    [Joint House and Senate Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                        THE PRC'S THREATS TO AMERICANS:
                            TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION
                           AND STATE-LEVEL RESPONSES

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                             CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
                               COMMISSION ON CHINA

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  JUNE 4, 2026

                                   __________

     Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

                     [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                  Available at www.cecc.gov or www.govinfo.gov

                                   ______

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    64-049 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2026

                  CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                        LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

    Senate                               House

    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chair          CHRIS SMITH, New Jersey, Co-chair
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa
    JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 ELISE STEFANIK, New York
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois            DALE STRONG, Alabama
    ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 JEN KIGGANS, Virginia
    LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware       JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts
                                         THOMAS SUOZZI, New York
                                         SUHAS SUBRAMANYAM, Virginia
                                         JAMES WALKINSHAW, Virginia

                         EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

                               Not yet appointed

                          Scott Flipse, Staff Director

                       Mary Vigil, Deputy Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                                   Statements

    Opening Statement of Hon. Chris Smith, a Representative from New
      Jersey; Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China.....     1
    Statement of James P. McGovern, a Representative from
      Massachusetts..................................................     3
    Statement of Suhas Subramanyam, a Representative from Virginia...     6
    Statement of Stephen J. Cox, Counsel to the Governor, State of
      Alaska.........................................................     8
    Statement of Eliot Bostar, Nebraska State Senator................    10
    Statement of Arthur Liu, owner, Inter-Pacific Law Group..........    12
    Statement of Anna Kwok, Board Director and former Executive
      Director, Hong Kong Democracy Council..........................    15

                                    APPENDIX
                              Prepared Statements

    Cox, Stephen J...................................................    29
    Bostar, Eliot....................................................    31
    Liu, Arthur......................................................    34
    Kwok, Anna.......................................................    35

    Smith, Hon. Chris................................................    36
    Sullivan, Hon. Dan...............................................    37
    McGovern, Hon. James P...........................................    38

                           Submissions for the Record

    Submission of Levi Browde and James Yu, Falun Dafa Information
      Center.........................................................    41
    Submission of Dr. Henryk Szadziewski, Director of Research,
      Uyghur Human Rights Project....................................    53

    CECC Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form..........................    57
    Witness Biographies..............................................    59

                                     (iii)

                        THE PRC'S THREATS TO AMERICANS:
                            TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION
                           AND STATE-LEVEL RESPONSES

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, JUNE 4, 2026

                                Congressional-Executive
                                           Commission on China,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The hearing was held from 1:34 p.m. to 3:07 p.m., in Room
    106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC,
    Representative Chris Smith, Co-chair, Congressional-Executive
    Commission on China, presiding.
        Also present: Representatives McGovern and Subramanyam.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF CHRIS SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
                  JERSEY AND CO-CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-
                     EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

        Co-chair Smith. The Commission will come to order. And
    thank you all for being here, and my good friend and colleague,
    Jim McGovern, at this hearing of the CECC. I want to thank all
    of you in advance. Before we begin I want to mark a solemn
    anniversary. Today marks the 37th anniversary of the Tiananmen
    Square massacre. Thirty-seven years ago millions of Chinese
    citizens peacefully asked for political reform, democratic
    openness, and basic human dignity. Their hope was met with
    tanks. The Chinese Communist Party unleashed the People's
    Liberation Army on peaceful demonstrators.
        Mothers lost sons, fathers lost daughters, and China lost
    an idealistic generation to the violence of June 4th, 1989.
    There has been no full accounting of those killed, imprisoned,
    or disappeared. The Party still tries to erase a massacre the
    world must never forget. But Tiananmen cannot be erased. The
    enduring image of that day is the Tank Man, the solitary figure
    standing before a column of tanks. His courage reminds us that
    the desire for freedom is not Western, not foreign, and it's
    not imposed from the outside. It is universal.
        As I have said before, a choice has been made by all of us.
    You either stand with the Tank Man or you stand with the tank.
    There is no middle ground. Tiananmen is not a detour for this
    hearing. It is the key to understanding it. The same party that
    tried to crush truth at home now tries to chase truth abroad.
    The tactics have not changed. The technology has changed, the
    reach has expanded, but the purpose is the same--to make people
    afraid to speak the truth, by almost any means necessary.
    Inside China, the CCP uses surveillance, censorship, prison,
    the pervasive use of torture, forced disappearance, and fear to
    maintain their grip on power.
        But what happens in China no longer stays in China. The
    Party wants to control what is said about China here, and to
    control who says it. The CECC has warned about the CCP's long
    arm for years. Long before transnational repression became a
    common phrase, I held a dozen hearings or so of this Commission
    and in my Subcommittee on Human Rights, documenting and
    exposing a consistent pattern of global abuse, starting with
    Confucius Institutes back in 2014. Over time, tactics have
    become more digital and more ruthless--detaining family members
    in China, doxing, the use of spyware, deepfakes, Hong Kong
    bounties, and the illegal
    police stations right here in the United States.
        It is outrageous and unacceptable, and it absolutely must
    stop. Transnational repression is not only a threat to
    Americans, it's a broader, interconnected CCP strategy. We see
    that strategy in scam networks stealing from U.S. citizens,
    fentanyl poisoning of our cities and our young people, PRC-
    linked land purchases near military installations, efforts to
    corrupt politicians and elections, steal private personnel and
    biometric data, and intellectual property theft from businesses
    and universities.
        I would note parenthetically, when I held a hearing on how
    Google, Microsoft, and Cisco were enabling the Chinese arm of
    repression in China by censoring what people could see when
    they did a Google search, my personal computer, my committee's
    computers, were all hit. Everything was taken. And it was all
    traced to Beijing. That was in 2005. They have gotten far more
    effective at doing that kind of repression. Everything was
    gone. And, you know, including personally identifiable
    information on me, and I'm not the only one. Many other people
    had the same thing happen.
        We see that strategy replicated in other countries as well.
    It's not just the United States. It's Canada and elsewhere.
    These may all look like separate problems, but they share a
    common purpose--
    exploit our openness, gather leverage, weaken our institutions,
    spread propaganda, and make Americans pay a price for standing
    up to Beijing. But I have news for them. We're not backing
    down. The members of this Commission, the people who are here
    today, our very distinguished witnesses, we will never bow down
    to this tyranny. Transnational repression is the most personal
    form of that strategy. It brings pressure campaigns to the
    doorstep of students, the journalists, dissidents, artists, and
    family members.
        That is why state and local responses matter. A victim may
    first call the police. A student may go to a university
    official. A state attorney general may see the pattern. A state
    legislator may realize the existing law does not fit the
    threat. So the questions are practical. Do local officials and
    officers recognize this threat? Do universities know how to
    protect their students? Do states have the tools they need? And
    does the Federal Government have a real strategy? And are we
    deploying enough of our capacity and capability to mitigate
    this threat?
        That's why I'm so proud to work with Chairman Sullivan,
    Senator Merkley, and Jim McGovern on the Transnational
    Repression Policy Act. This bipartisan, bicameral legislation
    would define the abuse, improve coordination, train officials,
    support targeted communities, and hold perpetrators
    accountable--because victims need more than just sympathy; they
    need protection and a place to turn, where those to whom they
    turn are well informed and equipped with tools to stop it.
        But let me make one point clear. A regime that fears a
    student's question, a refugee's protest, an artist's statue, or
    the simple memory of the Tiananmen Square massacre is not
    strong. It's not a confident superpower. I remember when we did
    that hearing--we brought in the Google people. We had them
    testify, as well as Cisco, Microsoft, and Yahoo. And I put up
    on the board what you get in China when you put in the
    Tiananmen Square massacre. You get nothing but pretty pictures
    of people smiling and taking snapshots and videos there on the
    square. Nothing about the massacre or the protests. They live
    in a culture of denial, and that denial has to be eradicated.
        I would say that any so-called superpower that does that
    lives in fear, and they are very afraid. It makes them perhaps
    even more dangerous. But they are not operating out of a
    position of confidence or power. Fear in the hands of a
    dictatorship, like I said, is dangerous. It becomes coercion.
    It becomes censorship. It becomes repression. It crosses
    borders and reaches right into our own communities. So our
    answer must be unmistakable. If the CCP threatens people here,
    there must be investigations and prosecutions. If it reaches
    across our borders to spread fear, there must be sanctions. If
    it takes family members hostage to silence a critic, which they
    do all the time, we will demand their release and expose the
    cruelty of that tactic. And if it tries to censor a free
    people, we will defend and spread the rights that Beijing fears
    most--freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of
    assembly, and the right to tell the truth without fear. Because
    in the United States of America, unlike China, no one needs the
    Party's permission to speak, to worship, to protest, to
    remember, or to be free. And that's why this hearing matters.
    And that's why having four very distinguished people testifying
    will help us get that message across. Thank you so much.
        [The prepared statement of Co-chair Smith appears in the
    Appendix.]
        Jim.

                    STATEMENT OF JAMES P. McGOVERN,
                  A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS

        Representative McGovern. Thank you very much. I want to
    thank my colleague from New Jersey, Congressman Smith, for his
    words and for his commitment to human rights, not only in China
    but all around the world. Good morning, everybody. I want to
    welcome our witnesses and our guests to today's hearing on
    transnational repression.
        Today is June 4th, and as Co-chair Smith pointed out, 37
    years ago the Chinese government directed the military to
    attack civilians who were exercising their right to freedom of
    expression to call for economic and political reform. Let us
    never forget those who bravely stood for freedom in Tiananmen
    Square and other cities, the mothers who never knew the fate of
    their children, and those who continue to tell the stories in
    the face of a government that seeks to silence them. And let us
    not forget that any society whose leaders are willing to use
    lethal force against peaceful protesters is a society at risk
    of losing its fundamental liberties.
        I am glad that the Commission continues to address
    transnational repression. In 2020, Co-chair Marco Rubio and I
    created a new chapter called ``Human Rights Violations in the
    U.S. and Globally'' in the annual report. And CECC staff have
    just released a new special report on transnational repression.
    I always appreciate the dedication of the nonpartisan subject
    matter experts who work for this Commission. This report is
    absolutely worth reading.
        China is the world's worst perpetrator of transnational
    repression. Freedom House lists the PRC with the most
    incidents, 319 since 2014. And that only accounts for reported
    incidents. Who knows how many people have gotten threatening
    texts or calls that they are too scared to report. But
    transnational repression is more than China. Freedom House
    lists Tajikistan, Rwanda, Russia, Egypt, and Belarus among the
    biggest violators. Last year I chaired a Tom Lantos Human
    Rights Commission hearing highlighting TNR by India, Pakistan,
    and Hong Kong. Yesterday afternoon Co-chair Smith and I
    convened a hearing on Turkiye, listed with 160 TNR incidents.
        You know, hearings are fine, but it really is time for
    action. Advocates tell us that their number one goal is to
    create a standard definition of transnational repression. I am
    proud to join with CECC leaders Senators Merkley and Sullivan,
    and Co-chair Smith, in sponsoring the Transnational Repression
    Policy Act. It defines TNR in statute, strengthening efforts to
    counter it at the federal, state, and local level. This bill
    was first introduced in the House three years ago, but it has
    gone nowhere. In March, Freedom House led a coalition of 35
    organizations, including Uyghur, Tibetan, Chinese, and Hong
    Kong human rights groups, in a statement to the chairs of the
    House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign
    Relations Committee, asking them to mark up the bill. Foreign
    Affairs has scheduled four markups since that letter, but the
    Transnational Repression Policy Act never makes the agenda. I
    ask Chairman Mast in the House to schedule it, to act.
        Our bill is important. It would give the U.S. the tools to
    lead on TNR. Equally important, we must acknowledge that the
    tools will only be effective if we avoid double standards. I
    worry that we're falling short. One, President Biden started,
    and President Trump completed, the rehabilitation of Saudi
    Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who directed the murder of
    Jamal Khashoggi in Turkiye. We lose credibility when the U.S.
    Government allows impunity for transnational repression.
        Two, this Commission characterized the deportation by
    Thailand of 40 Uyghurs to China as transnational repression,
    yet the Trump administration has deported individuals who have
    been transnationally repressed in the U.S. by Iran and by
    Russia, back to those countries. We lose credibility to ask
    other countries to protect TNR victims when the U.S. Government
    refuses to protect TNR victims.
        Three, to the extent we label political interference by
    China and the U.S. as transnational repression, then we must
    consider Senator Bernie Moreno's meddling in the Colombian
    election as transnational repression. We lose credibility when
    U.S. officials act like CCP officials.
        Four, last year the Trump administration sanctioned a
    Brazilian judge who brought insurrectionists to justice,
    falsely portraying legitimate accountability as transnational
    repression. We lose credibility when U.S. officials pervert TNR
    to help political allies.
        In September, our credibility will be again tested. Xi
    Jinping will visit Washington at President Trump's invitation.
    The last time he was in the U.S., thugs associated with the
    Chinese consulate in San Francisco beat up anti-Xi protesters.
        We must be prepared to defend the right of protest here.
    The question is, will we? And I mean, this administration has
    deployed security forces to suppress Americans' right to
    protest. They're doing it right now outside of Delaney Hall ICE
    facility in Newark, New Jersey. If Xi Jinping asked President
    Trump to contain or control Chinese, Uyghur, and Tibetan
    protesters, will he do that? Or will he be wind at the backs of
    those engaged in legitimate dissent? You know, this
    administration has deported people for exercising their free
    speech rights under the First Amendment and the ICCPR to
    criticize the Israeli government. If Xi Jinping, you know,
    asked President Trump to deport people, for whatever reason,
    back to China, we must make it clear that that is unacceptable,
    and we will not do that, and we will not stand for that.
        Transnational repression is a human rights violation. All
    human beings are entitled to the same rights, no matter where
    they live or how they feel about their government. And I thank
    the witnesses for being here today. I welcome the insight. I
    want to apologize in advance that I think--I don't know if
    we'll get to my questions, but we just got word that--I'm on
    the Rules Committee--at 2:30 we're taking up the rule. So,
    anyway--frustrating--but I want to be here for your testimony.
    Thank you. I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Representative McGovern appears
    in the Appendix.]
        Co-chair Smith. Thank you. I want to thank our Ranking
    Member. And you know, we do have some disagreements on some
    issues; you know, Delaney Hall is in my state, and I have been
    closely monitoring everything going on there. There are people
    who are credibly accused of rape, child sex trafficking--and I
    wrote five laws on human trafficking, including the Trafficking
    Victims Protection Act--who are in that facility. And the
    federal law enforcement, ICE, Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement, police have been bitten. They've been kicked,
    punched. The level of restraint that they have shown is
    incredible. Our governor brought in the state police, and now
    the Newark police are there as well. So, you know, there are a
    lot of people in that facility. They were claiming that the
    food wasn't good. It is good. I just can't believe--you know,
    just because somebody said, Oh, this water stinks, doesn't make
    it stink. We've got to be very careful. So this isn't the
    place, I guess, to debate that.
        We are here, united and standing with our friends, both
    here as part of the diaspora, as well as people inside of China
    who are suffering the cruelty of Xi Jinping each and every day.
    I'm barred from going to China. I have tried to go. I've been
    put on the list. Global Times named me as an enemy--they also
    named Marco Rubio as an enemy, and Jim, you know, so we need to
    push back as never before against the monstrous dictatorship of
    Xi Jinping. And, again, you, the four witnesses, help bring a
    great deal of light and scrutiny as to what to do next
    concerning this important issue.
        Congressman Subramanyam, do you want to say something?

