[Senate Hearing 119-51]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-51
ADVANCING AMERICAN INTERESTS
IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 5, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-032 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DAVID MCCORMICK, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
STEVE DAINES, Montana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
TED CRUZ, Texas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
MIKE LEE, Utah CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
RICK SCOTT, Florida TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
Naz Durakoglu, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
Risch, Hon. James E., Chairman, U.S. Senator From Idaho.......... 1
Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, Ranking Member, U.S. Senator From New
Hampshire...................................................... 3
Witnesses
Ledford, Dr. Joseph, Fellow and Assistant Director, Hoover
History Lab, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford,
California..................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Myers, Margaret, Senior Advisor, Inter-American Dialogue Global
Fellow, Wilson Center, Washington, DC.......................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Dr. Joseph Ledford to Questions Submitted by Senator
John Cornyn.................................................... 38
Responses of Ms. Margaret Myers to Questions Submitted by Senator
John Cornyn.................................................... 42
(iii)
ADVANCING AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 2025
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.
Risch presiding.
Present: Senators Risch [presiding], McCormick, Scott,
Curtis, Cornyn, Shaheen, Murphy, Kaine, Booker, and Van Hollen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
CHAIRMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Good morning, everyone.
The Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate will
come to order.
Today we are going to have a very interesting hearing on
the Western Hemisphere, an area that we do not spend nearly
enough attention to primarily because there is so much else
going on in the world.
But we, obviously, need to do that, and we want to
welcome--we have a number of students it looks like to me. I do
not know if we have a group here from somewhere. It is a
different kind of crowd than we usually get, and I usually give
a speech about you cannot disrupt the hearing or you will get
arrested and thrown out and banned for a year.
But I am not going to give that speech because it looks to
me like a very orderly crowd. So, thank you. You are welcome
here, and we are glad to have you and glad to have you watch
these proceedings.
We have a couple of very good witnesses today that--one
chosen by the Republicans, one chosen by the Democrats--who
will give us some insight into what is going on in Latin
America, and I am going to start by making an opening
statement.
I am then going to yield to the distinguished Ranking
Member to make an opening statement, and after that we will
hear from our witnesses, and after that we will open it up to
questions from the committee.
So, with that, in 1823 President Monroe asserted the right
and interest of the United States to oppose foreign powers
meddling with the emerging independent nations in the Western
Hemisphere.
Monroe's vision was an America that protects the Western
Hemisphere from foreign domination. Of course, Monroe lived in
a different era before world wars, before an increasingly
global economy, even, of course, before airplanes and any other
rapid transportation.
But his point is still relevant today. Prioritizing
America's national security interests means prioritizing a
stable and prosperous Western Hemisphere because America has
adversaries who look to undermine our interests and our
security by interfering in the affairs of our closest
neighbors.
As our enemies and competitors like Russia, China, and Iran
expand their footprint in our hemisphere we need to strengthen
security and economic cooperation with our democratic neighbors
to protect our interests.
It was interesting to hear yesterday on our panel the
people that were up for the ambassadorships focusing on the
importance of economic cooperation and bringing that back into
the equation, which has gotten a little lost, again, because
there are so many other problems.
The most pressing long term threat in the Western
Hemisphere is China. It has displaced the United States as the
top trading partner for almost every country in South America.
Across Latin America, China is extracting valuable critical
minerals, building strategic ports and deepening military
cooperation.
China remains the single greatest supplier of fentanyl to
Mexican cartels. It is illegal for Chinese companies to sell
these chemicals in China, but the Chinese government permits
the same companies to send chemicals to Mexico for production
of fentanyl.
The production of these opioids and the cartels who shuttle
them across our border are killing over 100,000 Americans every
year. That is a staggering number, particularly when you put it
on a daily and weekly basis.
Further south, China is meddling in the Panama Canal as it
seeks to control the shipping companies that move the cargo
through it.
President Trump is right to focus on China's involvement in
this critical infrastructure that we have spent so much
treasure and blood constructing. The fact of the matter is
China has and will use footholds in Latin America to threaten
the U.S. We must counter their presence today to ensure it is
not a vulnerability tomorrow.
Beyond China, Iran has expanded its reach into our
hemisphere. Iran warships have docked in Brazil, and Iranian
proxies have built networks across Latin America. Meanwhile,
Russia meddles in the region, conducting information operations
and deploying troops, military aircraft, and naval vessels to
Cuba and Nicaragua.
Chinese money supports the governments in Cuba and
Venezuela, and Russian personnel ensure they stay in power. We
cannot allow these authoritarian expansions of influence so
close to home.
While we need to push back we also need to protect
Americans by securing our border. President Trump and his team
are working aggressively at this, as we all know, and I
strongly support his efforts.
Monroe had the right idea. Let us prioritize solving the
problems right in front of us and redouble our efforts to
protect American national security by making sure our
hemisphere is stable.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how we can
do that.
I will now turn to my friend, the distinguished Ranking
Member, Senator Shaheen.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,
RANKING MEMBER, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Chairman Risch.
Before I get to my opening statement, I just wanted to make
a couple of announcements.
One is I brought up these maps of Latin America, and
Senator Kaine will recognize them because we saw them in the
Armed Services Committee, and they are actually a couple of
years old, but I think they speak to the challenges that we
have in Latin America.
As you can see the far map shows the PRC's regional
presence and activities, and you can see by how much of Latin
America is colored in a dark crimson the influence that China
has.
Anybody who wants to come up and look at some of the detail
after the hearing will find it very interesting.
The other map is Russia's influence in Latin America.
Again, you can see from the orangey red the extent to which
Russia is influencing Latin America, and as I said, while these
maps are a couple of years old I think they speak to the
challenge that we have in Latin America, which I am sure we
will hear from our witnesses.
So, thank you both for being here.
I also wanted to just announce--I am sure that most members
have seen it--but because so much of the last couple of
hearings has focused on what is happening with USAID and the
programs and services of foreign assistance, the Supreme Court
today sided with restoring the funding for those programs. So,
if folks have not seen that decision, it is probably worth our
all of us looking at.
So, now, to get to my official remarks.
After President Trump's tariffs on Canada and Mexico and
his address to Congress last night I think the question of how
the United States approaches the Western Hemisphere is more
important than ever.
This region offers incredible opportunity for the United
States, as the Chairman has said. It is home to one of our
largest trading partners in the world, Mexico. That trading
relationship amounted to about $800 billion recently.
Latin America also includes some of our closest allies.
Colombia became a NATO partner country in 2017, for example.
But whether it is the 25 percent tariffs that will affect
American businesses and consumers, or threats against Panama,
these actions undermine trust in the United States and push
away our allies when we need them.
Curbing immigration to our southern border and fighting
drug cartels, stopping the flow of illegal weapons and
fentanyl, all of those are critical issues, and we want
countries like Mexico and Canada to help us tackle these
challenges.
But undermining trust in the United States gives our
adversaries, like China and Russia, more of an opening across
the hemisphere. Even before the tariff threats trade with China
was surging across Latin America.
According to the World Economic Forum, China's trade with
Latin American countries could reach more than $700 billion in
the next decade.
At the same time, Vladimir Putin's propaganda machine has
flooded Latin America. According to the University of Oxford,
the Spanish language version of the program Russia Today is
Putin's most successful, more than RT in English, Arabic,
German, or French.
Not only is Putin trying to undermine democratically
elected governments in the region with disinformation, but
Russia's spy services have also been expanding their footprint.
As former CIA director Bill Burns explained, and I am
quoting, part of this is a function of the fact that so many
Russian intelligence officers have been kicked out of Europe.
In the face of these challenges it is deeply concerning
that the Administration has frozen foreign aid and attacked the
United States Agency for International Development, and as I
said, hopefully those issues are going to be worked out.
These programs stabilized societies. They gave people in
places like Colombia or Haiti incentives to stay home and to
not migrate to our borders. They supported women struggling
with gender based violence in places confronting a wave of
femicides.
As one U.N. report put it, at least 11 women were murdered
every day for gender related reasons in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
The foreign aid freeze has also thrown counter narcotics
programs from Guatemala to Mexico into chaos. One program with
the United Nations had been scanning for contraband and
fentanyl chemicals in Mexican ports, and that work has stalled.
Cuts to USAID and the Inter-American Foundation also make
it harder for the United States to compete with China's Belt
and Road infrastructure initiatives. Deep water ports, rail
lines, solar energy plants--these are the kinds of projects
that increase China's influence in the region.
So, Dr. Myers, Dr. Ledford, I appreciate you both coming to
testify before us today, and I think my basic question to both
of you is how do we keep from giving China and Russia complete
free rein in this atmosphere--I am sorry, in this hemisphere.
How does all of what we are doing make America safer, more
secure, and more prosperous? In the long term it is in our
interest to ensure that we have close relationships and growing
ties in the Western Hemisphere.
So, I look forward to hearing your thoughts. Thank you
both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator.
We will now hear from our witnesses. We are going to start
with Dr. Ledford.
Dr. Ledford is a Hoover Fellow and assistant director of
the Hoover History Lab at the Hoover Institution. His work
focuses on the exercise of American power abroad, particularly
in the Western Hemisphere, obviously in our wheelhouse today.
So, Dr. Ledford, we are glad you are here. We would like to
hear from you.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOSEPH LEDFORD, FELLOW AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
HOOVER HISTORY LAB, HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA
Dr. Ledford. Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this
invitation to testify before you on this critical matter.
The views I express today are mine and not the Hoover
Institution nor Stanford University.
The Western Hemisphere is foundational to American national
security. As the late great Secretary of State George Shultz
often said, foreign policy starts in your own neighborhood.
Indeed, throughout our nation's history policymakers
understood this guiding principle of statecraft. If the Western
Hemisphere is without security the United States cannot
continue to support its allies while confronting its
adversaries.
To ensure regional stability, preventing hostile foreign
powers from spreading their malign influence in the Western
Hemisphere must serve as the cornerstone of American foreign
policy.
It has in the past, and it should guide national security
strategy today. To be sure, the defensive principles enshrined
in the Monroe Doctrine have functioned as the enduring
bipartisan consensus until recently.
During the first quarter of the 21st century the United
States gradually became estranged from its neighbors and
America's enemies noticed the neglect.
Strategic competition has come to our neighborhood. In
America's absence, China has moved into the Western Hemisphere
to spread its economic, military, and political influence deep
and wide, complemented by the footprints of its despotic
partners Iran, Russia, and North Korea. You could have two more
maps up here to my left.
Chinese trade has soared in Latin America and the
Caribbean. China is the region's second largest trading partner
and South America's largest. Billions in investment have
targeted the sectors of energy, mining, manufacturing,
infrastructure, and technology.
Take, for instance, Huawei's market share or the mega port
that just opened in Peru, majority owned by a Chinese military
company, or the encroachment on the Panama Canal by Chinese
state enterprises.
The potential ramifications of such dual use infrastructure
should alarm every American. Beyond economics, Chinese military
and intelligence presence grows from spy stations in Cuba to
arms sales and military training programs to surveillance
technology exports to authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua,
and Venezuela.
Compounding these challenges, transnational criminal
organizations wreak havoc from South America to Canada. Drug
cartels present an intractable threat to the American homeland.
Their enterprises drive the opioid crisis that devastates
our communities and kills 200 Americans every day.
China contributes to this crisis by not only supplying the
precursor chemicals and the pill press equipment needed to
produce fentanyl but also the money laundering services to wash
the ill gotten gains.
With all these problems Americans may ask what are we doing
to advance our interests in the Western Hemisphere.
Well, Congress has led the way with bipartisan resolve,
especially on this committee, exemplified by the Western
Hemisphere Partnership Act enacted in December. This landmark
legislation mandates a comprehensive 5 year strategy due by
June to promote security, prosperity, and the rule of law.
It provides an overarching framework to address the very
issues that we discussed today. At the outset of President
Trump's second term, the United States appears now to be
pursuing an America first approach.
The Administration aims to eliminate drug cartels, roll
back Chinese malign influence in the region, and deepen our
partnerships with the Americas to bring about security and
prosperity.
These efforts signal a nascent strategic reorientation, but
more must be done, and I believe it can be accomplished with
bipartisanship and through cooperation between Congress and the
White House.
In closing, I will offer a few high level recommendations,
though, of course, they are easier said than done.
America must develop a 21st century framework for
hemispheric defense and development. To do so, the United
States must craft a realistic and attainable 5 year strategy as
mandated by legislation.
It must include the ways and means for America to secure
binding and sustainable long term economic agreements to
further regional integration.
It must also include revitalized security measures that
address these acute challenges of the 21st century. The United
States must compel China to end its involvement in the fentanyl
crisis.
The United States must seek a workable security framework
with Mexico. The United States must exercise leadership to
resolve the crisis in Haiti.
The United States must continue to isolate pressure and
encourage democracy in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.
The United States must consistently engage its neighbors.
Here, the President must nominate high quality diplomats to
serve and Congress must expedite their nominations--their
confirmations.
And last, Congress must continue working on the Western
Hemisphere in a bipartisan manner. This sends the strongest
signal to America's enemies.
Of course, what I have just laid out is easier said than
done, but I am an optimist.
With that, I yield, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ledford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Joseph Ledford
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and distinguished members
of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you and
testify on these critical issues. \1\
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\1\ The views and opinions expressed in this testimony are solely
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Hoover
Institution or Stanford University.
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I will begin with the obvious strategic rationale for this hearing:
The Western Hemisphere is foundational to American national security.
\2\ As the late Secretary of State George Shultz often said, ``foreign
policy starts in your own neighborhood.'' \3\ Indeed, throughout this
nation's history, policymakers understood this guiding principle of
American foreign affairs. If the Western Hemisphere is without
stability and security, the United States faces grave challenges at
home and abroad. How can the United States continue to support its
allies and partners while confronting its adversaries if malign foreign
influence disrupts its hemisphere and disorder prevails?
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\2\ For instance, the 2022 Biden-Harris National Security Strategy
declared, ``No region impacts the United States more directly than the
Western Hemisphere.'' For the 2022 National Security Strategy, see
National Security Council, U.S., National Security Strategy (The White
House, 2022), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf.
\3\ Quoted from James E. Goodby, ``Groundbreaking Diplomacy: An
Interview with George Shultz,'' Foreign Service Journal 93, no. 10
(December 2016): 58-59; See also, pp. 9-10 of George P. Shultz,
interview by Stephen F. Knott, Marc Selverstone, and James Sterling
Young, December 18, 2002, Stanford, California, Ronald Reagan Oral
History Project, Presidential Oral History Program, Miller center of
Public Affairs, University of Virginia, https://millercenter.org/the-
presidency/Presidential-oral-histories/ronald-reagan.
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Preventing hostile foreign powers from meddling in the Western
Hemisphere to ensure regional stability must serve as the cornerstone
of American foreign policy. It has in the past and should guide
national security strategy today. As Chairman Risch emphasized last
year in a speech at George Mason University, ``the Monroe Doctrine is
more vital than ever.'' \4\ To be sure, the principles enshrined in the
Monroe Doctrine have functioned as the enduring bipartisan consensus
throughout American history--until recently. During the first quarter
of the 21st century, the United States gradually became estranged from
its neighbors, and America's enemies noticed the neglect.
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\4\ See text of keynote address ``The Monroe Doctrine: An Evolving
Legacy'' at the National Security Institute at George Mason
University's Antonin Scalia Law School, April 15, 2024, https://
www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rep/release/risch-monroe-doctrine-is-
vital-as-ever-as-china-russia-iran-exert-influence-in-our-hemisphere.
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In America's absence, China moved into the Western Hemisphere. \5\
Here, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) opportunistically spread its
economic, military, and political influence deep and wide, complemented
by the expanded footprints of its despotic partners Iran, Russia, and
North Korea.
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\5\ James T. Areddy, Ryan Dube, and Roque Ruiz, ``How China
Capitalized on U.S. Indifference in Latin America,'' Wall Street
Journal, November 14, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/china-xi-jinping-
latin-america-acf6dbc1.
