

**THE PRC'S THREATS TO AMERICANS:
TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION
AND STATE-LEVEL RESPONSES**

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THE PRC'S THREATS TO AMERICANS: TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION AND STATE-LEVEL RESPONSES

THURSDAY, JUNE 4, 2026

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
COMMISSION ON CHINA,
Washington, DC.

The hearing was held from 1:34 p.m. to 3:07 p.m., in Room 106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, Representative Chris Smith, Co-chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, presiding.

Also present: Representatives McGovern and Subramanyam.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHRIS SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY AND CO-CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL- EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

Co-chair SMITH. The Commission will come to order. And thank you all for being here, and my good friend and colleague, Jim McGovern, at this hearing of the CECC. I want to thank all of you in advance. Before we begin I want to mark a solemn anniversary. Today marks the 37th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. Thirty-seven years ago millions of Chinese citizens peacefully asked for political reform, democratic openness, and basic human dignity. Their hope was met with tanks. The Chinese Communist Party unleashed the People's Liberation Army on peaceful demonstrators.

Mothers lost sons, fathers lost daughters, and China lost an idealistic generation to the violence of June 4th, 1989. There has been no full accounting of those killed, imprisoned, or disappeared. The Party still tries to erase a massacre the world must never forget. But Tiananmen cannot be erased. The enduring image of that day is the Tank Man, the solitary figure standing before a column of tanks. His courage reminds us that the desire for freedom is not Western, not foreign, and it's not imposed from the outside. It is universal.

As I have said before, a choice has been made by all of us. You either stand with the Tank Man or you stand with the tank. There is no middle ground. Tiananmen is not a detour for this hearing. It is the key to understanding it. The same party that tried to crush truth at home now tries to chase truth abroad. The tactics have not changed. The technology has changed, the reach has expanded, but the purpose is the same—to make people afraid to speak the truth, by almost any means necessary. Inside China, the

CCP uses surveillance, censorship, prison, the pervasive use of torture, forced disappearance, and fear to maintain their grip on power.

But what happens in China no longer stays in China. The Party wants to control what is said about China here, and to control who says it. The CECC has warned about the CCP's long arm for years. Long before transnational repression became a common phrase, I held a dozen hearings or so of this Commission and in my Subcommittee on Human Rights, documenting and exposing a consistent pattern of global abuse, starting with Confucius Institutes back in 2014. Over time, tactics have become more digital and more ruthless—detaining family members in China, doxing, the use of spyware, deepfakes, Hong Kong bounties, and the illegal police stations right here in the United States.

It is outrageous and unacceptable, and it absolutely must stop. Transnational repression is not only a threat to Americans, it's a broader, interconnected CCP strategy. We see that strategy in scam networks stealing from U.S. citizens, fentanyl poisoning of our cities and our young people, PRC-linked land purchases near military installations, efforts to corrupt politicians and elections, steal private personnel and biometric data, and intellectual property theft from businesses and universities.

I would note parenthetically, when I held a hearing on how Google, Microsoft, and Cisco were enabling the Chinese arm of repression in China by censoring what people could see when they did a Google search, my personal computer, my committee's computers, were all hit. Everything was taken. And it was all traced to Beijing. That was in 2005. They have gotten far more effective at doing that kind of repression. Everything was gone. And, you know, including personally identifiable information on me, and I'm not the only one. Many other people had the same thing happen.

We see that strategy replicated in other countries as well. It's not just the United States. It's Canada and elsewhere. These may all look like separate problems, but they share a common purpose—exploit our openness, gather leverage, weaken our institutions, spread propaganda, and make Americans pay a price for standing up to Beijing. But I have news for them. We're not backing down. The members of this Commission, the people who are here today, our very distinguished witnesses, we will never bow down to this tyranny. Transnational repression is the most personal form of that strategy. It brings pressure campaigns to the doorstep of students, the journalists, dissidents, artists, and family members.

That is why state and local responses matter. A victim may first call the police. A student may go to a university official. A state attorney general may see the pattern. A state legislator may realize the existing law does not fit the threat. So the questions are practical. Do local officials and officers recognize this threat? Do universities know how to protect their students? Do states have the tools they need? And does the Federal Government have a real strategy? And are we deploying enough of our capacity and capability to mitigate this threat?

That's why I'm so proud to work with Chairman Sullivan, Senator Merkley, and Jim McGovern on the Transnational Repression Policy Act. This bipartisan, bicameral legislation would define the

abuse, improve coordination, train officials, support targeted communities, and hold perpetrators accountable—because victims need more than just sympathy; they need protection and a place to turn, where those to whom they turn are well informed and equipped with tools to stop it.

But let me make one point clear. A regime that fears a student's question, a refugee's protest, an artist's statue, or the simple memory of the Tiananmen Square massacre is not strong. It's not a confident superpower. I remember when we did that hearing—we brought in the Google people. We had them testify, as well as Cisco, Microsoft, and Yahoo. And I put up on the board what you get in China when you put in the Tiananmen Square massacre. You get nothing but pretty pictures of people smiling and taking snapshots and videos there on the square. Nothing about the massacre or the protests. They live in a culture of denial, and that denial has to be eradicated.

I would say that any so-called superpower that does that lives in fear, and they are very afraid. It makes them perhaps even more dangerous. But they are not operating out of a position of confidence or power. Fear in the hands of a dictatorship, like I said, is dangerous. It becomes coercion. It becomes censorship. It becomes repression. It crosses borders and reaches right into our own communities. So our answer must be unmistakable. If the CCP threatens people here, there must be investigations and prosecutions. If it reaches across our borders to spread fear, there must be sanctions. If it takes family members hostage to silence a critic, which they do all the time, we will demand their release and expose the cruelty of that tactic. And if it tries to censor a free people, we will defend and spread the rights that Beijing fears most—freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, and the right to tell the truth without fear. Because in the United States of America, unlike China, no one needs the Party's permission to speak, to worship, to protest, to remember, or to be free. And that's why this hearing matters. And that's why having four very distinguished people testifying will help us get that message across. Thank you so much.

[The prepared statement of Co-chair Smith appears in the Appendix.]

Jim.

**STATEMENT OF JAMES P. MCGOVERN,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS**

Representative MCGOVERN. Thank you very much. I want to thank my colleague from New Jersey, Congressman Smith, for his words and for his commitment to human rights, not only in China but all around the world. Good morning, everybody. I want to welcome our witnesses and our guests to today's hearing on transnational repression.

Today is June 4th, and as Co-chair Smith pointed out, 37 years ago the Chinese government directed the military to attack civilians who were exercising their right to freedom of expression to call for economic and political reform. Let us never forget those who bravely stood for freedom in Tiananmen Square and other cities, the mothers who never knew the fate of their children, and those

who continue to tell the stories in the face of a government that seeks to silence them. And let us not forget that any society whose leaders are willing to use lethal force against peaceful protesters is a society at risk of losing its fundamental liberties.

I am glad that the Commission continues to address transnational repression. In 2020, Co-chair Marco Rubio and I created a new chapter called “Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally” in the annual report. And CECC staff have just released a new special report on transnational repression. I always appreciate the dedication of the nonpartisan subject matter experts who work for this Commission. This report is absolutely worth reading.

China is the world’s worst perpetrator of transnational repression. Freedom House lists the PRC with the most incidents, 319 since 2014. And that only accounts for reported incidents. Who knows how many people have gotten threatening texts or calls that they are too scared to report. But transnational repression is more than China. Freedom House lists Tajikistan, Rwanda, Russia, Egypt, and Belarus among the biggest violators. Last year I chaired a Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission hearing highlighting TNR by India, Pakistan, and Hong Kong. Yesterday afternoon Co-chair Smith and I convened a hearing on Türkiye, listed with 160 TNR incidents.

You know, hearings are fine, but it really is time for action. Advocates tell us that their number one goal is to create a standard definition of transnational repression. I am proud to join with CECC leaders Senators Merkley and Sullivan, and Co-chair Smith, in sponsoring the Transnational Repression Policy Act. It defines TNR in statute, strengthening efforts to counter it at the federal, state, and local level. This bill was first introduced in the House three years ago, but it has gone nowhere. In March, Freedom House led a coalition of 35 organizations, including Uyghur, Tibetan, Chinese, and Hong Kong human rights groups, in a statement to the chairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asking them to mark up the bill. Foreign Affairs has scheduled four markups since that letter, but the Transnational Repression Policy Act never makes the agenda. I ask Chairman Mast in the House to schedule it, to act.

Our bill is important. It would give the U.S. the tools to lead on TNR. Equally important, we must acknowledge that the tools will only be effective if we avoid double standards. I worry that we’re falling short. One, President Biden started, and President Trump completed, the rehabilitation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who directed the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in Türkiye. We lose credibility when the U.S. Government allows impunity for transnational repression.

Two, this Commission characterized the deportation by Thailand of 40 Uyghurs to China as transnational repression, yet the Trump administration has deported individuals who have been transnationally repressed in the U.S. by Iran and by Russia, back to those countries. We lose credibility to ask other countries to protect TNR victims when the U.S. Government refuses to protect TNR victims.

Three, to the extent we label political interference by China and the U.S. as transnational repression, then we must consider Senator Bernie Moreno's meddling in the Colombian election as transnational repression. We lose credibility when U.S. officials act like CCP officials.

Four, last year the Trump administration sanctioned a Brazilian judge who brought insurrectionists to justice, falsely portraying legitimate accountability as transnational repression. We lose credibility when U.S. officials pervert TNR to help political allies.

In September, our credibility will be again tested. Xi Jinping will visit Washington at President Trump's invitation. The last time he was in the U.S., thugs associated with the Chinese consulate in San Francisco beat up anti-Xi protesters.

We must be prepared to defend the right of protest here. The question is, will we? And I mean, this administration has deployed security forces to suppress Americans' right to protest. They're doing it right now outside of Delaney Hall ICE facility in Newark, New Jersey. If Xi Jinping asked President Trump to contain or control Chinese, Uyghur, and Tibetan protesters, will he do that? Or will he be wind at the backs of those engaged in legitimate dissent? You know, this administration has deported people for exercising their free speech rights under the First Amendment and the ICCPR to criticize the Israeli government. If Xi Jinping, you know, asked President Trump to deport people, for whatever reason, back to China, we must make it clear that that is unacceptable, and we will not do that, and we will not stand for that.

Transnational repression is a human rights violation. All human beings are entitled to the same rights, no matter where they live or how they feel about their government. And I thank the witnesses for being here today. I welcome the insight. I want to apologize in advance that I think—I don't know if we'll get to my questions, but we just got word that—I'm on the Rules Committee—at 2:30 we're taking up the rule. So, anyway—frustrating—but I want to be here for your testimony. Thank you. I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Representative McGovern appears in the Appendix.]

Co-chair SMITH. Thank you. I want to thank our Ranking Member. And you know, we do have some disagreements on some issues; you know, Delaney Hall is in my state, and I have been closely monitoring everything going on there. There are people who are credibly accused of rape, child sex trafficking—and I wrote five laws on human trafficking, including the Trafficking Victims Protection Act—who are in that facility. And the federal law enforcement, ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, police have been bitten. They've been kicked, punched. The level of restraint that they have shown is incredible. Our governor brought in the state police, and now the Newark police are there as well. So, you know, there are a lot of people in that facility. They were claiming that the food wasn't good. It is good. I just can't believe—you know, just because somebody said, Oh, this water stinks, doesn't make it stink. We've got to be very careful. So this isn't the place, I guess, to debate that.

We are here, united and standing with our friends, both here as part of the diaspora, as well as people inside of China who are suf-

fering the cruelty of Xi Jinping each and every day. I'm barred from going to China. I have tried to go. I've been put on the list. Global Times named me as an enemy—they also named Marco Rubio as an enemy, and Jim, you know, so we need to push back as never before against the monstrous dictatorship of Xi Jinping. And, again, you, the four witnesses, help bring a great deal of light and scrutiny as to what to do next concerning this important issue. Congressman Subramanyam, do you want to say something?

**STATEMENT OF SUHAS SUBRAMANYAM,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA**

Representative SUBRAMANYAM. Thank you so much to my colleagues on the Commission for all your leadership. I want to sort of home in on one particular issue when it comes to the People's Republic of China, and that's the treatment of the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. This is a campaign conducted using digital threats, coercion, and essentially taking families hostage to enforce silence here in the United States, and co-opting countries to detain exiles. I've heard stories firsthand from the Uyghur population in my district. I hosted a town hall with members of the Uyghur community last year, and the top concern they brought up was transnational repression.

Here's some of what I heard. You know, one quote from someone who wanted to remain anonymous was, "Our families do not face abstract threats, but we are enduring active, multilayered, state-sponsored transnational repression by the Chinese Communist Party right now." One Virginian, who many here may know, Rushan Abbas, spoke publicly about the mass internment camp system back in 2018, and within a week, her sister Gulshan was abducted by the Chinese government. She was subjected to a secret trial and then sentenced to 20 years in prison without any due process. On June 12th, she will be turning 64, and this is her eighth birthday in a row spent in jail.

Another constituent of mine shared how the Chinese government has also blocked communication between Uyghurs abroad and their relatives in China, and used families as leverage to prevent Uyghurs from speaking out. He said, "My family and I have not been able to speak with our loved ones back home for 10 years. We still do not know what happened to them. We've been trying to get information through multiple channels, but we have not been able to communicate. My wife, who is a U.S. citizen, only learned about her aunt's death in China nearly a year after it happened. And my daughter even asked if we have any relatives at all, because she can't speak to them."

It makes people crazy. It makes people sad. It's a terrible situation. And I could keep going. We have story after story of transnational repression, the silencing of American citizens because of what's going on in the Uyghur communities in China. And we will continue to speak out about this. We will not be silent. And we will certainly give those folks a voice. So thank you, and I yield back.

Co-chair SMITH. Before we go to our witnesses, I did want to announce—you probably all already know this—that the Congressional-Executive Commission on China today released a new report

on the PRC's transnational repression and malign influence. The report documents in highly disturbing detail how the Chinese Communist Party continues to extend its long arm beyond the Chinese borders. The report is available today. I do hope people will read it, use it, hopefully effectively. I want to especially thank Deanna Pelsang, Andrew Hartnett, and Rita Cheng, as well as our Chief of Staff Scott Flipse, for this important report.

Now I'll go to our witnesses, beginning first with Stephen Cox, counsel to the Governor of Alaska. Mr. Cox has served as U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas and in senior roles at the Department of Justice. In Alaska, his work is focused on public safety, consumer protection, and PRC-related risks, including illegal imports, counterfeit products, and technology threats. We are grateful for his perspective on how state law enforcement officials can better respond to the threats from foreign adversaries.

Let me say, Mr. Cox, you have a great Senator from Alaska. We do thank him for his leadership. We have worked together on many Chinese bills, including the FISH Act, which, amazingly, he got through the Senate. There have been several hearings, and he chaired the last one several months ago, on how the Chinese government has taken over fish. Half of all the calamari in the world is coming from forced labor with Chinese boats. I mean, it's a despicable thing. He has gotten passed a comprehensive human rights and real pro-trade bill called the FISH Act, and now we're looking to get it out on the House floor, his bill, ASAP. So I want to thank the Senator for that.

We'll then hear from Nebraska State Senator Eliot Bostar. Senator Bostar has introduced many bills in Nebraska to protect his state from foreign adversary threats, positioning Nebraska as a national leader in state-level security policy. One such bill, LB 644, was passed in June 2025. That legislation included the Crush Transnational Repression in Nebraska Act, another bipartisan provision to protect Nebraskans from malign influence from foreign countries. The federal government has a vital role to play, but states are on the front line as well, of this China challenge. And we look forward to hearing from him the lessons that Nebraska may offer to all of our states on how to combat this.

Our third witness is Arthur Liu, an attorney from the San Francisco Bay area and a longtime advocate for democracy and human rights in China. Mr. Liu was a student activist during the 1989 pro-democracy movement. He came to the United States as a political refugee after the June 4th massacre. He has continued his advocacy here, including outside PRC diplomatic facilities. His story shows the reach of transnational repression. Mr. Liu and his amazing daughter, Olympic gold medalist Alysa Liu, were targeted by PRC spying back in 2022 at the Winter Olympics. No family in America should live under intimidation from a foreign dictatorship. On the anniversary of Tiananmen Square, and in great recognition for the achievement—I mean, my wife and I watched her performances—they were amazing. And she got the gold medal, so that's fantastic.

Our final witness is Anna Kwok, a Hong Kong organizer and policy analyst based here in Washington. Anna serves as a board chair of the Hong Kong Democracy Council, where she supports

Hong Kong's pro-democracy movement in the United States. She has testified before this Commission before, has provided vital testimony about human rights conditions in Hong Kong. And, of course, we got passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, written by this guy over here, [Scott Flipse] our chief of staff. It is law. And Anna has been just amazing in what she has done there.

After Beijing imposed the so-called national security law on Hong Kong, Anna continued her advocacy publicly, despite serious risk. Hong Kong authorities later issued an arrest warrant and a bounty against her. Her father was imprisoned as retaliation for her work. The Chinese Communist Party wants brave men and women like Anna to believe there is no safe place to speak the truth, not even in the United States. She is the polar opposite of that, because she speaks the truth and does so with great grace and courage.

We thank all of our witnesses. I now yield to Mr. Cox.

**STATEMENT OF STEPHEN J. COX,
COUNSEL TO THE GOVERNOR, STATE OF ALASKA**

Mr. Cox. Co-chair Smith and members of the Commission, I want to thank you for inviting me to testify today. Thanks in particular to Senator Sullivan for inviting me. I know he couldn't make it today, but I want to thank the Commission for all the work that you have been doing over the last 25 years. I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to your good work, especially today on June 4th, the 37th anniversary of Tiananmen Square. As for me, I stand with the Tank Man.

