[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
.
[H.A.S.C. No. 119-30]
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES
IN THE GREATER
MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 10, 2025
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
64-360 WASHINGTON : 2026
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Nineteenth Congress
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice JOHN GARAMENDI, California
Chair DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
DON BACON, Nebraska JASON CROW, Colorado
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
RONNY JACKSON, Texas JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
PAT FALLON, Texas SARA JACOBS, California
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
NANCY MACE, South Carolina PATRICK RYAN, New York
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO,
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia Pennsylvania
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
CORY MILLS, Florida DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia GILBERT RAY CISNEROS JR.,
LANCE GOODEN, Texas California
CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana ERIC SORENSEN, Illinois
DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin MAGGIE GOODLANDER, New Hampshire
JOHN J. McGUIRE III, Virginia SARAH ELFRETH, Maryland
PAT HARRIGAN, North Carolina GEORGE WHITESIDES, California
MARK B. MESSMER, Indiana DEREK TRAN, California
DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas EUGENE SIMON VINDMAN, Virginia
JEFF CRANK, Colorado WESLEY BELL, Missouri
ABRAHAM J. HAMADEH, Arizona
Chris Vieson, Staff Director
Richard St. Onge, Professional Staff Member
William T. Johnson, Professional Staff Member
Reed Kessler, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Thompson, Katherine, Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary
of Defense International Security Affairs...................... 4
Kurilla, GEN Michael E., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command.... 6
Langley, Gen Michael E., USMC, Combatant Commander, United States
Africa Command................................................. 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Thompson, Katherine.......................................... 59
Kurilla, GEN Michael E....................................... 68
Langley, Gen Michael E....................................... 104
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Article submitted by Ms. Goodlander entitled ``Red Sea
passage remains a no-go for shipping despite U.S. action.'' 121
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Wilson................................................... 129
Ms. Stefanik................................................. 135
Mr. Scott.................................................... 131
Mr. Ryan..................................................... 141
Mr. Messmer.................................................. 143
Mr. Kelly.................................................... 137
Ms. Goodlander............................................... 142
Mr. Gooden................................................... 142
Mr. Crow..................................................... 139
Mr. Bell..................................................... 146
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE GREATER
MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, June 10, 2025.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [Chairman
of the Committee] presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Without objection, the chair reserves the right to declare
the committee in recess at any point.
Before we begin, I would like to remind those in the
audience that this hearing is open to the public, but actions
that disrupt or distract from the proceedings will not be
tolerated. The chair reserves the right to remove disruptive
persons from the hearing. U.S. Capitol Police are on hand to
assist with that task and I thank them for their service and
attendance.
Today, we continue our posture hearings with CENTCOM
[United States Central Command] and AFRICOM [United States
Africa Command]. As this will be both General Kurilla's and
General Langley's final appearance for this committee, I want
to thank you for your service to our nation. Both of you have
been exemplary in your roles and I want you to know you are
appreciated.
American deterrence in the Middle East and Africa eroded
under the last administration. The disastrous withdrawal from
Afghanistan emboldened our adversaries. The Biden
administration's appeasement of Iran only made matters worse.
After Hamas' barbaric onslaught, Iran opened a second front,
activating the Houthis to strike Israel and disrupt global
trade.
Since 2023, the Houthis have launched hundreds of attacks
on U.S. warships and commercial vessels. Yet, instead of
holding the Houthis accountable, the Biden administration
pulled them off the terror list.
Immediately upon taking office, President Trump set out to
restore peace through strength. He reinstated the maximum
pressure campaign on Iran and strengthened America's hand in
nuclear talks.
I strongly support his demand for Iran to permanently give
up its capacity to enrich uranium. Iran's nuclear program must
be dismantled for good but so must its proxy network.
Israel has taken decisive action against Hamas, Lebanese
Hezbollah, and other rogue actors that had been operating in
Assad's Syria. Thanks to Israel, what once seemed impossible is
becoming a reality. Iran's proxies are being destroyed.
The Trump administration is building on this momentum.
Nowhere is this clearer than in its response to the Houthis.
Under President Trump, the United States has hit back
decisively, but that threat is not gone. Recent reports
indicate Iran is buying materials from China for hundreds of
ballistic missiles. It is clear that Iran is determined to
rearm and resupply its proxies. So we must be equally
determined to stop them. This administration is right to
prioritize homeland security, but that mission begins well
beyond our borders.
We must stop terrorists abroad before they reach us. That
means denying terrorists a safe haven and for this U.S. forces
must be forward deployed. That is why I support the
Department's condition-based approach to rebalancing U.S.
forces in Syria. We cannot allow Syria to become a sanctuary
again for terrorists, Iran, or Russia.
The same applies for Africa. Al-Shabaab, ISIS [Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria], and Al Qaeda are all gaining ground
on that continent. Recent U.S. strikes in Somalia and across
Africa have disrupted their operations but that pressure must
continue.
Yet, AFRICOM is consistently under resourced. Even modest
increases in ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance] and security cooperation funding would go a
long way and empower our African partners to take on more of
the burden in the fight against terrorism.
We also must confront China's growing footprint on Africa.
The reality is that the threat China poses to the United States
extends well beyond the Indo-Pacific.
In Africa, Beijing is securing critical minerals and
building military infrastructure from Djibouti to West Africa.
If China secures a permanent naval base on Africa's Atlantic
coast it will threaten vital sea lanes and have serious
consequences for our ability to defend our homeland.
Russia is also deepening its presence across Africa. It is
trading arms and mercenaries for access to Africa's gold, oil,
and other resources. The resulting revenue is helping fund
Putin's malign activities worldwide.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how we can
continue to defend forward in CENTCOM and AFRICOM and ensure
the region's threats never reach the U.S. homeland.
And with that, I yield to my friend the ranking member for
any opening statement he may have.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that, and
I want to join you in our thank you's to our two military
witnesses today. They have served incredibly well for a long
time and sorry will not be seen before this committee. I don't
know if you share--if you will miss us as we miss you.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Smith. But we do appreciate your service. It is good to
have you back one more time. The degree of expertise that you
bring to these two very difficult regions is enormously helpful
to our committee but also to our country.
And I will agree with the chair--I think the region is
unbelievably unstable, both in CENTCOM and in Africa. The
chairman has a slightly more optimistic take on how things have
gone the last 6 months than I do. I think the instability is
still raging and it is still something we need to deal with.
Certainly, the war in Gaza goes on. The suffering there is
enormous. We need to get to a ceasefire as soon as possible.
There continues to be conflicts in the West Bank. We see in
Africa, and West Africa in particular, is a deeply concerning
situation, where terrorist offshoots are beginning to take over
more and more territory and threaten more and more countries.
Sudan's civil war continues to be a major destabilizing factor.
A war no one really pays much attention to continues to go on
between the DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo] and Rwanda,
with catastrophic consequences.
We have a lot of work to do in the region, even in Yemen.
Yes, it is good that the Houthis, for the moment, have said
that they are going to stop shooting at U.S. ships. But we
still don't have commercial shipping traffic feeling free to go
through the Red Sea.
So we still have a lot of work to do to get after all of
the instability in the region. I will agree with the chairman
that Iran is the primary driving force in that, without
question. You see their hand everywhere: Syria, Lebanon, Yemen,
Israel, Iraq. Getting an ability to contain that is crucially
important, and I actually think it is good that President Trump
is negotiating directly with Iran.
Now, my Republican colleagues would pretty much lose their
damn minds every time Biden even suggested that he might talk
to Iran. Sorry. So that particular hypocrisy grates a little
bit. But it is a good idea to try to have a conversation. I
think it is also crucially important in the negotiations that
we focus on their support for proxies. It is their support for
proxies that is the most destabilizing force in the region.
But we also need to work more closely with our Israeli
partners. I have an enormous amount of sympathy for the threats
that they face from Hamas, from Hezbollah, from Iran, and
others, but we need to find an alternative to Hamas. We need to
work with Palestinians to give us some sort of future beyond
Hamas.
Partners in the region--as you well know, Jordan, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, the UAE [United Arab Emirates] and others are
working with those Palestinian partners trying to generate that
and being rebuffed constantly by the Israeli government.
This war won't stop until Hamas is gone. I agree with that.
But Hamas won't be gone until there is some alternative for the
Palestinian people. I think it is really important that we step
up pressure to try to push those negotiations and show the
Palestinian people that they do have a future. If they don't
think they have a future it is going to be very difficult to
stop this conflict.
In Africa, I am very concerned about where that is going.
The terrorist groups, as I said, seem to be taking hold in a
number of countries. Russia has become more and more prominent
in the region.
They don't seem to be doing a particularly good job of
keeping the peace, but they are still very present and have
relationships with a number of countries. The path forward to
that is not clear to me. I will close with a note of agreement
with the chairman.
These regions matter. They lead to greater instability, and
when we talk about our primary concern being China, we must
understand that the challenge with China is global. Any notion
that we are going to pivot to Asia and, therefore, deal with
China and just ignore the rest of the world I think
fundamentally misunderstands what is happening.
As you gentlemen know, China is very active in Africa. They
are very active in the Middle East. Russia is as well. This is
a global challenge. These two regions are crucially important.
We need to be present, but we also need to work with partners
in the region to try to create greater stability in what is a
very challenging part of the world.
With that, I look forward to the testimony and the
questions and answers, and I yield back.
The Chairman. I would now like to introduce our witnesses.
First, we have Ms. Katherine Thompson. She is performing
the duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Affairs.
General Eric Kurilla is the commander of the United States
CENTCOM and General Michael Langley is the commander of United
States Africa.
Welcome to all of our witnesses.
Ms. Thompson, we will start with you. You are recognized
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF KATHERINE THOMPSON, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Ms. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Rogers,
Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the House Armed
Services Committee, thank you for inviting me today to testify
on our defense posture and policy in U.S. Central Command and
U.S. Africa Command, respectively. It is my honor to appear
alongside General Kurilla and General Langley.
The Department of Defense is reviewing our posture,
activities, and resources across all combatant commands,
including CENTCOM and AFRICOM, in line with President Trump's
America first priorities to make America safer, stronger, and
more prosperous.
In line with President Trump's peace through strength
framework, and under Secretary Hegseth's leadership, DOD
[Department of Defense] is putting core American interests
first in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs [area of responsibility]
to make America and our citizens more secure. America's core
national security interests in the CENTCOM AOR are to, one,
prevent and disrupt credible terrorist threats to the U.S.
homeland; two, deny Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon; and
three, support Israel's ability to defend itself.
State and non-state actors across the Middle East such as
ISIS, Iran, and its proxies continue to threaten the U.S.
homeland as well as our forces and posture across the region.
At the direction of the President the Department of Defense
maintains the forces and capabilities to defend against these
threats to our national security.
President Trump has already demonstrated his unrelenting
commitment to keep Americans safe by conducting operations
targeting Houthi terrorists in Yemen that successfully restored
freedom of navigation and American deterrence.
We will continue to work with our regional partners to
enable U.S. operations, coordinate on approaches to regional
challenges, and expand interoperability to address our shared
threats.
For example, our Iraqi security force partners now shoulder
the majority of operations against ISIS remnants, requiring
only a modest U.S. advisory role.
In addition, the historic package of $142 billion in
defense sales to Saudi Arabia, which Secretary Hegseth signed
last month in Riyadh, will help lock in another generation of
interoperability and burden sharing with critical regional
partners.
We will also continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with
Israel, a model ally for the region, as they defend against
threats from every direction. Secretary Hegseth has backed up
this commitment with action and has authorized the deployment
of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, missile
battery and its associated U.S. military crew to Israel.
In Africa, the most pressing security challenges include
potential threats to the U.S. homeland emanating from terrorist
activity as well as China's ambitions to expand its military
power projection capabilities via overseas basing naval access
as well as an ambition to establish dominance over critical
mineral resources on the continent that fund their defense
supply chains.
To address those security issues DOD has two priorities in
the AFRICOM AOR. One is to disrupt, degrade, and deny the
activities of Africa-based terrorist groups that have both the
capability and intent to strike the U.S. homeland or U.S.
personnel and facilities.
To this end, U.S. forces stand ready to engage and
neutralize terrorists through direct action. At the same time,
the department is working with African nations to grow their
operational independence and empower them to counter shared
threats.
At the same time, DOD will work to prevent and counter
efforts by China to position its own forces in the AFRICOM AOR
in ways that threaten our ability to defend the U.S. homeland
and deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific.
We will also work closely with interagency partners to
counter Chinese efforts to exclude the United States from
critical markets on the continent. DOD's largest force posture
location in Africa is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which hosts
3,300 DOD military personnel and civilians that support
AFRICOM, CENTCOM, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S.
Transportation Command operations.
This base, along with smaller, enduring locations, provides
support to contingency operations, episodic military-to-
military engagements, and crisis response.
To conclude, I want to emphasize the important role of
Congress in enabling the Department of Defense to achieve our
objectives in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM areas of responsibility.
Your support and funding have been and will continue to be
critical to advancing peace through strength.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the
Department of Defense, and we appreciate your continued support
to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Guardians, and
civilians who work every day to make the American people safer
and more secure.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Thompson can be found in the
Appendix on page 59.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Thompson.
General Kurilla, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL ERIK KURILLA, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND
General Kurilla. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify before you today.
I am joined today by Command Master Chief Fleet Derrick
Walters, the command senior enlisted leader of U.S. Central
Command.
Our partners have described the events of the last 20
months as a tectonic shift, an earthquake, one that began on 7
October 2023 and continued to produce aftershocks across the
region.
We have been at the brink of regional war several times.
Conflict was triggered in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, the Red
Sea, and Yemen. The region held its breath as Iran and Israel
traded blows in the first overt state on state attacks between
these two countries in their history.
At the same time, Tehran continued to increase their
stockpiles of uranium enriched to 60 percent for which there is
no civilian purpose, threatening catastrophic ramifications
across the region and beyond.
Global violent extremists exploited the turmoil wherever
possible to sustain their networks and regenerate capability.
This included in post-Assad Syria and the porous border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. We saw this threat actualized
multiple times throughout 2024 in high-profile attacks overseas
and attempted here at home.
However, from this disorder emerges opportunity. Iran is in
a weaker strategic position now than at any point in the past
40 years, though it maintains significant operational
capability.
Qasem Soleimani's vision of a Shi'a Crescent from Iran
through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon was shattered as the Syrian
regime collapsed and Assad fled to Russia.
Lebanese Hezbollah was decimated by Israel including the
death of many of their leaders who were implicated in the 1983
Beirut bombing that killed 241 American servicemembers.
This dealt a massive blow to Iran's terror network that has
targeted and killed U.S. personnel across the region for
decades.
The Houthis, Iran's new premier proxy, threatened the free
flow of commerce to a vital waterway and were met with a
sustained, deliberate, and focused campaign to re-establish
American freedom of navigation.
Terrorists are under pressure as CENTCOM's relentless
campaign against ISIS removed hundreds of fighters and leaders
from the battlefields in Iraq and Syria to include just 6 hours
ago.
Our network of partners dealt significant blows to the ISIS
Khorasan networks exploiting the tribal areas between
Afghanistan and Pakistan to include our Pakistani partners
bringing the terrorists behind the Abbey Gate bombing to
justice.
Finally, the reality of aligning with Russia and China was
laid bare as our partners across the region as they watched
Russia supporting Assad's atrocities against the Syrian people
and the Chinese Communist Party cynically exploit Iran-backed
violence in the Red Sea.
The United States now stands in a strategic window of
opportunity to secure its national interests in the central
region to protect the homeland, secure our economic prosperity,
establish freedom of navigation, and prevent a nuclear-armed
Iran.
CENTCOM's deep military-to-military partnerships have
proven a catalyst to these wide-ranging opportunities that now
lay before us.
Our relationships provide the foundation of the Middle East
Air Defense Initiative that defeated hundreds of Iranian
munitions and continues to set conditions for the rest of the
region's defense.
These relationships unleash our shared creative potential
in what has become a sandbox of experimentation, enabling us to
innovate together, develop rapid solutions to the entire joint
force.
Our partners are also on the front line in Iraq and Syria.
They remain crucial to the enduring defeat of ISIS, battling
the group across their respective countries as well as enabling
the repatriation of ISIS detainees and displaced persons.
The warfighters of U.S. Central Command, representing less
than 2 percent of the entire joint force, have been at the
forefront of these seismic events over the last year and often
on the front lines of conflict.
It was those warfighters who sprinted out of their bunkers
to fuel, arm, and fly their F-15s through a barrage of missiles
and UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle].
It was those warfighters who led the vanguard against
maritime terror in the Red Sea protecting the connective tissue
of the global economy and it was those warfighters who continue
to pursue and eliminate the remnants of ISIS wherever they are
to stop future attacks as far away from this homeland as
possible.
It is on their behalf--the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Guardians who serve this nation
on the front lines of freedom that I speak before you today. It
is the honor of my professional life to serve as their
commander.
As I close over 37 years of uniformed service to this
nation I would offer one final thought. I have spent most of my
adult life living, fighting, leading, and building partnerships
in the central region.
We have traditionally viewed the region as a risk to our
national interests, but as I depart, I would offer that there
has rarely been a time with greater opportunity to protect
those national interests than we have right now but only if we
have the courage to step through that window.
Thank you, and I do look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Kurilla can be found in
the Appendix on page 68.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General Kurilla.
General Langley, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL LANGLEY, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S.
AFRICA COMMAND
General Langley. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith,
distinguished committee members, it is an honor to appear here
today representing the outstanding servicemembers, civilians,
and families of the United States Africa Command.
As I get closer to the end of my tenure of command, I
remain in awe of the character and the capabilities of the men
and women willing to serve our nation. Our team of soldiers,
sailors, Marines, airmen, Guardian, and civilians perform
valiantly, and I am honored and proud to serve with them.
America remains in good hands. I am proud to testify with
my friend General Erik Kurilla, the commander of United States
Central Command, and my colleague Ms. Katherine Thompson from
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] policy. I would like
to extend my gratitude for their steadfast cooperation.
Now, ordinarily I would be joined by my command senior
enlisted leader Sergeant Major Michael Woods. However, as all
of our outstanding NCOs [Non-Commissioned Officer] do, Sergeant
Major Woods has chosen to put himself in the best position to
influence operations.
Today he is in Morocco for the Africa senior enlisted
leaders conference. Now, Morocco is a shining example of a
great return on our investment and their efforts in developing
the enlisted core across the continent is a crucial step in
African military professionalism.
I recently travelled to Morocco. I attended the African
Lion 2025. This exercise is the largest exercise with
participation of over 52 nations, 10 NATO allies, and 2 non-
NATO allies and over 10,000 soldiers participating.
I also just returned from Kenya where we jointly hosted the
African Chiefs of Defense Conference in Nairobi. This gathering
showcased the Kenyan Defense Force's commitment to fostering
military dialogue and demonstrated their leadership.
The insights drawn from that forum will help inform
AFRICOM's approach to hearing how our African partners are
solving challenges in their own neighborhoods and understanding
where they can shoulder more of the load.
Now, everything we do at the United States AFRICOM,
especially these types of partnerships, has an overarching goal
in mind, achieving peace through strength.
Now, this requires three things: a clear understanding of
national security threats, a robust and dependable network of
like-minded allies and partners, and appropriate resourcing to
match military requirements.
Now, as I have said in previous testimony, Africa remains a
nexus theater from which the United States cannot afford to
shift its gaze. It is home to terrorists who take advantage of
conditions in Africa to grow and export their ideology.
ISIS controls their global network from Somalia. It is
where the Chinese Communist Party actively works to change the
international rules-based order and establish regional hegemony
and it is where the Russian Federation seizes opportunities
created by chaos and instability.
Ladies and gentlemen, we must deter these nations and other
malign actors from their goals on the continent. Many of our
security and economic interests overlap with those of our
African and European partners.
Successful outcomes, enabled by burden-sharing, are
beneficial for all. As a posture-limited theater, we establish
strength and work towards peace by enhancing security
capabilities of our African partners.
Through our robust system of alliances, exercises, training
events, security cooperation, and foreign military sales
programs are the backbone of our military activities on the
continent.
Through these activities our forces lead by example with a
warrior ethos and stand by our partners and enhance trust in
the United States military. United States AFRICOM seeks to
match capabilities with current and emerging threats to ensure
the security of our forces while advancing American interests.
Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft,
crisis response forces, counter unmanned aerial systems
technology, and integrated air missile defense platforms are
critical resources to accomplish our mission.
I welcome your advocacy and ensuring that these necessary
tools are in AFRICOM's hands.
Ladies and gentlemen, I appreciate the opportunity to be
here today and I would like to close by thanking the committee
for your stalwart support during my tenure of command.
Our ability to accomplish the mission is always linked to
your advocacy and encouragement, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Langley can be found in
the Appendix on page 104.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General Langley.
The chair now recognizes himself for questions.
General Kurilla, Operation Rough Rider degraded Houthi
capabilities and took a target off U.S. commercial ships, but
they still keep hitting at Israel.
What more can the U.S. do to support Israel against the
Houthis and Iran's other terrorist proxies?
General Kurilla. So I would tell you right now that the
Iranian proxies are at one of the weakest levels they have been
with the decimation of--the disintegration of the Hezbollah
Hamas.
However, the Houthis--the biggest challenge with the
Houthis is they are being provided with Iranian weapons. They
provide the weapons and they assemble them inside of Yemen.
There are experts from the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps] that are inside of Yemen helping them to be able
to manufacture these systems as well. So this is going to be a
challenge, going forward.
We have got to stop the flow of the weapons into Yemen.
The Chairman. Thank you.
President Trump has made it clear that if Iran does not
permanently give up its nuclear enrichment military force by
the U.S. may be necessary. If the President directed, is
CENTCOM prepared to respond with overwhelming force to prevent
a nuclear-armed Iran?
General Kurilla. I have provided the Secretary of Defense
and the President a wide range of options.
The Chairman. I take that as a yes?
General Kurilla. Yes.
The Chairman. General Langley, your command was created in
2007 to address the shortcomings of the division of Africa
between CENTCOM, INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific
Command], and EUCOM [United States European Command]. Since
then, Africa's strategic importance has only grown with
transnational terrorism on the rise as well as China and Russia
working to undermine our interest on the continent.
Can you tell me, in your best military just judgment should
AFRICOM remain its own combatant command separate and apart
from EUCOM?
General Langley. Chairman, those statistics that you just
stated is more of a reason why AFRICOM needs to remain as a
overall command to be able to address these challenges.
Africa is a nexus theater for the great power competition
and then also with a number of violent extremist organizations
that are encroaching upon the continent. It is a threat. It is
a threat to our homeland and is a threat for our overall
national security and protection of our national interests.
The Chairman. I take that as a yes.
General Langley. Yes, Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes, and I fully agree with you. I made it
very clear publicly that I will vigorously oppose any effort to
consolidate AFRICOM into EUCOM.
As you heard in my opening statement, we need to be putting
more resources in AFRICOM to combat what China and Russia and
Iran are doing rather than looking at taking away attention and
resources.
General Kurilla, yesterday the ranking member and I
introduced the SPEED Act. It is our effort by this committee to
try to speed up acquisition of critical warfighting
capabilities to strengthen our defense industrial base.
What impact, if any, do you think this could have on our
ability to help our partners in CENTCOM?
General Kurilla. Thanks, Chairman.