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The United States, however, must contend with more than mere
strategic competition in its hemisphere. Transnational Criminal
Organizations (TCO) wreak havoc from South America to Canada. Latin
America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not the only areas profoundly
affected by TCOs. Drug cartels present an intractable threat to the
American homeland. The opioid crisis devastates communities, ruins
families, and kills far too many Americans on a daily basis.
Given the nature of the challenges from hostile foreign powers and
TCOs, America's inattention to the Western Hemisphere has proven ironic
and unfortunate. Americans care immensely about the Western Hemisphere,
even if the foreign policy priorities of administrations focus
elsewhere, often for important reasons. They care not only because of
cultural, political, and social connections, but also became of the
problems: illegal immigration and drugs consistently poll as their
chief concerns. This is the duality of America's hemispheric dilemma.
The United States ranks as both one of the largest Spanish speaking
countries in the world and the world's leader in deaths by drug
overdose. \6\
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\6\ Mark A. Green, ``The US is the World's Fourth Largest Spanish
Speaking Country,'' Stubborn Things, Wilson Center, September 6, 2022,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/us-worlds-fourth-largest-
spanish-speaking-country; Evan D. Gumas, ``U.S. Overdose Deaths Remain
Higher Than in Other Countries--Trend-Tracking and Harm-Reduction
Policies Could Help,'' To the Point (blog), Commonwealth Fund, January
9, 2025, https://doi.org/10.26099/ppdk-qy10.
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The United States finds itself at an inflection point in its
relationship with the Western Hemisphere. The decisions made now will
either chart the course for America to reestablish hemispheric security
or abandon the region to America's adversaries. America must prioritize
the Americas again. The United States must reorient its foreign policy
toward an ``Americas First'' approach. \7\ America possesses the
capabilities and resources to execute this strategic reorientation.
Legislators and policymakers understand its necessity. And, I believe,
it can be accomplished with bipartisanship and through cooperation
between Congress and the White House.
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\7\ Joseph Ledford, Americas First: Reorienting US Foreign Policy
(Hoover Institution Press, October 2024), https://www.hoover.org/
research/americas-first-reorienting-us-foreign-policy-ledford.
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On Capitol Hill, and within this Committee especially, the Western
Hemisphere summons the fierce spirit of bipartisanship. Congress has
been proactive in reengaging America's neighbors. Recently, for
example, the Western Hemisphere Partnership Act (P.L. 118-159) became
law through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2025. \8\ It required 2 years of tough legislative wrangling. Now, the
United States has the statutory requirements for a clear-eyed,
measurable long-term strategy for promoting security, democracy, trade,
investment, and development in the Western Hemisphere. This much-needed
strategy will be delivered by June 2025.
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\8\ Western Hemisphere Partnership Act of 2023, S. 1325, 118th
Cong. (2023-2024), https://www.Congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-
bill/1325.
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Supporting a secure and prosperous Western Hemisphere is also a
priority for the White House. On this matter, Congress and the
president are aligned. At the outset of his second term, President
Donald Trump and his foreign policy team have put a strategic focus on
the Americas. Secretary of State Marco Rubio's first trip abroad
signaled a positive direction for US-LAC relations.
Today, then, I will briefly address strategic competition in the
Western Hemisphere, the perils of transnational organized crime, and
current U.S. policies for promoting security and prosperity. In
conclusion, I will offer a few general recommendations for bolstering
America's position in its geopolitical neighborhood. These aims, taken
together, offer a path toward a new hemispheric order.
strategic competition in the western hemisphere
The Western Hemisphere is the paramount arena for the contest over
world order between China and the United States. China has sought
regional dominance while the United States bid for peace and stability
in other theaters. In doing so, China has forged formidable economic,
military, and political ties in the Americas. \9\
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\9\ For a brief overview, see Diana Roy, ``China's Growing
Influence in Latin America,'' Council on Foreign Relations, January 10,
2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-
argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri; See also, U.S. Library
of Congress, Congressional Research Service, China's Engagement with
Latin America and the Caribbean, by Ricardo Barrios and Karla I. Rios,
IF10982 (2023), https://crsreports.Congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10982/
20.
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The CCP has made staggering economic gains. 21 LAC countries joined
the Belt and Road Initiative (Panama has withdrawn). \10\ China's trade
with LAC ballooned from $12 billion in 2000 to $315 billion in 2020,
and it is projected to double in the next 10 years. \11\ In 2023,
estimates put the total around $478 billion. China's aggressive
economic efforts in LAC has resulted in it becoming the region's
second-largest trading partner as well as the largest trading partner
for South America. China is also Mexico's second-largest trading
partner, right behind the United States. In the last twenty-five years,
China's investments in LAC business sectors--energy, mining,
manufacturing, infrastructure, and technology--have reached roughly
$240 billion. Business has been good for the CCP, and it has placed the
United States at a strategic disadvantage in its own hemisphere. \12\
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\10\ Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Green Finance
& Development Center, https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-
road-initiative-bri/.
\11\ Tatiana Lacerda Prazeres and Pepe Zhang, ``China's Trade with
Latin America is Bound to Keep Growing. Here's Why that Matters,''
World Economic Forum, June 17, 2021, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/
2021/06/china-trade-latin-america-caribbean/.
\12\ Briefing, China's increasing presence in Latin America:
Implications for the European Union, Marc Jutten, European
Parliamentary Research Service, PE 769.504, February 2025, https://
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/769504/
EPRS_BRI(2025)769504_EN.pdf; This is a rough estimate. For an up-to-
date estimate, see American Enterprise Institute's China Global
Investment Tracker, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-
tracker/; China-Latin America and the Caribbean Economic Bulletin, 2024
Edition, Rebecca Ray, Zara C. Albright and Enrique Dussel Peters, July
29, 2024, https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2024/07/29/china-latin-america-and-
the-caribbean-economic-bulletin-2024-edition/.
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China targets new and old infrastructure, seeking to both build it
and embedded itself in it--telecommunications, electricity, and ports
alike. \13\ The most striking recent examples have been in Peru and
Panama, where American concerns with China dominating ``old
infrastructure'' have overtaken the dilemma of Huawei's market share in
LAC. In November 2024, Peru opened a brand-new $3.5 billion megaport in
Chancay, which could become the third biggest port in LAC based on its
potential capacity. But this engineering feat should not be celebrated.
COSCO Shipping is the majority-owner, a corporation identified by the
Department of Defense as a Chinese military company. With the
electrical grid in Lima already owned by two Chinese companies, a
Chinese military company now owns and operates Peru's largest strategic
asset in Chancay, which transforms the nature and volume of trade
between China and LAC. \14\ China has not shied away from boasting
about its purpose. China's Ambassador to Peru, Song Yong, proudly
declared the CCP's goal: ``China is betting on Chancay to become the
Shanghai of Peru.'' \15\
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\13\ Margaret Myers, Angel Melguizo, and Yifang Wang, ``'New
Infrastructure': Emerging Trends in Chinese Foreign Direct Investment
in Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Dialogue, China-LAC
Report, January 2024, https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/
2024/01/Emerging-Trends-in-Chinese-Foreign-Direct-Investment-in-
LAC.pdf; Congressional Testimony, ``Examining the PRC's Strategic Port
Investments in the Western Hemisphere and the Implications for Homeland
Security,'' Part I, Ryan C. Berg, CSIS, February 11, 2025, https://
www.csis.org/analysis/examining-prcs-strategic-port-investments-
western-hemisphere-and-implications-homeland.
\14\ ``Xi Jinping opens huge port in Peru funded by China,'' NBC
News, November 15, 2024, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/xi-jinping-
opens-huge-port-peru-funded-china-rcna180289; Entities Identified as
Chinese Military Companies Operating in the United States in Accordance
with Section 1260H of the William M. (``Mac'') Thornberry National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283)1,
https://media.defense.gov/2025/Jan/07/2003625471/-1/-1/1/ENTITIES-
IDENTIFIED-AS-CHINESE-MILITARY-COMPANIES-OPERATING-IN-THE-UNITED-
STATES.PDF; Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, and Henry
Ziemer, ``China-owned Chancay Port Set to Become Latin America's Third
Largest,'' CSIS, February 25, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/
china-owned-chancay-port-set-become-latin-americas-third-largest; Ryan
Dube and James T. Areddy, ``A New Chinese Megaport in South America Is
Rattling the U.S.,'' Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2024, https://
www.wsj.com/world/chancay-peru-port-china-south-america-trade-ffc75d32;
See also Julieta Pelcastre, ``China Gains Foothold in Peru with
Critical Infrastructure,'' Dialogo Americas, April 4, 2024, https://
dialogo-americas.com/articles/china-gains-foothold-in-peru-with-
critical-infrastructure/; ``Enel agrees to sell two Peruvian assets to
China's CSGI for $2.9 bln,'' Reuters, April 7, 2023, https://
www.reuters.com/markets/deals/enel-agrees-sell-two-peruvian-assets-
chinas-csgi-29-bln-2023-04-07/; Juan Pablo Cardenal, ``China in Peru:
The Unspoken Costs of an Unequal Relationship,'' United States
Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 531 (July 2024), https://
www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2024-07/sr-531_china-peru-unspoken-
costs-unequal-relationship.pdf.
\15\ Sergey Sukhankin, `` `From Chancay to Shanghai': Peru's
Strategic Role in PRC Maritime Strategy,'' China Brief, Vol. 24, No. 6,
Jamestown Foundation, March 15, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/
from-chancay-to-shanghai-perus-strategic-role-in-prc-maritime-
strategy/.
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In Panama, China likewise achieved symbolic and material gains in
its strategic competition with the United States. The CCP has turned a
LAC country with strong historical, economical, and security ties to
the United States into ``a strategic hub.'' \16\ Panama was the
inaugural LAC signatory to Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative. Since
2017, moreover, Panama withdrew diplomatic recognition of Taiwan,
opened a Beijing embassy, heavily increased Sino-Panamanian trade,
investments, and connections across all sectors. Panama welcomed many
Chinese companies to locate their regional headquarters in the Colon
Free Zone, and the CCP took advantage of the misplaced hospitality. Of
these troublesome activities, the footprint of Chinese state-owned
enterprises around the Panama Canal has caused the most alarm.
Beginning in March 1997, Hong Kong-Based CK Hutchison Holdings has
operated the Balboa and Cristobal ports at the Pacific and Atlantic
entryways, respectively. Such potential dual-use infrastructure
threatens the sovereignty of the Canal and violates the 1977 Torrijos-
Carter Treaties. \17\
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\16\ Sabina Nicholls, ``Panama: China's Strategic Hub,'' Dilogo
Americas, March 29, 2024, https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/panama-
chinas-strategic-hub/.
\17\ ``Panama cuts ties with Taiwan in favour of China,'' BBC, June
13, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40256499;
``Panama opens embassy in Beijing after break with Taiwan,'' Reuters,
July 26, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/panama-opens-
embassy-in-beijing-after-break-with-taiwan-idUSKBN1AA2V6/; On Sino-
Panamanian trade, see China/Panama data, Observatory of Economic
Complexity, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/
pan; Alexandra Stevenson and Keith Bradsher, ``Trump, the Panama Canal
and the Hong Kong Firm at the Heart of a Showdown,'' New York Times,
February 6, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/06/business/panama-
canal-ck-hutchison.html; John Yoo and Robert Delahunty, ``Trump and the
Panama Canal: Why He Should Invoke the Monroe Doctrine,'' Civitas
Outlook, January 9, 2025, https://www.civitasinstitute.org/research/
trump-and-the-panama-canal-why-he-should-invoke-the-monroe-doctrine.
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Worse still, the CCP has established a military and intelligence
footprint in LAC. China prioritizes security and defense measures in
the region. \18\ From Cuba, China performs electronic surveillance
operations out of four newly renovated spy stations, capturing signals
intelligence on the U.S. military, space and commercial industries, and
citizens. \19\ Beyond intelligence, China created the China-Latin
America High-Level Defense Forum, and Chinese military officials have
been busy making several hundred visits to LAC over the last 20 years.
The People's Liberation Army operates military training programs and
conducts military exercises with LAC countries. China also provides law
enforcement training exchanges and dispatches its police forces and
private security companies into the region. The CCP sends a steady
supply of weaponry and equipment to LAC, as well. Authoritarian regimes
are the most frequent customers. So, too, does China export
surveillance technology to these regimes in Venezuela and Cuba, further
entrenching their dictatorial control. \20\
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\18\ See the CCP's 2016 Defense Strategy paper, http://
english.www.gov.cn/archive/white--paper/2016/11/24/
content_81475499069158.htm.
\19\ Matthew P. Funaiole, Aidan Powers-Riggs, Brian Hart, Henry
Ziemer, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Ryan C. Berg, and Christopher
Hernandez-Roy, ``Secret Signals: Decoding China's Intelligence
Activities in Cuba,'' Center for Strategic and International Studies,
July 1, 2024, https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-
sigint/; Warren P. Strobel, ``Satellite Images Show Expansion of
Suspected Chinese Spy Bases in Cuba,'' Wall Street Journal, https://
www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-cuba-suspected-spy-bases-
da1d6ec9.
\20\ ``Why Is China Bolstering Military Ties in Latin America and
the Caribbean?,'' The Dialogue, March 28, 2022, https://
thedialogue.org/analysis/why-is-china-bolstering-military-ties-in-
latin-america-and-the-caribbean/; Benjamin Kurylo, ``Comparative
Analysis of U.S., Russian, and Chinese Military Cooperation with Latin
America and the Caribbean,'' Military Review, July 2024, https://
www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/military-review/online-exclusive/2024-
ole/kurylo-comparative-analysis/; Ryan C. Berg and Henry Ziemer,
Exporting Autocracy: China's Role in Democratic Backsliding in Latin
America and the Caribbean, Report of the CSIS Americas Program, Center
for Strategic and International Studies (February 2024), https://
www.csis.org/analysis/exporting-autocracy; Evan Ellis, Chinese Security
Engagement in Latin America, Report, Center for Strategic and
International Studies (November 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/
chinese-security-engagement-latin-america; On arms transfers, see data
in the SIPRI Arms Transfers Data base, https://armstransfers.sipri.org/
ArmsTransfer/.
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transnational criminal organizations
If mere strategic competition were not alarming enough, the United
States faces a severe hemisphere-wide problem from TCOs, particularly
Mexican drug cartels. These cartels dominate the trafficking into the
United States of cocaine, fentanyl, heroin, and methamphetamine,
leading to an unbearable human toll: an average of 200 deaths overdoses
per day. The nefarious operations of cartels also extend to arms
dealing, commodities theft, extortion, human smuggling, kidnapping,
money laundering, murder, and sex trafficking. Cartels engage in
rampant corruption and violence, undermining governance in Colombia,
Ecuador, and Mexico, among others. One can also look at the
humanitarian catastrophe taking place at US-Mexico border to see the
ills of their labor. \21\
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\21\ See page 36 in the transnational criminal organization section
of the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community
in Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, February 5, 2024, https://
www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-
Report.pdf; See also the National Intelligence Council's Transnational
Organized Crime Foldout, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
NIC_toc_foldout.pdf; See also, United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, Homicide and Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean,
UNODC Global Study on Homicide 2023, https://www.unodc.org/documents/
data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/GSH_2023_LAC_web.pdf; For overdose
statistics, see ``Drug Overdose Death Rates,'' National Institute on
Drug Abuse, https://nida.nih.gov/research-topics/trends-statistics/
overdose-death-rates; On the cartels contributing to migration crisis,
see Daina Beth Solomon and Laura Gottesdiener, ``Insight: Rise in
Mexican cartel violence drives record migration to the US,'' Reuters,
December 15, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/rise-mexican-
cartel-violence-drives-record-migration-us-2023-12-15/; On Mexican drug
cartels, see also U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research
Service, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, by
June S. Beittel R41576 (2022), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/
pdf/R/R41576/47.