                    STATEMENT OF SUHAS SUBRAMANYAM,
                     A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA

        Representative Subramanyam. Thank you so much to my
    colleagues on the Commission for all your leadership. I want to
    sort of home in on one particular issue when it comes to the
    People's Republic of China, and that's the treatment of the
    Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. This is a campaign
    conducted using digital threats, coercion, and essentially
    taking families hostage to enforce silence here in the United
    States, and co-opting countries to detain exiles. I've heard
    stories firsthand from the Uyghur population in my district. I
    hosted a town hall with members of the Uyghur community last
    year, and the top concern they brought up was transnational
    repression.
        Here's some of what I heard. You know, one quote from
    someone who wanted to remain anonymous was, ``Our families do
    not face abstract threats, but we are enduring active,
    multilayered, state-sponsored transnational repression by the
    Chinese Communist Party right now.'' One Virginian, who many
    here may know, Rushan Abbas, spoke publicly about the mass
    internment camp system back in 2018, and within a week, her
    sister Gulshan was abducted by the Chinese government. She was
    subjected to a secret trial and then sentenced to 20 years in
    prison without any due process. On June 12th, she will be
    turning 64, and this is her eighth birthday in a row spent in
    jail.
        Another constituent of mine shared how the Chinese
    government has also blocked communication between Uyghurs
    abroad and their relatives in China, and used families as
    leverage to prevent Uyghurs from speaking out. He said, ``My
    family and I have not been able to speak with our loved ones
    back home for 10 years. We still do not know what happened to
    them. We've been trying to get information through multiple
    channels, but we have not been able to communicate. My wife,
    who is a U.S. citizen, only learned about her aunt's death in
    China nearly a year after it happened. And my daughter even
    asked if we have any relatives at all, because she can't speak
    to them.''
        It makes people crazy. It makes people sad. It's a terrible
    situation. And I could keep going. We have story after story of
    transnational repression, the silencing of American citizens
    because of what's going on in the Uyghur communities in China.
    And we will continue to speak out about this. We will not be
    silent. And we will certainly give those folks a voice. So
    thank you, and I yield back.
        Co-chair Smith. Before we go to our witnesses, I did want
    to announce--you probably all already know this--that the
    Congressional-Executive Commission on China today released a
    new report on the PRC's transnational repression and malign
    influence. The report documents in highly disturbing detail how
    the Chinese Communist Party continues to extend its long arm
    beyond the Chinese borders. The report is available today. I do
    hope people will read it, use it, hopefully effectively. I want
    to especially thank Deanna Pelsang, Andrew Hartnett, and Rita
    Cheng, as well as our Chief of Staff Scott Flipse, for this
    important report.
        Now I'll go to our witnesses, beginning first with Stephen
    Cox, counsel to the Governor of Alaska. Mr. Cox has served as
    U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas and in senior
    roles at the Department of Justice. In Alaska, his work is
    focused on public safety, consumer protection, and PRC-related
    risks, including illegal imports, counterfeit products, and
    technology threats. We are grateful for his perspective on how
    state law enforcement officials can better respond to the
    threats from foreign adversaries.
        Let me say, Mr. Cox, you have a great Senator from Alaska.
    We do thank him for his leadership. We have worked together on
    many Chinese bills, including the FISH Act, which, amazingly,
    he got through the Senate. There have been several hearings,
    and he chaired the last one several months ago, on how the
    Chinese government has taken over fish. Half of all the
    calamari in the world is coming from forced labor with Chinese
    boats. I mean, it's a despicable thing. He has gotten passed a
    comprehensive human rights and real pro-trade bill called the
    FISH Act, and now we're looking to get it out on the House
    floor, his bill, ASAP. So I want to thank the Senator for that.
        We'll then hear from Nebraska State Senator Eliot Bostar.
    Senator Bostar has introduced many bills in Nebraska to protect
    his state from foreign adversary threats, positioning Nebraska
    as a national leader in state-level security policy. One such
    bill, LB 644, was passed in June 2025. That legislation
    included the Crush Transnational Repression in Nebraska Act,
    another bipartisan provision to protect Nebraskans from malign
    influence from foreign countries. The federal government has a
    vital role to play, but states are on the front line as well,
    of this China challenge. And we look forward to hearing from
    him the lessons that Nebraska may offer to all of our states on
    how to combat this.
        Our third witness is Arthur Liu, an attorney from the San
    Francisco Bay area and a longtime advocate for democracy and
    human rights in China. Mr. Liu was a student activist during
    the 1989 pro-democracy movement. He came to the United States
    as a political refugee after the June 4th massacre. He has
    continued his advocacy here, including outside PRC diplomatic
    facilities. His story shows the reach of transnational
    repression. Mr. Liu and his amazing daughter, Olympic gold
    medalist Alysa Liu, were targeted by PRC spying back in 2022 at
    the Winter Olympics. No family in America should live under
    intimidation from a foreign dictatorship. On the anniversary of
    Tiananmen Square, and in great recognition for the
    achievement--I mean, my wife and I watched her performances--
    they were amazing. And she got the gold medal, so that's
    fantastic.
        Our final witness is Anna Kwok, a Hong Kong organizer and
    policy analyst based here in Washington. Anna serves as a board
    chair of the Hong Kong Democracy Council, where she supports
    Hong Kong's pro-democracy movement in the United States. She
    has testified before this Commission before, has provided vital
    testimony about human rights conditions in Hong Kong. And, of
    course, we got passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy
    Act, written by this guy over here, [Scott Flipse] our chief of
    staff. It is law. And Anna has been just amazing in what she
    has done there.
        After Beijing imposed the so-called national security law
    on Hong Kong, Anna continued her advocacy publicly, despite
    serious risk. Hong Kong authorities later issued an arrest
    warrant and a bounty against her. Her father was imprisoned as
    retaliation for her work. The Chinese Communist Party wants
    brave men and women like Anna to believe there is no safe place
    to speak the truth, not even in the United States. She is the
    polar opposite of that, because she speaks the truth and does
    so with great grace and courage.
        We thank all of our witnesses. I now yield to Mr. Cox.

                      STATEMENT OF STEPHEN J. COX,
                COUNSEL TO THE GOVERNOR, STATE OF ALASKA

        Mr. Cox. Co-chair Smith and members of the Commission, I
    want to thank you for inviting me to testify today. Thanks in
    particular to Senator Sullivan for inviting me. I know he
    couldn't make it today, but I want to thank the Commission for
    all the work that you have been doing over the last 25 years. I
    appreciate the opportunity to contribute to your good work,
    especially today on June 4th, the 37th anniversary of Tiananmen
    Square. As for me, I stand with the Tank Man.
        My own interest in the broader China threat, particularly
    the threat that it poses to Americans here at home, goes back
    almost 20 years. When I served in the Bush administration at
    the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, I worked
    for the director. We encountered PRC gamesmanship surrounding
    removals and repatriation. And we realized that we were not
    just dealing with an immigration problem. It was an
    intelligence problem.
        During the first Trump administration, I served at the
    Department of Justice under Attorney General Jeff Sessions and
    Attorney General Bill Barr. And they carried on the China
    initiative. And they recognized, we recognized, that the PRC
    challenge touched nearly every dimension of American life,
    especially IP theft and commercial espionage. And most
    recently, when I served as Alaska's 28th attorney general, I
    stood up a counter-China initiative to examine how we could
    respond, using our own consumer protection authorities. That
    work continues in my new capacity as counsel to the Governor.
        To my mind, for the first time, consumers are on the front
    lines of our geopolitical conflict with China. When I say
    consumers, I'm not just talking about families and individuals.
    I'm talking about businesses and governments as well. Virtually
    all of us and our connected technology that we use can become
    an access point. That is where state attorneys general can play
    an important role. Consumer protection laws allow us to pursue
    deception and undisclosed risks, areas where foreign influence
    often hides in plain sight. Alaska's consumer protection laws
    are among the strongest in the
    nation.
        We're actively looking for opportunities to use those
    authorities both on our own and in partnership with attorneys
    general from around the country, including my co-panelist's
    attorney general from Nebraska, Mike Hilgers. Attorney General
    Hilgers, if I can just indulge a little bit, has been a
    national leader in this space using traditional consumer
    protection authorities to address risks involving Chinese-
    linked technologies that are sold to American consumers. These
    efforts and others demonstrate that traditional state
    authorities can play an important role in protecting Americans
    from risks that often have a national security dimension.
        Another area of concern, and the focus of today's hearing,
    of course, is transnational repression. We have not seen
    significant reported incidents in Alaska to date, but I would
    caution that this is not the sort of threat that is easy to
    identify without training and awareness. It may look like
    harassment or intimidation, unusual pressure on students,
    deepfakes, or threats directed at relatives overseas, but if
    law enforcement does not know what to look for, it can be
    happening right under our noses. That is why I strongly support
    efforts to educate state and local law enforcement on this
    threat, to train personnel to recognize it, and to coordinate
    closely with our federal authorities and federal partners when
    these situations arise.
        Looking ahead, I believe the next frontier will involve
    closer coordination between attorneys general and
    administrative enforcement agencies, too. One area that has
    drawn my particular attention involves cross-border payment
    platforms and money transmitters operating inside the United
    States. I want to give kudos to Senator Tom Cotton on this
    Commission, who deserves a lot of credit for publicly raising
    concerns about Airwallex with the U.S. Department of Justice,
    and the potential exposure of sensitive American financial data
    to CCP influence or access.
        I share those concerns about Airwallex and this industry
    more broadly, and I have begun to have conversations in Alaska
    about whether our state licensing and regulatory authorities
    should take a harder look at money transmitters that are
    connected to foreign adversary governments. A money transmitter
    license is a privilege. It's not a right. And I believe state
    regulators should be asking whether companies entrusted with
    sensitive financial information can satisfy their state law
    obligations when data, operations, and key personnel may be
    subject to foreign adversary influence.
        States do not need to, and we shouldn't, conduct foreign
    policy to play an important role here. But states can protect
    consumers. States can safeguard critical infrastructure. States
    can ensure that Americans are not unknowingly exposed to
    foreign adversary leverage. That mission resonates particularly
    strongly in a state like Alaska. Alaskans have an express
    constitutional right to privacy, and we take that right very
    seriously. If Alaskans are paying a premium for products and
    services, and we are, they deserve to know what they are
    getting and what risks may come with it. We are also America's
    Arctic state and a Pacific state. We sit at the intersection of
    strategic cargo, telecom, critical minerals, ports, fisheries,
    and Arctic logistics. As a result, many of the threats that we
    might be discussing today are not abstract for us.
        So my message is simple. Many of the Chinese Communist
    Party's threats to Americans increasingly manifest themselves
    through areas traditionally governed by states--public safety,
    consumer protection, licensing, and infrastructure. And because
    of that, states have both the authority and the responsibility
    to act carefully and lawfully and strategically, alongside our
    federal partners. Thank you again for having me, and I welcome
    any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Stephen Cox appears in the
    Appendix.]
        Co-chair Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Cox, for your
    testimony and insight. I'd like to now yield to Senator Bostar.