I have not read the full Act but I do know that it is
trying to speed acquisition--change acquisition to get into the
hands of the warfighter. Anything we can do to fix what I think
is a very bureaucratic and slow process will help the
warfighter.
The Chairman. Is there something else that you would
suggest that we do to try--
General Kurilla. I think we need to start from scratch with
a blank piece of paper on the FMS [Foreign Military Sales]
process. We have had dozens of task forces to look at FMS and I
have not seen much change. It is one of the number-one
complaints that we get from our foreign partners, and we are 40
percent of the entire FMS projects in the region.
The Chairman. And if you had that blank sheet of paper and
you were writing it out tell me what you would do with it.
General Kurilla. Well, I think there are four levers that
control FMS. There is DOD. I think we have to fix some of our
own processes internal on these requests.
The Chairman. Such as?
General Kurilla. Well, I think we take--sometimes we take
months and up to a year. When someone says, I would like to
sell you Patriots and we go back and forth for a year that
should be days or weeks.
It then goes to the State Department. Candidly, that is not
where a lot of hold up is. I think this body of Congress there
can be holds up for whatever reason that we hold, we don't want
to sell a weapon system to a country and, candidly, the biggest
problem we have right now is with industry that they are not
putting the investments and capital into their production
lines.
The biggest thing I think Congress can help with is multi-
year funding that would be able--if you are a business and you
say, I am only going to get funded 1 year, they are not going
to want to put the capital into those production lines.
I thank you for what you have done with some of the 2-year
funding but I think it needs to be multi-year funding so that
we can get these production lines up.
And I think we ought to look at our partners that are
offering to also produce inside the region. Sorry for the long
response.
The Chairman. Well, I think that last point especially
would be very helpful and I think I speak for this committee
when I say we are open to that idea. I hope that when you
testify before the appropriators you tell them the same thing.
With that, I yield to the ranking member for any questions
he may have.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
With regard to Iran and their nuclear program, without
getting into the more classified discussion about what Israel
might do on their own, if Israel were to act on their own and
attack Iran what implications would that have for our force
protection in your region and what should we be doing to try to
put ourselves in a position to protect against that?
General Kurilla. I think it would increase risk to our
forces in the region. But every day we are making assessments
of our posture and our risk to forces and we make adjustments
based on those.
We are fielding new systems and new equipment and making
adjustments every single day. We have a rule in CENTCOM--you
improve your foxhole every single day, whether that is through
rehearsals or any other actions that you are taking to better
protect our forces.
Mr. Smith. And what are the systems that you think are
working best? If we were to, you know, throw money at you and
say, here is what you need right now that could best put you in
a better position to protect your forces what systems would you
ask for?
General Kurilla. So counter-UAS [Unmanned Aircraft Systems]
is the number-one thing. We have a revolution in warfare. The
character of warfare is changing with the drone revolution and
unmanned systems.
We see that in Ukraine. We saw that with the Houthis and we
see that even in Iraq and Syria. The number-one challenge out
there is detect. It is the ability to detect the counter-UAS
systems and to defeat the swarms and I think anything we can do
in the air defense world.
You know, we went back to the FMS. You know, we ought to
ask ourselves the question why does a THAAD [Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense] missile cost three times as much as an
Arrow that is jointly developed between the U.S. and Israel and
the Missile Defense Agency. Why is an SM-3 [Standard Missile-3]
Block IIB six times more expensive than an Arrow missile with,
roughly, the same capabilities.
Mr. Smith. In Syria what is your--and I realize there is a
huge diplomatic piece of this but you are a diplomat as well as
well as a warrior--can you give us an update on where you see
the Syrian government?
Obviously, it is crucial that that government stabilize and
block Iran and Russia from getting back in. What can we most do
to help that and where do you see it at right now?
General Kurilla. I think what the President did with
talking about lifting some of the sanctions that is going to
allow other countries to come in and bring some of the
investments. That is one of the things that is desperately
needed is the investments back into the country.
We are working directly right now with the Syrian
Democratic Forces, our Kurdish partners and Arab partners on
the ground going after the ISIS to get them to integrate in
with the new Syrian government.
Turkiye has played a very positive role in that. That is a
big piece for the stability in terms of that. I think they got
to figure out how to run all of the administration of their
country. They have a few people that are running the country
right now.
I am very concerned with the stability but I think the fact
that we are at the table now having those discussions the
upside is great. The downside is very low to being at the
table.
Mr. Smith. How important is our troop presence in Syria to
helping facilitate that process and continue to keep ISIS at
bay?
General Kurilla. So our purpose for being in Syria is for
the de-ISIS fight. We literally took a strike this morning on
an external operations leader from Central Asia up in northwest
Syria.
We are still waiting for the full results of that. That is
what our forces do inside of Syria. We have made some
adjustments, some consolidation of bases based on the fall of
Assad. Right now we are making an assessment, going forward, of
what other bases. It is all conditions based.
But I will make my recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense and the President. But right now, the guidance to me
has been given to right now make an assessment on any other
adjustments that we need to make in our posture.
Mr. Smith. General Langley, there is a lot of concerning
aspects to Africa but West Africa right now seems to be the
most concerning. I mean, the most capable terrorist
organization is, you know, gaining influence in multiple
countries and threatening others.
We don't have much of a presence there. What would be your
recommendation in terms of how we contain that threat that is
growing out of West Africa?
General Langley. Ranking Member, I would say, you know,
since we moved out of Niger, we had to reset our CT
[counterterrorism] strategy and that is further engagement,
especially with the coastal West Africa countries who are
building capabilities and capacities to deter and a number of
countries it is working.
But JNIM [Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin], which is
AQIM [Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], and also ISIS-Sahel are
really starting to get their footing and effective cells across
the AES [Alliance of Sahel States] countries of Niger, Mali,
and Burkina Faso. I think that just collaboration with our
partners and increasing institutional capacity for an enduring
solution against those aforementioned VEOs [Violent Extremist
Organizations].
To do that it takes a whole-of-government approach. Not so
much our whole-of-government, but their whole-of-government,
and we need to invest in that.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Arizona, Mr. Hamadeh, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hamadeh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Generals, for your leadership and your service for our country.
And as a former Army Reserve intelligence officer who
served in the Middle East, it is incredible to see President
Trump's bold vision and a Middle East defined by, quote,
commerce, not chaos.
Now, those words are now backed by decisive actions that
nobody dreamed possible. President Trump changed Syria's path
overnight from endless bloodshed towards hope. There is a lot
of optimism right there, and I know Ambassador Tom Barrack and
Presidential Envoy Barrack is doing an incredible job in Syria
hitting the ground running. I don't know--he has a lot of
flights back and forth from Ankara to Damascus.
General Kurilla, I know there are so many questions about
Syria's transition and after coming off of a 50-year Assad rule
and ISIS mostly defeated, and I know you helped with the--you
just talked about it briefly, with the agreement between
integrating the Syrian Kurdish forces with the government
forces of Syria, how is that integration actually going?
General Kurilla. I would tell you it is actually going well
right now. There are some sticking points, but what is
happening is you have--the Syrian Kurds are talking directly to
Al-Sharaa and the Syrian government right now. Turkiye has
played a positive role in that as well but I think we are on a
good path right now.
Mr. Hamadeh. And do you envision that integration could
also include other minority militia like the Druze or the
Christians or Alawites in Syria?
General Kurilla. It could. Right now, though, I mean, we
are focused on our partner that we have right now up in the
northeast and that is the Kurds.
Mr. Hamadeh. Very good. And our counter ISIS train and
equip fund which helped the Syrian Kurds destroy ISIS could be
wrapping up. Now, can or should the train and equip shift to
include Syria's forces?
General Kurilla. I think that would have to be a wait and
see. I think the fact that we are at the table right now having
this discussion and that will allow U.S. to make an assessment
of that if that would be a wise choice.
Mr. Hamadeh. And how concerned are you about the foreign
fighters possibly being integrated within the Syrian Armed
Forces?
General Kurilla. That is the reason we have to take a wait
and see on this.
Mr. Hamadeh. And are they integrating them right now?
General Kurilla. So right now--I mean, if you remember,
these are some of the people that brought Sharaa into power.
They are integrated into some portions of the government, and
this is something that we have to make an assessment on.
Mr. Hamadeh. Very good.
Now, shifting toward Iraq where the same train-and-equip
fund is also used in Iraq, but why are we subsidizing Iraq
currently when it is withholding public salaries and military
equipment from our Kurdish allies up north?
General Kurilla. They have challenges. Every now and then
we end up working through them. They end up getting the
salaries. They end up getting the equipment. There is always
small frictions that we have to work through, but they are
getting what they need.
Mr. Hamadeh. Sure. And Iran's stronghold within Iraq is
that presence increasing even despite all of the setbacks that
Iran has been facing the last few months?
General Kurilla. I think Iran is trying to double down on
getting a grip inside of Iraq, but I think Iraq is a sovereign
nation and they don't want to be a vassal state of Iran.
Mr. Hamadeh. Of course, although there is a lot of Iranian
militias currently still operating Iraq. I know they are
holding a hostage, Elizabeth Tsurkov, that we want released as
well.
But how do you envision us pulling Iraq from Iran's
stronghold?
General Kurilla. It is a challenge because it is their
next-door neighbor. We partner at the military level with the
Iraqi Security Forces to go after ISIS. They are doing actually
a very good job in terms of going after ISIS.
We killed the number-two ISIS--global number-two ISIS Abu
Khadijah out in the Anbar with the assistance of the Iraqis.
So I think from a military-to-military standpoint they
understand the need and why they want to have a relationship
with the West. There are a lot of other reasons at the State
Department level on why we want to have a relationship with
Iraq. A stable Iraq helps with a stable Middle East.
Mr. Hamadeh. Thank you, General.
And shifting to AFRICOM, General Langley, I know you have a
lot of positive things to say about Morocco, and I do as well,
as they were the first country to recognize the United States'
independence and it seems like their alliance is increasing
with us.
Do you ever envision moving the headquarters of AFRICOM
from Germany to an African partner country like Morocco?
General Langley. Congressman, thanks for that question.
And as I look at it from the operational perspective, cost
benefit analysis, the benefit of moving to Morocco would not
exceed the cost.
The benefit operationally of us being able to operate from
Stuttgart headquarters onto it does not benefit an amount. The
cost of moving the headquarters would be a big dent to our
budget.
So I would say from a cost analysis perspective I think we
are advantageous of where we are right now. When we look at the
overall costs, we would not be benefiting from moving our
headquarters onto the African continent writ large.
But let me just say Morocco is a great partner and what
they do in exporting security is tremendous, especially in the
sub-Saharan countries.
Mr. Hamadeh. Very good.
Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Missouri, Mr. Bell.
Mr. Bell. Matthew 20:16, so the last shall be first and the
first shall be last.
Representative Wilson and Courtney, if you need any tips on
how to maximize your time, Rep. Hamadeh and myself are experts
in this particular committee.
I want to thank you to the chair, to our ranking member, to
our witnesses as well as the servicemembers I see behind you
for your service as well.
My district in the greater St. Louis region is home to the
production of some of the most advanced fighter aircraft in the
world, including many that CENTCOM has used in recent
operations such as intercepting incoming Iranian drones and
missiles that targeted Israel and our regional allies.
While I am proud to represent a region that contributes so
significantly to our national defense, I must also acknowledge
that many of my constituents are still struggling to recover
from the most disaster--the most devastating natural disaster
to impact our state since the late 1950s.
But as a region we will recover, and we are committed to
build and support our domestic industrial base that is crucial
to our national security. But what is not crucial to our
national security is turning our backs on our allies like we
have seen from the administration and cutting essential foreign
assistance programs that go hand in hand with our efforts to
promote strong U.S. global leadership.
China and Russia have made significant military and
economic inroads across the African continent, posing serious
implications for U.S. strategic interests.
At the same time, the Trump administration, under the guise
of pursuing efficiency, has slashed funding for global
development and humanitarian programs.
These cuts have in practice created greater inefficiencies
and undermined U.S. influence abroad.
General Langley, how does U.S. economic aid--how does U.S.
economic and humanitarian engagement on the continent
contribute to advancing AFRICOM military objectives,
particularly when it comes to countering the destabilizing
influence of Russia and China?
General Langley. Congressman, thanks for that question, and
I will just go back on the operations, especially the
operations that we do in Somalia.
So when we support the Somali National Army, as they have
gone through numerous phases to the liberation phase of
significant regions across Somalia they are getting into phase
four and some of the capabilities that--outside of the kinetics
and military operations where they were able to stabilize the
region.
So we are at a point now looking forward to what worked as
far as aid in the past, but this is where the Secretary has
charged me with engaging other countries of a shared burden, a
shared burden on looking at contributing countries, not only
troop contributing but also in a phase four operation which is
stabilization.
So those discussions are taking place at a higher level--at
the policy level and engagement with other countries so that we
can focus--laser focus on countering terrorism and shared
burden with other countries to able to take up that void.
Over.
Mr. Bell. And since Hamas' October 7th terrorist attack
against Israel, one notable development has been the
strengthening of military and security partnerships between
Israel and its Arab neighbors, especially evident during the
two Iranian missile and drone attacks last year.
This growing security cooperation has shown potential in
laying the groundwork for peace, and to the ranking member's
point we endeavor to see a future for Palestine beyond Hamas.
So, General Kurilla, from a security perspective how can
enhanced cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security
forces or broader regional security coordination help establish
a foundation for long-term peace and stability?
General Kurilla. Great question, Congressman.
There has to be--Hamas cannot be in charge. There has to be
an alternative to Hamas. I think that is some form of a
Palestinian governance. I think the regional partners can work
with Israel to figure out what that is and with the Palestinian
people.
Mr. Bell. For almost 20 months, the Iranian-backed Houthis
have wreaked havoc across the region, causing significant
instability. The administration recently announced an agreement
to cease all operations against the Houthis in exchange for a
halt in their attacks on U.S. ships.
I will submit my question, but I want to talk about how
this agreement excludes our regional allies and the
implications of that.
I yield back my time.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr.
Messmer.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, and thank you to
the witnesses for being here today.
General Kurilla, I couldn't agree with you more that FMS
reform is needed and we just have to do better in that regard.
In addition to reforming the FMS and DCS [Direct Commercial
Sales] process, would you also agree with the need to reform or
eliminate other non-treaty agreements that inhibit our ability
to work with our allies and partners such as missile-to-missile
technology control regime?
General Kurilla. Can you say the question again, please,
Congressman?
Mr. Messmer. Yes. How could--other than FMS and the DCS
process, would you agree that we need to reform or eliminate
other non-treaty agreements that inhibit our ability to work
with our allies and partners such as missile technology control
regimes?
General Kurilla. I think we should find those partners in
the region that can--that we know can safeguard the
technologies and we should work with them.
We have several in the region that have offered up to say
they would like to help produce. That is where we need help is
the production line right now and I think that is something we
should strongly look at.
Mr. Messmer. Okay, thank you.
Also, I would like to acknowledge the professionalism of
our forces who have conducted operations in the Red Sea. But I
am wondering what work needs to be done on the policy end with
our regional allies and within our own interagency to devise a
successful strategy against Yemen both that deters their
destabilizing military actions of the Houthis and coerce them
into making their closure of the Red Sea politically untenable
in the region.
General Kurilla. Is that to me or--
Mr. Messmer. To you.
General Kurilla. So I think from a--well, I will defer to
policy first for any policy question. Then I will take it.
Mr. Messmer. Okay.
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
I would just highlight two things. First, with the
conclusion of Operation Rough Rider we are not, certainly, in a
position where we are ending our entire engagement regarding
the Houthi problem set.
The Houthis are still under a foreign terrorist
organization designation and we are still pursuing a whole of
government approach, which obviously includes other interagency
elements to tackle this problem set.
And then I would just highlight some of the comments that
you made just a moment ago, which is this will--the longer-term
problem set for Yemen and the Houthis writ large really is
something that in our relationships with Saudi Arabia, UAE,
Qatar, and our other Gulf partners this is something where we
will look to burden-share this effort and really develop a
regional solution that empowers our Gulf partners that we have
continued to develop a deeper defense partnership with to
tackle the long-term elements of the problem set.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you.
General Kurilla, I also have concerns about the long-term
stability and strategic implications of using high-end
platforms and munitions like the B-2 bomber, JASSM [Joint Air-
to-Surface Standoff Missile], and Tomahawk cruise missiles
against supposedly unsophisticated adversaries like the
Houthis.
Has the use of these platforms and the rapid proliferation
of adversarial drones led to more consideration toward the
effectiveness of directed energy technologies encountering
these platforms?
General Kurilla. Yeah, we absolutely need to be putting
more work into directed energy high-powered microwave.
I think some of the innovations that have come out of this
since Operation Rough Rider about 40 percent of the drones shot
down were shot down by something called Advanced Precision
Weapon Kill System, a laser-guided 2.75-inch rocket fired off
our F-16s or F-15s.
That is a $25,000 munition going against a, roughly,
$50,000 or $100,000 drone that is an Iranian provided drone to
the Houthis.
Mr. Messmer. Excellent. So what role can our defense
industrial base play in advancing directed energy solutions to
ensure CENTCOM can maintain their technological advantage?
General Kurilla. Well, I would compliment someone like
General Randy George and his Army Transformation Initiative. He
is sending things over once they reach a technology readiness
level to a certain level. He has sent over directed energy,
mobile, short-range air defense.
We brought it into the theater. We tested it in the
harshest conditions you can find, against an active enemy and a
thinking enemy, and we provided feedback on its effectiveness
to make it better so they can make a better-informed decision
on that.
We have the same with high-powered microwave. We are doing
things with software. Software is a weapon as well and rapidly
changing this. The warfare--the character of warfare has
changed with the drone revolution and that is what we need to
be paying attention to.
Mr. Messmer. Okay, thank you.
Also, how would you assess the performance of Israel's
missile defense architecture during recent fighting,
particularly systems like David's Sling and Arrow that we co-
produced?
General Kurilla. So I would tell you that the missile
defense--out of the 300-plus missiles that were fired into
Israel, one person was killed, a Palestinian from Gaza who was
living in Jericho.
Mr. Messmer. Okay, thank you.
Has the attack highlighted any gaps in our budget requiring
additional resources from Congress?
General Kurilla. I think we need to figure out how we also
produce--I go back to my comment why does a THAAD cost three
times as much as an Arrow, why does an SM-2 Block--SM-3 Block
IIB cost six times as much? We have got to figure that out
because we are on the wrong side of the cost curve.
Mr. Messmer. Very good. Congress has appropriated those--
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Vindman.
Mr. Vindman. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to all the
witnesses. And General Kurilla and General Langley, thank you
for your decades of uniformed service.
I want to thank you, General Langley, for these great
placemats. I mean, it is a fantastic graphic depiction of why
Africa is so important to our national security now and into
the future, and in particular the things that I have sort of
honed in on is the fact that it is the--11 of the 20 fastest
growing economies in the world are in Africa.
25 percent of the 193 countries in the General Assembly of
the UN [United Nations] hold seats in Africa, and the rare
earths is probably maybe even more interesting in how much
China controls here.
So in this context--in this sort of geopolitical context,
when we look at all the elements of power we have diplomatic
information, military, economic, and I know there are various
iterations of this.
Ms. Thompson, you emphasize the importance of countering
China's influence in Africa. However, this week the House is
voting on a rescission package that cuts $3.7 billion in soft
power--for example, hundreds of millions in cuts to PEPFAR [the
U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief], a program
started by George W. Bush.
Forgetting the more than 25 million lives saved by PEPFAR
since the program started in 2003, there is no question that
there has been--that this has been an effective program in
extending America's power and influence.
This has made us safer and boosted our national security,
and in the testimony that DOD sent over for today's briefing it
said, unfortunately, the CCP [Chinese Communist Party]
information manipulation is significantly outpacing our efforts
to counter their campaigns.
Unchecked, China's efforts could reshape the information
landscape in Africa creating biases and gaps that could lead
African nations to make decisions to subordinate economic and
security interests to China's own.
So my question is given sort of the withdrawal that we have
seen this administration take in the information environment
and communicating through, you know, Voice of America and other
entities that are specifically focused on Africa and in
withdrawal of these critical soft power programs, are we more
or less in a position to make sure that our military objectives
are achieved?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
I can't speak explicitly to the State Department equities
in this, particularly the humanitarian aid that you speak
about.
However, I will say, from a Title 10 DOD perspective,
obviously, the department has--
Mr. Vindman. I am sorry. Let me stop you for a second. I am
talking about, like, sort of these elements of power, all
right, and there is a balance to these, right?
So by withdrawing from the informational--from the economic
elements does that make achieving the military objectives more
or less difficult?
Ms. Thompson. I appreciate the question, sir.
What I would say from a DOD perspective, thinking
exclusively about the Title 10 assistance that we provide
particularly on the continent, that is part of our review
process is understanding how our military--
Mr. Vindman. Let me--let me pause you right there.
General Langley, same question to you. Does this make
achieving the military objectives more or less difficult?
General Langley. Especially in the MISO [Military
Information Support Operations]: As far as our information
operations, countering some of the propaganda that the CCP is
putting out there, yes, that is where we need to be able to
confront them because we had a lot of success in the past, and
even going forward Secretary Hegseth has given us the tools to
press back on the CCP. We were--
Mr. Vindman. So thank you, General Langley. I heard yes,
which I think is the short answer to the question and I just
wanted a--
General Langley. Yes. There are things that we need to
counter them, going forward.
Mr. Vindman. Thank you.
Switching gears to the Houthis, General Kurilla, over the
last few months we spent over a billion dollars attacking the
Houthis in our campaign. Can you evaluate whether we have
disrupted, neutralized, destroyed their capabilities?
General Kurilla. So the President gave us a very specific
mission, which was to get the Houthis to quit shooting at
American ships. 6 months ago on 12 November 2024 was the last
time a destroyer went through the Bab Al-Mandab.
It was attacked 17 times with anti-ship ballistic missiles
and anti-ship cruise missiles and UAVs. In the last week we
have put four destroyers back through the Bab Al-Mandab and we
were not shot at.
Mr. Vindman. Okay. I got that. They are not attacking U.S.
shipping. Are they still attacking Israel, yes or no?
General Kurilla. They are still attacking Israel and we are
still defending Israel with our THAAD system.
Mr. Vindman. Thank you. So--
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. McGuire, you are now recognized for 5 minutes, sir.
Mr. McGuire. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you to our witnesses and to all of our military folks here. We
wouldn't have a country without you. Thank you.
Ms. Thompson, we really appreciate what you are doing in
this administration with peace through strength. I think we all
agree you have to have strong American leadership in the world
or you have a lot of problems.
How has the President's outreach to the new government in
Syria encouraged a good outcome for our Kurdish partners and
the Syrian Democratic Forces?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman, and
I would highlight the President's speech in Riyadh in
particular, this idea that the Middle East region is
transitioning from chaos to a region focused on commerce and
empowerment.
I think that this is an incredible good news story. When it
comes to the conversation around Syria we are giving the Syrian
government a chance at stability, if it holds in Syria, will be
monumental for the region and it is something that the
administration is really leaning forward on as a whole of
government effort.
Obviously, it is conditions-based and we will be very
careful as we watch the development, but it is a really
positive good-news story that further underscores that the
region is really transitioning from this region of chaos into a
region focused on prosperity.
Mr. McGuire. Thank you.
Ms. Thompson, since President Trump took office have
counterterrorism operations remained static or has there been
an increase in operations in Somalia that have removed a number
of terrorists from the battlefield?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question.
