[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RESPONDING TO CHINA'S INFILTRATION AND
COERCION IN EUROPE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
March 4, 2026
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Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe
[CSCE119-2]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via www.csce.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-084 WASHINGTON : 2026
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION
U.S. SENATE U.S. HOUSE
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JOE WILSON, South Carolina Co-
Chairman Chairman
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island STEVE COHEN, Tennessee Ranking
Ranking Member Member
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
KATIE BRITT, Alabama EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri
JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona JAKE ELLZEY, Texas
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire GREG MURPHY, North Carolina
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MARC VEASEY, Texas
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Department of State - to be appointed
Department of Defense - to be appointed
Department of Commerce - to be appointed
C O N T E N T S
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Page
COMMISSIONERS
Hon. Jake Ellzey, from Texas..................................... 1
Hon. Ruben Gallego, from Arizona................................. 9
Hon. Joe Wilson, Co-Chairman, from South Carolina................ 11
Hon. Marc Veasey, from Texas..................................... 18
WITNESSES
Audrye Wong, Nonresident Senior Fellow, American Enterprise
Institute...................................................... 3
Valbona Zeneli, Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council.. 5
Vidmantas Verbickas, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania. 7
RESPONDING TO CHINA'S INFILTRATION AND COERCION IN EUROPE
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN
EUROPE,
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Wednesday, March 4, 2026.
The hearing was held from 2:40 p.m. to 4:02 p.m., Room
2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Representative Jake Ellzey
[R-TX], Member, Commission for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, presiding.
Committee Members Present: Representative Joe Wilson [R-
SC], Co-Chairman; Representative Jake Ellzey [R-TX]; Senator
Ruben Gallego [D-AZ]; Representative Marc Veasey [D-TX].
Witnesses: Vidmantas Verbickas, Vice Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Lithuania; Audrye Wong, Nonresident Senior Fellow,
American Enterprise Institute; Valbona Zeneli, Nonresident
Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council.
OPENING STATEMENT OF JAKE ELLZEY, U.S. HOUSE, FROM TEXAS
Representative Ellzey: Good afternoon, and thank you for
joining us today on this hearing about China's infiltration and
coercion into Europe. I am grateful to Senator Wicker for the
opportunity to chair this important hearing. My name is Jake
Ellzey. I am the Congressman from the sixth congressional
district of Texas, just south of Dallas.
Before turning our attention to China and Europe, I want to
highlight the greatest current threat to the region that most
of us agree on: Russia. As we mark the fourth year of Russia's
genocidal war on Ukraine, I have tremendous admiration for
Ukrainians who have held the line against formidable odds. The
bravery of Ukrainian soldiers fighting on the frontline for
years on end without respite, neighbors helping each other keep
warm through this brutal winter, and children studying in metro
stations as air raid sirens blare, inspire us all and fuel
Western solidarity and support.
Putin and Western intelligence said the invasion would be
over in hours, but the spirit of Ukrainians proved them all
wrong. While there is always room to do more, I am proud to say
that the West has stood by Ukraine and strengthened our
collective deterrence against Russia. This includes NATO
nations increasing their spending on defense. We have all come
to understand the threat posed by war criminal No. 1, Vladimir
Putin, and his band of mobsters. However, through this ordeal,
many of our allies in Europe have been slow to recognize that
Russia's patron, China, is angling to become the true winner in
this war. Xi Jinping has complemented Putin's brute force with
a patient, persistent approach to establishing his global
dominance and upending the U.S.-led world order.
China has shrewdly used Russia's invasion, along with a
suite of overt and covert tools, to assert itself in Europe and
establish beachheads to manipulate the continent. A commitment
to transatlantic security requires attention from both the
threat of Russia's war as well as persistent threat posed by
China's pursuit of hegemony. In a few minutes, I will turn it
over to our panelists who will discuss how China is executing
its strategy to supplant U.S. leadership and European
independence, and the implications of failing to respond
effectively. First, I want to spend a few moments discussing
why Americans and Europeans should care about China's growing
influence.
For our partners in Europe who lacks official industrial
base or developed tech sector, China's no-strings-attached
offers of investment and trade seem enticing. As Europeans
spend significant resources bolstering Ukraine and growing
their own militaries, many do not seem to see the harm in
allowing China's cash to boost other key sectors. That cash
comes with a catch. With Russia on the march, some believe that
they do not have the resources or political capital to focus on
the harmful elements of China's presence in their countries.
This is a false choice. China and Russia share a vision for the
world where they do what they--the strong do what they can, and
the weak suffer what they must.
The free markets and democracy in the West are strategic
obstacles to them. We embrace free speech, whereas free speech
is challenged in China's industrial base, as concerned citizens
on both sides of the Atlantic demand publicly that China stop
using Uyghur forced labor. We uphold a commitment to freedom of
religion. That freedom compels people of faith to cry out and
demand accountability when China arrests pastors and destroys
churches that refuse to glorify the CCP. We depend on
journalists to bring facts to light. These journalists threaten
China's Belt and Road Initiative as they reveal a clear trend.
Chinese firms make big promises of massive infrastructure
development, but they deliver half-built ports and train
stations that collapse on commuters. They build junk.
The innovation and progress delivered by our market
economies provide unwanted competition for China's command
economy, which operates at the whims of central planners and
CCP cadres. Xi's approach to Europe includes concerted,
systematic efforts to undermine the rights and ideals that are
the bedrock of the transatlantic relationship. China's efforts
to silence dissenters, threaten diaspora communities, violate
citizens' privacy, and steal intellectual property have a dual
purpose--bolstering China's image and power while eroding the
values and institutions that set democracies apart. If our
allies in Europe wish to see the next century characterized by
the same freedom and prosperity that we have enjoyed for the
last eighty years, we ought to take the threat posed by China
deadly seriously.
We must marshal our arsenals, our cyber capabilities, and
our economic might to harden our countries against an insidious
force that seeks to marginalize us. We hope that all of Europe
rejects China's sinister overtures and follows the example set
by our friends in Ukraine and the Baltics, who recognize that
there is no price too high to pay for liberty and independence.
It is time to recommit to the wisdom of our founders: ``Those
who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.''
To discuss the troubling effects of China's increasing
infiltration in Europe and how our European allies and the rest
of the democratic world can best respond, I am pleased to
introduce our distinguished panel. Vidmantas Verbickas, vice
minister of foreign affairs for the Republic of Lithuania. I
have been to Lithuania twice in the last couple of years. I
love your country. My wife wants to move there tomorrow.
[Laughter.] Audrye Wong, nonresident fellow at the American
Enterprise Institute. Valbona Zeneli, nonresident senior fellow
at the American Enterprise Institute. It is a privilege to have
all three experts here today. Thank you to each of you for your
investment and time.
Dr. Wong, we will begin with you.
TESTIMONY OF AUDRYE WONG, NONRESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Dr. Wong: Representative Ellzey and the Helsinki
Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I
will just take the next few minutes to outline five key
takeaways about China's influence in Europe.
First, what are China's strategic goals on the European
continent? One, is to bolster friends and silence critics of
the Chinese Communist Party and its policies, especially on
politically sensitive issues such as human rights, abuse of
Uyghurs in Xinjiang, ongoing territorial disputes, and, of
course, to minimize opposition to Chinese claims over Taiwan.
Second, is to undermine transatlantic cooperation and European
unity through a divide-and-conquer strategy. Even just peeling
off a few dissenters can disrupt the formation of a durable
coalition to counter a malign Chinese influence.
Second, China adopts a multifaceted, multilayered approach
to exerting influence. It uses both coercion and inducements,
so weaponizing supply chains, for example, while dangling
promises, offers economic benefits. China employs a mix of
subversive and legitimate approaches. Beijing often seeks to
buy support through corrupt investments, through bribery,
through other covert influence tactics, but it also readily
uses elite co-optation, building and cultivating relationships
with a variety of stakeholders and interest groups in
democratic societies to try to persuade them of the validity of
China's interests and policies.