                       STATEMENT OF ELIOT BOSTAR,
                         NEBRASKA STATE SENATOR

        Mr. Bostar. Co-chair Smith and honorable members of the
    Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
    Over the last four years, the Nebraska legislature has passed a
    slate of laws designed to protect Nebraskans from transnational
    repression, safeguard Nebraska's data and critical
    infrastructure, combat malign influence operations, and enhance
    resilience to prepare for conflict. Nebraska is home to the
    U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base, as well as
    numerous nuclear missile installations, that make it a target
    for foreign adversaries. However, every state has critical
    industries, infrastructure, and institutions that our
    national security relies on.
        The People's Republic of China is a threat to every state
    and every community in our country. Our work to address the
    threats facing Nebraska from the PRC began when we were alerted
    to Pentagon concerns about the pervasiveness of Huawei
    technology near our critical defense infrastructure. In 2020,
    the U.S. Government took formal action to designate Huawei
    technologies as a threat to national security, but Huawei
    technology was still in use and being newly installed
    throughout Nebraska years later.
        In 2023, we drafted legislation to prohibit
    telecommunications companies from receiving state funds if they
    use or provide communications equipment deemed a national
    security threat. Additionally, telecom companies must annually
    certify that they don't use equipment designated as a threat by
    the FCC. The law also clears redtape obstacles to enhance
    security by stipulating that no additional permits or
    authorization from any state agency or local government will be
    required to remove prohibited equipment.
        Robust lobbying pressure was employed to keep Beijing-
    linked technologies in use, but elected officials from both
    parties ultimately rejected this pressure. After this law
    passed, my office was inundated with threat information from
    national security professionals who encouraged us to push
    forward. And we passed several more laws in 2024 to protect
    Nebraska against foreign adversaries. The Foreign-Owned Real
    Estate National Security Act prevents any person, foreign
    government, or entity determined to be a foreign adversary from
    holding land within 10 miles of a military installation,
    including nuclear missile silos. In cases of noncompliance, the
    law provides the Nebraska attorney general with authority to
    force divestment.
        The Pacific Conflict Stress Test Act created a joint
    legislative and executive committee on Pacific conflict to
    assess how a conflict in the Pacific could disrupt and endanger
    Nebraska. The committee meets quarterly to evaluate the state's
    supply chains, export markets, critical infrastructure, and
    security apparatus, and makes recommendations to strengthen
    resilience.
        Last, in 2024 we passed the Foreign Adversary Contracting
    Prohibition Act. The legislation prohibits companies controlled
    by foreign adversaries from procurement contracts involving
    communications technology, network systems, and critical
    infrastructure.
        As we worked to pass these laws, we learned about local
    government officials being contacted by the CCP, and we started
    to hear from victims of transnational repression. Reporting
    emerged regarding an alleged Chinese overseas service station
    operating in Omaha, highlighting the threat of intelligence
    activity and transnational repression within Nebraska. We
    sought to limit the CCP's ability to influence, manipulate, and
    hurt people in our state by introducing the Foreign Adversary
    and Terrorist Agent Registration Act and the Crush
    Transnational Repression in Nebraska Act in 2025.
        The Registration Act illuminates political propaganda and
    influence activities conducted by agents of foreign adversaries
    by requiring that they register with the Nebraska attorney
    general. Any informational material they distribute must be
    notated with a conspicuous statement identifying it as such and
    be submitted to the attorney general within 48 hours. The
    legislation also stipulates that if an individual or entity is
    representing a principal designated by the Pentagon as a
    Chinese military company, they must begin all lobbying
    activities by disclosing that they are representing such a
    company that is a foreign adversary of the United States.
    Violation of this provision results in a $100,000 fine, which
    increases by $100,000 for each subsequent violation, up to a
    maximum fine of $1 million per violation. Any individual who
    provides information leading to a penalty under this act is
    entitled to receive a $50,000 reward from the state.
        The Crush Transnational Repression in Nebraska Act defines
    covered offenses as specific crimes already existing in law
    that will now receive an enhanced charge if the person
    committing the offense is an agent of a foreign principal. This
    legislation also punishes unauthorized foreign law enforcement
    by establishing that an agent of a foreign adversary commits a
    felony by deliberately trying to enforce a foreign government's
    law or rule in Nebraska.
        Our final 2025 reform conformed with what Congress
    accomplished with the BIOSECURE Act and the most recent
    National Defense Authorization Act. Our genetic protection law
    establishes that no medical or research facility shall use any
    genetic sequencer or software for genetic sequencing if such
    device or software is produced in or by a foreign adversary.
        Chinese companies sanctioned by the Pentagon have developed
    some of the world's largest gene banks for the Chinese
    military, supporting potential genetically targeted bioweapons,
    about which senior Chinese military officials have written.
    This law takes every measure possible to cut off Chinese
    military companies from accessing the genetic data of
    Nebraskans, complementing the federal BIOSECURE Act.
        Just this spring, we enacted a new and unique protection
    for critical infrastructure focused on denying foreign
    adversary companies access that could be used for operational
    control or sabotage, either in person or remotely. Furthermore,
    we codified new enhanced penalties for crimes that we define as
    bioterrorism, including bringing in different pathogens for the
    purpose of damaging our farmlands.
        Although each of these pieces of legislation faced
    opposition, we were able to pass them into law with bipartisan
    support. The effects are already visible. Awareness among state
    and local officials has increased significantly. Procurement
    standards have hardened, infrastructure protections have
    expanded, law enforcement coordination has improved, and
    Nebraska now evaluates infrastructure and investment questions
    through a national security framework that simply did not exist
    several years ago. Other states are emulating these models.
    Congressional leaders, executive agencies, and even other
    nations, such as the United Kingdom, have learned from
    different facets of what Nebraska has achieved.
        Most importantly, Nebraska's leadership in combating malign
    foreign influence has demonstrated that states have power and
    responsibility in this space. In fact, both President Biden and
    President Trump have called upon states to lead in driving
    solutions where we are closest to the security risks. We know
    our adversaries are coordinated and adept at attacking us at
    every layer of government. We must be able to defend ourselves
    utilizing this same whole-of-government approach. We must
    strengthen coordination between the states themselves, and
    between the states and the federal government. Our work in
    Nebraska has been made possible with guidance from national
    security experts and practitioners. More established and
    formalized systems of coordination will help us further
    identify vulnerabilities, protect critical assets, and
    contribute fully and comprehensively to the defense of the
    American homeland. Thank you again for this opportunity to
    testify. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Eliot Bostar appears in the
    Appendix.]
        Co-chair Smith. Senator, thank you for your leadership.
    Thank you for what you are doing in leading the country. I hope
    that
    everybody follows suit. There are some states, like Texas, like
    Utah, Georgia, but far too few. So thank you for that
    leadership.

                       STATEMENT OF ARTHUR LIU,
                     OWNER, INTER-PACIFIC LAW GROUP

        Mr. Liu. Good afternoon, Co-chair Smith and distinguished
    members of the Commission. Thank you for inviting me to testify
    here today. My name is Arthur Liu. I came to the United States
    as a political refugee back in 1989, after the Tiananmen Square
    massacre. I'm also the proud father of Olympic gold medalist
    Alysa Liu, and four other wonderful children.
        Today is an especially sad day for me. Thirty-seven years
    ago, on June 4th, 1989, the Chinese government sent tanks and
    soldiers to kill students and civilians in Tiananmen Square,
    and also in Beijing. At that time, thousands of students and
    civilians just gathered peacefully to call for democracy,
    freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the rule of law, and
    for basic human rights in China. Thousands of them lost their
    lives, and hundreds more were
    severely injured. At that time, I was in Guangzhou, attending
    graduate school at Zhongshan University. I was one of the
    principal organizers of the democracy movement in Guangzhou,
    China.
        When news of the massacre reached Guangzhou, I was
    devastated. I could not understand and believe how a government
    that claimed to serve the people could turn its weapons against
    its own young people and civilians. In response, I organized
    more protests in Guangzhou against the massacre. Of course,
    soon afterwards I became one of the most wanted democracy
    activists in southern China. I was very fortunate to be able to
    escape from China to Hong Kong. After I came to America, I
    continued to organize protests in front of the Chinese
    consulate in San Francisco and also in front of the Chinese
    Embassy in Washington, D.C., calling upon the Chinese
    government to release political and religious prisoners in
    China. I have spoken publicly many times about the human rights
    abuses in China.
        Like many refugees, I believed that once I arrived in
    America I had left political persecution behind me. But an
    incident in late 2021 proved me wrong. To explain what
    happened, I must tell you a little bit about my daughter, Alysa
    Liu. Alysa recently won two gold medals for the United States
    of America at the 2026 Winter Olympic Games. Before that, she
    became the youngest U.S. women's champion in history when she
    won the U.S. Figure Skating Championship at the ages of 13 and
    14. She set records as the youngest female skater in history to
    ever land a triple Axel in international competition at the age
    of 12. And she was the first female skater in history to have
    landed a triple Axel and a quadruple jump in the same
    competition program. In 2021, it was clear that she was on her
    way to represent the United States of America in the 2022
    Winter Olympic Games in Beijing, China.
        Alysa posted a piece of news about the human rights
    violations in Xinjiang back in 2018, when she was only 12-13
    years old. And I guess the Chinese government never forgot
    about that. And since she was most likely going to Beijing for
    the Olympic Games, I may also be going as well, so they were
    concerned. One day in late October or early November in 2021, I
    received a phone call. The caller identified himself as an
    official from the U.S. Olympic Committee. He told me that he
    was conducting international travel preparedness and needed my
    passport and Alysa's passport. He gave me a fax number for me
    to fax our passports to him. I told him I would do it the next
    day.
        I never did. I was smarter than that. But later on I got a
    phone call. Just a few days later, I got a phone call from the
    FBI. And he told me he needed to meet with me. And I met him at
    a Starbucks. And he told me that a Chinese spy, acting on
    behalf of the Chinese government, was already in the San
    Francisco Bay area. That was in early November 2021. He would
    be tracking my movements. He would be surveilling my daily
    activities. He would be placing a GPS tracker on my car. And he
    would try to collect our personal information, like Social
    Security numbers, and particularly our passport information.
    The FBI told me to watch out for my surroundings and be
    careful.
        I was very worried when I heard the news, because Alysa was
    most likely going to Beijing. And I was also concerned that the
    spy might do something to her in the United States. At that
    time, Alysa was competing in Japan. So the next day, when she
    came back to America, I took her away from the San Francisco
    Bay area to another location for training. As we were boarding
    the plane I received a phone call from the FBI. He told me that
    the spy was right on his way to our house. I couldn't believe
    it. It was like a scene right out of a movie. It could not have
    been so coincidental that we were boarding the plane and the
    spy was right on his way to our house.
        The FBI agent informed me that they were ready to arrest
    those spies acting on behalf of the Chinese government at that
    time, but as a father I was terrified for the safety of Alysa
    when she goes to Beijing to compete for the United States of
    America. So I told them, can you please wait until she comes
    back from the Olympic Games? And the FBI said yes. I also
    requested additional security for Alysa. When she was in
    Beijing she was accompanied at all times by two adults, from
    venue to venue throughout the Olympic Games. On March 16th,
    2022, the Department of Justice announced criminal charges
    against the spies. One of them was
    Matthew Ziburis, the guy who called me posing as an official
    from the U.S. Olympic Committee, and who spied on me in the San
    Francisco Bay area.
        When the news came out, a neighbor from my office came over
    and told me that he had seen this guy, Matthew Ziburis, many
    times. He was lingering in the lobby right in front of my
    office. And of course, Matthew Ziburis was charged, along with,
    I believe, four other people in the spying on me and also on
    another dissident from China, and an artist in Los Angeles. I'm
    really grateful to the FBI agents who provided security for me
    and also my daughter. And I appreciate that the U.S. Government
    took forceful action to prosecute those spies to the fullest
    extent under the law.
        But America cannot stop there. We can't just prosecute
    them. We must understand that not just me, a political
    dissident from China, the Uyghurs, or the people from Hong
    Kong, we have to understand we will not be safe--America will
    not be safe--until China becomes a democracy. We must
    understand China must have a government which respects basic
    human rights and that honors the rule of law. We must also
    understand that America will not be safe until people all over
    the world can live peacefully and harmoniously together. We
    have a lot of work to do in America. Thank you for inviting me
    to testify here today. I look forward to answering your
    questions.
        Co-chair Smith. Mr. Liu, thank you for your testimony, your
    courage, and again, congratulations on such a fine performance
    by your daughter. To think that something that she wrote when
    she was very young would still be in the hands of the Chinese
    Communist Party to intimidate and threaten, again underscores
    the pervasiveness of this dictatorship. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Arthur Liu appears in the
    Appendix.]
        Anna Kwok.

                        STATEMENT OF ANNA KWOK,

             BOARD DIRECTOR AND FORMER EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

                      HONG KONG DEMOCRACY COUNCIL

        Ms. Kwok. Members of the Commission, thank you for inviting
    me to share my experience as a target of intensifying
    transnational repression in the United States. In this battle
    against the Chinese Communist Party, a regime that fears
    opposition, feeling safe is a privilege. I am among hundreds of
    thousands of rights defenders in America who live every single
    day knowing we're being watched and threatened. All incidents
    of transnational repression I share today took place on
    American soil. Together, they illustrate the varied tactics of
    a transnational repression campaign.
        I served as the executive director of the Hong Kong
    Democracy Council, a U.S. advocacy organization sanctioned by
    the PRC. In May 2023, after I testified before this very
    Commission on the loss of Hong Kong's political autonomy and
    its implications for the U.S., the regime swiftly retaliated by
    issuing a HK$1 million bounty on my head. My assets were frozen
    and my passport was revoked, crippling my international
    advocacy work. More bounties were also later issued on American
    citizens and residents.
        The bounty put a huge target on my back. State media, pro-
    CCP extremists, and individual propagandists launched a
    coordinated campaign to discourage the American public from
    associating with me. Explicit threats to hurt, kidnap, rape,
    and even execute me on American soil flooded my social media.
    The lawfare and digital threats became physical in November
    2023, during Chinese leader Xi Jinping's visit to the United
    States. When I organized protests against Xi and campaigned
    successfully to bar the sanctioned chief executive of Hong Kong
    from entering the country, the regime decided to retaliate on
    the streets of San Francisco.
        Masked men assaulted fellow protesters with metal poles,
    while WeChat groups circulated my whereabouts on the streets of
    San Francisco. I escaped physical harm only because fellow
    protesters protected me. Local police were completely oblivious
    to the existence of transnational repression and refused to
    intervene. To this day, none of the perpetrators, including
    American nationals, have been convicted. For the first time I
    felt as if I had been transported back to the lawless streets
    of Hong Kong; even though I was in the land of the free, I was
    not free.
        The online campaign and real-life violence achieved a
    chilling effect across America. Some supporters of the pro-
    democracy movement stopped showing up to events. A few went as
    far as to erase their digital footprints. Their response is all
    too familiar. It happened once in my first home in Hong Kong,
    and it is now happening again in my second home in America.
    Nonetheless, I
    refused to back down. I led a campaign to expose the foreign
    influence and transnational threats brought by the Hong Kong
    Economic and Trade Offices. In response, the regime unleashed
    its cruelest weapon, psychological warfare.
        Last May the regime arrested my father in Hong Kong. He was
    later convicted on fabricated charges. The state-run trial
    centered on an insurance policy my father had purchased when I
    was just a 2-year-old learning to say ``papa.'' My father is
    imprisoned simply because he is my father. He's now a hostage
    serving a sentence for crimes neither of us committed. The CCP
    weaponized my love for my family in an attempt to silence me
    forever. I speak to you today as my 70-year-old father sits in
    a cell 8,000 miles away. I speak as someone with a HK$1 million
    bounty on my head. I speak as a target of rampant transnational
    repression, and I speak as someone who is standing my ground to
    combat an urgent threat to American national security.
        When a hostile foreign power launches centralized efforts--
    spanning state agencies, united front groups, and individual
    extremists--to silence people inside the U.S., the government
    must respond with centralized, coordinated mechanisms. That's
    why I urge Congress, in particular the House Foreign Affairs
    Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to mark up
    the bipartisan Transnational Repression Policy Act immediately.
    Passing this legislation will provide a bedrock for building
    long-term cross-agency mechanisms that are necessary to protect
    America.
        This is a litmus test for the country. If the U.S. does not
    draw a hard line and act quickly, the PRC will continue to push
    our boundaries, from running secret police stations to co-
    opting state officials. States like Nebraska and Utah are
    gearing up to protect their people, and the nation should get
    ahead, too. We must confront the threat of transnational
    repression urgently, before it becomes a normalized pattern
    that cannot be undone. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Anna Kwok appears in the
    Appendix.]
                                  ----------