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As identified by the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Sinaloa and
Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion cartels are the principal threats. The
Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels manage global operations. They are
established in every American State and preside over every aspect of
the drug trade. Undoubtedly, their manufacturing and selling of
fentanyl have created and continue to drive the opioid crisis. In the
last 4 years, Mexican authorities have intercepted 5.4 tons of
fentanyl, with areas controlled by the Sinaloa cartel being the
locations for nearly all of it. \22\
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\22\ Drug Enforcement Administration, 2024 National Drug Threat
Assessment, May 2024, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/
NDTA_2024.pdf; Zedryk Raziel and Patricia San Juan Flores, ``Sinaloa,
inundada de fentanilo: Mexico golpea a Los Chapitos en el bastion de la
droga que parte a Estados Unidos,'' El Pais, February 22, 2024, https:/
/elpais.com/mexico/2025-02-23/sinaloa-inundada-de-fentanilo-mexico-
golpea-a-los-chapitos-en-el-bastion-de-la-droga-que-parte-a-estados-
unidos.html.
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China plays a critical role in facilitating this fentanyl trade out
of Mexico. The United States considers China to be a major illicit drug
producing country for its actions. \23\ ``The fentanyl crisis starts in
China,'' DEA Acting Chief of Operations Jarod Forget has stated, ``and
it ends in China.'' The process begins with Chinese companies supplying
the precursor chemicals and pill press equipment to produce fentanyl.
The House Select Committee on the CCP found that the CCP subsidizes and
owns partial stakes in the companies providing these materials to
cartels. Despite mild cooperation with the United States through a
counternarcotics working group, the CCP has not seriously cracked down
on their sales. Furthermore, once cartels have distributed the fentanyl
in America, Chinese Money Laundering Organizations (CMLO) offer the
financial services to launder the profits. Using the Chinese
underground banking system, cartels deliver dollars to CMLO assets in
the United States in an elaborate laundering scheme that circumvents
Chinese capital controls and U.S. law enforcement. In short, CMLOs use
WeChat to sell dollars to Chinese customers in exchange for yuan, which
they transfer into pesos for the cartels in Mexico. It reaps
multibillions for the cartels. \24\
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\23\ Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major
Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2025, September 15,
2024, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/09/24/2024-21951/
presidential-determination-on-major-drug-transit-or-major-illicit-drug-
producing-countries-for.
\24\ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,
China Primer: Illicit Fentanyl and China's Role, by Ricardo Barrios,
Susan V. Lawrence, and Liana W. Rosen, IF10890 (2024), https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10890; U.S. Congress, The
Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States
and the Chinese Communist Party, The CCP's Role in the Fentanyl Crisis,
118th Cong., 2d sess., 2024, H. Rep, https://
selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/
selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/
The%20CCP%27s%20Role%20in%20the%20Fentanyl%20Crisis%204.16.24%20%281%29.
pdf; Patricia Jowsmann, Dylan Tokar, and Brian Spegele, ``How Dirty
Money From Fentanyl Sales Is Flowing Through China,'' Wall Street
Journal, February 18, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-
fentanyl-trade-network-9685fde2; Press Release, ``Treasury Sanctions
Mexico- and China-Based Money Launderers Linked to the Sinaloa
Cartel,'' U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 1, 2024, https://
home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2439; See pages 19-20 and 29-30
in Department of Treasury, 2024 National Money Laundering Risk
Assessment, February 2024, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/
2024-National-Money-Laundering-Risk-Assessment.pdf; U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, Cornerstone Report Issue #45, ``Chinese Money
Laundering,'' October 5, 2023, https://content.govdelivery.com/
bulletins/gd/USDHSICE-3714ed3?wgt_ref=USDHSICE_WIDGET_217; On how
Chinese crime syndicates launder money for drug cartels, see Lisa
Cavazuti, ``Marijuana and Mexican Cartels: Inside the Stunning Rise of
Chinese Money Launderers,'' NBC News, August 3, 2024, https://
www.nbcnews.com/investigations/marijuana-mexican-cartels-stunning-rise-
chinese-money-launderers-rcna158030; See also, Joe Miller and James
Kynge, ``The New Money Laundering Network Fueling the Fentanyl
Crisis,'' Financial Times, June 26, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/
acaf6a57-4c3b-1c-89c4-c70d683a6619; For U.S. estimate on Chinese money
laundering totals, see pages 72-74 in U.S. Department of State Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume II: Money Laundering (March
2022), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/22-00768-INCSR-
92022-Vol-2.pdf.
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u.s. policies for promoting security and prosperity
As the United States grapples with manifold challenges, what is
being done to advance American interests in the Western Hemisphere? In
a bipartisan manner, I believe, Congress has been at the forefront of
reasserting America in its own hemisphere with purpose and direction.
Senators and Representatives have generated positive, workable ideas
for U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere, whether in the Americas Act
of the 118th Congress or the recent HALT Fentanyl Act, which several
members of this Committee co-sponsored. \25\ More consequentially,
though, Congress has passed monumental legislation.
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\25\ Americas Act, S. 3878, 118th Cong. (2023-2024), https://
www.congress.gov/118/bills/s3878/BILLS-118s3878is.pdf; HALT Fentanyl
Act, S. 331, 119th Cong. (2025-2026), https://www.congress.gov/bill/
119th-congress/senate-bill/331.
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Enacted in late December, the Western Hemisphere Partnership Act is
the most significant legislation passed on U.S. policy in the Western
Hemisphere in decades. The law requires the administration to develop
the policy framework under which it can craft and implement policies to
strengthen America's relationship with its neighbors. It ensures that
American foreign policy will no longer be rudderless in the Americas.
Crucially, as the law mandates, the United States will soon possess
not only ``a 5-year strategy to promote security and the rule of law in
the Western Hemisphere,'' but also clear guidelines for encouraging
investment, trade, and development in LAC. This comprehensive strategy,
which features a public diplomacy component, will address the most
pressing issues facing US-LAC relations, including TCOs, cybersecurity,
stable governance, development, and migration. Importantly, too, it
will contain a detailed assessment of the ways and means for attaining
concrete ends, in addition to the benchmarks by which the House Foreign
Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee can judge
the results during yearly briefings. None other than a co-sponsor of
the legislation, Secretary Rubio, is tasked with creating it in
consultation with the relevant agency heads. Given the stakes of
strategic competition in the Western Hemisphere, and the threats
America faces from TCOs, the U.S. Government must get this strategy
right to execute on a long-term vision for hemispheric security. \26\
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\26\ For the final version of the Western Hemisphere Partnership
Act, see fiscal year 2025 NDAA, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
BILLS-118hr5009enr/pdf/BILLS-118hr5009enr.pdf.
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To this end, the White House appears to be pursuing an ``Americas
First'' approach in foreign policy, aligning the executive branch with
congressional aims. \27\ In the opening weeks on his second term, the
Trump administration has prioritized the Americas, resolving to
eliminate drug cartels, rollback Chinese influence, and deepen regional
partnerships. At the outset, the administration strived to secure the
US-Mexico border and reduce illegal immigration. To more effectively
target TCOs, the administration designated six cartels and two
transnational gangs as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) and
Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT), including the Sinaloa
and Jalisco cartels. These actions are matched by a total-elimination
campaign at the Department of Justice and enhanced intelligence
operations against TCOs by the Central Intelligence Agency, which
include drone flights over Mexico, and U.S. Northern Command. \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Marco Rubio, ``An Americas First Foreign Policy,'' Wall Street
Journal, January 30, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/opinion/an-americas-
first-foreign-policy-secretary-of-state-rubio-writes-western-
hemisphere-too-long-neglected-a81707b0?mod=opinion_lead_pos7.
\28\ Rebecca Santana, Elliot Spagat, and Gisela Salomon, ``Trump
rolls out his blueprint on border security, but his orders will face
challenges,'' AP, January 20, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/trump-
deportation-immigration-homan-asylum-inauguration-
ac10480dc636b758ab3c435b974aeb19; Eric Schmitt, ``Pentagon Sending
Combat Forces to the Border in Line With Trump Directive,'' New York
Times, March 1, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/01/us/politics/
military-border-immigration.html; ``US Military Ramping Up Surveillance
of Mexican Cartels, General Says,'' Reuters, February 13, 2025, https:/
/www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-military-ramping-up-surveillance-
mexican-cartels-general-says-2025-02-13/; Julian E. Barnes, Maria Abi-
Habib, Edward Wong, and Eric Schmitt, ``C.I.A. Expands Secret Drone
Flights Over Mexico,'' New York Times, February 18, 2025, https://
www.nytimes.com/2025/02/18/us/politics/cia-drone-flights-mexico.html;
U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO) List, by John Rollins and Liana W. Rosen,
IF10613 (February 25, 2025), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/
pdf/IF/IF10613; Memorandum for All Department Employees, Attorney
General, Subject: Total Elimination of Cartels and Transnational
Criminal Organizations, February 5, 2025, https://www.justice.gov/ag/
media/1388546/dl?inline.
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Additionally, the president has proposed implementing 25 percent
tariffs on imports into the United States from Canada and Mexico to
spur aggressive anti-narcotics campaigns at America's northern and
southern borders. The diplomatic pressure has thus far resulted in
increased efforts. Mexico has sent 10,000 troops to the US-Mexico
border, extradited 29 sought-after cartel members, and considered
imposing tariffs on Chinese goods to augment those from the United
States. Canada, in turn, launched Operation Blizzard to fight narcotics
trafficking at the US-Canada border and designated cartels as FTOs to
aid the initiative. Based on the enhanced measures, Canada and Mexico
are seeking to work in tandem with the United States. The Trump
administration should proactively but sternly continue to engage with
these American allies to further counter TCOs as well as China. \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Drazen Jorgic, Laura Gottesdiener and Lizbeth Diaz, ``Mexico
sends major drug capos to US as Trump tariff threat looms,'' Reuters,
February 28, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexico-
extradite-us-convicted-drug-kingpin-caro-quintero-other-suspected-
cartel-2025-02-27/; Jasper Ward, ``Mexico has proposed matching US
tariffs on China, Bessent says,'' Reuters, February 28, 2025, https://
www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexico-has-proposed-matching-us-tariffs-
china-bessent-says-2025-02-28/; Randy Thanthong-Knight, ``Canada Lists
Cartels as Terrorists to Stall Trump Tariffs,'' Bloomberg, February 20,
2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-20/canada-lists-
cartels-as-terrorists-to-try-to-avert-trump-tariffs; Gabe Gutierrez and
Erika Angulo, ``Inside Mexico's border troop deployment following
Trump's tariff threats: Can it make a difference?,'' NBC News, February
20, 2025, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/mexico-troops-border-
trump-tariff-threat-rcna192924; News Release, ``CBSA launches Operation
Blizzard to target fentanyl and other synthetic narcotics,'' Canada
Border Services Agency, February 27, 2025, https://www.canada.ca/en/
border-services-agency/news/2025/02/cbsa-launches-operation-blizzard-
to-target-fentanyl-and-other-synthetic-narcotics.html.
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The White House has directly confronted China for its involvement
in the fentanyl crisis. In an opening move, the president has imposed
20 percent tariffs on Chinese imports into the United States. Despite
the punitive measure, the CCP has not indicated that China will yield
in its contribution to the fentanyl crisis in the face of economic
consequences. \30\
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\30\ Gavin Bade and Lingling Wei, ``Trump Plans Another 10% Tariff
on Products from China,'' Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2025,
https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/trump-plans-another-10-tariff-on-
products-from-china-f7c0d4d9.
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As for regional engagement, and rolling back Chinese malign
influence, the Trump administration has both sought to reestablish the
Panama Canal's sovereignty and build stronger regional partnerships.
During Secretary Rubio's historic first trip abroad, he visited Panama,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. There,
Secretary Rubio first brought some resolution to the Canal issue in
consultation with President Jose Raul Mulino, who subsequently acted to
withdraw Panama from the Belt and Road Initiative. The Panama Canal
Authority then signed a Cyber Cooperation Arrangement with U.S.
Southern Command, and Panama's Attorney General Luis Carlos Gomez
declared the port lease with CK Hutchison unconstitutional in a move to
terminate it. Elsewhere on the trip, Secretary Rubio advanced
agreements on transnational crime, development, and migration,
including a nuclear energy partnership, cybersecurity agreements, and
anti-narcotics initiatives. Such productive visits, which demonstrates
the importance of America's neighbors, should continue in the Americas,
as both symbolic gestures and cooperative agreements that advance
American interests. \31\
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\31\ Joseph Ledford, ``Trump's Americas Doctrine Starts at the
Canal,'' Defining Ideas, February 12, 2025, https://www.hoover.org/
research/trumps-americas-doctrine-starts-canal; ``Panama AG Agrees Hong
Kong Firm's Canal Concession Is 'Unconstitutional','' Barron's,
February 26, 2025, https://www.barrons.com/news/panama-ag-agrees-hong-
kong-firm-s-canal-concession-is-unconstitutional-30142ec3; Press
Release, Marco Rubio, ``Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Salvadoran
Foreign Minister Alexandra Hill Tinoco at the Signing of a Memorandum
of Understanding Concerning Strategic Civil Nuclear Cooperation,'' U.S.
Department of State, February 3, 2025, https://www.state.gov/secretary-
of-state-marco-rubio-and-salvadoran-foreign-minister-alexandra-hill-
tinoco-at-the-signing-of-a-memorandum-of-understanding-concerning-
strategic-civil-nuclear-cooperation/; Press Release, Marco Rubio,
``Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Costa Rican President Rodrigo
Chaves Robles at a Joint Press Availability,'' U.S. Department of
State, February 4, 2025, https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-
marco-rubio-and-costa-rican-president-rodrigo-chaves-robles-at-a-joint-
press-availability/; Press Release, Marco Rubio, ``Secretary of State
Marco Rubio and Guatemalan President Bernardo Arevalo at a Joint Press
Availability,'' U.S. Department of State, February 5, 2025, https://
www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-and-guatemalan-president-
bernardo-arevalo-at-a-joint-press-availability/; Press Release, Marco
Rubio, ``Secretary of State Marco Rubio And Dominican President Luis
Abinader At a Joint Press Availability,'' U.S. Department of State,
February 6, 2025, https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-
and-dominican-president-luis-abinader-at-a-joint-press-availability/.
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In conjunction with rejuvenated diplomacy, the United States
adopted a tougher posture toward its perennial adversaries in the
region. Maximum pressure has returned. Venezuela and Cuba face renewed
isolation and sanctions. President Trump revoked a license permitting
Chevron to operate in Venezuela, removing the Maduro regime's financial
buttress. Following the Venezuelan Navy's threat to ExxonMobil's
operations in Guayana, the State Department warned of steep
consequences. The Maduro regime will not persist without challenge. In
a similar fashion, the administration also reimposed economic and
travel restrictions on Cuba and relisted it as a State Sponsor of
Terrorism. \32\
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\32\ Press Release, Marco Rubio, ``Restoring a Tough U.S.-Cuba
Policy,'' U.S. Department of State, January 31, 2025, https://
www.state.gov/restoring-a-tough-u-s-cuba-policy/; Antonio Maria
Delgado, ``US warns Maduro of 'consequences' following incursion of
Venezuelan warship into Guyana,'' Miami Herald, March 1, 2025, https://
www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/
article301242254.html ; Ben Lefebvre, ``Trump Pulls Chevron License to
Export Venezuela Oil, Reversing Biden Deal,'' Politico, February 26,
2025, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/02/26/trump-reverses-biden-
era-concessions-allowing-venezuela-oil-exports-00206273.
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Beyond security, the contours of this administration's regional
economic engagement have emerged in recent weeks. Presented by the U.S.
Special Envoy for Latin America, Mauricio Claver-Carone, America Crece
2.0 seeks to increase America's stake in strategic assets in LAC as a
counter to the CCP. The initiative will involve the United States
reconstituting the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation
to promote private investment in energy and infrastructure, as well as
potentially enhancing America's six regional free trade agreements.
