    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    .
                             [H.A.S.C. No. 119-30]

                           U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND

                          NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

                                 IN THE GREATER

                             MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

                                   __________

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 JUNE 10, 2025

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                   __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    64-360                    WASHINGTON : 2026
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                        One Hundred Nineteenth Congress

                         MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           ADAM SMITH, Washington
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
    ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice    JOHN GARAMENDI, California
        Chair                            DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          RO KHANNA, California
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    TRENT KELLY, Mississippi             CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
    DON BACON, Nebraska                  JASON CROW, Colorado
    JACK BERGMAN, Michigan               MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
    RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
    PAT FALLON, Texas                    SARA JACOBS, California
    CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida           MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
    NANCY MACE, South Carolina           PATRICK RYAN, New York
    BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota              GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
    MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas               CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO,
    JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia            Pennsylvania
    JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
    CORY MILLS, Florida                  DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
    RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia           GILBERT RAY CISNEROS JR.,
    LANCE GOODEN, Texas                      California
    CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana              ERIC SORENSEN, Illinois
    DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin         MAGGIE GOODLANDER, New Hampshire
    JOHN J. McGUIRE III, Virginia        SARAH ELFRETH, Maryland
    PAT HARRIGAN, North Carolina         GEORGE WHITESIDES, California
    MARK B. MESSMER, Indiana             DEREK TRAN, California
    DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas                EUGENE SIMON VINDMAN, Virginia
    JEFF CRANK, Colorado                 WESLEY BELL, Missouri
    ABRAHAM J. HAMADEH, Arizona

                          Chris Vieson, Staff Director
                  Richard St. Onge, Professional Staff Member
                 William T. Johnson, Professional Staff Member
                        Reed Kessler, Research Assistant

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
      Committee on Armed Services....................................     1
    Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
      Member, Committee on Armed Services............................     2

                                   WITNESSES

    Thompson, Katherine, Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary
      of Defense International Security Affairs......................     4
    Kurilla, GEN Michael E., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command....     6
    Langley, Gen Michael E., USMC, Combatant Commander, United States
      Africa Command.................................................     8

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Thompson, Katherine..........................................    59
        Kurilla, GEN Michael E.......................................    68
        Langley, Gen Michael E.......................................   104

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        Article submitted by Ms. Goodlander entitled ``Red Sea
          passage remains a no-go for shipping despite U.S. action.''   121

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Wilson...................................................   129
        Ms. Stefanik.................................................   135
        Mr. Scott....................................................   131
        Mr. Ryan.....................................................   141
        Mr. Messmer..................................................   143
        Mr. Kelly....................................................   137
        Ms. Goodlander...............................................   142
        Mr. Gooden...................................................   142
        Mr. Crow.....................................................   139
        Mr. Bell.....................................................   146

     U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE GREATER
                             MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                Washington, DC, Tuesday, June 10, 2025.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [Chairman
    of the Committee] presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
             ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
        Without objection, the chair reserves the right to declare
    the committee in recess at any point.
        Before we begin, I would like to remind those in the
    audience that this hearing is open to the public, but actions
    that disrupt or distract from the proceedings will not be
    tolerated. The chair reserves the right to remove disruptive
    persons from the hearing. U.S. Capitol Police are on hand to
    assist with that task and I thank them for their service and
    attendance.
        Today, we continue our posture hearings with CENTCOM
    [United States Central Command] and AFRICOM [United States
    Africa Command]. As this will be both General Kurilla's and
    General Langley's final appearance for this committee, I want
    to thank you for your service to our nation. Both of you have
    been exemplary in your roles and I want you to know you are
    appreciated.
        American deterrence in the Middle East and Africa eroded
    under the last administration. The disastrous withdrawal from
    Afghanistan emboldened our adversaries. The Biden
    administration's appeasement of Iran only made matters worse.
    After Hamas' barbaric onslaught, Iran opened a second front,
    activating the Houthis to strike Israel and disrupt global
    trade.
        Since 2023, the Houthis have launched hundreds of attacks
    on U.S. warships and commercial vessels. Yet, instead of
    holding the Houthis accountable, the Biden administration
    pulled them off the terror list.
        Immediately upon taking office, President Trump set out to
    restore peace through strength. He reinstated the maximum
    pressure campaign on Iran and strengthened America's hand in
    nuclear talks.
        I strongly support his demand for Iran to permanently give
    up its capacity to enrich uranium. Iran's nuclear program must
    be dismantled for good but so must its proxy network.
        Israel has taken decisive action against Hamas, Lebanese
    Hezbollah, and other rogue actors that had been operating in
    Assad's Syria. Thanks to Israel, what once seemed impossible is
    becoming a reality. Iran's proxies are being destroyed.
        The Trump administration is building on this momentum.
    Nowhere is this clearer than in its response to the Houthis.
    Under President Trump, the United States has hit back
    decisively, but that threat is not gone. Recent reports
    indicate Iran is buying materials from China for hundreds of
    ballistic missiles. It is clear that Iran is determined to
    rearm and resupply its proxies. So we must be equally
    determined to stop them. This administration is right to
    prioritize homeland security, but that mission begins well
    beyond our borders.
        We must stop terrorists abroad before they reach us. That
    means denying terrorists a safe haven and for this U.S. forces
    must be forward deployed. That is why I support the
    Department's condition-based approach to rebalancing U.S.
    forces in Syria. We cannot allow Syria to become a sanctuary
    again for terrorists, Iran, or Russia.
        The same applies for Africa. Al-Shabaab, ISIS [Islamic
    State of Iraq and Syria], and Al Qaeda are all gaining ground
    on that continent. Recent U.S. strikes in Somalia and across
    Africa have disrupted their operations but that pressure must
    continue.
        Yet, AFRICOM is consistently under resourced. Even modest
    increases in ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance] and security cooperation funding would go a
    long way and empower our African partners to take on more of
    the burden in the fight against terrorism.
        We also must confront China's growing footprint on Africa.
    The reality is that the threat China poses to the United States
    extends well beyond the Indo-Pacific.
        In Africa, Beijing is securing critical minerals and
    building military infrastructure from Djibouti to West Africa.
    If China secures a permanent naval base on Africa's Atlantic
    coast it will threaten vital sea lanes and have serious
    consequences for our ability to defend our homeland.
        Russia is also deepening its presence across Africa. It is
    trading arms and mercenaries for access to Africa's gold, oil,
    and other resources. The resulting revenue is helping fund
    Putin's malign activities worldwide.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how we can
    continue to defend forward in CENTCOM and AFRICOM and ensure
    the region's threats never reach the U.S. homeland.
        And with that, I yield to my friend the ranking member for
    any opening statement he may have.

    STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
              RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that, and
    I want to join you in our thank you's to our two military
    witnesses today. They have served incredibly well for a long
    time and sorry will not be seen before this committee. I don't
    know if you share--if you will miss us as we miss you.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Smith. But we do appreciate your service. It is good to
    have you back one more time. The degree of expertise that you
    bring to these two very difficult regions is enormously helpful
    to our committee but also to our country.
        And I will agree with the chair--I think the region is
    unbelievably unstable, both in CENTCOM and in Africa. The
    chairman has a slightly more optimistic take on how things have
    gone the last 6 months than I do. I think the instability is
    still raging and it is still something we need to deal with.
    Certainly, the war in Gaza goes on. The suffering there is
    enormous. We need to get to a ceasefire as soon as possible.
        There continues to be conflicts in the West Bank. We see in
    Africa, and West Africa in particular, is a deeply concerning
    situation, where terrorist offshoots are beginning to take over
    more and more territory and threaten more and more countries.
    Sudan's civil war continues to be a major destabilizing factor.
    A war no one really pays much attention to continues to go on
    between the DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo] and Rwanda,
    with catastrophic consequences.
        We have a lot of work to do in the region, even in Yemen.
    Yes, it is good that the Houthis, for the moment, have said
    that they are going to stop shooting at U.S. ships. But we
    still don't have commercial shipping traffic feeling free to go
    through the Red Sea.
        So we still have a lot of work to do to get after all of
    the instability in the region. I will agree with the chairman
    that Iran is the primary driving force in that, without
    question. You see their hand everywhere: Syria, Lebanon, Yemen,
    Israel, Iraq. Getting an ability to contain that is crucially
    important, and I actually think it is good that President Trump
    is negotiating directly with Iran.
        Now, my Republican colleagues would pretty much lose their
    damn minds every time Biden even suggested that he might talk
    to Iran. Sorry. So that particular hypocrisy grates a little
    bit. But it is a good idea to try to have a conversation. I
    think it is also crucially important in the negotiations that
    we focus on their support for proxies. It is their support for
    proxies that is the most destabilizing force in the region.
        But we also need to work more closely with our Israeli
    partners. I have an enormous amount of sympathy for the threats
    that they face from Hamas, from Hezbollah, from Iran, and
    others, but we need to find an alternative to Hamas. We need to
    work with Palestinians to give us some sort of future beyond
    Hamas.
        Partners in the region--as you well know, Jordan, Egypt,
    Saudi Arabia, the UAE [United Arab Emirates] and others are
    working with those Palestinian partners trying to generate that
    and being rebuffed constantly by the Israeli government.
        This war won't stop until Hamas is gone. I agree with that.
    But Hamas won't be gone until there is some alternative for the
    Palestinian people. I think it is really important that we step
    up pressure to try to push those negotiations and show the
    Palestinian people that they do have a future. If they don't
    think they have a future it is going to be very difficult to
    stop this conflict.
        In Africa, I am very concerned about where that is going.
    The terrorist groups, as I said, seem to be taking hold in a
    number of countries. Russia has become more and more prominent
    in the region.
        They don't seem to be doing a particularly good job of
    keeping the peace, but they are still very present and have
    relationships with a number of countries. The path forward to
    that is not clear to me. I will close with a note of agreement
    with the chairman.
        These regions matter. They lead to greater instability, and
    when we talk about our primary concern being China, we must
    understand that the challenge with China is global. Any notion
    that we are going to pivot to Asia and, therefore, deal with
    China and just ignore the rest of the world I think
    fundamentally misunderstands what is happening.
        As you gentlemen know, China is very active in Africa. They
    are very active in the Middle East. Russia is as well. This is
    a global challenge. These two regions are crucially important.
    We need to be present, but we also need to work with partners
    in the region to try to create greater stability in what is a
    very challenging part of the world.
        With that, I look forward to the testimony and the
    questions and answers, and I yield back.
        The Chairman. I would now like to introduce our witnesses.
        First, we have Ms. Katherine Thompson. She is performing
    the duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
    Affairs.
        General Eric Kurilla is the commander of the United States
    CENTCOM and General Michael Langley is the commander of United
    States Africa.
        Welcome to all of our witnesses.
        Ms. Thompson, we will start with you. You are recognized
    for 5 minutes.

     STATEMENT OF KATHERINE THOMPSON, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE
       ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
              AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

        Ms. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Rogers,
    Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the House Armed
    Services Committee, thank you for inviting me today to testify
    on our defense posture and policy in U.S. Central Command and
    U.S. Africa Command, respectively. It is my honor to appear
    alongside General Kurilla and General Langley.
        The Department of Defense is reviewing our posture,
    activities, and resources across all combatant commands,
    including CENTCOM and AFRICOM, in line with President Trump's
    America first priorities to make America safer, stronger, and
    more prosperous.
        In line with President Trump's peace through strength
    framework, and under Secretary Hegseth's leadership, DOD
    [Department of Defense] is putting core American interests
    first in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs [area of responsibility]
    to make America and our citizens more secure. America's core
    national security interests in the CENTCOM AOR are to, one,
    prevent and disrupt credible terrorist threats to the U.S.
    homeland; two, deny Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon; and
    three, support Israel's ability to defend itself.
        State and non-state actors across the Middle East such as
    ISIS, Iran, and its proxies continue to threaten the U.S.
    homeland as well as our forces and posture across the region.
        At the direction of the President the Department of Defense
    maintains the forces and capabilities to defend against these
    threats to our national security.
        President Trump has already demonstrated his unrelenting
    commitment to keep Americans safe by conducting operations
    targeting Houthi terrorists in Yemen that successfully restored
    freedom of navigation and American deterrence.
        We will continue to work with our regional partners to
    enable U.S. operations, coordinate on approaches to regional
    challenges, and expand interoperability to address our shared
    threats.
        For example, our Iraqi security force partners now shoulder
    the majority of operations against ISIS remnants, requiring
    only a modest U.S. advisory role.
        In addition, the historic package of $142 billion in
    defense sales to Saudi Arabia, which Secretary Hegseth signed
    last month in Riyadh, will help lock in another generation of
    interoperability and burden sharing with critical regional
    partners.
        We will also continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with
    Israel, a model ally for the region, as they defend against
    threats from every direction. Secretary Hegseth has backed up
    this commitment with action and has authorized the deployment
    of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, missile
    battery and its associated U.S. military crew to Israel.
        In Africa, the most pressing security challenges include
    potential threats to the U.S. homeland emanating from terrorist
    activity as well as China's ambitions to expand its military
    power projection capabilities via overseas basing naval access
    as well as an ambition to establish dominance over critical
    mineral resources on the continent that fund their defense
    supply chains.
        To address those security issues DOD has two priorities in
    the AFRICOM AOR. One is to disrupt, degrade, and deny the
    activities of Africa-based terrorist groups that have both the
    capability and intent to strike the U.S. homeland or U.S.
    personnel and facilities.
        To this end, U.S. forces stand ready to engage and
    neutralize terrorists through direct action. At the same time,
    the department is working with African nations to grow their
    operational independence and empower them to counter shared
    threats.
        At the same time, DOD will work to prevent and counter
    efforts by China to position its own forces in the AFRICOM AOR
    in ways that threaten our ability to defend the U.S. homeland
    and deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific.
        We will also work closely with interagency partners to
    counter Chinese efforts to exclude the United States from
    critical markets on the continent. DOD's largest force posture
    location in Africa is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which hosts
    3,300 DOD military personnel and civilians that support
    AFRICOM, CENTCOM, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S.
    Transportation Command operations.
        This base, along with smaller, enduring locations, provides
    support to contingency operations, episodic military-to-
    military engagements, and crisis response.
        To conclude, I want to emphasize the important role of
    Congress in enabling the Department of Defense to achieve our
    objectives in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM areas of responsibility.
        Your support and funding have been and will continue to be
    critical to advancing peace through strength.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the
    Department of Defense, and we appreciate your continued support
    to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Guardians, and
    civilians who work every day to make the American people safer
    and more secure.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Thompson can be found in the
    Appendix on page 59.]
        The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Thompson.
        General Kurilla, you are recognized.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL ERIK KURILLA, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
                            CENTRAL COMMAND

        General Kurilla. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and
    members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify before you today.
        I am joined today by Command Master Chief Fleet Derrick
    Walters, the command senior enlisted leader of U.S. Central
    Command.
        Our partners have described the events of the last 20
    months as a tectonic shift, an earthquake, one that began on 7
    October 2023 and continued to produce aftershocks across the
    region.
        We have been at the brink of regional war several times.
    Conflict was triggered in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, the Red
    Sea, and Yemen. The region held its breath as Iran and Israel
    traded blows in the first overt state on state attacks between
    these two countries in their history.
        At the same time, Tehran continued to increase their
    stockpiles of uranium enriched to 60 percent for which there is
    no civilian purpose, threatening catastrophic ramifications
    across the region and beyond.
        Global violent extremists exploited the turmoil wherever
    possible to sustain their networks and regenerate capability.
    This included in post-Assad Syria and the porous border between
    Afghanistan and Pakistan. We saw this threat actualized
    multiple times throughout 2024 in high-profile attacks overseas
    and attempted here at home.
        However, from this disorder emerges opportunity. Iran is in
    a weaker strategic position now than at any point in the past
    40 years, though it maintains significant operational
    capability.
        Qasem Soleimani's vision of a Shi'a Crescent from Iran
    through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon was shattered as the Syrian
    regime collapsed and Assad fled to Russia.
        Lebanese Hezbollah was decimated by Israel including the
    death of many of their leaders who were implicated in the 1983
    Beirut bombing that killed 241 American servicemembers.
        This dealt a massive blow to Iran's terror network that has
    targeted and killed U.S. personnel across the region for
    decades.
        The Houthis, Iran's new premier proxy, threatened the free
    flow of commerce to a vital waterway and were met with a
    sustained, deliberate, and focused campaign to re-establish
    American freedom of navigation.
        Terrorists are under pressure as CENTCOM's relentless
    campaign against ISIS removed hundreds of fighters and leaders
    from the battlefields in Iraq and Syria to include just 6 hours
    ago.
        Our network of partners dealt significant blows to the ISIS
    Khorasan networks exploiting the tribal areas between
    Afghanistan and Pakistan to include our Pakistani partners
    bringing the terrorists behind the Abbey Gate bombing to
    justice.
        Finally, the reality of aligning with Russia and China was
    laid bare as our partners across the region as they watched
    Russia supporting Assad's atrocities against the Syrian people
    and the Chinese Communist Party cynically exploit Iran-backed
    violence in the Red Sea.
        The United States now stands in a strategic window of
    opportunity to secure its national interests in the central
    region to protect the homeland, secure our economic prosperity,
    establish freedom of navigation, and prevent a nuclear-armed
    Iran.
        CENTCOM's deep military-to-military partnerships have
    proven a catalyst to these wide-ranging opportunities that now
    lay before us.
        Our relationships provide the foundation of the Middle East
    Air Defense Initiative that defeated hundreds of Iranian
    munitions and continues to set conditions for the rest of the
    region's defense.
        These relationships unleash our shared creative potential
    in what has become a sandbox of experimentation, enabling us to
    innovate together, develop rapid solutions to the entire joint
    force.
        Our partners are also on the front line in Iraq and Syria.
    They remain crucial to the enduring defeat of ISIS, battling
    the group across their respective countries as well as enabling
    the repatriation of ISIS detainees and displaced persons.
        The warfighters of U.S. Central Command, representing less
    than 2 percent of the entire joint force, have been at the
    forefront of these seismic events over the last year and often
    on the front lines of conflict.
        It was those warfighters who sprinted out of their bunkers
    to fuel, arm, and fly their F-15s through a barrage of missiles
    and UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle].
        It was those warfighters who led the vanguard against
    maritime terror in the Red Sea protecting the connective tissue
    of the global economy and it was those warfighters who continue
    to pursue and eliminate the remnants of ISIS wherever they are
    to stop future attacks as far away from this homeland as
    possible.
        It is on their behalf--the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Guardians who serve this nation
    on the front lines of freedom that I speak before you today. It
    is the honor of my professional life to serve as their
    commander.
        As I close over 37 years of uniformed service to this
    nation I would offer one final thought. I have spent most of my
    adult life living, fighting, leading, and building partnerships
    in the central region.
        We have traditionally viewed the region as a risk to our
    national interests, but as I depart, I would offer that there
    has rarely been a time with greater opportunity to protect
    those national interests than we have right now but only if we
    have the courage to step through that window.
        Thank you, and I do look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Kurilla can be found in
    the Appendix on page 68.]
        The Chairman. Thank you, General Kurilla.
        General Langley, you are recognized.

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL LANGLEY, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S.
                             AFRICA COMMAND

