    [Senate Hearing 119-45]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                             S. Hrg. 119-45

                     RESEARCH SECURITY RISKS POSED BY FOREIGN
                      NATIONALS FROM COUNTRIES OF RISK WORK-
                      ING AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S NA-
                      TIONAL LABORATORIES AND NECESSARY MITI-
                      GATION STEPS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                          ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               FEBRUARY 20, 2025

                                   __________

                           Printed for the use of the
                   Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    60-021                    WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

                            MIKE LEE, Utah, Chairman
    JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming               MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho                RON WYDEN, Oregon
    STEVE DAINES, Montana                MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    DAVID McCORMICK, Pennsylvania        ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
    JAMES C. JUSTICE, West Virginia      CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada
    BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana              JOHN W. HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
    CINDY HYDE-SMITH, Mississippi        ALEX PADILLA, California
    LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska               RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
    JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota

                      Wendy Baig, Majority Staff Director
                Patrick J. McCormick III, Majority Chief Counsel
                     Jasmine Hunt, Minority Staff Director
                     Sam E. Fowler, Minority Chief Counsel

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                               OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                       Page
    Lee, Hon. Mike, Chairman and a U.S. Senator from Utah............     1
    Heinrich, Hon. Martin, Ranking Member and a U.S. Senator from New
      Mexico.........................................................     2

                                   WITNESSES

    Dabbar, Hon. Paul M., CEO and Co-Founder, Bohr Quantum
      Technology; former Under Secretary for Science, U.S. Department
      of Energy......................................................     5
    Puglisi, Anna B., Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford
      University.....................................................   108
    Richmond, Hon. Geraldine L., Presidential Chair in Science and
      Professor of Chemistry, University of Oregon; former Under
      Secretary for Science and Innovation, U.S. Department of Energy   118

              ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND APPENDIX MATERIAL SUBMITTED

    Dabbar, Hon. Paul M.:
        Opening Statement............................................     5
        Written Testimony with attached supplemental material........     7
        Responses to Questions for the Record........................   151
    Heinrich, Hon. Martin:
        Opening Statement............................................     2
    Lee, Hon. Mike:
        Opening Statement............................................     1
    Puglisi, Anna B.:
        Opening Statement............................................   108
        Written Testimony............................................   110
    Richmond, Hon. Geraldine L.:
        Opening Statement............................................   118
        Written Testimony............................................   120
        Responses to Questions for the Record........................   155

     RESEARCH SECURITY RISKS POSED BY FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM COUNTRIES OF
     RISK WORKING AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S NATIONAL LABORATORIES AND
                           NECESSARY MITIGATION STEPS

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 2025

                                           U.S. Senate,
                     Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in
    Room SD-366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mike Lee,
    Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE LEE,
                         U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH

        The Chairman. The Committee will come to order. The Senate
    Energy and Natural Resources Committee's hearing on research
    security risks posed by foreign nationals from countries of
    risk working at the Department of Energy's national
    laboratories and necessary mitigation steps. I will give my
    five-minute opening statement here in a moment. Then, I will
    turn to Ranking Member Heinrich for his opening statement.
    Then, I will introduce witnesses and give them an opportunity
    to give their five-minute opening statements.
        The U.S. Department of Energy oversees 17 national labs.
    These labs have been instrumental in shaping America's
    technological and military competitive edge. From the Manhattan
    Project to cutting edge AI research, DOE's national labs have
    pushed the boundaries of innovation and strengthened our
    national security. But for those very same reasons, they have
    also become a prime target for espionage. Secretary Chris
    Wright, at his confirmation hearing just a few weeks ago, said,
    ``We must protect and accelerate the work of the DOE labs to
    secure America's competitive advantage and security.'' I could
    not agree more. And that is precisely why we are here today at
    this hearing to explore ways that we can secure American
    technology for the benefit of our economic and national
    security.
        For years, the Chinese Communist Party has worked to
    infiltrate our national labs, targeting top scientists and
    siphoning off American research to fuel China's military
    ambitions through programs like the Thousand Talents Program.
    The CCP systematically recruited elite scientists, nationals of
    the People's Republic of China, who were trained in the West,
    built their careers in American labs, and worked with American
    funding to develop American technology. And then, the CCP lured
    them back to China. It is a deliberate strategy to leverage
    U.S. taxpayer-funded expertise for the benefit of the Chinese
    military, and tragically, we are starting to see the
    consequences. Former DOE researchers are helping China develop
    hypersonic missiles, deep earth penetrating warheads, and
    advanced submarines. These are weapons designed to outmatch and
    deter the United States. Make no mistake, Beijing is actively
    exploiting weak security protocols, academic collaboration
    loopholes, and U.S. grant programs to advance its military
    capabilities, all on American taxpayers' dime.
        During his first term, President Trump tightened DOE's
    security protocols at the labs. He cracked down on CCP
    recruitment programs and ensured accountability at the DOE for
    those who approved a researcher from a country of risk working
    on DOE projects, making it clear that our national labs
    wouldn't be used to strengthen the Chinese military. But
    President Biden loosened those restrictions, and the door is
    once again open to the CCP, which compels its citizens, by law,
    to disclose information that they might have that can benefit
    China's strategic goals. That is unacceptable to the United
    States. Congress and this Administration must act immediately
    to close the gaps, tighten security, and ensure that American
    research stays in American hands.
        I am looking forward to understanding how the Department of
    Energy, under the Biden Administration, allowed foreign
    adversaries to infiltrate our most sensitive research
    institutions and exploring ways to ensure this never happens
    again. If we fail to protect our scientific leadership, our
    intellectual property, and our national secrets, we don't just
    lose our competitive advantage, we hand it directly to our
    greatest geopolitical rival. So I look forward, needless to
    say, to hearing from our witnesses today and learning more
    about this emerging problem.
        Now we will turn to Senator Heinrich for his opening
    statement.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARTIN HEINRICH,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO

        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman Lee, and thank you to
    our expert panel of witnesses for coming to speak with us
    today.
        As Ranking Member of the Senate Energy and Natural
    Resources Committee, and also a member of the Senate Select
    Committee on Intelligence, counterintelligence at our national
    labs is a matter that I believe we should all take very
    seriously. But first, I want to discuss another
    counterintelligence risk. Last week, the Trump Administration
    laid off 1,800 DOE employees. Many of our nation's top experts
    in fields essential to our economic and national security, such
    as critical and emerging technologies and nuclear safety, were
    let go. These employees had top security clearances and were
    dismissed without following legal protocol to end those
    clearances. And the Trump Administration is now trying to
    reverse course and reinstate some of these employees. But you
    have to ask, why would they want to go back after being treated
    this way? Our best experts have lost trust in the U.S.
    Government. President Trump is doing exactly what our
    adversaries want. They aren't losing their best experts, we
    are. This is a national security threat that will have lasting
    impacts on our country for decades to come. I sent a letter to
    the President urging the Administration to halt these mass
    firings, and I would encourage my colleagues to do the same.
        Turning back to the research security at our DOE national
    labs, this is a sensitive issue. We want to avoid telegraphing
    to our adversaries details on the research our labs are doing
    and what security protocols our national labs take to protect
    it. We don't want to give our adversaries a blueprint of any
    vulnerabilities. This is why we have always discussed this
    issue in a classified setting. And quite frankly, I am
    disappointed to read some of the witness testimony to which we
    cannot appropriately respond in this open venue. But we are
    here today, so let's do our best to take care with how we have
    this discussion in a public setting.
        Additionally, as no one on this panel is currently at DOE
    or any of the national labs, I think it's important that we be
    briefed by DOE and its Office of Intelligence and
    Counterintelligence about how it is implementing recently
    passed legislation before using this hearing or any hearing as
    an impetus for future legislation.
        Most people think about the Department of Energy for its
    Manhattan Project beginnings or work advancing energy
    technologies. But DOE does much more than just nuclear weapons
    and energy. The Department is also the largest supporter of
    physical science scientific research in the Federal Government,
    conducting research and developing technologies across a range
    of fields, from artificial intelligence, to vaccine
    development, to astrophysics. The United States has been able
    to accomplish breakthroughs in space exploration,
    supercomputing, and the human genome project because of the
    work at the national laboratories. We have been able to
    accomplish so much and be the first to do it, in part because
    of the counterintelligence capabilities we possess that have
    kept our research safe and secure. The fact that DOE's
    Counterintelligence Office is under the umbrella of the
    intelligence community is a critical asset that we must
    leverage and strengthen.
        The threat of foreign espionage is becoming increasingly
    more complex and dangerous. We need to adapt. When scientists
    or students from other countries want to come and partake in
    our world-class research, we must take a serious look at the
    security risks involved, especially individuals from countries
    we have deemed a national security concern. On the one hand, we
    must recognize and embrace that much of America's science and
    technology expertise comes from abroad. Immigrants founded or
    co-founded nearly half of top startups in the U.S., and
    international students earn 60 percent of computer science
    doctorates. Between 1901 and 2023, immigrants have been awarded
    36 percent of the Nobel prizes won by Americans in chemistry,
    medicine, and physics. The Department of Energy would not exist
    without the contributions of Enrico Fermi and Hans Bethe--two
    immigrants from World War II adversarial nations--to the
    Manhattan Project.
        So we must be sure that we have strong research security
    safeguards in place while ensuring we can be a home to the best
    and brightest from around the world. Striking this balance
    between international cooperation in science and technology and
    our national security is not easy. In the CHIPS and Science
    Act, and more recently in the Fiscal Year 2025 Intelligence
    Authorization Act, we authorized bipartisan and balanced
    research security improvements for the DOE that strengthen
    their capabilities in this space.
        So I look forward to hearing about how Congress can best
    support DOE's efforts in safeguarding our research for the sake
    of our country's national security. However, as we all know,
    not all threats come from foreign entities. Thorough background
    checks are required before any individual has access to
    sensitive information. In the past few weeks, we have seen
    multiple instances of staffers from the Department of
    Government Efficiency--which is not a department--or DOGE, gain
    access to information systems throughout the Federal
    Government. We have seen instances of staff being able to
    access federal payment systems at the Treasury Department, as
    well as trying to access personal details of Americans at the
    Social Security Administration. Jay Tilden, the Head of DOE's
    Office of Intelligence, even had to remind staff that DOGE
    employees could not have access to SCIFs without a clearance.
    All of this is concerning. Along with my colleagues on the
    Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I sent a letter to the
    White House demanding answers regarding DOGE operations and
    their seemingly unfettered access to sensitive information.
    These are unprecedented risks to our national security, and it
    is paramount that we address them immediately.
        With that, Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
        It is, of course, important to remember that the President,
    under Article II, is vested with the ``executive Power,'' and
    the President has the authority, constitutionally and
    statutorily, to decide who can see what within his
    Administration, and when he designates someone as having access
    to it, they do have access to that.
        I want to thank our witnesses here today. Let me introduce
    each of them quickly, and then we will turn to each of you for
    your opening statements.
        First, we have Mr. Paul Dabbar. Mr. Dabbar is the co-
    founder of Bohr Quantum Technology and former Under Secretary
    of Science at the Department of Energy under the Trump
    Administration. As Under Secretary of Science, Mr. Dabbar
    managed the national laboratory complex at the Department of
    Energy.
        Next, we have Ms. Anna Puglisi. Ms. Puglisi is a Fellow at
    the Hoover Institute, a public policy think tank housed at
    Stanford University. Ms. Puglisi has testified extensively on
    this topic we are discussing today. So we will look forward to
    hearing your thoughts as well.
        Finally, Dr. Geri Richmond is the former Under Secretary
    for Science and Innovation at the Department of Energy under
    the Biden Administration. Dr. Richmond currently serves as the
    Presidential Chair in Science, and is a Professor of Chemistry
    at the University of Oregon.
        Thanks to all three of you for your willingness to appear
    in front of the Committee. We will now turn to Mr. Dabbar for
    your opening statement, then to Ms. Puglisi, in order of
    introduction, and then to Ms. Richmond.

      STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL M. DABBAR, CEO AND CO-FOUNDER, BOHR
     QUANTUM TECHNOLOGY; FORMER UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE, U.S.
                          DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Mr. Dabbar. Chairman Lee, Ranking Member Heinrich, it is
    great to be in front of this Committee yet again, and seeing
    many friends here.
        America leads the world in discovery and innovation. No one
    else comes close. One can see that in the Nobel Prizes
    referenced in the introduction. Examples include nuclear power,
    generation of chips, fusion, AI, quantum, solar PV, electric
    vehicles, gene editing, and chemistry of batteries of all
    types. And much of that was spearheaded at the DOE national
    labs. But our top adversary, China, puts tremendous pressure in
    appropriating this innovation and then manufacturing it.
    Examples include nuclear power stolen from Westinghouse,
    lithium-ion batteries at CATL, the LFP batteries at BYD stolen
    from MIT patents, electric vehicles, solar PV, GPUs,
    semiconductors, and they are trying to steal the future of
    quantum and fusion.
        Let me put this into historical context. When I took over
    the role of Under Secretary, I discovered that we had
    significant stealing of technology at the labs. Not only that,
    but our policy allowed our own researchers to legally be
    employed by Communist China at the same time as working at our
    national labs. After finding this out and going through the
    five stages of grief--I forgot from my academy days that NAVY
    is an acronym that stands for ``never again volunteer
    yourself''--I started mapping out security policy changes. We
    banned talent programs. We banned lab employees from working
    with countries of risk. We created the technology risk matrix
    to restrict engagement on frontier technologies. We restricted
    interactions with China and extended Communist China
    fundraising restrictions on university researchers who got DOE
    funding. All these felt like bringing back common sense.
        However, in the last several years, we have allowed that
    risk to increase. The Infrastructure Act funding was given to
    Communist-controlled entities in violation of the Act. As
    disclosed in the report at the Homeland Security Committee,
    Communist Chinese nationals who were employed at DOE labs stole
    inventions in violation of U.S. law, and took them to China for
    commercialization. They effectively created spy cells by
    recruiting new members, and they tried to recruit senior lab
    and former political officials. I wrote about that in the Wall
    Street Journal, and I submitted that as testimony. We must also
    remember that all PRC citizens are required by the Chinese
    National Security Law to hand over all information when
    directed by the Chinese state.
        In addition, DOE has restarted engagement with Communist
    China in sharing energy technologies. They have been
    proactively meeting with the Communist government to
    reestablish transfer of American invention to China. And what
    was interesting was that this effort was never publicly
    identified by DOE, but many were able to find that in meetings
    and articles in local Chinese newspapers, including pictures.
    And those officials in Communist China were hailing China
    technology appropriation. I do believe that there are plenty of
    people who think that this is important to share with Communist
    China for various different reasons, but I expect that the
    majority of the American people do not want us to turn over our
    technology to our adversaries. And I would venture to say that
    this is the view of this full Committee.
        New controls are needed for science and security, and I
    know that Secretary Wright is focused on that. While the
    current DOE orders on the DOE website provide a framework for
    security and counterintelligence, they provide too much
    flexibility and discretion for interpretation by politicals,
    careers, and lab employees. I recommend that the new DOE team
    roll out significant tightened controls, such as requiring lab
    under secretaries to be the sole authorizer, with no ability to
    delegate authority for all countries of risk, nationals hiring,
    visits by labs or meetings, and also create a list of the
    waivers that can be found by this Committee for its oversight.
    The Senate should consider legislation mandating security
    policies that require administrative policies that politicals
    would have little discretion in interpreting. I have also
    included in my written testimony an idea for DOE to recover
    stolen IP. And the Senate should consider extending the NNSA
    lab ban on adversary-nation nationals from the three NNSA labs
    to all the labs.
        America is the world's greatest superpower in both
    technology and in energy. As we invent the future, we should
    reengage on strong policies to protect our discovery
    leadership.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Dabbar follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Dabbar.
        Ms. Puglisi.

            STATEMENT OF ANNA B. PUGLISI, VISITING FELLOW,
                HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

        Ms. Puglisi. Thank you, Chairman Lee, Ranking Member
    Heinrich, distinguished members of the Committee and staff,
    thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's
    hearing. It is an honor to be here alongside the esteemed
    experts on this panel. As was mentioned, I am currently a
    Visiting Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution and
    previously served as the National Counterintelligence Officer
    for East Asia. The views presented here though today are my
    own.
        My testimony will address why the DOE labs are targeted by
    China, and then discuss research security and potential
    mitigation strategies. Lastly, I will offer some lessons
    learned that include that this is a U.S. problem, not just a
    Department of Energy problem. China's government has explicit
    efforts to exploit its diaspora. While this must be addressed
    and countered, the rights of persons of Chinese ethnicity in
    the U.S. must be protected. Finally, we can't protect what we
    don't have. We have to invest in the future.
        The U.S. science and technology research enterprise, and
    especially the Department of Energy labs, set the global
    standard for discovery and innovation. Creating a climate to
    safeguard science will take a mindset change. Many in the
    research community see current policy changes as punitive.
    Because of this, it is important to discuss benefits of
    collaboration broadly, as they are not the same across the
    different stakeholders. An individual researcher can benefit
    from a specific collaboration because it brings them additional
    resources, prestige, or access to data or equipment, but it
    might not be to the benefit of the U.S. Government, national
    security, or the U.S. taxpayer. While China is not the only
    country that targets the Department of Energy labs, China's
    policies to target the Department of Energy complex are a
    deliberate state-sponsored strategy to save time and money.
    China uses non-traditional collectors--expert scientists,
    business people, and students--to acquire technology and
    technological know-how. Our current system is not designed to
    counter this kind of threat.
        Current mitigation tools are tactical and narrow by design
    because they are crafted to mitigate behaviors with the
    assumption that the actor fully participates in a laws-based/
    rules-based system. They are basically designed for traditional
    counterintelligence threats that focus on intelligence
    officers, military end-use, and illegal activities. The
    protections in the CHIPS Act and NSPM-33, and as a result some
    of the individual programs that have been put in place by
    agencies, such as RTES and NSF SECURE Analytics, are a good
    start. However, in my written testimony, I provide some factors
    for consideration when determining access to the labs and
    funding decisions. Reviewing individual factors can help, but
    what we really need is a more comprehensive mitigation
    strategy. Piecemeal solutions will not have the desired
    outcomes.
        I cover these three suggestions in more detail in my
    written testimony, but briefly I put forth the following
    elements that would make up a national level program. First is
    establishing a national center for open-source information.
    This would provide detailed information at scale for our
    institutions and help them make informed decisions. Second
    would be to create a kind of pre-check for collaboration. It is
    important to establish an accepted framework of protections and
    make those clear--the standards, the norms, and expectations
    for visiting researchers, post-doctoral scientists, and
    students, and those that agree to those parameters have a fast-
    lane for collaborations. And finally, investing in the future--
    the investments we make or don't make today will impact our
    future competitiveness tomorrow.
        So in conclusion, it is important to remember that China
    takes a holistic approach to development. It blurs civilian and
    military, private and public. This has deep implications for
    the DOE complex because it impacts the basis of entry for
    Chinese students and post-docs to U.S. labs. China's laws,
    which include the ability to compel citizens to share
    information, regardless of who owns it, also complicate the
    ability for individual researchers to act independently. So
    moving forward, I leave the Committee with the following
    thoughts. We really must decide what winning looks like, and
    this will take a comprehensive strategy. Extreme positions,
    such as closing our eyes or closing our doors, only benefit
    China. We either discredit all the efforts to address the
    problem or we deprive ourselves of the contributions of
    foreign-born students or scientists.
        And China is not a neutral actor. And why does this matter?
    Because China intimidates and harshly silences its critics.
    This has only grown in the past few years, and places
    individuals in untenable situations. We do our foreign students
    and colleagues a disservice by not highlighting this behavior.
    So I want to thank the Committee again for continuing to
    discuss this issue. These issues will make us uncomfortable
    because they challenge assumptions and established norms.
    However, we as a nation have to have these conversations if we
    are going to protect and promote U.S. competitiveness.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Puglisi follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Dr. Richmond.