My own interest in the broader China threat, particularly the threat that it poses to Americans here at home, goes back almost 20 years. When I served in the Bush administration at the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, I worked for the director. We encountered PRC gamesmanship surrounding removals and repatriation. And we realized that we were not just dealing with an immigration problem. It was an intelligence problem.

During the first Trump administration, I served at the Department of Justice under Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Attorney General Bill Barr. And they carried on the China initiative. And they recognized, we recognized, that the PRC challenge touched nearly every dimension of American life, especially IP theft and commercial espionage. And most recently, when I served as Alaska's 28th attorney general, I stood up a counter-China initiative to examine how we could respond, using our own consumer protection authorities. That work continues in my new capacity as counsel to the Governor.

To my mind, for the first time, consumers are on the front lines of our geopolitical conflict with China. When I say consumers, I'm not just talking about families and individuals. I'm talking about businesses and governments as well. Virtually all of us and our connected technology that we use can become an access point. That is where state attorneys general can play an important role. Consumer protection laws allow us to pursue deception and undisclosed risks, areas where foreign influence often hides in plain sight. Alaska's consumer protection laws are among the strongest in the nation.

We're actively looking for opportunities to use those authorities both on our own and in partnership with attorneys general from around the country, including my co-panelist's attorney general from Nebraska, Mike Hilgers. Attorney General Hilgers, if I can just indulge a little bit, has been a national leader in this space using traditional consumer protection authorities to address risks involving Chinese-linked technologies that are sold to American consumers. These efforts and others demonstrate that traditional state authorities can play an important role in protecting Americans from risks that often have a national security dimension.

Another area of concern, and the focus of today's hearing, of course, is transnational repression. We have not seen significant reported incidents in Alaska to date, but I would caution that this is not the sort of threat that is easy to identify without training and awareness. It may look like harassment or intimidation, unusual pressure on students, deepfakes, or threats directed at relatives overseas, but if law enforcement does not know what to look for, it can be happening right under our noses. That is why I strongly support efforts to educate state and local law enforcement on this threat, to train personnel to recognize it, and to coordinate closely with our federal authorities and federal partners when these situations arise.

Looking ahead, I believe the next frontier will involve closer coordination between attorneys general and administrative enforcement agencies, too. One area that has drawn my particular attention involves cross-border payment platforms and money transmitters operating inside the United States. I want to give kudos to Senator Tom Cotton on this Commission, who deserves a lot of credit for publicly raising concerns about Airwallex with the U.S. Department of Justice, and the potential exposure of sensitive American financial data to CCP influence or access.

I share those concerns about Airwallex and this industry more broadly, and I have begun to have conversations in Alaska about whether our state licensing and regulatory authorities should take a harder look at money transmitters that are connected to foreign adversary governments. A money transmitter license is a privilege. It's not a right. And I believe state regulators should be asking whether companies entrusted with sensitive financial information can satisfy their state law obligations when data, operations, and key personnel may be subject to foreign adversary influence.

States do not need to, and we shouldn't, conduct foreign policy to play an important role here. But states can protect consumers. States can safeguard critical infrastructure. States can ensure that Americans are not unknowingly exposed to foreign adversary leverage. That mission resonates particularly strongly in a state like Alaska. Alaskans have an express constitutional right to privacy, and we take that right very seriously. If Alaskans are paying a premium for products and services, and we are, they deserve to know what they are getting and what risks may come with it. We are also America's Arctic state and a Pacific state. We sit at the intersection of strategic cargo, telecom, critical minerals, ports, fisheries, and Arctic logistics. As a result, many of the threats that we might be discussing today are not abstract for us.

So my message is simple. Many of the Chinese Communist Party's threats to Americans increasingly manifest themselves through areas traditionally governed by states—public safety, consumer protection, licensing, and infrastructure. And because of that, states have both the authority and the responsibility to act carefully and lawfully and strategically, alongside our federal partners. Thank you again for having me, and I welcome any questions.

[The prepared statement of Stephen Cox appears in the Appendix.]

Co-chair SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Cox, for your testimony and insight. I'd like to now yield to Senator Bostar.

**STATEMENT OF ELIOT BOSTAR,
NEBRASKA STATE SENATOR**

Mr. BOSTAR. Co-chair Smith and honorable members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. Over the last four years, the Nebraska legislature has passed a slate of laws designed to protect Nebraskans from transnational repression, safeguard Nebraska's data and critical infrastructure, combat malign influence operations, and enhance resilience to prepare for conflict. Nebraska is home to the U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base, as well as numerous nuclear missile installations, that make it a target for foreign adversaries. However, every state has critical industries, infrastructure, and institutions that our national security relies on.

The People's Republic of China is a threat to every state and every community in our country. Our work to address the threats facing Nebraska from the PRC began when we were alerted to Pentagon concerns about the pervasiveness of Huawei technology near our critical defense infrastructure. In 2020, the U.S. Government took formal action to designate Huawei technologies as a threat to national security, but Huawei technology was still in use and being newly installed throughout Nebraska years later.

In 2023, we drafted legislation to prohibit telecommunications companies from receiving state funds if they use or provide communications equipment deemed a national security threat. Additionally, telecom companies must annually certify that they don't use equipment designated as a threat by the FCC. The law also clears redtape obstacles to enhance security by stipulating that no additional permits or authorization from any state agency or local government will be required to remove prohibited equipment.

Robust lobbying pressure was employed to keep Beijing-linked technologies in use, but elected officials from both parties ultimately rejected this pressure. After this law passed, my office was inundated with threat information from national security professionals who encouraged us to push forward. And we passed several more laws in 2024 to protect Nebraska against foreign adversaries. The Foreign-Owned Real Estate National Security Act prevents any person, foreign government, or entity determined to be a foreign adversary from holding land within 10 miles of a military installation, including nuclear missile silos. In cases of noncompliance, the law provides the Nebraska attorney general with authority to force divestment.

The Pacific Conflict Stress Test Act created a joint legislative and executive committee on Pacific conflict to assess how a conflict in the Pacific could disrupt and endanger Nebraska. The committee meets quarterly to evaluate the state's supply chains, export markets, critical infrastructure, and security apparatus, and makes recommendations to strengthen resilience.

Last, in 2024 we passed the Foreign Adversary Contracting Prohibition Act. The legislation prohibits companies controlled by foreign adversaries from procurement contracts involving communications technology, network systems, and critical infrastructure.

As we worked to pass these laws, we learned about local government officials being contacted by the CCP, and we started to hear from victims of transnational repression. Reporting emerged regarding an alleged Chinese overseas service station operating in Omaha, highlighting the threat of intelligence activity and transnational repression within Nebraska. We sought to limit the CCP's ability to influence, manipulate, and hurt people in our state by introducing the Foreign Adversary and Terrorist Agent Registration Act and the Crush Transnational Repression in Nebraska Act in 2025.

The Registration Act illuminates political propaganda and influence activities conducted by agents of foreign adversaries by requiring that they register with the Nebraska attorney general. Any informational material they distribute must be notated with a conspicuous statement identifying it as such and be submitted to the attorney general within 48 hours. The legislation also stipulates that if an individual or entity is representing a principal designated by the Pentagon as a Chinese military company, they must begin all lobbying activities by disclosing that they are representing such a company that is a foreign adversary of the United States. Violation of this provision results in a \$100,000 fine, which increases by \$100,000 for each subsequent violation, up to a maximum fine of \$1 million per violation. Any individual who provides information leading to a penalty under this act is entitled to receive a \$50,000 reward from the state.

The Crush Transnational Repression in Nebraska Act defines covered offenses as specific crimes already existing in law that will now receive an enhanced charge if the person committing the offense is an agent of a foreign principal. This legislation also punishes unauthorized foreign law enforcement by establishing that an agent of a foreign adversary commits a felony by deliberately trying to enforce a foreign government's law or rule in Nebraska.

Our final 2025 reform conformed with what Congress accomplished with the BIOSECURE Act and the most recent National Defense Authorization Act. Our genetic protection law establishes that no medical or research facility shall use any genetic sequencer or software for genetic sequencing if such device or software is produced in or by a foreign adversary.

Chinese companies sanctioned by the Pentagon have developed some of the world's largest gene banks for the Chinese military, supporting potential genetically targeted bioweapons, about which senior Chinese military officials have written. This law takes every measure possible to cut off Chinese military companies from ac-

cessing the genetic data of Nebraskans, complementing the federal BIOSECURE Act.

Just this spring, we enacted a new and unique protection for critical infrastructure focused on denying foreign adversary companies access that could be used for operational control or sabotage, either in person or remotely. Furthermore, we codified new enhanced penalties for crimes that we define as bioterrorism, including bringing in different pathogens for the purpose of damaging our farmlands.

Although each of these pieces of legislation faced opposition, we were able to pass them into law with bipartisan support. The effects are already visible. Awareness among state and local officials has increased significantly. Procurement standards have hardened, infrastructure protections have expanded, law enforcement coordination has improved, and Nebraska now evaluates infrastructure and investment questions through a national security framework that simply did not exist several years ago. Other states are emulating these models. Congressional leaders, executive agencies, and even other nations, such as the United Kingdom, have learned from different facets of what Nebraska has achieved.

Most importantly, Nebraska's leadership in combating malign foreign influence has demonstrated that states have power and responsibility in this space. In fact, both President Biden and President Trump have called upon states to lead in driving solutions where we are closest to the security risks. We know our adversaries are coordinated and adept at attacking us at every layer of government. We must be able to defend ourselves utilizing this same whole-of-government approach. We must strengthen coordination between the states themselves, and between the states and the federal government. Our work in Nebraska has been made possible with guidance from national security experts and practitioners. More established and formalized systems of coordination will help us further identify vulnerabilities, protect critical assets, and contribute fully and comprehensively to the defense of the American homeland. Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Eliot Bostar appears in the Appendix.]

Co-chair SMITH. Senator, thank you for your leadership. Thank you for what you are doing in leading the country. I hope that everybody follows suit. There are some states, like Texas, like Utah, Georgia, but far too few. So thank you for that leadership.

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR LIU, OWNER, INTER-PACIFIC LAW GROUP

Mr. LIU. Good afternoon, Co-chair Smith and distinguished members of the Commission. Thank you for inviting me to testify here today. My name is Arthur Liu. I came to the United States as a political refugee back in 1989, after the Tiananmen Square massacre. I'm also the proud father of Olympic gold medalist Alysa Liu, and four other wonderful children.

Today is an especially sad day for me. Thirty-seven years ago, on June 4th, 1989, the Chinese government sent tanks and soldiers to kill students and civilians in Tiananmen Square, and also in Beijing. At that time, thousands of students and civilians just gath-

ered peacefully to call for democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the rule of law, and for basic human rights in China. Thousands of them lost their lives, and hundreds more were severely injured. At that time, I was in Guangzhou, attending graduate school at Zhongshan University. I was one of the principal organizers of the democracy movement in Guangzhou, China.

When news of the massacre reached Guangzhou, I was devastated. I could not understand and believe how a government that claimed to serve the people could turn its weapons against its own young people and civilians. In response, I organized more protests in Guangzhou against the massacre. Of course, soon afterwards I became one of the most wanted democracy activists in southern China. I was very fortunate to be able to escape from China to Hong Kong. After I came to America, I continued to organize protests in front of the Chinese consulate in San Francisco and also in front of the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., calling upon the Chinese government to release political and religious prisoners in China. I have spoken publicly many times about the human rights abuses in China.

Like many refugees, I believed that once I arrived in America I had left political persecution behind me. But an incident in late 2021 proved me wrong. To explain what happened, I must tell you a little bit about my daughter, Alysa Liu. Alysa recently won two gold medals for the United States of America at the 2026 Winter Olympic Games. Before that, she became the youngest U.S. women's champion in history when she won the U.S. Figure Skating Championship at the ages of 13 and 14. She set records as the youngest female skater in history to ever land a triple Axel in international competition at the age of 12. And she was the first female skater in history to have landed a triple Axel and a quadruple jump in the same competition program. In 2021, it was clear that she was on her way to represent the United States of America in the 2022 Winter Olympic Games in Beijing, China.

Alysa posted a piece of news about the human rights violations in Xinjiang back in 2018, when she was only 12–13 years old. And I guess the Chinese government never forgot about that. And since she was most likely going to Beijing for the Olympic Games, I may also be going as well, so they were concerned. One day in late October or early November in 2021, I received a phone call. The caller identified himself as an official from the U.S. Olympic Committee. He told me that he was conducting international travel preparedness and needed my passport and Alysa's passport. He gave me a fax number for me to fax our passports to him. I told him I would do it the next day.

I never did. I was smarter than that. But later on I got a phone call. Just a few days later, I got a phone call from the FBI. And he told me he needed to meet with me. And I met him at a Starbucks. And he told me that a Chinese spy, acting on behalf of the Chinese government, was already in the San Francisco Bay area. That was in early November 2021. He would be tracking my movements. He would be surveilling my daily activities. He would be placing a GPS tracker on my car. And he would try to collect our personal information, like Social Security numbers, and par-

ticularly our passport information. The FBI told me to watch out for my surroundings and be careful.

I was very worried when I heard the news, because Alysa was most likely going to Beijing. And I was also concerned that the spy might do something to her in the United States. At that time, Alysa was competing in Japan. So the next day, when she came back to America, I took her away from the San Francisco Bay area to another location for training. As we were boarding the plane I received a phone call from the FBI. He told me that the spy was right on his way to our house. I couldn't believe it. It was like a scene right out of a movie. It could not have been so coincidental that we were boarding the plane and the spy was right on his way to our house.

The FBI agent informed me that they were ready to arrest those spies acting on behalf of the Chinese government at that time, but as a father I was terrified for the safety of Alysa when she goes to Beijing to compete for the United States of America. So I told them, can you please wait until she comes back from the Olympic Games? And the FBI said yes. I also requested additional security for Alysa. When she was in Beijing she was accompanied at all times by two adults, from venue to venue throughout the Olympic Games. On March 16th, 2022, the Department of Justice announced criminal charges against the spies. One of them was Matthew Ziburis, the guy who called me posing as an official from the U.S. Olympic Committee, and who spied on me in the San Francisco Bay area.

When the news came out, a neighbor from my office came over and told me that he had seen this guy, Matthew Ziburis, many times. He was lingering in the lobby right in front of my office. And of course, Matthew Ziburis was charged, along with, I believe, four other people in the spying on me and also on another dissident from China, and an artist in Los Angeles. I'm really grateful to the FBI agents who provided security for me and also my daughter. And I appreciate that the U.S. Government took forceful action to prosecute those spies to the fullest extent under the law.

But America cannot stop there. We can't just prosecute them. We must understand that not just me, a political dissident from China, the Uyghurs, or the people from Hong Kong, we have to understand we will not be safe—America will not be safe—until China becomes a democracy. We must understand China must have a government which respects basic human rights and that honors the rule of law. We must also understand that America will not be safe until people all over the world can live peacefully and harmoniously together. We have a lot of work to do in America. Thank you for inviting me to testify here today. I look forward to answering your questions.

Co-chair SMITH. Mr. Liu, thank you for your testimony, your courage, and again, congratulations on such a fine performance by your daughter. To think that something that she wrote when she was very young would still be in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party to intimidate and threaten, again underscores the pervasiveness of this dictatorship. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Arthur Liu appears in the Appendix.]
Anna Kwok.

**STATEMENT OF ANNA KWOK,
BOARD DIRECTOR AND FORMER EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
HONG KONG DEMOCRACY COUNCIL**

Ms. KWOK. Members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me to share my experience as a target of intensifying transnational repression in the United States. In this battle against the Chinese Communist Party, a regime that fears opposition, feeling safe is a privilege. I am among hundreds of thousands of rights defenders in America who live every single day knowing we're being watched and threatened. All incidents of transnational repression I share today took place on American soil. Together, they illustrate the varied tactics of a transnational repression campaign.

I served as the executive director of the Hong Kong Democracy Council, a U.S. advocacy organization sanctioned by the PRC. In May 2023, after I testified before this very Commission on the loss of Hong Kong's political autonomy and its implications for the U.S., the regime swiftly retaliated by issuing a HK\$1 million bounty on my head. My assets were frozen and my passport was revoked, crippling my international advocacy work. More bounties were also later issued on American citizens and residents.

The bounty put a huge target on my back. State media, pro-CCP extremists, and individual propagandists launched a coordinated campaign to discourage the American public from associating with me. Explicit threats to hurt, kidnap, rape, and even execute me on American soil flooded my social media. The lawfare and digital threats became physical in November 2023, during Chinese leader Xi Jinping's visit to the United States. When I organized protests against Xi and campaigned successfully to bar the sanctioned chief executive of Hong Kong from entering the country, the regime decided to retaliate on the streets of San Francisco.

Masked men assaulted fellow protesters with metal poles, while WeChat groups circulated my whereabouts on the streets of San Francisco. I escaped physical harm only because fellow protesters protected me. Local police were completely oblivious to the existence of transnational repression and refused to intervene. To this day, none of the perpetrators, including American nationals, have been convicted. For the first time I felt as if I had been transported back to the lawless streets of Hong Kong; even though I was in the land of the free, I was not free.

The online campaign and real-life violence achieved a chilling effect across America. Some supporters of the pro-democracy movement stopped showing up to events. A few went as far as to erase their digital footprints. Their response is all too familiar. It happened once in my first home in Hong Kong, and it is now happening again in my second home in America. Nonetheless, I refused to back down. I led a campaign to expose the foreign influence and transnational threats brought by the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices. In response, the regime unleashed its cruelest weapon, psychological warfare.