I will defer to General Langley on any additional
operational comments, but I would say yes, the Somalia elements
that you highlight, the increase in precision targeting in
Somalia to take out terrorists who specifically pose a threat
to the U.S. homeland, demonstrating the capability and intent
to carry out operations against the U.S. homeland, our forces
and our people is an incredible success as part of this
administration's effort.
Obviously, countering terrorism and protecting the homeland
is one of our number-one national security objectives and I
think that the activities in Somalia since day one really do
highlight the capabilities that we have.
And so I would offer General Langley the opportunity for
any operational comments.
General Langley. Thanks, Congressman, for the question.
And I would say that, you know, when the President gave me
expanded authorities through the Secretary of Defense we have
been pressurizing ISIS in the Golis Mountains considerably.
That is re-instituting deterrence in a kinetic way and they
are yielding to us to the point that they are considering
moving to seek refuge elsewhere.
So this is what--the warrior ethos and the lethality that
we have imposed in the Golis Mountains against a foe that has
the capability of attacking our homeland. I think this movement
to increase our lethal effects on them is causing them to
establish pause.
Mr. McGuire. Thank you.
General Kurilla, Iran and its proxies across CENTCOM
continue to use drones to target critical infrastructure,
military installations, and commercial shipping in the region.
The conflict in Ukraine and Iran's attacks on Israel have
highlighted the challenges posed by saturation attacks
comprised of UAS and missile threats, and I am concerned about
the survivability of high-value air defense systems like
Patriot, THAAD against drones and drone swarms in the Middle
East as tensions remain high.
As the threat from proliferated small UAS technology grows
in CENTCOM, to the extent you can share in an open setting, how
is the Army thinking about requirements to defend deployed
assets in theater against coordinated attacks from advanced
aerial threats like drones and drone swarms?
General Kurilla. So that is why you want to have a layered
defense, Congressman, and we start everything that can reach as
far out, you know, a ballistic missile all the way down to the
group one quadcopters.
We have capabilities that we layer against all of that
whether it is electronic or kinetic, non-kinetic means as well.
What the Army is doing to help us with that is General George
is doing his Army Transformation Initiative, sending forward
capability not to replace but to augment, to put it in those
harshest conditions in CENTCOM against an active thinking
enemy, and we give him feedback on the effectiveness of those
to make it better before they do large purchases of those
equipment.
Mr. McGuire. Perfect. All right. From your perspective,
General Kurilla, and for integration would it be better to
baseline these requirements into existing weapon systems like
Patriot or THAAD or separate?
General Kurilla. What we want to be able to do is have a
layered defense, but we need all of those systems to talk to
each other. We can't have one-off proprietary software systems
that don't work with one overarching software system that
controls all of them.
Mr. McGuire. Awesome. Well, thank you for our witnesses for
answering the questions, and I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Tran, you are recognized for 5 minutes,
sir.
Mr. Tran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Langley, General Kurilla, thank you so much for
your service. Ms. Thompson, welcome.
General Langley, you rightfully stated that Africa is a
nexus theater where global interests converge and the United
States continues to face fierce competition from China and
Russia across the continent.
Chinese state-owned firms now hold stakes in 78 African
ports and China is currently negotiating a second PLA [People's
Liberation Army] Navy base in Gabon.
In your testimony you mentioned that the U.S. approach to
Africa is African partner led, U.S. and ally enabled.
General Langley, in your view which African partners are
the most important to furthering U.S. interests on the
continent and why?
General Langley. Congressman, thanks for that question.
It is a broad question, but as far as China is concerned
and their aspirations to become a global hegemon, I will just
give a statistic that is pretty compelling. They are
outspending AFRICOM militarily 100 to 1.
So as they have basing aspirations across the globe but
especially in Africa, in those places, whether it is on the
east side or the west side, they are trying to close the gap
from a geostrategic positioning to be able to stop our joint
forces for employing across the globe or A2AD, which is aerial
denial, anti-access.
So, and then also their critical minerals, trying to
control those supply chains. So those geostrategic regions are
ways of perfecting their geopolitical means to engage with a
number of countries. It is too many to say.
Mr. Tran. Sure, I appreciate that.
And then, you know, with U.S. engagement with certain
African countries being either cooled or stalled entirely,
General Langley, why is continued engagement with those African
countries that are still engaged with the U.S. so essential for
our national security?
General Langley. Absolutely, because some of these
countries we have shared interests in and we see it as
essential for the purposes of the shared commitment of
stability and security across the region, not only for
counterterrorism but just for the international rules-based
order.
A number of these countries see the importance of that and
that is why we have shared national security objectives so they
can get to the future of being able to stand on their own and
be able to create prosperity and across the future, and a
number of countries side with the United States and our ways to
do it.
Mr. Tran. Thank you.
General Langley, you mentioned in your opening that Morocco
is an example of success from our investment. Was hard power
the sole tool we deployed for that success and generally do you
believe that hard power is the only tool we have to further
U.S. interest in Africa?
General Langley. So it is a portfolio, a number of powers.
You know, whole of government, building institutional capacity,
having the African countries take a lead and share with one
another as a whole has proven to be the success against a
number of layered threats that are stalling progress across the
African continent.
Mr. Tran. That is right, and we need to be thinking about
all levers of power including the soft power tools at our
disposal when looking to counter Chinese influence, deter
further adversarial military expansion, and to protect access
to critical minerals on the continent.
In fact, that is why I plan on voting against a rescission
package on the House floor this week that rescinds bilateral
and multilateral investment in places like Africa.
General Kurilla, how is the U.S. military supporting the
delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza and what obstacles have
you observed that are preventing the seamless delivery of such
aid?
General Kurilla. So we have--in the past we have delivered
humanitarian aid through both air, sea, and land. We were
working with the Jordanians. We helped screen the convoys that
would then bring in the food for that.
But right now we are not actively working humanitarian aid.
Mr. Tran. Is there a reason why we are not?
General Kurilla. I mean, that--right now Israel has
contracted an American company that is doing the distribution
inside of Gaza. Hamas hates that because Hamas no longer has
control over that distribution.
So this is an American private company that Israel did.
There was no--CENTCOM was not part of that that contracted this
that is doing a million-ish meals, I think, they are doing a
day, a little more than that, through this private company.
Mr. Tran. And are we prepared to help if Israel was to ask
for our assistance?
General Kurilla. We are prepared if the President directs
us to do that.
Mr. Tran. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and your
testimony here today.
General Kurilla. Thank you.
Mr. Tran. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Wisconsin, Mr. Van Orden.
Mr. Van Orden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Kurilla, I want to congratulate you on a fantastic
career.
General Kurilla. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Van Orden. Thank you for your service to the country.
It is wonderful. I would also like to acknowledge your Master
back there. Derrick and I worked together for--well, you could
probably tell for how long by the color of my beard and the
amount of hair we both have on our heads. So you did well by
yourself there, General.
General Langley, you are a Marine, right? And then the
Marine hymn "From the Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of
Tripoli," right? Tripoli, that is Libya, and we went to war
with them because the Barbary pirates were kidnapping our
citizens. Thomas Jefferson did not want to do that but he did,
and other nations were paying tribute to these pirates and we
said, enough, right?
So I would like to gently remind some of my colleagues that
sit over there if they actually did their homework and read the
rescissions packages that are proposed by the Trump
administration, we are removing what can really reasonably be
titled 21st century tribute.
So we are going to be assisting our African partners and
our Middle East partners but we are not paying tribute anymore.
Those days are over, and you are in that uniform because we
stopped paying tribute back then.
So I can forward the package to anybody over there if you
want--actually want to read it instead of just complaining.
So former Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said he would
take the Taliban at their word when they are talking about
anti-terrorist operations, counter-terrorist operations, and
human rights in particular, to rights of women in Afghanistan.
General Kurilla, how is that working out for women in
Afghanistan?
General Kurilla. Not very well right now, sir.
Mr. Van Orden. Not very well. Okay. So the Houthis now have
said that, okay, my bad, we are going to stop shooting missiles
at ships, and I would encourage everybody to give as much
validity to the Taliban statement as we did, or excuse me, to
the Houthis' statement as we did or should have to the Taliban.
General Langley and General Kurilla, I spoke to the Special
Operations component commanders about this, so I understand the
issue with the Houthis is not a seam, you know, between your
two COCOMs [combatant commands]. But can you--in this setting
can you tell me, like, do we know how the Houthis are being
resupplied by Iran?
General Kurilla. A vast majority of it is by sea. They put
them on--they come out of the ports in Iran. They put them on
dhows, stateless dhows. Some of them go on maritime vessels
into Djibouti on the UN vessel inspection mechanism.
They put stuff inside a container. If you have a ship with
500 containers and it is in the bottom of it you can put all
those sensitive components in the bottom of that.
Now, a positive thing that just happened in the last month
is that the UN vessel inspection mechanism decided to go to 100
percent inspection of containers. I think it needs to be 100
percent unloading of all the containers to see what is inside
of them.
That is a positive step. But probably about 80 to 85
percent goes by sea.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay. Why are we not sinking these vessels?
So we have a--we have a terrorist nation, Iran, with these--
their minions.
They are sending lethal munitions to the minions, which
have shut off the Red Sea for commercial traffic. Why aren't
we,--I guess maybe that is a question for Ms. Thompson.
General Kurilla. We have to find the ships. The hardest
part is to find that ship. At any given time, there is between
3,000 and 5,000 dhows between the--Iran and Bab Al-Mandab. That
is the same distance from the tip of Florida to Boston that you
are trying to find these dhows.
Mr. Van Orden. I lived in Djibouti for a long time, and I
sent some of my guys to Yemen. That was a big secret, and it is
not anymore, obviously.
Ms. Thompson, have you guys looked at this from a policy
perspective? I mean, the last two SEALs that were killed in
combat, unfortunately, were in the Red Sea--Derrick and I's
teammates--and they were boarding these vessels to try to
prevent these munitions from getting to the Houthis. So this is
very personal to me.
Ms. Thompson?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman, and
rightly understood. I can say more on some of the particular
policy elements in closed session on this but what I would say
is one of the elements that we have looked at and continue to
engage on is our European partners.
They are actually very well equipped to continue to help us
with this effort, particularly from their positioning in the
region.
Mr. Van Orden. Ms. Thompson, I don't mean to interrupt you,
but I am going to because I have 20 seconds left.
Right now, from a policy perspective from the DOD, if the
United States of America understands our European allies find a
ship and we know for sure that there are munitions on there
that are going to the Houthis can we just sink it?
General Kurilla. We can board it. We have the authority to
board it and if we find the munitions we will take the crew. We
will transfer that crew and we can end up sinking the ship.
Mr. Van Orden. Very well.
General Kurilla. We did one on a dhow 2 weeks ago.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Van Orden. Thank you.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Whitesides.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Kurilla, General Langley, thank you both for being
here today, and thank you, ma'am, for being here today, and I
want to echo my colleagues in thanking you for your
distinguished service.
I want to begin by talking about a trip that we took last
month. We went to the CENTCOM area of responsibility including
Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE with Ranking Member Smith and
a bipartisan delegation from this committee.
I have to say, General Kurilla, how impressed I was by the
dedication and professionalism of the men and women serving in
your AOR, especially given the rapidly shifting landscape in
that part of the world.
That dedication is incredibly important. The Middle East is
a place that deserves American attention and investment, as I
am sure you would agree.
General Kurilla, in your time as CENTCOM commander you have
seen the culmination of the civil war in Syria, the explosion
of conflict in Gaza, a changing paradigm in Yemen and much
more.
In my visit I heard a sense of concern from our allies in
the region amid the serious change. Some of our partners in the
Middle East worry that we are taking our eyes off the ball.
General Kurilla, what are the tangible concrete steps you
think are necessary to reassure our allies that we are still
focused on your AOR and that we still stand with them?
General Kurilla. So I think words matter and actions
matter. I think what we are doing is we are transitioning from
a security guarantor to a security integrator.
I think the thing--we have to have a sufficient and a
sustainable posture. So we can't take everything. We have to
have enough that we can still be able to partner with our
partners in the region.
We need to be able to give them the military equipment--the
foreign military sales--so that that can be integrated into the
region. We saw that on the defense of Israel, systems that can
talk to each other, and this is one of the challenges with
foreign military sales. They have real security needs.
If we don't fill them, they are going to fill them. China
shows up with an Amazon catalog. They say, pick anything in
here--I will give you financing, free shipping, prime shipping,
and no end user agreement. But I tell them it will never touch
our networks.
So we have got to be able to provide them the tools that
they need to integrate in the region that we become the
security integrator.
Mr. Whitesides. Yeah, I would agree with that. We actually
heard that several times over there. We also need to be more
responsive in being able to fulfill the deals that we do do--
General Kurilla. That is the problem.
Mr. Whitesides. --so that people are not waiting, you know,
10 years or whatever for the systems. Maybe we can work
together with that.
Anyway, next question. What we are seeing around the world
is that allies are regarding the United States as an
increasingly uncertain partner as we impose and then remove
unilateral tariffs, consider cutting active duty and foreign
assistance programs, and discuss using military force to take
the territory of other nations like Greenland.
I believe that we are made safer through our alliances and
that making our alliances doubt our resolve makes us less
strong. That is particularly true in Africa where China has
made long-term efforts through various initiatives.
Meanwhile, the new administration muses publicly about
terminating AFRICOM. General Langley, can you describe in
general terms the concerns you have heard from our African
allies and security partners about this potential
administration policy change and the impact it would have on
our nation's security and economic resource requirements?
General Langley. Congressman, I was in Nairobi last week
and I would say the message from the Secretary of Defense by
the chiefs of defense across Africa was well received.
They get that they need to be able to provide their own
security. They get that they do not need to be dependent on us
anymore. There are things that they think that they can share
in a burden and they are ready to shift such as countries like
Morocco and Tunisia and Kenya.
But there are others also in that as well. So they
articulate what they need to push to that level. But at this
point here I think everything is positive that they need to be
able to take on their own security for Africa to prosper writ
large.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate your
service. I yield back. Thanks.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ma'am, gentlemen, thank you for being here. I look at the
flags behind you. Means a lot to us. I look at the streamers on
those flags, what they stand for, what they represent.
I think about the service that you two gentlemen have
provided to your country and the blood that you have shared and
friends that you have lost, brothers and sisters that are
represented in some of those streamers on those flags.
The significance of a hearing like this cannot be
overstated, really. We are in a era of adjustment in our nation
whereby we can move into the 21st century as the dominant
military force worldwide in order to maintain and preserve or
establish peace, and Congress has an incredibly significant job
to do, to listen to the experts that is provided to us so that
we can improve the means by which we provide our warfighters
with modern technology.
So I thank you for being here and for your service.
General Kurilla, you had mentioned multi-year funding
versus one-or two-year funding. Would you please clarify for
this committee the difference between multi-year funding for
the DOD versus multi-year contracting for our defense
contractors, because we don't want to lock into a technology
that could be replaced by a better, less expensive technology.
Would you touch on that?
General Kurilla. Sure. I agree. I mean, one of the
challenges I think you have if you are a business and you make
X you have this production line, but if you know you are only
going to get money from these companies you are spreading that
out.
You only have so much production lines. So when we have
partners come to us and say, we would like to purchase X and we
tell them they can get it in 2029 because we don't have the
production capability that is a concern.
I am also just as concerned that the industrial base cannot
keep up with the weapon expenditure. Every conflict that we
have had recently has underestimated the weapons--Russia,
Ukraine, Israel.
And so I think what we want to do--
Mr. Higgins. Right. Yes, sir. So not to interrupt you but
you are at the heart of the problem. What I want to get to here
is that if we--we have to find the sweet spot and I am going to
ask you what that is.
You have a problem of historically, like, constant design
changes with a program. We have to move away from that. If we
have multi-year funding for the Department of Defense that
gives greater executive authority to accomplish the mission and
build and procure and take delivery of the right vessels and
craft.
But we don't want to be locked in a multi-year contract
with a particular defense contractor because that would
insulate us against the emergence of significantly better tech
that is more effective and more lethal and less expensive. We
have to be able to make that shift.
So what is that sweet spot?
General Kurilla. I can't tell you exactly what the sweet
spot is but I do know we have to be agile. We have been making
Patriot missiles for a very, very long time.
So the multi-year funding on that I don't know if it is 3
to 5 years, but if I am a businessman I am not going to build
new production lines if I don't know if I am going to get money
next year.
Mr. Higgins. Understood. That is for, like, existing tech.
Okay. Shifting to some tech that is out there that I want to
know if it is being shared, some of our allies in the Middle
East have been incredibly wealthy.
They have unlimited funding for research and development,
and my research indicates that they are fielding some
autonomous tech that is far beyond what we have. Are they
sharing that with us?
General Kurilla. So we are partnered with several of these
partners in the Middle East. We do share quite a bit. There are
some things that we know that they are using as well but we
have quite a bit of visibility on that.
Mr. Higgins. And finally, what would it take to wipe out
the Houthi operational capabilities?
General Kurilla. I think the number-one thing that has to
happen is to have Iran quit resupplying them. They would die on
the vine without Iranian support.
Mr. Higgins. Die on the vine. We would like that.
General Langley, General Kurilla, Ms. Thompson, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Maryland, Ms.
Elfreth.
Ms. Elfreth. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for being here
and, Generals, thank you for your decades of service to this
nation. It is greatly appreciated.
I am going to start where my colleague left off with the
Houthis. Even though we have negotiated the ceasefire with the
designated terrorist organization, they continue to launch
attacks, as we have said, both at our allies and continue to
place global commerce at risk.
What can you tell us in this open session about the
specific drone attacks on Israel and what are we learning from
that?
General Kurilla. The specific what, ma'am?
Ms. Elfreth. Drone attacks on Israel.
General Kurilla. From Iran or from the Houthis?
Ms. Elfreth. From the Houthis.
General Kurilla. So for the Houthis, I mean, we are still
shooting down Houthi UAVs that are going towards Israel. They
have taken an Iranian UAV--it is called a KAS-04--with some
modifications, additional gas.
They call it a Yafa. It has the--I mean, there are some
Houthi firsts here but it is Iranian equipment that can go
2,600 kilometers.
And so when we have that we have shot down dozens of them
and so they are taking a very simple UAV, extending the range
of it, and then Israel has effective defenses as well.
Ms. Elfreth. It has been said but I want to reiterate we
are in between Ukraine and this region hypersonic technology
development with--particularly with drones. What evidence do
you have that the Houthis are sharing their drone warfare
knowledge with our adversaries?
General Kurilla. So with other adversaries--so I will take
you back to July of 2024. We killed seven individuals in Iraq
that were setting up two UAVs. Of the seven individuals killed
there was a Houthi UAV expert, a brigadier general.
There was an Iranian IRGC UAV expert there. There was three
Kata'ib Hezbollah individuals there as well and there was a
Lebanese Hezbollah individual there as well. So we are seeing
that.
There is Houthis that have outreached to Russia. They have
gone to China. They have cells in Iran. They are in Syria. They
are in Lebanon as well.
Ms. Elfreth. Okay, thank you.
Switching gears to General Langley, we have touched on in
this hearing the very real nexus between our long standing
humanitarian efforts and investments in Africa to build allies
and the same time the very real threat China poses,
particularly to naval progress but also the extraction of those
rare earth minerals that are critical to national defense, all
of that related to national security and your role.
Over the last six years the terrorist organization JNIM has
seen dramatic growth in activities. You recently gave remarks
emphasizing that the U.S. was focused on helping African
nations build the self-reliance to fight such terrorists.
But it was reported that the vast majority of programs run
through the Global Fragility Act, a multi-year initiative
intended to bolster stability in vulnerable west African
countries, has been shut down by this administration.
Can you please speak to the threat of JNIM to the region
and its stability?
General Langley. Congresswoman, thanks for the question.
Yes, the epicenter of JNIM right now lies within the
countries of Mali and Burkina Faso and, to some degree, Niger.
But it is threatening the former GFA recipient states. I have
met in Cote D'Ivoire with Ambassador Davis Ba, and the thing in
the past they have been able to benefit of being able to share
ways ahead for counterterrorism.
So in their northern regions of--excuse me, the southern
regions of Burkina Faso but the northern regions of Cote
D'Ivoire they have been very effective with the construct they
have established.
So, yeah, they benefited from their whole of government and
I think the GFA had been an enabler for that in the past. But
going forward, they know that with the straight talk that we
have already said that we need to share this burden and Burkina
Faso is--we have offered them other opportunities to be able to
benefit with what Cote D'Ivoire has been successful at.
So it's the sharing of ideas and sharing of the enduring
solution to counterterrorism which all of those countries can
benefit from.
Ms. Elfreth. Thank you, General.
And in my remaining moments I am just going to make a
statement about the President's recent desire or statements and
desire to develop the Gaza strip into the Riviera of the Middle
East and how deeply troubling those statements are.
Many of us share the desire for a lasting two-state
solution driven by self-governance and long-term stability in
the region. Yet, building such a resort and displacing 2
million Palestinians will only exacerbate tensions and create a
target for further hostilities in the region.
I understand this isn't directly related to your
responsibilities in the military but I fail to see the national
security reasoning.
Instead, I want to echo with my last moments my colleague
Congressman Tran's excellent proposal that CENTCOM use its
incredible logistics capabilities to support distribution of
humanitarian aid in Gaza.
Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentlelady yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Gooden.
Mr. Gooden. Thank you.
General Langley, I will start with you and then move east.
Regarding the DRC and Rwanda, could you give me kind of an
update, not necessarily history but where you see things as
they stand today with that conflict?
General Langley. Yes. At the cusp of--at the central piece
of it is the encroachment of M-23 forces into the DRC--eastern
DRC. They have been very successful in their offensive
operations going all the way down to South Kivu.
This encapsulates some of the regions that are rich in
critical minerals. So just at the diplomatic realm--and I won't
speak to that two piece but I know that Rwanda is allegedly
supporting M-23, and then President Tshisekedi in the DRC is
trying to get his forces right set so they can counter this.
So that is all in the diplomatic realm. SADC, a number of
regional constructs in southern Africa who are trying to solve
this problem and trying to come to a truce where we can effect
peace.
Over.
Mr. Gooden. Well, we would consider both countries to be
friends of ours, I believe. So it's tricky in that sense, but
in your mind what needs to happen to wrap this conflict up and
bring peace to the region?
General Langley. From an operational perspective, like I
said, this is mainly in the diplomatic realm so I have to defer
to the State Department.
Mr. Gooden. Fair enough. Thank you.
General, could you--the last time you were here I asked you
about Qatar and our relationship with them. Some of my
colleagues have questioned Qatar's reliability as a U.S.
partner and their status as a major non-NATO ally, and in light
of the President's recent visit could you clarify the strategic
benefits of continuing advanced military exports to Doha and
our relationship with them? How's that going?
General Kurilla. We have a phenomenal relationship military
to military with Qatar. They house the largest base in the
Middle East in Doha. They provide burden sharing in the form of
$300 million a year to run those bases.
They have been incredibly supportive of everything we do.
Generally, the answer is yes--what is the question when I talk
to them.
Mr. Gooden. Is the--I find that to be the case as well and
I share your belief toward that.
How does the--what opportunities could you see for us to
expand that relationship that would benefit our nation?
General Kurilla. Sure. Just last week we inducted for the
first time Patriot component into their depot level maintenance
and they repaired that component for us. One of the things
Qatar has offered to do is to help in either manufacturing or
depot level maintenance for some of the unique systems that we
both share.
