[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 119-29]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE FISCAL YEAR 2026 POSTURE
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 5, 2025
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
64-331 WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Nineteenth Congress
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, JOHN GARAMENDI, California
Vice Chair DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
DON BACON, Nebraska JASON CROW, Colorado
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
RONNY JACKSON, Texas JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
PAT FALLON, Texas SARA JACOBS, California
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
NANCY MACE, South Carolina PATRICK RYAN, New York
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO,
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia Pennsylvania
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
CORY MILLS, Florida DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia GILBERT RAY CISNEROS JR.,
LANCE GOODEN, Texas California
CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana ERIC SORENSEN, Illinois
DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin MAGGIE GOODLANDER, New Hampshire
JOHN J. McGUIRE III, Virginia SARAH ELFRETH, Maryland
PAT HARRIGAN, North Carolina GEORGE WHITESIDES, California
MARK B. MESSMER, Indiana DEREK TRAN, California
DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas EUGENE SIMON VINDMAN, Virginia
JEFF CRANK, Colorado WESLEY BELL, Missouri
ABRAHAM J. HAMADEH, Arizona
Chris Vieson, Staff Director
Whitney Verett, Professional Staff Member
Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
Austin Richards, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Meink, Troy E., Secretary of the Air Force....................... 4
Saltzman, Gen B. Chance, USSF, Chief of Space Operations, United
States Space Force............................................. 5
Allvin, Gen David W., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force...... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Combined statement of Dr. Meink, General Saltzman, and
General Allvin............................................. 79
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Houlahan................................................. 107
Ms. Tokuda................................................... 107
Ms. Goodlander............................................... 108
Mr. McGuire.................................................. 109
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Smith.................................................... 113
Mr. Wilson................................................... 114
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 114
Mr. Scott.................................................... 116
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 122
Mr. Carbajal................................................. 124
Mr. Bacon.................................................... 126
Mr. Bergman.................................................. 126
Ms. Sherrill................................................. 128
Mr. Jackson.................................................. 129
Ms. Strickland............................................... 131
Mr. Ryan..................................................... 131
Ms. Kiggans.................................................. 132
Ms. Tokuda................................................... 132
Mr. Moylan................................................... 134
Mr. Davis.................................................... 134
Mr. Gooden................................................... 136
Ms. Goodlander............................................... 137
Ms. Elfreth.................................................. 138
Mr. McGuire.................................................. 138
Mr. Hamadeh.................................................. 139
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE FISCAL YEAR 2026 POSTURE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, June 5, 2025.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [Chairman
of the Committee] presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. I want to welcome our witnesses and thank you
all for your service to our great country. We are here today to
hear from the Department of the Air Force on its FY26 budget
request. Unfortunately, we still have not received information
on the Air Force's budget request which makes today's hearing a
little difficult.
We'll need that budget in order to fully evaluate how
Congress can best support our Airmen and Guardians. We're
facing the most complex threat environment in history. China is
moving forward on sixth generation fighter jets and
sophisticated air defense systems.
They are expanding their nuclear arsenal at an alarming
rate. And they're deploying advanced hypersonic weapons and
long range cruise missiles capable of hitting our homeland.
That's why it's never been more important to invest in modern
systems that will deter and defeat threats against our nation.
Fortunately, the House passed a reconciliation bill. It
makes generational investments in our national security. The
bill provides over $7 billion to support air superiority,
including funds to acquire the F-47, the most advanced and
lethal aircraft ever built.
It provides 13 billion to modernize our nuclear deterrent
and rebuild related infrastructure. And it invests over 25
billion in Golden Dome layered missile defense system. But six
generation fighters, nuclear modernization, and Golden Dome are
all big ticket items that will take years to fully develop.
And the funding in our reconciliation bill will not be
enough to fully support those initiatives. That's why it's so
important for defense spending to grow in the out years.
Reconciliation is a one-time investment. We've got to do more.
It must be followed by healthy increases in the base budget
so we can afford to fill these critical capabilities without
cuts to readiness. While I'm supportive of much of the Air
Force's work, I do have concerns with some of the ongoing
projects. Nuclear deterrence is vital to our national security,
and I'm concerned that the Air Force is not adequately
prioritizing it.
Specifically, I'm troubled by past mismanagement of the
Sentinel Program. We must ensure Sentinel is ready in time to
replace the current intercontinental ballistic missiles before
they reach their end of life. Congress has been explicit about
the need to address Sentinel's cost and schedule overruns. We
have prioritized and appropriated funding to fix these
problems. And yet the Air Force has taken 1.2 billion out of
Sentinel funds and used them instead to meet our other
priorities in FY25.
I want to be very clear. The Sentinel Program is vital to
modernizing our triad and ensuring nuclear deterrence. Senior
Air Force leaders have made frequent statements agreeing that
the service must prioritize nuclear deterrence. It's time to
start walking the walk.
I look forward to working with you to get this program back
on track. I'm also concerned with our ability to fight and win
in space. Specifically, I worry that when we see the budget, it
may not adequately fund the Space Force.
This is one reason why we need budget details so we can
evaluate whether the funding is in line with our priorities.
Within the Space Force, I want to be sure we don't lose sight
of our mission. Space Force got its start in this committee,
driven by desire to improve the way we buy things for space.
Winning the fight in space requires us to quickly develop
advanced systems and platforms. Doing so starts with highly
trained acquisition professionals. Every Guardian supports the
warfighting mission. So I encourage you to ensure that in the
Space Force, operators, acquisition, intel, and cyber
professionals are all on equal footing.
Finally, as the Department starts rebalancing the general
officer corps, I strongly encourage you to ensure that the
Space Force receives additional billets to address its unique
needs as a new and growing service. I look forward to working
with you to ensure our Airmen and Guardians have the resources
they need to successfully carry out their critical missions.
I yield to my friend, the ranking member, for any opening
statement he may have.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And as is usually the
case, I agree substantially with your assessment. And the
budget certainly is where the problem starts. I mean, first of
all, we don't have one.
This is the latest we've gone in history, I believe,
without getting a budget. It is very important. I know you
gentlemen are not in charge of that. But to the extent that you
have influence, if we could encourage the White House to get
this process moving, that would be enormously helpful. It's
difficult for Congress to do its job and adequately fund our
needs without having the starting point of the President's
budget.
And the second problem is what the chairman alluded to.
Within the needs that we know that we're looking at in the Air
Force's area, there's a lot to cram in there. And it does not
appear like it's going to all fit.
So I'm particularly curious as you're trying to balance, as
we move towards the F-47, the former next generation air
dominance, we try to upgrade the nuclear triad, meet our
fighter attack needs, deal with the unmanned aerial vehicles.
All of that space, how does that come together and fit into a
budget that makes sense? Because it seems like we are starting
a lot of programs that ultimately we're not going to be able to
afford to fund all of them.
So it'd be better if we made choices up front. So you're
going to have a lot of questions about, how does that work? How
do all of these programs go forward and we still wind up with a
budget that we need?
In space, I am encouraged by the improvements that have
been made on building a resilient architecture. Space is so
central to everything we do in terms of secure communications,
dealing with contested logistics. We've made a lot of progress.
And I want to thank the chairman. In absentia, I thank Mr.
Cooper, our former member. It was the chairman and Mr. Cooper
who had the vision to create the Space Force in the first
place. I think that's enormously important. But we'd like to
get further updates on how that architecture is being updated
to make it more resilient and meet all of those very difficult
needs.
Lastly, as I'm sure you've heard, acquisition reform is an
enormous priority for this committee and for Congress. We're
going to take a big swing at it this year. I will be curious to
hear your thoughts about what that looks like.
Sadly, within your Department between the tanker, the F-35,
and the Sentinel, we have a lot of experience with programs
that went way over budget. What have we learned? How can we do
that better?
And then connected to that as well, something we talked
about yesterday, taking advantage of a lot of, in many cases,
smaller innovative companies that are building crucial things
around missiles, satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles that are
much cheaper and much more effective in many instances. How do
we integrate those new innovative companies into the Defense
Department so we can take advantage of the technologies and the
equipment that they're building?
With that, I look forward to your testimony, and I yield
back.
The Chairman. I thank the ranking member. Now I'd like to
introduce our witnesses. The Honorable Troy Meink is the
Secretary of the Air Force. Congratulations and welcome.
General Chance Saltzman, Chief of Space Operations, welcome
back. And General David Allvin is Chief of Staff of the Air
Force. Welcome back, General.
I want to start with you, Mr. Meink. You're recognized for
five minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TROY MEINK, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
THE AIR FORCE
Dr. Meink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So Chairman Rogers,
Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the
committee, General Allvin and General Saltzman and I thank you
for the opportunity to testify here today. We're looking
forward to it.
The Department of the Air Force is at an inflection point.
We are engaging in a fast paced race for technology superiority
against a well resourced, strategic opponent. However, we
simultaneously face personnel and platform challenges affecting
our immediate readiness.
We must balance our requirements to generate readiness and
project power today with imperative to rebuild our military and
develop capabilities so that we can continue to deter our
adversaries tomorrow. Our fiscal priorities are focused on
addressing the balance between these realities and supporting
national security objectives as outlined in the Interim
National Defense Guidance. The scope and severity the threat to
our homeland and national interests are significant and
increasing, and we are now facing one of the most dangerous
security environments in our history.
Department of the Air Force has structured our long-term
strategy around the belief that China is a pacing threat. And
this reality directly influences the Department's fiscal
priorities. China's defense budget has nearly doubled during
the past 11 years, growing 6 percent annually on average.
United States defense spending has seen around 3 percent
growth over the same period, increasing below the rate of
inflation over the last five years. And many of our allies and
partners, defense spending rates are even lower than ours.
These limitations have allowed China to start closing the gap.
Defending the homeland is the Department of the Air Force's
top priority. We will be continuing to do so by modernizing our
nuclear force, especially through the Sentinel, the B-21, Long
Range Standoff weapons as well as the nuclear command and
control and communication that supports these systems. We're
also eager to support the President's Golden Dome for America.
While still in the conceptual stage, there's no question that
the Department of the Air Force will have a significant role in
this project.
Our next priority is to deter China. We will do this
through investments in our people, our readiness, and our
posture within the Indo-Pacific region. We believe that our
people are and will continue to be one of the nation's key
competitive advantages.
We're working to train our Airmen and Guardians to confront
the brutal challenges that warfare without sanctuary presents.
We're emphasizing readiness by creating new inspections,
assessments, and exercises geared towards preparing our
personnel for this environment. Finally, we are strengthening
our posture with an Indo-Pacific region, conducting high-level
operational exercises that will test our ability to deploy and
operate in austere environments.
Lastly, the Department of the Air Force is prepared to
provide critical capabilities and forces to the joint
warfighter in order defeat our adversaries if deterrence fails.
We will concentrate our efforts in two areas, first, in our
ability to fight today, and second, in our ability to fight in
the future. Through our current and future investments, the
Department aims to establish a balance of high and low mix of
combat capabilities optimized to project power both from within
and outside the adversary's threat environment.
The Department of the Air Force is also looking to
streamline our forces whenever possible. This includes finding
creative ways to remove excess infrastructure and retire
obsolete inventory. We also recognize our need and
responsibility to pass an audit as soon as possible. And we are
working to make that a reality.
The Department of the Air Force is extremely proud of all
of our Airmen and Guardians defending our great nation and its
interest every hour of every day. We commit to working with
this committee to secure the FY26 budget request which will
directly support our Airmen and Guardians and their
uncompromising mission. We thank you for your time and look
forward to your questions.
[The combined prepared statement of Dr. Meink, General
Saltzman, and General Allvin can be found in the Appendix on
page 79.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Saltzman, you're recognized.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL B. CHANCE SALTZMAN, CHIEF OF SPACE
OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE
General Saltzman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Rogers,
Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee,
thank you for your continued support and for the opportunity to
testify on the Space Force's posture for FY26. Never before in
our history has space been more critical to the future of our
nation.
Now more than ever, satellites underpin our economic
prosperity, enabling everything from transportation,
communication to agriculture and finance. Space has likewise
become the backbone of national security. And today's Joint
Forces built around the assumption that space power will be
there when needed.
Global positioning system allows our forces to mass and
maneuver fires with unprecedented accuracy and efficiency.
Satellite communications ensure command and control of
operations around the world in real time. And today's cutting
edge satellites provide the warfighter with constant and
detailed battlefield awareness, alerting America's forces of
missile launches and threatening adversarial activity.
All of these effects and more are provided by your Space
Force. At a cost of only about 3 percent of the larger
Department of Defense budget and with less than 1 percent of
the personnel, there's no question our nation's Space Force is
a great value proposition for the Department and an
indispensable national asset for modern power projection. It is
imperative that we match the dramatic rise in threats and
increasing importance of space with resources to arm the Space
Force effectively.
The Space Force has been asked to accept new
responsibilities and new missions. These new missions require
new resources, or we will face tough choices between delayed
readiness, reduced capacity, or unaddressed vulnerabilities. To
illustrate my point, in the past three years, the Space Force
has been asked to take on critical new missions like ground and
air moving target indications, adding new space control
capabilities, advanced training requirements, and a threefold
increase in launch tempo at our national space ports.
The most recent addition to our mission set is the space
base technology associated with the Golden Dome program. These
are not modernization efforts or shifts from legacy missions.
They represent new requirements for missions that have never
been accomplished by a military space organization.
By FY26, we will have laid the foundational groundwork to
continue these efforts in earnest. Our acquisition efforts are
fully leveraging expanded authorities, enhanced contracting
mechanisms, and new processes like the software acquisition
pathway. If the resources are made available, the Space Force
will be postured to use them effectively in pursuit of these
critical priority missions at a time of increasing adversarial
challenges in the space domain.
To be successful in our expanding mission portfolio, we
must be able to control the space domain, protecting our
capabilities in space while denying an adversary the ability to
use space against us. In pursuit of our critical mission, Space
Force priorities have remained consistent: build comprehensive
domain awareness, deploy resilient mission architectures, and
develop the capacity to hold an adversary's space assets at
risk.
To that end, we are developing cutting-edge sensors and
networks to provide critical information to decision makers.
We're bolstering our launch infrastructure and deployed
proliferated constellations that are more resilient to attack.
We're developing a host of innovative means to protect our
satellites and networks, and we are investing in robust
counterspace systems to defeat space enabled threats to our
forces and to our homeland.
Driving a cultural change to increase the speed and
effectiveness of acquiring these new systems will be critical
to our success. In fact, this is part of the Guardian DNA since
improving acquisition was a driving force behind the creation
of the Space Force from day one. Our acquisition professionals
understand the unique needs of the warfighter.
And these Guardians have driven efficiencies across all
mission areas, saving hundreds of millions of dollars on launch
services, leveraging novel contracting authorities to shave
months off contracting timelines, and setting a new record for
tactically responsive space just last year. All this while
embracing a number of changes to our institutional culture to
support improved acquisition, readiness, and sustainment,
including standing up integrated units with sustainment and
operations side by side and establishing enhanced acquisition
training at all levels to ensure a firm understanding about
acquisitions and operations combined to create combat ready
forces.
We must institutionalize these early wins to ensure that
complex ecosystems of acquisition, budget, and requirements
continues to rapidly produce equipment our warfighters need to
win in space. Today with your support, our nation's guardians
are poised to ensure we maintain our national advantage in
space. So again, thank you to the committee for providing the
support to make these successes possible, and I thank you for
the opportunity to highlight the tremendous work that our
Guardians are doing to secure our nation's interest in, from,
and to space. I look forward to your questions.
[The combined prepared statement of Dr. Meink, General
Saltzman, and General Allvin can be found in the Appendix on
page 79.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General Saltzman.
General Allvin, you're recognized.
STATEMENT OF THE GENERAL DAVID W. ALLVIN, CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
General Allvin. Good morning, Chairman Rogers, Ranking
Member Smith, and distinguished members of this committee. I'm
proud to represent the 677,000 total force Airmen serving our
nation. Thank you for your support, not only to those Airmen
but to their families as well.
I'd like to open by expressing my immense pride in the
exemplary performance of our Airmen in securing our homeland
and deployed worldwide. From the Indo-Pacific to the Middle
East to our southern border, they're working around the clock
to deliver air power anytime, anywhere. The strategic landscape
has shifted dramatically.
We now operate in a world where the People's Republic of
China is not only rapidly modernizing its military but is doing
so with the clear intent to coerce its neighbors and reshape
the international order to include a People's Republic of China
nuclear breakout that demands unmatched deterrence
capabilities. In parallel, we're seeing unprecedented threats
to our homeland. Our mission is clear: maintain air power
dominance, safeguard our security, deter aggression, and
prevail in conflict. To achieve peace through strength, we must
adapt and evolve.
Reinforced by our most recent interim national defense
strategic guidance, our Air Force has three enduring
priorities. First, we must defend the homeland. Air and missile
threats are evolving in both speed and sophistication. And the
ability to detect, track, and defeat those threats in real time
is foundational to our national defense and is nonnegotiable.
Simultaneously, the United States Air Force provides
reliable, effective, and safe nuclear deterrent that is the
backbone of strategic stability. These priorities are
paramount, cannot fail, and must be given equal weight.
Finally, we must project power globally, either independently
or as part of the Joint Force to rapidly respond anywhere to
deter aggression and win.
This is what makes our Air Force unique, and it is needed
now more than ever. To achieve these priorities, we're asking
for sustained support for modernization and the development of
new capabilities. The FY26 budget request is designed to build
a force, aligned with today's operational realities.
This means preserving current readiness and optimizing our
force tailored to design for contested environments, one that
blends next generation aircraft, autonomous systems, and
resilient command and control. Our modernization efforts to
rebuild our military include the continued development of the
F-47, the integration of collaborative combat aircraft, and
other possibilities to expand combat mass at lower cost. We're
also upgrading the F-35 and F-15.
These platforms are critical to retain the edge our
warfighters need. At the same time, we're recapitalizing aging
fleets, essential for maintaining power projection in the
interim. Our investment in nuclear modernization remains a top
priority with funding directed towards Sentinel Program, B-21
radar, and revitalized B-52 fleet.
These systems will anchor our strategic deterrent for
decades to come. Equally important is the investment in our
Airmen. We are enhancing recruiting, expanding training
opportunities, and strengthening family support structures.
We suffered a recruiting setback due to the year-long
continuing resolution and subsequent reduction of nearly half a
billion dollars in our military personnel account. This will
result in our inability to fund the recruitment of 3,000
Americans who want to join our Air Force. Furthermore, the
reduced FY25 triggered by the continuing resolution led to a
decrease in facility sustainment, restoration, and
modernization by $642 million, directly affecting our Airmen's
quality of life. We must find a better way.
Investing in our Airmen means ruthlessly prioritizing the
right capabilities and projects while divesting from aging
systems and unused infrastructure. In January 2025, we reported
23 percent in excess facilities and 60 percent in excess
parking aprons and ramps. This inefficient lay down floor
structure across our installations suggests there are
opportunities for consolidation, innovation, or to divest and
focus our limited resources where they are most needed.
With your support, we will focus on utilizing the existing
authorities to reduce infrastructure, identify cost reduction
and revenue generating opportunities, and right-size our
infrastructure to achieve long-term efficiencies. We don't just
need more Air Force. We need a more capable one.
We need more tooth, less tail, a force that can deliver
rapid, decisive blows and reposition quickly. That means
investing in platforms and people that enhance our warfighting
capacity. More means more options for our nation, enhanced
homeland defense, strength and deterrence, and unmatched power
projection, one strategically postured to deny adversaries.
No other service can match what the Air Force delivers,
affects anywhere on the globe at any scale on minimal notice.
Our Airmen are the best in the world, ready to win today and
build the enduring force for tomorrow. With your support, we
can ensure the Air Force remains the cornerstone of American
power to the 21st century. Thank you and I look forward to your
questions.
[The combined prepared statement of Dr. Meink, General
Saltzman, and General Allvin can be found in the Appendix on
page 79.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General Allvin. I thank all of
you. I'd like to recognize myself first for questions.
Secretary, as the Space Force works to develop the culture of
warfighting in space, I want to make sure that we aren't
leaving behind our acquisition Guardians. General Saltzman and
I have talked about this at length. Can I get your commitment
to make sure that we aren't going to see their promotion rates
falling behind the average promotion rates of Space Force
officers in other categories?
Dr. Meink. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I commit to that.
The Chairman. Thank you. And as you are probably aware--I
hope you're aware that our current--and some of you have
referenced this. Our current defense acquisition system is
failing us. The ranking member and I have made it our focus
this year to address that. What specific authorities or support
can we provide you to fix this?
Dr. Meink. I think you actually--you highlighted it right
away with making sure that we have the right workforce and
promoting the right officers with the acquisition workforce.
The experience I've had is if you don't have the right team,
the right experience and educated team, the construction of the
program won't execute the program. No matter what else you do,
you're not going to be successful. So that's a starting.
And then you have to give the team the authority, right?
All the way from being able to manage, maybe not the high level
but the lower level requirements, the funding, all the things
that go into delivering the systems. You have to make sure that
they have that authority to do so.
And to be able to have that authority that they'd execute
quickly in a streamlined fashion. That's one of the problems
that we have is in many cases, technically, we have a lot of
authority to do these things. It's just there's so much
bureaucracy tied up that it takes too long.
The Chairman. Well, that's what we're trying to weed out.
So if your staff is already not doing so, I hope that they will
stay in touch with the House Armed Services Committee staff and
the Senate Armed Services Committee staff because this is not
just bipartisan. This is bicameral. And make sure that the
language we're putting in this year's National Defense
Authorization Act gets after the problems you just described
because we're all going to have to live with what we enact this
year. Go ahead.
Dr. Meink. Chairman, I would be happy to personally sit
down and walk through that with you if you're interested.
The Chairman. Well, we look forward to that. And also, it's
my understanding our newest KC-46s are coming off the line
hovering at a fully mission capability rate of only 60 percent.
We talked a little bit about this in the sensitive
compartmented information facility yesterday. I just urge you
to get after that. Sixty percent is not acceptable.
You made reference to and it's accurate that China's
defense budget has doubled in recent years. In fact, I think it
was General Allvin that brought this up. We have got to address
our defense spending in this country.
We are at the lowest level of defense spending as a
percentage of gross domestic product since before World War II.
And it's unacceptable. We're going to deal with it. The
President has set the goal.
He went over to Europe and told every member of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization that we all need to get 5 percent
of gross domestic product and defense spending. I fully agree
with him. General Saltzman talked about the need for his
department to have budget relief as did General Allvin.
We can't do it at the current rate. This reconciliation
bill is going to be a nice bump, a one-year bump. But to get
after the issues we talked about in our opening statements and
that you all just described is going to require sustained
increases in defense spending.
And I assure you that we're working to try to get there.
But it's going to be important that you continue to talk about
it. The fact is the public doesn't need to hear from the
President and us. You need to be talking about it because
you're the tip of the spear. And they need to hear from you
what the challenges are for you to meet the threats given the
constraints of your fiscal support at this point in time. So
with that, I will yield to ranking member for any questions he
may have.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Excuse me. Just curious, it's been a
lot in the news, Ukraine drone strikes that affect its ability,
basically tiny, cheap drones taking out billion dollars' worth
of big, heavy equipment.
Has it changed your thinking at all about what our needs
are going forward in terms of having more of those cheaper
attritable unmanned systems and also the vulnerabilities of
some of the larger systems that we're building? How does that
change your planning going forward? Or is the Ukraine-Russia
war sort of unique and not applicable to some of these other
lessons?
Dr. Meink. I can start, Congressman, and then turn it over
to General Allvin. But to be honest, I don't think it would
change my opinion at all. I've been very, very concerned with
that threat for years now.
We've seen it within U.S. against many of our installations
and our inability to deal with those, actually probably lower
threat than obviously what happened within Russia. But that's
been an ongoing threat that I think we've been thinking about
for a long time. And it's going to take a whole of government
approach to deal with it in the United States.
It's very difficult to defend against that sort of thing if
you're restricted to only operating within the geography of
your base. I think we have to work with a whole of government
to make sure that we have an approach to deal with that threat
because it is--
Mr. Smith. Anything--
Dr. Meink. --huge.
Mr. Smith. --specific on that in terms of this is a system
that we've been looking at that we desperately need now because
of that whereas maybe we shouldn't build all of this because
it's really expensive and really vulnerable?
Dr. Meink. If I could, I'll turn to General Allvin, maybe
take a couple of those.
General Allvin. Thanks. Congressman, you make the right
point where we shouldn't learn too much and we shouldn't ignore
what happened in Ukraine because there are geography-dependent,
context-dependent. But I would say that when something like
this happens, it turns the idea of small and less expensive
capabilities from an academic conversation to a real
conversation because we've seen it. And so understanding the
context that made it successful and those which might be
limitations is important.
But to Secretary Meink's point, we sort of always knew this
in the back of our mind. So when we're looking at it from two
directions, first of all to your point of where are our
exquisite systems and what are the vulnerabilities we hadn't
considered before which might be most vulnerable to those that
might have to cross an ocean and part of our continent rather
than just the geography of Central Europe, understanding those
nuances. But understanding also that the more sophisticated and
dependent we are on those exquisite capabilities, the higher
level of defense we need to have for them.
The flip side that I like to bring up is something that
solves another problem. When we see how effective these can be,
we need to think about putting them into our offensive arsenal.
And that's what we're looking at the United State Air Force is
our change, and new force design understands this range of
capabilities to include those when they can be responsive at
low cost and be disruptive. So there's an offensive thing we
need to consider on this as well.
Mr. Smith. Somewhat connected to that is the whole Golden
Dome concept. And I have a number of different concerns about
it. It reminds me vaguely of the future combat system that the
Army cranked up 30 years ago where it was, like, we know we got
to do a lot. So let's just put a name on it and say we're going
to do everything and it's all going to work.
It was a complete disaster. And the Golden Dome idea that
there's one system that's going to protect, it is a lot more
complicated than that. So I don't have that much time, so I'm
going to put both of my questions at you.
So number one, are we really going to make smart
investments about systems that have real world application as
opposed to engaging in some fantasy about some perfect system?
How much money could we potentially waste on that? And number
two, I haven't seen anybody in the White House or around this
system talking about the implications in terms of how
destabilizing it could be in the long-running understanding of
how to prevent nuclear war which is that it's not winnable.
Both sides will be vulnerable.
The message starts to get out there. We're going to build a
Golden Dome so we can be protected and we might win. That can
be incredibly destabilizing. Now there's probably ways to
manage it. But the fact that nobody working on this is even
talking about what we say to the Russians and the Chinese about
this is a little bit concerning. So in 44 seconds, can you hit
those two points?
General Allvin. Congressman, I'll do my best. To the first
part, about the capabilities, I think we--I have confidence
that at least in the air domain, the United States Air Force,
the capabilities that we imagine will be integrated as part of
the Golden Dome are not just bespoke, boutique capabilities for
that. Domain awareness, the ability to intercept hypersonics
and cruise missiles and those sort of things, those are
applicable globally. So we will ensure that--
Mr. Smith. That's what it better be. I'm not confident
we're there. We better take a look at it just quickly.
General Allvin. On the other hand, the strategic stability,
Congressman, very quickly, I would say what we need to focus on
as a nation is re-getting out intellectual capacity to
understand strategic deterrence. And now--like we did in the
Cold War. But understand it now with three capable which is
different.
It's not just an algebra equation. It's different when you
have three great powers or aspiring great powers with nuclear
capabilities. It's a different equation we need to sort out to
understand the risks.
Mr. Smith. Absolutely. I just say we seriously consider it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, not California.
Wouldn't do that to you, South Carolina, Joe Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you, Chairman Mike Rogers, for your
proven leadership, positive leadership in correcting states
correctly too. We appreciate all of your service and for a
strong America for peace through strength. We're in a Cold War
we didn't choose between dictators that invade democracies with
rule of law.
War Criminal Putin and the Chinese Communist Party continue
to expand and modernize their capabilities and rapidly expand
while we're forced to react to changes in the battlefield.
President Donald Trump is correct. Iran must not have a nuclear
bomb to achieve their goal of death to Israel and death to
America.
The U.S. [United States] must remain ahead of our
adversaries to ensure we do not fall behind, again, to maintain
peace through strength. With that in mind, Secretary Meink, we
are really grateful that the courageous patriots of Ukraine
cause devastating historic damage to Russia's strategic bombers
with a sophisticated drone attack. Ranking Member Smith is
correct as he just recognized bipartisan support of our
Ukrainian allies and the courage to the people of Ukraine.
With that in mind, every since War Criminal Putin has
invaded Ukraine, we're seeing drones take a larger role in
conventional warfare. The most recent attack once again
demonstrates the damage that low cost weapon systems can have
to a battlefield. Does the Air Force currently possess the
capability to protect its basis from such attacks in the United
States and abroad? If not, what is the Air Force doing to
ensure that we're able to counter these threats in a timely
manner?
Dr. Meink. So I think currently it's very challenging. As I
mentioned, we have a technical challenge that we're addressing
as quick as we can with counter-drone capability. But I also
think there's basically an operating conditions challenge that
we have.
And it really is going to require a whole of government. As
I mentioned, trying to defend against that sort of attack when
we're limited to just operating within our geographic
constraint of our base is very challenging. You have to be able
to address these issues in a much broader perspective working
with FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], local law
enforcement. That all has to be addressed. Or I think we're
going to continue to be very, very challenged to address that
threat within the U.S. or overseas.
Mr. Wilson. I can see the challenge. I grew up in the holy
city of Charleston. And so you have the Air Force base and the
civilian air base--airport next door. Good luck.
Also, Mr. Secretary, the United States is known to have the
most powerful Air Force in the world. However, we can't take
for granted our adversaries, especially China, as they continue
to modernize. And I especially appreciate the issue as my
father served in the 14th Air Force, the Flying Tigers, in
China during World War II, Kunming, Chengdu, Xian. Does the
U.S. currently have the capability to deter our enemies on
multiple fronts simultaneously?