It also attempts to influence a wide array of targets. We
see activities across, sort of, diplomatic and government
realms, business realms, public realms, and intersecting
tactics, combining economic, information, and propaganda. China
is quite opportunistic at forging alliances of convenience,
aligning--you know, trying to empower certain voices across the
political and ideological spectrum to get them to echo China's
talking points, whether for transactional or ideological
reasons.
Third, China's economic statecraft may be imperfect, but it
works well enough. What China has done best is to really create
divisions, to drive wedges within Europe among European
countries, as well as between Europe and the United States. You
have, you know, countries that receive a lot of Chinese
investment, who hope to receive more Chinese investment, right,
you know, taking stances in line with China, vetoing EU
statements critical of China, for example, and really co-opting
and adopting Beijing's political rhetoric. Individual countries
often fear targeted economic retaliation in Beijing. This
limits progress, right, at the EU level, when the European
Commission, for example, seeks to introduce more stringent
regulations. That makes it harder to achieve.
Of course, there is plenty of scrutiny and pushback against
poorly conceived Chinese projects and other forms of illicit
influence, thanks to the relative strength of institutions in
many European nations. The attractiveness of China's market and
its capital could be enough to buy silence on issues that China
really cares about. In addition, China really strategically
alternates the uses of economic inducements to buffer its
periodic use of economic coercion. We have seen examples of,
you know, sanctions imposed on member--you know, European
elected officials, in countries such as Lithuania, but then
subsequently they like to renormalize these trade and
investment flows and offer diplomatic reassurance.
These promises in this cycle keep governments and companies
coming back, you know, and hoping for more, rather than
actually concerted diversifying away from China. This
combination of carrots and sticks, you know, really helps to
minimize opposition to China, to stymie broader coalition
building against China. This creates more strategic space for
Beijing to pursue its interests with relative impunity.
The fourth point I want to make is that China often has a
first-mover advantage. There is relatively low, I think,
especially compared to United States elite and public literacy
on China. Because Russia has often been the foremost
conventional threat, this really allows Beijing to fill the
information gap, to dominate and propagate its strategic
narratives, and really shape perceptions and understandings of
Beijing's interests. This logic applies when CCP-linked actors
reach out to local officials, who are more likely to be
concerned with economic development. China often likes to
combine very assertive and aggressive propaganda messaging and
public diplomacy to claim credit and sometimes exaggerate the
importance of China as an economic partner. You have a bridge
constructed by a Chinese company in Croatia that was actually
funded primarily by the European Union. Most people think it is
funded and built by China.
The fifth point I want to make is that democratic
backsliding, corruption, and patronage politics really provide
weak entry points for Chinese influence and authoritarian
influence in general. We see the intersection of Chinese and
Russian activities, where the lack of transparency and
oversight really makes it easier for strongman politicians to
accept corrupt investment deals in exchange for falling in line
with Beijing's policies. These activities, in turn, perpetuate
a vicious cycle of autocratization, right, entrenching these
illiberal leaders and really undermining good governance.
At the same time, it is the CCP engages in these illegal
interference tactics, you know, and espionage and all of that,
but it is also quite adept exploiting the openness of
democratic societies, working within existing institutions and
processes, exploiting these vulnerabilities to forge links with
multiple stakeholders and really shape discourse in favor of
China, and create an impression of broader support for Chinese
interests. This sort of broader phenomenon and co-optation has
been quite key in shaping how many elected officials and
business leaders operate in this realm, right?
Many of these influence activities are managed under the
umbrella of the United Front, which is a diffuse and amorphous
global network of official, quasi-official, and grassroots
organizations that are tasked with mobilizing friends and
suppressing enemies of the Chinese state. CCP foreign influence
tactics have really included, you know, using political
fixtures, power brokers to gain access to government officials,
tasking aides to spy on behalf of China, and even tapping on
pro-China individuals to seek elected office.
To conclude, I think without overstating the extent of
China's influence, I think the scale of resources that the
party is able to allocate to its foreign policy goals means
that it can make a dizzying multitude of influence attempts and
play a waiting game to see which ones pay off. This is not just
a national security threat, but also corrodes the legitimate
functioning of free and open societies.
Thank you.
Representative Ellzey: Thank you, Dr. Wong.
Now, Valbona Zeneli, who is not with the American
Enterprise Institute, is with the Atlantic Council. Welcome.
TESTIMONY OF VALBONA ZENELI, NONRESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, THE
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Ms. Zeneli: Thank you very much, sir. Representative
Ellzey, distinguished members of the Commission, thank you for
the opportunity to testify on this important topic.
Let me begin with one central point. The European Union has
made significant progress in recalibrating the approach to the
People's Republic of China. However, it is critically important
to remind ourselves that Europe's China policy is not a single
strategy, but it is a product of a complex negotiation between
European Union institutions and 27 member states, each with
distinct economic interests, political pressures, and security
concerns. This reality makes unified and consistent action
toward Beijing very difficult.
China has expanded its economic footprint across Europe
with a clear strategic purpose: To acquire advanced
technologies, shape global value chains, and build leverage in
critical sectors. Beijing combines state-backed financing,
industrial subsidies, and political engagement to deepen its
presence, targeting advanced manufacturing in Western Europe,
infrastructure and energy in Southern Europe, political
economic relationship in Central and Eastern Europe and the
Western Balkans, through platforms like 14+1 and the Belt and
Road Initiative. For Beijing, this is not simply commercial
gain. This is strategic leverage. It seeks to build dependency
and expand its influence in critical sectors by exploiting
Europe's openness and its regulatory complexity.
This has structural implications for Europe. First, the
EU's economic security is affected. The economic balance has
shifted sharply over the last two decades. Now China's share of
the global economy is around 20 percent, while the European
Union's has fallen to 14 percent. Trade has expanded, but has
become increasingly imbalanced, with China supplying over 1/5th
of EU imports and a trade deficit exceeding $400 billion. State
subsidies, overcapacity market access restrictions, and export
controls, especially in rare earths and critical inputs, have
created vulnerabilities in European supply chains, triggering a
China shock.
Second, technology has become the sharpest area of
competition. Europe's reliance on Chinese semiconductors, 5G,
AI, and raw materials creates strategic dependencies, while
Beijing expands its leverage through standards, subsidies, and
embedded tech ecosystems. Third, defense and military security
are indirectly, but materially, affected. Economic leverage
creates constraints in decisions, complicates sanctions, and
weakens supply chains. Those are risks that are heightened by
China's alignment with Russia and its support for Moscow's war
in Ukraine.
In response, the European Union has shifted its posture.
Now has shifted from engagement to cautious competition with
China. Trends like China's growing assertiveness, human rights
issues, COVID-19 supply chain disruptions, and China's
alignment with Russia have created shared concerns across
Europe. In 2019, the EU defined China simultaneously as a
cooperation partner, an economic competitor, and a systemic
rival. Since then, the EU has adopted different mechanisms,
from investment screening mechanisms, anti-coercion
instruments, international public procurement instruments, 5G
security toolbox, Critical Raw Materials Act, a Digital
Services Act, and the Artificial Intelligence Act.
The EU derisking is to reduce strategic vulnerabilities
without severing economic ties. However, three structural
challenges remain. First, EU institutional fragmentation.
Authority over trade, technology, foreign policy, and security
is divided among EU institutions, Commission, Council, and
Parliament, and the 27 member states. This often produces slow
decisions, overlapping responsibilities, and uneven
implementation. Second, divergent national interests. Larger
economies must balance commercial ties with security concerns.