So I think there's tremendous opportunity that can help
also our industrial base as well as our maintenance base.
Mr. Gooden. I appreciate that. Thank you for the work you
are all doing, and good luck. Thanks so much. I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes gentlelady from New Hampshire, Ms.
Goodlander.
Ms. Goodlander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses for being here today, particularly to you,
General Kurilla and General Langley.
I want to thank you for your incredible service to our
country and I will miss you very much as a new member on this
committee. So thank you for everything you have done.
General Kurilla, I want to take you back to 2022, your
confirmation hearing, when you testified that Iran--the Iranian
regime is the number-one destabilizing force in the Middle
East. Is that still--
General Kurilla. Still remains the number-one malign
influence in the Middle East.
Ms. Goodlander. Thank you for that. You know, you--in your
written testimony you testified that Iran's nuclear threat--its
best chance at restoring deterrence and imposing its will on
the region is its nuclear threat and you also testified that
Iran has virtually doubled its enrichment capacity in the past
6 months, which is extremely alarming, I think, to everybody on
this committee.
And I just want to say at the outset that Congress is--we
are committed on a bipartisan basis to taking action on this
issue. I am proud to be supporting the Enhanced Iran Sanctions
Act of 2025 and we welcome the Pentagon's help in advising
Congress as we think through every tool that can be used to
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
I want to ask you, General, about, as many of my colleagues
have, the other pillar of the threat Iran poses its funding for
terrorist groups and particularly the Houthis.
So last month the President reached a ceasefire agreement
with the Houthis--the terrorist organization the Houthis. I
wanted to ask you the goal of that ceasefire agreement and the
terms of the agreement.
General Kurilla. So when the President gave the mission to
CENTCOM it was a very specific mission on March 10. He said, I
want the Houthis to quit shooting at our ships. That was the
mission that was given to us.
For 51 days we pounded the Houthis. They were screaming to
all of our partners in the region to include the Omanis to get
the Americans to stop pounding them. And so they came and said,
we will quit shooting at you if you quit--we will stop shooting
at you if you quit shooting at us. That met the President's
goal.
Ms. Goodlander. So stop shooting at American ships?
General Kurilla. That was the specific goal that was given
to me.
Ms. Goodlander. Understood. And the goal is to restore
freedom of navigation in this important part of the world where
so much of global commercial shipping depends upon the freedom
of navigation.
General Kurilla. 30 percent of all container traffic.
Ms. Goodlander. So has commercial shipping resumed?
General Kurilla. So that will be more of a lagging
indicator when the insurance rates come down. We just did a
freedom of navigation with four warships over the last week.
Nothing was shot at them.
We also had multiple other countries' frigates and a U.K.
destroyer went through there. I think you will see over time,
as long as the conditions exist, deterrence is always temporal.
As long as those conditions exist and the insurance rates
come back down it's a two-week faster transit to go through the
Red Sea and the Suez than to go around the Cape of Good Hope.
But right now the shipping industry is looking at as long
as the insurance rates stay high they will choose to go a
different route, and so that is going to be a lagging
indicator.
Ms. Goodlander. So how long do you expect it will take for
commercial shipping to resume?
General Kurilla. I think you will see us start to escort
some other U.S. flagships and I think others will start to go
through there as well over time as long as the conditions
exist.
Ms. Goodlander. Thank you, General.
As you know well the cost of this lagging indicator is very
real for the American people and, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
enter into the record an article dated June 5th ``Red Sea
passage remains a no-go for shipping despite U.S. action.''
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 121.]
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Goodlander. Thank you.
General, you know, I want to ask you about--well, first of
all, so our goal was to protect American ships. Our goal was
not to protect our ally Israel and we are seeing an escalation
in the conflict between the Houthis and our ally Israel.
You have testified to some of the things we can do to help
mitigate that threat to our ally but I just want to say for the
record that this--you have said well that this is a threat that
is metastasizing. It is a regional scourge and the United
States cannot give up on this.
General Kurilla. We are still protecting Israel. We have
THAAD battery there that is shooting down Houthi missiles and
we shoot down Houthi UAVs that are going towards Israel.
Ms. Goodlander. Thank you, General.
I was very interested--and I will be submitting more
questions for the record--in what you said about what CENTCOM
could do to help deliver humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Can
you tell us what resources CENTCOM has to bear towards what I
think we can all agree is a really important mission?
General Kurilla. So I think that the biggest resources that
CENTCOM can assist with is--the ground lock is where you--how
you move large quantities of that.
We assisted the Jordanians in scanning all of their trucks
before they went in and that met the Israeli security concerns
of any trucks going in and we deliver--
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Guam, Mr.
Moylan.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for your
participation today, especially what you have in front of you,
and over the last 18 months from the administration and CENTCOM
and AFRICOM you have engaged and you sustained some high tempo
operations involving missile defense and rapid force
protection.
You contested logistics and your counter proxy engagement
so many of which reflect the type of challenges we are
anticipating in the potential Indo-Pacific conflict. So lessons
learned.
I would like to hear from each of you from this kinetic
operations that you have been doing, whether it be from
CENTCOM's counter-Houthi maritime strikes or AFRICOM's
experience in the disperse operations and low access
environments.
What lessons are being actively incorporated into strategic
planning for a high-end fight in the Indo-Pacific? Ms.
Thompson, if we can start first with you, please.
Ms. Thompson. Thank you, Congressman. I think it's an
incredibly important question.
I will leave the operational details to General Langley and
General Kurilla, but I would say one of the most important
things that we are watching is, certainly, strategic waterways
and the ability to flow forces into the Indo-Pacific.
Obviously, freedom of navigation for U.S. military vessels
through the BAM and the Red Sea is critical to that effort. So
I would just highlight that as one of the big takeaways and one
of the strategic choke points that is very important to make
sure we have control over.
Mr. Moylan. General, please.
General Kurilla. So I think between both the Iranian
attacks on Israel as well as our--the Houthi attacks on our
naval forces we have learned a lot that are applicable and we
pass these back to the big Navy, big Air Force, the Army as
well.
Software is a weapon. Our ability to do combined joint all-
domain command and control, the things that we are doing with
software, is amazing. We have advanced that.
We have engineers every day making improvements on our
ability to do that. It's at warfighting headquarters. The
things that we are doing with ballistic missile defense--the
software is changing based on what we are seeing on the
battlefield.
The same thing I would tell you as it comes to counter-UAS
as well we are making changes to the Navy software on the spy
radars based on what we are seeing. It's the first time in the
history of warfare that anti-ship ballistic missiles have been
used against ships.
I would remind you that the Truman spent 51 days in the
longest sustained period of combat for an aircraft carrier
since World War II and they performed marvelously.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you.
General?
General Langley. Thank you, Congressman, for that question.
And from my perspective and operational sense I look at it as
supporting three different combatant commanders to include
CENTCOM in their globally integrated plan against their foes,
especially Iran, and then--and even EUCOM in their global plan
as well as INDOPACOM.
And on this map here that you see the strategic choke
points. As far as AFRICOM and what we are charged to do and
supporting those respective combatant commanders in support of
their global plans is be able to keep us at phase zero, phase
zero of deter, being able to deter and keep our free flow of
commerce and freedom of action around this.
So we work through our partners, a number of countries
across the Maghreb for the end. Every exercise has that teed up
as far as a objective to how we do that with shared objectives,
shared intel and common objectives, I should say, with other
countries, and that is an enabler for us in my support plans to
those respective combatant commanders.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, General.
General Kurilla, in most of my hearings I am always an
advocate for the Army, right, in the INDOPACOM area,
especially. But today I want to advocate for the Navy's role in
CENTCOM.
So how has the United States participated in this
multinational maritime task force to counter both state and
nonstate actors within your area of operation?
General Kurilla. So I am incredibly proud of the sailors in
our Navy and what they have been able to accomplish. So when I
look at CENTCOM it has three of the eight strategic choke
points in the world and what our Navy has been able to do to be
able to secure those has been fantastic.
I mean, they have really--when you look at what they have
done both against the Houthis and in their interdiction of
other things coming into the region they have done a fantastic
job.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you so much. Thank you for your service
to the nation. I appreciate you all.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Sorensen.
Mr. Sorensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning and welcome to General Kurilla, General
Langley, and Ms. Thompson.
I especially want to thank the two generals here today for
your many years of service, your dedication to our nation since
this will be the last time that you appear before our
committee. You have worn your uniforms so proudly and your
country will always be grateful of that.
Both sides of the aisle agree today that we must continue
to improve support to servicemembers as well as our standing
around the world.
But I must say that my constituents and I are still very
angry that our men and women in the CENTCOM theater were put at
risk by the Signal mess with Secretary Hegseth, Vice President
Vance, and other senior members of this administration. Our
brave servicemembers should never have to worry that our own
leaders are giving enemies our mission secrets.
As we have seen with the Houthis we need to be able to
properly protect ourselves from drones and we should be
outfitting our own warfighter with drones.
The Rock Island arsenals, a joint manufacturing and
technology center, 3D prints drones that then get outfitted
with the sensors and the systems needed for our important
missions. I think this is crucially needed.
But to both generals today can you talk about where we need
to be going in terms of both our unmanned air systems and
counter-UAS capabilities in our regions?
General Kurilla. If I could just jump on the additive
manufacturing and 3D printing.
So we have an innovation task force out there. One of them
is Task Force 39 which has an additive manufacturing in Kuwait.
We use that for both polymers and metallic additive
manufacturing.
We'll print parts, get that back to--get a system back up
until that OEM part can come in. We do that on a routine basis.
We are 3D printing drones down in Task Force 99 down in Qatar
and they do these small, attritable drones. We slap some
cameras on them and we use those very effectively as well.
So I think this is--you know, when you talk counter-UAS,
though, a big part of it is the detect and I think we have to
do a better job to be able to detect and that is something that
we have made some recommendations on as well.
Mr. Sorensen. General Langley?
General Langley. Now I am just going to state that my buddy
here Kurilla in the CENTCOM region has been the lead as far as
evolving technology to counter drones because what happens in
CENTCOM will eventually happen in AFRICOM.
So we have been following his lead in the technology and
experimentation and we have been leveraging that within the
AFRICOM region.
Mr. Sorensen. Thank you, sir.
The new regime in Syria certainly changes the landscape of
the Middle East. You know, I am hopeful that this will really
diminish Iran's influence in the region and lessen Russia's
foothold in the Middle East.
To General Kurilla, with our approach to Syria changing
where do you see things headed today and what opportunities and
challenges do you see, going forward?
General Kurilla. So the opportunities are significant. I
think I see a lot of upside. I see little downside for engaging
right now.
Ambassador Tom Barrack, he's the U.S. ambassador to Turkiye
but also the special envoy to Syria. I talk to him often. He is
at the table.
I think we waited a little too long to come to the table
with the fall of Assad back in December. We are now there and
we are able to engage and be able to shape the way forward. I
think that is a very, very positive thing.
Mr. Sorensen. One of the things that I worry about with the
current administration is how we are handling the relationships
that we have with our allies around the world--our ability to
forge new partnerships and friendships.
You know, building and maintaining these partnerships is so
crucial to our own safety and our interests, and as General
Kurilla mentioned and your written statement, we can't take our
partners for granted.
Can you speak to the importance of our allies in the region
and what we in Congress need to do to support them?
General Kurilla. Well, I think a big part of it is being
there for them. I have been to the region 45 times. You have to
be there.
You have to sit down, you have a meal together, and that is
how you build a friendship and a relationship. I talk to the
CHODs. Almost every single day I am talking to a different
CHOD, multiple--chiefs of defense. I am sorry.
Every single day I am talking to several of them. When they
are sending you pictures of their grandkids, you know you are
part of the family, and to be able to do that, though, what
they are asking of us is, hey, one, are you going to be there
for us and the answer is yes.
But it's the foreign military sales is their single biggest
frustration that they have on the time to deliver. They have
the means to purchase.
It's the time to deliver that equipment that they are
asking for and that is where I think we can--and I am 40
percent of all foreign military sales in the world in the
CENTCOM region and I think we can do a better job.
Mr. Sorensen. Thank you, gentlemen, both for your service
and we appreciate your dedication to our country.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Luttrell.
Mr. Luttrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for coming today and I would like to
thank everyone in uniform today as well as our veterans that
are in the room.
General Kurilla, you talked about ISIS-K in Afghanistan in
your opening statement. I would like a little deep dive, if you
don't mind.
General Kurilla. Sure.
All right. So ISIS-Khorasan, perhaps one of the most active
in trying to do external plots globally to include against the
homeland, right now what we saw is the Taliban in going after
ISIS-K--they hate each other--pushed a lot of them into the
tribal areas on the Afghan-Pakistan border.
Through a phenomenal partnership with Pakistan they have
gone after ISIS-Khorasan, killing dozens of them. Through a
relationship we have with them providing intelligence they have
captured at least five ISIS-Khorasan high value individuals.
They extradited back Jafar, who was one of the key
individuals behind the Abbey Gate bombing, and the first person
he called, Chief of Staff Munir, was me and said, I have caught
him, I am willing to extradite him back to the United States,
please tell the Secretary of Defense and the President.
So we are seeing Pakistan with limited intelligence that we
are providing them go after them using their means to do that
and we are seeing an effect on ISIS-Khorasan.
At the same point they are continuing to move around.
Sometimes they'll try and go back into Afghanistan. We have the
means to be able to collect, but for the most part right now
they are hanging out right in that border area of Pakistan.
And I would also tell you that, I mean, since 2024, the
beginning, Pakistan held over a thousand terrorist attacks in
the western area, killing about 700 security and civilians and
2,500 wounded.
They are in an active counterterrorism fight right now and
they have been a phenomenal partner in the counterterrorism
world.
Mr. Luttrell. It seems like--does it seem like they are
scaling down or scaling up?
General Kurilla. So I think from ISIS-Khorasan they got hit
very, very hard over the last several months and so they are--I
would tell you right now they are at a low point right now.
What we are getting out of interrogation and exploitation
has been significant. But remember, these are the same
individuals that did the Crocus Music City Hall attack in
Moscow.
They did the attack in Kerman, Iran, and they have
attempted other attacks and there was actually ties in a
classified setting that I could talk in terms of the homeland.
Mr. Luttrell. Whatever we have to do not to go back to that
place would be amazing.
General Kurilla. That is why we need to--if I could.
Mr. Luttrell. Yes, please.
General Kurilla. We have to have a relationship with
Pakistan and with India. I do not believe it is a binary switch
that we can't have one with Pakistan if we have a relationship
with India. We should look at the merits of the relationship
for the positives that it has.
Mr. Luttrell. General Langley, with--in regards to AFRICOM
it seems as if Russia more or less has Africa landlocked. Well,
I am looking at the map here.
Can you give me kind of a high level briefing when it comes
to Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya, the northern part of Africa? If
you roll the clock back maybe a decade that seems to be the
best place you could hide in plain sight, especially in the
northern point of Tunisia, with the vastness of the desert.
Are we seeing anything happening developing in the northern
part of Africa? Because it seems as if we are essentially kind
of focused on where all the rare earth minerals are being
mined.
General Langley. Congressman, that is a great question.
Now, I have always been through my tenure of command the
last three years engaging with all these countries. To the
degree, as we look at this is NATO's southern flank and I see
those strategic choke points on there.
We need freedom of navigation or freedom of action for our
ships in support of those war plans for NATO and for EUCOM.
So I have been working overtime and engaging with these
countries. Morocco is doing their part, and even Algeria
which--some realms that we disagree on some things but Algeria
we were able to sign a nonbinding agreement in cooperation.
But I will tell you that Russia is still there. They are
still trying to affect an agreement on their own so they can
get basing access or port access, and as you even go down into
Libya, you know, I met with Field Marshal Haftar almost--two
times--actually, two times engaging them to ensure that we can
work with them because they have--we have shared threats,
especially along the southern borders, of terrorism.
Just engaging with both sides, trying to get collective
agreement in Libya between the GNU and the LNA. That is
essential that we keep U.S. diplomatic agreements and
cooperation with these countries because we see what Russia is
trying to do establish some ports across the Mediterranean--
warm water ports, so that it'll affect their operations trying
to get a decisive advantage.
But we are not going to let that happen in phase zero
coherency operations that we do in AFRICOM.
Mr. Luttrell. Thank you.
Ms. Thompson, I have nothing for you today. Keep up the
great work.
I yield back, sir.
The Chairman. You got it easy today from him.
All right. We now have--Mr. Cisneros is recognized.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And General Kurilla and General Langley, thank you both for
your years of service and dedication to our country as you
both--you are ready to retire here in a while.
But, General Langley, you know, when I was in the Navy my
ship, the USS Ogden, stopped in Eritrea, which was at that time
a new independent nation. You know, we went there to show the
flag but to show a support for this new country and, really, to
the region as well.
But that is not the impression I am getting from the
current administration. They are pulling away foreign aid.
Ships aren't visiting the continent like they used to. We are
leaving a void for Russia and for the PRC to fill.
And you have been quoted as saying that the PRC is
replicating what we have done in Africa, targeting the
international military education and training program that they
also said they are going to increase security and training in a
number of countries.
In April it was reported that Cairo and the PRC were
planning to participate in a joint exercise between their air
forces. As the administration continues to pull back and the
PRC continues to build relations what, in your opinion, is the
national security risk and impact to Africa as well as to here
at home?
General Langley. I would say the CCP is trying to replicate
what we do, what we have done in the past, and have a strategic
advantage, and especially engaging with our African partners
because they want to be able to establish a enabler to close
the decisive gap that we have had over them for years.
I will just go on a maritime sense, especially with their
NETF, the NETF, which is their Naval Expeditionary Task Force.
They go around the periphery of the African continent engaging
with a number of countries. We need to be able to get that.
You brought up, you know, your naval background. You know,
when we had the ARG [Amphibious Ready Group] MEUs [Marine
Expeditionary Unit] we are not heel to toe anymore. We are not
3.0. We do need the Amphibious Readiness Group and the Marine
Expeditionary Units out there on ships. That is a force
multiplier for crisis response or any other show of deterrence.
I would say, you know, that is not--that doesn't go across
political lines. That goes in operational lines. You know,
Navy--as I met with the vice admiral in their operation sense
but also met with Admiral Kilby and also Stuart Munsch, and
they are bringing up the capability to try to provide Africa
with that capability so that we can compete with China,
especially in the maritime sense.
So I would say that one step in the right direction is
getting those ARG MEUs back out there and in the AFRICOM
theater.
Mr. Cisneros. All right. Gator Navy, all the way.
Ms. Thompson, you said in your opening remarks that the
department is working with its African--with African nations to
grow--working with them to increase operational independence
for these African nations.
But I think really what we are seeing, right, is they are
not doing that. They are moving towards the PRC. As--you know,
as I referenced here Egypt and the PRC are kind of talking
about doing joint operations.
How does the Department not see this as a red flag? Why
aren't we doing something about this? Why are we pulling away
and we are just pushing them in the direction of our--you know,
of our pacing threat here?
Ms. Thompson. Sir, thank you for the question. I really
appreciate it.
And I would point you first to our interim national defense
strategic guidance. Our top two priorities are defense of the
homeland, countering terrorist threats that have the capability
and intent to strike the homeland, and then deterrence of the
PRC, particularly in the Western Pacific.
But, obviously, as you outlined absolutely correctly that
bleeds over to the African continent as well. And so I would
say from our Title 10 security assistance approach to the
continent but then also, as we are in the development process
for our National Defense Strategy this is something that is top
of mind and this is certainly not an area where we are pulling
back.
We want to be very targeted and strategic in our approach
to make sure that we are deterring the PRC's--particularly
their ability to have a military advantage on the continent. So
I would share your assessment on that front.
Mr. Cisneros. Well, please take that back to the heads over
there, right. As we continue to pull away they are continuing
to build relationships with China and the PRC and, you know,
they are--the PRC is more than happy to fill that void as we
pull away and this should be a red flag that they are working
with these things and that is something that needs to be
brought up and considered.
And with that, I yield back my time.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Dr.
McCormick.
Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Kurilla, General Langley, it has been a pleasure
working with you. I wish you fair winds and following seas in
your next endeavors.
I am sure you will be highly successful. We'll miss you. I
consider you friends, and if any time you ever want to share a
beverage or a box of crayons just let me know. We'll always be
available.
General Langley, I will start with you. The Djibouti air
base cluster is within striking distance of some of the Houthi
weapons and I was wondering, especially with the development of
drones that have been developed in Iran and put together in
Yemen, what are we doing for countermeasures and do you think
we could do better?
How can we assist you in equipping our bases with
countermeasures for those advanced drones and what they are
trying to develop?
General Kurilla. Congressman, it is an evolving threat,
especially with the Houthis on the other side of the Red Sea,
and I will get into specifics of what we actually need to
improve upon, enhance upon.
We are protected now but I will get into specifics in
closed session of things that I think that we can continue to
enhance and evolve in that because it's not just Djibouti. It
is all the way down to Manda Bay in Kenya.
So I will say that this is evolving. The Houthis are
gaining in capability and then there's other illicit actors in
the region that is--that can be a threat within East Africa
writ large.
Dr. McCormick. Would you say that--is it safe to assume
that we have a ways to go to be secure in our endeavors?
General Langley. We will always do position improvement.
You know, our fighting holes always need to be improved for
force protection. That is my number-one mission is protecting
the troops on the ground.
Dr. McCormick. And in regards to CENTCOM we have seen
everything from Tower 22 to the ship lanes really kind of being
a proving ground for drone attacks and missile attacks, and I
am sure we are going to eventually encounter supersonic
missiles and other things that are very, very alarming.
What have you learned from those sort of contacts as we
advance our technologies and we have these new technologies to
deal with?
General Kurilla. You have--Congressman, you have to have a
layered defense is the first thing and you have to continue to
improve upon your capabilities and evolve faster and move
faster than the enemy can on theirs.
Look at what happened in Russia with the Ukraine when you
watched also them go to fiber optic drones because of the EW
and the jamming that was up there.
So they are moving very, very quickly in terms of
advancements. We have to move faster.
Dr. McCormick. And, look, I just talked to an AI community
about that very same thing: closing the kill chain, making sure
that our next technologies--I mean, fly-by-wire is awesome, but
it's kind of like a look-back at the TOW technology. I want to
look forward and look at new training models, how we are going
to do that.
What is your feeling--and this is an associated question
that I just came up on, just as we are talking--if we are going
to have different navigation systems that aren't going to be
controlled by semi-autonomous controllers. Autonomous weapon
systems that literally identify targets without any input once
they are launched and it is--
General Kurilla. They exist right now.
Dr. McCormick. The question is would that be a good--I get
a little bit squeamish when we talk about autonomous weapon
systems that direct themselves and they don't have that final--
General Kurilla. I think those exist right--they don't--I
know they exist right now. It's when you get into that final
mile, that final kilometer, that then locks on a target that is
an autonomous target--
Dr. McCormick. That is true.
General Kurilla. --recognition system that has then taken
it in. You can't jam it, et cetera.
Dr. McCormick. Good point. Good point.
One of the other things that I thought was really
interesting is there's USAID and other things we do in the
foreign investments we do that now come into question.
Now, some of it has been wasteful but, obviously, I am not
against foreign aid because it gives us real influence and
really creates stability in different regions.