        General Langley. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith,
    distinguished committee members, it is an honor to appear here
    today representing the outstanding servicemembers, civilians,
    and families of the United States Africa Command.
        As I get closer to the end of my tenure of command, I
    remain in awe of the character and the capabilities of the men
    and women willing to serve our nation. Our team of soldiers,
    sailors, Marines, airmen, Guardian, and civilians perform
    valiantly, and I am honored and proud to serve with them.
        America remains in good hands. I am proud to testify with
    my friend General Erik Kurilla, the commander of United States
    Central Command, and my colleague Ms. Katherine Thompson from
    OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] policy. I would like
    to extend my gratitude for their steadfast cooperation.
        Now, ordinarily I would be joined by my command senior
    enlisted leader Sergeant Major Michael Woods. However, as all
    of our outstanding NCOs [Non-Commissioned Officer] do, Sergeant
    Major Woods has chosen to put himself in the best position to
    influence operations.
        Today he is in Morocco for the Africa senior enlisted
    leaders conference. Now, Morocco is a shining example of a
    great return on our investment and their efforts in developing
    the enlisted core across the continent is a crucial step in
    African military professionalism.
        I recently travelled to Morocco. I attended the African
    Lion 2025. This exercise is the largest exercise with
    participation of over 52 nations, 10 NATO allies, and 2 non-
    NATO allies and over 10,000 soldiers participating.
        I also just returned from Kenya where we jointly hosted the
    African Chiefs of Defense Conference in Nairobi. This gathering
    showcased the Kenyan Defense Force's commitment to fostering
    military dialogue and demonstrated their leadership.
        The insights drawn from that forum will help inform
    AFRICOM's approach to hearing how our African partners are
    solving challenges in their own neighborhoods and understanding
    where they can shoulder more of the load.
        Now, everything we do at the United States AFRICOM,
    especially these types of partnerships, has an overarching goal
    in mind, achieving peace through strength.
        Now, this requires three things: a clear understanding of
    national security threats, a robust and dependable network of
    like-minded allies and partners, and appropriate resourcing to
    match military requirements.
        Now, as I have said in previous testimony, Africa remains a
    nexus theater from which the United States cannot afford to
    shift its gaze. It is home to terrorists who take advantage of
    conditions in Africa to grow and export their ideology.
        ISIS controls their global network from Somalia. It is
    where the Chinese Communist Party actively works to change the
    international rules-based order and establish regional hegemony
    and it is where the Russian Federation seizes opportunities
    created by chaos and instability.
        Ladies and gentlemen, we must deter these nations and other
    malign actors from their goals on the continent. Many of our
    security and economic interests overlap with those of our
    African and European partners.
        Successful outcomes, enabled by burden-sharing, are
    beneficial for all. As a posture-limited theater, we establish
    strength and work towards peace by enhancing security
    capabilities of our African partners.
        Through our robust system of alliances, exercises, training
    events, security cooperation, and foreign military sales
    programs are the backbone of our military activities on the
    continent.
        Through these activities our forces lead by example with a
    warrior ethos and stand by our partners and enhance trust in
    the United States military. United States AFRICOM seeks to
    match capabilities with current and emerging threats to ensure
    the security of our forces while advancing American interests.
        Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft,
    crisis response forces, counter unmanned aerial systems
    technology, and integrated air missile defense platforms are
    critical resources to accomplish our mission.
        I welcome your advocacy and ensuring that these necessary
    tools are in AFRICOM's hands.
        Ladies and gentlemen, I appreciate the opportunity to be
    here today and I would like to close by thanking the committee
    for your stalwart support during my tenure of command.
        Our ability to accomplish the mission is always linked to
    your advocacy and encouragement, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Langley can be found in
    the Appendix on page 104.]
        The Chairman. Thank you, General Langley.
        The chair now recognizes himself for questions.
        General Kurilla, Operation Rough Rider degraded Houthi
    capabilities and took a target off U.S. commercial ships, but
    they still keep hitting at Israel.
        What more can the U.S. do to support Israel against the
    Houthis and Iran's other terrorist proxies?
        General Kurilla. So I would tell you right now that the
    Iranian proxies are at one of the weakest levels they have been
    with the decimation of--the disintegration of the Hezbollah
    Hamas.
        However, the Houthis--the biggest challenge with the
    Houthis is they are being provided with Iranian weapons. They
    provide the weapons and they assemble them inside of Yemen.
        There are experts from the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary
    Guard Corps] that are inside of Yemen helping them to be able
    to manufacture these systems as well. So this is going to be a
    challenge, going forward.
        We have got to stop the flow of the weapons into Yemen.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        President Trump has made it clear that if Iran does not
    permanently give up its nuclear enrichment military force by
    the U.S. may be necessary. If the President directed, is
    CENTCOM prepared to respond with overwhelming force to prevent
    a nuclear-armed Iran?
        General Kurilla. I have provided the Secretary of Defense
    and the President a wide range of options.
        The Chairman. I take that as a yes?
        General Kurilla. Yes.
        The Chairman. General Langley, your command was created in
    2007 to address the shortcomings of the division of Africa
    between CENTCOM, INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific
    Command], and EUCOM [United States European Command]. Since
    then, Africa's strategic importance has only grown with
    transnational terrorism on the rise as well as China and Russia
    working to undermine our interest on the continent.
        Can you tell me, in your best military just judgment should
    AFRICOM remain its own combatant command separate and apart
    from EUCOM?
        General Langley. Chairman, those statistics that you just
    stated is more of a reason why AFRICOM needs to remain as a
    overall command to be able to address these challenges.
        Africa is a nexus theater for the great power competition
    and then also with a number of violent extremist organizations
    that are encroaching upon the continent. It is a threat. It is
    a threat to our homeland and is a threat for our overall
    national security and protection of our national interests.
        The Chairman. I take that as a yes.
        General Langley. Yes, Chairman.
        The Chairman. Yes, and I fully agree with you. I made it
    very clear publicly that I will vigorously oppose any effort to
    consolidate AFRICOM into EUCOM.
        As you heard in my opening statement, we need to be putting
    more resources in AFRICOM to combat what China and Russia and
    Iran are doing rather than looking at taking away attention and
    resources.
        General Kurilla, yesterday the ranking member and I
    introduced the SPEED Act. It is our effort by this committee to
    try to speed up acquisition of critical warfighting
    capabilities to strengthen our defense industrial base.
        What impact, if any, do you think this could have on our
    ability to help our partners in CENTCOM?
        General Kurilla. Thanks, Chairman.
        I have not read the full Act but I do know that it is
    trying to speed acquisition--change acquisition to get into the
    hands of the warfighter. Anything we can do to fix what I think
    is a very bureaucratic and slow process will help the
    warfighter.
        The Chairman. Is there something else that you would
    suggest that we do to try--
        General Kurilla. I think we need to start from scratch with
    a blank piece of paper on the FMS [Foreign Military Sales]
    process. We have had dozens of task forces to look at FMS and I
    have not seen much change. It is one of the number-one
    complaints that we get from our foreign partners, and we are 40
    percent of the entire FMS projects in the region.
        The Chairman. And if you had that blank sheet of paper and
    you were writing it out tell me what you would do with it.
        General Kurilla. Well, I think there are four levers that
    control FMS. There is DOD. I think we have to fix some of our
    own processes internal on these requests.
        The Chairman. Such as?
        General Kurilla. Well, I think we take--sometimes we take
    months and up to a year. When someone says, I would like to
    sell you Patriots and we go back and forth for a year that
    should be days or weeks.
        It then goes to the State Department. Candidly, that is not
    where a lot of hold up is. I think this body of Congress there
    can be holds up for whatever reason that we hold, we don't want
    to sell a weapon system to a country and, candidly, the biggest
    problem we have right now is with industry that they are not
    putting the investments and capital into their production
    lines.
        The biggest thing I think Congress can help with is multi-
    year funding that would be able--if you are a business and you
    say, I am only going to get funded 1 year, they are not going
    to want to put the capital into those production lines.
        I thank you for what you have done with some of the 2-year
    funding but I think it needs to be multi-year funding so that
    we can get these production lines up.
        And I think we ought to look at our partners that are
    offering to also produce inside the region. Sorry for the long
    response.
        The Chairman. Well, I think that last point especially
    would be very helpful and I think I speak for this committee
    when I say we are open to that idea. I hope that when you
    testify before the appropriators you tell them the same thing.
        With that, I yield to the ranking member for any questions
    he may have.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        With regard to Iran and their nuclear program, without
    getting into the more classified discussion about what Israel
    might do on their own, if Israel were to act on their own and
    attack Iran what implications would that have for our force
    protection in your region and what should we be doing to try to
    put ourselves in a position to protect against that?
        General Kurilla. I think it would increase risk to our
    forces in the region. But every day we are making assessments
    of our posture and our risk to forces and we make adjustments
    based on those.
        We are fielding new systems and new equipment and making
    adjustments every single day. We have a rule in CENTCOM--you
    improve your foxhole every single day, whether that is through
    rehearsals or any other actions that you are taking to better
    protect our forces.
        Mr. Smith. And what are the systems that you think are
    working best? If we were to, you know, throw money at you and
    say, here is what you need right now that could best put you in
    a better position to protect your forces what systems would you
    ask for?
        General Kurilla. So counter-UAS [Unmanned Aircraft Systems]
    is the number-one thing. We have a revolution in warfare. The
    character of warfare is changing with the drone revolution and
    unmanned systems.
        We see that in Ukraine. We saw that with the Houthis and we
    see that even in Iraq and Syria. The number-one challenge out
    there is detect. It is the ability to detect the counter-UAS
    systems and to defeat the swarms and I think anything we can do
    in the air defense world.
        You know, we went back to the FMS. You know, we ought to
    ask ourselves the question why does a THAAD [Terminal High
    Altitude Area Defense] missile cost three times as much as an
    Arrow that is jointly developed between the U.S. and Israel and
    the Missile Defense Agency. Why is an SM-3 [Standard Missile-3]
    Block IIB six times more expensive than an Arrow missile with,
    roughly, the same capabilities.
        Mr. Smith. In Syria what is your--and I realize there is a
    huge diplomatic piece of this but you are a diplomat as well as
    well as a warrior--can you give us an update on where you see
    the Syrian government?
        Obviously, it is crucial that that government stabilize and
    block Iran and Russia from getting back in. What can we most do
    to help that and where do you see it at right now?
        General Kurilla. I think what the President did with
    talking about lifting some of the sanctions that is going to
    allow other countries to come in and bring some of the
    investments. That is one of the things that is desperately
    needed is the investments back into the country.
        We are working directly right now with the Syrian
    Democratic Forces, our Kurdish partners and Arab partners on
    the ground going after the ISIS to get them to integrate in
    with the new Syrian government.
        Turkiye has played a very positive role in that. That is a
    big piece for the stability in terms of that. I think they got
    to figure out how to run all of the administration of their
    country. They have a few people that are running the country
    right now.
        I am very concerned with the stability but I think the fact
    that we are at the table now having those discussions the
    upside is great. The downside is very low to being at the
    table.
        Mr. Smith. How important is our troop presence in Syria to
    helping facilitate that process and continue to keep ISIS at
    bay?
        General Kurilla. So our purpose for being in Syria is for
    the de-ISIS fight. We literally took a strike this morning on
    an external operations leader from Central Asia up in northwest
    Syria.
        We are still waiting for the full results of that. That is
    what our forces do inside of Syria. We have made some
    adjustments, some consolidation of bases based on the fall of
    Assad. Right now we are making an assessment, going forward, of
    what other bases. It is all conditions based.
        But I will make my recommendations to the Secretary of
    Defense and the President. But right now, the guidance to me
    has been given to right now make an assessment on any other
    adjustments that we need to make in our posture.
        Mr. Smith. General Langley, there is a lot of concerning
    aspects to Africa but West Africa right now seems to be the
    most concerning. I mean, the most capable terrorist
    organization is, you know, gaining influence in multiple
    countries and threatening others.
        We don't have much of a presence there. What would be your
    recommendation in terms of how we contain that threat that is
    growing out of West Africa?
        General Langley. Ranking Member, I would say, you know,
    since we moved out of Niger, we had to reset our CT
    [counterterrorism] strategy and that is further engagement,
    especially with the coastal West Africa countries who are
    building capabilities and capacities to deter and a number of
    countries it is working.
        But JNIM [Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin], which is
    AQIM [Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], and also ISIS-Sahel are
    really starting to get their footing and effective cells across
    the AES [Alliance of Sahel States] countries of Niger, Mali,
    and Burkina Faso. I think that just collaboration with our
    partners and increasing institutional capacity for an enduring
    solution against those aforementioned VEOs [Violent Extremist
    Organizations].
        To do that it takes a whole-of-government approach. Not so
    much our whole-of-government, but their whole-of-government,
    and we need to invest in that.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
    back.
        The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    Arizona, Mr. Hamadeh, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Hamadeh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
    Generals, for your leadership and your service for our country.
        And as a former Army Reserve intelligence officer who
    served in the Middle East, it is incredible to see President
    Trump's bold vision and a Middle East defined by, quote,
    commerce, not chaos.
        Now, those words are now backed by decisive actions that
    nobody dreamed possible. President Trump changed Syria's path
    overnight from endless bloodshed towards hope. There is a lot
    of optimism right there, and I know Ambassador Tom Barrack and
    Presidential Envoy Barrack is doing an incredible job in Syria
    hitting the ground running. I don't know--he has a lot of
    flights back and forth from Ankara to Damascus.
        General Kurilla, I know there are so many questions about
    Syria's transition and after coming off of a 50-year Assad rule
    and ISIS mostly defeated, and I know you helped with the--you
    just talked about it briefly, with the agreement between
    integrating the Syrian Kurdish forces with the government
    forces of Syria, how is that integration actually going?
        General Kurilla. I would tell you it is actually going well
    right now. There are some sticking points, but what is
    happening is you have--the Syrian Kurds are talking directly to
    Al-Sharaa and the Syrian government right now. Turkiye has
    played a positive role in that as well but I think we are on a
    good path right now.
        Mr. Hamadeh. And do you envision that integration could
    also include other minority militia like the Druze or the
    Christians or Alawites in Syria?
        General Kurilla. It could. Right now, though, I mean, we
    are focused on our partner that we have right now up in the
    northeast and that is the Kurds.
        Mr. Hamadeh. Very good. And our counter ISIS train and
    equip fund which helped the Syrian Kurds destroy ISIS could be
    wrapping up. Now, can or should the train and equip shift to
    include Syria's forces?
        General Kurilla. I think that would have to be a wait and
    see. I think the fact that we are at the table right now having
    this discussion and that will allow U.S. to make an assessment
    of that if that would be a wise choice.
        Mr. Hamadeh. And how concerned are you about the foreign
    fighters possibly being integrated within the Syrian Armed
    Forces?
        General Kurilla. That is the reason we have to take a wait
    and see on this.
        Mr. Hamadeh. And are they integrating them right now?
        General Kurilla. So right now--I mean, if you remember,
    these are some of the people that brought Sharaa into power.
    They are integrated into some portions of the government, and
    this is something that we have to make an assessment on.
        Mr. Hamadeh. Very good.
        Now, shifting toward Iraq where the same train-and-equip
    fund is also used in Iraq, but why are we subsidizing Iraq
    currently when it is withholding public salaries and military
    equipment from our Kurdish allies up north?
        General Kurilla. They have challenges. Every now and then
    we end up working through them. They end up getting the
    salaries. They end up getting the equipment. There is always
    small frictions that we have to work through, but they are
    getting what they need.
        Mr. Hamadeh. Sure. And Iran's stronghold within Iraq is
    that presence increasing even despite all of the setbacks that
    Iran has been facing the last few months?
        General Kurilla. I think Iran is trying to double down on
    getting a grip inside of Iraq, but I think Iraq is a sovereign
    nation and they don't want to be a vassal state of Iran.
        Mr. Hamadeh. Of course, although there is a lot of Iranian
    militias currently still operating Iraq. I know they are
    holding a hostage, Elizabeth Tsurkov, that we want released as
    well.
        But how do you envision us pulling Iraq from Iran's
    stronghold?
        General Kurilla. It is a challenge because it is their
    next-door neighbor. We partner at the military level with the
    Iraqi Security Forces to go after ISIS. They are doing actually
    a very good job in terms of going after ISIS.
        We killed the number-two ISIS--global number-two ISIS Abu
    Khadijah out in the Anbar with the assistance of the Iraqis.
        So I think from a military-to-military standpoint they
    understand the need and why they want to have a relationship
    with the West. There are a lot of other reasons at the State
    Department level on why we want to have a relationship with
    Iraq. A stable Iraq helps with a stable Middle East.
        Mr. Hamadeh. Thank you, General.
        And shifting to AFRICOM, General Langley, I know you have a
    lot of positive things to say about Morocco, and I do as well,
    as they were the first country to recognize the United States'
    independence and it seems like their alliance is increasing
    with us.
        Do you ever envision moving the headquarters of AFRICOM
    from Germany to an African partner country like Morocco?
        General Langley. Congressman, thanks for that question.
        And as I look at it from the operational perspective, cost
    benefit analysis, the benefit of moving to Morocco would not
    exceed the cost.
        The benefit operationally of us being able to operate from
    Stuttgart headquarters onto it does not benefit an amount. The
    cost of moving the headquarters would be a big dent to our
    budget.
        So I would say from a cost analysis perspective I think we
    are advantageous of where we are right now. When we look at the
    overall costs, we would not be benefiting from moving our
    headquarters onto the African continent writ large.
        But let me just say Morocco is a great partner and what
    they do in exporting security is tremendous, especially in the
    sub-Saharan countries.
        Mr. Hamadeh. Very good.
        Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    Missouri, Mr. Bell.
        Mr. Bell. Matthew 20:16, so the last shall be first and the
    first shall be last.
        Representative Wilson and Courtney, if you need any tips on
    how to maximize your time, Rep. Hamadeh and myself are experts
    in this particular committee.
        I want to thank you to the chair, to our ranking member, to
    our witnesses as well as the servicemembers I see behind you
    for your service as well.
        My district in the greater St. Louis region is home to the
    production of some of the most advanced fighter aircraft in the
    world, including many that CENTCOM has used in recent
    operations such as intercepting incoming Iranian drones and
    missiles that targeted Israel and our regional allies.
        While I am proud to represent a region that contributes so
    significantly to our national defense, I must also acknowledge
    that many of my constituents are still struggling to recover
    from the most disaster--the most devastating natural disaster
    to impact our state since the late 1950s.
        But as a region we will recover, and we are committed to
    build and support our domestic industrial base that is crucial
    to our national security. But what is not crucial to our
    national security is turning our backs on our allies like we
    have seen from the administration and cutting essential foreign
    assistance programs that go hand in hand with our efforts to
    promote strong U.S. global leadership.
        China and Russia have made significant military and
    economic inroads across the African continent, posing serious
    implications for U.S. strategic interests.
        At the same time, the Trump administration, under the guise
    of pursuing efficiency, has slashed funding for global
    development and humanitarian programs.
        These cuts have in practice created greater inefficiencies
    and undermined U.S. influence abroad.
        General Langley, how does U.S. economic aid--how does U.S.
    economic and humanitarian engagement on the continent
    contribute to advancing AFRICOM military objectives,
    particularly when it comes to countering the destabilizing
    influence of Russia and China?
        General Langley. Congressman, thanks for that question, and
    I will just go back on the operations, especially the
    operations that we do in Somalia.
        So when we support the Somali National Army, as they have
    gone through numerous phases to the liberation phase of
    significant regions across Somalia they are getting into phase
    four and some of the capabilities that--outside of the kinetics
    and military operations where they were able to stabilize the
    region.
        So we are at a point now looking forward to what worked as
    far as aid in the past, but this is where the Secretary has
    charged me with engaging other countries of a shared burden, a
    shared burden on looking at contributing countries, not only
    troop contributing but also in a phase four operation which is
    stabilization.
        So those discussions are taking place at a higher level--at
    the policy level and engagement with other countries so that we
    can focus--laser focus on countering terrorism and shared
    burden with other countries to able to take up that void.
        Over.
        Mr. Bell. And since Hamas' October 7th terrorist attack
    against Israel, one notable development has been the
    strengthening of military and security partnerships between
    Israel and its Arab neighbors, especially evident during the
    two Iranian missile and drone attacks last year.
        This growing security cooperation has shown potential in
    laying the groundwork for peace, and to the ranking member's
    point we endeavor to see a future for Palestine beyond Hamas.
        So, General Kurilla, from a security perspective how can
    enhanced cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security
    forces or broader regional security coordination help establish
    a foundation for long-term peace and stability?
        General Kurilla. Great question, Congressman.
        There has to be--Hamas cannot be in charge. There has to be
    an alternative to Hamas. I think that is some form of a
    Palestinian governance. I think the regional partners can work
    with Israel to figure out what that is and with the Palestinian
    people.
        Mr. Bell. For almost 20 months, the Iranian-backed Houthis
    have wreaked havoc across the region, causing significant
    instability. The administration recently announced an agreement
    to cease all operations against the Houthis in exchange for a
    halt in their attacks on U.S. ships.
        I will submit my question, but I want to talk about how
    this agreement excludes our regional allies and the
    implications of that.
        I yield back my time.
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr.
    Messmer.
        Mr. Messmer. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, and thank you to
    the witnesses for being here today.
        General Kurilla, I couldn't agree with you more that FMS
    reform is needed and we just have to do better in that regard.
    In addition to reforming the FMS and DCS [Direct Commercial
    Sales] process, would you also agree with the need to reform or
    eliminate other non-treaty agreements that inhibit our ability
    to work with our allies and partners such as missile-to-missile
    technology control regime?
        General Kurilla. Can you say the question again, please,
    Congressman?
        Mr. Messmer. Yes. How could--other than FMS and the DCS
    process, would you agree that we need to reform or eliminate
    other non-treaty agreements that inhibit our ability to work
    with our allies and partners such as missile technology control
    regimes?
        General Kurilla. I think we should find those partners in
    the region that can--that we know can safeguard the
    technologies and we should work with them.
        We have several in the region that have offered up to say
    they would like to help produce. That is where we need help is
    the production line right now and I think that is something we
    should strongly look at.
        Mr. Messmer. Okay, thank you.
        Also, I would like to acknowledge the professionalism of
    our forces who have conducted operations in the Red Sea. But I
    am wondering what work needs to be done on the policy end with
    our regional allies and within our own interagency to devise a
    successful strategy against Yemen both that deters their
    destabilizing military actions of the Houthis and coerce them
    into making their closure of the Red Sea politically untenable
    in the region.
        General Kurilla. Is that to me or--
        Mr. Messmer. To you.
        General Kurilla. So I think from a--well, I will defer to
    policy first for any policy question. Then I will take it.
        Mr. Messmer. Okay.
        Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
        I would just highlight two things. First, with the
    conclusion of Operation Rough Rider we are not, certainly, in a
    position where we are ending our entire engagement regarding
    the Houthi problem set.
        The Houthis are still under a foreign terrorist
    organization designation and we are still pursuing a whole of
    government approach, which obviously includes other interagency
    elements to tackle this problem set.
        And then I would just highlight some of the comments that
    you made just a moment ago, which is this will--the longer-term
    problem set for Yemen and the Houthis writ large really is
    something that in our relationships with Saudi Arabia, UAE,
    Qatar, and our other Gulf partners this is something where we
    will look to burden-share this effort and really develop a
    regional solution that empowers our Gulf partners that we have
    continued to develop a deeper defense partnership with to
    tackle the long-term elements of the problem set.
        Mr. Messmer. Thank you.
        General Kurilla, I also have concerns about the long-term
    stability and strategic implications of using high-end
    platforms and munitions like the B-2 bomber, JASSM [Joint Air-
    to-Surface Standoff Missile], and Tomahawk cruise missiles
    against supposedly unsophisticated adversaries like the
    Houthis.
        Has the use of these platforms and the rapid proliferation
    of adversarial drones led to more consideration toward the
    effectiveness of directed energy technologies encountering
    these platforms?
        General Kurilla. Yeah, we absolutely need to be putting
    more work into directed energy high-powered microwave.
        I think some of the innovations that have come out of this
    since Operation Rough Rider about 40 percent of the drones shot
    down were shot down by something called Advanced Precision
    Weapon Kill System, a laser-guided 2.75-inch rocket fired off
    our F-16s or F-15s.
        That is a $25,000 munition going against a, roughly,
    $50,000 or $100,000 drone that is an Iranian provided drone to
    the Houthis.
        Mr. Messmer. Excellent. So what role can our defense
    industrial base play in advancing directed energy solutions to
    ensure CENTCOM can maintain their technological advantage?
        General Kurilla. Well, I would compliment someone like
    General Randy George and his Army Transformation Initiative. He
    is sending things over once they reach a technology readiness
    level to a certain level. He has sent over directed energy,
    mobile, short-range air defense.
        We brought it into the theater. We tested it in the
    harshest conditions you can find, against an active enemy and a
    thinking enemy, and we provided feedback on its effectiveness
    to make it better so they can make a better-informed decision
    on that.
        We have the same with high-powered microwave. We are doing
    things with software. Software is a weapon as well and rapidly
    changing this. The warfare--the character of warfare has
    changed with the drone revolution and that is what we need to
    be paying attention to.
        Mr. Messmer. Okay, thank you.
        Also, how would you assess the performance of Israel's
    missile defense architecture during recent fighting,
    particularly systems like David's Sling and Arrow that we co-
    produced?
        General Kurilla. So I would tell you that the missile
    defense--out of the 300-plus missiles that were fired into
    Israel, one person was killed, a Palestinian from Gaza who was
    living in Jericho.
        Mr. Messmer. Okay, thank you.
        Has the attack highlighted any gaps in our budget requiring
    additional resources from Congress?
        General Kurilla. I think we need to figure out how we also
    produce--I go back to my comment why does a THAAD cost three
    times as much as an Arrow, why does an SM-2 Block--SM-3 Block
    IIB cost six times as much? We have got to figure that out
    because we are on the wrong side of the cost curve.
        Mr. Messmer. Very good. Congress has appropriated those--
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
    Vindman.
        Mr. Vindman. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to all the
    witnesses. And General Kurilla and General Langley, thank you
    for your decades of uniformed service.
        I want to thank you, General Langley, for these great
    placemats. I mean, it is a fantastic graphic depiction of why
    Africa is so important to our national security now and into
    the future, and in particular the things that I have sort of
    honed in on is the fact that it is the--11 of the 20 fastest
    growing economies in the world are in Africa.
        25 percent of the 193 countries in the General Assembly of
    the UN [United Nations] hold seats in Africa, and the rare
    earths is probably maybe even more interesting in how much
    China controls here.
        So in this context--in this sort of geopolitical context,
    when we look at all the elements of power we have diplomatic
    information, military, economic, and I know there are various
    iterations of this.
        Ms. Thompson, you emphasize the importance of countering
    China's influence in Africa. However, this week the House is
    voting on a rescission package that cuts $3.7 billion in soft
    power--for example, hundreds of millions in cuts to PEPFAR [the
    U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief], a program
    started by George W. Bush.
        Forgetting the more than 25 million lives saved by PEPFAR
    since the program started in 2003, there is no question that
    there has been--that this has been an effective program in
    extending America's power and influence.
        This has made us safer and boosted our national security,
    and in the testimony that DOD sent over for today's briefing it
    said, unfortunately, the CCP [Chinese Communist Party]
    information manipulation is significantly outpacing our efforts
    to counter their campaigns.
        Unchecked, China's efforts could reshape the information
    landscape in Africa creating biases and gaps that could lead
    African nations to make decisions to subordinate economic and
    security interests to China's own.
        So my question is given sort of the withdrawal that we have
    seen this administration take in the information environment
    and communicating through, you know, Voice of America and other
    entities that are specifically focused on Africa and in
    withdrawal of these critical soft power programs, are we more
    or less in a position to make sure that our military objectives
    are achieved?
        Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
        I can't speak explicitly to the State Department equities
    in this, particularly the humanitarian aid that you speak
    about.
        However, I will say, from a Title 10 DOD perspective,
    obviously, the department has--
        Mr. Vindman. I am sorry. Let me stop you for a second. I am
    talking about, like, sort of these elements of power, all
    right, and there is a balance to these, right?
        So by withdrawing from the informational--from the economic
    elements does that make achieving the military objectives more
    or less difficult?
        Ms. Thompson. I appreciate the question, sir.
        What I would say from a DOD perspective, thinking
    exclusively about the Title 10 assistance that we provide
    particularly on the continent, that is part of our review
    process is understanding how our military--
        Mr. Vindman. Let me--let me pause you right there.
        General Langley, same question to you. Does this make
    achieving the military objectives more or less difficult?
        General Langley. Especially in the MISO [Military
    Information Support Operations]: As far as our information
    operations, countering some of the propaganda that the CCP is
    putting out there, yes, that is where we need to be able to
    confront them because we had a lot of success in the past, and
    even going forward Secretary Hegseth has given us the tools to
    press back on the CCP. We were--
        Mr. Vindman. So thank you, General Langley. I heard yes,
    which I think is the short answer to the question and I just
    wanted a--
        General Langley. Yes. There are things that we need to
    counter them, going forward.
        Mr. Vindman. Thank you.
        Switching gears to the Houthis, General Kurilla, over the
    last few months we spent over a billion dollars attacking the
    Houthis in our campaign. Can you evaluate whether we have
    disrupted, neutralized, destroyed their capabilities?
        General Kurilla. So the President gave us a very specific
    mission, which was to get the Houthis to quit shooting at
    American ships. 6 months ago on 12 November 2024 was the last
    time a destroyer went through the Bab Al-Mandab.
        It was attacked 17 times with anti-ship ballistic missiles
    and anti-ship cruise missiles and UAVs. In the last week we
    have put four destroyers back through the Bab Al-Mandab and we
    were not shot at.
        Mr. Vindman. Okay. I got that. They are not attacking U.S.
    shipping. Are they still attacking Israel, yes or no?
        General Kurilla. They are still attacking Israel and we are
    still defending Israel with our THAAD system.
        Mr. Vindman. Thank you. So--
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. McGuire, you are now recognized for 5 minutes, sir.
        Mr. McGuire. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
    you to our witnesses and to all of our military folks here. We
    wouldn't have a country without you. Thank you.
        Ms. Thompson, we really appreciate what you are doing in
    this administration with peace through strength. I think we all
    agree you have to have strong American leadership in the world
    or you have a lot of problems.
        How has the President's outreach to the new government in
    Syria encouraged a good outcome for our Kurdish partners and
    the Syrian Democratic Forces?
        Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman, and
    I would highlight the President's speech in Riyadh in
    particular, this idea that the Middle East region is
    transitioning from chaos to a region focused on commerce and
    empowerment.
        I think that this is an incredible good news story. When it
    comes to the conversation around Syria we are giving the Syrian
    government a chance at stability, if it holds in Syria, will be
    monumental for the region and it is something that the
    administration is really leaning forward on as a whole of
    government effort.
        Obviously, it is conditions-based and we will be very
    careful as we watch the development, but it is a really
    positive good-news story that further underscores that the
    region is really transitioning from this region of chaos into a
    region focused on prosperity.
        Mr. McGuire. Thank you.
        Ms. Thompson, since President Trump took office have
    counterterrorism operations remained static or has there been
    an increase in operations in Somalia that have removed a number
    of terrorists from the battlefield?
        Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question.
        I will defer to General Langley on any additional
    operational comments, but I would say yes, the Somalia elements
    that you highlight, the increase in precision targeting in
    Somalia to take out terrorists who specifically pose a threat
    to the U.S. homeland, demonstrating the capability and intent
