    [Senate Hearing 119-8]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                              S. Hrg. 119-8

                                  OPEN HEARING:
                        NOMINATION OF JOHN L. RATCLIFFE
                         TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL
                              INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                        SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                     OF THE

                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                JANUARY 15, 2025

                                   __________

          Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    58-615                      WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

               (Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.)

                         TOM COTTON, Arkansas, Chairman
                    MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman

    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho                RON WYDEN, Oregon
    SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
    JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota            JON OSSOFF, Georgia
    TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  MARK KELLY, Arizona
    MARCO RUBIO, Florida
                      JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ex Officio
                    CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
                    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Ex Officio
                      JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
                                  ----------

                           Ryan Tully, Staff Director
                      William Wu, Minority Staff Director
                         Kelsey S. Bailey, Chief Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                                JANUARY 15, 2025
                               OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                       Page
    Tom Cotton, U.S. Senator from Arkansas...........................     1
    Mark R. Warner, U.S. Senator from Virginia.......................     4

                                    WITNESS

    The Honorable John Ashcroft, Former United States Attorney
      General........................................................     6
    The Honorable John L. Ratcliffe, Nominee to be Director of the
      Central Intelligence Agency....................................     9
        Prepared Statement...........................................    13

                             SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

    Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............    42
    Additional Pre-Hearing Questions.................................    66
    Post-Hearing Questions...........................................   121

     OPEN HEARING: ON THE NOMINATION OF JOHN L. RATCLIFFE, TO BE DIRECTOR,
                          CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

                          WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 15, 2025

                                           U.S. Senate,
                              Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in Room
    SD-G50, in the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tom Cotton,
    Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Cotton (presiding), Warner, Collins,
    Cornyn, Moran, Lankford, Rounds, Young, Rubio, Heinrich, King,
    Bennet, Gillibrand, Ossoff, Kelly.

                              PROCEEDINGS

        Chairman Cotton. This hearing will come to order.
        We are holding this hearing before President-Elect Trump's
    Inauguration, therefore, we have not yet received Mr.
    Ratcliffe's nomination to be Director of the Central
    Intelligence Agency.
        Procedurally, the Senate must receive a nomination before
    we can vote on and report it out of committee; and therefore we
    are having this hearing in expectation that the nomination will
    follow on Monday.
        When formally nominated by the President after his
    inauguration, the Committee will convene a business meeting to
    vote on the nomination and report it to the full Senate.
        As an initial matter, Committee rule 5.4 states that no
    confirmation hearing shall be held sooner than seven calendar
    days after receipt of the nominee's background questionnaire,
    financial disclosure statement, and responses to additional
    prehearing questions unless the time limit is waived by a
    majority vote of the Committee.
        While the Committee received Mr. Ratcliffe's background
    questionnaire and responses to additional prehearing questions
    more than seven days in advance, the committee received a
    financial disclosure statement on January 14th. I therefore ask
    Members for unanimous consent to proceed with the hearing.
        Hearing no objection, we have consent to proceed.
        I want to remind all those in attendance that while they
    are welcome to observe today's hearing, I will not allow
    disruptions by the audience.
        Audience members may not verbally or physically distract
    from the hearing, including by shouting, standing, raising
    signs, or making gestures that block the view of other members
    of the audience. Those who do so will be immediately removed
    from the room.
        Our goal in conducting this hearing is to enable the
    Committee to begin consideration of Mr. Ratcliffe's
    qualifications and to allow for our Members' thoughtful
    deliberation. To date, Mr. Ratcliffe has provided substantive
    written responses to more than 170 questions presented by the
    committee. Today, of course, Members will be able to ask
    additional questions and hear from Mr. Ratcliffe in both this
    open session and in closed sessions.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TOM COTTON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
                                ARKANSAS

        Chairman Cotton. I want to welcome everyone to this hearing
    on President Trump's nomination of Mr. Ratcliffe to be our next
    Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
        Mr. Ratcliffe, welcome back to the Intelligence Committee.
    I also want to welcome your wife Michele and thank her and your
    daughters for the sacrifices they have made across a lifetime
    of public service.
        Former Attorney General John Ashcroft is also back before
    the Senate. Mr. Attorney General, I am sure your being here
    makes you nostalgic for your own confirmation process a few
    years back. (Laughter.)
        John, welcome. We look forward to your remarks.
        I want to acknowledge also my predecessor, Vice Chairman
    Warner. Senator Warner and I have worked together collegially
    over the years even when we have disagreed strongly. I expect
    this spirit of comity to continue and not just between the Vice
    Chairman and me, but across our committee.
        I also want to thank Senator Rubio for his service on the
    Committee. He remains a member of the Committee, but he is
    otherwise detained this morning at his own confirmation
    hearing. He has been a trusted colleague and respected leader
    on the Committee for years. We will miss him, but we also look
    forward to his distinguished service as our next Secretary of
    State.
        I want to extend my special thanks to our Committee senior
    staff on both sides as well. They put in yeoman's work over the
    holidays to be sure we could promptly move forward Mr.
    Ratcliffe's nomination.
        I want to begin with a few observations from my decade of
    service on the Intelligence Committee. The men and women of the
    intelligence community (IC) perform vital work to protect our
    Nation. They often serve in dangerous and squalid conditions.
    Their successes are seldom celebrated and even known. Unlike
    our troops, no one buys them beers in the airport. Sometimes
    their families don't even know what they do. So let me say to
    them today, on behalf of this Committee and a grateful nation:
    We respect you, we appreciate you, and we thank you.
        But we also need more from you. In these dangerous times,
    our intelligence agencies haven't anticipated major events or
    detected impending attacks. In just the last few weeks, the
    members of this Committee and, I presume, the President, had no
    forewarning of the New Orleans terrorist attack or the collapse
    of the Assad tyranny in Syria. The same goes for Hamas's
    October 7th atrocity against Israel in 2023.
        I could give other examples, but suffice it to say, we are
    too often in the dark. While this goes for the entire
    intelligence community, the problem is especially acute at the
    CIA which remains after all the ``central'' intelligence
    agency. The CIA needs to get back to its roots, but must
    overcome several challenges to do so.
        First, the CIA has neglected its core mission--collecting
    clandestine foreign intelligence. Put more simply, stealing
    secrets. Intelligence collection is the main effort. Every
    other job is a supporting effort. If you don't collect
    intelligence by, say, handling spies or hacking computers, you
    should ask yourself how you support those who do or how you
    harness and use what they produce.
        I have seen way too many reports over the years with
    phrases like ``according to,'' ``based on,'' ``judging by,''
    followed only by diplomatic accounts and press reports. In
    other words, not intelligence. And it has gotten worse over the
    last four years. Those sources are not unimportant, but without
    clandestine intelligence, we might as well get briefed by the
    State Department or a think tank or just read the newspaper.
        Second, the CIA has become too bureaucratic. Now I realize
    that Allen Dulles probably had the same complaint just five
    years after the CIA was created. But this has also gotten worse
    in recent years, in no small part thanks to former Director
    Brennan's so-called ``modernization.'' Lines of authority have
    grown blurry. Talkers have replaced doers and managers with no
    field experience have taken over operational roles, and more.
    Much like our military, the tooth-to-tail ratio at the CIA is
    badly out of balance.
        Third, the CIA's analysis and priorities have been
    politicized. Intelligence analysis all too often has aligned,
    curiously, with the Biden administration's policy preferences:
    The Afghan army is strong and cohesive. Ukraine's army will
    collapse within days of Russia's invasion. Israel can't
    possibly destroy Hamas or Hezbollah. Iran's air defenses are
    mighty and fearsome. Time and again, the CIA has produced
    inaccurate analysis that conveniently justifies President
    Biden's actions or as often his inaction.
        Likewise, the CIA's misplaced priorities have yielded too
    many reports on matters like the prospects for gay rights
    legislation in Africa or climate change. These topics may have
    their place in government, but it is not at the CIA.
        And I certainly hope to never again see another video
    statement or social media post from the CIA about diversity or
    equity or inclusion. If you wonder why our intelligence
    Agencies struggle to collect intelligence, consider this fact:
    The CIA offered to pay diversity consultants three times as
    much as a new case officer. I am sorry, but if you feel like
    you need a diversity consultant or an affinity group or your
    pronouns in an email, maybe the CIA isn't for you. This job
    isn't about your identity or your feelings. It is about our
    Nation's security.
        Fourth, the CIA dabbles too much in questions of political
    judgment, even as it neglects its core mission of intelligence
    collection. Some of the blame, to be fair, lies with us. I hear
    questions from this Committee about some nation's will to fight
    or if we do this, that, or the other thing, what will Vladimir
    Putin or Xi Jinping do in response. These aren't really
    intelligence questions but rather matters of statesmanship and
    political judgment or prudence--the statesman's supreme virtue.
    I would observe that Lincoln and Churchill didn't have our
    vast, modern intelligence apparatus, but they were pretty good
    wartime leaders because they were great statesmen.
        It is the CIA's responsibility to provide us and the
    President with timely, relevant secrets; for example, that
    Russia has mobilized multiple divisions on Ukraine's border at
    Christmastime and sent perishable fresh blood supplies to the
    front. It is our job to use that information to discern the
    inherent logic of events, not to defer passively to the
    intelligence community's judgment that it is a convenient
    conclusion that Putin hadn't yet decided to invade just days
    before the obviously impending invasion.
        Fifth, the CIA needs to become bolder and more innovative
    in covert action. I have seen successful covert action
    programs. I have seen debacles. The latter are usually caused
    by ill-advised constraints by political leaders or when a
    President used covert action as a substitute for policy and not
    a supplement for policy. I will have to save more for our
    closed session, of course, but let's for now say the timid
    indecision that has characterized the Biden administration's
    overt actions extends to its covert actions.
        Mr. Ratcliffe, you have a big job ahead of you. The Nation
    needs a strong, capable, and aggressive CIA. I believe the men
    and women you will lead want to serve in just that kind of
    Agency. They joined the CIA after all, not a church choir or a
    therapy session on a college campus. They and the Nation are
    counting on you to deliver badly needed reforms and on this
    Committee to ensure you do.
        I will now recognize the vice chairman for his opening
    remarks.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
                                VIRGINIA