    STATEMENT OF HON. GERALDINE L. RICHMOND, PRESIDENTIAL CHAIR IN
       SCIENCE AND PROFESSOR OF CHEMISTRY, UNIVERSITY OF OREGON;
        FORMER UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND INNOVATION, U.S.
                          DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Dr. Richmond. Thank you very much, Chairman Lee, Ranking
    Member Heinrich, and distinguished members of the Committee.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee
    on the important subject of protecting the integrity of the
    U.S. research enterprise from inappropriate foreign influence.
        As a lifelong scientist--working in science for 50 years
    now--and researcher, and also a devoted educator, I understand
    the critical importance of talking about this topic for
    maintaining the nation's competitive edge in science and
    technology and ensuring that our research efforts remain secure
    and beneficial to the American public. And may I add, in these
    50 years I have seen dramatic changes in how we have interacted
    with countries of concern like China. I have seen them change.
    I have seen the threats become even stronger, and they are as
    much of a concern to me now as they were when I was Under
    Secretary.
        The United States has long been a global leader in
    scientific discovery and technological innovation. It is one of
    the reasons why we are able to attract the best and the
    brightest in the world. According to a 2024 report from the
    National Science Foundation, foreign-born workers make up 19
    percent of the overall STEM workforce, as Senator Heinrich
    pointed out, and 60 percent of the doctoral level scientists
    and engineers in computer science and mathematics in the U.S.
    were born outside of this country. We are an open, innovative
    society. It is the key driver of our economic success. At the
    same time, I realize, as we had at the Department of Energy
    when I was there, the actions of certain foreign governments
    pose unacceptable risks to the scientific enterprise.
        During my tenure on the National Science Board under
    President Trump and now recently as Under Secretary for Science
    and Innovation at the Department of Energy under Biden, I saw
    firsthand the growing threats to the U.S. leadership in science
    and technology. As this Committee well knows, the U.S.
    enterprise would not function without foreign-born scientists
    and engineers, but we also cannot afford to have things stolen
    from us--properties stolen from us by nefarious acts that
    threaten our U.S. economy and our national security. We must
    strike a careful balance if we are to protect national security
    interests without stifling the innovation that has long been
    our nation's greatest strength. During my time as Under
    Secretary, DOE and its 17 national laboratories worked
    diligently to achieve the balance by aggressively strengthening
    research security through rigorous background screening, expert
    controls, and collaboration policies to mitigate risks of
    intellectual property theft and undue foreign influence. For
    example, DOE developed a science and technology risk matrix, as
    noted, to protect emerging technologies, and it continues to be
    updated. This matrix provides a guidance to address potential
    concerns associated with economic and international
    competitiveness by identifying the risks associated with a
    given topic and the resulting level of controls that are
    required.
        DOE also developed a comprehensive and rigorous approach to
    research, technology, and economic security--what I will refer
    to as RTES policy, established new procedures for reviewing
    financial awards and loans, and created a new RTES office to
    continue to evolve DOE's enhanced due diligence process, engage
    with external stakeholders, and review DOE national lab
    agreements involving foreign entities. These actions were
    supported by security directives from Congress--thank you--and
    administrative actions by the National Security Presidential
    Memorandum, which was worked on both in the Trump
    Administration and the Biden Administration--NSPM-33. Together,
    these measures are helping the Department and its partners
    mitigate risks that malign foreign governments pose to our
    research ecosystem, supply chains, and intellectual property.
        For most U.S. universities--research universities--the
    level of due diligence required by NSPM-33 and DOE's updated
    policies is a newer paradigm. I saw this when I was on the
    National Science Board and I have seen it now. Research
    universities serve a critical interface between government,
    industry, and academia, and since I am back in academia, I know
    this, going back to my home. That is why during my tenure as
    Under Secretary, DOE focused heavily on helping universities
    develop their own procedures for fostering secure, yet open
    scientific collaboration, and training researchers on best
    practices. I am proud of the way many university
    administrations have stepped up to this research security
    challenge, including my own at the University of Oregon.
    Security is in the DNA and the structure of our national
    laboratories. It has been historically at our national
    laboratories and in DOE. It has not been the case at
    universities. That's why it's so important for us to work with
    them.
        So as this Committee is evaluating research security
    measures of the U.S. science and technology research
    enterprise, I have offered several recommendations that are
    important to consider. While I cannot speak to the status of
    DOE activities in my current capacity, I can assure the
    Committee that regardless of the Administration, the Department
    of Energy and its national laboratories take the responsibility
    to protect the scientific integrity of our nation's assets
    seriously. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today on this important issue, and I look forward to our
    discussion.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Richmond follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        The Chairman. Thanks so much to all of you for your opening
    statements. We will now proceed to five-minute rounds of
    questions alternating between Republicans and Democrats, and I
    will begin that now.
        Ms. Puglisi, I would like to start with you, if that's all
    right?
        Last week, the New York Times published an article in which
    you were prominently featured. You were featured discussing how
    the CCP has used legal threats to intimidate American
    researchers, including yourself, in an effort to suppress
    research that exposes its influence operations. Now, if the CCP
    is brazen enough to do this, to try to pressure and influence
    American researchers, what does that say about the ability they
    have to exert pressure on Chinese nationals from the People's
    Republic of China working within U.S. national labs, and
    especially keeping in mind that those individuals, if they are
    residents of China, what does that say about their ability to
    have pressure brought to bear on them given that they are
    subject to Chinese laws that can compel them to cooperate with
    PRC intelligence-gathering operations?
        Ms. Puglisi. Thank you for that question, Senator.
        I think, you know, it really highlights a disturbing trend,
    right? I believe that, you know, we have talked a lot about how
    the hope was that as we moved forward with engagement and
    collaborations that China would change, and its laws and rules
    and norms would become more like our own. Unfortunately, that
    is not the case. And so, I think, as I mentioned in my opening
    statement and in my written testimony, the importance of
    talking about this behavior, and that if we ignore the
    pressures that these scientists and students are under, we
    really do them a disservice and we do our own society a
    disservice because then we become more like them.
        But it really, you know, I think, highlights as well that
    it's really hard, you know, for us to understand that kind of
    pressure and that we need to put in place those guidelines to
    both foster those collaborations, but also to protect that
    technology and to ensure that that does not happen.
        The Chairman. But needless to say, the pressure that could
    be brought to bear on Chinese nationals at these labs is
    immense.
        Ms. Puglisi. Yes, it is. And I think it highlights, as we
    have seen over the past year, the articles and stories about
    extralegal behavior, not only for scientists, but on different
    campuses of, you know, China's actions.
        The Chairman. Now, Mr. Dabbar, your testimony states that
    the Department of Energy under the Biden Administration
    restarted engagement with China to share U.S. energy
    technologies developed in our national labs. In at least one
    instance, in 2023, a Lawrence Berkeley National Lab scientist
    went to China, where he advised the Dean of the School of
    Energy, Power, and Engineering at--University, who also happens
    to be an affiliate of the foreign influence arm of the Chinese
    Communist Party on how best to construct an engineering lab for
    the school. Do you think U.S. national labs should be engaged
    in these efforts with our greatest global adversary, and should
    American taxpayers be funding such support that ends up
    benefiting our adversaries in this way?
        Mr. Dabbar. No, Senator Lee, I don't think we should. They
    have been very clear that they want to dominate the tech space.
    And as I listed in my testimony, there is a long series of
    technologies, including in energy, that were invented at the
    DOE national labs and invented by American companies that was
    stolen. And so, it is a long track record on this topic of much
    of which they are selling to the world was invented in America.
        And so, I think we need to be much more cognizant of this
    topic, and I think more controls are needed on this, as I
    mentioned in my testimony.
        The Chairman. So that's an expensive proposition, losing
    valuable research for which we have paid dearly, and having it
    go to our greatest geopolitical adversary isn't an ideal
    outcome. In fact, quite far from it. This can have devastating
    consequences.
        Now, Section 436 of the Fiscal Year 2025 Intelligence
    Authorization Act, which barred foreign nationals from
    adversarial nations from accessing our national laboratories
    received unanimous approval from the Senate Select Committee on
    Intelligence, by a vote of 17 to 0, but it was blocked from the
    National Defense Authorization Act due to opposition from the
    former Chairman of this Committee. The provision included a
    waiver process allowing exceptions when the Secretary of Energy
    determined the national or economic security benefits
    outweighed the risks. Now, given these strong bipartisan
    concerns, would you support enacting similar safeguards to
    protect our most sensitive research while allowing for limited
    high-level exceptions?
        Mr. Dabbar. I would, Senator. Obviously, it's a bipartisan
    topic. The way the current DOE order is written--that was done
    when I was Under Secretary--basically required sign-offs to
    have any Chinese interaction. I believe a lot of it was
    delegated down to lower levels, which basically opened the
    doors, as far as I could tell from my conversations with DOE. I
    think we need to potentially do exactly as the Intelligence
    Committee looked at, which is flip it. Instead of authorizing
    and sign-offs, is to do it the other way, where the base case
    is to ban that from adversarial nations, and to give waivers as
    required. I think that's a better way, given decades of Chinese
    infiltration and attempts.
        The Chairman. Leaving the default at ``on'' is dangerous,
    in other words.
        I see my time is expired. We will turn the time over to
    Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Thanks, Chairman.
        Ms. Richmond, you and I have interacted at some of our
    nation's most cherished national labs, places like Los Alamos.
    Do you have thoughts on what the current dismissals at DOE and
    NNSA could mean for our national security in the long term, and
    in particular for workforce morale?
        Dr. Richmond. Yes, Senator Heinrich. Thank you for that
    question.
        I agree, and you know, I hope you all know how committed I
    was in my position and now with regards to national security
    and the concern of China stealing our most valuable assets. But
    these cuts, particularly in the security area, but also having
    to do with our energy infrastructure, the cuts there, too, give
    me even greater concern because they are immediate, because to
    be able to work at NNSA, but also to be able to handle
    classified information, requires a tremendous amount of
    background checks, polygraphs. They ask all your neighbors, and
    so, my neighbors are sick of being asked for all these things I
    have done. But the point is that when we make these cuts, even
    if we say come on back after this weekend cut, what are the
    chances that we have increased the risk of someone being hired
    by China to come over and share what they have been doing? I,
    too, have been recruited. I got a letter not too long ago that
    was like, for one hour's work, I could take $40,000.
        Senator Heinrich. Yes.
        Dr. Richmond. Now, you know, I don't have a mortgage to