\33\ The key to its success, however, will be securing long-term,
sustainable binding agreements.
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\33\ Ari Hawkins, ``Trump Ditches Biden's Latin American Trade
Framework,'' PoliticoPro, February 15, 2025, https://
subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2025/02/trump-ditches-bidens-latin-
american-trade-framework-00204539.
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general recommendations for advancing american interests
in the western hemisphere
The United States must continue to prioritize combating
malign influence in the Western Hemisphere. America must develop a
21st-century framework for hemispheric defense and development.
American strategy must align resources, policies, and actions to
achieve both short-term and long-term objectives in the Western
Hemisphere.
To execute on such a framework, the United States must
craft a realistic and attainable 5-year strategy as mandated by the
Western Hemisphere Partnership Act. Due by June 21, 2025, this strategy
will guide U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere, with Congress and the
State Department working in concert. It must include the ways and means
for America to secure binding and sustainable long-term economic
cooperation in the Western Hemisphere to further regional integration
in conjunction with revitalized security measures that address the
acute challenges from China and TCOs.
The United States must compel China to end its involvement
in the production and selling of Fentanyl. In the context of a
strategic competition, the United States is engaged in a proxy war with
China over the drug cartels. The United States cannot dismantle and
eliminate the cartels without disrupting China's financial and material
contributions to the fentanyl trade.
The United States must seek a workable security framework
with Mexico to bring about stability and prosperity. It must have
attainable benchmarks and metrics to measure success in both the near
and long-term horizon, with a complete buy-in from Mexico.
The fentanyl crisis presents a supply and demand problem,
and it requires a supply and demand solution. Aggressive efforts to
degrade and dismantle drugs cartels must be matched with compassion for
Americans who suffer from the disease of addiction. The U.S. Government
must increase the Federal funding available for substance abuse
prevention and treatment programs.
The collapse of Haiti poses a severe threat to the United
States. The U.S. Government must not only increase its financial and
material support for restoring order in Haiti but also exercise
leadership on the issue to coordinate a larger coalition of regional
partners to bring adequate force to bear on the gangs destabilizing the
country. In doing so, U.S. policy must have metrics by which
legislators, policymakers, and citizens can judge the progress made
toward a stable Haiti.
The United States and Panama must jointly maintain the
sovereignty of the Panama Canal.
The United States must continue to isolate and pressure
the adversarial regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.
The United States must deter war between Venezuela and
Guayana. To prevent a conflict, the U.S. Government should consider a
Defense Cooperation Agreement with Guayana.
The United States must consistently and actively engage
its neighbors to ensure long-term prosperity and stability. This
requires prioritizing the cultivation and maintenance of relationships
in the Western Hemisphere. The president must nominate high-quality,
seasoned diplomats to serve in the Western Hemisphere, and Congress
must expediate their confirmations.
Congress should reauthorize the Development Finance
Corporation and enact changes to make the institution better suited to
advance American national security interests in the Western Hemisphere.
Congress must continue working on Western Hemisphere
related issues in a robust bipartisan manner. It sends a strong signal
to America's enemies.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
Now we will hear from Ms. Myers. Margaret Myers is a senior
advisor at the Inter-American Dialogue and the United States
Institute of Peace, and a global fellow at the Woodrow Wilson
Center.
Ms. Myers also serves in the faculties of Georgetown
University and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, and previously worked as Latin America
and China analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense.
Ms. Myers, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF MARGARET MYERS, SENIOR ADVISOR, INTER-AMERICAN
DIALOGUE GLOBAL FELLOW, WILSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Myers. Thank you very much, and good morning. I would
especially like to thank Senator Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen,
and the distinguished members of the committee for the
opportunity to testify today.
Hemispheric developments in U.S. national interests are
deeply intertwined. Shared borders, interpersonal ties,
economic interests, and security alliances have bound the
nations and people of our hemisphere for much of our recent
history.
We derive tremendous economic and other benefit from these
ties. At the same time, developments in the hemisphere present
some challenges to U.S. interests. Political shifts, violence,
natural disasters, and other difficulties have exacerbated
irregular migration, an issue that has tested the United States
across Administrations and overshadowed much of our substantive
engagement.
Other critical issues for the United States include
transnational crime, including the trafficking of illegal goods
and substances such as fentanyl, which has had a dramatic
wasting effect on the U.S. population.
As someone who has followed China's engagement with the
region for upwards of two decades now, I am also concerned
about the progress that China and Russia, for that matter, have
made toward dismantling U.S. ties in the region, whether
through targeted messaging campaigns, disinformation campaigns,
political alliances, or because of now extensive economic
footprint in the hemisphere that China maintains.
Fortunately, there is much that the United States can do to
maintain and grow its partnerships in the region to address
shared security and other challenges and also to compete
effectively with China and other extra regional actors.
But doing so begins with a commitment to constructive
engagement, carefully employing the widest range of economic
and diplomatic tools and platforms including new, innovative
mechanisms to bolster American competitiveness.
In this sense, the Supreme Court decision is quite
heartening. Engagement through the many U.S. and multilateral
organizations that provide economic and other forms of
assistance to the region should be an indispensable part of any
effort to advance American interest in the Western Hemisphere.
In fact, only by forging constructive partnerships with the
region can we hope to address the full range of challenges and
opportunities inherent in the Western Hemisphere-U.S.
relationship.
Forceful measures will generate immediate effects, but only
for so long. Reliance on sticks alone is not sustainable and
will not yield desirable long term outcomes whether for the
U.S. or our partners.
The United States is not the only viable economic or
political partner for Latin American nations. Unless we
recognize the strategic value of our hemispheric relations and
demonstrate that we have something substantial to offer,
including in the form of investment and development assistance,
Latin American nations will increasingly turn toward China or
other actors.
With this in mind we must pursue our many national economic
and security objectives--national and economic security
objectives in ways that support and reinforce our soft power
and economic stability and not undermine them.
Our foreign assistance, security cooperation, and
diversified economic engagement have historically distinguished
us from China.
If we hope to make the case that we are a more reliable,
trustworthy, and steadfast partner, then we must demonstrate
that to the region.
Equally, failing to invest meaningfully in our
relationships with Latin America will exacerbate the challenges
we face.
Finally, if we are serious about competing with China, this
is a definitive moment. China continues to engage across the
region, bringing wide ranging diplomatic and economic tools to
bear in support of its interests. Recently, it has aggressively
entered into the venture capital ecosystem in Latin America,
focusing on technology startups including fintech and AI
enabled companies.
If this sounds familiar it is because we have seen the same
playbook in strategic infrastructure, critical minerals, and
ICT.
The good news, again, is that there is considerable
opportunity for the United States to be a significant player
across many different sectors in Latin America while also
furthering regional integration and challenging China in the
process.
For instance, through the Development Finance Corporation
the U.S. Government has the capabilities to leverage trusted
and knowledgeable institutional partners like the Inter-
American Development Bank to present solutions to U.S. national
security challenges with relatively small investment.
At the same time, preserving our existing strengths, our
partnerships, programming, and relatedly, trust in our country
is fundamental.
It is very likely that we will look back on this moment as
a definitive one in our hemispheric relations and a possible
inflection point in China's global affairs. This is not a time
to sacrifice our hard won gains in partnerships.
It is a moment to think critically and carefully about what
constitutes power, what we stand for, and how we can creatively
and constructively achieve that.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Myers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Margaret Myers
Senator Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
Hemispheric developments and U.S. national interests are deeply
intertwined. Shared borders, interpersonal ties, economic interests,
and security alliances have bound the nations and people of our
hemisphere for much of our recent history.
Our economic ties are expansive, facilitated by U.S. company
engagement, free trade agreements with 11 Latin American and Caribbean
nations, and countless other forms of economic outreach. Since NAFTA
entered into force in 1994, U.S. foreign direct investment in Latin
America and the Caribbean and regional FDI in the United States have
both increased almost ninefold, according to Congressional Research
Service calculations. The region accounted for over 21 percent of U.S.
total trade in goods in 2023. Mexico is the top trading partner of the
U.S. worldwide, representing about 16 percent of our goods trade.
U.S. economic and other ties to the region are also of considerable
strategic importance. Hemispheric trade and supply chain development
are critical to reducing U.S. overreliance on Chinese goods, for
instance. And South America is a major source of the inputs needed for
U.S. AI and other high-tech industries. It contains 40 percent of the
world's copper reserves, 35 to 40 percent of lithium reserves, and
significant deposits of nickel, cobalt, and other critical minerals and
metals. Beyond our economic ties, our historic partnerships security
and development have been vital to hemispheric stability and our
collective ability to address security, humanitarian, and other issues.
Developments in the hemisphere also present some challenges to U.S.
interests. The region has experienced major political and socioeconomic
shifts in recent years and continues to grapple with the many effects
of transnational crime, lingering Covid-19 shocks, natural disasters,
and other difficulties. All of this has exacerbated irregular
migration--an issue that has tested the United States across
administrations and overshadowed much of substantive engagement with
the region. Other critical issues include transnational crime,
including the trafficking of illegal goods and substances, such as
fentanyl, which has had a dramatic, wasting effect on the U.S.
population.
Also of concern is the progress that China has made toward
dismantling U.S. ties in the region, whether through targeted messaging
campaigns, political alliances, or as a result if its now-extensive
economic footprint in the hemisphere. In just a matter of decades,
China has assumed a dominant economic position in certain sectors and
parts of the region. Trade underpins the China-Latin America
relationship, as many nations rely heavily on China's demand for their
raw materials and on often-artificially low-cost Chinese imports. Latin
American nations also look to China for other forms of economic
opportunity, including finance and investment. China's economic
presence ensures that Beijing's interests now factor prominently in the
region's economic and political decisionmaking.
Fortunately, there is much that the United States can still do to
maintain and grow its strategic hemispheric partnerships, to address
shared security and other challenges, and to compete effectively with
China in the Western Hemisphere. Doing so begins with a commitment to
constructive engagement, carefully employing the widest possible range
of economic and diplomatic tools and platforms, including new,
innovative mechanisms to bolster American competitiveness in the
hemisphere.
1. engage constructively, leveraging the many invaluable tools at our
disposal
Engagement, including through the many U.S. and multilateral
organizations that provide economic and other forms of assistance to
the region, will be an indispensable part of any effort to advance
American interests in the Western Hemisphere. Only by forging
constructive partnerships within the region can the United States
address the full range of challenges and opportunities inherent in the
U.S.-Latin America dynamic.
Our country's recent demands on Latin American nations have
prompted immediate action on certain issues of U.S. concern, but
reliance on ``sticks'' alone is not sustainable, and will not yield
desirable long-term outcomes, whether for the United States or our
partners. The United States is no longer the only viable economic or
political partner for Latin American nations. Unless we recognize the
strategic value of our hemispheric relations and demonstrate that we
have something substantial to offer, Latin American nations will
increasingly look to diversify their partnerships, leaning toward
China.
Lasting solutions to issues that have concerned our electorate--
migration, rule of law, transnational crime, drug flows--are also best
achieved through constructive engagement with our Western Hemisphere
partners. Progress on transnational crime requires law enforcement
cooperation, certainly, but also work within the region to address
common underlying problems such as weak rule of law, inadequate
security forces, and poor governance. Relying on force-based solutions
alone--especially unilateral ones--will fail to achieve desired
outcomes in the long-term, all while undermining international trust in
the United States. Sustained U.S. efforts to promote stability and
prosperity in Mexico, Central America, and other parts of the region,
through security cooperation and other forms of foreign assistance,
will produce greater and longer-lasting dividends in rooting out
lawlessness.
We must pursue our many national and economic security objectives
in ways that support and reinforce our soft power and economic
stability, not undermine them. Our foreign assistance, security
cooperation, and diversified economic engagement have historically
distinguished us from China. They are indications of our long-term and
sincere commitment to hemispheric stability. If we hope to make the
case that we are a more reliable, trustworthy, and steadfast partner
than other extra-hemispheric actors, then we must demonstrate that to
the region.
Equally, failing to invest meaningfully in our relationships with
Latin America will exacerbate the challenges we face, including China's
rise, democratic erosion, irregular migration, and organized crime. We
must pursue long-term solutions, and we need partnerships to achieve
real progress. Absent these, China is ready and waiting to seize upon
perceived U.S. departure from the region, by maintaining and furthering
its economic interests, certainly, but also through massive diplomatic
outreach, technical and security cooperation agreements, and efforts to
shape regional policymaking--all of which are part of the Belt and Road
Initiative. China's promises, however hollow, to address Latin America
economic, security, and other needs, must be met with constructive U.S.
proposals.
2. explore new, innovative solutions to advance u.s.
and broader hemispheric interests
China's engagement with Latin America is not static. It is ever-
evolving, consistent with China's own interests and opportunities in
the region. As a result, the United States must be creative and nimble
in its efforts to compete with China in the region, anticipating
China's next steps in Latin America, and crowding in resources where
possible.
Most recently, China has aggressively entered the venture capital
ecosystem in Latin America, focused on technology startups, including
fintech and AI-enabled companies. It is an open secret among Latin
American fund managers that China has been scouring funds' data rooms
for tech startups, particularly in Mexico. And, now we are seeing
wholly owned Chinese general partners entering the region. Meanwhile,
fund managers and entrepreneurs in the region are wary of taking
Chinese capital, but they are struggling to find alternatives. If this
sounds familiar, it's because we have seen this same Chinese playbook
in strategic infrastructure, critical minerals, and ICT (5G).
The good news is that there is considerable opportunity for the
United States to be a significant player across many different sectors
in Latin America, while also furthering regional integration, and
challenging China's inherently neocolonial model of engagement with the
hemisphere.
In addition to U.S. development assistance and technical
cooperation, which help to create the conditions for investment in the
region, the U.S. Government has the capabilities to leverage trusted
and knowledgeable institutional partners like the Inter-American
Development Bank and CAF-Development Bank of Latin America to provide
solutions to this challenge with a relatively small investment. Using a
collaborative capital model, the U.S. Development Finance Corporation
can create a pathway through which to deploy and crowd-in institutional
capital, including that of IDB, and especially IDB Invest. When
competing with China in the region, partnership with the Inter-American
Development Bank is among our most powerful and cost-effective options.
There, the United States pays a fraction of total cost, while
leveraging the IDB's excellent reputation and know-how in the region.
Additionally, the vast majority of the IDB's scaled projects are
squarely in the interests of the United States.
Through a DFC-led collaborative capital model, the U.S. can create
vehicles targeting sectors of strategic and national security interest
to the United States and partners, such as transport infrastructure,
venture capital, and critical minerals. The DFC's recent $25 million
deal with Techmet in Brazil, to develop a Brazilian nickel and cobalt
project that aims to supply the electric car industry, is a critical
example of the work that can be done through this mechanism. Scaling
this and other efforts--including by crowding in additional regional
financial institutions, such as the CAF--would be transformative for
the United States and the region. Passage of the Americas Act, which
has bipartisan support, would importantly complement these efforts and
bolster regional integration by facilitating regional trade,
encouraging reshoring of key industries to the United States, and
generating related supply chains across the Americas.
3. accurately diagnose china's prospects in latin america
The United States should aim to diagnose China-Latin America
developments correctly, accounting for China's many economic and
political advances, but also its missteps and deficiencies. Despite
China's substantial and growing relations with the region, this is a
moment when many in our hemisphere are seriously contemplating the
relative benefits and drawbacks of expanded relations with China.
China's massive industrial policy is altering the global economic
landscape in profound ways, provoking isolationist policymaking in the
developed and developing worlds alike. Latin America is not immune from
these effects. Latin American nations are increasingly overwhelmed with
artificially low-cost Chinese goods, including in sectors and
industries where they may hope to maintain some degree of industrial
capacity.