        Co-chair Smith. Anna, thank you very much for your bravery
    and testimony, bearing witness to an ugly truth that you are
    facing every day. You did say the word ``intensifying,''
    clearly denoting or conveying that it's getting worse. You
    know, Xi Jinping will be coming here again soon. We tried very
    hard when he came last time for the APEC summit, and it was,
    like--and when you say the local police were oblivious to what
    was actually happening on the ground, that's got to change, and
    a federal law could help that. The state laws obviously help
    it, with your own state police and other law enforcement
    assets, but it seems to me that we--I'm sure you will agree, we
    need a federal law.
        I have asked Chairman Mast to mark up the bill. I thought
    it might be up at our last markup, which just occurred, and it
    was not on there. I argued--as it turned out, not
    persuasively--to do so. So I'm taking all of your testimony
    back to the Chairman--and he's a good man, Chairman Mast--and
    his staff, and say, This has got to happen. It's got to happen
    now. The sooner it happens the better, especially--and we saw
    it in San Francisco, the way so many people--I had hearings
    then, and had press conferences, as you know, pointing out how
    brutal the people were, some of them seemingly coming out of
    the trade mission there. I have a bill that would close that
    thing down, but that too passed the House, never got through
    the Senate. Here we go again with that reprise. So we need this
    bill. I'm sure you all agree with that, so we will push really,
    really hard. It's got to be done before Xi Jinping comes again,
    because that will be the pivot catalyst for them to unleash
    hell on the best and the bravest and the brightest who have
    come here from China. And many of those, obviously, are still
    in China, their family members.
        You did say, Mr. Bostar, that with regard to the
    legislation, Senator, that there was some opposition. It's
    faced opposition. Who was against what you guys were doing?
        Mr. Bostar. Thank you, sir, for the question. We've faced
    opposition from a number of sources, but what tends to be
    utilized the most in Nebraska is primarily corporate-aligned
    opposition, linked to Chinese interests and corporations. And I
    think fundamentally that's mostly the case because they have
    the most robust lobbying presence in the state. We see that
    consistently, businesses themselves that are linked to China as
    well as the associations that they belong to, consistently
    trying to fight progress when it comes to guarding against CCP
    threats.
        One example I'll use and give you that was sort of shocking
    at the time--Nebraska is, obviously, a pretty significant
    agricultural state. When we were attempting to pass our foreign
    adversary registration requirements into law, we received
    thinly veiled threats from Smithfield, which is owned by the
    Chinese now, that if we went through with this and passed these
    bills that there was the potential that they could shut down
    operations, disrupting the economy of Nebraska certainly, as
    well as the food supply for the United States. So that's just
    one example that we faced, but we faced many.
        Co-chair Smith. Thank you for persevering. You know, I
    would just--back in 1994 I was one of those who led the effort
    to link most favored nation status with trade to China. Bill
    Clinton, sadly, de-linked human rights and trade on May 26,
    1994. But on one trip to Beijing I met with the U.S. Chamber of
    Commerce, and I couldn't believe how kowtowing they were to the
    Chinese dictatorship to get the next deal.
        That goes for Microsoft and Bill Gates and all these other
    people who--anything to get the next deal and to continue
    their--we had Enes Freedom testify here, and talked about how
    the NBA just threw him out because he spoke about the Uyghurs.
    Again, another brave man--a great basketball player, but a
    brave man. And he lost it all. He lost his whole career. And he
    says some of his fellow NBAers wanted to support him, but they
    said, we can't. We don't want to lose, you know, that NBA slot
    that we have. And so it's--you know, it's amazing how corporate
    America just capitulates so easily under the false impression
    that somehow China will matriculate from a dictatorship to a
    democracy if we just trade more. No. They'll become a more
    aggressive power with more capability, command and control,
    right on down the line, if we give them all that capacity,
    which they've gotten.
        You know, Chris Cox, you all recall, the former Member of
    Congress, did an amazing report back in the 1990s about how all
    the dual-use items that they were procuring that had a--
    ostensibly a civilian purpose, but also a very serious military
    purpose. So thank you for persevering against all of that
    pressure. But we've got to get a federal law and get more
    states to do the same with their laws, and to resist that
    pressure because it has been shameful how the almighty buck
    has--you know, you hold a dollar in front of some of these
    corporations--I had people that were part of the U.S. Chamber
    of Commerce in Beijing telling me they have full religious
    freedom here. I said, really? If you believe that, I'll sell
    you the Brooklyn Bridge. It just does not happen. Thank you for
    doing that.
        You know, you did say, Mr. Cox, about--suggested that the
    central point is that consumers are on the front lines of the
    geopolitical conflict with China--phones, apps, routers,
    cameras, payment platforms, cloud services, and connected
    services can become access points for PRC-linked data
    collection and leverage. Doesn't McAfee, and some of the things
    that we all buy--I have McAfee--does that not protect against
    that? Or are we being naive and somehow they could easily
    pierce that and get whatever they want?
        Mr. Cox. Thank you for the question. I wouldn't purport to
    be an expert on that kind of a question, but I will say that I
    do think that the Chinese are technologically very advanced.
    And a lot of times our defenses are just keeping up with the
    black hats. So I think it's right to be concerned. I think this
    is why I think state AGs, like Attorney General Hilgers, and
    Attorney General Paxton, and Attorney General Uthmeier have
    teamed up to target some of these consumer protection
    violations, where this technology has potential kill switches
    and back doors that allow information that belongs to American
    citizens to go back to China. And we know that China has
    certain laws, like the National Intelligence Law of 2017, that
    require, with severe penalties, cooperation by Chinese
    companies and individuals to cooperate with intelligence
    services like that, on command. And so I think it's right to
    look into this, to investigate, and to bring righteous cases.
    And we intend to do that in Alaska.
        Co-chair Smith. Are we deploying a sufficient number of
    federal assets, FBI for example, to combat this? Or do we need
    to beef this up significantly?
        Mr. Cox. I'll take that. Thank you for the question. I
    can't--I've worked with the FBI over the course of my career. I
    worked on the Fort Hood Commission with Judge Webster. I've
    worked for five state and federal law enforcement agencies over
    the course of my career. And I've never known a law enforcement
    agency to refuse more resources and more investigative
    resources. So, though I can't speak for the FBI, I suspect that
    they would love to do more with more resources.
        Co-chair Smith. Yes, Anna.
        Ms. Kwok. I would agree with Mr. Cox there, that the FBI
    definitely would appreciate more resources. And in my previous
    experience from working with the FBI, I've also noticed that
    there have not been enough resources being put into
    investigating the foreign influence and transnational
    repression into the United States. And often civil society has
    to also help share reports and research results with the FBI,
    just because they do not have adequate time or resources to
    conduct their own research. But of course, there is certain
    information or intelligence that we're not able to get from
    civil society. So if the FBI would be able to dedicate more
    resources into investigating transnational repression and
    foreign influence, I'm sure it will help protect American
    national security.
        Co-chair Smith. Let me just ask you, if I could, about AI,
    which is transforming, seemingly, everything. What additional
    threat does that pose? Just--this was not related to the
    Chinese, as far as we know--but just yesterday my top sheriff
    told me how some boys took pictures of two girls, 14 years old,
    13 years old, and then created a whole sex scenario with them.
    You know, it was all AI, but it's devastating. They found the
    kids, the two boys, and they arrested them, and they'll be
    prosecuted. I know in Europe and elsewhere that's being done
    now to diaspora and human rights advocates. Again, another
    devastating way of trying to demoralize and hurt people who
    speak out. How bad is that right now? And do you see that
    getting worse?
        Ms. Kwok. The CCP definitely uses artificial intelligence
    to further repression on diasporas around the world and rights
    defenders. For example, my fellow activists, Carmen Lau in the
    UK, and Laura Harth, they are both being targeted with
    deepfakes generated by AI, and with explicit images and videos
    that are used to defame them. And I think that is a very
    devastating development, especially for women defenders in this
    space.
        At the same time, we are also seeing more impersonation
    attempts getting more sophisticated to try to conduct phishing,
    identity theft, and to procure information from the human
    rights community. For example, my colleagues would often now
    receive emails impersonating myself with very sophisticated
    methods that sound like me and write like me, in order to get
    more information.
        And, last but not least, we're also seeing the rise of AI
    being used to generate propaganda materials on social media.
    With the use of AI, the CCP is able to now generate more
    materials that are dedicated to talking to the American public,
    to get into the rhetoric, and to form better narratives, or
    more effective narratives, in bringing false information to the
    United States.
        Co-chair Smith. Yesterday Marco Rubio testified before the
    Foreign Affairs Committee. And I asked him--we don't get much
    time. As you know, you get five minutes. I asked him about
    Jimmy Lai, I asked him a few other questions, and I did so--
    even more so privately. I asked him to help us get the Stop
    Forced Organ Harvesting Act passed. It passed 406 to 1 in the
    House last year. It passed in the Congress before that. You
    know, it's my bill. It's one of the most serious human rights
    abuses imaginable, and it's being done--it's hiding in plain
    sight. We just can't seem to get it out of the Senate, but
    we're trying, and we're hopeful.
        But if Marco were sitting here, and he used to sit right
    here. He co-chaired this Commission and did so--like the
    current Senator from Alaska--with great distinction. And I mean
    that. You know, we've got a great co-chair here. He brings an
    intel capacity and an understanding of Taiwan and elsewhere
    like no other that I know. He is just amazing, and he would
    have wanted to be here, but he just couldn't make it, but he
    sends his best. But what would you tell the President and Marco
    Rubio, again, on the eve of what will be another summit soon,
    and this is when the planning goes into it to try to make sure
    that everything we can do to mitigate Xi Jinping's cruelty is
    tried. What would you say to the President and to Marco?
        Mr. Cox. Thank you for the question. I'll say this, and
    this is a point that I think you have made at this hearing and
    others. There are certainly things that the states can do, but
    nothing speaks more loudly than federal action. And that can
    mean executive action, and it can mean legislative action. You
    know, the awareness about Huawei and the telecom threat
    increased a lot based on what was done with Huawei. The
    prosecution of the spies that targeted Mr. Liu, that increases
    awareness. Legislation that would also arm state and local law
    enforcement with the training and capabilities to spot the
    transnational repression behind some of these otherwise
    ordinary crimes would be very helpful. And all of that is
    federal.
        Mr. Liu. Thank you for that question, Mr. Smith. You know,
    I would tell President Trump and Secretary of State Rubio that
    the United States must take a tougher stand against the CCP's
    transnational repression and also against their human rights
    violations. I would call upon them to urge the Chinese
    government to release all political prisoners, including Mr.
    Bingzhang Wang. He has been in prison in China for over 20
    years. And I would urge Mr. Rubio and President Trump to call
    for the release of Jimmy Lai and other political prisoners in
    Hong Kong. And really push them to come to the international
    stage as a civil society, as a government which respects basic
    human rights and the rule of law. I think this is another
    opportunity--to be honest with you, without any political
    prisoners released with President Trump's visit in China--to
    bring those major issues up in the next visit. Thank you.
        Co-chair Smith. Thank you.
        Ms. Kwok. First, I would like to thank Secretary Rubio and
    President Trump for commemorating June 4th in Hong Kong.
    Because today we saw that the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong
    lighted candles in a place where vigils are no longer allowed.
    And for
    Hong Kong, currently we have 1,946 political prisoners. I want
    to
    urge President Trump to seriously consider calling for the
    release
    of Jimmy Lai, Chow Hang-tung, and other Hong Kong political
    prisoners.
        At the same time, the upcoming visit, where Xi would be
    visiting D.C., it would be the perfect opportunity to establish
    better TNR response. The last time Xi was in the United States,
    we have seen how it really opened up the devastating can of
    transnational repression. And once they widened the scope and
    widened the possibility of transnational repression, it was
    hard to push back. This would be the perfect opportunity for
    the United States to push back, to set, actually, better
    protocols for foreign visits, for diplomats who will be on the
    scene, and for Chinese nationals here in the United States, on
    how to behave, how to respect human rights, and how not to
    conduct transnational repression against people here on
    American soil.
        Co-chair Smith. Let me just ask you what your view might be
    of what people inside of China understand, especially today,
    being the remembrance of the Tiananmen Square massacre. I've
    met with many students who come visiting, including at the high
    school level, who say the Tiananmen Square massacre never
    happened. If you Google over there, and I went to one of their
    internet cafes once and googled ``Tiananmen Square massacre''
    and got nothing. I googled ``human rights'' and I got
    everything about--it was during the Bush administration--how
    bad he was, but nothing about there. And I even put in
    ``torture,'' because Manfred Nowak, who was then the special
    rapporteur for torture for the United Nations, had done a
    scathing report about the use of torture in China. So I put his
    name in, and it came up with everything but China.
        Is there really a serious lack of any kind of information
    in this culture of denial that they live in, perpetrated by the