        Vice Chairman Warner. Mr. Chairman, first of all,
    congratulations on becoming Chair of what I think is the most
    important Committee in the Senate. And I look forward to
    working with you in the kind of traditions that we have
    maintained in the now close to 15 years that I have been on the
    Committee. So congratulations, Tom.
        Mr. Ratcliffe, it is good to see you again. Congratulations
    on being nominated to be Director of the CIA. It was a pleasure
    to meet your wife. And I think you brought a great introducer
    in the former Attorney General Ashcroft. Pleasure to see you,
    sir.
        Mr. Ratcliffe, I appreciated the opportunity to meet with
    you last month and hear your views. You previously served on
    the House Intelligence Committee and obviously as Director of
    National Intelligence (DNI), so you obviously have an
    appreciation for the work done by our intelligence community
    generally and more specifically, the CIA. If confirmed, I
    believe you will be the first person who actually has served as
    both as DNI and head of the CIA.
        Echoing a little bit of what Chairman Cotton said, the
    Agency you have been nominated to is facing an unprecedented
    number of challenges which I believe as well requires a great
    deal of leadership. These challenges ranging from the conflicts
    in Ukraine and Gaza, competition with China especially with
    respect to artificial intelligence (AI) and other advanced
    technologies, the persistent threat of international terrorist
    organizations, and a constant theme of cyber threats from
    nation-states and their actors attacking our critical
    infrastructure to, candidly, just run-of-the-mill criminal
    ransomware actors.
        Adding to all this has been a focus of mine and I know so
    many of us on the committee, that the revolutions in technology
    from AI to synthetic bio to advances in energy require, I
    believe, fundamental changes in how we operate.
        In effect, it is the very fabric of warfare in many ways
    that is changing. I believe very strongly that national
    security is no longer determined by simply who has the most
    powerful ships and tanks, but who also will lead in this
    technology competition from semiconductors to drones to
    synthetic bio.
        I believe--and we have made some progress on this, but I
    still think we have a long way to go--that the IC must continue
    to adapt to these challenges. In particular, it must be better
    organized to collect on the development and use of advanced
    technology by our adversaries, because they pose a dramatic
    threat to United States leadership. The truth is, if we are not
    staying ahead of that, their ability for these foreign nation-
    states to use technology to get us in a stranglehold could be a
    huge, huge challenge.
        During such times it is also vital that we are able to
    recruit and retain the best possible talent for the IC. That
    starts with ensuring the workforce feels respected and valued.
    I am very concerned that the President-elect has continued to
    engage in undeserved attacks on the professional women and men
    of our intelligence agencies. These comments I do think affect
    the morale of these men and women who, as Senator Cotton said,
    they don't get the recognition or get their beer bought for
    them. They have to toil in anonymity. But they have, I believe
    consistently, regardless of which party is in power been
    willing to defend our Nation.
        Unsurprisingly, particularly public comments from our
    leaders have a negative effect on the recruitment and retention
    of the talent of these critical men and women of the IC.
        Mr. Ratcliffe, today is your opportunity to reassure the
    men and women of the CIA that they not fear reprisal for being
    willing to speak truth to power. The most critical role of the
    IC is speaking truth to power. I need your commitment that you
    will not fire or force out CIA employees because of their
    perceived political views and that you will not ask these
    employees to place loyalty to a political figure above loyalty
    to country. And I need to hear your plan on how you will
    reassure the CIA workforce on these issues.
        Also on the personnel front, I am concerned that we
    continue to hear from CIA officers who have been victims of
    sexual assault at work as well as those suffering from the
    lasting effects of anomalous health incidents (AHI). I would
    like to hear your plan for ensuring that those who come forward
    about being hurt in the line of duty are taken seriously and
    provided the care and the attention they deserve.
        Mr. Ratcliffe, if confirmed, you will be sitting at a
    critical intersection between intelligence and policymaking.
    Your job will be to give the President the best professional
    judgment of America's intelligence experts at the CIA, even
    when that judgment might be inconvenient or uncomfortable. I
    need your public assurance that you will always seek to provide
    unbiased, unvarnished, and timely intelligence assessments to
    the President, to the Cabinet, to his advisers, and to those of
    us in Congress.
        I need your assurance that this intelligence will represent
    the best judgments of the CIA, again, regardless of political
    implications or views.
        And though we should not need to say it out loud, I will
    also need your assurance that you will work to appropriately
    protect our intelligence community's sources and methods.
        Thank you again for your service so far. Thank you for
    providing what I know will be good testimony today, and I look
    forward to working with you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.
        Former Attorney General John Ashcroft kindly offered to
    introduce his former colleague when Congressman Ratcliffe was
    nominated to be the Director of National Intelligence in 2020,
    but COVID forced him to do so only by letter.
        Fortunately, we have another chance to hear from him today.
    So I am pleased to recognize Attorney General Ashcroft for his
    introduction.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ASHCROFT

        Mr. Ashcroft. Good morning, Chairman Cotton and Vice
    Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Members of the Committee: I want to thank you for your
    serious consideration and attention to the constitutional
    responsibility of confirming high ranking executive branch
    officials, and it is an honor for me to participate with you by
    my appearance here today.
        Testifying and sharing my profound support for the
    nomination of the Honorable John Ratcliffe as the Director of
    the Central Intelligence Agency is something for which I am
    deeply grateful. Good national security decisions proceed from
    the combination of valid intelligence, information, and
    considered judgment. Integrity is an indispensable imperative
    for intelligence--the best friend of national security.
    National security is the singular--unfortunately, is the
    singular portfolio most allergic to the infection and
    devaluation that results from inaccuracy and distortion. For
    high-quality decisionmaking, sound intelligence must never be
    diluted or contaminated by personal bias or political
    predisposition.
        John Ratcliffe's record of upholding the Constitution and
    enforcing the law, including his farsighted work in the
    intelligence field recommends him supremely to serve America as
    the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I have known
    and worked with John for almost decades. I know of no person--
    no person of a higher commitment to integrity. I have seen him
    speak the unvarnished truth to those he works with and those he
    works for, whether senior government officials or corporate
    CEOs.
        As a Member of the Congress, Ratcliffe's career stands as
    an outstanding record of public service. He is consistently
    well prepared, tough, but he is a tough and fair interrogator,
    fundamentally focused on the Constitution, never involving
    himself in personal attacks.
        John has served on the House Intelligence, Judiciary,
    Ethics, and Homeland Security Committees and as chairman of the
    House Homeland Security Committee's Cybersecurity and
    Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee.
        In the Department of Justice, John served as a Federal
    prosecutor, first as an assistant U.S. Attorney and chief of
    anti-terrorism and national security for the Eastern District
    of Texas; then as U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of
    Texas, where he pursued more than 30 national security and
    terrorism related matters. After his service as U.S. Attorney,
    I had the privilege of working with John in the Ashcroft,
    Sutton and Ratcliffe law firm where he focused on government
    and internal investigations, homeland security, and foreign
    corrupt practices law.
        In professional moments, both public and private, I have
    seen John's thoughtful, decisive, yet humble leadership. He is
    a careful and willing listener, skilled at proceeding and
    processing with different voices in complex situations. He is
    comfortable in being held to account, and he will require those
    in the Agency to be similarly accountable.
        Over the past 15 years, he served in crucial roles as both
    a developer and consumer of intelligence. John therefore brings
    to the Office of the Director of the Central Intelligence
    Agency a relevant reservoir of experience as well as sound
    judgment on an array of issues related to national security. He
    understands that the intelligence community exists to secure
    the liberties and freedoms of Americans--liberties and freedoms
    that he holds in highest regard.
        As a prosecutor, John dealt with national security and
    terrorism-related matters. This ranged from domestic and
    international terrorism to drug trafficking, human trafficking,
    and the transnational criminal organizations that threaten us
    in ways that we have previously not been accustomed to.
        During recent decades of our Nation's most elevated concern
    regarding terrorism, John developed excellent relationships
    with the international intelligence sources in order to aid
    America. That experience will serve him well in fostering
    appropriate cooperation with the intelligence agencies of our
    allies.
        Under John's leadership as Chairman of the House Homeland
    Security Committee's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
    Protection Subcommittee, he forged policies and statutes which
    will strengthen and do strengthen our Nation's intelligence
    gathering capacity.
        He is thoroughly conversant with a wide variety of national
    security topics with a focus on emerging and expanding
    cybersecurity threats. This includes investigating foreign
    cybersecurity interference, reviewing the Department of
    Homeland Security's efforts to secure government networks,
    evaluating the cyber threat intelligence integration center,
    the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the continuous diagnostics and
    litigation program together with the interagency coordination
    on cybersecurity.
        John enlisted bipartisan support to build a national cyber
    intelligence infrastructure to protect our country. President
    Obama signed a significant cybersecurity bill that John co-
    authored: The National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act
    which passed the House of Representatives with an overwhelming
    bipartisan vote.
        His record reflects a commitment to continued building a
    forward-looking intelligence community that is integrated and
    coordinated. His experience signals his possession of the
    skills necessary to lead the intelligence community in
    effectively addressing proliferating national security threats.
        John Ratcliffe is capable of and committed to delivering
    the most insightful, accurate intelligence and
    counterintelligence possible. He will supply decisionmakers
    with excellent information upon which they can base sound
    judgments safeguarding our national security.
        Mr. Chairman and Committee Members, thank you for what I
    consider to be a privilege of communicating to you my
    unreserved endorsement of John L. Ratcliffe for the Director of
    the Central Intelligence Agency. Thank you.
        Chairman Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Attorney General.
        I understand that Mr. Ashcroft will now step away?
        Mr. Ashcroft. I will join the citizens.
        Chairman Cotton. You are more than welcome to do so.
        Mr. Ashcroft. And observe from the high perch of
    citizenship the rest of the proceedings. And I pray God's
    blessing on this Committee. I am very, very pleased that the
    Committee is seriously considering the statement both of the
    vice chairman--we used to call that person the ranking member,
    but I think he is vice chairman now--and the chairman.
        I am grateful to you. Thank you for allowing me to be here.
        Chairman Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Attorney General.
        Mr. Ratcliffe, before we move to your opening statement, it
    is the custom of the Committee to ask a series of questions of
    all nominees. Nothing personal about you.
        So first off, do you solemnly swear that you will give this
    Committee your full and truthful testimony today and in the
    future?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I do.
        Chairman Cotton. Again, we have five standard questions. A
    simple ``yes'' will do. A ``no'' will require further
    explanation, if you needed help with the test.
        First, do you agree to appear before the Committee here and
    in other venues when invited?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
        Chairman Cotton. If confirmed, do you agree to send
    officials from your agency to appear before the Committee and
    designated staff when invited?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
        Chairman Cotton. Third, do you agree to provide documents
    and any other materials requested by the Committee in order for
    it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
        Chairman Cotton. Fourth, will you ensure that your office
    and your staff provide such material to the Committee when
    requested?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
        Chairman Cotton. Finally, do you agree to inform and fully
    brief to the fullest extent possible all members of this
    Committee of intelligence activities and covert actions rather
    than only the chairman and the vice chairman?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
        Chairman Cotton. All right. Thank you very much, Mr.
    Ratcliffe. The floor is yours for your opening statement.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN L. RATCLIFFE

        Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you very much, Chairman Cotton, Vice
    Chairman Warner, and distinguished Members of the Committee for
    the opportunity to appear before you as the President's nominee
    for the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I have
    enjoyed meeting with each of you individually, and I look
    forward to answering your questions today.
        Thank you to my friend and mentor former Attorney General
    John Ashcroft for being here today, and for his gracious and
    humbling remarks. Sir, I am forever grateful for your faith in
    me.
        Thank you to Director Burns and your excellent team at the
    CIA for your commitment to a smooth and professional
    transition.
        I would like to recognize my amazing family, my wonderful
    wife Michelle, our two daughters, Riley and Darby, my five
    brothers and sisters, and watching from above, my parents Bob
    and Kathie Ratcliffe. I simply have no words to adequately
    express my gratitude to all of you.
        Finally, thank you, President Trump, for the great honor of
    nominating me to lead the world's premier intelligence agency.
    I am grateful for the opportunity to serve under you once
    again, and if confirmed, I will work tirelessly to help you
    protect the American people and advance America's interests.
        Today, we face what may be the most challenging national
    security environment in our Nation's history. The Chinese
    Communist Party remains committed to dominating the world
    economically, militarily, and technologically. Transnational
    criminal organizations are flooding American communities with
    violence and deadly narcotics. The Russia-Ukraine war wages on,
    spreading devastation and increasing the risk of the United
    States being pulled into a conflict with a nuclear power. The
    Iranian regime and its terrorist proxies continue to export
    mayhem across the Middle East, and Iran is closer to nuclear
    breakout than ever before. North Korea remains a destabilizing
    force. Increasing coordination among America's rivals and
    adversaries threatens to compound the threats that they each
    pose to us individually. Numerous terrorist groups and other
    non-state actors, some of which have even crossed our southern
    border, still pose a persistent threat to our people and our
    homeland.
        These threats converge at a time of rapid technological
    change. Emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and
    quantum computing will define the future of national security,
    geopolitical power, and human civilization.
        Ubiquitous technical surveillance is presenting
    unprecedented challenges to one of the CIA's core missions,
    collecting human intelligence. In short, the challenges are
    great and increase the necessity of confirming a CIA Director
    who is prepared on day one to take them head on.
        For roughly a quarter of a century, I have devoted my
    professional life to U.S. national security. I served as the
    chief of antiterrorism and national security and then U.S.
    Attorney for of the Eastern District of Texas. As a
    Congressman, I was a Member of the House Intelligence, Homeland
    Security, and Judiciary Committees. As Director of National
    Intelligence, I had the privilege of working closely with
    President Trump and oversaw the 18 agencies of the U.S.
    Intelligence Community, including the Agency I now have the
    honor of being nominated to lead.
        In each of these roles I served with fidelity to the
    Constitution and the strict adherence to the rule of law, and I
    have always prioritized American civil liberties, something I
    will continue to do, if confirmed to serve again.
        Each of these experiences has shaped me as a leader and
    national security professional. Together they have prepared me
    to steer the CIA through a tumultuous time in the world and
    toward a future in which the CIA's mission will be both more
    difficult and more indispensable than ever before.
        If confirmed, my leadership at CIA will focus on setting
    and communicating priorities and demanding relentless
    execution. Above all will be a strict adherence to the CIA's
    mission. We will collect intelligence, especially human
    intelligence, in every corner of the globe, no matter how dark
    or difficult. We will produce insightful, objective, all-source
    analysis, never allowing political or personal biases to cloud
    our judgment or infect our products. We will conduct covert
    action at the direction of the President, going places no one
    else can go and doing things no one else can do.
        To the brave CIA officers listening around the world, if
    all of this sounds like what you signed up for, then buckle up
    and get ready to make a difference. If it doesn't, then it is
    time to find a new line of work.
        We must be the ultimate meritocracy. I will
    unapologetically empower the most talented, hardest working,
    and most courageous risk takers and innovators to protect the
    American people and advance America's interests. And I will not
    tolerate anything or anyone that distracts from our mission.
        It would be inappropriate in an unclassified setting for me
    to discuss in detail some of my views on intelligence
    collection priorities, but I am happy to do so in the
    classified hearing that will follow this one.
        However, if confirmed, there are several organizational
    priorities that I plan to focus on that I would like to discuss
    here.
        The first is talent. As you are all no doubt aware, the CIA
    has a remarkably low turnover rate among its workforce. This
    shows the CIA's success in attracting mission-focused public
    servants who find deep meaning and value in the unique work
    they are privileged to do every day. But in some cases, it also
    suggests that complacency is tolerated. High performers hate
    nothing more than mediocrity and nothing poisons a high-
    performance workplace culture than leaders who don't hold team
    members accountable when they don't meet expectations. The CIA
    must be a place that incentivizes and rewards meaningful
    contributions to our Nation's security and holds accountable
    low performers and bad actors who are not focused on our
    mission.
        It has been said that the CIA's World War II predecessor,
    the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), described its ideal
    recruit as ``a Ph.D. who could win a bar fight.'' This
    sentiment is the essence of what today's CIA must recapture,
    but we must find that fighting spirit in recruits whose
    talents, skill sets, and backgrounds are more varied than ever.
        I will also work to develop pathways for mid-career
    professionals with highly sought after skills to fill gaps in
    the Agency's workforce and for CIA officers to do rotations in
    the private sector that broaden their perspectives.
        I am committed to protecting and supporting CIA's
    workforce. We will fully investigate workforce health and
    wellness issues, including anomalous health incidents (AHI).
    Our officers must embrace a culture of toughness and resilience
    but we must also be clear that when they put themselves in
    harm's way we will make sure they are taken care of when they
    return home. We owe that to America's men and women in uniform,
    and we owe it to the silent warriors who risk their lives in
    the shadows as well.
        Altogether, these talent strategies will be particularly
    important in addressing another organizational priority that I
    will focus on--technology. At the CIA technology is both a tool
    and a target. As a tool, technology is baked into nearly every
    facet of the Agency, from the spy gadgets imagined and created
    by the Directorate of Science and Technology and used by the
    Directorate of Operations, and the cyber capabilities deployed
    by the Directorate of Digital Innovation to the Directorate of
    Support using new technology tools to support our workforce and
    the AI-powered large language models used by the Directorate of
    Analysis. But over the decades, as technological innovation has
    shifted more and more from the public sector to the private
    sector, the CIA has struggled to keep pace. As a target,
    technology is more important than ever, whether it is
    understanding our adversaries' capabilities in AI and quantum
    computing or their developments in hypersonics and emerging
    space technologies or their innovations in counterintelligence
    and surveillance, the recent creation of the Agency's
    Transnational and Technology Mission Center was an
    acknowledgment of that fact, but much more has to be done
    because our adversaries, and one in particular, that I will
    discuss now, understand that the Nation who wins the race of
    emerging technologies of today will dominate the world of
    tomorrow.
        Which brings me to the need for the CIA to continue in
    increasing intensity to focus on the threats posed by China and
    its ruling Chinese Communist Party.
        As DNI, I dramatically increased the intelligence
    community's resources devoted to China. I openly warned the
    American people that from my unique vantage point as an
    official who saw more intelligence than anyone else, I assessed
    that China was far and away our top national security threat.
        President Trump has been an incredible leader on this
    issue, and it is encouraging that a bipartisan consensus has
    emerged in recent years. The recent creation of the CIA's China
    Mission Center is an example of the good work that must
    continue.
        In closing, the Agency must provide the President and U.S.
    policymakers with the best possible intelligence to inform
    their decisionmaking in hopes of preserving peace and spreading
    prosperity. This is our once in a generation challenge. The
    intelligence is clear. Our response must be clear as well.
        I am honored for the opportunity to appear before you
    today, and I thank you for your consideration of my nomination
    to be Director of the CIA, and I look forward to answering your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of the witness follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe.
        Colleagues, I will remind you that we will move on to
    questions now for five minutes each in order of seniority at
    the gavel. When we conclude this open session will have a 30-
    minute break and move directly into a closed session.
        Mr. Ratcliffe, the Director of the CIA has four
    responsibilities under the law: No. 1, collecting foreign
    intelligence and counterintelligence; No. 2, correlating,
    evaluating, and disseminating that intelligence; No. 3,
    directing and coordinating all human intelligence collection
    outside the U.S., and No. 4, performing other intelligence
    functions as directed by the President.
        The way I count those four responsibilities, at least three
    of them are about collecting foreign intelligence. And I said
    in my opening statement that collecting foreign intelligence is
    the core mission of the CIA. Do you agree that it is the core
    mission of the CIA to aggressively and unapologetically collect
    foreign intelligence; which is to say, steal the secrets of our
    adversaries to protect this Nation?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I do, Senator. That is why in my opening I
    said we would go to every corner of the globe no matter how
    dark or difficult to do that. Look, I know this Committee knows
    as well that on this issue with regard to HUMINT, the
    collecting of human intelligence, we are not where we are
    supposed to be. And other agencies collect HUMINT, but CIA is
    the world's premier and must be the world's premier clandestine
    collector of human intelligence.
        Yes, there are challenges. We talked about some of those--
    ubiquitous technical surveillance--but some of that, Senator,
    is an issue of making it a priority and focus and execution.
    You mentioned in your opening a former director once recently
    said that the CIA does not steal secrets, and I think that was
    demoralizing to the Directorate of Operations. So I am here to
    publicly say that if confirmed, that is exactly what the CIA is
    going to do.
        Good decisions are hostage to good information and good
    intelligence, and the better we do at collecting human
    intelligence, the better decisions you all can make, the better
    analytic judgments analysts can make, and the fewer
    intelligence lapses or failures that you highlighted, Mr.
    Chairman, will occur, if we embrace that as a priority.
        Chairman Cotton. Thank you.
        With intelligence collection as the core mission of the
    CIA, then I presume you agree in my opening statement that the
    people who collect the intelligence are the main effort in the
    Agency, everyone else is a supporting effort--important jobs to
    be sure but a supporting effort; is that right?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
        Chairman Cotton. Do we need to increase the ratio of people
    in that main effort who are collecting intelligence to the
    people who are supporting and using it to harness its use?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. To the point of what the core mission is in
    increasing human intelligence one of the things if confirmed I
    will spend some time. I had an opportunity to go out to the
    Agency a few times as a nominee, but if confirmed, I do want to
    spend time looking at that, Senator, in terms of the ratios and
    how resources are being deployed, the structure in which those
    resources exist currently, and whether or not that needs to
    change to improve our performance.
        Chairman Cotton. Thank you. Let's talk a little bit about
    analytic objectivity at the CIA. That starts with you. You have
    a partisan background. We all on this dais have partisan
    backgrounds. We have thrown partisan punches as much as the
    next guy has. It also is not without precedent. Republican
    politicians have taken over this job before--George H.W. Bush
    or Mike Pompeo; Democratic politicians like Leon Panetta have
    taken it over. I think for the record all three of them were
    pretty good at the job. Can you assure the committee, your
    workforce at the Agency and the American people that despite
    your partisan background and politics, you will set aside those
    partisan views and you will be someone who can be effectively
    lead the Agency delivering the intelligence and analysis that
    the President and the Congress depends on?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I can, Mr. Chairman.
        While I enjoyed my time in Congress, I enjoyed more my time
    as DNI and the opportunity to be apolitical, and look forward
    to, if being confirmed as CIA Director, to continuing to do
    that. It is absolutely essential that the CIA leader be
    apolitical.
        As you know that when you walk in the building at the CIA,
    inscribed on the wall is the quote ``and ye shall know the
    truth and the truth shall make you free.'' That is a reminder
    to CIA officers when they walk in about the truth. Collecting
    the truth, intelligence, critical information, so that American
    people can be free. Freedom and liberty are dependent on the