After three decades of enhanced engagement by Chinese companies,
banks, and other actors, the region is also assessing the effects of
Chinese activity across economic sectors. While most countries are
still interested in expanding their exports to China and attracting new
investment, especially in growth-promoting sectors, concerns about
project quality and debt levels are evident in parts of the region. In
other cases, Latin American nations are grappling with projects gone
wrong and general overdependence on China's economy, which limits their
decisionmaking prospects.
Beyond all of this is a reckoning in the region with China's own
economic limitations and what it can realistically bring to bear at
this juncture in support of the region's development. Chinese economic
activity, technical cooperation, and donations still feature
prominently in Latin America and the Caribbean, but countries such as
Honduras--which sacrificed its ties with Taiwan in 2023 in pursuit of
new, China-backed infrastructure investment--may very well be left
waiting. Moving ahead, Latin American nations will need to consider
whether their expectations for engagement from China are consistent
with their own national planning objectives, and also in line with
China's current economic realities and priorities.
China is clearly committed to continued engagement with the region,
but if we look beyond the headlines, this would seem a moment of great
opportunity for the United States to compete more effectively with
China in Latin America, bringing vast U.S. public and private sector
resources to bear in innovative ways. We must be bold in recalibrating
our approach and show up for our partners in the region. Doing so will
be critical to our country's continued international leadership and our
ability to compete with China and other increasingly influential extra-
regional actors.
I firmly believe that we will look back on this moment as a
definitive one in our hemispheric relations--and a possible inflection
point in China's global affairs. This is not the time to sacrifice our
hard-won gains and partnerships. It is a moment to think critically and
carefully about what constitutes power, what we stand for, and how we
can creatively and constructively achieve that.
Senator Risch. Well, thank you.
We are going to do a round of 5 minute questions and then
have a second round if there is interest in doing that.
And so I want to start with a basic question for both of
you, and that is that I think most Americans would be shocked
to hear that now, on this map, China has replaced the United
States as being the trade partner that is first.
And it is surprising, it is shocking in a lot of respects,
and admittedly--the Chinese is a communist government, and they
obviously--the government actually owns, controls and deploys
the capital.
In a capitalist system like ours it is the private sector
that does that. Well, the private sector only goes and invests
and puts their money where there is going to be a profit.
Communist countries do not have that same restriction. They
go and spend money, and we see it over and over again with the
Chinese, they will underbid our people.
They will pay money under the table. They will do all kinds
of things to replace the United States as a purveyor of goods
or services, or whatever it is.
And that is what is causing this is is they have the
ability to do this, whereas a capitalist system does not. And
so that is a real challenge for us, because we do not do it. We
will never do it.
It is just not in our DNA to do that, and we have become
the most successful country in the history of the world by
doing the things we do in a free market and a capitalist way.
So, how do you--how do you overcome that in a situation
like this? Because, look, these countries are going to go--when
it is particularly a country that is destitute or close to it,
if there is money on the table, they are going to take it.
They do not care whether the Devil himself puts it there or
the Chinese Communist Party. They are going to take it and do
the kinds of things they need to do to get their hands on it.
So, Doctor, why do we not start with you and give us your
thoughts on that line of thinking?
Dr. Ledford. Thank you, Senator.
It is a great question and one that policymakers have been
grappling with for decades or at least the last decade.
I think there are ways that we can leverage our
institutions for public-private partnerships, whether it is the
DFC or new programs and some ideas that have been generated in
Congress about creating a development fund that leverages
private equity to invest in critical infrastructure in Latin
America and provide terms and remove barriers to do so.
In regards to the DFC, Congress should not have to sign off
on every loan that is over $10 million. We should remove those
barriers. There have to be national security waivers for every
country but four.
Let us remove those barriers, and let us catalyze our
powerful capital inside the United States with the backing of
the government to invest in these industries.
We just have to provide the alternative, and without
providing it and without leveraging our strengths in the United
States, the Chinese Communist Party will just continue to fill
the void.
Thank you.
Senator Risch. Ms. Myers.
Ms. Myers. Thank you.
It is a--this is sort of the critical question, right, for
us in terms of our ability to compete with China effectively
across sectors in the Latin American region.
The first point I would make is that we are at something of
a shifting moment in the China-Latin America dynamic in which
Latin America is looking at China a bit differently, right,
more seriously, thinking, contemplating much more seriously
both the benefits and especially the drawbacks of engagement
with China.
Many decades now have experienced dealing with China, of
projects gone wrong, of complicated debt obligations, have
changed somewhat the tenor of the relationship over time.
In addition to this, you know, there are now concerns about
what China can even bring to bear as it struggles with its own
economic development. A lot of what the region is expecting
will not come to pass even though China continues to engage in
serious and important ways across the region.
So, for me, this really is a period of strategic
opportunity for the U.S. to engage more extensively through
messaging, through collaboration with our partners, right, but
also to begin to engage through creative mechanisms in various
forms.
A lot of the work that is already being done to even the
playing field, right, to work on institutional capacity, to
work on the possibility of bringing in investment review
mechanisms, right, in countries, and there is some receptivity
to that is really quite critical.
State Department, Commerce, many others are working very
hard to make this happen, and I hope they will continue to be
able to do so.
In other cases, I agree--you know, I agree entirely that we
need to pursue some new creative mechanisms, and you know,
collaborative capital models of the sort that were described--
you know, crowding in venture capital, crowding in
institutional capital, is a terrific mechanism through which to
do this.
This can be DFC led, incorporating a national security
lens, but crowding in institutions such as--and resources from
institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank which
are critical partners for the United States and which pursue
programming that is overwhelmingly in the interest of the
United States.
So, both our current trajectory, understanding, right,
where things stand in the China-Latin America dynamic and
moving forward with creative solutions would seem to me a good
strategy.
Senator Risch. Well, I appreciate both your thoughts on
that. I think everybody on this committee meets regularly with
heads of state and on down from other countries.
And the thing that always strikes me is we are the partner
of choice. They want to do business with America. Having said
that, like I said, if the Chinese come along with free money or
what have you, and we have all seen what has happened in the
ports where they build a port, loan them the money, and it
turns out to be a predatory loan, and Chinese wind up with a
port.
These stories have gone around the world, and people
understand that. They like dealing with us because of the fact
that we have a rule of law, and that is the biggest strength
that we have is the rule of law.
It also is a weakness because we have laws that prohibit
paying money from under the table. In certain Third World
countries that is the only way you get a contract is by paying
the government official who is making the decision under the
table.
And it is--again, Americans really do not have a real idea
of how ubiquitous this is around the world, and that includes
Latin America as well as other continents. So, this is
something that hopefully we continue to gain on, and I think we
are making gain on it.
It is what I call reputational business, and they want to
do business with us because we have the reputation. But we will
have to see as time goes on whether that carries the day or
not.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you.
And just to follow up on that a little bit, 2 years ago I
joined Senator Cornyn at a congressional delegation to Latin
America.
We visited four countries--Panama, Colombia, Argentina, and
Brazil--and I think Senator Cornyn, it is fair to say that
everywhere we went what we heard from officials is they would
like to have a trade agreement with the United States.
And it seems to me that that is a tool that we have ignored
as we have looked at those opportunities for investment in
Latin America.
And so could both of you speak to the importance of trade
agreements and what we should be thinking about, and why that
would be helpful for us to look at those as opportunities for
American investment in Latin America?
And I will ask you to start, Ms. Myers.
Ms. Myers. Certainly. Thank you, Senator.
Yes. I mean, as we know and as was mentioned in the opening
remarks, China's trade engagement with Latin America is
expansive, especially in South America.
It is the top trade partner for most of the countries in
the region at this juncture, and those very trade dynamics
contribute extensively to its influence in the region.
When you are exporting almost all of your goods, right, or
major commodities to China you think twice before rocking the
boat or challenging China on wide ranging policy issues.
And so, you know, with that in mind it is critical both
from an economic perspective, certainly, but also in terms of
our interests in pursuing certain policy agendas and areas of
political cooperation that the U.S. also engage in trade, grow
trade where possible.
We have been in something of a stasis on this for a number
of years now, and there are efforts underway to try to think
creatively about how these partnerships can be expanded
including through the Americas Act, for example, and through
other mechanisms that fall, you know, somewhat short of a free
trade agreement.
But without this, without these trade dynamics even, you
know, expanded investment is not going to fundamentally alter
the power dynamics at play in the region when China is indeed
the top, you know, trade partner for so many countries in the
region, and that dependency dynamic is there and has profound
effects on decisionmaking.
So, I think absolutely this is a priority to whatever
extent possible. It is one that needs to be advanced.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Dr. Ledford, do you agree with that?
Dr. Ledford. Yes. We should pursue free trade agreements.
In fact, I think we could secure one with Argentina right now.
They are certainly seeking one.
We should also revisit the agreements we currently have.
DR-CAFTA--Nicaragua should not be in DR-CAFTA and I know the
Administration----
Senator Shaheen. Amen.
Dr. Ledford [continuing]. Is looking seriously at removing
Nicaragua from DR-CAFTA. I know the other member countries are
also seriously considering backing that.
So, that is something that everyone should pay attention to
and certainly encourage the Administration to pursue, if
possible.
Long term, secure binding agreements is a step forward. We
are not going to change the balance in the trade dynamics in
Latin America vis-a-vis China in the near term, but if we do
not do anything we will just continue to lose economic ground
in our own hemisphere.
Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Well, and staying with you, Dr. Ledford,
you noted in your essay last year ``Americas First: Reorienting
U.S. Foreign Policy'' that Russia sought to exert anti-American
influence throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, and they
have done that through a range of things. Launching propaganda
about Russia's war in Ukraine has been one of those.
So, how do we--are you continuing to be concerned about
Russia's malign influence in the hemisphere, and what steps can
we take to counter that influence?
And as we are thinking about the war in Ukraine is there
anything that we think is relevant to what is happening now in
terms of peace negotiations that those Latin American countries
can be helpful with?
Dr. Ledford. Yes, I am very concerned about Russian malign
influence in the Western Hemisphere. I think, first and
foremost, we can continue to isolate the countries that are
most closely associated with Russia, Venezuela, for example,
and Cuba.
As far as the effect from the Ukraine war, I am not
prepared to comment on that. I do not know enough about Latin
American influence on that, although I will say that Russia
uses economic coercion to further its aims.
It has pressured Latin American countries not to support
Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression, Ecuador
being the most striking case in which Vladimir Putin refused to
buy bananas because Ecuador was going to ship old weapons in
exchange for new weapons with the United States.
So, it actually prevented the United States from combating
gains that are destabilizing Ecuador.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I just want to--I am over my time, but I just want to
follow up really quickly because last week the United States
sided with Russia in a resolution before the U.N. condemning
Russia's invasion in Ukraine, and we sided with countries like
North Korea and Nicaragua, some of those countries that are our
adversaries with respect to most issues that we are working on.
What kind of message does that send to the other countries
in Latin America?
Dr. Ledford. Well, I am not in the Administration. I am not
privy to the conversations that went on behind the decision to
do that. I would recommend, in general, that the United States
not side with our adversaries in the Western Hemisphere.
But occasionally there are trade offs in the pursuit of
larger goals, such as peace negotiations.
Senator Shaheen. Ms. Myers, did you have anything to add to
that?
Ms. Myers. In terms of the signal it sends to our partners
in the region, I think it is deeply concerning. It has sowed
tremendous confusion. Certainly, is a departure from U.S.
foreign policy objectives and U.S. foreign policy messaging and
interest.
Over many years and decades and in many cases, I think,
undermines the extensive and effective work that we have been
doing to challenge the influence, not just of China but of
Russia, right, and many other actors in the region to date.
Will this be taken seriously? Looking ahead, will we find
partnerships on these issues? Will we pursue partnerships on
these issues? All of these are critical questions, and so I
think it has sowed tremendous confusion and reduced somewhat
trust in our foreign policy.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Risch. Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If you do not mind, I would like to give you a homework
assignment.
So, back in 1823 the Monroe Doctrine was announced, the
official policy of the U.S. Government with regards to the
Western Hemisphere and the activities of other countries in the
region.
Obviously, that has evolved over many, many years. But I
would like for you to tell us what do you think instead of the
Monroe Doctrine what the Trump doctrine should be for the
Western Hemisphere, and maybe with the students here maybe they
can come up with some ideas as well. That would be, I think, a
useful exercise.
So, Blackrock just purchased two ports in and around Panama
from a Hong Kong company which obviously is a front for the
Chinese government and their activities in the area.
I think you alluded to this a little bit, Dr. Ledford.
But how can we access the capital markets? How can Congress
encourage U.S. capital markets, which are a tremendous source
of strength for the country? We do not have a lot of money to
spend because we are looking at $36 trillion plus in debt.
But if we can access our capital markets to encourage
purchasing of facilities in Central and South America by the
United States or our friends, it seems to me that would be a
good idea.
And maybe Senator McCormick, having come from maybe a
little bit of that background, has some ideas as well. But if
you could tell us what can we do to encourage more of that.
Dr. Ledford. Thank you, Senator. It is an excellent
question.
I think Congress has developed some workable ideas. The
conceptual framework behind the Americas Act, I think there is
much Congress could do to incentivize a program through the
Commerce Department to work on capital, catalyzing the private
capital to purchase the facilities that we are discussing. and
I certainly would encourage all of you to look at that.
Senator Cornyn. One of the things that on our trip that
Senator Shaheen mentioned a couple years ago that we heard from
Southern Command--General Laura Richardson at the time--was
that the absence of U.S. Ambassadors in the region was a big
problem because there was not somebody that leaders of these
countries could talk to knowing that they were a representative
of the United States President.
And how important--maybe I will start with you, Dr. Myers--
how important is it for us to have representation there in
these countries of the President of the United States in the
form of a U.S. Ambassador?
Ms. Myers. Thank you very much.
It is absolutely of paramount importance, both symbolically
as we aim to demonstrate our commitment to engagement with
these countries, with our partners in the region, but also
operationally, as you have noted.
If there is nobody to talk to, if there is nobody to
express concerns to, if there is nobody to negotiate with, then
these countries are at a loss and our partnerships and our
bilateral relations suffer.
So critically important to get people in place, and if we
do not, then this provides an opportunity for others to step
into the fold and to do so during those periods where, you
know, truly our leadership is absent.
Senator Cornyn. Yes. It seems like if the Chinese and the
Russians have high level representatives there in the region,
and we do not, that sounds like a sort of a self-inflicted
wound.
I still remember when General Kelly was head of Southern
Command years ago, talked about the counter drug issue. And of
course, a lot of the drugs do not just start in Mexico. They
end up there and then are brought to the United States, and
obviously, Columbia's role in the cocaine trade is well known.
But I still remember General Kelly when he was head of
Southern Command, he said as a result of the lack of assets for
the United States military and the counter drug mission that
they only were able to interdict about 17 percent, I think, is
the number that sticks in my mind, of the drugs that make their
way from South America through Central America through Mexico
into the United States.
And of course, I think it is entirely appropriate that
Senator Shaheen has these maps from the Armed Services
Committee. Obviously, the American military has to cover a lot
of territory.
But how important is it for the U.S. Government in the form
of the U.S. military Southern Command to provide assets there
to interdict the drugs that make their way from South America,
Central America, and Mexico and into the United States?
Dr. Ledford. Thank you, Senator. That is an excellent
point.
I think it is incredibly important and vital that the
Defense Department work with our partner countries in Latin
America to interdict drugs, and I encourage deployment of all
available assets, sharing intelligence, giving capabilities.
Many of these efforts need to be host country led, and we
have seen the most successful ones led by the countries
themselves.
But the United States should be there to provide guidance
and the capabilities and the intelligence to do so, and the
assets, if necessary.
Senator Risch. Thank you. And that is an appropriate point,
particularly when it comes to drugs.