Some Central European countries continue to seek Chinese
investment. Nordic and Baltic countries often prioritize
security and human rights, so achieving consensus across these
different perspectives is difficult.
Third, domestic political pressures. Governments must
reconcile political business interests and those that are
seeking market access with security communities that are
warning about dependencies. This produces policy
inconsistencies, even within single-member states. To be
effective, policy responses must operate both at national and
multinational levels. China's assertiveness, coercion, lack of
reciprocity, and alignment with Russia have drawn Europe and
the United States closer, reinforcing the need for
transatlantic unity despite the differences. The key question
is how to implement it.
Three recommendations. First, the United States and the
European Union should establish a high-level coordination
mechanism to counter China and promote shared economic
security. This should include joint initiatives like critical
minerals, chip manufacturing, aligned inbound and outbound
investment screening, and shared threat assessment. Second,
technology alignment is urgent. Cooperation on export controls,
semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies,
and dual-use goods must be sustained and enforcement-focused.
American technological leadership and European regulatory power
are complementary strengths. Differences over industrial policy
and strategic autonomy must be bridged.
Third, security cooperation should expand to address China-
enabled support for Russia, strengthen counterespionage and
cyber defenses, and align Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific
strategies where interests intersect. If effectively aligned,
the combined scale of the U.S. and EU economies can shape
global standards, reinforce supply chains, and counter economic
coercion. This will not come from expecting Europe to act as a
Federal superstate, but from sustained cooperation that
combines American economic and military power with Europe's
regulatory authority and market scale.
In closing, China's rise is the defining geopolitical
challenge of this century. Meeting it requires strategic
clarity, institutionalized cooperation, and a shared commitment
to preserving an open yet secure rules-and values-based
international order.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Representative Ellzey: Thank you.
Minister Verbickas, over to you.
TESTIMONY OF VIDMANTAS VERBICKAS, VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, LITHUANIA
Mr. Verbickas: Thank you so much, Honorable Representative
Ellzey, distinguished members of Helsinki Commission. It is a
profound honor for me today, as a representative of Lithuania,
to address the U.S. Congress here.
We are deeply grateful for America's steadfast partnership,
principled leadership, and enduring commitment to securing the
freedom of Lithuania and our region. Today, in my remarks, I
will focus on key elements of Lithuania's experience with
China's coercion. For Lithuania, economic security is not
theoretical. It is shaped by lived experience. When we restored
our independence in 1990, the Soviet Union responded with a
full economic blockade, cutting trade and energy supplies. That
experience taught us a lasting lesson: Dependence creates
vulnerabilities. Since then, we have deliberately reduced
strategic dependencies. We built LNG infrastructure,
diversified energy supply, and synchronized our grid with
continental Europe.
Today, 70 percent of our energy supplies come from United
States. For us, economic policy and national security are
inseparable. Both must serve and protect our core democratic
values, and the freedom to make independent political choices
without external coercion. This longstanding national approach
to economic security informed Lithuania's decision in 2021.
That year, Lithuania reassessed its economic engagement
frameworks and withdrew from China-led 17+1 format. Lithuania
also expanded economic and cultural engagement within its
existing one-China policy framework, including permitting the
establishment of a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius.
In response, China imposed unprecedented economic and
diplomatic coercion.
First, bilateral trade was targeted. Lithuania, as a
country, miraculously disappeared from China's customs systems.
Export permits were delayed or denied. Contracts were not
renewed. Then pressure escalated. Multinational companies were
warned that using Lithuanian components could jeopardize their
access to Chinese market. The impact was immediate. In the
first months, Lithuanian-origin exports to China fell by 99.7
percent, essentially to zero. This was not a commercial
dispute. It was a politically motivated pressure designed to
change a sovereign policy decision.
At the same time, China undertook unprecedented diplomatic
measures. It unilaterally downgraded diplomatic relations,
without Lithuania's consent, creating a false appearance of
mutual agreement. Our embassy staff was forced to surrender
accreditation and leave Beijing. Lithuania does not recognize
this downgrade, and we maintain our embassy. It continues to
exist. Consular access to detained Lithuanian nationals in
China has also been severely restricted, raising humanitarian
and legal concerns. Lithuania's case illustrates a broader
pattern of economic and diplomatic coercion used against
democratic states whose sovereign decisions do not align with
Beijing's preferences. Trade, supply chains, and diplomatic
status were weaponized altogether.
How did we respond? First, we acted through the European
Union. European Commission initiated WTO dispute settlement
proceedings. We appreciate the United States stepping up as a
third party in this. Our case accelerated adoption of EU anti-
coercion instrument, strengthening collective response
mechanisms. Second, we intensified coordination with partners,
especially the United States, in critical sectors such as
semiconductors, photonics, biotechnology, and defense
technologies. Third, we diversified rapidly. Lithuanian
exporters oriented toward trusted markets. In subsequent years,
namely last year, 89 percent of Lithuanian-origin exports went
to European Union, European Economic Area, OECD, NATO, and
Indo-Pacific countries.
By 2025, overall trade flows with China had recovered. The
structure of our exports, though, has changed. Only 1.2 percent
of exports are going to China, Belarus, and Russia. This
adjustment was not accidental. Together with diversification,
Lithuania strengthened its international resilience. Our
investment screening system, in place since 2001, was
reinforced and expanded. It has enabled Lithuania to take
concrete security decisions, including exclusion of high-risk
lenders such as Huawei from our 5G infrastructure. Monitoring
and mitigating strategic dependencies have become a permanent
element of our economic policy. At the same time, we led
international dialogue on economic coercion in OECD with
partners like European Union, the United States, Japan, and
other democracies, to share experience and strengthen
resilience.
Today, Lithuania remains committed to working closely with
the United States and other like-minded partners to strengthen
resilient and transparent supply chains among democracies. It
is worth mentioning here that Lithuania remains open to
dialogue, restoring diplomatic representation with China. We
believe that stable relations must be based on reciprocity,
respect, and adherence to international conventions.
Thank you so much. I am looking forward to your questions.
Representative Ellzey: Thank you, Vidmantas.
Okay. Well, we have been joined by a couple of our members,
Senator Ruben Gallego, who is a senator from Arizona. His time
is tight. He is a combat Marine who has also sacrificed. As I
see so many people out here who understand what the price of
freedom is, so does he. I leave it over to you.
STATEMENT OF RUBEN GALLEGO, U.S. SENATE, FROM ARIZONA
Senator Gallego: All right. Thank you, Chairman. Joe, good
to see you again, sir. Good to be back here on this side. Thank
you, Mr. Vidmantas. It has been great to work with Lithuania
and the other Baltic states on the Baltic Security Initiative,
and proud to continue that work.
You know, one of the things you hit upon is one of the
things I did here on the House side, which was 5G coordination.
What happened with 5G is by time, Europe, and to some degree
the United States, was slow to respond. Now we have a
significant share of 5G infrastructure across the continent
that still relies on Chinese vendors, despite, you know, the
presence of European firms that we trust also in the United
States, like Nokia. I am concerned that we might be repeating
that same mistake when it comes to 6G. Ms. Zeneli, I believe--
if I said that correctly, and I apologize if I did not--you
brought up a very good point about trying to have coordinated
action.
I guess one of the things I am trying to figure out is,
like, how do we do that? Because the best way for us to stop
the emergence of 6G Chinese dominance is for us to have
standards, European standards--or just, like, free world
standards, I would say, aligning with Japan, South Korea, so
that we have market dominance. That way, we actually can find
ourselves in a--we can find our allied tech backings have
market capability. How does that look? How would that look, in
your opinion? What can we do as countries to start doing that
kind of coordination in terms of, you know, market policy,
regulations, and things of that nature?