    to carry out operations against the U.S. homeland, our forces
    and our people is an incredible success as part of this
    administration's effort.
        Obviously, countering terrorism and protecting the homeland
    is one of our number-one national security objectives and I
    think that the activities in Somalia since day one really do
    highlight the capabilities that we have.
        And so I would offer General Langley the opportunity for
    any operational comments.
        General Langley. Thanks, Congressman, for the question.
        And I would say that, you know, when the President gave me
    expanded authorities through the Secretary of Defense we have
    been pressurizing ISIS in the Golis Mountains considerably.
        That is re-instituting deterrence in a kinetic way and they
    are yielding to us to the point that they are considering
    moving to seek refuge elsewhere.
        So this is what--the warrior ethos and the lethality that
    we have imposed in the Golis Mountains against a foe that has
    the capability of attacking our homeland. I think this movement
    to increase our lethal effects on them is causing them to
    establish pause.
        Mr. McGuire. Thank you.
        General Kurilla, Iran and its proxies across CENTCOM
    continue to use drones to target critical infrastructure,
    military installations, and commercial shipping in the region.
        The conflict in Ukraine and Iran's attacks on Israel have
    highlighted the challenges posed by saturation attacks
    comprised of UAS and missile threats, and I am concerned about
    the survivability of high-value air defense systems like
    Patriot, THAAD against drones and drone swarms in the Middle
    East as tensions remain high.
        As the threat from proliferated small UAS technology grows
    in CENTCOM, to the extent you can share in an open setting, how
    is the Army thinking about requirements to defend deployed
    assets in theater against coordinated attacks from advanced
    aerial threats like drones and drone swarms?
        General Kurilla. So that is why you want to have a layered
    defense, Congressman, and we start everything that can reach as
    far out, you know, a ballistic missile all the way down to the
    group one quadcopters.
        We have capabilities that we layer against all of that
    whether it is electronic or kinetic, non-kinetic means as well.
    What the Army is doing to help us with that is General George
    is doing his Army Transformation Initiative, sending forward
    capability not to replace but to augment, to put it in those
    harshest conditions in CENTCOM against an active thinking
    enemy, and we give him feedback on the effectiveness of those
    to make it better before they do large purchases of those
    equipment.
        Mr. McGuire. Perfect. All right. From your perspective,
    General Kurilla, and for integration would it be better to
    baseline these requirements into existing weapon systems like
    Patriot or THAAD or separate?
        General Kurilla. What we want to be able to do is have a
    layered defense, but we need all of those systems to talk to
    each other. We can't have one-off proprietary software systems
    that don't work with one overarching software system that
    controls all of them.
        Mr. McGuire. Awesome. Well, thank you for our witnesses for
    answering the questions, and I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Tran, you are recognized for 5 minutes,
    sir.
        Mr. Tran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Langley, General Kurilla, thank you so much for
    your service. Ms. Thompson, welcome.
        General Langley, you rightfully stated that Africa is a
    nexus theater where global interests converge and the United
    States continues to face fierce competition from China and
    Russia across the continent.
        Chinese state-owned firms now hold stakes in 78 African
    ports and China is currently negotiating a second PLA [People's
    Liberation Army] Navy base in Gabon.
        In your testimony you mentioned that the U.S. approach to
    Africa is African partner led, U.S. and ally enabled.
        General Langley, in your view which African partners are
    the most important to furthering U.S. interests on the
    continent and why?
        General Langley. Congressman, thanks for that question.
        It is a broad question, but as far as China is concerned
    and their aspirations to become a global hegemon, I will just
    give a statistic that is pretty compelling. They are
    outspending AFRICOM militarily 100 to 1.
        So as they have basing aspirations across the globe but
    especially in Africa, in those places, whether it is on the
    east side or the west side, they are trying to close the gap
    from a geostrategic positioning to be able to stop our joint
    forces for employing across the globe or A2AD, which is aerial
    denial, anti-access.
        So, and then also their critical minerals, trying to
    control those supply chains. So those geostrategic regions are
    ways of perfecting their geopolitical means to engage with a
    number of countries. It is too many to say.
        Mr. Tran. Sure, I appreciate that.
        And then, you know, with U.S. engagement with certain
    African countries being either cooled or stalled entirely,
    General Langley, why is continued engagement with those African
    countries that are still engaged with the U.S. so essential for
    our national security?
        General Langley. Absolutely, because some of these
    countries we have shared interests in and we see it as
    essential for the purposes of the shared commitment of
    stability and security across the region, not only for
    counterterrorism but just for the international rules-based
    order.
        A number of these countries see the importance of that and
    that is why we have shared national security objectives so they
    can get to the future of being able to stand on their own and
    be able to create prosperity and across the future, and a
    number of countries side with the United States and our ways to
    do it.
        Mr. Tran. Thank you.
        General Langley, you mentioned in your opening that Morocco
    is an example of success from our investment. Was hard power
    the sole tool we deployed for that success and generally do you
    believe that hard power is the only tool we have to further
    U.S. interest in Africa?
        General Langley. So it is a portfolio, a number of powers.
    You know, whole of government, building institutional capacity,
    having the African countries take a lead and share with one
    another as a whole has proven to be the success against a
    number of layered threats that are stalling progress across the
    African continent.
        Mr. Tran. That is right, and we need to be thinking about
    all levers of power including the soft power tools at our
    disposal when looking to counter Chinese influence, deter
    further adversarial military expansion, and to protect access
    to critical minerals on the continent.
        In fact, that is why I plan on voting against a rescission
    package on the House floor this week that rescinds bilateral
    and multilateral investment in places like Africa.
        General Kurilla, how is the U.S. military supporting the
    delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza and what obstacles have
    you observed that are preventing the seamless delivery of such
    aid?
        General Kurilla. So we have--in the past we have delivered
    humanitarian aid through both air, sea, and land. We were
    working with the Jordanians. We helped screen the convoys that
    would then bring in the food for that.
        But right now we are not actively working humanitarian aid.
        Mr. Tran. Is there a reason why we are not?
        General Kurilla. I mean, that--right now Israel has
    contracted an American company that is doing the distribution
    inside of Gaza. Hamas hates that because Hamas no longer has
    control over that distribution.
        So this is an American private company that Israel did.
    There was no--CENTCOM was not part of that that contracted this
    that is doing a million-ish meals, I think, they are doing a
    day, a little more than that, through this private company.
        Mr. Tran. And are we prepared to help if Israel was to ask
    for our assistance?
        General Kurilla. We are prepared if the President directs
    us to do that.
        Mr. Tran. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and your
    testimony here today.
        General Kurilla. Thank you.
        Mr. Tran. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    Wisconsin, Mr. Van Orden.
        Mr. Van Orden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Kurilla, I want to congratulate you on a fantastic
    career.
        General Kurilla. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Van Orden. Thank you for your service to the country.
    It is wonderful. I would also like to acknowledge your Master
    back there. Derrick and I worked together for--well, you could
    probably tell for how long by the color of my beard and the
    amount of hair we both have on our heads. So you did well by
    yourself there, General.
        General Langley, you are a Marine, right? And then the
    Marine hymn "From the Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of
    Tripoli," right? Tripoli, that is Libya, and we went to war
    with them because the Barbary pirates were kidnapping our
    citizens. Thomas Jefferson did not want to do that but he did,
    and other nations were paying tribute to these pirates and we
    said, enough, right?
        So I would like to gently remind some of my colleagues that
    sit over there if they actually did their homework and read the
    rescissions packages that are proposed by the Trump
    administration, we are removing what can really reasonably be
    titled 21st century tribute.
        So we are going to be assisting our African partners and
    our Middle East partners but we are not paying tribute anymore.
    Those days are over, and you are in that uniform because we
    stopped paying tribute back then.
        So I can forward the package to anybody over there if you
    want--actually want to read it instead of just complaining.
        So former Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said he would
    take the Taliban at their word when they are talking about
    anti-terrorist operations, counter-terrorist operations, and
    human rights in particular, to rights of women in Afghanistan.
        General Kurilla, how is that working out for women in
    Afghanistan?
        General Kurilla. Not very well right now, sir.
        Mr. Van Orden. Not very well. Okay. So the Houthis now have
    said that, okay, my bad, we are going to stop shooting missiles
    at ships, and I would encourage everybody to give as much
    validity to the Taliban statement as we did, or excuse me, to
    the Houthis' statement as we did or should have to the Taliban.
        General Langley and General Kurilla, I spoke to the Special
    Operations component commanders about this, so I understand the
    issue with the Houthis is not a seam, you know, between your
    two COCOMs [combatant commands]. But can you--in this setting
    can you tell me, like, do we know how the Houthis are being
    resupplied by Iran?
        General Kurilla. A vast majority of it is by sea. They put
    them on--they come out of the ports in Iran. They put them on
    dhows, stateless dhows. Some of them go on maritime vessels
    into Djibouti on the UN vessel inspection mechanism.
        They put stuff inside a container. If you have a ship with
    500 containers and it is in the bottom of it you can put all
    those sensitive components in the bottom of that.
        Now, a positive thing that just happened in the last month
    is that the UN vessel inspection mechanism decided to go to 100
    percent inspection of containers. I think it needs to be 100
    percent unloading of all the containers to see what is inside
    of them.
        That is a positive step. But probably about 80 to 85
    percent goes by sea.
        Mr. Van Orden. Okay. Why are we not sinking these vessels?
    So we have a--we have a terrorist nation, Iran, with these--
    their minions.
        They are sending lethal munitions to the minions, which
    have shut off the Red Sea for commercial traffic. Why aren't
    we,--I guess maybe that is a question for Ms. Thompson.
        General Kurilla. We have to find the ships. The hardest
    part is to find that ship. At any given time, there is between
    3,000 and 5,000 dhows between the--Iran and Bab Al-Mandab. That
    is the same distance from the tip of Florida to Boston that you
    are trying to find these dhows.
        Mr. Van Orden. I lived in Djibouti for a long time, and I
    sent some of my guys to Yemen. That was a big secret, and it is
    not anymore, obviously.
        Ms. Thompson, have you guys looked at this from a policy
    perspective? I mean, the last two SEALs that were killed in
    combat, unfortunately, were in the Red Sea--Derrick and I's
    teammates--and they were boarding these vessels to try to
    prevent these munitions from getting to the Houthis. So this is
    very personal to me.
        Ms. Thompson?
        Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman, and
    rightly understood. I can say more on some of the particular
    policy elements in closed session on this but what I would say
    is one of the elements that we have looked at and continue to
    engage on is our European partners.
        They are actually very well equipped to continue to help us
    with this effort, particularly from their positioning in the
    region.
        Mr. Van Orden. Ms. Thompson, I don't mean to interrupt you,
    but I am going to because I have 20 seconds left.
        Right now, from a policy perspective from the DOD, if the
    United States of America understands our European allies find a
    ship and we know for sure that there are munitions on there
    that are going to the Houthis can we just sink it?
        General Kurilla. We can board it. We have the authority to
    board it and if we find the munitions we will take the crew. We
    will transfer that crew and we can end up sinking the ship.
        Mr. Van Orden. Very well.
        General Kurilla. We did one on a dhow 2 weeks ago.
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Van Orden. Thank you.
        The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    California, Mr. Whitesides.
        Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Kurilla, General Langley, thank you both for being
    here today, and thank you, ma'am, for being here today, and I
    want to echo my colleagues in thanking you for your
    distinguished service.
        I want to begin by talking about a trip that we took last
    month. We went to the CENTCOM area of responsibility including
    Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE with Ranking Member Smith and
    a bipartisan delegation from this committee.
        I have to say, General Kurilla, how impressed I was by the
    dedication and professionalism of the men and women serving in
    your AOR, especially given the rapidly shifting landscape in
    that part of the world.
        That dedication is incredibly important. The Middle East is
    a place that deserves American attention and investment, as I
    am sure you would agree.
        General Kurilla, in your time as CENTCOM commander you have
    seen the culmination of the civil war in Syria, the explosion
    of conflict in Gaza, a changing paradigm in Yemen and much
    more.
        In my visit I heard a sense of concern from our allies in
    the region amid the serious change. Some of our partners in the
    Middle East worry that we are taking our eyes off the ball.
        General Kurilla, what are the tangible concrete steps you
    think are necessary to reassure our allies that we are still
    focused on your AOR and that we still stand with them?
        General Kurilla. So I think words matter and actions
    matter. I think what we are doing is we are transitioning from
    a security guarantor to a security integrator.
        I think the thing--we have to have a sufficient and a
    sustainable posture. So we can't take everything. We have to
    have enough that we can still be able to partner with our
    partners in the region.
        We need to be able to give them the military equipment--the
    foreign military sales--so that that can be integrated into the
    region. We saw that on the defense of Israel, systems that can
    talk to each other, and this is one of the challenges with
    foreign military sales. They have real security needs.
        If we don't fill them, they are going to fill them. China
    shows up with an Amazon catalog. They say, pick anything in
    here--I will give you financing, free shipping, prime shipping,
    and no end user agreement. But I tell them it will never touch
    our networks.
        So we have got to be able to provide them the tools that
    they need to integrate in the region that we become the
    security integrator.
        Mr. Whitesides. Yeah, I would agree with that. We actually
    heard that several times over there. We also need to be more
    responsive in being able to fulfill the deals that we do do--
        General Kurilla. That is the problem.
        Mr. Whitesides. --so that people are not waiting, you know,
    10 years or whatever for the systems. Maybe we can work
    together with that.
        Anyway, next question. What we are seeing around the world
    is that allies are regarding the United States as an
    increasingly uncertain partner as we impose and then remove
    unilateral tariffs, consider cutting active duty and foreign
    assistance programs, and discuss using military force to take
    the territory of other nations like Greenland.
        I believe that we are made safer through our alliances and
    that making our alliances doubt our resolve makes us less
    strong. That is particularly true in Africa where China has
    made long-term efforts through various initiatives.
        Meanwhile, the new administration muses publicly about
    terminating AFRICOM. General Langley, can you describe in
    general terms the concerns you have heard from our African
    allies and security partners about this potential
    administration policy change and the impact it would have on
    our nation's security and economic resource requirements?
        General Langley. Congressman, I was in Nairobi last week
    and I would say the message from the Secretary of Defense by
    the chiefs of defense across Africa was well received.
        They get that they need to be able to provide their own
    security. They get that they do not need to be dependent on us
    anymore. There are things that they think that they can share
    in a burden and they are ready to shift such as countries like
    Morocco and Tunisia and Kenya.
        But there are others also in that as well. So they
    articulate what they need to push to that level. But at this
    point here I think everything is positive that they need to be
    able to take on their own security for Africa to prosper writ
    large.
        Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate your
    service. I yield back. Thanks.
        The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
    recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins.
        Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ma'am, gentlemen, thank you for being here. I look at the
    flags behind you. Means a lot to us. I look at the streamers on
    those flags, what they stand for, what they represent.
        I think about the service that you two gentlemen have
    provided to your country and the blood that you have shared and
    friends that you have lost, brothers and sisters that are
    represented in some of those streamers on those flags.
        The significance of a hearing like this cannot be
    overstated, really. We are in a era of adjustment in our nation
    whereby we can move into the 21st century as the dominant
    military force worldwide in order to maintain and preserve or
    establish peace, and Congress has an incredibly significant job
    to do, to listen to the experts that is provided to us so that
    we can improve the means by which we provide our warfighters
    with modern technology.
        So I thank you for being here and for your service.
        General Kurilla, you had mentioned multi-year funding
    versus one-or two-year funding. Would you please clarify for
    this committee the difference between multi-year funding for
    the DOD versus multi-year contracting for our defense
    contractors, because we don't want to lock into a technology
    that could be replaced by a better, less expensive technology.
    Would you touch on that?
        General Kurilla. Sure. I agree. I mean, one of the
    challenges I think you have if you are a business and you make
    X you have this production line, but if you know you are only
    going to get money from these companies you are spreading that
    out.
        You only have so much production lines. So when we have
    partners come to us and say, we would like to purchase X and we
    tell them they can get it in 2029 because we don't have the
    production capability that is a concern.
        I am also just as concerned that the industrial base cannot
    keep up with the weapon expenditure. Every conflict that we
    have had recently has underestimated the weapons--Russia,
    Ukraine, Israel.
        And so I think what we want to do--
        Mr. Higgins. Right. Yes, sir. So not to interrupt you but
    you are at the heart of the problem. What I want to get to here
    is that if we--we have to find the sweet spot and I am going to
    ask you what that is.
        You have a problem of historically, like, constant design
    changes with a program. We have to move away from that. If we
    have multi-year funding for the Department of Defense that
    gives greater executive authority to accomplish the mission and
    build and procure and take delivery of the right vessels and
    craft.
        But we don't want to be locked in a multi-year contract
    with a particular defense contractor because that would
    insulate us against the emergence of significantly better tech
    that is more effective and more lethal and less expensive. We
    have to be able to make that shift.
        So what is that sweet spot?
        General Kurilla. I can't tell you exactly what the sweet
    spot is but I do know we have to be agile. We have been making
    Patriot missiles for a very, very long time.
        So the multi-year funding on that I don't know if it is 3
    to 5 years, but if I am a businessman I am not going to build
    new production lines if I don't know if I am going to get money
    next year.
        Mr. Higgins. Understood. That is for, like, existing tech.
    Okay. Shifting to some tech that is out there that I want to
    know if it is being shared, some of our allies in the Middle
    East have been incredibly wealthy.
        They have unlimited funding for research and development,
    and my research indicates that they are fielding some
    autonomous tech that is far beyond what we have. Are they
    sharing that with us?
        General Kurilla. So we are partnered with several of these
    partners in the Middle East. We do share quite a bit. There are
    some things that we know that they are using as well but we
    have quite a bit of visibility on that.
        Mr. Higgins. And finally, what would it take to wipe out
    the Houthi operational capabilities?
        General Kurilla. I think the number-one thing that has to
    happen is to have Iran quit resupplying them. They would die on
    the vine without Iranian support.
        Mr. Higgins. Die on the vine. We would like that.
        General Langley, General Kurilla, Ms. Thompson, thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield.
        The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
        The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Maryland, Ms.
    Elfreth.
        Ms. Elfreth. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for being here
    and, Generals, thank you for your decades of service to this
    nation. It is greatly appreciated.
        I am going to start where my colleague left off with the
    Houthis. Even though we have negotiated the ceasefire with the
    designated terrorist organization, they continue to launch
    attacks, as we have said, both at our allies and continue to
    place global commerce at risk.
        What can you tell us in this open session about the
    specific drone attacks on Israel and what are we learning from
    that?
        General Kurilla. The specific what, ma'am?
        Ms. Elfreth. Drone attacks on Israel.
        General Kurilla. From Iran or from the Houthis?
        Ms. Elfreth. From the Houthis.
        General Kurilla. So for the Houthis, I mean, we are still
    shooting down Houthi UAVs that are going towards Israel. They
    have taken an Iranian UAV--it is called a KAS-04--with some
    modifications, additional gas.
        They call it a Yafa. It has the--I mean, there are some
    Houthi firsts here but it is Iranian equipment that can go
    2,600 kilometers.
        And so when we have that we have shot down dozens of them
    and so they are taking a very simple UAV, extending the range
    of it, and then Israel has effective defenses as well.
        Ms. Elfreth. It has been said but I want to reiterate we
    are in between Ukraine and this region hypersonic technology
    development with--particularly with drones. What evidence do
    you have that the Houthis are sharing their drone warfare
    knowledge with our adversaries?
        General Kurilla. So with other adversaries--so I will take
    you back to July of 2024. We killed seven individuals in Iraq
    that were setting up two UAVs. Of the seven individuals killed
    there was a Houthi UAV expert, a brigadier general.
        There was an Iranian IRGC UAV expert there. There was three
    Kata'ib Hezbollah individuals there as well and there was a
    Lebanese Hezbollah individual there as well. So we are seeing
    that.
        There is Houthis that have outreached to Russia. They have
    gone to China. They have cells in Iran. They are in Syria. They
    are in Lebanon as well.
        Ms. Elfreth. Okay, thank you.
        Switching gears to General Langley, we have touched on in
    this hearing the very real nexus between our long standing
    humanitarian efforts and investments in Africa to build allies
    and the same time the very real threat China poses,
    particularly to naval progress but also the extraction of those
    rare earth minerals that are critical to national defense, all
    of that related to national security and your role.
        Over the last six years the terrorist organization JNIM has
    seen dramatic growth in activities. You recently gave remarks
    emphasizing that the U.S. was focused on helping African
    nations build the self-reliance to fight such terrorists.
        But it was reported that the vast majority of programs run
    through the Global Fragility Act, a multi-year initiative
    intended to bolster stability in vulnerable west African
    countries, has been shut down by this administration.
        Can you please speak to the threat of JNIM to the region
    and its stability?
        General Langley. Congresswoman, thanks for the question.
        Yes, the epicenter of JNIM right now lies within the
    countries of Mali and Burkina Faso and, to some degree, Niger.
    But it is threatening the former GFA recipient states. I have
    met in Cote D'Ivoire with Ambassador Davis Ba, and the thing in
    the past they have been able to benefit of being able to share
    ways ahead for counterterrorism.
        So in their northern regions of--excuse me, the southern
    regions of Burkina Faso but the northern regions of Cote
    D'Ivoire they have been very effective with the construct they
    have established.
        So, yeah, they benefited from their whole of government and
    I think the GFA had been an enabler for that in the past. But
    going forward, they know that with the straight talk that we
    have already said that we need to share this burden and Burkina
    Faso is--we have offered them other opportunities to be able to
    benefit with what Cote D'Ivoire has been successful at.
        So it's the sharing of ideas and sharing of the enduring
    solution to counterterrorism which all of those countries can
    benefit from.
        Ms. Elfreth. Thank you, General.
        And in my remaining moments I am just going to make a
    statement about the President's recent desire or statements and
    desire to develop the Gaza strip into the Riviera of the Middle
    East and how deeply troubling those statements are.
        Many of us share the desire for a lasting two-state
    solution driven by self-governance and long-term stability in
    the region. Yet, building such a resort and displacing 2
    million Palestinians will only exacerbate tensions and create a
    target for further hostilities in the region.
        I understand this isn't directly related to your
    responsibilities in the military but I fail to see the national
    security reasoning.
        Instead, I want to echo with my last moments my colleague
    Congressman Tran's excellent proposal that CENTCOM use its
    incredible logistics capabilities to support distribution of
    humanitarian aid in Gaza.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. The gentlelady yields back.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
    Gooden.
        Mr. Gooden. Thank you.
        General Langley, I will start with you and then move east.
    Regarding the DRC and Rwanda, could you give me kind of an
    update, not necessarily history but where you see things as
    they stand today with that conflict?
        General Langley. Yes. At the cusp of--at the central piece
    of it is the encroachment of M-23 forces into the DRC--eastern
    DRC. They have been very successful in their offensive
    operations going all the way down to South Kivu.
        This encapsulates some of the regions that are rich in
    critical minerals. So just at the diplomatic realm--and I won't
    speak to that two piece but I know that Rwanda is allegedly
    supporting M-23, and then President Tshisekedi in the DRC is
    trying to get his forces right set so they can counter this.
        So that is all in the diplomatic realm. SADC, a number of
    regional constructs in southern Africa who are trying to solve
    this problem and trying to come to a truce where we can effect
    peace.
        Over.
        Mr. Gooden. Well, we would consider both countries to be
    friends of ours, I believe. So it's tricky in that sense, but
    in your mind what needs to happen to wrap this conflict up and
    bring peace to the region?
        General Langley. From an operational perspective, like I
    said, this is mainly in the diplomatic realm so I have to defer
    to the State Department.
        Mr. Gooden. Fair enough. Thank you.
        General, could you--the last time you were here I asked you
    about Qatar and our relationship with them. Some of my
    colleagues have questioned Qatar's reliability as a U.S.
    partner and their status as a major non-NATO ally, and in light
    of the President's recent visit could you clarify the strategic
    benefits of continuing advanced military exports to Doha and
    our relationship with them? How's that going?
        General Kurilla. We have a phenomenal relationship military
    to military with Qatar. They house the largest base in the
    Middle East in Doha. They provide burden sharing in the form of
    $300 million a year to run those bases.
        They have been incredibly supportive of everything we do.
    Generally, the answer is yes--what is the question when I talk
    to them.
        Mr. Gooden. Is the--I find that to be the case as well and
    I share your belief toward that.
        How does the--what opportunities could you see for us to
    expand that relationship that would benefit our nation?
        General Kurilla. Sure. Just last week we inducted for the
    first time Patriot component into their depot level maintenance
    and they repaired that component for us. One of the things
    Qatar has offered to do is to help in either manufacturing or
    depot level maintenance for some of the unique systems that we
    both share.
        So I think there's tremendous opportunity that can help
    also our industrial base as well as our maintenance base.
        Mr. Gooden. I appreciate that. Thank you for the work you
    are all doing, and good luck. Thanks so much. I yield back.
        The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
        The chair now recognizes gentlelady from New Hampshire, Ms.
    Goodlander.
        Ms. Goodlander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    our witnesses for being here today, particularly to you,
    General Kurilla and General Langley.
        I want to thank you for your incredible service to our
    country and I will miss you very much as a new member on this
    committee. So thank you for everything you have done.
        General Kurilla, I want to take you back to 2022, your
    confirmation hearing, when you testified that Iran--the Iranian
    regime is the number-one destabilizing force in the Middle
    East. Is that still--
        General Kurilla. Still remains the number-one malign
    influence in the Middle East.
        Ms. Goodlander. Thank you for that. You know, you--in your
    written testimony you testified that Iran's nuclear threat--its
    best chance at restoring deterrence and imposing its will on
    the region is its nuclear threat and you also testified that
    Iran has virtually doubled its enrichment capacity in the past
    6 months, which is extremely alarming, I think, to everybody on
    this committee.
        And I just want to say at the outset that Congress is--we
    are committed on a bipartisan basis to taking action on this
    issue. I am proud to be supporting the Enhanced Iran Sanctions
    Act of 2025 and we welcome the Pentagon's help in advising
    Congress as we think through every tool that can be used to
    prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
        I want to ask you, General, about, as many of my colleagues
    have, the other pillar of the threat Iran poses its funding for
    terrorist groups and particularly the Houthis.
        So last month the President reached a ceasefire agreement
    with the Houthis--the terrorist organization the Houthis. I
    wanted to ask you the goal of that ceasefire agreement and the
    terms of the agreement.
        General Kurilla. So when the President gave the mission to
    CENTCOM it was a very specific mission on March 10. He said, I
    want the Houthis to quit shooting at our ships. That was the
    mission that was given to us.
        For 51 days we pounded the Houthis. They were screaming to
    all of our partners in the region to include the Omanis to get
    the Americans to stop pounding them. And so they came and said,
    we will quit shooting at you if you quit--we will stop shooting
    at you if you quit shooting at us. That met the President's
    goal.
        Ms. Goodlander. So stop shooting at American ships?
        General Kurilla. That was the specific goal that was given
    to me.
        Ms. Goodlander. Understood. And the goal is to restore
    freedom of navigation in this important part of the world where
    so much of global commercial shipping depends upon the freedom
    of navigation.
        General Kurilla. 30 percent of all container traffic.
        Ms. Goodlander. So has commercial shipping resumed?
        General Kurilla. So that will be more of a lagging
    indicator when the insurance rates come down. We just did a
    freedom of navigation with four warships over the last week.
    Nothing was shot at them.
        We also had multiple other countries' frigates and a U.K.
    destroyer went through there. I think you will see over time,
    as long as the conditions exist, deterrence is always temporal.
        As long as those conditions exist and the insurance rates
    come back down it's a two-week faster transit to go through the
    Red Sea and the Suez than to go around the Cape of Good Hope.
        But right now the shipping industry is looking at as long
    as the insurance rates stay high they will choose to go a
    different route, and so that is going to be a lagging
    indicator.
        Ms. Goodlander. So how long do you expect it will take for
    commercial shipping to resume?
        General Kurilla. I think you will see us start to escort
    some other U.S. flagships and I think others will start to go
    through there as well over time as long as the conditions
    exist.
        Ms. Goodlander. Thank you, General.
        As you know well the cost of this lagging indicator is very
    real for the American people and, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
    enter into the record an article dated June 5th ``Red Sea
    passage remains a no-go for shipping despite U.S. action.''
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 121.]
        The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
        Ms. Goodlander. Thank you.
        General, you know, I want to ask you about--well, first of
    all, so our goal was to protect American ships. Our goal was
    not to protect our ally Israel and we are seeing an escalation
    in the conflict between the Houthis and our ally Israel.
        You have testified to some of the things we can do to help
    mitigate that threat to our ally but I just want to say for the
    record that this--you have said well that this is a threat that
    is metastasizing. It is a regional scourge and the United
    States cannot give up on this.
        General Kurilla. We are still protecting Israel. We have
    THAAD battery there that is shooting down Houthi missiles and
    we shoot down Houthi UAVs that are going towards Israel.
        Ms. Goodlander. Thank you, General.
        I was very interested--and I will be submitting more
    questions for the record--in what you said about what CENTCOM
    could do to help deliver humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Can
    you tell us what resources CENTCOM has to bear towards what I
    think we can all agree is a really important mission?
        General Kurilla. So I think that the biggest resources that
    CENTCOM can assist with is--the ground lock is where you--how
    you move large quantities of that.
        We assisted the Jordanians in scanning all of their trucks
    before they went in and that met the Israeli security concerns
    of any trucks going in and we deliver--
        The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Guam, Mr.
    Moylan.
        Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for your
    participation today, especially what you have in front of you,
    and over the last 18 months from the administration and CENTCOM
    and AFRICOM you have engaged and you sustained some high tempo
    operations involving missile defense and rapid force
    protection.
        You contested logistics and your counter proxy engagement
    so many of which reflect the type of challenges we are
    anticipating in the potential Indo-Pacific conflict. So lessons
    learned.
        I would like to hear from each of you from this kinetic
    operations that you have been doing, whether it be from
    CENTCOM's counter-Houthi maritime strikes or AFRICOM's
    experience in the disperse operations and low access
    environments.
        What lessons are being actively incorporated into strategic
    planning for a high-end fight in the Indo-Pacific? Ms.
    Thompson, if we can start first with you, please.
        Ms. Thompson. Thank you, Congressman. I think it's an
    incredibly important question.
        I will leave the operational details to General Langley and
    General Kurilla, but I would say one of the most important
    things that we are watching is, certainly, strategic waterways
    and the ability to flow forces into the Indo-Pacific.
        Obviously, freedom of navigation for U.S. military vessels
    through the BAM and the Red Sea is critical to that effort. So
    I would just highlight that as one of the big takeaways and one
    of the strategic choke points that is very important to make
    sure we have control over.
        Mr. Moylan. General, please.
        General Kurilla. So I think between both the Iranian
    attacks on Israel as well as our--the Houthi attacks on our
    naval forces we have learned a lot that are applicable and we
    pass these back to the big Navy, big Air Force, the Army as
    well.
        Software is a weapon. Our ability to do combined joint all-
    domain command and control, the things that we are doing with
    software, is amazing. We have advanced that.
        We have engineers every day making improvements on our
    ability to do that. It's at warfighting headquarters. The
    things that we are doing with ballistic missile defense--the
    software is changing based on what we are seeing on the
    battlefield.
        The same thing I would tell you as it comes to counter-UAS
    as well we are making changes to the Navy software on the spy
    radars based on what we are seeing. It's the first time in the
    history of warfare that anti-ship ballistic missiles have been