You know, there is so much money involved in the drug trade
that the corruption is staggering in places where they are--
where they do produce a lot of drugs and, yet, sometimes it is
very difficult for the people who are trying to do the right
thing to do the right thing because of that.
Senator Kaine, you know a little bit about Latin America.
Would you care to share with us?
Senator Kaine. Thank you. Well, I am really happy to be
here with the witnesses, and you know, just a thought about the
Monroe Doctrine.
One of the things we need to be a little bit careful of is
in Latin America, the Monroe Doctrine is viewed as--the U.S.
was not really interested in Latin America. It was interested
in Europe.
And it was a doctrine that ``we are going to keep Europe
out,'' not ``you are important.'' It was ``we are going to keep
Europe out,'' and sometimes I think that Latin American
countries believe that U.S. pays attention when others are
interested, like China or Russia, but we are not paying
attention because we value the relationships.
And I think any new doctrine is one that certainly, we
ought to be worrying about this, but we also need to be
communicating the message that we value the relationship, and
that should be first. And we do need more attention.
I am worried about the USAID cuts. I am worried about--
Secretary Hegseth gave a directive to departments in the
Pentagon to develop a cut plan, and then he exempted certain
parts of the Pentagon from the cut plan but not SOUTHCOM.
SOUTHCOM always complains about not having enough resources.
We will see what the cut plan actually is. But if
SOUTHCOM's resources are degraded further, that is a problem.
And then the other thing I am concerned about is the
Administration has announced, not with respect to the Americas
but more generally, a desire to shrink the number of consular
offices around the world.
So, if there begins to be less of a presence in Latin
America or elsewhere that could have a challenge. So, I hope we
can work on those.
Let me tell you from really loving this area and having
lived there, three challenges that I see, and I may ask you to
pick any of them and address them, and give us some advice.
Number one, in the Americas I think China sometimes gets
more credit than they really deserve for this reason. China
will come with a pretty big checkbook, and a Chinese company is
viewed as part of the Chinese government. They got a big
checkbook.
The U.S. Government comes with a small checkbook but then
U.S. businesses are all over Latin America with a big
checkbook. But the Government--the U.S. Government--does not
get credit for the U.S. investment. That is kind of all--well,
that is kind of happening, you know, because of free markets,
et cetera.
So, when you hear Latin American leaders say, well, you
know, China has got a lot on the table--what about you guys?
What do you have on the table? They are giving us credit
for the U.S. Government check. They are not really considering
the total investment.
So, I think one challenge we have is figuring out a way
through financing tools and others to really help message that,
hey, we are more present than China. If you consider whole of
society and measure that against whole of Chinese society, we
are more present.
We are not getting credit for the private sector
investment. I am really thrilled about this Blackrock
investment that Senator Cornyn discussed.
Second--here is another problem in the Americas--we pay
attention to the trouble spots and not the successes. And of
course, we ought to pay attention the trouble spots--Nicaragua,
Cuba, Venezuela.
But when you have got Uruguay doing some things well,
Panama doing some things well--Paraguay, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Chile, Colombia, military to military very strong
even though we have got some challenges on the civilian side.
We are more paying attention to the headaches, and we are
not paying attention to the success stories, and some of the
successful nations are, like, hey, we would be we would be
better off being your adversary. You would pay more attention
to us.
Our humanitarian aid--once nations get to sort of a middle
income place, the tools of USAID, even if we turn on the funds,
they do not get them.
They can get a security deal but not development
assistance. China is not stopping development assistance to
nations when they get to be middle income. They are, like, we
are glad to be there.
So, I think the way to--if we are worried about Latin
American like democracy and success, the best thing is to help
the successful nations even be more successful because then
their next door neighbors will look at them and say, yes, we
want to be more like that.
So, us lecturing them about how to be successful is not
going to be near as successful as seeing a successful neighbor
next door. We ought to figure out ways to take the nations that
are doing things right and give them more resources and
attention.
And then the third thing--and I blame myself for this, I am
very guilty of this--talk about the Americas. We do not do
enough in the Caribbean, and then we end up with all these
Caribbean nations voting against us in the U.N. on all kinds of
things.
Because when we think about the Americas, I know I am
always thinking about Central America and South America, and I
put that on myself.
We need to broaden the aperture a little bit to maybe
invest more in the Caribbean, and they are very hungry for us
to put more attention in.
So, address either of those. How can we get more credit for
what we do society wide? How can we pay more attention to the
successes than the headaches, and what should we be doing more
in the Caribbean?
If you could each pick one of those and give a quick
answer.
Dr. Ledford. I will begin. Excellent points. Maybe I can
touch on all three.
I think what you are really hinting at is what has to be
included in the strategy that will be due in June is a public
diplomacy component to message the success cases while also
combating democratic backsliding and so forth--to put the
message across of the points that you have hit on.
And I very much agree about the Caribbean, and as I pointed
out in my opening statement the crisis in Haiti is the looming
crisis that is going to challenge the United States that we are
not paying enough attention to in the Western Hemisphere.
If Haiti completely collapses as a country of 12 million to
13 million people where do you think they are headed? It
creates a humanitarian catastrophe. The Dominican Republic next
door, another nation of 12 million to 13 million people, will
be on the verge of collapse.
And sticking with the Dominican Republic, great success
case. We should strengthen our strategic partnership with the
Dominican Republic across all sectors. They are hungry for it.
There has been a lot of progress made on that front with
Secretary Rubio's recent trip. We can--in fact, they are asking
us and inviting us to help them develop their critical
minerals, rare earth industry. This is a nation that is
projected to have 5 percent GDP growth.
Senator Kaine. Might I have Ms. Myers just say something
really quick, Mr. Chair?
Senator Risch. Sure.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Please, Ms. Myers.
Ms. Myers. No, I would love to--first of all, I agree
wholeheartedly on all of these points. They are absolutely
fundamental, you know, and especially the conceptualization of
the Monroe Doctrine and how that is problematic and how we have
to ensure that our Latin America policy does not come across as
a China policy or as a Russia policy or any other form of
alignment with our adversaries.
On the issue of China getting more credit than it deserves
this is a--I mean, to me, largely a messaging issue, right.
China comes to the table with big numbers.
Many of those numbers are not met, right. It comes to the
table with a lot of promises. A lot of those promises do not
come to pass. I am thinking about the lithium sector right now
where there have been promises to build factories to build
lithium batteries all over Argentina and elsewhere.
None of that has happened. None of that--there is no
intention for that to happen, right.
So, making that clear, demonstrating that those promises
indeed are unlikely to come to pass, I think, is absolutely
fundamental while also working on our own communication
strategy.
We do so much in the region. We have historically. We do
not toot our own horn enough, right, often. There are
obviously, you know, ways to do this that are more--some are
more effective than others. Depends on the context, depends on
the country.
But we need to think very critically about the types of
projects we are pursuing through development assistance, right,
and how best to amplify the gains and communicate the value of
those both here domestically to justify their continuation but
also overseas.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
Senator Kaine. He always says, you have nothing to yield
back, Kaine--you have gone way over your time. He said that to
me yesterday.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Senator McCormick.
Senator McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member Shaheen, for calling this hearing and thank you to our
distinguished guests.
Over the past 4 years communities in Pennsylvania, my home
State, and across the country have first hand experienced the
consequences of a vacuum, a lack of leadership in Latin
America, and the traffic in fentanyl and other illicit drugs in
particular and the flow of illegal immigrants from around the
world across the southern border have affected the entire
region.
The Mexican drug cartels and the other transnational
criminal organizations rake in massive profits, as the Chairman
has said, in a variety of ways.
To make matters worse, as has been discussed, the Chinese
Communist Party has stepped into that vacuum left by
uninterested leaders in Washington to expand its activity and
influence in Latin America.
And for Beijing the calculation simple--gain access to
resources and critical infrastructure to support the CCP's
global ambitions while undermining the influence and economic
priorities of the United States in its own backyard.
This cannot continue, and that is why I am so glad that
Secretary Rubio and the Trump administration have focused on
these challenges.
With that backdrop, Ms. Myers, I would like to start with
you. Mexico is both the third largest recipient of Chinese
investment in Latin America and the largest trading partner of
the United States, and I am particularly concerned about the
investment by China in strategic industries, important sectors
in Mexico that could undermine our national security, and for
that matter, their national security.
What is your assessment of how the new Mexican government
is addressing these concerns? And in the United States we, of
course, have CFIUS as the process. What are the Mexican
officials--what is the Mexican government doing to address
this?
Ms. Myers. Thank you. That is a critical question.
My assessment is that, you know, for a number of years now
there has been a concerted effort on the part of Chinese
officials to engage far more extensively with Mexico to build
ties, to strengthen partnerships, to upgrade the overall
relationship, to be able to achieve various aims in strategic
sectors.
This has worked to some degree, right. There has been
movement. There have been new deals struck including in
critical minerals, for example, and critical infrastructure, as
you have mentioned, and we have seen as we have seen elsewhere
in the region a real effort on localization, right.
China is not just engaging with presidents. It is not just
engaging with heads of state. It is engaging at the state
level, at the municipal level, with tiny towns in certain
cases, if there are projects of strategic interest there.
And so so much is happening in Jalisco. It is happening in
other, you know, Mexican states. And so, you know, the
challenge is a bit bigger when you are dealing with different
administrative levels and having to manage that and account for
it.
What I do see now, though, is a real effort to respond to
U.S. concerns about, you know, the extent of Chinese
involvement, the extent of Chinese investment, using the USMCA
as a back door, potentially, for--to, you know, ship goods to
the United States that would otherwise be subject to tariffs,
and we will see how far that goes.
But there does seem to me a willingness to at least sit
down and have these discussions, and an openness to investment
review mechanisms of some form, even if they do not look
exactly like CFIUS.
Senator McCormick. Great. Thank you.
Dr. Ledford, I was very happy to see Secretary Rubio
designate the cartels as terrorist organizations, and of
course, as you know that unlocks a whole new set of authorities
and possibilities for how the United States can engage on the
security threat--national security threat.
Now what? How would you suggest--what is the framework for
how the United States military, border patrol, national
security infrastructure should engage with the Mexican
government in pursuit of addressing the cartels, particularly
given what the Chairman mentioned about the deep seated
corruption that exists within Mexico and the cartels?
Dr. Ledford. Thank you for the question, Senator.
I think this is the million dollar question, how do we have
a long term stable and prosperous Mexico that is free and
secure. It is going to be on the Mexican authorities' side to
decide how deep the engagement goes with the United States.
We have the tools and the resources and the volition. We
need to renegotiate our security framework with Mexico, and I
have been heartened by the recent moves by the president of
Mexico to deploy more guards to the border, turn over cartel
members.
But we need new legal authorities to deepen security
cooperation on intelligence, on providing equipment. But it has
to be Mexican led, and this has always been the issue, I think,
less on our side and more on the Mexican government's side, and
it is my understanding the Administration is engaged in these
kind of conversations, and it is part of the tense negotiations
that are bound up in tariffs and so forth.
But I am optimistic that we can develop a new framework. As
far as the FTO designation goes, I think one positive aspect of
that will be reducing the flow of illicit arms southbound,
because now if someone sells arms to someone associated with an
organization that is designated under the FTO they will be
prosecuted for it under Federal guidelines.
Senator McCormick. That is a good point. Thank you.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
Senator Booker.
Senator Booker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to
the Ranking Member for holding this important hearing.
I am really grateful for the two colleagues to be here but
I want to--Dr. Ledford, I am really excited that you are here,
not just because of your great haircut but also because you are
from the Hoover Institution.
And I was a Stanford student--Stanford graduate student.
Took classes over there. Larry Diamond was one of the more
influential people in my early life, taking his classes. I
think his last book--I wish it could make it--hand it out to
everybody.
The title alone is pretty cutting--``Ill Winds'' I think it
was, countering Russia's rage, China's, I think, opportunism.
But then he talks a lot about American complacency and that
this erosion of the global democracy is a failure in many ways
for us to counter the Russian-Chinese influence and these
charts, in so many ways, really speak to that.
And I just really worry. I have traveled around the world
and have seen how when we step up--I was in east Africa and
seeing how it was American State Department programs that
really created a better environment for U.S. business
investment, and I saw some extraordinary partnerships between
American investors and east African leaders that transformed
entire communities, literally millions of them, bringing
stability, rising people out of poverty, whether it was the
agricultural input, the marketing of those products, the
bringing them overseas in trade relationships.
Without that, though, and very candidly people would tell
me in that context, you create this environment for chaos, for
terrorism, or for Chinese opportunism.
And so as we look at this hemisphere I am just wondering--I
do not know your relationship with my professor who gave me an
A---you could tell him I am still upset about that--in his
extraordinary class.
But can you--do you agree with him that there is an urgent
role for the use--as he would call it, the reduction of our
using of soft power--not just military power but really the
soft power necessary to counter China?
Dr. Ledford. Thank you, Senator. Glad to be here all the
way from the farm. I will tell Larry you said hello.
Senator Booker. Please.
Dr. Ledford. Yes, I very much agree with Professor
Diamond--the exercise of soft power--and that can be done
through the State Department.
And it is to a point that others have raised and that I
have raised myself about constant engagement, that we have to
have both high level engagement and mid-level engagement,
ambassadors on the ground, secretaries there, but the
institutions that you have talked about to further that kind of
engagement.
So, I am in agreement. I do not have much more to add on
that.
Senator Booker. And let me double down there then.
So, I remember when Secretary Mattis sat before us and
said, if you make cuts at the State Department buy me more
bullets, and when I see us now cutting programs, some of which
I have visited and other of my colleagues have visited, that
provide some basic health care and stability, and then we
decide to do the far more expensive intervention when it comes
to suddenly mass migration coming out of these unstable
countries.
If you were just an investor--forget advising Senators--but
if you were, like, a business investor it seems much more wise
to invest on a lot of the root causes of this global crisis of
migration than to be responding to the cartels that
opportunistically exploit people, the drugs that are related to
that, and more.
Am I correct?
Dr. Ledford. Yes, Senator. We always have to pair any sort
of security measures with long term development to address, as
you say, the root cause strategy.
Of course, the success rate is on a long term horizon. We
do not see those results as quick as we do as aggressive
efforts on the law enforcement side. But we have to pair those
together because you are not going to have security without
development.
Senator Booker. I am so grateful you said that.
And the last thing I really want to address, and I was so
grateful to my colleague for bringing up the importance of
expanding the aperture to the Caribbean, and Haiti is one of
these crises that is--and I know the sort of faith traditions
of a lot of my colleagues here--the moral urgency alone.
But should we not be engaged in stability there, in trying
to bring about some kind of restoration of governance or
dealing with the humanitarian crisis?
The consequences for our country seem to be dire. To ignore
it, to pull back from using U.S. soft power and the strength of
our nation, it seems to come with consequences. Would you agree
with that?
Dr. Ledford. Yes. Dire consequences. The United States has
to take a leadership role to bring democracy and order to
Haiti.
Senator Booker. I really appreciate it, and thank you very
much. Please tell Professor Diamond he really shaped my view of
the world, and I am privileged that I am in a position now that
I could use the wisdom and all the good things he taught me
when I was a student there.
Thank you.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator.
Senator.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
both.
And I want to follow up a little bit on Senator Booker's
question regarding soft power but also direct assistance in the
form of foreign assistance.
As Senator Shaheen mentioned at the outset of this hearing,
we did get a step forward in terms of a court order. The
Supreme Court 5 to 4 ordered that AID and others pay funds
already due and owing under contracts, which seems pretty
straightforward. The U.S. Government should make good on its
obligations that have already been incurred.
But the outstanding question, of course, remains the freeze
on other foreign assistance, whether it is AID funds or other
forms of foreign assistance, military security assistance.
So, Ms. Myers, would you agree that by stopping this
assistance we not only do not provide important help to our
friends in Latin America but we open the door even wider to
China and other adversaries?