    CIA doing that job and doing it in an apolitical way. So I am
    very much committed to that, and look forward to that if
    confirmed.
        Chairman Cotton. Thank you.
        Congress mandated by law the creation of the Office of the
    Ombudsman for Objectivity at the CIA. It requires the office to
    quote ``conduct a survey of analytic objectivity among officers
    and employees of the Agency.'' In your preparation for this
    hearing, have you had an opportunity to review the results of
    the most recent survey of that office?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I have had a chance to see a summary. I
    haven't seen in detail the results of the congressionally
    mandated survey. I do know, though, that looking at it, what I
    can tell you at the top line, the participation in the survey
    was not what it should be and it reflects that a significant
    percentage of the current CIA workforce does have concerns
    about the objectivity of the products that they are producing,
    and even cited that in specific instances to include the PDB,
    the President's daily brief, included some of those products
    that the workforce felt were not being objectively produced.
        Chairman Cotton. Thank you. I am glad you saw and reached
    those conclusions. The office in that survey is a good way for
    the workforce to communicate to the leadership and to the
    Congress what is happening sometimes out of our sight, and I am
    hopeful that you will address that if confirmed.
        Vice Chairman.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
        And Mr. Ratcliffe, thank you for your opening comments. I
    appreciate your comments about technology. I appreciate your
    comments about independence in the workforce. I appreciate
    actually the Chairman asking this as well.
        I want to come back to a couple of these topics, because
    there is concern in the community. I hear it, you may have
    heard it. When we hear statements by incoming administration
    officials, and occasionally even from the President-elect
    himself, attacking the intelligence community and threatening
    to replace long-term career civil servants if they are somehow
    deemed as not sufficiently loyal. You have addressed this but I
    want to address it again right now.
        What assurances can you provide to this Committee and to
    the CIA workforce that you will resist efforts to fire or force
    out career CIA employees because of perceived political views
    or somehow their views of loyalty to the President?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I think the best example of that, Mr. Vice
    Chairman, is if you look at my record, and my record as DNI.
    That never took place. That is never something anyone has
    alleged and it is something that I would never do. So I would
    approach this position very much the same way and provide the
    same assurance.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Again, I think there has been--a lot
    has happened in the last four years since your prior service.
    There have been these comments.
        I would emphasize again, if you are asked to remove
    personnel, to get rid of individuals based on this political
    litmus test, I would ask that you keep the committee informed
    of those requests.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I certainly will.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Same thing--and again, I appreciate
    the Chairman raising this as well. The most important job for
    you, for the folks at the CIA, is speaking truth to power. And
    I want to again reiterate the question Senator Cotton raised.
    We want to make sure your analysis is objective. It is not
    politically influenced. We have got to make sure it is timely.
    This willingness to speak truth to power, even if it is
    uncomfortable. I would like you to speak to that again.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Vice Chairman Warner, I appreciated the
    opportunity for you and I to visit. As you recall, this issue
    came up, and I was grateful then and will take this opportunity
    to talk about what my record is in terms of speaking truth to
    power.
        If you recall, we talked about the fact that as a Member of
    Congress, I was the individual who was outside the Judiciary
    Committee in 2019 listening to the former FBI Director Jim
    Comey say that my line of questioning was political; that the
    idea that intelligence authorities at the FISA Court being
    abused couldn't possibly happen--was a bunch of nonsense. But I
    had reviewed those applications and I knew that I was speaking
    truth to power, and the inspector general and the subsequent
    FBI Director later confirmed that under oath.
        To that point, Director Wray this week in his exit
    interview said that China was the defining threat of our
    generation. I wrote that and said that four years ago as DNI,
    and when I did I was accused of being political. But I wasn't.
    I was speaking truth to power. I wasn't outsizing the threat
    from China.
        In 2020, when a chairman of an intelligence committee
    misrepresented that a laptop owned by then-candidate Biden's
    son was somehow a Russian intelligence operation and 51 former
    intelligence officials used the imprimatur of IC authority to
    go along with that, I stood in the breach. I stood alone and
    told the American people the truth about that.
        So I think my record in terms of speaking truth to power
    and defending the intelligence community and its good work is
    very clear. And what I can assure you is, those types of
    instances if I am in that position as CIA Director and have to
    do that again, as uncomfortable as that can be to be accused,
    you know, the truth will ultimately defend itself, and I think
    that intelligence will as well.
        Vice Chairman Warner. And the truth will defend itself even
    if that truth is counter to the views of the current
    administration. At the end of the day it has to lead back to
    the truth.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Correct.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Time for one last question. As you
    well know, our intelligence community is the best in the world,
    but we also receive an enormous amount of benefit from our
    partners around the world. We have got to make sure, and
    obviously the President has the right to declassify
    information; but we have seen that willingness to declassify in
    advance of Putin's brutal attack on Ukraine used effectively
    but if we look at the declassification particularly if it is
    done below the Presidential level, making sure we consider the
    sources and methods of our allies, there is no requirement that
    intelligence is shared. It is based on a trust relationship.
        I'd like you to briefly speak to how we maintain that trust
    relationship with the very valuable information we receive from
    our allies and partners around the world.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, I agree completely. As DNI, I was able
    to experience what you just said. We do have the best
    intelligence enterprise in the world, but we have great
    partners around the world that we work with to do great things
    to improve not just our national security posture, but theirs.
    That is reliant upon mutual trust and respect for intelligence
    sharing between intelligence agencies.
        And as CIA Director, if confirmed, I will understand that
    improving our national security posture and protecting the
    American people will be absolutely dependent upon maintaining
    those relationships and maintaining that trust.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Thanks. Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome. For the past nine years at least, anomalous health
    incidents also known as the Havana syndrome, have been a
    serious and persistent problem within the intelligence
    community. At first there was a robust effort to investigate
    the cause of these incidents and to support the possible
    victims. Along with other Senators on this Committee, I was one
    of the authors of the HAVANA Act to ensure that there was
    funding available for those who had been afflicted.
        However, more recently, support for both investigative
    analysis and for victims within the CIA have decreased. Then we
    have had some interesting developments. On December 5th, the
    House Committee on Intelligence released an unclassified report
    finding that there was an increasing likelihood that a foreign
    adversary was responsible for at least some of the reported AHI
    cases.
        Then on the 10th of January, the ODNI released an updated
    intelligence assessment of the AHIs that revealed that two
    intelligence agencies reported that they believed a foreign
    actor may have used some sort of novel weapon or prototype
    device to inflict AHI's on our personnel.
        This is very disturbing to me. It raises questions of
    whether dissenting voices were suppressed in earlier analyses.
    And my basic question to you is this: What actions, if
    confirmed, will you take to ensure that the CIA aggressively
    and objectively investigates the causes of the AHIs including
    examining whether or not a foreign adversary is responsible for
    harming the men and women who are serving our country?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Senator Collins, thank you for the question,
    and I want to start by saying that I enjoyed the chance to
    visit with you. And as you recall, we talked about this issue
    from my perspective four years ago when I was the Director of
    National Intelligence and you were as concerned then as you are
    now about this issue, along with Senator Rubio.
        I asked then-CIA Director Haspel to look into the issue
    four years ago. Having stepped away, I share your frustration
    that four years later we are very much in the same place in
    terms of trying to make an assessment and determination on the
    cause of this. I share your frustration in not being able to
    understand why. But, if confirmed, and have the opportunity to
    be briefed on all the assessments and intelligence, my pledge
    to you is that I will drill down and look carefully at that
    issue and work with you to see.
        I read the unclassified report, the House report and the
    unclassified version of the Intelligence Community Assessment.
    I have not had access to the--my understanding--very lengthy
    classified report. But I look forward to drilling down on that
    because as I talked about in my opening, the workforce has been
    affected by this and it has affected their morale because of
    this and it is why I highlighted that.
        So the cause of it is one point, but the care of the CIA
    workforce that has been affected is another. But they are
    equally important to me. So my pledge is to look into it but to
    work with you to try and--obviously we need to know if we have
    an adversary that is using a weapon against our people, and I
    look forward to my ability to look at that intelligence for
    myself.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, and I look forward to working
    with you.
        I have very little time left. The Chairman mentioned that
    the intelligence community for which I have the greatest
    respect has had some significant misjudgments lately.
        For example, there was a misjudgment of how long the Afghan
    government would stand after the United States' hasty and ill-
    advised withdrawal. The IC missed early assessments on
    Ukraine's willingness to fight, projecting incorrectly how
    quickly the Russians would be able to take Kyiv. They did not
    warn or predict the Hamas mass attack against Israel. The IC
    was surprised at South Korea's martial law declaration, nor did
    they predict the rapid collapse of the Syrian regime.
        My question to you--and I know the IC is not going to get
    it right every time. But when there is a pattern or even when
    there is a miss, what should the IC do to review why these
    major intelligence changes were not identified or predicted?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Senator.
        It is what I talked about I think in response to Chairman
    Cotton's question about this. The intelligence community is not
    always going to get it right. It hasn't always gotten it right.
    But we have had too many instances where you all as
    policymakers are finding out by watching news reports about
    some of these things that I think can be at least in some cases
    at least fairly characterized as intelligence failures or
    lapses.
        We talked about what can we do, what do we need to do. Part
    of it is a technical thing in terms of improving our
    collection, addressing ubiquitous technical surveillance. I
    know I haven't been fully briefed on this but I am impressed by
    some of the things for instance that the Directorate of Science
    and Technology is doing to help us solve for X with regard to
    operating as human sources in an environment of UTS.
        But I also think a bigger part of this that I am going to
    focus on, Senator, is to look at what is happening in terms of
    the focus and execution on core mission. Better--as I said,
    good decisions are hostage to good information and we all know
    that the human intelligence collection isn't where it needs to
    be. So, looking at the reasons why we have lost our focus there
    and some of those things are, you know, if you have a
    politically motivated bureaucratically imposed social justice
    agenda that takes up part of your attention, that can distract
    from the core mission of collecting human intelligence that
    matters and providing it to you in a timely way. My pledge to
    you is that I am as every bit as concerned, and I don't want
    those intelligence failures or lapses to happen on my watch,
    and I will do everything I can to ensure that it doesn't.
        Chairman Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe, for the thorough
    answer. I know that you would be thrilled to stay here all day
    long to answer our questions. But, colleagues, try to move it
    along. I know there are four or other five hearings going on.
    Some of you may have to get to those hearings. Let's try to
    move quickly and stick to the 5-minute limit. We will have a
    chance to question Mr. Ratcliffe in the closed hearing, and I'm
    sure he will be happy to answer your questions for the record
    as well.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. I am hoping that quantum computing might
    solve the problem of having to be three places at once here
    after these hearings.
        I first want to acknowledge a new Senator at the end of the
    dais, Senator Young, and welcome him to the committee. I am
    pleased he is joining us and I know he will make a great
    contribution.
        Mr. Ratcliffe, congratulations.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you.
        Senator King. Welcome. It seems to me that you have an
    initial task that is a little unusual but also very important
    and that is to restore the confidence of the President-elect in
    the intelligence community. Before you could deliver the
    information that he needs to know, you need to get him to a
    place where he does have confidence in the judgments that are