    used against ships.
        I would remind you that the Truman spent 51 days in the
    longest sustained period of combat for an aircraft carrier
    since World War II and they performed marvelously.
        Mr. Moylan. Thank you.
        General?
        General Langley. Thank you, Congressman, for that question.
    And from my perspective and operational sense I look at it as
    supporting three different combatant commanders to include
    CENTCOM in their globally integrated plan against their foes,
    especially Iran, and then--and even EUCOM in their global plan
    as well as INDOPACOM.
        And on this map here that you see the strategic choke
    points. As far as AFRICOM and what we are charged to do and
    supporting those respective combatant commanders in support of
    their global plans is be able to keep us at phase zero, phase
    zero of deter, being able to deter and keep our free flow of
    commerce and freedom of action around this.
        So we work through our partners, a number of countries
    across the Maghreb for the end. Every exercise has that teed up
    as far as a objective to how we do that with shared objectives,
    shared intel and common objectives, I should say, with other
    countries, and that is an enabler for us in my support plans to
    those respective combatant commanders.
        Mr. Moylan. Thank you, General.
        General Kurilla, in most of my hearings I am always an
    advocate for the Army, right, in the INDOPACOM area,
    especially. But today I want to advocate for the Navy's role in
    CENTCOM.
        So how has the United States participated in this
    multinational maritime task force to counter both state and
    nonstate actors within your area of operation?
        General Kurilla. So I am incredibly proud of the sailors in
    our Navy and what they have been able to accomplish. So when I
    look at CENTCOM it has three of the eight strategic choke
    points in the world and what our Navy has been able to do to be
    able to secure those has been fantastic.
        I mean, they have really--when you look at what they have
    done both against the Houthis and in their interdiction of
    other things coming into the region they have done a fantastic
    job.
        Mr. Moylan. Thank you so much. Thank you for your service
    to the nation. I appreciate you all.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
    Sorensen.
        Mr. Sorensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning and welcome to General Kurilla, General
    Langley, and Ms. Thompson.
        I especially want to thank the two generals here today for
    your many years of service, your dedication to our nation since
    this will be the last time that you appear before our
    committee. You have worn your uniforms so proudly and your
    country will always be grateful of that.
        Both sides of the aisle agree today that we must continue
    to improve support to servicemembers as well as our standing
    around the world.
        But I must say that my constituents and I are still very
    angry that our men and women in the CENTCOM theater were put at
    risk by the Signal mess with Secretary Hegseth, Vice President
    Vance, and other senior members of this administration. Our
    brave servicemembers should never have to worry that our own
    leaders are giving enemies our mission secrets.
        As we have seen with the Houthis we need to be able to
    properly protect ourselves from drones and we should be
    outfitting our own warfighter with drones.
        The Rock Island arsenals, a joint manufacturing and
    technology center, 3D prints drones that then get outfitted
    with the sensors and the systems needed for our important
    missions. I think this is crucially needed.
        But to both generals today can you talk about where we need
    to be going in terms of both our unmanned air systems and
    counter-UAS capabilities in our regions?
        General Kurilla. If I could just jump on the additive
    manufacturing and 3D printing.
        So we have an innovation task force out there. One of them
    is Task Force 39 which has an additive manufacturing in Kuwait.
    We use that for both polymers and metallic additive
    manufacturing.
        We'll print parts, get that back to--get a system back up
    until that OEM part can come in. We do that on a routine basis.
    We are 3D printing drones down in Task Force 99 down in Qatar
    and they do these small, attritable drones. We slap some
    cameras on them and we use those very effectively as well.
        So I think this is--you know, when you talk counter-UAS,
    though, a big part of it is the detect and I think we have to
    do a better job to be able to detect and that is something that
    we have made some recommendations on as well.
        Mr. Sorensen. General Langley?
        General Langley. Now I am just going to state that my buddy
    here Kurilla in the CENTCOM region has been the lead as far as
    evolving technology to counter drones because what happens in
    CENTCOM will eventually happen in AFRICOM.
        So we have been following his lead in the technology and
    experimentation and we have been leveraging that within the
    AFRICOM region.
        Mr. Sorensen. Thank you, sir.
        The new regime in Syria certainly changes the landscape of
    the Middle East. You know, I am hopeful that this will really
    diminish Iran's influence in the region and lessen Russia's
    foothold in the Middle East.
        To General Kurilla, with our approach to Syria changing
    where do you see things headed today and what opportunities and
    challenges do you see, going forward?
        General Kurilla. So the opportunities are significant. I
    think I see a lot of upside. I see little downside for engaging
    right now.
        Ambassador Tom Barrack, he's the U.S. ambassador to Turkiye
    but also the special envoy to Syria. I talk to him often. He is
    at the table.
        I think we waited a little too long to come to the table
    with the fall of Assad back in December. We are now there and
    we are able to engage and be able to shape the way forward. I
    think that is a very, very positive thing.
        Mr. Sorensen. One of the things that I worry about with the
    current administration is how we are handling the relationships
    that we have with our allies around the world--our ability to
    forge new partnerships and friendships.
        You know, building and maintaining these partnerships is so
    crucial to our own safety and our interests, and as General
    Kurilla mentioned and your written statement, we can't take our
    partners for granted.
        Can you speak to the importance of our allies in the region
    and what we in Congress need to do to support them?
        General Kurilla. Well, I think a big part of it is being
    there for them. I have been to the region 45 times. You have to
    be there.
        You have to sit down, you have a meal together, and that is
    how you build a friendship and a relationship. I talk to the
    CHODs. Almost every single day I am talking to a different
    CHOD, multiple--chiefs of defense. I am sorry.
        Every single day I am talking to several of them. When they
    are sending you pictures of their grandkids, you know you are
    part of the family, and to be able to do that, though, what
    they are asking of us is, hey, one, are you going to be there
    for us and the answer is yes.
        But it's the foreign military sales is their single biggest
    frustration that they have on the time to deliver. They have
    the means to purchase.
        It's the time to deliver that equipment that they are
    asking for and that is where I think we can--and I am 40
    percent of all foreign military sales in the world in the
    CENTCOM region and I think we can do a better job.
        Mr. Sorensen. Thank you, gentlemen, both for your service
    and we appreciate your dedication to our country.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
        The chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
    Luttrell.
        Mr. Luttrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for coming today and I would like to
    thank everyone in uniform today as well as our veterans that
    are in the room.
        General Kurilla, you talked about ISIS-K in Afghanistan in
    your opening statement. I would like a little deep dive, if you
    don't mind.
        General Kurilla. Sure.
        All right. So ISIS-Khorasan, perhaps one of the most active
    in trying to do external plots globally to include against the
    homeland, right now what we saw is the Taliban in going after
    ISIS-K--they hate each other--pushed a lot of them into the
    tribal areas on the Afghan-Pakistan border.
        Through a phenomenal partnership with Pakistan they have
    gone after ISIS-Khorasan, killing dozens of them. Through a
    relationship we have with them providing intelligence they have
    captured at least five ISIS-Khorasan high value individuals.
        They extradited back Jafar, who was one of the key
    individuals behind the Abbey Gate bombing, and the first person
    he called, Chief of Staff Munir, was me and said, I have caught
    him, I am willing to extradite him back to the United States,
    please tell the Secretary of Defense and the President.
        So we are seeing Pakistan with limited intelligence that we
    are providing them go after them using their means to do that
    and we are seeing an effect on ISIS-Khorasan.
        At the same point they are continuing to move around.
    Sometimes they'll try and go back into Afghanistan. We have the
    means to be able to collect, but for the most part right now
    they are hanging out right in that border area of Pakistan.
        And I would also tell you that, I mean, since 2024, the
    beginning, Pakistan held over a thousand terrorist attacks in
    the western area, killing about 700 security and civilians and
    2,500 wounded.
        They are in an active counterterrorism fight right now and
    they have been a phenomenal partner in the counterterrorism
    world.
        Mr. Luttrell. It seems like--does it seem like they are
    scaling down or scaling up?
        General Kurilla. So I think from ISIS-Khorasan they got hit
    very, very hard over the last several months and so they are--I
    would tell you right now they are at a low point right now.
        What we are getting out of interrogation and exploitation
    has been significant. But remember, these are the same
    individuals that did the Crocus Music City Hall attack in
    Moscow.
        They did the attack in Kerman, Iran, and they have
    attempted other attacks and there was actually ties in a
    classified setting that I could talk in terms of the homeland.
        Mr. Luttrell. Whatever we have to do not to go back to that
    place would be amazing.
        General Kurilla. That is why we need to--if I could.
        Mr. Luttrell. Yes, please.
        General Kurilla. We have to have a relationship with
    Pakistan and with India. I do not believe it is a binary switch
    that we can't have one with Pakistan if we have a relationship
    with India. We should look at the merits of the relationship
    for the positives that it has.
        Mr. Luttrell. General Langley, with--in regards to AFRICOM
    it seems as if Russia more or less has Africa landlocked. Well,
    I am looking at the map here.
        Can you give me kind of a high level briefing when it comes
    to Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya, the northern part of Africa? If
    you roll the clock back maybe a decade that seems to be the
    best place you could hide in plain sight, especially in the
    northern point of Tunisia, with the vastness of the desert.
        Are we seeing anything happening developing in the northern
    part of Africa? Because it seems as if we are essentially kind
    of focused on where all the rare earth minerals are being
    mined.
        General Langley. Congressman, that is a great question.
        Now, I have always been through my tenure of command the
    last three years engaging with all these countries. To the
    degree, as we look at this is NATO's southern flank and I see
    those strategic choke points on there.
        We need freedom of navigation or freedom of action for our
    ships in support of those war plans for NATO and for EUCOM.
        So I have been working overtime and engaging with these
    countries. Morocco is doing their part, and even Algeria
    which--some realms that we disagree on some things but Algeria
    we were able to sign a nonbinding agreement in cooperation.
        But I will tell you that Russia is still there. They are
    still trying to affect an agreement on their own so they can
    get basing access or port access, and as you even go down into
    Libya, you know, I met with Field Marshal Haftar almost--two
    times--actually, two times engaging them to ensure that we can
    work with them because they have--we have shared threats,
    especially along the southern borders, of terrorism.
        Just engaging with both sides, trying to get collective
    agreement in Libya between the GNU and the LNA. That is
    essential that we keep U.S. diplomatic agreements and
    cooperation with these countries because we see what Russia is
    trying to do establish some ports across the Mediterranean--
    warm water ports, so that it'll affect their operations trying
    to get a decisive advantage.
        But we are not going to let that happen in phase zero
    coherency operations that we do in AFRICOM.
        Mr. Luttrell. Thank you.
        Ms. Thompson, I have nothing for you today. Keep up the
    great work.
        I yield back, sir.
        The Chairman. You got it easy today from him.
        All right. We now have--Mr. Cisneros is recognized.
        Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And General Kurilla and General Langley, thank you both for
    your years of service and dedication to our country as you
    both--you are ready to retire here in a while.
        But, General Langley, you know, when I was in the Navy my
    ship, the USS Ogden, stopped in Eritrea, which was at that time
    a new independent nation. You know, we went there to show the
    flag but to show a support for this new country and, really, to
    the region as well.
        But that is not the impression I am getting from the
    current administration. They are pulling away foreign aid.
    Ships aren't visiting the continent like they used to. We are
    leaving a void for Russia and for the PRC to fill.
        And you have been quoted as saying that the PRC is
    replicating what we have done in Africa, targeting the
    international military education and training program that they
    also said they are going to increase security and training in a
    number of countries.
        In April it was reported that Cairo and the PRC were
    planning to participate in a joint exercise between their air
    forces. As the administration continues to pull back and the
    PRC continues to build relations what, in your opinion, is the
    national security risk and impact to Africa as well as to here
    at home?
        General Langley. I would say the CCP is trying to replicate
    what we do, what we have done in the past, and have a strategic
    advantage, and especially engaging with our African partners
    because they want to be able to establish a enabler to close
    the decisive gap that we have had over them for years.
        I will just go on a maritime sense, especially with their
    NETF, the NETF, which is their Naval Expeditionary Task Force.
    They go around the periphery of the African continent engaging
    with a number of countries. We need to be able to get that.
        You brought up, you know, your naval background. You know,
    when we had the ARG [Amphibious Ready Group] MEUs [Marine
    Expeditionary Unit] we are not heel to toe anymore. We are not
    3.0. We do need the Amphibious Readiness Group and the Marine
    Expeditionary Units out there on ships. That is a force
    multiplier for crisis response or any other show of deterrence.
        I would say, you know, that is not--that doesn't go across
    political lines. That goes in operational lines. You know,
    Navy--as I met with the vice admiral in their operation sense
    but also met with Admiral Kilby and also Stuart Munsch, and
    they are bringing up the capability to try to provide Africa
    with that capability so that we can compete with China,
    especially in the maritime sense.
        So I would say that one step in the right direction is
    getting those ARG MEUs back out there and in the AFRICOM
    theater.
        Mr. Cisneros. All right. Gator Navy, all the way.
        Ms. Thompson, you said in your opening remarks that the
    department is working with its African--with African nations to
    grow--working with them to increase operational independence
    for these African nations.
        But I think really what we are seeing, right, is they are
    not doing that. They are moving towards the PRC. As--you know,
    as I referenced here Egypt and the PRC are kind of talking
    about doing joint operations.
        How does the Department not see this as a red flag? Why
    aren't we doing something about this? Why are we pulling away
    and we are just pushing them in the direction of our--you know,
    of our pacing threat here?
        Ms. Thompson. Sir, thank you for the question. I really
    appreciate it.
        And I would point you first to our interim national defense
    strategic guidance. Our top two priorities are defense of the
    homeland, countering terrorist threats that have the capability
    and intent to strike the homeland, and then deterrence of the
    PRC, particularly in the Western Pacific.
        But, obviously, as you outlined absolutely correctly that
    bleeds over to the African continent as well. And so I would
    say from our Title 10 security assistance approach to the
    continent but then also, as we are in the development process
    for our National Defense Strategy this is something that is top
    of mind and this is certainly not an area where we are pulling
    back.
        We want to be very targeted and strategic in our approach
    to make sure that we are deterring the PRC's--particularly
    their ability to have a military advantage on the continent. So
    I would share your assessment on that front.
        Mr. Cisneros. Well, please take that back to the heads over
    there, right. As we continue to pull away they are continuing
    to build relationships with China and the PRC and, you know,
    they are--the PRC is more than happy to fill that void as we
    pull away and this should be a red flag that they are working
    with these things and that is something that needs to be
    brought up and considered.
        And with that, I yield back my time.
        The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Dr.
    McCormick.
        Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        General Kurilla, General Langley, it has been a pleasure
    working with you. I wish you fair winds and following seas in
    your next endeavors.
        I am sure you will be highly successful. We'll miss you. I
    consider you friends, and if any time you ever want to share a
    beverage or a box of crayons just let me know. We'll always be
    available.
        General Langley, I will start with you. The Djibouti air
    base cluster is within striking distance of some of the Houthi
    weapons and I was wondering, especially with the development of
    drones that have been developed in Iran and put together in
    Yemen, what are we doing for countermeasures and do you think
    we could do better?
        How can we assist you in equipping our bases with
    countermeasures for those advanced drones and what they are
    trying to develop?
        General Kurilla. Congressman, it is an evolving threat,
    especially with the Houthis on the other side of the Red Sea,
    and I will get into specifics of what we actually need to
    improve upon, enhance upon.
        We are protected now but I will get into specifics in
    closed session of things that I think that we can continue to
    enhance and evolve in that because it's not just Djibouti. It
    is all the way down to Manda Bay in Kenya.
        So I will say that this is evolving. The Houthis are
    gaining in capability and then there's other illicit actors in
    the region that is--that can be a threat within East Africa
    writ large.
        Dr. McCormick. Would you say that--is it safe to assume
    that we have a ways to go to be secure in our endeavors?
        General Langley. We will always do position improvement.
    You know, our fighting holes always need to be improved for
    force protection. That is my number-one mission is protecting
    the troops on the ground.
        Dr. McCormick. And in regards to CENTCOM we have seen
    everything from Tower 22 to the ship lanes really kind of being
    a proving ground for drone attacks and missile attacks, and I
    am sure we are going to eventually encounter supersonic
    missiles and other things that are very, very alarming.
        What have you learned from those sort of contacts as we
    advance our technologies and we have these new technologies to
    deal with?
        General Kurilla. You have--Congressman, you have to have a
    layered defense is the first thing and you have to continue to
    improve upon your capabilities and evolve faster and move
    faster than the enemy can on theirs.
        Look at what happened in Russia with the Ukraine when you
    watched also them go to fiber optic drones because of the EW
    and the jamming that was up there.
        So they are moving very, very quickly in terms of
    advancements. We have to move faster.
        Dr. McCormick. And, look, I just talked to an AI community
    about that very same thing: closing the kill chain, making sure
    that our next technologies--I mean, fly-by-wire is awesome, but
    it's kind of like a look-back at the TOW technology. I want to
    look forward and look at new training models, how we are going
    to do that.
        What is your feeling--and this is an associated question
    that I just came up on, just as we are talking--if we are going
    to have different navigation systems that aren't going to be
    controlled by semi-autonomous controllers. Autonomous weapon
    systems that literally identify targets without any input once
    they are launched and it is--
        General Kurilla. They exist right now.
        Dr. McCormick. The question is would that be a good--I get
    a little bit squeamish when we talk about autonomous weapon
    systems that direct themselves and they don't have that final--
        General Kurilla. I think those exist right--they don't--I
    know they exist right now. It's when you get into that final
    mile, that final kilometer, that then locks on a target that is
    an autonomous target--
        Dr. McCormick. That is true.
        General Kurilla. --recognition system that has then taken
    it in. You can't jam it, et cetera.
        Dr. McCormick. Good point. Good point.
        One of the other things that I thought was really
    interesting is there's USAID and other things we do in the
    foreign investments we do that now come into question.
        Now, some of it has been wasteful but, obviously, I am not
    against foreign aid because it gives us real influence and
    really creates stability in different regions.
        Where do you think we could redirect those funds that have
    maybe been not spent on the most efficient systems? This is for
    both of you, and I know we only have only have 45 seconds left.
        But where can we best spend the money we do to influence
    and create stability in those regions that we are talking about
    right now?
        General Kurilla. Well, I think from the USAID the State
    Department is now taking on that responsibility. For us there
    are certain countries that absolutely don't have the natural
    resources and those are things that we need to look at and I
    can get specific with you if you have a written question.
        I will turn it over to Mike.
        General Langley. Phase four operations. Stability. I have
    seen it work in Somalia, you know, as they were going through
    Lower and Middle Shabelle from 2022 heretofore. But without
    that recreation or recreating that or getting it from other
    countries there's going to be a lapse in completing a credible
    force to do the hold.
        Dr. McCormick. My best to you both, gentlemen. Loved
    working with you. Semper fi.
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms.
    Jacobs.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will echo all of
    my colleagues' thanks to both of you for your many decades of
    service. I have very much enjoyed working with all of you and,
    General Kurilla, as predicted I outlasted you.
        General Langley, I first want to discuss our strategy in
    Somalia. Under your leadership the United States has rapidly
    increased the pace of air strikes against both al-Shabaab and
    ISIS-Somalia.
        In the past 5 months alone the U.S. has conducted 37
    strikes compared to just four during the entire first year of
    the Biden administration. That is actually nearly as many as
    President Trump authorized in his first year, which totalled
    39.
        So could you first tell me what is the objective of these
    air strikes?
        General Langley. Congresswoman, this is one of the number-
    one objectives that Secretary Hegseth came in--when he became
    the Secretary of Defense. He said AFRICOM needs to do
    counterterrorism operations to protect the homeland.
        Up there in the Golis Mountains you have ISIS-Somalia. They
    have the propensity to affect the homeland whether it be global
    financing. We had to stop that. You know, we did have an
    operation back in 2023 but ISIS-Somalia has grown. Matter of
    fact, the emir is there now.
        They have only increased their capability and capacity.
    That is why we had to turn up the heat on putting pressure
    through lethal means to be able to attrite that.
        Ms. Jacobs. I understand the threat. I guess what I am
    concerned about is that we have been using this same logic for
    decades.
        It doesn't seem like it's attached to any ability for us to
    eventually leave and we saw that, for instance, in 2019 when
    there was expanded air strikes that it didn't actually
    translate to fewer al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia.
        So are these air strikes part of a coherent, articulated
    strategy aimed at enabling long-term stability and ultimately
    drawing down the U.S. military footprint?
        General Langley. Yes, that is our operational intent right
    now, to be able to cease or deter their ability for ex ops to
    protect the homeland.
        Ms. Jacobs. Okay. That is different than there being an
    actual strategy.
        Ms. Thompson, you said Somalia is an incredible success. I
    think I would disagree with your assessment of that. Is there a
    whole of government coherent, articulated strategy aimed at
    enabling long-term stability and ultimately drawing down the
    U.S. military footprint in Somalia?
        Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman.
        I would highlight my commentary was meant to associate with
    the INDSG [Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance]
    guidance. Our number-one objective is, obviously, to deter and
    deny and degrade credible ex ops threats to the homeland, and
    as I have highlighted and as you highlighted in your opening
    comments, the significant uptick in strikes is demonstrative of
    basically attaching those activities to our number-one INDSG
    objective.
        So I would articulate that that is where the connection to
    the strategy is. In terms of force posture in Somalia on a
    long-term basis this is something that, obviously, we would
    contemplate as part of the broader global force posture review
    and no decisions for AFRICOM or for anywhere else have been
    made at this time. But it's certainly something that would
    factor into this--
        Ms. Jacobs. None of this sounds like an actual strategy to
    create stability in Somalia so I will look forward to following
    up with you both on that.
        General Kurilla, I would like to turn to you now on Yemen.
    Civil society and media organizations have reported numerous
    civilian casualties caused by recent U.S. operations in Yemen,
    many as a result of the use of heavy explosive weapons in
    populated areas.
        For example, the U.S. strikes on Ras Isa Port in Hodeidah
    on April 17th reportedly killed at least 84 civilians.
        So, one, did CENTCOM foresee the level of civilian harm
    reported and what steps did CENTCOM take to mitigate the risks
    of civilian harm during the conduct of recent strikes in Yemen?
        General Kurilla. So, any civilian death is a tragedy. What
    we have is a civilian harm mitigation team that investigates
    every single one of these to determine if they are credible.
    There are still several that are under investigation.
        You mentioned Ras Isa. There were several things that we
    did to mitigate that prior to include heavy ISR soaking of that
    prior to that. We did messaging to the individuals there. We
    did messaging to the ships. We ensured the weaponry and the
    mitigation of those systems.
        Now, the problem is you have a fuel port that is being hit.
    We did not target the trucks that were in the port at that same
    time. But, again, that is under investigation to determine the
    actual numbers and, again, I would argue that this is the
    Houthi casualty numbers as well.
        Ms. Jacobs. And can you commit today on behalf of CENTCOM
    to publish your findings on civilian casualties in Yemen?
        General Kurilla. We push all of that up to the OSD and they
    end up pushing those out.
        Ms. Jacobs. Okay. So you will publish that?
        General Kurilla. Absolutely.
        Ms. Jacobs. Excellent. Thank you so much.
        And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. The gentlelady yields back.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
    Crank.
        Mr. Crank. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Thompson, thank you for being here. Generals Kurilla
    and Langley, thank you for being here and for your service.
        I want to start by asking you the same question I have
    asked every combatant commander that has come before HASC
    [House Armed Services Committee] this year. In your opinion,
    has the space-based threat from China and Russia in your
    theater improved or worsened in the last 5 years?
        General Kurilla. From a CENTCOM perspective, Russia has
    actually gone down because they are no longer really in the
    region where they were basing some of their space-based
    threats. China has probably increased but I would tell you Iran
    has significantly increased.
        Mr. Crank. So overall increased you would say?
        General Kurilla. An increase.
        Mr. Crank. Yeah.
        General Langley?
        General Langley. On the continent of Africa it has
    increased, especially down in Namibia, dual-use state-sponsored
    type space-enabling capabilities by the CCP.
        Mr. Crank. Yeah. Obviously, we are in an open setting here
    but can you provide maybe a brief description of how this
    threat affects your operations, General Kurilla?
        General Kurilla. I would be happy to do that in a closed
    session.
        Mr. Crank. Okay. That sounds good.
        General, the same? Okay.
        General Langley. Yes, in a closed session.
        Mr. Crank. Okay, thank you.
        On another topic, I am concerned about the nuclear threat
    from Iran and reports that they rejected the latest proposal
    for a new nuclear deal from the U.S., and it seems like Iran is
    hell bent on having nuclear weapons, which would be a direct
    threat to the existence of Israel.
        General Kurilla, in your written testimony you say, quote,
    a nuclear-armed Iran would change the Middle East overnight and
    forever, potentially setting off a regional arms race with
    catastrophic consequences, unquote.
        Can you expand on this? What would a Middle East with a
    nuclear Iran look like?
        General Kurilla. I think you would see other countries in
    the region doing everything they could to obtain a nuclear
    weapon, either development or through purchase, to be able to
    gain one to be able to retain deterrence back with Iran.
        Mr. Crank. And how can CENTCOM deter Iran from proceeding
    with their nuclear development program? How can they strengthen
    the President's hand at the negotiating table?
        General Kurilla. I provide a range of options to the
    President but I am in all favor of having a negotiated
    settlement that prevents Iran from getting a nuclear weapon
    because of the consequences of conflict.
        Mr. Crank. Okay. And then, General Kurilla, what lessons
    can the U.S. learn from Iron Dome that could be applied to the
    development of Golden Dome? Do you believe deterrence by denial
    to be an effective strategy?
        General Kurilla. It can be, but I would tell you some of
    the biggest lessons learned is how Israel's defense industrial
    base works. You cannot even sell a system to the Israeli
    military, the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces], that is not open
    architecture that will not work with the rest of their systems
    so you don't end up with a proprietary system that stand alone.
    We need systems that can integrate and all talk to each other.
        Mr. Crank. And so Golden Dome should take note of that?
        General Kurilla. That would be my recommendation.
        Mr. Crank. Okay. Thank you, General.
        Ms. Thompson, how does our partnership with Jordan advance
    peace and stability in the Middle East?
        Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, sir.
        I think Jordan in particular and our partnership with the
    Jordanian Armed Forces not only goes to promote greater burden
    sharing throughout the region to include countering shared
    threats that we have, particularly on the terrorism front, but
    then also weapons and narcotics smuggling and interdiction.
    They are a really great partner on that, and then UAS and
    ballistic missile interdiction as well.
        And I am sure General Kurilla can provide some more
    operational specifics but those are the main pillars of the
    security relationship that we have with the Jordanians.
        Mr. Crank. General?
        General Kurilla. They are one of our strongest partners.
    They are the country I have visited the most when I go to the
    Middle East.
        Mr. Crank. Okay, is there any more that the Department
    could do to support Jordanian Armed Forces?
        General Kurilla. I think there are things that we can do to
    strong point Jordan in the counter-UAS. Counter-UAS in Jordan
    defends both Jordan, U.S. forces, and Israel.
        Mr. Crank. Okay. Thank you.
        Ms. Thompson, after years of neglect by President Biden,
    President Trump is right to prioritize our Gulf partners. How
    did his recent visit to the region advance U.S. national
    security interests?
        Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, sir, and I would
    just highlight particularly the deepening of defense
    partnerships that we have.
        Not only--I mean, as General Kurilla has highlighted,
    obviously, we have a long way to go on working through the
    kinks in our FMS process and defense industrial base but
    deepening those partnerships to enable greater allied burden
    sharing but then also interoperability and empowerment of our
    Gulf partners to take on more of the responsibility in the
    region, particularly given normalized relations with Israel.
    For a few of them it is a massive step in the right direction
    for the posture we want to have in the region.
        And then I would also just highlight the commercial success
    as well that is coupled with the defense success and I think
    both per President Trump's comments in Riyadh really echo that
    sentiment.
        Mr. Crank. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        I do want to make the announcement that we will be
    concluding the open session at 12:30 and going into a
    classified session a few minutes thereafter because votes are
    going to be called on the House floor at 1:30.
        So with that, the chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    New York, Mr. Ryan, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am sorry to my colleague from Pennsylvania. I think I got
    here after you.
        Thank you all for being here, especially given that it's
    both of your last hearings, Generals Kurilla and Langley. I
    just want to--that is an appropriate fist bump--I just want to
    commend and thank you both as I know many of my colleagues have
    but it cannot be said enough. I appreciate it.
        And, General Kurilla, in particular I want to commend you.
    I don't think you've--I know you are a humble, quiet
    professional but I think in particular what you did in defense
    of Israel, in defense of the region, in defense of the U.S.,
    most importantly, in your leadership on two unprecedented
    direct attacks as you said in your opening testimony that have
    never occurred in the history of either Iran or Israel, your
    leadership in preparing and executing that defense was
    exceptional and I think we all have a lot to learn on a bunch
    of levels from that. But I just wanted to say that publicly
    here today.
        Ms. Thompson, I appreciate you being here again. I know the
    last time you were here I was a little frustrated that we
    weren't getting really many answers from you. Hopefully, we can
    get some more answers.
        My line of questioning is similar to what I asked you last
    time. I know it's been hit on by colleagues but I want to come
    back on it again.
        I want to bring in what General Kurilla said in his opening
    very powerfully in speaking about both the risks and the
    tectonic shift but also the opportunity vis-a-vis Iran on its
    heels or, arguably, knees and our ability and opportunity to
    press, press, press in that moment, and I am trying to just
    wrestle with the dissonance between that and some of the both
    appointees of this administration and some of the rhetoric of
    this administration, not so much you today in your testimony
    specifically.
        But I have pointed this out before. The DASD [Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense] for the Middle East, Mr.
    Dimino, has said deeply concerning things including that the
    Middle East does, quote, not really matter for U.S. interests;
    that, quote, vital or existential threats in the Middle East
    are, quote, best characterized as minimal to non-existent. He's
    also specifically characterized Iran's missile attacks on
    Israel as, quote, fairly moderate.
        I think, General Kurilla, I am not going to put you on the
    spot. I might disagree with that. He's vocally opposed
    attacking Iran's nuclear program, described U.S. strikes
    against the Houthis as, quote, futile.
        Can you just explain to us--I mean, I agree what I have
    heard from General Kurilla and other experienced military
    leaders. We need to press the advantage we have vis-a-vis Iran
    and their proxies. How are we supposed to do that when senior
    appointees in the Pentagon are saying things like that?
        Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
        First and foremost, I will just note that I was not
    involved in the hiring of any officials in the administration
    or the political--
        Mr. Ryan. But you are here to speak on its behalf, right?
        Ms. Thompson. So what I would say from the--yeah, from the
    ISA [International Security Affairs] perspective within the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I will make very clear
    we support the President's objective to not only, first and
    foremost, defend the state of Israel but second, of course,
    deny Iran the ability to obtain a nuclear weapon.
        That is something we are 100 percent committed to, and I
    will also note that we support the President's objective and
    stand ready to provide military options should his strategy of
    pursuing peace with Iran through a negotiated solution and
    denying Iran a nuclear weapon through a negotiated solution--we
    stand ready as a department and with an OSD policy to provide
    the Secretary and the President--
        Mr. Ryan. But--I am sorry, but how are you ready if you are
    not in agreement? I mean--
        Ms. Thompson. I can only speak--
        Mr. Ryan. Should Mr. Dimino be in the position then if he's
    not aligned with the President's intent?
        Ms. Thompson. That is not something that I can specifically
    speak to but I can speak to--for the international security--
    the international security role that I play in the Department
    of Defense.
        This is what we are committed to. Working under Under
    Secretary Colby we are very much in line with Secretary Hegseth
    and President Trump's guidance on this and none of that has
    changed.