    pay, but there are other people that do. So I just have to say
    that these cuts, and especially how they are going to impact
    the energy infrastructure----
        Senator Heinrich. Yes.
        Dr. Richmond [continuing]. I think it's time for us to go
    to the new Administration and to Secretary Wright and ask what
    was the process to decide how to do that, to make these cuts,
    because the process that we have at the Department of Energy to
    make cuts--and we do make cuts of our federal employees--is
    based on budget priorities. When we develop our budgets, we set
    the priorities, and if your part of DOE does not fit into those
    priorities of the White House and also the Secretary of Energy,
    then you eliminate those people, but you do it in almost a two-
    year process while you develop this budget.
        Senator Heinrich. Yes.
        Dr. Richmond. Because the priorities are changing all the
    time.
        Senator Heinrich. And one of the things that I think it's
    important to share with folks is that one of the--probably the
    leading red flag for someone being a risk with respect to
    recruitment is financial distress. So we just created a whole
    bunch of people with really important clearances, really
    important expertise, who are all under financial distress. We
    created a bunch of targets for the CCP. And I think, I just--I
    am aghast at how unthoughtfully this is all being carried out.
        Mr. Dabbar, good to see you again. I want to ask you to
    sort of walk us through what currently happens--well, talk
    about how the intelligence officers at the labs, the lab
    directors, and then DOE intelligence coordinate and then what
    happens when they don't all line up and agree.
        Mr. Dabbar. Yes, Senator. So obviously, this has been a big
    focus. There's a classified report from MITRE that's out there
    that has evaluated the details of that. I think that's kind of
    safe to say, and they have obviously had some recommendations
    on that particular topic.
        In general, what happens is that the intelligence component
    of the DOE has local officers at each of the labs for
    counterintelligence. They will do the screening of employees,
    if people are traveling, interactions, grant security
    clearances. And so, they do that interaction as part of that
    intelligence component with the lab complex. In general, that
    works quite well. DOE's intel arm is quite well-integrated with
    that effort. And I think the biggest challenge on this is not
    the structure of it, but as I was mentioning, who has the
    approval, right, to allow this interaction to happen. I will
    give an example. I have been told many times that any lab
    employee can actually do a recommendation and potentially, I
    have heard, even a sign-off on people coming to visit a lab.
        And so, if there is a PRC citizen who is employed at the
    lab, they could recommend another PRC group coming from China
    to enter the lab. And if the authority has been delegated down
    to the lab, sometimes these things are happening at a higher
    rate than maybe some people at headquarters might like. And so,
    who has authority in the sign-off and the interaction of that,
    I think that's the core practical issue that probably deserves
    to be raised to a more senior level than has, I believe, been
    delegated.
        Senator Heinrich. If you have specific examples of that, I
    would appreciate if you would share them with this Committee.
        Thanks.
        The Chairman. Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        From my work on the Intelligence Committee over the last 10
    years, and now as Chairman, I can tell you this issue is of
    critical concern to me. Our national labs are where we develop
    some of the scientific research and capabilities that are the
    envy of the world, but they lack security measures. And I can
    say that it's not just me, it's many other members of the
    Intelligence Committee. Five members are on this Committee.
    There is a reason why we passed legislation last year,
    unanimously, that would have stopped scientists from China and
    Russia and even Iran and North Korea and Cuba from being in our
    labs.
        Mr. Dabbar, do you know how many Chinese and Russian
    scientists were in our labs in the last Fiscal Year for which
    we have data?
        Mr. Dabbar. If I have seen your past testimony, I think the
    number is around 8,000.
        Senator Cotton. Eight thousand. Out of a total of how many?
    Do you know?
        Mr. Dabbar. Well, total lab employees are probably----
        Senator Cotton. No, total foreign visitors.
        Mr. Dabbar. Oh, I am not certain about that.
        Senator Cotton. Forty thousand. So one out of every five
    foreign scientists in an American national lab is Chinese or
    Russian. Do you know how many American scientists get to go to
    equivalent sites in China and Russia?
        Do you know, Mr.----
        Mr. Dabbar. I think it's less.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cotton. If I put the over/under at 0.5, would you
    bet the over or the under?
        Mr. Dabbar. Maybe even under.
        Senator Cotton. Ms. Puglisi, how many American scientists
    get to go to the equivalent sites in Russia and China?
        Ms. Puglisi. Senator, I currently don't have that number.
    However, I think that's a point that I have made before this
    Committee and others is that it's not reciprocity. I mean, true
    collaboration comes from transparency and reciprocity. And
    that's one of the things that we are not seeing.
        Senator Cotton. I couldn't agree more.
        Ms. Richmond, do you think one out of every five foreign
    scientists at a Chinese or Russian equivalent site is American?
        Dr. Richmond. I don't know those numbers, I'm sorry----
        Senator Cotton. Yes, there is zero reciprocity on this
    issue. Why would we allow Chinese and Russian scientists into
    our national labs, to say nothing of Iranians and Cubans and
    North Koreans, when they don't allow our scientists there? We
    have told the directors of these labs for a long time, the
    Intelligence Committee, that if they do not get a hold of this
    problem then the Congress will solve it for them. And the
    legislation that we introduced and passed through the
    Intelligence Committee last year, although it didn't get passed
    into law, will be brought back up this year. And I am going to
    champion that on this Committee and on the Intelligence
    Committee because we have to put an end to this threat.
        There are a lot of great people working in the Department
    of Energy, to include at our labs and at the Office of
    Intelligence and Counterintelligence, one of the very best of
    our small intelligence offices around the government, but there
    are too many people that have this ``open science'' mindset,
    this naive ideological commitment that we have to allow these
    foreign adversary scientists into our labs, no matter what the
    risk.
        Mr. Dabbar, who has the final word on allowing such a
    foreign visitor to visit his or her lab?
        Mr. Dabbar. So the order is flexible on who has the
    authority. Previously, when we instituted it, when I was Under
    Secretary, it was required to be up at my level, and we were
    able to squash a lot of the thousand talents programs. We found
    many, many people working for China, including joint nuclear
    weapons work. That's a pretty stunning comment I just gave that
    we found at one of the labs. I believe--I was told in my
    conversations with DOE recently that a lot of that has been
    delegated down to the individual lab level, and I am not
    exactly certain----
        Senator Cotton. And again, we have great people working at
    our individual labs, but by and large, the directors of these
    places tend to come from a scientific background, is that
    correct?
        Mr. Dabbar. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. They are not coming from the intelligence
    community. They are not coming from law enforcement.
        If a foreign national is excluded from one lab, is he
    therefore excluded from every other lab?
        Mr. Dabbar. I am not certain how it's currently being
    executed.
        Senator Cotton. I think the answer is no.
        Mr. Dabbar. Yes.
        Senator Cotton. If one of our lab directors says no, this
    guy from Russia is too dangerous a risk and can't be here, he
    can just turn around and try to go to one of the other labs as
    well.
        Is it fair to say that sometimes there is a little bit of
    competition between these labs for money or prestige or talent?
        Mr. Dabbar. Senator, in one of my times, one of my many
    times of uncovering things with intelligence,
    counterintelligence at the labs, we found a Chinese national
    who had been hired at one of the DOE labs and then they used
    that to shift to NIST in Colorado and use the--of having been
    hired at a DOE national lab to join a very important quantum
    effort at NIST. And as soon as we found that out, we had to
    reach out to Commerce very quickly and point out that we were
    sorry that this person had gotten that role and basically, we
    allowed them to end up at another lab.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        I just want to thank the Chairman for having this hearing.
    This is not something that we discuss much in a public setting.
    We have examined it very closely for years on the Intelligence
    Committee. But it is a grave national security threat. It is a
    threat to our prosperity as well because so much of these
    technologies end up getting commercialized. And to be clear,
    what we are talking about here, again, is foreign nationals.
    There has been a lot of testimony, or a lot of statements from
    members and the witnesses about the history throughout American
    life of foreign-born, naturalized scientists. We are not
    talking about that. We are not talking about someone who has
    raised their hand and taken the oath of affirmation to become a
    citizen or even a legal permanent resident. We are talking
    about foreign nationals coming to our lab. This is a grave
    threat and we can't allow it to continue.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Wyden.
        Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Good to have all our guests, and especially good to be able
    to welcome Dr. Geri Richmond, who is a long-time expert in
    security and also a long-time University of Oregon Duck, and we
    welcome you.
        Dr. Richmond. Go Ducks.
        Senator Wyden. Let me, if I might, ask you about what we
    learned at DOE in the Pacific Northwest here very recently.
    There were abrupt and significant workforce reductions last
    week in the office that carries out the critical work to keep
    our electric grid reliable. My take is that this raises
    national security issues. It raises fundamental issues for our
    economy. What are the implications of something like that, Dr.
    Richmond?
        Dr. Richmond. Well, thank you, Senator Wyden, it's good to
    be here with you too.
        I think that in terms of our power, our energy
    infrastructure, and particularly the cuts at BPA, as well as
    the 1,800 people that were just cut off at the Department of
    Energy with no clear understanding of the procedure, or why, it
    really is going to--I believe as a citizen, that it's going to
    not only compromise the safety of our grid, but also will drive
    up energy prices. I believe that it will delay current projects
    in communities and that it will disrupt our supply chains.
    These are, again, my personal opinions, having served as the
    Under Secretary for three years, but I think it also is sowing
    confusion and chaos among the federal workers because they are
    learning about things in the news, and I can't confirm what's
    in the news either. But the point is that it's just leading to
    a lot of confusion.
        For example, with BPA, there were a number of employees
    that were cut. And as a Pacific Northwesterner, like you,
    that's really chilling because BPA is so important.
        Senator Wyden. Let me see if I can get a couple of other
    questions in real quickly.
        When you went through the process of getting your security
    clearance, did you have to disclose all of your foreign
    financial conflicts of interest and contacts with government
    officials?
        Dr. Richmond. Yes. In fact, because I have worked in so
    many different countries--over two dozen developing countries,
    in particular--I had to list all the countries I had been to,
    whether they had paid for my travel support--which most of them
    did not--whether I had any kind of a conflict of interest with
    them, with any type of financial support from them continuing,
    what all my finances are with regards to all of the investments
    that we have. We had to declare all those. We had to be cleared
    for a general counsel. I had to get a polygraph test.
        Senator Wyden. I think I got the drift.
        Dr. Richmond. Okay.
        Senator Wyden. If a U.S. Government official had
    significant business dealings with the government of China or
    failed to disclose all of these contacts with Chinese
    government officials, could that derail their access to
    sensitive Department of Energy secrets or classified
    information?
        Dr. Richmond. Yes, and in fact what happened in the
    laboratories, during my time, was you had both the IN and also