Last May the regime arrested my father in Hong Kong. He was later convicted on fabricated charges. The state-run trial centered on an insurance policy my father had purchased when I was just a 2-year-old learning to say "papa." My father is imprisoned simply because he is my father. He's now a hostage serving a sentence for

crimes neither of us committed. The CCP weaponized my love for my family in an attempt to silence me forever. I speak to you today as my 70-year-old father sits in a cell 8,000 miles away. I speak as someone with a HK\$1 million bounty on my head. I speak as a target of rampant transnational repression, and I speak as someone who is standing my ground to combat an urgent threat to American national security.

When a hostile foreign power launches centralized efforts—spanning state agencies, united front groups, and individual extremists—to silence people inside the U.S., the government must respond with centralized, coordinated mechanisms. That’s why I urge Congress, in particular the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to mark up the bipartisan Transnational Repression Policy Act immediately. Passing this legislation will provide a bedrock for building long-term cross-agency mechanisms that are necessary to protect America.

This is a litmus test for the country. If the U.S. does not draw a hard line and act quickly, the PRC will continue to push our boundaries, from running secret police stations to co-opting state officials. States like Nebraska and Utah are gearing up to protect their people, and the nation should get ahead, too. We must confront the threat of transnational repression urgently, before it becomes a normalized pattern that cannot be undone. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Anna Kwok appears in the Appendix.]

Co-chair SMITH. Anna, thank you very much for your bravery and testimony, bearing witness to an ugly truth that you are facing every day. You did say the word “intensifying,” clearly denoting or conveying that it’s getting worse. You know, Xi Jinping will be coming here again soon. We tried very hard when he came last time for the APEC summit, and it was, like—and when you say the local police were oblivious to what was actually happening on the ground, that’s got to change, and a federal law could help that. The state laws obviously help it, with your own state police and other law enforcement assets, but it seems to me that we—I’m sure you will agree, we need a federal law.

I have asked Chairman Mast to mark up the bill. I thought it might be up at our last markup, which just occurred, and it was not on there. I argued—as it turned out, not persuasively—to do so. So I’m taking all of your testimony back to the Chairman—and he’s a good man, Chairman Mast—and his staff, and say, This has got to happen. It’s got to happen now. The sooner it happens the better, especially—and we saw it in San Francisco, the way so many people—I had hearings then, and had press conferences, as you know, pointing out how brutal the people were, some of them seemingly coming out of the trade mission there. I have a bill that would close that thing down, but that too passed the House, never got through the Senate. Here we go again with that reprise. So we need this bill. I’m sure you all agree with that, so we will push really, really hard. It’s got to be done before Xi Jinping comes again, because that will be the pivot catalyst for them to unleash hell on the best and the bravest and the brightest who have come

here from China. And many of those, obviously, are still in China, their family members.

You did say, Mr. Bostar, that with regard to the legislation, Senator, that there was some opposition. It's faced opposition. Who was against what you guys were doing?

Mr. BOSTAR. Thank you, sir, for the question. We've faced opposition from a number of sources, but what tends to be utilized the most in Nebraska is primarily corporate-aligned opposition, linked to Chinese interests and corporations. And I think fundamentally that's mostly the case because they have the most robust lobbying presence in the state. We see that consistently, businesses themselves that are linked to China as well as the associations that they belong to, consistently trying to fight progress when it comes to guarding against CCP threats.

One example I'll use and give you that was sort of shocking at the time—Nebraska is, obviously, a pretty significant agricultural state. When we were attempting to pass our foreign adversary registration requirements into law, we received thinly veiled threats from Smithfield, which is owned by the Chinese now, that if we went through with this and passed these bills that there was the potential that they could shut down operations, disrupting the economy of Nebraska certainly, as well as the food supply for the United States. So that's just one example that we faced, but we faced many.

Co-chair SMITH. Thank you for persevering. You know, I would just—back in 1994 I was one of those who led the effort to link most favored nation status with trade to China. Bill Clinton, sadly, de-linked human rights and trade on May 26, 1994. But on one trip to Beijing I met with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and I couldn't believe how kowtowing they were to the Chinese dictatorship to get the next deal.

That goes for Microsoft and Bill Gates and all these other people who—anything to get the next deal and to continue their—we had Enes Freedom testify here, and talked about how the NBA just threw him out because he spoke about the Uyghurs. Again, another brave man—a great basketball player, but a brave man. And he lost it all. He lost his whole career. And he says some of his fellow NBAers wanted to support him, but they said, we can't. We don't want to lose, you know, that NBA slot that we have. And so it's—you know, it's amazing how corporate America just capitulates so easily under the false impression that somehow China will matriculate from a dictatorship to a democracy if we just trade more. No. They'll become a more aggressive power with more capability, command and control, right on down the line, if we give them all that capacity, which they've gotten.

You know, Chris Cox, you all recall, the former Member of Congress, did an amazing report back in the 1990s about how all the dual-use items that they were procuring that had a—ostensibly a civilian purpose, but also a very serious military purpose. So thank you for persevering against all of that pressure. But we've got to get a federal law and get more states to do the same with their laws, and to resist that pressure because it has been shameful how the almighty buck has—you know, you hold a dollar in front of some of these corporations—I had people that were part of the U.S.

Chamber of Commerce in Beijing telling me they have full religious freedom here. I said, really? If you believe that, I'll sell you the Brooklyn Bridge. It just does not happen. Thank you for doing that.

You know, you did say, Mr. Cox, about—suggested that the central point is that consumers are on the front lines of the geopolitical conflict with China—phones, apps, routers, cameras, payment platforms, cloud services, and connected services can become access points for PRC-linked data collection and leverage. Doesn't McAfee, and some of the things that we all buy—I have McAfee—does that not protect against that? Or are we being naïve and somehow they could easily pierce that and get whatever they want?

Mr. COX. Thank you for the question. I wouldn't purport to be an expert on that kind of a question, but I will say that I do think that the Chinese are technologically very advanced. And a lot of times our defenses are just keeping up with the black hats. So I think it's right to be concerned. I think this is why I think state AGs, like Attorney General Hilgers, and Attorney General Paxton, and Attorney General Uthmeier have teamed up to target some of these consumer protection violations, where this technology has potential kill switches and back doors that allow information that belongs to American citizens to go back to China. And we know that China has certain laws, like the National Intelligence Law of 2017, that require, with severe penalties, cooperation by Chinese companies and individuals to cooperate with intelligence services like that, on command. And so I think it's right to look into this, to investigate, and to bring righteous cases. And we intend to do that in Alaska.

Co-chair SMITH. Are we deploying a sufficient number of federal assets, FBI for example, to combat this? Or do we need to beef this up significantly?

Mr. COX. I'll take that. Thank you for the question. I can't—I've worked with the FBI over the course of my career. I worked on the Fort Hood Commission with Judge Webster. I've worked for five state and federal law enforcement agencies over the course of my career. And I've never known a law enforcement agency to refuse more resources and more investigative resources. So, though I can't speak for the FBI, I suspect that they would love to do more with more resources.

Co-chair SMITH. Yes, Anna.

Ms. KWOK. I would agree with Mr. Cox there, that the FBI definitely would appreciate more resources. And in my previous experience from working with the FBI, I've also noticed that there have not been enough resources being put into investigating the foreign influence and transnational repression into the United States. And often civil society has to also help share reports and research results with the FBI, just because they do not have adequate time or resources to conduct their own research. But of course, there is certain information or intelligence that we're not able to get from civil society. So if the FBI would be able to dedicate more resources into investigating transnational repression and foreign influence, I'm sure it will help protect American national security.

Co-chair SMITH. Let me just ask you, if I could, about AI, which is transforming, seemingly, everything. What additional threat does that pose? Just—this was not related to the Chinese, as far

as we know—but just yesterday my top sheriff told me how some boys took pictures of two girls, 14 years old, 13 years old, and then created a whole sex scenario with them. You know, it was all AI, but it's devastating. They found the kids, the two boys, and they arrested them, and they'll be prosecuted. I know in Europe and elsewhere that's being done now to diaspora and human rights advocates. Again, another devastating way of trying to demoralize and hurt people who speak out. How bad is that right now? And do you see that getting worse?

Ms. KWOK. The CCP definitely uses artificial intelligence to further repression on diasporas around the world and rights defenders. For example, my fellow activists, Carmen Lau in the UK, and Laura Harth, they are both being targeted with deepfakes generated by AI, and with explicit images and videos that are used to defame them. And I think that is a very devastating development, especially for women defenders in this space.

At the same time, we are also seeing more impersonation attempts getting more sophisticated to try to conduct phishing, identity theft, and to procure information from the human rights community. For example, my colleagues would often now receive emails impersonating myself with very sophisticated methods that sound like me and write like me, in order to get more information.

And, last but not least, we're also seeing the rise of AI being used to generate propaganda materials on social media. With the use of AI, the CCP is able to now generate more materials that are dedicated to talking to the American public, to get into the rhetoric, and to form better narratives, or more effective narratives, in bringing false information to the United States.

Co-chair SMITH. Yesterday Marco Rubio testified before the Foreign Affairs Committee. And I asked him—we don't get much time. As you know, you get five minutes. I asked him about Jimmy Lai, I asked him a few other questions, and I did so—even more so privately. I asked him to help us get the Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act passed. It passed 406 to 1 in the House last year. It passed in the Congress before that. You know, it's my bill. It's one of the most serious human rights abuses imaginable, and it's being done—it's hiding in plain sight. We just can't seem to get it out of the Senate, but we're trying, and we're hopeful.

But if Marco were sitting here, and he used to sit right here. He co-chaired this Commission and did so—like the current Senator from Alaska—with great distinction. And I mean that. You know, we've got a great co-chair here. He brings an intel capacity and an understanding of Taiwan and elsewhere like no other that I know. He is just amazing, and he would have wanted to be here, but he just couldn't make it, but he sends his best. But what would you tell the President and Marco Rubio, again, on the eve of what will be another summit soon, and this is when the planning goes into it to try to make sure that everything we can do to mitigate Xi Jinping's cruelty is tried. What would you say to the President and to Marco?

Mr. COX. Thank you for the question. I'll say this, and this is a point that I think you have made at this hearing and others. There are certainly things that the states can do, but nothing speaks more loudly than federal action. And that can mean executive ac-

tion, and it can mean legislative action. You know, the awareness about Huawei and the telecom threat increased a lot based on what was done with Huawei. The prosecution of the spies that targeted Mr. Liu, that increases awareness. Legislation that would also arm state and local law enforcement with the training and capabilities to spot the transnational repression behind some of these otherwise ordinary crimes would be very helpful. And all of that is federal.

Mr. LIU. Thank you for that question, Mr. Smith. You know, I would tell President Trump and Secretary of State Rubio that the United States must take a tougher stand against the CCP's transnational repression and also against their human rights violations. I would call upon them to urge the Chinese government to release all political prisoners, including Mr. Bingzhang Wang. He has been in prison in China for over 20 years. And I would urge Mr. Rubio and President Trump to call for the release of Jimmy Lai and other political prisoners in Hong Kong. And really push them to come to the international stage as a civil society, as a government which respects basic human rights and the rule of law. I think this is another opportunity—to be honest with you, without any political prisoners released with President Trump's visit in China—to bring those major issues up in the next visit. Thank you.

Co-chair SMITH. Thank you.

Ms. KWOK. First, I would like to thank Secretary Rubio and President Trump for commemorating June 4th in Hong Kong. Because today we saw that the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong lighted candles in a place where vigils are no longer allowed. And for Hong Kong, currently we have 1,946 political prisoners. I want to urge President Trump to seriously consider calling for the release of Jimmy Lai, Chow Hang-tung, and other Hong Kong political prisoners.

At the same time, the upcoming visit, where Xi would be visiting D.C., it would be the perfect opportunity to establish better TNR response. The last time Xi was in the United States, we have seen how it really opened up the devastating can of transnational repression. And once they widened the scope and widened the possibility of transnational repression, it was hard to push back. This would be the perfect opportunity for the United States to push back, to set, actually, better protocols for foreign visits, for diplomats who will be on the scene, and for Chinese nationals here in the United States, on how to behave, how to respect human rights, and how not to conduct transnational repression against people here on American soil.

Co-chair SMITH. Let me just ask you what your view might be of what people inside of China understand, especially today, being the remembrance of the Tiananmen Square massacre. I've met with many students who come visiting, including at the high school level, who say the Tiananmen Square massacre never happened. If you Google over there, and I went to one of their internet cafés once and googled "Tiananmen Square massacre" and got nothing. I googled "human rights" and I got everything about—it was during the Bush administration—how bad he was, but nothing about there. And I even put in "torture," because Manfred Nowak, who was then the special rapporteur for torture for the United Nations,

had done a scathing report about the use of torture in China. So I put his name in, and it came up with everything but China.

Is there really a serious lack of any kind of information in this culture of denial that they live in, perpetrated by the government, that they don't even know this stuff is happening, or happened, past tense? Because it's just—I met with a group of high school students at a school in my state who said I was lying about Tiananmen Square. And then this—as I might have indicated—Chi Haotian, who was the butcher of Beijing, who ordered the actual bayoneting and killing, he came to this country, went down to the Clinton White House. He got a 19-gun salute, because by then he had been elevated to head of their Department of Defense, the equivalent of our defense secretary, got a 19-gun salute. I said he should have been taken to The Hague for crimes against humanity.

So we did a hearing. He goes to the Army War College and says nobody died at Tiananmen Square. And all over, you know, the *Global Times*, the *People's Daily*, because I read the English versions, were extolling how he had said all this. And I had a hearing two days after he said it. We had all these witnesses, most of whom were Chinese witnesses, who said it did happen. The *Time* magazine correspondent who watched people die. But he got away with it. You know, Clinton himself should have said: Hey, pal, a lot of people died at Tiananmen Square. Quit—you know, don't lie about this, because if you lie about this, what else are you lying about?

But they did lie. But I'm really concerned that it's as if it never happened, which is so important. And in Hong Kong, of course, they crushed the remembrances there, and of course throughout the rest of China. How do we get that through to the people as to what has happened in the past and what is happening today?

Anna.

Ms. KWOK. China, or the Chinese Communist Party, certainly excels in twisting history and twisting narratives. And right now, I would say there is currently an ongoing war on narratives and discourse between the U.S. and democracies around the world vs. China. Every single day I go on social media, and I see China spreading misinformation and disinformation about history, about what has happened, and especially on June 4th, today. In Hong Kong we are also hearing rumors that, starting next year, textbooks will no longer be allowed to mention, you know, even one line on June 4th. As of now, Hong Kong is not even allowing people to hold candles on the streets of Hong Kong.

This morning, or last night, we saw news in Hong Kong where the police were actually stationed on street corners in Hong Kong, waiting to arrest people who dare to just walk around, who dared to just express themselves with very creative art, and who dared to just share symbols of June 4th, no matter how implicit. So we're seeing that China is really being very harsh and zoning in on canceling or on erasing any moments of history, any memories of history. And that reminds me of a scholar currently in the United States, Rowena He, who specializes and extensively discusses the importance of remembering the Tiananmen massacre.

Because it goes beyond just the Tiananmen massacre. It is about remembering the atrocities of this regime. It is about remembering

the present crimes conducted by this regime. And it is, most importantly, remembering the people who have been sacrificing to fight for democracy and human rights in China. So I urge the United States and the American public to remember what has happened on June 4th of 1989, but also be cognizant of what is happening today on American soil. Thank you.

Co-chair SMITH. I have one final question. And, again, thank you for your time, your expertise, and above all your leadership. The Chinese Students and Scholars Associations and other PRC-linked campus groups, there's talk of, you know, further networking with them. We saw it with the Confucius Centers, which were nothing but soft power instruments by the Chinese Communist Party. But in 2015 I chaired a hearing with NYU Chancellor Jeffrey Lehman, and I raised the issue about complicity with the Chinese propaganda organs—you know, they were gifted a campus in Shanghai. Imagine that, a whole campus.

And yet they were charging an exorbitant amount of money for tuition. I asked him, who picks the students, the Chinese Communist Party? What's the selection process? If you're online, what can you go and visit? Can you talk about the Dalai Lama? I don't think so. All those things I asked him. And I also invited myself to go speak. And I actually got a visa. And he had me there to speak. And I always appreciated that. But it's the complicity of many of our institutions of higher learning to gain access. One of the most infamous of all was back in the early 1980s when Steven Mosher at Stanford University, broke the news about the one child per couple policy and the use of forced abortion, and the fact that the government decreed brothers and sisters illegal. And that even with the one, you had to get permission from the Communist Party to have that baby. Otherwise, you're forcibly aborted.

I did a number of bills that passed in the House, some in the Senate, to defund any organization, like the U.N. Population Fund, which was getting a great deal of money, and Reagan was all for it, and we did just that. Trump has done the same thing again with the U.N. Population Fund and others. But meanwhile, Stanford, which is where Steven Mosher was earning his doctorate, threw him over the side. They threw him out. As a matter of fact, it was so bad that the Wall Street Journal did a piece that said, "Stanford Morality" and talked about how he had been disenfranchised from the university because he broke a story that they didn't want to have to deal with because they wanted access.

So my question is, Are we seeing any improvement on the part of our colleges and universities to the mega threat that the Communist Party poses, how they can be manipulated and used, you know, the information transfer that is applicable to their military? You know, at the state level you gentlemen are doing tremendous work, but we need to do more, seems to me, on the federal level on all of this as well. But I keep asking our universities, stop partnering with these individuals. Now, if they were free, partner away, but they're not. It's a dictatorship. And again, anything they glean technology-wise is going right into their military-industrial complex. So if anybody would want to take a stab at that, on the universities.

Mr. BOSTAR. Thank you for that. In Nebraska we're certainly making progress on the university front, as far as attempting to decouple where we can with those specific programs. But I think your question brings up a broader challenge that we face with all of this, which is it's always inconvenient to do what we need to do. Whether or not universities are being gifted a new campus, or whether or not Chairman Xi is coming to the United States, and not wanting to disrupt a possible deal, there's always a reason why it's the wrong time to do what we should do. And it's exactly for that purpose that we have to resist that. We have to take the actions now.