    coming to him and he is notoriously skeptical of the
    intelligence community. Being skeptical is not necessarily a
    bad thing. But I hope that is one of the first things that you
    can work with him on is to make him receptive to the
    information and the truth that you will be providing as a
    result of your position.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, thank you, Senator.
        I think one of the reasons that I am having this
    opportunity for you all to consider me for confirmation is
    because President Trump knows and wants me to lead with
    integrity, wants me to carry out the duties of the CIA as
    director to follow the law and authorities as far as it will go
    and no further to protect America's national security.
        Senator King. I think that confidence he has in you is an
    important asset. I would suggest rebuilding his confidence in
    the community is an important task.
        Let me move forward. Everybody has talked about telling the
    truth to power. Dan Coats, one of your predecessors at DNI, put
    it most succinctly and persuasively. He said the mission of the
    intelligence community is to find the truth and tell the truth.
    I think that is a very good way to look at it. We haven't
    talked much here today about why that is so important.
        I recently reread David Halberstam's book ``The Best and
    the Brightest,'' a comprehensive history of Vietnam.
        It is heartbreaking about the intelligence failures and
    frankly, intelligence manipulation that led to a great deal of
    that tragedy. So that is why it is so important, because skewed
    intelligence can equal lives lost. And you have already
    committed and I won't make you say so again, but I think you
    understand how important this is.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I do.
        Senator King. Four years ago I asked you a series of yes
    and no questions and you answered them all correctly. I would
    like to run through them once more very briefly.
        Would you ever ask, encourage, or support an intelligence
    professional adjusting his or her assessment to avoid criticism
    from the White House or political appointees?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. No.
        Senator King. Would you ever change or remove content in an
    intelligence assessment for political reasons or at the behest
    of political leadership?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. No.
        Senator King. Would you consider an individual's personal
    political preferences to include loyalty to the President in
    making a decision to hire, fire, or promote an individual?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. No.
        Senator King. And do you commit to exclusively consider
    professional qualifications and IC personnel decisions without
    consideration of partisan or political factors?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
        Senator King. If you were to receive credible evidence as
    Director of the CIA that an individual was undermining
    objectivity and furthering a political agenda in the
    intelligence community, would you remove or discipline that
    person?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
        Senator King. Will you or any of your staff impose a
    political litmus test for CIA employees?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. No.
        Senator King. Finally, if confirmed, will you reassure your
    workforce that loyalty tests are not allowed and not encouraged
    in the CIA?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I will.
        Senator King. Those were exactly the answers that you gave
    before. Thank you.
        One other brief question. I believe that you are the author
    of an important statute on cybersecurity. And I have done
    extensive work in that area myself. I believe that one of the
    great failings in national policy is a lack of the cyber
    deterrent strategy that our adversaries, particularly China,
    feel that they can attack our telecommunications system, our
    electrical system or whatever with impunity. Do you believe it
    would serve the national interest to develop a declaratory
    cyber deterrent strategy similar to the strategy that underlies
    the rest of our national defense posture?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I do, Senator, and I know we share a similar
    view on the threat from cyber. There is so much focus on the
    integrity--the sovereignty and integrity of our territorial
    borders, but as you well know, it is invasion through our
    digital borders from half a world away and a few seconds and a
    few key strokes that can cause----
        Senator King. And it is happening every day.
        Mr. Ratcliffe [continuing]. So much damage. The deterrent
    effect has to be that there are consequences to our adversaries
    when they do that.
        One of the things that I hope to do if confirmed as CIA
    Director is to work on the development of the types of tools
    that will be effective in allowing us to do those things. The
    deployment of those capabilities, of course, will be a policy
    decision for others to make. But I would like to make sure that
    we have all of the tools necessary to go on offense against our
    adversaries in the cyber means.
        Senator King. Thank you very much. I hope you will advocate
    in the councils of the national security apparatus of the
    administration. Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe. I appreciate your
    testimony.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Lankford.
        Senator Lankford. John, Michele, thank you for being here.
    Thanks for your leadership. Thanks for your sacrifice, and what
    you have already done to serve the Nation. We really appreciate
    that.
        It is a tremendous sacrifice to serve in the intelligence
    community. As my wife has said to me a couple of times, we
    share everything about everything and talk about life together.
    But now there is a portion of my life I can't talk about with
    her, serving on the Intelligence Committee. You have had even
    more of that serving as DNI. So thanks for your sacrifice to
    serve.
        I have several questions I want to run through quickly on
    this. There are a group of folks in Oklahoma City. I can't name
    who they are because they are alive, but their lives were
    threatened on election day by an ISIS terrorist in Oklahoma
    City that was discovered initially by a 702.
        That 702 authority is important. There are people in my
    neighborhood that are alive today because of that 702
    authority. You have been outspoken on this. It has been much
    maligned in many ways, but it has been vital for intelligence
    collection around the world.
        What is your position on 702 authority?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Senator Lankford, for the
    sentiment and for the question. FISA and particularly Section
    702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is an
    indispensable national security tool. There is no other way to
    get around that. I say that not as a matter of opinion, but as
    an informed judgment in my role as Director of National
    Intelligence being the President's principal intelligence
    adviser, advising the President in the Oval Office and
    understanding that a significant percentage--sometimes more
    than half of the actionable foreign intelligence that we
    provide to the President as the policymaker to act as Commander
    in Chief comes from FISA-derived or 702-derived action.
        I will say I have supported FISA in that regard, but I
    also, as I outlined earlier, understand that it is an important
    indispensable tool but one that can be abused.
        Senator Lankford. Right.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. And that we must do everything we can to
    ensure it has the appropriate safeguards, because it can't come
    at the sacrifice of Americans' civil liberties. So I have
    supported those reforms and called out those abuses when they
    have taken place.
        Senator Lankford. I think the best way to do that is by
    actually enforcing. Those that have abused it, that they are
    actually called out and accountability is held for those
    individuals so everybody knows this is an indispensable tool.
    Don't abuse it. I think that becomes very clear. You have
    mentioned in your testimony, we cannot ignore CIA's critical
    counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions in support of
    border security efforts. I think few Americans understand just
    south of our border is one of the most violent areas of the
    world. Today, there are murders, beheadings. There are aerial
    bombardments with one cartel fighting within itself fighting
    for leadership right now. It is an incredibly violent area just
    south of our border, not to mention the thousands of Americans
    that die with the narcotics they pump into the United States,
    and destabilize our economy and our families. That is a
    critical role for us in our national security. How do you
    perceive that?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, and it also ties in, Senator, to your
    question about the importance of FISA. So much of what the CIA
    has done and can do to support U.S. Government efforts to
    interrupt the drug trafficking rings and the places from which
    the precursor chemicals for those drugs come from, our
    disruptions are often as a result of FISA-derived information.
        But you highlight an important point. We talk about the
    threats from China and Russia and other adversaries overseas,
    but I think we all know and understand and acknowledge that the
    failures and the integrity of our border has turned my home
    State of Texas as not only a border State but every State into
    a border State. We have to make sure, and one of the things, if
    confirmed, that I want to talk about and pledge is the
    understanding that in addition to drug trafficking I made the
    point about terrorists coming across our border, that we not
    lose sight of counterterrorism as something that the CIA needs
    to be focused on as we talk so much about the threat from China
    and Russia and the great power competition.
        Senator Lankford. Mr. Chairman, I will yield back 12
    seconds to you. How about that for a gift?
        Chairman Cotton. Thank you. Senator Bennet, please follow
    Senator Lankford's example.
        Senator Bennet. Thank you. I will take Senator Lankford's
    12 seconds. I'm just kidding.
        I want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on taking on this
    role, and I want to thank the Vice Chairman for your leadership
    on this Committee. I hope that we will continue with the
    standard that you set for all of us in terms of politics.
        Congressman Ratcliffe, it is good to see you again. Thank
    you for your visit to the office.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. As well.
        Senator Bennet. I know you are a student of history and a
    student of this Committee, know that this Committee came out of
    the series of reforms that Congress put together to deal with a
    really dark chapter in American history. Senator King from
    Maine talked about bad intelligence during Vietnam. There were
    instances of the CIA engaging in assassination plots abroad. It
    is hard to imagine today that that is even true.
        That provoked bipartisan outrage, and the reason this
    Committee exists in part is not just to make the policy that
    you have been talking about and others this morning, but also
    to provide oversight on behalf of the American people and our
    colleagues who, as Senator Lankford was just saying, don't have
    access to the intelligence that the people on this Committee
    have.
        I would just ask you to talk a little bit about your views
    on what the purpose of that congressional oversight is and
    what, if you are confirmed to this position, what your
    responsibility to this Committee will be?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Senator Bennet. I enjoyed the
    chance to visit with you and talk about a number of issues. As
    you know from my background, I came from Congress. I was on an
    Oversight Committee, the House Permanent Select Committee on
    Intelligence. So I think it gives me a unique perspective, I
    brought that over as DNI and if confirmed, as CIA Director. I
    have the perspective of both the executive branch and the
    legislative branch.
        I will confess that one of the things I was disappointed in
    was the fact that despite being on a congressional Oversight
    Committee over the intelligence communities, there was so much
    intelligence that I learned for the first time as DNI that I
    knew that no Member of Congress was aware of.
        And I think that that sort of speaks to my approach and
    understanding, that I take seriously the obligation that I will
    have if confirmed as CIA Director to keep this Committee fully
    and currently informed on intelligence issues.
        It is not that this Committee or any Intelligence Committee
    or any oversight committee in Congress needs to know
    everything, but you should at least know the topic exists.
        Senator Bennet. So let's talk about that a little bit,
    Congressman. When the President gets his Presidential daily
    brief every day. There is a very high standard for veracity for
    what is in that because he has to obviously make the most
    significant decisions that any human has to make about
    deploying our defense assets or the other things that a
    President does.
        We don't have anything like that in Congress. And a lot of
    the time we are often, as you said, finding ourselves fishing
    around in headlines and sort of less well-organized
    intelligence materials that we are provided, with no assurance
    that it is a complete picture of anything. So I wonder what
    your conclusion about that is and what the obligation of the
    CIA or any intelligence agency is with your leadership to be
    able to provide a fuller picture, the picture that you are
    talking about that a Member of Congress who is on this
    Committee should actually know rather than be guessing about?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, my perspective is you have highlighted
    all the things that sort of reveal that our national security
    posture is impacted in a negative way when we are not
    communicating well between the branches of government, and
    particularly on sensitive national security matters.
        I think a better informed Congress will allow for better
    national security decisions and keep the American people safe.
    I am open to a continuing dialogue about how--I won't stand on
    tradition. This is traditionally what the CIA does or shares. I
    am open to at the end of the day, we talk about the core
    mission of the CIA. It is to provide a decisive strategic
    advantage to you and to the President as policymakers. I don't
    view it as just informing the President. I view it as integral
    that I be informing you to provide that same strategic decisive
    advantage.
        Senator Bennet. I am out of time but I appreciate very much
    of the fulsomeness of your answer. I want to observe that it is
    really easy for politicians to accuse the intelligence agencies