    the lab leaders talking about when there is a concern about a
    person being in the laboratory. And what they go through is,
    who is going to come onsite, what is their background, what
    kind of access would be controlled if they did come onsite, and
    this is for visitors also, and what projects can they work on,
    and what partnerships do they have? If there is a disagreement
    between those two entities in the laboratory, then it gets sent
    up to me. I did not have any concerning ones that came up to
    me. And the laboratory said this at the HSST hearing, the
    director said this last week.
        Senator Wyden. Thank you, Dr. Richmond.
        Colleagues, I am asking these questions for several
    reasons, and one of them is, according to public reporting, Mr.
    Elon Musk is running DOGE while remaining Tesla's largest
    shareholder. And according to that public reporting, Tesla has
    invested billions in China and makes one million cars a year at
    a factory in Shanghai on land owned by the Chinese government.
    Finally, according to public reporting, Tesla's contract allows
    the Chinese government to revoke Tesla's lease on the land at
    any time if it determines doing so is in the public interest.
    Now, on this Committee, every one of us works for the American
    public interest, and given that as our highest priority, I
    intend, colleagues, to come back and ask further questions
    about this in the days ahead.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Wyden.
        Senator McCormick.
        Senator McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
    our panel. Grateful to the witnesses for coming to discuss such
    an important issue for our national security, but also for
    Pennsylvania. Pittsburgh is the home of the National Energy
    Technology Laboratory. Many employees from the Princeton Plasma
    Physics Laboratory commute across the Delaware River to call
    Pennsylvania home. And we must ensure that this critical
    national research and these wonderful assets are secure from
    foreign adversaries, and that America remains the global leader
    on energy and other advanced technologies.
        So I really share the concerns raised by so many today
    about the continued theft of American research and innovation
    by the Communist Chinese Party. It is a huge national security
    risk for all the reasons we have talked about, but it's also
    the stated goal to dominate the commanding heights of
    technology and to use that technological supremacy to undermine
    America's economic might, its geopolitical position, our very
    way of life, and that research and technology theft is a well-
    documented key pillar of the CCP strategy. So with forced
    technology transfers, IP thefts, scientific espionage, not only
    providing the CCP with advantages in economic and
    environmentally important technologies, it's also undercutting
    American workers in Pennsylvania and in other places. We are
    essentially paying for the R&D that China steals to beat us in
    the market space. How can American companies compete in that
    environment?
        So let me start with you, Ms. Puglisi. You pointed out that
    because the CCP does not play by the same rules in science and
    technology, that our often-narrow research security tools are
    outmatched by China's efforts to steal American technology and
    know-how. How can we make the jump from piecemeal solutions,
    some of which we have discussed here, to a national strategy
    for mitigating these threats?
        Ms. Puglisi. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
        I think it's important to highlight, first, and the reason
    why--what creates this challenge is China takes a very hybrid
    approach. It takes a very holistic approach to its S&T
    development. And so, oftentimes, you know, we try to separate
    things out into complete buckets. And so, to have a national
    approach, what we need to do is recognize how different this
    system is, and to look at the individuals and the companies
    that we are dealing with holistically, and acknowledge those
    ties to the Chinese government, and in moving forward, how
    policies that are across both our infrastructure and in
    commerce that recognize that these are supported, that they
    oftentimes don't have to make market-based decisions, that
    individuals--and we know this--are sent to study here, to work
    in the laboratories for a purpose. And we just have to be much
    more deliberate about the way we look at people's backgrounds.
    And to begin with, I think putting in place very clear
    guidelines, because, you know, our system has been built on
    trust, right? And I have been in the lab. I have worked in the
    lab, and no one wants to believe that their collaborator is
    stealing their technology or the student that they are
    supporting is doing that or has some other alternative motives.
        And so, we must make it very clear.
        Senator McCormick. And yet, we know they are.
        Ms. Puglisi. Yes.
        Senator McCormick. In many cases they are.
        Ms. Puglisi. And unfortunately, this has been the case, and
    it is well documented. I know the other witnesses have talked
    about this. I, myself, have written a lot about this. And so, I
    think the starting point is being very clear--what are those
    assumptions that we are making?
        Senator McCormick. Yes.
        Ms. Puglisi. And you know, sometimes we can't get to yes
    with some of these collaborations.
        Senator McCormick. Yes.
        Ms. Puglisi. And that's why we have to engage, you know,
    with the research community to really make clear on that and--
    --
        Senator McCormick. Thank you. I am going to just move on to
    one more question here if I can.
        Ms. Puglisi. Okay, sorry.
        Senator McCormick. Thank you.
        Ms. Puglisi. Yes.
        Senator McCormick. Mr. Dabbar, good to see you again.
        Many research institutions, just following up on this
    question, including the national labs, are engaging in research
    collaboration with third parties--I don't think we have talked
    about that much--here in the United States and overseas, and
    those third parties can also be exploited by our adversaries to
    steal sensitive research, particularly the CCP. What policies
    should DOE put in place to ensure that the research
    collaborations and joint research projects that may be outside
    the labs don't create additional security vulnerabilities? What
    authorities and directives can Congress use to help on that
    mission?
        Mr. Dabbar. So that certainly happens. Let me give you an
    example. We do accelerator technology with our European
    friends, where they ship us some accelerators sometimes and we
    ship them some equipment sometimes. We generate IP in some of
    these very large pieces of equipment that could have dual-use
    points, and sometimes the Chinese go into Germany, to a lab in
    Germany, to try to appropriate IP that we invented at one of
    our national labs. I know that happened. I have specific
    examples of that. So I do think of any of our collaborations
    with our allies, we need to push the ball. I think we have
    pushed a ball of awareness of them in Germany, France, and
    whatnot, that China is trying to steal stuff, and that if they
    want to work with us, and if we are going to share technology
    with them, they have to meet the same sort of standards that we
    have for ourselves.
        Senator McCormick. So I think it's fair to say, regardless
    of how tight our security is in our own labs, if we have third
    party research efforts underway that are not equally strong in
    the security measures, then there is a back door where some of
    the same challenges of IP theft and so forth can occur.
        Mr. Dabbar. Absolutely, Senator. I will pick on one thing
    that Senator Risch has been doing on fusion. America is about
    to break some major bounds on fusion in this next four years.
    There is going to be some major examples. They are trying to
    steal it from us and our international collaborations on
    fusion. And so, that's something that historically was more
    open science, and I think very clearly both domestically as
    well as international, that needs to be greatly enhanced since
    we are about to accomplish quite a bit.
        Senator McCormick. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator Gallego, you are up next.
        Senator Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Perfect timing.
    And thank you to our Ranking Member, also.
        Our national and energy security should always be, of
    course, top-of-mind. And I was proud to be a leader in passing
    the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA. Among many other things, that bill
    enhanced vetting and limited the entrance of certain foreign
    nationals to DOE lab facilities to protect national security.
    But as former Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee
    on Intelligence and Special Operations, I also know exactly how
    important it is to be deliberate in the way we discuss
    sensitive operations, especially in open settings. As we do our
    duty to oversee national labs in this Committee, we must not
    give away information that our adversaries could use against us
    or actively gather.
        So I have a couple questions for Dr. Richmond. In United
    States military operations, our armed forces work with
    interpreters and local allies who make our operations more
    secure and successful. I certainly experienced that in Iraq in
    combat with local nationals, as well as foreign nationals, and
    third-party companies. And so, we have talked a lot about the
    risks of foreign infiltration in our DOE labs. Can you expand
    on the risks of siloing ourselves too much and missing vital
    information from our allies and foreign-born scientists?
        Dr. Richmond. Yes, thank you, Senator, and thank you for
    your service also.
        I think that we cannot closet ourselves. I have to say that
    before the wall came down in Europe, I was actually in East
    Germany and I got to see--it was weeks before the wall came
    down--and I could see what a closeted country looks like and I
    have also done the same in Cuba. We have to rely on
    intelligence from other countries too. We have to decide
    whether we trust it or not. We have to decide what we are going
    to do with it. But I am going to go back to your comments,
    ma'am, because we need a coordinated effort across all agencies
    and universities if we are going to use what intelligence we
    have in order to move forward. And the armed forces play a
    critical role in that, and as you know, if we did not have that
    outside information, those partners with us, it would be tough
    to go forward.
        Senator Gallego. And even along the kind of siloing of
    information and sharing of information, from my experience,
    kind of, as the past Chairman of Intel/Special Operations, I
    even had complaints from our Five Eyes nations, people that we
    are supposed to share our most intricate and sophisticated
    intelligence with, that we still are in such a silo that we
    couldn't really share our intel across platforms fast enough
    for them to actually use it as actual intelligence. When it
    comes to sharing with our close Five Eyes partners or other
    intelligence treaty nations, do you see that also still being a
    problem in terms of some of the research that's found in maybe
    the UK, for example, not being as quickly transferable or
    easily shared for us to actually consume, use, or effectively
    continue the research on?
        Dr. Richmond. Well, I think it's important--thank you for
    that question. I think it's important for us to add to this
    conversation this issue of open science. Open science is
    science that's going to end up in literature, it's going to be
    published together. That kind of collaboration happens at the
    laboratory because it's natural to do that, whether it be in
    fields like I have worked in with lasers and optics and other
    fields too. We have to have that open science. So what I fear
    is the discussion of really restricting the labs to even things
    in personnel, even things that are truly open science, then my
    concerns are there. So I don't know if that went to your
    question, but it's a point I feel is really important for this
    Committee, many who are not scientists, to understand what the
    open science is as opposed to something that is truly an
    economic threat to us.
        Senator Gallego. And your testimony outlines multiple
    measures, including a risk matrix to protect emerging research
    and tech at DOE. Are you also concerned that any of those
    security measures will be disrupted or dismantled under new
    agency leadership that does not really understand the goal and
    intent of that matrix?
        Dr. Richmond. As a citizen myself, yes, I am concerned
    because when you have--what we have always found, and when I
    have gone into the SCIF--and we are not going to divulge any
    classified information--first of all, we do have people from
    other countries that are helping us in the intelligence for
    some of these countries. But the point is that we really have
    to be able to go forward in a manner that allows us to share
    the information that we need and be able to go forward. I am
    not sure if that quite went to your point.
        Senator Gallego. Thank you. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Senator Risch.
        Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    holding this meeting. Look, this is a really, really important
    issue that gets almost no attention. I have been 17 years on
    both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Intel Committee,
    and we have watched this cancer grow over those years, and it's
    not going away. It's getting worse and worse. So I am going to
    start at 50,000 feet and bring this down. In 1983, I traveled
    in China. I left China thinking, you know, we are never going
    to have to worry about this. They had no plumbing. They had no
    toilets. They had no phones. They had nothing. It smelled. It
    was terrible. That was in 1983. If you go there today, it's
    like America. Now, it took us over 200 years to get where we
    are. And it has taken them only a handful of decades to get
    where they are. Are they that much smarter than we are? We all
    know better than that. They stole every good idea that we have,
    except for democracy and respect for human rights.
        So how did that happen? Well, it happened because America
    is so open and so free that we just open the flood gates. And
    today, this problem of the people coming into the labs is
    joined with the question of people that come into the colleges
    and universities. They are identical problems, and the numbers
    are stunning. Americans have no idea that there are hundreds--
    hundreds of thousands of Chinese students studying in America,
    and we have a tiny fraction of that. And as Tom Cotton pointed
    out--he went and dug out the figures--of the thousands of
    Chinese people who visited our labs, and zero Americans have
    visited their labs. I am intimately familiar with the INL, of
    course, you know, the birthplace of nuclear energy on the
    planet. And I talk to those people all the time. I have never
    met a person who has set foot in a Chinese laboratory.
        So this is the problem--we have given away the farm. And I
    would disagree with Ms. Richmond about open science. We should
    never have given them that, but that ship has sailed. The open
    science is there. It's all over the internet. It's everyplace.
    But they have used it to bootstrap themselves up where they
    are.
        So let's change lanes for just a second and talk about who
    we are dealing with. A student who comes here, or for that
    matter, an engineer who comes here and goes to one of the labs,
    may have no malign ideas whatsoever. But for a person who lives
    in a communist, autocratic country, nothing belongs to them.
    Their property doesn't belong to them, their thinking doesn't
    belong to them, their intellectual knowledge doesn't belong to
    them. It belongs to the Chinese Communist Party, because in
    those states, the state doesn't exist for the people as it does
    in a democracy like we have, people exist for the state, and
    the state always comes ahead of the people. And so, they take
    these people--when the students go home, they are debriefed by
    the Chinese Communist Party, and every scintilla of information
    they have then belongs to the Chinese Communist Party.
        And I mean, it's two different systems. There is absolutely
    no question about it. But again, it's really time to slam the
    door on this thing. I have preached about this for years. And
    with all due respect to the scientific community, I can't get
    it through their head that this is a national security issue.
    They say, well, we are all on this planet together. The
    knowledge we have helps everybody. Well, yeah, to a degree. If
    we are fighting polio, that's true. But not when we are
    designing quantum computers. It's not like that at all. And we
    shouldn't be sharing that information at all.
        So, and by the way, I get real pushback from the colleges
    and universities. Why? There are millions of dollars being
    transferred from China to the colleges and universities. And
    those colleges and universities get very defensive of the
    grants and that that they get from the Chinese Communist Party.
        Anyway, that's where we are. Folks, how do we get the word
    out to the community, and how do we get the word out to
    Americans that this is a huge problem? And I have only got a
    few minutes left. Start down here and give me your 30-second
    take on that.
        Ms. Puglisi. Okay, thank you, Senator.
        First, I just want to add that the whole issue of basic
    science comes up quite a bit, but it's important to note that
    collaborations are very important, and I, myself, have been a
    proponent for open science. However, I think what is lost in
    that conversation is that not everything is shared. And that is
    the challenge because what is happening is that the time and
    resource-intensive parts of that basic research, oftentimes,
    the data, the know-how, the access to how do I actually do
    something, and oftentimes what doesn't work is what is stolen.
    And so, those are the kinds of things, I think, that we really
    need to focus on and have that conversation.
        Senator Risch. Ms. Richmond, I am almost out of--I am out
    of time--give me a short shot and I am going to give you----
        Dr. Richmond. Yes, let me say, I am glad to meet you. I
    have been through Chinese laboratories, back in 2010.
        Senator Risch. I have met somebody, finally. All right.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Risch. I have met one. How many people in America,
    330 million? All right, I've got one.
        Dr. Richmond. Yes. But the point is, things are changing--
    --
        Senator Risch. By the way, did you get into the Wuhan lab,
    because we are really interested----
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Risch. Probably not.
        Dr. Richmond. You know, I can't read Chinese, so I have no
    idea what lab I was in. Okay?
        But the point is, you raise a very important point. Things
    are changing. Your issue about the open science is right, but
    on the other hand collaborations are really important too. But
    again, I believe that we need to have a full discussion of this
    out in the open. Universities need to--and faculty at
    universities need to understand that they could be involved in
    the areas of high-performance computing, AI, quantum,
    bioscience, biotech, accelerator science, battery science, that
    we at the labs consider to be extraordinarily high-risk, so
    that they can understand that they are----
        Senator Risch. You got that exactly right.
        Dr. Richmond. Yes.
        Senator Risch. Paul.
        Mr. Dabbar. Senator, I think this is a big but narrow
    topic. America is the bright light to recruit people from all
    around the world who want to work at the DOE national labs and
    people want to become Americans. And I think that's good. When
    I was there, we had four lab directors who were naturalized
    citizens from the UK and Canada and Germany and so on, and that
    is excellent, right? They came here. They became American
    citizens. We are still a very small percentage of the world in
    terms of population in the big scheme of things, and I think
    doing that, and all the other people underneath them, with
    citizens from all over. China is the topic----
        Senator Risch. China is a problem because those people
    can't stay here. We all know what happens to their families if
    they say, hey, we are giving up China, and we are going to
    become a U.S. citizen. They will start--well, anyway, I don't
    want to go into that. They do bad, bad things to their
    families.
        So my time is up. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Cortez Masto.
        Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you. I appreciate the panel
    discussion today. It's good to see some of you again.
        Let me start off with the Nevada National Security Site.
    Most people don't have it in their backyard. I do. Most people
    don't grow up next to it. I did. Most people don't have family
    and friends that work there. I have and still do. So this is an
    issue that is important for us in Nevada, and I appreciate the
    conversation today.
        Dr. Richmond, let me start with you. In your testimony you
    outlined various legislation like the CHIPS and Science Act and
    the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act that
    address research security concerns that we have talked about,
    right, that are getting ready to go into effect. Specifically,
    though, you mentioned that DOE was getting prepared to
    implement Section 3112 of the NDAA, which would ban foreign
    nationals from China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran from
    accessing the national laboratories operated by the National
    Nuclear Security Administration without secretarial waivers. So
    given the enhanced research security measures outlined in the
    Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA, how do you think these new regulations
    will affect the mission at Nevada's national laboratories, such
    as the Nevada National Security Site, which we know is
    essential for maintaining our nation's nuclear weapons
    stockpile.
        Dr. Richmond. Well, thank you, Senator, for that question.
    As you may know, Director Hruby--Jill Hruby--was the one that
    oversaw NNSA while I was in my position, so I don't have all
    the depth of knowledge that she would have, but I do think that
    the lab directors that spoke last week at HSST, even Dr. Kim
    Budil was there, and she does oversee Lawrence Livermore
    National Laboratory. And all five directors that were there--
    three or four of them were NNSA labs--they are ready to do it
    and have accepted it and we will have it done by April 15 or
    whatever the deadline is.
        Senator Cortez Masto. Okay.
        Dr. Richmond. What impact that has, I can't speculate on
    it, but I think they are ready to take it on. The concern is,
    though, that they are now going to have to fire, I think, a
    number of people. I think it was close to a thousand or
    something like that, and that, again, compromises our security
    because those people could easily be picked up by our
    adversaries.
        Senator Cortez Masto. Can I touch on that, because I only
    have so much time, and that was my next question because we are
    now implementing legislation to address foreign nationals
    coming into our labs, but what we are not doing is addressing
    the workforce that is necessary. Now, I have heard all of you,
    and we have had this conversation before about STEM, making
    sure our kids are exposed to it, that they want to go into that
    area of science. We want to make sure that they are now
    stepping into, as they graduate, jobs like we have at the test
    site. What does it say to them that we have just done this
    wholesale firing of people, particularly in my state. People
    are paying attention--their family members, their friends, they
    know what is going on. What does that say to our ability to
    develop that workforce for the future in these STEM courses?
        Dr. Richmond. Okay, I will put my academic hat on now.
    People are scared. Students are scared. Parents of students are
    scared. Spouses are scared about paying mortgages, that all the
    energy that they have put into this passion they have for
    science is now being questioned for its value. It's very
    personal.
        Senator Cortez Masto. Let me touch on one final thing. We
    have talked about foreign nationals, and I agree that we have
    to address it. We have passed legislation to do just that, but
    there are other security challenges we are not even talking
    about--cyber threats. Where are we talking about cyber threats
    here? And should we be addressing that as Congress as well?
        And let me open it up to any of the panel members: talk to
    me about cyber threats. What should we know that we are not
    talking about today that is the next step for us to implement
    when it comes to our national labs?
        Ms. Puglisi or Mr. Dabbar.
        Ms. Puglisi. That's a very important point and that's why I
    advocate that we really need a holistic, comprehensive program
    that looks across the board, and cyber would be one of those,
    and also, both external and internal to understand, okay, who's
    sharing what with whom. So that's one. And I just want to pull
    the thread on the collaborations because that's an important
    point and why we really need to demand that reciprocity and
    transparency because it can't be a one-way street, right? And
    we talked about how many people are in our labs, how many
    people in their labs, I mean, these are serious topics and
    serious countries do serious things. And so, we need to ensure
    that there is that reciprocity of, not only people, but
    information. And one of the challenges, I think, with China is
    they are coming down on open science--access to their data,
    access to academic papers, you know, that does not demonstrate
    to me a place that has a serious desire to do true
    collaborations.
        Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you.
        I know my time is up. Mr. Dabbar, do you have anything?
        Mr. Dabbar. So Senator, this is a university example, but
    not a lab example. This just goes to show you that you need to
    have strict controls, and sometimes things can go wrong. We
    found a cybersecurity effort that was funded by DOE at a
    university in which all the principal investigators were PRC
