    [Senate Hearing 119-37]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 119-37

                      AFTER ASSAD: NAVIGATING SYRIA POLICY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               FEBRUARY 13, 2025

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

     [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                      Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    59-893 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman

    PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska                JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    DAVID MCCORMICK, Pennsylvania          CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
    STEVE DAINES, Montana                  CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
    BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee                TIM KAINE, Virginia
    JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming                 JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
    RAND PAUL, Kentucky                    CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
    TED CRUZ, Texas                        BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
    MIKE LEE, Utah                         CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
    RICK SCOTT, Florida                    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah                   JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas

                 Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
               Naz Durakoglu, Democratic Staff Director
                       John Dutton, Chief Clerk

                                  (ii)

                             C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   Statements

    Risch, Hon. James E., Chairman, U.S. Senator From Idaho..........     1

    Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, Ranking Member, U.S. Senator From New
      Hampshire......................................................     3

                                   Witnesses

    Singh, Michael, Managing Director and Lane-Swig Senior Fellow,
      The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC..     6
        Prepared statement...........................................     8

    Stroul, Dana, Director of Research and Shelly and Michael Kassen
      Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
      Washington, DC.................................................    13
        Prepared statement...........................................    15

                  Additional Material Submitted for the Record

    Letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from Gen.
      Mazloum Abdi, Command-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces,
      February 13, 2025, submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen.........    40

    Statement for the Record from Citizens for a Safe and Secure
      America et al., February 13, 2025, submitted by Senator Jeanne
      Shaheen........................................................    42

    Letter to Senator Shaheen from the Access Centre For Human Rights
      (ACHR) et al., February 10, 2025, submitted by Senator Jeanne
      Shaheen........................................................    52

    Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance in Syria, submitted by Senator Jeanne
      Shaheen........................................................    60

    The White House's wildly inaccurate claims about USAID spending,
      the Washington Post, February 7, 2025, submitted by Senator
      Chris Van Hollen...............................................    62

                                    (iii)

                      AFTER ASSAD: NAVIGATING SYRIA POLICY

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2025

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:46 a.m., in
    room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.
    Risch, chairman of the committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Ricketts, McCormick,
    Shaheen, Coons, Kaine, Van Hollen, Duckworth, and Rosen.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
                   CHAIRMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

        Senator Risch. Today we are going to talk about Syria. I
    would call it opportunities that we want to look at--this is an
    important hearing.
        For those of you in the audience, we are glad to have you.
    This is a public hearing, and we appreciate you attending and
    watching what we do, but participation is not allowed.
        So as I have said over and over again, if you interrupt the
    proceedings, if you try to get attention, if you try to
    distract the committee or witnesses in any way, you will
    immediately be removed by our friends here who are working
    security and be charged, and also you will be banned from the
    committee for a year.
        So with that, on a zero tolerance policy, I have got a few
    remarks I would like to make to open. Then I am going to yield
    to the distinguished ranking member for remarks.
        Then we have two excellent witnesses here, one alumni of
    the staff of this committee, and so, obviously, well trained,
    and we are anxious to hear their thoughts.
        The ranking member and I have been discussing this issue
    for some time, and I think there are opportunities here.
        Since the Hamas October 7 terror attack in Israel, long
    held policy assumptions governing the Middle East have been
    turned on their head. Iran's ring of fire, which had encircled
    Israel with terror proxies and instability for decades, is now
    in ruins.
        Thanks to our ally, Israel, Hamas is on its deathbed. The
    crown jewel of Tehran's terror groups, Hezbollah, is in
    tatters. Iran's weapons superhighway through Syria has been
    severed, and perhaps, most shockingly, the Assad regime, a
    fixture of brutality, collapsed in what seems like an instant.
        The fall of the Assad regime presents policymakers with a
    dilemma. How should the United States engage with Syria? Should
    we engage with Syria and at the same time safeguard U.S.
    national security interests now that the Assad regime is gone?
        There is a very real tradeoff between opportunity and risk.
    Too much engagement too soon could create more security
    dilemmas but no or little engagement
        Too little engagement could give Russia and Iran the
    ability to wield substantial influence again and also signal
    that the U.S. has no interest, which would be an incorrect
    assumption.
        Make no mistake, there are very real dangers to lifting
    sanctions too quickly. After all, Syria's interim leader al-
    Sharaa has rebranded himself as a moderate, but he has
    supported some of the most violent terror groups in the Middle
    East. He fought under al-Qaeda in Iraq, worked under the
    Islamic State, and pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda all in the
    past.
        In addition, Syria is rightly subject to a vast array of
    sanctions to include sanctions placed on the Caesar Act, which
    I drew and all of us supported to get in place.
        Before the United States expands its engagement, several
    vital security interests need to be addressed, and I am going
    to list four of those in just a minute.
        Going back to al-Sharaa--and we should be fair that he has
    been saying the right things, and much of the bad behavior that
    he committed, admittedly, is quite a ways in the past.
        So let us talk about the things that need to be addressed
    if we are going to engage with Syria.
        Number one, following the tragic attacks in New Orleans,
    which was inspired by the Islamic State, and troubling reports
    of ISIS infiltration across the southern border during the
    Biden administration, we need evidence that the interim
    government will not allow Syria to be a launching pad for
    terror attacks against the United States or our partners.
        This includes full accountability and elimination of the
    Assad regime's chemical weapons stockpiles.
        Second, Russia and Iran must be permanently ejected from
    Syria. Moscow must not have use of its port on the
    Mediterranean to threaten the United States or our allies. I am
    particularly troubled by Damascus recently hosting a Russian
    delegation to explore basing agreements.
        Third, the Assad regime tragically turned Syria into a
    narco state, flooding the region with illegal drugs and fueling
    corruption and instability in the region. Additionally, this
    trade of methamphetamine and Captagon served as a source of
    revenue for the Assad regime, undermining the impact of U.S.
    and international sanctions and wreaking havoc on Syria's
    neighbors.
        Assad's methamphetamine empire, and with its sprawling
    infrastructure and literal mountains of inventory, has to be
    destroyed.
        Fourth, the interim government must account for American
    citizens detained by the Assad regime, including Austin Tice.
    This is a top priority for the United States and should be a
    top priority for Syrian leaders if they truly wish to work
    toward change in our bilateral relationship.
        Finally, al-Sharaa dissolved the Syrian constitution and
    appointed himself president for 4 years. Syrians deserve a
    realistic political roadmap that returns power to the Syrian
    people and does not fall back into a brutal dictatorship that
    threatens them or American security.
        On all of these fronts the United States requires more than
    promises. If the new Syrian regime wants to have a friend in
    the United States, which the new interim government says that
    they do, we need to see action on the items I have laid out. If
    they do that they will find a willing partner in the United
    States.
        In short, we must help and do enough to show the new
    interim government we are sincere in our desire to build an
    alliance, and at the same time we must, with clear eyes,
    maintain the ability to disengage if they prove to be nothing
    more than just another authoritarian government with no respect
    for human rights or religious diversity.
        So I know the National Security Council at the White House
    is working on a Syrian policy. I am happy they are doing that.
        We are giving them our input, and what I would propose that
    they seriously consider what we are going to say here today,
    and I am not talking about United States taxpayer dollars.
        What I am talking about is a gradual lifting of the Caesar
    sanctions that we have put in place. Let them come into place.
    Let us see how we are doing.
        Let us see how the new interim government acts, and if that
    happens we will continue in a stream of lifting those
    sanctions, and I am urging, because time is of the essence
    here, that the National Security Council take this up as soon
    as possible. Until that happens this is the policy of the
    United States I believe we should follow that I will be
    pursuing.
        With that, I know the ranking member and I share some
    common thoughts in this regard. We have spoken about it a lot,
    and like myself she has spoken with a lot of the Syrian people
    and other people who have interests in the region.
        So with that, let me yield to Senator Shaheen.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,
            RANKING MEMBER, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Risch,
    and welcome to our witnesses.
        Thank you both for joining us today.
        Let me also recognize--I understand we have some
    representatives from the White Helmets who are in the audience
    today.
        Let me thank you for your service to the people of Syria.
        I would like to begin by asking for consent to enter three
    statements into the record, Mr. Chairman.
        The first is from General Mazloum who is the commanding
    general of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the second is from the
    Syrian American diaspora, and the third is from NGOs who have
    been working on Syria assistance.
        Senator Risch. Without objection.
        [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be
    found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record''
    section at the end of this document.]
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Senator Risch and I, as he indicated, have spent a number
    of years working toward a better Syria. We are both relieved
    that after 50 years the Assad regime has finally fallen.
        This was a regime that tortured and killed hundreds of
    thousands of Syrians. They forced millions to flee their homes.
    They gave an opening for terror groups like ISIS. They extended
    Vladimir Putin's reach and power into the Middle East.
        Assad's fall was a defeat for Putin. We want to make sure
    that it continues to be a defeat for Putin. He not only lost a
    deepwater port that allowed him to threaten NATO's southern
    flank, but he lost a reliable defense partner who gave Russia a
    decade to practice the military tactics in Syria that they are
    using today in Ukraine.
        So Assad's fall, as Chairman Risch has pointed out, creates
    an opportunity. It is a chance for us to rebuild from the
    rubble, a chance for the economy to recover, a chance for
    refugees to come home, and a chance to deny Putin, as well as
    Iran's Revolutionary Guard, a strategic foothold in the region.
        Tehran wants the Syrian land bridge to the Mediterranean
    and to its proxies. They want their UAV development and missile
    sites back. They want to return to training security forces in
    Syria.
        Stopping them, I believe, is critical to U.S. interests and
    to our partners in the region like Lebanon and Israel.
        U.S. efforts in Syria are also key to preventing ISIS from
    taking advantage of the vacuum. ISIS has terrorized people
    across Syria and the region, and ISIS has radicalized and
    inspired lone wolf terrorists who have struck inside the
    American homeland--San Bernardino, California; Orlando,
    Florida; Garland, Texas; Ohio State University; New York; New
    Orleans.
        It is a very long list, and we should be doing everything
    we can to prevent this terrorist group from reconstituting
    itself.
        And it is not enough to leave the mission up to Turkey. We
    need to stand with our Kurdish allies and the entire global
    coalition to defeat ISIS. We cannot cut and run at this
    critical moment.
        That is why the foreign aid freeze and recent attempts to
    shut down the United States Agency for International
    Development are so disturbing.
        Mr. Chairman, I would ask for consent to enter a summary on
    assistance blocked in Syria for the record as well.
        Senator Risch. Without objection.
        [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be
    found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record''
    section at the end of this document.]
        Senator Shaheen. Not only have these efforts meant cutting
    off programs to educate women and girls and help the very basic
    needs like delivering babies, they have directly undermined
    efforts to combat ISIS, to preserve evidence, to hold Assad and
    his regime accountable for their crimes.
        We have heard that security guards have been at risk at Al-
    Hol, which is a huge detention camp in Syria where ISIS is
    looking to reconstitute itself. We cannot allow that to happen.
        Evidence that could help bring Austin Tice and recover
    Americans who have been murdered in Syria needs to be
    addressed. That is why I have asked Secretary Rubio to
    immediately issue waivers for aid to Syria including to support
    the security of ISIS detention facilities.
        At the same time, we need to move quickly toward targeted
    sanctions relief, and we are not talking about throwing open
    the doors to the U.S. banking system.
        These sanctions were put in place on the Assad regime. That
    regime is gone. If we do not reevaluate those sanctions we
    punish all Syrians for the sentence of Assad.
        Syria's transitional government needs to understand the
    expectations of the United States and the international
    community, and that means we need clear, measurable benchmarks
    for an inclusive government that respects the rule of law and
    protects the Syrian people.
        Sanctions relief will also help bring in the investments
    from regional partners and the international community that
    Syria needs to rebuild.
        This is a once in a generation opportunity, but it will not
    last forever.
        So I hope our witnesses will speak to the challenges there
    and the opportunities and help us think about how we can move
    swiftly to take advantage of the situation.
        How can we incentivize inclusive governance, transparency,
    and the rule of law? How can we support stability in Syria and
    prevent our adversaries like Russia and Iran from regaining a
    foothold?
        And what steps can we take in this short window of
    opportunity to keep Americans safe from the threat of terrorist
    groups like ISIS?
        So I look forward to hearing your testimony today and to
    our conversation. Thank you.
        Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        And the matters of expenditures of U.S. taxpayer dollars on
    a lot of these matters, as you know, were fluid and being
    reviewed. I have no doubt that this will get resolved
    appropriately in the not too distant future.
        So with that, we are going to turn to our distinguished
    panel.
        First of all, we are going to start with Mr. Michael Singh.
    He is the managing director and Lane-Swig senior fellow at the
    Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
        He was senior director of the Middle East affairs at the
    White House from 2007 to 2008 and a director on the National
    Security Council staff from 2005 to 2007. Mr. Singh co-chaired
    the bipartisan congressionally appointed Syria Study Group with
    Ms. Stroul, who also joins us here today.
        The group released its final report on U.S. policy toward
    the conflict in Syria in September 2019. Much has changed since
    then, which is why we are here today, and I suspect both of you
    are surprised, as a lot of us were, at the breathtaking speed
    and pace at which Syria changed.
        So with that, Mr. Singh, the floor is yours.

      STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SINGH, MANAGING DIRECTOR AND LANE-SWIG
     SENIOR FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY,
                             WASHINGTON, DC

        Mr. Singh. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Shaheen, members of the committee. It is great to be back with
    you to discuss this subject at a time that I agree is fraught
    with risk but is also full of hope. The question before us,
    really, is how do we seize this opportunity that both of you, I
    think, have eloquently and accurately described while getting
    around the many obstacles that there are to actually realizing
    some of these positive benefits. I, frankly, find a lot to
    agree with in both of your statements, and I will try to avoid
    repeating it.
        First, the opportunity. You both described it. Syria has
    been for years a Star Wars bar for U.S. adversaries in the
    region, whether that is ISIS and al-Qaeda, Iran, Russia.
        It has been the platform for power projection for those
    adversaries, where their actions have not just been confined to
    Syria, but they have used Syria to try to attack Israel, to
    destabilize Lebanon, and so on and so forth.
        And the conflict in Syria over the past 14 years has not
    remained confined to Syria. It has drawn in numerous foreign
    forces, including ours. It has sparked massive refugee flows to
    Europe and to Syria's neighbors.
        It has led to, as you mentioned, to Syria's rise as a major
    narco trafficking state, something which we had not seen
    before, and even saw the first use of chemical weapons in war
    for decades since, I think, World War I.
        And when you go through that list, it is absolutely clear
    that the emergence of a new and better government in Syria
    would represent probably the starkest and most positive change
    of the many changes that the Middle East has seen since the
    heinous attacks of October 7, 2023.
        But we are a long way from realizing that opportunity. We
    can see it, but it is not yet within our grasp. What are the
    obstacles?
        First, both of you mentioned Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, the
    group that has taken Damascus, and its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa
    and his background.
        It does seem as though Sharaa and HTS have sincerely, as
    far as we can tell, broken ties with ISIS and with al-Qaeda,
    and even cracked down on those groups within the territory they
    previously controlled in Idlib.
        But HTS continues, as far as we can tell, to adhere to a
    rigid and intolerant Islamist ideology, and it is reflected in
    the way that they governed Idlib, which was repressive toward
    minorities and toward women, toward dissent, and it was also
    authoritarian. Sharaa's rule was unchallenged in Idlib.
        HTS for the past several years, since at least 2018, has
    tried to reassure us that we are not their enemy and that they
    want to work with the West.
        But there, I would say, are unmistakable parallels between
    the rise of HTS and the rerise of the Taliban in Afghanistan,
    which made a lot of the same promises that we are seeing now
    from HTS and has not, obviously, followed through on those
    promises.
        The second obstacle, as both of you mentioned, ISIS is not
    defeated, and in fact, we have seen a resurgence in ISIS
    attacks, according to CENTCOM, over the past year, and I think
    there is a lot of reason to worry just from initial reports
    that ISIS is trying to use this time--this time of instability
    and transition, to mount a comeback, and there is a lot of
    reason to worry that they could try to free those fighters and
    those family members that both of you mentioned who are in
    northeastern Syria hoping that, you know, we will take our eye
    off the ball or otherwise the situation will break down.
        Third, I think there is a real risk that a new chapter of
    conflict could open in Syria, whether that is between Syrian
    factions, as HTS tries to consolidate its power, or as Turkey
    tries to seize territory and target Kurdish fighters, including
    those making up the SDF with which, as you know, we work.
        And then, fourth and finally, my view is our adversaries
    are going to try to regain their footing in Syria.
        As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, Russia wants to salvage a
    role for itself. China's role was modest under the Assad
    regime, but they may see strategic and economic opportunities
    here. And even Iran, which the--I do not think the new
    government of Syria is going to like, will try to take
    advantage as it often does, of this poorly governed space and
    to try to work through proxies.
        So what do we do? How can we seize the opportunity and get
    around these obstacles?
        Briefly, let me recommend the following. First, we need to
    continue to prioritize our counterterrorism operations and
    partnerships. We cannot ease up the pressure on ISIS.
        Second, I do think we should engage pragmatically with HTS
    and test its willingness to cooperate on areas of shared
    concern like countering Iran and ISIS, counter narcotics,
    border security and so forth, and we need to watch and see if
    HTS is truly committed to more inclusive governance, which is,
    I think, the key to long term peace and stability and the key
    to our interests as well.
        Third, we should take a phased and performance based
    approach to the relief of sanctions, which is something
    absolutely Syrians will need as they go forward.
        And then, finally, as we look at the bigger regional
    picture, I lay out a full agenda in my written testimony, but
    several things are key.
        First and foremost, we have to work assiduously to ensure
    that Syria never again falls into the orbit of Iran, and we
    cannot cede the ground of Syria to Russia and China.
        Second, we need to work in lockstep with our Arab partners.
    We did not do this in Iraq after 2003. And what happened was
    those partners shunned Baghdad, and we and they left it exposed
    to Iranian domination. We do not want to see that happen here.
        Third, we need to reach an understanding with Turkey that
    it should respect Syrian sovereignty and refrain from actions
    that are going to undermine stability or our interests there.
        And then, finally, we need to take this opportunity to try
    to cement Israeli-Syrian nonaggression understandings, which
    could eventually lead to actual peace between Israel and Syria,
    which is something we have sought for a long time.
        It is a full agenda but I agree it is a historic
    opportunity, and seizing it, I think, is going to take
    patience, pragmatism, but most of all American leadership.
        Thanks very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Singh follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Mr. Michael Singh

        Since Hamas' heinous attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the
    geopolitical landscape in the Middle East has shifted dramatically. Yet
    many of these changes are tentative or incomplete--Hamas in Gaza and
    Hezbollah in Lebanon will seek to rebuild with Iran's help, and Iran
    itself will look to Russia and China as it aims to rearm. In each
    place, whether the changes wrought by a year-and-a-half of war are
    lasting or fleeting depends heavily on the actions and determination of
    local and external actors.
        In Syria, on the other hand, change is not only certain, it is
    unfolding swiftly. More than fifty years of Assad family rule has come
    to an abrupt end. It is cause for satisfaction in Washington--the Assad
    regime sponsored terrorism against the United States and Israel, served
    as a base of operations for Iran and Russia, brutally repressed the
    Syrian people, employed chemical weapons and clandestinely sought
    nuclear weapons, and in recent years became a leading trafficker of
    illegal narcotics. Whatever Syria's next chapter may hold, it will be a
    sharp break from the past five decades.
        Yet there is good reason for unease regarding what Syria's future
    holds and its implications for American interests. The new government
    in Damascus is dominated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a US-designated
    terrorist group whose roots lie in the global jihadist movement
    spearheaded by Al-Qaida and whose leader--now appointed as Syria's
    president--spent time in prison for fighting against US forces in Iraq.
    Even if the group's intentions are good, the task facing it is
    enormous--Syrian history between its independence in 1946 the rise of
    Hafez al-Assad in 1970 was marked by numerous coups and communal
    violence, and since 2011 the country has been effectively divided into
    statelets and occupied by foreign forces. The divisions which Syrians
    will need to surmount if they are to come together and rebuild their
    society and economy are deep indeed, and extend beyond the country's
    own borders.
        While putting Syria on a better path may be a daunting challenge,
    it is also an opportunity--not just for Syrians themselves, but for the
    Middle East, the West, and the United States. The Assad regime was
    implicated in many of the most serious national security threats
    emanating from the region and contributed to threats globally. The
    United States should, through pragmatic but cautious engagement,
    explore whether the Assad regime's collapse could represent a
    meaningful reduction in these threats.
                            threats to us interests
        In a world full of conflicts, the war in Syria has long stood out
    for the threats it posed to US interests. As detailed in the September
    2019 report of the congressionally mandated Syria Study Group \1\,
    numerous threats have long originated in the country. ISIS, Al-Qaida,
    and other terrorist groups--including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which has
    historical links to both--have long operated out of Syria. Though ISIS
    is diminished, it continues to mount attacks. Syria has also been a
    forward operating base for Iran, which used the country both to
    coordinate with regional terrorist proxies and for the transshipment of
    arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon and groups in the West Bank; and for
    Russia, whose 2015 intervention in Syria aimed to thwart US objectives
    there and reestablish Moscow as a regional player. The conflict saw the
    open use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime and raised questions
    about the disposition of any residual elements of Syria's nuclear
    program, which was largely destroyed by Israel in 2007.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The Syria Study Group report can be found here: https://
    www.usip.org/syria-study-group-final-report
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Nor were the Syrian conflict's effects confined within the
    country's own borders--Syrian refugees flooded and imposed a
    significant economic burden on the region and Europe. The conflict drew
    in Turkey, Israel, and of course the United States, among others, and
    placed US partners like the Syrian Democratic Forces into direct
    conflict with Turkish and Russian-backed forces, the latter of which
    also used Syria to project power into the Mediterranean and Africa.
    More recently, Syria has also become a major global narco-trafficking
    hub, producing eighty percent of the world's captagon supply and
    generating illicit revenues worth three times those earned by Mexican
    drug cartels, according to the British government. \2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ https://www.gov.uk/government/news/tackling-the-illicit-drug-
    trade-fuelling-assads-war-machine
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These threats have evolved but not disappeared with the collapse of
    the Assad regime. Several risks stand out in the current situation:

         The Rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. The Assad regime's
    overthrow came at the hands of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which had
    for several years ruled over the city and province of Idlib in northern
    Syria. HTS presents a complex case for US counter-terrorism policy, and
    in many respects a novel one, though its rise has parallels to the
    Taliban in Afghanistan. HTS' leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, at one point
    fought with Al-Qaida in Iraq (which later became ISIS) against US
    forces, subsequently spending 7 years in an American-run prison. From
    there, he traveled a circuitous path, breaking from ISIS and
    affiliating with Al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, with whom he also
    subsequently broke ties pursuant to his decision to focus on fighting
    the Assad regime rather than engaging in international terrorism.
        While HTS and Sharaa eschewed attacks abroad, their record
    governing Idlib gives cause for concern. Though the group acted against
    jihadists in its territory who sought to mount overseas attacks, HTS
    fighters also clashed as recently as 2022 with US forces pursuing ISIS
    leaders. In addition, Sharaa and HTS have praised the use of terrorism
    elsewhere, such as Hamas' attacks against Israel. In addition, Sharaa
    in the past characterized HTS as defending not just Syria, but
    defending Sunni Muslims globally, and the HTS government in Idlib
    persecuted non-Sunni minorities, executed dissenting Sunni scholars,
    repressed women, and even imprisoned and tortured Western journalists.
    Furthermore, the HTS government of Idlib was essentially authoritarian,
    with Sharaa as its unchallenged leader.
        In recent years however--even before taking control of Damascus in
    December 2024--Sharaa and HTS have sought to project moderation. The
    group reportedly provided assurances to US envoys in 2018 that it did
    not consider the United States an enemy, softened its policies toward
    the Christian and Druze residents of Idlib, denied plans to enforce a
    harsh Islamist agenda, and since assuming control of the Syrian
    government placed women in a handful of senior positions and welcomed
    envoys from the West and elsewhere. Yet there is reason to worry that
    HTS' shifts may simply represent new means for accomplishing
    longstanding ends. HTS ideologues have compared the group to the
    Taliban, with Washington Institute scholar Aaron Zelin noting, ``The
    Taliban's successful negotiation of the United States' exit from
    Afghanistan in August 2021 and the prior talks that occurred in Doha,
    Qatar, provide a potential example of new strategies that jihadist
    groups might employ to further their ultimate goals.'' \3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/
    PolicyFocus175Zelinv2.pdf

         A Possible Resurgence of ISIS. While ISIS no longer
    controls significant territories in Syria, the group is not defeated.
    Indeed, as of June 2024, ISIS was on track to double the number of
    attacks it conducted in 2023, according to Centcom. \4\ There is good
    reason to worry that ISIS may seize upon current events to mount a
    broader comeback. In the days following the fall of the Assad regime,
    ISIS reportedly seized significant numbers of weapons in formerly
    regime-held areas. Among other purposes, those weapons could be used in
    any effort to free the thousands of ISIS fighters imprisoned in
    northeastern Syria, of the tens of thousands of ISIS family members--
    spouses but especially children--from the Al-Hol and Roj camps. These
    prisons and camps are guarded by the US-partnered Syrian Democratic
    Forces, who have already come under new pressures since the regime's
    collapse.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-
    View/Article/3840981/defeat-isis-mission-in-iraq-and-syria-for-january-
    june-2024/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        There is also a risk that Syria could become a safe haven for other
    terrorist groups. In its campaign to oust Assad and focus on Syria
    first and foremost, HTS did not just break from but clashed with AQ,
    ISIS, and other externally focused groups in recent years. Now that it
    has accomplished its proximate goal of overthrowing Assad, however, its
    will and ability to persist in this approach will be tested. Western
    policymakers will doubtless be mindful of the fact that the Afghan
    Taliban also pledged not to permit territory they controlled to be used
    in overseas terror plots, but has not honored that promise. Nor is it
    clear that HTS, now that it is in control of Damascus, will adopt the
    same disapproving attitude toward Palestinian terrorist groups active
    there as they have done toward jihadist groups targeting the West,
    especially given Sharaa's past praise for Hamas attacks on Israel.