    government, that they don't even know this stuff is happening,
    or happened, past tense? Because it's just--I met with a group
    of high school students at a school in my state who said I was
    lying about Tiananmen Square. And then this--as I might have
    indicated--Chi Haotian, who was the butcher of Beijing, who
    ordered the actual bayoneting and killing, he came to this
    country, went down to the Clinton White House. He got a 19-gun
    salute, because by then he had been elevated to head of their
    Department of Defense, the equivalent of our defense secretary,
    got a 19-gun salute. I said he should have been taken to The
    Hague for crimes against humanity.
        So we did a hearing. He goes to the Army War College and
    says nobody died at Tiananmen Square. And all over, you know,
    the Global Times, the People's Daily, because I read the
    English versions, were extolling how he had said all this. And
    I had a hearing two days after he said it. We had all these
    witnesses, most of whom were Chinese witnesses, who said it did
    happen. The Time magazine correspondent who watched people die.
    But he got away with it. You know, Clinton himself should have
    said: Hey, pal, a lot of people died at Tiananmen Square.
    Quit--you know, don't lie about this, because if you lie about
    this, what else are you lying about?
        But they did lie. But I'm really concerned that it's as if
    it never happened, which is so important. And in Hong Kong, of
    course, they crushed the remembrances there, and of course
    throughout the rest of China. How do we get that through to the
    people as to what has happened in the past and what is
    happening today?
        Anna.
        Ms. Kwok. China, or the Chinese Communist Party, certainly
    excels in twisting history and twisting narratives. And right
    now, I would say there is currently an ongoing war on
    narratives and discourse between the U.S. and democracies
    around the world vs. China. Every single day I go on social
    media, and I see China spreading misinformation and
    disinformation about history, about what has happened, and
    especially on June 4th, today. In Hong Kong we are also hearing
    rumors that, starting next year, textbooks will no longer be
    allowed to mention, you know, even one line on June 4th. As of
    now, Hong Kong is not even allowing people to hold candles on
    the streets of Hong Kong.
        This morning, or last night, we saw news in Hong Kong where
    the police were actually stationed on street corners in Hong
    Kong, waiting to arrest people who dare to just walk around,
    who dared to just express themselves with very creative art,
    and who dared to just share symbols of June 4th, no matter how
    implicit. So we're seeing that China is really being very harsh
    and zoning in on canceling or on erasing any moments of
    history, any memories of history. And that reminds me of a
    scholar currently in the United States, Rowena He, who
    specializes and extensively discusses the importance of
    remembering the Tiananmen massacre.
        Because it goes beyond just the Tiananmen massacre. It is
    about remembering the atrocities of this regime. It is about
    remembering the present crimes conducted by this regime. And it
    is, most importantly, remembering the people who have been
    sacrificing to fight for democracy and human rights in China.
    So I urge the United States and the American public to remember
    what has happened on June 4th of 1989, but also be cognizant of
    what is happening today on American soil. Thank you.
        Co-chair Smith. I have one final question. And, again,
    thank you for your time, your expertise, and above all your
    leadership. The Chinese Students and Scholars Associations and
    other PRC-linked campus groups, there's talk of, you know,
    further networking with them. We saw it with the Confucius
    Centers, which were nothing but soft power instruments by the
    Chinese Communist Party. But in 2015 I chaired a hearing with
    NYU Chancellor Jeffrey Lehman, and I raised the issue about
    complicity with the Chinese propaganda organs--you know, they
    were gifted a campus in Shanghai. Imagine that, a whole campus.
        And yet they were charging an exorbitant amount of money
    for tuition. I asked him, who picks the students, the Chinese
    Communist Party? What's the selection process? If you're
    online, what can you go and visit? Can you talk about the Dalai
    Lama? I don't think so. All those things I asked him. And I
    also invited myself to go speak. And I actually got a visa. And
    he had me there to speak. And I always appreciated that. But
    it's the complicity of many of our institutions of higher
    learning to gain access. One of the most infamous of all was
    back in the early 1980s when Steven Mosher at Stanford
    University, broke the news about the one child per couple
    policy and the use of forced abortion, and the fact that the
    government decreed brothers and sisters illegal. And that even
    with the one, you had to get permission from the Communist
    Party to have that baby. Otherwise, you're forcibly aborted.
        I did a number of bills that passed in the House, some in
    the Senate, to defund any organization, like the U.N.
    Population Fund, which was getting a great deal of money, and
    Reagan was all for it, and we did just that. Trump has done the
    same thing again with the U.N. Population Fund and others. But
    meanwhile, Stanford, which is where Steven Mosher was earning
    his doctorate, threw him over the side. They threw him out. As
    a matter of fact, it was so bad that the Wall Street Journal
    did a piece that said, ``Stanford Morality'' and talked about
    how he had been disenfranchised from the university because he
    broke a story that they didn't want to have to deal with
    because they wanted access.
        So my question is, Are we seeing any improvement on the
    part of our colleges and universities to the mega threat that
    the Communist Party poses, how they can be manipulated and
    used, you know, the information transfer that is applicable to
    their military? You know, at the state level you gentlemen are
    doing tremendous work, but we need to do more, seems to me, on
    the federal level on all of this as well. But I keep asking our
    universities, stop partnering with these individuals. Now, if
    they were free, partner away, but they're not. It's a
    dictatorship. And again, anything they glean technology-wise is
    going right into their military-industrial complex. So if
    anybody would want to take a stab at that, on the universities.
        Mr. Bostar. Thank you for that. In Nebraska we're certainly
    making progress on the university front, as far as attempting
    to decouple where we can with those specific programs. But I
    think your question brings up a broader challenge that we face
    with all of this, which is it's always inconvenient to do what
    we need to do. Whether or not universities are being gifted a
    new campus, or whether or not Chairman Xi is coming to the
    United States, and not wanting to disrupt a possible deal,
    there's always a reason why it's the wrong time to do what we
    should do. And it's exactly for that purpose that we have to
    resist that. We have to take the actions now.
        It was never convenient for us in Nebraska to pass the
    bills we did, to create the laws we did, to create the
    structures of accountability on the CCP, because there are
    costs. There are political costs. There are economic costs.
    We've allowed ourselves to become so dependent and integrated
    on our adversaries that it is painful to do what we need to do
    and separate ourselves. But it's required, because there's
    never going to be a convenient time to do it. And so, yes, I
    think we're making that progress, but there is so much more
    that we have to do.
        Ms. Kwok. Co-chair Smith, I'm actually an alumnus from New
    York University. And I have a story to share. Back in 2019,
    during the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, I tried to
    organize a protest at NYU in support of people on the streets,
    as an anonymous organizer. And initially, we were only
    expecting a few dozen Hong Kongers to show up in solidarity,
    but in the end hundreds of people showed up. And these hundreds
    of people were not supportive of what we did. Instead, they
    were students, faculty members, people, members recruited by
    the CSSA on campus at New York University.
        When they had such an overwhelming number of people, they
    encircled us, they started taking photos of us, and, at the
    time, even though I was fully anonymous, they tried to identify
    me and dox me online, circulating our photos, videos on WeChat
    groups to try to find out which student this is, what classes
    they were taking, trying to trace where we lived, and things
    like that. And very unfortunately, this was not the only time I
    encountered a CSSA. In 2023, when I was in San Francisco, as I
    talked about before, for the APAC summit, once again CSSA was
    mobilized. And this time at the San Francisco protest, many
    Chinese nationals were mobilized to support Xi Jinping. And
    among all the groups that were on the ground, the CSSA actually
    mobilized the majority of them.
        They managed to get thousands of Chinese students traveling
    to San Francisco from Los Angeles, from other areas of
    California to support Xi Jinping, and to show that China is the
    kind of leader they wanted, which, of course, we know is a lie.
    And even though they were not the most hostile crowd,they
    definitely were the largest crowd. And we also found evidence
    that the CSSA actually promised paid meals and accommodations,
    telling students that they could just go to San Francisco for a
    trip, while in reality it was for propaganda. And it was also
    for intimidating people like us. So I would say that for higher
    institutions the existence of these Chinese Students and
    Scholars Associations is definitely a problem.
        And the issue that they are still present in the United
    States allows the Chinese government plenty of apparatuses for
    them to spy on and surveil students in America, including Hong
    Kong students in America who are merely trying to express
    themselves. So that's why I urge higher institutions to really
    reconsider their partnership with the Chinese government and
    also reconsider the existence of CSSAs on campus while there
    has been plenty of evidence that they are acting as adversaries
    of American institutions and the government.
        Co-chair Smith. To follow up on those students that flocked
    into San Francisco, was there any element of coercion--you
    know, to their families back home, you do this or else? Or was
    it more that they were ideologically simpatico with the Chinese
    Communist Party--naive, perhaps--or what? I mean, or they're
    getting a free trip?
        Ms. Kwok. Yes. I would say the majority of them actually
    are more naive. They're thinking that they're getting a free
    trip, it doesn't really matter if they go, they're just
    standing there waving flags. That's what we observed the most
    from their WeChat groups. But at the same time there were also
    definitely ideologues who would go out of their way to really
    shout at us on the streets, or try to intimidate us with the
    number of people they have. And I think even though they are
    naive, as we have said in the earlier remarks, sometimes in the
    end you have to pick a side--always, as you said. It's either
    with the Tank Man or with the tanks. And I think for them,
    being naive doesn't excuse them from the fact that they are
    deciding to associate with the tanks.
        Mr. Liu. I just want to add that, from a diplomatic point
    of view, we must engage the Chinese government, whether it's
    higher education in America, or whether it's the government, or
    businesses. I strongly encourage them to engage in China, deal
    with China. But at the same time we have to take a very strong
    position against human rights violations, and for the release
    of political prisoners. We can't isolate China. We have to
    change China. Thank you.
        Co-chair Smith. Could states do more on this?
        Mr. Bostar. I think the short answer is yes. Several states
    have done a lot. Most states have done something. Some states
    have done nothing. But no state has done enough, and so we need
    to be more strategic and coordinated with our actions. We often
    find ourselves--you know, I talk to my legislative colleagues
    from across the country. We spend, frankly, too much time
    reinventing the wheel. We need better mechanisms of
    coordinating among ourselves, and we also need better
    mechanisms of coordinating between the states and the federal
    government.
        You know, this is a policy area that for too long was left
    simply to the federal government. And because of that, and
    because it's more novel and it's newer for subnational
    political entities to be engaging in this, we don't yet have
    the necessary connective tissue to allow for this to be done as
    efficiently as possible. And so we need to be deliberate about
    developing those relationships and creating those systems and
    partnerships to allow us to really do what we have to do and
    move forward.
        Co-chair Smith. To conclude, I just hope and pray, and want
    to let you know, if there's anything we can do--especially Anna
    and Arthur--with regard to the ongoing threats that you
    receive, maybe as a result of testifying today. And Anna, as
    you know, this is not your first time. You are just incredibly
    brave; we will do everything we can. So if there's someone, the
    FBI, or otherwise, that we need to further alert to all of
    this--because again, these people are brutal. They are
    absolutely brutal.
        I would reiterate my request to the Chinese Communist Party
    to allow me to lead a delegation to Xinjiang. I'd love to stop
    in Hong Kong as well and visit prisoners there. You know, even
    during the worst of the Soviet days, because I've been here
    since 1981, Frank Wolf and I--Congressman from Virginia--got
    into Perm Camp 35 in the early 1980s, where Sharansky and all
    of those great political prisoners were, a thousand miles
    outside of Moscow in the Ural Mountains. We talked to the
    procurator general at a big human rights conference. He said,
    Nothing to hide. We said we wanted to go to the Perm Camp. It
    took two years, but we got there. We interviewed every
    prisoner, and one by one, we got prisoners out. And then, of
    course, the Soviet Union fell, and they all got out.
        But in terms of China, the foreign ministry said anybody
    who wants to go to Xinjiang can go there. So they were already
    attacking my Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act at the embassy
    right here in town. Really, all lies, lies. No, the lies are on
    your side. But then they also, almost the same week--it was the
    same week--said anybody who wants to go there can go. We did a
    letter immediately saying, We want to go. We want to go. We've
    asked repeatedly. So I'm asking again from the dais here,
    knowing that they'll hear this. I want to lead a delegation, I
    want it to be bipartisan, to go to Xinjiang, to go to the
    camps, to raise these issues, and to do so very, you know,
    professionally. Talk to prisoners without any fear of
    retaliation, and all of that. So the request is, again,
    requested. Because they already said, We have nothing to hide--
    anybody can come. And we've been denied.
        Thank you. Is there anything you want to add before we
    close? I don't want to keep you longer than--your testimony was
    outstanding. Helps us to do more. You're helping the cause
    mightily. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:07 p.m., the hearing ended.]