It was never convenient for us in Nebraska to pass the bills we did, to create the laws we did, to create the structures of accountability on the CCP, because there are costs. There are political costs. There are economic costs. We've allowed ourselves to become so dependent and integrated on our adversaries that it is painful to do what we need to do and separate ourselves. But it's required, because there's never going to be a convenient time to do it. And so, yes, I think we're making that progress, but there is so much more that we have to do.

Ms. KWOK. Co-chair Smith, I'm actually an alumna from New York University. And I have a story to share. Back in 2019, during the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, I tried to organize a protest at NYU in support of people on the streets, as an anonymous organizer. And initially, we were only expecting a few dozen Hong Kongers to show up in solidarity, but in the end hundreds of people showed up. And these hundreds of people were not supportive of what we did. Instead, they were students, faculty members, people, members recruited by the CSSA on campus at New York University.

When they had such an overwhelming number of people, they encircled us, they started taking photos of us, and, at the time, even though I was fully anonymous, they tried to identify me and dox me online, circulating our photos, videos on WeChat groups to try to find out which student this is, what classes they were taking, trying to trace where we lived, and things like that. And very unfortunately, this was not the only time I encountered a CSSA. In 2023, when I was in San Francisco, as I talked about before, for the APAC summit, once again CSSA was mobilized. And this time at the San Francisco protest, many Chinese nationals were mobilized to support Xi Jinping. And among all the groups that were on the ground, the CSSA actually mobilized the majority of them.

They managed to get thousands of Chinese students traveling to San Francisco from Los Angeles, from other areas of California to support Xi Jinping, and to show that China is the kind of leader they wanted, which, of course, we know is a lie. And even though they were not the most hostile crowd, they definitely were the largest crowd. And we also found evidence that the CSSA actually promised paid meals and accommodations, telling students that they could just go to San Francisco for a trip, while in reality it was for propaganda. And it was also for intimidating people like us. So I would say that for higher institutions the existence of these Chinese Students and Scholars Associations is definitely a problem.

And the issue that they are still present in the United States allows the Chinese government plenty of apparatuses for them to spy on and surveil students in America, including Hong Kong students in America who are merely trying to express themselves. So that's why I urge higher institutions to really reconsider their partnership with the Chinese government and also reconsider the existence of CSSAs on campus while there has been plenty of evidence that they are acting as adversaries of American institutions and the government.

Co-chair SMITH. To follow up on those students that flocked into San Francisco, was there any element of coercion—you know, to their families back home, you do this or else? Or was it more that they were ideologically simpatico with the Chinese Communist Party—naïve, perhaps—or what? I mean, or they're getting a free trip?

Ms. KWOK. Yes. I would say the majority of them actually are more naïve. They're thinking that they're getting a free trip, it doesn't really matter if they go, they're just standing there waving flags. That's what we observed the most from their WeChat groups. But at the same time there were also definitely ideologues who would go out of their way to really shout at us on the streets, or try to intimidate us with the number of people they have. And I think even though they are naïve, as we have said in the earlier remarks, sometimes in the end you have to pick a side—always, as you said. It's either with the Tank Man or with the tanks. And I think for them, being naïve doesn't excuse them from the fact that they are deciding to associate with the tanks.

Mr. LIU. I just want to add that, from a diplomatic point of view, we must engage the Chinese government, whether it's higher education in America, or whether it's the government, or businesses. I strongly encourage them to engage in China, deal with China. But at the same time we have to take a very strong position against human rights violations, and for the release of political prisoners. We can't isolate China. We have to change China. Thank you.

Co-chair SMITH. Could states do more on this?

Mr. BOSTAR. I think the short answer is yes. Several states have done a lot. Most states have done something. Some states have done nothing. But no state has done enough, and so we need to be more strategic and coordinated with our actions. We often find ourselves—you know, I talk to my legislative colleagues from across the country. We spend, frankly, too much time reinventing the wheel. We need better mechanisms of coordinating among ourselves, and we also need better mechanisms of coordinating between the states and the federal government.

You know, this is a policy area that for too long was left simply to the federal government. And because of that, and because it's more novel and it's newer for subnational political entities to be engaging in this, we don't yet have the necessary connective tissue to allow for this to be done as efficiently as possible. And so we need to be deliberate about developing those relationships and creating those systems and partnerships to allow us to really do what we have to do and move forward.

Co-chair SMITH. To conclude, I just hope and pray, and want to let you know, if there's anything we can do—especially Anna and Arthur—with regard to the ongoing threats that you receive, maybe as a result of testifying today. And Anna, as you know, this is not your first time. You are just incredibly brave; we will do everything we can. So if there's someone, the FBI, or otherwise, that we need to further alert to all of this—because again, these people are brutal. They are absolutely brutal.

I would reiterate my request to the Chinese Communist Party to allow me to lead a delegation to Xinjiang. I'd love to stop in Hong Kong as well and visit prisoners there. You know, even during the worst of the Soviet days, because I've been here since 1981, Frank Wolf and I—Congressman from Virginia—got into Perm Camp 35 in the early 1980s, where Sharansky and all of those great political prisoners were, a thousand miles outside of Moscow in the Ural Mountains. We talked to the procurator general at a big human rights conference. He said, Nothing to hide. We said we wanted to go to the Perm Camp. It took two years, but we got there. We interviewed every prisoner, and one by one, we got prisoners out. And then, of course, the Soviet Union fell, and they all got out.

But in terms of China, the foreign ministry said anybody who wants to go to Xinjiang can go there. So they were already attacking my Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act at the embassy right here in town. Really, all lies, lies. No, the lies are on your side. But then they also, almost the same week—it was the same week—said anybody who wants to go there can go. We did a letter immediately saying, We want to go. We want to go. We've asked repeatedly. So I'm asking again from the dais here, knowing that they'll hear this. I want to lead a delegation, I want it to be bipartisan, to go to Xinjiang, to go to the camps, to raise these issues, and to do so very, you know, professionally. Talk to prisoners without any fear of retaliation, and all of that. So the request is, again, requested. Because they already said, We have nothing to hide—anybody can come. And we've been denied.

Thank you. Is there anything you want to add before we close? I don't want to keep you longer than—your testimony was outstanding. Helps us to do more. You're helping the cause mightily. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:07 p.m., the hearing ended.]

A P P E N D I X

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN COX

Chairman Sullivan, members of the Commission—thank you for inviting me to testify today, and thank you for the work this Commission has done over these 25 years. I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to that work.

My own interest in the China threat—particularly the threat it poses to Americans here at home—goes back almost 20 years.

Early in my career, during the Bush administration, I served in the Director's Office at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. One of the recurring challenges we dealt with involved the Chinese government's gamesmanship in repatriating Chinese nationals who had been ordered removed under our immigration laws. At the time, we did not see this simply as an immigration problem. We saw it partly as an intelligence problem—because of the way the PRC leveraged overseas networks, influence relationships, and diaspora connections inside the United States.

Fast forward to my service during the first Trump administration at the Department of Justice. Attorney General Jeff Sessions launched, and AG Bill Barr continued, the China Initiative because DOJ increasingly recognized that the PRC challenge touched nearly every dimension of American life: intellectual property theft, espionage, cyber intrusions, economic coercion, higher education, infrastructure, research institutions, supply chains, and influence operations.

When I moved to Texas in 2020 to become U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas, it was a few months later that the State Department shut down the Chinese Consulate in Houston after determining that it had become a hub for espionage, intellectual property theft, and influence operations directed against the United States. The closure was a stark reminder that the PRC threat was not an abstract foreign-policy concern overseas—it was operating on American soil, targeting American institutions, businesses, and citizens.

Most recently, as the 28th Attorney General of Alaska, I began standing up what we called a Counter-China Initiative—to consider an all-of-government approach to threats posed by the PRC to consumers, businesses, infrastructure, and public institutions in Alaska. And in my current role as Counsel to the Governor, I intend to continue and expand that work with the new Acting Attorney General and across other state agencies.

To my mind, for the first time, consumers are on the front lines of our geopolitical conflict with China, and many of the CCP's threats to Americans now arrive through ordinary consumer channels. And when I say consumers, I mean not only families, but businesses and governments as well. Every phone, app, router, camera, payment platform, and cloud service can potentially become an access point. We know in a theoretical sense how Beijing's access to massive amounts of American data could create a problem. A November article from the Financial Times gave one specific example: that a large Chinese technology company was providing American data to China's military in order to help them target Americans. This weaponized usage of American data gets directly at the threat of transnational repression which we are discussing today. State attorneys general are uniquely positioned because consumer protection laws allow us to pursue deception, data abuse, undisclosed risks, and unfair trade practices—areas where foreign influence often hides in plain sight.

Alaska's consumer protection laws are among the strongest in the country, and I believe consumer protection is one of the most powerful state-level tools available to address aspects of the Chinese threat. We are actively looking for opportunities to use those authorities—both on our own and in partnership with other strong attorneys general around the country, like Nebraska Attorney General Mike Hilgers, Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier, and Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton.

General Hilgers has been a national leader in this space. His office has pursued actions involving allegedly deceptive data-collection practices by Chinese-linked

technology platforms and has also taken action involving connected camera and surveillance technologies sold to American consumers. General Paxton has also been a leader here. Texas currently has open claims against TP-Link, the largest router provider in America, along with Chinese television producers, camera companies, and mobile app providers. These efforts demonstrate that traditional consumer-protection authorities can play an important role in protecting Americans from risks that often have a national-security dimension.

We approached the China threat from another angle in Alaska. We became concerned about the flood of Chinese vape products entering American markets outside normal FDA review and approval processes. Many were marketed aggressively to younger consumers, with little transparency regarding sourcing, ingredients, or safety. The FDA has primary authority here, but we took steps to educate businesses and consumers about these risks that consumers, frankly, weren't aware of.

Another area of concern from a public safety perspective—and the focus of today's hearing—is transnational repression. We have not seen significant reported incidents in Alaska to date. But I would also caution that this is not the sort of threat that is easy to identify without training and awareness. That's because if you do not know what to look for, it could be happening right in front of your nose.

It may look like harassment. It may look like unusual pressure on a student. It may look like intimidation of a family after someone attends a protest or speaks publicly. It may involve digital surveillance, pressure campaigns, coercive phone calls, or threats directed at relatives overseas.

I would strongly support efforts to educate law enforcement on this threat, how we train personnel to recognize it, and how we coordinate with federal authorities when these situations arise.

Looking ahead, I believe the next frontier will involve closer coordination between attorneys general and administrative enforcement agencies—particularly in areas involving financial regulation, money transmission, data access, and critical infrastructure. One area that has drawn my attention involves cross-border payment platforms and money transmitters operating inside the United States, where questions of licensing, data security, cloud architecture, and foreign access increasingly intersect.

On this front, I want to commend Senator Tom Cotton of this Commission for publicly urging the Department of Justice to investigate reported risks involving Airwallex and potential exposure of sensitive American financial data to CCP influence or access.

I have my own concerns about this sector generally. A money-transmitter license is a privilege, not a right, and it carries obligations relating to consumer protection, data security, anti-money-laundering compliance, and the overall fitness of the licensee to handle sensitive financial information. I think it is reasonable to ask whether those obligations are fully compatible with a business model that places sensitive data, operational control, or key personnel within the reach of foreign-adversary governments, particularly where those governments claim legal authority to compel access to information. Those are the kinds of questions that state regulators increasingly will need to confront, and I've begun to have those conversations with our state regulators in Alaska.

States do not need to conduct foreign policy to play an important role here. But states can protect consumers. We can protect critical infrastructure. We can investigate deception, data abuse, and undisclosed risks. And we can ensure that Americans are not unknowingly exposed to foreign-adversary leverage through the products and services they use every day.

In other words, states should build upon domestic resilience in line with the federal direction on national security threats. The federal government tells us who our foreign adversaries are. States can be a force multiplier for securing our nation, and provide stronger and deeper front-line resilience against global threats.

That mission resonates particularly strongly in Alaska. Alaskans have an express constitutional right to privacy, and we take that right seriously. We also live in a place where consumer products, technology, and services are often more expensive and harder to obtain than elsewhere in the country. If Alaskans are paying a premium for a product or service, they deserve to know what they are getting—and what risks may come with it.

We are also America's Arctic state and a Pacific state. We sit at the intersection of strategic cargo, telecommunications, critical minerals, ports, fisheries, and Arctic logistics. As a result, many of the issues discussed today are not abstract for us.

My message is simple: many of the CCP's threats to Americans increasingly manifest themselves through areas traditionally governed by the states—public safety, consumer protection, licensing, and infrastructure. And because of that, states have

both the authority and the responsibility to act—carefully, lawfully, and strategically—alongside our Federal partners.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELIOT BOSTAR

Chair Sullivan, Co-chair Smith, and honorable members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

Over the last four years, the Nebraska Legislature has passed a slate of laws designed to protect Nebraskans from transnational repression, safeguard Nebraska's data and critical infrastructure against threats by foreign adversaries, and combat malign influence operations. Our first major statewide reform came in 2023. Since then, we have either led or partnered with other states in enacting pioneering security reforms every legislative session. In 2024, we focused on preparing our state for a potential conflict in the Pacific, in 2025 we worked to root out foreign influence operations and transnational repression, and earlier this year, we passed laws to protect our critical infrastructure. Nebraska is creating tangible results to protect our state and our citizens and building solutions that can serve as a model for other states, Congress, and even allied countries.

Nebraska is home to the U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base as well as numerous nuclear missile installations. We are one of the world's leading agricultural producers, and we are deeply integrated into America's transportation systems, financial and insurance systems, telecommunications networks, and other critical infrastructure. These attributes make Nebraska an attractive target for foreign adversaries. However, these attributes are also common across our nation. Every state has critical industries, infrastructure, and institutions that our national security relies on.

The People's Republic of China is a threat to every state and every community in our country.

Our work to address the threats facing Nebraska from the PRC began when we were alerted to concerns held by the Department of Defense about the pervasiveness of Huawei technology within the vicinity of critical defense infrastructure in Nebraska, including Strategic Command and nuclear missile sites.

Two years prior—in 2020—the U.S. Government took formal action to designate Huawei Technologies as a threat to national security, and Congress approved \$1.9 billion to remove this Chinese-made cellular technology from communications systems across America. But Huawei technology was still in use—and being newly installed—throughout Nebraska years later.

In 2023, we drafted legislation to address this security risk by prohibiting telecommunications companies from receiving state-directed funds, including from the Nebraska Universal Service Fund, if they use or provide communications equipment deemed a national security threat. Additionally, telecommunications companies must certify annually that they are not utilizing any equipment identified as a threat by the FCC, and are subject to fines and penalties if they cannot provide that certification. The law also incentivizes the removal of prohibited equipment by stipulating that any telecommunications company that removes or replaces equipment identified as a national security threat shall not be required to obtain any additional permits or authorization from any state agency or local government for that removal or replacement. This provision prevents bureaucratic red-tape from endangering our national security.

Robust lobbying pressure was employed to keep Beijing-linked technologies in use throughout Nebraska's telecommunications infrastructure. But elected officials from both parties ultimately rejected this pressure and made certain that state funds were not subsidizing foreign surveillance. Nebraska enacted this legislation and paired it with executive actions restricting other state support for telecommunications equipment tied to Huawei and related entities.

After passage of this law, my office was inundated with information from national security and defense professionals who identified threats that could be addressed at the state level. Their expertise and partnership encouraged us to push forward, and we passed several more laws in 2024 to protect Nebraska against foreign adversaries.

The Foreign-owned Real Estate National Security Act works to protect strategic land near military installations and restrict foreign adversary ownership of critical real estate. This act prevents any person, foreign government, or entity determined to be a foreign adversary, from holding land within ten miles of a military installation, including nuclear missile silos. In cases of noncompliance, the law provides the Nebraska Attorney General with authority to force divestment.

We passed legislation to address the security gap left by the expiration of federal Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards. The federal standards were created after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to ensure that high-risk chemical facilities were secure and protected from weaponization by terrorists. With passage of our bill, high-risk chemical facilities in Nebraska are now required to participate in the otherwise voluntary ChemLock program to promote continued security against potential terrorist threats involving hazardous chemicals.

The Pacific Conflict Stress Test Act created the joint Legislative and Executive Committee on Pacific Conflict with a straightforward purpose: to assess how a conflict in the Pacific could disrupt and endanger Nebraska. The Committee meets quarterly and works to identify ongoing vulnerabilities—evaluating the state’s supply chains, export markets, critical infrastructure, and security apparatus—to make recommendations to strengthen state resilience.

Lastly, in 2024, we passed the Foreign Adversary Contracting Prohibition Act. This legislation prohibits companies controlled by foreign adversaries from participation in sensitive procurement contracts involving communications technology, networked systems, and critical infrastructure.

As we worked to pass these laws, we encountered significant opposition from a variety of interests. We learned about local government officials being contacted by the CCP, and we started to hear from victims of transnational repression, who were willing to share their stories. Reporting emerged regarding an alleged Chinese “overseas service station” operating in Omaha, which further elevated our concerns regarding intelligence activity and transnational repression occurring within Nebraska. It became clear that we needed to take action to limit the CCP’s broader ability to influence, manipulate, and hurt people in our state. This confluence of factors led us, in 2025, to introduce the Foreign Adversary and Terrorist Agent Registration Act and the Crush Transnational Repression in Nebraska Act.