         Renewed Intra-Syrian Conflict. In abolishing Syria's
    constitution and declaring himself president, Ahmed al-Sharaa also
    called for the dissolution of the country's numerous armed groups.
    While this putatively included his own group, HTS, it also implied that
    groups such as the Turkish-supported Syrian National Army (SNA) and US-
    partnered Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) should cease to exist as
    independent entities and somehow be integrated into a national
    military. While talks are reportedly ongoing between the new government
    and the SDF, it is not clear whether an agreement will be reached;
    Syria's Kurdish minority not only faces possible attack by Turkish-
    backed forces and ISIS remnants, but has a history of persecution at
    the hands of Damascus which will likely diminish its willingness to
    disband its forces.
        Other flashpoints in post-Assad Syria include the Syria-Turkey
    border, where Turkey and its local partners have sought to expand the
    territory they control; the Golan Heights, where Israel has moved into
    territories previously controlled by forces allied with the Syrian
    regime; and the Iraq-Syria border, which remains closed by the Iraqi
    government and patrolled by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.
        Role of Iran, Russia, and China. The fall of the Assad regime was a
    blow to Russia, for whom Syria was a traditional locus of Soviet
    influence in the Middle East and then a last bastion of post-Soviet
    Russian influence. Syria was also touted by Moscow as an example of
    Russia's steadfastness as an ally, something US partners in the region
    were quick to echo when seeking commitments from Washington. Syria also
    served more pragmatic ends for Russia--it provided both an air base and
    a warm-water port, a showcase for Russian arms sales, and a proving
    ground for Russian commanders, many of whom subsequently fought in
    Ukraine. Despite Assad's fall, however, the new Syrian government and
    the Russian government have already held multiple high-level contacts,
    and Sharaa has expressed a certain pragmatism in approaching Moscow,
    noting the Syrian military equipment and energy facilities are Russian
    in origin. If Syria cannot obtain what it needs in the defense, energy,
    industrial, and other sectors from the West--or cannot do so at a
    competitive price--it may turn to Russia despite Moscow's past support
    for Assad.
        For Iran, Syria even more important than it was for Russia.
    Damascus was the closest thing that Tehran had to a state ally in the
    region, its other key partners all being nonstate actors. Syria
    provided strategic depth to Iranian efforts in Lebanon and the West
    Bank: a transshipment point, operations room, and source of revenue all
    in one. When the Syrian revolution erupted in 2011, Iran provided the
    Assad regime with the shock troops it needed to survive, in the form of
    Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon, militants and conscripts from Iraq,
    Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and even officers of the Islamic
    Revolutionary Guard Corps itself. The loss of the Assad regime is
    grievous for Iran's so-called ``forward defense'' model, interrupting
    the land and air bridge from Iran through Iraq and Syria into Lebanon
    and the West Bank. Without a compliant government in Damascus, Iran
    will be hard pressed to rebuild Hezbollah or liaise as it did before
    with Palestinian terrorist groups.
        It seems unlikely that any new Syrian government will want to
    replicate Assad's cozy relationship with Tehran. While Sharaa has
    called for normal relations with Tehran, this is in itself something of
    a rebuke, as it carries the implicit accusation that the prior
    arrangement disrespected Syrian sovereignty. More significantly, the
    Iranian embassy was ransacked during the storming of Damascus, and the
    new Syrian authorities have reportedly seized Iranian weapons bound for
    Hezbollah on more than one occasion. More likely than a close Syrian-
    Iranian security relationship under HTS rule would be Iran seeking to
    capitalize on security and governance vacuums in Syria by working with
    non-state actors in poorly governed regions or in the Lebanese and
    Iraqi border regions where Iranian proxies are influential, or even
    seeking to use them to weaken or destabilize a fledgling Syrian
    government.
        While China has not been nearly as involved in Syria as either
    Russia or Iran, it may perceive economic and strategic opportunities in
    Syria--as it has in Iraq and Afghanistan--if the country seems to be
    stabilizing to the point where Chinese officials and businessmen could
    operate safely. China frequently used its Security Council veto to
    protect the Assad regime and reportedly engaged in intelligence
    cooperation with Syrian counterparts, but is likely not nearly as
    associated with the former government as are Russia or China in the
    minds of Syrians. While Beijing may be discomfited by HTS' past
    associations with Uyghur foreign fighters, it will not consider HTS'
    ideology an insurmountable obstacle to good relations, especially if it
    can crowd out Western influence in cultivating them.
                          considerations for us policy
        The fall of the Syrian regime is a vindication of a sustained,
    bipartisan US policy opposing Assad's continued rule and supporting his
    opponents. US sanctions undoubtedly helped to weaken Assad, as did
    American pressure on his key supporters--Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia.
    At the same time, American support for and partnership with Syrian
    opposition groups not only isolated the regime, but helped to suppress
    ISIS and other terrorist groups. Nevertheless, US policy must now
    inevitably shift in response to events and in order to ensure the
    advancement of American interests.

         Engagement with HTS. It is not the case, unfortunately,
    that simply because the Assad regime was an enemy of the United States
    that the new Syrian government will be a friend. Even if HTS maintains
    its opposition to international terrorism having accomplished its
    proximate goal of overthrowing Assad, it remains an Islamist movement
    with a record of intolerance, repression, and authoritarianism. How--
    and if--it will work with other groups and factions in Syria and US
    partners in the region remains to be seen.
        In approaching HTS, the US should be patient, pragmatic, and
    interests-focused. This was the approach of the Trump administration in
    its first term toward HTS in Idlib, when then-Special Envoy Ambassador
    Jim Jeffrey held back-channel talks with Ahmed al-Sharaa. This
    pragmatism also characterized the initial approach the Biden
    administration took toward HTS and Sharaa, lifting the bounty on the
    latter but otherwise insisting that US policy would be based on HTS'
    actions, not its words.
        In our dealings with Sharaa and his government, the US should look
    for areas of common interest where HTS' intentions can be tested and
    trust can be built. These include sharing intelligence on border
    security, drug trafficking, terrorism, and the Iranian threat network,
    against which the new Syrian authorities have already reportedly been
    acting. When it comes to issues of Syrian governance, Washington should
    be patient and take our lead from Syrians themselves. While a Syria
    that is governed in an authoritarian or sectarian manner is unlikely to
    be stable, prosperous, or friendly to the West, the US should avoid
    seeking to impose our views regarding precisely what form of government
    Syria must have or how it should arrive at it. Likewise, it should be
    up to Syrians to decide how to balance backward-looking accountability
    for the many heinous crimes committed during a decade-plus of war
    against the need to move forward as a unified society.

         Sanctions. The highest-priority request of the new Syrian
    government has been for the US and the West to lift sanctions, and
    understandably so--Syria's economy and infrastructure have been
    devastated by war, causing the previously middle-income country to
    descend into wrack and ruin. The Biden administration provided modest
    initial sanctions relief, largely to support humanitarian relief and
    the provision of essential services in Syria. Yet extensive sanctions
    remain targeting both the Syrian government and HTS itself.
        Washington should adopt a phased and performance-based approach to
    relieving sanctions--as HTS and Syrian authorities demonstrate that the
    original grounds for the sanctions no longer apply, Congress and the
    Trump administration should consider waiving or lifting them. Sanctions
    that were intended primarily to isolate the Assad regime might be the
    first to be eased, whereas those prohibiting sensitive defense and
    related exports might remain in place for some time, for example.
        Just as importantly, however, the US approach to sanctions relief
    should be tied clearly to US interests rather than to any well-
    intentioned efforts at political engineering. While Washington would be
    wise to use sanctions to incentivize the Syrian government to break
    from extremism, shun Iran, and govern inclusively, placing too many
    conditions on sanctions relief, especially those not clearly connected
    to US national security interests, risks alienating the new Syrian
    government and pushing them toward US rivals. Conversely ``Not Assad''
    is an insufficient condition for sanctions relief, and moving too
    quickly would risk setting a precedent that extremist groups elsewhere
    might hope to emulate.

         Counter-terrorism. Sharaa has called the US presence in
    Syria ``illegal'' and has called for the US-partnered Syrian Democratic
    Forces (SDF) to dissolve, disarm, and integrate into the new Syrian
    military. At least superficially, Sharaa's apparent goal of a unified
    Syria under a single authority could well align with US interests; in
    the long run, the best way to prevent an ISIS resurgence or the
    establishment of terrorist safe havens is for Syria to be well and
    capably governed, to cultivate professional and effective security
    forces, and to eschew the use of terrorism as a policy tool. The US
    should support Syria's movement in this direction, for example by
    encouraging the SDF to reach appropriate understandings with any new
    government in Damascus whose legitimacy is internationally recognized.
    But in the meantime the US should continue to prioritize counter-
    terrorism operations in order to prevent a resurgence of ISIS or
    related groups.

         Geopolitical Concerns. While the Assad regime's collapse
    has been followed by popular expectations that Syria's diplomatic
    alignment would shift, the reality is likely to be more complex. While
    the new Syrian government may, as noted above, have pragmatic reasons
    for good relations with Moscow and Beijing, it is important to US
    interests that Syria durably leave the orbit of Iran and its proxies.
        While Sharaa and HTS have reached out to Arab neighbors--many of
    whom were in the process of normalizing with Assad before he fled to
    Russia--their strongest regional relationship is with Turkey, whose
    influence in Syria is resented by Arab Gulf states in particular and
    which may yet harbor designs on portions of Syrian territory occupied
    by Turkish forces or proxies. The Arab states themselves, which regard
    political Islamism as nearly great a threat as they do Iran, are likely
    to be wary in their own engagement with Damascus. This has been
    demonstrated by the divergent approaches that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have
    adopted toward Sharaa thus far, with the former offering aid and the
    latter holding back. For its part, Israel acted swiftly after Assad's
    fall to defend its interests, but Sharaa and other Syrian officials
    have suggested an openness toward better relations with Jerusalem.
        It is up to HTS to satisfy their neighbors that they pose no
    threat, but the US has an undeniable stake in the outcome. Assuming
    Damascus can assuage their concerns, Washington should encourage its
    Arab allies to partner closely with Syria in order to avoid a repeat of
    post-2003 Iraq, which was shunned by fellow Arab states and became easy
    pickings for Iran and other malign actors. For Washington, several
    priorities stand out:
        1) Ensuring that Syria never again becomes a conduit for Iranian
    power projection in the region, working as necessary with the Syrian
    government to this end;
        2) Limiting the security and defense relationship between Damascus,
    Moscow, and Beijing, while recognizing that, as elsewhere in the
    region, these relationships are likely to be cordial ones;
        3) Coordinating with Arab partners to present Damascus with common
    benchmarks for sanctions relief and economic and security partnership
    and Syria's eventual integration into regional security frameworks;
        4) Ensuring that Turkey respects Syrian sovereignty and does not
    seek to capitalize on this transitional period in ways that undermine
    the country's future stability or US interests;
        5) Brokering Israel-Syria non-aggression understandings that could
    lead to eventual peace and normalization, as well as working to improve
    Israel-Turkey relations to prevent the two US allies from increased
    friction; and
        6) Working closely with US partners in Europe--particularly
    France--and elsewhere to ensure a common Western approach to the Syrian
    transition.
                                   conclusion
        The fall of the Assad regime in Syria is a watershed moment for the
    Middle East and could be a boon for US interests and those of our
    regional partners. In recent years the US has been torn between
    excessive intervention and exasperated neglect in our approach to the
    Middle East. The current situation in Syria calls for neither, but
    instead requires policymakers to recognize that vital American
    interests are implicated there, and advancing them will require
    patience, pragmatism, and US leadership.

        Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
        Now we will turn to Ms. Stroul. She is the director of
    research and Shelly and Michael Kassen senior fellow at the
    Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
        As mentioned, she co-chaired the Syria Study Group with Mr.
    Singh in 2019 before leaving the institute from 2021 through
    2023 to serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the
    Middle East, the Pentagon's top civilian official with
    responsibility for the region.
        Prior to joining the institute in 2018 she served for 5
    years as a senior professional staff member of this
    distinguished committee where she covered the Middle East,
    North Africa, and Turkey.
        Undoubtedly, you have some thoughts on this, and we would
    love to hear you, and welcome back.

     STATEMENT OF DANA STROUL, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH AND SHELLY AND
    MICHAEL KASSEN SENIOR FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR
                      EAST POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC

        Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much, Senator.
        Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, members of the
    committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify.
        Five years ago, serving as a co-chair of the Syria Study
    Group alongside Mr. Singh, what we testified then was that
    Syria and a robust U.S. engagement in Syria is in the American
    national security interest, and we also said at the time that
    the drivers of conflict in Syria remained even though there was
    an assumption that the Assad regime had won, the drivers of
    conflict would leave Syria perpetually unstable, and I think
    those recommendations have borne out.
        The Assad regime had not won. We failed to understand how
    hollowed out his tenuous hold over Syria was. But the main
    point that I want to make here is that those drivers of
    conflict remain today, and if there is not a concise,
    coordinated effort to address those drivers of conflict, the
    risk is that Syria falls back into conflict, which is what
    happens in most post-conflict societies that have experienced
    this kind of deadly conflict for as long as the Syrian people
    have.
        The risks are too high and I think it is worth noting,
    again, both of you mentioned these in your opening statements,
    what the risks are because of how Syria under Assad served as a
    base from which terrorism and instability radiated across the
    region, affecting our national security as well as that of
    Europe and the Middle East.
        Under Assad, Syria had a nuclear weapons and a chemical
    weapons program. He emptied his prisons of violent Sunni
    extremists during the U.S. war in Iraq, which led to al-Qaeda
    in Iraq and an insurgency against U.S. forces.
        He used chemical weapons, which remain in the country
    today. Torture, barrel bombs, starvation, and other brutal
    measures against the Syrian people, sending millions of
    refugees fleeing for safety, which still affect the stability
    of our partners today.
        He granted Russia a naval base on the eastern
    Mediterranean, remained Iran's one strategic ally in the
    region, and allowed Hezbollah and various Iran backed groups to
    attack U.S. forces and Israel from within Syria.
        His regime produced and smuggled the narcotic Captagon on
    across the Middle East, and finally, his brutality and
    unwillingness to address the drivers of conflict in Syria made
    the seizure of Syrian territory by ISIS and al-Qaeda a reality.
        With Assad out and a new transitional government in, we
    have an opportunity to shape outcomes in Syria that protect
    American interests, specifically with respect to
    counterterrorism and counter Iran objectives.
        But events on the ground and international engagement with
    Ahmed al-Sharaa are outpacing U.S. policy. We must urgently
    update our approach to the post-Assad Syria.
        No surprise I am going to agree with a lot of what Mr.
    Singh said. I think a U.S. policy review must answer the
    following three questions.
        Engagement--what commitments does Washington seek from
    Damascus's new leaders?
        Sanctions--what actions are required in order to begin the
    process of providing expanded sanctions relief and lifting
    state level sanctions on Syria?
        And three is the U.S. military presence. What are the
    necessary conditions in order for the U.S. military to transfer
    its counterterrorism mission in northeast Syria without risking
    the reemergence of ISIS?
        We should engage the new government in Damascus and set out
    a series of benchmarks to assess whether Ahmed al-Sharaa,
    Syria's unelected president who grew out of al-Qaeda, is
    willing and able to govern in a manner that does not further
    destabilize Syria and the region or threaten American
    interests.
        Examples of benchmarks--appropriate counterterrorism action
    against ISIS, al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and Iran associated
    groups; limiting acts of violence outside the rule of law and
    enabling transitional justice and accountability; holding him
    accountable for the transition timeline he set out himself,
    including drafting a new constitution, ensuring equitable
    representation in governance and resource distribution, and
    recommitting to the 1974 disengagement agreement with Israel.
        Now, building on what Mr. Singh said about
    counterterrorism, there is no alternative to the U.S. military
    and its local partner, the SDF, for the defeat ISIS mission.
        The U.S. should reaffirm our commitment to maintaining U.S.
    forces in Syria lest all the gains against ISIS be squandered.
    We should also begin consultations and planning for the
    conditions under which we could transfer the military mission
    without breathing new life into ISIS.
        Though the Administration announced important exemptions to
    the assistance freeze for lifesaving humanitarian aid,
    nonhumanitarian aid is just as important.
        This committee has played a critical role for more than a
    decade in oversight of assistance to groups like the White
    Helmets, NGOs working at ISIS detention camps, stabilization
    programs in communities liberated from ISIS, and the
    documentation of war crimes.
        Cutting off programs that help communities recover after
    surviving the brutalities of either Assad's rule or ISIS
    without plans to transition funding or services to non-U.S.
    actors will exacerbate the drivers of conflict that will keep
    Syria unsafe.
        Moreover, the dismantling of USAID and anticipated
    reduction in State Department career personnel, the U.S.
    Government risks losing critical technical expertise in
    implementing U.S. programs and the delicate work of engaging
    post-conflict countries.
        The United States is safer if Syria is stable and can
    address threats rising from within its territory without
    outside intervention.
        In turn, a more resilient Syria promotes greater security
    across the Middle East, leading to more stable countries and
    prospects for widened economic and security cooperation with
    the United States.
        Finally, a Syria that is not destabilizing, attacking, or
    antagonizing its neighbors--Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and
    Turkey--is also in the U.S. national security interest.
        Thank you so much for the opportunity to testify today.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Stroul follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Ms. Dana Stroul

        Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, members of the committee,
    thank you for the opportunity to testify on the future of U.S. policy
    toward Syria. Five years ago, while serving as a co-chair of the Syria
    Study Group, I testified before this committee on the enduring
    importance of Syria for U.S. national security. Today, not only do
    developments in Syria remain critical for protecting Americans at home,
    but they also present real opportunities for the Syrian people, for the
    Middle East, and for the United States.
        In order to grasp the stakes for Middle East stability, and the
    safety of Americans, it is important to recall how Syria--under the
    rule of Bashar al-Assad--was long a base from which terrorism and
    instability radiated across the region and U.S. adversaries thrived.
        Under Assad's rule:

         Syria developed a covert nuclear weapons program, which
    was eliminated by Israel in 2007.

         Syria developed a chemical weapons program, which to date
    has not been entirely dismantled.

         Syria emptied its prisons of violent Sunni extremists
    during the second Gulf war, which began in 2003, and facilitated their
    movement to Iraq, leading to the establishment of al-Qaeda in Iraq and
    an insurgency against U.S. forces that killed and wounded thousands.

         The Assad regime used chemical weapons, torture, barrel
    bombs, starvation, and other brutal measures to suppress peaceful
    protests by Syrian citizens, sending millions of refugees fleeing for
    safety across the Middle East and into Europe.

         The Assad regime welcomed Russian and Iranian support,
    allowing both to gain access to the Mediterranean and use land routes
    to arm Lebanese Hezbollah and disperse increasingly sophisticated
    weapons across the region.

         Assad, as Iran's one strategic ally in the Middle East,
    allowed the use of Syrian territory by Hezbollah and various Iran-
    backed militia groups to attack U.S. forces and Israel.

         The drivers of conflict related to the Assad regime's
    brutal rule facilitated the seizure of Syrian territory by the Islamic
    State (ISIS) and al-Qaeda affiliates. For years, ISIS has flourished
    most in Assad-regime-held areas.

         Assad-regime forces produced and smuggled the narcotic
    Captagon across the Middle East, utilizing criminal and terrorist
    networks.

        With Bashar al-Assad out and a new transitional government in
    Damascus, the United States has an opportunity to work with its allies
    and partners to shape outcomes in Syria that promote regional security
    and protect American interests, specifically with respect to
    counterterrorism and counter-Iran objectives. U.S. engagement toward
    the new Syrian leadership is fraught: its leaders grew out of al-Qaeda
    and many are designated as terrorists, while others espouse extremist
    views. But events on the ground and international engagement with the
    new leadership in Syria are outpacing U.S. policy. America must
    urgently update its approach to post-Assad Syria, and test the new
    Syrian leadership to determine the opportunities and risks associated
    with engagement. The United States retains significant levers of
    influence: military pressure against ISIS through its continued
    presence in northeast Syria; the U.S.-led sanctions architecture, the
    unlocking of which could facilitate meaningful economic recovery and
    reconstruction; U.S. diplomatic leadership and its unmatched ability to
    convene like-minded partners; and U.S. foreign and technical
    assistance.
        A U.S. policy review must address the following issues:

         Engagement. What actions and commitments does Washington
    seek from Damascus's new leaders in order to acknowledge the new
    government as the internationally recognized representative of Syria?

         Sanctions. What actions and commitments are required in
    order to begin the process of providing expanded sanctions relief and
    lifting state-level sanctions on Syria?

         U.S. military presence. What are the necessary conditions
    in order for the U.S. military to transfer its counterterrorism mission
    in northeast Syria without risking the reemergence of ISIS?

        Engagement. The self-appointed transitional president of Syria,
    Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known by his nom de guerre--Muhammad al-Jolani--
    is moving quickly to signal his commitment to governing in an inclusive
    manner, disarming and integrating all armed groups, stabilizing Syria's
    economy, and reintegrating Syria into the international community. Al-
    Sharaa emphasizes his commitment to not imposing strict Islamic law on
    Syria's religiously and ethnically diverse society, and to preventing
    both terrorist activity at home and Syria serving as a base for
    terrorist operations abroad. The challenge for the United States is
    determining if his nascent government is appropriately separated from
    its al-Qaeda/ISIS roots and both willing and able to counter terrorism,
    resist malign Iranian influence, and govern Syria in a manner that does
    not lead to further cycles of violence.
        While the United States has not yet determined if the new Damascus
    leaders' early moves meet benchmarks for support, an emerging coalition
    of U.S. allies and partners across the Middle East, Europe, and Turkey
    is moving quickly to engage him. These governments, however, are not
    coordinating messaging or expectations with each other or with America;
    the risk is that Damascus hears mixed messages and does not feel
    compelled to commit to any program of action that can prevent future
    instability and violence. It is noteworthy that while the United States
    has engaged Sharaa only at the assistant secretary level in December
    2024, the Qatari emir recently visited him in Damascus, and Sharaa'
    first trip abroad was to meet with the crown prince of Saudi Arabia
    followed by the president of Turkey. Al-Sharaa now has invitations to
    Paris and Berlin, and may attend the Egypt-hosted emergency summit on
    the Palestinians in late February.
        The United States should engage the new government in Damascus at
    the political level, and set out a series of benchmarks to assess
    whether Sharaa and his government are willing and able to govern Syria
    in a manner that does not further destabilize Syria or the region, or
    threaten American interests. Benchmarks include:

         Holding the government accountable for its own transition
    timeline of three to 5 years, including the national dialogue and
    drafting of a new constitution.

         Taking appropriate counterterrorism actions against ISIS/
    al-Qaeda/affiliates and Iran-associated non-state groups. (Here, the
    new government's actions to counter Hezbollah-associated networks'
    operations on the Lebanon-Syria border is an encouraging early
    indicator.)

         Consolidating security control over formerly regime-held
    areas of Syria and demobilizing armed groups.

         Working to limit acts of retributive violence outside the
    rule of law, and enable transitional justice and accountability for all
    Syrians who suffered under the Assad regime.

         Ensuring equitable representation at the national and
    local levels in Syria's governance, and fair distribution of resources.

         Upholding commitments that ensure the security of U.S.
    allies, including recommitment to the 1974 disengagement agreement with
    Israel.

        Sanctions. Before Assad's ouster, U.S.-led sanctions only permitted
    humanitarian aid delivery to regime-held areas, otherwise blocking all
    economic engagement or reconstruction. In early January of this year,
    the United States issued General License 24 for a 6-month period to
    allow certain transactions with the Syrian government and personal
    remittances through the Syrian Central Bank. It also provided a waiver
    to the Foreign Assistance Act in order for America's partners to
    provide aid to Syria without the risk of violating U.S. sanctions. But
    the U.S. designation of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism, and
    other state-level sanctions like the congressional Caesar sanctions,
    will reduce appetites for the kind of economic engagement necessary to
    effect real change in Syria. The United States should urgently initiate
    a thorough and deliberative process regarding the state-level terrorism
    designations on Syria and sanctions tied to the behavior of the Assad
    regime.
        In the short term, the United States can do more to ease Syria's
    economic recovery by getting out of the way: partners in Europe and the
    Middle East can fill in gaps and provide assistance even if America
    will not, as long as they are assured of not violating U.S. sanctions.
    U.N. technical experts, as well as international financial
    institutions, can also play a role in stabilizing Syria's economy and
    setting it on a path to recovery. This will require targeted sanctions
    relief and waivers, and a clearly communicated strategy. A process
    should be initiated soon to expand the waivers granted in General
    License 24.
        In the medium-to-long term, more expansive sanctions relief should
    be tied to the performance of the new government and its commitment to
    following through on its promising reform and stabilization agenda.
        U.S. military presence. About two thousand U.S. military personnel
    remain in northeast Syria under the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
    These forces are sustaining pressure on ISIS through unilateral and
    partnered military strikes, and supporting the Kurdish-majority Syrian
    Democratic Forces (SDF), who maintain custody of nearly nine thousand
    ISIS detainees and forty thousand ISIS-affiliated families in displaced
    persons camps. The U.S. partnership with the SDF is the main irritant
    with NATO ally Turkey, which considers the SDF part of the Turkey-based
    Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)--an entity designated as a terrorist
    group by the United States, Turkey, and others. Ankara in turn opposes
    SDF ambitions to establish a semiautonomous region within Syria, on
    Turkey's border. The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is
    currently engaged in a military offensive against the SDF in northeast
    Syria.
        The new leadership in Damascus has stated its commitment to
    preventing Syria from being exploited for transnational terrorism, a
    willingness to take over security at the ISIS detention facilities and
    displaced persons camps, and an openness to absorbing the SDF into the
    new national Syrian security forces. But this is a significant
    undertaking that will require training, equipment, intelligence
    support, and time. In the near term, there is no viable, combat-
    credible alternative to the United States and the SDF to take over the
    defeat-ISIS mission. Therefore, the U.S. should urgently initiate a
    political and military dialogue with key stakeholders on the timeline
    and conditions under which it could transfer the military mission, and
    underscore its commitment to maintaining U.S. forces in Syria for the
    short-to-medium term lest all the battlefield gains against ISIS be
    squandered.

         With the SDF, the United States needs to back its local
    partner while facilitating dialogue with the new government in
    Damascus. The SDF leadership has already acknowledged its commitment to
    a future within a unified Syria; the U.S. should support the SDF's
    leaders in seeking reasonable assurances to integrate into the new
    Syrian national forces and secure commitments for Syrian Kurdish
    representation in the central government along with a local-level role.
    The SDF should immediately take steps to separate its forces from non-
    Syrian fighters like those from the PKK.

         With the Damascus government, the United States is already
    testing its commitment to countering terrorism by providing operational
    intelligence against ISIS threats. If the new government demonstrates
    will and capability for targeting ISIS and al-Qaeda threats within
    Syria, the United States should begin a multiyear process to transfer
    the on-the-ground mission and determine how it can still support
    counterterrorism activities without such a presence. This supporting
    role could include intelligence sharing, training, and the provision of
    limited kinds of equipment.

         With Turkey, the United States should initiate a political
    and military dialogue that takes stock of the Islamic State's ability
    to reconstitute in Syria, and formulates the conditions and timeline
    under which America could safely redeploy out of Syria. As part of this
    dialogue, the U.S. should seek commitments from Turkey to stop
    targeting the SDF and direct the SNA to cease attacking the SDF and
    terrorizing communities in the northeast: these actions are threatening
    hard-fought gains against ISIS.