    =======================================================================

                                A P P E N D I X

    =======================================================================

                              Prepared Statements

                                    ------

                       Prepared Statement of Stephen Cox

        Chairman Sullivan, members of the Commission--thank you for
    inviting me to testify today, and thank you for the work this
    Commission has done over these 25 years. I appreciate the opportunity
    to contribute to that work.
        My own interest in the China threat--particularly the threat it
    poses to Americans here at home--goes back almost 20 years.
        Early in my career, during the Bush administration, I served in the
    Director's Office at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. One of
    the recurring challenges we dealt with involved the Chinese
    government's gamesmanship in repatriating Chinese nationals who had
    been ordered removed under our immigration laws. At the time, we did
    not see this simply as an immigration problem. We saw it partly as an
    intelligence problem--because of the way the PRC leveraged overseas
    networks, influence relationships, and diaspora connections inside the
    United States.
        Fast forward to my service during the first Trump administration at
    the Department of Justice. Attorney General Jeff Sessions launched, and
    AG Bill Barr continued, the China Initiative because DOJ increasingly
    recognized that the PRC challenge touched nearly every dimension of
    American life: intellectual property theft, espionage, cyber
    intrusions, economic coercion, higher education, infrastructure,
    research institutions, supply chains, and influence operations.
        When I moved to Texas in 2020 to become U.S. Attorney for the
    Eastern District of Texas, it was a few months later that the State
    Department shut down the Chinese Consulate in Houston after determining
    that it had become a hub for espionage, intellectual property theft,
    and influence operations directed against the United States. The
    closure was a stark reminder that the PRC threat was not an abstract
    foreign-policy concern overseas--it was operating on American soil,
    targeting American institutions, businesses, and citizens.
        Most recently, as the 28th Attorney General of Alaska, I began
    standing up what we called a Counter-China Initiative--to consider an
    all-of-government approach to threats posed by the PRC to consumers,
    businesses, infrastructure, and public institutions in Alaska. And in
    my current role as Counsel to the Governor, I intend to continue and
    expand that work with the new Acting Attorney General and across other
    state agencies.
        To my mind, for the first time, consumers are on the front lines of
    our geopolitical conflict with China, and many of the CCP's threats to
    Americans now arrive through ordinary consumer channels. And when I say
    consumers, I mean not only families, but businesses and governments as
    well. Every phone, app, router, camera, payment platform, and cloud
    service can potentially become an access point. We know in a
    theoretical sense how Beijing's access to massive amounts of American
    data could create a problem. A November article from the Financial
    Times gave one specific example: that a large Chinese technology
    company was providing American data to China's military in order to
    help them target Americans. This weaponized usage of American data gets
    directly at the threat of transnational repression which we are
    discussing today. State attorneys general are uniquely positioned
    because consumer protection laws allow us to pursue deception, data
    abuse, undisclosed risks, and unfair trade practices--areas where
    foreign influence often hides in plain sight.
        Alaska's consumer protection laws are among the strongest in the
    country, and I believe consumer protection is one of the most powerful
    state-level tools available to address aspects of the Chinese threat.
    We are actively looking for opportunities to use those authorities--
    both on our own and in partnership with other strong attorneys general
    around the country, like Nebraska Attorney General Mike Hilgers,
    Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier, and Texas Attorney General Ken
    Paxton.
        General Hilgers has been a national leader in this space. His
    office has pursued actions involving allegedly deceptive data-
    collection practices by Chinese-linked technology platforms and has
    also taken action involving connected camera and surveillance
    technologies sold to American consumers. General Paxton has also been a
    leader here. Texas currently has open claims against TP-Link, the
    largest router provider in America, along with Chinese television
    producers, camera companies, and mobile app providers. These efforts
    demonstrate that traditional consumer-protection authorities can play
    an important role in protecting Americans from risks that often have a
    national-security dimension.
        We approached the China threat from another angle in Alaska. We
    became concerned about the flood of Chinese vape products entering
    American markets outside normal FDA review and approval processes. Many
    were marketed aggressively to younger consumers, with little
    transparency regarding sourcing, ingredients, or safety. The FDA has
    primary authority here, but we took steps to educate businesses and
    consumers about these risks that consumers, frankly, weren't aware of.
        Another area of concern from a public safety perspective--and the
    focus of today's hearing--is transnational repression. We have not seen
    significant reported incidents in Alaska to date. But I would also
    caution that this is not the sort of threat that is easy to identify
    without training and awareness. That's because if you do not know what
    to look for, it could be happening right in front of your nose.
        It may look like harassment. It may look like unusual pressure on a
    student. It may look like intimidation of a family after someone
    attends a protest or speaks publicly. It may involve digital
    surveillance, pressure campaigns, coercive phone calls, or threats
    directed at relatives overseas.
        I would strongly support efforts to educate law enforcement on this
    threat, how we train personnel to recognize it, and how we coordinate
    with federal authorities when these situations arise.
        Looking ahead, I believe the next frontier will involve closer
    coordination between attorneys general and administrative enforcement
    agencies--particularly in areas involving financial regulation, money
    transmission, data access, and critical infrastructure. One area that
    has drawn my attention involves cross-border payment platforms and
    money transmitters operating inside the United States, where questions
    of licensing, data security, cloud architecture, and foreign access
    increasingly intersect.
        On this front, I want to commend Senator Tom Cotton of this
    Commission for publicly urging the Department of Justice to investigate
    reported risks involving Airwallex and potential exposure of sensitive
    American financial data to CCP influence or access.
        I have my own concerns about this sector generally. A money-
    transmitter license is a privilege, not a right, and it carries
    obligations relating to consumer protection, data security, anti-money-
    laundering compliance, and the overall fitness of the licensee to
    handle sensitive financial information. I think it is reasonable to ask
    whether those obligations are fully compatible with a business model
    that places sensitive data, operational control, or key personnel
    within the reach of foreign-adversary governments, particularly where
    those governments claim legal authority to compel access to
    information. Those are the kinds of questions that state regulators
    increasingly will need to confront, and I've begun to have those
    conversations with our state regulators in Alaska.
        States do not need to conduct foreign policy to play an important
    role here. But states can protect consumers. We can protect critical
    infrastructure. We can investigate deception, data abuse, and
    undisclosed risks. And we can ensure that Americans are not unknowingly
    exposed to foreign-adversary leverage through the products and services
    they use every day.
        In other words, states should build upon domestic resilience in
    line with the federal direction on national security threats. The
    federal government tells us who our foreign adversaries are. States can
    be a force multiplier for securing our nation, and provide stronger and
    deeper front-line resilience against global threats.
        That mission resonates particularly strongly in Alaska. Alaskans
    have an express constitutional right to privacy, and we take that right
    seriously. We also live in a place where consumer products, technology,
    and services are often more expensive and harder to obtain than
    elsewhere in the country. If Alaskans are paying a premium for a
    product or service, they deserve to know what they are getting--and
    what risks may come with it.
        We are also America's Arctic state and a Pacific state. We sit at
    the intersection of strategic cargo, telecommunications, critical
    minerals, ports, fisheries, and Arctic logistics. As a result, many of
    the issues discussed today are not abstract for us.
        My message is simple: many of the CCP's threats to Americans
    increasingly manifest themselves through areas traditionally governed
    by the states--public safety, consumer protection, licensing, and
    infrastructure. And because of that, states have both the authority and
    the responsibility to act--carefully, lawfully, and strategically--
    alongside our Federal partners.
                                     ______

                       Prepared Statement of Eliot Bostar

        Chair Sullivan, Co-chair Smith, and honorable members of the
    Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
        Over the last four years, the Nebraska Legislature has passed a
    slate of laws designed to protect Nebraskans from transnational
    repression, safeguard Nebraska's data and critical infrastructure
    against threats by foreign adversaries, and combat malign influence
    operations. Our first major statewide reform came in 2023. Since then,
    we have either led or partnered with other states in enacting
    pioneering security reforms every legislative session. In 2024, we
    focused on preparing our state for a potential conflict in the Pacific,
    in 2025 we worked to root out foreign influence operations and
    transnational repression, and earlier this year, we passed laws to
    protect our critical infrastructure. Nebraska is creating tangible
    results to protect our state and our citizens and building solutions
    that can serve as a model for other states, Congress, and even allied
    countries.
        Nebraska is home to the U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force
    Base as well as numerous nuclear missile installations. We are one of
    the world's leading agricultural producers, and we are deeply
    integrated into America's transportation systems, financial and
    insurance systems, telecommunications networks, and other critical
    infrastructure. These attributes make Nebraska an attractive target for
    foreign adversaries. However, these attributes are also common across
    our nation. Every state has critical industries, infrastructure, and
    institutions that our national security relies on.
        The People's Republic of China is a threat to every state and every
    community in our country.
        Our work to address the threats facing Nebraska from the PRC began
    when we were alerted to concerns held by the Department of Defense
    about the pervasiveness of Huawei technology within the vicinity of
    critical defense infrastructure in
    Nebraska, including Strategic Command and nuclear missile sites.
        Two years prior--in 2020--the U.S. Government took formal action to
    designate Huawei Technologies as a threat to national security, and
    Congress approved $1.9 billion to remove this Chinese-made cellular
    technology from communications systems across America. But Huawei
    technology was still in use--and being newly installed--throughout
    Nebraska years later.
        In 2023, we drafted legislation to address this security risk by
    prohibiting telecommunications companies from receiving state-directed
    funds, including from the Nebraska Universal Service Fund, if they use
    or provide communications equipment deemed a national security threat.
    Additionally, telecommunications companies must certify annually that
    they are not utilizing any equipment identified as a threat by the FCC,
    and are subject to fines and penalties if they cannot provide that
    certification. The law also incentivizes the removal of prohibited
    equipment by stipulating that any telecommunications company that
    removes or replaces equipment identified as a national security threat
    shall not be required to obtain any additional permits or authorization
    from any state agency or local government for that removal or
    replacement. This provision prevents bureaucratic red-tape from
    endangering our national security.
        Robust lobbying pressure was employed to keep Beijing-linked
    technologies in use throughout Nebraska's telecommunications
    infrastructure. But elected officials from both parties ultimately
    rejected this pressure and made certain that state funds were not
    subsidizing foreign surveillance. Nebraska enacted this legislation and
    paired it with executive actions restricting other state support for
    telecommunications equipment tied to Huawei and related entities.
        After passage of this law, my office was inundated with information
    from national security and defense professionals who identified threats
    that could be addressed at the state level. Their expertise and
    partnership encouraged us to push forward, and we passed several more
    laws in 2024 to protect Nebraska against foreign adversaries.
        The Foreign-owned Real Estate National Security Act works to
    protect strategic land near military installations and restrict foreign
    adversary ownership of critical real estate. This act prevents any
    person, foreign government, or entity determined to be a foreign
    adversary, from holding land within ten miles of a military
    installation, including nuclear missile silos. In cases of
    noncompliance, the law provides the Nebraska Attorney General with
    authority to force divestment.
        We passed legislation to address the security gap left by the
    expiration of federal Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards. The
    federal standards were created after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
    attacks to ensure that high-risk chemical facilities were secure and
    protected from weaponization by terrorists. With passage of our bill,
    high-risk chemical facilities in Nebraska are now required to
    participate in the otherwise voluntary ChemLock program to promote
    continued security against potential terrorist threats involving
    hazardous chemicals.
        The Pacific Conflict Stress Test Act created the joint Legislative
    and Executive Committee on Pacific Conflict with a straightforward
    purpose: to assess how a conflict in the Pacific could disrupt and
    endanger Nebraska. The Committee meets quarterly and works to identify
    ongoing vulnerabilities--evaluating the state's supply chains, export
    markets, critical infrastructure, and security apparatus--to make
    recommendations to strengthen state resilience.
        Lastly, in 2024, we passed the Foreign Adversary Contracting
    Prohibition Act. This legislation prohibits companies controlled by
    foreign adversaries from participation in sensitive procurement
    contracts involving communications technology, networked systems, and
    critical infrastructure.
        As we worked to pass these laws, we encountered significant
    opposition from a variety of interests. We learned about local
    government officials being contacted by the CCP, and we started to hear
    from victims of transnational repression, who were willing to share
    their stories. Reporting emerged regarding an alleged Chinese
    ``overseas service station'' operating in Omaha, which further elevated
    our concerns regarding intelligence activity and transnational
    repression occurring within Nebraska. It became clear that we needed to
    take action to limit the CCP's broader ability to influence,
    manipulate, and hurt people in our state. This confluence of factors
    led us, in 2025, to introduce the Foreign Adversary and Terrorist Agent
    Registration Act and the Crush Transnational Repression in Nebraska
    Act.
        The Foreign Adversary and Terrorist Agent Registration Act brings
    transparency to political, propaganda, and influence activities
    conducted by agents of foreign adversaries. The Act makes it unlawful
    for any person to act as an agent of a foreign adversary nation or
    foreign terrorist organization unless that person has registered with
    the Nebraska Attorney General. The Act requires any informational
    material distributed by an agent of a foreign adversary to be notated
    with a conspicuous statement identifying it as such, and to be
    submitted to the Attorney General within 48 hours.
        Additionally, with passage of this Act, it is now against the law
    for an agent of a foreign adversary to communicate in any way with
    local or state government, any political propaganda or information on
    topics of politics, policy, or public interest, unless the
    communication is accompanied by a statement that the individual is
    registered as an agent of a foreign adversary. If an agent of a foreign
    adversary is testifying before the state legislature or any local
    government, they must provide the body with a copy of the most recent
    registration filed with the Attorney General.
        The legislation also stipulates that if an individual or entity is
    representing a principal designated by the Pentagon as a Chinese
    military company, they must present an affirmative acknowledgment that
    they are working on behalf of, and thereby acting as an agent of, a
    foreign adversary of the United States. They must also disclose that
    they are lobbying on behalf of a Chinese military company and disclose
    that the Chinese military company is a foreign adversary of the United
    States in all lobbying activities, including mail, telephone calls,
    email, in-person meetings, or testimony at legislative hearings.
        Violation of this provision results in a $100,000 fine, which
    increases by $100,000 for each subsequent violation, up to a maximum
    fine of $1 million per violation. Any individual who provides
    information leading to a penalty under this act is entitled to receive
    a $50,000 reward from the state.
        The Crush Transnational Repression in Nebraska Act defines covered
    offenses of transnational repression, which are specific crimes already
    existing in law, that will now receive an enhancing charge in Nebraska
    if the person committing the offense is an agent of a foreign
    principal. This legislation also punishes foreign law enforcement, such
    as what reportedly occurs at so-called Chinese police stations, by
    establishing that an agent of a foreign adversary commits a felony if
    such person intentionally attempts to enforce a law or rule of a
    government of a foreign country in Nebraska.
        We also passed legislation to reform our economic incentive
    programs to prevent foreign adversary companies from accessing any
    benefit from the state of Nebraska.
        The Chinese Communist Party is adept at creating corporations
    ultimately answerable to the Chinese military apparatus and maneuvering
    those entities into positions where they are receiving American dollars
    to underwrite espionage efforts within our borders. No entity loyal to
    an adversary of this nation should be the beneficiary of any economic
    incentive paid for by our tax dollars.
        In our final 2025 reform, we passed legislation in line with what
    Congress accomplished with the BIOSECURE Act in the most recent
    National Defense Authorization Act. Our genetic protection law
    establishes that no medical or research facility shall use any genetic
    sequencer, or software for genetic sequencing, if such device or
    software is produced in or by a foreign adversary. Chinese companies
    sanctioned by the Pentagon for human rights abuses have developed some
    of the world's largest gene banks. This genetic information is
    effectively property of the Chinese military and used for surveillance
    and military purposes. These massive stockpiles of genetic information
    provide the People's Republic of China and the Chinese military a clear
    advantage for creating bioweapons. Senior Chinese military officials
    have in fact already argued in favor of creating genetically targeted
    bioweapons that can incapacitate individuals based upon ethnicity. This
    law takes every measure possible to cut off Chinese military companies
    from accessing the genetic data of Nebraskans, and it complements and
    extends the congressional accomplishments in the BIOSECURE Act.
        Just this spring, we enacted a new and unique protection for
    critical infrastructure, which contains two important provisions.
    First, foreign adversary companies are prohibited from providing
    critical infrastructure or contracting with critical infrastructure
    providers in such a way that would allow them to exercise operational
    control over critical infrastructure. Second, critical infrastructure
    providers are prohibited from utilizing network-connected technologies
    that would allow for remote operational control and sabotage.
        Furthermore, we codified new enhanced penalties for crimes that we
    define as bioterrorism, including bringing in different pathogens for
    the purpose of damaging our farmlands as a tactic of hybrid warfare. We
    have seen several Chinese nationals
    arrested in Michigan for this type of crime over the past year alone.
        Although we faced significant opposition to each of these pieces of
    legislation, we were able to pass them into law with bipartisan
    support.
        The effects of Nebraska's actions are already visible. Awareness
    among state and local officials has increased significantly.
    Procurement standards have hardened. Infrastructure protections have
    expanded. Law enforcement coordination has improved. And Nebraska now
    evaluates infrastructure and investment questions through a national
    security framework that simply did not exist several years ago. Some of
    our most impactful reforms have received inquiries from other states
    that have replicated them. Congressional leaders, executive agencies,
    and even other nations like the United Kingdom have learned from
    different facets of what Nebraska has achieved.
        Most importantly, Nebraska's leadership in combating malign foreign
    influence has demonstrated that states have power and responsibility in
    this space. America is a continental power. Our country is
    geographically massive, and our constitutional system is strongly
    federalist. States have dual sovereignty, and state leaders are closer
    to many of the national security risks that our citizens face. It only
    makes sense that states drive reforms that are aligned with or layer on
    top of federal protections. In fact, both President Biden and President
    Trump have called upon states to lead in driving solutions where we are
    closest to the security risks. We know our adversaries are coordinated
    and adept at attacking us at every layer of government--we must be able
    to defend ourselves utilizing this same whole-of-government approach.
        We must strengthen coordination both between the states themselves
    and between the states and the federal government. Our work in Nebraska
    has been made possible by the guidance and partnership we have received
    from national
    security experts and practitioners. To meet the challenge across our
    nation, we need more established and formalized systems of
    coordination. We must ensure that we all have access to timely threat
    information, clear guidance, and meaningful partnerships so that we can
    identify vulnerabilities, protect critical assets, and contribute fully
    and comprehensively to the defense of the American homeland.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward
    to your
    questions.

