've already interdicted 50 metric tons of cocaine,
    right? And, and actually arrested 84 detainees.
        Again, when you think about this piece, our partners are
    with us. Eighty percent of our interdiction last year was done
    by our partners using actually a ship special mission. We
    actually bring out interceptors from our partners along with us
    and get after the fight. So, they're all in with us.
        I would like to continue to do that security operation. I
    haven't seen any impacts at this point, but we'll look and I'd
    be happy to let the committee know.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and General Guillot, as you're
    looking at the challenges with our northern border, are you
    finding Canada willing to cooperate in all of the ways that are
    important as we're looking at the interdiction of drugs and
    other illegal activities across our border?
        General Guillot. Yes, Senator, I am. I find that my
    counterparts in Canada are very open to planning potential
    partnering on the northern border to detect illegal crossings
    both ways in the future.
        Senator Shaheen. Canada has developed a plan to address
    their commitments to NORTHCOM. Are you seeing that beginning to
    be built out at this point, or is all that still in the future?
    Did we participate in the development of that plan?
        General Guillot. Senator, they were very collaborative on
    defining the NORAD requirements and their NORAD modernization
    is at the very, in beginning stages. We are seeing improved F-
    18 radars and missile capabilities already. The next step we'll
    see is the arrival of the F-35 in the next 2 years. So, they're
    well on the track, but we do have some immediate improvements
    with their
    F-18.
        Senator Shaheen. Great. Thank you both.
        Chairman Wicker. Again, I'm looking forward to our friends
    in Canada fulfilling their commitment to NATO. Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen. General Guillot, as
    the chairman mentioned his opening statements, I have
    legislation with Senator Gillibrand to address the drone threat
    here in America. We seem to have drones just flying around
    everywhere and many times people don't know what's going on.
    Most notably in the public eye late last year in New Jersey.
        This is also happening around our military bases a lot.
    You've had drone incursions over Joint Base Langley, Wright-
    Patterson Air Force Base, Vandenberg Space Force Base,
    Picatinny Arsenal, Andersen Air Force Base. Could you explain
    to us briefly what is the threat that these drones pose to U.S.
    military operations facilities, and personnel?
        General Guillot. Senator, the primary threat I see for them
    in the way they've been operating is detection and perhaps
    surveillance of sensitive capabilities on our installations.
        Senator Cotton. That's all installation, not just super
    sensitive ones like nuclear sites. It could be our fighter
    bases or army bases or naval bases or what have you?
        General Guillot. Yes, sir. There were 350 detections
    reported last year on military installations, and that was 350
    over a total of hundred different installations of all types
    and levels of security.
        Senator Cotton. Yes, but it's the case right now that only
    at certain sites, which you might call the supersensitive sites
    like nuclear bases, do commanders have the authority to protect
    their airspace from these drone incursions?
        General Guillot. That's correct, Senator. We call those
    covered installations and not all the ins about half are
    covered
        Senator Cotton. Which sounds crazy to me, and I think most
    Americans would think it, it doesn't show a lot of common
    sense. I mean, base commanders at every base around America,
    they have the authority and they have the capability to protect
    their perimeters.
        Say if some terrorist got a dump truck and drove it through
    the front gate or we're trying to breach the perimeter fence,
    we would expect base commanders to protect their base with
    force if necessary. Is that correct?
        General Guillot. That's correct, sir, and I would propose
    and advocate for expansion of 130i to include all military
    installations, not just covered installations.
        Senator Cotton. I'm glad to hear you say that because I
    have legislation to do just that, the counteract with Senator
    Gillibrand that, again, would give these commanders the legal
    authority they need, plus the capability required to protect
    their bases from these kinds of incursions and then hold them
    accountable for doing so. Is that exactly what you're
    advocating for?
        General Guillot. That is, sir and if I could add, I'd also
    like to see the range expanded to slightly beyond the
    installation, so they don't have to wait for the threat to get
    over the installation before they can address it. Because many
    of these systems can use side looking or slant range, and so
    they could surveil the base from outside the perimeter and
    under the current authorities, we can't address that.
        Senator Cotton. Even better. Now, last year, you also said
    there were thousands of drone incursions over the southern
    border, and just last week, Mexican cartel leaders were
    reportedly authorized used drones to equipment with explosives
    against U.S. border patrol agents. Now I know that this is
    primarily a Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
    responsibility at the southern border, but do you need
    authorization for DOD to share information with DHS and the
    border authorities about these incursions?
        General Guillot. Yes, Senator, I would like 130i to be
    expanded to allow a seamless exchange of data on drones.
        Senator Cotton. Again, sounds like a great idea. I'm glad
    that Senator Gillibrand and I have legislation to do just that,
    and I hope that we can pass into law this year. Thank you,
    General.
        Admiral, I know that the Navy is responsible for Guantanamo
    Bay, but Southern Command is responsible for some of the
    operations there to include the operations I gather of the
    violent illegal migrants who are recently transported. Could
    you give us a little bit of sense of the security measures in
    place that protects against any risk of violent criminals and
    terrorists being held at GTMO?
        Admiral Holsey. Senator, the JTF-GTMO is the detention
    facility, we have a highly trained military police who come
    down on rotation with the guard's force. They're on a 1-year
    rotation, they're highly qualified, they've been trained to do
    their mission, they've been doing it for years throughout. So,
    again, I think they're very capable of force and they're ready
    to deal with any situation.
        Senator Cotton. You're confident that your personnel are
    trained and ready to do that and are safe in doing so?
        Admiral Holsey. One hundred percent, sir.
        Senator Cotton. That's great because I'm also very
    confident that it's much safer to have depraved savage
    criminals from other countries waiting at Guantanamo Bay for
    deportation than it is to have them waiting at a base on the
    American mainland soil where we hope they'd never be able to
    cause any problems, but you never know there are American
    citizens on those bases and just outside those bases.
    Gentlemen, thank you again both for your appearance, sir.
        Chairman Wicker. Excellent point Senator Cotton. Senator
    Hirono, and then Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Guillot,
    the President's recent missile defense executive order tasks
    you with providing ``an updated assessment of the strategic
    missile threat to the Homeland'' that is the President's
    direction to you.
        I remain concerned about the viability of DOD'S strategy to
    defend Hawaii, specifically from missile threats. We're looking
    at China, North Korea examples. Will you commit to include the
    missile defense of Hawaii as part of your assessment?
        General Guillot. Senator, I absolutely will. Hawaii and the
    defense from ballistic missiles for Hawaii is part of my
    responsibility.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you again. For you General, last
    year, the former National Guard Bureau chief testified that the
    border security mission provides no military training value to
    guardsmen and does not prepare troops for great power
    competition.
        Additionally, a Government Accountability Office (GAO)
    report from 2021 found that multiple units lost critical
    training opportunities due to deployments to the border. That
    of course impacts military and operational readiness. General,
    do you agree with the assessment that these missions provide no
    military training value to guardsmen?
        General Guillot. Senator, I don't agree. I think that
    specifically in the helicopters and in our intel specialties
    that are conducting missions on the southern border, those are
    exactly in line with their training specialty. However, I
    certainly recognize there are areas where they're cross-trained
    and they are not getting immediate benefit to their primary
    specialty in about half of those roles.
        Senator Hirono. So, your testimony is that using military
    troops at the border, that is not going to have an impact on
    readiness. How many troops are do we have on the border right
    now and do you expect that number to grow?
        General Guillot. Senator, we have 5,000 title 10 forces on
    the southern border right now, and I do expect that number to
    grow.
        Senator Hirono. As the Ranking Member on the Readiness
    Committee, I do have concerns about what these kinds of troop
    movements will do to readiness. What specific military training
    events and readiness exercises will NORTHCOM forego due to the
    resource demands of the Board of Mission?
        General Guillot. Senator to this point none have been
    altered and we don't project that we would lose any of our
    exercises as the forces are provided by the services. We still
    have the capabilities to conduct all of our scheduled
    exercises.
        Senator Hirono. Well, the GAO report noted that there will
    be some critical training opportunities that will be lost and I
    am going to followup with you as to whether that is also what
    is happening.
        For Admiral Holsey, in your confirmation hearing last
    September, you stated that SOUTHCOM's main campaigning tool is
    security cooperation utilizing a whole-of-government approach
    that includes USAID. How will President Trump's decision to
    freeze foreign assistance and dismantle USAID affect SOUTHCOM's
    security cooperation Mission?
        Admiral Holsey. Senator for right now, we're still
    assessing the impacts of USAID, I'll tell you from a military
    standpoint, I still can do my security cooperation at this time
    and so I look to Tradewinds exercise, right?
        So, that's one we do yearly, and it's focuses on the
    humanitarian assistance just released in the Caribbean, right?
    So, we go out there, we do these missions, we're training our
    forces for earthquakes, hurricanes, and the like. So, those
    type of opportunities give our partners a chance to develop
    their skills for you know emergencies or contingencies.
        Senator Hirono. I really don't see how an action like
    closing USAID would not have a negative impact on part of your
    mission. Regarding Guantanamo Bay, this is again, for Admiral
    Holsey. SOUTHCOM is responsible for implementing the
    President's directive to expand the detention center in
    Guantanamo Bay to hold 30,000 migrants.
        Admiral Holsey, who are these migrants and where will they
    be coming from and what is the estimated cost to lead the
    expansion and support of this development, Department of
    Homeland Security mission, including food, medical care,
    construction, and sustainment?
        We're talking about a big, I would say, infrastructure that
    we're going to need to house 30,000 migrants. Can you explain
    how all this is happening? How much it will cost? How it will
    impact SOUTHCOM's mission? Briefly, I've run out time.
        Admiral Holsey. So very, very briefly. From the standpoint
    of who decides, that's DHS who decide who comes to the base for
    the migrants, they decide at that point and we just support
    them. We're in support of DHS with regard to the pricing. We're
    still understanding it's a phase approach right now, and so
    we're going to build it up and as we understand how large we'll
    get, we'll have a better focus on the price.
        Senator Hirono. So even if this is DHS, we're going to want
    to know how much this is actually going to cost. I know that
    you were asked about the amount of money that went to deporting
    104 people to India, and whether or not that was an appropriate
    use of your funds.
        Chairman Wicker. Perhaps witnesses can take that for the
    record.

        [The information referred to follows:]
        Admiral Holsey. OSD Comptroller has centralized cost
    estimating and reporting. I defer to OSD Comptroller for
    further details.