The Foreign Adversary and Terrorist Agent Registration Act brings transparency to political, propaganda, and influence activities conducted by agents of foreign adversaries. The Act makes it unlawful for any person to act as an agent of a foreign adversary nation or foreign terrorist organization unless that person has registered with the Nebraska Attorney General. The Act requires any informational material distributed by an agent of a foreign adversary to be notated with a conspicuous statement identifying it as such, and to be submitted to the Attorney General within 48 hours.

Additionally, with passage of this Act, it is now against the law for an agent of a foreign adversary to communicate in any way with local or state government, any political propaganda or information on topics of politics, policy, or public interest, unless the communication is accompanied by a statement that the individual is registered as an agent of a foreign adversary. If an agent of a foreign adversary is testifying before the state legislature or any local government, they must provide the body with a copy of the most recent registration filed with the Attorney General.

The legislation also stipulates that if an individual or entity is representing a principal designated by the Pentagon as a Chinese military company, they must present an affirmative acknowledgment that they are working on behalf of, and thereby acting as an agent of, a foreign adversary of the United States. They must also disclose that they are lobbying on behalf of a Chinese military company and disclose that the Chinese military company is a foreign adversary of the United States in all lobbying activities, including mail, telephone calls, email, in-person meetings, or testimony at legislative hearings.

Violation of this provision results in a \$100,000 fine, which increases by \$100,000 for each subsequent violation, up to a maximum fine of \$1 million per violation. Any individual who provides information leading to a penalty under this act is entitled to receive a \$50,000 reward from the state.

The Crush Transnational Repression in Nebraska Act defines covered offenses of transnational repression, which are specific crimes already existing in law, that will now receive an enhancing charge in Nebraska if the person committing the offense is an agent of a foreign principal. This legislation also punishes foreign law enforcement, such as what reportedly occurs at so-called Chinese police stations, by establishing that an agent of a foreign adversary commits a felony if such person intentionally attempts to enforce a law or rule of a government of a foreign country in Nebraska.

We also passed legislation to reform our economic incentive programs to prevent foreign adversary companies from accessing any benefit from the state of Nebraska.

The Chinese Communist Party is adept at creating corporations ultimately answerable to the Chinese military apparatus and maneuvering those entities into positions where they are receiving American dollars to underwrite espionage efforts

within our borders. No entity loyal to an adversary of this nation should be the beneficiary of any economic incentive paid for by our tax dollars.

In our final 2025 reform, we passed legislation in line with what Congress accomplished with the BIOSECURE Act in the most recent National Defense Authorization Act. Our genetic protection law establishes that no medical or research facility shall use any genetic sequencer, or software for genetic sequencing, if such device or software is produced in or by a foreign adversary. Chinese companies sanctioned by the Pentagon for human rights abuses have developed some of the world's largest gene banks. This genetic information is effectively property of the Chinese military and used for surveillance and military purposes. These massive stockpiles of genetic information provide the People's Republic of China and the Chinese military a clear advantage for creating bioweapons. Senior Chinese military officials have in fact already argued in favor of creating genetically targeted bioweapons that can incapacitate individuals based upon ethnicity. This law takes every measure possible to cut off Chinese military companies from accessing the genetic data of Nebraskans, and it complements and extends the congressional accomplishments in the BIOSECURE Act.

Just this spring, we enacted a new and unique protection for critical infrastructure, which contains two important provisions. First, foreign adversary companies are prohibited from providing critical infrastructure or contracting with critical infrastructure providers in such a way that would allow them to exercise operational control over critical infrastructure. Second, critical infrastructure providers are prohibited from utilizing network-connected technologies that would allow for remote operational control and sabotage.

Furthermore, we codified new enhanced penalties for crimes that we define as bioterrorism, including bringing in different pathogens for the purpose of damaging our farmlands as a tactic of hybrid warfare. We have seen several Chinese nationals arrested in Michigan for this type of crime over the past year alone.

Although we faced significant opposition to each of these pieces of legislation, we were able to pass them into law with bipartisan support.

The effects of Nebraska's actions are already visible. Awareness among state and local officials has increased significantly. Procurement standards have hardened. Infrastructure protections have expanded. Law enforcement coordination has improved. And Nebraska now evaluates infrastructure and investment questions through a national security framework that simply did not exist several years ago. Some of our most impactful reforms have received inquiries from other states that have replicated them. Congressional leaders, executive agencies, and even other nations like the United Kingdom have learned from different facets of what Nebraska has achieved.

Most importantly, Nebraska's leadership in combating malign foreign influence has demonstrated that states have power and responsibility in this space. America is a continental power. Our country is geographically massive, and our constitutional system is strongly federalist. States have dual sovereignty, and state leaders are closer to many of the national security risks that our citizens face. It only makes sense that states drive reforms that are aligned with or layer on top of federal protections. In fact, both President Biden and President Trump have called upon states to lead in driving solutions where we are closest to the security risks. We know our adversaries are coordinated and adept at attacking us at every layer of government—we must be able to defend ourselves utilizing this same whole-of-government approach.

We must strengthen coordination both between the states themselves and between the states and the federal government. Our work in Nebraska has been made possible by the guidance and partnership we have received from national security experts and practitioners. To meet the challenge across our nation, we need more established and formalized systems of coordination. We must ensure that we all have access to timely threat information, clear guidance, and meaningful partnerships so that we can identify vulnerabilities, protect critical assets, and contribute fully and comprehensively to the defense of the American homeland.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ARTHUR LIU

Chairman Sullivan, Co-Chairman Smith, and members of the Commission: Thank you for inviting me to testify here today. My name is Arthur Liu. I am a political dissident from China and the father of Olympic Gold Medalist Alysa Liu.

It is especially meaningful to testify before this Commission on June 4, the anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre, because the story I am telling today began in 1989 and, in many ways, continues to this day.

June 4 is a day that I will never forget. Thirty-seven years ago today, the Chinese government sent tanks and soldiers into the streets of Beijing and used military force against its own people. Thousands of students and civilians who had gathered peacefully to call for democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the rule of law, and basic human rights lost their lives. Hundreds more were severely injured.

At that time, I was in Guangzhou attending graduate school at Zhongshan University. I was one of the principal organizers of the democracy movement there.

When news of the massacre reached Guangzhou, I was devastated. I could not understand and believe how a government that claimed to serve the people could turn its weapons against its own young people. In response, I organized additional peaceful protests and demonstrations condemning the violence. Soon afterwards, I became the most wanted democracy activist in southern China.

I was fortunate to escape to Hong Kong. I came to America as a refugee at the end of 1989.

After I came to America, I continued to organize protests in front of the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco and in front of the Chinese Embassy here in Washington, D.C. calling upon the Chinese government to release political and religious prisoners in China. I have spoken publicly many times about the human rights abuses in China.

Like many refugees, I believed that once I arrived in America, I had left political persecution behind. An incident in late 2021 proved me wrong!

To explain what happened, I must first tell you a little bit about my daughter, Alysa Liu. Alysa recently won two gold medals for the United States of America at the 2026 Winter Olympic Games in Milan-Cortina. Before that, she became the youngest U.S. women's champion in history when she won the U.S. Figure Skating Championship at ages 13 and 14. She set records as the youngest female skater in history ever to land a triple Axel in international competition, at the age of 12, and she was the first female skater in history to land both a triple Axel and a quadruple jump in the same competition program. In 2021, it was clear that she was on her way to represent the United States of America in the 2022 Winter Olympic Games in Beijing, China.

One day in late October or early November 2021, I received a phone call. The caller identified himself as an official associated with the United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee. He told me that he was conducting travel preparedness for international travel for me and my daughter and needed copies of our passports. He gave me a fax number to fax them to him. I told him that I would do it the next day. But I never did. That request felt unusual to me given that I knew how to submit our passports to the U.S. Figure Skating Association for international competitions.

A few days later, I got a phone call from the FBI, and they wanted to meet with me. During that meeting, agents informed me that my daughter and I were the targets of a Chinese government intelligence operation. They told me that an individual operating on behalf of the People's Republic of China had come to the San Francisco Bay area and was attempting to obtain personal information about us, including passport information.

I was shocked. My first thought was not about myself. It was about my daughter. I felt fearful for Alysa's safety not only in Beijing, but also in the United States. When Alysa returned from a competition in Japan, I decided to take her to another city for training.

As we were boarding our flight, I received a telephone call from the FBI. The agent informed me that the spy was on his way to our home. I will never forget that moment. It's a scene straight out of a movie! I was feeling chills in my bones.

The FBI agent informed me that they were prepared to move forward with the arrest of the spies. But I was terrified for Alysa's safety in Beijing and mental stress if the spying operation came to light. I asked the FBI not to take any action until after the Olympic Games and until Alysa returned home safely from China. I also requested additional security precautions for her during the Olympic Games.

Throughout her time in Beijing, Alysa was accompanied by two adults as she traveled between venues and participated in the Olympic Games. That gave me

some comfort. But it never completely eliminated my fear for her safety. As a father, I was worried every day and prayed for her safe return to America, every day.

On March 16, 2022, after the Olympic Games, the Department of Justice announced criminal charges against the spies; one of them was Matthew Ziburis.

According to the federal criminal complaint, I was identified as “Dissident 3,” and Alysa was identified as the “family member.” The complaint alleged efforts to obtain information about me and my family, including passport information, personal identifying information, and details about our lives. The complaint further alleged surveillance efforts directed at me, including placing a GPS tracker on my car to track my daily activities.

After the spying operation came to light in the news, a neighboring business owner came over to me and told me that he had seen the spy identified as Matthew Ziburis several times lingering around the lobby in front of my office.

I am personally grateful to the brave FBI agents who provided security for me and my daughter. I appreciate that the U.S. Government took forceful action to prosecute those spies. However, America cannot just stop there.

We all must understand that America will not be safe until China becomes a democracy! We all must understand that America will not be safe until China has a government which respects basic human rights and honors the rule of law! We all must understand that America will not be safe until people all over the world can live peacefully and harmoniously together.

America, we have a lot of work to do! Thank you!

Thank you again for inviting me to testify here today. I look forward to answering your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANNA KWOK

Distinguished Members of the Commission:

Thank you for inviting me to share my experience as a target of *intensifying* transnational repression in the United States.

In this battle against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—a regime that fears opposition—feeling safe is a privilege. I am among hundreds of thousands of rights defenders in America who live every single day knowing we are being watched and threatened. All incidents of transnational repression I share today took place on American soil. Together, they illustrate the varied tactics of a transnational repression campaign.

I served as the Executive Director of the Hong Kong Democracy Council, a U.S. advocacy organization sanctioned by the PRC. In May 2023, after I testified before this very Commission on the loss of Hong Kong’s political autonomy and its implications for the U.S., the regime swiftly retaliated by issuing a 1 million HKD bounty on my head. My assets were frozen, and my passport was revoked, crippling my international advocacy work. More bounties were later issued on American citizens and residents.

The bounty put a huge target on my back. State media, pro-CCP extremists, and online propagandists launched a coordinated campaign to discourage the American public from associating with me.

Explicit threats to hurt, kidnap, rape, and even execute me on American soil flooded my social media.

The lawfare and digital threats became physical in November 2023 during Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s visit to the U.S. When I organized protests against Xi and campaigned successfully to bar the sanctioned Hong Kong Chief Executive from entering the country, the regime retaliated on the streets of San Francisco: masked men assaulted fellow protesters while WeChat groups circulated my whereabouts. I escaped physical harm only because fellow protesters protected me; local police were completely oblivious to the existence of transnational repression and refused to intervene. To this day, none of the perpetrators, including American nationals, have been convicted. For the first time, I felt as if I had been transported back to the lawless streets of Hong Kong; even though I was in the land of the free, I was not free.

The online campaign and real-life violence achieved a chilling effect across America: Some supporters of the pro-democracy movement stopped showing up to events; a few went so far as to erase their digital footprints. Their response is all too familiar: it happened once in my first home, Hong Kong, and it is now happening in my second home, America.

Nonetheless, I refused to back down. I led a campaign to expose the foreign influence and transnational threats brought by the Hong Kong Economic and Trade

Offices (HKETOs). In response, the regime unleashed its cruelest weapon: psychological warfare.

Last May, the regime arrested my father in Hong Kong. He was later convicted on fabricated charges. The state-run trial centered on an insurance policy my father had purchased when I was just a two-year-old learning to say “papa.” My father is imprisoned simply because he is my father. He is now a hostage serving a sentence for crimes neither of us committed. The CCP weaponized my love for my family in an attempt to silence me forever.

I speak to you today as my 70-year-old father sits in a cell 8,000 miles away. I speak as someone with a 1 million HKD bounty on my head. I speak as a target of rampant transnational repression. And I speak as someone who is standing my ground to combat an urgent threat to American national security.

When a hostile foreign power launches centralized efforts—spanning state agencies, united front groups and individual extremists—to silence people inside the U.S., the government must respond with centralized, coordinated mechanisms. I urge the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee to mark up the bipartisan *Transnational Repression Policy Act* immediately—passing this legislation will provide the bedrock for building long-term cross-agency mechanisms that are necessary to protect America.

This is a litmus test for the country. If the U.S. does not draw a hard line and act quickly, the PRC will continue to push our boundaries, from running secret police stations to co-opting state officials. States like Nebraska and Utah are gearing up to protect their people; the nation should get ahead, too. We must confront the threat of transnational repression urgently, before it becomes a normalized pattern that cannot be undone. Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS SMITH

Before we begin, I want to mark a solemn anniversary. Today marks the 37th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Thirty-seven years ago, millions of Chinese citizens peacefully asked for political reform, democratic openness, and basic human dignity. Their hope was met with tanks.

The Chinese Communist Party unleashed the People’s Liberation Army on peaceful demonstrators. Mothers lost sons. Fathers lost daughters. And China lost an idealistic generation to the violence of June 4, 1989. There has been no full accounting of those killed, imprisoned, or disappeared. The Party still tries to erase a massacre the world must never forget.

But Tiananmen cannot be erased. The enduring image of that day is the Tank Man—the solitary figure standing before a column of tanks. His courage reminds us that the desire for freedom is not Western, not foreign, and not imposed from outside. It is universal.

As I have said before, a choice has to be made by us all: you either stand with the Tank Man, or you stand with the tank. There is no middle ground.

And there is no middle ground in the subject before us today. Tiananmen is not a detour from this hearing. It is the key to understanding it. The same Party that tried to crush truth at home now tries to chase truth abroad.

The tactics have changed. The technology has changed. The reach has expanded. But the purpose is the same: to make people afraid to speak the truth—by almost any means necessary. Inside China, the CCP uses surveillance, censorship, prison, torture, forced disappearance, and fear to maintain power.

But what happens in China no longer stays in China. The Party wants to control what is said about China here, and control who says it.

The CECC has warned about the CCP’s long arm for years. Long before “transnational repression” became a common phrase, I held a dozen or so Commission hearings documenting and exposing a consistent pattern of global abuse—starting with the Confucius Institutes in 2014.

Over time, tactics have become more digital and more ruthless: detaining family members in China, doxxing, spyware, deepfakes, Hong Kong bounties, and illegal police stations right here in the United States. It is outrageous and unacceptable and must be stopped.

Transnational repression is not the only threat Americans face, but it is part of a broader, interconnected CCP strategy. We see that strategy in scam networks stealing from U.S. citizens, fentanyl poisoning our cities, PRC-linked land purchases near military installations, efforts to corrupt politicians and elections, steal private personnel and biometric data, and intellectual property theft from businesses and universities.

These may look like separate problems, but they share a common purpose: exploit our openness, gather leverage, weaken our institutions, spread propaganda, and make Americans pay a price for standing up to Beijing.

Transnational repression is the most personal form of that strategy. It brings the pressure campaign to the doorstep of the student, journalist, dissident, artist, and family member. That is why state and local responses matter. A victim may first call local police. A student may go to a university official. A state attorney general may see the pattern. A state legislator may realize existing law does not fit the threat.

So the questions are practical: Do local officers recognize this threat, do universities know how to protect students, do states have the tools they need, and does the federal government have a real strategy?

That is why I am proud to work with Chairman Sullivan, Senator Merkley, and Representative McGovern on the Transnational Repression Policy Act. This bipartisan, bicameral legislation would define the abuse, improve coordination, train officials, support targeted communities, and hold perpetrators accountable—because victims need more than sympathy. They need protection and a place to turn.

Let me make one point clear. A regime that fears a student's question, a refugee's protest, an artist's statue, or the simple memory of Tiananmen is not a strong and confident superpower. It is afraid. And fear in the hands of a dictatorship is dangerous. It becomes coercion. It becomes censorship. It becomes repression that crosses borders and reaches into our communities.

So our answer must be unmistakable. If the CCP threatens people here, there must be investigations and prosecutions. If it reaches across our borders to spread fear, there must be sanctions. If it takes family members hostage to silence a critic, we will demand their release and expose the cruelty of that tactic. And if it tries to censor a free people, we will defend and spread the rights Beijing fears most: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, and the right to tell the truth without fear.

Because in the United States of America, unlike in China, no one needs the Party's permission to speak, to worship, to protest, to remember, or to be free.

That is why this hearing matters.

Thank you. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN

Today's hearing comes at a pivotal moment. Because one of the clearest lessons of the last decade is this: what happens in China does not stay in China.

The Chinese Communist Party is not content to repress people inside China's borders. It is increasingly trying to export that repression abroad, including here in the United States. And that is what this hearing is about: threats to Americans, on American soil.

Let me say at the outset, very clearly: That is unacceptable, it is outrageous and it has to stop. And the title of this hearing goes directly to legislation that Congressman Smith and Congressman McGovern are leading in the House, and that Senator Merkley and I are advancing in the Senate: the Transnational Repression Policy Act.

That bill starts from a very basic principle. If the CCP is going to harass, surveil, threaten, and intimidate people living in freedom in the United States, then the United States needs to respond—seriously, strategically, and on a bipartisan basis. Because this is not some secondary issue. It is about protecting Americans.