    of politicization and actually it is important that we do that
    when it is an the appropriate thing to do. But this is the
    place where that oversight is supposed to be provided. These
    are the people that are supposed to fix that problem. And it
    can only be done if we have people with integrity that are
    working at the heads of these agencies that can help us fix the
    problems, not just complain about it. And I hope we will be
    able to work together to do that. Thank you Mr. Ratcliffe. I
    look forward to working with you.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ratcliffe,
    thank you for your service to our country already, and to
    Michele, thank you for the sacrifice which you also offer in
    allowing him to do this particular job in the future.
        I want to go back to the FISA Section 702 just a little
    bit. We are in an open session, and I think one of the
    opportunities that we have is to perhaps share with the
    American people with a little bit more clarity what 702 is
    really all about and what actually happens.
        Can you kind of describe in an approach that--OK. It is
    coming up for renewal again in April of next year. And between
    now and then we are going to have to convince the American
    people and other Members of Congress that we have made
    significant improvements in the protections, but also we have
    done our best to try to explain why this is such an important
    part of, as a tool, in our collection approach.
        Can you talk a little bit about the mechanics so that as
    those who listen to you today, they understand what FISA 702
    actually is and how it fits into the collection process?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Sure. Senator, thank you. I enjoyed the
    chance to visit with you. I know we, we are like-minded in
    terms of the importance of 702 as I talked with Senator
    Lankford and how I view it as an indispensable tool.
        It is one that I used as a prosecutor. General Ashcroft
    talked about national security and terrorism related
    investigations. I have used it as a practical matter there.
    Like you as a legislator have seen it. But then the unique
    perspective as DNI and if confirmed here, the importance of it
    in fulfilling the core mission.
        702 allows for foreign--collecting foreign intelligence on
    foreign persons, not on U.S. persons. The controversy, why some
    people think that FISA is, no pun intended, a four-letter word,
    that in the course of technical collection on foreign persons
    for foreign intelligence to make good decisions to keep our
    country safe, that sometimes U.S. persons are incidentally
    collected. In other words, they are having a conversation with
    a foreign person.
        Senator Rounds. Look, we eavesdrop, don't we?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
        Senator Rounds. We are not eavesdropping on Americans. We
    are eavesdropping on people that are not American citizens and
    we are doing it outside of our country.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. That's right.
        Senator Rounds. And in the middle of it, we have Americans
    that are sometimes caught up and maybe perhaps having a
    conversation with somebody outside the country.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. That's right.
        Senator Rounds. At that point there may have been something
    collected inadvertently. Can we use that?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. So there is, for instance, when the CIA
    collects intelligence, it is allowable to do a U.S. person
    query where you are looking for someone that might be
    communicating with some foreign person to do something bad to
    the United States.
        What you can't have is accessing that or making the query
    for political reasons or for some reason other than protecting
    our national security. We have to have the safeguards to make
    sure that those kinds of abuses can't take place and be
    misused. And my pledge to you is, if confirmed as CIA Director,
    that that won't happen.
        I will point out that I haven't been briefed on everything,
    but I am impressed with the CIA's compliance rate with regard
    to U.S. person queries is 99.6 percent, meaning they do a
    really good job of making sure that Americans who are swept up
    incidentally aren't having their civil liberties violated. Is
    it perfect? No. But----
        Senator Rounds. But there were reforms made based upon
    practices that were not appropriate several years ago.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. That's correct.
        Senator Rounds. As you are reporting it. But they have
    already been addressed.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. That's correct.
        Senator Rounds. So you would be supportive of the renewal
    of 702 and perhaps there are some additional considerations,
    but at this point it is critical we get it renewed?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. It is critical. It is indispensable, and for
    critics of it, no one has offered a replacement. If, for
    instance, half of the actionable foreign intelligence comes
    from FISA 702, what are we going to replace that with? And the
    critics haven't provided any alternative to that. And so----
        Senator Rounds. And look, and I agree and I thought it was
    important in this open setting that we there be a better
    understanding or a better clarification.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I mean.
        Senator Rounds. How critical it is and what it really is.
    It is basically looking at things overseas and not in the
    United States.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I think it is going to be an iterative
    ongoing discussion and needs to be as it comes up for
    reauthorization again, and it will be incumbent on me if
    confirmed both within the administration and outside stress the
    things that you and I are talking about and make sure that
    people understand, and to dispel false narratives about how
    FISA is being misused or can be misused.
        Senator Rounds. Correct. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
    Ratcliffe, for your service. Thank you for meeting with me. We
    had an excellent conversation about a number of our priorities
    on the committee, but mine specifically. Pandemic preparedness
    was one issue. AHIs which Senator Collins covered very
    effectively and sexual assault and harassment in the military.
    So I just want to address those so you can talk about them
    publicly.
        As we discussed, we need to do a much better job in
    detecting and preventing and knowing the intelligence to
    prepare for the next pandemic. We didn't have the type of
    collaboration we needed to prepare for COVID. We had
    disagreements about how COVID began and we never really got
    resolution on that, which is a concern for me. But this idea of
    a one-health proposal is creating essentially a fusion center
    for the CIA, the NSA, the DoD, the Department of Agriculture,
    and HHS, so that you are in real time working collaboratively
    to detect this information. Because agriculture and science,
    they often share data and information, and we know with regard
    to the Wuhan lab that they were publishing data and information
    about the tests they were doing. The scientific community had
    access to that. The CIA, on the other hand, was looking into
    other intelligence. They might have been able to get the
    details about illnesses quicker than anyone else. But none of
    these groups were talking so the data wasn't shared in a timely
    basis, so we didn't really have the information we could have
    had if the CIA was talking to the medical community, the
    scientific community, and the agricultural community, in terms
    of research. So I just want your commitment that you will work
    with me on this very important issue because the CIA can play
    such a meaningful role in protecting our Nation from such other
    threats such as a pandemic or any use of a biological weapon or
    any use of that kind of harm to the United States.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Senator Gillibrand, I really did enjoy the
    chance to visit and talk about these issues. I agree
    completely. I do pledge to work with you on that.
        You know, we go back to one of the worst incidents in our
    Nation's history, 9/11. It was a failure of communication. We
    had the intelligence. We just weren't sharing it with each
    other in a way that would prevent that. And you brought up
    COVID is the more recent example where maybe as many as 25
    million people died worldwide and at least a million Americans
    as a result of that. And one of the things--when I came in as
    DNI--to your point, was I was surprised at the lack of
    coordination between for instance the intelligence community
    and health agencies like the CDC and NIH and the ability to--
    that channels were not open to share information like you are
    talking about. So many of these things can be if not prevented
    mitigated quickly if we are communicating and sharing
    intelligence better.
        I completely agree with the sentiment that you have
    expressed and look forward to working with you to make sure
    that we are doing those things if I am confirmed as CIA
    Director.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. And I just want to associate
    myself with the comments of Senator Collins with regard to
    AHIs. I think it is essential, as I mentioned in our hearing,
    that you collaborate with the Department of Defense, with their
    intelligence agencies, to understand what the nature of these
    effects are, what causes them, and what type of adversaries can
    be using technology in a way to actually harm our
    servicemembers.
        I really appreciate that you will commit to delving deep
    into this issue and really try to limit the siloing of
    information between the CIA and the DoD on this very topic.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I will. I look forward to it. The CIA is the
    premier intelligence agency in the world. And I am not saying
    that it should always be able to make an assessment about
    cause, but over time it is typically something we should expect
    and in some cases demand.
        For instance, COVID. You brought up that. That is one
    issue. But AHI is another one. I am curious and look forward to
    reading the classified version of the AHI in terms of the
    assessments that were made or the inability to make an
    assessment on causation, and if I am not satisfied, will
    continue to look at that.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. And my last question--
    obviously, the scourge of sexual assault is problematic in
    every area of society. We want to make sure that the CIA is a
    safe place to work and that people who are being harassed or
    assaulted can come forward and demand justice. I just ask your
    commitment that you will work with this Committee to make sure
    all of our members of this community can work in a safe
    environment.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I will, Senator. I appreciate your
    leadership on this issue. I know it has been something you have
    highlighted. And as we talked about in our meeting, over the
    course of my career, I am grateful for what my record reflects
    in leadership positions I have had and organizations I have had
    in terms of not tolerating sexual assault and sexual abuse when
    I was U.S. Attorney, when I was DNI, when I was in Congress,
    all of those. And so I make that pledge to you gratefully.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Young.
        Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is great to
    serve with you and other members of this Committee.
        Mr. Ratcliffe, had a nice visit with you in the office. You
    answered many of my questions. What I will ask you here today
    will be familiar to you and build on that meeting.
        Thank you again for your willingness to serve your country.
    You are prepared, I think, for this step, this position. You
    are qualified. I anticipate supporting your nomination. So we
    will begin with that.
        You spoke in your testimony to the growing role of emerging
    technology and to advances being made by our adversaries. If
    confirmed, how will you direct the agency to analyze and
    respond to foreign threats that undermine, often overlook
    critical areas of our security and economic well-being, such as
    the food and Ag sectors?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. So, thank you for the question. I did enjoy
    our visit, Senator Young, and enjoyed serving with you in the
    House of Representatives, and if confirmed, look forward to
    working with you from this perspective.
        I was talking with Senator Gillibrand about COVID-19, the
    origins of that and the things that the intelligence community
    needs to do to be better. Part of that is to your point in
    embracing emerging technologies and making sure that one of the
    things that the CIA does is adapt to the technology curve. For
    instance, when we talk about utilizing artificial intelligence
    and machine learning, there is so much data that's out there in
    this great technological age that we live in, that sometimes
    the intelligence community spends so much time sifting through
    the data that they can't find the signal for the noise. And one
    of the things that technology allows us to do is to find the
    signal in all of that noise. In other words, so that we can
    find the intelligence, spend more time using the intelligence,
    and less time looking for it. You brought up different issues
    where that can be valuable and where that can be helpful.
        One of the things that I know you are interested in and we
    have talked about was the biosecurity and the biointelligence
    issues and how the CIA needs to expand its authorities in that
    regard. And its relationships with scientists and researchers
    to be on the leading edge of information as it is coming out
    and develop early warnings to some of the problems that we are
    talking about in that space.
        Senator Young. I am encouraged that you are thinking
    critically about this topic, and it is clear to me you are. You
    should know as you are likely aware, but all others who are
    watching this should know, that there has been commissioned by
    Congress a National Security Commission on Emerging
    Biotechnology, and that commission is charged with looking at
    the national security implications of our current biotech
    leadership but also making recommendations to make sure that
    the United States can stay ahead of our adversaries, in
    particular China.
        So we will produce those recommendations in the spring
    timeframe. I am chairman of that commission currently. And some
    of those will implicate very directly our intelligence
    community. And so I would just ask that you, your staff, review
    that report when it is published and work with this Committee
    and others on some of its recommendations.
        Do you commit yourself, without having seen the report, but
    to be attentive to its recommendations and findings?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I absolutely do and I appreciate your