General Allvin. Congressman, I'll take a shot at that.
Certainly, as we look to the size of our Air Force, we also
need to look at shaping it, to your point of being able to
project power anytime, anywhere and be able to deter. And we
have--within a limited capacity, we have a range of
capabilities from high end to low end.
And as I mentioned about our reimagination of our force
design, understanding we're learning from things in the Middle
East that we're seeing, their low cost capabilities. We're
starting to develop some low cost capabilities of our own so
we're not on the wrong side of the cost curve when we're
engaging with the Houthis, et cetera, et cetera. So as we do
that, we are preserving the force for the most pacing threat
that our national defense strategy has basically said over the
past near decade for the pacing threat of China. However, we
retain through our capacity and capabilities and our
interactions with our allies and partners the ability to deter
across the rest of the world.
Mr. Wilson. And General, in regard to the A-10 fleet, we
see that they're getting ready to be retired. But they've been
so successful and important. Is there any way that instead of
retiring them that we can provide them to our allies such as
Jordan to deter aggression?
General Allvin. The challenge with that, Congressman, is
the cost. It seems like it's cheap. It's not cheap. You have to
have the ability to maintain the depot structure to sustain
them, the pilot training, institutional. The actual overall
cost versus the value is more expensive than our allies could
really afford or want to pay. And for us, we can't afford it
within our budget to be able to privilege the higher end
capabilities we need against the pacing threat.
Mr. Wilson. Well, we have your trust in what you're doing,
but any way we can protect our allies such as Jordan. Thank you
very much.
General Allvin. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Meink, congratulations on your recent confirmation. As
Secretary of the Air Force, you oversee two-thirds of the
nuclear triad as well as the Space Force.
So I just want to pick up on some of the questions from the
ranking member about the implications strategically for Golden
Dome. There are a lot of things that are parts of Golden Dome
that we clearly need to do. The Ukrainian attack on the Russian
bomber fleet highlighted the vulnerability of bases, and that's
a vulnerability we face as well.
You said that we've been working on addressing it. There's
also bipartisan agreement on the need for better domain
awareness so that if we get attacked by hypersonics or other
missiles coming our way, we know in time to respond. Both of
these things would increase strategic stability because we and
our adversaries know that our nuclear deterrent is safe,
reliable, and effective.
So in other words, if they attack us, we'll know they're
attacking and we will be able to respond. And what establishes
strategic stability for the world and has prevented a nuclear
exchange for 70 years is the fact that both sides know that. So
how do you expect Russia and China to respond to the idea that
their nuclear deterrent is not effective because Golden Dome
will shoot down all their incoming missiles?
Dr. Meink. Thanks for the question, Congressman. When we go
to deterrence, you're exactly right. It started with MAD many,
many years ago, mutually assured destruction. I think the world
we're in right now is a little bit different. You have that
high level strategic deterrence you need to do. But there's
also a significant threat of a smaller scale attack that is
less than a full strategic kind of engagement but is still--
Mr. Moulton. I agree. But my question is how do you get
Russia and China to respond to the idea as the President has
stated that we will shoot down all of their incoming missiles?
Dr. Meink. Well, I would hope that the response would be
that they would be more open to negotiation to ensure that
those engagements never happen in the first place. In the end,
peace through strength, right? Make sure that we can protect
ourselves and then it opens a lot more opportunity for
negotiation.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. Secretary, hope is not a strategy. And it
would be helpful to know if we're going to spend what the CBO
[Congressional Budget Office] estimates could be about 500
billion taxpayer dollars that we understand how our adversaries
are going to respond. Because a more logical response would be
for them to develop ways to get around Golden Dome.
That's exactly what they've done ever since President Bush
pulled out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in the early
2000s. That's why they've developed hypersonics, to get around
those defense capabilities. So if we're going to put something
up in the sky for $500 billion and it just starts an arms race
and then it doesn't work because they can get around it, then
that's a massive waste of taxpayer dollars.
But even more concerning, it decreases strategic stability
and it makes it more likely we have a nuclear exchange. But
what is the administration doing to develop a philosophy, a
plan, a strategy for how this thing is going to work? The enemy
gets a vote here.
Dr. Meink. The enemy does get a vote. And I would say two
things. First off, there's been an arms race ongoing already.
To be honest, what we're doing is responding to the arms race,
both from the space--not just for the nuclear perspective but
from the counter-space, space control perspective. The U.S. has
actually sat idle for quite some time and allowed the Chinese
to make huge advances and really in some cases gain the high
ground in that area. So sitting back and not doing what's
necessary--
Mr. Moulton. The high ground--Mr. Secretary, the high
ground in what area?
Dr. Meink. Well, actually unfortunately, Congressman, they
made significant advances both in space, air, maritime, across
the board.
Mr. Moulton. Would you say--
Dr. Meink. They've made significant advantages--or
advances.
Mr. Moulton. Where have they made the most advances?
Percentage-wise, where have they increased their capabilities
the most?
Dr. Meink. I think their fielding of their space systems.
Mr. Moulton. I would agree. I would agree.
Dr. Meink. But I wouldn't underestimate--
Mr. Moulton. Mr. Secretary, I'm running out of time. But I
agree that space is where they've expanded the most. So why are
you cutting the space budget? Why are you cutting our space
budget?
Dr. Meink. So the final total budgets have not been
released.
But we'd be happy to come and talk about it.
Mr. Moulton. But what we know right now is the space budget
is going to be cut. So you have no theory for how Golden Dome
is going to work. But we're doing it because China is
increasing its space and you plan to cut the space budget. That
doesn't sound like a good plan.
Dr. Meink. We do have a--I think we have some pretty good
ideas of how Golden Dome would be developed. And I think--
Mr. Moulton. We'd like to hear those ideas--
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Moulton. --Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank our
witnesses for joining us. General Saltzman, I was really
encouraged by our conversation yesterday. And I'm glad that you
share my sense that we need extensive launch capability across
all the different spectrums, especially small and medium
launch.
We know that we're quickly getting to capacity there,
Canaveral and there in California. We want to make sure that
we're using the other areas to the same extent that we're using
Vandenburg and Canaveral. From your perspective, give me your
thoughts about the value of small and medium launch capability,
especially in the context of the national security space launch
program, Phase 3 Lane 1, and the rocket systems launch program,
all of those integrated to make sure we continue to build that
capacity.
We are still ahead of the Chinese there. But we know what
they're doing to quickly catch up. Our existing facilities are
getting at capacity pretty quickly.
General Saltzman. Thank you, sir. I agree with you
completely. Capacity is an important issue with regards to our
launch infrastructure.
If we are going to continue on the pace of growth that we
have seen over the last few years, we are going to have to
increase that capacity.
With regards to small and medium launch capabilities, this
is an important area in terms of putting up experimentation,
putting up prototypes, putting up demonstrations. This is all a
campaign that reduces risk in programs that mature technology.
And, rather than a large satellite or a large investment
with a high-end satellite, the ability to test payloads at
smaller scale using small and medium launch, will be important
going forward.
Mr. Wittman. I would like to formally invite you to join
Representative Kiggans and myself at the Mid-Atlantic Regional
Launch Facility there.
I hope that your staff will work with ours to set a date
for us to go there and visit and continue this conversation. I
think it is incredibly important.
I also want to talk about the Space Force's effort to have
a tactically responsive space mission. I mean, we talk about
the threats in space, those continue to grow.
We have to be able to do the launch of a satellite in a 24-
hour scenario. And, that requires things across the spectrum.
I think capacity at our launch facilities and the cadence
that they can provide is they are, the challenge is, is how do
we bring our partners in that produce the space launch
platforms, the constellations, the interfaces, those kinds of
things?
So, I wanted to get your perspective, now that we know, we
know we have the CASR [Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve]
program that has now been ramped up to where we can use
existing assets in space.
But, there are going to be instances where our adversaries
are going to look to take out key assets and we can't find
layering opportunities there. We are going to have to be able
to launch literally on a moment's notice.
I am interested in your thoughts about how can we leverage
commercial space launch capabilities, not just the launch
itself, but also the interfaces and the satellites to go along
with it?
And, can we use that capacity for testing and training
activities that can actually provide us opportunities to
exercise a capability, if necessary, to go at a moment's
notice?
General Saltzman. Thank you, sir. Thanks for that question,
because I agree completely.
First, I am very proud of what our Acquisition Corps has
been able to do in terms of reducing the time line associated
with what we are calling tactically responsive space. We were
able to take a satellite from a warehouse and put it on orbit
and operationalized in less than 90 hours.
We were going to beat the 24-hour launch order to obit,
three hours of weather kind of got in the way, we did it in 27
hours. We really reduced all of those to really provide a real
capability.
Your point about tests and training is spot on, sir. The
ability to buy capability, and maybe it is there for an
insurance policy.
But, because we can't just have, pay hundreds of millions
of dollars for an insurance policy to use it on a routine basis
to add test and training capability on orbit and then replenish
that with the next reserve launch capability, I think, is a
good strategy that we are exploring.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you. General Allvin, you have
a pretty complex calculus problem in front of you to go ahead
and modernize tactical aircraft, strategic aircraft, all the
different elements there, modernizing our nuclear deterrent,
both with aircraft and with missile platforms.
Give me your perspective on how do you do that? How do you
do that too in a round where there may be a little infusion of
resources, but if you look longer down the road, you know, we
are going to have to find ways, I think, internally, to make
best use of the resource that we already have.
And then, you talked a little bit about maybe redirecting
resources and being able to maximize efficiency and what
happens within the Air Force structure. So, just give me a
quick viewpoint on that.
General Allvin. Thank you, Congressman. I say very quickly,
it is two parts.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
General Allvin. The first part is, do what we have been
doing more recently, which is more clearly articulating what we
think the value of air power is to the nation. And, that lets
the Department, the President, and the Congress decide how much
Air Force that they are willing to resource.
So, we want to provide that. But, the other part is
internally, we are making sure every dollar is going to the
maximum lethality but also solving for agility.
Not putting ourselves into capital investments that we
won't be able to adapt to the future, ingest disrupt
technologies, et cetera, et cetera.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair
now recognizes the gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Ms. Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am going to do my
very best to ask two pretty wonky questions in my five minutes.
I was in the Air Force as an acquisition officer. And, in
keeping with this committee's emphasis on procurement and
acquisition, on modernization, Mr. Secretary, my first question
is to you.
We have long been supportive on this committee of the Air
Force's innovation efforts, particularly through AFWERX and the
Agility Prime program. I am concerned by very recent reports
that the vertical takeoff and landing, or VTOL, portfolio is
being descoped and terminated, not due to contractor
performance, but because of budget constraints and contracting
shortfalls.
These actions are obviously very risky, because they waste
taxpayer dollars and private sector dollars, and they also
delay or derail capabilities that our military urgently needs.
So, my first question, and there are many, is, are there
any transition plans in place to ensure that there would be
continuity or orderly transition of the contract that is being
administered by AFWERX and VTOL contracts?
Is there a standard transition protocol that you are aware
of?
Dr. Meink. I am not aware, Congresswoman. General Allvin,
are you aware of that issue?
General Allvin. Congresswoman, one of the reasons why we
had, we looked to descope is again, with the limited capacity
budget, we are looking to find ones who did have a transition
partner.
So, it is really about making sure we look at the force
design and see how these capabilities can find their way into
actually delivering capability to the war fighter.
And so, as we look at that, we are transforming our
organizational structure to move towards a more integrated
capability command that can take those great innovative ideas
but be able to see more clearly their value proposition going
forward.
Ms. Houlahan. So, I appreciate that. And, this is where I
am trying to tease this out. When I was, a while ago, looking
at my phone and realizing all of a sudden there was a
capability to text or voice to text, and my first thoughts were
why would I ever need that?
I think the problem that I am struggling with right now is
that these are technological ideas and innovations that don't
necessarily have a natural transition because why would I ever
need such a thing?
I think that that is our problem in acquisition, is that we
are not being innovative enough and we are looking for
traditional pathways that we used to have in acquisitions,
rather than being thoughtful about our transitions.
General Allvin. I think that is correct. And, it is also a
matter of those are the art of the possible that are always
competing with the art of the known, with respect to the
readiness and the modernization challenges that we know of.
So, that is a constant tension that we have. But, I take
your point that we don't want to pass opportunities up just by
focusing on the known risks.
Ms. Houlahan. I would love to continue to follow up with
you on this. I also have understood that there are
conversations or reports suggesting that the Air Force doesn't
have enough people to manage these kinds of contracts.
Is this something that is true? What is the basis if that
is true for this shortage?
Is this happening because of DOGE [Department of Government
Efficiency] cuts? Or, are perhaps early retirements or
resignations? Or, perhaps in my case because we didn't see a
pathway for promotion?
Dr. Meink. So, may I jump there. I don't think it is in
numbers games, Congresswoman. I think it is what you hit on in
the end.
I think we need to make sure that we are training and
properly incentivizing the acquisition workforce to ensure that
we have that skill mix from the very entry level all the way up
through the senior general officers.
And, that is something I will be focusing on, because back
to my earlier comment is, the most important thing in
acquisition, I would love to talk more about it Congresswoman,
but the most important thing in acquisition is having a
skilled, well-educated team. Otherwise, you have no hope.
And, it is not just innovation. We have to be innovative,
but we also have to innovate faster than our potential
adversary. And, they are innovating very fast.
So, it is a combination of just innovation, but you have to
innovate quickly. And, you need a team to do that.
Ms. Houlahan. And, in the interest of the time that I have,
the other thing that I remember very acutely is that this is
not just a force of uniform personnel, there is a significant
force of civilian personnel as well, that we rely upon.
And, my real concern is that we are DOGEing these people
without understanding why they are important, because they are
critical to our mission.
Dr. Meink. I came through, most of my career has been as a
civilian acquisition person in both the IC [Intelligence
Community] and the DoD [Department of Defense]. So, I agree
with the Congresswoman.
And, that is, will it be a priority to not only the
military side of the house, but the civilian side of the house,
to make sure we are recruiting. And, quality of service that is
key too, that is quality of life, quality of service across the
board.
Ms. Houlahan. Yes. And, I only have 30 seconds left, so I
probably will submit the bulk of this question for the record.
But, my other concern is with the Space Force, General,
whether or not we are continuing to be very thoughtful of
taking advantage of commercial capabilities that are already
available to us rather than reinventing them.
I remember the not invented here problem, and would love to
make sure that we are following. I follow up with you on that
concern as well.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 107.]
Thank you, and I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Saltzman,
thank you for your leadership, not just for the amazing way in
which you are rising to the threats that we are facing, but
also your leadership in shaping the organization that is new
and is rising to the needs that we have.
The topic I am going to discuss with you is not going to be
a surprise to you. And, that is what I believe, is the Cuban
Missile Crisis in space.
And, the fact that we are facing the prospects that Russia
might place in space, an anti-satellite nuclear weapon. The
Secretary General of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization],
Rutte, recently just said that as early as this year, Russia
might place an anti-satellite nuclear weapon in space.
I believe, as do many on this committee, that that anti-
satellite nuclear weapon should never be permitted to be put in
space. You, I believe, coined the best phrase ever, and that
was, you said, if that went into space, it would be day zero.
And, many people think that if an anti-satellite nuclear
weapon was in space and it was detonated, that that would be
day zero. But, you identified it being placed in space as day
zero, because you said that would be the day from which we
would no longer be able to depend on space.
Because, the very next day it would be irresponsible to
depend on space, because if it was detonated, as Dr. Plumb has
said here, that it would wipe out everything in low earth
orbit, and low earth orbit would be unhabitable for up to a
year. And, it would take trillions of dollars in technology
that we don't have in order to be able to respond to that loss.
So, since this is a budgetary hearing, General Saltzman, if
that, if day zero happened, how would it affect your budget,
the budget of DoD, the budget of the Air Force, if we were at
day zero and that anti-satellite nuclear weapon was permitted
to be in space and we had to suddenly face that, it would be
irresponsible to count on space the next day?
General Saltzman. Well, thank you for that. And, obviously,
I agree with you that this is a tremendous threat that we have
to think through in terms of contingency planning.
A detonation on orbit would be catastrophic across a number
of mission areas. It would foul the domain. It would foul
certainly lower earth orbit and potentially middle earth orbit
for an extended period of time.
So, it would make replenishment and reconstitution
extremely difficult. It would put at risk the lives of the
astronauts that are currently on orbit, catastrophic.
And so, when you asked me how would it affect our budget,
if this came to pass and it became a real threat that we had to
invest and to mitigate, we have run some basic numbers in terms
of trying to harden satellites and trying to position them in a
way so that there is redundancies.
Should we lose any portion of the constellation, will we
have redundancies? And, I can't get to a cost reasonable number
to say, with $3 trillion, I can fix this.
I just can't come up with a reasonable number. And so, that
is why I am trying not to be too alarmist. But, day zero really
is that.
We just cannot count on space, because I don't know how to
create the replenishment and the reconstitution to overcome
that kind of a detonation.
Mr. Turner. It should never be permitted to be placed in
space. And, General Saltzman, thank you for the clarity of your
description of the threat if that is in space.
Mr. Secretary, you have some of our most important advances
that need to be made for our being able to address the advances
that our adversaries have made. You have missile defense, you
have hypersonics, you have nuclear deterrents, you have our new
advances in weapon systems.
You have our advances in air, both manned and unmanned
systems. Our adversaries are currently doing some things that
we can't do, and you are the one who is supposed to close that
gap.
CRs [Continuing Resolutions] have an impact on that. How
are you going to close the gap, and could you please give a
commercial as too why Congress should stop giving you the
impediment of continuing resolutions that affect your ability
to close that gap?
Dr. Meink. Yes. Well, yes, continuing resolutions are very,
very challenging. They have implications, as was mentioned,
just from a personnel perspective.
The personnel budget, it has also some significant, in some
ways, an outweighed effect on acquisitions. How you do
acquisitions, how you start new, how you be innovative, as our
last discussion, is heavily infected by, particularly with a
year-long CR.
It stops a lot of that, or at the very least, makes it much
more challenging to get approved. So yes, it has a huge impact
on our ability to innovate, and innovate quickly, as well as
making sure we have the personnel that can execute those
programs.
Yes, the Chinese have made, and I would be happy to talk
about it in a different forum in more detail, but they have
made phenomenal advancements.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair
now recognizes the gentlemen from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you to
the witnesses for your testimony today.
Again, at the outset, I just want to associate myself with
the remarks of the Chair and Ranking Member about the lateness
of the budget.
We are less than four months away from the start of the
fiscal year, and we are now being told that the actual budget
document won't be over here until the end of the month, the
last week of the month. And, you know, I certainly agree with
Mr. Turner about the harm of CRs and the testimony of the
Secretary.
But, having a delivery date of the budget with less than
three months to go before the start of the fiscal year, I
think, you know, this process is doomed in terms of trying to
avoid a CR. This place is not a rubber stamp.
Article One of the Constitution makes it pretty clear, you
know, who is the decision maker in terms of both appropriations
and authorizations.
And, the lateness of the delivery of the budget is the real
impediment that we are facing right now. So, again, the sooner
the better in terms of it coming over.
On page 11 of your testimony, paragraph, special mission
aircraft, there is a discussion about the replacement of Air
Force One program. Again, I serve on the committee with Mr.
Kelly that has jurisdiction over Executive Air Lift.
We had a hearing a couple weeks ago where Barbara Costello,
the Acting Secretary, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force,
testified that there was actually some progress being made as
far as the replace, the recapitalization of the two aircraft
that were purchased back in 2018.
And, she actually talked about a possible delivery date
sometime during the calendar year of 2027. Mr. Secretary, can
you sort of give us your view of that testimony?
Dr. Meink. Yes. Yes, Congressman, we have, and thanks for
the question. We have been working closely with the contractor,
Boeing, in this case, to accelerate that program.
As you know, it has experienced significant delays. Is it
going to get back into 2027? I couldn't guarantee that
Congressman.
But, we are doing whatever we can to pull it back to, I
think it was, before they started working to pull it back, it
was in the 2030s I believe.
So, it is tough to do. But, we are working with the
contractor to pull it back. I think 2027 is going to be really
tough though.
Mr. Courtney. Yes. It was actually 2029 I think, was the
last sort of guesstimate that was there. And, certainly, yes,
we have been tracking this from day one.
Can you give us the cost estimate of the retrofit of the
Qatar plane that is all over the news?
Dr. Meink. I think it would be difficult for me to give you
the exact details here. But, we would be actually happy to talk
about some of those specifics in a different forum.
I think there has been a number thrown around on the order
of $1 billion. But, a lot of those costs associated with that
are costs that we would have experienced anyway.
We just, we will experience them early. Buying additional
platforms for training, for spares, things like that are
actually the majority of that amount.
So, it wouldn't be anywhere near that. But, we can talk in
detail about exactly what we are buying in a different forum
and what the cost drivers are. But, it is nowhere near that
much.
Mr. Courtney. So, I think, you know, it is unfortunate that
again, and when we are hearing about all the challenges the Air
Force faces that what I think is going to be a pretty big
ticket item can't be sort of discussed publicly, because I
think people need to know that.
And, I would just say, based on the experience of the 2018
planes, we know that the contract for retrofit was $3.9
billion. Again, some of that was purchase of the planes from
Boeing, roughly about $800 million.
But again, if you just do the math, it was about $3 billion
for retrofit. There has been cost overruns. They had to strip
those planes that were built for another purpose down to the
studs.
And, as you said, there has been issues. The contractor who
was doing the interior work went out of business, and Boeing
has had to kind of figure out a plan to do the fitting out of
the interior of the plane.
But again, just using that as and extrapolating from that,
I mean, it is clear that this new third plane is going to cost
well over $1 billion. I mean, it is just you can't retrofit a
plane that is built for another purpose for Air Force One and
expect it to be a free plane.
You have got to, you know, install encrypted communication
technology. You have to harden the defenses. You have to put
countermeasures in there. Obviously, you need to have all the,
it is a flying situation room that is there.
And, the notion that we can't find out when we are about
to, you know, take up a very difficult budget. And, based on
the experience we already have gone through with retrofitting
planes that, 747s, it is clear that this is going to be a drain
on the Air Force's budget.
And, I think that the sooner we just sort of rip the
bandaid off and get that information out there, it would be
helpful for us in terms of deciding whether this is a smart
path to go down.
With that, oh, go ahead.
Dr. Meink. Thank you, Congressman. We would be happy to
come down and talk to you in detail about it in a different
environment.
Unfortunately, some of the, particularly some of the things
you are talking about and what those costs are, those are
classified sensitive capabilities that we put on the platform.
So, we would be happy to come down and talk to you about
the specifics. But, again, I will restate that we believe the
actual retrofit of that aircraft is actually significantly, it
is probably less than $400 million to retrofit that aircraft.
We will be happy to come talk to you about it.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. I just want
to emphasize a point that Representative Courtney just made.
And, I am not blaming you.
But, Congress is going to decide what we do and don't
spend. The Administration, OMB [Office of Management and
Budget] in particular, not getting us a budget, is not going to
compel us to comply with what they give us late.
So, whoever is listening to this hearing from OMB needs to
understand, we want to have a healthy dialogue with military
professionals like this, about what we need to spend to get us
where we need to be.
We need a budget to help inform that dialogue. But, if we
don't get it, we are going to write it without it. We have
gotten a skinny budget which legally allows us to comply with
the requirement that we receive a budget.
So, there is no reason not to get us some information. But,
I think Mr. Courtney is right, and we all need to acknowledge
the fact that being delayed with that presentation is not
helpful.
With that, I will recognize the gentleman from Tennessee,
Dr. DesJarlais.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman Rogers. General Allvin,
I appreciate our meeting yesterday, and also your comments
about doing everything we can to accelerate Sentinel.
As I noted to you, and as our Chairman made abundantly
clear in his opening statement, I am concerned that the Air
Force's decision to cut funding for FY2025 adds risk to the
program, the Sentinel program, particularly if we begin FY2026
on a Continuing Resolution.
Secretary Meink, I would like to ask you a question I
raised with General Allvin, will the Air Force be prepared to
submit an anomaly request for Sentinel, or reprogram additional
resources to the program to avoid disruption?
And, is that something you will consider if the
circumstances warrant?
Dr. Meink. So, Congressman, Sentinel is, if not the number
one priority for me, it is definitely in the top two or three.
We will do whatever it takes to deliver that program as
quickly as possible. It is nuclear deterrence. It is national
security.
We will do whatever is necessary to ensure that that
program is properly funded. I expect you probably know it is in
the middle of a Nunn-McCurdy.
So, some of the work has been slowed down, which required a
rephasing of the resources. But, we are making sure the
resources are there and that we are taking the appropriate
recommendations out of the Nunn-McCurdy restructure and move
forward with that program.
It has my highest priority. It is the thing I have spent
the most time on since I have been in this job. It has only
been two and a half weeks, but it is the program I spent the
most time on.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And, by the way, congratulations. I
wanted to talk just for a second about the Arnold Engineering
Development Complex.
First, General Allvin, I thanked you yesterday, and I want
to thank you again for taking time to meet with the Arnold
Community Council from AEDC last month.
That visit was deeply appreciated, not just by the local
community but by also the broader Tennessee Congressional
Delegation. And, Secretary Meink, we look forward to hosting
you at Arnold at your earliest convenience.
As you know, Arnold Engineering Development Complex plays a
central role in testing for hypersonics, next generation
aircraft, and potentially an expanded mission into space
testing, depending on what happens with the basing decision for
space command.
But, based on what we have seen, the current funding model
doesn't appear to keep pace with the scale or complexity of
those demands. Do you believe there is a need to rethink how we
resource and manage test infrastructure like AEDC, to ensure it
is aligned with the Air Force and the broader mission where it
is headed?
General Allvin. Yes, thank you, Congressman for that
question. I think it is very important. And, as I was
mentioning before, we need to make sure we are getting every
bit of capability out of every dollar we put into the United
States Air Force.
And so, the manner in which we are sort re-imagining the
way we develop capabilities in an integrated fashion, different
from the past where we might look at developing a fighter
system, and over here a mobility system, and here a, you know,
an IT [Information Technology] system.
Looking at it from an entire, we will call a mission
thread, what it takes to do everything from the concept to
developing an entire capability, that will allow us to shed
more light on some of those critical, but maybe not headline
grabbing capabilities, much like AEDC.
And, those things that require the testing that if you
don't fund them, they will find themselves the cause of slowing
down of a program.
So, as we look at it through more of that lens, I think we
are going to be able to highlight and advocate more for those
critical but less popular parts of the entire capability
development portfolio.
Dr. DesJarlais. And, Secretary Meink, did you have anything
to add to that?
Dr. Meink. Just wholehearted agreement that the testing
infrastructure across the board is just critical for us to be
able to train against the representative threats of what we are
almost assuredly going to see overseas.
Dr. DesJarlais. Well, thank you both for that. And, I will
just note for the record that OSD's [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] O&E [Obligation and Expenditure] requirements are
placing a real burden on the work being done to modernize
Arnold.
Director Wilcox, who oversees T&E [Test and Evaluation] has
been a strong advocate for Arnold's unique mission. But, as far
as we are aware, there is no clear path to address this through
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], only through SD's
[Secretary of Defense] internal policy direction.
So, I plan to raise this directly with Secretary Hegseth in
the coming weeks and hope I can count on your support as we
look to accelerate our testing enterprise.
And, with that Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Crow.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Chairman. General Saltzman, what is
your most important asset?
General Saltzman. Are you talking about the on-orbit
capabilities?
Mr. Crow. I hope you say it is your people.
General Saltzman. Well, of course. I mean, there is no
doubt that the acquisition, and operators, and intelligence
personnel--
Mr. Crow. It is the guardians.
General Saltzman. --are the assets.
Mr. Crow. Do they have a unique skill set and technical
capability?
General Saltzman. Yes.
Mr. Crow. Do you rely on a large civilian workforce?
General Saltzman. In relative comparison, probably. It is
about 5,000 civilians in the Space Force of our total, less
than 15,000.
Mr. Crow. So, but, about a third, over a third, which is a
larger proportion than most services.
General Saltzman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Crow. Secretary Meink, would you share that assessment
that your most important asset is your people?
Dr. Meink. Yes, definitely, Congressman.
Mr. Crow. And, that your people have unique skills and
capabilities?
Dr. Meink. Yes, they do.
Mr. Crow. And, that the civilian workforce is an essential
element to your mission.
Dr. Meink. Yes, across the entire department.
Mr. Crow. General Saltzman, can you force your civilian
workforce to move?
General Saltzman. Not most of them.
Mr. Crow. But, guardians, Active Duty servicemembers, you
can compel to move. But, you can't go to a civilian and say you
have to relocate you and your family.
General Saltzman. With very few exceptions.
Mr. Crow. They can actually leave employment if you do
that.
General Saltzman. Correct.
Mr. Crow. What would happen if you lost half of your
civilian workforce for a major unit or capability?
General Saltzman. That unit would be underperforming.
Mr. Crow. Is China moving really fast?
General Saltzman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Crow. Are they moving faster than us in some
capability, in some technologies?
General Saltzman. I don't know how to measure the speed of
certain capabilities. But, they are definitely moving fast in
counter-space capabilities for example.
Mr. Crow. So, if we slowed down one of our capabilities,
would that put us at a strategic disadvantage?
General Saltzman. I do not want to slow down the
development of any of our capabilities.
Mr. Crow. Secretary Meink, U.S. Space Command is
headquartered in Colorado. It is at full operational
capability. And, it relies substantially on the civilian
workforce, correct?
Dr. Meink. That is correct.
Mr. Crow. Are you familiar with some of the surveys that
were done of the civilian workforce that if it were to be moved
out of Colorado, a substantial portion of that civilian
workforce would refuse to move?