         With Damascus and with Ankara, the U.S. must have credible
    assurances that ISIS detainees, as well as families in displaced
    persons camps, will be treated securely and humanely in accordance with
    international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict. The U.S.
    should also reenergize efforts to repatriate Iraqi and third-country
    nationals from these facilities, so that the population is more
    manageable.

        U.S. foreign assistance freeze. Though the Trump administration
    announced exemptions to the assistance freeze for lifesaving
    humanitarian aid, the impact of this policy is harming U.S. interests
    in Syria and further destabilizing a fragile situation. Consider that
    before Assad's ouster 16.7 million Syrians required humanitarian
    assistance, the highest level inside the country since the civil war
    started in 2011. Before the freeze, the United States was the largest
    bilateral donor for Syria's humanitarian needs, providing $1.2 billion
    in 2024 and more than $18 billion since 2011.
        Non-humanitarian U.S. aid goes to Syrian civil society groups like
    the White Helmets, whose members conduct search-and-rescue missions and
    clear unexploded ordnance. At displaced persons camps in northeast
    Syria, American assistance supports water and sanitation services, and
    administrative management and security. The United States provides
    stabilization funds, separate from humanitarian aid, to communities
    liberated from ISIS in northeast Syria. This kind of support is
    critical to mitigate conditions that make communities vulnerable to
    violent extremist propaganda and actions. Another area of U.S. support
    currently frozen is funding for documentation of war crimes and crimes
    against humanity. For years, the United States has provided funding and
    training to preserve evidence of the Assad regime's crimes, which sent
    an important signal to Syrians suffering from Assad-regime brutality.
        This committee can encourage the State Department to prioritize
    Syria in the ninety-day review of all U.S. programs, and quickly make
    determinations as to which programs make America stronger, safer, and
    more prosperous based on the criteria articulated by Secretary of State
    Rubio. Put simply, cutting off programs that help communities recover
    after surviving the brutalities of either Assad's rule or the Islamic
    State--without plans to transition funding or continuity in services to
    non-U.S. actors--risks exacerbating drivers of conflict that could
    undermine stability in Syria and in the Middle East. The United States
    is safer if Syria is stable and can address threats rising from within
    its territory; a more resilient Syria promotes greater security across
    the Middle East, leading to more stable countries and prospects for
    widened economic and security cooperation with the United States. A
    Syria that is not destabilizing, attacking, or antagonizing its
    neighbors--Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey--is also in the
    U.S. national security interest.
        Beyond funding, the U.S. Government possesses deep technical
    expertise and knowledge in post-conflict stabilization and
    reconstruction. The first Trump administration produced a Stabilization
    Assistance Review (SAR) in 2018 calling for the selective use of
    taxpayer dollars and the expectation of burden sharing by partners. It
    also correctly identified stabilization as an inherently political
    endeavor, the goal of which is to ``create conditions where legitimate
    authorities and systems can manage conflict and prevent violence.'' The
    SAR identified the State Department as the lead agency for
    stabilization efforts--it has an entire bureau focused on conflict and
    stabilization policy--and the U.S. Agency for International Development
    (USAID) as the lead implementing agency. With the dismantling of USAID
    and the removal of most of its civil servants, the U.S. Government
    risks losing critical technical expertise in implementing U.S. programs
    and overseeing the distribution of U.S. funds to local groups.
        Blocking adversaries/working with partners. From 2015 until
    recently, a widely held assumption was that Russian and Iranian backing
    for the Assad regime was more decisive than any support offered to the
    opposition by the United States, Europe, or Arab governments. The U.S.
    has an opportunity to further undermine Russian and Iranian positions
    in the Middle East, building upon their failure to back Assad, which
    dealt a strategic blow, and the widespread resentment across Syria of
    their support for his brutal campaign against his own people.
        While the assumption of an unbreakable Damascus-Tehran-Moscow axis
    has been disproven, the networks that sustained this alliance remain
    intact, from commercial relationships, smuggling routes, and
    agricultural ties to remaining Soviet influence in Syria's armed forces
    and Iran's work to project soft power influence. Tehran and Moscow will
    look to these networks of influence as they seek to protect their own
    interests in post-Assad Syria, from retaining Russia's naval base on
    the Mediterranean to securing commercial contracts to Iran's land route
    for rearming Hezbollah. Russia and Iran are well positioned to play
    spoiler to Syria's recovery and reintegration into the international
    fold. Therefore, it will be critical for the United States to
    coordinate an approach to post-Assad Syria that can keep Europe, Arab
    governments, and Turkey aligned sufficiently to deny adversaries
    opportunities to play this spoiler role.
        Aligning with like-minded partners on Syria is imperative. Turkey,
    a NATO ally, maintains the closest ties to the new Damascus leadership
    and is positioned to shape the policies of Syria's leaders, but
    Washington should seek clarification from Ankara on its objectives in
    Syria considering its well-known support for Islamist and Muslim
    Brotherhood groups and movements across the Middle East. Even as Turkey
    maintains significant influence, it lacks the resources given its own
    fragile economy to fund Syria's recovery. Here, U.S. strategic partners
    in the Gulf are critical because of their strong economies and
    assistance pledges. Gulf leaders are already engaging the Sharaa
    government though without agreement on or articulation of a strategy or
    vision for Syria and its future role in the Middle East. The United
    States should be working to convene, organize, and align its partners
    in the region and outside--particularly in Europe--on metrics and
    indicators that Syria's post-Assad recovery is on a stable path, while
    also consistently raising problematic actions that can undermine
    progress.
        Conclusion. Five years ago, members of the bipartisan Syria Study
    Group argued that the threats posed by the conflict in Syria were
    sufficiently serious to merit a determined response from the United
    States. The report presciently argued that the Assad regime had not won
    the war, and the drivers of conflict in Syria remained. The final
    report argued that American engagement in Syria can lead to better
    outcomes for America, for Syria, for the Middle East, and for like-
    minded allies and partners. The challenge then remains relevant and
    urgent today: development of a realistic strategy and application of an
    appropriate mix of U.S. tools, along with prioritization of Syria by
    high-level U.S. officials with their counterparts. Today's hearing is a
    critical step forward toward addressing these urgent goals.