Let me make this concrete. Alaska may not sit at the center of the PRC's transnational repression apparatus, but even Alaska has not been spared. An Alaskan constituent recounted to me that, during a high-level CCP official's visit to Alaska, he was intimidated and surrounded by Chinese security officials after staging a one-person protest. He said that a local Chinese community group was then contacted to register displeasure over his exercise of free speech.

Think about that. One person, standing alone, on American soil, exercising a constitutional right. And that was enough to trigger an effort by the Chinese Communist Party to intimidate him into silence.

That incident took place some time ago. Since then, the CCP's tactics have evolved, its operations have expanded, and its reach has grown much more sophisticated. Freedom House has described the PRC's transnational repression campaign as the most sophisticated, comprehensive, and far reaching in the world. But the goal is still the same—to use the power and pressure of the party-state to coerce, censor, and silence critics far beyond China's borders.

That is why this hearing matters.

And more and more, the CCP is not just targeting the critic. It is targeting the family. It threatens relatives, jails family members, uses exit bans, and pressures loved ones back in China in order to silence people living freely here in America. We should call that what it is: hostage diplomacy. It is a way of telling people in the United States that if they speak out, somebody they love may pay the price.

Chinese students and scholars are intimidated on university campuses. Chinese military-backed companies are forging ties with university researchers and buying land near sensitive military sites. We have even seen efforts to establish Chinese police stations here in the United States. The CCP is targeting critics, pressuring families, stealing from Americans through scam centers tied to Chinese criminal networks, and making people in this country think twice before they speak.

These may look like different problems on paper, but they reflect the same basic approach: project power, spread fear, gather leverage, and probe for weakness here in the United States.

One encouraging sign is that states are not waiting around for Washington. Texas took action in 2024 to protect Texans from PRC-led transnational repression. And in 2025, lawmakers in Texas, Nebraska, and Arizona—Republicans and Democrats—passed bipartisan legislation to strengthen penalties and improve law-enforcement responses.

We should be learning from those efforts. What is working? Where are the gaps? What tools do state and local officials need and how can the federal government actually be helpful?

These are practical questions. But they are also urgent ones. Because every day this goes unanswered, the CCP gets a little bolder. And we cannot allow that to become normal.

People who come to America for freedom should not have to live in fear on American soil. People exercising rights protected by our Constitution should not have to look over their shoulder because Beijing is threatening their family members back home. Chinese students on American campuses should not have to wonder whether the regime is watching them. And the Chinese Communist Party should never come to believe that it can use surveillance, intimidation, or deepfakes to police speech or spread fear inside the United States without a response.

Threats to Americans are unacceptable. That is the bottom line. And if the CCP thinks it can intimidate people in the United States and get away with it, then this hearing should send a very clear message: Not here. Not in this country. And not without a concerted and tough response.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES P. MCGOVERN

I want to thank my colleague from New Jersey, Congressman Smith, for his words and for his commitment to human rights, not only in China but all around the world.

Good morning. I join my colleagues in welcoming our witnesses and guests to today's hearing on transnational repression.

Today is June 4th. And as Co-chair Smith pointed out, 37 years ago, the Chinese government directed the military to attack civilians who were exercising their right to freedom of expression to call for economic and political reform.

Let us never forget those who bravely stood for freedom in Tiananmen Square and other cities, the mothers who never knew the fate of their children, and those who continue to tell the stories in the face of a government that seeks to silence them.

And let us not forget that *any* society whose leaders are willing to use lethal force against peaceful protesters is a society at risk of losing its fundamental liberties.

I am glad that the Commission continues to address transnational repression. In 2020, Co-chair Marco Rubio and I created a new chapter called "Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally" in the Annual Report.

CECC staff have just released a special report on transnational repression. I always appreciate the dedication of the non-partisan subject matter experts who work for the Commission. This report is absolutely worth reading.

China is the world's worst perpetrator of transnational repression. Freedom House lists the PRC with the most incidents (319) since 2014—and that only accounts for reported incidents. Who knows how many people have gotten threatening texts or calls that they are too scared to report?

But transnational repression (TNR) is more than China. Freedom House lists Tajikistan, Rwanda, Russia, Egypt, and Belarus among the biggest violators. Last year I chaired a Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission hearing highlighting TNR by India, Pakistan, and Hong Kong. Yesterday afternoon Co-chair Smith and I convened a hearing on Türkiye, listed with 160 TNR incidents.

Hearings are fine. But it really is time for action.

Advocates tell us their #1 goal is to create a standard definition of transnational repression. I am proud to join with CECC leaders Senators Merkley and Sullivan and Co-chair Smith in sponsoring the Transnational Repression Policy Act. It defines TNR in statute, strengthening efforts to counter it at the federal, state and local level. This bill was first introduced in the House three years ago. But it has gone nowhere.

In March, Freedom House led a coalition of 35 organizations, including Uyghur, Tibetan, Chinese, and Hong Kong human rights groups, in a statement to the chairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asking them to mark up the bill.

Foreign Affairs has scheduled *four* mark-ups since that letter. But the Transnational Repression Policy Act never makes the agenda. I ask Chairman Mast in the House to act.

Our bill is important because it would give the U.S. the tools to lead on TNR. Equally important, we must acknowledge that the tools will only be effective if we avoid double standards. I worry we are falling short:

1. President Biden started and President Trump completed the rehabilitation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who directed the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey. *We lose credibility when the U.S. Government allows impunity for transnational repression.*
2. This Commission characterized the deportation by Thailand of 40 Uyghurs to China as transnational repression. Yet the Trump administration has deported individuals who have been transnationally repressed in the U.S. by Iran and Russia back to those countries. *We lose credibility to ask other countries to protect TNR victims when the U.S. Government refuses to protect TNR victims.*
3. To the extent we label political interference by China in the U.S. as transnational repression, then we must consider Senator Bernie Moreno's meddling in the Colombian election as transnational repression. *We lose credibility when U.S. officials act like CCP officials.*
4. Last year the Trump administration sanctioned a Brazilian judge who brought insurrectionists to justice, falsely portraying legitimate accountability as transnational repression. *We lose credibility when U.S. officials pervert TNR to help political allies.*

In September, our credibility will again be tested. Xi Jinping will visit Washington at President Trump's invitation. The last time he was in the U.S., thugs associated with the Chinese consulate in San Francisco beat up anti-Xi protesters. We must be prepared to defend the right to protest here.

The question is: Will we?

The Trump administration has deployed security forces to suppress Americans' right to protest. They're doing it now outside the Delaney Hall ICE facility in Newark, New Jersey. If Xi Jinping asks President Trump to contain or control Chinese, Uyghur, and Tibetan protesters, will he do that, or will he be wind at the backs of those engaged in legitimate dissent?

The administration has deported people for exercising their free speech rights under the First Amendment and the ICCPR to criticize the Israeli government. If Xi Jinping asks President Trump to deport people, for whatever reason, back to China, we must make it clear that that is unacceptable, and we will not do that, and we will not stand for that.

Transnational repression is a human rights violation. All human beings are entitled to the same rights, no matter where they live, or how they feel about their government.

I thank the witnesses for being here and I welcome their insight.

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Written Testimony for the Record

Beijing's Playbook on American Soil: An Escalating Transnational Repression Campaign Targeting Falun Gong and Shen Yun

Submitted to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

Hearing entitled: *"The PRC's Threats to Americans: Transnational Repression & State-level Responses"*

Levi Browde, Executive Director of the Falun Dafa Information Center
James Yu, Senior Director of the Falun Dafa Information Center

05/31/2026

Chairman Sullivan, Co-Chairman Smith, and distinguished members of the Commission, thank you for holding a hearing on this crucial issue and for allowing us to submit this written testimony.

In this submission, we would like to draw your attention to the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) escalating transnational repression targeting Falun Gong practitioners over the past few years, both in the United States and globally. We offer findings based on new evidence from a wide range of credible sources: first-hand accounts, leaked internal CCP records, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) press releases, court documents, third-party investigations, and the Falun Dafa Information Center's (FDIC's) own research. Specifically:

- Since 2022, the CCP has dramatically intensified its campaign targeting overseas Falun Gong practitioners, deploying a more sophisticated playbook: espionage, surveillance, co-opting U.S. federal officials, lawfare, disinformation and misinformation, impersonation, hoax threats, sabotage, assaults, physical intimidation, diplomatic pressure and proxy mobilization.
- The escalating campaign follows orders from the highest echelons of the Party—Xi Jinping himself. Key security ministries are central to these operations, leveraging foreign-based proxies and supporting individuals with established ties to the CCP.
- Shen Yun Performing Arts, a New York-based classical Chinese dance company founded by Falun Gong practitioners, has become the primary target, accounting for the majority of documented incidents.
- A recent survey of 1,080 U.S. Falun Gong practitioners shows that nearly half reported experienced increased transnational repression, and 90% reported increased negative media coverage or disinformation since 2022. Over 60% are anxious about the CCP's surveillance capacity in the United States and its implications.
- The CCP's aggressive acts against the overseas Falun Gong community pose a serious national-security threat: a playbook proven effective against Falun Gong can be turned against any group, community, or business on U.S. soil.

I. The Escalation Confirmed: Key New Evidence

Falun Gong, also known as Falun Dafa, is a spiritual practice in the Buddhist tradition centered on the tenets of truthfulness, compassion, and tolerance¹. Introduced in China in 1992, it is now practiced in more than 100 countries. Since July 1999, the CCP has waged one of the country's most widespread

¹ <https://faluninfo.net/what-is-falun-gong-falun-dafa/>



campaigns of persecution against Falun Gong, employing arbitrary detention, torture, killing, and forced organ harvesting. That campaign has never stayed within China's borders. For over two decades, practitioners abroad have been a primary target of what Freedom House in 2021 called the world's "most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive campaign of transnational repression."²

Since 2022, the FDIC has observed a sharp increase in transnational repression incidents against Falun Gong, marked by new and more sophisticated tactics. Between March 2024 and May 2026, the FDIC has documented 388 such incidents across 25 countries on five continents. Among them are 290 violent threats³—a tactic previously rarely seen—directed at Falun Gong practitioners, supporters, public venues, government officials, and even several national leaders⁴. The United States accounts for 56% of the incidents (218 cases), followed by 13% in Taiwan and 8% in Canada. This geographic distribution is consistent with leaked CCP documents that identify the United States—where Falun Gong's founder, Mr. Li Hongzhi, and Shen Yun Performing Arts are based—as the primary battlefield of the campaign⁵, while explicitly calling for its execution "on an international scale."⁶

U.S. federal courts have provided one of the clearest confirmations of this escalating campaign. Since 2024, the Department of Justice has obtained convictions or guilty pleas in six prosecutions of PRC agents whose conduct included targeting Falun Gong practitioners and Shen Yun, spanning four federal court districts:

- John Chen and Lin Feng were sentenced in 2024 for bribing an undercover agent posing as an IRS official to revoke Shen Yun's nonprofit status, with Chen explicitly describing the goal as "toppl[ing] ... the Falun Gong" on a recorded call.⁷
- Ping Li was sentenced in November 2024 to four years for over a decade of intelligence work for the PRC's Ministry of State Security (MSS) that included reporting on practitioners.⁸
- Yaoning "Mike" Sun was sentenced in February 2026 to four years for acting as a PRC agent explicitly tasked, in part, with suppressing Falun Gong influence in U.S. communities.⁹
- "Harry" Lu Jianwang was convicted in May 2026 for running an undeclared Ministry of Public Security (MPS) police station in Manhattan directed in part to surveil and counter Falun Gong, with his co-defendant Chen Jinping having pleaded guilty to the same charge in December 2024 and awaiting sentencing.¹⁰

Notably, two convicted operatives have ties to the 610 Office, the extralegal body created on June 10, 1999, to eradicate Falun Gong: John Chen admitted to an inmate that he worked for the 610 Office for a

² <https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression/china/>

³ <https://faluninfo.net/incident-tracker-monitoring-the-ccps-latest-transnational-repression-and-disinformation-campaign-against-falun-gong/>

⁴ <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3gj35q5410>; <https://www.thepoachtimes.com/world/carney-other-canadian-officials-targets-of-china-linked-terrorist-threats-over-shen-yun-performances-5994371>

⁵ https://faluninfo.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/1/2022/11/CCP_Infiltration_FG_LeakedDocs_Chinese_Eng-22-0902-1.pdf

⁶ <https://endtransplantabuse.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Professor-Yuan-Statement-Transcript.pdf>

⁷ <https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/california-man-sentenced-acting-illegal-agent-peoples-republic-china-government-and-bribery>

⁸ <https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/florida-telecommunications-and-information-technology-worker-sentenced-conspiring-act-agent>

⁹ <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/political-operative-sentenced-48-months-federal-prison-acting-covert-agent-peoples-republic>

¹⁰ <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/bronx-man-convicted-operating-police-station-chinese-government-new-york-city-and>



monthly salary of about \$52,000¹¹; Lu Jianwang acknowledged a personal affiliation with the former Director of the MPS's 610 directorate.¹²

During the same period, various independent institutions with no affiliation to Falun Gong also provided verification of the same trend. Key findings include:

- **X (Previously Twitter)** removed a network of thousands of suspected CCP-linked bot and fake accounts that were amplifying misleading or distorted narratives of Falun Gong and Shen Yun in March 2025. An article targeting Shen Yun received over 28,000 reposts; however, fewer than 6% of the sharing accounts had more than 50 followers, and approximately 80% had none. This pattern indicates coordinated inauthentic amplification rather than organic engagement.¹³
- **Taiwan's Criminal Investigation Bureau** traced a wave of bomb threats against Shen Yun performances to Xi'an, China, specifically to a "Huawei Research Institute," following its own law-enforcement investigation in April 2025.¹⁴
- **Vancouver Police Department's Cybercrime Unit** traced a hoax bomb-threat email targeting Shen Yun's April 2026 run at the Queen Elizabeth Theatre to a phone number based in China. Separately, Global News documented the Chinese Consulate in Vancouver pressuring city staff to cancel the same performances and warning sponsors that their China business interests and travel visas would be at risk.¹⁵
- **Freedom House** has documented the PRC as the world's leading perpetrator of transnational repression, responsible for 22% of all incidents recorded globally between 2014 and 2024, with Falun Gong practitioners among the primary identified targets.¹⁶
- **Graphika**, the leading commercial open-source-intelligence firm on disinformation, published a forensic investigation in January 2026 mapping 12 domains and 12 subdomains spoofing Western media, including imitations of *the New York Times*, *the Los Angeles Times*, and *the Wall Street Journal*, used to produce and amplify anti-Falun Gong and anti-Shen Yun disinformation, and amplified by a network of Beijing-linked X accounts.¹⁷
- **The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ)**, through its 'China Targets' investigation, has documented a systematic pattern of transnational repression by the CCP. Working alongside 42 media partners and interviewing over 100 victims across 23 countries, the ICIJ uncovered a range of coercive tactics targeting Falun Gong practitioners and other dissident groups. These include arrests timed to Xi Jinping's state visits, the weaponization of Interpol Red Notices, and the detention of family members in China to pressure overseas targets.¹⁸

II. A Campaign Ordered from the Top: Xi's Directives

The documented repression above did not arise on its own. This pattern—the growing prosecutions of CCP agents, coordinated disinformation, and surge in incidents worldwide—traces directly to directives issued personally by Xi Jinping and carried out through the Party's security apparatus.

¹¹ <https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/media/1381256/dl>

¹² https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-04/police_station_-_23-mj-265_amended_complaint_signed.pdf

¹³ <https://faluninfo.net/x-takes-down-bot-accounts-attacking-falun-gong/>

¹⁴ <https://faluninfo.net/taiwanese-police-trace-fake-bomb-threats-targeting-shen-yun-to-huawei-institute-in-china/>

¹⁵ <https://globalnews.ca/news/11825739/chinese-consulate-vancouver-shen-yun-communist-party/>

¹⁶ <https://freedomhouse.org/article/ten-findings-ten-years-data-transnational-repression>; <https://chinadissent.net/>

¹⁷ <https://graphika.com/reports/glass-onion>

¹⁸ <https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-targets/ahead-of-xi-jinpings-state-visit-to-malaysia-police-arrested-dozens-of-falun-gong-followers/>; <https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-targets/inside-china-targets-the-data-footprints-of-chinas-transnational-repression/>



In February 2025, the International Coalition to End Transplant Abuse in China (ETAC) published a statement from Chinese scholar and political dissident Yuan Hongbing. In the statement, Yuan revealed details about internal CCP meetings in late 2022 where Xi Jinping refocused the regime's attacks on Falun Gong internationally.¹⁹ News outlets like *The Diplomat* also covered these orders to escalate the anti-Falun Gong crackdown abroad.¹⁹

Yuan noted directives from Xi to use “public opinion warfare,” “legal warfare,” and other more sophisticated methods to undermine Falun Gong globally, citing multiple sources in the Party. According to Yuan:

[In a 2022 speech] Xi Jinping said that...the suppression of Falun Gong internationally was largely a failure. Xi Jinping further stated...the methods used to suppress Falun Gong abroad were too conservative, too traditional, lacked creativity, and lacked innovation. Xi Jinping instructed to completely, and on an international scale, suppress Falun Gong's momentum...It was confirmed at this meeting, after the 20th National Congress, that the crackdown on Falun Gong overseas would be coordinated mainly by the Ministry of State Security. That is, coordinated by Chen Yixin [the PRC's Minister of State Security].²⁰

Another set of leaks emerged in mid-2024. These were notes from internal CCP security meetings, smuggled out by sympathizers inside the apparatus. They warned of a coordinated campaign to turn the U.S. government and American public opinion against Falun Gong, and named two YouTubers who had begun spreading misleading content about Falun Gong and Shen Yun in late 2023.²¹

The following quote from detailed notes of internal MPS meetings held in June 2024 illustrates how the regime's plans were articulated:

Mobilize concealed agents to create and escalate the internal conflicts of Falun Gong, to expand nonstop the fighting strength, depth, and reach of [social media influencers targeting Falun Gong and Shen Yun] ... they must attract the continuous attention of the entire United States society, and force the U.S. government to strike on all fronts, eliminating the force of Falun Gong.