                        Prepared Statement of Arthur Liu

        Chairman Sullivan, Co-Chairman Smith, and members of the
    Commission: Thank you for inviting me to testify here today. My name is
    Arthur Liu. I am a political dissident from China and the father of
    Olympic Gold Medalist Alysa Liu.
        It is especially meaningful to testify before this Commission on
    June 4, the anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre, because the story I
    am telling today began in 1989 and, in many ways, continues to this
    day.
        June 4 is a day that I will never forget. Thirty-seven years ago
    today, the Chinese government sent tanks and soldiers into the streets
    of Beijing and used military force against its own people. Thousands of
    students and civilians who had gathered peacefully to call for
    democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the rule of law,
    and basic human rights lost their lives. Hundreds more were severely
    injured.
        At that time, I was in Guangzhou attending graduate school at
    Zhongshan University. I was one of the principal organizers of the
    democracy movement there.
        When news of the massacre reached Guangzhou, I was devastated. I
    could not understand and believe how a government that claimed to serve
    the people could turn its weapons against its own young people. In
    response, I organized additional peaceful protests and demonstrations
    condemning the violence. Soon afterwards, I became the most wanted
    democracy activist in southern China.
        I was fortunate to escape to Hong Kong. I came to America as a
    refugee at the end of 1989.
        After I came to America, I continued to organize protests in front
    of the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco and in front of the Chinese
    Embassy here in Washington, D.C. calling upon the Chinese government to
    release political and religious prisoners in China. I have spoken
    publicly many times about the human rights abuses in China.
        Like many refugees, I believed that once I arrived in America, I
    had left political persecution behind. An incident in late 2021 proved
    me wrong!
        To explain what happened, I must first tell you a little bit about
    my daughter, Alysa Liu. Alysa recently won two gold medals for the
    United States of America at the 2026 Winter Olympic Games in Milan-
    Cortina. Before that, she became the youngest U.S. women's champion in
    history when she won the U.S. Figure Skating Championship at ages 13
    and 14. She set records as the youngest female skater in history ever
    to land a triple Axel in international competition, at the age of 12,
    and she was the first female skater in history to land both a triple
    Axel and a quadruple jump in the same competition program. In 2021, it
    was clear that she was on her way to represent the United States of
    America in the 2022 Winter Olympic Games in Beijing, China.
        One day in late October or early November 2021, I received a phone
    call. The caller identified himself as an official associated with the
    United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee. He told me that he was
    conducting travel preparedness for international travel for me and my
    daughter and needed copies of our passports. He gave me a fax number to
    fax them to him. I told him that I would do it the next day. But I
    never did. That request felt unusual to me given that I knew how to
    submit our passports to the U.S. Figure Skating Association for
    international
    competitions.
        A few days later, I got a phone call from the FBI, and they wanted
    to meet with me. During that meeting, agents informed me that my
    daughter and I were the targets of a Chinese government intelligence
    operation. They told me that an individual operating on behalf of the
    People's Republic of China had come to the San Francisco Bay area and
    was attempting to obtain personal information about us, including
    passport information.
        I was shocked. My first thought was not about myself. It was about
    my daughter. I felt fearful for Alysa's safety not only in Beijing, but
    also in the United States. When Alysa returned from a competition in
    Japan, I decided to take her to another city for training.
        As we were boarding our flight, I received a telephone call from
    the FBI. The agent informed me that the spy was on his way to our home.
    I will never forget that moment. It's a scene straight out of a movie!
    I was feeling chills in my bones.
        The FBI agent informed me that they were prepared to move forward
    with the arrest of the spies. But I was terrified for Alysa's safety in
    Beijing and mental stress if the spying operation came to light. I
    asked the FBI not to take any action until after the Olympic Games and
    until Alysa returned home safely from China. I also requested
    additional security precautions for her during the Olympic Games.
        Throughout her time in Beijing, Alysa was accompanied by two adults
    as she traveled between venues and participated in the Olympic Games.
    That gave me some comfort. But it never completely eliminated my fear
    for her safety. As a father, I was worried every day and prayed for her
    safe return to America, every day.
        On March 16, 2022, after the Olympic Games, the Department of
    Justice announced criminal charges against the spies; one of them was
    Matthew Ziburis.
        According to the federal criminal complaint, I was identified as
    ``Dissident 3,'' and Alysa was identified as the ``family member.'' The
    complaint alleged efforts to obtain information about me and my family,
    including passport information, personal identifying information, and
    details about our lives. The complaint further alleged surveillance
    efforts directed at me, including placing a GPS tracker on my car to
    track my daily activities.
        After the spying operation came to light in the news, a neighboring
    business owner came over to me and told me that he had seen the spy
    identified as Matthew Ziburis several times lingering around the lobby
    in front of my office.
        I am personally grateful to the brave FBI agents who provided
    security for me and my daughter. I appreciate that the U.S. Government
    took forceful action to prosecute those spies. However, America cannot
    just stop there.
        We all must understand that America will not be safe until China
    becomes a democracy! We all must understand that America will not be
    safe until China has a government which respects basic human rights and
    honors the rule of law! We all must understand that America will not be
    safe until people all over the world can live peacefully and
    harmoniously together.
        America, we have a lot of work to do! Thank you!
        Thank you again for inviting me to testify here today. I look
    forward to answering your questions.
                                     ______

                        Prepared Statement of Anna Kwok

        Distinguished Members of the Commission:
        Thank you for inviting me to share my experience as a target of
    intensifying transnational repression in the United States.
        In this battle against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)--a regime
    that fears opposition--feeling safe is a privilege. I am among hundreds
    of thousands of rights defenders in America who live every single day
    knowing we are being watched and threatened. All incidents of
    transnational repression I share today took place on American soil.
    Together, they illustrate the varied tactics of a transnational
    repression campaign.
        I served as the Executive Director of the Hong Kong Democracy
    Council, a U.S. advocacy organization sanctioned by the PRC. In May
    2023, after I testified before this very Commission on the loss of Hong
    Kong's political autonomy and its implications for the U.S., the regime
    swiftly retaliated by issuing a 1 million HKD bounty on my head. My
    assets were frozen, and my passport was revoked, crippling my
    international advocacy work. More bounties were later issued on
    American citizens and residents.
        The bounty put a huge target on my back. State media, pro-CCP
    extremists, and online propagandists launched a coordinated campaign to
    discourage the American public from associating with me.
        Explicit threats to hurt, kidnap, rape, and even execute me on
    American soil flooded my social media.
        The lawfare and digital threats became physical in November 2023
    during Chinese leader Xi Jinping's visit to the U.S. When I organized
    protests against Xi and campaigned successfully to bar the sanctioned
    Hong Kong Chief Executive from entering the country, the regime
    retaliated on the streets of San Francisco: masked men assaulted fellow
    protesters while WeChat groups circulated my whereabouts. I escaped
    physical harm only because fellow protesters protected me; local police
    were completely oblivious to the existence of transnational repression
    and refused to intervene. To this day, none of the perpetrators,
    including American nationals, have been convicted. For the first time,
    I felt as if I had been transported back to the lawless streets of Hong
    Kong; even though I was in the land of the free, I was not free.
        The online campaign and real-life violence achieved a chilling
    effect across America: Some supporters of the pro-democracy movement
    stopped showing up to events; a few went so far as to erase their
    digital footprints. Their response is all too familiar: it happened
    once in my first home, Hong Kong, and it is now happening in my second
    home, America.
        Nonetheless, I refused to back down. I led a campaign to expose the
    foreign influence and transnational threats brought by the Hong Kong
    Economic and Trade
    Offices (HKETOs). In response, the regime unleashed its cruelest
    weapon: psychological warfare.
        Last May, the regime arrested my father in Hong Kong. He was later
    convicted on fabricated charges. The state-run trial centered on an
    insurance policy my father had purchased when I was just a two-year-old
    learning to say ``papa.'' My father is imprisoned simply because he is
    my father. He is now a hostage serving a sentence for crimes neither of
    us committed. The CCP weaponized my love for my family in an attempt to
    silence me forever.
        I speak to you today as my 70-year-old father sits in a cell 8,000
    miles away. I speak as someone with a 1 million HKD bounty on my head.
    I speak as a target of rampant transnational repression. And I speak as
    someone who is standing my ground to combat an urgent threat to
    American national security.
        When a hostile foreign power launches centralized efforts--spanning
    state agencies, united front groups and individual extremists--to
    silence people inside the U.S., the government must respond with
    centralized, coordinated mechanisms. I urge the House Foreign Affairs
    Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee to mark up the
    bipartisan Transnational Repression Policy Act immediately--passing
    this legislation will provide the bedrock for building long-term cross-
    agency mechanisms that are necessary to protect America.
        This is a litmus test for the country. If the U.S. does not draw a
    hard line and act quickly, the PRC will continue to push our
    boundaries, from running secret police stations to co-opting state
    officials. States like Nebraska and Utah are gearing up to protect
    their people; the nation should get ahead, too. We must confront the
    threat of transnational repression urgently, before it becomes a
    normalized pattern that cannot be undone. Thank you.
                                     ______

                     Prepared Statement of Hon. Chris Smith

        Before we begin, I want to mark a solemn anniversary. Today marks
    the 37th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Thirty-seven
    years ago, millions of Chinese citizens peacefully asked for political
    reform, democratic openness, and basic human dignity. Their hope was
    met with tanks.
        The Chinese Communist Party unleashed the People's Liberation Army
    on peaceful demonstrators. Mothers lost sons. Fathers lost daughters.
    And China lost an idealistic generation to the violence of June 4,
    1989. There has been no full accounting of those killed, imprisoned, or
    disappeared. The Party still tries to erase a massacre the world must
    never forget.
        But Tiananmen cannot be erased. The enduring image of that day is
    the Tank Man--the solitary figure standing before a column of tanks.
    His courage reminds us that the desire for freedom is not Western, not
    foreign, and not imposed from outside. It is universal.
        As I have said before, a choice has to be made by us all: you
    either stand with the Tank Man, or you stand with the tank. There is no
    middle ground.
        And there is no middle ground in the subject before us today.
    Tiananmen is not a detour from this hearing. It is the key to
    understanding it. The same Party that tried to crush truth at home now
    tries to chase truth abroad.
        The tactics have changed. The technology has changed. The reach has
    expanded. But the purpose is the same: to make people afraid to speak
    the truth--by almost any means necessary. Inside China, the CCP uses
    surveillance, censorship, prison, torture, forced disappearance, and
    fear to maintain power.
        But what happens in China no longer stays in China. The Party wants
    to control what is said about China here, and control who says it.
        The CECC has warned about the CCP's long arm for years. Long before
    ``transnational repression'' became a common phrase, I held a dozen or
    so Commission hearings documenting and exposing a consistent pattern of
    global abuse--starting with the Confucius Institutes in 2014.
        Over time, tactics have become more digital and more ruthless:
    detaining family members in China, doxxing, spyware, deepfakes, Hong
    Kong bounties, and illegal police stations right here in the United
    States. It is outrageous and unacceptable and must be stopped.
        Transnational repression is not the only threat Americans face, but
    it is part of a broader, interconnected CCP strategy. We see that
    strategy in scam networks stealing from U.S. citizens, fentanyl
    poisoning our cities, PRC-linked land purchases near military
    installations, efforts to corrupt politicians and elections, steal
    private personnel and biometric data, and intellectual property theft
    from businesses and universities.
        These may look like separate problems, but they share a common
    purpose: exploit our openness, gather leverage, weaken our
    institutions, spread propaganda, and make Americans pay a price for
    standing up to Beijing.
        Transnational repression is the most personal form of that
    strategy. It brings the pressure campaign to the doorstep of the
    student, journalist, dissident, artist, and family member. That is why
    state and local responses matter. A victim may first call local police.
    A student may go to a university official. A state attorney general may
    see the pattern. A state legislator may realize existing law does not
    fit the threat.
        So the questions are practical: Do local officers recognize this
    threat, do universities know how to protect students, do states have
    the tools they need, and does the federal government have a real
    strategy?
        That is why I am proud to work with Chairman Sullivan, Senator
    Merkley, and Representative McGovern on the Transnational Repression
    Policy Act. This bipartisan, bicameral legislation would define the
    abuse, improve coordination, train officials, support targeted
    communities, and hold perpetrators accountable--because victims need
    more than sympathy. They need protection and a place to turn.
        Let me make one point clear. A regime that fears a student's
    question, a refugee's protest, an artist's statue, or the simple memory
    of Tiananmen is not a strong and confident superpower. It is afraid.
    And fear in the hands of a dictatorship is dangerous. It becomes
    coercion. It becomes censorship. It becomes repression that crosses
    borders and reaches into our communities.
        So our answer must be unmistakable. If the CCP threatens people
    here, there must be investigations and prosecutions. If it reaches
    across our borders to spread fear, there must be sanctions. If it takes
    family members hostage to silence a critic, we will demand their
    release and expose the cruelty of that tactic. And if it tries to
    censor a free people, we will defend and spread the rights Beijing
    fears most: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of
    assembly, and the right to tell the truth without fear.
        Because in the United States of America, unlike in China, no one
    needs the Party's permission to speak, to worship, to protest, to
    remember, or to be free.
        That is why this hearing matters.
        Thank you. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
                                     ______