    leadership on that issue and as we talked about, and we will
    talk about more. I look forward to supporting and collaborating
    your efforts in that regard.
        Senator Young. Thank you. Time is winding down and I am the
    new guy, but one other quick question here. Would you like to
    volunteer any particular approaches that you might want to lead
    the agency in to delay or degrade the threats posed by foreign
    nations using emerging technologies like AI or biotech?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I think we can talk about some of those
    things in the classified session, Senator. I think that what I
    would say in this setting is that when it comes to technology,
    we have so much concern about what China and Russia and our
    adversaries, what they are doing and how we need to counter
    them. I have absolute confidence that we can and will. There is
    only one country in the world that can parallel park a 200-foot
    rocket booster. The Chinese can't do it. The Russians can't do
    it. We do it, and we do it in part because of the great
    collaboration we have and can have and need to deepen between
    the private sector where there is so much innovation and
    ingenuity in the space of emerging technologies, and I am
    committed as CIA Director if allowed, to expanding upon that.
        Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Ossoff.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Ratcliffe,
    congratulations on your nomination. Thank you for your service
    to the country and congratulations to your family. I enjoyed
    our engagement a few weeks ago. It is a useful opportunity for
    me to learn more about your views and your plans for CIA.
        I want to begin with a matter that impacts Georgia.
        On election day 2024, there were a series of bomb threats
    issued against polling places in DeKalb County, Georgia,
    principally. Predominantly Black, predominantly democratically
    leaning precincts that disrupted election operations and the
    ability of folks to vote on the afternoon of election day. Our
    State election officials attributed those threats to Russian
    actors.
        What assurance can you give my constituents in Georgia that
    CIA will sustain collection to identify threats to voting
    rights and election administration in the United States?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Senator, for the question. I
    enjoyed our visit as well. I can give every assurance. As you
    know, the CIA doesn't have domestic authorities. When we talk
    about election security issues, the FBI and DHS are the
    agencies that provide that protection. Where the CIA plays a
    role is if we have bad actors who want to influence or impact
    our elections, as you have related in this case. I haven't seen
    that specific intelligence, but, for instance, if Russia--
    Russian actors were behind those threats, those are the kinds
    of things that the CIA not only should do but must do and,
    frankly, do better in terms of collecting intelligence on how
    our adversaries intend, whether it is through physical means or
    through a cyber means of disrupting or influencing elections.
    And the CIA's role should be to identify those threats over
    there before they come over here.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you for that commitment to sustain
    that collection. I appreciate it.
        I want to give you the opportunity to provide some
    clarifying information about events that have attracted some
    scrutiny in September of 2020 when you sent a letter to the
    chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee that declassified
    certain intelligence about Russian analytic products that had
    been collected by the intelligence community and which pertain
    to events four years past, during the 2016 election and the
    controversy over alleged links between the Trump campaign and
    the Russian Government. And my purpose is not to interrogate or
    to relitigate that ancient history from 2016 but to understand
    why you chose to send that letter to the Senate Judiciary
    Committee declassifying intelligence on that day, September 29?
        You will no doubt recall that that was the same day as the
    Presidential debate, yes?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I don't recall that it was that date, but it
    may be.
        Senator Ossoff. You don't recall? Your testimony is that
    you are not aware that that letter was sent to the Judiciary
    Committee by you on the same day as the Presidential debate.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I don't recall that it was on that date, but
    I will take you at your word. The dates will reflect what they
    are. But to your question----
        Senator Ossoff. I want to drill down on that. Because my
    purpose is not to suggest some kind of political intent, but
    you made it very clear that avoiding politicization of the
    intelligence community's activities is a high priority for you;
    is that correct?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Correct.
        Senator Ossoff. It strikes me that in releasing politically
    sensitive intelligence that you'd think carefully about the
    timing of that; that you might consider that doing so on the
    day of a Presidential debate, when this was intelligence
    collected four years in the past, might reasonably draw the
    question of whether or not there was some political impetus. Is
    that reasonable?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. It is reasonable for you to ask that, and if
    I can, you asked me to clarify, if I can do that. You are
    correct, it was my decision, but it wasn't my process.
        To your point, that effort was actually the request of this
    Committee during my confirmation hearing as DNI, was to go back
    and look at the intelligence from 2016 and 2017 Intelligence
    Community Assessment. I also received separately a request from
    the Attorney General and from then special counsel to
    declassify certain intelligence relating to that in support of
    what would be a public report from the special counsel.
        I in addition to that received what I would call requests
    or what I would call demands from other Senate committees to
    include the Judiciary Committee and the Senate Homeland
    Security and Government Accountability--whatever the title of
    that committee is, for information related to that. That took
    place over a course of several months. And the process, just so
    you are clear, was an iterative, collaborative process that
    included the Attorney General, the CIA Director, the Director
    of the NSA, myself as DNI, and again, an iterative process that
    resulted in a highly redacted product to protect sources and
    methods, but yet to respond to these requests or demands to put
    that information out. So I take----
        Senator Ossoff. That is useful information and my time is
    running short, but we can discuss further in the closed session
    if we need to. I appreciate you and enjoyed our recent meeting.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I thank you for that.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. Mr. Ratcliffe, I think I have the
    distinction of having known you longer than anybody else on
    this Committee. I remember when you were----
        Mr. Ratcliffe. They call that misfortune.
        Senator Cornyn. [continuing]. When you were the mayor of
    Heath, Texas. How many people live in Heath, Texas?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Around 7,000.
        Senator Cornyn. You still live there with your wife?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I do. It is a great community.
        Senator Cornyn. It is.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I say hi to all the Heathans out there.
    (Laughter.)
        Senator Cornyn. Absolutely.
        So I have every confidence that you will do an outstanding
    job as the next Director of the CIA. And I say that advisedly,
    because as I said I have known you for a long time and watched
    your career from the private sector to U.S. Attorney, acting
    U.S. Attorney for a while, to Member of Congress. And I had the
    privilege of introducing you to the committee at your previous
    confirmation hearing as Director of National Intelligence. So I
    don't really have any doubt about your qualifications.
        I do want to talk about a couple of subjects, and one is, I
    know people have heard the discussion of FISA and Section 702,
    and I appreciate the clarity which you explain how essential
    this tool is. I think part of the problem we have had with
    reauthorization is that people don't trust the people actually
    implementing that tool, because they have seen the abuses by
    Members of the IC, including the FBI, particularly dating back
    during President Trump's administration. So they figure, well,
    everybody must misuse these tools.
        But I thought you had a great analogy when we discussed
    this on the phone. You said, well, you probably have a bunch of
    steak knives in your kitchen, and they can be used for useful
    and beneficial purpose but they can also be misused. And I
    think that was a pretty good analogy.
        But I want to ask you about one of the quote ``fixes'' that
    some people have suggested to the current state of the law, and
    that is to require a warrant to query lawfully collected FISA
    information. You have properly identified the fact that these
    are directed at people overseas--overseas--foreigners overseas
    not Americans. But you are a former U.S. Attorney and a pretty
    good lawyer, and you understand what probable cause requires.
    To be able to establish probable cause in front of a judge you
    need to have evidence. And if all you have is a FISA query of a
    foreign target that happens to mention an American citizen or a
    U.S. person, is there any way for you to go to court and
    establish the requirements of a warrant or probable cause in
    order to query that data?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, Senator, you know the answer to that
    better than I do because you are a better lawyer and were an
    Attorney General. But the answer is no, because the danger
    there is that you really don't have the information to obtain
    the warrant. And the process of obtaining the warrant, we are
    talking about national security issues where sometimes minutes
    matter and the ability to disrupt or interdict the bad actors
    or to act upon the intelligence that you can gain from that. So
    the process of even getting a warrant, the time that it takes,
    much less the fact that as you say you won't have a probable
    cause basis to get there.
        Senator Cornyn. Well, I think there is a lot of
    misunderstanding and misinformation about how FISA works. And,
    admittedly, I have to periodically go back and refresh my own
    memory because it does get to be fairly convoluted sometimes.
    But the fact of the matter is it is illegal to use this tool to
    spy on American citizens, and there are protocols in place to
    lessen the likelihood that that could ever possibly occur. But
    I think basically what has happened is there has been a lack of
    trust in the people who had access to those tools in the recent
    past, and I hope you will help restore that trust. I also think
    you are going to need to share your experience and wisdom with
    the nominees for FBI and Director of national security, because
    we have had these conversations as well, and I think there is
    some confusion about whether a warrant should be required or
    not.
        I think you are absolutely right, and that is I think is
    not the answer. Thank you.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations on
    your new job. I look forward to working with you on this
    Committee. And Mr. Ratcliffe, congratulations to your
    nomination for this position. And congratulations to your
    family as well.
        I want to follow up on what Senator Ossoff was referring
    to, the intelligence that was released prior to the 2020
    election. That intelligence was rejected. First of all it was
    before I was on the committee, but my understanding that it was
    rejected by Democrats and Republicans on this Committee as
    having no factual basis that put Russian disinformation into
    the public sphere.
        I just want to understand. So, in hindsight, knowing what
    you know now, and this is four years removed from that and we
    have had another election and, obviously, we have got
    challenges we face with Russian, Chinese, Iranian
    disinformation in our politics. So, in hindsight, are there any
    changes that you would make to the way you handled that
    information?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Senator, I appreciate the question. You
    know, I certainly--looking back, having the opportunity to
    change certain things might do that. I don't know in this case.
    For instance, Senator Ossoff raised the point that the
    declassification occurred on the day of a Presidential
    election. I don't recall that. Obviously, that is when it did.
        Senator Kelly. I think he said debate.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Debate, I am sorry. I wasn't aware of that.
    I certainly don't think I did everything perfectly in terms of
    making decisions about every issue that relates to--I am
    talking generally. But I talked about my record in terms of how
    I approach these things and how in terms of speaking truth to
    power which sometimes includes declassifying information. Most
    of the things that I have done, Senator, aged very well, and I
    think others will continue to.
        For instance, on COVID origins, I think that ultimately I
    believe there will be an assessment that is consistent with the
    position that I have taken.
        Senator Kelly. It is hard to get this stuff exactly right.
    I get that. This is complicated. In this case, you know, it did
    become rather political and I appreciate your willingness to
    look back.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. The other thing I want to say is, part of my
    answer to your question is classified, and I look forward in
    the classified session to talk to you about one of the things
    this Committee asked me to do that did influence my decision
    was to look at the 2018 Intelligence Community Assessment. And
    in not only looking at that, what I did--so to be clear. I
    requested a briefing from the CIA from some members of the team
    that were involved in that. And I am not sure that that
    information or that intelligence has been shared with this
    Committee. So I look forward----
        Senator Kelly. Let's follow up on that.
        I got a few more things to cover here and I got about maybe
    90 seconds left here.
        In your response to the committee, you indicated--this is a
    different topic.
        You agreed with the Trump administration's 2017 assessment
    that the Assad regime used chemical weapons, including in
    Douma, killing hundreds, injuring hundreds more. The U.S.
    intelligence community had a similar assessment that these
    weapons were used.
        If you are serving or when you are serving as the Director
    and the DNI asks you to explore evidence that Douma or other
    attacks were staged or that analysis indicating the use of