        Senator Risch. Well, thank you to both of you.
        It is obvious we have the right people here to talk about
    this, and I think it is also obvious this is not a partisan
    issue, and I think we ought to all work together to get to a
    place on foreign policy as it relates to Syria and move forward
    with it and move forward with it quickly.
        As you have indicated, the door is ajar, but it is going to
    close on us if we do not take advantage of where we are.
        I have got a couple of questions I would like to get to. I
    do want to say one thing.
        Mr. Singh, you had referenced the fact that the interim
    government and its leader had not done very well in Idlib, and
    I have heard the same thing.
        But interestingly enough, I met and I think maybe the
    ranking member also met with maybe even the same group, but
    probably 25 or 30 people from Syria who all were interested in
    doing the right thing and building Syria back up again.
        And at the table there were Sunnis. There were Shi'a. There
    were Christians. There were Druze. There were Alawites. It was
    across the board.
        They were not at all interested in talking about their
    religious persuasion, and I asked them that question, and they
    pointed out, hey, in Syria we have been living together for
    centuries. You guys are new to this, OK. We have been living
    together for centuries, and we can go back to living again
    together if things are done right.
        So, again, the experience you referred to in Idlib is
    troubling. Nonetheless, I think the new leadership understands
    that we are looking for something different than that.
        If you do not have religious tolerance in this region, the
    country has got a big problem, and we all know that from the
    other things that happened.
        Well, let me tell you one of the things I am concerned
    about, and that is--you know, when you look at the map of
    Syria, I mean, it looks like a flat Rubik's cube because of the
    way that the country is divided up, and what we are talking
    about is mainly the governance of the western part of the
    country.
        And certainly that is important, and without that you are
    not going to have anything else. But I would like to hear your
    thoughts on how we thread the needle because we do have these
    other parts of the country that we are going to have to deal
    with.
        I guess my idea is we need to focus on this western part
    and continue to look at the others. But the first objective is
    if you do not get a handle on this you are not going to get a
    handle on the rest of the country.
        Mr. Singh, your thoughts?
        Mr. Singh. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I think that is right. Look, obviously, in Syria, as you
    mentioned, the bulk of the population is in the west, and so
    that has been the focus of many things and is the focus right
    now of the new government.
        They came down from Idlib to the south and have, largely,
    taken over that sort of western strip of the country. And in
    the northeast, of course, you have Kurdish forces, you have
    some other forces, but you also have some pretty vast areas
    which are lightly inhabited, and ISIS actually has been able to
    use those areas to sort of regroup and conduct its activities.
        I would say that the question in my mind is, you know, HTS,
    which has maybe tens of thousands of fighters, has swept down
    from Idlib, maybe had more success than even they anticipated.
        It does not seem to me that they could actually right now
    assert their authority over the entire country. So they will
    need to reach understandings with groups in the other parts of
    Syria, and of course, the one that is of greatest interest to
    us are the Kurds and others in northeastern Syria with whom we
    work.
        I think that we can focus on what is happening in western
    Syria, deal with the government there, while also trying to
    encourage and maybe facilitate this process of coming together
    among these groups.
        You know, the new self-appointed president of Syria, Ahmed
    al-Sharaa, has asked these other groups to dissolve. The
    reality is, though, if they did not exist, I am not sure that
    HTS could come in and fill in for them.
        And so you have to have this kind of internal negotiation
    process. Ultimately, we want, in the long run, one authority in
    Syria, one authority in Damascus, that can exercise its control
    over the entire state.
        That is an ideal outcome from us, but it is going to happen
    in stages, and it is going to happen through these
    negotiations.
        Senator Risch. Well said.
        Ms. Stroul, your thoughts?
        Ms. Stroul. He has set out--Mr. al-Sharaa, the self-
    appointed president of Syria--a series of benchmarks for
    himself in terms of reasserting control over Syria, and he is
    making some progress in these early days of this transitional
    government.
        He is working to disarm and integrate the non-HTS aligned
    armed groups. He is working on border security. In the past
    couple days many of us have been closely following the clashes
    on the Lebanon-Syria border.
        This is actually forces aligned with President al-Sharaa
    working on stopping residual Hezbollah trafficking networks
    from using that border area to rearm Hezbollah.
        So actually he is doing things that are in our interest,
    which is cutting down that weapons proliferation. I think we
    should watch very carefully what he is doing to reassert
    security control over the parts of Syria and set out our
    expectations for not seeing revenge violence, and that there
    should be local participation in governance as he reasserts
    control.
        And then the longer pole in the tent I agree with Mr. Singh
    is the SDF, and we obviously, because of our military presence
    and our commitments to them, because they have bled and died
    for what we share is an objective of making sure ISIS is
    enduringly defeated, we need to work to facilitate dialogue
    between the SDF and the Sharaa government in Damascus about how
    they eventually reintegrate into the fabric of the Syrian
    government.
        Senator Risch. Well said.
        You mentioned it, and the next round of questions I am
    going to ask a little bit about Lebanon because, again, it is a
    similar situation than what we have.
        There is opportunity there, we need to engage, and the
    relationship between these two countries is incredibly
    important. So we will talk about that next.
        But in the meantime, Senator Coons.
        Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your testimony today and for your
    service.
        As the Chairman and Ranking Member have both laid out, and
    as you have painted more detail, for more than a decade Syria
    has been a hotbed of extremism, a source of massive regional
    destabilization through migration, a base from which both Iran
    and Russia projected malign power, and today we have a narrow
    window of opportunity.
        It is critical that we get it right. No one should mourn
    the fall of the Assad regime of decades, but there is a lot of
    reconstruction and reconciliation to do. There are, roughly, 2
    million children out of the school system.
        Ninety percent of Syrians living in poverty. The medical
    system is in tatters. There are no real jobs or electricity or
    support.
        The agricultural fields are littered with unexploded
    ordnance and land mines, and entire towns lay almost completely
    in rubble.
        In these circumstances a small amount of support can go a
    long way to rebuilding homes, trust, and engagement, to work on
    demining, to provide food and water, and this outcome really is
    zero sum.
        If the al-Sharaa government continues to move in a
    direction that meets the strategic objectives the chairman laid
    out we should be willing to engage with them, both indirectly
    through U.N. and international NGOs and maybe ultimately
    directly by the United States, because if they do not get
    assistance from us and our Western partners, they will get it
    from Iran, from Russia, and from China, and ISIS will reemerge
    as a very real threat.
        But at the moment, because of the freeze in all U.S.
    foreign assistance, we are withholding exactly what the Syrian
    people need to see the American people engaging with them--
    food, medicine, education.
        We have even pulled away in the first days of what I view
    as a disastrous foreign aid freeze, security from guarding ISIS
    prisoners at the Al-Hol prison, although that funding
    mercifully has been turned back on.
        So, Ms. Stroul, you know the stakes here better than
    anyone, certainly better than I do. What assistance should we
    be considering to provide in the interest of stability and
    security with this new Syrian state, and what are the risks if
    we do not provide some leadership in this area?
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
        First of all, I think this committee has played and should
    continue to play an incredibly important oversight role into
    all of the assistance, both the humanitarian and the
    nonhumanitarian assistance going into Syria.
        As a former staffer I can tell you we put USAID and the
    State Department through its paces, and I know you all are
    continuing to do that.
        My recommendation is that we encourage Secretary Rubio and
    the State Department to accelerate that 90 day review. All U.S.
    assistance should be subject to oversight and whether or not it
    is in line with U.S. priorities.
        But the nonhumanitarian aid going to Syria is as important
    for arresting those drivers of instability that could sink
    Syria back into conflict and again make it a proliferator of
    terrorism instability across the region.
        So in a post-conflict environment the most important thing
    is local security and law enforcement, then clearing out the
    unexploded ordnance, then getting communities back, lights on,
    services, kids in school.
        All of this requires nonhumanitarian aid, and it also
    requires coordination with others. What we know----
        Senator Coons. To be clear, if I could, Ms. Stroul, while
    there are waivers for humanitarian assistance, there is no
    funding flowing. In the last 48 hours I have spoken with the
    leaders of each of the major NGOs that implements humanitarian
    work around the world.
        Almost none of them--and 98 percent of the programs that we
    discussed under things like PEPFAR working to fight malaria or
    TB, to contain Ebola, demonstrably humanitarian, the money is
    not flowing yet because the aid freeze has not yet translated,
    largely, because the key people who need to turn the financial
    system back on and approve the reversal of the stop work orders
    are not there.
        So not just longer term development aid after some aid
    review, but the humanitarian relief is not flowing.
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for that clarification. I
    could not agree with you more. The loss of the career civil
    servants inside USAID, the threats of a reduction in the State
    Department staff--what we know about post-conflict societies is
    that reconstruction and stabilization are inherently political
    tasks.
        It is not something the U.S. military could do, which is
    why we need to get this funding turned back on.
        Senator Coons. Could I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman?
        I am alarmed by speculation that the Administration is
    considering a hasty withdrawal of our troops from Syria. I am
    concerned about the stability and the future of the SDF and of
    northeastern Syria.
        If both of you could briefly answer what are the risks of a
    hasty departure of the U.S. presence in northeastern Syria,
    particularly vis-a-vis our hard fought gains against ISIS, and
    who would fill that vacuum?
        Ms. Stroul. Mr. Singh.
        Ms. Stroul. The about 2,000 U.S. military forces are both
    supporting the SDF and keeping pressure on ISIS. They are still
    doing their own unilateral strikes, our U.S. military against
    ISIS. They are also supporting the SDF who maintain custody of
    nearly 9,000 ISIS fighters in detention facilities.
        ISIS is looking at them to replenish its ranks, and it is
    looking at the young children and families in the Al-Hol
    detention camp as ISIS 2.0.
        If we are not there to provide intelligence and support to
    the SDF and the SDF are being attacked both by the Syrian
    National Army--the SNA--and our NATO ally Turkey, they will
    prioritize focusing on their own communities, and they will
    take pressure off ISIS.
        ISIS will then have an opportunity to retake territory and
    not only terrorize people in Syria, but direct transnational
    terrorism abroad including against the United States.
        Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Coons.
        And Ms. Stroul, I do not think you could have said it more
    clearly. I think most everyone who deals with this has a clear
    understanding of that. I do not share the immediate concerns
    you do about them pulling out of there. I think that there is
    an understanding of what would happen.
        Look, we have minimal troops there at 2,000--1,900,
    whatever it is--and their keeping 9,000 ISIS people in the
    prison is critical.
        So with that----
        Senator Coons. Glad to hear that, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Risch. Thank you.
        Senator Ricketts, you are up.
        Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        As we see what is unfolding in Syria we know that the
    ramifications are from Putin's war in Russia. His
    miscalculation there is rippling through the system.
        We see it in Nagorno-Karabakh. We see it here in Syria, how
    he was not able to support the Assad regime. But we know in
    years past that Russia was critical to keeping Assad afloat and
    basically responsible for killing Syrians.
        And so with HTS victory, Russia has been set back on its
    heels, and we discussed or you mentioned, Mr. Singh, the
    Russian naval base Tartus. You have got the Latakia air base
    just outside of there.
        So Russia has got some key assets. I think they moved some
    equipment out of the Latakia area, but obviously, that was how
    they were doing their power projection, and they have had to
    really flee with their tails between their legs here.
        And the question is what will happen going forward here
    with regard to how will Russia engage. I mean, al-Sharaa has
    got to stabilize his country. He is seeking legitimacy both
    internationally and with his own people.
        How is this all going to play together with regard to the
    role of Russia? Will Russia be completely kicked out?
    Obviously, things like oil, grain, even military weapons is
    something that Syria is going to need.
        They have been getting that historically from Russia. But
    recently we have been reading reports that the Europeans have
    been in conversations with al-Sharaa about, again, lifting some
    of the sanctions, and one of the conditions being kicking the
    Russians, basically, out of their naval base and the air base.
        So what do you see as the role for us in this? Should we be
    making that a condition of lifting our sanctions as we look at
    this, that the Russians have to withdraw and what is the
    practicality of that?
        Can you just kind of give us an assessment of what you
    think we should be thinking about with regard to our sanctions
    and Russia's presence and the military presence in these naval
    bases?
        Mr. Singh. Sure. Thanks a lot, Senator.
        And look, you are right. I mean, Russia has had, even going
    back to Soviet times, a long standing relationship with Syria
    and with the Assad regime ever since Hafez al-Assad took over
    in 1970.
        Assad was Moscow's guy. He was also Tehran's guy. But you
    see where he ended up. He ended up in Moscow. That is how close
    that relationship was.
        At the same time, my sense of the Russians has always been
    that they kind of view Syria as their last bastion, as it were,
    of their influence in this region, and they are going to be
    loath to give that up. And we already see, as several of you
    have mentioned, a pretty sort of high tempo of engagement
    between Russia and this new transitional Syrian government.
        I worry, frankly, that it is a higher tempo than ours or
    the Europeans' or even the region's. The Russians are really
    going to Damascus, and the Syrians are coming to them. And part
    of that, I think, is due to the fact that you have this
    integration of sort of Russian stuff, as it were, into Syria.
    You have defense equipment, you have energy facilities, and so
    forth.
        And so, you know, if you have got this military equipment
    you have captured from the Assad regime, and it is Russian,
    well, you are going to have to turn to the Russians, perhaps,
    to service it, to update it, and so forth.
        We have to somehow kind of put a wedge into that, and so I
    think part of that is going to be carrot, and part of that is
    going to be stick. The carrot part is, obviously, we are going
    to through this kind of patient, pragmatic engagement and
    setting of benchmarks, which Ms. Stroul also talked about, hold
    out the prospect of Western cooperation.
        I do think it should be conditional, and I do think one of
    those conditions has to be, look----
        Senator Ricketts. If I could just interrupt you for a
    second.
        Mr. Singh. Yes.
        Senator Ricketts. When you say Western help you are also
    saying Western military aid----
        Mr. Singh. So we have----
        Senator Ricketts [continuing]. Like weapons and equipment?
    That sort of thing?
        Mr. Singh. We have sanctions preventing that now, and I
    think it is very--those will probably be some of the last we
    would want to consider lifting.
        But I think you have to hold out the prospect that there
    could be, under the right conditions, a much more robust
    relationship across the board, a security relationship
    including--security broadly defined.
        But if that is ever going to happen, they cannot also be
    hosting Russian forces. But I think that there is a stick side
    of it as well, which is where the sanctions come in, and you
    know, my own view is we need a phased and gradual withdrawal of
    those sanctions, and we need to see performance on this issue
    in addition to others.
        I would just say do not leave out of this conversation the
    Chinese because, you know, they supported Assad in other ways
    through the use of their veto, for example. They tend to be
    cautious about going into places that are in conflict.
        But if they perceive the situation as having changed, they
    will also see both the economic and strategic opportunity here.
    And I think that has to be on the list of conditions.
        Senator Ricketts. So I am running out of time here. But
    just briefly, what is the risk for al-Sharaa if he cuts a deal
    with the Russians?
        I mean, Russia was complicit with what Assad did--you know,
    the killing of their own people. Does he have a risk internally
    with his own people if he cuts a deal even if, say, he gets
    Assad extracted back to Syria? Does he have a risk there?
        Mr. Singh. I think there certainly is a risk. How he
    perceives that risk, how big a risk he perceives it compared
    to, say, the risk of dealing with Iran is hard to say.
        But certainly there are a lot of sore feelings about the
    way Russia conducted itself, bombing hospitals and schools and
    things like that in Syria.
        Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you, Mr. Singh.
        Senator Risch. FYI for the committee, we heard the same
    thing from the Syrians, that the populace is not happy with
    either Iran or Russia, who conducted themselves very poorly in
    colluding with the Assad regime.
        So that is a good thing for us, for the people that are
    getting that understanding.
        So with that, Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am going to start off with just a little bit of an
    opening statement.
        In the immediate aftermath of the Assad regime's fall,
    Syria faces a pivotal and fragile moment in its history that
    will not only determine the fate of its people for decades to
    come but will also hold immense consequence for the trajectory
    of its role on the global stage.
        This is a moment of cautious hope for Syrians and
    democracies around the world alike, a moment of opportunity for
    a democratic transition of power and of hope for the millions
    of displaced Syrians who wish to finally return home to safety.
        But instead of recognizing this opportunity for the U.S. to
    flex its muscle and showcase its strength, the U.S. is notably
    absent amid a dire need for a stabilizing force.