        Chairman Wicker. Also, we'll have another round, if we need
    to, then we have Senator Sullivan and Senator King.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you for your testimony. I want to echo what the chairman's been
    saying, we do need Canada to step up, you know, when they don't
    meet their 2 percent GDP NATO commitments, it undermines the
    entire alliance. So I appreciate the chairman mentioning that.
        General, it was good to meet with you. The other day we had
    a meeting with senior Trump administration officials just a
    couple days ago, a number of senators who were focused on the
    border, and they focused like your testimony, a lot on the
    northern border, which I really appreciate.
        I have a chart here that depicts a lot of the air and sea
    incursions that we've seen in the last few years. It's been
    quite remarkable, particularly the Joint Chinese, Russian
    strategic bomber missions into our air and the joint Chinese
    Russian naval task force quite big, a 12-ship naval task force
    last summer.
        President Trump himself commented recently, and we need to
    increase military investments in Alaska as Russian and China
    make more menacing moves in the region. That's just an example
    of all the different incursions air and sea just in the last 3
    years, which is quite astounding.
        General, I want to go into a little bit more detail. Your
    troops have done a great job of intercepting these strategic
    bombers by the way. They come with armed Mikoyan-Gurevich
    (MiGs), right? This is a serious incursion, not easy to do. Our
    navy's done a good job, although the first time we had that
    joint Russian Chinese task force, we didn't have any Navy
    response. Nothing, which was ridiculous in my view, 150-foot
    Coast Guard cutter.
        But these are difficult missions made more difficult, for
    example, when you're intercepting strategic bombers, a lot of
    times our fighters are having to fly over a thousand miles just
    to get to the end of the--is to intercept them.
        So, my question. Do you agree we need more infrastructure?
    You and I have talked about reopening the airfield in the navy
    base at Adak, this out here on the Aleutians Island chain, or--
    Utqiagvik and Barrow Alaska to help with the search and rescue
    (SAR) emissions. Can you explain that in a little bit more
    detail?
        Admiral Paparo is in agreement with you on this, where
    these incursions are going to increase. This is America, our
    northern border, and yet the infrastructure we have for the
    young men and women who are doing these dangerous intercept
    missions, both at sea and in the air, they need more
    infrastructure for their safety and for our rapid response.
        Do you agree with me that they do? Would you support
    reopening the Adak Naval base in the extension of the Barrow
    Runway, which is way up there, in the northern part of America.
        General Guillot. Senator, I do agree with you, and as you
    mentioned, Admiral Paparo and I are very closely linked and
    aligned on all issues in the Pacific. I would support Adak for
    sure, for maritime and air access, and as you pointed out, dead
    horse or a point at the far north part of Alaska, because those
    missions aren't only long, a thousand miles or more with five
    or six or seven air fuelings usually at night.
        But also, the harsh conditions if a pilot should have to
    eject having those forward points that you mentioned would
    allow us to pre-position search and rescue aircraft or be able
    to land there in an emergency, which are capabilities that we
    just don't have right now.
        Senator Sullivan. Great, thank you on that. Again, I want
    to thank the men and women under your command. They do these
    intercept missions all the time. They're very tough, they're
    dangerous. They don't make a lot of news down here in the lower
    48, but they're doing a great job.
        Let me turn to missile defense. Senator Cramer and I
    recently introduced our Iron Dome Act that reinforces what
    President Trump's executive order does. That's a depiction of
    that covering the whole United States with integrated missile
    defense systems to protect our Homeland. I'd love to get co-
    sponsorship from all my colleagues, my 2017 advancing America's
    Missile Defense Act, which pretty much became law in the
    National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), had 30 co-sponsors,
    10 Democrats, 20 Republicans.
        But can I get your sense to first a commitment to work with
    me and Senator Cramer on that? Then you mentioned the NGIs and
    the ground-based missile interceptors. Those are almost all
    based in Alaska. Why is it taking so long to fill those 20
    silos that we just filled out that are needed? Can I get your
    commitment to work with me as part of this Iron Dome Act to
    accelerate that?
        General Guillot. Senator, you have my full commitment to
    work with you on the Iron Dome, it's the core mission of NORAD
    and NORTHCOM is to defend just as you described there. You also
    have my full commitment to work to move all defense industrial
    based capabilities to the left, to bring these capabilities
    earlier as our adversaries are advancing their capability, and
    we must keep pace.
        Chairman Wicker. Great. Thank you, General. I ask unanimous
    consent that the three charts that Senator Sullivan referred to
    be admitted to the record at this point. Without objection,
    it's so ordered.
        [The information referred to follows:]
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        Chairman Wicker. Senator Kaine, and then Senator Scott.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to our
    witnesses for your service. This morning, I received an email
    from one of my long-standing staff members. Mark runs
    constituent services from me, and he did so when I was Governor
    as well. Mark graduated in Richmond from J.R. Tucker High
    School. Kind of looked in the mirror and decided he wasn't
    college material yet, and enlisted in the United States Marine
    Corps.
        Mark served for 4 years as an enlistee in the United States
    Marine Corps, and it put him on a path. It's been an amazing
    path. He finished his marine service, and then went and got a
    social work degree at Virginia Commonwealth University, and
    advice to any of my colleagues, if you want somebody great in
    constituent services, pick a marine with a social work degree.
    The dogged persistence of the Marines, and the skill in working
    with organizations and listening to people of a social worker,
    Mark exemplifies that.
        Mark sent me this morning, he reached out to send me this
    article that appeared on the 10th of January in military.com,
    ``Military drops recruiting efforts at prestigious Black
    Engineering Awards event''. I'd like it entered into the
    record, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Wicker. No objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Kaine. First two paragraphs of the article. Here
    they are, ``The Army and other service branches are abandoning
    recruiting efforts at a prestigious Black engineering event
    this week, turning down access to a key pool of highly
    qualified potential applicants amid President Donald Trump's
    purge of diversity initiatives in the military.
        Until this week, army Recruiting Command had a longstanding
    public partnership with the Black Engineer of the Year Awards
    or BEA, an annual conference that draws students, academics,
    and professionals in science, technology, engineering, and
    math, also known as STEM. The event which takes place in
    Baltimore has historically been a key venue for the Pentagon to
    recruit talent, including awarding Reserve Officers Training
    Corps (ROTC) Corps scholarships and pitching military service
    to rising engineers.
        Past BEA events have included the Army Chief of Staff and
    the Defense Secretary. This is one of the most talent dense
    events we do, when Army Recruiter told military.com, on the
    condition that their name not be used, ``our footprint there
    has always been significant. We need the talent''.
        My staffer, Mark, said to me when he sent me this article,
    I would never have served in the military if there weren't men
    and women who looked like me in the recruiting process.
    Limiting military recruitment to avoid qualified Black
    applicants in the name of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion
    (DEI) will ultimately hurt our all-voluntary military. I was
    intending to ask questions about NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM until I
    got Mark's email this morning.
        Intentionally avoiding an event chockfull of STEM Talent
    and Engineers, because it happens to be a draw for Black
    engineers, is more than an anti-DEI initiative. It is an
    intentional effort to avoid certain kinds of people in
    recruiting. The article goes on to say, it's not just the army
    that has pulled out of this event. All the service branches
    have pulled out of this event.
        I just want to put this on the record. Two things happened
    on January 31st that I found very unusual. The President of the
    United States, Donald J. Trump, did what every President since
    Gerald Ford has done on January 31st, he declared February
    Black History Month.
        On January 31st, the Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth,
    put out a directive, ``Identity months are dead at DOD.'' That
    was not the newspaper headline summarizing the directive, that
    was the directive from the Secretary of Defense. ``Identity
    Months are Dead at DOD,'' including Black History Month.
        So, we have two events on January 31st, we have the
    President and Commander in Chief issuing the standard Black
    History Month proclamation for the Nation, but apparently at
    DOD it's different. At DOD, Black History Month is dead, at
    DOD, we won't go and recruit engineers who happen to be Black
    to come in and serve at a time when we need more people serving
    in the military and all of our service branches are struggling
    with attracting talent.
        There's a lot of issues dealing with NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM.
    I'm glad my colleague Senator Cotton asked about Unmanned
    Aircraft Systems (UASs), I had a whole series of questions I
    wanted to ask about Haiti and other SOUTHCOM priorities,
    Admiral Holsey, I'm glad we had the chance to talk about those
    in my office. The United States military has been at the
    forefront of including talent of all kinds, with the actions on
    January 31 the President acknowledging Black History Month, but
    within the DOD family, now this is dead.
        I worry that the military will no longer be at the
    forefront, won't even be at the average, but will be behind.
    That would be a terrible sellout of an amazing tradition that
    our United States military should be very, very proud of. With
    that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Scott.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for being
    here. Thank you for all the servicemen and women that serve
    with you. So all these hearings are important. This is
    important one, I like this one a lot because SOUTHCOM's here
    and it's from my home State of Florida. I was hoping my good
    friend Senator Sullivan was still here because all he talks
    about is Alaska all the time.
        So one thing I would always like is if people understood
    the risk that we're having in Latin America, and I think we
    have to put more effort into it. I know Admiral Holsey, we
    talked about that yesterday, and I know you're focused on it.
    So after years of Joe Biden's open border crisis wreaking havoc
    on our domestic security, with millions of illegal alien
    encounters at our border, an appeasement dangerous of dangerous
    regimes, the safety of our Nation in communities are top of
    mind, I think for all of us.
        I think you have a very important job here as we bring back
    peace through strength. So let me just get to the questions
    first. General, President Trump recently signed two executive
    orders, one to seal the southern border, which is right, and
    another deploying 1,500 service men and women to the southern
    border, which none of us hoped he would have to do, but
    unfortunately, he'll have to do to secure the border.
        Can you speak to how the administration's preparing for and
    do you feel you have the capability to face down the cartels
    and other U.S. enemies present in Mexico?
        General Guillot. Senator, I do think that we have the
    capability and the support to meet the requirements established
    in the executive orders. As you might know, we've doubled the
    number of title 10 forces inside of a week, down there in their
    operating in seven roles in support of the Department of
    Homeland Security.
        Then we've also increased some uniquely military
    capabilities that will get after the point you made, the
    cartels, which are driving the illegal migration. That's
    primarily through Airborne ISR to get more information on those
    and figure out how we can counter their actions.
        Senator Scott. You think there's any chance you're going to
    need a carrier strike group in the Gulf of America?
        General Guillot. Senator at this time I haven't gotten to a
    carrier strike group, but I will need a significant increased
    maritime presence in cooperation with the Coast Guard.
        Senator Scott. Are the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) at
    Mayport helpful at all?
        General Guillot. Yes, sir. Those would be right in line
    with what we're looking to do in the Maritime. Thanks.
        Senator Scott. So Admiral Holsey, I've been up here about a
    little over 6 years and it seems like, and I think we talked
    about this a little bit, Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and
    Synchronous Communication Satellite (Syncom) receive a majority
    of this Committee's attention and a lot of their assets. I
    think we're seeing a little bit of change under President
    Trump.
        SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility faces real threats to
    national security as we all know, we've got problems in Cuba,
    Venezuela, Nicaragua, and potentially Columbia. So you might
    need additional assets, especially with what China, Russia,
    Iran are doing in the region. Can you talk about the importance
    of having the right assets at SOUTHCOM to be able to deal with
    the threats?
        Admiral Holsey. Yes, Senator, to be clear, presence means
    power, presence mean relationships, and so not only when out of
    area deployers come, or the Transnational Criminal
    Organizations (TCOs) are moving drugs, when they see presence,
    it gives them pause. But also, when we come down and work with
    our friends and partners in the region, they look for us as
    leadership.
        So when they see our ships, our aircraft, you know, our
    boots on the ground working with them again and again, it
    builds those partnerships and it shows that we are there
    enduring, and we can block out the PRC and others.
        Senator Scott. Thanks. Can you talk about the importance of
    Homestead Air Force Base and its mission?
        Admiral Holsey. Yes, sir. For Homestead Air Force Base
    located there in south of Miami right now, we've used it in the
    past. We used it in our Haiti operations as a jump off point.
    We use it in exercises as well. So again, it's a key location
    when I think about contingencies down range and how I engage
    and using that as a base to forward deploy, if you will. Also,
    I'm looking at some opportunities coming up for unmanned assets
    as well. So I continue to work on that.
        Senator Scott. You think it needs to be returned as an
    Active Duty base?
        Admiral Holsey. I think it's more in the AirForce lane to
    answer that, but I could definitely use an Active Duty base,
    sir.
        Senator Scott. [Presiding.] Thank you, Chairman. Now
    Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Acting Chairman. Appreciate
    it.
        Senator Scott. First time, big promotion.
        Senator King. As we're sitting here, news feeds often come
    across and I just saw one that the Department of Defense has
    indicated in its February in its 2025 procurement plan to buy
    $400 million worth of Tesla trucks. I'm going to just let that
    fact sink in, that's all I'm going to say about that.
        Admiral, you talked about the activity of the Chinese in
    Latin America. Do you believe that that activity is number one
    significant and number two increasing? The nature of the
    activity, as I understand it is public works projects ports,
    two ports in Panama, for example, is this significant activity
    on behalf of China and Latin America?
        Admiral Holsey. Yes, Senator. I think all their efforts
    from an infrastructure standpoint, the development of dual use
    sites and facilities, is a challenge, and we should be
    concerned about that.
        Senator King. I would point out to the committee that 2
    weeks ago we unilaterally disarmed in Latin America when we
    destroyed the Agency for International Development, because
    that's the agency that provides funds for these kinds of
    projects. So, basically, we've left the field in Latin America,
    and I think that should be understood.
        We're always talking about competition with China and the
    outpacing threat. But here is a place where we basically have,
    as I say, left the field, we've abdicated, we've surrendered to
    China in Latin America by unilaterally and illegally and
    unconstitutionally abandoning the vehicle by which we were
    competing with them in terms of development and work in Latin
    America. I just think that should be noted.
        We've gone almost entirely through this hearing and not
    talked much about terrorism. I believe that in all the talk
    about pivoting to great power competition, the Indo-Pacific,
    we've taken our eye off terrorism, and it worries me that
    that's still a threat. General, is terrorism's still a threat
    to this country? I believe you mentioned lone wolfs, which is
    the most difficult kind of terrorism to combat.
        General Guillot. Senator it's still a threat and a concern
    and one of the primary focus in the NORTHCOM part of my job. To
    address that we have very close ties with central command and
    special operations command to follow their operations in
    overseas, and they give me any indication of activities moving
    toward the United States that we'd have to plan for.
        Of course, we have great relations across the intel and
    interagency to ensure that we have a consolidated look at any
    terror threats to the U.S.
        Senator King. Well, I hope that there is significant
    emphasis because I worry that this is one of those things we're
    going to wake up and find ourselves under attack, and
    everybody's going to say, well, what happened? It's a matter of
    taking our eye off the terrorism ball. That's one of the
    greatest threats to this country, particularly if terrorists
    get a hold of nuclear material.
        There's a growing nuclear family, including Iran and North
    Korea where nuclear material might become available, and that's
    the nightmare scenario because deterrence doesn't work with
    terrorists. They don't care about dying, and they don't have a
    capital city to destroy. So, intelligence and awareness of what
    the terrorists are thinking and planning and plotting, I think
    is absolutely critical.
        Admiral, every year when we have this hearing, I talk to
    the SOUTHCOM commander about the fact that we have intelligence
    reports about drug shipments coming to the U.S. in the maritime
    domain, and we have the assets to interdict 25 percent of them.
    To me, that is just straight up unconscionable.
        There are people dying in my State from fentanyl overdoses,
    from drug overdoses generally, and we are not meeting because
    of a lack of basically allocation of assets, the drug shipments
    that we know about. That's what's so objectionable about this.
    Is that percentage still reasonable? Seventy-five percent is
    not being interdicted that we know of?
        Admiral Holsey. Yes, sir. About 10 to 20 percent is what we
    can get after what we see. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. That's because of a lack of assets. Is that
    not, correct? We don't have enough boats, ships?
        Admiral Holsey. Primary lack of assets, the lack of
    resources ISR capability, yes, sir.
        Senator King. Well, I would argue that, again, this is a
    misallocation of resources. That here is an active attack on
    America that's killing our citizens and we don't have enough
    ships and whether it's Coast Guard or Navy in the region to
    interject these drug shipments.
        I think that's basically a dereliction of duty, not of you,
    but of the entire policy apparatus, and this goes back three,
    four administrations. But it's one that I hope that this
    Administration might pay some attention to, and correct. Maybe
    there's a second round we'll talk about icebreakers General.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Scott. Thanks Senator King. One thing did, was it
    secretary, was it State or defense about the Tesla's? Do you
    know?
        Senator King. My understanding it was the Department of
    Defense armored Tesla Cyber trucks. Okay.
        Senator Scott. All right. Senator Budd.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman, congrats on the
    promotion.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Budd. Admiral, General, thank you all for being
    here. General, I enjoyed our conversation earlier this week,
    and also, just want to thank you on behalf of those in Western
    North Carolina for your efforts there. In the early days, late
    September of last year, early October, there was some
    bureaucratic hand wringing at the top, but that was not from
    you, that was not from our military. So again, thank you for
    all those in uniform who served those out west.
        I want to shift to the southern border, and we've heard
    this a lot from our colleagues this morning, and I share the
    concern about fentanyl. In North Carolina we lose every single
    year the totality of what we lost on 9/11 just in North
    Carolina, and that's our whole country compared to just my
    great State.
        I'm interested in stopping the supply of these Chinese
    precursors and chemicals that end up in Mexico and make their
    way here. Also stopping the Chinese nationals that are being
    caught illegally crossing our southern border in record
    numbers, I think it's up by a factor of 50 from 2021 to 2023.
        So, what concerns do you have, if any, that foreign actors,
    not just South American immigrants, but they're using the
    southern border to access our nation? We'll start with you,
    Admiral.
        Admiral Holsey. Senator, as I look at the daring gap over
    the last year or so, we did see an increase in number of
    Chinese actors coming across. Typically, what we do is we've
    been working with the Panamanians as well as Colombian to kind
    of support them in stopping the flow of migration. Now, it's
    slowed down this year, I think President Mulino was pretty
    clear to try to stop migration when he got in office.
        We've supported from a logistics intelligence and training
    equipment standpoint, with the Columbia and Panamanians. We saw
    the drop about 90 percent coming through the daring right now,
    but we have to keep our eye on it,
        Senator Budd. Of course. Thank you, General?
        General Guillot. Senator, I want thank you for your
    comments for the men and women of primarily the 18th Airborne
    Corps that did an outstanding job supporting their teammates in
    the western part of North Carolina. I appreciate that. I share
    the concern on the intent of many that are crossing the border
    and in particular, work closely with the Border Patrol to
    figure out why the Chinese migrants, one, are so many and two,
    through such a narrow corridor in the San Diego region.
        My concern there is a wolf and sheep's clothing coming
    across having someone who intends us harm. So we work very
    closely with the border patrol to see who is coming across and
    making sure that our intel agencies are tracking them. I'm
    encouraged by the recent decrease in detections and incursions
    across the border. But as I've mentioned before, the increase
    in military presence down there and some of the unique military
    capabilities, I hope will continue to seal that border.
        Senator Budd. Thank you for that. Let's go to another topic
    which was previously discussed in regards to Unmanned Aircraft
    Systems (UAS). As you mentioned in your opening statement and
    in the discussion with Senator Cotton, we've seen UAS
    incursions over sensitive sites, military bases, it's an
    alarming amount. Can you briefly, briefly describe how bases
    are determined to be ``covered facilities''? Under title 10,
    section 130i and titling them to an active defense.
        General Guillot. Yes, Senator. To become a covered
    installation, there's nine criteria that any one of those could
    allow the base to be covered, ranges from nuclear deterrence,
    missile defense, all the way down to if it's a test facility
    there, roughly half of the 360 installations in the U.S. meet
    those criteria.
        My request and proposal would be is if we look at 130i
    again, would be to expand coverage to all military
    installations and not just those that are covered.
        Senator Budd. Thank you. So, as the lead synchronizer of
    counter unmanned aerial system operations in the U.S., how are
    you preparing our bases to defend themselves from these
    threats? I know there's a policy discussion in your prior
    answer, but what are you doing right now?
        General Guillot. Senator, since we received this
    responsibility in November, we're responsible for coordinating
    any response. The authority to defend a base as Senator Cotton
    mentioned, remains with the installation commander and the
    services. But we can be a synchronizer role and are a
    synchronizer role to ensure standardized training response,
    tactical techniques, and procedures.
        If the base and the service aren't able to handle the
    incursion, we can bring in help from across the interagency and
    DOD to support, and perhaps most critically is we can work
    closely with the interagency to give them the authority to
    operate the systems once they arrive due to our close
    relationship with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
        In the near future, I think we will have our own
    capabilities to bring in from NORTHCOM once we procured them to
    assist if the service and the installation cannot handle the
    incursions.
        Chairman Wicker. [Presiding.] Thank you very much.
        Senator King. Mr. Chairman, in your absence, I made a
    statement about the purchase of Tesla trucks I was misinformed,
    it was not the Department of Defense that's announced this
    purchase, it's the Department of State. So, I just wanted to
    clarify the record.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, and thank you very much for
    that. Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Trump
    administration is sending troops to the southern border and
    holding immigrants at Guantanamo, redirecting Active Duty
    military personnel from critical missions and costing taxpayers
    several times more than when DHS does the same job. That seems
    to be bad for national security, bad for our military families
    and bad for America's bottom line.
        We've seen this before. When the first Trump administration
    deployed troops to the border, it pegged the cost at a billion
    dollars over 3 years. But the GAO found that the Department of
    Defense estimates were not ``reliable'' and excluded
    ``significant costs''. DOD reports to Congress missed more than
    half the actual total for entire fiscal years.
        GAO made seven detailed recommendations for the Department
    of Defense to improve its cost estimates, but 4 years later,
    the Department of Defense has not executed a single one. Now,
    DOD estimates that this new border deployment will cost almost
    a billion dollars over the next 8 months, but that may be
    another underestimate. So, general Guillot, you are overseeing
    the border deployment, does underestimating the cost of an
    operation put future missions and future readiness at risk?
        General Guillot. Senator, I would assume so, but I think I
    need to point out that NORTHCOM is not appropriated funds for
    the Southwest border, and we've never had reprogramming or pass
    through funding. This is all done through the department
    comptroller and the services.
        Senator Warren I appreciate that, but I'm asking the
    question about running past the limits and the consequences of
    that, because the money has to come from somewhere, and I'm
    concerned that we're going to see the same problem that we saw
    the last time, big costs and little transparency and
    accountability.
        When DOD has been tasked with doing DHS's job, it has cost
    taxpayers a lot more money. It costs three times more to deport
    migrants on military aircraft than civilian planes that
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) often uses, and has
    cost ICE at least five times more per detention bed to hold
    migrants at Guantanamo Naval Base than at facilities in the
    United States.
        Anytime civilian authorities ask DOD for help, DOD is
    supposed to evaluate the request based on six criteria,
    including cost, but we don't even have a cost estimate for the
    new Guantanamo operations. So, Admiral Holsey, what do you
    expect the budgetary cost of SOUTHCOM Guantanamo operations
    will be through the end of this fiscal year?
        Admiral Holsey. Senator, we're new into the process right
    now, we surged assets down there to start building out the
    camp. It's a phased approach, so it's not automatically going
    up to 30,000. So right now----
        Senator Warren So, you're telling me you actually don't
    know the cost yet?
        Admiral Holsey. Not at this point, ma'am.
        Senator Warren Not at this point. So, the decision to
    deploy DOD personnel and assets was made without knowing the
    cost, which is exactly what DOD is supposed to consider in
    making the decision to deploy. Will you at least commit to
    provide that estimate to Congress as soon as you have it?
        Admiral Holsey. Yes. Senator.
        Senator Warren All right.
        Admiral Holsey. Yes, I'll work with the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (OSD) and DOD to get that to you.
        Senator Warren All right. I will hold you to that. I'm
    relying on both of you also to tell us if, DOD blows past
    whatever estimates you give us, given the potentially
    astronomical costs, will you commit to informing this Committee
    if you determine that these operations are not militarily
    effective?
        Admiral Holsey. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Warren All right. You know, we need to know if the
    operations are having an unmanageable impact on readiness and
    morale. Political stunts like this can easily damage troop
    morale. Many Texas National Guard members who deployed to the
    southern border have felt isolated without purpose and some
    have even committed suicide. I think it is important that we
    have better oversight over these plans and that we make these
    plans that conform to the law. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Yes, Senator King.
        Senator King. One followup, General. Give us an outline of
    the Russian activity and militarization of the Northern Arctic
    Ocean. I don't know how to define Northern and Southern when
    you're coming from the North Pole, but on the Russian
    shoreline.
        General Guillot. Senator, over the last year, we've seen a
    significant increase in both Russian air and maritime activity
    in the vicinity of Alaska, both in the bearing and up in the
    Arctic Ocean. In fact, the incursions in the number of ships
    this past year equal or exceeded the rate that it was before
    the Ukraine invasion, after which I think we all know the
    numbers dropped.
        We've also seen increase in air patrols on the eastern
    side, what we call the two o'clock approach through the
    Greenland and Iceland gap toward Maine and the northeast
    portion of the United States. So I'm certainly concerned by
    that and I would expect the numbers on both sides of our coast
    to increase in the coming year.
        Then also sir, along those lines also the Russian out of
    area patrols for both surface and undersea was significant last
    year, and I expect to see that on both coasts again this year.
        Senator King. The Chinese are increasingly active, are they
    not?
        General Guillot. Yes, sir. Last year we saw the most
    Chinese vessels off the coast of Alaska than we've ever seen
    and simultaneously.
        Senator King. I was at a conference some years ago on the
    Arctic, and there was a huge delegation from China, and I said
    what is China's interest? They said, we are a near Arctic
    nation. My response was, Maine is a near Caribbean State. They
    are very active in increasing their actions. Now how about
    where are we? Do we have a port for a facility, for example in
    the Arctic? Second, give us a breakdown of the status of
    icebreakers. We are woefully inadequate in terms of
    icebreakers, particularly for the use of the Northwest passage.
        General Guillot. Senator, I was going to use the same word.
    We're in a woeful situation with icebreakers. The Coast Guard
    is working very hard to increase that for us, but at this time
    we're completely outnumbered with icebreakers.
        Senator King. They're building one new icebreaker, but it's
    really merely a replacement for the ancient one that's about to
    go out of service, is that not correct?
        General Guillot. It is.
        Senator King. So, there's no net gain in icebreakers?
        General Guillot. That right, Senator.
        Senator King. The icebreakers, we have commute between the
    Arctic and the Antarctic, is that not correct?
        General Guillot. That that's correct as well.
        Senator King. How many icebreakers do you estimate the
    Russians have in the Arctic?
        General Guillot. Between 20 and 40?
        Senator King. Twenty and fourty to less than one?
        General Guillot. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. I would argue that the icebreakers are the
    essential infrastructure of the Arctic region and to say we are
    inadequate and behind where we should be as I believe is an
    understatement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Senator King, let me just say, I think
    you'll find a lot of bipartisan support, both in the Congress
    and in the administration for a substantial increase quickly in
    our number of icebreakers.
        Senator King. I believe that's the case, and I appreciate
    that, Mr. Chairman. All right.
        Chairman Wicker. We have Senator Peters, and then Senator
    Rosen.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you for your service to our country and for being here today.
    As Ranking Member of the Homeland Security and Governmental
    Affairs Committee, as well as having served in the U.S. Navy
    Reserve, I want to echo some of my colleagues concerns on the
    dangers of increasing the Department of Defense's role in
    border security and civil immigration enforcement.
        I'm going to be following up with both the Department of
    the Defense and the Department of Homeland Security to get
    additional information, related to the DOD deportation flights
    and DHS's use of naval station Guantanamo Bay.
        But my questions first, General Guillot, as you have
    previously stated, the successful execution of your mission as
    commander of both NORTHCOM and NORAD, ``relies on cohesive
    strategies, integrated planning, and collaboration across the
    whole-of-government.'' I completely agree with that, and with
    your assessment, and believe this also applies to executing
    SOUTHCOM missions as all.
        So, my question for you, General, how do your commands
    collaborate with several intergovernmental agencies, including
    the Department of Homeland Security, Missile Defense Agency,
    and the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency in executing
    your missions? How do you coordinate with these agencies and
    deconflict efforts to ensure the successful defense of our
    Homeland while certainly maintaining a Left-of-Launch
    framework?
        General Guillot. Senator, our partnership with DOD, other
    combatant commands and the interagency is critical to us. The
    way we approach it is we have well over 100 liaison officers,
    usually very high ranking, highly placed and trusted from their
    home agencies that work in our headquarters and participate in
    every one of our morning updates, Intel and operations updates,
    commander's updates, as well as all of our planning efforts.
        Then for the combatant commands, we meet regularly, we talk
    regularly, and just for example, in this southern border the
    responsibility is widely shared between us, SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM,
    and TRANSCOM, and the commanders. At all levels of our command,
    we integrate daily in a number of different planning groups and
    sessions.
        Senator Peters. Wonderful. Question for both of you, you
    both know about the importance of artificial intelligence
    systems (AI) and the pivotal role that they play in informing
    commanders' decisions by providing predictive analysis, real-
    time decision support and enhanced situational awareness in a
    future conflict.
        Earlier this week, we received a classified briefing from
    U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Kurilla who
    shared those views as well. So, my question to each of you is,
    given the rapid advancements in AI, how do you see AI shaping
    the future of commanders' decisions-making ability, defensive
    operations, and weapons integration for both SOUTHCOM and
    NORTHCOM? How can we be helpful in your efforts to accelerate
    the use of these new technologies?
        General Guillot. Senator, the use of AI is becoming more
    and more important in NORAD and NORTHCOM. We currently use some
    capabilities in helping us look at imagery and find assets or
    activities with imagery using AI to help alert our intel
    analysts. Anything in the future that you'll see from us
    incorporating artificial intelligence certainly will always
    have what we call the man on the loop. We will always have men
    and women that are quality controlling (QC-ing) it, but we're
    finding that we can go through reams and reams of information
    much quicker.
        I think that I should point out, we're also looking to see
    what the adversary is doing with AI and how we might be
    vulnerable to them and their use of AI in our defensive
    capabilities.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Admiral?
        Admiral Holsey. Senator at SOUTHCOM, we're in the process
    now of sending some of our senior leaders through training to
    actually learn more about AI so we can continue to use it.
    Another thing, we're doing it at South Joint Interagency Task
    Force South, we actually have AI marine machine learning battle
    lab.
        We're able to take 15 years of data based off a ship size.
    You think about a drug smuggled ship size, location, time of
    year, expected route, and now we can use that predictably to
    locate our assets to interdict them and that's been very
    successful, and we'll continue to look for some more support to
    get after that even faster.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you. Senator Peters. Senator
    Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman
        [Laughter.].
        Chairman Wicker. I'm sorry, I should recognized Senator
    Rosen first.
        Senator Duckworth. I am more than happy to.
        Chairman Wicker. The first mistake I've made. Unanimous
    consent to my left. Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Senator Rosen, thank you, Senator
    Duckworth. Really appreciate it. So, General Guillot, and for
    both of you, Admiral, you as well, so both NORTHCOM and
    SOUTHCOM have been tasked with supporting a border security and
    immigration enforcement mission. While I agree that our
    immigration system's broken and that we have to do more to
    secure the southern border, I'm concerned about the effect of
    these missions on our military readiness.
        General Guillot, last week, over a hundred migrants were
    flown to India on a C-17, costing the American taxpayer
    approximately $2.5 million dollars, and using up the limited
    flight hours allocated to that aircraft. Using military air
    costs around $28,000 an hour or so, for a C-17, that's four
    times as much if ICE would've chartered a flight.
        Given the strain on strategic airlift assets, are you
    concerned that continued use of C-17s and C-130's, and C-130's
    are less expensive, but still there are readiness issues with
    that? Are you concerned that using these for deportation
    flights could impact availability for higher priority missions?
        General Guillot. Senator, we work closely with the
    transportation command that operates these flights and are
    always looking to see if there are the authorities to contract
    that capability.
        Senator Kelly. Do you know what missions were dropped? And
    Admiral Holsey, same for you. Do you know if we dropped any
    missions to be able to support the flights to India or GTMO?
        Admiral Holsey. I do not know, sir.
        General Guillot. Senator, I'm not aware either.
        Senator Kelly. Are you aware what the chain of custody
    looks like for detainees as we transfer them?
        Admiral Holsey. As far as right now, the DHS has the chain
    of custody for the detainees as far as those coming to GTMO.
        Senator Kelly. So that's not a military responsibility at
    all?
        Admiral Holsey. No, sir.
        Senator Kelly. All right, and then, Admiral, I've got a
    question. We talked a little bit in my office about this
    yesterday. We're in the midst of a global strategic competition
    with China and China continues efforts to influence politics
    and societies in the Western Hemisphere in our neighborhood,
    and they use economic engagement to gain access and influence
    in countries in Latin America and in the Caribbean.
        So, what's your assessment of the security situation in
    Panama, and what is your strategy to deter CCP influence in the
    region without contesting Panama's control over the Panama
    Canal?
        Admiral Holsey. Senator, just like all places around the
    world now, China continues to gain their economic and
    infrastructure influence, and so we know they have some
    controlling interests in ports on both ends of the canal. We
    know that they have infrastructure projects as well. My role as
    the SOUTHCOM commander is to defend the Panama Canal in time of
    crisis or contingency. And I intend to do that.
        Senator Kelly. Do you agree that working with our partners
    would be part of this strategy?
        Admiral Holsey. Yes, Sir, it is.
        Senator Kelly. Our partners, meaning the Panamanians?
        Admiral Holsey. Yes, sir. The Panamanians are key to
    working with us. In fact, right now we have an exercise called
    Panamax we do every year. That's an exercise where we work with
    the Panamanians and our allies and partners in the region to do
    a scenario where we defend the Panama Canal. Just recently, the
    Panamanian President mentioned that he wants to do Panamax in
    Panama. So, that's a change, right? So, we'll continue to work
    with allies and partners continue to work with Panamanians as
    we go forward.
        Senator Kelly. Can you describe a little bit what that
    exercise would look like in Panama?
        Admiral Holsey. Yes, sir. So, we think about nefarious
    actors trying to create an explosion on something in the canal
    or stop up the canal. So again, as we're working in the
    approaches to the canal, so it's whole, entire thing to include
    cyber activity as well. So again, in every exercise we do
    throughout the region, there's always some cyber component, and
    so, we continue to work that.
        Senator Kelly. So, we do have a strategy and this exercise
    being part of the strategy to counter the PRCs influence in the
    region as it is today.
        Admiral Holsey. Yes, sir, and to be clear, I think I go
    back to a statement I made earlier about presence, right? Any
    presence in the region, presence means power, presence, blocks
    out the PRC, and so, I'll continue to do that.
        Senator Kelly. All right, thank you, and thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you. Senator Kelly. General and
    Admiral, Senator Kelly was not the first to mention the cost of
    Mill Aris as compared to the cost of a charter flight to your
    knowledge are those figures correct?
        General Guillot. Senator, to tell you the truth, I don't
    have knowledge of that because those are all run through U.S.
    transportation command. I don't have access to those numbers.
        Chairman Wicker. Okay, but you'll get that to us, will you
    not?
        General Guillot. Senator chairman, of course. I'll be very
    transparent.
        Chairman Wicker. How about you, Admiral?
        Admiral Holsey. I don't know the figure Senator but we can
    work to get that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Guillot. Mr. Chairman, per data provided by
    USTRANSCOM, the total actual cost for the India flight in
    question was $2,070,745.