Leaked notes from a December 2024 conference chaired by MPS head Wang Xiaohong further directed operatives to make prominent practitioners “break with Falun Gong” and to fabricate and disseminate misconduct allegations within the Falun Gong community.²²

These directives run through a consistent chain of command. Authority originates with Xi Jinping and passes to the Political and Legal Affairs Commission (PLAC). From there it flows to the MSS and MPS, which drive global disinformation and ground operations respectively, and through the 610 Office and the Joint Office for Combating Falun Gong in North America²³. These bodies then work through state-owned and front organizations to reach operatives on U.S. soil. Those operatives, in turn, target federal agencies, courts, media, social-media platforms, theaters, and the streets.

¹⁹ <https://thediplomat.com/2025/02/leaked-ccp-files-expose-global-crackdown-on-dissent/>

²⁰ <https://endtransplantabuse.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Professor-Yuan-Statement-Transcript.pdf>

²¹ <https://faluninfo.net/weaponizing-social-media/>

²² <https://faluninfo.net/internal-ccp-source-during-video-conference-minister-of-public-security-outlines-plans-to-intensify-campaign-against-falun-gong-shen-yun-in-the-united-states/>

²³ <https://library.faluninfo.net/joint-office-for-combating-falun-gong-mps-mss-2021/>



III. The CCP's Expanded Arsenal of Repression

In its escalating campaign against the Falun Gong diaspora, Beijing has significantly expanded its transnational repression playbook. Within months of Xi's directive, the FDIC began noting the emergence of new and more sophisticated tactics to target the community that closely match the very instructions the CCP chief had issued in late 2022²⁴.

The tactics used by the CCP can be classified into the following categories: espionage, surveillance, and co-opting federal officials; lawfare; disinformation, misinformation and distorted reporting; impersonation; hoax threats; sabotage, assaults, and physical intimidation; diplomatic pressure and proxy mobilization. The cases below illustrate each category but represent only a fraction of documented incidents. Taken together, they reveal not a single line of attack but a coordinated, multi-instrument campaign.

Espionage, Surveillance, and Co-opting Federal Officials. These tactics aim to turn the machinery of the U.S. government against Beijing's targets: surveilling the Falun Gong community to identify vulnerabilities and co-opting federal officials into wielding their authority on the CCP's behalf. More broadly, espionage provides the intelligence foundation for the other tactics.

The campaign's reach into U.S. federal institutions is best illustrated by the Chen–Feng bribery scheme. Acting on direction from a PRC official, Chen and Feng attempted to bribe a federal officer, whom they believed to be an IRS official, to revoke Shen Yun's nonprofit status. The bribery was not the operatives' first assignment. Feng admitted to the FBI that he and Chen had traveled to New York to surveil Falun Gong residents in Orange County and to gather information for a potential environmental lawsuit meant to inhibit the community's growth.²⁵

In the Lu–Chen undeclared police station case, Lu admitted being directed to surveil practitioners and track their attendance at events; to plant anti-Falun Gong material in U.S. newspapers; and, during Xi Jinping's 2015 state visit, to recruit and bus paid counter-protesters from New York to Washington to drown out peaceful Falun Gong demonstrators.²⁶

Together, these cases show the same apparatus operating across multiple fronts at once: surveillance, the attempted co-opting of federal officials, press disinformation, and the suppression of peaceful protest via proxy mobilization, each directed from Beijing and carried out by agents embedded in American communities.

Lawfare. These suits aim less to win than to inflict the cost of being sued—draining a target's finances and attention while generating a steady stream of hostile press on a timetable the foreign actor controls and the defendant pays for. The lawsuit itself is the product, regardless of how it is ultimately resolved.

The clearest use of this tactic is against Dragon Springs, Shen Yun's New York training campus. Since 2019 it has faced repeated environmental suits from a plaintiff who had spent the prior fifteen years in Tianjin, China; a federal court dismissed four of them—the latest, in September 2024, with prejudice as “illogical.”²⁷ Nevertheless, in September 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed

²⁴ <https://faluninfo.net/launching-a-knockout-punch-ccp-campaign-to-sabotage-shen-yun-falun-gong/>

²⁵ Letter from Gov't to Hon. Kenneth M. Karas, *United States v. Chen*, No. 7:23-cr-00286-NSR (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2023), ECF No. 20-1.

²⁶ https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-04/police_station_-_23-mj-265_amended_complaint_signed.pdf

²⁷ <https://faluninfo.net/federal-judge-dismisses-frivolous-lawsuit-against-falun-gong-shen-yun-campus/>



the dismissal on a procedural technicality, without reaching the merits.²⁸ Convicted PRC agent Feng had admitted to surveilling local Falun Gong residents to lay the groundwork for this environmental lawsuit, as described above.

Since late 2024, several former Shen Yun dancers have filed lawsuits against the company after leaving and establishing ties to the Beijing Dance Academy (BDA), a CCP-run institution. One such performer, who initially spoke positively of her experience and sought to rejoin Shen Yun, abruptly altered her stance after visiting Beijing and collaborating with BDA.²⁹ In November 2024, she initiated a civil lawsuit against Shen Yun and its headquarters, Dragon Springs, which led to misleading mainstream media reports that portrayed Shen Yun as an abusive environment. The plaintiff's claims run counter to available information about working conditions at Shen Yun, while news coverage has omitted relevant details such as the medical attention performers received, past false statements made by the plaintiff, or a conflict of interest due to her recently developed ties to China.³⁰

Over 1,550 current and former performers and family members have signed a petition citing their concerns about “gross distortions and false narratives about our work, our faith, and our way of life echoing through mainstream media, and bolstered by lawfare as well as malicious calls for government inquiries.”³¹ Phelim Kine, a senior China correspondent at *Politico*, described this lawsuit in an X post as a “propaganda coup for Beijing” in its decades-long campaign against Falun Gong³², highlighting its alignment with the CCP’s broader disinformation efforts.

Disinformation, Misinformation and Distorted Reporting. These tactics aim to shape public opinion against Falun Gong and Shen Yun through promoting false or inaccurate narratives in information channels.

The leaked MPS meeting notes cited above explicitly demand mobilization of social media influencers against Falun Gong and Shen Yun. Indeed, two Chinese-speaking YouTubers have ratcheted up attacks against Falun Gong and Shen Yun starting in mid-2023 and intensifying since early 2024. Recently leaked documents from the MPS specify these individuals by name and instruct cadres to “fully support” their attacks on Falun Gong and Shen Yun.³³ Other pieces of evidence have also emerged. In late 2024, a prominent U.S. YouTuber exposed that someone had offered him \$200 to insert content demonizing Falun Gong into his video feed; he refused but claimed others may have accepted the offer.³⁴

Beginning in August 2024, *the New York Times* published a series of articles on Shen Yun and on the faith of Falun Gong itself. The content falsely depicts Shen Yun as abusive and the faith community as hood-winked zealots.³⁵ Multiple dubious elements stand out in the reporting: (a) relying on a small number of sources, some of whom have ties to a Chinese state-run dance academy; (b) failing to disclose these ties to readers; (c) disregarding good-faith efforts to provide contrary information; (d) ignoring medical and subject matter experts; (e) withholding critical context on how other arts and boarding schools operate; and (f) continuing a long-term editorial pattern of distorting Falun Gong’s beliefs and the

²⁸ *Mid-New York Environ. v. Dragon Springs*, No. 24-2451 (2d Cir. Sept. 16, 2025)

²⁹ <https://faluninfo.net/beijing-dance-academy-a-chinese-state-owned-art-institute-closely-intertwined-with-the-chinese-communist-party/>

³⁰ <https://faluninfo.net/key-things-to-know-about-the-new-york-times-investigation-of-shen-yun-falun-gong/>

³¹ <https://www.shenyuncommunity.org/our-petition>

³² <https://x.com/phelimkine/status/1861205086413684913?s=46>

³³ <https://faluninfo.net/weaponizing-social-media/>

³⁴ <https://thepopulisttimes.com/new-report-exposes-chinese-communist-partys-platform-manipulation-to-attack-shen-yun/>

³⁵ <https://faluninfo.net/new-york-times-continues-unfounded-attack-on-falun-gong-shen-yun/>



scale of persecution, such as suggesting there is no evidence of systematic forced organ harvesting in China despite two decades of independent investigations establishing that these atrocities had been committed. The reporting raises serious concerns about journalistic ethics and the irreparable harm done to a persecuted religious minority.³⁶

As a prominent outlet, the *Times*' flawed coverage has quickly influenced outlets worldwide to repeat inaccurate remarks about Falun Gong and Shen Yun. Furthermore, thousands of bot and fake X accounts with suspected CCP links³⁷—later removed by X—along with official Chinese government websites³⁸, amplified the *Times*' content in an apparent effort to legitimize the regime's human rights abuses. In March 2025, materials based on the *Times*' articles were handed out by organized protesters outside Shen Yun's Lincoln Center performances. Photo and video evidence linked the protesters to a CCP-linked figure with United Front ties and a co-founder of the Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance (CACWA), a group previously sued for civil-rights violations against Falun Gong practitioners. Some protesters acknowledged being paid; others appeared unaware of what they were distributing.³⁹

Impersonation. Another widely used tactic has been impersonating Falun Gong practitioners to send damaging and at times threatening messages to tarnish Falun Gong's reputation. For example, in August 2024, multiple departments of the Central Park Zoo in New York City received a threat via email and a contact form submission that claimed to be a Falun Gong practitioner and said they had placed bombs throughout the zoo. The email demanded the zoo send \$5 million to Dragon Springs. One of the threats also listed the email address of the FDIC's executive director in an apparent attempt to implicate the organization. The zoo, skeptical of the threat's credibility, contacted the director, who confirmed the false impersonation attempt.⁴⁰

Hoax Threats. Beginning in early 2024, a spate of anonymous violent threats has been sent via email and website contact forms. The threats have included bombings, mass shootings, car accidents, arson, and sexual assault, targeting Falun Gong practitioners and their families, elected officials and other supporters, and public venues such as theaters. This trend escalated beginning in December 2024. From March 2024 to May 2026, the total number of such threats received has reached 290.⁴¹

In February 2025, the Kennedy Center in Washington received an emailed bomb threat, written in Chinese, demanding that Shen Yun be canceled⁴². The threat forced the evacuation and drew an on-record condemnation from the White House Press Secretary.⁴³

In a disturbing February 2025 case, a graphic threat, written in Chinese, targeted the children of Falun Gong practitioners in the United States, claiming they would be kidnapped and murdered. The anonymous message was sent from separate accounts to four Falun Gong-related websites, indicating a

³⁶ <https://faluninfo.net/key-things-to-know-about-the-new-york-times-investigation-of-shen-yun-falun-gong/>

³⁷ <https://faluninfo.net/x-takes-down-bot-accounts-attacking-falun-gong/>

³⁸ <https://faluninfo.net/january-2026-transnational-repression-update/>

³⁹ <https://faluninfo.net/anti-shen-yun-protesters-tied-to-notorious-ccp-linked-figure-in-new-york/>

⁴⁰ <https://faluninfo.net/incident-tracker-monitoring-the-ccps-latest-transnational-repression-and-disinformation-campaign-against-falun-gong/#august-10-2024>

⁴¹ To learn more about the threats, the Falun Dafa Information Center documents and constantly updates an incident tracker: <https://faluninfo.net/incident-tracker-monitoring-the-ccps-latest-transnational-repression-and-disinformation-campaign-against-falun-gong/>

⁴² <https://www.fox5dc.com/news/threat-kennedy-center-leads-building-evacuation-road-closures>

⁴³ <https://en.minghui.org/html/articles/2025/3/19/225903.html>



coordinated effort. The email, which was accompanied by images of knives, described the torture and sexual assault of young girls in the community.⁴⁴

To date, the threats appear to be false alarms, aiming to intimidate and deter Falun Gong practitioners or supporters, but nonetheless violate U.S. and other applicable laws. Even as hoaxes, the threats have prompted increased security costs, building evacuations, and delayed or canceled cultural events or film screenings⁴⁵. Notably, Toronto's Shen Yun venue canceled remaining performances in April 2026 in response to threats that police had determined to be "unfounded."⁴⁶

Despite the anonymity, attribution to China has been possible on multiple occasions. Beyond the Taiwanese and Vancouver police tracings noted earlier, the FDIC in May 2026 discovered a Gmail account that sent at least 28 documented malicious emails across six countries targeting Falun Gong between January and April 2026. Multiple technical and behavioral indicators point to an operator based in mainland China: timestamps correlating to working hours in Beijing's time zone, linguistic patterns consistent with a Chinese-language user, a China-registered phone number linked to the Gmail account, VPN routing, and the sender's own admissions.⁴⁷

Sabotage, Assaults, and Physical Intimidation. These tactics aim to put practitioners in real physical danger, deterring them from speaking out and silencing the witnesses Beijing most wants quiet.

In March 2024, the tire of a Shen Yun performance bus in Costa Mesa, CA was found to have been slashed. There was a cut halfway through the rubber, ensuring that the tire would not deflate right away but would burst under pressure at high speed on the freeway. According to the police report, the cut looked fresh. The bus had been under round-the-clock watch following a similar previous attempt, but had been briefly taken to a garage for routine maintenance which provided a window of opportunity for the incident.⁴⁸

Multiple assaults targeting practitioner volunteers have taken place in 2026. In late February, two female practitioners were assaulted at information booths in New York City and London within a span of four days. The victims were bloodied and hospitalized by assailants simply for sharing information about Falun Gong and the Chinese regime's persecution.⁴⁹ In a letter responding to the London assault, UK Minister of State for Security Dan Jarvis affirmed that "any foreign state-directed crime against an individual in the UK will never be tolerated."⁵⁰ In March, a third assault occurred in New York City, when a female practitioner was attacked while walking home after a volunteering shift at an information booth.⁵¹ The following month in Los Angeles, a middle-aged assailant was arrested after tearing down an "End CCP" banner and striking an elderly female practitioner with a tree branch.⁵²

⁴⁴ <https://faluninfo.net/incident-tracker-monitoring-the-ccps-latest-transnational-repression-and-disinformation-campaign-against-falun-gong/#feb-16-25>

⁴⁵ <https://faluninfo.net/chinese-coordinated-death-threats-target-taiwan-screenings-and-government-officials/>

⁴⁶ <https://www.ctvnews.ca/toronto/article/remaining-shows-in-shen-yuns-run-at-torontos-four-seasons-centre-cancelled-amid-escalating-threats-presenters/>

⁴⁷ <https://faluninfo.net/one-pro-beijing-email-account-114-days-a-sustained-threat-campaign-targeting-falun-gong-and-shen-yun/>

⁴⁸ <https://leeshailamish.com/on-shen-yun/2024/03/17/tire-slashing-is-back/>

⁴⁹ <https://faluninfo.net/falun-gong-practitioner-assaulted-at-information-booth-in-new-york-city/>

⁵⁰ <https://faluninfo.net/uk-security-minister-condemns-assault-on-falun-gong-practitioner-outside-british-museum-reiterates-zero-tolerance-for-transnational-repression/>

⁵¹ <https://faluninfo.net/physical-assault-robbery-elderly-falun-gong-practitioner-targeted-in-flushing-amid-ongoing-safety-concerns/>

⁵² <https://faluninfo.net/exclusive-suspect-arrested-in-los-angeles-following-violent-assault-on-falun-gong-practitioner/>



Facing international accusations that it forcibly harvests organs from Falun Gong practitioners and other prisoners of conscience, the CCP has been targeting key individuals or events dedicated to exposing these abuses. Mr. Cheng Peiming, the first-known survivor of China's forced organ harvesting practices, reportedly had his U.S. home in New York state broken into in November 2024. The incident followed several other attempted attacks on Mr. Cheng and his vehicle in the preceding three months.⁵³

Diplomatic Pressure and Proxy Mobilization. This is the most longstanding and the most visible tactic: the use of Chinese embassies, consulates, and U.S.-based proxies to pressure American institutions to censor, distance themselves from, or speak against Shen Yun and Falun Gong.

For example, in 2024, the State University of New York at Purchase signed a student-exchange agreement—one that included political-selection criteria—with the Beijing Dance Academy, a CCP-run institution. Soon after, SUNY Purchase canceled Shen Yun's 2025 contract, ending more than a decade of performances at the venue. The Jamestown Foundation documented this case as an example of how a state-controlled Chinese cultural institution could serve as a vehicle for extending Beijing's preferences into an American campus.⁵⁴

During Xi Jinping's November 2023 visit to San Francisco, several respondents described being harassed by Li Huahong and others tied to the Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance (CACWA). One California practitioner over the age of 65 recalled CCP-hired individuals blocking their signs and shouting to disrupt passersby seeking information, while another respondent, working as a journalist, described being surrounded and nearly beaten by the group. A 2024 report by the Hong Kong Democracy Council and Students for a Free Tibet documented several of these same incidents.⁵⁵

IV. Shen Yun as the Primary Target

Shen Yun Performing Arts, a New York-based classical Chinese dance company founded in 2006 by Falun Gong practitioners, seeks to revive traditional Chinese culture free of communist influence, including pieces that artistically depict the persecution of Falun Gong. Now reaching over 200 cities and more than a million live audience members a year, Shen Yun shows what China can look like when the Party is not in charge. For this reason, it has drawn sustained CCP efforts to disrupt its performances in at least 38 countries through violent threats, diplomatic pressure, disinformation, physical sabotage, and cyberattacks. While most venues and officials have rebuffed this pressure, Beijing has succeeded in blocking or forcing the cancellation of a performance in at least 25 cases across 14 countries.⁵⁶

Consistent with what leaked internal notes reveal, Shen Yun and its headquarters, Dragon Springs, have become the primary target of the CCP's escalating repression. As of May 2026, more than three-fourths of documented violent threats targeting Falun Gong, and more than two-thirds of those targeting government officials or institutions globally, are related to Shen Yun.⁵⁷

Approximately 100 Shen Yun performers and their families have been directly affected by the persecution in China—mothers, fathers, aunts, and uncles imprisoned, sent to labor camps, tortured, or killed.⁵⁸ Steven Wang, a former principal dancer and current dance instructor, learned in March 2023, while on tour with Shen Yun, that his mother had just been sentenced to four years in prison—a case documented in the U.S.