Secondarily, one of the things we saw with 5G last time
around was that we were able to convince, especially a lot of
our NATO and European Union allies, and other countries, near
allies. It was, you know, your emerging countries that were
willing to take on the cheaper, subsidized Huawei versus our
Western standards. What can we do? Can we set up a separate
fund that would help some of these developing countries to just
avoid the money trap, the honey trap that China always engages
in? This question could be for--really, for any--all three
here. I do think that, you know, us making sure that we do not
allow China to win the 6G war is going to be extremely
important for us in terms of continuing to have, you know,
democratic dominance in this world.
Thank you.
Ms. Zeneli: Well, thank you very much, Representative
Gallego. First of all, thank you for your service.
I think I fully agree with your point. I believe that at
this time of really growing international tension and rapid,
disruptive technological change, I think strengthening
transatlantic cooperation, but also with the partners in the
Indo-Pacific, is essential. Not only for security, but also for
technological and economic competitiveness, and the ability,
which is most important, of the democratic system to play a
leading role in global technological governance. It is about
the future of technological governance. I think, in this
context, closer coordination between the public and the private
sectors, not only between the governments, on both sides of the
Atlantic and with the Indo-Pacific partners, is increasingly
important.
The goal, I believe, is to promote shared policy
priorities, like you mentioned, and stronger partnerships,
including moving toward maybe a more integrated transatlantic
technological ecosystem. I could bring an example from Italy,
where I am based now. There is a new law which is called ``Buy
Transatlantic.'' It is focused on enhancing resilience,
actually, growth, security in the years ahead, really looking
at buying all the new technologies, focusing on countries--both
European Union countries but also the United States.
Now, what to do with countries that do not have the
resources, maybe, to buy--focus on buying cheaper energy? Like
Representative Ellzey mentioned, the no-strings-attached
approach, actually, we believe it's a ropes attached approach
for most of these countries. I think to disincentivize risky
tech partnerships, like with Huawei, in sensitive systems,
governments need a mix of clear rules--they have to be
national, but also European rules--economic incentives, and
allied coordination. First, countries should exclude, actually,
high-risk vendors from critical sectors, including government
communications--we have seen in some cases even the government
is using those risky technologies--lawful intercept systems,
and core infrastructure.
Second, transatlantic partners should align export
controls, I think it is important, and investment screening, so
companies cannot exploit the gaps that exist within the
European Union, but also within the transatlantic community.
Then, third, governments should offer incentives. They should
offer financial and industrial alternatives, helping allies
reducing those supply risky equipment, and diversify supply
chains. The future is really more coordination in the
transatlantic world.
Senator Gallego: Anyone else want to answer that? Yes, Mr.
Verbickas.
Mr. Verbickas: If I am allowed, shortly, like, I just have
to add something to the wonderful answer by Madam Zeneli. In
Lithuania, we heard such discussions about cheaper versus
secure. When we built up our LNG terminal in Klaipeda, we were
criticized for excessive spending, for very expensive
equipment, and decisions. Twelve years later, this project is
economically feasible. It is the same, like, we postponed--you
know, Lithuania was in advancement. It had to be the first
country in Europe to introduce 5G network, and we were the last
country to introduce 5G network, because of that, we forbid
Huawei to enter the market because of economic security
concerns and national security concerns.
Right today, our ICT development and our local businesses
are working with 5G networks and looking for solutions where
working can expand it. Lithuania is the best advocate for
transatlantic partnership and coordination here. We really need
to find a way to agree between European Union and United States
to work together on those issues--critical materials, energy
mix, energy security, advanced technologies, artificial
intelligence, SMRs, you name it. We have to work together here.
Thank you.
Senator Gallego: I apologize. I have to go pick up my
daughter from daycare. That is the real important thing.
[Laughs.] You know, in terms of--I think the easier thing is
the coordination. The harder thing is the funding, because we
are dealing with a lot of countries that have budgets that are
overrun. We are demanding our European partners to have--you
know, go up to five percent of GDP when it comes to their
defense spending, which I am not against either. How do we
create that international fund that is not going to necessarily
benefit Western Europe, Europe in general, but what about when
we are talking about countries like the Philippines, or Africa,
or South America, where they are going to have to make these
trade decisions between do I spend money here and try to stay
good with our Western partners, or do I take the cheap option?
I think that is something that we have to kind of think about
kind of globally as partners.
Thanks so much, guys. I will see you.
Representative Ellzey: You are welcome.
Thank you.
Now I would like to welcome Congressman Joe Wilson from
South Carolina, who is--you are going to have plenty of time,
Joe. We have got another forty-five minutes. I would like to--
Co-Chairman Wilson: Just one second.
Representative Ellsey: Go ahead.
Co-Chairman Wilson: Hey, before the senator leaves. Hey,
Senator, I want to say something nice about you. [Laughter.]
Okay.
Representative Ellzey: I said--
Co-Chairman Wilson: No, hey--
Representative Ellzey: I thought we were not going to do
that. [Laughter.]
STATEMENT OF JOE WILSON, CO-CHAIRMAN, U.S. HOUSE, FROM SOUTH
CAROLINA
Co-Chairman Wilson: No, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
commend Senator Gallego. He actually led a delegation to Kyiv
in December 2021. While we were there, we were meeting with the
military officials as they were planning for resistance, for
guerrilla warfare. The belief was that war criminal Putin would
roll over the people of Ukraine. Four years later, with the
encouragement of good people--bipartisan--can you believe
Republicans, Democrats, working together--indeed, working
together, supporting the people of Ukraine. Of course,
Lithuania has been so strong in supporting the people of
Ukraine. Over and over again, I just wanted to point out that
we can have bipartisanship, and we do. I appreciate Senator
Gallego's service on behalf of the American people.
Indeed, that was December 2021. The worst fears came forth
on February 24, 2022, when war criminal Putin, earlier in the
month, had met with President Xi Jinping in China. Together,
the two dictators embraced, declaring, quote, ``no limits
partnership.'' Then, later, clearly authorized by Beijing, the
war criminal Putin invaded Ukraine and launched a genocidal,
full-scale war, with full confidence that China was going to be
100 percent behind it. Putting that in mind, personally, I have
grown up with a great appreciation of the people of China. My
father served in India and China during World War II, in the
Flying Tigers and the 14th Air Force. As I was growing up, I
learned how hardworking the people of India and China are, and
my dad's service in Kunming, Chengdu, and Xi'an.
Then, sadly, 20 years ago, I actually met with President
Jiang Zemin in the Presidential compound in Beijing. When I was
introduced, Chairman Ellzey, as a Member of Congress, he
yawned. Then somebody said, `` Hey, Joe's the son of a Flying
Tiger.'' He threw his arms up in the air and announced, `` The
American military is revered in China.'' Sadly, that is not
where we are today. Indeed, Americans can be proud of what we
did to liberate China, and our appreciation for the people of
China, people of Taiwan, but understanding there is evil called
the Chinese Communist Party.
Since the full-scale invasion, cooperation between the
Chinese Communist Party and Russia has deepened. China steals
Western intellectual property, then provides Russia the
technology it depends on to murder Ukrainian families, just as
we see Khomeini has murdered Iranian families. Now he is gone.
China keeps war criminal Putin on life support by purchasing
Russian oil, coal, and natural gas. China is running
interference for Russia in international organizations,
ensuring that war criminal Putin and his army do not face
accountability for their sickening treatment of the Ukrainians.
China's patronage of Russia has also extended to
destabilize and control Europe. While the CCP's vision for
global dominance by 2049 is grander than the Kremlin's, Xi
Jinping still sees Russia spreading chaos and violence as
useful in weakening Europe and making it more malleable to its
vision. While Russian agents carry out arson attacks and
assassinations, Chinese agents conduct corporate espionage and
silence dissent by threatening and renditioning dissidents. War
criminal Putin's shadow war in the United States and Europe is
also for the Chinese Communist Party. The tactics each
dictatorship uses have been increasingly similar and more
sophisticated, and disturbingly, are aided by technology and
innovation.