        Senator Kelly. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make one
    comment.
        Chairman Wicker. Absolutely.
        Senator Kelly. Just from experience, about 21,000 pounds an
    hour of fuel for C-17, 737 is about 5,000 pounds per hour for
    fuel costs. So just in fuel costs, it's about four times.
        Chairman Wicker. Okay. Thank you. But you'll followup. The
    witnesses will followup. I think we now have Senator Banks.
        Senator Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Guillot,
    the President's executive order to establish the Iron Dome for
    America stresses the need for both weapons to shoot down enemy
    missiles and also the satellites to track them. The Executive
    Order (EO) called for the ``acceleration of the deployment of
    the hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor layer.''
        If NORTHCOM is going to have an effective Iron Dome for the
    U.S. Homeland, how important is it that we expand our fleet of
    ballistic and hypersonic missile tracking satellites and space-
    based sensors?
        General Guillot. Senator, expanding those capabilities
    would be imperative to having a successful shield over the
    North American continent.
        Senator Banks. You expand on that, why that's important.
        General Guillot. First and foremost, Senator, we have to
    detect anything that we want to defeat, and so, the HBTSS that
    you described is the first capability that we think will
    reliably and accurately track hypersonic missile.
        We have some capability already that can detect
    intercontinental ballistic missiles, but those are fairly easy
    to track because their ballistic profile, whereas the
    hypersonic are both maneuverable and much faster. So getting
    the space-based capability to detect and track those that could
    cue defeat mechanisms in the end is imperative.
        Senator Banks. How fast do we need them?
        General Guillot. How fast do we need the capability?
        Senator Banks. Yes.
        General Guillot. Immediately.
        Senator Banks. Thank you for that. Admiral, some of my
    colleagues have said that the U.S. military operations to
    defend the neutrality of the Panama Canal would be
    unprecedented or illegal. Do you agree with that?
        Admiral Holsey. Senator, that's more of a policy
    discussion. I think Department of State is better equipped to
    handle that.
        Senator Banks. So, no opinion on whether or not that's--if
    you were ordered to defend the Panama Canal that would be legal
    to do so.
        Admiral Holsey. So, my job as commander is to provide
    options to the President, sir.
        Senator Banks. Fair enough. Mr. Chairman, that's all I've
    got. I yield back.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member
    Reed for holding this hearing. I'd like to thank General
    Guillot and Admiral Holsey for testifying today and for your
    service to our country. We really appreciate you.
        I want to talk a little bit about Guantanamo Bay. So,
    Admiral Holsey, the Administration has announced it's using our
    naval base at Guantanamo Bay to house undocumented individuals
    detained in the United States. Although I have deep concerns
    about this cruel and misguided policy, including about whether
    we can trust that ICE is not detaining American citizens, legal
    permanent residents, Temporary Protected Status (TPS)
    recipients, dreamers, or children in these facilities.
        But Admiral Holsey, understanding that you are only
    implementing policy decided to be by others, how is DOD
    planning to pay for the transport and care? More importantly,
    what are the divisions of the missions and the responsibilities
    between DOD and ICE? Are military personnel charged with the
    guarding, carrying, feeding of people, or Guantanamo base? Are
    you paying to get them there? Are you staffing when they are
    there?
        Admiral Holsey. So, Senator, we're not paying for them to
    arrive. I guess TRANSCOM would probably be able to answer that
    question there. As far as our role is to provide safe, humane
    treatment of those in the facility. To be clear, we've done
    this mission before, from a migrant standpoint, I plan every
    year for a mass migration scenario. So, it's kind of a
    modification to the existing mission, and again, to bring them
    on board. The role of the military forces there is to provide
    supplies, food care, shelter medical support at this time.
        Senator Rosen. Well, I guess we have a lot of things to
    worry about in that, whether it impedes our readiness from a
    readiness perspective, having to take care of migrants takes
    you away from your mission. But I'll move on because we only
    have 3 minutes.
        I want to talk to you, Admiral Holsey, now about critical
    language skills, because the Department of Defense is
    increasingly making investments on countering the people's
    Republic of China. We know they are a major threat to us. Are
    there any concerns regarding a lack of language expertise
    needed for countries in SOUTHCOM area of responsibility,
    especially considering the involving situation at GTMO, the
    potential need for more Spanish speakers?
        How will the elimination of some of these diversity
    initiatives impact your ability to recruit and retain
    linguists, people who speak all of the different languages,
    speak Chinese to enable your critical mission?
        Admiral Holsey. To be clear Senator, we're a war fighting
    organization. So, our most fundamental duty is supported within
    the Constitution, ensure the safety and security of the
    American people. We look for talent throughout.
        So, I think right now, as I look at the critical skills,
    language skills in the SOUTHCOM or throughout my entire
    headquarters, I have several multilingual people. Then we've
    been able to hire folks as well. We'll continue to do that and
    that's kind of my point to be made there.
        Senator Rosen. Well, we just want to be sure you're not
    hampered in doing that because it is critical to have those
    language skills. I want to move on and talk about with general
    Guillot, psych guarding, domain awareness. You know, our
    competitors continue to feel advanced capabilities across
    domains that have the potential to threaten the Homeland.
        In light of these threats, NORTHCOM and NORAD have to
    ensure the system providing the Homeland with domain awareness
    are survivable, adaptable, and modern. In addition, the systems
    must be hardened as they're going to be subject to an array of
    cyber-attacks during any contingency. I'm encouraged by your
    efforts to modernize, but what steps are you currently taking
    to harden our command-and-control nodes, particularly in the
    cyber domain, so that we're able to effectively share
    operational picture during a potential conflict?
        General Guillot. Senator, as you alluded to, the most
    persistent and present threat that we face in the NORTHCOM area
    of responsibility every day is in the cyber domain, with
    hundreds or maybe even thousands attacks or attempted attacks
    on our networks.
        So, the way we harden that is primarily through cyber
    protection teams, that we have that first look at our unique
    NORAD and NORTHCOM computer systems and networks, and then
    across the DOD network in partnership with Cyber Command to
    make sure that those are protected.
        Then when you go outside of that ring, we look at critical
    infrastructure for capabilities that not only help the American
    citizens, but also help the DOD. Then it's four partners we
    have there, or three others in addition to NORTHCOM, Cyber
    Command (CYBERCOM), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
    and Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA). We worked
    very well with them to monitor the cyber domain to ensure that
    all of those systems are protected.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank You. Senator Rosen. Senator
    Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen,
    thank you for being here, and thanks for your service. Good
    visiting with you, both of you. You got tough jobs.
        General, you talked in your opening statement about the
    cooperation and the coming together of our adversaries. What do
    we need to do and what do you need to do for the next 3 or 4
    years to protect our country from those coalitions that are
    coming together, possibly for a threat to us?
        General Guillot. Senator, first, we need to continue to
    work on our ability to detect their activities. Not only are
    they working together, but even independently, they're
    increasing their own capabilities and they can affect us from
    further ranges than they could in years past, individually, and
    certainly combined, that just magnifies that challenge.
        Our ability to detect them from all domains, undersea all
    the way to space is the first. So we can watch what they're
    doing and have awareness of what they're doing. Then after that
    is just presence, not only with the U.S. Forces, but within our
    command. Anything that we can do with the Canadian forces to
    show that we can, one, detect them and two respond to them in
    order to deter their activities, would be the second emphasis
    that I have.
        Senator Tuberville. That's the other question I want to ask
    you, as we speak how is our working relationship with our
    Canadian partners up North?
        General Guillot. Senator, on a military-to-military basis,
    it's outstanding. NORAD is a binational command, and so they're
    partnered with the United States at every level of the command.
    We talked earlier about the first time ever, the Chinese and
    the Russians flew together in the Arctic, our intercept of that
    was with United States and Canadian fighters that were
    completely integrated.
        So, at the mil-to-mil level in NORAD, it's excellent. Then
    also between NORTHCOM and CJOC, the Canadian Joint Operations
    Command, there's several times where we have Russian or Chinese
    ships out in the Arctic that are being patrolled by the
    Canadians out of United States bases to build that strength and
    relationship we have.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes. Speaking of the Arctic, do we
    actually have an icebreaker that works now?
        General Guillot. The Coast Guard has one that was just
    repaired, but unfortunately it was out of service for a period
    of time over the last few months.
        Senator Tuberville. We obviously need to add to that. I
    would imagine. Admiral, you and I talked about saildrones,
    which were made in my great State of Alabama. Can you give us
    this group a kind of a rundown of what you think about
    saildrones, your experience and the need probably for more all
    over the world? We have them in the Indo-Pacific, and we have
    them in the Caribbean and your experience with saildrone?
        Admiral Holsey. Yes, Senator. Over the last couple years,
    we've seen a decrement in navy assets in the region, and one
    thing that Navy has done with this new hybrid fleet out of the
    United States Naval Forces Southern Command (NAVSOUTH), we've
    been able to incorporate saildrones into our mission sets. They
    provide great domain awareness.
        Right now, we're doing operation Southern Sphere where at
    this point, we'll have saildrones in the Caribbean and in the
    Eastern Pacific, along with other unmanned assets to counter
    drug fight, right? So, it gives me more maritime domain
    awareness, and it helps our partners as well because we're
    trying to bring them into this piece and so have a better
    understanding.
        One thing our partners continue to ask for is domain
    awareness, intel sharing. So again, having those assets in the
    region for a lack of other assets is making a difference for
    me.
        Senator Tuberville. What main reason are they used for, as
    we speak for, drug runners?
        Admiral Holsey. So right now, it's maritime domain
    awareness, so overall surveillance, right? They actually have
    the capability to patch back to our MOC, our Maritime
    Operations Center, in NAVSOUTH. So again, they can pick up
    contacts and it completes the picture, right? The information
    can sell. So, if you spread these assets out, they can cover
    more domain as opposed to just one ship.
        Senator Tuberville. As we speak, how many do you have
    Operatable in the Caribbean?
        Admiral Holsey. So right now, I have eight operational in
    the Caribbean and three in the Eastern Pacific and more flowing
    in. So, I have a total of 20 here in the next couple days.
        Senator Tuberville. That's great. Well, we appreciate what
    both of you do and anything we can do to help let us know.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
    Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Yay. It's my turn. Thank you. Mr.
    Chairman and Ranking Member Reed. The number of troops assigned
    to the Board of Mission continues to grow. We've had this
    discussion today, but I want to emphasize it, with the total
    expected to reach at least 3,600. I think General, you
    testified that it'll be maybe even upwards getting closer to
    5,000 potentially. This number includes some of our most
    experienced infantry and support units.
        Are we really preparing for great power competition with
    the communist PRC? Or are we asking our Marines to lay
    Constantino wire at the border? Are we asking our pilots to be
    combat ready, or are they supporting deportation flights?
        As we consider the ways that responding to these missions
    in NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM impacting the military's ability to
    focus on the primary mission of great power competition and war
    fighting, we need to also factor in uncertain, but rapidly
    increasing costs of DOD support at Guantanamo Bay.
        On January 29th, President Trump green lighted the
    expansion of the Migrant Operations Center, or MOC, at
    Guantanamo Bay. As you're likely where this expansion comes
    with the range of costs that will impact the overall budget,
    everything from medical care and sanitation to education for
    migrants, as well as expenses tied to deploying military
    personnel to GTMO.
        Admiral Holsey, could you provide a breakdown of the
    timeline and projected construction costs for increasing
    Gitmo's capacity to 30,000 people as outlined by the
    President's directive?
        Admiral Holsey. Senator at this time we're doing a phase
    approach. So right now, we're going to have a capability for
    about 2,500 cots, and that plan's going to go up if we continue
    to phase it in. We haven't decided that yet, I'm waiting
    further direction. So, at the initial point, I don't have a
    cost estimate of what would take for 30,000. So right now,
    we're still in the infancy phase of it.
        Senator Duckworth. Well, you have a Presidential directive,
    have you not started planning to fulfill that directive?
        Admiral Holsey. So right now, again, it's a stage approach,
    a tailor approach, right? So right now, we won't necessarily
    go, we don't know. We're working with DHS to understand the
    flow of migrants. So, we're not going to go, we won't go to
    30,000 unless we know that migrant flow will come. So, we're
    waiting at this point.
        Senator Duckworth. Well, as that planning process moves
    forward, can you get me those data, figures?
        Admiral Holsey. Yes, Senator
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Admiral Holsey. OSD Comptroller has directed the Services
    and Agencies to establish accounting mechanisms to track costs
    of the mission. I defer to OSD Comptroller for further details.