Dr. Meink. Yes, Congressman, I am aware that we would have
attrition. And, it would be very important that we manage that
move over a period of time if that occurs.
Mr. Crow. With what General Saltzman just said, would it
slow us down though, relative to the speed of China?
Dr. Meink. I think it would be our job to do everything we
can to assure that doesn't happen.
Mr. Crow. Well, of course it would be your job. But, it is
true, those civilian workers, many of whom have said outright,
they will not move, and that is why it is unacceptable in a
very important command and mission that we move it at this time
or ever.
It is working. It is built out, and we owe it to America
and our national security to invest in it in Colorado.
And, there are a lot of folks in Congress who believe that
is an important part of our mission in National Defense.
General Allvin, to you. Are you familiar with our National
Defense Strategy?
General Allvin. I am familiar with the current one as well
as the National Defense Strategic Guidance.
Mr. Crow. And, what is the number one goal of the National
Defense Strategy?
General Allvin. Defend the homeland.
Mr. Crow. And, do we have an integrated, fully capable air
defense system that can operate without fixed wing aircraft to
do that job?
General Allvin. Could you repeat the question? Do we have
a--?
Mr. Crow. Can we do that without fighter jets in the United
States?
General Allvin. Not currently. No, not with a--
Mr. Crow. In the next eight years could we do that without
fighter jets?
General Allvin. It is hard to predict if we have our
collaborative combat aircraft--
Mr. Crow. It is unlikely, isn't it?
General Allvin. Given our current inventory.
Mr. Crow. Are you familiar with the north, the Commander of
NORTHCOM [United States Northern Command] came before this
committee, and just last year testified that it is essential
for his capability to protect the homeland that there be
fighter jets in Colorado on mission ready status to protect the
Western United States?
Are you familiar with that testimony?
General Allvin. I am not familiar with the testimony. But,
I trust General Guillot. And, I trust that if he said that he
did that under his--
Mr. Crow. It was his predecessor.
General Allvin. Authority as the responsibility for NORAD
[North American Aerospace Defense Command] NORTHCOM.
Mr. Crow. I represent Buckley Space Force Base where that
mission is located. There is an F-16 squadron there that
actually does that mission of protecting the western United
States.
General Allvin. Yes.
Mr. Crow. There is no integrated, fully capable missile
defense system in the United States. We need a plan to
recapitalize that fighter wing to keep that capability to
protect the homeland.
We all want to invest in long-term capabilities. But, that
is a ways out. We need to make those interim investments today
to make sure we can accomplish that mission.
I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, General Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you to all
three of you for being here today. And, I enjoyed seeing all
three of you at the Air Force Academy graduation.
What a moving ceremony. I got to tell you, there is nothing
like seeing the graduating class march out on that field with
the music. So, it was an incredible sight to see.
I am concerned about what we are hearing on the President's
budget. It appears he is proposing a minor increase for the Air
Force and a decrease for the Space Force.
And, if that is true, it is hard to put that up with the
fact that we are trying to counter China, because both the Air
Force and the Space Force will be front and center in any fight
in the Far East.
I would anticipate if we were serious about countering
China that we would be seeing a sizable increase in both the
Air Force and the Space Force budgets.
I also want to just remind folks in this room and those
listening that 20 percent of the budget that goes to the Air
Force and Space Force is pass through money and doesn't even go
to the Air Force or Space Force. It goes to DoD agencies.
So, if you look at the share of the pie of what the Air
Force and Space Force is getting, it is quite a bit smaller
than the Army and the Navy. And, I just think we need to
readdress this in this committee, but also in the Pentagon.
I have, my first question is to the Secretary. I really
enjoyed chatting with you about the Looking Glass mission. I am
excited that you understand that mission better than most.
Could you give us an update with what you know that is
going on there?
For those who aren't familiar with the Looking Glass, it
gives us the capability to command our ICBMs [Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles], or bombers, or submarines if the White
House is hit, if the Pentagon is hit, or STRATCOM [United
States Strategic Command] is hit. We used to have a 24-hour a
day airborne mission. We stopped doing that when the Cold War
ended.
However, I think we are going back to the threats where
this capability is needed again. And, we know the Navy is at
some point walking away from this mission.
So, I would love to get your update, Mr. Secretary, on this
important mission.
Dr. Meink. If I could Congressman, I would just say I
agree, and thank you for coming out to the Academy graduation.
It is just under three weeks I have been here and that was
the funnest thing that I have done. And, it is impossible to
not get kind of excited when you have 900 cadets.
Mr. Bacon. The keynote speaker must have got you excited.
Dr. Meink. To come through the, yes, come up there, also
excited. My hand got a little sore after 900 cadets. But, it
was great.
Yes, so, but specific to your question. Yes, the Looking
Glass, the Air Force has postured to support our role in that.
And, we will continue to do so.
As you have alluded to, there is discussion going on about
the future of the mission. And, we will continue to participate
in that, and we will take on whatever role that the Department
assigns to us.
General Allvin, if you have anything else?
General Allvin. Just, the Navy has agreed to continue that
until they are relieved. But, when they are relieved, if the
mission comes to us, we will take it.
We would ask to be appropriately resourced for it. But, as
long as that mission is required, we will ensure that between
us and our other services, we are able to support the nation in
that critical mission.
Mr. Bacon. And, I submit to you, it is critical with 15-
minute warning times with some of the nuclear weapons that
Russia and China can deliver here with hypersonics.
We need to have the survivable thinking, and it is
important for deterrence. They need to know that no matter what
they do, they can't decapitate us. That we have the ability to
respond.
General Allvin, you have been a two-time classmate with me.
The Air Combat Command says we need over 20 Compass Call
aircraft, yet the programmer record is at 10. Could you give us
your mind of what we should be doing with this in the future?
General Allvin. Congressman, and correctly so. We are
understanding that, you know, electronic warfare it sort of
drifted in the back of our mind, is now back in the front of
our mind as we see the criticality of that.
The great thing about the EA-37 is, once we put that, as
you know, once we put the operators in the back of them, those
things, they are creating new and interesting ways to really
put dilemmas in the minds of the enemy.
So, the program of record right now is 10 and understand
those ACC [Air Combat Command] puts the requirement as higher.
This is a matter of resources. Is it this or munitions? Is it
this or tankers? Is it this or other things? All of the things
we need.
But, I will tell you, we are understanding how we can
squeeze every ounce of capability out of every platform that we
get. And, they all go into the big prioritization.
Mr. Bacon. General Saltzman, what are the one or two things
you think you need to do first to posture the space for the
Golden Dome?
General Saltzman. Well, I think as we look across the
portfolio of things that we already bring to bear, whether it
is sensors, whether it is the data networks that have to move
the data quickly, the software that enables rapid decision-
making, even before we get to the effectors that actually can
mitigate the threats, that all has to be stitched together.
So, we are doing the mission analysis, and I think that is
the first thing that has to be done, which systems are required
to put together so we can move data to the right places, and
most effectively orchestrate a very complex mission set.
So, we have got to do the mission planning first.
Mr. Bacon. Okay. Thank you. With that, I have got one
second left. I will give it back to the Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the
gentlelady from New Hampshire, Ms. Goodlander.
Ms. Goodlander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you to
our witnesses for being here today. I really appreciate it.
I appreciate your testimony at the outset about the
importance of an audit. It is something I care about deeply. It
is something that is important to my constituents and their
public trust in our military.
And, I wanted to ask you, Mr. Secretary, if you could tell
us more about the concrete steps you are taking to ensure that
the Department of the Air Force passes a clean audit this
fiscal year.
Dr. Meink. Yes. Thanks, Congresswoman. Yes, we spend quite
a bit of money in the military. I want to make sure we are good
stewards of the taxpayer in how we do that.
In my previous job, the organization I worked in, we
actually had 16 clean consecutive audits. So, I do understand
those, kind of the steps and the things that are required to do
that.
Now, obviously, this is a much larger scale. So, I am in
the process of actually assessing where we have our
deficiencies, and then laying in a plan to go after those.
I just signed out a note to put the Undersecretary, and it
is one of his primary jobs is to ensure that that gets
accomplished. But, the fundamental thing is--
Ms. Goodlander. What is the time line, Mr. Secretary, for
identifying those deficiencies?
Dr. Meink. So, those deficiencies, yes, with the past
audits have been, many of them have been identified. I think
the question is what do you do?
Okay, what is the strategy, you probably know,
congresswoman, what do you do to address those deficiencies?
Ms. Goodlander. Yes.
Dr. Meink. Some of them can be very challenging. Some of
them are just tying together all the systems that manage the
data, manage the finances.
Those can be really challenging steps. And so, identifying
those deficiencies, budgeting to fix those things right, and
get them right, is what we are going to be focused on.
Ms. Goodlander. Well, I would appreciate the chance to hear
from you in real time how your progress is going and what this
committee can do to support you in that effort. We have got the
National Defense Authorization Act, which is one of the reasons
I came to this committee. It is knocking on wood, 63-years and
running a bill.
And, we would very much like to work with you to be sure
that you can join our colleagues from the Marine Corps in
passing a clean audit as soon as possible.
I wanted to also ask you about, you know, another issue
that matters a lot to my constituents, the right to repair.
Could you tell us a bit about your understanding of what the
right to repair means?
To me, the notion that our military cannot repair our own
equipment, and weapon systems, and aircraft is an outrage. It
is costing us billions and billions of dollars to the taxpayer.
It is delaying our military readiness. It is a driver of
waste, fraud, and abuse. And, we are all very committed to
cutting down on waste, fraud, and abuse.
So, I wanted to ask you, we heard from Secretary Driscoll
yesterday about his commitment to ensure that going forward,
any contracts and, you know, the way that the right to repair
is undermined is really through highly obscure and technical
provisions in our contracts, that going forward that doesn't
continue and working retroactively.
So, can you tell us about your efforts on this front?
Dr. Meink. So, first off, as with Secretary Driscoll, I
gave you my commitment that this will be something that we will
ensure contracts going forward that we have full flexibility.
And, I think as you alluded to, there is a whole spectrum.
It can be all the way from the contractor who has the full
right and authority to do that.
To, even if they don't, the government doesn't actually
have enough of the technical specs to actually do it. So, we
are still relying upon the contractor.
So, one of the things I have been doing, and there isn't a
one size fits all, because it varies across the different
contracts we have within the Department, looking into the
conditions are different, and we are going to have to go in and
address every one of those conditions in a little bit different
way.
But, in the end, and we have already made some progress.
But, in the end, I think we have to get there. There is no
question about it. I don't know, General, if you have any other
comments on that?
General Allvin. I just totally associated with what the
Secretary said. It is some of the contractual pieces that we
entered into. The more we can get relief from that, the more
flexibility. We are all about that.
Ms. Goodlander. Well, I appreciate that. And, we want to
support you. We have got bipartisan support for provisions in
the year's NDAA. And, we would love to work with you on that.
General Saltzman, I thank you for being here. My home state
of New Hampshire is home to the New Boston Space Force Station
in Hillsborough County.
And, you know, I had a chance to visit New Boston. They are
providing critical around the clock satellite command and
control capabilities for our country.
I wanted to ask you, I only have 10 seconds left, so maybe
we can follow up offline. But, I am eager to talk to you about
how we can ensure that our infrastructure installations, like
the New Boston Space Force Station, are protected from the wide
range of vulnerabilities that are out there?
General Saltzman. Very quickly. We have a new program--
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 108.]
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired. The Chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gimenez.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last weekend, I think
we saw a pivotal moment in warfare when the Ukrainian Army
launched an unbelievable attack on the Russian Air Force.
But, it also, for me, underlined a vulnerability for us.
For a long time we thought, you know, distance was a great
equalizer.
But, now with the, you know, with the onset of drones, et
cetera, you could have malign actors here in the United States
take out a lot of our assets in a very short period of time.
What are we doing to protect against drones?
This kind of activity to protect our assets here on the
homeland, General Allvin?
General Allvin. Thank you, Congressman. And, to the
conversation we had earlier, it is really a, it is a joint
force problem.
And, it is one of those that is multifaceted different. It
is different in characterization than what happened with Russia
and Ukraine.
But, it certainly shows the consequences if we don't pay
attention to it. This is one of those where we have to have an
understanding of the current restrictions that we have in place
with respect to rules of engagements with the local county,
state, federal.
Mr. Gimenez. Well, forget that.
General Allvin. Okay.
Mr. Gimenez. Okay. Do we have--my concern is the capability
of us being able to defend against AI [Artificial Intelligence]
drones. We may have the capability to defend against piloted
drones. All right?
But, I have always been afraid of AI drones that are
unpiloted. And, that you basically have to knock them out of
the sky.
You just can't say, okay, you can't pilot anymore, and they
fall to the ground. That is not the case anymore. I am worried
about our capabilities there. All right? And, that is all I am
going to say.
And also, not only for our civilian, our military, but also
on our civilians and our civilian transportation
infrastructure, because if some kind of an attack happens on a
civilian aircraft, then basically air travel grinds to a halt.
Nobody is going to take a plane.
And so, I would hope, Secretary that we are on this. And,
not only just for protecting our military assets, but also our
entire transportation network.
So, that is all I am going to say. I really don't want to
get into what you are doing. But, maybe in a classified setting
we would find out what it is we are doing to protect against
this threat.
I have been really worried about this threat for a really
long time. And, what happened last weekend just, you know, puts
an exclamation point on my worry about what could happen here.
Just for the sake, how much does a B-2 bomber cost?
Dr. Meink. Yes. I think it is probably, I don't know what
the replacement cost would be.
Mr. Gimenez. It is billions.
Dr. Meink. But, I think originally they are multiple
billions.
Mr. Gimenez. Are they all clustered around the same place?
Dr. Meink. Well, a lot of them are at one base.
Mr. Gimenez. Okay. So, one of the things maybe we should be
looking at, is maybe dispersing our assets, okay? In the near
term, until we figure out how we can deal with this.
On space, and I think that we do need to enhance our
capabilities, but I also think that eventually we are also
going to need to develop redundancy to a lack of space.
If somebody knocks our space assets out, are we too reliant
on space?
Do we have redundancy so that we can continue to operate
without the space platform? General Saltzman?
General Saltzman. No. I think there are missions we are
doing from space that we can't easily just redundantly cover if
we were to lose space.
Mr. Gimenez. Well, I think if we are too overly reliant on
space and we don't have redundancy, we are asking for trouble.
Because, everything that we can put up can be taken down.
And, you have to, you know, I kind of believe in Murphy's
Law, which doesn't mean that everything that--it means that
everything that bad can happen will. It just means that
anything that can happen will.
And so, let's not rely too much on space. I am not saying
invest in space, absolutely, okay. And try to defend it as much
as we can. But, as a just in case, if it just gets taken out,
we can't be helpless as a nation.
And so, Secretary Meink, I am asking again, are we, do we
have redundancy? Are we developing redundancy to space?
Again, that is another question for another time. Are we
investing in directed energy?
Dr. Meink. I think at this level we can say yes, we are
investing in direct energy.
Mr. Gimenez. Okay. Very good. And, you know, I guess I have
15 seconds left. And, I guess my time is up and I yield back to
the Chairman. Thank you.
The Chairman. I would follow up, let the gentleman from
Florida know that we have been for many years developing
directed energy capabilities. And, it is maturing at a nice
clip.
What you just saw happen in Israel with Iron Beam is part
of our investment. But, yes, and a lot of it, I would be happy
for you to learn more in SCIF [Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facility].
But, I am very proud of that technology. And, it has got
great potential in the future.
With that, the Chair, I recognize the gentlelady from
Maryland, Ms. Elfreth.
Ms. Elfreth. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Gentleman, thank you for
being here and good morning.
I echo the Chair's and the concerns you heard from both
sides of the aisle of this committee around the lateness of the
budget, and particularly Mr. Courtney's concerns around having
an open, honest, and transparent conversation on the future of
Air Force One.
I am going to start with a local issue and then expand to a
national issue. We have talked about A-10s quite a bit. And, I
know that you all have talked about the future of A-10s quite a
bit in every one of our states.
But, as you well know, Maryland's National Guard, our 175th
Wing is unique, it comprises both the flight component and the
cyber component, which I am very grateful for the expansion of
the cyber component.
But, with the divestment of the A-10s, we will lose that
flight mission, but the cyber component is not yet stood up.
And so, there is going to be a bit of a gap in our mission.
And, I would just love some greater clarity, I guess,
General Allvin, about Cyber Wing's expansion, when do you
expect the full operational capacity?
What is our planning to manage this transition period? I am
giving you all this at once. And then, how are we coordinating
with CYBERCOM [United States Cyber Command] in particular, to
properly integrate this expansion?
General Allvin. Well, thank you very much. And it truly is
a key mission going forward in the growth industry in the cyber
wing. So we want to go as fast as we possibly can.
So it really is not going to be a gap of sorts. There will
be a gap from full capability to full capability, but we expect
the sundowning of the A-10 mission by the end of fiscal year
2025, so in about five months. But in October is when we start
building, and we expect within 36 months of that we'll have an
initial operation of capability.
But in between times, we will slowly be gaining missions.
So there will be things we will already be doing, just
robusting up in both capacity and sophistication. And having
Fort Meade right up the street is one of those where we're
going to be leverage that capability to bring that on as fast
as possible.
One of the advantages is the greatest asset that we have in
a cyber wing are the personnel. And so being able to track that
talent in that area is one of the big advantages there, and it
also reduces the ability for potential extra MILCON that will
go within another platform coming in.
So we are going to be aggressively standing up between 1
October, 2025, to the beginning of 2026. Thirty-six months
later, we are looking to get IOC [Initial Operating Capacity],
and we would like to get it sooner.
Ms. Elfreth. I share I would like to get it sooner, as
well. And, Mr. Secretary, just following up on that, our air
wing in Maryland, we have seen eight combat deployments in
just--since 2001, just over 23 years. My governor, Governor Wes
Moore, recently sent you a letter, I believe it was last week,
asking for a meeting. I appreciate you have been on the job two
and a half weeks, but, to expand in detail on what the general
just shared, can I ask for a commitment right now, you and your
staff to meet with my governor and the Maryland delegation to
walk through this so we have that seamless transition?
Dr. Meink. I would be happy to.
Ms. Elfreth. Okay. My staff will follow up with your staff
literally as we walk out the door. Thank you very much. Thank
you for that.
Okay. Moving on to General Saltzman, well, actually, to
everybody at the panel. I bring this up, I am a broken record,
but I am really proud that my first CODEL [Congressional
Delegation], being a member of Congress 153 days so far, was
actually to Vandenburg, and I greatly enjoyed that experience.
It also kind of opened my eyes to physically seeing you have a
solar field. You are generating energy at Vandenburg, which is
very exciting. We talk about energy resilience and capability,
particularly as, you know, we are overly relying on 50 states
for energy generation and delivery.
So you have a solar-generating farm, but you have no
storage. So it gives me great pause to think about our
vulnerabilities, both just from a grid system but also our
vulnerability from foes. Very easy to disrupt readiness
capabilities when we don't have energy to and from.
So if you could speak specifically to Vandenburg, General.
And then, Mr. Secretary, your plans to--obviously, the low-
hanging fruit is at Vandenburg, but I would love to hear your
plans on how we are going to make sure our installations are as
energy independent and resilient as possible from a readiness
perspective.
General Saltzman. Well, thank you for that. And I
appreciate you coming out to Vandenburg and taking a look at
all the great people and mission they are doing out there.
I couldn't agree more that energy resiliency is operational
readiness, especially in the Space Force where we do most of
our missions from our in-base locations. We don't have to
deploy to do space operations or launch operations. And so we
take it very seriously. We do mission-continuity exercises on a
routine basis to uncover where the particular shortfalls or
vulnerabilities are. We flow those back up to try to make sure
we are as resilient as possible.
The other initiative that we have taken on is a weapon
system infrastructure accounting drill, making sure that, when
we talk about power generation, it is a part of our readiness
account. We haven't traditionally done that. That is not
something that other forces have to do to the same degree we
do. So we are redesigning how we have transparency of our
readiness in that kind of infrastructure, and I think that
will--
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Luttrell.
Mr. Luttrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
for coming to see us today and thank you all for your service.
Ms. Elfreth and Mr. Wilson actually started this
conversation about the A-10s. I think I got lost in space when
I was talking--I am not talking to you when I say that--that
the A-10s shelf life is gone and then we are going to create
the next asset. I think that is a horrible idea. I think the A-
10 is probably one of the best creations we have, and I have
been in the theater of war calling that plane in and it saved
my life countless times. And there is nothing more terrifying
than that flying bathtub with bombs and that gun hanging off
the front of it, and I think we are in a bad spot, if we clack
off somewhere and we put boots on the ground, that is going to
be the asset that we are going to be flying overhead. I am not
taking anything away from everything else that we have, but I
just felt like I needed to say that because, again, that plane
has saved my life and my teammates' lives more times than I can
possibly count.
I am going to shift gears and talk hypersonics. Mr.
Secretary and General Allvin, you guys can kind of pick which
one is going to answer this. I have a list of the weapon assets
and the weapon systems that China and Russia have right here.
And, General, you said rapid modernization evolving, kind of
evolution of technology in the PLA [People's Liberation Army],
I think they are there. I mean, I think we are kind of looking
at them as that is kind of the bar that has been set.
Very focused in on hypersonic. Can you give me a current
briefing on where we are and when that capability and that
asset will be able to be employed?
General Allvin. I can give you the broad brush at this
classification level--
Mr. Luttrell. Absolutely; yes, sir.
General Allvin. --broad brush it, and it is interesting
because, when you juxtapose, you know, the rapid advance in
technology and go into hypersonics and you compare it to what
we all love, which is the A-10, that second question is sort of
the answer to the first. Those are the things that are making
that awesome A-10 less and less survivable. The most important
thing for--
Mr. Luttrell. I would agree with you if we had hypersonics
that worked.
General Allvin. Well, I would say it is not only
hypersonics. It is the other advanced capabilities are going to
be more survivable for our boots on the ground in the future,
given the enemy capabilities, than the A-10, which we all love.
In the element of hypersonics, at this level, I will tell
you that we are looking, we are developing and have, you will
see in the budget submission, assuming it is what we had put
forward, two different programs. One is a larger form factor
that is sort of more strategic long range that we have already
tested several times; it is called ARRW. And the other one is
HACM [Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile]. We will just leave it
there.
But there are two systems that are now continuing to
develop and moving beyond the R&D [Research and Development]
team and getting into the procurement range in the very near
future, and I will be happy to go, at a higher classification
level, the specifics of both of those. But we are accelerating
in our development not only the technology but of the
procurement of the capabilities that it will create.
Mr. Luttrell. Mr. Secretary, are you having conversations
about increasing funding for hypersonic capabilities in the Air
Force?
Dr. Meink. Yes. Well, two sides of that coin. The first is
we really need to, as we mature the technology, and we focused
on maturing the technology, and now we need to focus on
lowering the cost and getting it into production. It has got to
be affordable. We have got to be able to buy more than ten of
these things, right. So that is a big focus right now is
lowering the production costs, well, ramping up the production
and lowering the costs, so we can get enough of that kit to
actually make a difference.
But, yes, on the other side of the house, making sure that,
once we do kind of get more efficient in production, that we
will probably fund those programs to deliver that capability,
and it is really across the force, not just in the Air Force
but the entire department is looking at these systems. And
there is no question the Chinese moved really fast on these
capabilities.
Mr. Luttrell. General Saltzman, as far as AI capabilities
in Space Force, when the current budget plan comes out that we
get to see, how are those numbers looking? Are we comfortable
in where we sit at this classification level?
General Saltzman. Yes, sir. A lot of it is early S&T work
that is being done. We are focusing heavily on decision support
kinds of AI, take a lot of data and turn it into decision
quality as fast as possible. There is some good returns in the
S&T [Science and Technology] environment, and they fully fund
it and are in support of those efforts.
Mr. Luttrell. Okay. And I will close with this. Mr.
Secretary, you and the general answered this, and I know
General Allvin would say the same thing, but your most
cherished asset is your people. And their health and well-being
is everything, and I would ask that you take, even if you R&R
[Rest and Recovery], take a very hard look currently and as
they transition out because, once they transition out, we get
lost in space.
And, Mr. Secretary, you most likely probably already know
that. But the generals, mark my words, okay, so health and
welfare of our servicemembers as they transition out, current
and transitioning out, please--
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Whitesides.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here today. Mr. Secretary, congratulations on your
confirmation. It is good to have someone with your depth of
relevant experience leading a military department. I had the
opportunity to work with Director Scolese back at NASA
[National Aeronautics and Space Administration], so welcome.
I represent the northern side of Los Angeles County, and I
want to begin by just thanking your teams for their crucial
role in fighting the Los Angeles fire storm in January. Between
the Fire Guard data program, firefighting aircraft, and other
aspects, we are deeply grateful to your teams. I want to
support those efforts going forward as much as I can. I am also
enthusiastic about the possibility of using autonomy and aerial
platforms and advance remote sensing to enable us to more
quickly suppress fires that threaten critical installations,
like the Vandenburg Space Force Base, in our home communities.
And I would love to work with your teams to continue to think
about that.
As you know, I am proud to represent Plant 42, the home of
the B-21 Raider. To me, that program is really a gold standard.
It is delivering tremendous capability with an efficient
development and manufacturing program.
With that said, I want to follow up on a question that
Senator Fischer asked this group during the SASC [Senate Armed
Services Committee] posture hearing late last month. As Senator
Fischer noted, General Cotton has recommended that the Air
Force procure at least 145 B-21s. I couldn't agree with him
more, especially when increasing our total could decrease costs
and move the production time line to the left.
Mr. Secretary, you noted to Senator Fischer that you were
going to meet with General Cotton and discuss his B-21
requirements. I was just wondering has that discussion
happened? Are there any updates that you might be able to share
at this time?
Dr. Meink. I have not, but I expect to have an opportunity
to talk to him next Tuesday, right? Just checking. I have not
had that detailed conversation with him, but I will soon. And
we are looking very closely at how we increase production just
to get to the 100, right. We want to increase the production
rate. The program is executing very well.
Really the challenge we have right now is getting the
production rate up to deliver the numbers that we would like,
which then gives the opportunity to increase numbers if we can.
Mr. Whitesides. Thanks for that, Mr. Secretary. The
committee has had multiple discussions over the past few months
about the importance of developing robust space domain
awareness, something that I strongly support. Most of my
career, I have been focused on securing U.S. leadership in
space both from an economic and national security perspective.
Remote sensing is central to the fight of the future, and
space-based capabilities are critical.
That said, as I recently raised with General Guillot and
his representative Gimenez discussed, space-based capabilities
cannot be the basket in which we put all of our eggs. We need
redundancies across domains. That is underscored by the
insatiable appetite for remote-sensing information from forward
operators.
Mr. Secretary, I know you spent much of your incredible
career around space assets. Can you give us some reassurance
that you will support an appropriate balance between space,
air, and terrestrial-based systems when it comes to remote-
sensing capabilities?
Dr. Meink. Yes, Congressman, I can. You never allow
yourself to be put into a single-point failure situation to
where, if you lose a system, you have totally lost that
capability. So both on space, redundancy in space is going to
be critical. General Saltzman talked a little bit about that
earlier, so that is going to be important. But, also, you know,
a mix between the different domains is going to be critical
going forward, and that is something we intend to continue.
It is always a balance. You are never going to be able to
afford everything. As was mentioned, we have a lot of
modernization going on simultaneously across the department, so
we're never going to build in everything you would like, but it
is important to make sure that you are not, you know, single-
point failure on these critical capabilities.
Mr. Whitesides. Thanks so much. Last week, I had a great
visit to Edwards Air Force Base, which is just north of my
district in the 412th Test Wing, and just on the point that--by
the way, you have got an incredible team out there. They are
doing incredible work. And, General Allvin, we are grateful for
the great support you have made to them.
Just on the point, minor point, but on the point that
Representative Elfreth made about energy storage, they have a
huge private solar storage installation on that base territory.
And if you could just provide a little linkage in solar local
storage, I think you could make Edwards ensure that it keep
operating through potential natural and manmade disruption. So
something to think about for the future.
And with that, I yield back. Thanks so much.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Guam, Mr. Moylan.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to our
distinguished witnesses, thank you for your leadership and
joining us here today.
General Allvin, given the recent reports of unsafe and
substandard conditions in unaccompanied housing on Guam, what
steps is the department taking in the fiscal year 2026 budget
to address these deficiencies and ensure habitability of our
servicemembers?
General Allvin. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate the
question, and, certainly, that is something that we take very
seriously. We always pride ourselves in really working hard for
unaccompanied housing; and, when the secretary of the Navy went
out there, he happened to find our very worst, through the
Building Condition Index, assessment, the very worst in our
United States Air Force, but even our very worst should not be
that bad.
So with respect to specifically Palau dorm and then Rota
after that, we aren't waiting until fiscal year 2026. We had
seen this coming, and it has been about 56 months since we took
over all of those facilities from the Navy. And we tried to
identify and ensure that we are moving forward with all of our
unaccompanied housing across the way. And then, of course,
Mawar didn't help at all.
But this year, we now expect to award $53 million for the
improvement of Palau dorm this year, and it should start
within, we should award it within 90 days and should start
within 60 days after that. And so we are getting after that
right now.
It is never enough and, as you know, Guam is such an
important place, we need to make sure our men are focused on
mission rather than just their housing. So between the Palau
dorms and the Rota dorms and across the board, we have an
aggressive schedule against that.
Mr. Moylan. That is great to hear, General. Thank you so
much for that. And as a follow-up, is the department
considering privatizing unaccompanied housing as a long-term
solution? And what oversight mechanisms will be in place to
ensure quality and accountability?