Where do you think we could redirect those funds that have
maybe been not spent on the most efficient systems? This is for
both of you, and I know we only have only have 45 seconds left.
But where can we best spend the money we do to influence
and create stability in those regions that we are talking about
right now?
General Kurilla. Well, I think from the USAID the State
Department is now taking on that responsibility. For us there
are certain countries that absolutely don't have the natural
resources and those are things that we need to look at and I
can get specific with you if you have a written question.
I will turn it over to Mike.
General Langley. Phase four operations. Stability. I have
seen it work in Somalia, you know, as they were going through
Lower and Middle Shabelle from 2022 heretofore. But without
that recreation or recreating that or getting it from other
countries there's going to be a lapse in completing a credible
force to do the hold.
Dr. McCormick. My best to you both, gentlemen. Loved
working with you. Semper fi.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms.
Jacobs.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will echo all of
my colleagues' thanks to both of you for your many decades of
service. I have very much enjoyed working with all of you and,
General Kurilla, as predicted I outlasted you.
General Langley, I first want to discuss our strategy in
Somalia. Under your leadership the United States has rapidly
increased the pace of air strikes against both al-Shabaab and
ISIS-Somalia.
In the past 5 months alone the U.S. has conducted 37
strikes compared to just four during the entire first year of
the Biden administration. That is actually nearly as many as
President Trump authorized in his first year, which totalled
39.
So could you first tell me what is the objective of these
air strikes?
General Langley. Congresswoman, this is one of the number-
one objectives that Secretary Hegseth came in--when he became
the Secretary of Defense. He said AFRICOM needs to do
counterterrorism operations to protect the homeland.
Up there in the Golis Mountains you have ISIS-Somalia. They
have the propensity to affect the homeland whether it be global
financing. We had to stop that. You know, we did have an
operation back in 2023 but ISIS-Somalia has grown. Matter of
fact, the emir is there now.
They have only increased their capability and capacity.
That is why we had to turn up the heat on putting pressure
through lethal means to be able to attrite that.
Ms. Jacobs. I understand the threat. I guess what I am
concerned about is that we have been using this same logic for
decades.
It doesn't seem like it's attached to any ability for us to
eventually leave and we saw that, for instance, in 2019 when
there was expanded air strikes that it didn't actually
translate to fewer al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia.
So are these air strikes part of a coherent, articulated
strategy aimed at enabling long-term stability and ultimately
drawing down the U.S. military footprint?
General Langley. Yes, that is our operational intent right
now, to be able to cease or deter their ability for ex ops to
protect the homeland.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. That is different than there being an
actual strategy.
Ms. Thompson, you said Somalia is an incredible success. I
think I would disagree with your assessment of that. Is there a
whole of government coherent, articulated strategy aimed at
enabling long-term stability and ultimately drawing down the
U.S. military footprint in Somalia?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman.
I would highlight my commentary was meant to associate with
the INDSG [Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance]
guidance. Our number-one objective is, obviously, to deter and
deny and degrade credible ex ops threats to the homeland, and
as I have highlighted and as you highlighted in your opening
comments, the significant uptick in strikes is demonstrative of
basically attaching those activities to our number-one INDSG
objective.
So I would articulate that that is where the connection to
the strategy is. In terms of force posture in Somalia on a
long-term basis this is something that, obviously, we would
contemplate as part of the broader global force posture review
and no decisions for AFRICOM or for anywhere else have been
made at this time. But it's certainly something that would
factor into this--
Ms. Jacobs. None of this sounds like an actual strategy to
create stability in Somalia so I will look forward to following
up with you both on that.
General Kurilla, I would like to turn to you now on Yemen.
Civil society and media organizations have reported numerous
civilian casualties caused by recent U.S. operations in Yemen,
many as a result of the use of heavy explosive weapons in
populated areas.
For example, the U.S. strikes on Ras Isa Port in Hodeidah
on April 17th reportedly killed at least 84 civilians.
So, one, did CENTCOM foresee the level of civilian harm
reported and what steps did CENTCOM take to mitigate the risks
of civilian harm during the conduct of recent strikes in Yemen?
General Kurilla. So, any civilian death is a tragedy. What
we have is a civilian harm mitigation team that investigates
every single one of these to determine if they are credible.
There are still several that are under investigation.
You mentioned Ras Isa. There were several things that we
did to mitigate that prior to include heavy ISR soaking of that
prior to that. We did messaging to the individuals there. We
did messaging to the ships. We ensured the weaponry and the
mitigation of those systems.
Now, the problem is you have a fuel port that is being hit.
We did not target the trucks that were in the port at that same
time. But, again, that is under investigation to determine the
actual numbers and, again, I would argue that this is the
Houthi casualty numbers as well.
Ms. Jacobs. And can you commit today on behalf of CENTCOM
to publish your findings on civilian casualties in Yemen?
General Kurilla. We push all of that up to the OSD and they
end up pushing those out.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. So you will publish that?
General Kurilla. Absolutely.
Ms. Jacobs. Excellent. Thank you so much.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentlelady yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Crank.
Mr. Crank. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Thompson, thank you for being here. Generals Kurilla
and Langley, thank you for being here and for your service.
I want to start by asking you the same question I have
asked every combatant commander that has come before HASC
[House Armed Services Committee] this year. In your opinion,
has the space-based threat from China and Russia in your
theater improved or worsened in the last 5 years?
General Kurilla. From a CENTCOM perspective, Russia has
actually gone down because they are no longer really in the
region where they were basing some of their space-based
threats. China has probably increased but I would tell you Iran
has significantly increased.
Mr. Crank. So overall increased you would say?
General Kurilla. An increase.
Mr. Crank. Yeah.
General Langley?
General Langley. On the continent of Africa it has
increased, especially down in Namibia, dual-use state-sponsored
type space-enabling capabilities by the CCP.
Mr. Crank. Yeah. Obviously, we are in an open setting here
but can you provide maybe a brief description of how this
threat affects your operations, General Kurilla?
General Kurilla. I would be happy to do that in a closed
session.
Mr. Crank. Okay. That sounds good.
General, the same? Okay.
General Langley. Yes, in a closed session.
Mr. Crank. Okay, thank you.
On another topic, I am concerned about the nuclear threat
from Iran and reports that they rejected the latest proposal
for a new nuclear deal from the U.S., and it seems like Iran is
hell bent on having nuclear weapons, which would be a direct
threat to the existence of Israel.
General Kurilla, in your written testimony you say, quote,
a nuclear-armed Iran would change the Middle East overnight and
forever, potentially setting off a regional arms race with
catastrophic consequences, unquote.
Can you expand on this? What would a Middle East with a
nuclear Iran look like?
General Kurilla. I think you would see other countries in
the region doing everything they could to obtain a nuclear
weapon, either development or through purchase, to be able to
gain one to be able to retain deterrence back with Iran.
Mr. Crank. And how can CENTCOM deter Iran from proceeding
with their nuclear development program? How can they strengthen
the President's hand at the negotiating table?
General Kurilla. I provide a range of options to the
President but I am in all favor of having a negotiated
settlement that prevents Iran from getting a nuclear weapon
because of the consequences of conflict.
Mr. Crank. Okay. And then, General Kurilla, what lessons
can the U.S. learn from Iron Dome that could be applied to the
development of Golden Dome? Do you believe deterrence by denial
to be an effective strategy?
General Kurilla. It can be, but I would tell you some of
the biggest lessons learned is how Israel's defense industrial
base works. You cannot even sell a system to the Israeli
military, the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces], that is not open
architecture that will not work with the rest of their systems
so you don't end up with a proprietary system that stand alone.
We need systems that can integrate and all talk to each other.
Mr. Crank. And so Golden Dome should take note of that?
General Kurilla. That would be my recommendation.
Mr. Crank. Okay. Thank you, General.
Ms. Thompson, how does our partnership with Jordan advance
peace and stability in the Middle East?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, sir.
I think Jordan in particular and our partnership with the
Jordanian Armed Forces not only goes to promote greater burden
sharing throughout the region to include countering shared
threats that we have, particularly on the terrorism front, but
then also weapons and narcotics smuggling and interdiction.
They are a really great partner on that, and then UAS and
ballistic missile interdiction as well.
And I am sure General Kurilla can provide some more
operational specifics but those are the main pillars of the
security relationship that we have with the Jordanians.
Mr. Crank. General?
General Kurilla. They are one of our strongest partners.
They are the country I have visited the most when I go to the
Middle East.
Mr. Crank. Okay, is there any more that the Department
could do to support Jordanian Armed Forces?
General Kurilla. I think there are things that we can do to
strong point Jordan in the counter-UAS. Counter-UAS in Jordan
defends both Jordan, U.S. forces, and Israel.
Mr. Crank. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Thompson, after years of neglect by President Biden,
President Trump is right to prioritize our Gulf partners. How
did his recent visit to the region advance U.S. national
security interests?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, sir, and I would
just highlight particularly the deepening of defense
partnerships that we have.
Not only--I mean, as General Kurilla has highlighted,
obviously, we have a long way to go on working through the
kinks in our FMS process and defense industrial base but
deepening those partnerships to enable greater allied burden
sharing but then also interoperability and empowerment of our
Gulf partners to take on more of the responsibility in the
region, particularly given normalized relations with Israel.
For a few of them it is a massive step in the right direction
for the posture we want to have in the region.
And then I would also just highlight the commercial success
as well that is coupled with the defense success and I think
both per President Trump's comments in Riyadh really echo that
sentiment.
Mr. Crank. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
I do want to make the announcement that we will be
concluding the open session at 12:30 and going into a
classified session a few minutes thereafter because votes are
going to be called on the House floor at 1:30.
So with that, the chair now recognizes the gentleman from
New York, Mr. Ryan, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am sorry to my colleague from Pennsylvania. I think I got
here after you.
Thank you all for being here, especially given that it's
both of your last hearings, Generals Kurilla and Langley. I
just want to--that is an appropriate fist bump--I just want to
commend and thank you both as I know many of my colleagues have
but it cannot be said enough. I appreciate it.
And, General Kurilla, in particular I want to commend you.
I don't think you've--I know you are a humble, quiet
professional but I think in particular what you did in defense
of Israel, in defense of the region, in defense of the U.S.,
most importantly, in your leadership on two unprecedented
direct attacks as you said in your opening testimony that have
never occurred in the history of either Iran or Israel, your
leadership in preparing and executing that defense was
exceptional and I think we all have a lot to learn on a bunch
of levels from that. But I just wanted to say that publicly
here today.
Ms. Thompson, I appreciate you being here again. I know the
last time you were here I was a little frustrated that we
weren't getting really many answers from you. Hopefully, we can
get some more answers.
My line of questioning is similar to what I asked you last
time. I know it's been hit on by colleagues but I want to come
back on it again.
I want to bring in what General Kurilla said in his opening
very powerfully in speaking about both the risks and the
tectonic shift but also the opportunity vis-a-vis Iran on its
heels or, arguably, knees and our ability and opportunity to
press, press, press in that moment, and I am trying to just
wrestle with the dissonance between that and some of the both
appointees of this administration and some of the rhetoric of
this administration, not so much you today in your testimony
specifically.
But I have pointed this out before. The DASD [Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense] for the Middle East, Mr.
Dimino, has said deeply concerning things including that the
Middle East does, quote, not really matter for U.S. interests;
that, quote, vital or existential threats in the Middle East
are, quote, best characterized as minimal to non-existent. He's
also specifically characterized Iran's missile attacks on
Israel as, quote, fairly moderate.
I think, General Kurilla, I am not going to put you on the
spot. I might disagree with that. He's vocally opposed
attacking Iran's nuclear program, described U.S. strikes
against the Houthis as, quote, futile.
Can you just explain to us--I mean, I agree what I have
heard from General Kurilla and other experienced military
leaders. We need to press the advantage we have vis-a-vis Iran
and their proxies. How are we supposed to do that when senior
appointees in the Pentagon are saying things like that?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
First and foremost, I will just note that I was not
involved in the hiring of any officials in the administration
or the political--
Mr. Ryan. But you are here to speak on its behalf, right?
Ms. Thompson. So what I would say from the--yeah, from the
ISA [International Security Affairs] perspective within the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I will make very clear
we support the President's objective to not only, first and
foremost, defend the state of Israel but second, of course,
deny Iran the ability to obtain a nuclear weapon.
That is something we are 100 percent committed to, and I
will also note that we support the President's objective and
stand ready to provide military options should his strategy of
pursuing peace with Iran through a negotiated solution and
denying Iran a nuclear weapon through a negotiated solution--we
stand ready as a department and with an OSD policy to provide
the Secretary and the President--
Mr. Ryan. But--I am sorry, but how are you ready if you are
not in agreement? I mean--
Ms. Thompson. I can only speak--
Mr. Ryan. Should Mr. Dimino be in the position then if he's
not aligned with the President's intent?
Ms. Thompson. That is not something that I can specifically
speak to but I can speak to--for the international security--
the international security role that I play in the Department
of Defense.
This is what we are committed to. Working under Under
Secretary Colby we are very much in line with Secretary Hegseth
and President Trump's guidance on this and none of that has
changed.
Mr. Ryan. Might this dissonance explain, for example, why
in the recent back and forth about the negotiations which we
all agree we want to happen there's lack of clarity on level of
enrichment that might be allowed within the administration,
signaling division and weakness to our adversaries.
Ms. Thompson. So that is not something I can speak to. That
is something--that would be a question for Ambassador Witkoff's
team at the State Department because they are the lead for
negotiation.
Mr. Ryan. And, Ms. Thompson, I will interrupt you again. I
respect you. I know you have a hard job and I know you are
performing the duties of, if I am saying that--right, yes,
performing the duties of.
But can the administration send us someone that can speak
to--these are pretty important questions. Can we get somebody
that can speak to these?
Ms. Thompson. I would very much like to come and do a broad
Iran briefing for you all if that would be something that is
helpful, but I would respectfully ask that the State Department
be present for that as well, because Ambassador Witkoff's team,
as the lead for negotiations, really would have the most--
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from South
Carolina, Ms. Mace.
Ms. Mace. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Iran's reckless behavior continues to threaten U.S. forces,
our allies, and regional stability. Its support for Hamas,
Hezbollah, and the Houthis and other dangerous proxy groups
continue to sow chaos throughout the Middle East, as I know you
all are very familiar.
Its support for proxy militias and terrorists threatens our
interests and those of our allies while it advances in
ballistic missile technology and pursuit of nuclear weapons
threatened to plunge the region into greater turmoil.
CENTCOM's presence in the region deters aggression against
our personnel and Middle Eastern allies. We must impose real
costs on the ayatollahs and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to
ensure that deterrence is fully restored and Iran ceases its
destructive activities.
We must also send a clear message any advance toward Iran
acquiring nuclear weapons is unacceptable to the United States.
I commend President Trump's efforts to ensure Iran's
nuclear program is fully dismantled. Nothing short of full
dismantlement of their nuclear capabilities will ensure peace
and stability in the region.
So the Iranian regime has mastered the art of wielding
proxy groups against its adversaries in the region repeatedly.
From Hamas barbarianism to Hezbollah's arsenals in Lebanon and
the Houthi strikes in the Red Sea, Iran leverages its
surrogates to strike our allies and harm our interests.
So my first question today for General Kurilla, can you
briefly discuss the threat landscape you see from Iran
including the use of proxies?
General Kurilla. So Iran, basically, has three pillars that
they use. The first one is long-range weapons and they access
aerial denial. So think long-range missiles, UAVs.
The second is their proxy networks. The number-one proxy
they had was Lebanese Hezbollah which acted as a bit of a sword
of Damocles over the top of Israel. Israel's--the doctrinal
term disintegration of Lebanese Hezbollah should be studied by
every military--
Ms. Mace. I was recently there and saw that destruction and
they did a very successful work.
General Kurilla. It was brilliant what they have done to
Hamas. The Houthis were one that not a lot of people thought
about before because at one point it was the lowest priority
for intelligence.
I think it is something that we have to pay a lot of
attention to. I think what you are seeing with the Iranian-
aligned militia groups inside of Iraq--they used to be inside
of Syria.
With the fall of Assad that basically severed the Shi'a
Crescent. Qasem Soleimani, who we killed back in 2020, he
wanted to have this Shi'a Crescent that ran from Iran to Iraq,
Syria to Lebanon.
The fall of Assad severed that. That is probably the single
biggest event that has happened in the Middle East.
Ms. Mace. And what has changed since October 7th?
General Kurilla. I think what has changed since October 7th
is Israel feels they are an existential threat to their very
existence with a lot of these Iranian proxies that are
attacking them and we had the first state-on-state attacks--
blows between the two countries.
Iran is in a weaker strategic position. They have lost a
lot of their proxies. Their air defense network is not what it
used to be. However, they still have a lot of operational
capability in terms of their long-range weapons. At the
classified session I can talk in great detail their
capabilities.
Ms. Mace. Do you have any concern about the Houthis and
their relationship with Saudi Arabia?
General Kurilla. The relationship with Saudi Arabia? No, I
don't have--I mean, Saudi Arabia has been a strong supporter of
what we were doing in operations.
Ms. Mace. Yes, they have.
You know, my understanding is we designate the Houthis, for
example, as not the top tier terrorist organization. They are
on the lower rung of designation. Is that correct?
General Kurilla. They were, ma'am. They were first a
specially designated terrorist group and then we made them a
foreign terrorist organization under President Trump. So they
are at the top level.
Ms. Mace. They are at the top level now, which is something
I advocated for when Biden was president and it didn't happen,
which means there are consequences to that in the Middle East,
which is good for the United States and our allies overseas.
Has the degradation of Iran's proxy network affected its
ability to destabilize the region?
General Kurilla. So one challenge we have with Iran they
get petro dollars.
Ms. Mace. Okay.
General Kurilla. 90 percent--85 to 90 percent of their oil
is purchased by China. So China is effectively supporting and
financing Iran's malign behavior. We still see the amount of
funds that are going to the IRGC Quds force. That is who runs
the proxy networks outside of Iran.
So as we look at the sanctioned oil I think for the first
time the State Department sanctioned what are called the Teapot
Refineries. These are refineries along the Chinese coast that
these ships take this sanctioned oil. Iran--this is 10 percent
of all Chinese oil they get.
They import 70 percent. 50 percent goes to the Strait of
Hormuz but it is 85 to 90 percent from Iran. It goes into these
Teapot Refineries and I think the first time we have ever done
it is we have sanctioned one of those Teapot Refineries.
Ms. Mace. Last question, thoughts on Qatar?
General Kurilla. We have a very strong relationship
military-to-military. Largest base there. They fund the base.
They do burden-sharing. When I ask them a question they say the
answer is yes, what is the question.
Ms. Mace. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentlelady yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Pennsylvania,
Ms. Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and that is what you
get for being late to the gavel.
I really appreciate your service General and General. Thank
you so much for your amazing careers and for the opportunity to
speak with you.
Most questions have been asked so I am going to ask the one
that I have that hasn't yet been asked.
General Langley, you spoke a lot about what is going on in
Africa and the fact that you have had a conversation with our
partners and allies and that they understand and are embracing,
in your, I think, words their new roles and responsibilities.
I would like to believe that and so let's say that that is
true because I hear that a lot from all of Europe as well about
Europe and Ukraine.
Assuming that is true, can you describe how AFRICOM is
operationalizing that process of transitioning the
responsibilities and roles over to our allies and to our
partners and can you also explain--and this is for both of you
all--how you would measure or what sort of metrics or
benchmarks you would have to know whether or not our partners
are, indeed, transitioning and are really, truly prepared to be
able to take on this sort of operational responsibility.
That is my only question so I would love it if you would
give it some real thought because it is really, really
important that if we assume that these folks can or are
interested in doing this that we have performance metrics or
standards that we are looking for and that we also have an
operational plan that we have to transition those
responsibilities over.
General Langley. Congresswoman, I am grateful for the
question. I know we last spoke when we were at the Munich
Security Conference and we were in the throes of the Title 22
pause and then at the forefront of the Title 10 review.
So at AFRICOM what we had to do is reassess where we were
and try to do some predictive analytics of what the effects
would be.
This is all in parallel with structuring our narrative--of
structuring our narrative of going to our partners, going to
our allies, and come up with straight talk of what it really
means of a shared burden for the sake of stability and security
on the continent of Africa.
So I did--further, I did meet with the NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] rep for the southern neighborhood, as they
call it--they call it SNAP [Southern Neighborhood Action
Plan]-- and shared that with him. I said, you know, our
government we are all in for stability and security across
Africa but we need a shared commitment from you because this is
your southern neighborhood.
What happens as far as mass migration or migration of
terrorists that can threaten your neighborhood, your borders,
is our same concern with our southwest border.
So that soaked in well with our African partners' shared
commitment. They say, well, it is going to take a little time,
and also we are going to diversify our partner so we get that
as long as we have those shared objectives, as long as we have
those shared values to reach that end state.
So in Nairobi last week, I collectively got with the chiefs
of defense and said, ``hey, you know,'' their biggest message
to me, ``hey, we are not looking to be saved.'' We can hit
stability in--
Ms. Houlahan. What does that look like? And when you are
talking about, you know, a narrative, narratives don't get it
done. You know, what is the plan?
What is the operational plan that we all have collectively
on our responsibility to hand that over and on our ability to
measure whether it has actually been handed over with any sort
of security or safety or assurance that we--that it will be
consistent to the standards that we have always put to the
region?
General Langley. And, Congresswoman, I will just tell you
the plan is theirs. You know, every country is different. We
don't push ourselves to invade on their sovereignty.
Every country is coming up with their own plan. That was
their takeaway. But they also know that the militaries--all
these military leads know that they are giving their best
military advice for the enduring solution from their layered
threats, one of them being that is a shared threat of ours is
terrorism.
So there lies their ability and their responsibility to
come up with their own plans. I am seeing it different from
coastal West Africa all the way to Somalia. They all have a
different approach. I have to respect that, and how we--
Ms. Houlahan. Sure.
General Langley. Then we decide--you know, then we go
through our Title 10 review and we double down based on
empirical data what has worked in the past and what didn't
work. What did work to--
Ms. Houlahan. But how do you weave those strategies
together or do you just walk away and say everybody has got
their own plan and it looks like to be--
General Langley. No.
Ms. Houlahan. Excuse me, a bunch of Democrats. You know, we
are all going to have a different plan. You don't want that.
You want people to figure out how to work together and us
walking away from this is irresponsible unless we feel as
though we are walking away with a plan that is unified and not
just individual sovereignty.
Am I making sense?
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I appreciate it.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank our witnesses for joining us.
Ms. Thompson, General Kurilla, General Langley, thank you
so much for your service. Thanks for all you have done for our
nation.
I want to try to maybe draw a line amongst a number of
different issues that you all are dealing with. I really think
that the combatant commands being there on the front lines
probably have the best assessment and understanding of the
threat and the timeliness of the threat and then how that needs
to be expressed in the assets that we need in order to counter
that threat.
I mean, we see our exquisite assets, the ones you have in
theater, General Kurilla, General Langley. You see where we--
you know, we pulled the Carl Vinson from the East China Sea. We
extended the deployment of the Harry Truman.
General Langley, you know that when we had needs there in
Africa, whether it is places like Sudan, Morocco, even some of
the other events there in the Red Sea.
We see the demand signal go up and then when we'd like to
have a crisis response team and an ARG MEU we don't have it or
we have to move other assets around.