    nationals. Electric grid cybersecurity funded by DOE at a
    university with PRC nationals developing the software for
    cybersecurity for the electric grid. We stopped that as soon as
    we found out that that had been done, and I won't go through
    the details, but it's an example that people were not thinking,
    okay, at the Department, when they were issuing funding of
    something that I think is pretty commonsense.
        So I think this comes back to rules and proper oversight so
    that people down below don't do things that wouldn't pass, you
    know, kind of commonsense for, I think, anyone in this room.
        Senator Cortez Masto. But if we don't have the staff to
    catch it. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The focus today has been on national security, as well it
    should be. That's one of our jobs around here. On the other
    hand, there is an opportunity cost of excluding talent that
    could be important in furthering our own interest in terms of
    technological development.
        Ms. Richmond, talk to me about that. It seems to me what we
    really need to do is try to find a path between total exclusion
    and not being cognizant of national security risk, but not
    exclude people who can make a significant contribution to our
    national welfare. Do you see what I am trying to find?
        Dr. Richmond. Yes, so, Senator King, thank you for that
    question. There are so many examples of where Chinese citizens
    have made--I would be happy to give the Committee many
    examples, especially of Chinese researchers who continue to
    contribute in our laboratories and also our universities. It is
    a balance. And particularly for our universities, we have,
    while I was Under Secretary, we started the RTES Office, which
    is Research for Technology and Economic Security. And that is
    basically to make sure that we don't have things happen like
    happened in your Administration, which would check every one
    that's a PI going in for a grant. In the FOA that goes out, it
    is checked to make sure that it is very clear that we are going
    to ask this kind of information when you apply for a grant.
    Then, when the selections are made, look to see who the PIs
    are, are they ones that are safe to go forward with? Is the
    topic one--what about the topic, because the security for some
    topics----
        Senator King. But universities don't have the security
    clearance apparatus----
        Dr. Richmond. No.
        Senator King [continuing]. That the national labs have.
        I believe that there may be more risk, frankly, on the
    university level than there is at the national labs because at
    the national labs you have a whole--you have
    counterintelligence at Department of Energy and you have those
    kinds of examinations.
        Dr. Richmond. And that's why we are working with them and
    that's why we are sharing the risk matrix with them as well. I
    was on a video call recently to talk about what they need to do
    in proposals with their PIs to give them guidance on making----
        Senator King. Mr. Dabbar, how do you think we should strike
    this balance?
        Mr. Dabbar. Yes, so, one of the orders that we also
    implemented was banning giving money to university researchers
    if they were also taking money under the Thousand Talents
    Program. We had found out that during the previous
    Administration, that they had allowed that, so that literally a
    researcher could be getting money from the Chinese state at the
    same time as from DOE. We decided that was a bad idea. We
    actually spent a bunch of time with university presidents
    explaining that. They had a lot of worry about that. And then,
    at the end of the day, they reached a conclusion that the
    Federal Government can decide what to do its money. I know it's
    a simple kind of conclusion.
        But one of the big things that they found, as a part of our
    pushing on this topic, was they found out that they had
    researchers who were spending significant time in Communist
    China and basically taking their research--it had nothing to do
    with DOE, it could have been from anyplace. And they didn't
    even know it was happening. I found out at Stanford, for
    example, there was a professor who was supposedly full time,
    who spent nine months a year in China. And the university
    didn't even realize it was going on, even though they were
    paying that professor.
        So I think awareness with the university system, that they
    need to address their own problems, but I do think additional
    controls around how the Federal Government money is given to
    PIs, the principal investigators----
        Senator King. Let's go back to the national labs.
        Mr. Dabbar. Yes.
        Senator King. If there is a total ban, no Chinese
    researchers whatsoever, is that a good policy or would that
    cost us some good scientific breakthroughs that would otherwise
    be useful? I am trying to find the right line between national
    security and opportunity cost of brilliant researchers from
    anywhere in the world.
        Mr. Dabbar. I think, Senator, given that there has been,
    literally, a whole generation of successful efforts by
    Communist China in stealing stuff, the Los Alamos Club, but
    then the thousand talents. They keep coming at us. I think the
    better way of doing it is this proposed legislation from the
    Intel Committee that was referenced, which is a ban with
    Chinese nationals at the national labs, which are at the very
    highest level of the United States with the ability of the
    Department of do a waiver. And so, this flexibility----
        Senator King. So the default would be no.
        Mr. Dabbar. The default should be no, is my recommendation,
    which was the Intel Committee's unanimous vote, with the
    ability of the Department to grant waivers. So there is still
    flexibility in the idea, but once again, I think the DOE
    national labs are at the top of the security worries.
        Senator King. I understand.
        Quick follow-up question. Who is Chinese? There are a lot
    of Chinese Americans. Are they swept into this? What's the
    definition?
        Mr. Dabbar. Yes, so the way the orders are written is, it's
    citizens.
        Senator King. Chinese citizens.
        Mr. Dabbar. Citizens.
        Senator King. Okay, so a Chinese American who has been here
    50 years or a couple of generations would not be included?
        Mr. Dabbar. Citizens is the way that the order is currently
    written.
        Senator King. Okay, thank you.
        Mr. Dabbar. Or Russians, or, I mean, we had an Iranian
    trying to get hired, like an Iranian citizen, and we had
    concerns on the type of technology and we decided not to let
    them in.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cassidy [presiding]. Thank you.
        And I have taken the gavel, just for everybody's
    information, while Senator Lee goes to vote.
        Let me follow up on that. I don't know the particulars of
    it, but by the way, I have been elsewhere, so if I ask
    something which is a repeat, I apologize, but I am going to
    pick up where Senator King left off. There were two folks who
    apparently were American citizens, but who were passing
    information to the Chinese Communist Party, that were recently
    arrested from the DOD. And I want to say it's out in San Diego.
    I am a little vague on all of this, but suffice it to say that
    this occurred. So if the restriction is on Chinese citizens,
    and by the way, I am Irish American, right? So I am not saying
    we have this kind of prohibition upon Chinese Americans. I am
    trying to understand this kind of interface where there has
    been an infusion of people who now are naturalized U.S.
    citizens, but in some way still might pose a security risk.
        And so, we want fairness. We want to capitalize upon
    incredible human talent, but we don't want to be someone's
    sucker. So take into account these naturalized citizens, and
    how would we do that, as a follow up to what Senator King asked
    in terms of establishing security?
        Yes, ma'am, would you like to go?
        Dr. Richmond. Yes, so, I think that's a really good
    question. So we have, just to put some data out there, of the
    Chinese citizenship at graduation. After they have been here
    for five years, 88 percent have stayed, and after ten years, 81
    percent have stayed. So some--I mean, a lot of them are going
    to stay. And the question is, which ones are the ones that you
    need to be concerned about? So I think what we have done with
    working with the universities and NSF and certainly, Paul, with
    your administration work on this too, is the Department of
    Energy, back in 2019, and then 2021, every PI, every one that
    wants money, has to put down all their connections, okay? And
    with regards to money, visits, financial support, all of that
    has to be there if you are going to get DOE money.
        And I have been in the SCIF where I have been talking to
    our intelligence people about someone that may arise that
    causes them concern. And those people are also working with our
    vetting--RTES group--in order to figure out who those people
    are because they--I tell university PIs that if you don't
    disclose, and we find out that something is wrong, you are out
    of here.
        Senator Cassidy. So let me ask you this, though, because I
    once read about how the Chinese missile program began because
    there was a Chinese American who was doing fabulous work, but
    because of a security issue, was not given clearance to
    continue and he just wanted an outlet for his intellect. And
    so, he returned to Communist China and helped develop their
    program. So I guess that brings to mind, is there a way to
    discern between those people who are more loyal to China and
    those who are more loyal to the United States, but if we shut
    off opportunity, they will go where they have opportunity. Do
    you follow where I am going there?
        Dr. Richmond. Well, Senator Cassidy, that's exactly what we
    have been talking about here, is the concern about all the cuts
    that are happening in the Department of Energy--300 employees
    at NNSA, 1,800 across the Department, and those people have an
    incredible knowledge, scientific background, and if they are
    just really upset, shall I say, they may decide to do that. So
    it concerns me that----
        Senator Cassidy. Well, people have got to eat. So they have
    got to have a job.
        Dr. Richmond. Yes, you have to pay the mortgage. You have
    to eat. You can take that contract that I, you know, asked that
    I--the letter that I got recently that said $40,000 for an
    hour's worth of work in China. We will pay all your expenses.
    And you know, for somebody that is mad, is angry at the
    government or for----
        Senator Cassidy. But that's not actually, that's not my
    fundamental question though. I am going back to this person in
    the 1940s or 50s who was really seeking opportunity. So is
    there a way to discern between those who might be a security
    risk and those who are, you know, they are just, they may
    leave, but they are going to leave because of opportunity or
    other circumstances, not because of their security risk,
    fundamentally?
        Dr. Richmond. So in the case of the people, again, we go
    through with the RTES program and also the risk matrix at the
    laboratories, we go through as much information as we can that
    they will give us with regards to when they are employed at the
    university or, excuse me, employed in the Federal Government to
    find out whether they could possibly be a risk.
        Senator Cassidy. And of course, this would apply to people
    of multiple nationalities. I think I heard you mention as I
    walked in, because there are talented people coming into the
    United States for graduate school from the world over, right?
        Dr. Richmond. Yes, but you don't have to only worry about
    if someone has Chinese background.
        Senator Cassidy. I get that.
        Dr. Richmond. There are American scientists that have
    decided they needed the money so they went over to China.
        Senator Cassidy. I am a little suspicious about some of the
    Canadians----
        [Laughter.]
        Dr. Richmond. I don't know, I think it's Irish Americans we
    need to worry about.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cassidy. You don't have to worry about Irish
    Americans for much.
        Senator Hickenlooper.
        Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks
    to all of you for being here. I appreciate this. I grew up in a
    time back in the 60s, where at the height of the Cold War there
    was a continuing cartoon series in Mad Magazine where it was
    Spy vs. Spy, and there was a white spy and a black spy, and
    they were constantly doing tricks with each other in a comical
    competition. We are way beyond that. And I think, you know,
    when I was just getting--I got a master's in earth and
    environmental science, and we had a number of foreign students
    within our program, and it was embryonic in that sense of how
    much they added from their educational system to things that we
    didn't emphasize or didn't understand as well and vice versa. I
    got a great appreciation with that.
        I taught field geology for a year down in Costa Rica while
    I was still a graduate student and saw that culture and got
    those exchanges. It's incredibly powerful. I mean, look at the