        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. The Fiscal Year 2017 Military
    Construction (MILCON) actually a project for mass migration
    complex was actually for 13,000 migrants, and it cost $33
    million in fiscal year 2017, just as a comparison. It stands to
    reason that an expansion to more than double that capacity
    nearly 10 years later would mostly, most certainly cost much
    more than the $33 million that was projected to cost in fiscal
    year 2017.
        In addition to facilities costs in 2019, the commander of
    detentions estimated that it cost more than $100,000 for each
    guard, each guard's 9-month deployment to GTMO cost taxpayers a
    hundred thousand dollars. Admiral Holsey, do you have, as
    you're doing this, do you have an estimate for the personnel
    costs associated with this effort, even for the first 2,500?
        Admiral Holsey. No, we do not yet. But I can say that the
    cost of running GTMO at this point, just the facility the last
    several years been approximately $100 million.
        Senator Duckworth. One hundred million dollars per year?
        Admiral Holsey. Yes, for the JTF-GTMO facility along with
    the rotational enforcers that comes in.
        Senator Duckworth. How many detainees are there?
        Admiral Holsey. Currently, there are 30 detainees, and 15
    war detainees, and then approximately, 68 other detainees, so
    not detainees, but migrants from the DHS.
        Senator Duckworth. So, to house 118 detainees there and to
    maintain GTMO, it's costing taxpayers $100 million dollars
    currently, and we're going to project to go up to $30 million?
        Admiral Holsey. For the GTMO facility.
        Senator Duckworth. Just the facility, so the cost would be
    much higher than that. What is the source of funding for the
    expansion of the MOC?
        Admiral Holsey. Right now, as the forces flow in, the
    services are bearing the initial cost for the initial flow, and
    so that's where it's at right now, the services.
        Senator Duckworth. So, it's coming out of the services
    pockets. What priorities will be left unfunded as a result of
    this shift in priorities?
        Admiral Holsey. I can't answer that, ma'am. I think we have
    to ask the services.
        Senator Duckworth. Okay. I would also like to address
    accountability on the DOD flights. Admiral Holsey, what is
    being done to ensure that risk mitigated is mitigated for
    pilots and what security measures are in place to manage the
    personnel on board?
        Admiral Holsey. Right now, the DHS actually, or is
    controlled those flights along with TRANSCOM probably have a
    better understanding of the flow of migrants to what they do on
    the aircraft.
        Senator Duckworth. So TRANSCOM is responsible for the
    safety of the crew of the aircraft on those flights?
        Admiral Holsey. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Duckworth. I do think that we need to run this
    down, and if the DOD does not take ownership of migrants
    boarding their aircraft, who onboard the aircraft is
    responsible for the passengers?
        Admiral Holsey. Again, I would say that TRANSCOM has a plan
    in place and TRANSCOM would better have that the understanding
    of how they protect their aircraft in flight.
        Senator Duckworth. A lot of unanswered questions. Thank
    you, Admiral.
        Chairman Wicker. Indeed, and Senator Duckworth, this is
    part of our oversight responsibility, and so I appreciate the
    members participation today. This concludes the open portion of
    today's hearing. I'd like to thank our witnesses for their
    testimony. For the information of Members, questions for the
    record will be due to the Committee within two business days of
    the conclusion of this hearing.
        We will commence the closed portion of this hearing in
    Senate Security in 15 minutes. We have until 11:45 a.m.
        [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                      manned fighters in homeland defense
        1. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, we've learned from the Chinese
    spy balloon and several drone incursions that our Homeland is
    dangerously exposed to attack. What role do you believe manned fighters
    play in securing our National Airspace?
        General Guillot. Manned fighters are a critical and indispensable
    piece of layered defense employed by NORAD and USNORTHCOM in the
    defense of the Homeland. The vast majority of air-breathing threats can
    be defeated by employing manned fighters under an ``eyes on'' construct
    in which trained fighter pilots obtain positive visual identification
    and assessments of potential threats, which can range from civilian
    aircraft to long-range Russian and Chinese bombers and cruise missiles.
    Positive visual identifications remain the best way to judge the intent
    of potential threats and are critical to making accurate assessments
    and taking appropriate action. Fighter aircraft remain the most
    capable, versatile, and flexible means to defeat the majority of air
    threats we face.

        2. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, do you believe fighter aircraft
    play a necessary and complementary role to ballistic missile
    interceptors in defending the Homeland from air and missile threats?
        General Guillot. Yes. I see manned fighters operating in a
    complementary role to ballistic missile interceptors in defending the
    Homeland from air and missile threats. Manned fighters are employed to
    respond to threats ranging from general aviation aircraft to advanced
    cruise missiles. Manned fighters are not the answer to every air and
    missile threat to the Homeland, but they do play a critical role and
    remain a critical asset for our ability to defend the Homeland.

        3. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, in 3 decades, the Air Force
    fighter fleet has shrunk to less than half its size. Will you have
    enough aircraft over the next decade to keep our airspace secure and
    meet the China threat?
        General Guillot. Department of Defense force management processes
    provide USNORTHCOM sufficient resources to conduct its day-to-day
    aerospace control mission for the United States, including the
    allocation of additional aircraft and other capabilities as necessary
    to meet heightened operational requirements. I anticipate this will
    continue to be the case in the coming years given the primacy of the
    homeland defense mission and continued fielding of innovative
    capabilities and implementation of novel homeland defense concepts. I
    will remain a vocal advocate for sufficient fighter allocation to the
    Homeland Defense mission.
                             cruise missile threat
        4. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, can you explain how Russia and
    China can use conventionally armed cruise missiles to threaten and
    coerce the United States?
        General Guillot. Cruise missiles pose unique warning and defense
    challenges due to their reduced signatures and flexible flight
    profiles. Conventionally armed cruise missiles--launched from the air
    or sea--provide Russia and China a viable strike option against the
    United States Homeland without the escalatory risks associated with
    nuclear strikes. Today, Russian long-range heavy bombers can employ
    air-launched cruise missiles against U.S. critical infrastructure from
    multiple axes. Russian Navy surface combatants and the growing fleet of
    ultra-quiet Severodvinsk II-class guided missile submarines can employ
    land-attack cruise missiles against the Homeland from the Atlantic and
    the Pacific.
        The PLA Navy will soon have the ability to conduct long-range
    precision strikes against land targets from its submarine and surface
    combatants using land-attack cruise missiles. It is also possible the
    PRC is developing a launcher that can fit inside a standard commercial
    shipping container for employing these missiles aboard merchant ships.
    In the air domain, the PRC is developing a new generation of long-range
    bombers that may debut sometime in the next decade and be capable of
    launching conventional weapons.
        During a conflict, Russian and PRC military leaders would likely
    consider employing these conventional strike capabilities against North
    American critical economic and military infrastructure as part of an
    effort to degrade our political will, disrupt our force flows to
    regional conflicts, and compel negotiations to end those conflicts.

        5. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, are the services moving quickly
    enough to field capabilities to detect and defend against these cruise
    missiles? In other words, are we pacing the threat?
        General Guillot. No, legacy acquisition processes are not
    maintaining pace with the rapidly shifting landscape of potential
    threats. However, I am encouraged by the Department's renewed emphasis
    on leveraging flexible authorities provided by Congress to accelerate
    fielding of advanced capabilities. For example, the Golden Dome for
    America will be a pivotal opportunity to correctly prioritize and align
    our efforts to deliver and field capabilities at a much faster rate.
    Specific to cruise missiles, I view the ability to defeat cruise
    missiles that threaten critical infrastructure as the biggest
    capability gap we face. I support increased development of new
    capabilities, including directed energy and other low-collateral, non-
    kinetic means.

        6. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, what additional resources do
    you need to address this threat?
        General Guillot. Defense of the Homeland will require a layered,
    integrated, multi-domain architecture that includes next generation
    sensors and effectors. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are considering the full
    range of threats and mitigation methods in developing Golden Dome for
    America. Investment in advanced capabilities remains critical to
    addressing present and future threats. The primary capabilities we need
    are space-based Airborne Moving Target Indicator, over-the-horizon
    radar, E-7 Wedgetail, and cruise missile defeat mechanisms.
                            counter drone authority
        7. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, you mentioned expanding
    authorities for detecting unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) beyond the
    perimeter of military installations to improve the identification and
    tracking of threats. Could you briefly describe what a layered defense
    would look like, and how detection capabilities beyond the fence lines
    would strengthen efforts to counter hostile drone threats?
        General Guillot. A layered defense against unmanned aerial systems
    consists of passive and active detection as well as kinetic and non-
    kinetic defeat capability. Detection capabilities should include active
    or passive radars, radio-frequency sensors, electro-optical and
    infrared cameras, and low collateral defeat systems such as low-
    collateral interceptors, high-powered microwaves, and high-energy laser
    systems. It is important to detect, track, and identify potential
    threats before a UAS crosses an installation boundary because
    unauthorized UASs operating over installations present an immediate
    risk to safety and security and because acquiring an inbound UAS prior
    to an installation incursion greatly increases the likelihood of
    successful mitigation.