    chemical weapons is incorrect or there is some kind of similar
    situation, what would you do?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, look at the intelligence. So you are
    right, I did include that. That was based upon the intelligence
    that I was able to review during my time as DNI. And I think
    the intelligence was clear. I think the assessments were, I
    forget if they were with high confidence, but I believe that
    they were. What I haven't seen is any intelligence in the last
    four years that I wouldn't have access to. So I would look at
    that. But I would be surprised if there is intelligence that
    would change my initial assessment but I certainly go back and
    look at that.
        Senator Kelly. Could I just very briefly just have a few
    more seconds here? I just want to get your commitment to work
    with me, focusing on transnational criminal organizations on
    the other side of the border. It is a big problem. It affects
    my State in a big way.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. And my State.
        Senator Kelly. Yes.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I absolutely make that pledge in working
    with you to address that threat.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Moran.
        Senator Moran. Chairman, thank you.
        Mr. Ratcliffe, I appreciate our conversation in the office.
    I particularly appreciate the indication of your transparency
    with this Committee, your forthrightness, telling us the truth.
    It has been difficult from time to time to know what the true
    story is, and there is certainly--there are opinions about
    truth but we ought to be trying to find the truth.
        I want to ask you about statements that you have made. I
    agree with you that China is the greatest threat facing our
    country. I rate Russia as our second-greatest threat and
    believe it is the most acute threat today.
        Will you describe the scope of the threat as you see it,
    and the importance of countering the Kremlin?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. The question, the threat from Russia?
        Senator Moran. Threat from Russia. You indicate China is
    the first and greatest threat.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Absolutely. So Russia is very clearly an
    adversary of the United States. The threat, it courses a
    country with a very large nuclear stockpile. The thing that
    separates the threat from Russia from China in my mind and why
    I put them even though we include them in the great power
    competition is that the United States is the largest economy in
    the world. China is the second largest. Russia has an economy
    that is roughly the same size as my home State of Texas. So
    what it means is that the Russians have to decide where they
    are going to compete with the United States, and so they have
    chosen areas like hypersonics and other areas. But that comes
    with a cost. I think we saw some of the costs in terms of troop
    readiness as they engaged in their aggression against Ukraine.
    So, a dangerous lethal adversary who in many respects is,
    because of the limitations that I have talked about is focused
    on areas where there are great equalizers, and one of those is
    cybersecurity.
        Countries that can't compete with the United States in
    terms of kinetic firepower across the board can do so through
    cyber means. In other words--and we see that with Iran and
    North Korea and other countries who can't compete with us
    kinetically focus on cyber means to cause us harm. Russia
    certainly falls into that category as well in terms of where a
    lot of their focus is and my assessment of them in terms of the
    malign activities that they take across, against the U.S.
        Senator Moran. Certainly invasion of another country has
    significantly complicated the security of our allies and
    perhaps the United States. I would point out that you are the
    first Texan I have ever met that belittled the State of Texas.
    (Laughter.)
        In your answers to the committee's questionnaire you state
    regarding Russia that you ``believe.'' I am quoting you. You
    believe ``we cannot let our adversarial relationship boil over
    into unintended wars.'' And you go on to say ``I will advise
    the President when there are opportunities to work toward
    mutually beneficial outcomes with Russia.''
        You did not make a similar commitment for China, Iran, or
    North Korea. What is the difference?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I don't recall, like the context of the
    question why there would be a difference.
        For instance, I think what I was referring to there,
    Senator, was for all of the things that I talked about in terms
    of Russia as a threat and the things where they challenge us
    with malign activity, there are areas where we, for instance,
    countering terrorism. Some of the same threats that we face
    from terrorist groups are threats that they face. So there are
    occasions where information or intelligence can be shared or
    things can be done in our mutual--to the mutual benefit of our
    countries and those types of things.
        That would be true with China as well. You know. I think
    President Trump's approach from a policy standpoint is to not
    look for conflict with anyone, including our adversaries, but
    to provide a strong deterrent effect to their malign activities
    through America's strength--peace through strength.
        I think Iran may be different in the sense that it is a
    terrorist State, a terrorist regime, and has been designated by
    the Trump administration. So I would put that in a different
    category.
        Senator Moran. In addressing the importance of analytical
    objectivity and speaking truth to power, you state that as the
    DNI you represented the IC's analysis to policymakers
    faithfully, including dissenting views even when the full
    analytical picture was unpopular.
        Could you give me an example?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Sure. In connection with the 2020
    Presidential election, assessment was made as to whether China
    was trying to undermine President Trump's re-election efforts,
    and there was a split between the community.
        A majority opinion was that China was not doing that and
    wouldn't do that for a number of reasons. The minority opinion
    was that they were. I agreed with the minority opinion. But
    what I did was not try to substitute my judgment for the
    community. I wrote a dissent that would be public and people
    could see the reasons for that and in the process supported a
    whistleblower, one of our leading cyber officers, in support of
    that position.
        I will say that 15 months later, FBI Director Wray held a
    press conference talking about the exact things that I was
    saying China had engaged in that they were doing. And so the
    opinion that China would never engage in those kind of
    activities proved to be false, and I think that my dissent aged
    well.
        Senator Moran. Not only did you speak out against the
    majority but you turned out to be right.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
        On July 21, 2020, you sent a letter to this Committee
    stating that while you agreed to appear at the committee's Open
    Worldwide Threat hearing as DNI, as Director of National
    Intelligence, that you would not take any questions in open
    session. And you wrote that letter while committing twice in
    your confirmation hearing that you would appear and answer
    questions.
        Obviously, this position is one that requires congressional
    oversight. I don't think any of us up here would ever ask you
    to answer questions in a way that revealed anything that was
    classified or was more appropriate for closed session. I want
    to ask you why you thought that was appropriate, and today, can
    you commit that, if confirmed, you will appear at this
    Committee's annual Open Hearing on Worldwide Threats and take
    questions from the Committee itself?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Senator, thanks for the question. I think
    there was a slight mischaracterization.
        I didn't refuse. I made a proposal about how to handle the
    worldwide threats hearing. I did that for a number of reasons.
    First of all, I didn't at that time as DNI--which, as you know,
    the DNI speaks for the entire intelligence community.
        My proposal was actually a reflection of multiple leaders
    across the intelligence community who shared my opinion that
    other countries don't hold public hearings like that where we
    discuss sensitive national security information.
        The problem isn't in terms of you asking questions about
    classified material. The issue comes up in terms of being put
    on the spot to provide an answer where sometimes you might
    inadvertently provide information that is classified because
    you don't recall at what level or if it is classified at all.
    That is the danger, and that has happened.
        That explains how I approached that issue.
        What I would say is this. I am being considered for the CIA
    Director which is not the head of the intelligence community. I
    understand notwithstanding my opinion about how the worldwide
    threat assessment hearing should take place, that the
    committee--and I learned from that the committee disagreed and
    didn't want that proposal. So that would not be an issue if I
    am confirmed as CIA Director.
        Senator Heinrich. So you will come.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
        Senator Heinrich. And take appropriate questions.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
        Senator Heinrich. Let me ask you and you answered Mr.
    Ratcliffe this question in writing but I think it is important
    for the American people and frankly for the world to hear your
    answer in an open hearing as well.
        Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
    fiscal year 2016 prohibited the use of any interrogation
    technique that was not authorized in the Army Field Manual.
    Will you abide by this law?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
        Senator Heinrich. In your answers to the committee
    questions you wrote that the CIA must, and this is a quote from
    you: ``The CIA must help rebuild public confidence in the
    intelligence community in the wake of prior abuses.'' End
    quote.
        You reference that on a number of different occasions in
    your answers. I, frankly, never have been one to shy away from
    criticizing either the IC or the CIA when I felt it was
    appropriate. But I think most of us up here can agree that on
    the whole that CIA's men and women produce the finest
    intelligence in the world with a great deal of objectivity and
    integrity, and if there is a lack of public confidence, it is
    because it has become too easy for some elected officials to
    throw around terms like the ``Deep State.''
        If you are confirmed, what precisely would you do to help
    rebuild public confidence in the agency, and where do you see
    that necessary and appropriate?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Senator, for the question. I
    think it is the things we have talked about already and some of
    it you may not have been present for, but in terms of leading
    by example if confirmed as a CIA Director. I went through a
    series of examples where I talked about speaking truth to power
    and the importance of that and setting the right example in
    connection with that. So I think that is essentially how I
    would go about it, is to lead by example.
        Senator Heinrich. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. I believe the vice chairman has a follow-
    up question.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also
    quickly want to mention. I appreciate your answer to Senator
    Heinrich's question about appearance here. I think we do have a
    unique situation in America where we have public congressional
    oversight. I think it is critically important to help restore
    that trust, and I appreciate your commitment to appear and
    testify.
        This is a topic I am going to raise in closed, but I wanted
    to also at least get you on the record in the open session and
    I think you will concur. Senator Cotton pointed out a number of
    times, the Chairman pointed out when the IC didn't get it right
    in recent times. And I think--I am not sure we are ever going
    to get an all-seeing IC, but one particular area I have been
    concerned about is the ability for the IC to monitor technology
    advancement. I think historically that has not been the case.
    We have told our spies to go spy on the military or foreign
    governments, but we see repeatedly as we think about this
    technology competition, particularly with China. And I can cite
    chapter and verse from CIA getting it wrong about how slick it
    was going to be to move to lower level semiconductors or to
    move to smaller conductors or smaller semiconductors, area
    after area.
        I think Director Burns current administration we moved the
    enterprise some. I think we still have a lot more to do. But I
    did want you in this public setting to weigh in on how it is
    absolutely critical that the CIA is able to not only look at
    our adversaries in terms of government and military presence
    but clearly in this technology competition and how we have to
    up our game in terms of collection?
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I agree 100 percent completely. You talked
    about it, Senator, earlier in terms of military threats are one
    thing, but, as you know, I believe for instance, the NSA, we
    have the best code makers and code breakers in the world, but
    if China gets to quantum computing before we do, that causes a
    real problem. We have got to win the war, the race on
    technology to stay ahead of the technology curve. Part of that
    is, when we talk about technology as a tool and a target is, we
    have to disrupt. CIA has to play a really important role in
    disrupting our adversaries' technologies in terms of trying to
    get ahead of us.
        You mentioned semiconductors. We all know that the issue
    that relates to Taiwan and that 95 percent of advanced
    semiconductors are there and we are trying to address those
    supply chain issues. But we can do things and CIA must do
    things to disrupt how our adversaries are dealing with their
    supply chain issues in regard to that. That is just one
    example.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. For the information of Senators, we intend
    to hold a Committee vote on Mr. Ratcliffe's nomination as soon
    as possible, most likely on Monday afternoon; therefore, any
    Member who wishes to submit questions for the record after
    today's hearing, please do so by close of business tomorrow.
        Mr. Ratcliffe, I presume we can expect you to provide your
    replies even more promptly.
        Thank you all. The open session of this hearing is
    adjourned.
        We will reconvene in closed session in 30 minutes. That
    will be at 12:37 p.m. Thank you.
        (Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 12:07 p.m.)
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