        Our adversaries, as we have already discussed today, Russia
    and Iran are closely watching, and they are eager to step in to
    fill the vacuum left behind by the United States.
        This is a dangerous consequence of President Trump's attack
    on U.S. foreign assistance and a clear reflection of his
    blatant disregard for the importance of U.S. global leadership
    and participation as a national security imperative.
        His attack on USAID will jeopardize the safety and well
    being of innocent people in Syria who rely on USAID for
    critical humanitarian assistance and leaves an already
    vulnerable state at a greater risk of malign influence.
        So no, we are not talking dollars wasted. There are direct
    investments in U.S. national security and a projection of U.S.
    strength through USAID's work.
        As the largest global donor in humanitarian aid and
    development, the U.S. plays a critical role in supporting the
    development of infrastructure that provides space for a
    democratic transition of power, which is only possible if Syria
    has the proper resources to strengthen its internal policies to
    build that future for themselves.
        An unstable Syria not only means more suffering for its
    people, it becomes a potential breeding ground for terrorism in
    the Middle East.
        Now more than ever the United States cannot abandon our
    commitment to the Syrian people, and I hope that all of my
    colleagues will agree that a stable Syria is clearly in our own
    national security interests.
        Every U.S. dollar spent on stabilization, importantly on
    humanitarian aid, is an investment that requires less funding
    down the line for security and fewer U.S. troops who have to be
    deployed in a way that puts their lives at risk, and we know
    that a dollar goes a very long way in Syria.
        We are hearing that Syrian hospitals are struggling and
    even closing during a time when the need and demand for medical
    resources is high due to the sudden cut in funding as
    lifesaving grants programs under USAID are now paused.
        One such hospital that relies on USAID funding is the Al-
    Shifa hospital located in the majority Kurdish city of Afrin,
    Syria. This hospital serves as a critical area, given the
    native Kurdish population as well as internally displaced
    persons.
        Your 2019 report talked about energizing efforts to address
    the humanitarian crisis in Syria. Right now the money is not
    flowing. How do you assess the current freeze will impact our
    Kurdish partners in Syria and specifically regarding access to
    humanitarian assistance and medical care?
        I think, Mr. Singh, if you could talk about that, I would
    appreciate it.
        Mr. Singh. Well, thanks, Senator.
        So look, I think that my own view is we need to distinguish
    between sort of the dollars that are going in the programs
    themselves. We are not talking about huge chunks of money here.
        Senator Duckworth. No.
        Mr. Singh. And where the money comes from, whether it is
    from the United States or from, say, a regional partner, look,
    for the amount of money that we have spent yearly in Syria on
    USAID programs, for example, you could get one LIV golfer, I
    think.
        And so Saudi Arabia and other regional states could step
    forward and provide revenues. I think when you think about the
    U.S. contribution sanctions relief, for example, is going to be
    much more powerful for the Syrian economy than any infusion of
    U.S. taxpayer dollars.
        The mechanisms that we create that others can pay into, and
    some of the technical expertise we offer, I think, is, in a way
    much more powerful than the actual money.
        So I think there is a conversation you could have about
    where is this money going to come from. Is it going to come
    from the Saudis, Emiratis, who I think do need to bear some of
    the burden of stability in their own region, and they have been
    too reluctant to do that in the past.
        And then the question, for example, of sanctions relief,
    which could open up free markets to come in and help Syria.
        But again, I think that that has to happen under certain
    conditions, and I think that is the most powerful tool that we
    have.
        Senator Duckworth. I could not agree with you more on
    sanctions. I had a very long conversation with the Syrian
    American community leaders from Illinois this week on this very
    issue.
        Since you already addressed this, for both of you how do
    you perceive the current sanctions impede Syria's ability to
    obtain relief needed to rebuild and heal, and what would you
    recommend to members of this committee in revisiting those
    sanctions?
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
        There is no doubt that the state level sanctions on Syria,
    both Syria's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and
    then legislation like the Caesar Act, are preventing both
    others from coming in to further stabilize and reconstruct
    Syria, are difficult for Syrians abroad to send remittances
    home, and are creating nervousness within the NGO community on
    how much they can engage.
        I think the General License 24 issued in early January was
    an important first step. Six months is not a lot of time to
    build confidence in the networks to expand that humanitarian
    aid.
        So number one, the sanctions, I think, are incredibly
    significant, and they are preventing the kind of money,
    funding, and contracting that will be necessary to stabilize
    Syria.
        I will agree with Mr. Singh. I do not think we should rush
    in and lift all the sanctions now. I think how we provide that
    relief should be performance based, and that is one of the main
    sources the United States has in terms of influencing the
    development of a more stable Syria and a more responsible
    governance.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        Senator Risch. Thank you.
        Well said, Ms. Stroul.
        The important thing here, I think, today or something that
    is noteworthy is how unanimous we are in thinking about what
    should be done and how we ought to go about it.
        Obviously, the devil is always in the details, but there is
    really unanimity here as far as how to proceed, and that is
    good. I think that as we go forward that the unanimity will be
    helpful.
        So with that, speaking of helpful, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you.
        And again, thank you both, and I think everyone has done a
    good job of pointing out the opportunities this presents to
    prevent Russia and Iran from coming back in and regaining a
    foothold in Syria.
        So I want to talk a little bit about the role of Turkey,
    because Turkey asserts that they could lead counter ISIS
    efforts in northeast Syria, that we do not need to back the
    Syrian Democratic Forces that are led by the Kurds.
        So how real is that, and how concerned should we be about
    Syria increasing their presence in a way that would actually
    result in conflict with the Kurds?
        Whoever.
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
        When ISIS first took over large swaths of Iraq and Syria,
    the U.S. military did look to Turkey, thinking through how we
    could dislodge ISIS from Syria, and there was no presentation
    of an immediate combat credible viable force of Turkish
    military that could be sent in.
        And if you look at what Turkey is doing right now, it is
    working through nonstate groups like the Syrian National Army--
    the SNA--who is terrorizing local communities and committing
    terrible atrocities and human rights violations against the
    communities there. And because our local partner, the SDF, is
    now having to defend its forces and its communities from the
    SNA, there is less focus on ISIS, which gives ISIS more of an
    opportunity to reconstitute.
        Turkey is a NATO ally, and I do think we should be engaging
    very soon in a political and military dialogue with Turkey
    about what I think is a shared interest. Nobody wants to see
    ISIS reconstitute, and we should be looking at what the
    conditions are under which the U.S. military could at some
    point transition that mission.
        But there is no near term alternative or viable combat
    credible alternative to the U.S. military and the SDF right
    now, and part of that also is that Turkey does not have the
    forces to maintain custody of those 9,000 ISIS fighters in
    detention facilities.
        Senator Shaheen. And so what leverage have we got with
    Turkey in trying to engage them?
        Ms. Stroul. The U.S.-SDF relationship has been the main
    irritant in our relationship with Turkey, but they do have some
    legitimate concerns.
        Their concerns are that the SDF has absorbed non-Syrian
    Kurdish groups like the Turkish Kurdish PKK, which seeks to
    create a state or an autonomous area on Turkey's border and
    threaten Turkey. I think that is a legitimate concern.
        The PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by the
    United States. So we should have a conversation with Turkey
    about its security needs and requirements, and ultimately, the
    future of the SDF is within a unified Syria, and because of our
    relationship with the SDF and the leverage and influence we
    have because of our sanctions and what our proactive engagement
    could bring to the table with Damascus, which Damascus wants,
    we are positioned to play a key facilitator and mediation role.
        Turkey can also be a huge spoiler and undermine the hard
    fought gains against ISIS. So I think this will require
    hardnosed, tough diplomacy but acknowledgement of their
    legitimate security concerns.
        Senator Shaheen. And assuming the United States withdraws
    our military from Syria, how long will it take for ISIS to
    reconstitute itself in ways that threaten the United States?
        Ms. Stroul. Well, we have seen this before. We saw it in
    Afghanistan. When the United States withdrew hastily and
    without a plan, the local--the Afghan Security Forces that we
    worked to train collapsed, and the Taliban has reimposed brutal
    rule over Afghanistan.
        And we know that when ISIS has territory in Iraq and Syria
    it used it to inspire, direct, plan, and launch attacks from
    that territory, and ISIS has its army in waiting already in
    Syria.
        It is those 9,000 fighters in detention facilities, and it
    has the next generation of ISIS. It is the 40,000 ISIS
    affiliated families in a detention camp, and there is no plan
    right now to rapidly reduce either of those populations in a
    way that would not jeopardize our security.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, so let us talk about that a little
    bit, because one of the things--my understanding is that we
    have turned back on the foreign assistance that supports
    security at Al-Hol, but that we have not continued to support
    the other assistance that engages families that helps with the
    radicalization that is going on.
        And so how much of a concern is that? And I would say
    yesterday we had a chance to talk to General Kurilla, who is
    the head of Central Command, who indicated that there is a plan
    to reduce the number of people in the camps and how important
    is it going to be to ensure that the foreign assistance
    programs that are available for those camps are there if we are
    going to reduce the numbers?
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you for those questions.
        So we also know how this works because of our post-conflict
    experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, among many others even
    from Europe in the 1990s.
        So after deadly conflict, if communities do not understand
    what the plan is for them to remain safe, to be protected from
    the underlying drivers of conflict, to know that their kids
    will not step on unexploded ordnance, to know that they will
    have assistance in their homes and communities being rebuilt,
    that they will be able to purchase food, that they will have
    jobs, that their kids can go back to school, those communities
    remain perpetually vulnerable and weak, and that is exactly
    what ISIS wants, which is why the nonhumanitarian assistance
    should be turned back on, or/and we should be working with
    allies and partners who also share an interest in ISIS not
    reconstituting.
        I would agree with General Kurilla. One of the ways in
    which--what families want to know when they are leaving these
    camps is that wherever they go they are going to have those
    assurances.
        They want what we want, which is safety and a better future
    for their families and their kids. That requires funding, it
    requires leadership, and it requires assistance coordination
    with our partners and allies, and that is what I hope comes out
    of the Syria policy review that this Administration is
    conducting.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Your reference--and I will get back to this in the next
    round of questions. But the relationship between the Turks and
    the Kurds cause us no end of grief there. Turkey is allegedly
    an ally of ours, sometimes--at best a recalcitrant ally,
    particularly when it comes to that relationship. We will
    explore that a little bit more.
        But right now I would like to recognize Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you.
        And I will be brief because I am going to ask you about
    something I bet you have covered a whole lot while I was
    toggling between two other hearings and this one, but that is
    with respect to the sanctions, it sounds like there is a pretty
    good consensus here that we should not miss this opportunity to
    engage with the new Syrian government.
        If we are too slow in engaging, or too miserly in engaging,
    we run the risk of creating a vacuum that others will fill who
    are adversaries, and one of the keys to this is the sanctions--
    Caesar sanctions that are currently in place.
        I should know the answer to this question, but I do not. To
    what extent can sanctions be--I think we all agree that they
    should be lifted in a phased way based on performance criteria,
    but to what extent can they be lifted by the Administration
    versus would there need to be congressional action to lift
    sanctions?
        Senator Risch. I can answer that. That will not take
    congressional action. When we passed the bill it was--as
    anything you passed the President will not sign it unless he
    has full authority to put them on and take them off. We are
    good there.
        Senator Kaine. My understanding, and correct me on this if
    I am wrong, is that that is the case for most of the sanctions
    but there may have been sanctions directed against individuals
    that the Administration could not waive and that would need
    congressional action. Is that right or not?
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
        If I could offer what I think the different layers of
    decisions are.
        First of all, what the executive branch can do now is think
    through more waivers or an expanded waiver beyond what it has
    done with General License 24, not necessarily to permanently
    lift sanctions but basically to get out of the way so that
    allies or partners that we would like to see engaging in Syria
    responsibly can do that.
        Number two, it is the state level sanctions that are
    preventing economic recovery and stabilization in Syria. One of
    the big ones is that under Assad, Syria was designated as a
    state sponsor of terrorism. That would require executive
    action.
        The Caesar Act has several criteria in it for the executive
    branch to determine if the government of Syria, then the Assad
    government, has met certain benchmarks in order to receive
    sanctions relief, and here I think there is clearly an active
    role for Members of Congress who were the initiators of this
    very important piece of legislation to engage about what their
    intent is for measured sanctions relief.
        Senator Kaine. Well, I hope that we might do something
    together as a committee to express an opinion to the
    Administration. It does seem like there is a lot of meeting of
    the minds on this side.
        Senator Risch. And I agree with that, Senator Kaine. I
    think that--the Administration has wide, wide authority here.
    Having said that, because of the Caesar legislation we passed
    and others, they are going to be looking for us, and I am going
    to be anxious to give them my--I already have given part of my
    input on this.
        So I think your inquiry is absolutely valid, but I do not
    think that is a problem. I really do not, but thank you for
    that.
        Senator Kaine. Yield back.
        Senator Risch. Thank you.
        Let us see. Senator McCormick.
        Senator McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    to our speakers today.
        Michael, good to see you again after many years.
        This hearing comes at such a critical time for the Syrian
    people and to thousands of Syrian Americans living in
    Pennsylvania in the Lehigh Valley. I share your joy at the fall
    of the butcher of Syria.
        But even with Assad gone significant challenges, to state
    the obvious, remain and it was discussed today the new interim
    president in Damascus and many of his advisers are U.S.
    designated terrorists with longstanding links to al-Qaeda.
        We do not yet know whether this transition process underway
    will lead to a government that will protect all Syrians, and
    this process will matter a great deal, of course, to Israel's
    security and to America's security.
        So, Mr. Singh, I would like to start with you on the topic
    of counter terrorism. From the truck attack in New Orleans to
    the 2016 shooting of a Philadelphia police officer, Jesse
    Arnett, our nation has seen firsthand how terrorist groups like
    ISIS can use Syria as a safe haven and inspire acts of violence
    in the United States.
        How concerned are you about the enduring presence of ISIS
    in Syria, and what would take, and we have talked about some of
    this already, but what would take, if you were going to do the
    couple key points, from Syria reemerging as a sanctuary for
    global terrorist groups?
        Mr. Singh. Well, thanks a lot, Senator McCormick. It is
    great to see you up there.
        Look, I think one thing we can take away from not just the
    Syria situation but the past 18 months of war in the Middle
    East is as much as we may want to move on to other issues and
    other challenges, terrorism remains a top threat to U.S.
    national security and to the security of our allies, and we
    have to take it seriously.
        We cannot afford to sort of ease up on the pressure on
    groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS, which remain active and
    determined to attack us around the world.
        I mean, one of the--we have talked in this hearing about
    the break between HTS and some of these groups, and one of the
    reasons they broke apart was over this question of attacks
    globally against the West, where ISIS and al-Qaeda are
    determined to keep doing that.
        And those groups are active every day in Syria, and it is
    through the joint efforts of a lot of different actors who we
    have mentioned here today, the United States for sure.
        Also our local partners like the SDF. Also other forces in
    northern and southern Syria that prevent those actors from
    mounting terrorist attacks.
        I would say that it would not take a lot. If you have the
    opportunity because you have the absence of legitimate
    governing or security forces, if you have a thriving radical
    ideology and a system that is kind of nurturing that because--
    you know, Senator you have served in war zones. You know that
    ideological piece is, in a way, just as important if not more
    so than the actual weapons and plots.
        If you have those pieces you could absolutely have a
    resurgence of ISIS, and they could absolutely direct attacks
    against the United States. We have to be vigilant against that.
        Senator McCormick. Thank you.
        Ms. Stroul, two quick questions that I hope you can respond
    to. The first is we talked a little bit--Michael, you talked
    about this a bit--of this phasing out of sanctions based on the
    performance of the new government.
        And if you were going to think about the sequencing of that
    what would be sort of the first milestone, and what would be
    the first set of sanctions that you would consider withdrawing?
        The second topic is repatriation of refugees. My wife and I
    and my kids had the chance a couple years ago to work in the
    camps in Jordan, where there is millions--as you know, millions
    of Syrian refugees that have been there for years and also have
    put a huge burden on the Jordanian government and economy.
        Is there any talk of repatriation? Has any of that started