General Kurilla, you spoke at length about the building
threat from one-way attack drones and all you have to do is to
look at the aerial photographs of the runways there in Russia
and ask the Russians about the impact of one-way attack drones
and give the Ukrainians credit.
But the thing that concerns me is that is a scenario that
can play in the opposite direction today and tomorrow, and I
just don't believe we have the counter-UAS capability that we
need.
I want your perspective because I think the COCOMs are
closest to the threat, and if you were tomorrow to say these
are the things that I need that I can operationalize quickly--I
love our exquisite platforms and we need them but they are not
coming quickly and they are not coming inexpensively. But there
are lots of opportunities with expendables and attritables.
Give me your perspective. If you could give us on your UFR
list--if you could say today--today--my top priorities on the
UFR list, the way you see the threat as it is today, both of
you, what would be your top five priorities to make sure this
nation gives you at least a part of the tool set that you need,
part of the kit that you would need to counter what you see and
how it changes on a daily basis?
General Kurilla. So the greatest risk, Congressman, in the
CENTCOM AOR is the unmanned aerial systems and ballistic
missiles. So it would be in the detect and kill of counter-UAS
to include swarms, large numbers.
You need magazine depth. And then in terms of our air
defense assets that are forward deployed you have to be able to
protect those from counter-UAS as well. We need to be very
mobile.
We need to be able to integrate them into the systems. When
I took over three years ago if I walked into a base defense
operations center--that is where they do all the command and
control for the base to be able to defend against drones--you
would see five systems, five screens, five operators.
Now when you walk in we have been able to integrate that
into maybe two screens and two operators but you have now seven
systems integrated into there. So we need to really do better
at the detect.
We are only going to see the systems get smaller, more
lethal, electronic magnetic information--the electromagnetic
spectrum when we try and jam them. That is why the Ukraine and
Russia went to fiber optics going out to 40 kilometers of fiber
optic drones. You can't jam that.
So those are the things I would ask right now is the
counter-UAS detect. I think we need to put aerial AESA radars
for a low radar cross section to be able to pick up, elevate
it, and then ballistic missile defense. Keep ballistic missile
defense.
Mr. Wittman. General Langley? Yeah, thank you.
General Langley. I think my top three is about the same as
Erik Kurilla's. Counter-UAS, integrated air missile defense,
and--but I was going to add sense to make sense--ISR. I am at a
deficit for ISR across the continent emanating threats. Match
capabilities to the threats. That is what Secretary Hegseth
told me to do and that is what I am requesting.
But just going further down the list, maritime capability.
Like I said, I have said it already but I am just going to bang
the drum. We miss the ARG MEU. We miss the Amphibious Readiness
Group.
The Marine Expeditionary Units they are ready, but they are
sitting on the shore. But we need to fix the ship problem, you
know. The three-ship ARG is what is needed.
We can't do heel to toe anymore. Sometimes we are not even
1.0. We need to get back there. I talked to the vice CNO [Chief
of Naval Operations] the other day, and he gets it, as well as
I talked to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We missed that
in the AFRICOM AOR, you know, from crisis response. We need
that sea base forward.
You are right, Congressman, we really did need that, and
when Hemedti was going at it with Burhan in Sudan we really
needed that offshore to utilize that.
So and then also for a force deterrent it is a show of
power to contend with the NETF that the Chinese is running
around the purview of the continent.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
This will conclude the open portion of our hearing. We will
reconvene in 10 minutes at 12:40 in room 2212 for the
classified portion.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
June 10, 2025
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 10, 2025
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 10, 2025
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
June 10, 2025
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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. With the United States decision to reduce our footprint
in Syria possibly below 1,000 personnel, will we still have the
sufficient resources to face the resurgence of ISIS and other terrorist
groups? How can we ensure our regional partners are working in tandem
to address these threats?
General Kurilla. (U) Our consolidation in Syria is being carefully
metered against the threat and the prevailing security circumstances.
This includes an assessment of the degree to which ISIS is successful
in trying to exploit any security vacuums left after the fall of the
Assad regime, the capacity of the Syrian government to afford security,
and the success of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) agreed
integration into the new Syrian security architecture. The U.S.
military's tasks in Syria have been focused on Advise, Assist and
Enable tasks in support to the SDF, underwriting their considerable
success in the D-ISIS fight. This includes offensive action against
ISIS cells left at large in Syria, management of the Partner Managed
Detention Facilities which hold captured ISIS fighters, and management
of the Displaced Persons camps of Al Hol and Roj as potential
recruiting pools for the next generation of ISIS fighters. As the SDF
integrates into the new Syrian security architecture, U.S. forces in
Syria may be able change emphasis towards support to the U.S.
burgeoning diplomatic mission to Syria, thereby supporting the D-ISIS
fight indirectly through the Syrian government, and potentially,
conditions dependent, a normalization of the U.S.'s security
relationship in Syria. The security conditions, and specifically the
success of the D-ISIS fight in Iraq andSyria are interlinked. At the
invitation of the Iraqi government, we have been working closely with
the Iraqi Security Forces to ensure they continually increase their
competence in the D-ISIS fight. Success here will sustain the pressure
against ISIS and narrow the opportunities for ISIS to find safe havens
within which they can reconstitute and from which they can launch att
acks, locally, regionally or potentially against the U.S. homeland.
Beyond U.S. and coalition efforts in Syria and Iraq, other regional and
international partners are providing significant support to the D-ISIS
fight which include contributions - across Diplomatic, Information,
Military and Economic levers - from the 89 members of the Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS. While an important contribution, the total
numbers of U.S. personnel deployed in Syria are only a portion of the
totality of the effort to eradicate the scourge of ISIS.
Mr. Wilson. In your testimony, you mentioned that the International
Atomic Energy Agency estimates that Iran's stockpile of enriched
uranium has almost doubled what it was six months ago. You also
highlighted that the regime has the resources and centrifuges needed to
produce enough weapons-grade uranium in a week for a simple nuclear
weapon, should it choose to.
What actions are we taking to ensure the Iranian regime does not
achieve its goal of gaining nuclear weapons to use on Isreal and the
United States?
What further resources do you need to deter Iran from achieving
this capability?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
Mr. Wilson. In your testimony you mentioned that having an absence
in the Sahel region limits our ability to monitor terrorist
organizations in the area which would allow them to grow. We have seen
how quickly terrorist organizations, like ISIS, can grow if left
unchecked.
Can you talk about the potential impacts that would occur in
AFRICOM with an increased absence in the Sahel and how this affects
other combatant commands?
What additional resources do you need to ensure that this threat is
minimized?
General Langley. Since the withdrawal of US and French forces from
Mali in 2022 and, more recently, the withdrawal of US and French forces
from Niger in 2024, terrorist organizations have made significant
advancements in the Sahel and are now threatening the littoral
countries of the Gulf of Guinea. The only capabilities in place to
counter the terrorist threat are special operations and conventional
forces from our Allies that receive limited US support. If left
unchecked, these terrorist organizations will continue to gain strength
and develop the ability to conduct attacks in the USEUCOM area of
responsibility, as well as other regions. Further, destabilization in
the Sahel region causes illicit criminal activity and migration flows
that affects not only USAFRICOM but USSOUTHCOM, USEUCOM, and most
importantly the Homeland. ISR is a key resource required to monitor the
threat in the Sahel but access, basing, and overflight restrictions
complicate its employment. Ideally, diplomatic engagement would secure
ISR basing to ensure these resources, when allocated by the Joint
Staff, are employed to their maximum effect to minimize the terrorist
threat.
Mr. Wilson. We are seeing the United States and allies constantly
losing presence in Africa while our adversaries continue to increase
theirs. The Chinese Communist Party is expanding its footprint and is
working to build up their military-to-military relationships in the
region. I'm grateful that both you and Secretary Hegseth understand the
need to prevent the Chinese Communist Party from taking a foothold in
Africa.
Can you provide an update on the Chinese Communist Party's
activities in the region, and what further resources you need to combat
this threat?
General Langley. China views Africa as integral to expanding its
global power projection strategy, and works across the political,
economic, and defense domains to achieve its goals on the continent.
Beijing uses its African diplomatic and economic engagements to obtain
support for its geopolitical priorities. Beijing also seeks to maintain
access to Africa's markets, natural resources, and critical minerals
that support its defense and commercial industries. China's defense
engagements in the region protect its economic and diplomatic
investments, and Beijing increasingly seeks to position itself as a key
security partner to African countries. USAFRICOM would benefit from
additional funding for security cooperation, information operations,
and naval assets to promote American political and economic core
interests. Regarding Foreign Military Sales, we would benefit from laws
and policy to support an expedited system. Although we are the
preferred partner in most cases, we are getting "out cycled" by our
adversaries.
Mr. Wilson. Last August the United States was forced to withdraw
1,000 service members from Niger, and we simultaneously lost access to
key locations, like our ISR base in Agadez. This asset was key to
counterterrorism operations in the Sahel, a region which accounted for
19% of all terrorist attacks worldwide, and 51% of global terrorism-
related deaths in 2024. What's more, the withdrawal of US and French
forces has resulted in the presence of Russian mercenaries in more than
six African countries, filling the gap by offering unconditional
security assistance in exchange for resource extraction rights and
political influence.
What are we doing to ensure we find new partners in the region to
address the gaps that have resulted from our lost presence in AFRICOM
and the Sahel?
General Langley. USAFRICOM continues to maintain strategic
partnerships in West Africa by working alongside our allies and
partners to address shared security concerns. USAFRICOM is prioritizing
limited and tailored security cooperation activities and investments
that enable our African Partners to defend against regional terrorist
threats. These efforts predominantly include counter terrorism
training, defense equipment, and intelligence sharing. Moreover,
USAFRICOM is actively seeking ways to increase this counter-terrorism
burden with NATO and Non-NATO allies who have similar security concerns
for the region. USAFRICOM is also encouraging capable African security
partners to share their military expertise and assist other countries
to counter regional terrorist threats so that U.S. forces can focus on
global networks that threaten the U.S. Homeland.
Mr. Wilson. In your testimony, you mentioned that without a
persistent presence in the Sahel, we are limited in the ability to
monitor the expanding influence of terrorist organizations in the
region. You also mentioned that these organizations will, "continue to
grow and their threat to regional stability.will only intensify."
How will this growth in the threat affect the Sahel and AFRICOM's
neighbors in CENTCOM?
How are we making up for the capability gaps that are growing as we
are forced out of our footprints in the Sahel?
General Langley. The Sahel has become the epicenter of global
terrorism, a situation which is greatly exacerbated by the withdrawal
of US and French forces. Terrorist groups now threaten instability to
the littoral regions of West Africa, including Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana,
Togo and Benin. Expanded terrorist operating areas enable them to plan
and potentially launch attacks from West Africa. While this threat is
linked more to USEUCOM, it could eventually threaten security in
USCENTCOM and eventually pose risks to the homeland in the form of
terrorism, illicit criminal activity, and migration flows.
Since the withdrawal of US and French forces from Mali in 2022 and
more recently the withdrawal of US and French forces from Niger in
2024, terrorist organizations have made significant advancements in the
Sahel and are now threatening the littoral countries of the Gulf of
Guinea. The only capabilities in place to counter the terrorist threat
are special operations and conventional forces from our Allies that
receive limited US support.
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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. Has the intelligence and data provided by Ukraine on
Russian technology, captured equipment, battlefield operational guides,
weapon performance, and countermeasures against U.S. and Allied systems
been useful to your command? Will it have saved the lives of U.S.
service personnel in a war against an enemy peer nation?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
Mr. Scott. Has the intelligence and data provided by Ukraine on
Russian technology, captured equipment, battlefield operational guides,
weapon performance, and countermeasures against U.S. and Allied systems
been useful to your command? Will it have saved the lives of U.S.
service personnel in a war against an enemy peer nation?
General Langley. Congressman, I can answer that question at a
higher classification level.
Mr. Scott. Sec. 8006 of H.R. 2882, the Further Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2024 (P.L. 118-47) made $100,000,000 available
for transfer to "expand cooperation, share operational information,
advance interoperability , or improve the capabilities of our allies
and partners" for both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM. How has USAFRICOM made use
of this transfer authority?
General Langley. The $100,000,000 available for transfer authority
was allocated evenly between USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM, with each
receiving $50,000,000. USAFRICOM applied the funding to a number of
efforts that aligned with its scope, to include African Partner Rescue
and Casualty Evacuation, Aviation Landing Zone Improvements, Small Arms
Range improvements, Improved Maritime Domain Awareness Capabilities,
Training to African Partner Capacity across various issue areas
(disease control, intelligence sharing, humanitarian assistance,
disaster relief, disinformation remediation), and Vehicle Recovery Kits
for African partners countering Violent Extremist Organizations
(VEOs).These efforts specifically supported partners in Benin, Cote
d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya, with positive cascading effects
across other African Partner nations.
Mr. Scott. Earlier this year, due to budget uncertainty, USAFRICOM
abruptly ordered the withdrawal of two commercially-provided manned-ISR
aircraft from Abidjan, Cote D'Ivoire which had been supporting SOCAF CT
and AFRICOM GPC missions. What impacts has this reduction in manned-ISR
assets had on the ability of USAFRICOM to understand and react to
growing terrorist threats, and actions of our adversaries like China
and Russia in West Africa? What resources would USAFRICOM require in
order to resume the use of these commercially-provided manned ISR
operations in West Africa?
General Langley. The reduction in manned-ISR in Cote D'Ivoire
negatively impacted our ability to monitor, characterize, and counter
potential threats to partners in the West African littorals. Notably,
Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) and ISIS branches in
West Africa desire a presence in littoral West Africa and JNIM has
conducted several attacks in Benin since early January. Airborne-ISR
provided unique counterterrorism collection capabilities in terms of
purpose-built sensors, flexibility to conduct missions at the time and
place most effective for operational action, and ability to readily
share information real-time with our partners. In the case of GPC
missions, the loss of manned ISR has impacted planned partner support
against nefarious activities such as monitoring and reporting countries
complicit in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU-F)
activities within their Exclusive Economic Zones.
To resume Airborne ISR in West Africa, we need dedicated air
assets, basing, overflight accesses, and liaison officers. To
reconstitute these necessary African partnerships, we need to consider
expanding the scope of discussion beyond manned-ISR to unmanned-ISR,
including Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (TUAS).
Mr. Scott. What is AFRICOM's current assessment of the scale and
impact of IUUF in African waters, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea,
and how does it prioritize this issue relative to other maritime
security threats?
General Langley. IUUF, particularly activities by China and other
foreign nation distance water fleets, are leading to the rapid
reduction of West African and Gulf of Guinea fish stocks. This
complicates maritime security efforts in the region by exacerbating
food scarcity issues and depleting revenues for local governments.
USAFRICOM has limited resources to provide tailored training to local
coast guards, and only a small amount of equipment to provide to select
partner forces. We support regional security constructs, and when able,
highlight IUUF violations to our partners. Currently, USAFRICOM has no
assigned or allocated Coast Guard or Navy ships, and our ability to
counter this malign activity is minimal.
Mr. Scott. How does AFRICOM integrate IUUF into its broader
maritime security strategy, and what role does it play in shaping U.S.
national security objectives in Africa, as outlined in the 2022
National Security Memorandum on Combating IUUF?
General Langley. USAFRICOM's priorities are to defend the U.S.
Homeland from terrorist threats and to deter PRC global military
ambitions on the African continent in alignment with the 2025 Interim
National Defense Strategic Guidance. We are currently conducting
assessments of our campaign activities to identify areas where our
African partners can assume a more active role in countering illicit
activities so that our limited resources can be focused on stated DoD
priorities. Key Partners in this strategy to prioritize burden sharing
include Senegal, Cabo Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Seychelles
and Mauritius. Through tailored, limited investments in training and
equipment, USAFRICOM can better enable willing partners to
independently address their regional maritime security challenges.
Mr. Scott. How does AFRICOM support African navies and coast guards
in building capacity for IUUF enforcement, particularly in areas like
evidence collection, legal prosecution, and cross-border interdiction?
General Langley. Historically, USAFRICOM has conducted small boat
operations/interdictions, as well as mentoring, through both OBANGAME
and CUTLASS EXPRESS exercises. Maritime partners participate in NAVAF
and USAFRICOM-sponsored exercises and operations, working alongside the
US and other African partners to operationalize the capabilities to
monitor their territorial waters and conduct counter-IUUF missions. The
EXPRESS series of exercises, including OBANGAME, CUTLASS, and PHOENIX,
all include IUUF enforcement scenarios focused on training national and
regional response to IUUF and associated crimes. Additionally, NAVAF's
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises train
partners to the identify illegal fishing and dark vessel activity in
the host nation's waters, supported by the U.S. Maritime Operations
Center (MOC) Support Team through the U.S. Maritime SAFE interagency
working group. CARAT was conducted for the first time in FY25 with
Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Ghana, Our embedded liaison officers
from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Customs and Border
Patrol (CBP), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) coordinate
evidence collection, legal prosecution and cross-border interdiction
training and awareness. We are currently assessing our campaign
activities and exercises to identify areas where our African partners
can assume a more active role in countering illicit activities so that
our limited resources can be focused on countering terrorist threats to
the Homeland and countering malign PRC activities on the continent.
Mr. Scott. What specific capabilities and resources does AFRICOM
leverage to enhance maritime domain awareness (MDA) and counter IUUF in
African waters, and how are these coordinated with regional partners
like the Yaounde Code of Conduct signatories?
General Langley. USAFRICOM provides select African Partners with
joint maritime domain awareness capabilities to counter IUUF and other
illicit activity. One capability, SeaVision, has been used by our
African partners to counter IUUF and other illicit activity.
Additionally, a combination of data sets, models, and visualization
techniques has been used to inform African partners and NATO allies
during engagements and planning efforts to better enable their
respective independent operations. NAVAF has Security Cooperation
programs with 15 African maritime partners that provide coastal radar
systems and other sensors, maritime operation center equipment, and
training by US Navy and US Coast Guard operations center experts. The
programs also provide coastal patrol watercraft and spare parts
packages, along with training to build maintenance and sustainment
programs for those new equipment packages. These are multi-year Title
10 funded programs, usually spanning 5+ years from concept to equipment
and training delivery. As a result, NAVAF has been able to foster
strong relationships that lead to African support of other beneficial
activities such as regional maritime initiatives, joint operations, and
significant key leader engagements.
Mr. Scott. What challenges does AFRICOM face in addressing the
nexus between IUUF and transnational crimes, such as drug smuggling,
human trafficking, and illegal transshipment, and how are these
addressed in operations?
General Langley. Our greatest challenge is maintaining focus on
global terrorist threats to the U.S. Homeland emanating from Africa
while simultaneously preventing PRC military encroachment on the
African continent. These challenges require a resource-informed
prioritization of operations, activities, and investments that help
enable African Partners and allies to more actively shoulder the burden
of monitoring regional illegal activities, including IUU fishing.
Without maritime assets and the authorities to fund bilateral
operations between the U.S. Navy/Coast Guard and our African partners,
USAFRICOM is limited in its ability to support the partners for
effective interdiction beyond information sharing and training within
the EXPRESS and CARAT exercises. Due to the law enforcement nature of
interdicting transnational crimes, U.S. Coast Guard support is vital,
and with the bilateral Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Program (AMLEP),
USAFRICOM and NAVAF are able to directly assist signed partners in law
enforcement. Fishing vessels are often used in other crimes, such as
drug smuggling and illegal immigration. For example, the multinational
boarding team on the USS Mount Whitney interdicted a Brazilian fishing
vessel ferrying cocaine off Cabo Verde in 2023 based on information
received through the Maritime Operations center (MAOC) in Portugal.
This diversity of crimes associated with IUUF requires a whole of
government approach, which the U.S. government has recognized through
the establishment of the Maritime SAFE working group. A majority of the
U.S.'s initiatives to counter IUUF are unfunded, apart from specific
Department of State initiatives. While the persistence of the counter-
IUUF support operations stands as a success story of effective
coordination between dedicated interagency point of contacts, the
process is by no means streamlined and efficient for the pursual of
supporting the African partners.
Mr. Scott. How does AFRICOM utilize partnerships with the U.S.
Coast Guard and other interagency entities to enhance IUUF
countermeasures, and what gaps remain in these collaborations?
General Langley. USAFRICOM partners with the U.S. Coast Guard
through the African Maritime Law Enforcement Program, which uses law
enforcement authorities to support African countries in their fight
against IUUF. USAFRICOM values all interagency coordination, which
helps enable our priorities to defend the Homeland and deter China's
military ambitions on the African continent. We will continue to
coordinate with the Coast Guard as they enable African Partners to
shoulder the burden of illegal fishing activities off the coast of
Africa.
Mr. Scott. What emerging technologies or innovative approaches is
AFRICOM exploring to improve detection and deterrence of IUUF in
African waters?
General Langley. USAFRICOM supports the use of technology to
improve the detection of IUUF in African waters. We collaborate with
the interagency, allies, and partners to implement such capabilities.
However, USAFRICOM's primary focus regarding emerging technologies is
on the ability to conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance activities that monitor terrorist organizations with the
capability and intent to attack the US Homeland. Additionally, we seek
innovative solutions to address information gaps regarding PRC
intentions in Africa, as well as advanced technology to counter
information operations propaganda campaigns designed to diminish U.S.
credibility among African Partners. In the FY25 CUTLASS and OBANGAME
exercises, the Navy's Disruptive Capabilities Office used advanced data
streams, including radio frequency (RF) and Electro-Optic data to track
a dark vessel in the scenario. NAVAF provided Maritime Domain Awareness
(MDA) subject matter experts from the Department of Transportation,
Naval Air Warfare Center (NAVAIR) and Naval Warfare Center (NAVWAR) to
coach the US and partner forces. The Coordinated Afloat Readiness and
Training (CARAT) exercise was a new approach in Africa this year.
Although the Navy does not have a vessel assigned to USAFRICOM, we
provided partners with logistics, planning, MDA and intelligence
support so that they could conduct their own interdiction operations.
FY25 CARATs were completed in Kenya, Cote D'Ivoire and Senegal, with
more scheduled for Ghana and Cabo Verde. There were great results in
all locations. For example, in Kenya, the Kenyan Navy boarded two
fishing vessels and hailed 12 more. USAFRICOM could accomplish much
more with assigned naval assets. NAVAF also deploys unmanned systems to
the region to collect information. For example, during OBANGAME EXPRESS
and the Senegal CARAT, SIXTH Fleet CTF-66 deployed unmanned surface
vessels that provided imagery of vessels of interest into SeaVision.
NAVAF also provided Starlink capabilities for the ships for the CARATs
to pass video to land in real time.
Mr. Scott. How does AFRICOM assess the potential for IUUF to
destabilize coastal African states, and what preventive measures are in
place to mitigate risks of conflict or economic collapse?
General Langley. While the broader interagency should continue to
address IUUF, the greatest destabilizing threat to Coastal West Africa
involves terror networks that actively target civilians and partner
militaries. We are assessing our campaign activities to identify areas
where our African partners can assume a more active role in countering
illicit activities so USAFRICOM can focus our limited resources on
countering terrorist threats to the Homeland and countering PRC
military encroachment on the continent. USAFRICOM uses our limited
resources to provide tailored training and a small amount of equipment
to select partner forces, enabling them to better independently counter
this malign activity, along with other regional maritime security
challenges.
Mr. Scott. What is AFRICOM's long-term vision for reducing IUUF in
Africa, and how does it plan to measure success in terms of ecological,
economic, and security outcomes?