                    Prepared Statement of Hon. Dan Sullivan

        Today's hearing comes at a pivotal moment. Because one of the
    clearest lessons of the last decade is this: what happens in China does
    not stay in China.
        The Chinese Communist Party is not content to repress people inside
    China's borders. It is increasingly trying to export that repression
    abroad, including here in the United States. And that is what this
    hearing is about: threats to Americans, on American soil.
        Let me say at the outset, very clearly: That is unacceptable, it is
    outrageous and it has to stop. And the title of this hearing goes
    directly to legislation that Congressman Smith and Congressman McGovern
    are leading in the House, and that Senator Merkley and I are advancing
    in the Senate: the Transnational Repression Policy Act.
        That bill starts from a very basic principle. If the CCP is going
    to harass, surveil, threaten, and intimidate people living in freedom
    in the United States, then the United States needs to respond--
    seriously, strategically, and on a bipartisan basis. Because this is
    not some secondary issue. It is about protecting Americans.
        Let me make this concrete. Alaska may not sit at the center of the
    PRC's transnational repression apparatus, but even Alaska has not been
    spared. An Alaskan constituent recounted to me that, during a high-
    level CCP official's visit to
    Alaska, he was intimidated and surrounded by Chinese security officials
    after staging a one-person protest. He said that a local Chinese
    community group was then contacted to register displeasure over his
    exercise of free speech.
        Think about that. One person, standing alone, on American soil,
    exercising a constitutional right. And that was enough to trigger an
    effort by the Chinese Communist Party to intimidate him into silence.
        That incident took place some time ago. Since then, the CCP's
    tactics have evolved, its operations have expanded, and its reach has
    grown much more sophisticated. Freedom House has described the PRC's
    transnational repression campaign as the most sophisticated,
    comprehensive, and far reaching in the world. But the goal is still the
    same--to use the power and pressure of the party-state to coerce,
    censor, and silence critics far beyond China's borders.
        That is why this hearing matters.
        And more and more, the CCP is not just targeting the critic. It is
    targeting the family. It threatens relatives, jails family members,
    uses exit bans, and pressures loved ones back in China in order to
    silence people living freely here in America. We should call that what
    it is: hostage diplomacy. It is a way of telling people in the United
    States that if they speak out, somebody they love may pay the price.
        Chinese students and scholars are intimidated on university
    campuses. Chinese military-backed companies are forging ties with
    university researchers and buying land near sensitive military sites.
    We have even seen efforts to establish Chinese police stations here in
    the United States. The CCP is targeting critics, pressuring families,
    stealing from Americans through scam centers tied to Chinese criminal
    networks, and making people in this country think twice before they
    speak.
        These may look like different problems on paper, but they reflect
    the same basic approach: project power, spread fear, gather leverage,
    and probe for weakness here in the United States.
        One encouraging sign is that states are not waiting around for
    Washington. Texas took action in 2024 to protect Texans from PRC-led
    transnational repression. And in 2025, lawmakers in Texas, Nebraska,
    and Arizona--Republicans and Democrats--passed bipartisan legislation
    to strengthen penalties and improve law-
    enforcement responses.
        We should be learning from those efforts. What is working? Where
    are the gaps? What tools do state and local officials need and how can
    the federal government actually be helpful?
        These are practical questions. But they are also urgent ones.
    Because every day this goes unanswered, the CCP gets a little bolder.
    And we cannot allow that to become normal.
        People who come to America for freedom should not have to live in
    fear on American soil. People exercising rights protected by our
    Constitution should not have to look over their shoulder because
    Beijing is threatening their family members back home. Chinese students
    on American campuses should not have to wonder whether the regime is
    watching them. And the Chinese Communist Party should never come to
    believe that it can use surveillance, intimidation, or deepfakes to
    police speech or spread fear inside the United States without a
    response.
        Threats to Americans are unacceptable. That is the bottom line. And
    if the CCP thinks it can intimidate people in the United States and get
    away with it, then this hearing should send a very clear message: Not
    here. Not in this country. And not without a concerted and tough
    response.
                                     ______

                  Prepared Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern

        I want to thank my colleague from New Jersey, Congressman Smith,
    for his words and for his commitment to human rights, not only in China
    but all around the world.
        Good morning. I join my colleagues in welcoming our witnesses and
    guests to today's hearing on transnational repression.
        Today is June 4th. And as Co-chair Smith pointed out, 37 years ago,
    the Chinese government directed the military to attack civilians who
    were exercising their right to freedom of expression to call for
    economic and political reform.
        Let us never forget those who bravely stood for freedom in
    Tiananmen Square and other cities, the mothers who never knew the fate
    of their children, and those who continue to tell the stories in the
    face of a government that seeks to silence them.
        And let us not forget that any society whose leaders are willing to
    use lethal force against peaceful protesters is a society at risk of
    losing its fundamental liberties.
        I am glad that the Commission continues to address transnational
    repression. In 2020, Co-chair Marco Rubio and I created a new chapter
    called ``Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally'' in the
    Annual Report.
        CECC staff have just released a special report on transnational
    repression. I always appreciate the dedication of the non-partisan
    subject matter experts who work for the Commission. This report is
    absolutely worth reading.
        China is the world's worst perpetrator of transnational repression.
    Freedom House lists the PRC with the most incidents (319) since 2014--
    and that only accounts for reported incidents. Who knows how many
    people have gotten threatening texts or calls that they are too scared
    to report?
        But transnational repression (TNR) is more than China. Freedom
    House lists Tajikistan, Rwanda, Russia, Egypt, and Belarus among the
    biggest violators. Last year I chaired a Tom Lantos Human Rights
    Commission hearing highlighting TNR by India, Pakistan, and Hong Kong.
    Yesterday afternoon Co-chair Smith and I convened a hearing on Turkiye,
    listed with 160 TNR incidents.
        Hearings are fine. But it really is time for action.
        Advocates tell us their #1 goal is to create a standard definition
    of transnational repression. I am proud to join with CECC leaders
    Senators Merkley and Sullivan and Co-chair Smith in sponsoring the
    Transnational Repression Policy Act. It defines TNR in statute,
    strengthening efforts to counter it at the federal, state and local
    level. This bill was first introduced in the House three years ago. But
    it has gone nowhere.
        In March, Freedom House led a coalition of 35 organizations,
    including Uyghur, Tibetan, Chinese, and Hong Kong human rights groups,
    in a statement to the chairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and
    Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asking them to mark up the bill.
        Foreign Affairs has scheduled four mark-ups since that letter. But
    the Transnational Repression Policy Act never makes the agenda. I ask
    Chairman Mast in the House to act.
        Our bill is important because it would give the U.S. the tools to
    lead on TNR. Equally important, we must acknowledge that the tools will
    only be effective if we avoid double standards. I worry we are falling
    short:

            1.  President Biden started and President Trump completed the
            rehabilitation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who
            directed the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey. We lose
            credibility when the U.S. Government allows impunity for
            transnational repression.

            2.  This Commission characterized the deportation by Thailand
            of 40 Uyghurs to China as transnational repression. Yet the
            Trump administration has deported individuals who have been
            transnationally repressed in the U.S. by Iran and Russia back
            to those countries. We lose credibility to ask other countries
            to protect TNR victims when the U.S. Government refuses to
            protect TNR victims.

            3.  To the extent we label political interference by China in
            the U.S. as transnational repression, then we must consider
            Senator Bernie Moreno's meddling in the Colombian election as
            transnational repression. We lose credibility when U.S.
            officials act like CCP officials.

            4.  Last year the Trump administration sanctioned a Brazilian
            judge who brought insurrectionists to justice, falsely
            portraying legitimate accountability as transnational
            repression. We lose credibility when U.S. officials pervert TNR
            to help political allies.

        In September, our credibility will again be tested. Xi Jinping will
    visit Washington at President Trump's invitation. The last time he was
    in the U.S., thugs associated with the Chinese consulate in San
    Francisco beat up anti-Xi protesters. We must be prepared to defend the
    right to protest here.
        The question is: Will we?
        The Trump administration has deployed security forces to suppress
    Americans' right to protest. They're doing it now outside the Delaney
    Hall ICE facility in Newark, New Jersey. If Xi Jinping asks President
    Trump to contain or control Chinese, Uyghur, and Tibetan protesters,
    will he do that, or will he be wind at the backs of those engaged in
    legitimate dissent?
        The administration has deported people for exercising their free
    speech rights under the First Amendment and the ICCPR to criticize the
    Israeli government. If Xi Jinping asks President Trump to deport
    people, for whatever reason, back to China, we must make it clear that
    that is unacceptable, and we will not do that, and we will not stand
    for that.
        Transnational repression is a human rights violation. All human
    beings are
    entitled to the same rights, no matter where they live, or how they
    feel about their
    government.
        I thank the witnesses for being here and I welcome their insight.

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                              Witness Biographies

        Stephen J. Cox, Counsel to the Governor, State of Alaska

        Stephen J. Cox serves as Counsel to the Governor of Alaska and
    previously served as Alaska's 28th Attorney General. In state service,
    he has advised the Governor and executive agencies on major legal,
    constitutional, and policy matters, including litigation, public
    safety, regulatory initiatives, resource development priorities,
    consumer protection, and risks connected to China such as illegal
    imports, counterfeit and unsafe products, and technology concerns
    affecting vulnerable Alaskans. He previously served as Senior Vice
    President and Chief Legal and Strategy Officer at Bristol Bay
    Industrial, and earlier as principal attorney for Apache Corporation's
    Alaska operations. Cox also served in senior roles at the U.S.
    Department of Justice, including as Deputy Associate Attorney General
    and U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas, where his work
    included corporate enforcement policy, regulatory reform, white collar
    crime, elder fraud, and violent crime prosecutions.

        Eliot Bostar, Nebraska State Senator

        State Senator Eliot Bostar represents District 29 in the Nebraska
    Legislature, where he was first elected in 2020 and re-elected in 2024.
    A nonprofit executive and graduate of St. John's Northwestern Military
    Academy and Embry-Riddle University, he serves on the Banking, Commerce
    and Insurance Committee, the Revenue Committee, the Committee on
    Committees, the Reference Committee, the Rules Committee, the Executive
    Board, the Legislature's Planning Committee, the Streamlined Sales and
    Use Tax System Committee, and the Statewide Tourism and Recreational
    Water Access and Resource Sustainability Committee. Senator Bostar
    introduced LB644 at the request of Nebraska's Governor; the measure,
    approved by the Governor in June 2025, adopted the Foreign Adversary
    and Terrorist Agent Registration Act and the Crush Transnational
    Repression in Nebraska Act, among other provisions related to foreign-
    adversary contracting and genetic sequencing data.

        Arthur Liu, Owner, Inter-Pacific Law Group

        Arthur Junguo Liu is an attorney in the San Francisco Bay area and
    the father of two-time Olympic gold medalist figure skater Alysa Liu.
    Born and raised in China, Liu was attending graduate school at
    Zhongshan University in Guangzhou in 1989 when he organized student
    demonstrations calling for democracy, human rights, and an end to
    corruption. After the June 4 Massacre, he became one of the most wanted
    student activists in South China and came to the United States as a
    political refugee at the end of 1989. He later earned an MBA and JD in
    California and has practiced law for more than 27 years. Liu has
    continued his advocacy for democracy and human rights in China by
    organizing protests outside the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco and
    the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C. After PRC-linked efforts to
    recruit Alysa Liu to compete for China, Liu and his daughter became
    targets of PRC spying operations before the 2022 Winter Olympic Games.

        Anna Kwok, Board Director and former Executive Director, Hong Kong
    Democracy Council

        Anna Kwok is a Hong Kong organizer and policy analyst based in
    Washington, D.C. She is a Board Director and former Executive Director
    of the Hong Kong
    Democracy Council, a nonpartisan nonprofit organization that supports
    Hong Kong's pro-democracy movement and Hong Kongers in the United
    States through policy advocacy, diaspora empowerment, and research and
    education. Kwok previously worked as an anonymous activist on major
    international campaigns, later choosing to make her identity public
    after the imposition of Hong Kong's National Security Law in order to
    resist the climate of fear affecting Hong Kong activists abroad. In
    2023, Hong Kong authorities issued an arrest warrant and offered a HK$1
    million bounty in connection with her advocacy work. In 2025, Kwok's
    father was arrested and imprisoned in what she and other advocates have
    described as retaliation for her advocacy.

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