General Allvin. Now, of course, the secretary has said he
has only been in for two and a half weeks. We certainly haven't
had those conversations, and it isn't really, of all of the
things we would consider, privatizing. That really isn't on our
list right now because of that criticality of the young Airmen
who are living in there need sort of that oversight and
leadership of other next-level NCOs [Non-commissioned Officers]
to be there.
That's not currently in the plans for me to propose for the
secretary. We want to remain that under government control.
Mr. Moylan. I am looking forward to this great improvement.
Thank you, General. Another question, General Allvin. Your
testimony highlights REFORPAC [Resolute Force Pacific] and the
need to operate from austere airfields in contested
environments. How is the Air Force resourcing Guam to support
agile combat employment, particularly in terms of dispersed
logistics, airlift, and handling of infrastructure under real-
world contingency conditions?
General Allvin. Thank you for that question, Congressman.
Now, we are very excited about the REFORPAC, the Resolute Force
Pacific, exercises. This will be one of the largest exercises
that we have done since the Cold War, quite frankly, because,
as we do exercises by sort of piece parts, we get insights, but
we really want to see where the true shortfalls are.
And we expect and we have talked about this, Congressman,
and we know logistics is going to be important. It is not just
logistics because the tyranny of distance. It is going to be
logistics under attack and understanding those contested
environments.
We are going to ring this out this summer. We have already
in the past couple of years been putting forward requests in
our budget for things like shelters and hardening and some non-
kinetic capabilities to sense, so we know we have work to do to
make this very critical concept of agile combat employment
work. This summer, this exercise is going to help expose
anymore shortfalls that we haven't already identified. In
addition, we know having preposition of parts and forward
storage to be able to accelerate the repair of the platforms
when they break down, that is also another key performance that
we have to have in the Indo-Pacific. And that's why I put in my
unfunded priority list about $1.5 billion for spare parts to
increase the health of the shelf, so we can increase the combat
generation under attack.
Mr. Moylan. Excellent. Thank you, General. Secretary Meink,
on a CODEL last Congress, I flew to Guam with my colleagues on
an Air Force C-40. The jet suffered a landing gear malfunction
and was stranded on Guam, which doesn't mean it is bad to be
stranded on Guam but it was stranded there for several days
while awaiting parts from CONUS. Does our operational force
encounter this type of issue? And how can new force design
concepts, or prepositioning, ensure Airmen are not stranded
while operating in the Pacific?
Dr. Meink. I know I don't have much time, so, just real
quickly, yes, that happens. I think the key thing you almost
alluded to is making sure you have enough spare parts and
enough supplies to repair the aircraft across the force, and
that is a focus in our budget submissions.
And then prepositioning. We can't preposition everywhere
because we will never have--it would be terribly inefficient.
So those sort of conditions do happen, but those are the two
things: make sure we have the right parts and make sure--
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired. I would
point out that all housing at Guam has fallen into an
unacceptable state of disrepair, not just unaccompanied, and
there is a lot of blame to go around up on the dias, as well as
at the witness table. But we all need to be focused on
correcting that, and, General Allvin, I am thrilled to hear
about what you just described. But I would urge you, General
Saltzman and the secretary, to let us know how we can help deal
with all of it because that is a critical area for our national
security, and we need to start putting a lot of resources
against its capabilities and what we need to do for our
servicemembers that are stationed there.
With that, I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr.
Cisneros.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all
our witnesses today for taking time, I know, out of your busy
schedules to be here today.
General Allvin, I appreciate, in your opening comments,
about the continuing resolution and really the effect that it
is having on quality of life, as well as recruiting. I wonder
if you could go into more detail about how important it is to
have a robust budget with recruiting in order to recruit
individuals? Because we are competing with corporations out
there today that is vying for the same talent, so please.
General Allvin. Thank you for that, Congressman. It really
is because our recruiters are just the hardest working in the
business right now, and they work very hard to bring those
Americans who want to raise their right and serve the United
States Air Force, they work very hard to give them some sense
of this is what you can expect, welcome to the team, this is
when you're going to get here. And if we don't have that
funding to be able to follow through on that and to bring those
in not only to keep the Americans to want to come into our
force but to ensure that we are bringing the right talent at
the right time. Without that predictability of funding or, in
this case, the mark that, when we already intended to recruit
3,000 more, we had to back off of that because we didn't have
the funding. It is very disruptive, and, that lack of
reliability, it has ripple effects well into the future.
Mr. Cisneros. All right. So even though we are talking
about a continuing resolution now, a possibility of maybe
another one, I mean, how many years down the line could that
have effects into your recruiting?
General Allvin. Well, actually, the fact that we have been
under a continuing resolution about most of the time for the
past decade-plus, that is part of the challenge that we are
seeing here today.
Mr. Cisneros. Well, thank you for that. I appreciate your
answer on that.
General Saltzman, former Secretary Kendall had written an
article at the beginning of this year about the future of the
Space Force and really about how it needs to really kind of
transform. I think the example you used was he's Navy, now that
you have a Merchant Marine going into actually becoming a
fighting-force Navy. Where are we on that time line, and,
really, what is it going to take us to get there to where we
can see the Space Force becoming the fighting force that it
should be?
General Saltzman. Thank you for that, sir. It is equipment,
it is training, and it is the operational concepts. I think we
have done some pretty good work on the operational concepts. We
generally know what we want to do. Acquisition of the equipment
is a little longer-to-lead item, but I feel good about the
protection assets that we put in place in terms of resiliency
and now we have got good plans in place to put together the
counterspace capabilities that convert us to the Navy, not the
Merchant Marine.
And then training: modeling and simulation, range assets,
high-fidelity simulators to train our people to make sure that
they practice the tactics that are going to be necessary. All
of those are coming together. We will have to grow a little bit
as a force as we bring new capabilities on, new missions on.
But I think we are well along our way to evolution.
Mr. Cisneros. And, you know, all the services still do
space. They are still in the space game there. But as the Space
Force grows and becomes, you know, larger, is it taking over
more of these roles to where now it will be Space Force will
kind of be there, or will it be more of a working together with
the other services to kind of oversee their missions, as well?
General Saltzman. Well, thank you for that because it came
up a little earlier, too. And I think General Allvin would
agree with me, when we think about our missions and how we are
going to perform our missions, the last question we ask is
which domain should we use. First, it is about what are the
threats, what are the capabilities, what is required of us to
be survivable, to create the effects we want. You can get to
where should this platform be located, is it an airborne
platform. You can get to that, but that's not our starting
point.
And so I see all of our challenges as all-domain
challenges. Some of those will play out in space. Some of
those. I rely on maritime capability do the counterspace
missions. So it is an all-domain effort now in this networked
environment. The modern battlefield doesn't just restrict
itself to one domain or another.
Mr. Cisneros. All right. Thank you for that. Mr. Secretary,
you commented earlier about the Qatari 747, about $250 million,
yes, $250 million to retrofit it. But in that estimate that you
gave to kind of modernize it or estimate to bring it up to
standards, to meet the president's needs, did it also consider
what it is going to take to go through that and make sure that
that aircraft hasn't been compromised? Because as soon as I
heard about this in the news, if I was the CPC [Chinese
Communist Party], I would be trying to get somebody on there
bugging it, doing whatever they can. So how are we going to
make sure that the aircraft was not compromised?
Dr. Meink. Thanks, Congressman. First off, I didn't say
$250 million. We can talk more details in a different
environment about what needs to go on there, but part of
upgrading it is, essentially, doing a deep-sweep to make sure
that there is no counterintelligence threats on the platform.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Dr. Jackson.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our
witnesses for being here today. I have three real quick
questions I am going to try to ask for General Allvin and for
the Secretary all related to Sheppard Air Force Base, but I
will start with one of my early achievements as a member of
Congress was back in 2021 when I was successful in getting the
new child development center at Sheppard Air Force Base funded
and authorized years ahead of its schedule. Shortly after
breaking ground in 2023, however, construction crews identified
asbestos in the ground and the project has still yet to be
completed. I am concerned that the Department of the Air Force
has not been aggressive enough in resolving these types of
issues.
Mr. Secretary and General Allvin, how are we addressing
delays for projects like the CDC [Child Development Center] at
Sheppard? Would both of you please commit to ensuring that this
project can stay on track, if at all possible, and we can
deliver this critical support that we need for our families at
Sheppard?
General Allvin. Absolutely, I can commit and I can commit
to proposing to the secretary that we put the right funding
against it. The remediation should be complete by October to
get us back on track. We understand this is one of those at
discovery. The last thing we want to do, though, is put a CDC
where there is lead and harm to the children, so we wanted to
make sure that entire environment is fully cleaned up. And so,
by October 2025, we should be over remediation and get back on
track.
Dr. Jackson. Yes, sir. I understand that, and I appreciate
that. Mr. Secretary.
Dr. Meink. I think we are expecting by the end of the year
get it cleaned up, get going. I think we are looking at, like,
2028 to have it complete.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you. I appreciate that. And if there is
any opportunity to expedite things after that to make up for
some of the lost time, I think we should do that. Thank you. I
appreciate it.
Another question here. Across the aircraft fleets in the
U.S. Air Force inventory, pilot training is foundational to our
readiness. As the service continues to struggle with the pilot
shortage, I am also concerned about the delayed acquisition of
the T-7, which is further constraining the pilot-training
pipeline. Despite announcements earlier this year that the
program may achieve an accelerated initial operational
capability, there has been limited information about whether
this will translate into expedited deliveries.
General Allvin, would you provide an update on the T-7 time
line and what these delays mean for the Air Force's ability to
train our pilots? What actions has the department taken to
expedite delivery of these platforms, and when could we expect
delivery at Sheppard Air Force Base in particular?
General Allvin. Congressman, we can give you the current
understanding of the lay down of the order and the sequence and
the timing. It still is for Sheppard--I will go to the last
question first--right now, it is about seven years from now
before it finally--however, that can be accelerated, and here
is what we have done to accelerate that: We have taken some of
the articles that were going to be production articles and we
put them into tests. We have accelerated the number of T-7
platforms that are in tests. Now, we have completed 140
flights. Sixty-seven of them were in all of last year. Already
this year, we have made up the other ground.
So we are accelerating the tests, and, as a test pilot, I
have been checking in with it quite often and the airplane is
performing phenomenally. So we are trying to buy down the risk
as fast as we can.
If, when we put the more platforms in, we can accelerate
and move it to less by buying down the test risk, we are ready
to do that because you know, Congressman, the T-38s are
operating great, but those J-85 engines and all those
challenges are things we don't want to contend with into the
next decade.
So we are stepping through and making sure that the MILCON
is lined up associated with all the funding. And with Sheppard,
of course, we have, it is a crown jewel. It has got the Euro-
NATO piece, which means they all get a say in when funding goes
in to do the MILCON. And so we want to make sure we don't get
ahead of that and make promises that our international partners
would have to put money against that we have to renege on. So
we want to make sure we have confidence in that and buy down
the test risk as we lay out the actual production and the
delivery capability across. It is a great platform. We can't
get it fast enough.
Dr. Jackson. Thanks. I appreciate that. And I agree 100
percent, and, obviously, as important as that training program
is to not only our pilots but our allied pilots, seven years is
a long time. So anything, you know, that I could do on my end,
obviously, from where I see it, I am anxious and willing to
help expedite that. It seems like that is a long ways out.
Thank you. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Sorenson.
Mr. Sorenson. Thank you to our chairman and ranking member.
Good morning, just about good afternoon, and welcome to
Secretary Meink, General Allvin, and General Saltzman. Thank
you for your many years of service and dedication to our
nation.
I first have to say I am really excited about where the Air
Force is headed in terms of investing in new technology and new
capabilities while also making sure that we are equipping the
Air National Guard. These new assets and capabilities will be
crucial to our national security. Our next-generation air
missions, like the F-47s and CCAs [Collaborative Combat
Aircraft], must also be fielded to the Air National Guard.
I proudly represent the heart of Illinois, home to the
182nd Airlift Wing in Peoria. As you all are well aware, they
are the gold standard for Air National Guard service. And I
know I speak for everyone back home when I say that we are so
excited to welcome the C-130J model to our airports and our
airspace. The 182nd Wing is exemplary, and I am proud to
support their work. Doing the crucial work that many of our
neighbors, my neighbors are doing, Title 5 employees, at the
Peoria Air National Guard.
Like so many of my colleagues here in the committee, I am
troubled why Donald Trump's administration thinks that cuts to
the defense workforce are a good idea. This drain of expertise
is detrimental at a time when we should be improving our
readiness to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. I am
concerned about the loss of Title 5 civilian employees in our
Air National Guard bases across the country and what it means
for overall readiness.
To the secretary, could you explain how the loss of these
employees in Air National Guard will impact our missions, but
how should other federal workers feel? How are they supposed to
keep their morale so high if cuts are happening to the best
workers on their team?
Dr. Meink. Congressman, thanks. I can't speak specifically
to Peoria. Been there a couple times but can't speak to the
Guard base there and how they are going to handle the civilian
workforce impacts. I think, overall, though, across the
department, the push--and, again, civilian workers have been
critical, I have been one for thirty-odd years, so critical to
the Defense Department.
Saying that, though, there is always an opportunity to
improve efficiencies in your organization has an opportunity to
improve efficiencies, and I think that is what is going on in
the department right now is how do we continue to increase
efficiency, support or prioritize the workforce on the highest-
priority missions, so that we can deliver these capabilities
and have more resources to build our critical capabilities.
But it is always going to be a balance, right? There is
always going to be a balance. I have seen this many times in my
careers where there is give and take on the size of the
workforce, and we are in another area where we are trying to
improve our efficiencies. You know, I have done it before, and
that's where I will be working across the department to try to
make sure that we continue to meet the priorities.
Mr. Sorenson. So what do I say to people when they, back
home, when somebody hears we want to improve efficiency, there
is a skip of your heart because does the improving of the
efficiency mean it is my job? What do I say?
Dr. Meink. So it is always hard. You are exactly right, it
is always hard. But as we have discussed, the prioritization of
funds, both on hardware and people, are the tough decisions,
sometimes, that we have to make. But we need to do everything
we can to support the workforce as we do that.
Mr. Sorenson. I am also concerned about our National Guard
federal technicians. Do you expect that the president's 2026
budget will request adequate funding to support our National
Guard's federal technicians?
Dr. Meink. I would be happy to discuss that once the budget
is released, Congressman.
Mr. Sorenson. I look forward to seeing it, as everyone
does. And while I have just one minute left, I want to
acknowledge that just yesterday the Rock Island Arsenal's Joint
Manufacturing and Technology Center just received their AS9100
certification. This will allow them to deliver the best
components to the aerospace industry, and I strongly urge the
Air Force to make efforts to partner with our organic
industrial base to make sure that our warfighters have
everything that they need.
Also, as a meteorologist, I would be remiss, as we begin
hurricane season, my thanks to the courageous folks at the Air
Force Reserve Hurricane Hunters who do everything that they can
to fly into the world's biggest storms with the sole purpose of
keeping us safe. So may they stay safe in this hurricane
season, and, if you ever need a meteorologist from Congress to
fly with them, just give me a call.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. That is a first for me. The gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. McGuire, is recognized.
Mr. McGuire. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
witnesses. Thank you to our men and women in the military. Your
service is important, and we would not have a country without
you.
I want to make a couple of statements before I get into
questions. I have a resolution I am working on. It is H.R.
3478. I would ask the witnesses to write that down, H.R. 3478.
It is the Manned Aircraft Clarification Act. There are many
reasons why Langley and other places didn't engage drones. I am
sure you know some of that I don't know. But I believe a lot of
the hesitation was an advisory put out by the DOJ [Department
of Justice] in 2020. So the Manned Aircraft Clarification Act,
H.R. 3478, will take care of almost all of the SLTT [State,
local, tribal, and territorial] problems and almost all of the
DOT [Department of Transportation] problems. And I know you
guys have got actual ways of shooting them down.
Now, my wife and I were with our church in Israel about
three years ago on a mountain looking into a valley, and we saw
F-35s come in and landing and then disappearing under ground,
kind of like an aircraft carrier. I am sure that would be super
expensive, but look at what happened in Russia. I am sure you
guys would consider that and other options.
All right. Now to the questions. Secretary Meink, I think I
heard one of you say earlier that new missions require new
resources. The Air Force continues to prioritize modernization
across its missile enterprise, including next-generation
missiles, propulsion, advanced tactical and air defense
systems, space launch, and nuclear modernization, all of which
depend on solid rocket motors. Concerns have been voiced about
the domestic supply chain and increase in domestic demand
signals for these critical Air Force needs. How is the Air
Force working to ensure a stable and competitive domestic
supply of solid rocket motors to meet program requirements to
include addressing current industrial base constraints and
production bottlenecks?
Dr. Meink. So, Congressman, thanks for the question. I am
not sure I can speak to the overall approach. I'll ask General
Allvin for help on that. I know we have seen a couple of
challenges, particularly in some of the, actually, in some of
our launch programs and other programs there has been some
challenges with the solid rocket motors that are being
addressed right now. But for the overall, particularly in the
missile category, I will have General Allvin--
General Allvin. Actually, I have nothing to add
systemically across the board, but, with each, the integration
has always been the challenge and making sure that we have the
right capability on those. But we can take that one for the
record and see if there's anything more--
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 109.]
Mr. McGuire. Sure. Has the Air Force considered supporting
campus-style solid rocket motor production models that would
leverage proven private-sector expertise collate, located,
manufacturer--I went toward Starbase in Texas, and they have
got this campus style, everything is all in one spot. So I
would ask that you guys consider that.
All right. General Saltzman, President Trump's Golden Dome
executive order calls for development and deployment of non-
kinetic capabilities to augment the kinetic defeat of advanced
cruise missiles. Some of these capabilities include lasers and
particle beam weapons technologies, which require a large
amount of power to operate. I would expect the Space Force to
fully explore deploying these capabilities to their Interceptor
architecture. Since I have been in Congress, I have been a big
proponent of deploying advanced nuclear reactor technology,
like small module reactors and micro, micro nuclear reactors on
orbit and microreactors in orbit. Nuclear energy has 1,000
times the power density of solar and will power not just lasers
but our communications and data collections, as well.
So is the Space Force looking into the adoption of nuclear
technology into our next-generation space architecture?
General Saltzman. Well, first and foremost, I can tell you
that we are looking into directed energy. We see this the same
way you do. This is a very promising technology that we have to
explore. If you don't mind, I would like to talk to you maybe
in a different environment about the things that we are doing
and see if there is room for that. We will have to take that
for the record. I am not tracking anything specific.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 109.]
Mr. McGuire. That sounds great. And then, Secretary Meink
and General Allvin, what is the Air Force strategy to store and
transport a large stockpile of CCAs? How will you coordinate
your efforts with the U.S. Transportation Command?
General Allvin. Thank you for that question, Congressman,
because the beauty of what we are doing right now, we are still
having those CCAs be developed in a prototype, part of its life
cycle. At the same time, we are standing up an experimental
operations unit, so, as we understand the platform, we
understand the autonomy, we are looking into how we intend to
actually employ, sustain, maintain them, and that will drive
our operational concepts as to whether they are, some are
forward positioned or whether forward deployed or whether
stored here. That is work that is ongoing, but that is front of
mind for our experimental operations units, understanding how
to make sure that we take on this capability as the game
changer that it really is.
Mr. McGuire. Well, thank you very much, and I yield back my
time.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina who almost has
good barbecue, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. Thank you for acknowledging that, Mr. Chair. Mr.
Secretary, congratulations on your recent appointment; and,
actually, I really look forward to working with you. So
congratulations to you. And, General Saltzman, thank you always
for what you are doing in this space world.
General Allvin, it is always good to see you. I appreciate
our conversations in between these meetings, and I probably
just want to spend a little bit more time on questions that we
have already talked about, just having your assurances, you
know, towards those conversations, to be candid.
So the first question is, as we are talking about Seymour
Johnson Air Force Base, could you please expand on the
commitment, if it remains as we have had many conversations now
or several conversations, and I am saying beyond just you,
General Spain, and others, regarding bringing the block 229 F-
15Es to Seymour Johnson Air Force Base once those F-35s come
online.
General Allvin. Yes. Thank you. That continues to be our
plan as we get them there. So that is on track or has been in
the last couple of years. We still think it is the right thing
to do, to keep that capability and keep Seymour Johnson for the
core F-15E and F-15EX training, as well.
Mr. Davis. Thank you so much, which then also brings me
into the next question. Being that we are seeing an increasing
role of the training at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base,
continue to put on, obviously, a reconciliation package going
through, how do we plan to address that increased training?
General Allvin. Yes. We are certainly working with that
with Air Combat Command to understand what the increased
throughput would be. Right now, we are also looking at getting
more pilot training graduates out as we are starting to
increase that pipeline. So Air Combat Command is looking at
specifically to make sure that we can handle--now, at that
point, it just becomes you put more platforms in and do require
more maintenance and more instructors, et cetera, et cetera, to
accommodate that. So we are looking at the increased throughput
caused by those, which is going to be ramping up over the next
few years. We are taking a close look at that right now.
Mr. Davis. Thank you so much for that. And then, obviously,
then it brings me back to still dealing with reconciliation.
When we have dealt with Congress, the prior conversations
dealing with investment, obviously, there was a period, as we
were dealing with those conversations and the ultimate
decision, and now the decision has been made and we are
bringing forth now revenue appropriations, $127 million, to
address the current needs in terms of operational needs at
Seymour, the F-15Es that are currently there, those 220s. Could
you speak on that, please, the commitment of making sure those
funds remain in place?
General Allvin. Because those are just as critical as the
others. We still have a portion of our force that is flying in
the 220s and, regardless of that, the quality of the support
infrastructure and everything that makes that mission happen,
we can let it drop because, as we see with an increase in the
introduction of the F-15EX, there is just a general proposition
that this is going to be a platform with both variants. That's
going to be a part of our future, a growing part of out future,
more so than we thought of when we started these conversations
several years ago.
Mr. Davis. That's fine. And I will just take a moment to
continue to articulate I am constantly on the base, constantly
staying engaged, and realize the dire need that exists there.
And some of this is because of just dealing with the prior
decisions that now have been made but, nevertheless, as
decisions are being made, we need to make sure we are still in
position to deal with addressing those decisions. And I just
want to continue to uplift those, bring them to the forefront.
Now, looking into the future, I, obviously, a lot of
interest in Seymour Johnson Air Force Base. In a world of we
continue to talk about F-15EXs and notice the argument and our
conversations have driven just trying to increase the H-15E
presence at Seymour with the 229s, but do you maybe see the
world, a world in which maybe the F-15EXs or, you know, under
NGAD [Next Generation Air Dominance], you know, my question
would be, you know, even potentially F-47s at Seymour.
General Allvin. Well, we certainly need to look at the
mission. Of course, when we think of the F-47, it eventually is
the follow-on to the F-22, so it is never a one-for-one
replacement but understanding the different mission sets that
are required of those different types of platform.
But when we certainly look at the future, we need to also
understand where we might want to put--
Mr. Davis. Let me take my last five seconds here. Do you
see the world as transferring aircraft from Seymour to the
Guard to help--
General Allvin. We need to have a balanced total force to
make sure that we have capability for the future, so I wouldn't
take anything off the table at this point.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Dr. McCormick.
Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you,
gentlemen, for being here with us today. That is awesome.
One of the things that really worried us about the lessons
learned we had overseas right now with the Operation Rough
Rider and the deployment to the Yemen area. What kind of
lessons--I'll probably this with you, General. What kind of
lessons have we learned with the Houthis and what we can do
better with both measures and countermeasures, offensive and
defensive coordination, against those sort of terrorist
organizations?
General Allvin. Well, we are certainly learning a lot in
CENTCOM [United States Central Command]. You mentioned Houthis
specifically. Between that and the salvo that came from Iran 18
months ago or almost two years ago now, we are learning a lot
about how we need to address threats that might be low cost,
high volume, and don't end up on the wrong side of the cost
curve.
And so even just most recently, we had developed
capabilities that were lower cost that we are now putting on
platforms over in the Middle East. So, for example, whereas
before we would have an F-15 E with an AIM-9X on it, which
400,000 a pop, to maybe an AMRAAM [Advanced Medium-Range-Air-
to-Air Missile], which is over a million dollars a pop,
shooting down the cheaper drones.
Now, we need to protect our assets, so we did what the
situation required. However, we have more recently developed
capabilities to where we can have laser-guided rockets, which
are doing the same thing against those platforms. So instead of
$400,000 or $1 million a pop, these things are $32,000 a shot
and you can put 42 shots on an aircraft. So it is showing that
we have the ability to adapt our current force structure to
meet those threats in the Middle East, that we aren't expending
all the resources that we need to do to develop the
capabilities, the high-end capabilities to meet the Chinese
threat in the Indo-Pacific.
Dr. McCormick. And do you think our countermeasures, as far
as like they can send after us, we had some U.S. troops
actually killed not that long ago by drone strikes from
terrorists and it was on our bases. What kind of hardened
structures are we using or even nets, anything cheap, whatever
we can use? Are we looking at some things that are
realistically going to be deployed against these things that
are very difficult to go after mass-wise?
General Allvin. We are. In fact, within CENTCOM, and I'm
speaking for the Air Force bases, of course this is all
outside, but, in the Air Force bases, I was in one of the bases
here over Christmastime, and they are using these various,
stitching together the various counter-UAS [Unmanned Aircraft
System] systems but rethinking this is not only just the
capabilities, it has to be the operational concepts on how to
defend a base in a way we haven't thought about because they
have been uncontested for 25-30 years.
So, now, having a unit train ahead of time to know how to
defend the base and go in and preserve that installation and
the force generation that it provides is absolutely key. I
think we are making some progress. It is not only capabilities.
It is the units that are trained to go over there and fight,
but they are trained ahead of time as units. Those things are
key.
Dr. McCormick. Perfect. And, Mr. Secretary, I know one of
the things that we talked about, AI predictability and
maintenance, and the chair talked about our ability to stay up
above 60 percent, especially with aircraft, and I know that,
when you have a bunch of aircraft that are down because we
didn't predict it appropriately, it puts us at a disadvantage.
Some of the readiness rates are really, really poor,
obviously. Are you using AI-predictive models to get on top of
that?
Dr. Meink. We are. There has been a number of efforts to
start doing that, and I think that is going to help. But I also
think, even over the years, because of budget pressures, we
have squeezed that and even though we knew--well, we knew we
were squeezing it. So it really didn't take advance predictive
models to know that we were actually squeezing it and we are
trying to put more focus on readiness, trying to make sure that
we have the parts, sustainment, and we had a little discussion
over there about right to repair, those sorts of things.
So there is going to be a focus across the board, but some
of the advanced analytics to help predict that are going to be
important, as they are now. But they will continue to probably
increase in importance.
Dr. McCormick. I always encourage the secretaries, just
like the commandants and the leaders of each individual
service, to be as transparent as possible about the stuff you
guys need, and you always need more, always need more. I
remember when General Krulak was the only general out of the
service commanders that really said, hey, we need more, we're
suffering. And then, when everything started falling apart,
they are like only one general told us we needed more. The
chair has been very open and honest about the fact that we need
more investment in our military, so just be very aggressive on
that. We will receive that well, I think.
Final question. Now, this doesn't really apply to the Space
Force because you guys are brand new, but we can see a lot of
legacy systems that aren't benefitting all the services. The
Marine Corps is trying to shed some of those things that we
don't use for the next war, not the last war. And there is some
protectionism in Congress, I think, on systems. I think the
last recent Futures Command analysis of the Air Force was like
30 percent of your assets really aren't futuristic, they are
not thinking about the next war, they are thinking about the
last war. Maybe they are protectionist from the standpoint of
people have things produced in their districts.
I would love to see you identify stuff. We can replant
those things with the futuristic cheaper, better stuff that we
use in the future. I hope you will work with us to identify
those things that we don't need anymore. It is okay. Work with
us in Congress. We will help you collectively.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Tran.
Mr. Tran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Meink, General
Saltzman, General Allvin, thank you all for your service and
for your testimony today. As you know, the Space Development
Agency was created to drive innovation and field capabilities
rapidly, but, as the SDA transitions further into the Space
Force, there are uncertainties about maintaining its agility
and unique acquisition model.
Recently, there have been rumors suggesting that SDA's
Tranche 2 and Tranche 3 transport layers are facing termination
within the current 2026 DoD budget in favor of Mil Net. As you
know, SDA's transport layer is the only direct-to-platform
constellation in development. The alternative currently does
not have a direct-to-platform capability and is optimized for
high-data rate transfer to ground stations and then
dissemination of data. SDA's transport layer provides essential
low-latency communication that reaches the tactical edge.
Transport is the only proven Link 16 capability in space. The
Link 16 capabilities will not exist for at least three years.
Not only would cancellation of Tranche 2 result in the
termination of hundreds of millions of dollars of ongoing
fixed-price contracts severely degrading and eliminating areas
of the growing space industrial base but also would delay
getting this critical capability directly to the warfighter.
Can you ensure that SDA's Tranche 2 transport layer will be
protected within the department's 2026 budget? Will you also
speak generally about the importance of SDA to the growing
space industrial base in California and across the country and
how it ensures competition and resiliency moving forward?
General Saltzman. So the fiscal year 2025 budget, of
course, is not finalized yet. The request hasn't come over yet,
so we will take a look at the specific details once those are
finalized for sure.
I agree with you 100 percent that the capabilities that SDA
is pursuing are vital to almost every aspect of the Space Force
mission and the joint force writ large. The data transport
layer is vital. And the capabilities that we are delivering in
Tranche 2 in particular are key to that success, so we are
committed to making sure that that program is successful and
looking at the broad array of capabilities that might
complement it.
Mr. Tran. Thank you so much. I appreciate that. The Air
Force has emphasized the urgency of the Combat Collaborative
Aircraft, CCA, program in enabling affordable mass and
operational advantage against pure adversaries. Yet, there is
concerns that Increment 1 aircraft under development may be
treated primarily as test beds rather than operational assets.