        Mr. Ryan. Might this dissonance explain, for example, why
    in the recent back and forth about the negotiations which we
    all agree we want to happen there's lack of clarity on level of
    enrichment that might be allowed within the administration,
    signaling division and weakness to our adversaries.
        Ms. Thompson. So that is not something I can speak to. That
    is something--that would be a question for Ambassador Witkoff's
    team at the State Department because they are the lead for
    negotiation.
        Mr. Ryan. And, Ms. Thompson, I will interrupt you again. I
    respect you. I know you have a hard job and I know you are
    performing the duties of, if I am saying that--right, yes,
    performing the duties of.
        But can the administration send us someone that can speak
    to--these are pretty important questions. Can we get somebody
    that can speak to these?
        Ms. Thompson. I would very much like to come and do a broad
    Iran briefing for you all if that would be something that is
    helpful, but I would respectfully ask that the State Department
    be present for that as well, because Ambassador Witkoff's team,
    as the lead for negotiations, really would have the most--
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from South
    Carolina, Ms. Mace.
        Ms. Mace. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Iran's reckless behavior continues to threaten U.S. forces,
    our allies, and regional stability. Its support for Hamas,
    Hezbollah, and the Houthis and other dangerous proxy groups
    continue to sow chaos throughout the Middle East, as I know you
    all are very familiar.
        Its support for proxy militias and terrorists threatens our
    interests and those of our allies while it advances in
    ballistic missile technology and pursuit of nuclear weapons
    threatened to plunge the region into greater turmoil.
        CENTCOM's presence in the region deters aggression against
    our personnel and Middle Eastern allies. We must impose real
    costs on the ayatollahs and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to
    ensure that deterrence is fully restored and Iran ceases its
    destructive activities.
        We must also send a clear message any advance toward Iran
    acquiring nuclear weapons is unacceptable to the United States.
        I commend President Trump's efforts to ensure Iran's
    nuclear program is fully dismantled. Nothing short of full
    dismantlement of their nuclear capabilities will ensure peace
    and stability in the region.
        So the Iranian regime has mastered the art of wielding
    proxy groups against its adversaries in the region repeatedly.
    From Hamas barbarianism to Hezbollah's arsenals in Lebanon and
    the Houthi strikes in the Red Sea, Iran leverages its
    surrogates to strike our allies and harm our interests.
        So my first question today for General Kurilla, can you
    briefly discuss the threat landscape you see from Iran
    including the use of proxies?
        General Kurilla. So Iran, basically, has three pillars that
    they use. The first one is long-range weapons and they access
    aerial denial. So think long-range missiles, UAVs.
        The second is their proxy networks. The number-one proxy
    they had was Lebanese Hezbollah which acted as a bit of a sword
    of Damocles over the top of Israel. Israel's--the doctrinal
    term disintegration of Lebanese Hezbollah should be studied by
    every military--
        Ms. Mace. I was recently there and saw that destruction and
    they did a very successful work.
        General Kurilla. It was brilliant what they have done to
    Hamas. The Houthis were one that not a lot of people thought
    about before because at one point it was the lowest priority
    for intelligence.
        I think it is something that we have to pay a lot of
    attention to. I think what you are seeing with the Iranian-
    aligned militia groups inside of Iraq--they used to be inside
    of Syria.
        With the fall of Assad that basically severed the Shi'a
    Crescent. Qasem Soleimani, who we killed back in 2020, he
    wanted to have this Shi'a Crescent that ran from Iran to Iraq,
    Syria to Lebanon.
        The fall of Assad severed that. That is probably the single
    biggest event that has happened in the Middle East.
        Ms. Mace. And what has changed since October 7th?
        General Kurilla. I think what has changed since October 7th
    is Israel feels they are an existential threat to their very
    existence with a lot of these Iranian proxies that are
    attacking them and we had the first state-on-state attacks--
    blows between the two countries.
        Iran is in a weaker strategic position. They have lost a
    lot of their proxies. Their air defense network is not what it
    used to be. However, they still have a lot of operational
    capability in terms of their long-range weapons. At the
    classified session I can talk in great detail their
    capabilities.
        Ms. Mace. Do you have any concern about the Houthis and
    their relationship with Saudi Arabia?
        General Kurilla. The relationship with Saudi Arabia? No, I
    don't have--I mean, Saudi Arabia has been a strong supporter of
    what we were doing in operations.
        Ms. Mace. Yes, they have.
        You know, my understanding is we designate the Houthis, for
    example, as not the top tier terrorist organization. They are
    on the lower rung of designation. Is that correct?
        General Kurilla. They were, ma'am. They were first a
    specially designated terrorist group and then we made them a
    foreign terrorist organization under President Trump. So they
    are at the top level.
        Ms. Mace. They are at the top level now, which is something
    I advocated for when Biden was president and it didn't happen,
    which means there are consequences to that in the Middle East,
    which is good for the United States and our allies overseas.
        Has the degradation of Iran's proxy network affected its
    ability to destabilize the region?
        General Kurilla. So one challenge we have with Iran they
    get petro dollars.
        Ms. Mace. Okay.
        General Kurilla. 90 percent--85 to 90 percent of their oil
    is purchased by China. So China is effectively supporting and
    financing Iran's malign behavior. We still see the amount of
    funds that are going to the IRGC Quds force. That is who runs
    the proxy networks outside of Iran.
        So as we look at the sanctioned oil I think for the first
    time the State Department sanctioned what are called the Teapot
    Refineries. These are refineries along the Chinese coast that
    these ships take this sanctioned oil. Iran--this is 10 percent
    of all Chinese oil they get.
        They import 70 percent. 50 percent goes to the Strait of
    Hormuz but it is 85 to 90 percent from Iran. It goes into these
    Teapot Refineries and I think the first time we have ever done
    it is we have sanctioned one of those Teapot Refineries.
        Ms. Mace. Last question, thoughts on Qatar?
        General Kurilla. We have a very strong relationship
    military-to-military. Largest base there. They fund the base.
    They do burden-sharing. When I ask them a question they say the
    answer is yes, what is the question.
        Ms. Mace. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
        The Chairman. The gentlelady yields back.
        The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Pennsylvania,
    Ms. Houlahan.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and that is what you
    get for being late to the gavel.
        I really appreciate your service General and General. Thank
    you so much for your amazing careers and for the opportunity to
    speak with you.
        Most questions have been asked so I am going to ask the one
    that I have that hasn't yet been asked.
        General Langley, you spoke a lot about what is going on in
    Africa and the fact that you have had a conversation with our
    partners and allies and that they understand and are embracing,
    in your, I think, words their new roles and responsibilities.
        I would like to believe that and so let's say that that is
    true because I hear that a lot from all of Europe as well about
    Europe and Ukraine.
        Assuming that is true, can you describe how AFRICOM is
    operationalizing that process of transitioning the
    responsibilities and roles over to our allies and to our
    partners and can you also explain--and this is for both of you
    all--how you would measure or what sort of metrics or
    benchmarks you would have to know whether or not our partners
    are, indeed, transitioning and are really, truly prepared to be
    able to take on this sort of operational responsibility.
        That is my only question so I would love it if you would
    give it some real thought because it is really, really
    important that if we assume that these folks can or are
    interested in doing this that we have performance metrics or
    standards that we are looking for and that we also have an
    operational plan that we have to transition those
    responsibilities over.
        General Langley. Congresswoman, I am grateful for the
    question. I know we last spoke when we were at the Munich
    Security Conference and we were in the throes of the Title 22
    pause and then at the forefront of the Title 10 review.
        So at AFRICOM what we had to do is reassess where we were
    and try to do some predictive analytics of what the effects
    would be.
        This is all in parallel with structuring our narrative--of
    structuring our narrative of going to our partners, going to
    our allies, and come up with straight talk of what it really
    means of a shared burden for the sake of stability and security
    on the continent of Africa.
        So I did--further, I did meet with the NATO [North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization] rep for the southern neighborhood, as they
    call it--they call it SNAP [Southern Neighborhood Action
    Plan]-- and shared that with him. I said, you know, our
    government we are all in for stability and security across
    Africa but we need a shared commitment from you because this is
    your southern neighborhood.
        What happens as far as mass migration or migration of
    terrorists that can threaten your neighborhood, your borders,
    is our same concern with our southwest border.
        So that soaked in well with our African partners' shared
    commitment. They say, well, it is going to take a little time,
    and also we are going to diversify our partner so we get that
    as long as we have those shared objectives, as long as we have
    those shared values to reach that end state.
        So in Nairobi last week, I collectively got with the chiefs
    of defense and said, ``hey, you know,'' their biggest message
    to me, ``hey, we are not looking to be saved.'' We can hit
    stability in--
        Ms. Houlahan. What does that look like? And when you are
    talking about, you know, a narrative, narratives don't get it
    done. You know, what is the plan?
        What is the operational plan that we all have collectively
    on our responsibility to hand that over and on our ability to
    measure whether it has actually been handed over with any sort
    of security or safety or assurance that we--that it will be
    consistent to the standards that we have always put to the
    region?
        General Langley. And, Congresswoman, I will just tell you
    the plan is theirs. You know, every country is different. We
    don't push ourselves to invade on their sovereignty.
        Every country is coming up with their own plan. That was
    their takeaway. But they also know that the militaries--all
    these military leads know that they are giving their best
    military advice for the enduring solution from their layered
    threats, one of them being that is a shared threat of ours is
    terrorism.
        So there lies their ability and their responsibility to
    come up with their own plans. I am seeing it different from
    coastal West Africa all the way to Somalia. They all have a
    different approach. I have to respect that, and how we--
        Ms. Houlahan. Sure.
        General Langley. Then we decide--you know, then we go
    through our Title 10 review and we double down based on
    empirical data what has worked in the past and what didn't
    work. What did work to--
        Ms. Houlahan. But how do you weave those strategies
    together or do you just walk away and say everybody has got
    their own plan and it looks like to be--
        General Langley. No.
        Ms. Houlahan. Excuse me, a bunch of Democrats. You know, we
    are all going to have a different plan. You don't want that.
        You want people to figure out how to work together and us
    walking away from this is irresponsible unless we feel as
    though we are walking away with a plan that is unified and not
    just individual sovereignty.
        Am I making sense?
        The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I appreciate it.
        The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    Virginia, Mr. Wittman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank our witnesses for joining us.
        Ms. Thompson, General Kurilla, General Langley, thank you
    so much for your service. Thanks for all you have done for our
    nation.
        I want to try to maybe draw a line amongst a number of
    different issues that you all are dealing with. I really think
    that the combatant commands being there on the front lines
    probably have the best assessment and understanding of the
    threat and the timeliness of the threat and then how that needs
    to be expressed in the assets that we need in order to counter
    that threat.
        I mean, we see our exquisite assets, the ones you have in
    theater, General Kurilla, General Langley. You see where we--
    you know, we pulled the Carl Vinson from the East China Sea. We
    extended the deployment of the Harry Truman.
        General Langley, you know that when we had needs there in
    Africa, whether it is places like Sudan, Morocco, even some of
    the other events there in the Red Sea.
        We see the demand signal go up and then when we'd like to
    have a crisis response team and an ARG MEU we don't have it or
    we have to move other assets around.
        General Kurilla, you spoke at length about the building
    threat from one-way attack drones and all you have to do is to
    look at the aerial photographs of the runways there in Russia
    and ask the Russians about the impact of one-way attack drones
    and give the Ukrainians credit.
        But the thing that concerns me is that is a scenario that
    can play in the opposite direction today and tomorrow, and I
    just don't believe we have the counter-UAS capability that we
    need.
        I want your perspective because I think the COCOMs are
    closest to the threat, and if you were tomorrow to say these
    are the things that I need that I can operationalize quickly--I
    love our exquisite platforms and we need them but they are not
    coming quickly and they are not coming inexpensively. But there
    are lots of opportunities with expendables and attritables.
        Give me your perspective. If you could give us on your UFR
    list--if you could say today--today--my top priorities on the
    UFR list, the way you see the threat as it is today, both of
    you, what would be your top five priorities to make sure this
    nation gives you at least a part of the tool set that you need,
    part of the kit that you would need to counter what you see and
    how it changes on a daily basis?
        General Kurilla. So the greatest risk, Congressman, in the
    CENTCOM AOR is the unmanned aerial systems and ballistic
    missiles. So it would be in the detect and kill of counter-UAS
    to include swarms, large numbers.
        You need magazine depth. And then in terms of our air
    defense assets that are forward deployed you have to be able to
    protect those from counter-UAS as well. We need to be very
    mobile.
        We need to be able to integrate them into the systems. When
    I took over three years ago if I walked into a base defense
    operations center--that is where they do all the command and
    control for the base to be able to defend against drones--you
    would see five systems, five screens, five operators.
        Now when you walk in we have been able to integrate that
    into maybe two screens and two operators but you have now seven
    systems integrated into there. So we need to really do better
    at the detect.
        We are only going to see the systems get smaller, more
    lethal, electronic magnetic information--the electromagnetic
    spectrum when we try and jam them. That is why the Ukraine and
    Russia went to fiber optics going out to 40 kilometers of fiber
    optic drones. You can't jam that.
        So those are the things I would ask right now is the
    counter-UAS detect. I think we need to put aerial AESA radars
    for a low radar cross section to be able to pick up, elevate
    it, and then ballistic missile defense. Keep ballistic missile
    defense.
        Mr. Wittman. General Langley? Yeah, thank you.
        General Langley. I think my top three is about the same as
    Erik Kurilla's. Counter-UAS, integrated air missile defense,
    and--but I was going to add sense to make sense--ISR. I am at a
    deficit for ISR across the continent emanating threats. Match
    capabilities to the threats. That is what Secretary Hegseth
    told me to do and that is what I am requesting.
        But just going further down the list, maritime capability.
    Like I said, I have said it already but I am just going to bang
    the drum. We miss the ARG MEU. We miss the Amphibious Readiness
    Group.
        The Marine Expeditionary Units they are ready, but they are
    sitting on the shore. But we need to fix the ship problem, you
    know. The three-ship ARG is what is needed.
        We can't do heel to toe anymore. Sometimes we are not even
    1.0. We need to get back there. I talked to the vice CNO [Chief
    of Naval Operations] the other day, and he gets it, as well as
    I talked to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We missed that
    in the AFRICOM AOR, you know, from crisis response. We need
    that sea base forward.
        You are right, Congressman, we really did need that, and
    when Hemedti was going at it with Burhan in Sudan we really
    needed that offshore to utilize that.
        So and then also for a force deterrent it is a show of
    power to contend with the NETF that the Chinese is running
    around the purview of the continent.
        Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
    back.
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        This will conclude the open portion of our hearing. We will
    reconvene in 10 minutes at 12:40 in room 2212 for the
    classified portion.
        [Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 June 10, 2025