This playbook has been on full display in the Republic of
Georgia. Bidzina Ivanishvili and his Georgian Dream
dictatorship have jailed nearly every opposition leader, defied
the Georgian people who want freedom and prosperity, not
Chinese debt trap diplomacy, as Russian oligarchy. Russia has
long been Bidzina's base of operations and source of wealth.
Since the Georgian Dream seized power through fraudulent
elections in 2024, China has been providing them much of the
surveillance technology, propaganda channels, and financial
backing needed to address and oppress the will of the pro-
American Georgian people. President Donald Trump has rightfully
prioritized Central Asia, the middle corridor. to secure and
diversify our supply chain. The Georgian Dream has essentially
given over the Georgian infrastructure to the Chinese Communist
Party and sold its country into debt slavery. American access
to the middle corridor is essentially controlled by the Chinese
Communist Party.
Dictators increase violent oppression when they are the
weakest. War criminal Putin has sacrificed over one million
Russians for roughly one percent of Ukrainian territories.
Ukrainians have been so successful in their efforts. Xi has
purged nearly all top military officials. Europe, accommodating
manipulative trade policy and gray zone attacks, will not stop
them. Much weakness will only empower them to grow bolder with
their aggression. Xi and war criminal Putin only understand the
language of strength. I urge European allies to look to lessons
learned from past economic integration and appeasement of
Russia. The unholy alliance between the Chinese Communist Party
and war criminal Putin must be met with complete resolve.
Lithuania is to be commended for its resolve on Taiwan. We
encourage them to continue their legacy of upholding the
democratic values of maintaining the name of the Taiwan
Representative Office. Indeed, Lithuania is appreciated for the
support of legitimate President Sviatlana [Tsikhanouskaya] of
Belarus, and supporting the courageous people of Ukraine,
successfully defeating war criminal Putin. Western Europe could
learn from our East European allies, and it is an extraordinary
day. I just left the floor to recognize the elimination of the
dictatorship in Tehran.
With Khomeini being removed, that is the last really
Russian ally in the Middle East, particularly if you add in
that Assad, the dictator of Syria, has actually moved to
Moscow. Now we have a government with President Ahmed al-Sharaa
that is reaching out to work. President Donald Trump is giving
Syria a chance, and, of course, another dictator gone is Maduro
of Venezuela. We can all hope and pray that one day, Lukashenko
of Belarus will join his fellow dictators relocating to Moscow.
With that, I yield back.
Representative Ellzey: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let us talk
about China-Russia cooperation real quick. I am going to
address this to Audrye. China and Russia seem to be using
similar gray zone tactics when attacking countries in Europe
and Asia, including subsea cable cutting, influence and
information manipulation campaigns, and airspace incursions. To
what extent are China and Russia's militaries and political
leadership directly collaborating on these types of attacks? Or
are they just copying each other?
Dr. Wong: Thank you, Representative Ellzey, for the
question.
I think we certainly see a high degree of alignment in
Chinese and Russian interests. This is not to say that, you
know, they do not have their disagreements. I think at times
they are wary of each other. By and large, I think China is--
you know, is aligned with Russian, and wants to see sort of
destabilization and weakening of democratic, free, and open
societies, including the United States and the European Union.
No. 1, you know, Representative Ellzey, you have outlined sort
of a range of tactics that they have been using. I think we see
a lot of synchronization, especially in the strategic
narratives that they are using on Russia's invasion of Ukraine,
and sort of amplifying, echoing a lot of disinformation that
Russian state media has been propagating.
I think we also see China sort of going beyond that, where
not only is it sort of amplifying and, you know, spreading
disinformation that is meant to sow discord and sort of expose
the fissures and sort of vulnerabilities in democratic
societies, I think China--in my work, I found that Chinese
state media is actively sort of trying to push the message of
what I call autocratic advantage. Sort of, you know,
highlighting the performance advantages of authoritarian
regimes. Not calling it, you know, autocracy, per se, but sort
of highlighting some of the benefits and advantages that, you
know, having a strongman in power has, and that centralization
of power affords for the people of a country.
I think in my research I found that actually has
significant impacts on how public--foreign publics globally
think about democracy and the degree of support for democracy.
I think we see an intersection where China is sort of not only
trying to shape the views of China itself, but also, I think,
fundamentally undermining, I think, support for democracy and
accelerating democratic backsliding.
Representative Ellzey: Thank you, Audrye. Anybody else want
to address that? Go ahead, Valbona.
Ms. Zeneli: Yes, sir. I think that China and Russia are
strange bedfellows. However, they have shared strategic
alignment. It is mainly to counter--in opposition to the United
States, in opposition to NATO, and that is very open in the
narrative when they repeat each other's narrative, but also to
the liberal international order more in general. I think what
the difference is between China and Russia is that Russia is a
revisionist nuclear power seeking to undermine NATO and destroy
the current international order, while China, which is the
primary long-term competitor of the United States, aims to
reshape--use the global institutions, and reshape and take
advantage of those institutions.
I think what is important, especially when it comes to the
European Union perspective also on China, which is the topic
also of conversation today, is that one of the main trends that
has changed perceptions in Europe has been really the support
that Beijing has given to Russia for its war in Ukraine. That
has raised awareness in the European Union about the security
challenges. China, at the same time, is a competitor, a
partner, but also a systemic rival. That part of the systemic
rival has increased of its importance, especially after the--
you know, the shattering of the security architecture of Europe
after the invasion of Ukraine. The no limits partnership has
strengthened that, but also the economic cooperation between
the two countries, because they need each other in the
current--in the current stage.
The Chinese officials have been very open that they would
like--they would not like Russia to go down, even in talks with
members from the European Commission. It is very, very clear.
We just need to be eye-opened and not to really apply sometimes
mirror imaging on things that we think do not make sense,
because they are very openly stating the obvious. Just in the
last--just in the last two years, they have met more than forty
times, President Xi and President Putin. That should tell us
something.
Representative Ellzey: Sure does. Thank you. Okay. I am
going to yield time to Chairman Wilson for five minutes of
questions. Go ahead, sir.
Co-Chairman Wilson: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Indeed, witnesses, thank you for being here today. It is just
so refreshing to have each of you here. I appreciate the
leadership of Chairman Ellzey today to keep things moving well.
With that in mind, Ms. Zeneli, Italy has become a shining
example of working in the European Union and NATO in great--you
better believe the current[Meloni] government is the longest-
serving out of 67 since World War II. What an incredible
tribute that is. Additionally, I have a personal interest. My
number-two son was a doctor in Naples in the U.S. Navy. I have
three grandchildren speak Italian perfectly, so our
relationship is so positive.
With that in mind, that is not true with other countries.
It is so sad to me that the success of Italy with the EU and
NATO, and then we have countries that are just weak, almost
complicit. Hungary. It is just the country that should have
inspired everyone from the 1956 revolution, now is bowing down
to the people who drove over patriots there, in Hungary, and
then Spain. Spain's decision last August to trust Huawei with
sensitive information, including judicial wiretaps, has
underscored the threat China still poses to a unified, secure,
and resilient transatlantic tech policy. How can we continue to
disincentivize such tech partnerships that threaten to create
hardware or train vulnerability to be exploited by the Chinese
Communist Party?
Ms. Zeneli: Thank you very much, Co-Chairman Wilson.