What specific steps is the department taking to ensure that
these Increment 1 platforms are not merely prototypes for
evaluation but are, in fact, fielded in meaningful numbers on
an operationally-relevant time line to meet the pacing threat
from China?
General Allvin. Thank you very much for the question
because, frankly, that is the first I have heard that anyone is
considering them only becoming test articles. We are absolutely
integrating them into our operational Air Force. As a matter of
fact, the two competitors that we down-selected for prototypes,
General Atomics and Anduril, are competing very heavily against
each other for us to be able to use both of them.
In parallel to the development and the prototyping of the
actual platforms, we have a simultaneous program going on for
the development of the autonomy. It is called Project VENOM. So
we are understanding how we can leverage the autonomy, put them
into the platforms, and make better use of them in human
machine teaming. Simultaneous to that, we have the experimental
operational unit. So as soon as they come online, we are
expecting to have a couple of hundred of them by the end of the
FYDP. As soon as they come online, we want to be able to
integrate them, employ them, and advance their capabilities,
and learn about the human-machine team in an operationally
relevant time frame.
The challenge is that we are going to stick with, there is
always something you say, if you spend a little longer, we can
put something else on it, we can put something--speed to ramp
is the key here. Get it out there, get the usefulness of it,
and learn from it. I fully expect them to be operationally
utilized.
Mr. Tran. That is right. Thank you so much, General. I
appreciate that testimony. And thank you to all three of you
for being here.
With that, Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Harrigan.
Mr. Harrigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
your testimony today, gentlemen. Great to have you here. We had
the Army in here yesterday and learned a lot from them, and I
wanted to talk to you, General Allvin.
In January of this year, you wrote an op-ed for Breaking
Defense in which you stated that the Air Force is now kind of
at a make-or-break moment. And I fully agree with you, couldn't
agree more. The Air Force cannot afford to keep doing things
the way that it has always done them. And if we are truly
serious about prevailing in the next conflict or properly
deterring the next conflict against the PRC [People's Republic
of China], we have got to get serious about how we actually
align our resources. And when I take a look at the equivalent
of the balance sheet in the P&L [Profit and Loss]for the Air
Force, it bleeds red from both an infrastructure perspective
and a legacy systems perspective. Your own end budgets are just
absolutely bleeding, and you talked a little bit about that
today. You talked about some excess infrastructure that you
have both from facilities perspective, as well as from an
available apron perspective. My colleague from Georgia talked
about identifying certain systems that, as we all know here,
may be parochial, right? They may be, and some of these
decisions have been made in the best interests of certain
districts across the country, but they haven't been made in the
best interests of the United States of America moving forward.
And I think we need to fix that.
So my question for both you and the secretary is are and do
you have a similar plan, much like we were briefed yesterday by
the Army, the Army Transformation Initiative, do you have a
similar plan in the Air Force to purge these legacy weapon
systems, these legacy force structures, and reallocate some of
this real estate that you have that is not helping your budgets
right now so that we can create the Air Force of the future? Do
you have a formal plan for that?
General Allvin. I will take the first shot at it and then
let the secretary correct me 100 percent. But our plan is
different from the Army's is that our plan, it requires growth
either way. And so when we look at specifically with the
infrastructure, that is one where there can be pure savings,
but it is not as easy as saying, well, let's just close this or
that, which is why we really want to work with Congress because
you might have ten installations that might have ten-percent
excess each on them, but that doesn't mean you close any one of
them without some collaboration or understanding.
For me and for my advice to the secretary is, however that
gets resolved, as long as it is off my books, that excess
infrastructure, whatever it costs to do that, we can
recapitalize that. So that would be one plan is to work with
ways to generate revenue or do something to where that excess
infrastructure that is not supporting our Airmen's quality of
work or quality of life is no longer on our books because that
is when, tooth to tail, that is all tail. And so eliminating
that is part one.
The other part is, the tougher part is really fully
divesting ourselves of some of the legacy force structure. I
will tell you, though, that this prioritization that we are
directed to do to ensure what would it look like if we had to
drop off some percentage of our budget to make room for the
president's priorities, that sharpened our focus. And so it is
very clearly in the aggregate. Three things: defend the
homeland from the air, and we do the nuclear recapitalization
to support strategic returns, and then projecting power to
deter the PRC.
Some things fall out of the bottom of those, but they are
very important to the joint force. So we find that the joint
force loves the Air Force, as well. So we find ourselves
challenged to say pull any of the main capabilities out not
only because they are a parochial interest within districts and
states but also there are some parochial interests within other
parts of the joint force.
So we will continue to identify those things that are least
dear to us, but, before it makes it out of the Department of
Defense, you need to understand they may be least dear to us,
but, if they are so dear to the joint force, then that needs to
be resourced elsewhere. So that is the challenge for us.
Mr. Harrigan. Thanks, General. And before, Mr. Secretary,
you give your answer, I would like to say very clearly I don't
think anybody has any interest in closing off any
infrastructure. We have got to make it relevant because, once
we lose it, we never get it back, and it is a loss of national
capability. So just to clarify that.
Mr. Secretary, do you have any thoughts? You have got about
40 seconds.
Dr. Meink. I guess I would just reinforce your statement
that evolving and modernizing the force is critical. The
question I asked earlier about some of the things we learned in
Yemen and you had a lot of the low-end threats, but we also
learned that, unfortunately, the proliferation of some of the
high-end Russian anti-aircraft and other systems and what we
have seen within the Ukraine theater is, if you don't have a
survival system, you are in trouble, even if you are over
Yemen.
Mr. Harrigan. Mr. Secretary, in about ten seconds, I am
going to reclaim my time here. I would just encourage both of
you to take a very hard look at the assets that we have and, if
they have not helped us win the last 30 years of war and if
they are not helpful to deterring or defeating China, we need
to make the hard decisions and get rid of them. Thank you.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Meink,
welcome. I look forward to working with you in the days ahead.
I note your extensive experience in space operations and I'll
focus on that.
General Saltzman, good to see you once again. You are going
to get a bye this time. As for you, General Allvin, we have
been down through this. Would you be disappointed if I didn't
take up the Sentinel? I suspect, Secretary, you have been well
briefed. I understand the Sentinel has come up from some of my
colleagues, and that is good.
This is a question for you, Mr. Secretary. This is a quote
from the president not so long ago: There is no reason for U.S.
to be building brand new nuclear weapons. We are all spending a
lot of money that we could be spending on other things that are
actually, hopefully, much more productive.
Secretary Meink, do you agree or disagree with the
president?
Dr. Meink. Well, what I will tell you is that nuclear
deterrence across the board is one of the highest priorities of
the nuclear enterprise. National security is the highest
property, and Sentinel is one of those programs. We continue
to, obviously, support that program, and we are doing
everything we can to get it back on track. I think the concern
has been, and this is really the delivery system for nuclear
weapons, nothing to do with nuclear weapons themselves. We
don't build those. This is the delivery systems and just the
fact that we need to modernize, given the age of the Minuteman
III, is critical, as well as some additional capability we need
to operate in the future environment that we can talk about in
more detail in a separate environment.
So we are spending a lot of time making sure that we are
doing this program right. Obviously, costs grew, and we got to
make sure that we execute, execute, execute, so that we are
efficient in line with the president's directive to support the
homeland and deter China.
Mr. Garamendi. If I were to look at the written testimony
that will soon be available, yours and others, it would seem as
though you disagree with the president because the Sentinel is
a new nuclear delivery system.
Dr. Meink. So, Congressman, I would have to go back and
look at specifics at the quote you pulled. I have never and do
not believe that I disagree with the president on anything. I
think we are supporting his priorities, which is support the
homeland, and this is one of the programs that we will use to
support the homeland, along with a number of the other programs
that the department provides to the nation.
Mr. Garamendi. This introduction was specifically to bring
your attention a $200 billion new weapon system. The rocket
itself and the various infrastructure needed is well over $150
billion now. There is a new nuclear bomb, new command and
control systems, and other bits and pieces along the way that
have pushed this to $200 billion. Quoting the president, we are
spending a lot of money that we could be spending on other
things that are actually, hopefully, much more productive.
Direct quote from the president, and I will get that delivered
to you.
Bottom line of this is that we have a third leg of the
triad, the Minuteman III, which, under the current plan for the
Sentinel, would require that the Minuteman III continue to be
operative for at least another decade, at which time the first
Sentinel would be available to begin the replacement process.
We don't have to stop the Sentinel program, but we can
certainly delay it and then spend that money on things that
have been discussed by my colleagues here, which are much more
relevant to today's fighting.
There is a very interesting word that is used in support of
the Sentinel and the Minuteman III and that is that it is the
most responsive leg, and I would opine that the reason it is
the most responsive is that it is the use-it-or-lose-it leg in
which the rockets would have to be deployed or be taken out by
an incoming nuclear attack. However, there are other very
responsive ones. The B-21, for example, that is something less
than a billion dollars a copy. Let's just assume it is $150
billion. How many B-21s could you have that are clearly
responsive?
Dr. Meink. Congressman, I am not going to try to do the
math in my head. I would say that--
Mr. Garamendi. Somewhere about 150.
Dr. Meink. --the Sentinel program is designed to be,
actually, a very survivable system and--
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Fallon.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
witnesses. What I want to talk to you, General Allvin, about is
recruiting. We had the posturing on the Army, and, literally,
when the secretary of the Army mentioned that they had hit
their goals, I cheered and other members of this committee did
because we were in a crisis mode year over year. It is one
thing to miss your recruiting goals in a given year, but when
you are doing it year over year three, four, five in a row,
then it gets to be crisis.
So if you could talk to us a little bit about where we are
with recruiting with the Air Force, why you think it turned
around. What I would also encourage you to do and the
secretary, as well, is let's find out the reasons. Everybody
has their suppositions and maybe expectations as to why, but I
would really like to figure out why people are now joining so
we can then replicate it and continue on, if you could expound.
General Allvin. Thank you very much. And I am going to be
very brief because I could go on for an hour with you. Maybe I
will come and see you afterwards. I would say, first of all, I
love the way you characterize it, crisis versus a challenge.
The Air Force only had one year we didn't make it.
Mr. Fallon. Okay.
General Allvin. We have only had one year that we didn't
meet our recruiting goals. Since then, we have. We think it is
a combination of several things: The COVID hangover where we
couldn't get our folks into the schools and start getting the
Americans excited about joining the United States Air Force. We
also had certain maybe outdated policies. We also had this sort
of mix-in of the new medical system by which you evaluated
people's ability to join, and that caused some bottlenecks in
the time between when you got the contact or, as the Marines
say, contact to contract, that sort of mucked up that for a
little while. All those things came together.
But, fundamentally, we think it is several things. It is
also a unifying focus, focusing on the threat, focusing on the
warrior ethos, all of these things come together. And as we do
that, we want to ensure, to your point, Congressman, to your
point, we want to ensure the things that we are doing
different, we want to track in a longitudinal study format to
see, year over year, are those the recruits the ones that are
staying, the ones that are performing.
So we are doing that analysis. We are confident with good
shoe leather, good IT support for our recruiting, it will
continue to get more contacts out there, and that is the--
Mr. Fallon. In general, roughly, what is the number when
you are talking Air Guard, Reserve, and active on a year-over-
year basis? What are we looking at roughly?
General Allvin. Well, on the active side, we look for about
31,000 was the goal for recruiting, and on the Guard side it is
closer to--I want to make sure I got it right--
Mr. Fallon. Guard and Reserve total.
General Allvin. Well, on the Guard side, I think it is
6,000 and the Reserves 4,000. I will get you--
Mr. Fallon. Okay. Thank you. And then are we making--real
quickly because I want to move on to a couple of other things.
For those that qualify in every other regard but, you know,
physically, they're not quite up to mark, are we doing anything
special for them?
General Allvin. We are still holding them to the same
standard.
Mr. Fallon. Okay. We're not, if they miss--I think one of
the other branches is putting them through another month of
prep. They are not kicking them back out.
General Allvin. We haven't had to do that.
Mr. Fallon. You haven't had to do that. Okay. Thank you. As
far as, Mr. Secretary--I'm sorry. General Saltzman, with cyber,
tomorrow it is going to be more important than it is today and
furthermore. How are we attracting folks to serve in cyber
because it is set with specificity and maybe not just with the
military, maybe on the civilian side; and how are we training
them and how are we retaining them? And then what can we do in
Congress to give you the tools to get these very critical
people in the future, today and in the future?
General Saltzman. We have had a lot of luck with
recruiting. There is a lot of interest in coming in and
learning cyber techniques and cyber capabilities in the
military, and we are taking advantage of that certainly. We
rely on the Air Force training pipeline to train our enlisted
cadre with regards to cyber, and we are almost uniquely wholly
committed to cyber mission defense, meaning we are not
protecting our unclassified networks, our administrative
networks. We are focused on just the weapons systems and those
mission networks. So we have a smaller cyber force dedicated to
just that mission network protection.
But the point you raised about can we keep them in and keep
them retained, we are doing everything we can to make sure they
stay on the leading edge of cyber defense technology, working
with industry, deploying some of our guardian cyber people into
industry to learn the techniques there and then come back and
deliver to us. So we are trying to do as much as we can to keep
the education at a high level.
Mr. Fallon. And if we have to in Congress provide any
monies for specific scholarships, just let us know, Mr.
Secretary, what we can do in that regard because it is so
critical moving forward.
And with my last 20 seconds, I want to say, Mr. Secretary,
welcome. You were the right man at the right time in the right
place for the right job, and it is great to have you here.
Dr. Meink. Thank you.
The Chairman. You have 11 more seconds.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you very much. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank our
witnesses. I just want to deal first with the probe about
research and development and readiness issues, and I noticed,
you know, with AFWERX and I noticed with AF Ventures, you know,
coordination with the Air Force and the commercial side of
things. But one of the areas I think it really would be
advantageous is to have more of a collaboration with the
universities, colleges, and other schools. I know the Air Force
does that with Howard, but, you know, in my district, I am
looking at collaboration sometimes with MIT [Massachusetts
Institute of Technology] and Lincoln Laboratories, those
groups; but I also look at a program we have we deal with the
Navy at the University of Massachusetts in my district where
they have a program for marine undersea technology research and
they develop their own curriculum in conjunction with the Navy,
and they are working on the research very successfully. But,
also, those people are a pipeline to more recruitment and more
service personnel.
Elsewhere in my district is a community college working on
avionics. The Cape Cod Community College has a program on
avionics training, and they have avionics maintenance
technician licenses that come out of it, avionics electronic
technology technicians licenses on it. And there is a waiting
list to participate in this.
So could you tell me what avenues you have either with
grants or other outreaches to the universities and the schools
that are there? Bridgewater State University in my district has
a pilot training program. So is there ways we can link because
I see a benefit all the way around to really expanding interest
in these kind of relationships. I guess Mr. Secretary or
General Allvin probably would be the better two, I guess, for
this.
Dr. Meink. So, Congressman, I agree. We develop and operate
some of the most complex systems and innovating faster than the
adversary is just critical for us to maintain our lethality
edge. Access to the technical skills within the U.S. not just
industry but at universities is important. One of the things,
interestingly, just yesterday, I had a conversation about how
we might make it easier to get access to some of that technical
skill. Sometimes, it takes a while for us to set up agreements
with universities. Is there a way we can standardize that--
Mr. Keating. The Navy, for instance, has a grant.
Dr. Meink. Yes. Maybe we can make it a little bit easier
for us to get access and more flexible for us to get access to
that talent. So I think it is important and that is something
that I will continue to--
Mr. Keating. Yes. I think it is not just research, it is a
pipeline to recruitment.
Dr. Meink. Oh, sure. Once you get access and--
Mr. Keating. Trained recruitment, too. They are already
trained.
Dr. Meink. One of the best ways to maintain and get people
to stay in the service is keep them interested, and one of the
ways to get them into the service is to get them interested
through university programs like--
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you. I just have a little over a
minute left, and I just wanted to just touch on one issue. We
have done a lot of discussions about morale from the bottom up.
Can you discuss--I have some concerns for morale from the top
down in our branches. How important is it to have that strong
morale at the top of the chain of command?
General Allvin. I think it is critical across the board to
ensure that, you know--and, of course, by the time you hang
around as long as Salty and I have, you know, you have got that
commitment and you know what the purpose is, but it is very
important to keep the morale and--
Mr. Keating. Yes. I am worried because, you know, and I
understand there is discretion. But in the short period of this
administration, there is 40 generals or somewhere along that
line, four-star rank and above, and ten percent of them have
been removed, and that is the discretion of the administration.
But I am worried.
And, you know, when I look at someone that I have had great
admiration for by being on this committee, General Timothy
Hawk, by being on this committee, I mean, few people in our
military have the expertise that he had. I mean, he has got the
cyber expertise unmatched, I think, among many and the
technical intel that goes with that. He is an extraordinary
resource, and he was removed without cause, even though he
served four presidents. He was removed without cause, and the
rumors were or the reports were the only reason was a
conspiracy theorist for 9/11, Laura Loomer.
So I am worried if this continues for morale from the top
down, and I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Meink, Robins
Air Force Base, Robins Air Logistics Complex is a critical
logistics depot maintenance part of the United States Air
Force. I would love for you to come down and visit Robins and
accompany you there where we look forward to accepting the F-
35. Can you confirm that the U.S. Air Force is still committed
to a three-depot strategy?
Dr. Meink. Yes, Congressman, I can confirm that and looking
forward to coming for a visit and Robins' critical
infrastructure.
Mr. Scott. Yes, sir. Is the Air Force, as other branches
continue to divest older equipment, non-survivable equipment, I
want to speak specifically to ISR. So we are getting rid of a
lot of theater airborne ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance]. How are you going to handle the demand for the
ISR services that the combatant commanders need? How are we
going to take that with the draw downs?
Dr. Meink. Congressman, that is always, you ask any
combatant commander, they are always looking for more theater
ISR. And they say ISR. When you think about it, intelligence is
an outcome. SNR, you know, surveillance and reconnaissance, is
a mission. They really want that situational awareness to help
them make decisions. That is what it is. And, historically, it
has come through platforms, and so that's what they say, I need
the theater ISR. They really need some of those decision
support mechanisms.
And so, as we move from some of that that's been manned to
some of that that's been unmanned, some of that has been an
airborne layer, and now some of it is going to go to space.
Some of it has been evolving with open-source intelligence
fusion.
So I think we need to be creative about understanding what
is the capability you need rather than the platform you need
and, as they do design the platforms in any one domain or
another, then we are going to have to manage those scarce
resources as we evolve to those things that we have used in the
past because we have had more permissive environments to those
things that will be survivable in the most contested
environment.
Mr. Scott. I agree with you on that. I would also tell you,
though, that we have the Western Hemisphere, we have large
areas of Africa that we do have systems that are capable of
operating in those areas, and we are drawing down those systems
in the belief that we are going to have other systems. And I do
worry that we draw down faster than we put up. And when it
comes to carrying out the mission, we are collecting a
tremendous amount of data in the new platforms. That data has
to be processed and turned into information to carry out the
mission on the ground. So there are a lot of steps there, and
we have to get every one of them right because any missing
link, you know, causes a problem for the troops that are
carrying out the mission on the ground.
One last question. The training ranges. This was brought up
during the confirmation hearing of General Caine. He
highlighted how the training ranges are inadequate to prepare
both air and space forces for our modern adversaries. How do
you intend to better incorporate low cost, electronic warfare
targets, and decoys to better replicate near-peer adversaries?
General Allvin. Thank you, Congressman. I can let General
Saltzman speak to the space side, but on the air side,
obviously, the Nevada Test and Training Range and JPARC [Joint
Pacific Alaska Range Complex] up in Alaska in the Pacific are
the primary ones that we want to ensure we are paced for the
high-end threat. To the extent that we can bring up the other
ranges, we will do so.
But you made the right point which is these threat emitters
are the ones that can replicate better than they have been able
to do in the past to get better training on those ranges. Those
low and mid-cost threat emitters are the key. And as we do
that, we also need to look into the procurement of those
emitters, just like we are doing everything else, think about
open systems, modular architecture that allows us to take new
technologies, as a new characterization of threats changes,
that we need to be able to adapt so the emitters that we have
today aren't obsolete tomorrow.
So those are the answer. You hit the answer: getting more
of those emitters, putting them on the ranges, and being able
to exercise them is going to be the key going forward. And that
is our path.
Mr. Scott. General Saltzman, briefly.
General Saltzman. Yes, sir. I would just add to that that
we are investing heavily in digital ranges to make sure that
operators have the threat replication to practice their
tactics. But we are also looking at on-orbit capabilities both
for live tests, as well as training, to make sure we get live
data to better build the models that go into our digital
ranges.
Mr. Scott. Gentlemen, thank you.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to all
the witnesses for being here today and your service. General
Saltzman, as you know, the increased launch cadence at
Vandenburg, which is in my district, has caused noise
disturbance. As the cadence of launches has increased, the
number of constituent complaints have grown. Space is critical
to our national security, and I am one of the biggest
supporters in Congress. But we need to get buy-in from the
surrounding bases.
The leadership at Vandenburg has been extremely helpful, I
must say, in working with me and my team to find solutions,
like changing launch windows and trajectories, when possible,
to minimize sonic boom impacts to area residents. So I wanted
to thank you for that.
General Saltzman, do you think additional studies on sonic
booms from launch would help us better understand how to
minimize their impact on nearby communities?
General Saltzman. Well, thank you for your support,
Congressman. It is good to see you. I think absolutely having
data that we can assess based on the new environmental
conditions with the launch tempo, the fog alone changes the
acoustics out there on the point, as you know. So collecting
that data, which we are actively doing and then building,
modeling and simulation software to ingest that data and help
us determine exactly how we might be able to best mitigate
those circumstances is what we are pursuing. But we are doing
that hand-in-glove with community outreach because we want to
make sure we understand precisely what the issues are and where
those issues are being seen as part of the data collection, and
we want to be as transparent as we can with the local community
because they are so important to us.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I also appreciate you putting
sound monitors throughout the Central Coast to make sure that
we get it as best and as right as possible in mitigating the
noise. So thank you again.
So far, through NSSL [National Security Space Launch], only
SpaceX is certified to launch out of both the eastern and
western ranges. ULA [United Launch Alliance] has had to give up
two of its, previously one, launches out of Vandenburg because
it lacked certification on the West Coast. Blue Origin can't
even compete for launches from Vandenburg because they don't
yet have a West Coast launch pad.
If NSSL launches out of the western range can only be
provided by one company, then we don't really have competition,
do we? The Space Force can create an environment for
competition, but we still need providers to compete seriously.
General Saltzman, will you say it is a national security risk
to only have one NSSL provider certified to launch out of the
western range, and what can the Space Force do to ensure we
have all our Lane 2 launch providers operational on both
coasts?
General Saltzman. Assured access to space requires that
kind of resiliency. That is industrial-based resiliency, as
well as geographic resiliency and different rocket systems so
that a problem in one doesn't create an assured access problem
for us. So I agree with you.
We are working quickly, and there is a pathway to getting
ULA certification on the western range. And I just was out
there and I listened to the leadership team talk about their
long-term infrastructure plan to add additional launch complex
capabilities to allow for other insurance to have the launch
complexes they need, as well. So long-term plan, those aren't
quick, but we do have a plan in place to do that.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Well, the quicker, the better.
General Saltzman, are there plans to make TacSRT [Tactical
Surveillance Reconnaissance and Tracking] a program of record?
If not, why?
General Saltzman. Because it is heavily reliant on
commercial services, and so I don't want to take it on as a
program of record where it is organically done by us because I
think we would miss out on the innovation we get through the
commercial imagery providers. So TacSRT, the benefit of it is
that we only pay for what we need when we need it, and we allow
the commercial industry to innovate as quickly as possible. I
just need the money to bolster the marketplace, so there is a
continued demand signal for that commercial imagery.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. And my last question may not get
to an answer, but, General Saltzman, can you speak to the Space
Force's commitment to the TacRS [Tactically Responsive Space]
initiative, particularly how it plans to continue support-
responsive space maneuvering for orbital warfare and space
surveillance?
General Saltzman. Yes, sir. Tactically-responsive space is
a key element of what we are trying to do, and we are committed
to getting it better and more robust as we go forward.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman from California. The
chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Messmer.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
witnesses, for being here today. General Saltzman, during an
interview earlier this year, you stated that the Golden Dome
would need a layered approach with Space Force playing a
central role in this new initiative. How significant is a
contribution of Space Force have from a space-based Interceptor
and space-based radar perspective?
General Saltzman. Yes, Congressman, we are central to that
effort because there is going to be a sensor network that has
to be space enabled that will have to move the data quickly,
which will have a space component to it, as well. And then, as
mentioned in the executive order, that space-based Interceptor
is technology that we are pursuing, but it will be a system of
systems. It is going to be more than just the Space Force to
try to stitch together.
Mr. Messmer. Right. Which leads to my next question, have
there been preliminary conversations on how the Space Force
will contribute and integrate with other service branches?
General Saltzman. Absolutely. It is absolutely essential
that we do.
Mr. Messmer. Okay. Secretary Meink and General Allvin, can
you also comment on the Air Force contributions to the Golden
Dome for America initiative?
General Allvin. Yes. Congressman, again, as that plays out,
we do believe that there is the air layer in there, so there is
the sense of domain awareness that we have to do. We need to
understand how we can support and integrate with the sensing
and the capabilities that are coming from Space to be able to
either work with through see-through battle management,
integrate that command and control with it, or be able to do
the defensive interception of hypersonic and cruise missiles
coming through the air domain and air layer.
But they come through multidomain, as General Saltzman
mentioned. We all look at this multidomain, so my partner with
the United States Air Force is to ensure that we have those
capabilities to integrate overall in the Golden Dome.
Mr. Messmer. Okay. Thank you. Which kind of leads to my
next question, General Allvin. During the Senate Armed Services
Committee a few weeks ago, you stated that air and missile
threats are evolving from both a speed and sophistication
standpoint, hypersonics being one of the more significant new
threats. How has the Air Force prepared for rapid innovation by
Russia and China in their hypersonic programs?
General Allvin. So defending against hypersonics and then
there is creating our own hypersonics. I think you are alluding
to the defense of these hypersonics. This becomes more and more
challenging. And we find that it is one of those that's not
just an Air Force-only problem, it is a joint force problem.
Any time you have fixed defenses or things that could be the
target of those sort of hypersonics capabilities, ballistic or
cruise missiles, this is an overall joint force challenge. And
so we are looking at anything from the kinetic effects to
directed energy to the non-kinetic, understanding that these
are threats we need to have a layered approach to. And the
further out you can get after them, the better. And if you can
actually get after them to where they are seeking their targets
through their long-range kill chain and you can interrupt that,
we are looking at that, as well. So we are trying to make sure
that we aren't just fighting from a point defense area. We are
trying to fight them from as far away as possible.
Mr. Messmer. Further left of boom as possible, right?
General Allvin. There you go.
Mr. Messmer. And that, obviously, involves combining ground
and satellite central systems.
General Allvin. Absolutely. Multi-domain, as General
Saltzman said many times.
Mr. Messmer. Okay. Thank you. Secretary Meink, the Air
Force's ability to project power through global strike and
rapid mobility is critical. How is the Air Force integrating
directed energy systems into its airlift and air refueling
programs to protect these assets from drone threats during
high-intensity conflicts?
Dr. Meink. I believe that I can say, at this level, at this
level, is that we are looking at directed energy across the
spectrum for both protection and defense and offense.
Mr. Messmer. Okay. Thank you. Secretary Meink, when
President Trump recently spoke at Michigan's Selfridge Air
National Guard Base, he stated that the United States Air Force
will likely invest in the Guard to reinstate fighter wings. In
my district, in the 8th District of Indiana, the 181st Fighter
Wing transitioned in 2008 to the 181st Intelligence Wing.
Bringing fighter capability back to Indiana is a priority of me
and my district. What can Congress do to assist the Air Force
in expediting the process of reimplementing fighter
capabilities to former fighter wings?
Dr. Meink. Let me take a start at it, and then hand it over
to General Allvin for additional comments. Yes. The biggest
thing is support us in the production of the aircraft as we
both grow all the way across from EXs to the 35s, F-47 going
forward. The more airplanes we have, which is what we need, the
more opportunity there is.
General Allvin, other comments?
General Allvin. Absolutely. It is about the funding and,
quite frankly, when we are looking at the overall capabilities,
we sort of do need to squint into the future and long range and
say the capacity as far as physical assets in the Air Force is
going to be different in the future from what it is right now.
So just trying to regurgitate to make sure we have capabilities
at the same number of installations that we had before I think
is something that we are going to need to be very careful
about. We are so proud of what Indiana has done in the
transition to that wing; I think it's very important.
So it is an overall force structure where cyber and intel
are gaining in importance. We want to make sure we just don't
recreate what we had before.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Bell.
Mr. Bell. First, I want to express my disappointment with
the chair for recognizing North Carolina barbecue and not St.
Louis and even Kansas City.
General Saltzman, General Allvin, thank you for being here
today and for your continued service to our nation. I also want
to join my colleagues in congratulating you, Mr. Secretary, on
your recent confirmation to the role. And I also want to
recognize the servicemembers sitting behind you. Thank you for
your service, as well.
I am proud to represent St. Louis, a region that plays a
critical role in our national security. Everyday, my
constituents contribute to vital missions from intelligence
work at the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency to
sustaining global mobility at Scott Air Force Base just across
the river to advancing the capabilities of our warfighters
through aerospace innovation and manufacturing. St. Louis is
home to the production of some of the most advanced fighter
aircraft in the world, including the F-15EX. Our region also
plays an central role in the development of the Air Force's
six-generation fighter jet.