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 June 10, 2025

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                       DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 June 10, 2025

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                 RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

        Mr. Wilson. With the United States decision to reduce our footprint
    in Syria possibly below 1,000 personnel, will we still have the
    sufficient resources to face the resurgence of ISIS and other terrorist
    groups? How can we ensure our regional partners are working in tandem
    to address these threats?
        General Kurilla. (U) Our consolidation in Syria is being carefully
    metered against the threat and the prevailing security circumstances.
    This includes an assessment of the degree to which ISIS is successful
    in trying to exploit any security vacuums left after the fall of the
    Assad regime, the capacity of the Syrian government to afford security,
    and the success of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) agreed
    integration into the new Syrian security architecture. The U.S.
    military's tasks in Syria have been focused on Advise, Assist and
    Enable tasks in support to the SDF, underwriting their considerable
    success in the D-ISIS fight. This includes offensive action against
    ISIS cells left at large in Syria, management of the Partner Managed
    Detention Facilities which hold captured ISIS fighters, and management
    of the Displaced Persons camps of Al Hol and Roj as potential
    recruiting pools for the next generation of ISIS fighters. As the SDF
    integrates into the new Syrian security architecture, U.S. forces in
    Syria may be able change emphasis towards support to the U.S.
    burgeoning diplomatic mission to Syria, thereby supporting the D-ISIS
    fight indirectly through the Syrian government, and potentially,
    conditions dependent, a normalization of the U.S.'s security
    relationship in Syria. The security conditions, and specifically the
    success of the D-ISIS fight in Iraq andSyria are interlinked. At the
    invitation of the Iraqi government, we have been working closely with
    the Iraqi Security Forces to ensure they continually increase their
    competence in the D-ISIS fight. Success here will sustain the pressure
    against ISIS and narrow the opportunities for ISIS to find safe havens
    within which they can reconstitute and from which they can launch att
    acks, locally, regionally or potentially against the U.S. homeland.
    Beyond U.S. and coalition efforts in Syria and Iraq, other regional and
    international partners are providing significant support to the D-ISIS
    fight which include contributions - across Diplomatic, Information,
    Military and Economic levers - from the 89 members of the Global
    Coalition to Defeat ISIS. While an important contribution, the total
    numbers of U.S. personnel deployed in Syria are only a portion of the
    totality of the effort to eradicate the scourge of ISIS.
        Mr. Wilson. In your testimony, you mentioned that the International
    Atomic Energy Agency estimates that Iran's stockpile of enriched
    uranium has almost doubled what it was six months ago. You also
    highlighted that the regime has the resources and centrifuges needed to
    produce enough weapons-grade uranium in a week for a simple nuclear
    weapon, should it choose to.
        What actions are we taking to ensure the Iranian regime does not
    achieve its goal of gaining nuclear weapons to use on Isreal and the
    United States?
        What further resources do you need to deter Iran from achieving
    this capability?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
        Mr. Wilson. In your testimony you mentioned that having an absence
    in the Sahel region limits our ability to monitor terrorist
    organizations in the area which would allow them to grow. We have seen
    how quickly terrorist organizations, like ISIS, can grow if left
    unchecked.
        Can you talk about the potential impacts that would occur in
    AFRICOM with an increased absence in the Sahel and how this affects
    other combatant commands?
        What additional resources do you need to ensure that this threat is
    minimized?
        General Langley. Since the withdrawal of US and French forces from
    Mali in 2022 and, more recently, the withdrawal of US and French forces
    from Niger in 2024, terrorist organizations have made significant
    advancements in the Sahel and are now threatening the littoral
    countries of the Gulf of Guinea. The only capabilities in place to
    counter the terrorist threat are special operations and conventional
    forces from our Allies that receive limited US support. If left
    unchecked, these terrorist organizations will continue to gain strength
    and develop the ability to conduct attacks in the USEUCOM area of
    responsibility, as well as other regions. Further, destabilization in
    the Sahel region causes illicit criminal activity and migration flows
    that affects not only USAFRICOM but USSOUTHCOM, USEUCOM, and most
    importantly the Homeland. ISR is a key resource required to monitor the
    threat in the Sahel but access, basing, and overflight restrictions
    complicate its employment. Ideally, diplomatic engagement would secure
    ISR basing to ensure these resources, when allocated by the Joint
    Staff, are employed to their maximum effect to minimize the terrorist
    threat.
        Mr. Wilson. We are seeing the United States and allies constantly
    losing presence in Africa while our adversaries continue to increase
    theirs. The Chinese Communist Party is expanding its footprint and is
    working to build up their military-to-military relationships in the
    region. I'm grateful that both you and Secretary Hegseth understand the
    need to prevent the Chinese Communist Party from taking a foothold in
    Africa.
        Can you provide an update on the Chinese Communist Party's
    activities in the region, and what further resources you need to combat
    this threat?
        General Langley. China views Africa as integral to expanding its
    global power projection strategy, and works across the political,
    economic, and defense domains to achieve its goals on the continent.
    Beijing uses its African diplomatic and economic engagements to obtain
    support for its geopolitical priorities. Beijing also seeks to maintain
    access to Africa's markets, natural resources, and critical minerals
    that support its defense and commercial industries. China's defense
    engagements in the region protect its economic and diplomatic
    investments, and Beijing increasingly seeks to position itself as a key
    security partner to African countries. USAFRICOM would benefit from
    additional funding for security cooperation, information operations,
    and naval assets to promote American political and economic core
    interests. Regarding Foreign Military Sales, we would benefit from laws
    and policy to support an expedited system. Although we are the
    preferred partner in most cases, we are getting "out cycled" by our
    adversaries.
        Mr. Wilson. Last August the United States was forced to withdraw
    1,000 service members from Niger, and we simultaneously lost access to
    key locations, like our ISR base in Agadez. This asset was key to
    counterterrorism operations in the Sahel, a region which accounted for
    19% of all terrorist attacks worldwide, and 51% of global terrorism-
    related deaths in 2024. What's more, the withdrawal of US and French
    forces has resulted in the presence of Russian mercenaries in more than
    six African countries, filling the gap by offering unconditional
    security assistance in exchange for resource extraction rights and
    political influence.
        What are we doing to ensure we find new partners in the region to
    address the gaps that have resulted from our lost presence in AFRICOM
    and the Sahel?
        General Langley. USAFRICOM continues to maintain strategic
    partnerships in West Africa by working alongside our allies and
    partners to address shared security concerns. USAFRICOM is prioritizing
    limited and tailored security cooperation activities and investments
    that enable our African Partners to defend against regional terrorist
    threats. These efforts predominantly include counter terrorism
    training, defense equipment, and intelligence sharing. Moreover,
    USAFRICOM is actively seeking ways to increase this counter-terrorism
    burden with NATO and Non-NATO allies who have similar security concerns
    for the region. USAFRICOM is also encouraging capable African security
    partners to share their military expertise and assist other countries
    to counter regional terrorist threats so that U.S. forces can focus on
    global networks that threaten the U.S. Homeland.
        Mr. Wilson. In your testimony, you mentioned that without a
    persistent presence in the Sahel, we are limited in the ability to
    monitor the expanding influence of terrorist organizations in the
    region. You also mentioned that these organizations will, "continue to
    grow and their threat to regional stability.will only intensify."
        How will this growth in the threat affect the Sahel and AFRICOM's
    neighbors in CENTCOM?
        How are we making up for the capability gaps that are growing as we
    are forced out of our footprints in the Sahel?
        General Langley. The Sahel has become the epicenter of global
    terrorism, a situation which is greatly exacerbated by the withdrawal
    of US and French forces. Terrorist groups now threaten instability to
    the littoral regions of West Africa, including Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana,
    Togo and Benin. Expanded terrorist operating areas enable them to plan
    and potentially launch attacks from West Africa. While this threat is
    linked more to USEUCOM, it could eventually threaten security in
    USCENTCOM and eventually pose risks to the homeland in the form of
    terrorism, illicit criminal activity, and migration flows.
        Since the withdrawal of US and French forces from Mali in 2022 and
    more recently the withdrawal of US and French forces from Niger in
    2024, terrorist organizations have made significant advancements in the
    Sahel and are now threatening the littoral countries of the Gulf of
    Guinea. The only capabilities in place to counter the terrorist threat
    are special operations and conventional forces from our Allies that
    receive limited US support.
                                     ______

                  RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
        Mr. Scott. Has the intelligence and data provided by Ukraine on
    Russian technology, captured equipment, battlefield operational guides,
    weapon performance, and countermeasures against U.S. and Allied systems
    been useful to your command? Will it have saved the lives of U.S.
    service personnel in a war against an enemy peer nation?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
        Mr. Scott. Has the intelligence and data provided by Ukraine on
    Russian technology, captured equipment, battlefield operational guides,
    weapon performance, and countermeasures against U.S. and Allied systems
    been useful to your command? Will it have saved the lives of U.S.
    service personnel in a war against an enemy peer nation?
        General Langley. Congressman, I can answer that question at a
    higher classification level.
        Mr. Scott. Sec. 8006 of H.R. 2882, the Further Consolidated
    Appropriations Act of 2024 (P.L. 118-47) made $100,000,000 available
    for transfer to "expand cooperation, share operational information,
    advance interoperability , or improve the capabilities of our allies
    and partners" for both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM. How has USAFRICOM made use
    of this transfer authority?
        General Langley. The $100,000,000 available for transfer authority
    was allocated evenly between USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM, with each
    receiving $50,000,000. USAFRICOM applied the funding to a number of
    efforts that aligned with its scope, to include African Partner Rescue
    and Casualty Evacuation, Aviation Landing Zone Improvements, Small Arms
    Range improvements, Improved Maritime Domain Awareness Capabilities,
    Training to African Partner Capacity across various issue areas
    (disease control, intelligence sharing, humanitarian assistance,
    disaster relief, disinformation remediation), and Vehicle Recovery Kits
    for African partners countering Violent Extremist Organizations
    (VEOs).These efforts specifically supported partners in Benin, Cote
    d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya, with positive cascading effects
    across other African Partner nations.
        Mr. Scott. Earlier this year, due to budget uncertainty, USAFRICOM
    abruptly ordered the withdrawal of two commercially-provided manned-ISR
    aircraft from Abidjan, Cote D'Ivoire which had been supporting SOCAF CT
    and AFRICOM GPC missions. What impacts has this reduction in manned-ISR
    assets had on the ability of USAFRICOM to understand and react to
    growing terrorist threats, and actions of our adversaries like China
    and Russia in West Africa? What resources would USAFRICOM require in
    order to resume the use of these commercially-provided manned ISR
    operations in West Africa?
        General Langley. The reduction in manned-ISR in Cote D'Ivoire
    negatively impacted our ability to monitor, characterize, and counter
    potential threats to partners in the West African littorals. Notably,
    Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) and ISIS branches in
    West Africa desire a presence in littoral West Africa and JNIM has
    conducted several attacks in Benin since early January. Airborne-ISR
    provided unique counterterrorism collection capabilities in terms of
    purpose-built sensors, flexibility to conduct missions at the time and
    place most effective for operational action, and ability to readily
    share information real-time with our partners. In the case of GPC
    missions, the loss of manned ISR has impacted planned partner support
    against nefarious activities such as monitoring and reporting countries
    complicit in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU-F)
    activities within their Exclusive Economic Zones.
        To resume Airborne ISR in West Africa, we need dedicated air
    assets, basing, overflight accesses, and liaison officers. To
    reconstitute these necessary African partnerships, we need to consider
    expanding the scope of discussion beyond manned-ISR to unmanned-ISR,
    including Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (TUAS).
        Mr. Scott. What is AFRICOM's current assessment of the scale and
    impact of IUUF in African waters, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea,
    and how does it prioritize this issue relative to other maritime
    security threats?
        General Langley. IUUF, particularly activities by China and other
    foreign nation distance water fleets, are leading to the rapid
    reduction of West African and Gulf of Guinea fish stocks. This
    complicates maritime security efforts in the region by exacerbating
    food scarcity issues and depleting revenues for local governments.
    USAFRICOM has limited resources to provide tailored training to local
    coast guards, and only a small amount of equipment to provide to select
    partner forces. We support regional security constructs, and when able,
    highlight IUUF violations to our partners. Currently, USAFRICOM has no
    assigned or allocated Coast Guard or Navy ships, and our ability to
    counter this malign activity is minimal.
        Mr. Scott. How does AFRICOM integrate IUUF into its broader
    maritime security strategy, and what role does it play in shaping U.S.
    national security objectives in Africa, as outlined in the 2022
    National Security Memorandum on Combating IUUF?
        General Langley. USAFRICOM's priorities are to defend the U.S.
    Homeland from terrorist threats and to deter PRC global military
    ambitions on the African continent in alignment with the 2025 Interim
    National Defense Strategic Guidance. We are currently conducting
    assessments of our campaign activities to identify areas where our
    African partners can assume a more active role in countering illicit
    activities so that our limited resources can be focused on stated DoD
    priorities. Key Partners in this strategy to prioritize burden sharing
    include Senegal, Cabo Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Seychelles
    and Mauritius. Through tailored, limited investments in training and
    equipment, USAFRICOM can better enable willing partners to
    independently address their regional maritime security challenges.
        Mr. Scott. How does AFRICOM support African navies and coast guards
    in building capacity for IUUF enforcement, particularly in areas like
    evidence collection, legal prosecution, and cross-border interdiction?
        General Langley. Historically, USAFRICOM has conducted small boat
    operations/interdictions, as well as mentoring, through both OBANGAME
    and CUTLASS EXPRESS exercises. Maritime partners participate in NAVAF
    and USAFRICOM-sponsored exercises and operations, working alongside the
    US and other African partners to operationalize the capabilities to
    monitor their territorial waters and conduct counter-IUUF missions. The
    EXPRESS series of exercises, including OBANGAME, CUTLASS, and PHOENIX,
    all include IUUF enforcement scenarios focused on training national and
    regional response to IUUF and associated crimes. Additionally, NAVAF's
    Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises train
    partners to the identify illegal fishing and dark vessel activity in
    the host nation's waters, supported by the U.S. Maritime Operations
    Center (MOC) Support Team through the U.S. Maritime SAFE interagency
    working group. CARAT was conducted for the first time in FY25 with
    Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Ghana, Our embedded liaison officers
    from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Customs and Border
    Patrol (CBP), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) coordinate
    evidence collection, legal prosecution and cross-border interdiction
    training and awareness. We are currently assessing our campaign
    activities and exercises to identify areas where our African partners
    can assume a more active role in countering illicit activities so that
    our limited resources can be focused on countering terrorist threats to
    the Homeland and countering malign PRC activities on the continent.
        Mr. Scott. What specific capabilities and resources does AFRICOM
    leverage to enhance maritime domain awareness (MDA) and counter IUUF in
    African waters, and how are these coordinated with regional partners
    like the Yaounde Code of Conduct signatories?
        General Langley. USAFRICOM provides select African Partners with
    joint maritime domain awareness capabilities to counter IUUF and other
    illicit activity. One capability, SeaVision, has been used by our
    African partners to counter IUUF and other illicit activity.
    Additionally, a combination of data sets, models, and visualization
    techniques has been used to inform African partners and NATO allies
    during engagements and planning efforts to better enable their
    respective independent operations. NAVAF has Security Cooperation
    programs with 15 African maritime partners that provide coastal radar
    systems and other sensors, maritime operation center equipment, and
    training by US Navy and US Coast Guard operations center experts. The
    programs also provide coastal patrol watercraft and spare parts
    packages, along with training to build maintenance and sustainment
    programs for those new equipment packages. These are multi-year Title
    10 funded programs, usually spanning 5+ years from concept to equipment
    and training delivery. As a result, NAVAF has been able to foster
    strong relationships that lead to African support of other beneficial
    activities such as regional maritime initiatives, joint operations, and
    significant key leader engagements.
        Mr. Scott. What challenges does AFRICOM face in addressing the
    nexus between IUUF and transnational crimes, such as drug smuggling,
    human trafficking, and illegal transshipment, and how are these
    addressed in operations?
        General Langley. Our greatest challenge is maintaining focus on
    global terrorist threats to the U.S. Homeland emanating from Africa
    while simultaneously preventing PRC military encroachment on the
    African continent. These challenges require a resource-informed
    prioritization of operations, activities, and investments that help
    enable African Partners and allies to more actively shoulder the burden
    of monitoring regional illegal activities, including IUU fishing.
    Without maritime assets and the authorities to fund bilateral
    operations between the U.S. Navy/Coast Guard and our African partners,
    USAFRICOM is limited in its ability to support the partners for
    effective interdiction beyond information sharing and training within
    the EXPRESS and CARAT exercises. Due to the law enforcement nature of
    interdicting transnational crimes, U.S. Coast Guard support is vital,
    and with the bilateral Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Program (AMLEP),
    USAFRICOM and NAVAF are able to directly assist signed partners in law
    enforcement. Fishing vessels are often used in other crimes, such as
    drug smuggling and illegal immigration. For example, the multinational
    boarding team on the USS Mount Whitney interdicted a Brazilian fishing
    vessel ferrying cocaine off Cabo Verde in 2023 based on information
    received through the Maritime Operations center (MAOC) in Portugal.
    This diversity of crimes associated with IUUF requires a whole of
    government approach, which the U.S. government has recognized through
    the establishment of the Maritime SAFE working group. A majority of the
    U.S.'s initiatives to counter IUUF are unfunded, apart from specific
    Department of State initiatives. While the persistence of the counter-
    IUUF support operations stands as a success story of effective
    coordination between dedicated interagency point of contacts, the
    process is by no means streamlined and efficient for the pursual of
    supporting the African partners.
        Mr. Scott. How does AFRICOM utilize partnerships with the U.S.
    Coast Guard and other interagency entities to enhance IUUF
    countermeasures, and what gaps remain in these collaborations?
        General Langley. USAFRICOM partners with the U.S. Coast Guard
    through the African Maritime Law Enforcement Program, which uses law
    enforcement authorities to support African countries in their fight
    against IUUF. USAFRICOM values all interagency coordination, which
    helps enable our priorities to defend the Homeland and deter China's
    military ambitions on the African continent. We will continue to
    coordinate with the Coast Guard as they enable African Partners to
    shoulder the burden of illegal fishing activities off the coast of
    Africa.
        Mr. Scott. What emerging technologies or innovative approaches is
    AFRICOM exploring to improve detection and deterrence of IUUF in
    African waters?
        General Langley. USAFRICOM supports the use of technology to
    improve the detection of IUUF in African waters. We collaborate with
    the interagency, allies, and partners to implement such capabilities.
    However, USAFRICOM's primary focus regarding emerging technologies is
    on the ability to conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance activities that monitor terrorist organizations with the
    capability and intent to attack the US Homeland. Additionally, we seek
    innovative solutions to address information gaps regarding PRC
    intentions in Africa, as well as advanced technology to counter
    information operations propaganda campaigns designed to diminish U.S.
    credibility among African Partners. In the FY25 CUTLASS and OBANGAME
    exercises, the Navy's Disruptive Capabilities Office used advanced data
    streams, including radio frequency (RF) and Electro-Optic data to track
    a dark vessel in the scenario. NAVAF provided Maritime Domain Awareness
    (MDA) subject matter experts from the Department of Transportation,
    Naval Air Warfare Center (NAVAIR) and Naval Warfare Center (NAVWAR) to
    coach the US and partner forces. The Coordinated Afloat Readiness and
    Training (CARAT) exercise was a new approach in Africa this year.
    Although the Navy does not have a vessel assigned to USAFRICOM, we
    provided partners with logistics, planning, MDA and intelligence
    support so that they could conduct their own interdiction operations.
    FY25 CARATs were completed in Kenya, Cote D'Ivoire and Senegal, with
    more scheduled for Ghana and Cabo Verde. There were great results in
    all locations. For example, in Kenya, the Kenyan Navy boarded two
    fishing vessels and hailed 12 more. USAFRICOM could accomplish much
    more with assigned naval assets. NAVAF also deploys unmanned systems to
    the region to collect information. For example, during OBANGAME EXPRESS
    and the Senegal CARAT, SIXTH Fleet CTF-66 deployed unmanned surface
    vessels that provided imagery of vessels of interest into SeaVision.
    NAVAF also provided Starlink capabilities for the ships for the CARATs
    to pass video to land in real time.
        Mr. Scott. How does AFRICOM assess the potential for IUUF to
    destabilize coastal African states, and what preventive measures are in
    place to mitigate risks of conflict or economic collapse?
        General Langley. While the broader interagency should continue to
    address IUUF, the greatest destabilizing threat to Coastal West Africa
    involves terror networks that actively target civilians and partner
    militaries. We are assessing our campaign activities to identify areas
    where our African partners can assume a more active role in countering
    illicit activities so USAFRICOM can focus our limited resources on
    countering terrorist threats to the Homeland and countering PRC
    military encroachment on the continent. USAFRICOM uses our limited
    resources to provide tailored training and a small amount of equipment
    to select partner forces, enabling them to better independently counter
    this malign activity, along with other regional maritime security
    challenges.
        Mr. Scott. What is AFRICOM's long-term vision for reducing IUUF in
    Africa, and how does it plan to measure success in terms of ecological,
    economic, and security outcomes?
        General Langley. We will continue to support the work of U.S.
    Government agencies focused on fisheries enforcement through
    information sharing. With key allies in the lead, and with the support
    of the interagency, our African Partners will be better positioned to
    act independently to address regional illegal activity. USAFRICOM will
    continue to assess our campaign objectives and refine our targeted
    burden sharing investments to better enable our Partners and allies for
    success in the future.
        Mr. Scott. What lessons from Obangame Express 2025 can AFRICOM
    apply to future exercises to enhance African partners' ability to
    independently secure their waters against IUUF?
        General Langley. One lesson learned is including our African
    partners' interagency counterparts in the exercises. We cannot make
    progress in IUUF without improving the transparency between agencies
    like navies, fisheries, ports and harbors and maritime authorities.
    Further, NAVAF is only allowed to spend funds to work with maritime
    security agencies and, thus, cannot provide SeaVision licenses or
    support the participation of any other agencies in the exercises. This
    is a serious constraint. Expanding funding and authorities for other
    U.S. agencies to support OBANGAME EXPRESS would allow for more robust
    training in support of the whole-of-government approach.
        Mr. Scott. What role do you envision for space capabilities in
    shaping AFRICOM's long-term theater security cooperation strategy, and
    how will these efforts strengthen trust and collaboration with African
    partners?
        General Langley. Space capabilities are increasingly vital for
    USAFRICOM's security cooperation strategy, mirroring their global
    importance. African nations are actively developing their space
    sectors, evidenced by the 67 satellite launches since 1998 and the
    upcoming establishment of the African Space Agency. While initially
    focused on socio-economic and environmental needs, these advancements
    are now extending to security and defense objectives, emulating the
    U.S. Joint Force's reliance on space.
        The U.S. has a unique opportunity to partner with African nations,
    aiding them in developing space capabilities to support shared goals.
    However, with growing commercial options and partnerships with other
    nations, we must proactively engage with allies, through Department of
    Commerce, Department of State, the Department of Defense, and NASA, to
    remain the preferred partner in this rapidly expanding sector.
        Mr. Scott. How is AFRICOM incorporating space-based capabilities,
    such as satellite communications or imagery, into theater security
    cooperation programs to strengthen the capacity of African partner
    nations in areas like border security or counterterrorism?
        General Langley. USAFRICOM incorporates commercial imagery,
    satellite communications, and space capabilities training into theater
    security cooperation programs to strengthen the capacity of African
    partner nations. Commercially available satellite imagery gives African
    partners critical information for border security, such as monitoring
    illicit activity, unregulated border crossings, and detecting potential
    threats. The increasing capability and capacity of commercial
    collection, particularly imagery, has significantly increased the
    amount and quality of products that can be shared. The implementation
    of a National Geospatial Agency tool allows for dissemination of
    products over the internet, eliminating the need for classified
    networks or in-person transfer of hard copy products. USAFRICOM builds
    partner capacity through training and skills development on the use of
    space-based capabilities. Training includes imagery analysis
    tradecraft, communication systems infrastructure management, and
    counterterrorism network and pattern development.
        A prime example of training is with Angola. Our planned FY27
    Significant Security Cooperation Initiative (SSCI) will add a crucial
    strategic military intelligence component to the existing USSPACECOM
    space domain awareness initiative. This integrated approach will
    leverage Angola's planned Airbus electro-optical satellite, making it a
    cornerstone of their ISR architecture. USAFRICOM will empower Angola to
    receive data and independently collect, process, analyze, and share it
    using the software and training we provide. This initiative will
    include instruction on imagery analysis techniques, data fusion, and
    ground station operations ensuring long-term sustainability and true
    partner ownership. This training also directly strengthens our ability
    to burden share with our African partners.
        Mr. Scott. What initiatives is AFRICOM pursuing to share space-
    derived data with African partners to foster collaborative security
    efforts and enhance regional stability?
        General Langley. USAFRICOM employs a National Geospatial-
    Intelligence Agency tool called the Protected Internet Exchange (PIX)
    Portal. This tool serves as a secure platform for accessing and
    disseminating critical imagery and geospatial data. Similarly, the "GXP
    Xplorer" application allows partner analysts to visualize and interact
    with this data effectively. One example of PiX's efficacy is through
    Angola. USAFRICOM provided Angola's Military Intelligence and Security
    Service (SISM) with the PIX portal. Currently, we are introducing SISM
    personnel to these tools and commercial satellite imagery to enhance
    their independent analytic capabilities. These tools allow SISM
    analysts to generate intelligence products relevant to Angolan regional
    security priorities.
        USAFRICOM also uses Global Positioning Systems to advise African
    partners' operational planning and execution. This data is critical in
    operational border security and counterterrorism. It prevents
    fratricide or unintended engagement with neighboring nations and
    mitigates unnecessary risk against terrorist actors. Additionally,
    USAFRICOM is exploring the use of commercial Radio Frequency-sensing to
    detect and track anomalies in electronic emissions. Detecting these
    emissions alerts partners to investigate potential security threats
    within their areas of influence. Deciphering emissions lends to further
    burden sharing to our African partners to combat illicit maritime and
    border activity.
        Mr. Scott. How does AFRICOM leverage space-based tools in exercises
    to train African partners for disaster response and humanitarian
    assistance, particularly in using satellite imagery for rapid crisis
    assessment?
        General Langley. USAFRICOM is limited to UNCLASSIFIED space-based
    tools when exercising with African partners. Primarily, USAFRICOM
    exercises leverage commercial satellite imagery for use in planning.
    These capabilities allow the US joint force to evaluate terrain,
    population centers, and infrastructure while planning operations within
    exercises. Most importantly, since these images are UNCLASSIFIED, the
    US joint force participants can share their work with African partners
    to conduct combined planning and de-confliction of operational spaces.
        Mr. Scott. What steps is AFRICOM taking to educate and train
    African partner forces on the importance of space domain awareness and
    its role in modern military operations?
        General Langley. Commercial satellite imagery is used in exercises
    because it is fully releasable to partners. These tools allow the US
    joint force to plan operations which are synchronized and de-conflicted
    with local security forces, all using the same up-to-date maps and
    imagery. This demonstrates the benefits of space-informed battlespace
    awareness and leads to more interoperable communications with partners,
    especially those participating in small-unit CT missions in East
    Africa.
                                     ______

                RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
        Ms. Stefanik. General Kurilla, as the Islamic Republic of Iran
    deepens ties with countries like China, Russia, North Korea and others
    that seek to destroy our way of life, in ways ranging from drone
    exports to arms tech-how do you assess the long-term risk to U.S.
    military deterrence and our interests in the CENTCOM AOR?
        General Kurilla. (U) Iran's deepening ties with these countries
    presents a risk of increased regional instabilit y. China and Russia
    have proven their tendency to take advantage of partnerships to the
    detriment of their counterparts, and there is reason to believe that
    this would be the case in the CENTCOM AOR. Our ability to deter
    aggression diminishes as these nations increase their involvement in
    the region. For this reason, our regional partnerships are of paramount
    importance. The Middle East nations must continue to see us as the more
    reliable partner, in comparison to China and Russia, and this takes
    engagement and presence.
        Ms. Stefanik. What is your assessment of Iran's military and
    technological cooperation with China? Specifically, how is China
    supporting Iran's missile programs, drone technology, or nuclear
    ambitions, and what risks does this pose to U.S. forces and allies in
    the CENTCOM region?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
        Ms. Stefanik. As we know, Russia also continues to supply Iran with
    advanced weaponry and intelligence support. How is this relationship
    enhancing Tehran's ability to challenge U.S. interests and regional
    stability, especially through proxy groups in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
        Ms. Stefanik. What else do we need to do in order to continue to
    deter the growing axis of evil?
        General Kurilla. (U) Deterrence is a functional of capability,
    capacity, messaging and most importantly will. Iranian proxies and Iran
    directly respond to strength and action and they must know we will hold
    them accountable for attacks on our forces. We must always signal,
    through our actions and messages, to our allies and partners that we
    stand with them and that we are a reliable partner. Strengthening those
    relationships and bolstering our partners' capacities is key to
    limiting the growth and influence of the axis of evil.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you all for being here today and thank you
    General Kurilla and General Langley for your service to this country.
    With reports that Iran is only weeks away from producing weapons-grade
    uranium and its nuclear infrastructure more vulnerable than ever, can
    you speak to your concerns regarding a potential Iranian nuclear
    breakout?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
        Ms. Stefanik. During his first administration, President Trump
    moved Israel from EUCOM to CENTCOM marking a historic shift and
    furthering his reputation as the most Pro-Israel President in American
    history. General Kurilla, can you speak about how the mil to mil
    relationship has strengthened between the two countries since this
    change in 2021?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
        Ms. Stefanik. Since October 2023, there have been at least 210
    Iran-backed attacks targeting U.S. troops in Iraq, Syria, or Jordan.
    Can you discuss how CENTCOM's credible deterrence posture under
    President Trump has changed the Ayatollah's calculus?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
        Ms. Stefanik. Can you discuss some of the work that Fort Drum's
    10th Mountain Division has done with developing key counter-UAS
    technology under your leadership?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
        Ms. Stefanik. General Kurilla, Israel's decisive military success
    against Hezbollah, the toppling of the Assad regime in Syria, along
    with the recent political advancements in both countries are welcomed
    developments. However, it is clear that Hezbollah and other Iranian
    proxies are actively working to rebuild and restore their networks of
    terror. Can you explain why it's strategically important for the United
    States to push back decisively against Iranian-backed proxies?
        General Kurilla. (U) Iran and its proxies thrive in chaotic and
    unstable conditions and therefore will do all in their power to create
    such conditions. Pushing back against these proxies through a whole-of-
    government approach will help prevent them from meeting their goal of
    generating instability that they can later capitalize on. Our goal of a
    peaceful and stable Middle East cannot be achieved if these Iranian-
    backed proxies are able to operate with impunity.
        Ms. Stefanik. How does our posture toward these proxies affect the
    confidence of regional partners like Israel, Jordan, and the Gulf
    states in our commitment to collective security?
        General Kurilla. (U) The posture of the United States towards
    Iranian proxies has a significant impact on regional partners' (Israel,
    Jordan, and Gulf states) confidence in American commitment to
    collective security in the region. Regional partners are concerned with
    Iranian aspirations for regional dominance, which they see as a threat
    to their own security and stability. If the US is perceived as not
    taking adequate and acceptable measures to counter Iranian proxy
    threats, it can create a sense of uncertainty and insecurity in the
    region, eroding partners' confidence in US commitment to their own
    security and decrease their willingness to cooperate with the US on
    regional security issues. Regional partners generally acknowledge the
    need for a collective approach to address the challenges posed by Iran
    andits proxies. Although each partner has its own view on what that
    means, they all consistently look to the US to play a leading role in
    developing and implementing a comprehensive strategy to counter these
    threats. US CENTCOM must have a sufficient sustainable, and predictable
    posture to be able to deter these Iranian proxies as well as to
    integrate with our partners in the region. If you do not have
    sufficient posture, you cannot deter or partner.
        Ms. Stefanik. How does our posture toward these proxies affect the
    confidence of regional partners like Israel, Jordan, and the Gulf
    states in our commitment to collective security?
        General Kurilla. (U) The posture of the United States towards
    Iranian proxies has a significant impact on regional partners' (Israel,
    Jordan, and Gulf states) confidence in American commitment to
    collective security in the region. Regional partners are concerned with
    Iranian aspirations for regional dominance, which they see as a threat
    to their own security and stabilit y. If the US is perceived as not
    taking adequate and acceptable measures to counter Iranian proxy
    threats, it can create a sense of uncertainty and insecurity in the
    region, eroding partners' confidence in US commitment to their own
    security and decrease their willingness to cooperate with the US on
    regional security issues. Regional partners generally acknowledge the
    need for a collective approach to address the challenges posed by Iran
    andits proxies. Although each partner has its own view on what that
    means, they all consistently look to the US to play a leading role in
    developing and implementing a comprehensive strategy to counter these
    threats. US CENTCOM must have a sufficient sustainable, and predictable
    posture to be able to deter these Iranian proxies as well as to
    integrate with our partners in the region. If you do not have
    sufficient posture, you cannot deter or partner.
        Ms. Stefanik. With Hezbollah's recent military losses and Iran's
    intent to rebuild, how do you assess the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
    and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon's (UNIFIL) current
    capability to interdict weapons flows and prevent Hezbollah's
    resurgence?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
        Ms. Stefanik. General Kurilla, when Israel officially shifted into
    the CENTCOM AOR in 2021 from EUCOM, it was hailed a major success.
    Given Azerbaijan's increasing military and intelligence cooperation
    with Israel, its strengthening ties with the U.S., and its active role
    in countering Iranian aggression in the region, can you explain why
    Azerbaijan is not currently included within CENTCOM's Area of
    Responsibility or AOR?
        General Kurilla. (U) The UCP is written with Combatant Command and
    Service input but ultimately authored by the Joint Staff and OSD and
    signed by the President. USCENTCOM is not a decision authority. We
    refer you to OSD for more information.
        Ms. Stefanik. What are the implications of this exclusion for U.S.
    strategic interests, coordination in the broader Middle East, and the
    current dispute with the neighboring Armenia?
        General Kurilla. (U) Despite the exclusion of Azerbaijan from our
    AOR, we are able to work effectively with EUCOM to implement policy and
    achieve U.S. interests regarding Azerbaijan and relations with CENTCOM
    nations. Azerbaijan and Israel maintain a positive relationship with
    strong diplomatic, economic, and security ties, driven by a shared
    interest in regional stability and a desire to counter Iranian
    influence. CENTCOM coordinates daily across COCOM boundaries to achieve
    objectives in parallel with adjacent COCOMs.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you all for being here today and thank you
    General Kurilla and General Langley for your service to this country.
    With reports that Iran is only weeks away from producing weapons-grade
    uranium and its nuclear infrastructure more vulnerable than ever, can
    you speak to your concerns regarding a potential Iranian nuclear
    breakout?
        General Langley. There is most definitely a worldwide concern
    surrounding the increased threats posed by a nuclear weaponized Iran;
    however for specifics, I would defer to General Kurilla.
                                     ______

                  RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY
        Mr. Kelly. General Kurilla, Uzbekistan remains one of our most
    capable and reliable security partners in Central Asia-and through the
    National Guard's State Partnership Program, we've built a relationship
    rooted in trust, not just transactions. But we know Russia and China
    are working overtime to erode that influence. From your vantage point,
    what's the strategic risk if we don't adequately support this
    partnership-with tools like FMS, targeted capability investments, or
    military-to-military cooperation programs like SPP?
        General Kurilla. (U) Uzbekistan is one of our closest partners in
    Central Asia, and the Mississippi National Guard does an outstanding
    job of building the military-to-military relationship with Uzbekistan
    through continuous and reliable engagements. I strongly support the
    State Partnership Program (SPP), especially as we continue to build the
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (!SR) aircraft program
    in Uzbekistan using Title 10 333 authorities and funding. The aircraft
    program is designed to allow for increased intelligence sharing,
    improved security along Uzbekistan's border with Afghanistan, and
    improving Uzbekistan's capabilities to counter violent extremist
    organizations. If we fail to prioritize our relationship with
    Uzbekistan, the real strategic risk is ceding space and influence to
    Russia and China.
        Mr. Kelly. AFRICOM and CENTCOM relies heavily on host-nation
    support and discreet basing access across the continent. What's the
    risk to U.S. posture and responsiveness if we don't invest in those
    relationships-whether through infrastructure support, partner training,
    or co-development efforts?
        General Kurilla. (U) USCENTCOM's military-to-military relationships
    with Central Region partners is a strategic advantage, built over years
    of developing an integrated network of regional security constructs
    that enhance warfighting capabilities not only for the U.S. but also
    for our partners. The significance of these relationships was evident
    in recent operations, such as the defense of Israel against Iranian
    ballistic missile and UAS attacks, defending freedom of navigation in
    the Red Sea, and executing Operation MIDNIGHT HAMMER, which may not
    have been achievable without the established framework. Neglecting
    these relationships could limit access to critical infrastructure,
    intelligence, and logistics, as well as discourage partners from
    sharing the burden.
        Mr. Kelly. Our subcommittee has consistently advocated for giving
    combatant commanders the ability to pull capabilities when they need
    them-not wait years for procurement cycles. One example is in ISR and
    other capabilities-as-a-service tools that can deliver persistent
    coverage or effects without long acquisition tails. This includes
    space-based, unmanned, and aerial refueling capabilities. Please tell
    the Committee about the extent of your use of capabilities as a service
    and how it fits into your toolkit as commanders. Please prioritize the
    list of CaaS that you use most often/with the highest dollar amount. If
    the accounts were zero-sum, how would you re-balance the list of CaaS
    you currently use?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
        Mr. Kelly. One of the reasons I've championed the SHIPS for America
    Act-alongside my colleagues from California the Honorable John
    Garamendi and 60 others, and our Senate colleagues Todd Young, Mark
    Kelly and many others-is because we can't surge to the fight if we
    can't move the fight. And right now, we're staring down a sealift
    shortfall with an aging, shrinking fleet that's frankly on borrowed
    time. From your positions as combatant commanders: what are the
    operational consequences if we don't recapitalize our strategic sealift
    fleet? How does the current state of our sealift capacity impact your
    ability to move force packages at speed in a major contingency?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
        Mr. Kelly. AFRICOM and CENTCOM relies heavily on host-nation
    support and discreet basing access across the continent. What's the
    risk to U.S. posture and responsiveness if we don't invest in those
    relationships-whether through infrastructure support, partner training,
    or co-development efforts?
        General Langley. Maintaining strong relationships through posture
    and agreements ensures reliable access and improves our operational
    capabilities relative to competitors. Crisis response, counterterrorism
    efforts, and adversary deterrence activities are all made possible
    through relationships with strong African Partners. USAFRICOM's
    locations, while limited, are crucial for swift responses, including
    non-combatant evacuations and potential support for major combat
    operations. Because host nations often do not have infrastructure to
    the requisite standard or scale to support requirements, they rely on
    small U.S. investments as a force multiplier to meet shared security
    objectives.
        Mr. Kelly. Our subcommittee has consistently advocated for giving
    combatant commanders the ability to pull capabilities when they need
    them-not wait years for procurement cycles. One example is in ISR and
    other capabilities-as-a-service tools that can deliver persistent
    coverage or effects without long acquisition tails. This includes
    space-based, unmanned, and aerial refueling capabilities. Please tell
    the Committee about the extent of your use of capabilities as a service
    and how it fits into your toolkit as commanders. Please prioritize the
    list of CaaS that you use most often/with the highest dollar amount. If
    the accounts were zero-sum, how would you re-balance the list of CaaS
    you currently use?
        General Langley. In USAFRICOM, "ISR-as-a-service" is our top-
    priority "Capability-as-a-service." It provides persistent surveillance
    across a vast area of responsibility where we have limited assigned or
    allocated assets, allowing us to respond quickly to emerging threats
    without waiting on procurement cycles.
        We also leverage the USAFRICOM Warfighter Recovery Network as a
    personnel recovery and CASEVAC service. It ensures we can rapidly
    recover and care for U.S. personnel in austere and contested
    environments.
        If resources were constrained, ISR-as-a-service would remain our
    top priority given its broad operational impact.
        Mr. Kelly. One of the reasons I've championed the SHIPS for America
    Act-alongside my colleagues from California the Honorable John
    Garamendi and 60 others, and our Senate colleagues Todd Young, Mark
    Kelly and many others-is because we can't surge to the fight if we
    can't move the fight. And right now, we're staring down a sealift
    shortfall with an aging, shrinking fleet that's frankly on borrowed
    time. From your positions as combatant commanders: what are the
    operational consequences if we don't recapitalize our strategic sealift
    fleet? How does the current state of our sealift capacity impact your
    ability to move force packages at speed in a major contingency?
        General Langley. A failure to recapitalize the strategic sealift
    fleet significantly degrades the U.S.'s ability to project power,
    respond to crises, and deter aggression. It introduces unacceptable
    risks to national security and undermines the effectiveness of the U.S.
    military. The speed at which the U.S. can respond is diminished, and
    the overall cost of deployment likely increases as airlift is used as a
    stopgap. An additional issue to consider is having adequately trained
    and equipped sailors to man them. In 2025, for example, USAFRICOM lost
    the USS Herschel Woody Williams due to a shortfall of available
    Merchant Mariners.
                                     ______