In Italy, under Prime Minister Meloni, the government has
recalibrated, actually, over the last four years, its China
policy by exiting the Belt and Road Initiative, which has been
one of the perfect examples of showing that, and strengthening
its alignment with the United States and the broader
transatlantic community. I emphasize that because, based on our
research at the Atlantic Council where we look at the current
trends and if the European Union is waking up to the China
challenge, what we have found out is that countries that have
closer relationship with the United States, they go--have been
going closer to the EU perception and to the EU policy on
China, which the European Commission has a very, very serious
policy on China.
Unfortunately, as I was explaining in my open remarks,
there are so many differences inside Europe, and that makes EU
policy very difficult. Some countries, such as Hungary, have
been the main recipients of foreign direct investment from
China. In 2024, the majority of foreign direct investment that
was arriving in the European Union actually went to Hungary,
with some investment in factories of electric vehicles and
other areas that have become really vulnerabilities also for a
European market, and the supply chains inside Europe.
Going back to Italy, I will mention a couple of points that
maybe should be a good example for other countries, what has
happened in recent years. It is, of course, you know this
blending of transatlantic loyalty, also with economic caution,
because China is an important market also for Italy. I believe
that should also be the guiding principle for other European
countries. Rome has strengthened its Golden Power investment
screening rules, so even going further, more deeply than the
European Union investment screening rules, and has blocked or
restricted acquisitions of, you know, strategic sectors, such
as in areas such as semiconductors, robotics, and also
telecommunication.
It has adopted the ``Buy Transatlantic,'' which is the way
to go, also for other countries' procurement approach that
prioritizes European Union member states and American
companies. It is--but also the third element, which is clearly
around democratic values, has raised concerns about human
rights. We do not see that, unfortunately, throughout the
European Union. That is why it is so difficult to have a united
policy in the European Union when it comes to China, because of
the diverging interests and also because of diverging interests
of the economic community in the European Union.
Co-Chairman Wilson: Indeed, follow the money. That is so
sad. I do not know many people who are aware of the level of
Chinese Communist Party investment with the government and
Hungary. Again, the last government that should be, because
they were the first to stand up to Soviet imperialism.
With that, I yield back. I will be happy to have other
questions later.
Representative Ellzey: Mr. Chairman, I am going to go ahead
and give you a couple more minutes. Keep going. It is just the
two of us. Let's have a conversation here. This is good stuff.
Co-Chairman Wilson: No, no, hey, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
See how--what a good chairman he is? It is amazing. People from
Texas are very bright.
Indeed, Mr. Verbickas, an example of success is the Baltic
republics. America should--Americans should know that in 1940,
when the Red Army occupied the Baltic Republics, the United
States never recognized the occupation. We never recognized
that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were happy Soviet
republics. They were not happy, and they were not Soviet
republics. They were independent countries. Then, once you
achieve your freedom in 1989 and 1990, it is exciting that the
three countries have just blossomed. What a contrast to the
Russian Federation. Then, equally significant, we learned
recently, Jake and I, that the economies of Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania, with Poland, are one and a half times the size
of the Russian Federation and growing much quicker. Hey, what
an example for the people of Russia, they can do better,
looking across the Neva River, and do better as the Baltic
republics.
With that in mind, which EU members have, from your point
of view, been the greatest allies in responding to China's
economic coercion? What of the greatest challenges that
Lithuania has had in working with EU cooperation to face the
challenge of the Chinese Communist Party?
Mr. Verbickas: Thank you. Thank you, Honorable Congressman,
for your kind words. Really appreciate all the United States
efforts and the Vilnius Summit declaration, and nonrecognition
of Lithuania and Baltics' occupation. I got a chance to serve
at the consulate in Chicago, where we have on our wall the old
sign of a Lithuanian consulate from pre-war period. We
appreciate that. To have our diplomatic missions, which never
ceased to work during the occupation period. This is very, very
cherishable moment for us.
Thank you for the question. Here, like, listening to what
my colleague said about European Union, we just have to
remember that if economic coercion for Lithuania, as I
mentioned in my statement, we saw it from the very, very
beginning in European Union's economic security strategy, which
was adopted in the year 2023, in June, with the first steps of
implementation next year. We can say that the understanding on
strategic rival-ship with China is in European Union. As you
rightly stated, this has a lot of angles, so internal
businesses, domestic investment, what was made of it? When we
withdraw from 17+1 Road and Belt Initiative, we have met a lot
of nonunderstanding from our partners what we are doing, why we
are doing, because it is easy money, as you told, follow the
money. We had that Klaipeda seaport, which China wanted to take
over, and incentives were on the table on big amounts.
Coming back, what do we see? There is a lot more
understanding within European Union. Renewed FDI screening
mechanism, which will be in force from January 1st next year.
Dual-use export control mechanism. Outbound investment control,
which none of those countries are keen to see in, but we even
see our like-minded partners within the states and economies,
like Netherlands, for instance, who understand that this is a
threat. This is a threat to lose their comparative advantages.
I will not be naming countries here, because we are 27 in the
same pool. We better work together. We better work together,
find ways to understand each other, to understand each other
even when we are talking about Hungary, right? What is
happening? Why is it happening? We better do that.
I will repeat transatlantic cooperation mentioned not once
here at our table. Again, we would consider as utmost
importance to have that mutual common understanding, to work
together on our strategic rivals, softly speaking, and to find
that connection. To find that connection and not to be afraid
of that cooperation.
Thank you.
Co-Chairman Wilson: Thank you very much. I would like to
point out, as you mentioned, about the location in Chicago, I
am sure that it is a real affirmation of the warm relationship
we have between Lithuania and the United States. I am sure that
the second-largest Lithuanian city after Vilnius is Chicago.
The second-largest Polish city in the world is Chicago. The
second-largest Bulgarian city in the world is Chicago.
[Laughs.] We all came together. Of course, I was celebrating
Bulgaria's National Day yesterday, so, hey, thank you.
Representative Ellzey: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Okay, I would like to take a little time here, because
Audrye's got a stop clock. I have seen you writing furiously. I
do not have a question for you. What is it you want to say over
the next couple of minutes? Because you are the expert here. I
can ask all the questions I want, but you have got some
thoughts on your mind, so go ahead and give us what they are.
Dr. Wong: Sure. Well, actually, it was sort of in response
to Chairman Wilson's, you know, question and comment about, you
know, which countries have been most susceptible to Chinese
influence, and which countries best respond. I sort of think,
taking a step back, I think, you know, it highlights the
importance of strengthening democratic resilience and ensuring
that institutions are strong. That there are checks and
balances in, you know, all these societies and these countries,
right, to ensure that there is transparency, awareness of what
China is doing. That there are enough, you know, stakeholders
that are able to push back, right, and not just let a dictator
or a strongman politician sort of be able to accept, you know,
corrupt deals and do what he wants with it.
I think, you know, in terms of looking forward, right, it
is, I think, you know, sort of, looking at each individual
country and trying to ensure that civil society, that, you
know, there is free and fair elections, all of these attributes
are key in allowing individual countries to be able to push
back against Chinese influence more broadly.
Representative Ellzey: Thank you. Okay, since you have just
got a few more minutes and my friend Marc Veasey from Texas, my
neighbor to the west, and north, and--he surrounds me--
[laughter]--and I would like to welcome him to the hearing
today. Marc, Audrye's got until 3:45. If you have some
questions for her, go ahead and ask them, and you have some
time.
STATEMENT OF MARC VEASEY, U.S. HOUSE, FROM TEXAS
Representative Veasey: I will. Anybody can answer them. I
wanted to ask, particularly as it relates to the supply chain
issues that we have talked about related to Greenland, what
sort of steps can the EU take to prevent China from gaining
leverage through infrastructure investment or resource access
when it comes to the issue around Greenland, and the critical
mineral supply chains? China already dominates those supply
chains. That is something that I am really concerned about.