However, while these contributions are vital, we must also
recognize that the same people building our national defense
are facing severe challenges at home. Many are still recovering
from the worst natural disaster to hit our region since the
late 1950s. My constituents are dedicated Americans helping to
defend our country not only in uniform but through their work
on our defense industrial base who now need our support. We
cannot overlook their needs, nor can we afford to weaken the
very industrial base they sustain.
That brings me to another crucial concern. The Air Force
has contracted for 98 F-15EX aircraft with final delivery
expected by 2029. I am concerned that, without continued
procurement beyond that point, we risk not only losing critical
workforce capacity in places like St. Louis but also
jeopardizing the strategic resilience of our tactical air craft
industrial base.
General Allvin and Secretary Meink, do you agree that
maintaining a degree of redundancy in the nation's tactical
fighter manufacturing capability is a strategic imperative?
General Allvin. Thank you for that, Congressman. I do. And
the F-15EX, it is so far proving itself out very well. We will
see going in the fiscal year 2026 budget and beyond what the
possibilities for the future are, but we are seeing that it is
putting more weapons on rails and being able to do that is very
relevant in the Indo-Pacific.
Mr. Bell. Secretary, did you want to--
Dr. Meink. Agree. And we have multiple, Lockheed, Boeing.
They are our two primary. F-16s are still being built in the
U.S., so we actually have three contractors who are building
fighters in the U.S. I think it is important to maintain that
level of redundancy for competition in the future, as well as
just resilience.
Mr. Bell. And then given the evolving and unpredictable
threat environment our warfighters are now facing, what is the
rationale behind not maintaining two active tactical fighter
production lines until the next-generation aircraft is fully
operational? General.
General Allvin. If your question is why aren't we having
more fighter lines, it is a matter of resources. I mean, we
would take all the resource and those are prioritizations
against--you want to make sure also they are competing with
munitions, also with the air refueling capability, also with
the infrastructure. And so it really is just a matter of trying
to build the whole force to the level that we think the nation
needs and not having a misshapen force that has too much of one
thing that can't be used because we don't have everything else.
Mr. Bell. And the F-15EX that just achieved initial
operational capability last year is an even more capable
aircraft building on the payload, range, and speed of the F-15
with the addition of next-generation capabilities for enhanced
lethality and survivability. Can you talk about the importance
quickly of the F-15EX to the Air Force's fighter fleet?
General Allvin. Adding that in, it is starting to prove its
worth not only in our exercises but in our larger-scale
exercises and, seeing it performing in the Indo-Pacific, it
provides more weapons on rails and more range and more
relevance and survivability in the Indo-Pacific.
Mr. Bell. Okay. And I will yield my remaining seconds back
to the chair if he wants to respond to the allegations that
have--
The Chairman. We are going to resolve this. Probably the
night of the NDAA we will have to have a little competition. We
will engage.
With that, I will recognize the gentleman from Colorado,
Mr. Crank.
Mr. Crank. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Colorado has nothing to
offer in regards to barbecue, by the way. Secretary Meink, I
hope you will agree with me that the number-one priority of the
federal government is our national security and that the first
question our military leaders must consider when making major
decisions is how it could affect defense on the homeland.
With that in mind and cognizant of the growing space-based
threat from China and from Russia, to your knowledge, has the
location of U.S. Space Command headquarters at Peterson Space
Force Base caused the Air Force to need to withhold or sub-
optimize any support to the command in any way that has
undermined readiness?
Dr. Meink. And I will ask for a little help from General
Saltzman here, as well, but, with respect to the current Space
Command location, we have been supporting them to the full
level required for them to get to FOC [Full Operating
Capability]. As you are aware, I am sure there is restrictions
with respect to MILCON, but we are supporting them for
readiness at this point.
General Saltzman. Yes, Congressman. We have not seen any
drops in readiness as a result of the location.
Mr. Crank. Okay. And as you may know, Mr. Secretary,
Section 2889 of the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA blocked the
Department of Defense from constructing a new headquarters for
Space Command at Peterson Space Force Base until the DoD IG
[Inspector General] and the GAO [Government Accountability
Office] released their reports on the 2023 basing decision led
by the secretary of the Air Force that found Colorado Springs
to be the best home for Space Command. The DoD IG report has
been released, revealing the alarming loss of capability and
personnel that would result if Space Command was moved from
Peterson, and the GAO report finally came out last week
highlighting the unique benefits to the command that the close
proximity to Northern Command allows. The GAO report also says
that Space Command is struggling to meet its staffing needs due
to uncertainty regarding the command's final location, and this
is delaying the command's ability to build long-term
institutional knowledge.
The result is clear. The most effective home for Space
Command is Peterson Space Force Base in Colorado Springs. And
it is essential the issue is put to rest once and for all, so
Space Command and the men and women who work there can put
their full focus on one goal: defending the nation.
Secretary Meink, now that the conditions of Section 2889
have been satisfied, is it your understanding that the planning
and design of a permanent headquarters building for Space
Command at Peterson will resume immediately?
Dr. Meink. So, Mr. Congressman, we are in the process of
reviewing the report, the final report out of the GAO. I would
defer questions on the final decision for location of Space
Command to the White House Leg Affairs.
Mr. Crank. Okay. Thank you. General Saltzman, any comments?
General Saltzman. Nothing there. Thank you.
Mr. Crank. Okay. Thank you. Very quickly, in the Fiscal
Year 2025 NDAA, Congress required the Department of the Air
Force to submit a report to Congress on how it intends to
better coordinate emerging space activities, such as spacecraft
reentry recoveries at DoD test ranges with other federal
agencies, like the FAA. The report was originally due on
January 31st of this year. The Air Force then delayed delivery
of the report to March 31st, then to May 31st, and then last
week it was delayed again to August 31st. Meanwhile, U.S.
commercial reentry operators are seeking out and currently
utilizing reentry landing sites in other countries, such as
Australia.
I know this all took place before you were sworn in, Mr.
Secretary, but it is frustrating that we will not have this
report until after the committee drafts and marks up this
year's NDAA. Mr. Secretary, I would like to respectfully ask
for your commitment that this report will be delivered to the
committee no later than August 31st and that it will contain a
description of the factors leading to its delay. I would also
appreciate a briefing on the report as soon as possible.
Dr. Meink. I will commit to giving that to you as soon as
possible. I will have to go back and check on the status, and I
will let you know one way or another.
Mr. Crank. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for your
service, and congratulations on your confirmation. I yield
back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms. Tokuda.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Secretary, in 2004,
the Air Force completed a full environmental impact statement
for the closure of Johnston Atoll following decades of nuclear
testing and chemical weapon storage. That exit process took
years and involved extensive interagency and stakeholder
coordination. Now, as the Air Force moves to reactivate the
site for the Rocket Cargo Vanguard program, we are seeing far
less rigor. An environmental assessment promised was now
delayed until the fall and, from what we are hearing back home,
the process feels very rushed, risky, and dismissive of
ecological and community concerns, especially given that
Johnston is a national wildlife refuge.
Coming from Hawaii, I fully recognize the strategic
importance of this project to advancing forward logistics and
sustainment in the Indo-Pacific. But that being said, if a full
EIS [Environmental impact statement] was necessary just to
close the site, why isn't one being done now to reopen it,
especially given the ecological sensitivity, the long-term
risks, and the growing public concern around Johnston?
Dr. Meink. Congresswoman, we continue to value safety not
only for the people in the military but the communities. I am
not that familiar with that particular issue, but I will make
sure I go check on it and get back to you on why we are not
doing additional activities there. I don't know, General
Allvin, if you have any--
Ms. Tokuda. Well, I can definitely tell you that there is
concern that at least an EIS is not being done. I would also
suggest then, as you further review this, given SpaceX's role
in this project, we would love the Air Force, in fact we would
like the Air Force to factor in the company's environmental
track record, particularly incidences like those at Boca Chica,
where wastewater discharge violations were confirmed by the EPA
[Environmental Protection Agency] when evaluating the
environmental risks in this assessment.
Are you familiar with the fact that SpaceX is involved in
this project and they have had past environmental issues and
concerns in other areas where they are stationed?
Dr. Meink. I am aware of the operations of SpaceX in that
area in the past. I am not fully aware of the environmental
impacts, but I will take it for the record.
Ms. Tokuda. Okay. Again, in looking at this environmental
assessment and perhaps a full EIS should be required,
considering the partners involved have been in violation of
various discharge, you know, regulations, I would suggest that.
I raise this, though, issue as part of a larger
conversation unfolding across Hawaii. As you know, we are in
the middle of land lease renewal negotiations ahead of the 2029
deadline, and just recently the Hawaii Board of Land and
Natural Resources rejected the Army's EIS for Pohakuloa
Training Area and will soon consider Army training lands on
Oahu.
In Hawaii, environmental stewardship matters, respect for
our natural resources, the waters that surround us, the
ecosystems that connect us. And how the military across all
branches handle sensitivity towards environmental and cultural
issues shapes how our community views your presence and your
partnerships, especially in the Pacific where our lands and
waters are all seen as connected in one, all of this matter.
So while the Army may be at the center of those land lease
debates today, the Air Force actions on Johnston Atoll, which
native Hawaiians call Kalama, are part of that same equation as
to how this will proceed successfully or unsuccessfully going
towards 2029, and I think we all want to find a sustainable
path forward but one that respects, recognizes, embraces, and
protects our host culture, our natural resources, and our
ecosystems. So I look forward to your response to that when you
are prepared.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 107.]
I wanted to move now to NOAA [National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration] and our capacity, given that we are
currently and officially in hurricane season. NOAA is
forecasting a 60 percent higher chance above normal year for
experiencing a hurricane. This is especially high stakes for
Hawaii and other coastal communities.
The Air Force and NOAA have a vital partnership through
Hurricane Hunter flights which collects life-saving data to
support storm forecasting, evacuation planning, disaster
response. But a recent GAO report found that both agencies are
struggling to meet growing demand due to aircraft maintenance
issues, staffing shortage, and poor coordination. It is now
further compounded by the fact that there was a decision to
slash NOAA's budget, layoff two of its eight flight directors
and an engineer, reducing its mission capacity by over 25
percent.
Do these reductions concern you, and what steps is the Air
Force taking to respond to the GAO's findings and ensure both
the continued accuracy of our storm forecast and the strength
of our partnership with NOAA?
Dr. Meink. I certainly can't speak to the impact with
respect to NOAA, but I can tell you that our performance from
the Hurricane Hunters and all those who gear up every year for
this, they are preparing and certainly looking to put their
best foot forward in whatever Mother Nature brings. But I don't
have a sense really of how the impact--
Ms. Tokuda. Are you aware of the GAO report?
Dr. Meink. I have not read it--
Ms. Tokuda. Okay. I have run out of time. If you could look
at the report and respond how you will be addressing those
shortages, in addition to NOAA's 25-plus percent cuts.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 107.]
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Hamadeh.
Mr. Hamadeh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have the honor of
representing Arizona's 8th congressional district. I am the
only member of our delegation on the House Armed Services
Committee, and right next to my district is Luke Air Force
Base, home to the world's largest fighter wing. Elsewhere in
the state, we have Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, a KC-135
refueler wing in Phoenix, and Barry Goldwater Range.Now, the
Air Force is of huge importance to Arizona.
My first question to you, General Allvin, it was good to
have that phone call with you earlier this year, and I know you
have deep roots in Arizona in Pine Top. And it is pretty rare
to meet somebody from Pine Top, Arizona.
But, General, I am concerned about what I have heard. While
I will agree that we have too many flag officers, I received
confirmation recently that Luke Air Force Base is being
downgraded. Have you heard of that?
General Allvin. We are certainly considering that in the
context of the GAO reduction and the reorganization for our Air
Force, yes.
Mr. Hamadeh. So has any decision been made yet?
General Allvin. It hasn't become final, but it is certainly
in our planning horizon.
Mr. Hamadeh. Okay. I just have concerns with it because
Luke Air Force Base trains 75 percent of the world's F-35
pilots, and I know image and stature matter with our foreign
partners quite substantially and we would support to keep a
unified command behind a one-star general at Luke Air Force
Base. But if you have an assessment, can you send that over to
us for the ramifications of Luke Air Force Base for the
potential downgrade?
General Allvin. Sure. We can put an assessment together for
you. I think, to your point about the value of Luke Air Force
Base, that is undeniable. But I think more so than stature, our
foreign partners look forward, look at the quality, and the
quality is there in the instructor pilots and all of that. I am
not sure that a general officer versus a colonel leading that
is as important as a quality of training, that when you are
trained by the best in the world, that is how you aspire to be
the best in the world. So we are never going to let that slip
at all because that is what the real value of Luke Air Force
Base is, in the instruction, I think.
Mr. Hamadeh. Of course. But it also being led by a one-star
general this whole time, so I just worry that a downgrade, I
don't want to see it affect our training mission over there.
But, hopefully, we can arrange a meeting with you and the
secretary with the Arizona delegation to talk about this
further, as well.
And I have another question, I believe for you, General
Allvin. As you know, Arizona is home to the massive Barry
Goldwater Range used by the Marines and the Air Force, and Fort
Huachuca is the Army's premier test bed for unmanned systems.
No single post base or range can enable the testing across the
expanse of kill chains. Yet, we can link these different
domains together to simulate island chain warfare even within
the American Southwest.
So how do we better connect all the air space land area and
signal spectrum owned by different branches and think bigger
and broader about joint capabilities, rather than just within
the service silos?
General Allvin. It is a great point, Congressman. It is
about collaboration and coordination, and we are getting there.
We are doing that. We are seeing that, as you know, the ranges
were, because of Arizona's unique sort of topography and
geography, those were great things for each service. But right
now, to your point, we can stitch them together and we can
replicate something that really can't be replicated in many
other areas of our United States, and that is sort of a long-
range kill chain scenario.
So we are working with the FAA, and we are coming to sort
of the final throes of a negotiation to be able to do that on a
more periodic basis and sort of more routinize it. But, right
now, we have been stitching them together to do these in
exercises like Bamboo Eagle. It is a unique opportunity and a
place so close to the West Coast that we are continuing to work
with the FAA to make sure that is something we do more often.
But it is just coordination and collaboration amongst all
services, and we can all see value in it.
Mr. Hamadeh. Very good. And congratulations, Mr. Secretary,
for your recent confirmation. And with that, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Vindman.
Mr. Vindman. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to the
witnesses for coming today. General Saltzman, General Allvin,
great to see you again. And, Mr. Secretary, congratulations on
your confirmation.
I have three military installations in my district about 25
miles from where we sit right now. Dahlgren is a Navy base, but
it houses the 19th Delta, and I was privileged to go down there
and observe the unique and critical skills and, frankly, the
integral role they play in national defense. And so I just want
to mention that I was truly impressed by the work they do
there.
I want to turn my attention to Operation Spiderweb, which
revealed how adversary military or terrorists could coordinate
mass drone swarms, electronic jamming, and long-range precision
strikes to paralyze U.S. strategic bombers with power
projection capabilities before even a single shot is fired. It
is really, if you think about it, a poor man's Air Force. In
fact, if these drones exhibit the same characteristics and
advantages as an air component does.
So, Secretary Meink, General Allvin, General Saltzman, I am
going to open this to all three of you: What specific
investments or shifts in doctrine are the Air Force and Space
Force making to detect, disrupt, and survive this kind of
integrated domain attack?
Dr. Meink. I will start and then have General Allvin jump
in. We talked a little bit about before, I think you need to
both look at the offensive and the defensive side of this
equation. And the Ukraine attack demonstrated both, right? It
demonstrated what you can do with a pretty innovative approach
to utilizing UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle] at scale but also
the challenges if you don't defend against it. So both of them
are of interest to the Department of the Air Force, and we are
investing on both sides.
As we discussed before, there is more than just the
technical aspect of building systems to defend against UASs. It
is really a whole government requirement. It is almost easier
to defend some of our bases overseas than they are in the U.S.
because of some of the restrictions in the air traffic that
surrounds our bases, how careful we have to be. So you have to
really look at both the technology side, on the defense on the
technology side, and then on the whole-government approach to
getting the proper authority so that you can operate and
actually protect your bases against something like that.
On the offensive side of the house, we are looking closely
at that, as well.
Mr. Vindman. If I could leave it at that and let the
generals also pop in here.
General Allvin. Yes. I associate with what the secretary
said, and then, of course, as we have had conversations all
throughout this hearing about this, this is an area where we
are taking note. I would maybe adjust the characterization of a
poor man's Air Force. It does do some things to the air domain
to be able to do it at scale, to be able to do it across all
geographies, to be able to do it in different areas.
Contestation is a little bit different. But the wake-up call is
we have already been awakened to this, but it is showing that
maybe our high-value assets, there is different ways we need to
look at defending those.
These are not just Air Force issues. These are joint
issues.
Mr. Vindman. That is what makes it a poor man's Air Force
versus the Air Force that--
General Allvin. Right.
Mr. Vindman. General Saltzman, anything to add on that?
General Saltzman. Well, just real quickly, it is the
asymmetric attack that was most disturbing, I think. And one of
the ways I am thinking about that is, as we put together a
network for networks, that increases the service area for
attack, and so we have to make sure that, from a cyber
perspective, we are looking at the vulnerabilities, where the
shortfalls are, where somebody might have inroads into our
systems. You don't have to attack space capabilities on orbit,
you can attack them in the networks. And so we are looking at
cyber mission defense as a key attribute.
Mr. Vindman. Thank you for that. So what I am concerned
about is that, I mean, I don't think we have really good
deterrence against these types of threats both from terrorists
or from nation states because we are not going to--if we have
our bases attacked and we lose billions and billions of dollars
in strategic assets, we are not going to drop WMDs [Weapons of
Mass Destruction] or anything like that. We are going to have
to respond conventionally. And if they have these capabilities
and we have already been degraded, I just feel like we are in
danger of losing deterrence in this regard, especially if we
think about the fact that they are killing the archer, not the
arrow. That is a critical approach.
And, Mr. Chairman, if I may, given the nature of this
threat and how far behind we are, I would suggest we go as far
as creating a select committee to address the revolution in
drone warfare both in the offense and defense. We know the
regulatory issues associated here. There are statutory issues.
There are multiple committees in the House that has overlapping
jurisdiction and industrial barriers. And the costs, if we fail
in this regard, are just too large to imagine, I think.
Eight seconds. Does Golden Dome do anything to protect us
against this threat, yes or no?
General Saltzman. I would say it is too early in the
mission analysis to determine.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Bergman.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to the
fight, Mr. Secretary. General Allvin, nice to hear you use the
phrase warrior ethos. Warriors don't leave warriors behind no
matter whether it is in basic training, in the fight, in
housing. General Saltzman, great to see you.
I have got good news and bad news. So let's start with the
bad news. The Air Force is, I believe, way behind in fulfilling
its obligation at Wurtsmith Air Force Base in Oscoda, Michigan.
Subject is PFAS [Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances]. There
has been a lot of promises made over the years, and, despite
years of testing and monitoring the PFAS levels and the
groundwater, you know, still sits at literally tens of
thousands of times above the EPA and Michigan safety standards.
So given the persistent and severe PFAS--can't even say it--
contamination. Too many syllables for a Marine. We are behind.
The Air Force is behind.
I know you are coming into this, but there has been
promises made but promises not kept over too long a time. We
have done all the testing necessary, but the delay that the
interim cleanup would be and the interim cleanup to address
most of these, the PFAS plumes, has not occurred. The remedial
actions have been delayed for years, and now we are not
expected to begin until late in 2028 or potentially 2029. So
this really is a breach of trust with the local residents up
there because they are concerned about that.
Now, it is a combination, but we have been dealing with
this for, well, let's put it this way: too long a time. We are
talking decades now. So I am not going to ask you how the Air
Force is justified in doing the delays. I am asking you to dig
into it as the new secretary and make this right for the folks
up there because we know PFAS is not going to go away on its
own, and there has to be mitigated cleanup. I sound like I am
giving a lecture now, but I just wanted to inform you of this
because we are leaving some warriors behind and their families
with the PFAS piece.
Now let's turn to something a little positive. Selfridge
Air National Guard Base is now slated to get F-15EXs. In fact,
I did literally a personal drive tour at the base a couple of
days ago because I still have my retired military ID and I can
just go on the base, and they didn't even know I was there,
which is great because then nobody was trying to show me what
they wanted me to see and not what I wanted to see.
The point is Selfridge is a base that, given its proximity
to the Great Lakes and the training ranges that we have, the
capabilities that are there right now, currently the A-10s that
are being phased out--by the way, there was a flight or two
taking off when I pulled in, and they were landing as I left,
so it was really kind of interesting that, you know, the powers
that be gave me a free air show there of the A-10s as they
leave.
But the challenge is the, okay, the EXs are coming, the A-
10s are leaving. We don't want to accidentally create a gap
where the people who do the maintenance and all the technical
capabilities, that we don't lose readiness because of that.
So, again, I am really not asking you for answers. Now, I
am asking you just for prioritized consideration of blending
when the A-10s leave with when the EXs arrive, so we don't
accidentally create some personnel gaps, skill set gaps,
whatever it happens to be, okay?
You all are in a different fight because Space Force is
going to fight in space. The Air Force is going to fight, you
know, in the sky. The challenge we have as a committee is
understanding how your vision of the fight is developing and
how we appropriately fund you without some of the maneuvering
that has gone on in the past, okay? You be honest, up-front,
you're going to have pretty much a bipartisan effort here to
support you.
So I am glad you are here, but let's get rolling on the
PFAS up there and honor our commitment to those fine men and
women up there. And just consider how we avoid the personnel
gaps.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, you have
displayed an impressive command of the issues and refreshingly
candid and unscripted, so thank you for that. I had the
opportunity, I am a hardworking guy, but I believe I am the
only enlisted veteran with prior service in Army Military
Police Corps, on this body, which is why the chairman gives me
the privilege of questioning last on a regular basis.
I talked to my people across my district and state and,
indeed, the country, and the American people are stakeholders
in the decisions that we have to make regarding deployment of
our assets and how we spend our money. And the American people
have been through a lot and have been paying attention. Some
things have happened, recent phenomena of the drone incursion
of the East Coast. This was alarming to the American people.
Observations of modern warfare and surprise attack and the
Russian-Ukraine war, the people are observant of this. The
terrorist actions in our own homeland, shocking. What we went
through in 2021, '22, '23, and 2024 regarding open borders at
our Southern Border.
This altogether has impacted the American citizenry and
brought us to a point where there is a clear understanding
amongst the Americans I speak to that our military must posture
domestically to stage effectively to be able to patrol our
borders, our maritime borders, and to respond to a threat,
which brings us to my question to you gentlemen, Mr. Secretary
and General Allvin, regarding the 159th Fighter Wing at Belle
Chasse in Louisiana. The National Guard supports a 24/7
aerospace control alert mission with the F-15C support. It
ensures our maritime's Southern Border response in the Gulf of
America and to protect against threat. But I am concerned that
the Air Force is not fully focused on the utility that the F-
15EX, that unique capability can bring to maintaining our
Southern Border security, which, again, America is calling for,
our security against unknown and alarming and surprise attack
from the air and the sea.
I spoke with General Guillot of NORTHCOM about having F-
15EXs at Belle Chasse. He wants them, he wants F-15EXs. So I
will ask you, Secretary and General Allvin, what are the plans
for F-15EXs for the 159th Fighter Wing in Louisiana?
General Allvin. The plans for that really haven't changed.
They are coming to Louisiana. Now, as we have this new
integration, some of the fielding of it is how fast we can get
Boeing to produce. We have procured them, and then we are
trying to right feathering of this in with the Selfridge
decision from the president to ensure that we don't have a gap
anywhere. We want to ensure that, until we switch to the F-
15EX, we make sure those Cs are like the platinum F-15Cs. We
are on path to continue that, as we have, to make sure that the
F-15EXs do come to Belle Chasse.
Mr. Higgins. That is a beautiful answer, and I stand at
your avail, good sir, to assist in that. And I happen to have a
pretty good relationship with the chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee. I feel confident that he will help, as
well.
Mr. Secretary.
Dr. Meink. Yes. The chief hit the nail on the head there.
The challenge of the F-15E is the same challenge we have had
with the 35 and the B-21. Now it is getting the production
rates to what we need to support what we are trying to do. It
is very difficult to ramp up the production rates in these
platforms, so we are just managing that across the board.
Mr. Higgins. And there is certainly recognition in your
office, sir, and amongst your senior staff that the American
people were alarmed about some of the things we have suffered
and observed.
Dr. Meink. I think we were all alarmed at it, as well, with
the American people for sure.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is
expired. I yield.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. I want to thank
the witnesses. Good job. Thank you for what you do for our
country. Thank you for being here today. And we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
June 5, 2025
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 5, 2025
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
June 5, 2025
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN
General Saltzman. The United States Space Force (USSF)
continues to implement the USSF Commercial Space Strategy.
Pursuant to that strategy, the Space Force is committed to
building a resilient and agile space architecture that supports
mission execution in all environments-including contested and
degraded ones. Commercial partnerships are a key element of
that approach. They provide scalable capabilities, rapid
innovation, and critical redundancy that complement our
government-owned systems without supplanting them. This
integration aligns with the direction set forth in Executive
Order 14265, "Modernizing Defense Acquisitions and Spurring
Innovation in the Defense Industrial Base." Issued in April
2025, the order directs the DoD to adopt a "first preference"
for commercial solutions, using flexible tools like Other
Transaction Authority (OTA) to accelerate procurement and spur
innovation. This reflects a deliberate strategic shift toward
leveraging-not limiting-commercial capabilities to enhance U.S.
defense effectiveness and resilience.
In the past year we have fully integrated the Joint
Commercial Operations Cell, which commercially purchases data
to assist the National Defense Space Center with space
situational awareness. Additionally, the USSF has commenced
experimentation to build up the Commercial Augmentation Space
Reserve to address how we will build the full integration of
immediate response by commercial space in times of crisis and
conflict. Lastly, our acquisition community has conducted a
full review of their programs to determine what current program
development we can transition or partially support with
commercially available services and technologies.
We will continue to strengthen these partnerships
thoughtfully, ensuring they are structured to support strategic
objectives, maintain operational control, and uphold national
security. [See page 19.]
------
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TOKUDA
Dr. Meink. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) is
sensitive to the concerns of the Native Hawaiian community. The
DAF is holding the Environmental Assessment (EA) for the
proposed Rocket Cargo landing demonstration on Johnston Atoll
in abeyance, during which time the Air Force Research
Laboratory will explore if there are available options for
conducting the demonstration at a location other than Johnston
Atoll. The DAF will continue to ensure full compliance with the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other applicable
laws on this activity regardless of where it occurs. When the
DAF determines the way ahead for the demonstration, a decision
about the appropriate level of environmental analysis will be
made consistent with applicable law. [See page 67.]
Dr. Meink. The Department of the Air Force values its
partnership with National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and the critical role our weather
reconnaissance missions play in enhancing storm forecasting,
supporting the National Hurricane Center's (NHC) ability to
produce accurate, timely predictions, and strengthening
emergency preparedness. The Air Force Reserve Command's (AFRC)
53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (53 WRS) "Hurricane
Hunters" supports this mission through storm-penetrating
flights into extreme weather events to collect atmospheric data
that feeds real-time decision-making. This data is essential to
NHC models used to determine storm track, intensity, and
timing, enabling public officials to make informed decisions on
evacuations and emergency response. This complements NOAA's
capabilities, which support both operational forecasting and
research, used by the Department of Defense to safeguard forces
and assets at home and abroad. This reflects the close
coordination essential to national storm response efforts. The
recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report highlights
a few challenges related to Hurricane Hunter operations,
including increased mission demand, aircraft maintenance, and
staffing pressures across both NOAA and AFRC. The 53 WRS will
continue to meet mission demands by adjusting maintenance
schedules around peak storm periods, managing aircrew
availability to support forecast-driven taskings. AFRC is also
taking steps to improve coordination with NOAA to ensure clear
communication and strategic and operational alignment,
consistent with the GAO's recommendations. While I am not in a
position to comment on decisions made regarding NOAA's internal
staffing or budget, the Air Force remains committed to
supporting this important mission and maintaining the close
operational partnership with NOAA that supports national
preparedness and homeland defense efforts. [See page 68.]
------
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GOODLANDER
General Saltzman. The Space Force's ability to conduct
critical 24/7 operations from our home stations is reliant on
resilient installation systems and infrastructure. We maintain
resilient energy and water through a comprehensive approach to
security, multi-source system redundancy, and risk management
to ensure our systems remain operationally capable across the
entire spectrum of conflict. Guardians train to ensure mission
continuity by identifying utility disruptions, ensuring their
systems seamlessly transfer to backup power, and by
implementing procedures to return to main power as appropriate.
We have Field mission-continuity exercises at the command-
level-similar to Department of the Air Force-level Energy
Resilience Readiness Exercise (ERREs)-and intend to exercise
utility disruptions to ensure operators identify their
shortfalls, are prepared to survive first contact, and grow
confidence in their weapon system infrastructure (WSI). [See
page 31.]
------
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCGUIRE
General Allvin. The Air Force is partnering with industry,
academia, and DoD stakeholders to ensure a robust, resilient,
responsive, and competitive domestic solid rocket motors (SRM)
industrial base that can meet the current and future needs of
the Nation's defense. We are investing in expanding and
modernizing domestic SRM production facilities to include
infrastructure upgrades at our existing government-owned,
contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities and investments in
advanced manufacturing technologies. The Air Force is committed
to working with DoD and SRM industry partners to review
existing acquisition processes and explore all opportunities to
expand the number of qualified sources for key SRM components
and systems. [See page 45.]