        8. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, how far beyond the perimeter of
    a military installation would Department of Defense (DOD) need to
    detect UAS threats in order to defend against intruders crossing the
    fence line?
        General Guillot. Installation commanders would ideally have the
    ability to detect and track unmanned aerial systems five miles from
    installation boundaries to allow base force protection teams to
    determine the best method for defeating potential threat UAS and the
    time to employ appropriate defeat mechanisms.
                                  panama canal
        9. Senator Cotton. Admiral Holsey, how can China use its ports near
    the canal to disrupt or shut down canal operations?
        Admiral Holsey. As we saw with the 2021 Suez Canal disruption by a
    cargo ship running aground, or the impact of last year's drought
    conditions in Panama, it doesn't take much to impact the flow of
    traffic through these critical maritime chokepoints. In the event of
    hostilities, China might leverage its current port access near the
    canal, which includes access to physical infrastructure and human
    connections, to choose and disrupt canal operations via sabotage,
    cyberattack, or even Global Positioning System jamming that might
    result in an accidental blockage.

        10. Senator Cotton. Admiral Holsey, has U.S. Southern Command
    (SOUTHCOM) allocated sufficient resources to help Panama properly
    defend the Canal?
        Admiral Holsey. The SOUTHCOM team dedicates significant attention
    to the security of the Canal, as we strive to be credible, present, and
    engaged with our Panamanian partners.
        SOUTHCOM has detailed plans to preserve neutrality of the Canal and
    continuously monitors for threats. Should a specific credible threat
    emerge, it could potentially lead to a request for additional forces or
    capabilities.
        We endeavor to provide persistent presence in Panama primarily
    through our Army Security Force Assistance teams and other rotational
    assets. We capitalize on a long history and close partnership with our
    Panamanian counterparts. We conduct bi-lateral Operations, Activities
    and Investments with our Panamanian counterparts and employ theater
    security cooperation efforts to build Panamanian defensive capabilities
    and capacities as well as enhance our interoperability to execute bi-
    lateral operations in defense of the Panama Canal. Finally, we exercise
    our Defense of the Canal Concept of Operations Plan every 2 years as a
    major regional exercise. Panama has agreed to host our major security
    exercise PANAMAX in 2026.

        11. Senator Cotton. Admiral Holsey, has SOUTHCOM conducted planning
    for defense of the Panama Canal in a potential Taiwan conflict
    scenario?
        Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM conducts prudent planning for the Defense
    of the Panama Canal as directed by the Joint Staff and in accordance
    with U.S. obligations from the 1977 Neutrality Treaty. Our planning
    addresses several potential threats. I recently signed an updated plan
    and am happy to discuss in the appropriate setting.
                            russia/cuba cooperation
        12. Senator Cotton. Admiral Holsey, what military advantage does
    Russia gain by increasingly cooperating with Cuba?
        Admiral Holsey. By increasing cooperating with Cuba, Russia
    solidifies its foothold in the United States' near abroad, 90 miles
    from the Homeland. Cuba's geographic location is appealing to Moscow as
    it seeks to enhance its regional intelligence-gathering capabilities.
    Moscow also may leverage its cooperative relationship with Havana to
    ensure acceptance of additional Russian navy port call requests, such
    as the submarine and surface combatant port visits Russia conducted in
    2024. These port calls help expand Russian access to Cuban ports or
    airfields for Russian power projection that could be weaponized against
    the Homeland.

        13. Senator Cotton. Admiral Holsey, should the United States be
    concerned about Russian submarine access to a port so close to the
    Homeland in event of a conflict with Russia--or even with China, for
    that matter?
        Admiral Holsey. The U.S. military's primary mission is to defend
    the Homeland. We take adversary combatant movements into our hemisphere
    very seriously and monitor them very closely.
        That said, I could use additional maritime and ISR capability to
    better monitor, track and respond to potential threats.

        14. Senator Cotton. Admiral Holsey, what additional resources do
    you need to deter Russian military activity around Cuba?
        Admiral Holsey. In the SOUTHCOM AOR, presence means power. SOUTHCOM
    needs additional resources to better deter Russian activities and
    presence in and around Cuba. Russia deploying a nuclear-powered
    submarine to Cuba last summer illustrates our deterrence challenges. To
    improve our posture, SOUTHCOM has consistently requested U.S. Navy
    assets to provide presence, reassure our partners and Allies, and deter
    our adversaries. Additionally, SOUTHCOM has requested, through the
    annual Global Force Management process, intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance assets to better understand adversary activities in the
    AOR.
        Given SOUTHCOM's limited air and naval presence, we coordinate with
    NORTHCOM and the Coast Guard to share assets to help mitigate risk and
    meet mission critical needs. We have streamlined the force sharing
    procedures that NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM have put in place to enable force
    sharing between our two Commands to address threats in the Western
    Hemisphere. Our work with Allies has been another way we are working to
    better integrate and synchronize efforts in the Western Hemisphere to
    address threats together.

                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Michael Rounds
                                    spectrum
        15. Senator Rounds. General Guillot, how critical is unimpeded use
    of the electromagnetic spectrum to our current Homeland defense
    architecture?
        General Guillot. Uninterrupted access to the electromagnetic
    spectrum is essential for homeland defense, as it underpins crucial
    communications, radar, surveillance, and missile defense systems.
    Disruptions or interference with the spectrum will significantly impair
    military operations, intelligence gathering, and overall national
    security. Secure spectrum access is vital for ensuring the
    effectiveness of defense capabilities for the Homeland and timely
    threat response.

        16. Senator Rounds. General Guillot, on January 27, President Trump
    issued an Executive Order directing the building of an ``Iron Dome
    Missile Defense Shield for America.'' In your professional military
    opinion, would an Iron Dome for America be feasible if DOD was forced
    to vacate portions of the Lower-3 GHz and 7-8 GHz bands of the
    spectrum?
        General Guillot. Developing a Golden Dome for America would be
    severely challenged if the DOD was forced to vacate the Lower-3 GHz and
    7-8 GHz bands. These frequencies are essential for radar systems used
    in missile detection and interception. Without access to these bands,
    radar effectiveness would be compromised, reducing detection
    capabilities and increasing susceptibility to interference.
    u.s. northern command and cyber authorities vs. transnational criminal
                                 organizations
        17. Senator Rounds. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, section
    1505 of the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
    grants the Secretary of Defense the authority for ``countering illegal
    trafficking by Mexican transnational criminal organizations in
    cyberspace.'' Is there anything preventing you from coordinating with
    U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), National Security Agency (NSA), and
    other relevant agencies to exercise those authorities?
        General Guillot. USNORTHCOM has not received an implementing
    directive or been delegated authorities related to section 1505 of the
    Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA. However, USNORTHCOM is coordinating closely with
    USCYBERCOM and NSA to use other authorities in the cyber domain until
    authorization to use Section 1505 is received.
        Admiral Holsey. NORTHCOM leads Department of Defense operations and
    activities involving Mexican transnational criminal organizations. I
    will defer to General Guillot.

        18. Senator Rounds. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, is anyone
    in the Department using those section 1505 Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA
    authorities?
        General Guillot. Not to my knowledge. Implementation of section
    1505 authorities is pending a Department of Defense implementing
    directive. USNORTHCOM is evaluating options that include current
    authorities, as well as potential integration of Sec. 1505 authority to
    counter transnational criminal organizations.
        Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM does not use Section 1505 Fiscal Year 2024
    NDAA authorities.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
                         united states northern command
        19. Senator Ernst. General Guillot, in Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA, I
    secured a provision that more clearly defines the DOD's
    responsibilities under title 10 to safeguard our skies against the
    threats posed by drug cartels using drones at our borders. Has U.S.
    Northern Command (NORTHCOM) started implementing the policies outlined
    in the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA to address the threat of drug cartels
    using drones at our borders?
        General Guillot. USNORTHCOM is using all relevant authorities to
    address the potential threat presented by cartel drones operating along
    the U.S. southern border. In accordance with directives from the
    President and the Secretary of Defense to secure the southern border,
    USNORTHCOM is providing unique military capabilities to the Department
    of Homeland Security to augment Customs and Border Protection
    operations.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
       missile defense and increasing response options and deterrence of
                              missile engagements
        20. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, in response to President
    Trump's executive order on an ``Iron Dome for America,'' myself and
    Senator Cramer introduced the Increasing Response Options and
    Deterrence of Missile Engagements (IRONDOME) Act in the Senate. The act
    does three things: enhances domain awareness; bolsters existing missile
    defeat capacity; and accelerates new capabilities, including in space,
    to counter future threats. In your opinion, what are the necessary
    investments we need to make for increasing our domain awareness?
        General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM require a system of layered
    sensors from the seafloor to space and cyberspace to provide persistent
    all-domain awareness. NORAD and USNORTHCOM's domain awareness
    investment priorities include space-based multi-domain Air Moving
    Target Indicator (AMTI) systems, E-7 Wedgetail, Over-the-Horizon Radar
    (OTHR), terrestrial-and space-borne missile warning and tracking
    sensors, and the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System. Additionally,
    N&NC requires an integrated Command, Control, and Communications
    architecture to tie these systems together and present the Commands
    with an effective system to employ defeat mechanisms.

        21. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, currently there are 20
    missile silos at Fort Greely, AK sitting empty because of delays to the
    Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) program. These ground-based
    interceptors give our Nation the necessary capacity to defeat missiles
    launched at the Homeland. How will you work to increase production of
    those ground-based interceptors and accelerate development and
    procurement of the Next-Generation Interceptor program?
        General Guillot. The President's Executive Order on Golden Dome for
    America has made the fielding of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI)
    an even more vital element in defending the United States against a
    Long-Range Ballistic Missile attack. USNORTHCOM will continue to work
    with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to energize the industrial base
    and identify and exploit efficiencies in the fielding process to pull
    the delivery timeline to the left. I will also further advocate for an
    objectives-based NGI inventory informed by policy and threat
    assessments with the DOD and Joint Staff.

        22. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Holsey, in 2021 the Chinese tested a
    Hypersonic Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) which could
    theoretically reach the Homeland by going over the South Pole, making
    it much more difficult to detect and defeat with our existing
    infrastructure. One of the provisions in my Increasing Response Options
    and Deterrence of Missile Engagements (IRONDOME) Act is a Southern
    hemisphere-facing early warning radar in the Homeland. However, we know
    that having partners in an integrated missile defense system can help
    provide the early warning that we need to notice weapons before they
    hit the Homeland. Do you believe that there are viable options or
    partners in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility that we could build
    relationships with to provide for early warning detection?
        Admiral Holsey. When considering partners in the SOUTHCOM AOR who
    could assist in the provisioning of early warning detection, there are
    two elements that we examine--capability and willingness. Regarding
    capability, there are Partners within the AOR, or Allies who have
    interest in the region, that could potentially provide sensors to
    contribute to early warning detection.
        However, from a willingness perspective, other than Allies, Chile
    might be the only Partner who has both the willingness and capability.
    That said, in the absence of organic capabilities, I think there are
    several partner nations in the SOUTHCOM AOR who might agree to host
    U.S. systems, if asked.

        23. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, do you believe that a
    southern hemisphere-facing sensor or radar system is an essential
    element of homeland missile defense given current threats?
        General Guillot. Domain awareness is my top priority for fulfilling
    the President's Golden Dome for America Executive Order. A terrestrial
    southern hemisphere-oriented array of sensors capable of tracking
    ballistic, hypersonic, cruise, and other advanced threats is an
    important element of the layered approach to domain awareness.
    Developing and fielding 360+ all-domain awareness capability from the
    seafloor to space is paramount to defending the Homeland from advanced
    threats.
       air defense identification zone/exclusive economic zone incursions
        24. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, over the past 5 years we
    have seen over 140 foreign vessels and aircraft penetrate the Air
    Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) at
    our Northern Border in Alaska. Of these, a third have occurred in the
    last year alone. To what do you attribute the increased aggression from
    the Russians and Chinese over the past year, and do you expect it to
    continue?
        General Guillot. Russia's ADIZ penetrations over the past year
    likely represent a return to pre-COVID and pre-Ukraine conflict levels
    of activities and is a reminder that Russia is a global power. This
    level of activity is likely to continue. The majority of recent PRC
    activity near Alaska has been in the maritime domain, to include the
    three PRC state-owned research vessels that operated in international
    waters within the U.S. EEZ in 2024. This Chinese activity is dual use
    with both military and scientific applications, and NORAD and
    USNORTHCOM characterize PRC maritime activity as a continuation of
    Beijing's desire to normalize its presence in the region and
    demonstrate relevance as a noteworthy voice on issues pertaining to the
    Arctic. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are also closely monitoring the steady
    increase in combined air and maritime PRC-Russian military activity in
    and over the Bering and Chukchi Seas near Alaska. I also expect the
    level of Chinese activity near Alaska to increase.

        25. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, the Russians and Chinese
    have sailed together several times over the last few years near our
    Northern Border in Alaska. In July 2024, however, they also conducted
    the first joint strategic bomber incursion into our ADIZ. How concerned
    are you about the increasing cooperation between the Russians and
    Chinese and how do you think we should change our posture to compete
    strategically in the region?
        General Guillot. I am concerned about the growing cooperation
    between Russia and the PRC in the Arctic. The Arctic is a region of
    critical security and economic importance to Russia, while the PRC sees
    tremendous opportunity for accessing vital natural resources in the
    region. These converging interests, along with a shared desire to
    counter the U.S. worldview, have driven them closer--not just
    economically, but militarily--in a region that constitutes the closest
    avenue of approach for striking North America. This growing cooperation
    could ultimately result in Russia allowing PRC military access to
    Arctic airfields and ports, providing PRC the ability to project
    conventional forces toward North America as was demonstrated during
    their combined bomber incursion into the Alaskan ADIZ. To give them
    pause, NORAD made a concerted effort to showcase a highly professional
    and binationally integrated response to the relatively rudimentary
    combined Russian-PRC patrol. I believe that demonstrating readiness
    through presence; increased patrols and exercises with Artic-trained
    and equipped forces; updated infrastructure; and modernized all-domain
    awareness will make it clear that the U.S. is committed to defending
    the Arctic.

        26. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, the men and women of
    NORTHCOM do an outstanding job each and every time these intercepts
    occur. These aircraft sortie from interior Alaska at Eielson Air Force
    Base (AFB) or Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER) and fly thousands
    of miles, tanking multiple times in order to make the intercept.
    Luckily these intercepts have occurred largely without incident, but
    what steps should we take to reduce the risk to our aircrews, decrease
    search and rescue response time, and give you operational flexibility
    for responding to the continued aggression of Russian and Chinese
    patrols?
        General Guillot. Decreasing search and rescue (SAR) response time
    is a threefold challenge of timely incident reporting, coordinating a
    response, and executing the rescue. The impeccable reporting and
    coordination between the Alaska Rescue Coordination Center, U.S. Coast
    Guard District 17, and State emergency management and law enforcement
    agencies informs and activates the military and civil SAR enterprises
    supporting NORAD and USNORTHCOM operations. As missions continue to
    expand in both scope and scale, we should further bolster SAR
    capabilities by revitalizing dispersed operating locations that
    increase forward operating capabilities along the Aleutians and
    Northern Alaska. Additionally, as the Department's Arctic advocate, I
    support continued training and exercise opportunities in the Joint
    Pacific Alaska Range Complex that provide our Joint force access to the
    largest and most relevant training and exercise venue in the DOD and
    introduce them to the force generation and power projection challenges
    within the Arctic region, all while continuing our deterrence presence
    throughout the region.

        27. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, notwithstanding your close
    relationship with Admiral Samuel Paparo, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific
    Command (INDOPACOM), do you believe that Congress should reevaluate the
    Unified Command Plan with respect to the Northern Pacific and Arctic to
    streamline operational handoff of assets in the region between future
    NORTHCOM commanders and INDOPACOM?
        General Guillot. I do not see the need to adjust the Unified
    Command Plan assigned Area of Responsibility (AOR) boundary in the
    Northern Pacific between USINDOPACOM and USNORTHCOM. NORAD and
    USNORTHCOM coordinate on a regular basis with the USINDOPACOM for the
    seamless hand-off of tracking responsibility for adversary maritime and
    air assets and share resources without regard for the UCP boundary in
    order to defend Alaska, the Arctic, and Western U.S.