    to happen? What has been the posture of the new government on
    that topic?
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for those questions.
        With respect to sanctions, the most significant sanctions
    are these state level sanctions, the state sponsor of terrorism
    designation on the Syrian central government, and then the
    Caesar sanctions. Those are--when you lift the state sponsor of
    terrorism it is a onetime shot.
        So my recommendation would be to work on successive
    expansions of the waivers and exemptions to facilitate
    stabilization and to facilitate allies, partners, and financial
    institutions like the IMF and World Bank, who will not want to
    run afoul of U.S. law and sanctions first.
        But because this is about terrorism, we need to test them
    on the criteria of these designations, and we are doing some of
    that now.
        There was a Washington Post article about some operational
    counterterrorism intelligence that the U.S. military has
    provided to the al-Sharaa government to go after ISIS cells. We
    should continue to test that premise.
        Senator McCormick. And the Hezbollah transition too you
    talked about, which is important. Yes.
        Ms. Stroul. I think they are doing the right thing, and we
    should test when operationally relevant what information we can
    provide to them to go after threats that threaten Syria,
    threaten our neighbors and partners in the region, and threaten
    our national security.
        And with respect to refugees, President al-Sharaa has made
    very clear that he would like Syrians to be able to return to
    their home, and we know that a lot of these refugees in Jordan
    and Lebanon and Iraq and Turkey would want to come home, and a
    lot of them are already testing the premise.
        So they are coming in for short periods of time to see what
    is happening in their home. Some of them are flying home from
    Europe.
        But they are going to need to be assured that if they are
    really going to go repatriate, that there is going to be
    services, the rubble is going to be cleared, Syrian currency is
    not going to crash. There will be jobs. There will be food.
        And this, again, comes back to the kinds of engagement that
    we can facilitate in order to address those underlying drivers
    of conflict.
        Senator McCormick. Very good. Thank you.
        Senator Shaheen [presiding]. Senator Van Hollen.
        Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Senator Shaheen, and thank
    both of you for your testimony and sharing your expertise on
    these issues, and I am glad we are having this hearing on
    Syria, given the perilous moment we are in. Also a moment of
    opportunity.
        I really think this committee also has to have an emergency
    hearing on what is happening at the State Department with
    respect to foreign assistance and specifically the
    dismantlement of AID.
        I am really shocked we have not had a hearing yet. I am
    thankful to Senator Shaheen who organized an alternative
    hearing yesterday. We had four great witnesses. Unfortunately,
    none of our Republican colleagues were there to hear them.
        But we are facing a mountain of disinformation about AID
    from Elon Musk and others, and I would like, Senator Shaheen,
    to ask unanimous consent to put in the record a Washington Post
    fact checked article on claims being made about AID. It is
    entitled, ``The White House's wildly inaccurate claims about
    USAID spending.''
        Senator Shaheen. I am sure that is without objection.
        [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be
    found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record''
    section at the end of this document.]
        Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
        So this does not even include the big lie that we heard
    from the White House podium about the $50 million worth of
    condoms to Gaza, which was just absolutely untrue. I think my
    colleagues should understand that Elon Musk called AID a,
    quote, ``criminal enterprise.''
        That makes at least the members who have served on this
    committee for a long time and those who have served in the
    Senate longer co-conspirators in a criminal enterprise because
    we authorize and appropriate funds for AID.
        And we all know that is not the case, but we really need as
    a committee on a bipartisan basis to stand up to Elon Musk. And
    it is outrageous that we have not done that yet, because he is
    doing great damage around the world.
        I think most agree that AID is an important part of our
    overall national and foreign policy, and I would just like to
    ask you, Ms. Stroul, with respect to Syria.
        Syria has had its assistance frozen. It appears we might
    get an exemption for some of the UNHCR refugee issues, which
    are obviously critical at this point in time.
        I think Senator Shaheen mentioned al-Hol prison camp that
    detains a lot of ISIS fighters. If they all get out Americans
    are in peril.
        So could you just speak briefly to how at this critical
    moment in Syria, which is also a moment of opportunity but also
    peril, this freeze on U.S. assistance is emboldening our
    adversaries and preventing the United States from really trying
    to seize this opportunity?
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
        First of all, so there are different layers to the, in my
    view, negative impact of the targeting of USAID.
        First of all, it is the dismantlement of the staff. So the
    staff in the headquarters possess tremendous technical
    expertise in how to distribute, conduct oversight, conduct
    audits, and how to do assistance in a unique, fragile, post-
    conflict environment.
        Number two is that stop work order. So what is happening is
    USAID and longtime U.S. partners--as a former staffer of this
    committee we conducted rigorous oversight over how USAID
    partners on the ground, and there were many instances even when
    I was on the committee where here were concerns about a
    specific partner or a specific program, and we stopped those
    programs but we found ways to safely continue programs that we
    thought were in the interest of American security and good
    stewards of U.S. taxpayer dollars.
        But the stop work order and the firing of our implementing
    partners on the ground will dismantle the ecosystem around this
    very important work. Then there is the funding, which is not
    flowing.
        The humanitarian work is, obviously, critical immediately
    but over the long term we need to be helping societies and
    communities recover. They want more than a handout from
    humanitarian aid.
        And finally, it is the oversight. None of our partners
    possess the kind of technical expertise that we do in
    monitoring dollars and monitoring performance benchmarks for
    these programs, and we have seen in plenty of other scenarios
    when the funds of our partners have led to poor outcomes.
        So all of these different ways in which I think the freeze
    in USAID and the funding and the stop work order are very
    detrimental to our interests.
        And finally, there is the question of U.S. leadership. So
    when a community or an individual or a mother who needs formula
    for her child or a diaper or medicine is in need, and they see
    a U.S. flag or a stamp on that box, they think of the United
    States and know that we had a role in saving their lives, and
    then that feeds into positive views of the United States, and
    when we want to partner with that government or a community in
    the future, the door is more open. So we are closing doors that
    could impact our security and our interest for generations to
    come.
        Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
        Thank you all.
        Senator Shaheen. Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. OK. Well, thank you.
        Thank you, Senator McCormick.
        Thank you. I want to thank Chairman Risch, Ranking Member
    Shaheen, of course, for holding this hearing.
        Thank you for to our witnesses for your work, for
    testifying today.
        I also want to thank Senator Shaheen for highlighting the
    positive impact that USAID has around the world, the difference
    that we know we are making on the ground for so many--keeping
    children alive, feeding hungry people, preventing disease. So I
    want to just thank Senator Shaheen for that.
        And I want to move on and talk a little bit about
    empowering women in Syria because the U.S. does have an
    opportunity to play a critical role in supporting Syria's
    political transition following the fall of Assad's regime.
        So I believe we should be ready to use all the tools in our
    toolbox to push that transitional government to be inclusive,
    democratic, nonsectarian, and I am particularly interested in
    the role women can play in supporting the new Syria, and how
    the U.S. could and should help to facilitate this.
        So, Ms. Stroul, can you talk about the current role of
    women in Syria's new leadership and how the Administration
    could work with the transitional government to ensure that
    women are empowered to play a critical role in governance,
    peace building, reconstruction?
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
        And, of course, Ranking Member Shaheen must be acknowledged
    for her leadership and important work on women, peace, and
    security in this element.
        If only 50 percent of Syrian society is engaged in a
    conversation about the future of Syria, meaning the other 50
    percent, women, are not included, then you are not listening to
    half of your society and that will not lead to a stable
    outcome.
        Generally speaking, across most all post-conflict societies
    when transitional justice, reconstruction, and stabilization
    are critical, women have unique peace building roles, unique
    perspectives, tend to think more about the needs of their
    communities.
        If their voices and recommendations are not taken into
    account, which means that less than 50 percent of Syrian
    society would be involved in the decisionmaking and dialogue
    about the future of Syria, it will not be stable and inclusive
    over the long term.
        President al-Sharaa yesterday announced the committee that
    will be responsible for organizing and making recommendations
    for the national dialogue for Syria, that he announced in his
    transition timeline of 3 to 5 years, there are two women on a
    committee of seven.
        Good start. We should see more, and we should expect more.
    The main areas of leverage, of course, are that U.S. leadership
    can help facilitate Syria's entry back into the international
    community.
        We should demand that more women have a seat at that table,
    and of course, through either sanctions, waivers relief, and
    eventually lifting.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you.
        I want to move on and talk a little bit about Iran and the
    resurgence of Iran possibly with the fall of Assad's brutal
    dictatorship. It is going to have profound implications for
    Iran, which has supported Assad's regime since about 2011.
        So coupled with Hamas' defeat in Gaza, the decapitation of
    Hezbollah, the leadership there in Lebanon, Assad's collapse
    has left Tehran weaker, more isolated than it has been in
    decades, and I believe we cannot squander this opportunity.
        Iran must be kept out of Syria, denied the opportunity to
    terrorize our partners, allies in the region, and we also at
    the same time cannot allow our adversaries like China and
    Russia to swoop in and fill those gaps. We know they are
    waiting.
        Dr. Singh, in Syria, President Trump's aid freeze only
    serves to further Iran's malicious intent, right? And so the
    aid freeze stops the programs that directly address the
    instability, and which we know IRGC they thrive on instability,
    right?
        So, again, we know Iran wants to exploit the aid freeze for
    its own gain. So in your opinion how do you think it might do
    that, and what proactive steps should we be looking at to stop
    Iran from potentially doing that?
        Mr. Singh. Well, thanks a lot, Senator.
        I think you are right that where Iran sees a poorly
    governed or ungoverned space in the Middle East, it tries to
    fill that space, and it fills that space with its proxies,
    proxies sometimes that it creates out of whole cloth.
        You know, we have seen Iran, for example, in Syria import
    fighters from places like Afghanistan and Pakistan and so
    forth, and we do not want to see that happen again.
        And so I would say, look, as we think about how we are
    going to relate to this new government with all the tools of
    our power--diplomatically, intelligence sharing across the
    board, military--we need to set out areas of shared concern
    where we can try to engage pragmatically with this new
    government that is dominated by HTS, and this is certainly one
    of them.
        So I think--you know, Ms. Stroul mentioned before
    intelligence sharing, for example. I think this is an area
    where we can test them. Are they willing to work
    collaboratively with us on this area of shared concern?
        And if the answer is yes, we have just gained another new,
    powerful tool in our toolkit to counter Iran in the region.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Senator Risch [presiding]. Thank you very much.
        Senator Shaheen, you had a follow up.
        Senator Shaheen. I do.
        I actually have a brief comment and then a follow up
    question, and I want to just point out, thank you for your
    comments, Ms. Stroul, relative to the importance of women being
    at the table, and to Senator Rosen for her question.
        And I think it is important to point out that the reason
    that makes a difference is because it does make a difference.
        It makes a difference in conflict resolution. We know that
    when women are at the table the negotiations are likely to last
    a third more--for 15 years or longer than if they are not at
    the table.
        So there is good data to show that this makes a difference,
    and I would argue that one of the reasons that we saw the fall
    happen so fast in Afghanistan is because women were excluded
    from that negotiating process. But that is another issue.
        I did want to get back--I know this is about Syria, but
    yesterday we heard some testimony about the impact in Lebanon,
    that like Syria, this is also an opportunity for us in Lebanon
    because there is a new government that is not affiliated with
    Hezbollah, and they have been resistant despite the pressure,
    and that the halt to many of our foreign assistance programs
    are having real implications in Lebanon for the ability of that
    new government to be able to maintain power.
        The failure to continue to support the Lebanese Armed
    Forces, which have been the one stable institution in the
    country, have real ramifications.
        So I do not know if either of you could speak to that and
    to the importance of addressing the issues in Lebanon as well.
        Mr. Singh. Look, so I think we have talked about the
    opportunity in Syria. There is an opportunity in Lebanon for
    sure because with Hezbollah decimated, you know, thanks to
    Israel, that kind of loosens their grip on that government, and
    taking advantage of that opportunity should be something that
    we want to do, and it is going to require tremendous investment
    of--you know, we are talking a lot about resources, but it is
    going to take time. It is going to take attention as well at a
    moment where we have lots of priorities around the world.
        So I was very happy to see Morgan Ortagus, the deputy
    special envoy for the Middle East, go there and spend some time
    there with the government, and she got, I think, quite positive
    reviews for the time that she spent there.
        That is a good first step, and I think what we really need
    to see is that kind of engagement, and it needs to be done in
    partnership with key allies, and that includes allies like
    France but also allies in the region.
        And when it comes down to it we are going to need to
    support these institutions--security institutions but also the
    other institutions of the state, and I would say we can do that
    collaboratively with our allies, and we are going to have to do
    that collaboratively with our allies going forward, otherwise
    we are going to lose that opportunity.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, I would agree, and I would also
    argue that it is going to cost us a lot less to do this now and
    when we have this opening than it would to fail and to see
    Hezbollah and our other adversaries come back not only in Syria
    but in Lebanon.
        Ms. Stroul. If I could add to what Mr. Singh said.
        The past several years of assistance we have actually
    approached it quite cautiously by the executive branch in
    consultation with Congress, which is that U.S. assistance has
    gone around the central government in Beirut only for
    humanitarian because Beirut port blast, collapsed economy--all
    of the reasons why we did not have confidence in the central
    government in Beirut.
        So our assistance actually adapted around that, and then we
    provided security assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces.
        So the challenge now is, one, is the security aid to the
    Lebanese Armed Forces is halted at the exact moment when by the
    terms of the ceasefire with Israel they need to be deploying
    south and disarming Hezbollah.
        So we are asking them to take on a significant undertaking
    and putting nothing in it and telling them they need to do it
    anyway.
        Number two, humanitarian--that needs to flow, obviously,
    because the Lebanese people are suffering and have suffered for
    a very long time.
        And then, three, because we have not yet provided
    assistance through the government in Beirut, we have an
    opportunity to incentivize the kind of behavior we would like
    to see with this new leadership.
        We can also encourage the World Bank and the IMF, who have
    held off because of the lack of meaningful economic reform
    measures.
        So this is actually an example where we have used
    assistance effectively to say we are not going to support this
    bad behavior, and now we can use it as an incentive.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you both.
        Mr. Singh. Senator, with your forbearance I just want to
    vehemently agree with the idea that a society that oppresses
    its women is not going to be a successful society.
        Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that. Thank you.
        Senator Risch. Thank you.
        Thank you to the witnesses.
        And you know, I raised the Lebanon issue when we started,
    and that is something we maybe ought to have a hearing on too,
    because it is just as important as this.
        I think it is a little less complicated but not very much
    less complicated. So that is the important thing.
        There has been--as far as your raising the issue of women
    being involved you, like I, have met with the diaspora here.
    There are some very competent and ready to engage women who are
    ready to do that.
        When we were in Munich this weekend, if we meet with these
    people you may want to raise that with them, and I think that
    would be important.
        A couple of things that were raised here during the hearing
    was USAID freeze. In fact, they even drug Elon Musk, I guess,
    through the ringer while I was not here.
        Look, everybody needs to stay calm. We are going to get
    through this, and one thing that we never talk about and should
    is we are going in debt a trillion dollars every hundred days,
    and it has got to stop.
        And yes, there is going to be some angst getting there but
    we will get there, and the things that are necessary for best
    interest of the United States will continue. I am convinced of
    that.
        But there are things--and I am not going to go through the
    list now so we do not start a fight--but there is money been
    spent that should not have been spent.
        So in any event, with that thank you to the witnesses. I
    think this was a very good hearing and very helpful to us. We
    do a lot of these, and very seldom do we see the kind of
    progress, I think, and unanimity that we have seen today.
        So with that, thanks to the witnesses for attending today,
    providing us with the benefit of your testimony. For the
    information of members, the record will remain open until the
    close of business tomorrow.
        We ask the witnesses to respond as promptly as possible
    with your responses. That will be very helpful to us. So thank
    you for that.
        And with that, the hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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