Ms. Myers. I could not agree more. Certainly, I mean, not
only is this detrimental to us as a--to our partnerships, to
our relations with the region, to trust in the United States to
fulfill its obligations and to support, you know, hemispheric
affairs, which it is so--for so many years committed to do.
But we have, on the other hand, you know, a China that is
coming to the region with a very comprehensive Belt and Road
strategy underway which has continued for upwards of a decade
now and which contains at this point, and I would say over the
past 3 or 4 years, an expansion of activity in the people to
people space, in diplomatic activity, in technical cooperation,
military assistance, in all of these areas that we have been
really dominant in for so many years.
So, taking a step back now is essentially akin to shooting
ourselves in the foot.
Senator Van Hollen. I agree.
And Dr. Ledford, I have been listening in terms of the
points you have been making. I agree entirely. We need a
comprehensive strategy here.
We need an economic strategy engaging with the private
sector. We sort of need to approach this from all angles to
both, you know, make sure that our interests are served, that
our values are advanced, and that we do our best to keep our
adversaries from further advancing in the region.
And so as part of that would you agree that the foreign
assistance that we have provided has been a useful tool among
many in terms of advancing our interests?
Dr. Ledford. Thank you, Senator.
Yes, I agree that foreign assistance aligned with the
aims--the political aims and the values of our country is an
effective tool amongst other tools in bringing a comprehensive
framework to bear on hemispheric security and prosperity.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that, and of course, it is
one tool, but I believe it is a very important tool, and it is
especially dangerous when we are seen to be retreating or
forfeiting one of our many tools.
I was here at the beginning when Senator Shaheen pointed
out these maps, and I apologize if this has been covered, but
in which countries in Latin America do you believe that China
has gained the most leverage and the most influence through its
efforts?
And if I can just start with you, Ms. Myers.
Ms. Myers. You know, if I were asked that 5 years ago I
would have a different answer than today. But at this juncture,
China has considerable leverage across the entirety of the
region in some form or another.
There are some countries, and I would say particularly
South American countries, where China has, you know, expansive
trade relations that underpin the dynamic and which ensure some
degree of dependence, and therefore more overall influence.
Also, those countries that are smaller and have received
infusions of capital from China that are--make essentially an
outsized contribution to the overall economic development tend
to also align more closely with China on wide ranging issues.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
Dr. Ledford.
Dr. Ledford. I concur with my brilliant co-panelist, but I
just want to highlight the gains made in Peru.
It is not just the mega port which will fundamentally
change trade routes between China and Latin America, but they--
China--own the electrical grids, business, potential
corruption.
So, we want to look at in terms of Chinese influence,
particular choke points in Latin America. But, again, it is
across the entire region.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Senator Scott.
Senator Scott of Florida. Thank you, Chairman.
Thanks for being here.
How much do you think we have spent in foreign aid in
Central and South America in the last 10 years? What is your--
do you guys have any idea?
Dr. Ledford. In totality? I will just take a stab in the
dark. Maybe $20 billion. I think $2.2 billion was authorized
for fiscal year 2025.
Senator Scott of Florida. Is that--do you think that is
what the number is?
Ms. Myers. I do not have the numbers, Senator. Apologies.
Senator Scott of Florida. OK. So, what if you--so let us
say it is $20 billion. So, if I went to the taxpayers back in
my State and said, this is what you got for $20 billion what
would you say we got? What would a Florida taxpayer say we got
out of that $20 billion expenditures?
Senator Risch. You might have----
Dr. Ledford. If I had to guess I would say that they would
probably say not enough.
Senator Scott of Florida. Like, what would be something
concrete that we could say that so--that we got out of the--you
know, if I went back to talk to taxpayers, and they would say,
so with that $20 billion this is what we got?
Dr. Ledford. We fund law enforcement measures in Mexico.
Now, given they are not as productive as we would like them to
be.
We have given millions recently to support the multilateral
security support mission in Haiti to prevent the collapse of
the country. So, in terms of the security measures, we do
support anti-narcotic efforts.
Senator Scott of Florida. What would you say that--if I
have to go back to a taxpayer and tell him I got a return
somehow what would you say I got?
Ms. Myers. I mean, obviously, some of these taxpayers may
be looking for, you know, immediate solutions to the problems
that they are witnessing and encountering.
The challenge is that a lot of this is medium to long term
in nature, right? It is an effort to work overtime with our
partners to address issues that are enormously complex and
require multifaceted solutions. That is hard to explain to a
taxpayer.
But I mean, truly the across the board it is health, it is
education, it is addressing the root causes of migration to
over time reduce overall flows of irregular migration to the
United States. It is addressing insecurity. It is building
ties. It is building trust. It is building----
Senator Scott of Florida. Let us go through that for a
second. So, if I went back to Florida and say, I just spent $20
billion of your money, and we prevented drugs from coming in,
they would say, wait a minute.
Seventy thousand people died of fentanyl last year. They
would say, you have not been very successful. They would say,
we are worried about crime in our country, and you are worried
about--you are paying for police in another country when we do
not have enough police on the streets in our country.
In, I think, 2023 something like one out of every 43
Americans were subject to a violent crime. They would say, you
know, we have got--you know, you spent money, you said, on
health care, and they say, we have people in our country that
do not have enough health.
I mean, or food, all these things. I mean, I have been up
here 6 years. This is the busiest time since I have been up
here. Everybody in my office is asking for money, and I just--
and here is my pitch to them.
I say, I just went through a campaign. There is not one
person--almost on every issue that people are talking about
they are worried about cutting spending--that one Floridian
brought up that we got to make sure we do that. There is not
one, and then my problem is I cannot go back to Florida and
say, boy, I am excited about how much money we have spent on
foreign aid because I got--something could happen.
Let us see, the Castro regime still controls Cuba.
Venezuela just stole another election. Ortega is getting
stronger in Nicaragua. Petro is a terrorist. Name it. Lula is
trying to destroy Brazil. I do not know--did we help Milei get
elected? I do not think so.
We got to--so I look at it and say, what did we--so short
term, long term, 20 years, I cannot see what we did in Latin
America that we spent--if we spent $20 billion that we got a
return.
And that is what I have to do. I have to go home and say,
here is your--here is how your tax dollars are going to get
spent. I mean, what would you be thinking how--if you think
that way, like, citizens that does not--that thinks their taxes
are too high what do you say to them?
Ms. Myers. Again, I think--I mean, this is not a--there is
not a country that does not struggle with this to some degree.
I mean, these debates are ongoing everywhere including in
China, right, where they say what is this Belt and Road
Initiative about--stop spending our money on it, and do
something at home, right? These are the--this is the problem
that many, many countries are experiencing.
Nevertheless, most have conceded that foreign aid achieves
wide ranging objectives--you know, strategic, security related,
you know, health and safety related. I mean, really, you name
it.
And in terms of building our partnerships with the region,
if we believe that there is strength in numbers, right, these
are--a lot of this is intangible. A lot of this is, again, you
know, medium to long term, and so it is very difficult to
explain to an electorate.
But I think we need to determine whether we believe that
this is the right course of action ourselves, right, and then
make the effort to come up with narratives that do demonstrate
the value over time of these commitments.
And I am sure--I am not particularly equipped to offer
concrete, you know, evidence at this particular moment, but I
am sure that the many institutions that do these things have,
you know, countless examples of the ways in which they have
impacted the region positively and U.S. citizens positively,
directly as a result. I wish I had something more concrete to
offer in the way of messaging.
Senator Risch. I hate to cut off this debate because this
is a really, really important debate.
Unfortunately, we are in the process of voting. They are
going to call all of us down there in a minute, and Senator
Curtis, I want to give you a shot at this, please.
Senator Curtis. Thank you. I will be careful with my time.
I would like to note--thank you for doing this hearing--I
would like to note that it is my honor to replace Secretary
Rubio as the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee chair and really
look forward to delving in on some of these issues and working
with the Secretary on these.
I would like to know, in your view, the primary strategic
goals of both Russia and China in the Western Hemisphere--how
those goals differ between the two, and how can the United
States better position ourselves to counterbalance those goals.
Go ahead.
Ms. Myers. I am happy to begin.
It is my view that China's goals in the region are largely
the same as they were. Around the 1990s during this moment of
the going out strategy, right, which wherein China was seeking
resources, it was seeking markets for its products, and it was
seeking to internationalize its companies to make them more
competitive, right.
We are seeing the same dynamic at play now. Resources are
absolutely fundamental. Markets are more important than ever as
China looks to export its excess capacity, especially in high
tech goods, which is fundamental to its economic growth.
It is an existential challenge for China at the moment, and
we continue to see efforts to try to ensure that Chinese
companies are not only competitive but dominant across certain
strategic sectors including in the high tech space. This is
something that China is looking to pursue in Latin America and
has pursued for many, many years.
In addition to this, of course, are other interests that
facilitate these objectives. Reducing U.S. influence, U.S.
ability to engage, creates an environment in which China is
able to pursue its objectives more extensively, more easily.
And so wide ranging communications, you know, campaigns,
people to people contacts, other forms of engagement have
sought to do that and have done so very effectively in certain
instances.
So, China--I mean, I still see China's engagement as
largely economic in nature, but obviously with a political
component to it and a strategic component to it in that all of
these things are dramatically interrelated.
For Russia, my sense--and I do not follow Russia as
carefully as China--is that, you know, this is much more
directed at undermining U.S. influence, U.S. interests at all
junctures, right, with or without an economic interest, you
know, accompanying that.
And we see that across the board in terms of the ways that
Russia pursues certain deals, the types of agreements that it
is striking, the folks that it engages with in the Latin
American context.
China engages with everyone, as we mentioned earlier.
Russia really is very targeted in its engagements in an effort
to undermine U.S. interests across the board.
Senator Curtis. Thank you.
Doctor, if you can give me the short version. This way I
can try to squeeze another question in. Thank you.
Dr. Ledford. I would just like to add Iran.
Senator Curtis. Thank you. Yes.
Dr. Ledford. I think we have not focused enough on the
Ayatollah. Iran has deepened its engagement to undermine the
U.S. specifically, and also its proxy Hezbollah which operates
in the tri-border region to the tune of about $300 million to
$400 million a year to fund its terrorist activities in the
Middle East. So, it is very much about undermining the U.S. in
its own hemisphere.
Senator Curtis. Thank you both.
Let me shift to a similar topic. Several Latin American and
Caribbean nations have recently shifted considering their
diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of
China.
Can you both just briefly touch on how the U.S. can reward
those who are more aligned with our position? What
opportunities, diplomatic or otherwise, do we have to
strengthen our friend Taiwan?
Doctor, why do you not start?
Dr. Ledford. Yes. I think we should reward our allies in
the region that continue to recognize Taiwan with closer
engagement and the benefits that come with being a close
strategic partner with the United States and to continue to
encourage their engagement with Taiwan and dissuade them from
giving in to PRC influence to derecognize Taiwan.
Ms. Myers. And if I could add to that.
In addition to continuing to work with them in substantive
ways, offering assistance in the areas that they are
prioritizing from a developmental perspective, it will be
critical also for us to communicate sort of the lack of
progress that some of those countries that have made this
recent decision to cut ties with Taiwan have had with China,
right?
There is not a lot happening or at least, certainly, what
is happening is not what was anticipated. And so, you know,
that is a critical message for us to convey as well. It is not
necessarily that you are going to get everything you want from
China once you play this critical economic and diplomatic card.
Senator Curtis. Thank you. I am out of time, and I will not
push this. I have a lot of questions and hopefully we can have
a continued dialogue. Thank you very much. I yield my time.
Senator Risch. Thank you. The record is going to stay open
until close of business tomorrow so if you want to submit some
questions for the record, I am sure our witnesses will respond.
Senator Curtis. We certainly will. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Risch. A sincere thank you to our witnesses on
behalf of both Senator Shaheen and I. This has been a very
enlightening discussion. I think a lot more talk about problems
than solutions but possible solutions.
This is an area that USG has got to spend more time on. We
just really do. If you not there you cannot play in the game,
and so we are--Senator Shaheen and I are committed to getting
ambassadors there where we do not have ambassadors. That is
critical.
We had a good hearing yesterday with three of the people
that are going to the State Department. All three of them were
committed to the proposition that we talked about today, and
that is how important economic engagement is to your
relationship with a country, and they are all committed to see
that USG is there at the table, if necessary, with U.S.
companies to try to make things happen down there.
So, a sincere thank you to both of you for attending today
and providing us with the benefit of your testimony.
For the information of members, the record will remain open
until the close of business tomorrow.
We would ask the witnesses to respond to those questions as
rapidly as possible, and again, with thanks to the committee,
this committee is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Dr. Joseph Ledford to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
Question. What steps can Congress and the administration take to
develop CFIUS-like mechanisms with our partners to curb PRC investment
in our hemisphere?
Answer. In the Western Hemisphere, the United States must export to
regional partners the protocols, principles, and best practices of the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to
restrain and eventually restrict investments from the People's Republic
of China (PRC) in sectors with national security ramifications--
agriculture, energy, infrastructure, and technology.
With the passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act of 2018, it has been the ``Sense of Congress'' that
presidents should engage with American allies and partners to create
CFIUS-like processes to review foreign investments that threaten
national security. Now, Congress must pass legislation to expand and
formalize a broader scope of collaboration for CFIUS. It must extend
beyond information sharing and into capacity building for regional
partners due to the scale and intent of Chinese investment in the
Western Hemisphere.
In expanding the role and authorities of CFIUS by amending
legislation, Congress could establish and fund a hemispheric
cooperation council (or another appropriate title), whereby CFIUS
provides the technical knowhow and resources to equip hemispheric
partners with a CFIUS-type body. Each CFIUS-like mechanism should be
suited for the partner nation's institutions and laws, but it must
function in accordance with American standards.
Under such hemispheric cooperation, CFIUS could advise, train, and
offer tools for partner countries to establish their respective inter-
agency bodies. CFIUS could dispatch American experts from the
Department of Treasury or other relevant agencies to assist partner
countries with screening investments, especially if Chinese investments
will have an impact on the US supply chain or strategic chokepoints.
Congress could require an annual classified briefing on CFIUS
hemispheric joint investment review efforts to assess the progress and
identify any potential implementation challenges.
To incentivize regional partners to participate, Congress could
allocate a sufficient budget for the hemispheric cooperation council,
including funds to offset the costs for establishing new screening
committees in partner countries. Congress could also offer economic
incentives for regional collaborators, including but not limited to
tariff reductions, aid packages and/or preferential treatment for
American investment through public-private partnerships.
In lieu of new CFIUS legislation, however, President Donald Trump
could pursue bilateral agreements with hemispheric partners to review
foreign investments in the Americas. Using CFIUS as a model, the United
States and regional partners could negotiate agreements to engage in
joint screening of PRC investments in critical sectors, either
leveraging existing frameworks or creating new ones. Mexico should take
precedence for the first in a series of investment security agreements,
given its outsized economic and security importance to the United
States.
The United States and Mexico have flexibility for pursuing a
partnership on investment reviews. A joint investment screening process
with Mexico could be embedded within the USMCA framework. The Essential
Security exception under Article 32.2 of the USMCA would permit the
United States and Mexico to undertake a joint investment security
initiative with a CFIUS-like mechanism.
Beyond the USMCA, President Trump and President Claudia Sheinbaum
could establish protocols for jointly reviewing Chinese investments in
critical sectors as a component of a new security cooperation
framework. In fact, any new security framework replacing the
Bicentennial Framework must include an explicit economic pillar to
address the hemispheric security risks posed by PRC investments.
Question. Do you think the Trump administration should negotiate a
new security cooperation framework with Mexico, and what should be
included in such framework?
Answer. Yes, the Trump administration must seek a reenvisioned
binational security cooperation framework with Mexico to replace the
Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health and Safe Communities
negotiated by the Biden administration.