        28. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, do you believe that we need
    to increase our anti-submarine sensor capabilities in the northern
    pacific?
        General Guillot. Yes, I believe it is necessary to increase anti-
    submarine sensor capability in the northern Pacific. These sensors are
    crucial to undersea domain awareness as peer competitors continue to
    develop and deploy advanced attack submarines and unmanned underwater
    vehicles (UUVs) that could threaten the Homeland. A robust undersea
    sensor system is crucial to maintaining a comprehensive understanding
    of the underwater domain and deterring a spectrum of threats to the
    Homeland.
                                 arctic basing
        29. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, I know you are aware of the
    increased authoritarian aggression on our Nation's border near the
    State of Alaska. Russia and China are increasing collaboration in the
    air and on the sea. In 2022, 7 Russian and Chinese naval vessels were
    spotted 75 miles from Alaska. In 2023, a flotilla of 11 ships sailed
    near the Aleutians. In 2024, the first joint Russian and Chinese bomber
    task force flew into our Alaskan ADIZ. The same year, we saw the
    Chinese Coast Guard traverse through the Bering Strait, the first time
    we've seen them near Alaska. I have concerns that we are not adequately
    postured to respond to these threats posed by Russia and China in the
    Arctic Region and to our Homeland. Perhaps my biggest concern is that
    every time we respond to these threats, fighter aircraft fly over one-
    thousand miles, sometimes requiring multiple refueling operations along
    the way, because of lack of basing. Additionally, for the U.S. Navy and
    Coast Guard to maintain a constant presence in the Bering Sea and meet
    the Russians and Chinese where they are, they have to refuel at
    locations hundreds of miles away, such as Dutch Harbor. Can I get you
    to commit to helping me reopen basing on Adak?
        General Guillot. Yes, I am very interested in conducting operations
    from Adak, and our command has just completed an assessment of the Adak
    facilities and infrastructure. Further, USNORTHCOM and Alaskan Command
    (ALCOM) are working to identify infrastructure and logistics
    requirements in Alaska with a focus on Forward Operating Locations
    (FOLs) situated along the North Slope, Western Coast, and Aleutian
    Islands.

        30. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, how will this island assist
    you in strategic response in our ADIZ/EEZ?
        General Guillot. A Forward Operating Location (FOL) proximate to
    operating locations presents many benefits such as reduced air
    refueling tanker requirements, more rapid turn-around of fighters, and
    Naval port operations. As mentioned, Adak is included in our analysis
    of needed military infrastructure in Alaska.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
       intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and counter
                                   narcotics
        31. Senator Scott. General Guillot, to provide airborne coverage in
    support of stopping the flow of illegal migration, the Department has
    reportedly deployed high-end airborne assets such as P-8 Poseidon and
    RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft to patrol the border with Mexico. As we
    continue to manage priorities in INDOPACOM and elsewhere that require
    such assets for Great Power Competition-focused missions, are there
    other cost-effective airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and
    Reconnaissance (ISR) assets DOD is considering to add capacity to
    patrolling our border?
        General Guillot. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
    (ISR) capability in support of USNORTHCOM requirements along the
    southern border have proven to be critical. Sustainable operational
    costs are an important consideration for long-range planning, and
    USNORTHCOM is researching various platforms that can provide affordable
    and capable operations. Those options include unmanned systems of all
    sizes, especially novel long endurance platforms that can be used to
    complement, and potentially reduce the reliance on, systems such as the
    P-8 and RC-135.

        32. Senator Scott. Admiral Holsey, the Administration has
    prioritized countering Transnational Criminal Organizations, including
    Latin American drug cartels, from threatening U.S. interests. What
    additional assets could you deploy to support Joint Interagency Task
    Force South (JIATF-S) to increase the frequency and success rate of
    cocaine interdiction operations, including commercially available
    support that DOD's counter-drug fund had previously funded?
        Admiral Holsey. I believe that with increased investment, JIATF-S
    can make a significant impact in the fight against TCOs and aid in
    securing our Nation's borders. Additional surface assets and Maritime
    Patrol Aircraft would immediately increase the success rate of cocaine
    interdictions. As demonstrated by our CN surge operations in 2020, with
    more assets, JIATF-S can increase the success rate of illicit drug
    interdictions. Deploying more Coast Guard Cutters, particularly
    National Security Cutters, and Navy CRUDES with USCG Law Enforcement
    Detachments would significantly bolster the Task Force's capabilities.
    The sensor capabilities on these types of vessels make them very
    effective for the CN mission.
        Commercial capabilities, such as the Ship Special Mission (SSM), a
    contracted mothership that extends Partner Nation interceptors' range
    for high-seas interdictions, have helped offset gaps in DOD surface
    assets for unsourced validated requirements. For example, the SSM
    supported 23 disruptions in FY24, a 56 percent increase from FY22 and
    FY23.
        In addition to surface assets, increasing the availability of
    Maritime Patrol Aircraft is crucial to enhancing JIATFS interdiction
    capabilities. Commercial air ISR capabilities can help offset these DOD
    resourcing gaps and provide critical support to our operations.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
                                  panama canal
        33. Senator Budd. Admiral Holsey, if conflict broke out in the
    Pacific, can SOUTHCOM ensure freedom of passage for our Navy through
    the Panama Canal with their assigned forces? If not, what additional
    forces or capabilities would you need?
        Admiral Holsey. My number one priority is warfighter readiness.
    SOUTHCOM has comprehensive plans to preserve neutrality of the Canal
    and ensure unimpeded access. Should a specific credible threat emerge,
    I would request additional forces or capabilities.
        SOUTHCOM works by, with and through our Allies and Partners to
    address defense of the canal to ensure freedom of passage. I need
    presence across all domains--air, sea, space, and cyber space to be
    effective.
                          resourcing southern command
        34. Senator Budd. Admiral Holsey, understanding that SOUTHCOM is
    often resourced at less-than desired levels, what military options do
    you recommend to mitigate national security risks as efficiently as
    possible?
        Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM must be credible, present, and engaged
    with our regional partners for us to be successful. Working together
    with our Allies and partners to address common security challenges
    throughout the region is a significant force multiplier. Our allies add
    operational depth and significant maritime capacity to ongoing
    missions, especially in support of Counter Illicit Trafficking efforts.
    We must continue to prioritize our efforts to build partner capacity
    and ensure interoperability of key partners. Our side-by-side
    cooperation bolsters US security and blocks out adversaries. I need
    presence across all domains--air, sea, space, and cyber space to be
    effective.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                   communication with the mexican government
        35. Senator Blumenthal. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, the
    Mexican Government recently announced it would be deploying 10,000
    troops from its National Guard to the border to counter the flow of
    drugs and illegal migration. At certain points along the border, U.S.
    servicemembers are stationed less than 50 yards from the wall. To what
    extent is the Mexican Government sharing information with you?
    Specifically, how is that information relayed to the non-commissioned
    officers (NCOs) and junior soldiers manning the Military Sealift
    Command (MSC) on the border?
        General Guillot. Information from the Mexican Government is shared
    with and through our military forces, interagency partners, such as the
    Department of State, Customs and Border Protection, and other law
    enforcement agencies. From there, information is rapidly communicated
    to the appropriate military personnel on the border. We currently
    benefit from heightened information sharing with Mexican military
    forces, both on the border and at sea.
        Admiral Holsey. Operational coordination with the Mexican military
    is under the purview of NORTHCOM. I will defer to General Guillot.

        36. General Guillot, the Mexican State police, Mexican Federal
    police, Mexican National Guard, transnational criminal organizations,
    including the cartels are all operating on the Mexican side of the
    border near MSC Asarco, near El Paso, Texas. Border Patrol, Immigration
    and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Active Duty troops, Federalized National
    Guard troops, and the Texas National Guard supporting Operation Lone
    Star are all operating on the U.S. side of the border at MSC Ascaro.
    Can personnel from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
    Department of Defense communicate their operations at the tactical
    level? If so, how are commanders and DHS leaders deconflicting
    operations at all echelons?
        General Guillot. Operational information between the Department of
    Homeland Security and Department of Defense is shared regularly at
    various echelons of command. DOD personnel have been supporting Customs
    and Border Patrol agents directly, with communication and tactical
    coordination occurring regularly. Regarding communicating operational
    information from the U.S. side of the border to Mexican officials, that
    information is shared with and through JTF-Southern Border,
    USNORTHCOM's interagency partners, such as the Department of State, and
    Border Protection, and other law enforcement agencies.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                          scope of domestic operations
        37. Senator Warren. General Guillot, please provide a complete list
    of Active Duty units deployed to the southern border and the estimated
    length of deployment for each.
        General Guillot.
    Active Duty Army Units (as of 17 March 2025)
        89th Military Police (MP) Brigade (BDE) HQ until 30 September 2025

        41st Combat Engineer Company (CO) until 30 September 2025

        23d MP CO until 30 September 2025

        401st MP CO until 30 September 2025

        530th Combat Engineer Co (CEC) until 30 September 2025

        716th MP Battalion (BN) until 30 September 2025

        66th MP CO until 30 September 2025

        202d MP CO until 30 September 2025

        720th MP BN until 30 September 2025

        759th MP BN until 30 September 2025

        977th MP CO until 30 September 2025

        549th MP CO until 30 September 2025

        569th CEC until 30 September 2025

        24th Press Camp HQ until 30 September 2025

        10th Mountain Division HQ until 30 September 2025

        2-4ID Stryker BDE Combat Team until 30 September 2025

        101st Division Sustainment BDE until 30 September 2025

        264th Combat Sustainment Support BN (-) until 30 September 2025

        A CO, 189th DSSB until 30 September 2025

        B CO, 68th Division Sustainment Support BN (-) until 30 September
    2025

        C CO, 129th Division Sustainment Support BN (-) until 30 September
    2025

        Field Feeding Company, 61st Quartermaster BN until 30 September
    2025

        70th Movement Control Team until 30 September 2025

        19th Public Affairs Detachment until 30 September 2025

        3d Combat Aviation BDE until 15 October 2025

        2-3 GSAB until 30 September 2025

    Allocated, not yet deployed:

        20th Engineer BDE HHC until 30 September 2025

        19th Engineer BN until 30 September 2025

        15th Engineer CO until 30 September 2025

        687th Engineer CO until 30 September 2025

    U.S. Marine Corps
        1st Combat Engineer Battalion until 30 September 2025

    U.S. Navy
        Patrol Squadron 5 (2 P-8A AAS detachment) until 30 April 2025
    Joint Sourcing
        Joint Intelligence Company (Multiple units from Active Duty and
    Service Reserve Components sourced ISO CBP RFA25)
        24x USMC, 44x USA, 34x USAF, 30x USN, 6x USSF until 30 September
    2025

        Joint Intelligence Task Force--Southern Border (Multiple units from
    Active Duty and Service Reserve Components)
        29x USMC, 3x USSF, 38x USAF (currently still sourcing)

    Army Reserve Units
        90th Combat Sustainment BDE until 30 September 2025
        489th Engineering (EN) BN CO until 30 September 2025
        214th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment until 30 September 2025
        346th MP CO until 30 September 2025
        192d Quartermaster (QM) CO until 30 September 2025
        313th Army Band CO until 27 October 2025
        808th EN CO until 30 September 2025

        38. Senator Warren. General Guillot, please list all National Guard
    forces that are currently participating in southern border operations
    and the authority under which they have deployed.
        General Guillot. The following National Guard Units are deployed to
    the Southern Border. These units are activated in a Title 10 authority.
        3-140th Aviation (AV) BN until 30 September 2025

        277th Ordnance (OD) CO until 30 September 2025

        724th EN BN until 30 September 2025

        152th MP CO until 30 September 2025

        877th EN CO until 30 September 2025

        144th Transportation CO until 30 September 2025

        168th MP BN until 30 September 2025

        1463th Transportation CO until 30 September 2025

        157th MP CO until 30 September 2025

        142d EN BN until 30 September 2025

        109th EN BN until 30 September 2025

        132d MP CO until 30 September 2025

        1055th Transportation CO until September 2025

        118th Transportation CO until 30 September 2025

        39. Senator Warren. General Guillot, is DOD considering using any
    military bases or DOD-contracted facilities within the United States
    for migrant detention operations?
        General Guillot. DHS is conducting Pre-Deployment Site Surveys at
    several DOD locations but have yet to provide a RFA for proposed DOD
    support sites for OSD approval. I understand the sites under
    consideration include Camp Atterbury, IN; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-
    Lakehurst, NJ; Dover AFB, DE; Camp Parks, CA; and Travis AFB, CA.
    Additionally, the Department of the Army has received OSD approval to
    support the expansion of the DHS-ICE Montana facility in El Paso, TX.

        40. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, please
    provide a full list of tasks to which Active Duty Forces, DOD
    contractors, and DOD civilian employees will be assigned at the border
    and Guantanamo, along with a summary of functions to date and a summary
    of upcoming functions DOD troops will engage in.
        General Guillot. DOD border tasks are approved within Secretary of
    Defense Action Memorandums in support of DHS requests for assistance.
    Expanded and additional (e.g., upcoming) tasks are pending Secretary of
    Defense approval on a case-by-case basis. These tasks, collectively,
    function to establish, maintain, and seal the border to ensure
    territorial integrity of the United States.
        Current tasks include:
          Detection and Monitoring
          Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
          Maritime Patrol
          Warehousing / Logistical supply chain support
          Transportation support
          Vehicle maintenance support
          Training Support such as range safety officer, role
    players, and basic classroom preparation and maintenance
          Data entry support
          Light rotary wing aerial reconnaissance
          Medium rotary wing lift
          Provide airlift support to DHS to repatriate illegal
    aliens
          General Engineering support
          Intelligence analysis
          All-domain Intelligence Preparation of the Environment
        Admiral Holsey. The primary function of the Department of Defense
    (DOD) forces at GTMO is to support Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS)/Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). We provide the
    facilities and some services/logistical support to include on island
    transportation of the illegal aliens (IA)'s. Control and custody remain
    with ICE. Our tasks include:
          Expand migrant operations, as directed, to provide
    additional holding space for IAs.
          Establish camp operation and expansion of camps on the
    leeward side of NSGB and support operations on the Windward side to
    meet IA holding operations.
          Enhance IA Holding Operation at the Windward Holding
    Facility (Camp VI).
          Conduct IA holding operations at NSGB to provide care,
    safety, security, and transportation as required.

        41. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, how will
    DOD assess whether its southern border and Guantanamo operations are
    militarily effective?
        General Guillot. The USNORTHCOM southern border concept plan
    defines measures of performance, measures of effectiveness, and clear
    objectives for each line of effort in the southern border mission.
    USNORTHCOM headquarters and supporting joint task forces, in
    coordination with our interagency partners, develop and track metrics
    daily to refine military operations and improve effectiveness.
        Admiral Holsey. I have been tasked with increasing capacity to hold
    illegal aliens at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay (NSGB) as repatriation
    efforts occur in support of DHS and ICE. At the same time, I am working
    with NORTHCOM to address defense of the Homeland as we look further out
    into the SOUTHCOM AOR and work to counter threats and address security
    challenges that pose a threat to the Homeland before they reach our
    borders. I will assess SOUTHCOM's effectiveness through that lens and
    our overall contributions to defense of the Homeland. Our operation's
    effectiveness will be measured in coordination with DOD and DHS
    objectives.

        42. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, please describe DOD's precise
    role(s) in Guantanamo's migrant detention operations.
        Admiral Holsey. The DOD has tasked SOUTHCOM to support the DHS in
    response to the President's Executive Order and declaration of a
    national emergency for the border. SOUTHCOM is supporting DHS with the
    transport, care and safety of illegal aliens with final deportation
    orders at Guantanamo Bay until they are repatriated or accepted by
    another country.

        43. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, how, if at all, are DOD
    personnel directly involved in the detention of any migrants at
    Guantanamo?
        Admiral Holsey. DOD's role is in support to DHS/ICE. ICE maintains
    custody of illegal aliens and DOD helps by providing facilities and
    other approved services and logistics support, e.g. food, laundry,
    medical services, security, and utilities. To this effort, our force is
    comprised primarily of security personnel (Miliary Police), HQs staff,
    and logistical support.

        44. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, has DOD (or any of its
    components) signed any memoranda of understanding or similar agreements
    with DHS regarding the detention of migrants at Guantanamo? Please
    provide a copy of any agreements if so.
        Admiral Holsey. DOD and DHS signed a Memorandum of Understanding on
    7 March 2025 that clarifies the scope of DOD support. Defer to OSD to
    provide the signed MOU.