Dr. Wong: I think some of my colleagues will have good
answers to that, but I will take a first shot. I think you
raise--you know, it is a very serious problem and question. I
think, you know, what we have been talking about, sort of the
importance of coordination and sort of combining, you know,
allies in Europe with allies in the Indo-Pacific, so sort of
thinking about Japan and South Korea and improving that
coordination to ensure that, you know, there is sort of
vertical integration of these supply chains, that at each step
we are not dependent on China for mining and extraction, for
processing for the technologies are required, right, to, you
know, transform these rare earth and critical minerals into the
strategic inputs for technology and other important sectors.
I think ensuring that there is strategic coordination at
the high levels. I think also putting, you know, your money
where your mouth is, right? That you are saying, here are
maybe, you know, some funds. You know, sort of everyone
pitching in and saying, here is how we can support, you know,
companies to invest in the whole supply chain. Not just, you
know, mining, but also the technologies to refine and process
rare earths, I think, is critical to, you know, diversify and
derisk and, you know, ensure that we're not dependent on China
for this at any stage.
Representative Veasey: Yes, no, absolutely. Ms. Zeneli, I
want to ask you, when President Trump and his efforts to want
to--or say, initially, I guess he has kind of walked back a
little bit, his efforts to want more influence in Greenland,
has that helped or hurt Chinese influence in Greenland?
Ms. Zeneli: Well, thank you very much, Congressman Veasey.
I would like to go a little bit back into the leverage that
the Chinese have, especially when it comes to Europe. Because
Europe depends 97 percent on Chinese rare earth and critical
inputs for its--you know, its technologies. It is a double-
edged sword, also for the fact that all those that are not
needed for more spending, more development in defense and
technologies for the European Union, are dependent on the
Chinese. That is why we have this dependence and leverage that
the Europeans have on China.
However, Europe has reacted. It has a Critical Mineral Act
recently. It has a procurement--a new procurement strategy that
the, you know, European companies will get together and also
work together toward those issues. When it comes to the
collaboration with the United States, I would like to point out
a very important thing that happened a couple of weeks ago.
Which was the critical mineral summit that took place in
Washington, DC, with participation of many European Union
members, but also allies from Indo-Pacific. Right after that,
there was also an action plan that was signed between the
United States, the European Union, and Japan to work together
on those critical minerals.
When it comes to Greenland, I would like to say that,
really, what is important, if we want to focus and really
counter the Chinese influence in the world, it is transatlantic
cooperation in all areas. Not only when it comes to China, but
also when it comes to trade between the United States and
European Union, when it comes to political alignment, so all
those issues are critical. That is the best thing that we can
do to strengthen our cooperation, work together, and understand
that the transatlantic economy is bound by foreign direct
investment, not so much trade. One point two trillion [dollars]
is the trade between the United States and Europe and dwarfs
any trade relations with China or other partners. It is 7.2
trillion [dollars] of foreign direct investment that supports
jobs on both sides of the Atlantic--15 million jobs that are
supported.
That is what we should not overlook, the importance of
transatlantic trade, but also what bonds us together, which is
values and the values-based and rules-based international
order. Working together, I think it is the best--it is the best
way to also counter Chinese influence.
Representative Veasey: Yes. Yes. Absolutely. I know that--I
know that somebody has to go. Jake, I think--who has to go?
Someone has to leave.
Representative Ellzey: Audrye has to leave. I guess she has
a hard stop at--we were told you had a hard stop. If you do
not, that is fine.
Representative Veasey: Okay. Well, this will be my last
one. What I very quickly wanted to ask is, what are EU
countries looking at as it relates to America and China? As it
relates to, like, Taiwan, Vietnam, and other countries in the
Pacific? Just watching that retrenchment and watching that
relationship, and watching everything unfold, what do you think
that EU countries are watching to see how America handles that
situation, that is much closer to China, obviously, from a
geographical standpoint?
Dr. Wong: Your questions are what lessons are--
Representative Veasey: What do you think the EU countries
are watching? Like, do you think that they are saying, okay--
because obviously, for instance, if we were to--if we were to,
you know, move further away from Taiwan, for instance, right,
or Japan, and they were left to have to defend themselves, or
even from a non-defense standpoint when it comes to trade. If
China becomes the predominant trade partner to some of the
countries that we have historically had closer relationships
with, what do you think EU countries are looking at to see how
all of that sort of unfolds with China, particularly with those
countries being closer neighbors to China?
Dr. Wong: Yes. I think there would--in that unfortunate
scenario, right, I think there would be a bandwagoning effect,
right? That is what you are saying. If the United States is not
going to support Taiwan, if it is retrenching from support for
its longstanding alliance relationships in Japan and Korea and
the Philippines, right, and given that, you know, in the past,
right, United States has articulated that Asia is an
important--and the Indo-Pacific is an important strategic
region for Washington and for U.S. interests, I think it would
send a very strong signal of sort of uncertainty, of U.S.
unreliability.
I think that has unfortunately been a very common theme or
fear, right, that has inhibited--I think, has affected U.S.
reputation. I think makes countries--you know, they may not
like China, but they feel, oh, we have no alternative because
China is providing the investments, or China is the important
trading partner. I sort of--I think security retrenchment,
accompanied by already--I think, already relatively weak U.S.
economic strategy in the Pacific, right, I think will have, you
know, brought ramifications for our perceptions of the U.S. as
a reliable and global leader.
Representative Veasey: Yes. Yes. Thank you. Thank you.
Representative Ellzey: Keep going, man.
Representative Veasey: No, no. [Laughs.] Not right now.
Representative Ellzey: Okay. Well, recent reporting
suggests that China stepped up espionage efforts in high-tech
firms and academic research centers focused on critical
emerging industries like AI. What steps should governments,
companies, and universities be taking to protect intellectual
property?
Valbona.
Ms. Zeneli: Thank you, sir. Unfortunately, not much is
being--I mean there are things that are being developed in
Europe, but this has been an area where we have not seen big
policies also coming from the European Union. Unfortunately,
what we are seeing now in Europe is that, until five years ago,
we mainly saw state-owned companies, Chinese state-owned
companies, investing in the European Union. Now we are seeing
more private companies with smaller investments, investments
that are not going into the screening mechanism. That is what
is very important. Right now, governments--there are some
governments, like Lithuania and some others, that are looking
deeper into that area, looking at research and development
institutes, looking at the Confucius Institutes. This is,
unfortunately, until now, this is not widely European, so we do
not have those standards that also countries can reach out and
understand and implement those into their--into their own
policies.
As I was mentioning at the beginning, this is another--this
is the most important area of future competition, the tech
competition. That is why we need to protect our, you know,
technologies. That does not mean that Europe and the United
States should not be open, because that is our biggest strength
that we have. However, we should protect and be--you know, be
safe from theft and from spillover of those technologies toward
our adversaries.
Representative Ellzey: Vidmantas.
Mr. Verbickas: If I may, I will back a little bit to the
question of Honourable Veasey, to combine with this one. What
does Europe do here? Europe, we think, is waking up, finally, a
little bit. Not so quick, we want to, as Lithuania, when we are
talking about, but let us see. Free trade agreement with
Mercosur negotiated more than 25 years. Free trade agreement
with India. Indo-Pacific strategy. Free trade agreement with
United Arab Emirates. Europe is looking for diversification in
all spheres. We do understand that those goods who are not
entering United States market from China, they are now trying
to flood European market. This is in all senses, for consumers
as well as for businesses and producers, and for technologies.
Now, this year, my colleague participated at New Delhi
artificial intelligence summit in India. A lot of European
representations this year. Two years ago, it was almost
nonexistent. We are sharing and talking about transatlantic
cooperation, but also there is that need to have that
diversification of businesses, diversification of technological
cooperation. Because, yes, of course, there are several
technologies, emerging technologies, which China is now
dominating, 19 out of 24. This is not good. We need to be back
a little bit here.