General Langley. We will continue to support the work of U.S.
Government agencies focused on fisheries enforcement through
information sharing. With key allies in the lead, and with the support
of the interagency, our African Partners will be better positioned to
act independently to address regional illegal activity. USAFRICOM will
continue to assess our campaign objectives and refine our targeted
burden sharing investments to better enable our Partners and allies for
success in the future.
Mr. Scott. What lessons from Obangame Express 2025 can AFRICOM
apply to future exercises to enhance African partners' ability to
independently secure their waters against IUUF?
General Langley. One lesson learned is including our African
partners' interagency counterparts in the exercises. We cannot make
progress in IUUF without improving the transparency between agencies
like navies, fisheries, ports and harbors and maritime authorities.
Further, NAVAF is only allowed to spend funds to work with maritime
security agencies and, thus, cannot provide SeaVision licenses or
support the participation of any other agencies in the exercises. This
is a serious constraint. Expanding funding and authorities for other
U.S. agencies to support OBANGAME EXPRESS would allow for more robust
training in support of the whole-of-government approach.
Mr. Scott. What role do you envision for space capabilities in
shaping AFRICOM's long-term theater security cooperation strategy, and
how will these efforts strengthen trust and collaboration with African
partners?
General Langley. Space capabilities are increasingly vital for
USAFRICOM's security cooperation strategy, mirroring their global
importance. African nations are actively developing their space
sectors, evidenced by the 67 satellite launches since 1998 and the
upcoming establishment of the African Space Agency. While initially
focused on socio-economic and environmental needs, these advancements
are now extending to security and defense objectives, emulating the
U.S. Joint Force's reliance on space.
The U.S. has a unique opportunity to partner with African nations,
aiding them in developing space capabilities to support shared goals.
However, with growing commercial options and partnerships with other
nations, we must proactively engage with allies, through Department of
Commerce, Department of State, the Department of Defense, and NASA, to
remain the preferred partner in this rapidly expanding sector.
Mr. Scott. How is AFRICOM incorporating space-based capabilities,
such as satellite communications or imagery, into theater security
cooperation programs to strengthen the capacity of African partner
nations in areas like border security or counterterrorism?
General Langley. USAFRICOM incorporates commercial imagery,
satellite communications, and space capabilities training into theater
security cooperation programs to strengthen the capacity of African
partner nations. Commercially available satellite imagery gives African
partners critical information for border security, such as monitoring
illicit activity, unregulated border crossings, and detecting potential
threats. The increasing capability and capacity of commercial
collection, particularly imagery, has significantly increased the
amount and quality of products that can be shared. The implementation
of a National Geospatial Agency tool allows for dissemination of
products over the internet, eliminating the need for classified
networks or in-person transfer of hard copy products. USAFRICOM builds
partner capacity through training and skills development on the use of
space-based capabilities. Training includes imagery analysis
tradecraft, communication systems infrastructure management, and
counterterrorism network and pattern development.
A prime example of training is with Angola. Our planned FY27
Significant Security Cooperation Initiative (SSCI) will add a crucial
strategic military intelligence component to the existing USSPACECOM
space domain awareness initiative. This integrated approach will
leverage Angola's planned Airbus electro-optical satellite, making it a
cornerstone of their ISR architecture. USAFRICOM will empower Angola to
receive data and independently collect, process, analyze, and share it
using the software and training we provide. This initiative will
include instruction on imagery analysis techniques, data fusion, and
ground station operations ensuring long-term sustainability and true
partner ownership. This training also directly strengthens our ability
to burden share with our African partners.
Mr. Scott. What initiatives is AFRICOM pursuing to share space-
derived data with African partners to foster collaborative security
efforts and enhance regional stability?
General Langley. USAFRICOM employs a National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency tool called the Protected Internet Exchange (PIX)
Portal. This tool serves as a secure platform for accessing and
disseminating critical imagery and geospatial data. Similarly, the "GXP
Xplorer" application allows partner analysts to visualize and interact
with this data effectively. One example of PiX's efficacy is through
Angola. USAFRICOM provided Angola's Military Intelligence and Security
Service (SISM) with the PIX portal. Currently, we are introducing SISM
personnel to these tools and commercial satellite imagery to enhance
their independent analytic capabilities. These tools allow SISM
analysts to generate intelligence products relevant to Angolan regional
security priorities.
USAFRICOM also uses Global Positioning Systems to advise African
partners' operational planning and execution. This data is critical in
operational border security and counterterrorism. It prevents
fratricide or unintended engagement with neighboring nations and
mitigates unnecessary risk against terrorist actors. Additionally,
USAFRICOM is exploring the use of commercial Radio Frequency-sensing to
detect and track anomalies in electronic emissions. Detecting these
emissions alerts partners to investigate potential security threats
within their areas of influence. Deciphering emissions lends to further
burden sharing to our African partners to combat illicit maritime and
border activity.
Mr. Scott. How does AFRICOM leverage space-based tools in exercises
to train African partners for disaster response and humanitarian
assistance, particularly in using satellite imagery for rapid crisis
assessment?
General Langley. USAFRICOM is limited to UNCLASSIFIED space-based
tools when exercising with African partners. Primarily, USAFRICOM
exercises leverage commercial satellite imagery for use in planning.
These capabilities allow the US joint force to evaluate terrain,
population centers, and infrastructure while planning operations within
exercises. Most importantly, since these images are UNCLASSIFIED, the
US joint force participants can share their work with African partners
to conduct combined planning and de-confliction of operational spaces.
Mr. Scott. What steps is AFRICOM taking to educate and train
African partner forces on the importance of space domain awareness and
its role in modern military operations?
General Langley. Commercial satellite imagery is used in exercises
because it is fully releasable to partners. These tools allow the US
joint force to plan operations which are synchronized and de-conflicted
with local security forces, all using the same up-to-date maps and
imagery. This demonstrates the benefits of space-informed battlespace
awareness and leads to more interoperable communications with partners,
especially those participating in small-unit CT missions in East
Africa.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
Ms. Stefanik. General Kurilla, as the Islamic Republic of Iran
deepens ties with countries like China, Russia, North Korea and others
that seek to destroy our way of life, in ways ranging from drone
exports to arms tech-how do you assess the long-term risk to U.S.
military deterrence and our interests in the CENTCOM AOR?
General Kurilla. (U) Iran's deepening ties with these countries
presents a risk of increased regional instabilit y. China and Russia
have proven their tendency to take advantage of partnerships to the
detriment of their counterparts, and there is reason to believe that
this would be the case in the CENTCOM AOR. Our ability to deter
aggression diminishes as these nations increase their involvement in
the region. For this reason, our regional partnerships are of paramount
importance. The Middle East nations must continue to see us as the more
reliable partner, in comparison to China and Russia, and this takes
engagement and presence.
Ms. Stefanik. What is your assessment of Iran's military and
technological cooperation with China? Specifically, how is China
supporting Iran's missile programs, drone technology, or nuclear
ambitions, and what risks does this pose to U.S. forces and allies in
the CENTCOM region?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
Ms. Stefanik. As we know, Russia also continues to supply Iran with
advanced weaponry and intelligence support. How is this relationship
enhancing Tehran's ability to challenge U.S. interests and regional
stability, especially through proxy groups in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
Ms. Stefanik. What else do we need to do in order to continue to
deter the growing axis of evil?
General Kurilla. (U) Deterrence is a functional of capability,
capacity, messaging and most importantly will. Iranian proxies and Iran
directly respond to strength and action and they must know we will hold
them accountable for attacks on our forces. We must always signal,
through our actions and messages, to our allies and partners that we
stand with them and that we are a reliable partner. Strengthening those
relationships and bolstering our partners' capacities is key to
limiting the growth and influence of the axis of evil.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you all for being here today and thank you
General Kurilla and General Langley for your service to this country.
With reports that Iran is only weeks away from producing weapons-grade
uranium and its nuclear infrastructure more vulnerable than ever, can
you speak to your concerns regarding a potential Iranian nuclear
breakout?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
Ms. Stefanik. During his first administration, President Trump
moved Israel from EUCOM to CENTCOM marking a historic shift and
furthering his reputation as the most Pro-Israel President in American
history. General Kurilla, can you speak about how the mil to mil
relationship has strengthened between the two countries since this
change in 2021?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
Ms. Stefanik. Since October 2023, there have been at least 210
Iran-backed attacks targeting U.S. troops in Iraq, Syria, or Jordan.
Can you discuss how CENTCOM's credible deterrence posture under
President Trump has changed the Ayatollah's calculus?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
Ms. Stefanik. Can you discuss some of the work that Fort Drum's
10th Mountain Division has done with developing key counter-UAS
technology under your leadership?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
Ms. Stefanik. General Kurilla, Israel's decisive military success
against Hezbollah, the toppling of the Assad regime in Syria, along
with the recent political advancements in both countries are welcomed
developments. However, it is clear that Hezbollah and other Iranian
proxies are actively working to rebuild and restore their networks of
terror. Can you explain why it's strategically important for the United
States to push back decisively against Iranian-backed proxies?
General Kurilla. (U) Iran and its proxies thrive in chaotic and
unstable conditions and therefore will do all in their power to create
such conditions. Pushing back against these proxies through a whole-of-
government approach will help prevent them from meeting their goal of
generating instability that they can later capitalize on. Our goal of a
peaceful and stable Middle East cannot be achieved if these Iranian-
backed proxies are able to operate with impunity.
Ms. Stefanik. How does our posture toward these proxies affect the
confidence of regional partners like Israel, Jordan, and the Gulf
states in our commitment to collective security?
General Kurilla. (U) The posture of the United States towards
Iranian proxies has a significant impact on regional partners' (Israel,
Jordan, and Gulf states) confidence in American commitment to
collective security in the region. Regional partners are concerned with
Iranian aspirations for regional dominance, which they see as a threat
to their own security and stability. If the US is perceived as not
taking adequate and acceptable measures to counter Iranian proxy
threats, it can create a sense of uncertainty and insecurity in the
region, eroding partners' confidence in US commitment to their own
security and decrease their willingness to cooperate with the US on
regional security issues. Regional partners generally acknowledge the
need for a collective approach to address the challenges posed by Iran
andits proxies. Although each partner has its own view on what that
means, they all consistently look to the US to play a leading role in
developing and implementing a comprehensive strategy to counter these
threats. US CENTCOM must have a sufficient sustainable, and predictable
posture to be able to deter these Iranian proxies as well as to
integrate with our partners in the region. If you do not have
sufficient posture, you cannot deter or partner.
Ms. Stefanik. How does our posture toward these proxies affect the
confidence of regional partners like Israel, Jordan, and the Gulf
states in our commitment to collective security?
General Kurilla. (U) The posture of the United States towards
Iranian proxies has a significant impact on regional partners' (Israel,
Jordan, and Gulf states) confidence in American commitment to
collective security in the region. Regional partners are concerned with
Iranian aspirations for regional dominance, which they see as a threat
to their own security and stabilit y. If the US is perceived as not
taking adequate and acceptable measures to counter Iranian proxy
threats, it can create a sense of uncertainty and insecurity in the
region, eroding partners' confidence in US commitment to their own
security and decrease their willingness to cooperate with the US on
regional security issues. Regional partners generally acknowledge the
need for a collective approach to address the challenges posed by Iran
andits proxies. Although each partner has its own view on what that
means, they all consistently look to the US to play a leading role in
developing and implementing a comprehensive strategy to counter these
threats. US CENTCOM must have a sufficient sustainable, and predictable
posture to be able to deter these Iranian proxies as well as to
integrate with our partners in the region. If you do not have
sufficient posture, you cannot deter or partner.
Ms. Stefanik. With Hezbollah's recent military losses and Iran's
intent to rebuild, how do you assess the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon's (UNIFIL) current
capability to interdict weapons flows and prevent Hezbollah's
resurgence?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
Ms. Stefanik. General Kurilla, when Israel officially shifted into
the CENTCOM AOR in 2021 from EUCOM, it was hailed a major success.
Given Azerbaijan's increasing military and intelligence cooperation
with Israel, its strengthening ties with the U.S., and its active role
in countering Iranian aggression in the region, can you explain why
Azerbaijan is not currently included within CENTCOM's Area of
Responsibility or AOR?
General Kurilla. (U) The UCP is written with Combatant Command and
Service input but ultimately authored by the Joint Staff and OSD and
signed by the President. USCENTCOM is not a decision authority. We
refer you to OSD for more information.
Ms. Stefanik. What are the implications of this exclusion for U.S.
strategic interests, coordination in the broader Middle East, and the
current dispute with the neighboring Armenia?
General Kurilla. (U) Despite the exclusion of Azerbaijan from our
AOR, we are able to work effectively with EUCOM to implement policy and
achieve U.S. interests regarding Azerbaijan and relations with CENTCOM
nations. Azerbaijan and Israel maintain a positive relationship with
strong diplomatic, economic, and security ties, driven by a shared
interest in regional stability and a desire to counter Iranian
influence. CENTCOM coordinates daily across COCOM boundaries to achieve
objectives in parallel with adjacent COCOMs.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you all for being here today and thank you
General Kurilla and General Langley for your service to this country.
With reports that Iran is only weeks away from producing weapons-grade
uranium and its nuclear infrastructure more vulnerable than ever, can
you speak to your concerns regarding a potential Iranian nuclear
breakout?
General Langley. There is most definitely a worldwide concern
surrounding the increased threats posed by a nuclear weaponized Iran;
however for specifics, I would defer to General Kurilla.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY
Mr. Kelly. General Kurilla, Uzbekistan remains one of our most
capable and reliable security partners in Central Asia-and through the
National Guard's State Partnership Program, we've built a relationship
rooted in trust, not just transactions. But we know Russia and China
are working overtime to erode that influence. From your vantage point,
what's the strategic risk if we don't adequately support this
partnership-with tools like FMS, targeted capability investments, or
military-to-military cooperation programs like SPP?
General Kurilla. (U) Uzbekistan is one of our closest partners in
Central Asia, and the Mississippi National Guard does an outstanding
job of building the military-to-military relationship with Uzbekistan
through continuous and reliable engagements. I strongly support the
State Partnership Program (SPP), especially as we continue to build the
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (!SR) aircraft program
in Uzbekistan using Title 10 333 authorities and funding. The aircraft
program is designed to allow for increased intelligence sharing,
improved security along Uzbekistan's border with Afghanistan, and
improving Uzbekistan's capabilities to counter violent extremist
organizations. If we fail to prioritize our relationship with
Uzbekistan, the real strategic risk is ceding space and influence to
Russia and China.
Mr. Kelly. AFRICOM and CENTCOM relies heavily on host-nation
support and discreet basing access across the continent. What's the
risk to U.S. posture and responsiveness if we don't invest in those
relationships-whether through infrastructure support, partner training,
or co-development efforts?
General Kurilla. (U) USCENTCOM's military-to-military relationships
with Central Region partners is a strategic advantage, built over years
of developing an integrated network of regional security constructs
that enhance warfighting capabilities not only for the U.S. but also
for our partners. The significance of these relationships was evident
in recent operations, such as the defense of Israel against Iranian
ballistic missile and UAS attacks, defending freedom of navigation in
the Red Sea, and executing Operation MIDNIGHT HAMMER, which may not
have been achievable without the established framework. Neglecting
these relationships could limit access to critical infrastructure,
intelligence, and logistics, as well as discourage partners from
sharing the burden.
Mr. Kelly. Our subcommittee has consistently advocated for giving
combatant commanders the ability to pull capabilities when they need
them-not wait years for procurement cycles. One example is in ISR and
other capabilities-as-a-service tools that can deliver persistent
coverage or effects without long acquisition tails. This includes
space-based, unmanned, and aerial refueling capabilities. Please tell
the Committee about the extent of your use of capabilities as a service
and how it fits into your toolkit as commanders. Please prioritize the
list of CaaS that you use most often/with the highest dollar amount. If
the accounts were zero-sum, how would you re-balance the list of CaaS
you currently use?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
Mr. Kelly. One of the reasons I've championed the SHIPS for America
Act-alongside my colleagues from California the Honorable John
Garamendi and 60 others, and our Senate colleagues Todd Young, Mark
Kelly and many others-is because we can't surge to the fight if we
can't move the fight. And right now, we're staring down a sealift
shortfall with an aging, shrinking fleet that's frankly on borrowed
time. From your positions as combatant commanders: what are the
operational consequences if we don't recapitalize our strategic sealift
fleet? How does the current state of our sealift capacity impact your
ability to move force packages at speed in a major contingency?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
Mr. Kelly. AFRICOM and CENTCOM relies heavily on host-nation
support and discreet basing access across the continent. What's the
risk to U.S. posture and responsiveness if we don't invest in those
relationships-whether through infrastructure support, partner training,
or co-development efforts?
General Langley. Maintaining strong relationships through posture
and agreements ensures reliable access and improves our operational
capabilities relative to competitors. Crisis response, counterterrorism
efforts, and adversary deterrence activities are all made possible
through relationships with strong African Partners. USAFRICOM's
locations, while limited, are crucial for swift responses, including
non-combatant evacuations and potential support for major combat
operations. Because host nations often do not have infrastructure to
the requisite standard or scale to support requirements, they rely on
small U.S. investments as a force multiplier to meet shared security
objectives.
Mr. Kelly. Our subcommittee has consistently advocated for giving
combatant commanders the ability to pull capabilities when they need
them-not wait years for procurement cycles. One example is in ISR and
other capabilities-as-a-service tools that can deliver persistent
coverage or effects without long acquisition tails. This includes
space-based, unmanned, and aerial refueling capabilities. Please tell
the Committee about the extent of your use of capabilities as a service
and how it fits into your toolkit as commanders. Please prioritize the
list of CaaS that you use most often/with the highest dollar amount. If
the accounts were zero-sum, how would you re-balance the list of CaaS
you currently use?
General Langley. In USAFRICOM, "ISR-as-a-service" is our top-
priority "Capability-as-a-service." It provides persistent surveillance
across a vast area of responsibility where we have limited assigned or
allocated assets, allowing us to respond quickly to emerging threats
without waiting on procurement cycles.
We also leverage the USAFRICOM Warfighter Recovery Network as a
personnel recovery and CASEVAC service. It ensures we can rapidly
recover and care for U.S. personnel in austere and contested
environments.
If resources were constrained, ISR-as-a-service would remain our
top priority given its broad operational impact.
Mr. Kelly. One of the reasons I've championed the SHIPS for America
Act-alongside my colleagues from California the Honorable John
Garamendi and 60 others, and our Senate colleagues Todd Young, Mark
Kelly and many others-is because we can't surge to the fight if we
can't move the fight. And right now, we're staring down a sealift
shortfall with an aging, shrinking fleet that's frankly on borrowed
time. From your positions as combatant commanders: what are the
operational consequences if we don't recapitalize our strategic sealift
fleet? How does the current state of our sealift capacity impact your
ability to move force packages at speed in a major contingency?
General Langley. A failure to recapitalize the strategic sealift
fleet significantly degrades the U.S.'s ability to project power,
respond to crises, and deter aggression. It introduces unacceptable
risks to national security and undermines the effectiveness of the U.S.
military. The speed at which the U.S. can respond is diminished, and
the overall cost of deployment likely increases as airlift is used as a
stopgap. An additional issue to consider is having adequately trained
and equipped sailors to man them. In 2025, for example, USAFRICOM lost
the USS Herschel Woody Williams due to a shortfall of available
Merchant Mariners.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CROW
Mr. Crow. GEN Kurilla, in FY23 this committee created the Civilian
Protection Center of Excellence (CPCOE) on a bipartisan basis. We
understand that we can't effectively conduct our mission, win the
support of the local population, reduce civilian casualties, and ensure
the effectiveness of our precision and targeting unless we make
protecting civilians mission essential. Based on your leadership of a
battalion in Iraq in 2005 and extensive experience at CENTCOM, do you
agree that engaging with civilian populations and reducing civilian
casualties as part of our operations is mission essential? Is it
accurate to say that precision makes us more combat effective because
it reduces civilian casualties which earns the support of civilian
populations?
General Kurilla. (U) Yes, reducing civilian casualties is always a
priority when planning and executing our military operations and is
something we take very seriously. Precision does make us more
effective. While we will never be able to eliminate all civilian harm
during military operations, it is important that we make every effort
to minimize it, admit when it happens, and learn from past operations
how to meet our military objectives.
Mr. Crow. GEN Kurilla, the US military has spent many years working
to improve its ability to prevent and mitigate civilian harm from its
operations, consistent with both US values and strategic goals -
including through the development of the DoD Instruction on Civilian
Harm under the first Trump administration and the Civilian Harm
Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP). The Department of
Defense has provided notice to Congress that they are going to defund
and shut down the CPCOE. How could cuts to the CPCOE affect your
command's ability to prevent and respond to civilian harm? How do
civilian harm mitigation and response efforts further CENTCOM's
operational effectiveness?
General Kurilla. (U) CPCoE and CENTCOM CHMR billets contribute to
our strategic goals as they enable us to be more precise and mitigate
risk to civilian populations, differentiating us from our enemies. The
CPCoE enhances the DoD's ability to retain and share our lessons
learned. Additionally , the reduction of combatant command CHMR
positions will force other warfighting / staff billets to execute the
civilian harm mitigation and response effort s, which is particularly
burdensome in our very kinetic AOR. CHMR pos it ions increase our
precision and capability to mitigate civilian harm, ultimately
enhancing our operational effectiveness.
Mr. Crow. GEN Kurilla, civil society and media organizations have
reported civilian casualties caused by recent US operations in Yemen.
Were the civilian harm mitigation and response experts at CENTCOM and/
or at the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence consulted in
planning for these strikes? How is CENTCOM assessing reports of
civilian harm? When will CENTCOM publish the findings of these
assessments?
General Kurilla. (U) Yes. Every planned target undergoes thorough
vetting and validation, including detailed analysis of its proximity to
civilian infrastructure, population centers, and potential collateral
damage risks. Civilian Harm Mitigation Response (CHMR) expert s conduct
in-depth assessments, leveraging all available tools and sources of
information, to predict the potential for civilian harm. CENTCOM has
CHMR expert s fully integrated within the Joint Targeting Process as
part of the Joint Fires Element. CHMR experts analyze post-strike data
and provide feedback from the information environment to identify areas
for improvement and refine our processes for future strikes.
(U) Our Civilian Harm Assessments Cell is processing all received
reports and will publish the findings in the Annual CIVCAS Section 1057
Report to Congress which is submitted annually by May 1.
Mr. Crow. GEN Kurilla, the administration issued a travel ban for
Afghan citizens, with President Trump saying that it applies to
countries that "don't have things under control." What is your
assessment of the current threat environment in Afghanistan? Have
civilians that assisted American coalition forces been targeted by the
Taliban and are they at risk of reprisals?
General Kurilla. (U) Afghans who are former members of the Afghan
military or who assisted U.S./Coalition Forces are most at risk. They
would likely be subjected to reprisals from the Taliban for these
connections. The Taliban Regime has a policy against such reprisals,
but it is likely poorly enforced. Rogue Taliban members or other
aggrieved parties could retaliate against the above-mentioned
individuals with relative impunity.