General Saltzman. On January 27, 2025, President Trump
signed Executive Order 14186 directing the Secretary of Defense
to plan, develop, and deploy a next-generation missile defense
shield. To fulfill this mission, the DoD is developing the
Golden Dome for America, which will provide technologically
advanced capabilities to defend the United States against
ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and other
next-generation aerial attacks from peer, near-peer, and rogue
adversaries. The DAF is awaiting further guidance from OSD and
looks forward to supporting this important effort. [See page
46.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
June 5, 2025
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. Space is a contested, warfighting domain with increasing
threats from both China and Russia to U.S. satellites. The Department
must be assured of our ability to survive and operate in space during
conflict. Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellations are in range of all
adversary terrestrial anti-satellite weapons, and Russia is developing
an indiscriminate orbital nuclear weapon to damage potentially
thousands of satellites in LEO. The United States flies exquisite
satellites in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) that have been referred
to as easy targets for an increasingly sophisticated adversary. But in
between LEO and GEO is a vast volume of space called Medium Earth Orbit
(MEO) that is very sparsely populated due to its higher radiation
environment, among other reasons. Secretary Meink and General Saltzman,
I'd like your thoughts on the value of MEO to the warfighter from a
survivability perspective. If we can solve for the radiation challenges
in a way that would enable affordable constellations, how would MEO
strengthen the nation's space posture?
Dr. Meink. The mission of the United States Space Force is to
secure our Nation's interests in, from, and to space. Space Superiority
is the desired outcome of space control operations and allows forces to
operate at a time and place of their choosing without prohibitive
interference from counterspace threats, while also denying the same to
an adversary.
Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) is no exception. MEO, an orbit between
10,000 and 20,000 kilometers above Earth, provides immense value to the
Nation's space posture and improves Joint Force survivability. Today,
the Space Force uses MEO to provide Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
(PNT) and Missile Warning / Missile Tracking to the warfighter. Placing
satellites in MEO continues enhancing a proliferated and resilient
Missile Warning and Tracking constellation designed to detect and track
a range of threats, from large, bright intercontinental ballistic
missile launches to dim, maneuvering hypersonic missiles. Space Systems
Command recently awarded a $1.2 billion contract for 10 Epoch 2 space
vehicles, accelerating acquisition of robust, infrared-sensing Missile
Warning and Tracking satellites. MEO capabilities offer opportunities
to strengthen the Nation's space posture, and the Space Force continues
to leverage these advantages in the space domain.
Mr. Smith. Space is a contested, warfighting domain with increasing
threats from both China and Russia to U.S. satellites. The Department
must be assured of our ability to survive and operate in space during
conflict. Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellations are in range of all
adversary terrestrial anti-satellite weapons, and Russia is developing
an indiscriminate orbital nuclear weapon to damage potentially
thousands of satellites in LEO. The United States flies exquisite
satellites in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) that have been referred
to as easy targets for an increasingly sophisticated adversary. But in
between LEO and GEO is a vast volume of space called Medium Earth Orbit
(MEO) that is very sparsely populated due to its higher radiation
environment, among other reasons. Secretary Meink and General Saltzman,
I'd like your thoughts on the value of MEO to the warfighter from a
survivability perspective. If we can solve for the radiation challenges
in a way that would enable affordable constellations, how would MEO
strengthen the nation's space posture?
General Saltzman. The mission of the United States Space Force is
to secure our Nation's interest in, from, and to space. Space
Superiority is the desired outcome of space control operations and
allows forces to operate at a time and place of their choosing without
prohibitive interference from counterspace threats, while also denying
the same to an adversary. Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) is no exception.
MEO, an orbit between 10,000 and 20,000 kilometers above Earth,
provides immense value to the Nation's space posture and improves Joint
Force survivability. Today, the Space Force uses MEO to provide
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) and Missile Warning / Missile
Tracking to the warfighter. Placing satellites in MEO continues
enhancing a proliferated and resilient Missile Warning and Tracking
constellation designed to detect and track a range of threats, from
large, bright intercontinental ballistic missile launches to dim,
maneuvering hypersonic missiles. Space Systems Command recently awarded
a $1.2 billion contract for 10 "Epoch 2" space vehicles, accelerating
acquisition of robust, infrared-sensing Missile Warning and Tracking
satellites. MEO capabilities offer opportunities to strengthen the
Nation's space posture, and the Space Force continues to leverage these
advantages in the space domain.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. While the Next Generation Air-refueling System (NGAS)
is in development for future contested environments, an interim
procurement strategy-often referred to as Air Refueling Capability
Modernization (ARCM)-is needed to bridge the gap. Congress has directed
the Air Force to submit a more detailed modernization plan or "tanker
roadmap" with its FY26 budget request, and stakeholders are awaiting a
formal acquisition strategy in 2025.
Has the Air Force finalized its requirements for the interim tanker
tranche? If not, what is the timeline for doing so?
General Allvin. The Air Force is currently refining future tanker
requirements with the Joint Staff. The capacity to refuel the Joint
Force continues to be met by the recapitalization of the legacy Tanker
Fleet with KC-46A aircraft, and the Air Force remains committed to
continuous tanker recapitalization. The Air Force anticipates having
finalized requirements soon for continued recapitalization of the KC-
135 fleet and an acquisition strategy is expected by 1QFY26.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. The Administration has emphasized the principle of
"exploit what we have, buy what we can, and only build what we must."
How are you aligning DoD policies with this guidance, Presidential EOs,
and Congressional guidance particularly as it concerns commercial
space-based capabilities for RF, imagery, and radar? How do we ensure
the easily shareable commercial, space-based RF, Radar, and EO data and
analytics remain readily available for our COCOMs, warfighters, allies,
and partners?
General Allvin. The "exploit, buy, build" philosophy is the essence
of the U.S. Space Force's Commercial Space Strategy released last year
as well as a key element of the Department of the Air Force's approach
to space acquisition. The development of the Commercial Space Strategy
was prescient in that it is well-aligned with proposed legislation like
the Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery
(SPEED) Act and the Administration's executive orders (EOs). We are
working with OSD to implement EOs that will streamline our acquisition
procedures and give commercial providers greater opportunities to
supply innovative capabilities quickly to the warfighter. By leveraging
commercial space capabilities for radio frequency (RF), imagery, and
radar, the Department of the Air Force can enhance its operational
effectiveness, reduce costs, and foster innovation in the space sector.
However, it is important to address the challenges and considerations
associated with the use of commercial space capabilities to ensure that
they are secure, resilient, and ready in time of war.
The Department of the Air Force is taking a comprehensive approach
to ensure that commercial, space-based RF, radar, and EO data and
analytics remain readily available for Combatant Commands (COCOMs),
warfighters, allies, and partners. This approach encompasses data
standards, secure infrastructure, collaborative platforms, and policy
frameworks. By addressing the challenges and considerations associated
with data sharing, the Department can maximize the value of commercial
data and enhance its operational effectiveness. The success of this
effort depends on ongoing collaboration between the Department,
commercial providers, and other stakeholders.
The Joint Task Force- Space Defense Commercial Operations (JCO) is
a great example of this type of collaboration. The JCO is helping to
improve the government's ability to track and analyze objects in space,
predict potential collisions, and detect threats while serving as a
joint service, multi-national collaborative platform to advance our
work on data standards, secure infrastructure, and operational
policies. This integration strengthens overall Space Domain Awareness,
which is vital for national security. The JCO's success hinges on its
ability to effectively bridge the gap between the government and the
commercial space sector.
Mr. Wittman. The Administration has emphasized the principle of
"exploit what we have, buy what we can, and only build what we must."
How are you aligning DoD policies with this guidance, Presidential EOs,
and Congressional guidance particularly as it concerns commercial
space-based capabilities for RF, imagery, and radar? How do we ensure
the easily shareable commercial, space-based RF, Radar, and EO data and
analytics remain readily available for our COCOMs, warfighters, allies,
and partners?
Dr. Meink. The "exploit, buy, build" philosophy is the essence of
the U.S. Space Force's Commercial Space Strategy, released last year,
and is a key element of the Department of the Air Force's approach to
space acquisition. The development of the Commercial Space Strategy was
prescient in that it is well aligned with proposed legislation like the
Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery (SPEED)
Act and the Administration's executive orders (EOs). We are working
with OSD to implement EOs that will streamline our acquisition
procedures and give commercial providers greater opportunities to
supply innovative capabilities quickly to the warfighter. By leveraging
commercial space capabilities for radio frequency (RF), imagery, and
radar, the Department of the Air Force can enhance its operational
effectiveness, reduce costs, and foster innovation in the space sector.
However, it is important to address the challenges and considerations
associated with the use of commercial space capabilities to ensure that
they are secure, resilient, and ready in time of war.
The Department of the Air Force is taking a comprehensive approach
to ensure that commercial, space-based RF, radar, and EO data and
analytics remain readily available for Combatant Commands (COCOMs),
warfighters, allies, and partners. This approach encompasses data
standards, secure infrastructure, collaborative platforms, and policy
frameworks. By addressing the challenges and considerations associated
with data sharing, the Department can maximize the value of commercial
data and enhance its operational effectiveness. The success of this
effort depends on ongoing collaboration between the Department,
commercial providers, and other stakeholders.
The Joint Task Force- Space Defense Commercial Operations (JCO) is
a great example of this type of collaboration. The JCO is helping to
improve the government's ability to track and analyze objects in space,
predict potential collisions, and detect threats while serving as a
joint service, multi-national collaborative platform to advance our
work on data standards, secure infrastructure, and operational
policies. This integration strengthens overall Space Domain Awareness,
which is vital for national security. The JCO's success hinges on its
ability to effectively bridge the gap between the government and the
commercial space sector.
Mr. Wittman. The Administration has emphasized the principle of
"exploit what we have, buy what we can, and only build what we must."
How are you aligning DoD policies with this guidance, Presidential EOs,
and Congressional guidance particularly as it concerns commercial
space-based capabilities for RF, imagery, and radar? How do we ensure
the easily shareable commercial, space-based RF, Radar, and EO data and
analytics remain readily available for our COCOMs, warfighters, allies,
and partners?
General Saltzman. The "exploit, buy, build" philosophy is the
essence of the U.S. Space Force's Commercial Space Strategy released
last year as well as is a key element of the Department of the Air
Force's approach to space acquisition. The development of the
Commercial Space Strategy was prescient in that it is well-aligned with
proposed legislation like the Streamlining Procurement for Effective
Execution and Delivery (SPEED) Act and the Administration's executive
orders (EOs). We are working with OSD to implement EOs that will
streamline our acquisition procedures and give commercial providers
greater opportunities to supply innovative capabilities quickly to the
warfighter. By leveraging commercial space capabilities for radio
frequency (RF), imagery, and radar, the Department of the Air Force can
enhance its operational effectiveness, reduce costs, and foster
innovation in the space sector. However, it is important to address the
challenges and considerations associated with the use of commercial
space capabilities to ensure that they are secure, resilient, and ready
in time of war.
The Department of the Air Force is taking a comprehensive approach
to ensure that commercial, space-based RF, radar, and EO data and
analytics remain readily available for Combatant Commands (COCOMs),
warfighters, allies, and partners. This approach encompasses data
standards, secure infrastructure, collaborative platforms, and policy
frameworks. By addressing the challenges and considerations associated
with data sharing, the Department can maximize the value of commercial
data and enhance its operational effectiveness. The success of this
effort depends on ongoing collaboration between the Department,
commercial providers, and other stakeholders.
The Joint Task Force- Space Defense Commercial Operations (JCO) is
a great example of this type of collaboration. The JCO is helping to
improve the government's ability to track and analyze objects in space,
predict potential collisions, and detect threats while serving as a
joint service, multi-national collaborative platform to advance our
work on data standards, secure infrastructure, and operational
policies. This integration strengthens overall Space Domain Awareness,
which is vital for national security. The JCO's success hinges on its
ability to effectively bridge the gap between the government and the
commercial space sector.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. Has the intelligence and data provided by Ukraine on
Russian technology, captured equipment, battlefield operational guides,
weapon performance, and countermeasures against U.S. and Allied systems
saved U.S. taxpayer dollars? Will it have saved the lives of U.S.
service personnel in a war against an enemy peer nation?
General Allvin. The U.S. military and allied forces gain numerous
strategic benefits from intelligence and data provided by Ukraine that
enhance the capabilities of the joint force. These benefits include
guiding the development of offensive and defensive systems, validating
testing and evaluation processes, refining tactics, and training
programs, and informing intelligence assessments of adversary threats.
When combined with accurate intelligence about enemy capabilities and
vulnerabilities, these insights contribute to more effective targeting
and better battlefield decision-making. This integrated approach can
accelerate the development of countermeasures and prevent redundant
investments-ultimately resulting in cost savings and safeguarding
taxpayer dollars. Furthermore, improved understanding of enemy systems
and vulnerabilities can lead to more successful engagements, reducing
risks to U.S. and allied personnel and decreasing casualties.
Collectively, these outcomes strengthen operational effectiveness,
protect defense investments, and enhance the force's lethality and
survivability against peer adversaries.
We can provide a more detailed response at a higher classification
level if desired.
Mr. Scott. How is the Air Force working with USNORTHCOM to
investigate counter-UAS requirements and technologies with limited
collateral effects for deployment in the homeland? What additional
resources do you need from Congress provide to address this?
General Allvin. Commander United States Northern Command will
continue in its role as Homeland Counter small Unmanned Aerial System
Synchronizer to synchronize, integrate, and coordinate preparation and
response efforts in the U.S. homeland. The Department of the Air Force
(DAF) is deeply concerned by the proliferation of Unmanned Aerial
Systems and the ability of adversaries to use them. The Air Force
approach to this problem is to use whole of government references and
modular, open-systems architectures to create scalable and tailorable
solutions across the force. The Air Force is working on development of
a Low Collateral Effects Interceptor for use in areas where civilian
populace and infrastructure preclude the use of kinetic defeat
solutions. The DAF is working closely with the OSD to prioritize these
rapidly developing needs against all other requirements, and these
requirements are fully informed by USNORTHCOM interests. Fully funding
Replicator II efforts will help promulgate Counter Unmanned Aerial
System capabilities to covered locations.
Mr. Scott. The war in Ukraine has shown the susceptibility to
exquisite launchers to cheap drones targeting their radars and this
threat has begun to materialized in the homeland through incursions at
our military installations. I understand that Air Force and Space Force
will play a large role in building out President Trump's Golden Dome
architecture. I'm concerned about the survivability of its critical
ground infrastructure against drone swarms. How are you thinking about
the protection of critical missile defense infrastructure - such as
interceptors, radars, and networking hubs - against drone threats as
the Golden Dome architecture matures?
General Allvin. On January 27, 2025, President Donald J. Trump
signed Executive Order 14186 directing the Secretary of Defense to
plan, develop, and deploy a next-generation missile defense shield. To
fulfill this mission, the DoD is developing the Golden Dome for America
(GDA) which will provide technologically advanced capabilities to
defend the United States against ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise
missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks from peer, near-
peer, and rogue adversaries. The DAF is awaiting further guidance from
OSD and looks forward to supporting this important effort.
Mr. Scott. Is Putin going to stop in Ukraine?
General Allvin. I will defer this question to Gen. Alexus G.
Grynkewich, Commander, EUCOM, who can provide you with the most current
information.
Mr. Scott. How is the Air Force enhancing combat trauma care
training for medics and pararescuemen to ensure they are prepared for
austere and contested environments, such as those outlined in Great
Power Competition scenarios?
General Allvin. The Air Force Medical Services (AFMS) has three
primary focus areas for combat preparedness: (1) the Joint Trauma
System (JTS), (2) Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) Course and (3)
Mil-Civ Partnerships (MCPs) with Trauma Centers. The AFMS leverages
curriculum developed by the JTS to obtain trauma skill proficiency for
all Service members. The training is required every 36 months and 12
months prior to deployment. TCCC courses establish entry requirements
into the USINDOPACOM theater and deployment locations. MCPs like Air
Force Centers for Sustained Trauma and Readiness Skills (CSTARS)
provide periodic and "prior-to-deployment" trauma training and skill
sustainment. Efforts to expand existing MCPs or identify new
opportunities for trauma training are ongoing; Mission Zero Act funding
(Public Law 116-22) has been invaluable to making these programs work.
The goal of training is to reduce the morbidity, mortality, and
increase survivability for all trauma patients.
Mr. Scott. What investments or innovations in medical technology
(e.g., portable ultrasound, telemedicine, or AI-assisted diagnostics)
is the Air Force prioritizing to improve battlefield trauma care
outcomes?
General Allvin. Through Military-Civilian Partnerships (MCPs) and
industry partnership, Air Force projects include: (a) carrying our pre-
clinical testing of to safely transfuse a patient's shed blood, (b)
collaborating with state government to place Air Force Research Lab's
Battlefield Assisted Trauma Distribution Kit emergency record on
helicopters and collect prehospital vital signs, (c) collaborating with
an industry partner for new ultrasound technology that can "see
through" bone, (d) examining innovative therapies to mitigate ischemia-
reperfusion injury and decrease tourniquet-related injuries, (e)
developing improved mechanical ventilation-interoperable with a
portable oxygen concentrator and rebreathing system-to deliver
respiratory support that improves survival, conserves oxygen, and
reduces medic workload in austere environments, and (f) developing
autonomous care technologies to enable central monitoring of patients
and autonomic dynamic control to improve patient outcomes and extend
the providers during aeromedical evacuation.
Mr. Scott. How is the Air Force adapting its aeromedical evacuation
capabilities to maintain rapid and effective casualty transport in
high-threat, distributed operational environments?
General Allvin. The Air Force's Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) system
remains an indispensable component of the Nation's mobility
capabilities, directly supporting priorities outlined in the Interim
National Defense Strategic Guidance. The demands of operating in a high
threat, distributed operational environment places high value on the
Air Force's ability to sustain rapid AE patient movement for the Joint
Force within challenging and complex areas of responsibility. Training
for our Aeromedical Evacuation Crewmembers has shifted over recent
years with increased focus on Tactical Combat Casualty Care management,
unregulated patient movement, and an emphasis on operating in a denied,
degraded, intermittent and limited bandwidth environment. To accomplish
this training, we use large, department-level and tactical scale
exercises such as Mobility Guardian. Additionally, the Air Force has
undertaken a restructuring of the Total Force Enroute Care Unit of
Action. This initiative commenced with a thorough evaluation of
existing force presentation models and the necessary modifications to
establish a streamlined, efficient, and effective Capability Generation
Team for our Joint and allied partners.
Mr. Scott. What steps are being taken to improve interoperability
with other branches and allied forces in combat trauma care protocols,
particularly for joint special operations or large-scale combat
operations?
General Allvin. The DoD Joint Trauma System curriculum has been
reviewed for implementation in the Ground Surgical Team training course
at Camp Bullis. The joint Tactical Combat Casualty Care training is
standard for all services and joint training occurs at multiple
exercises such as Balikatan, REFORPAC, and Patriot Medic. All
pararescuemen attend joint paramedic training at the Army's Special
Operations - Advanced Tactical Paramedic course to enhance
interoperability and standardization. The Air Force Medical Service is
improving interoperability through joint training and this capability
will be tested during Mobility Guardian and Ultimate Caduceus'
exercises in summer 2025.
Mr. Scott. Given the potential for delayed evacuation in future
conflicts, how is the Air Force expanding its prolonged field care
training and resources for medical personnel deployed in forward
locations?
General Allvin. The Air Force Medical Service is increasing
prolonged field care emphasis in training programs with realistic
simulations, revising training such as Aeromedical Evacuation and
Patient Staging Course. Teams are equipped with advanced diagnostics
and extended-duration supply kits.
Mr. Scott. How is the Air Force integrating psychological first aid
and early mental health interventions into its combat trauma care
framework to address acute stress reactions on the battlefield?
General Allvin. The AF is implementing iCOVER, a brief peer-based
intervention designed to help Service members overcome acute stress
reactions and return to full functioning in their operational duties as
well as utilizing Behavioral Health Guidelines for mEdic Assessment and
Response (BH GEAR) to train medics without prior mental health training
to identify, manage, and triage common mental health conditions in
austere environments.
Mr. Scott. What role is the Air Force playing in advancing combat
trauma care research, such as hemorrhage control or traumatic brain
injury treatments, through partnerships with institutions like the Air
Force Research Laboratory?
General Allvin. The Air Force Medical Service, Air Force Research
Laboratory, and the TriService Nursing Research Program (TSNRP) are
advancing battlefield medical care through research on high-fidelity
manikins that simulate austere environments and care under fire.
TSNRP's funding of operational military nursing research and evidence-
based practice is crucial for ensuring the medical readiness of
America's forces, enabling them to support warfighters.
Mr. Scott. How are Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve medical
units being incorporated into combat trauma care strategies to ensure
seamless readiness and deployment capabilities?
General Allvin. The ARC (Air Reserve Component) is standardizing
Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) training while enhancing it with
civilian medical expertise, reflecting the dual-role experience of many
ARC members. When not serving in their civilian capacities, ARC medics
are integrated into trauma centers to maintain clinical proficiency,
bridging military and civilian trauma care. This dual exposure sharpens
both medical and tactical decision-making, especially for contested
environments requiring adaptable training and equipment designed with
ARC input. To counter skill atrophy, ARC units-often in coordination
with active duty-prioritize continuous training, simulation, and
individual medical readiness. Notably, the Critical Care Air Transport
Team (CCATT) sustainment center in Minneapolis provides critical, high-
fidelity training for airborne trauma teams, ensuring they retain the
capabilities necessary for safe and effective patient movement across
operational settings.
Mr. Scott. What key lessons from recent operations or exercises are
shaping Air Force combat trauma care doctrines, particularly in terms
of pre-hospital care and casualty stabilization?
General Allvin. The AF continuously improves training and resources
based on lessons learned, of late the mass casualty event during
Operation Allies Refuge in 2021, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict,
and exercises such as Mobility Guardian and Ultimate Caduceus have
provided the following lessons: 1) Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC)
at or close to the point of injury for rapid hemorrhage control prior
to rapid evacuation is key to survival. 2) Medical supply/resource and
whole blood product availability, rapid medical resupply, and rapid
evacuation to a location with surgical capabilities for damage control
surgery and stabilization are critical to survivability. 3) Those who
succeed in caring for combat casualties are those who are highly
trained and have a breadth of experience caring for complex polytrauma
patients. 4) Russia-Ukraine conflict highlights how the nature of
combat operations impacts injury patterns, with a shift from severe
injuries in high-intensity phases to less severe but still surgically
demanding injuries in lower-intensity, unmanned aerial vehicle-
dominated phases.
Mr. Scott. What initiatives are in place to recruit and retain
highly skilled medical personnel, such as critical care flight
paramedics and surgeons, to meet the demands of future combat trauma
care missions?
General Allvin. Recruitment initiatives focus on providing
financial assistance through the Health Professions Scholarship
Program, the Financial Assistance Program, and the Health Professions
Loan Repayment Program. Retention is a multifaceted challenge as recent
retention survey data show the top reasons for medical providers
leaving include work/life balance, job stress, and job assignments. For
trauma surgeons specifically, assignments with a robust clinical/
surgical practice that maintain readiness surgical skills while
supporting the Air Force mission increase the chance of retention. To
meet the current and future requirements, AF efforts focus on
fortifying the recruitment initiatives and mitigating retention
challenges.
Mr. Scott. The Air Force has invested in enterprise data and AI
capabilities to enhance data-driven readiness and decision making since
2020, relying on commercial technology firms to provide the software
foundation through the implementation of Project Brown Heron and the
Envision platform capabilities. Over 75,000 DAF users utilize the
Envision platform for readiness workflows. What are the Department's
plans to use existing commercial capabilities to provide and enhance
the DAF's enterprise data and AI architecture and outcomes supporting
Operations and Readiness?
Dr. Meink. Consistent with EO 14271, the Department will continue
leveraging existing commercial capabilities to the maximum extent
practicable, including the Envision platform, to enhance our enterprise
data and AI architecture. The DAF Data Strategy is designed to maximize
the value of these types of commercial capabilities by establishing
guidance to ensure all DAF data is discoverable and VAULTIS (Visible,
Accessible, Understandable, Linked, Trusted, Interoperable, and
Secure). The DAF will continue using existing commercial capabilities
to enhance enterprise data and AI architecture and outcomes in
accordance with the DoD's adopt-buy-create approach.
Mr. Scott. In light of the Department's success in utilizing
commercial, off the shelf AI solutions, what efforts are being made to
sunset the Department's legacy or custom capabilities?
Dr. Meink. The Department is focused on scaling generative AI
through an enterprise platform that integrates commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) tools using an agile acquisition framework and pathfinder model.
The DAF is establishing an AI Center of Excellence (CoE), which will be
used to identify legacy efforts, capability gaps, and AI adoption
barriers across the Department. The AI CoE is envisioned to play a key
role in streamlining the transition from pilot to operational use.
These efforts ensure unneeded legacy systems are phased out in a way
that supports modernization and mission continuity.
Mr. Scott. With respect to the Air Force Envision platform, what
are the Department's plans for the production and deployment of
capabilities?
Dr. Meink. The Envision platform has over 60,000 users across the
DAF. It continues to provide foundational, mission-focused capability,
enabling the production and deployment of data-driven capabilities. The
DAF plans to implement a shared cost model for the Envision platform to
increase platform scalability and promote efficient resource
utilization. Implementation of the cost sharing model will be phased,
beginning in fiscal year (FY) 2026 with the sharing of costs for vendor
development work.
A Program Executive Office will be assigned to the Envision
program, ensuring procured solutions are cost-effective and meet the
strategic requirements of the DAF enterprise.
Mr. Scott. We have we seen a series of drone incursions at Langley
Air Force Base, posing a threat to readiness and high-value assets at
the base. Since then, incursions have been reported at Edwards Air
Force Base, Vandenberg Space Force Base, Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base, and more. How are you working with leadership in the Pentagon and
across the inter-agency to ensure that base commanders can deploy non-
kinetic counter-UAS in response to incursions with limited bureaucratic
processes? What additional authorities could Congress provide to
streamline this process? Do you believe you have the necessary
authorities to mitigate drone threats to your installations, or does
130i need to be expanded to address this challenge?
Dr. Meink. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) is working closely
with the OSD to prioritize these rapidly developing needs against all
other requirements. Fully funding Replicator II efforts will help
promulgate Counter Unmanned Aerial System capabilities to covered
locations. All installation commanders retain the inherent right to
self-defense in accordance with the Standing Rules for Use of Force.
Furthermore, the DAF is working closely with OSD, in coordination with
the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), to ensure our
installations can deploy counter-small unmanned aerial systems (C-sUAS)
capabilities when the safety and security of DOD property is
threatened. We recognize the evolving nature of the threat requires
agility, and we assess that updating 130i authorities to close critical
gaps in DOD's ability to address threats posed by an unmanned aircraft
system or unmanned aircraft will enable better protection of DoD
assets.
Mr. Scott. The war in Ukraine has shown the susceptibility to
exquisite launchers to cheap drones targeting their radars and this
threat has begun to materialized in the homeland through incursions at
our military installations. I understand that Air Force and Space Force
will play a large role in building out President Trump's Golden Dome
architecture. I'm concerned about the survivability of its critical
ground infrastructure against drone swarms. How are you thinking about
the protection of critical missile defense infrastructure - such as
interceptors, radars, and networking hubs - against drone threats as
the Golden Dome architecture matures?
Dr. Meink. On January 27, 2025, President Trump signed EO 14186
directing the Secretary of Defense to plan, develop, and deploy a next-
generation missile defense shield. To fulfill this mission, the DoD is
developing the Golden Dome for America, which will provide
technologically advanced capabilities to defend the United States
against ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and other
next-generation aerial attacks from peer, near-peer, and rogue
adversaries. The DAF is awaiting further guidance from OSD and looks
forward to supporting this important effort.
Mr. Scott. Has the intelligence and data provided by Ukraine on
Russian technology, captured equipment, battlefield operational guides,
weapon performance, and countermeasures against U.S. and Allied systems
saved U.S. taxpayer dollars? Will it have saved the lives of U.S.
service personnel in a war against an enemy peer nation?
General Saltzman. The U.S. military and allied forces gain numerous
strategic benefits from intelligence and data provided by Ukraine that
enhance the capabilities of the joint force. These benefits include
guiding the development of offensive and defensive systems, validating
testing and evaluation processes, refining tactics, and training
programs, and informing intelligence assessments of adversary threats.
When combined with accurate intelligence about enemy capabilities and
vulnerabilities, these insights contribute to more effective targeting
and better battlefield decision-making. This integrated approach can
accelerate the development of countermeasures and prevent redundant
investments-ultimately resulting in cost savings and safeguarding
taxpayer dollars. Furthermore, improved understanding of enemy systems
and vulnerabilities can lead to more successful engagements, reducing
risks to U.S. and allied personnel and decreasing casualties.
Collectively, these outcomes strengthen operational effectiveness,
protect defense investments, and enhance the force's lethality and
survivability against peer adversaries.
We can provide a more detailed response at a higher classification
level if desired.
Mr. Scott. The war in Ukraine has shown the susceptibility to
exquisite launchers to cheap drones targeting their radars and this
threat has begun to materialized in the homeland through incursions at
our military installations. I understand that Air Force and Space Force
will play a large role in building out President Trump's Golden Dome
architecture. I'm concerned about the survivability of its critical
ground infrastructure against drone swarms. How are you thinking about
the protection of critical missile defense infrastructure - such as
interceptors, radars, and networking hubs - against drone threats as
the Golden Dome architecture matures?
General Saltzman. On January 27, 2025, President Donald J. Trump
signed Executive Order 14186 directing the Secretary of Defense to
plan, develop, and deploy a next-generation missile defense shield. To
fulfill this mission, the DoD is developing the Golden Dome for America
(GDA) which will provide technologically advanced capabilities to
defend the United States against ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise
missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks from peer, near-
peer, and rogue adversaries. The DAF is awaiting further guidance from
OSD and looks forward to supporting this important effort.