                  RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CROW
        Mr. Crow. GEN Kurilla, in FY23 this committee created the Civilian
    Protection Center of Excellence (CPCOE) on a bipartisan basis. We
    understand that we can't effectively conduct our mission, win the
    support of the local population, reduce civilian casualties, and ensure
    the effectiveness of our precision and targeting unless we make
    protecting civilians mission essential. Based on your leadership of a
    battalion in Iraq in 2005 and extensive experience at CENTCOM, do you
    agree that engaging with civilian populations and reducing civilian
    casualties as part of our operations is mission essential? Is it
    accurate to say that precision makes us more combat effective because
    it reduces civilian casualties which earns the support of civilian
    populations?
        General Kurilla. (U) Yes, reducing civilian casualties is always a
    priority when planning and executing our military operations and is
    something we take very seriously. Precision does make us more
    effective. While we will never be able to eliminate all civilian harm
    during military operations, it is important that we make every effort
    to minimize it, admit when it happens, and learn from past operations
    how to meet our military objectives.
        Mr. Crow. GEN Kurilla, the US military has spent many years working
    to improve its ability to prevent and mitigate civilian harm from its
    operations, consistent with both US values and strategic goals -
    including through the development of the DoD Instruction on Civilian
    Harm under the first Trump administration and the Civilian Harm
    Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP). The Department of
    Defense has provided notice to Congress that they are going to defund
    and shut down the CPCOE. How could cuts to the CPCOE affect your
    command's ability to prevent and respond to civilian harm? How do
    civilian harm mitigation and response efforts further CENTCOM's
    operational effectiveness?
        General Kurilla. (U) CPCoE and CENTCOM CHMR billets contribute to
    our strategic goals as they enable us to be more precise and mitigate
    risk to civilian populations, differentiating us from our enemies. The
    CPCoE enhances the DoD's ability to retain and share our lessons
    learned. Additionally , the reduction of combatant command CHMR
    positions will force other warfighting / staff billets to execute the
    civilian harm mitigation and response effort s, which is particularly
    burdensome in our very kinetic AOR. CHMR pos it ions increase our
    precision and capability to mitigate civilian harm, ultimately
    enhancing our operational effectiveness.
        Mr. Crow. GEN Kurilla, civil society and media organizations have
    reported civilian casualties caused by recent US operations in Yemen.
    Were the civilian harm mitigation and response experts at CENTCOM and/
    or at the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence consulted in
    planning for these strikes? How is CENTCOM assessing reports of
    civilian harm? When will CENTCOM publish the findings of these
    assessments?
        General Kurilla. (U) Yes. Every planned target undergoes thorough
    vetting and validation, including detailed analysis of its proximity to
    civilian infrastructure, population centers, and potential collateral
    damage risks. Civilian Harm Mitigation Response (CHMR) expert s conduct
    in-depth assessments, leveraging all available tools and sources of
    information, to predict the potential for civilian harm. CENTCOM has
    CHMR expert s fully integrated within the Joint Targeting Process as
    part of the Joint Fires Element. CHMR experts analyze post-strike data
    and provide feedback from the information environment to identify areas
    for improvement and refine our processes for future strikes.
        (U) Our Civilian Harm Assessments Cell is processing all received
    reports and will publish the findings in the Annual CIVCAS Section 1057
    Report to Congress which is submitted annually by May 1.
        Mr. Crow. GEN Kurilla, the administration issued a travel ban for
    Afghan citizens, with President Trump saying that it applies to
    countries that "don't have things under control." What is your
    assessment of the current threat environment in Afghanistan? Have
    civilians that assisted American coalition forces been targeted by the
    Taliban and are they at risk of reprisals?
        General Kurilla. (U) Afghans who are former members of the Afghan
    military or who assisted U.S./Coalition Forces are most at risk. They
    would likely be subjected to reprisals from the Taliban for these
    connections. The Taliban Regime has a policy against such reprisals,
    but it is likely poorly enforced. Rogue Taliban members or other
    aggrieved parties could retaliate against the above-mentioned
    individuals with relative impunity.
        Mr. Crow. GEN Kurilla, the Department of Homeland Security plans to
    terminate the Temporary Protected Status of around 10,000 Afghans on
    July 14th, leaving them open to deportation back to Taliban-controlled
    Afghanistan. DHS claims that the security and economic situation in
    Afghanistan has improved enough to remove their Temporary Protected
    Status. Is Afghanistan now safe enough for civilians that fled the
    Taliban to return?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
        Mr. Crow. GEN Kurilla, Secretary of State Rubio recently testified
    that without increased foreign aid and investment, Syria is on the
    verge of a full-scale civil war. Do you share the State Department's
    assessment that Syria is on the brink of another civil war and is the
    transitional government at risk of imminent collapse? How does lifting
    sanctions and allowing foreign aid impact security dynamics in Syria?
        General Kurilla. (U) Syria's stability remains fragile after a mere
    seven months following the collapse of the Assad regime. Absent
    progress on foreign aid, investment, and sanctions relief, Syria's
    economic and security situation will remain volatile, putting the
    country at risk for internal conflict. As you are aware, Syria is a
    patchwork of ethno-sectarian constituencies with competing regional
    interests and has been a key operating area for terrorist groups and
    Iran-backed malign elements. The Syrian governing aut horit ies'
    ability to deliver on civil services, foster commerce, mend sectarian
    divides, combat terrorism, and establish good governance with popular
    representation all play into Syria's trajectory and ultimately the risk
    to our homeland.
        (U) From a military perspective, a critical challenge for the
    transitional government is providing a secure and stable environment
    for Syrians, and that comes at a massive financial cost following
    decades of conflict amid the Assad regime's rule. If it is unable to
    fund essential services and a cohesive, funct ioning security
    apparatus, the government is at risk of collapse. If the government
    collapses, it could trigger another civil war with significant regional
    and transregional impacts. Lifting sanctions and allowing foreign aid
    can provide the government a way to establish security partnerships
    that build and enable effective Syrian security forces to confront
    internal and external threats. With our help, and that of the
    international community, Syria could grow into a strong and reliable
    regional partner with robust economic, political and military
    institutions.
        Mr. Crow. GEN Kurilla, what is the current state of Russian and
    Iranian operations in Syria? How would increased Iranian influence in
    Syria affect the security and stability of your area of operation? How
    have Turkish forces along Syria's northern border reacted to the SDF-
    HTS integration agreement?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
        Mr. Crow. GEN Langley, in your opening statement before this
    committee last year, you said "USAID resources can cultivate economic
    and human development so African governments have more resources for
    security independence." How has shuttering USAID initiatives affected
    internal stability and security cooperation in your area of operation?
    Do you believe the freeze in foreign assistance has allowed China to
    expand its influence in Africa?
        General Langley. As the State Department continues to assume and
    assess the roles that were previously fulfilled by USAID, USAFRICOM
    remains committed to working with the interagency to ensure a whole of
    government approach to addressing the causes of terrorism and
    countering the PRC on the African continent. Through DoD's Office of
    Strategic Capital, we are also working with the Department of State,
    Department of Commerce, and other appropriate agencies to address the
    malign activity of China and Russia that exploits African nations for
    critical resources that feed their respective defense economies.
        Mr. Crow. GEN Langley, a new Health Policy analysis estimates that
    1 million children could become infected with HIV, nearly half a
    million could die from AIDS by 2030, and 2.8 million children could be
    orphaned in the region without consistent, stable funding programs like
    PEPFAR. What kind of destabilizing effect would this have in your area
    of operation?
        General Langley. The USAFRICOM AOR, with 53 sovereign nations and
    over 1.5 billion people, has many acute challenges that require a whole
    of government approach to address. USAFRICOM, with its limited
    resources, is focused on the most pressing terrorist threats to the
    U.S. Homeland and PRC military encroachment on the continent. As we
    continue assessing our campaign activities to ensure alignment to the
    interim national defense strategic guidance, we will remain linked with
    OSD Policy to discuss potential opportunities for interagency
    coordination. We value the investment of our allies and partners on
    shared interests, to include health diplomacy activities, that help
    enable African Partners to become more stable and more effective
    security exporters. We will continue to collaborate with the State
    Department to better enable our allies and Partners to address this
    issue.
        Mr. Crow. GEN Langley, you recently stated before a conference on
    African defense in Kenya that the US is assessing the future of AFRICOM
    and its potential merger with EUCOM. How would merging AFRICOM and
    EUCOM impact your ability to coordinate operations with African allies
    and partners? What effect would a merger have on your capabilities and
    operational control across Africa?
        General Langley. As I stated in my testimony to the Senate on April
    3rd, I will not speculate on evolving defense policy. However, I will
    reiterate the importance of the African theater of operations. It is a
    nexus of serious threats to U.S. national security, and where global
    terrorist organizations, the PRC, Russia, and Iran all are actively
    pursuing malign activities on the continent to undermine U.S.
    influence.
        In 2007, the amount of worldwide terrorist activities originating
    from Africa represented only 2% of the total. Today, 43% of the world's
    terrorist activity is found on the African continent. In that same
    timeframe, the PRC has invested $72 Billion dollars across Africa.
    China is Africa's largest trading partner, with trade reaching $295.6
    billion in 2024 alone. Africa must continue to be prioritized as a
    theater that reflects its role as the fastest growing continent in the
    world, but one with nearly 50% of the world's terrorist activity, and
    its great importance to the PRC for long-term resource sustainment.
        Mr. Crow. Ms. Thompson, Given the importance of civilian harm
    mitigation and response efforts and the vital role of the CPCOE in
    furthering our capabilities, why is the Department of Defense trying to
    dismantle the CPCOE?
        Ms. Thompson. DoD is in the process of reviewing multiple programs
    to ensure their alignment with administration priorities. Any
    organizational changes to the CP CoE will reflect our effort to
    optimize its functions, potentially integrating them into other
    existing structures, while still fulfilling the underlying objective of
    minimizing civilian harm. The Secretary of Defense retains the
    authority to determine the most effective organizational structure for
    the CP CoE and other offices to ensure they effectively support DoD
    efforts to mitigate and respond to civilian harm without compromising
    operational effectiveness.
                                     ______

                  RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RYAN
        Mr. Ryan. General Kurilla and General Langley: Several COCOMs have
    successfully fielded an initial scaling of Maven Smart System. However,
    there are still large gaps in who has it and on what networks. In your
    experience, has this system been successful in maximizing speed,
    accuracy and better information and decisions? And should it be further
    scaled to ensure all CENTCOM and AFRICOM warfighters have this joint
    warfighting software to enable a data-centric approach to informing
    decisions and operations?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
        Mr. Ryan. General Kurilla and General Langley: Several COCOMs have
    successfully fielded an initial scaling of Maven Smart System. However,
    there are still large gaps in who has it and on what networks. In your
    experience, has this system been successful in maximizing speed,
    accuracy and better information and decisions? And should it be further
    scaled to ensure all CENTCOM and AFRICOM warfighters have this joint
    warfighting software to enable a data-centric approach to informing
    decisions and operations?
        General Langley. Maven Smart Systems (MSS) and Advana have been
    successful in improving the speed, accuracy, and quality of information
    that feeds our decision-making processes. Office of the Secretary of
    Defense (OSD) guidance to pipe data from authoritative source systems
    into Advana's data lake makes it easy for combatant commands to quickly
    service relevant and valuable information into our decision-making
    processes that resides within MSS. The centralized deployment of Advana
    and MSS by the OSD Chief Data Analytics Officer (CDAO) is a critical
    factor in successfully providing combatant commands with decision-
    advantage. OSD CDAO's management of software licenses, hardware, and
    the IT security overhead would be overwhelming for any single combatant
    command. Further still, the centralized deployment of Advana and MSS
    allows each of the combatant commands to see, learn, and quickly copy
    successful decision-making processes from other combatant commands for
    their own use.
                                     ______

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GOODEN
        Mr. Gooden. General Kurilla, Physical AI is the process of
    acquiring data from the physical world through cameras and other
    sensors to model data outside of traditional text AI platforms. I am
    aware that at Al Udeid Air Force Base, AFCENT has a pilot program for a
    physical Artificial Intelligence Monitoring System (AIMS) that
    integrates with existing infrastructure, leveraging the base's existing
    cameras and sensors to create a real-time common operating picture,
    transforming the base into a live data stream that is continuously
    analyzed in motion. I understand this has saved almost $150M over the
    last 5 years in decreasing workforce oversight costs. What are some of
    the major benefits of this program at Al Udeid and do you see it
    expanding to other bases across the middle east?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
                                     ______

               RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GOODLANDER
        Ms. Goodlander. What resources does U.S. Central Command have in
    the region that could be accessed and delivered to Gaza to provide
    critical aid to civilians?
        What steps would U.S. Central Command need to take in order to
    mobilize these resources, from an operational perspective?
        What barriers are there to access and deliver these resources?
        What logistical or other support is required from allies and
    partners in the region?
        If directed by the President of the United States, how quickly
    could U.S. Central Command mobilize and deliver this aid to civilians?
        General Kurilla. (U) USCENTCOM maintains an extensive logistics
    network across the AOR that could, if directed, be leveraged to provide
    aid to civilians. These capabilities include fixed and rotary wing
    cargo aircraft, ground cargo assets, and contingency stockpiles of
    meals and other supplies.. The broader Joint Force has additional
    logistical capabilities if allocated. In terms of authority, it would
    require SECDEF or POTUS issue a directive to do so, much like during
    the 2024 Gaza relief mission. DoD stocks for humanitarian assistance
    (food, medical, clothing) are relatively limited and require costly
    replacements.
        (U) From an operational perspective, to mobilize resources, CENTCOM
    would need to coordinate with the Department of State, which serves as
    the lead federal agency for humanitarian assistance. This would involve
    requesting unique capabilities from the Department of Defense, which
    would then require approval from the Secretary of Defense to authorize
    the Commander of the United States Central Command to execute a Foreign
    Disaster Relief Operation in support of aid to civilians. However, it's
    worth noting that the international community is generally better
    positioned to respond to "slow onset" disasters, such as those
    involving extreme cases of malnutrition or famine, due to their
    specialized expertise and resources. The Department of Defense
    resources and capabilities could be utilized as an interim solution in
    emergency situations, but a more effective approach would be to
    leverage the international community's capabilities, with CENTCOM
    playing a supporting role, such as delivering humanitarian rations and
    commodities to areas where the humanitarian community does not have
    access.
        (U) The use of Department of Defense capabilities to deliver
    humanitarian aid is typically not a cost-effective option and requires
    careful coordination with the Department of State to ensure that goods
    and commodities are delivered appropriately to provide the most
    effective support to those in need. Furthermore, the government of
    Israel, as well as neighboring countries, would need to provide their
    support and approval for these efforts, including access to basing and
    overflight privileges. A significant barrier to access and delivery is
    simply risk to force depending on the delivery method.
        (U) Ally and partner logistical or other support would include
    access, basing and overflight approvals for US Central Command to
    coordinate and deliver aid whether by air, ground, or sea. In addition,
    the US would rely on allies and partners for contracting of supplies
    and services, funding, coordination, donations, security and force
    protection, and distribution of aid through ally and partner provided
    distribution resources.
        (U) If directed by the President, CENTCOM could mobilize and
    deliver aid to civilians through various means, including ground, sea
    and U.S. airdrops, or partner-enabled airdrops. The use of established
    ports and ground transportation is the most effective and efficient way
    to deliver assistance and could be done relatively quickly with the
    appropriate approvals. Air drops could potentially occur within a week,
    delivering culturally appropriate Meals Ready to Eat, assuming
    overflight privileges; however, this is the least effective method of
    delivering aid. Movement of aid by truck is the most effective and
    cost-efficient method to deliver aid. Ultimately, the success of these
    efforts would rely on significant and deliberate coordination with
    Israel and the humanitarian community.
                                     ______

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MESSMER
        Mr. Messmer. If you had to start with a blank piece of paper on the
    Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, in your best military advice, how
    would you design the process, including DOD's internal process?
        General Kurilla. (U) The U.S. FMS process remains a vital and
    influential tool to bolster partner nation capabilities, integrate
    regional networks, and build influence with partner leadership that is
    critical to U.S. interests. Despite this, the process is nuanced,
    complicated, and appears opaque to our partners. The FMS process
    remains bureaucratic and rife with delays. Within CENTCOM, we currently
    have over 30 of our priority cases - all aimed at enabling partners
    with critical capabilities - stalled. These delays are a persistent
    relational irritant to partners - who are essential to regional
    security and stability - and frequently drive them into the arms of our
    strategic competitors. We assess these delays are tied to four areas:
    industry delays, partner delays, USG Policy delays, and U.S. process
    delays.
        (U) In response to your question, I would overhaul our legacy FMS
    process to make it more transparent, more responsive, and better suited
    to building partner capabilities that will facilitate burden sharing.
    This is not all inclusive of possible measures, but some examples are
    below:
        1. I believe it is essential that we incentivize industry to invest
    in expanded capacity for current and surge capacity to ensure we can
    meet our pacing threats. I would invest in the infrastructure required
    to create surge capacity among our defense industry partners. Current
    surge capabilities take years to stand up; this needs to be shortened
    to months for critical and priority requirements. In addition, I would
    hold Industry accountable to the timelines and pricing that the partner
    agrees to in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance ( LOA). The time and
    cost overruns that afflict the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) should not
    be passed on to our partners. A stark example of where we have failed
    at this is in our partnership with Saudi Arabia. Vendor mismanagement
    and oversight shortfalls have almost derailed Saudi Arabia's attempt to
    purchase the Multi-Mission Surface Combatant (MMSC) vessel. This
    mismanagement has resulted in an approximate seven-year delay in
    delivery and $430M in cost overruns that our Navy fully intends to bill
    to the Kingdom. I recommend the USG hold industry to the same standards
    for partner delivery as for U.S. delivery. Recently, the Pentagon
    withheld $5M per aircraft from Lockheed Martin for delays in F-35
    deliveries to the USAF. We should exact the same on delivery overages
    for partner FMS. In the FMS process, we could codify accountability
    measures when implemented cases move to the contracting phase.
        2. I believe we should allow industry to offer only one
    standardized export variant of each major end item (such as fighter
    aircraft). Customization , along with resultant design delays and
    integration challenges, accounts for the single biggest partner nation
    delay we experience. Industry profits from these custom builds, but the
    system does not. Customization leads to long delays and increased cost
    as vendors work through engineering and integration challenges.
    Proactive review and certification of exportability for standardized
    systems would accelerate case development, production, and delivery. An
    example of the pitfalls inherent in customized builds is Jordan's F-16
    Blk 70 FMS case. Efforts to customize the jets led to years of
    negotiations with industry, an exorbitant price for the aircraft and a
    five-year delay in availability of the aircraft to Jordan.
        3. Process transparency is paramount. DSCA should be proactive in
    keeping partners apprised of process delays . This will be central to
    restoring and maintaining partner trust in the system. Coordinated,
    transparent messaging to the partner is essential whenever any policy
    or process delays pushes agreed upon timelines. AI could help. We could
    benefit from getting rid of informal Tiered Review and adhering to
    Congressional Notification (CN) timelines for review. Cases can
    languish in Tiered Review for years without any communication to the
    partner. This leads to pricing increase, exasperates the customers and
    impedes integration with U.S. forces. We must be able to process cases
    in a reasonable, predictable, clearly understood timeline that keeps
    partners informed of the precise status of their purchases. The NASAMS
    case for Egypt has been in staffing for two years. After submitting the
    LOR in 2023, the CN package cleared Tiered Review in May 2025 and was
    formally notified to Congress on 24 July 2025. A predictable
    Congressional Notification timeline would significantly encourage our
    partners continuing to select us as the partner of choice.
        4. I propose we re-evaluate the Congressional Notification dollar
    thresholds to account for inflation rates and cost increases since
    originally published in the 1976 Arms Export Control Act. Those
    thresholds are in the table below. These thresholds should be adjusted
    to take into account inflationary price increases as a minimum.
        For NATO countries, Australia, Israel, Japan, ROK, New Zealand -
    Major Defense Equipment: $25M - Any Articles, Services, or Both (TCV):
    $100M - Design and Construction Services: $300M For All other
    countries, NATO organizations , all other International Organizations -
    Major Defense Equipment: $14M - Any Articles, Services, or Both (TCV)
    $50M - Design and Construction Services: $200M
        5. I would also right-size the workforce in DSCA, the Service
    Implementing Agencies and International Program Offices dedicated to
    case development and case management to match the record increases in
    sales over recent years. While positive, increased sales and the
    resultant case load burden the system and challenge the workforce to
    meet case development timelines. While automation and innovation have
    helped, the DSCA team that manages the CENTCOM portfolio is roughly the
    same size as it was a decade and a half ago while our case load has
    more than doubled and the complexity of the technology in the systems
    we offer has evolved immeasurably. An example of the impact of
    enterprise manpower shortages is Egypt's case for AN/TPS-78 Radars. The
    USAF program office does not have adequate manpower to execute the case
    once implemented . The program office identified critical shortages of
    program managers, engineers, and contracting support and assesses
    contract award post-case implementation could take 12 additional months
    on top of the normal 9-12-month period to get a case on contract. One
    potential approach to fix this would be to increase the administrative
    fee partners pay for execution of FMS cases, perhaps increasing it from
    3.2% to 4.2%. Doing this would allow us to fund additional manpower at
    no cost to taxpayers.
        6. I would add Service implementing agency liaison billets to
    Combatant Command headquarters. This would facilitate information flow,
    particularly with respect to Combatant Command priorities, which should
    - along with Department of Defense priorities - focus the efforts of
    DSCA and the Service Implementing Agencies.
        7. Combatant Commanders should have a formal "JUON-like" mechanism
    to enable the enterprise, including industry, to surge for partner
    urgent operational needs. This could be actioned through a Cross-
    Departmental Working Group (CDWG) and would allow Combatant Commanders
    to nominate specific FMS cases for accelerated case development.
    Current surge capabilities take years to stand up; this needs to be
    shortened to months for critical priority partner requirements. To
    highlight this, our regional partners are currently enduring an
    existential threat manifested by ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial
    systems (UAS). Concurrently, we are resequencing (delaying) delivery of
    Patriot interceptors purchased via FMS and, on the Counter-UAS front,
    we have one exportable program of record - the "low, slow, unmanned
    aircraft integrated defeat system" (LIDS). Seven partners have
    expressed interest in the LIDS system. The only partner with an active
    LIDS case is Qatar, whose LIDS will not be fielded until 2029. That
    timeline is simply not how we should treat a valued partner nation who
    hosts our forces in theater.
        Mr. Messmer. How does the deployment of such a large portion of our
    B-2 bomber fleet in CENTCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR) affect our
    ability to meet STRATCOMs mission requirements, and the broader
    deterrence posture that B-2s take part in?
        General Kurilla. (U)CENTCOM defers to STRATCOM on the impact to
    STRATCOMs mission requirements.
        Mr. Messmer. If the security of the ISIS prisons in Syria were
    compromised and larger ISIS cells reconstituted across Syria and Iraq,
    would that require a CENTCOM led response, or does our array of allies
    in the region have what they need to counter a potential ISIS
    resurgence?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
        Mr. Messmer. What recommendations do you have for how we can
    further strengthen the U.S.-Saudi security partnership?
        General Kurilla. (U) As the largest partner in the region,
    strengthening the U.S.-Saudi security partnership is crucial for
    building and maintaining regional stability and addressing regional
    security challenges. Opportunities to further advance the US-Saudi
    military partnership include support to Saudi Arabia's efforts for
    continued regional security initiatives; boost defense modernization;
    increase interoperability through bilateral and multilateral exercises;
    enhance counter-terrorism cooperation; and support Saudi Arabia's
    military transformation goals. Additionally, bilateral defense planning
    highlights the need for additional access and basing in support of
    contingencies and presents important opportunities to leverage burden
    sharing for regional security efforts. Key to these efforts is
    delivering on approved foreign military sales commitments. Overall,
    these initiatives enable partner capacity and increase interoperability
    between US and Saudi Arabia.
        Mr. Messmer. In 2024, the Biden Administration came to an agreement
    with the Iraqi government to transition the current U.S. force posture
    in the country from one operating under Operation Inherent Resolve to a
    new U.S.-Iraq bilateral security agreement by 2026. Has this agreement
    been implemented at any stage in the past few months? In your best
    military advice, should the implementation of this agreement be
    reconsidered considering the threat environment in the region?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.
        Mr. Messmer. Coups and regime change have proliferated throughout
    the Sahel region of Africa, and due to Section 7008, DOD has withdrawn
    our security partnerships with such governments. Now that we do not
    have a persistent present in the Sahel, how is DOD seeking to monitor
    and counter terrorist organizations in the Sahel going forward?
        General Langley. USAFRICOM is employing the full spectrum of
    available national intelligence capabilities to try to mitigate our
    limited footprint in the Sahel. We have some capability to monitor
    terrorist organizations in the Sahel; however, without appropriate
    resources - posture locations, overflight, ISR, maneuver forces,
    partner nations, etc. - we are extremely limited to counter these
    terrorist threats.
        Mr. Messmer. Do you see the People's Republic of China (PRC)
    stepping into these recently "Coup Belt" African countries and seeking
    to become a guarantor of funding and possibly security - effectively
    replacing us as the partner of choice in the region?
        General Langley. China is not interested in becoming a guarantor of
    security to the "Coup Belt" African countries. Beijing views these
    nations through an opportunistic lens, only providing superficial and
    limited military support that reinforces its broader economic and
    political goals. In the same vein, China does not intend to serve as a
    funding guarantor for these countries. Instead, it promotes regional
    economic investment that aligns with its own interests, which are to
    secure access to these countries' natural resources, such as critical
    minerals and oil. These investments and incentives include security
    cooperation, training, and arms sales, which China promotes through its
    engagement with African countries via its Global Security Initiative,
    its Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027),
    and other multilateral fora. The United States is still the preferred
    partner for FMS/FMF. We must capitalize on this by speeding up those
    processes and maintaining that competitive edge in the face of growing
    investment by the PRC.
        Mr. Messmer. You've mentioned during the most recent Africa Lion
    Exercise that our African partners will be expected to stand up more on
    their own militarily. In that vein, AFRICOM has trained and assisted
    partners with Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism operations
    conducted in the Sahel and across Africa - are these missions going to
    persist, or will partner nations be held to an expectation of
    independent capability?
        General Langley. USAFRICOM continues to maintain strategic
    partnerships in Africa by working alongside our allies and partners to
    address shared security concerns. USAFRICOM is prioritizing limited and
    tailored security cooperation activities and investments that enable
    our African Partners to defend against regional terrorist threats. As
    key Partner nations become more capable of independent operations, we
    will look to transition our limited resources to other willing Partners
    who share security objectives. Additionally, we will continue to
    leverage capabilities of NATO and Non-NATO allies to enable African
    Partners who require continued support.
        Mr. Messmer. Can you touch upon our efforts to support the Somalia
    National Army against Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia?
        Do you expect the Somalia National Army to be able to independently
    operate and succeed against these terrorist organizations without the
    support AFRICOM usually provides, including self-defense airstrikes?
        General Langley. USAFRICOM's objective with every partner is to
    achieve operational independence while achieving our shared security
    objectives. This objective applies equally to the security forces of
    Somalia; however, the Federal Government of Somalia and its security
    institutions are realistically years away from the absorptive capacity
    required for such complex systems as air support, ISR, and fires. On
    the other hand, al-Shabaab's capabilities in these essential
    warfighting functions continue to increase thanks to support from
    groups such as the Houthis. In the near term, the Somali's will
    continue to rely on air support and fires provided by the United States
    and other allies and partners in order to maintain any advantage over
    al-Shabaab. USAFRICOM is pursuing options in the mid to long term to
    share more of the burden for providing this type of support to other
    allies and partners, to allow us to focus more on essential
    counterterrorism activities.
                                     ______

                  RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BELL
        Mr. Bell. You had been pushing for a more aggressive approach to
    counter the Houthi threat. With this deal in place, what steps are
    being taken to reassure and support our regional allies who continue to
    face these threats?
        General Kurilla. (U) CENTCOM continues to aggressively invest in
    improving our regional partners' capabilities in integrated air and
    missile defense, maritime security, and counterterrorism. Additionally,
    US naval vessels continue to transit the Bab al-Mandeb as necessary,
    exercising freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. CENTCOM is in close
    coordination with regional partners in efforts to interdict advanced
    conventional weapons enroute the Houthis and remains postured to
    immediately counter any Houthi threat that may arise should the Houthis
    elect to recommence attacks on U.S. maritime traffic. Our forces are
    ready, and plans are in place to apply US military power at the
    President's order.
        Mr. Bell. Recent plans have been announced to further consolidate
    U.S. troop presence in Syria and Iraq. I've asked European Command how
    this might impact our counterterrorism operations in the Eastern
    Mediterranean. Can you expand on any additional concerns CENTCOM has
    regarding this consolidation?
        General Kurilla. The answer provided is classified and is retained
    in the committee files.

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