        45. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, describe DOD's precise role at
    the Migrant Operations Center (MOC) and Camp VI and how this role is
    currently projected to evolve.
        Admiral Holsey. DHS operates the MOC building. SOUTHCOM is
    providing external security around the MOC building to support DHS/ICE
    with holding the low threat IAs. At Camp VI, SOUTHCOM supports DHS/ICE
    by providing the facility to hold High Threat Illegal Aliens and
    assisting with internal security. DOD supports operations at both
    locations by providing other approved services and logistics support.
    ICE retains full custody of all IAs.

        46. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, there are reports that DOD
    personnel are guarding migrants at Camp VI. Please explain in detail
    who is currently guarding Camp VI and whether there are plans to change
    the personnel stationed at Camp VI.
        Admiral Holsey. Camp VI is being used to support DHS/ICE with
    holding of high threat illegal aliens. For DOD, we have Army Military
    Police that provides external security and assist ICE with internal
    security. These Military Police are under the operational control of
    Joint Task Force Southern Guard.

        47. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, please provide a summary of the
    age and gender of migrants currently being held at Guantanamo's MOC.
        Admiral Holsey. I defer to the DHS to provide current status and
    numbers regarding illegal aliens at NSGB.

        48. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, has DOD been informed of any
    plan to detain women or children at Guantanamo?
        Admiral Holsey. At this point, SOUTHCOM has not been informed of
    any plans by DHS to transfer any persons but unaccompanied adult males
    for holding at NSGB.

        49. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, how will DOD assess whether its
    Guantanamo operations are militarily effective?
        Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM is in support of DHS for this operation.
    Camp operations have been sufficient to meet DHS current and projected
    need. We will strive to meet our obligations to support DHS while
    remaining good stewards of financial resources, equipment, and
    personnel assigned to the mission while continuing to meet our theater
    requirements.
                          cost and private contractors
        50. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, how is DOD
    tracking border and Guantanamo support activity costs and ensuring the
    accuracy of cost tallies?
        General Guillot. USNORTHCOM provides inputs on expenditures by the
    combatant command headquarters for southern border operations to the
    Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) in accordance
    with the 13 April 2018 ``Reporting Requirements for the Department of
    Defense Support to Department of Homeland Security in Securing the
    Southern Border.'' For questions on broader DOD cost tracking,
    USNORTHCOM defers to the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense
    (Comptroller), which is responsible for capturing and tracking overall
    costs for border operations.
        Admiral Holsey. OSD Comptroller has directed the Services and
    Agencies to establish accounting mechanisms to track costs of the
    mission. I've directed my Headquarters staff and Components to collect
    and report costs back to their Service Comptrollers and OSD
    Comptroller. I defer to OSD Comptroller for further details.

        51. Senator Warren. General Guillot, what was the total cost of
    DOD's border deployment between 2018 to 2020?
        General Guillot. The border deployment activation is Service
    funded. Costs are captured and reported to the Office of the
    Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) using Standard Financial
    Information System (SFIS). USNORTHCOM does not have visibility into
    Service financial systems to track costs.

        52. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, what does
    DOD currently project the total cost of border and Guantanamo
    operations will each be this fiscal year?
        General Guillot. USNORTHCOM defers to OUSD Comptroller which
    projects and tracks total costs.
        Admiral Holsey. As the Combatant Commander, I execute the directed
    mission, the Services provide the forces and resources, and the
    Services report projected and actual costs to OSD. DOD and DHS signed a
    Memorandum of Understanding on 7 March 2025 that clarifies the scope of
    DOD support. There remain details to be defined such as the standards
    of care and the number of illegal aliens to be held at Naval Station
    Guantanamo Bay. Once defined, OSD Comptroller will work with the
    Services to assess projected costs.

        53. Senator Warren. General Guillot, DOD previously informed the
    Senate Armed Services Committee that it estimates the Department will
    spend roughly $900 million on its southern border deployment through
    the end of this fiscal year. How did DOD reach that estimate, and what
    assumptions underlie that estimate?
        General Guillot. For questions regarding Department projections,
    USNORTHCOM defers to OUSD Comptroller, which is responsible for
    projecting DOD costs.

        54. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what does DOD project the total
    cost of Guantanamo's MOC operations will be this fiscal year? If no
    single cost estimate is available, please provide a series of cost
    estimates based on the different scenarios for which DOD is planning.
        Admiral Holsey. DOD and DHS signed a Memorandum of Understanding on
    7 March 2025 that refines the scope of DOD support. There remain
    details to be defined such as the standards of care and the number of
    illegal aliens to be held at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay. Once
    defined, OSD Comptroller will work with the Services to assess
    projected costs.

        55. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, what have
    been the total operational costs of DOD's border and Guantanamo
    deployment since January 20, 2025?
        General Guillot. For questions regarding Department cost
    assessments, USNORTHCOM defers to the OUSD Comptroller.
        Admiral Holsey. As Combatant Commander, I execute the mission, and
    the Services provide the forces and resources. I'm appreciative of the
    support received from all the Services. In terms of costs, OSD
    Comptroller has centralized cost reporting and collects costs from all
    Services and Agencies. FY25 obligations for Operation Southern Guard
    are approximately $31M as of 27 March 2025, which covers
    transportation, supplies, facilities improvements and repairs, and base
    operation support.

        56. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, what
    budgetary account will be used to pay for the border and Guantanamo
    operations?
        General Guillot. OUSD Comptroller determines the budgetary accounts
    used for border operations. Costs are captured and reported to the
    Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) using Standard
    Financial Information System (SFIS).
        Admiral Holsey. OSD Comptroller has centralized cost reporting and
    collects costs from all Services and Agencies. Per OSD's cost reporting
    system, Service Operations and Maintenance accounts have been used to
    pay for Operations Southern Guard to date. My Headquarters' costs for
    temporary duty travel and civilian overtime have been paid using Army
    Operations and Maintenance appropriations. I defer to OSD Comptroller
    and the Services for further details.

        57. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, which
    border and Guantanamo expenses, if any, is DOD paying for on a non-
    reimbursable basis? If DOD is waiving reimbursement for any expenses
    under title 10 U.S.C. Sec.  277, provide the justification for doing
    so.
        General Guillot. In accordance with Secretary of Defense Guidance,
    DOD is supporting Department of Homeland Security on a non-reimbursable
    basis under authorities provided by Section 1059 of the 2016 NDAA.
        Admiral Holsey. I am presently tasked to provide support to DHS on
    a non-reimbursable basis. The determination of reimbursement is made by
    OSD, and I defer to OSD.

        58. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, does DOD
    currently have a contract with any private contractor for migrant-
    related border or Guantanamo operations? If so, for each contract,
    please share the name of the company, the tasks it performs under the
    contract, the amount and duration of the contract, and a copy of the
    contract.
        General Guillot. USNORTHCOM does not have any contracts with any
    private contractor for migrant-related border operations that directly
    engage in migrant-related activities such as processing, holding,
    transporting, feeding, billeting. Current contracts are limited to
    operations to secure the border, force sustainment, and logistics. Our
    current southern border contract support is conducted through Army
    North (ARNORTH), Joint Task Force North (JTF-N), and Joint Task Force
    Southern Border (JTF-SB).
        Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM has not entered into any new contracts to
    support IA holding operations at NSGB. Instead, the Navy has
    temporarily modified existing Base Operating Service (BOS) Contracts to
    meet immediate needs until the requirements have been defined and
    negotiated between DOD and the DHS, namely, the number of IAs to be
    housed at GTMO and the standards of care for those IAs.
        The contracts that have been modified to support Illegal Alien
    Holding Operations at NSGB up to this point include:

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                      Fiscal Year 2025 Est.
                               Company                                                           Task                                         Cost
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Kira Construction Management LLC.............................        Port / Ferry Operation Services: Support increased ferry                  $170,000
                                                                       operations to/from the airfield and holding facilities and
                                                                              concrete delivery for security fencing construction
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Pentad Corporation...........................................                                          Food Galley Services: Leew$2.02 million contract
                                                                                U.S. Forces for 90 days with two 30 days options.      with $750,000 for 90
                                                                                                                                                       days
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Vectrus (GCSC)...............................................                                     Security Fencing and Other Limited Serv$3.795 millionted 81
                                                                                           mile of security fencing around Camps L1 and L6, planning
                                                                                                services, and mobile light plants
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Vectrus (GCSC)...............................................     Base Operating Services (BOS) Blanket Task Order: Providing                  $300,000
                                                                                                             sustainment services
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        59. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, given the
    Government Accountability Office's 2021 findings that DOD's estimates
    of the costs of its border operations were ``not reliable'' and
    excluded ``significant costs,'' what steps is DOD now taking to ensure
    the reliability of its cost estimates for border and Guantanamo
    operations?
        General Guillot. OUSD Comptroller has directed the Department of
    Defense to track costs using a Standard Contingency Code per the 13
    April 2018 Reporting Requirements for the Department of Defense Support
    to Department of Homeland Security in Securing the Southern Border.
        Admiral Holsey. OSD Comptroller is working with the Services to
    establish cost estimates for the operation. I defer to OSD Comptroller
    for details.

        60. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what does DOD project the cost
    per bed will be at Guantanamo's MOC and at Guantanamo's Camp VI?
        Admiral Holsey. OSD Comptroller is working with the Services to
    establish cost estimates for the operation. I defer to OSD Comptroller
    for details.

        61. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, how much does DOD expect to
    spend to get the permanent infrastructure at Guantanamo up to habitable
    standards this fiscal year?
        Admiral Holsey. At this time, no permanent structure construction
    is planned or requested.

        62. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, how much does DOD expect to
    spend on soft-sided facilities at Guantanamo this fiscal year?
        Admiral Holsey. I defer to OSD for further details.

        63. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, how much
    does DOD expect to spend on deploying personnel to the border and
    Guantanamo this fiscal year?
        General Guillot. While I defer to the OUSD Comptroller for its cost
    estimates, it is my understanding that OUSD Comptroller and the Joint
    Staff are currently preparing FY25 DOD estimates to deploy personnel to
    the border.
        Admiral Holsey. OSD Comptroller has directed the Services and
    Agencies to establish accounting mechanisms to track costs of the
    mission. I defer to OSD Comptroller for further details.
                                   readiness
        64. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, please
    describe how DOD is assessing the impact of southern border and
    Guantanamo operations on troops' readiness.
        General Guillot. As the Commander of USNORTHCOM, I am responsible
    for assessing the readiness to execute the missions assigned to
    USNORTHCOM. To date, the forces I have been provided have been
    performing all assigned missions admirably. I defer to the military
    Services for assessments of troop readiness within their respective
    services as the force providers assess the impact of current and
    emerging requirements and the impact on their readiness to provide
    ready and trained forces for other current and future requirements. I
    will continue to coordinate with force providers to ensure they have an
    accurate picture on current and upcoming requirements.
        Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM is monitoring impact to unit and mission
    readiness though monthly readiness reporting in the Defense Readiness
    Reporting System (DRRS). Units, especially JTF GTMO and ARSOUTH
    continue to evaluate and will update impacts during daily updates, if
    urgent, or in the monthly DRRS reports. Additionally, I routinely
    engage my service components and staff to better understand the mission
    impacts on troop readiness in addition to utilizing the official DOD
    system of record to gauge readiness (DRRS).

        65. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, have any
    training exercises been delayed or canceled due to the recent
    deployments to the southern border or Guantanamo? Please provide the
    date and type of any affected training exercises and explain which
    units were impacted.
        General Guillot. No NORAD and USNORTHCOM exercises have been
    delayed or canceled due to recent deployments and Southern Border
    operations. However, although not due to deployments, the Tier 1 ARDENT
    SENTRY 25 exercise that took place 12-18 March 2025 was scaled down to
    a Headquarters-response cell level of participation to meet cross-
    Combatant Command objectives. N&NC Components also scaled their
    participation in AS 25 to a response cell to address competing mission
    demands.
        Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM has not canceled or delayed any training
    exercises due to the recent deployments to NSGB.

        66. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, is DOD
    separating units when sending personnel to the border or Guantanamo? If
    so, please explain the rationale for doing so, given evidence of how
    doing so between 2018 to 2020 harmed units' readiness.
        General Guillot. I defer to the Joint Staff regarding the sourcing
    of forces assigned to the mission on the southern border.
        Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM has requested specific capabilities from
    DOD but does not make the overall determination of which units from
    across the military services will meet the request. In some instances,
    the services provide a capability in the appropriate size for the
    mission, such as a Military Police Company or Field Feeding Team, while
    retaining some home station capabilities and depth.

        67. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, the
    Government Accountability Office (GAO) previously found that ``DOD has
    not defined what it considers to be a manageable impact on readiness.''
    How is DOD determining when an anticipated impact on readiness is
    ``manageable''?
        General Guillot. I defer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Department-
    level assessments of readiness.
        Admiral Holsey. Within the SOUTHCOM theater, we see this operation
    as having a manageable impact on readiness. As we continue to execute
    our other priority missions SOUTHCOM monitors impact to unit and
    mission readiness through monthly readiness reporting in the Defense
    Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). Units continually evaluate readiness
    and will update impacts as appropriate.
                                     morale
        68. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, how, if at
    all, is DOD monitoring the impact of the border deployment on troops'
    morale?
        General Guillot. Troop morale is monitored at all echelons of
    command. All units deployed to the southern border have a commander and
    senior enlisted leader who conduct unit circulation as a means of
    monitoring unit performance and morale. These leaders report their
    assessment of unit morale up the chain of command.
        Admiral Holsey. Commanders and all leaders routinely assess the
    morale of our highly trained forces to ensure they remain focused on
    the mission.

        69. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, will DOD
    commit to inform the Senate Armed Services Committee if it sees
    patterns of suicide, substance abuse, and other warning signs that the
    border operations are degrading servicemembers' mental health?
        General Guillot. I commit to working with Department to ensure our
    military personnel receive the necessary care and treatment in support
    of the southern border mission and will always be transparent with the
    Committee.
        Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM will continue to report suicide and
    substance abuse events consistent with established reporting
    requirements and procedures, and Commanders will continue to assess the
    behavioral health and readiness of their units. All servicemembers
    deployed in support of JTF-SG have access to NSGB's hospital, programs
    and services, including Morale, Welfare & Recreation, and Behavioral
    Health. JTF-SG has a mobile hospital with primary care, laboratory, and
    X-Ray capabilities. It is staffed with two (2) behavioral health
    personnel.

                             conduct and conditions
        70. Senator Warren. General Guillot, what are the rules of
    engagement that govern each unit deployed to the border?
        General Guillot. Units deployed to the Southern Border are
    operating under the Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF)
    established in CJCSI 3121.01. NORTHCOM has further clarified arming
    guidance, specifically to ensure force protection, for the forces in
    close proximity to the Southern Border.

        71. Senator Warren. General Guillot, are servicemembers authorized
    to use force at the border?
        General Guillot. The SRUF authorizes servicesmembers to use
    appropriate force in self-defense. The Chairman of Joint Chiefs of
    Staff Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) apply to actions taken
    by U.S. commanders and their forces during all DOD civil support and
    routine Military Department functions occurring inside U.S. territory
    or territorial seas. SRUF sets out the basic self-defense posture, and
    the use of force is only authorized when applicable pursuant to the
    SRUF.

        72. Senator Warren. General Guillot, in 2020, the DOD Inspector
    General found that some troops did not receive Standing Rules for the
    Use of Force (SRUF) training. What percentage of troops currently
    deployed to the border have completed training on when and how they can
    use force? Please describe the training they receive on the
    authorization of military force.
        General Guillot. All servicemembers arriving for duty at the
    Southern Border receive Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF)
    training as part of the Joint Reception, Staging, Onward-Movement, and
    Integration (JRSOI) process. The SRUF training consists of
    instructional discussion followed by a series of scenario-based
    vignettes.

        73. Senator Warren. General Guillot, are servicemembers under DOD's
    command authorized to use force against unarmed civilians at the
    border?
        General Guillot. SRUF sets out the basic self-defense posture, and
    the use of force against unarmed civilians is only authorized when
    applicable pursuant to the SRUF.
        The Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules for the Use of
    Force (SRUF) apply to actions taken by U.S. commanders and their forces
    during all DOD civil support and routine Military Department functions
    occurring inside U.S. territory or territorial seas.

        74. Senator Warren. General Guillot, under what circumstances, if
    any, are servicemembers under DOD's command authorized to make arrests
    at the border?
        General Guillot. Servicemembers are not authorized to make arrests
    at the border. CBP conducts all law enforcement functions at the
    border.

        75. Senator Warren. General Guillot, how does DOD handle encounters
    with citizens at the border?
        General Guillot. DOD notifies CBP upon detection of people/groups
    attempting to cross the border illegally and CBP takes appropriate
    actions.