Mr. Crow. GEN Kurilla, the Department of Homeland Security plans to
terminate the Temporary Protected Status of around 10,000 Afghans on
July 14th, leaving them open to deportation back to Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan. DHS claims that the security and economic situation in
Afghanistan has improved enough to remove their Temporary Protected
Status. Is Afghanistan now safe enough for civilians that fled the
Taliban to return?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
Mr. Crow. GEN Kurilla, Secretary of State Rubio recently testified
that without increased foreign aid and investment, Syria is on the
verge of a full-scale civil war. Do you share the State Department's
assessment that Syria is on the brink of another civil war and is the
transitional government at risk of imminent collapse? How does lifting
sanctions and allowing foreign aid impact security dynamics in Syria?
General Kurilla. (U) Syria's stability remains fragile after a mere
seven months following the collapse of the Assad regime. Absent
progress on foreign aid, investment, and sanctions relief, Syria's
economic and security situation will remain volatile, putting the
country at risk for internal conflict. As you are aware, Syria is a
patchwork of ethno-sectarian constituencies with competing regional
interests and has been a key operating area for terrorist groups and
Iran-backed malign elements. The Syrian governing aut horit ies'
ability to deliver on civil services, foster commerce, mend sectarian
divides, combat terrorism, and establish good governance with popular
representation all play into Syria's trajectory and ultimately the risk
to our homeland.
(U) From a military perspective, a critical challenge for the
transitional government is providing a secure and stable environment
for Syrians, and that comes at a massive financial cost following
decades of conflict amid the Assad regime's rule. If it is unable to
fund essential services and a cohesive, funct ioning security
apparatus, the government is at risk of collapse. If the government
collapses, it could trigger another civil war with significant regional
and transregional impacts. Lifting sanctions and allowing foreign aid
can provide the government a way to establish security partnerships
that build and enable effective Syrian security forces to confront
internal and external threats. With our help, and that of the
international community, Syria could grow into a strong and reliable
regional partner with robust economic, political and military
institutions.
Mr. Crow. GEN Kurilla, what is the current state of Russian and
Iranian operations in Syria? How would increased Iranian influence in
Syria affect the security and stability of your area of operation? How
have Turkish forces along Syria's northern border reacted to the SDF-
HTS integration agreement?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
Mr. Crow. GEN Langley, in your opening statement before this
committee last year, you said "USAID resources can cultivate economic
and human development so African governments have more resources for
security independence." How has shuttering USAID initiatives affected
internal stability and security cooperation in your area of operation?
Do you believe the freeze in foreign assistance has allowed China to
expand its influence in Africa?
General Langley. As the State Department continues to assume and
assess the roles that were previously fulfilled by USAID, USAFRICOM
remains committed to working with the interagency to ensure a whole of
government approach to addressing the causes of terrorism and
countering the PRC on the African continent. Through DoD's Office of
Strategic Capital, we are also working with the Department of State,
Department of Commerce, and other appropriate agencies to address the
malign activity of China and Russia that exploits African nations for
critical resources that feed their respective defense economies.
Mr. Crow. GEN Langley, a new Health Policy analysis estimates that
1 million children could become infected with HIV, nearly half a
million could die from AIDS by 2030, and 2.8 million children could be
orphaned in the region without consistent, stable funding programs like
PEPFAR. What kind of destabilizing effect would this have in your area
of operation?
General Langley. The USAFRICOM AOR, with 53 sovereign nations and
over 1.5 billion people, has many acute challenges that require a whole
of government approach to address. USAFRICOM, with its limited
resources, is focused on the most pressing terrorist threats to the
U.S. Homeland and PRC military encroachment on the continent. As we
continue assessing our campaign activities to ensure alignment to the
interim national defense strategic guidance, we will remain linked with
OSD Policy to discuss potential opportunities for interagency
coordination. We value the investment of our allies and partners on
shared interests, to include health diplomacy activities, that help
enable African Partners to become more stable and more effective
security exporters. We will continue to collaborate with the State
Department to better enable our allies and Partners to address this
issue.
Mr. Crow. GEN Langley, you recently stated before a conference on
African defense in Kenya that the US is assessing the future of AFRICOM
and its potential merger with EUCOM. How would merging AFRICOM and
EUCOM impact your ability to coordinate operations with African allies
and partners? What effect would a merger have on your capabilities and
operational control across Africa?
General Langley. As I stated in my testimony to the Senate on April
3rd, I will not speculate on evolving defense policy. However, I will
reiterate the importance of the African theater of operations. It is a
nexus of serious threats to U.S. national security, and where global
terrorist organizations, the PRC, Russia, and Iran all are actively
pursuing malign activities on the continent to undermine U.S.
influence.
In 2007, the amount of worldwide terrorist activities originating
from Africa represented only 2% of the total. Today, 43% of the world's
terrorist activity is found on the African continent. In that same
timeframe, the PRC has invested $72 Billion dollars across Africa.
China is Africa's largest trading partner, with trade reaching $295.6
billion in 2024 alone. Africa must continue to be prioritized as a
theater that reflects its role as the fastest growing continent in the
world, but one with nearly 50% of the world's terrorist activity, and
its great importance to the PRC for long-term resource sustainment.
Mr. Crow. Ms. Thompson, Given the importance of civilian harm
mitigation and response efforts and the vital role of the CPCOE in
furthering our capabilities, why is the Department of Defense trying to
dismantle the CPCOE?
Ms. Thompson. DoD is in the process of reviewing multiple programs
to ensure their alignment with administration priorities. Any
organizational changes to the CP CoE will reflect our effort to
optimize its functions, potentially integrating them into other
existing structures, while still fulfilling the underlying objective of
minimizing civilian harm. The Secretary of Defense retains the
authority to determine the most effective organizational structure for
the CP CoE and other offices to ensure they effectively support DoD
efforts to mitigate and respond to civilian harm without compromising
operational effectiveness.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RYAN
Mr. Ryan. General Kurilla and General Langley: Several COCOMs have
successfully fielded an initial scaling of Maven Smart System. However,
there are still large gaps in who has it and on what networks. In your
experience, has this system been successful in maximizing speed,
accuracy and better information and decisions? And should it be further
scaled to ensure all CENTCOM and AFRICOM warfighters have this joint
warfighting software to enable a data-centric approach to informing
decisions and operations?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
Mr. Ryan. General Kurilla and General Langley: Several COCOMs have
successfully fielded an initial scaling of Maven Smart System. However,
there are still large gaps in who has it and on what networks. In your
experience, has this system been successful in maximizing speed,
accuracy and better information and decisions? And should it be further
scaled to ensure all CENTCOM and AFRICOM warfighters have this joint
warfighting software to enable a data-centric approach to informing
decisions and operations?
General Langley. Maven Smart Systems (MSS) and Advana have been
successful in improving the speed, accuracy, and quality of information
that feeds our decision-making processes. Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) guidance to pipe data from authoritative source systems
into Advana's data lake makes it easy for combatant commands to quickly
service relevant and valuable information into our decision-making
processes that resides within MSS. The centralized deployment of Advana
and MSS by the OSD Chief Data Analytics Officer (CDAO) is a critical
factor in successfully providing combatant commands with decision-
advantage. OSD CDAO's management of software licenses, hardware, and
the IT security overhead would be overwhelming for any single combatant
command. Further still, the centralized deployment of Advana and MSS
allows each of the combatant commands to see, learn, and quickly copy
successful decision-making processes from other combatant commands for
their own use.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GOODEN
Mr. Gooden. General Kurilla, Physical AI is the process of
acquiring data from the physical world through cameras and other
sensors to model data outside of traditional text AI platforms. I am
aware that at Al Udeid Air Force Base, AFCENT has a pilot program for a
physical Artificial Intelligence Monitoring System (AIMS) that
integrates with existing infrastructure, leveraging the base's existing
cameras and sensors to create a real-time common operating picture,
transforming the base into a live data stream that is continuously
analyzed in motion. I understand this has saved almost $150M over the
last 5 years in decreasing workforce oversight costs. What are some of
the major benefits of this program at Al Udeid and do you see it
expanding to other bases across the middle east?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GOODLANDER
Ms. Goodlander. What resources does U.S. Central Command have in
the region that could be accessed and delivered to Gaza to provide
critical aid to civilians?
What steps would U.S. Central Command need to take in order to
mobilize these resources, from an operational perspective?
What barriers are there to access and deliver these resources?
What logistical or other support is required from allies and
partners in the region?
If directed by the President of the United States, how quickly
could U.S. Central Command mobilize and deliver this aid to civilians?
General Kurilla. (U) USCENTCOM maintains an extensive logistics
network across the AOR that could, if directed, be leveraged to provide
aid to civilians. These capabilities include fixed and rotary wing
cargo aircraft, ground cargo assets, and contingency stockpiles of
meals and other supplies.. The broader Joint Force has additional
logistical capabilities if allocated. In terms of authority, it would
require SECDEF or POTUS issue a directive to do so, much like during
the 2024 Gaza relief mission. DoD stocks for humanitarian assistance
(food, medical, clothing) are relatively limited and require costly
replacements.
(U) From an operational perspective, to mobilize resources, CENTCOM
would need to coordinate with the Department of State, which serves as
the lead federal agency for humanitarian assistance. This would involve
requesting unique capabilities from the Department of Defense, which
would then require approval from the Secretary of Defense to authorize
the Commander of the United States Central Command to execute a Foreign
Disaster Relief Operation in support of aid to civilians. However, it's
worth noting that the international community is generally better
positioned to respond to "slow onset" disasters, such as those
involving extreme cases of malnutrition or famine, due to their
specialized expertise and resources. The Department of Defense
resources and capabilities could be utilized as an interim solution in
emergency situations, but a more effective approach would be to
leverage the international community's capabilities, with CENTCOM
playing a supporting role, such as delivering humanitarian rations and
commodities to areas where the humanitarian community does not have
access.
(U) The use of Department of Defense capabilities to deliver
humanitarian aid is typically not a cost-effective option and requires
careful coordination with the Department of State to ensure that goods
and commodities are delivered appropriately to provide the most
effective support to those in need. Furthermore, the government of
Israel, as well as neighboring countries, would need to provide their
support and approval for these efforts, including access to basing and
overflight privileges. A significant barrier to access and delivery is
simply risk to force depending on the delivery method.
(U) Ally and partner logistical or other support would include
access, basing and overflight approvals for US Central Command to
coordinate and deliver aid whether by air, ground, or sea. In addition,
the US would rely on allies and partners for contracting of supplies
and services, funding, coordination, donations, security and force
protection, and distribution of aid through ally and partner provided
distribution resources.
(U) If directed by the President, CENTCOM could mobilize and
deliver aid to civilians through various means, including ground, sea
and U.S. airdrops, or partner-enabled airdrops. The use of established
ports and ground transportation is the most effective and efficient way
to deliver assistance and could be done relatively quickly with the
appropriate approvals. Air drops could potentially occur within a week,
delivering culturally appropriate Meals Ready to Eat, assuming
overflight privileges; however, this is the least effective method of
delivering aid. Movement of aid by truck is the most effective and
cost-efficient method to deliver aid. Ultimately, the success of these
efforts would rely on significant and deliberate coordination with
Israel and the humanitarian community.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MESSMER
Mr. Messmer. If you had to start with a blank piece of paper on the
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, in your best military advice, how
would you design the process, including DOD's internal process?
General Kurilla. (U) The U.S. FMS process remains a vital and
influential tool to bolster partner nation capabilities, integrate
regional networks, and build influence with partner leadership that is
critical to U.S. interests. Despite this, the process is nuanced,
complicated, and appears opaque to our partners. The FMS process
remains bureaucratic and rife with delays. Within CENTCOM, we currently
have over 30 of our priority cases - all aimed at enabling partners
with critical capabilities - stalled. These delays are a persistent
relational irritant to partners - who are essential to regional
security and stability - and frequently drive them into the arms of our
strategic competitors. We assess these delays are tied to four areas:
industry delays, partner delays, USG Policy delays, and U.S. process
delays.
(U) In response to your question, I would overhaul our legacy FMS
process to make it more transparent, more responsive, and better suited
to building partner capabilities that will facilitate burden sharing.
This is not all inclusive of possible measures, but some examples are
below:
1. I believe it is essential that we incentivize industry to invest
in expanded capacity for current and surge capacity to ensure we can
meet our pacing threats. I would invest in the infrastructure required
to create surge capacity among our defense industry partners. Current
surge capabilities take years to stand up; this needs to be shortened
to months for critical and priority requirements. In addition, I would
hold Industry accountable to the timelines and pricing that the partner
agrees to in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance ( LOA). The time and
cost overruns that afflict the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) should not
be passed on to our partners. A stark example of where we have failed
at this is in our partnership with Saudi Arabia. Vendor mismanagement
and oversight shortfalls have almost derailed Saudi Arabia's attempt to
purchase the Multi-Mission Surface Combatant (MMSC) vessel. This
mismanagement has resulted in an approximate seven-year delay in
delivery and $430M in cost overruns that our Navy fully intends to bill
to the Kingdom. I recommend the USG hold industry to the same standards
for partner delivery as for U.S. delivery. Recently, the Pentagon
withheld $5M per aircraft from Lockheed Martin for delays in F-35
deliveries to the USAF. We should exact the same on delivery overages
for partner FMS. In the FMS process, we could codify accountability
measures when implemented cases move to the contracting phase.
2. I believe we should allow industry to offer only one
standardized export variant of each major end item (such as fighter
aircraft). Customization , along with resultant design delays and
integration challenges, accounts for the single biggest partner nation
delay we experience. Industry profits from these custom builds, but the
system does not. Customization leads to long delays and increased cost
as vendors work through engineering and integration challenges.
Proactive review and certification of exportability for standardized
systems would accelerate case development, production, and delivery. An
example of the pitfalls inherent in customized builds is Jordan's F-16
Blk 70 FMS case. Efforts to customize the jets led to years of
negotiations with industry, an exorbitant price for the aircraft and a
five-year delay in availability of the aircraft to Jordan.
3. Process transparency is paramount. DSCA should be proactive in
keeping partners apprised of process delays . This will be central to
restoring and maintaining partner trust in the system. Coordinated,
transparent messaging to the partner is essential whenever any policy
or process delays pushes agreed upon timelines. AI could help. We could
benefit from getting rid of informal Tiered Review and adhering to
Congressional Notification (CN) timelines for review. Cases can
languish in Tiered Review for years without any communication to the
partner. This leads to pricing increase, exasperates the customers and
impedes integration with U.S. forces. We must be able to process cases
in a reasonable, predictable, clearly understood timeline that keeps
partners informed of the precise status of their purchases. The NASAMS
case for Egypt has been in staffing for two years. After submitting the
LOR in 2023, the CN package cleared Tiered Review in May 2025 and was
formally notified to Congress on 24 July 2025. A predictable
Congressional Notification timeline would significantly encourage our
partners continuing to select us as the partner of choice.
4. I propose we re-evaluate the Congressional Notification dollar
thresholds to account for inflation rates and cost increases since
originally published in the 1976 Arms Export Control Act. Those
thresholds are in the table below. These thresholds should be adjusted
to take into account inflationary price increases as a minimum.
For NATO countries, Australia, Israel, Japan, ROK, New Zealand -
Major Defense Equipment: $25M - Any Articles, Services, or Both (TCV):
$100M - Design and Construction Services: $300M For All other
countries, NATO organizations , all other International Organizations -
Major Defense Equipment: $14M - Any Articles, Services, or Both (TCV)
$50M - Design and Construction Services: $200M
5. I would also right-size the workforce in DSCA, the Service
Implementing Agencies and International Program Offices dedicated to
case development and case management to match the record increases in
sales over recent years. While positive, increased sales and the
resultant case load burden the system and challenge the workforce to
meet case development timelines. While automation and innovation have
helped, the DSCA team that manages the CENTCOM portfolio is roughly the
same size as it was a decade and a half ago while our case load has
more than doubled and the complexity of the technology in the systems
we offer has evolved immeasurably. An example of the impact of
enterprise manpower shortages is Egypt's case for AN/TPS-78 Radars. The
USAF program office does not have adequate manpower to execute the case
once implemented . The program office identified critical shortages of
program managers, engineers, and contracting support and assesses
contract award post-case implementation could take 12 additional months
on top of the normal 9-12-month period to get a case on contract. One
potential approach to fix this would be to increase the administrative
fee partners pay for execution of FMS cases, perhaps increasing it from
3.2% to 4.2%. Doing this would allow us to fund additional manpower at
no cost to taxpayers.
6. I would add Service implementing agency liaison billets to
Combatant Command headquarters. This would facilitate information flow,
particularly with respect to Combatant Command priorities, which should
- along with Department of Defense priorities - focus the efforts of
DSCA and the Service Implementing Agencies.
7. Combatant Commanders should have a formal "JUON-like" mechanism
to enable the enterprise, including industry, to surge for partner
urgent operational needs. This could be actioned through a Cross-
Departmental Working Group (CDWG) and would allow Combatant Commanders
to nominate specific FMS cases for accelerated case development.
Current surge capabilities take years to stand up; this needs to be
shortened to months for critical priority partner requirements. To
highlight this, our regional partners are currently enduring an
existential threat manifested by ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial
systems (UAS). Concurrently, we are resequencing (delaying) delivery of
Patriot interceptors purchased via FMS and, on the Counter-UAS front,
we have one exportable program of record - the "low, slow, unmanned
aircraft integrated defeat system" (LIDS). Seven partners have
expressed interest in the LIDS system. The only partner with an active
LIDS case is Qatar, whose LIDS will not be fielded until 2029. That
timeline is simply not how we should treat a valued partner nation who
hosts our forces in theater.
Mr. Messmer. How does the deployment of such a large portion of our
B-2 bomber fleet in CENTCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR) affect our
ability to meet STRATCOMs mission requirements, and the broader
deterrence posture that B-2s take part in?
General Kurilla. (U)CENTCOM defers to STRATCOM on the impact to
STRATCOMs mission requirements.
Mr. Messmer. If the security of the ISIS prisons in Syria were
compromised and larger ISIS cells reconstituted across Syria and Iraq,
would that require a CENTCOM led response, or does our array of allies
in the region have what they need to counter a potential ISIS
resurgence?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
Mr. Messmer. What recommendations do you have for how we can
further strengthen the U.S.-Saudi security partnership?
General Kurilla. (U) As the largest partner in the region,
strengthening the U.S.-Saudi security partnership is crucial for
building and maintaining regional stability and addressing regional
security challenges. Opportunities to further advance the US-Saudi
military partnership include support to Saudi Arabia's efforts for
continued regional security initiatives; boost defense modernization;
increase interoperability through bilateral and multilateral exercises;
enhance counter-terrorism cooperation; and support Saudi Arabia's
military transformation goals. Additionally, bilateral defense planning
highlights the need for additional access and basing in support of
contingencies and presents important opportunities to leverage burden
sharing for regional security efforts. Key to these efforts is
delivering on approved foreign military sales commitments. Overall,
these initiatives enable partner capacity and increase interoperability
between US and Saudi Arabia.
Mr. Messmer. In 2024, the Biden Administration came to an agreement
with the Iraqi government to transition the current U.S. force posture
in the country from one operating under Operation Inherent Resolve to a
new U.S.-Iraq bilateral security agreement by 2026. Has this agreement
been implemented at any stage in the past few months? In your best
military advice, should the implementation of this agreement be
reconsidered considering the threat environment in the region?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
Mr. Messmer. Coups and regime change have proliferated throughout
the Sahel region of Africa, and due to Section 7008, DOD has withdrawn
our security partnerships with such governments. Now that we do not
have a persistent present in the Sahel, how is DOD seeking to monitor
and counter terrorist organizations in the Sahel going forward?
General Langley. USAFRICOM is employing the full spectrum of
available national intelligence capabilities to try to mitigate our
limited footprint in the Sahel. We have some capability to monitor
terrorist organizations in the Sahel; however, without appropriate
resources - posture locations, overflight, ISR, maneuver forces,
partner nations, etc. - we are extremely limited to counter these
terrorist threats.
Mr. Messmer. Do you see the People's Republic of China (PRC)
stepping into these recently "Coup Belt" African countries and seeking
to become a guarantor of funding and possibly security - effectively
replacing us as the partner of choice in the region?
General Langley. China is not interested in becoming a guarantor of
security to the "Coup Belt" African countries. Beijing views these
nations through an opportunistic lens, only providing superficial and
limited military support that reinforces its broader economic and
political goals. In the same vein, China does not intend to serve as a
funding guarantor for these countries. Instead, it promotes regional
economic investment that aligns with its own interests, which are to
secure access to these countries' natural resources, such as critical
minerals and oil. These investments and incentives include security
cooperation, training, and arms sales, which China promotes through its
engagement with African countries via its Global Security Initiative,
its Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027),
and other multilateral fora. The United States is still the preferred
partner for FMS/FMF. We must capitalize on this by speeding up those
processes and maintaining that competitive edge in the face of growing
investment by the PRC.
Mr. Messmer. You've mentioned during the most recent Africa Lion
Exercise that our African partners will be expected to stand up more on
their own militarily. In that vein, AFRICOM has trained and assisted
partners with Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism operations
conducted in the Sahel and across Africa - are these missions going to
persist, or will partner nations be held to an expectation of
independent capability?
General Langley. USAFRICOM continues to maintain strategic
partnerships in Africa by working alongside our allies and partners to
address shared security concerns. USAFRICOM is prioritizing limited and
tailored security cooperation activities and investments that enable
our African Partners to defend against regional terrorist threats. As
key Partner nations become more capable of independent operations, we
will look to transition our limited resources to other willing Partners
who share security objectives. Additionally, we will continue to
leverage capabilities of NATO and Non-NATO allies to enable African
Partners who require continued support.
Mr. Messmer. Can you touch upon our efforts to support the Somalia
National Army against Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia?
Do you expect the Somalia National Army to be able to independently
operate and succeed against these terrorist organizations without the
support AFRICOM usually provides, including self-defense airstrikes?
General Langley. USAFRICOM's objective with every partner is to
achieve operational independence while achieving our shared security
objectives. This objective applies equally to the security forces of
Somalia; however, the Federal Government of Somalia and its security
institutions are realistically years away from the absorptive capacity
required for such complex systems as air support, ISR, and fires. On
the other hand, al-Shabaab's capabilities in these essential
warfighting functions continue to increase thanks to support from
groups such as the Houthis. In the near term, the Somali's will
continue to rely on air support and fires provided by the United States
and other allies and partners in order to maintain any advantage over
al-Shabaab. USAFRICOM is pursuing options in the mid to long term to
share more of the burden for providing this type of support to other
allies and partners, to allow us to focus more on essential
counterterrorism activities.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BELL
Mr. Bell. You had been pushing for a more aggressive approach to
counter the Houthi threat. With this deal in place, what steps are
being taken to reassure and support our regional allies who continue to
face these threats?
General Kurilla. (U) CENTCOM continues to aggressively invest in
improving our regional partners' capabilities in integrated air and
missile defense, maritime security, and counterterrorism. Additionally,
US naval vessels continue to transit the Bab al-Mandeb as necessary,
exercising freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. CENTCOM is in close
coordination with regional partners in efforts to interdict advanced
conventional weapons enroute the Houthis and remains postured to
immediately counter any Houthi threat that may arise should the Houthis
elect to recommence attacks on U.S. maritime traffic. Our forces are
ready, and plans are in place to apply US military power at the
President's order.
Mr. Bell. Recent plans have been announced to further consolidate
U.S. troop presence in Syria and Iraq. I've asked European Command how
this might impact our counterterrorism operations in the Eastern
Mediterranean. Can you expand on any additional concerns CENTCOM has
regarding this consolidation?
General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
in the committee files.
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