    number of our largest companies that have been started by
    immigrants. The amazing innovations and breakthroughs that have
    come from people that came to this country because they wanted
    to live in a free country. To be quite honest, that magnet is
    still very powerful.
        But I want to ask each of you, I mean, are we doing enough?
    Is the current system sufficient to protect our classified
    research from foreign espionage?
        Mr. Dabbar. So Senator, I do think, as we have been
    discussing, I think a heightened level of awareness because
    there has been generation after generation of Chinese just
    adapting to try to steal. I would make a broadening point to
    your question, which is not just classified, I mean, the
    leading renewables lab in the world is in your state. It's not
    even close, okay? No other country comes close to that.
        And so, just to pick on a topic: perovskites for thin-film
    solar may be the next big thing. We don't want that to be in
    Xinjiang, produced by coal and slaves, literally slaves, right,
    because they are the wrong religion. I thought we were over
    that in 1945, but the Chinese are doing that.
        Senator Hickenlooper. Right.
        Mr. Dabbar. And I am certain they are trying to steal it
    from your lab--or your nation's lab.
        Senator Hickenlooper. I view it as my lab.
        Mr. Dabbar. Yeah, yeah--in your state.
        And so, I think as a broadening point--not just
    classified--it includes both economic impact technologies as
    well as classified.
        Senator Hickenlooper. I would agree.
        Dr. Richmond.
        Dr. Richmond. Yes, I agree with that. And I think what we
    are talking about here is an evolving situation, and it will
    continue to evolve. So we have to have a system together that
    is adaptable, can quickly move----
        Senator Hickenlooper. But is our system now sufficient, is
    the question, right? We have got to be adaptable, but there are
    all kinds of things we can do to improve it, but----
        Dr. Richmond. It can always be improved. It can always be
    improved, but I think, certainly under the Biden
    Administration, we took what we got from the past
    administration, heightened it up even more. And as we go
    through, we are going to have to look to see how much it needs
    to be heightened any more.
        Senator Hickenlooper. That's fair.
        Dr. Richmond. But again, it's not just classified
    information. It's also the AI and many of the other areas.
        Ms. Puglisi. And I am going to foot-stomp that. It's
    beyond--it's more than the classified information because it's
    really a lot of the technologies of the future--it's AI, it's
    biotech, it's the new materials in manufacturing. And so, I
    think what is really important is to focus on the behavior. And
    I think that a lot of the new regulations and rules that are
    being put in place are a start and are beginning to do that,
    but I think it's going to take time to implement those. And
    again, I think we have to take that really holistic look. And
    we can't set and forget, right? This is dynamic. The technology
    is changing. The vectors--the threat vectors are changing. And
    so, it's going to require a constant dialogue.
        Senator Hickenlooper. The magnitude of those threat vectors
    has never been greater.
        Ms. Puglisi. Right.
        Senator Hickenlooper. And I think we have to maintain that
    sense of urgency that you guys all have shown.
        Ms. Puglisi. Yes.
        Senator Hickenlooper. So I appreciate that.
        Several of you have talked about foreigners coming into our
    universities and being more motivated or adding a great deal to
    innovation. I think we have got to get back, also, to how do we
    get our kids in this country--I mean, the reason universities
    are receiving and open to receiving these foreign students is
    because we don't have a pipeline that is sufficient to provide
    the technology and the STEM kids. We have got to get to them in
    elementary school. Do you guys have, do you realize--do you
    connect that problem and the solution of it with this issue
    about our national security?
        Start at this end, this side.
        Ms. Puglisi. That's an excellent point. I mean, STEM
    education, we should start at K-12 and really do things to
    support----
        Senator Hickenlooper. K-3.
        Ms. Puglisi. Yes, actually, the earlier parts, I mean,
    because you hear kids, by the time they are in middle school,
    they are saying----
        Senator Hickenlooper. Absolutely.
        Ms. Puglisi [continuing]. I can't do math.
        But that's going to take an effort, and we want to make
    sure that we draw from the wide swath of Americans from all
    over the country. And so, that starts, you know, with support
    from the undergraduate and make people understand what the
    possible is and also, I want to--it's the technically
    proficient workforce----
        Senator Hickenlooper. We are out of time.
        Dr. Richmond. So do you realize that our country has the
    lowest retention rate in the world for kids that decide they
    want to be a scientist at 18 and don't end up being a scientist
    at 24?
        Senator Hickenlooper. Outrageous. I totally--I do know----
        Dr. Richmond. Lowest.
        Senator Hickenlooper. Outrageous.
        Senator Cassidy. Senator Justice.
        Senator Justice [presiding]. Oh, thank you so much, Mr.
    Chairman.
        You know, I have said this a bunch of times, but I am
    probably a new kid on the block, but I am not a kid, you know,
    I have got a lot of white hair and I have been around, and
    around, and around. I can tell you just simply just this--I
    truly believe that energy, absolutely, is the key to just about
    every single thing that we have got going. That's all there is
    to it.
        Now, and if it's that level of key, I have just got to
    share with you just a couple things, real quick. First of all,
    we have one of these 17 labs in Morgantown, West Virginia, and
    we are really proud of that. And I can tell you that I have
    just gotten through being the Governor of the great State of
    West Virginia for eight years, and to be perfectly honest, we
    were able to do lots and lots and lots of good stuff. And
    little West Virginia, that a lot of people told a lot of bad
    jokes about, to tell you the truth, along the way, became a
    diamond in the rough that everybody missed. And with all that
    being said, successes like you can't imagine. And we are
    really, really proud of exactly what we did.
        Now, with that being said, along the way, there was a
    gentleman that I ran into way, way, way before I ever became
    Governor, and he was a PRC national and just the most
    legitimate-speaking gentleman that you could ever be around.
    And then, all of a sudden, as I became the Governor, we found
    out things that were going on with him in his life and
    everything that tied right back to his homeland that absolutely
    astounded us. I mean, absolutely a gentleman that--as a guy
    that is suspicious of almost everybody a lot of times, but
    absolutely trusting in everybody--I believed with all in me
    that this guy was the real deal. A guy that absolutely we
    trusted in every way. And we were astounded with what we found.
    That's all there is to it.
        Now, energy is, I think, so important it's off the chart
    right now. It's off the chart how important energy is. Do you
    realize if you are a business guy--and that's me--do you
    realize that we can't cut our way out of these messes? We
    can't. We can mind the store and we can surely do a lot better,
    but at the end of the day, we got to find a way to grow. And
    the way to grow, absolutely, hands down, is energy, period.
    That's all there is to it.
        So if it is the most important--and it is, it truly is, you
    know--then we have got to be on guard and we have got to do
    better because the world is trying to absolutely discover or
    steal our inner-most secrets all the time--all the time. So
    with all that being said, I would say to everybody, from the
    guy that's the white-haired guy from West Virginia that's a
    business guy, not a politician--I am a guy that talks to you
    just with common sense and logic. I would say beware. And
    absolutely, we got to do better. And these folks right here are
    the key to us doing better in a lot of ways.
        So I do have one question, and it just parallels everything
    that I have already said because, you see, I really believe
    that President Trump, because I am a real friend with the
    family, and I am proud of that, and absolutely, I am trusting
    of the family, and he is our President and he is now saying to
    all of us, look, we have got a problem here. We need to do
    better. And so, let's get at doing better. But my question real
    fast is just this, and this is to Ms.--is it Puglisi? Did I get
    that halfway close?
        Ms. Puglisi. Puglisi, yes.
        Senator Justice. Okay, you know, and my question is just
    this, given your expertise in counterintelligence or research
    security, can you provide insight into the extent of
    collaboration between DOE national laboratories and the Seven
    Sons universities in China, please?
        Ms. Puglisi. Thank you very much.
        Well, I, myself, have not done empirical research to be
    able to give you the exact numbers. There have been a number of
    articles that look at those kinds of collaborations. And for
    those who are not aware, the Seven Sons are universities that
    work directly with the military. And so, you know, this is very
    concerning because, you know, China says that it will--it's
    civil military fusion. It will use anything that it acquires
    and apply it to its military. And so, those are affiliations
    and collaborations that we really need to take a closer look
    at.
        Senator Justice. Well, thank you so much. And I know my
    time is expired, but I would say just this--I will do anything
    and everything I can do to help all of you in every way at any
    time. We have got to become safer and we have got to become
    more protective, in my book.
        Thank you so much.
        The Chairman [presiding]. I want to thank all of our
    witnesses for being here today. This really has been a great
    hearing, and we are going to keep the record open until close
    of business, 6:00 p.m., tomorrow, February 21, for the
    submission of written questions for the record for our
    witnesses and items included in the hearing record.
        I do, before we gavel out, I want to just correct the
    record on some things that have been said today.
        Over the last week there has been a lot of fairly
    misleading and poorly sourced reporting regarding dismissals at
    the U.S. Department of Energy, and here are some facts that I
    think are relevant and significant, but often omitted.
    President Trump and the Department of Energy are committed to
    making government more accountable, efficient, and restoring
    proper stewardship of the American taxpayer dollar. And the
    previous Administration was not a responsible steward of that,
    and we are paying the price for it heavily in the form of
    inflation. In just four years, the Biden Administration
    expanded the Department of Energy's federal workforce, and it
    did so by more than 20 percent, adding more than 3,000 federal
    employee positions. In the last year alone, the Biden
    Administration increased the size of the Department of Energy
    federal workforce with 1,000 new employees.
        Delivering on President Trump's mandate, supported by more
    than 77 million American voters, the Energy Department began on
    Thursday dismissing a portion of recently hired federal
    employees classified in the Federal Government as probationary
    employees. Across the Energy Department, less than 700
    probationary employees have been dismissed. These dismissal
    numbers pale in comparison to the total amount of positions the
    Biden Administration hired over the last four years. They are
    also less than the total positions added by the Biden
    Administration in the last year.
        Now, contrary to many news reports, the Energy Department's
    nuclear weapons production plants and nuclear laboratories are
    exempt from these dismissals. So those aren't part of it. At
    the Energy Department's Power Marketing Administration, PMA,
    fewer than three percent of total employees were dismissed and
    were primarily administrative roles. Of the more than 70,000
    contractors and federal employees at the National Nuclear
    Security Administration, or NNSA, fewer than 50 employees were
    dismissed. These employees held primarily administrative and
    clerical roles. The Energy Department will continue its
    critical mission of protecting our national security and
    nuclear deterrents in the development, modernization, and
    stewardship of America's atomic weapons enterprise, including
    the peaceful use of nuclear technology and non-proliferation.
        So it is important that we keep the facts aligned. When
    people are crying that the sky is falling, it usually is not,
    and that certainly is the case here. In any event, I thank the
    witnesses for being here today. It has been a good, informative
    discussion. We have laid a good record and I very much
    appreciate your help.
        The hearing stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

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