        76. Senator Warren. General Guillot, are any noncitizens currently
    being held at the Buckley Space Force Base in Colorado? If so, please
    describe the authority under which they are being held and the protocol
    for them to access legal counsel.
        General Guillot. According to reporting by Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement, no illegal aliens were held at Buckley Space Force Base.

        77. Senator Warren. General Guillot, has DHS informed DOD of
    whether Guantanamo's MOC will be used to hold any migrants who have not
    received final orders of removal?
        General Guillot. I defer to the Commander of U.S. Southern Command
    regarding matters related to Guantanamo Bay, and to the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense regarding Department-level discussions.

        78. Senator Warren. General Guillot, have any migrants currently at
    the MOC not received final removal orders?
        General Guillot. I defer to the Commander of U.S. Southern Command
    regarding matters related to Guantanamo Bay.

        79. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, are migrants at the MOC or Camp
    VI free to leave or are they being formally detained? If they are
    detained, under what legal authority are migrants being detained at
    Guantanamo's Camp VI?
        Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM is providing DOD facilities and limited
    types of services/logistics to DHS in response to a Request for
    Assistance from the Secretary of DHS. DHS detains these IAs in
    enforcement of U.S. immigration law, and DHS retains full legal custody
    and control over the illegal aliens at the MOC and Camp VI on NSGB. At
    this point, DHS has transferred only those illegal aliens with a final
    removal status to NSGB. Historically, any migrants encountered at sea
    by USCG are under full custody of DHS or their custody is transferred
    to the Department of State while held at the MOC.

        80. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, GAO has found that DHS has
    detained U.S. citizens after mistaking them for foreign nationals. What
    steps, if any, does DOD take to confirm the identity of an individual
    before taking them into custody at a military facility or on a military
    aircraft?
        Admiral Holsey. All individuals transferred to NSGB have been
    evaluated through DHS and ICE procedures and are the subject of final
    removal orders and remain in the full legal custody and control of DHS/
    ICE.

        81. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, to date, has DOD, to the
    Department's knowledge, accidentally or otherwise, taken any U.S.
    citizens into custody at a military facility or on a military aircraft?
    If so, please list all such circumstances, including an explanation for
    how and why these individuals were taken into custody, and how long
    they were in DOD custody.
        Admiral Holsey. We are not aware of any U.S. citizens transported
    to NSGB under DHS control or custody. We are informed by DHS that all
    persons transferred to NSGB have been the subject of final removal
    orders under U.S. immigration law.

        82. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what is DOD's timeline for
    constructing permanent structures at the MOC and what will be the
    capacity of the permanent structures that DOD is constructing?
        Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM is still assessing future Illegal Alien
    holding options at Naval Station Guantanamo. At this time, no permanent
    structure construction is planned or requested.

        83. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, how long on average do you
    anticipate a migrant will be held in a tent or other soft-sided
    facility?
        Admiral Holsey. Currently, no IAs are being held in the tents or
    soft-sided facilities.

        84. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what term is being used to
    describe noncitizens deported from the United States to Guantanamo?
        Admiral Holsey. The term being used to describe noncitizens removed
    by DHS from the U.S. to NSGB is `illegal alien.'

        85. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what is DOD's plan for migrants
    held at Guantanamo whose home country will not accept their
    repatriation?
        Admiral Holsey. I defer to the DHS to answer this question.

        86. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what is DOD's plan for
    evacuating the MOC during extreme weather events?
        Admiral Holsey. Naval Region South-East is finalizing an extreme
    weather shelter plan with all stakeholders at NSGB. We will develop
    options, tailored to the extreme weather threat, to include shelter in
    place options and evacuation options.

        87. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what Government entities, if
    any, will conduct onsite inspections of Guantanamo's MOC and Camp VI,
    and at what frequency? Will they publicly report on findings?
        Admiral Holsey. Our standards of care for both Camp VI and the MOC
    are based on interim Standard Operating Procedures utilized by DHS as
    the lead Federal agency, with the DOD supporting. The frequency of
    inspections and any reporting process within DOD/DHS still needs to be
    determined, consistent with the newly signed MOU between the
    departments.

        88. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, has DOD received requests for
    access to the MOC or Camp VI by legal service providers, humanitarian
    organizations, press, or other members of the public and how have
    requests been handled?
        Admiral Holsey. DHS is the lead Federal agency for immigration
    enforcement. SOUTHCOM is providing support to DHS illegal alien holding
    operations on Guantanamo Bay. DHS/ICE retains legal, physical, and
    administrative custody of illegal aliens in their charge, and the roles
    and responsibilities for support are dictated by a Memorandum of
    Agreement and ICE Detention Standards. All requests for access are
    immediately forwarded to DHS and DOD Policy for coordination with DHS/
    ICE and JTF Southern Guard personnel co-located on Guantanamo Bay for
    their action as appropriate.

        89. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, describe DOD's plans for
    facilitating migrants' access to counsel.
        Admiral Holsey. DOD is in support of DHS requirements, to include
    access to counsel. On February 19, 2025, DHS posted written notice, in
    English and Spanish, of the procedure for illegal aliens to request to
    place a private, unmonitored telephone call to counsel. For illegal
    aliens housed at Camp VI, counsel calls are conducted in a building
    adjacent to Camp VI. It has six telephones in six separate rooms, each
    with a table and chair. During the calls, guards maintain line of sight
    through the use of video monitoring (which does not include sound). DOD
    facilitates DHS movements of the illegal aliens for these calls as
    needed. For low threat illegal aliens housed at the MOC on the Leeward
    side of the Naval Station, counsel calls occur from a private room in
    the MOC, which is under the control of DHS.

        90. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, has the Department of Homeland
    Security requested that DOD facilitate confidential legal phone calls
    or legal visits?
        Admiral Holsey. See above response for coordination with DHS for
    use of DOD facilities.

        91. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what steps is DOD taking to
    make the MOC and Camp VI facilities habitable for the number of
    migrants expected to be held at Guantanamo?
        Admiral Holsey. DHS is responsible for the MOC building. SOUTHCOM
    and JTF-SG are responsible for the Camp VI facility, with ICE
    responsible for maintaining custody of IAs. SOUTHCOM has a facilities
    maintenance team that responds to any maintenance requirements for
    cells in Camp VI, or to assist ICE. DOD is committed to meeting
    standards of care for IAs to include meals and hygiene.

        92. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, are any migrants currently
    housed in spaces with black mold, leaks, electrical fires, other
    housing quality issues?
        Admiral Holsey. JTF-SG relocated some IAs after individual cells
    began to experience clogged toilets and plumbing issues after excessive
    use or misuse. The damaged cells have been repaired and are currently
    available for reoccupation. I defer to DHS to provide information on
    conditions in the MOC building.

        93. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, as of the date of your
    response, what is the current capacity of the MOC at Guantanamo?
        Admiral Holsey. The DHS/ICE run MOC building capacity is 50 IAs.
    JTF-SG has established tents with cots in the MOC West and East
    overflow areas that could house an additional 520 IAs. These are the
    same tents and cots U.S. service members routinely live in.

        94. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, how long does DOD anticipate it
    will take DOD to complete the first phase of the MOC expansion to 2,000
    migrants?
        Admiral Holsey. JTF-SG has already established the physical space
    for holding up to 2,500 IAs if needed.

        95. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what is the maximum number of
    migrants for whom Guantanamo's MOC currently has the capacity and
    resources to provide sanitary facilities, medical care, food, and
    potable water?
        Admiral Holsey. We currently have combined capacity for 570 IAs in
    the MOC building and MOC overflow tents, with restrooms, showers, food,
    water, and cots. DHS is responsible for medical and plans to meter
    their medical footprint based on the IA population in the MOC. DOD is
    available to provide other authorized medical care if needed.

        96. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, please explain the standards of
    care that DOD personnel are bound to provide at Guantanamo and provide
    a copy of DOD's protocol, if any, on standards of care.
        Admiral Holsey. Illegal Alien Holding Operations on NSGB are in
    support of DHS execution of national immigration law, ICE maintains
    legal custody of the illegal alien population and is responsible for
    applying standards of care consistent with care required to provide
    under US law and regulations. An MOU between DOD and DHS on roles and
    responsibilities for holding illegal aliens at NSGB was signed on March
    7, 2025. It provides for broad standards of care with a goal to have
    DOD and DHS agree additional requirements within 15 days. Those
    discussions are underway to ensure proper custody with care and
    treatment in accordance with U.S. law.

        97. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what emergency and non-
    emergency medical services are provided to migrants at Guantanamo?
        Admiral Holsey. DOD may provide IAs with preventative health
    services, first aid and emergent life-saving medical care if needed
    subject to capability and availability on NSGB. DHS is responsible for
    MEDEVAC for any higher level of care needed that is not provided by DOD
    for IAs at NSGB.

        98. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what is the number of medical
    providers available to treat migrants at Guantanamo?
        Admiral Holsey. As are pre-screened to prevent any medically
    fragile adult males from being held at GTMO. DHS is the lead agency for
    medical care of IAs and currently has more than 15 providers at NSGB.
    DOD is available to provide preventative health services, first aid and
    emergent life-saving medical care if needed.
        99. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, are there plans to downgrade
    the naval hospital at Guantanamo to a clinic? If so, what services
    would no longer be available to migrants?
        Admiral Holsey. DOD may provide IAs with preventative health
    services, first aid and emergent life-saving medical care if needed
    subject to capability and availability on NSGB. DHS is responsible for
    MEDEVAC for any higher level of care needed that is not provided by DOD
    for IAs at NSGB.

        100. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, to date, have there been any
    injuries, medical events, or fatalities of migrants at Guantanamo? If
    so, please provide a list of all such incidents.
        Admiral Holsey. DHS is the lead agency for medical care of IAs.
    There have been no fatalities of IAs at NSGB but there have been 10
    cases of IAs committing acts of self-harm, 3 IAs treated for
    hyperglycemia, and 5 cases of dental work. All cases were provided
    appropriate medical treatment for their corresponding condition.

                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
           joint task force guantanamo expansion effects on readiness
        101. Senator Kelly. Admiral Holsey, SOUTHCOM has been asked to
    dramatically expand the Migrant Operations Center at Naval Station
    Guantanamo to accommodate up to 30,000 migrants, well beyond the level
    ever held there. When you consider the cost of transporting a migrant
    there before deporting them to Cuba, it's clear this is about headlines
    and intimidation. SOUTHCOM is already balancing many critical missions,
    including counter-narcotics operations. Any resources dedicated to
    expanding detention capacity at Guantanamo--whether personnel, funding,
    or infrastructure--must come from somewhere. What are specific
    tradeoffs that SOUTHCOM must make to accommodate this mission?
        Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM is monitoring impact to unit and mission
    readiness though monthly readiness reporting in the Defense Readiness
    Reporting System (DRRS). As of the 1 March report, SOUTHCOM components
    have not reflected any impact to their readiness, apart from the need
    for additional augmentees from force providers, if an additional
    contingency should arise. Units, especially JTF GTMO and ARSOUTH are
    continuing to evaluate and will update impacts during daily updates, if
    urgent, or in monthly DRRS reports.

        102. Senator Kelly. Admiral Holsey, how many ICE personnel are
    stationed at Guantanamo now?
        Admiral Holsey. ICE personnel currently supporting this mission at
    NSGB fall under DHS. At the time of this response, there are 20 ICE
    officers and 70 ICE contracted guards.

        103. Senator Kelly. Admiral Holsey, what is the division of duties
    between SOUTHCOM and DHS as it relates to the immigration detainees?
        Admiral Holsey. DOD and SOUTHCOM are in a support role to DHS and
    ICE. ICE is responsible for the custody of all IAs at NSGB. DOD
    military police augment the ICE contract guards with interior security,
    whereas U.S. Marines provide perimeter security exterior to the camps.

        104. Senator Kelly. Admiral Holsey, are the U.S. servicemembers
    serving in Guantanamo Bay trained on non-combatant detainee operations
    in accordance with applicable laws and regulations?
        Admiral Holsey. Yes, but this is not a DOD non-combatant detainee
    operation under DODD 2310.01E. I want to clearly distinguish the
    Illegal Alien Holding Operations in support of DHS from the Law of War
    Detention Operations and Military Commissions. They have separate guard
    forces and are completely different missions. For the Illegal Alien
    Holding Operations, specific training in line with ICE detention
    standards is being reviewed. All interactions with the illegal alien
    population in ICE custody ensure their humane treatment and safety and
    security of all personnel.
                fentanyl / transnational criminal organizations
        105. Senator Kelly. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, I am deeply
    concerned about cartels and the flow of drugs across the southern
    border. NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM are uniquely positioned to provide
    counter narcotics support to prevent the manufacturing of fentanyl with
    precursors imported from China. NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM have long
    supported counter narcotics and human trafficking operations across the
    southern border. What have you seen within your areas regarding the
    importation of Fentanyl precursors from China?
        General Guillot. China continues to be the primary source for
    precursor chemicals used to produce fentanyl. These precursor chemicals
    make their way to Mexico through air and maritime conveyances and are
    often concealed in legitimate goods that are mislabeled or routed
    through third party countries. However, not all precursors used in the
    production of illegal drugs are themselves illegal. Supply chain
    disruption is made more difficult by the unlawful diversion of
    otherwise lawful dual-use chemicals imported for legitimate business
    purposes. Additionally, the chemical companies often communicate
    directly with customers through encrypted platforms and accept
    cryptocurrency payments which reduce their risk of detection by law
    enforcement.
        Admiral Holsey. We are not seeing fentanyl trafficking in the
    maritime domain. Legal fentanyl precursors are shipped into Mexico.
    Mexican Cartels produce finished fentanyl in Mexico and traffic it over
    the Southwest U.S. land border. Maritime interdictions directly support
    investigations into transnational criminal networks involved in
    fentanyl productions/trafficking and other criminal activity.
        The majority of illicit fentanyl synthesis occurs in Mexico, and we
    do not have confirmed cases of any illicit fentanyl synthesis in the
    SOUTHCOM AOR. However, Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Guatemala are
    identified as potential hotspots for fentanyl supply manufacturing.

        106. Senator Kelly. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, I know much
    of your work on counter narcotics efforts requires collaboration and
    cooperation from our partners in the region. I worry the
    Administration's actions using the military for deportations and
    threatening tariffs appear to be creating unnecessary tensions with our
    regional partners. What does that cooperation look like today and what
    can be done to improve cooperation toward your efforts in the region?
        General Guillot. The United States-Mexico military-to-military
    relationship is strong and resilient. My Mexican military counterparts
    and I have regular communications to facilitate transparency and
    coordination, to reiterate mutual respect for sovereignty, and to
    ensure the combined security of the border. USNORTHCOM security
    cooperation efforts with Mexico focus on homeland defense and
    addressing the following mutual defense priorities: (1) Domain
    Awareness, (2) Domain Control, and (3) Institutional Strengthening.
    USNORTHCOM invests over $25 million annually in Title 10 security
    cooperation funding with the Mexican military and includes significant
    investments in air interception, intel sharing, ISR, cUAS, riverine and
    littoral capabilities, counter-WMD, SOF capabilities, logistics,
    training, equipment, exercises, and subject matter expert exchanges
    with the Mexican Secretariats of National Defense and Navy. These
    security cooperation efforts address long-term North American defense
    priorities while enabling Mexico's border security and counter
    transnational criminal organization operations. With sufficient
    resources, our existing USNORTHCOM managed bilateral framework could be
    increasingly leveraged to support emerging southern border and
    territorial integrity requirements.
        Admiral Holsey. Overall, our mil-mil engagements in the region
    remain strong, especially in areas like counternarcotics and targeting
    cartels that threaten both the United States and our partners. Our
    approach to strengthening military and security partnerships takes the
    'long view;' through joint operations, multinational exercises, and
    training, we build a foundation of trust and mutual understanding that
    endures despite any geopolitical changes.
        In the area of counternarcotics, our partners are eager to work
    with us to counter the flow of drugs, people, and other illicit traffic
    by cartels and criminal groups, and our collaboration in this area has
    never been stronger. Partners and Allies now contribute to 880 percent
    of JIATF South interdictions, and we are deepening CN cooperation
    nations like the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Guatemala, who
    welcome our engagement and share our commitment to hemispheric
    security. With the recent designation of certain cartels and criminal
    groups as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), many nations are
    expressing an interest in even greater CN cooperation. Simply put, our
    partners are with us in this fight, and I anticipate a deepening of our
    defense and security relationships in the year ahead.
        Working by, with, and through our partners to address security
    challenges in the hemisphere is what we do every day. But we see
    increasing competition in security cooperation with malign State actors
    like the China and Russia. That is why it is so critical for us to
    continue to meet our partners at their needs, delivering security
    solutions to address common security challenges that also impacts
    United States national security interests.

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