In doing so, the United States and Mexico should not only integrate
the effective elements of prior security cooperation frameworks but
also adapt the purpose to confront 21st-century threats to North
America. A new US-Mexico security cooperation framework should combine
the Merida Initiative's emphasis on intelligence, training, and
equipment support with the Bicentennial Framework's focus on curbing
arms and human trafficking, drug use, and economic insecurity, while
expanding its aim to counter both transnational criminal organizations
and the PRC.
Aimed at revitalizing the US-Mexico security relationship, this
framework should contain realistic benchmarks, like monthly arrests of
high-profile targets and drug seizures, alongside annual reductions in
murders and overdoses, to achieve measurable near and long-term
results.
The United States and Mexico should not delay negotiations.
Presidents Trump and Sheinbaum should promptly convene high-level
meetings to fashion this security cooperation framework. It should rest
on five mutually reinforcing pillars that blend past goals with the
present challenges of strategic competition:
Eliminating Cartels
Enhancing Border Security
Strengthening Institutions
Building Communities
Fortifying North America
Derived from the effective elements of the Merida Initiative and
Bicentennial Framework, the first four pillars would pursue familiar
objectives. These encompass dismantling cartels, securing ports of
entry, eradicating corruption and bolstering the rule of law, and
increasing economic opportunities.
The fifth pillar on strategic competition, however, merits further
explanation.
Because of mutual national security interests, the United States
and Mexico must collaborate to counter China's malign influence in the
Western Hemisphere, especially to disrupt and destroy the cartels.
China's crucial role in the fentanyl crisis as well as Chinese
investments in Mexico present paramount threats to North America.
Under the fifth pillar of the US-Mexico security cooperation
framework, then, joint efforts could be undertaken to prevent fentanyl
precursors from entering Mexico and crack down on cartel money
laundering facilitated by Chinese brokers. Moreover, the United States
and Mexico could coordinate economic retaliation against China for its
continued involvement in the drug trade, including synchronized tariffs
on Chinese imports. To complement the anti-narcotic component with
economic pressure, the framework could establish a CFIUS-like entity to
screen Chinese investments in critical sectors (see response to
question 1).
Shared interests, priorities, and threats underscore the need for a
reenvisioned US-Mexico security cooperation framework. To be sure, the
ambitious framework outlined here will require from both countries
expanded legal authorities, unprecedented law enforcement cooperation,
greater financial contributions--and, above all, renewed binational
trust.
Question. What can the U.S. do to induce the Sheinbaum government
to improve its ability to counter transnational criminal organizations,
specifically to prevent the flow of fentanyl?
Answer. Outside of negotiating a new US-Mexico security cooperation
framework, the United States can use old-fashioned diplomacy and
conditional material support to encourage a more robust anti-narcotics
campaign from the Sheinbaum government.
At the outset of his administration, President Trump tackled the
fentanyl crisis using tariffs as a diplomatic tool, proposing tariffs
on Mexican imports to spur a greater effort from the Sheinbaum
government. In response, President Sheinbaum sent thousands of national
guardsmen to the border, requested additional US drone flights to
acquire intelligence on cartels, and extradited high-profile criminals.
During their multiple exchanges on trade, migration, and drugs,
Presidents Trump and Sheinbaum have formed a working relationship based
on shared interests that has impressed observers. It should not,
however, come as a surprise, as Sheinbaum governs pragmatically and
sees the benefits to her domestic agenda from stronger collaboration
with the United States. Degrading the cartels is a surefire way to
boost the prospects of Sheinbaum's economic program, Plan Mexico.
The Trump administration can grow this nascent partnership through
sustained high-level engagement, befitting of a close ally, to
strengthen Mexico's anti-narcotics efforts. Indeed, close US-Mexico
relations can be the foundation for this administration's ``Americas
First'' approach to foreign policy. To support this aim, the Senate
must expedite Ronald D. Johnson's confirmation as US Ambassador to
Mexico while the administration must continue sending delegations to
Mexico. Building on Secretary Kristi Noem's recent meeting with
President Sheinbaum in Mexico City, Deputy Secretary of State
Christopher Landau, a former US Ambassador to Mexico, and Secretary of
State Marco Rubio should travel to Mexico City to reinforce the US-
Mexico partnership. Ultimately, President Trump should make a state
visit to Mexico. If only Richard Nixon could go to China, only Trump
can go to Mexico. The president should seize the opportunity to
invigorate US-Mexico relations for the 21st century.
In conjunction with diplomacy, the Trump administration must
dedicate sufficient financial resources to assist the Sheinbaum
government. Nothing signals cooperation and commitment quite like more
money, training, and equipment, provided Mexico demonstrates results.
The United States could increase the budget of the State Department's
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to
provide a substantially larger amount of aid to Mexico. In return, the
Trump administration could condition this assistance on the Sheinbaum
government increasing the security portion of Mexico's budget to
properly fund its new National Security Strategy. Furthermore, the
United States could require Mexico to conduct more aggressive anti-
corruption operations, supply more reliable data on interdictions, and
commit to greater military and law enforcement collaboration.
Since the United States and Mexico have shared security concerns,
and Sheinbaum's domestic programs depend on a reduction in crime, the
challenges to Mexican anti-narcotics efforts are not insurmountable.
With deft diplomacy and conditional aid, the United States can persuade
Mexico to intensify its anti-narcotics operations to advance its own
national interest. The United States, for its part, must devote
appropriate attention and considerable resources to show commitment and
facilitate cooperation. In turn, Mexico must provide a reciprocal
investment.
Question. How do you perceive the challenges presented by illicit
gold mining in Latin America?
Answer. In the Western Hemisphere, illicit gold mining, like drug
trafficking, presents a series of interconnected and widespread
challenges with criminal, environmental, political, and social
dimensions. In remote areas, the shadowy enterprise is pursued through
illegal small, medium, and large-scale operations. It provides a major
source of funding for transnational criminal organizations, terrorist
groups, and the authoritarian regimes in Nicaragua and Venezuela.
In the last decade, due in part to the global demand for gold,
illicit gold mining has become increasingly profitable, encouraging
malign actors to further engage in the damaging activity. It affects
many countries in the region, occurring in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Suriname, and
Venezuela. In the cases of Colombian and Peruvian illicit gold mining,
for instance, it generates higher profits than cocaine production.
In addition to propping up dictatorships and financing criminal
outfits, illicit gold mining destroys the environment and encourages
human rights violations. Used by miners to extract gold, mercury
contaminates the air, land, and water of mining regions, poisoning
workers and locals alike, even those far afield. Illegal gold mining
operations also cause deforestation, particularly in the Amazon
rainforest, and drive the widespread displacement of populations
located in mining areas, of which the greatest impact has been on
indigenous communities.
Furthermore, labor exploitation and human trafficking accompany
illegal mining operations. Either through deception, recruitment or
coercion, criminal organizations make workers, including children,
labor long hours in hazardous conditions. These same groups engage in
sex trafficking, luring--and forcing--women and young girls into
prostitution at the mining sites.
As a result of the diverse, transnational nature of the threat
posed by illicit gold mining, the United States faces several barriers
to ending the practice.
Easy profits fuel the underground industry. At an average of $3000
per ounce, the value of gold offers a lucrative incentive for its
unlawful extraction. Poverty, alongside a longstanding dependence on
artisanal and small-scale mining, continues to push individuals into
seeking out mining work, though many are forced into it.
The gold business is conducive to illicit practices. A commodity
with a nearly impossible to trace origin, the global gold supply chain,
which includes refineries in China, India, Italy, Switzerland, United
Arab Emirates, and the United States, permits easy laundering through
intermediaries that sell the illicit gold to legitimate, commercial
suppliers.
A diminished state capacity proves incapable of dealing with the
problem. Weak governance in remote regions, as well as corrupt
officials, facilitate the illegal gold trade.
Despite the complex and intractable problems created by illicit
gold mining, they are solvable if the United States acts swiftly. Three
actions would have an immediate effect.
Congress must pass the United States Legal Gold and Mining
Partnership Act (S. 799) introduced by Senator John Cornyn and co-
sponsored by Senator Tim Kaine. This would create a statutory
requirement for a ``Legal Gold and Mining Partnership Strategy,'' which
would provide the United States with a holistic, long-term set of
policies for working with regional partners to curb the mining of
illicit gold, disrupt the financial networks enabling the enterprise,
and prevent the regimes in Venezuela and Nicaragua from profiting off
it. To this end, the United States must cease all gold imports from
Nicaragua, and the Trump administration must impose tougher sanctions
on the Nicaraguan gold sector under Executive Order 14088. Last, the
United States should build on the Memoranda of Understanding with
Colombia and Peru by pursuing additional MOUs with countries contending
with an increase in illicit gold mining, such as Brazil, Ecuador,
Guyana, and Panama.
This would only be the beginning. Since illicit gold mining
presents a range of challenges akin to drug trafficking, the United
States must be likewise aggressive and forward-thinking in developing
the policies to combat it. So, too, must American policymakers be aware
that the scourge of illicit gold mining will not be resolved overnight.
Question. How can we better elucidate the harms of overreliance on
the PRC in the minerals sector to our neighbors in the Western
Hemisphere, and encourage de-risking and collaboration with the United
States in the critical minerals sector?
Answer. Containing the world's largest copper and lithium deposits,
as well as vast reserves of silver, tin, zinc, nickel, bauxite,
graphite, gold, and rare earth elements, Latin America has enormous
potential for economic growth by contributing to the global energy and
technology sectors. To facilitate such growth while reducing the
region's reliance on China, the United States must develop an effective
public diplomacy campaign in conjunction with a novel policy agenda for
developing, expanding, and securing the critical minerals sector
throughout the Americas.
In short, America must provide the Americas with a viable strategic
alternative from China, which requires not only a message and
attention, but also the capital and commitment.
Launching an ``all that glitters is not gold'' public diplomacy
campaign would prove useful in highlighting how China's predatory
involvement in Latin America's critical mineral sector will not result,
over the long term, in desirable economic benefits, especially given
China's hostile behavior and willingness to use economic coercion.
Through media, events, and diplomatic engagements, this campaign should
drive the message that the investments and profits from China today
undermine Latin America's economy and sovereignty tomorrow.
Due to recent legislation, a statutory requirement exists for a
public diplomacy initiative in the Western Hemisphere, which offers a
framework for the Trump administration. The Western Hemisphere
Partnership Act (P.L. 118-159), enacted in December 2024 via the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, mandates a
comprehensive 5-year strategy that contains a public diplomacy
component. In crafting this strategy, the Trump administration should
include a multi-year plan for encouraging America's neighbors to engage
in hemispheric partnerships to further the region's critical mineral
industry without a reliance on Chinese investment and purchasing. The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee
can monitor how well the United States conveys this message during the
mandated yearly briefings on the strategy's implementation.
Yet the United States must do more than inform regional partners
that China offers nothing but coercion and dependency. America must
offer concrete opportunities for prosperity and independence.
With varying degrees of risk and sizable reserves, Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Mexico, Panama, and Peru possess critical mineral industries worthy of
American investment. The United States must commit to initiatives that
channel private capital into these nations' critical mineral sectors to
spur development and secure the regional supply chain.
Such programs can incentivize American investment in exploration,
refineries, and infrastructure. The United States is now pursuing an
economic program in the Americas that would catalyze it. Under America
Crece 2.0, the Trump administration seeks to facilitate investments in
energy and infrastructure from US private capital. To support the
administration's private-sector led approach to the Americas and
bolster the Americas-centric critical mineral supply chain, Congress
must consider legislation to create an Americas specific fund located
in the Commerce Department to stimulate private equity investments in
Latin American mining and processing. Through the reauthorization of
the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Congress can
also help promote investments in critical minerals by easing
restrictions on DFC involvement in Latin America, which includes
raising its cap and permitting investments in middle and high-income
countries without a waiver.
In addition, Congress should consider drafting a tailored version
of the Critical Minerals Security Act of 2025 for the Western
Hemisphere. Like the global version, this Act could direct the
Secretary of the Interior to submit a report on the vast critical
mineral and rare earth element resources located in the Western
Hemisphere, including which foreign entities control them, and how the
United States can work with regional partners to strengthen the Western
Hemisphere supply chain.
The Act could also require a strategy from the Secretary of the
Interior for the United States to work with regional partners to
develop clean mining, refining, separation, and processing
technologies. This report and strategy would inform both the public
diplomacy and capital campaigns designed to encourage Latin American
countries to de-risk and collaborate with the United States in the
critical minerals sector.
Diversifying America's critical mineral supply chain through
regional partnerships will augment domestic production, leading to a
self-reliant hemisphere that breaks China's dominance of the market.
Slowly but surely, Latin America can end its critical mineral exports
to China, and the United States can stop importing critical minerals
from China.
Responses of Ms. Margaret Myers to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
Question. What steps can Congress and the administration take to
develop CFIUS-like mechanisms with our partners to curb PRC investment
in our hemisphere?
Answer. There is considerable resistance in the region to the
implementation of CFIUS-like mechanisms. Many stakeholders fear
economic retaliation from China. It will be important to continue
discussions with the private sector, government agencies, and others
about the value of investment review, especially at a moment when China
is poised to affect even those industries in which Latin American
nations have retained some degree of competitiveness, and noting that
there are many models of investment review that countries can adopt in
support of their economic and national security interests.
That said, we can easily reduce concerns about economic retaliation
from China by providing viable alternatives to Chinese investment and
finance. The United States will be far more convincing on investment-
related and other policymaking if we can demonstrate the economic value
of U.S. partnership, especially at a moment when some in the region are
viewing their trade and other agreements with the United States as
liabilities.
Question. Do you think the Trump administration should negotiate a
new security cooperation framework with Mexico, and what should be
included in such framework?
Answer. Cooperation is the very best way to address the wide-
ranging security challenges that Mexico and the United States are
facing at present. This is an optimal moment for the Trump
administration to pursue a strategy of cooperation, while also
requesting that Mexico take certain steps to remedy a worsening
situation, moving away from AMLO's historically reluctant approach to
battling crime.
A new security cooperation framework would necessarily involve
systemic mechanisms for intelligence sharing, surveillance, law
enforcement cooperation, including on discrete operations, and the
provision of resources and equipment to ensure effective control of
organized crime.
Question. What can the U.S. do to induce the Sheinbaum government
to improve its ability to counter transnational criminal organizations,
specifically to prevent the flow of fentanyl?
Answer. As present, there is considerable U.S. interest in
leveraging the trade and broader economic relationship to ensure
Mexican compliance with U.S. demands. And Mexico may very well concede,
noting its commitment to achieving certain mutual objectives. But
Mexico's resources and ability to control the problem are limited.
Strategic and tactical cooperation will be critical to ensuring real
progress. A degree of trust in the bilateral relationship will also be
important to achieving future gains. Here, the relationship would
benefit from a sincere and concerted effort on both sides of the border
to address the wide-ranging demand and supply side factors that are
driving trade in drugs and other illicit activities.
Question. How do you perceive the challenges presented by illicit
gold mining in Latin America?
Answer. Illicit gold mining in Latin America has been enormously
impactful from an environmental, health, security-related, and economic
perspective--and for a matter of many decades. Unfortunately, countries
in the region appear increasingly ill-equipped to address the
challenge, especially as illegal mining expands across parts of the
region.
Question. How can we better elucidate the harms of overreliance on
the PRC in the minerals sector to our neighbors in the Western
Hemisphere, and encourage de-risking and collaboration with the United
States in the critical minerals sector?
Answer. We must invest. We must be present in these sectors by
helping to derisk these investments for U.S. companies. As we have
seen, absent viable alternatives, Latin American governments,
regardless of their political leanings, will continue to pursue
economic opportunity with China, whether in critical minerals or other
frontier industries. Argentina is a perfect case in point, despite
Argentine President Javier Milei's apparent affinity for the Trump
administration. Absent investment in the lithium triangle or elsewhere,
the United States might consider encouraging countries to take more
ownership of their resources. Chile's efforts to do so have naturally
limited Chinese engagement in that country's lithium industry.
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