Thank you.
Representative Ellzey: Thank you. Thank you, Audrye. You
got one more? Go ahead, then I will make a closing statement as
we are wrapping up our time.
Representative Veasey: The one thing that I did want to
ask, I know you said that Europe is waking up. If Europe feels
like they need to have more of a trade policy or trade
agreement with China to fill some of the gaps that may be left
from the U.S. not being able to fill those needs, for whatever
reason, anymore, do you think that there are enough safeguards
in place? Like, for instance, you know, there has been a lot of
talk about a few years ago, I think--I cannot remember if it
was Airbus or if it was Boeing--but there was, like, an entire
plane that was basically, you know, stolen that the Chinese
replicated for their own use, to try to break up the duopoly
between Airbus and Boeing. Do you think that there is enough--
that European countries also, if they want to go into a newer--
if they want to go into these newer agreements, that they are
putting enough safeguards up to protect their countries from
Chinese being able to spy on their proprietary entities that
they have? Either one of you can answer.
Mr. Verbickas: I can repeat shortly what I have said
earlier about European Union introducing economic security
policy in 2023. Just three years ago. We have started to do
things we have been doing a long way ago, like Lithuania and
foreign direct investment screening since 2001.
Representative Veasey: Do you think you can do all of that,
though, and still have a robust trading partnership with China?
Is what I am trying to get at.
Mr. Verbickas: Ah, robust trade partnership with China does
not exist.
Representative Veasey: Yes. Okay.
Mr. Verbickas: So.
Ms. Zeneli: Well, Honorable, I would like to say that--
repeat here--that the EU has come a long way when it comes to
recognizing, you know, what China is doing, also seeing China
as a competitor too, and a rival. I would like to remind
everyone that back in 2012, when the 16+1 was established,
there was even optimistic view from the European Union, because
it was seen as a way to pump more money, more investment in a
Europe that was suffering from big financial economic crisis.
That was when the opening also for the Chinese big companies
was created in Europe, after the crisis, investment from China
went from less than one billion a year to forty billion a year
in 2016. That was when the opening was also created for the
Chinese companies that invested in Central and Eastern Europe,
but also in Southern Europe. That is the first point. The
European Union has come a long way.
For the very first time, I would like to repeat that the
European Union is linking economics with national security,
which was not part of the European vocabulary. However, there
are divisions inside the European Union. Even the fact that you
cannot put really in one sentence, though it is pragmatic
partner, competitor, and rival. That really shows that inside
the European Union, for 27 member states, there is something
for everyone. I would also like to remind that while this--
[inaudible]--was published by the European Commission in 2019,
the European Council only adopted that four years later, after
Russia's invasion of Ukraine. That raised awareness of
challenges from China.
On trade, I would like to say that in the last year, only
trade balance has increased of more than one hundred billion
between the European Union and China. It is creating--it is
creating issues and suffering for European companies. That is
the main issue, I believe, now that Europe and China have to
sit and really look at, you know, how this overcapacity, which
is pushed because of the internal problems inside the Chinese
economy, is then deployed to the European Union.
Representative Ellzey: Thank you, Marc.
Okay, in the last few minutes, I would like to just close
with a couple of thoughts. One, is the elephant in the room
right now is, there is a conflict going on with Iran. I am
trying to soak up everything I can in the news right now, like
everybody else is, about what is going on, what the end state
is, and what our goal is. I saw an article from my other
favorite group of people, from the Hudson Institute, Zineb
Riboua, wrote. ``The Iran Strike is All About China.'' It is a
remarkable article. If you have not had a chance to read it,
please do, but there is a theme. We are at the point now where
it has become understood by our friends across the world, those
who cherish freedom, those who value the freedoms that they
have gained, in many cases, just 30 years ago, just under a
generation ago, that none of these four countries--Iran,
Russia, China, and North Korea--are operating in a silo. When
we talk about Russia in the Middle East, or China in the Middle
East, it is not ``or; '' it is ``and.'' They are all working
together.
You have the former ayatollah, may he rot in hell. Genocide
of the Jews, genocide of his own people, 40,000 dead just a few
weeks ago. Genocide. Vladimir Putin, genocide of Ukrainians.
Genocide of Ukrainians. Not right. He sits at the end of the
table because he knows what's awaiting him down the road. Kim
Jong-un murdering his own people, starving his own people, up
to 50 warheads, giving his own daughter the remote control for
missile launches. Not right in the head. Xi Jinping. Genocide
of the Uyghurs. Purging of his top staff. A cult of
personality. They are all working together, just like they were
back in 1938 and 1940. You could argue, based on your
understanding of warfare, are we already in it? Is it already
number three, because of the economic warfare, the intellectual
property theft? I leave that up to somebody else to discuss.
I do like the direction that we are going now as a nation--
as a world of free nations, slowly getting back together.
Democracies and freedom-loving people like to avoid the idea
that there is evil in the world, but you cannot ignore it, and
it never goes away. It did not end after World War I. It did
not end after World War II, and it still exists. Unless it is
stomped on and put out of its misery, it never actually goes
away. Because it is an idea. With China, you know, my view of
all of this is a discussion of China and Russia and these other
countries, those other nations are the imperial guard for
Russia--for China. China is sitting on the throne of swords,
behind, just waiting. These are vassal states that it is using
and employed in dastardly ways to take complete control of the
world.
You know, the dollar is the reserve currency of the free
world--of the entire world. That is not what China wants. This
is about power and economic power. It is not going to be ruble.
It is not going to be the real. It is not going to be the North
Korean won. They want it to be the yuan. This is a godless,
sinister government that has no moral compass and is willing to
take lives for power. We need to recognize that as an
international community. The U.N. needs to get over being
feckless. They need to understand what exactly is at stake.
As I look out into this room, and as somebody who has to
shake hands for a living and meet people and understand what is
going on in their lives, every time I come to a Helsinki
Commission meeting, I look at the people in the crowd. No. 1,
they are always youthful. No. 2, I know that they are one
degree away from knowing somebody, or they themselves have
witnessed what it is like under tyrannical governments. I
notice that when I look out into the crowd, they are looking at
me as if they want me to look at them and understand, and look
into their eyes, the fear they feel from what these tyrannical
governments are capable of. I have gained a lot from just
watching the crowds in these--in these hearings. I am deeply
grateful for it.
I just want you to know that as you are looking and they
are asking, is the United States still involved? Are they still
watching out? Do they still care? Well, I tell you, all you
have to do is listen. Listen closely to Joe Wilson, who is a
very conservative Republican from South Carolina. who every day
wears that pin from Ukraine. Just listen to him. Nobody is--he
is not losing his seat because he supports Ukraine. He is not
losing his seat because he supports these countries, the
Baltics, the Nordics, those who understand what tyranny is
like. He is going to be around here for a long time, so am I,
so is Marc Veasey. We all work together. Do not buy into the
narrative of what you see in the media, because it is not news.
It is a narrative.
I tell you what, when I go to Lithuania, and I go to
Vilnius, the wonderful, happy people there, they are fantastic.
They are joyous. They sing once a year in a group of 10,000. It
is a remarkable thing to hear. Mention Russia and watch what
happens. You are not afraid of Russia. You are not afraid of
China. You, Israel, Ukraine, the leaders of the free world
right now, because you are willing to fight for what you
believe in.
Last, I will just say all is not dark. The horizon is
bright because the arc of the universe bends toward justice. I
think right now we are rapidly bending toward justice because
we understand. All of our heads are out of the sand, and we are
all united in that one belief that good must survive over evil.
I love associating with good people like Marc and you here on
our panel. I would like to thank all of you for being here,
attending, and spending some time with us today.
Thank you very much.
This meeting is adjourned. [Applause.]
[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the hearing ended.]
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