⁵³ <https://faluninfo.net/forced-organ-harvesting-survivor-in-the-u-s-faces-threats-suspected-break-in/>

⁵⁴ <https://jamestown.org/beijing-dance-academy-dances-to-the-tune-of-zhongnanhai/>

⁵⁵ <https://ccpexportingrepression.com/>

⁵⁶ <https://library.faluninfo.net/diplomatic-disruptions-and-disinformation-beijings-global-drive-to-stop-shen-yun/>

⁵⁷ Incident Tracker by the FDIC, see footnote 30.

⁵⁸ <https://faluninfo.net/how-media-criticisms-and-investigations-seriously-miss-the-mark/>



Commission on International Religious Freedom's prisoner database; his father had died in 2009 after years of detention and torture.⁵⁹ For dozens of Shen Yun artists, the threat to family in China is an active coercive tool the CCP wields in real time.

V. Impact on the Falun Gong Community

The CCP's aggressive transnational repression has taken a profound toll on the Falun Gong community in the U.S. and around the world. To better document and understand its scope, the FDIC recently conducted a survey of American Falun Gong practitioners. The full results will be published in the coming weeks, but we would like to share a few top-line findings with the Commission.

- The survey received over 1,000 valid responses from practitioners across 41 U.S. states.
- Nearly half of respondents (48%) reported experiencing increased transnational repression since 2022.
- An overwhelming majority of respondents (90%) reported noticing increased negative media coverage, social media campaigns, or misinformation about Falun Gong since 2022.
- Respondents reported over 600 incidents of transnational repression since 2020, including physical assaults, verbal harassment, property damage, cyberbullying, violent threats, censorship, surveillance, and reprisals against family in China. Furthermore, the number of reported incidents showed a dramatic increase, from 16 cases reported in 2020 to 172 in 2025.
- In 130 of the reported cases, Chinese regime agencies—including the MPS, the MSS, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—were directly involved.
- American institutions were also pressured or deceived into suppressing or restricting the freedom of expression of Falun Gong practitioners in the United States. Over 80 respondents reported instances of being barred from parades, community events, or national conferences because they practice Falun Gong.
- Known for their resilience in the face of repression, the vast majority of Falun Gong practitioners report feeling safe to practice their faith and engage in human rights advocacy on behalf of those persecuted in China, despite the regime's escalating tactics and a growing atmosphere of bias and intolerance. However, over 60% are anxious about the CCP's surveillance capacity in the United States and its implications.
- Many of the cases reported by respondents have gone unpunished due to the anonymity of attackers, the absence of reporting by victims, insufficient law-enforcement, or inadequate laws to protect Americans from transnational repression.

VI. Conclusion

The CCP's transnational repression targeting Falun Gong practitioners through violence, threats, lawfare, media manipulation, and attempts to co-opt U.S. federal agencies, have been documented by U.S. federal courts, allied law enforcement agencies, American companies, leading human-rights organizations, disinformation network researchers, investigative journalists, and the Falun Gong community itself. All these points to a sophisticated, tried-and-true playbook to harm and alienate a religious minority.

The implications extend far beyond the Falun Gong community—if the CCP is left unchecked, its tactics targeting Falun Gong could easily be used against any American institution of Beijing's choosing. This poses as a major risk to the U.S. national security and demands strong responses from the U.S. government to counter Beijing's playbook.

⁵⁹ <https://faluninfo.net/mother-of-steven-wang/>



VII. Recommendations

1. **A Congressional hearing on transnational repression of U.S. religious minorities by the CCP**, with sworn testimony from FBI counterintelligence officials, current and former Shen Yun performers, Falun Gong practitioners, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York (which prosecuted Chen and Feng), and independent researchers from Freedom House, the Jamestown Foundation, and ETAC.
2. **Global Magnitsky Act sanctions** against named individuals identified as drivers of the campaign, including 610 Office leadership, MSS Minister Chen Yixin, MPS head Wang Xiaohong, and Joint Office for Combating Falun Gong in North America Director Wu Xiuhua. These authorities exist; the evidence threshold has been met.
3. **Department of Justice continuation and expansion of Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) enforcement** against the U.S.-soil network that supported the Chen/Feng/Sun, Ping Li, and Lu Jianwang/Chen Jinping activities. In particular, financial-flow analysis of consulate payments and of the 610 Office payments John Chen described should be a stand-alone investigative priority.
4. **FBI counterintelligence prioritization of transnational repression as a stand-alone category**, with clear public reporting of Chinese-government-linked threats against U.S. nonprofits, religious communities, and journalists.
5. **Treasury and Department of Education review of state-owned Chinese cultural institutions operating partnerships with U.S. universities and theaters**—the Beijing Dance Academy/SUNY Purchase exchange that resulted in Shen Yun's contract cancellation is an example that should be studied and constrained.
6. **Passage of the Falun Gong and Victims of Forced Organ Harvesting Protection Act (S.4009)**, a bipartisan bill currently pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

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June 10, 2026

Senator Dan Sullivan (R-AK)
Chair, Congressional-Executive
Commission on China

Representative Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ)
Co-Chair, Congressional-Executive
Commission on China

Re: Congressional-Executive Commission on China Hearing, June 4, 2026: "The PRC's Threats to Americans: Transnational Repression & State-Level Responses"

Dear Chairman Sullivan and Co-Chair Smith:

On behalf of the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP), I submit this written statement in regards to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's (CECC) June 4, 2026 hearing, "The PRC's Threats to Americans: Transnational Repression & State-Level Responses." UHRP welcomes the Commission's continued examination of the Chinese government's transnational repression and commends its sustained attention to the threats the PRC poses to United States citizens and legal permanent residents.

As the Commission's June 2026 "Report on the PRC's Transnational Repression and Malign Influence in 2025" documents, China's targeting of dissidents, diaspora communities, researchers, politicians, and civil society organizations in the United States pose a growing challenge to human rights, free expression, and national sovereignty. The threats against family members in China, online harassment, and disinformation campaigns aimed at silencing criticism and shaping narratives favorable to the Chinese Communist Party noted in CECC's report calls for a coordinated U.S. government response to counter transnational repression and protect affected communities.¹ Further, the Commission's findings substantiate earlier reporting from Freedom House regarding the extent of Chinese transnational repression in the United States.²

Along with other human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Foundation and World Without Genocide,³ UHRP has long documented China's transnational repression of Uyghur Americans. In "The Fifth Poison: The Harassment of Uyghurs Overseas," published in November 2017, we first presented evidence of how the Chinese government monitors,

¹ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, *Report on the PRC's Transnational Repression and Malign Influence in 2025* (Washington, DC: Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2026), https://www.cecc.gov/sites/evo-subsites/cecc.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/long-arm-report-cecc_0.pdf.

² Freedom House, *Unsafe in America: Transnational Repression in the United States* (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2022), <https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression/united-states>.

³ Human Rights Foundation, "Beyond Borders: China's Transnational Repression of Uyghurs," accessed June 10, 2026, <https://hrf.org/latest/beyond-borders-chinas-transnational-repression-of-uyghurs/>; World Without Genocide, "Transnational Repression: A Global Problem," accessed June 10, 2026, <https://worldwithoutgenocide.org/genocides-and-conflicts/transnational-repression-a-global-problem>.

harasses, and intimidates Uyghurs living abroad, including in the U.S., through threats to their family members in China, pressure to act as informants, and surveillance of communications.⁴

In “Repression Across Borders: The CCP’s Illegal Harassment and Coercion of Uyghur Americans,” published in 2019, UHRP focused on threats, surveillance, and coercive messaging (via WeChat and other channels) aimed at U.S.-resident Uyghurs. We concluded these measures China impeded Uyghur Americans’ rights to free speech and activism by leveraging fear for relatives in the Uyghur Region. Furthermore, in 2021, UHRP reported on the continuing pattern of transnational pressure through digital communications, noting China’s use of “proof-of-life” videos between family members as a means of transmitting misinformation and fear.⁵ In a joint report published in 2022 with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, UHRP highlighted the Chinese state’s broader digital transnational repression, which combines digital surveillance with cyberattacks against Uyghurs in liberal democracies, like the U.S., undermining the liberty and security of diaspora communities.

Our most recent report, published in February 2026, “Fading Ties: Uyghur Family Separation as a Tool of Transnational Repression” uncovered how the Chinese government has transformed family separation into a deliberate mechanism of transnational repression, severing communication between Uyghurs in the United States and their relatives in the Uyghur homeland in order to silence advocacy and deter public criticism of Beijing’s policies.

Drawing on testimonies from members of the Uyghur diaspora, the report shows how the threat of retaliation against family members, combined with surveillance, intimidation, and arbitrary detention, has left many Uyghur Americans unable to contact parents, siblings, or extended family for years, creating psychological distress while weakening community networks and political activism. Our report concludes that the disruption of family ties is not merely a byproduct of repression in the Uyghur Region, but an intentional strategy that extends the reach of the Chinese state into the United States by leveraging concern for loved ones to constrain the exercise of fundamental rights.

One of the most significant impacts of China’s transnational repression on Uyghurs in the United States is the psychological and emotional harm caused by the loss of contact with family members in the Uyghur Region. The report finds that many Uyghur Americans live with persistent uncertainty about the fate of loved ones. This family separation generates anxiety, depression, grief, and feelings of helplessness, while also discouraging some Uyghurs from engaging in activism, public advocacy, or even ordinary expressions of identity out of concern that their actions could endanger loved ones in China. By weaponizing family relationships, the Chinese government extends its coercive power beyond its borders, weakening community

⁴ Nicole Morgret, *The Fifth Poison: The Harassment of Uyghurs Overseas* (Washington, DC: Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2017), <https://uhrp.org/report/the-fifth-poison-the-harassment-of-uyghur-overseas/>.

⁵ Emily Upson, “*The Government Never Oppresses Us*”: China’s proof-of-life videos as intimidation and a violation of Uyghur family unity (Washington, DC: Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2021), https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/POLVReportFinal_2021-01-29.pdf.

cohesion and undermining the ability of Uyghur Americans to fully participate in civic and political life.

When a foreign government intimidates, surveils, harasses, or coerces people on U.S. soil, it is effectively attempting to exercise power within the United States. Whether through threats to diaspora communities, cyber harassment, or pressure campaigns, transnational repression challenges the principle that only U.S. laws and institutions should govern people living in the United States. When people in the United States cannot freely speak, organize, or advocate for human rights without fear of foreign retaliation, core constitutional freedoms are undermined. It creates a precedent that endangers all Americans and democratic institutions.

China's transnational repression is not limited to the Uyghur community. The measures used against Uyghurs can be deployed against journalists, academics, elected officials, researchers, and other diaspora groups. Allowing foreign governments to operate with impunity inside the United States weakens democratic institutions and encourages interference in American public life.

While federal efforts to contain transnational repression in the United States remain ongoing,⁶ state-level actions lag far behind the threat China poses to citizens and legal permanent residents. Beyond Texas Executive Order No. GA-47, which addresses the transnational harassment of Texans,⁷ state measures relevant to Uyghurs predominately focus on procurement policies.⁸ As such, the Uyghur Human Rights Project proposes the following recommendations for U.S. state governments.

Advocate for Family Protection and Communication: State governments that maintain economic and cultural relations with Chinese counterparts should work to ensure Uyghur Americans can safely communicate with and, where possible, reunite with family members.

Monitor and Document Transnational Repression: State-level offices should systematically track cases of harassment, surveillance, and coercion targeting Uyghur Americans, including threats to relatives abroad, cyberattacks, and intimidation through proxies. Data collected should inform public reporting, legal action, and intergovernmental coordination to identify and disrupt PRC operations.

Support Diaspora Mental Health and Cultural Continuity: Provide funding for mental health services, counseling, and culturally competent community support for Uyghur Americans experiencing trauma from threats, family separation, or harassment. Support programs that

⁶ Uyghur Human Rights Project, "Transnational Repression Policy Act (H.R. 4829 / S. 2525)," accessed June 10, 2026, <https://uhrp.org/bill-summary/transnational-repression-policy-act-h-r-4829-s-2525/>.

⁷ Office of the Texas Governor, "Governor Abbott Issues Executive Order Targeting Chinese Communist Party's Harassment of Texans," November 18, 2024, <https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-issues-executive-order-targeting-chinese-communist-partys-harassment-of-texans>.

⁸ Michigan House of Representatives, House Bill 5288 (2025), accessed June 10, 2026, <https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Bills/Bill?ObjectName=2025-HB-5288>.

preserve Uyghur language and intergenerational connections to strengthen resilience against transnational repression.

Counter State Propaganda and Disinformation: State governments should support independent media, research institutions, advocacy groups, and educational programs that expose PRC disinformation campaigns targeting Uyghurs. This includes amplifying credible reporting on forced family separation, harassment, and other forms of transnational repression, while promoting public awareness campaigns to counter misinformation.

UHRP supports the views expressed by Co-Chair Smith and Commissioner McGovern at the June 4 hearing and believes that subnational governments in the United States should take bolder steps towards protecting U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents from China's transnational repression.

Sincerely,



Dr. Henryk Szadziewski, Director of Research.



**United States House of Representatives
Congressional-Executive Commission on China**

"Truth in Testimony" Disclosure Form

In accordance with Rule XI, clause 2(g) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, witnesses are asked to disclose the following information. Please complete this form and attach it to your written testimony and it may be made publicly available in electronic format.

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_____ Yes _____ No

False Statement Certification:

Knowingly providing material false information to this commission, or knowingly concealing material information from this commission, is a crime (18 U.S.C. 1001). This form may be made part of the hearing record.

Witness Signature

Date

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*Witness Biographies***Stephen J. Cox, Counsel to the Governor, State of Alaska**

Stephen J. Cox serves as Counsel to the Governor of Alaska and previously served as Alaska's 28th Attorney General. In state service, he has advised the Governor and executive agencies on major legal, constitutional, and policy matters, including litigation, public safety, regulatory initiatives, resource development priorities, consumer protection, and risks connected to China such as illegal imports, counterfeit and unsafe products, and technology concerns affecting vulnerable Alaskans. He previously served as Senior Vice President and Chief Legal and Strategy Officer at Bristol Bay Industrial, and earlier as principal attorney for Apache Corporation's Alaska operations. Cox also served in senior roles at the U.S. Department of Justice, including as Deputy Associate Attorney General and U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas, where his work included corporate enforcement policy, regulatory reform, white collar crime, elder fraud, and violent crime prosecutions.

Eliot Bostar, Nebraska State Senator

State Senator Eliot Bostar represents District 29 in the Nebraska Legislature, where he was first elected in 2020 and re-elected in 2024. A nonprofit executive and graduate of St. John's Northwestern Military Academy and Embry-Riddle University, he serves on the Banking, Commerce and Insurance Committee, the Revenue Committee, the Committee on Committees, the Reference Committee, the Rules Committee, the Executive Board, the Legislature's Planning Committee, the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax System Committee, and the Statewide Tourism and Recreational Water Access and Resource Sustainability Committee. Senator Bostar introduced LB644 at the request of Nebraska's Governor; the measure, approved by the Governor in June 2025, adopted the Foreign Adversary and Terrorist Agent Registration Act and the Crush Transnational Repression in Nebraska Act, among other provisions related to foreign-adversary contracting and genetic sequencing data.

Arthur Liu, Owner, Inter-Pacific Law Group

Arthur Junguo Liu is an attorney in the San Francisco Bay area and the father of two-time Olympic gold medalist figure skater Alysa Liu. Born and raised in China, Liu was attending graduate school at Zhongshan University in Guangzhou in 1989 when he organized student demonstrations calling for democracy, human rights, and an end to corruption. After the June 4 Massacre, he became one of the most wanted student activists in South China and came to the United States as a political refugee at the end of 1989. He later earned an MBA and JD in California and has practiced law for more than 27 years. Liu has continued his advocacy for democracy and human rights in China by organizing protests outside the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco and the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C. After PRC-linked efforts to recruit Alysa Liu to compete for China, Liu and his daughter became targets of PRC spying operations before the 2022 Winter Olympic Games.

Anna Kwok, Board Director and former Executive Director, Hong Kong Democracy Council

Anna Kwok is a Hong Kong organizer and policy analyst based in Washington, D.C. She is a Board Director and former Executive Director of the Hong Kong Democracy Council, a nonpartisan nonprofit organization that supports Hong Kong's pro-democracy movement and Hong Kongers in the United States through policy advocacy, diaspora empowerment, and research and education. Kwok previously worked as an anonymous activist on major international campaigns, later choosing to make her identity public after the imposition of Hong Kong's National Security Law in order to resist the climate of fear affecting Hong Kong activists abroad. In 2023, Hong Kong authorities issued an arrest warrant and offered a HK\$1 million bounty in connection with her advocacy work. In 2025, Kwok's father was arrested and imprisoned in what she and other advocates have described as retaliation for her advocacy.