Mr. Scott. Is Putin going to stop in Ukraine?
General Saltzman. I will defer this question to Gen. Alexus G.
Grynkewich, Commander, EUCOM, who can provide you with the most current
information.
Mr. Scott. How is the U.S. Space Force working with Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania to ensure space resilience against hybrid
threats, such as GPS jamming or cyberattacks, in the Baltic region?
General Saltzman. Currently, U.S. Space Forces Europe-Africa
(USSPACEFOREUR-AF) is building its relationships with Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania. The Component, in coordination with the Latvian Ministry
of Defense, has approval to build a site that will serve as a
deployment location with necessary security, power, and communication
capabilities for Space Electromagnetic Warfare capabilities. The effort
is part of a broader concept enabling the Component to support U.S.
European Command (USEUCOM) operational priorities and mission by
establishing operational-ready locations for USSF and sister-service
space systems throughout the USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR).
Additionally, the Component creates yearly international engagement
plans in support of USEUCOM objectives for future engagements with the
Baltic States. As North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance
Members, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are supported by the NATO Space
Operations Center (NSpOC) at Ramstein AB Germany. These nations have
access to Global Positioning Satellite jamming data through the NATO
developed Radar Electromagnetic and Communication Coverage Tool
Position Navigation Timing (REACT PNT) analysis system operated by the
NSpOC. REACT analysis can be directly requested by the nation or is
available through the NATO Command Structure, specifically the
operations centers of the NATO Joint Force Commands. Further the NSpOC
is a node of the USSPACECOM Joint Commercial Operation (JCO), staffed
with U.S. Space Force personnel and international JCO trained
personnel. The NSpOC can provide the full range of commercial JCO
services to the Alliance, on-demand. NSpOC also teaches the JCO 200
course for Alliance members.
Mr. Scott. What role do the Baltic States play in NATO's space
strategy, particularly in ensuring interoperability of space assets for
collective defense?
General Saltzman. The Baltic States, like all NATO nations,
maintain a Permanent Representative (Ambassador) to NATO and a Senior
(OF-8, 3-Star equivalent) Military Representative on the NATO Military
Committee. The Permanent Representative provides political guidance
from the nation to the Alliance and the Military Representative
provides military guidance. NATO is in the middle of the 5-year NATO
Defense Planning Process (NDPP) and will commence writing the Political
Guidance 2027 (PG27) later this year. PG27 will govern the next 5-year
NDDP cycle which will have major implications on the direction of the
NATO Space Domain. The Baltic States have an equal stake in this
process. Further, the Baltic Military Representatives will prepare an
Operational Requirements Statement (ORS) in response to the PG27. The
ORS will recommend the resourcing and military force structure needed
by the Alliance to conduct steady state and Article-5 space operations.
In preparation for PG27, Commander Combined Force Space Component
Command, Air Marshal Sir Johnny Stringer (OF8 UK), is preparing his
Commander's Estimate on the Space Domain to present to Supreme Allied
Commander Europe as the basis for the next ORS.
Mr. Scott. Are there plans for joint Space Force exercises with the
Baltic States to simulate space-enabled operations in a contested
environment near Russia's border?
General Saltzman. While USSPACEFOREUR-AF has not yet directly
collaborated with the Baltic States on simulated space-enabled
operations in dedicated exercises, opportunities exist. Broader USEUCOM
and NATO exercises offer avenues to integrate the Baltic States into
operational type exercises. This integration can be achieved through
two primary pathways: incorporating their space systems and
capabilities into joint frameworks or deploying U.S. space assets
within their sovereign territory for exercise operations. Key among
these are NATO's Maritime Command's Baltic Operations, which
specifically targets the Baltic Sea region, and STEADFAST DUAL,
encompassing the entire AOR. Both exercises represent platforms for
enhancing joint readiness and interoperability with the Baltic States,
particularly in the increasingly contested space domain.
Mr. Scott. How can the Space Force support the Baltic States in
accessing commercial space services, such as small satellite
constellations, to enhance regional security and economic development?
General Saltzman. USSPACEFOREUR-AF, as the USSF Service Component
in Europe, can work with USSF Field Commands (e.g. Space Systems
Command) and with USSF Headquarters to facilitate support to Baltic
States in accessing commercial space services. Namely, the opportunity
to join the Joint Commercial Operations Cell (JCO) for commercial SDA
and access to the Global Data Marketplace. Further, USSPACEFOREUR-AF
can facilitate support of commercial data buys through the Global
Mission System. Additionally, the NATO Combined Force Space Component
Command (CFSpCC) is the Commercial Integrator (NATO common funds) for
space data and effects. As the integrator, the CFSpCC plans and
procures space data and effects into the Deterrence and Defense of the
Euro-Atlantic (DDA) Family of Plans.
NATO is not only a Joint Commercial Operation (JCO) member through
the CFSpCC and NATO Space Operations Center (NSpOC), but as of July
2025, we have an active Global Data Marketplace (GDM) account, which
enable short duration Project Work Statements and rapid contracting of
space services in support of the Alliance. All of this is delivered
through the Unified Data Library of the JCO.
Baltic States have access to the GDM currently through NATO but
could also directly apply for their own accounts.
Mr. Scott. What is the Space Force's approach to fostering
trilateral cooperation among Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in space
education and workforce development to build a regional space
ecosystem?
General Saltzman. All three Baltic States-Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania-possess Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, which provide
direct access to space education support from the National Security
Space Institute (NSSI). This support is delivered comprehensively
through both in-residence programs and the deployment of NSSI's mobile
training teams. A development in this regard is the proactive
engagement from the Baltic Defense College (BDC), located in Estonia.
As a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-accredited institution
with a demonstrated history of fostering international collaboration
(hosting students from 11 countries in past classes), the BDC has
formally requested a Space 100 course for its FY26 curriculum. This
engagement will allow the expansion of NSSI's mobile training footprint
across the Baltic States, bolstering regional space expertise and
interoperability.
Mr. Scott. How is the U.S. Space Force collaborating with Estonia
to enhance space situational awareness, given Estonia's advanced
cybersecurity capabilities and its strategic position near Russia?
General Saltzman. Through USSPACEFOREUR-AF, the U.S. Space Force is
facilitating Baltic States' access to critical commercial space
services, including participation in the Joint Commercial Operations
Cell for Space Domain Awareness and access to the Global Data
Marketplace. NATO, through its Combined Force Space Component Command,
serves as a key commercial integrator, procuring space data and effects
for Alliance deterrence and defense. NATO's active Global Data
Marketplace account, operational by July 2025, further streamlines
access to commercial space services for the Alliance, including the
Baltic States, via the Unified Data Library. Baltic States also have
the option to directly apply for their own Global Data Marketplace
accounts.
On the educational front, all three Baltic States benefit from
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, granting them direct access to
space education support from the National Security Space Institute
(NSSI) through both in-residence and mobile training programs. A
significant development is the Baltic Defense College's (BDC) request
for a Space 100 course for its FY26 curriculum. This engagement will
expand NSSI's mobile training footprint across the region,
significantly bolstering Baltic space expertise and interoperability.
Mr. Scott. What opportunities exist for Latvia to contribute to
NATO's space operations, particularly through its emerging space
technology sector and its participation in EU space programs?
General Saltzman. If Latvia is looking to rapidly invest, they can
follow the Luxembourg model and provide Voluntary National
Contributions through personnel and or financing to NATO Space.
Luxembourg has funded the Allied Persistent Surveillance from Space
(APSS) operation in support of Space Based Intelligence Surveillance
Reconnaissance (ISR) at the Combined Force Space Component Command
(CFSpCC). Latvia can participate directly as a contributing ISR nation
to APSS. APSS achieves initial operational capability 1 Jan 2026,
currently in pilot program.
Mr. Scott. How is the Space Force engaging with Lithuania to
bolster space-enabled intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) capabilities in response to regional threats?
General Saltzman. The USSF is developing a Joint Commercial
Operation (JCO) to enable rapid sharing of Intelligence Surveillance
Reconnaissance (ISR) imagery, Space Domain Awareness (SDA) and analysis
with allies and partners, which will give access to relevant products
as the Baltic States need them. Lithuania could place a person in the
NATO Space Operations Center at Ramstein AB, where the JCO is also
located.
Mr. Scott. What steps can be taken to support Lithuania's
integration into NATO's space domain operations, given its strategic
location and growing interest in space technologies?
General Saltzman. If Lithuania is looking to rapidly invest, they
can follow the Luxembourg model and provide Voluntary National
Contributions through personnel and or financing to NATO Space.
Luxembourg has funded the Allied Persistent Surveillance from Space
(APSS) operation in support of Space Based Intelligence Surveillance
Reconnaissance (ISR) at the Combined Force Space Component Command.
Lithuania can participate directly as a contributing ISR nation to
APSS. APSS achieves initial operational capability 1 Jan 2026,
currently in pilot program.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
Mr. Moulton. General Allvin, are you comfortable risking the life
of a pilot for a mission that can be accomplished by an unmanned
system? How is this trade-off impacting Air Force strategy and
operational planning?
General Allvin. The decision to employ manned aircraft in
situations where unmanned systems could potentially be used is never
taken lightly. It involves a careful and rigorous assessment of several
factors.
While unmanned systems offer tremendous potential to reduce risk to
aircrews, they are not yet capable of replacing manned aircraft in all
situations. There are inherent limitations in current unmanned
technologies regarding autonomy, adaptability, decision-making in
complex and dynamic environments, and the ability to handle unforeseen
circumstances and considering factors like: mission requirements,
threat environment, technological capabilities, operational
constraints, legal and ethical considerations, redundancy and
resiliency, and maintaining positive command and control.
The evolving capabilities of unmanned systems are reshaping Air
Force strategy and operational planning as we actively pursue a future
force mix that optimizes the use of both manned and unmanned assets.
This includes prioritizing investments in Research and Development,
specifically in advanced unmanned technologies like improved autonomy,
artificial intelligence, sensor fusion, and cyber resilience. We are
also developing new future operating and operational concepts that
explore innovative ways to integrate manned and unmanned systems to
achieve synergistic effects, such as manned-unmanned teaming, where
manned aircraft control and coordinate the actions of multiple unmanned
systems. Furthermore, we are adapting training and education to prepare
aircrews and support personnel to operate effectively in a mixed
environment, modernizing existing platforms by equipping them with
advanced sensors and communication systems to enhance collaboration
with unmanned systems, and evolving the force design to adjust the size
and composition of our manned and unmanned fleets to meet evolving
threats and mission requirements. Our ultimate goal is to create a
force that is more agile, more resilient, and more capable of deterring
aggression and defending our Nation. We are working towards future
operating concepts and strategies where unmanned systems can perform an
increasing number of missions, thereby reducing the risk to our pilots,
while maintaining the necessary capabilities to address the full
spectrum of threats.
Mr. Moulton. General Allvin, you've emphasized the importance of
modernizing our force and rethinking how we project airpower. As
unmanned Collaborative Combat Aircraft become a reality, should the Air
Force reassess the number of manned F-35s it truly needs?
General Allvin. At this stage of the Combat Collaborative Aircraft
(CCA) program, we view them as force multipliers rather than
replacements for the crewed aircraft they will partner with to achieve
air superiority. We're looking at different ways to execute the same
mission, going beyond `single platforms equal single capabilities.' We
are embracing and leaning into human-machine teaming and understanding
what autonomy can do for us. The Air Force currently has two CCA
prototypes and recently activated a CCA Experimental Operations Unit
for testing and refining human-machine teaming concepts. The insights
gained from these efforts will be crucial in shaping the future of the
program as well as informing the proper balance of manned to unmanned
assets in our inventory.
Mr. Moulton. Given the cost constraints we face, we must recognize
that our allies are often under even greater financial pressures. While
they've followed our lead in procuring the F-35, the maintenance costs
alone can be a significant burden. How can the Air Force assist in
guiding them toward more cost-effective and affordable solutions moving
forward?
General Allvin. The F-35 is the most advanced mass-produced
aircraft in history, and it will provide the U.S. and allies and
partners with the level of capability and interoperability required to
defeat our priority threats. Maintenance and logistics challenges
impact the USAF just as much as they impact our allies and partners.
The Air Force actively supports F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO)-led
maintenance and sustainment improvement initiatives, which are designed
to target the key processes and logistic drivers that impact fleet
mission capability rates. The USAF recommends allies and partners
continue to articulate national sustainment challenges to the JPO to
inform and enable enterprise-wide solutions.
Mr. Moulton. Over the past five years, we've seen dramatic
advancements in commercial remote sensing: up to 400% more daily
coverage at high resolution (30-50?cm), 15-30x faster revisit rates,
and 40% better resolution. This capability is a clear advantage that
the United States must take full advantage of. Given this how is the
Space Force fully utilizing all available tools to make use of this
incredible growth in data?
Dr. Meink. Under the Tactical Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and
Tracking (TacSRT) program, the U.S. Space Force (USSF) is leveraging
commercially available data to deliver analytical products to the
warfighter through the Global Data Marketplace. Future commercial data
exploitation activities will be guided by the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) signed by the USSF and the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA) in May 2025.
Mr. Moulton. Over the past five years, we've seen dramatic
advancements in commercial remote sensing: up to 400% more daily
coverage at high resolution (30-50?cm), 15-30x faster revisit rates,
and 40% better resolution. This capability is a clear advantage that
the United States must take full advantage of. Traditional analytical
tradecraft is clearly unable to keep up with this growth in data, can
you share your roadmap for integrating commercial sensing and
associated AI tools into the Space Force?
Dr. Meink. The USSF is leveraging commercially available data to
deliver analytical products to the warfighter through the Global Data
Marketplace. Future commercial data exploitation activities will be
guided by the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed by the USSF and NGA
in May 2025. The MOA requires the service to collaborate with NGA
support teams to "ensure data purchases and derived product...conform
to consistent, mutually agreed upon National System for Geospatial
Intelligence standards." We expect many of these commercial
capabilities to incorporate AI tools.
Mr. Moulton. Why hasn't the Space Force moved faster or more
aggressively to integrate commercial remote sensing for tactical
support to the warfighter?
Dr. Meink. The USSF will work with its stakeholders in the
Intelligence Community to identify future opportunities for
exploitation of commercial remote sensing data in support of warfighter
requirements. To that end, in May 2025, the USSF and NGA signed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) delineating how the organizations will
share duties for buying space-based intelligence from commercial
providers. The MOA requires the service to collaborate with NGA support
teams to "ensure data purchases and derived products. conform to
consistent, mutually agreed upon National System for Geospatial
Intelligence standards."
Mr. Moulton. Does the FY26 Space Force budget expand, or at least
sustain, full funding for the Tactical Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(TacSR) program, which is supposed to bridge this gap?
Dr. Meink. The President's Budget Request for FY 2026 does not
request funds for the TacSRT program.
Mr. Moulton. Over the past five years, we've seen dramatic
advancements in commercial remote sensing: up to 400% more daily
coverage at high resolution (30-50?cm), 15-30x faster revisit rates,
and 40% better resolution. This capability is a clear advantage that
the United States must take full advantage of. Given this how is the
Space Force fully utilizing all available tools to make use of this
incredible growth in data?
General Saltzman. The U.S. Space Force (USSF) is leveraging
commercially available data to deliver analytical products to the
warfighter through the Global Data Marketplace. Future commercial data
exploitation activities will be guided by the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) signed by the USSF and the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA) in May 2025.
Mr. Moulton. Over the past five years, we've seen dramatic
advancements in commercial remote sensing: up to 400% more daily
coverage at high resolution (30-50?cm), 15-30x faster revisit rates,
and 40% better resolution. This capability is a clear advantage that
the United States must take full advantage of. Traditional analytical
tradecraft is clearly unable to keep up with this growth in data, can
you share your roadmap for integrating commercial sensing and
associated AI tools into the Space Force?
General Saltzman. The USSF is leveraging commercially available
data to deliver analytical products to the warfighter through the
Global Data Marketplace. Future commercial data exploitation activities
will be guided by the MOA signed by the USSF and the NGA in May 2025.
The MOA requires the service to collaborate with NGA support teams to
"ensure data purchases and derived product...conform to consistent,
mutually agreed upon National System for Geospatial Intelligence
standards." We expect many of these commercial capabilities to
incorporate AI tools.
Mr. Moulton. Why hasn't the Space Force moved faster or more
aggressively to integrate commercial remote sensing for tactical
support to the warfighter?
General Saltzman. Through our critical partnerships with NGA and
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the Space Force will improve
delivery of products to the warfighter. We are continuing to ensure
tax-payer dollars are invested responsibly in products that are timely
and effective with confidence that the U.S. Government is avoiding
duplication and only paying once.
Mr. Moulton. Does the FY26 Space Force budget expand, or at least
sustain, full funding for the Tactical Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(TacSR) program, which is supposed to bridge this gap?
General Saltzman. The President's Budget Request for FY 2026 does
not request funds for the TacSRT program.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
Mr. Carbajal. The Space Force's Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS)
Initiative, led by the Space Safari team, has benefited from consistent
funding, enabling the development of critical capabilities, concepts of
operations, and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that support
rapid 24-hour response timelines. This committee appreciates that these
initiatves have demonstrated industry's ability to deliver of
responsive space-based solutions that support our nation's space
superiority objectives.-Notably, TacRS has proven its advancement of
responsive space maneuvering, orbital warfare and the need for
proliferated reconnaissance across multiple orbits to enhance space
superiority and address urgent needs such as surveillance and recon of
foreign-launched objects.
1. Can you elaborate on the USSF's commitment to the TacRS
initiative, particularly how it plans to continue to support responsive
space maneuvering and proliferated recon to achieve space superiority
and meet CCMD requirements for orbital warfare and space surveillance?
2. Can you assure this committee that TacRS program element line will
remain a sustained priority through the Future Years Defense Program to
enable aggressive approach for rapidly integrating and deploying agile,
end-to-end space-based capabilities tailored to urgent CCMD needs,
without relying on large-scale spacecraft production?
Dr. Meink. In the April 2025 publication of Space Force Doctrine
Document 1, (SFDD-1), the Space Force identified Responsive Launch as a
mission set under our Space Access Core Function. Responsive Launch
operations deliver and operate capabilities across all Space Force
mission areas, currently focused on space control and space domain
awareness. Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS) prioritizes commercial,
fixed-price contracts to take advantage of evolving commercial
capabilities, technology advancements, and reduced production timelines
to rapidly deliver minimum viable warfighter solutions. As part of the
President's Budget Request, the TacRS portfolio is programmed to
$168.282M for FY26.
There are several excellent examples of the Space Force's
commitment to TacRS. Space Safari conducts the experimentation and
analysis required to make TacRS a part of the future of the Space
Force. VICTUS SOL will be the first operational TacRS mission. VICTUS
SURGO is a Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO) Prepositioned Threat
Response (PTR) mission that will image Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and
geostationary orbit (GEO) space objects through dynamic maneuvering;
VICTUS SALO is a low earth orbit (LEO) PTR mission that utilizes
dynamic maneuvering to image LEO space objects.
Mr. Carbajal. The Space Force's Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS)
Initiative, led by the Space Safari team, has benefited from consistent
funding, enabling the development of critical capabilities, concepts of
operations, and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that support
rapid 24-hour response timelines. This committee appreciates that these
initiatves have demonstrated industry's ability to deliver of
responsive space-based solutions that support our nation's space
superiority objectives.-Notably, TacRS has proven its advancement of
responsive space maneuvering, orbital warfare and the need for
proliferated reconnaissance across multiple orbits to enhance space
superiority and address urgent needs such as surveillance and recon of
foreign-launched objects.
1. Can you elaborate on the USSF's commitment to the TacRS
initiative, particularly how it plans to continue to support responsive
space maneuvering and proliferated recon to achieve space superiority
and meet CCMD requirements for orbital warfare and space surveillance?
2. Can you assure this committee that TacRS program element line will
remain a sustained priority through the Future Years Defense Program to
enable aggressive approach for rapidly integrating and deploying agile,
end-to-end space-based capabilities tailored to urgent CCMD needs,
without relying on large-scale spacecraft production?
General Saltzman. In the April 2025 publication of Space Force
Doctrine Document 1, the Space Force identified Responsive Launch as a
mission set under our Space Access Core Function. Responsive Launch
operations deliver and operate capabilities across all Space Force
mission areas, currently focused on space control and space domain
awareness. Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS) prioritizes commercial,
fixed-price contracts to take advantage of evolving commercial
capabilities, technology advancements, and reduced production timelines
to rapidly deliver minimum viable warfighter solutions. As part of the
President's Budget Request, the TacRS portfolio is programmed to
$168.282M for FY26.
There are several excellent examples of the Space Force's
commitment to TacRS. Space Safari conducts the experimentation and
analysis required to make TacRS a part of the future of the Space
Force. VICTUS SOL will be the first operational TacRS mission. VICTUS
SURGO is a Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO) Prepositioned Threat
Response (PTR) mission that will image Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and
geostationary orbit (GEO) space objects through dynamic maneuvering;
VICTUS SALO is a low earth orbit (LEO) PTR mission that uses dynamic
maneuvering to image LEO space objects.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
Mr. Bacon. On 20 November 2024, USSF and Space Launch Delta 45
(SLD-45) released a request for information (RFI) regarding the future
lease of Space Launch Complex-37 (SLC-37). The availability of a heavy-
launch site such as SLC-37 is exceedingly rare. Furthermore, the
necessity for resilient and redundant assured access to space continues
to grow in importance. Regarding the future use of SLC-37: 1. Has an
allocation decision been made for a commercial launch service provider
(CLSP) to lease SLC-37? 2. If yes, was a competitive and transparent
award process used? 3. If no, will a standard request for proposal
(RFP) follow?
General Saltzman. SLC-37's size and the separation from neighboring
operations make it the only Cape Canaveral Space Force Station launch
pad suitable for a super-heavy rocket. The Department of the Air Force
(DAF) conducted significant market research, including an RFI for
launch providers to submit plans on how they would develop a super-
heavy launch program at SLC-37. After a formal review of all the market
research, including multiple responses to the RFI, the Space Force
determined SpaceX was the only launch provider that could meet the
requirements for the super-heavy launch program. The Space Force will
decide no later than this fall whether to lease SLC-37 to SpaceX, after
completion of the Environmental Impact Statements and the issuance of a
record of decisions. Any decision to lease will comply with the
requirements of 10 U.S.C. 2667.
Mr. Bacon. On 20 November 2024, USSF and Space Launch Delta 45
(SLD-45) released a request for information (RFI) regarding the future
lease of Space Launch Complex-37 (SLC-37). The availability of a heavy-
launch site such as SLC-37 is exceedingly rare. Furthermore, the
necessity for resilient and redundant assured access to space continues
to grow in importance. Regarding the future use of SLC-37: 1. Has an
allocation decision been made for a commercial launch service provider
(CLSP) to lease SLC-37? 2. If yes, was a competitive and transparent
award process used? 3. If no, will a standard request for proposal
(RFP) follow?
Dr. Meink. SLC-37's size and the separation from neighboring
operations make it the only Cape Canaveral Space Force Station launch
pad suitable for a super-heavy rocket. The Department of the Air Force
(DAF) conducted significant market research, including an RFI for
launch providers to submit plans on how they would develop a super-
heavy launch program at SLC-37. After a formal review of all the market
research, including multiple responses to the RFI, the Space Force
determined SpaceX was the only launch provider that could meet the
requirements for the super-heavy launch program. The Space Force will
decide no later than this fall whether to lease SLC-37 to SpaceX, after
completion of the Environmental Impact Statements and the issuance of a
record of decisions. Any decision to lease will comply with the
requirements of 10 U.S.C. 2667.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN
Mr. Bergman. Given the persistent and severe PFAS contamination at
Wurtsmith AFB, and the ongoing frustration in the community over the
pace and transparency of cleanup efforts, what specific actions will
the Air Force take in the next 12 months to accelerate permanent
remediation? Additionally, what is the timeline to implement the
agreed-upon interim actions at Wurtsmith?
Dr. Meink. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) is continuing to
address PFAS under the federal cleanup law, CERCLA. DAF is in the
Remedial Investigation Phase. In addition to the CERCLA process, DAF
has taken and planned multiple interim remedial actions (IRAs) to
accelerate PFAS mitigation measures.
The status and timeline of the overall CERCLA efforts: -Remedial
Investigation: Underway, Estimated Completion Date (ECD): 3rd quarter
of fiscal year 2027 (3QFY2027) --Preliminary Characterization Summary
Report: Underway, ECD: 4QFY2025 --Remedial Investigation Data gap: On
schedule to award 4QFY2025, ECD: 3QFY2027 -Feasibility Study: Planned,
1QFY2028 -Proposed Plan(s): Planned, 3QFY2028 -Record(s) of Decision:
Planned, 1QFY2029 -Remedial Actions: Planned, 1QFY2030
While CERCLA phases progress, DAF has planned the following planned
actions within the next 12 months: -DRMO & Landfill 30/31 IRA focused
on reducing groundwater discharge to Lake Van Etten --Continue Pre-
design investigation and design; IRA estimated operational 2Q2027 -
Three-Pipes Source Area IRA focused on treating the source area to
reduce groundwater discharge to the Au Sable River --Estimated 4QFY2025
begin Pre-design investigation and design; IRA estimated operational
2Q2029 --Complete negotiation of the agreement with City of Oscoda to
fund execution of a project focused on stormwater pipe joint sealing to
minimize PFAS impacted groundwater from entering the pipe and
discharging to Au Sable River. Estimated award 4QFY2025; ECD 2QFY2026.
-Wastewater Treatment Plant IRA focused on reducing groundwater
discharge to the Au Sable River --Estimated 4QFY2025 begin pre-design
investigation and design, IRA estimated operational 2Q2029
The IRAs at Wurtsmith remain consistent as reported to the
Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) in May 2025, and will be executed
subject to available appropriations.
The DAF will communicate progress and updates on timelines to the
RAB.
Mr. Bergman. How is the Air Force implementing the Defense Business
Board recommendations to the Secretary of Defense concerning industry
supply chain best practices? Please specifically address the Board's
recommendations regarding use of commercial tools and the need for
continuous monitoring of your vendors independently from prime-
contractor voluntary self-reporting.
Dr. Meink. The Air Force is supporting the Secretary of Defense's
implementation of Defense Business Board (DBB) recommendations through
the Supply Chain Risk Management Integration Center (SCRM-IC). The
SCRM-IC is centralizing DoD leadership, establishing data standards,
and promoting department-wide collaboration. Specifically, regarding
commercial tools, the SCRM-IC sponsored General Services
Administration's Supply Chain Risk Illumination Professional Tools and
Services (SCRIPTS) blanket purchase agreements (BPAs), which provide
subscription-based commercial tools and analytic support for risk
assessment.
Mr. Bergman. The Committee understands that many of the supply
chain risk management efforts throughout the Air Force rely both on
paper-based and manpower intensive processes, do not provide near real-
time monitoring as suggested by the Board, and are often stand-alone
programs and contracts that are not integrated Air Force wide, or even
major Command wide. What is your plan to address this situation?
Dr. Meink. The Air Force is addressing the need to move beyond
paper-based, manpower-intensive, and unintegrated supply chain risk
management (SCRM) efforts by establishing SCRM focal points within Air
Force Materiel Command and Space Systems Command. These focal points
are developing capabilities to illuminate and continuously monitor
supply chain risks and standardize processes. As these capabilities
mature, the Air Force will consolidate stand-alone programs and
contracts and integrate efforts across major commands.
Mr. Bergman. Now that GSA has put in place almost $1.0 billion of
best-of-breed supply chain illumination tools and products available at
fixed subscription rates for all federal agencies, what is your plan to
have Air Force organizations use them?
Dr. Meink. Following the award of the GSA Supply Chain Risk
Illumination Professional Tools and Services (SCRIPTS) Blanket Purchase
Agreement (BPA) on March 28, 2025, several Air Force and Space Force
acquisition program offices have already engaged with the General
Services Administration team. The Air Force will continue to actively
promote SCRIPTS and ensure widespread awareness to maximize its
adoption across organizations.
Mr. Bergman. Please provide for the record the supply chain risk
management programs in place today for each major organization in the
Air Force Material Command and how they will be integrated in the
future such that the government only pays for supply chain illumination
data annually but then shares it more broadly with the Air Force, in a
manner consistent with industry best practices recommended by the
Board.
Dr. Meink. The Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) supply chain risk
management (SCRM) Focal Point utilizes a centralized data approach.
AFMC annually procures supply illumination data and integrates it with
government data sources to create supply chain risk assessments for use
across all major organizations within the command. This system provides
Air Force-wide data sharing, eliminating redundancy, reducing costs,
improving data visibility, and enhancing proactive risk management.
Mr. Bergman. Given the critical national security need to qualify
electronics for missions beyond Low-Earth Orbit, what steps is the
Space Force taking to address this challenge?
General Saltzman. The Space Force prioritizes qualifying
electronics for missions beyond low earth orbit, due to harsh radiation
and extreme temperatures. Our strategy includes enhanced radiation
hardening through R&D and advanced testing, while strategically
leveraging commercial innovation and commercial off the shelf
components with shielding and redundancy. We are also refining on-orbit
validation capabilities through dedicated experiments and hosted
payloads.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHERRILL
Ms. Sherrill. As a veteran and advocate for women in national
security, I remain concerned about retaining and promoting talented
women in the Air Force. How does the FY26 budget support leadership
development, career progression, and retention of women in the Air
Force-particularly in operational and technical roles? What data is the
Air Force tracking to ensure women are advancing equitably in combat
and command positions?
General Allvin. The Air Force retains and promotes Airmen to
promote lethality, meritocracy, accountability, standards, and
readiness. This framework ensures that all Airmen, regardless of sex,
can contribute their maximum potential to the mission.
We collect and analyze data on recruitment, retention, and
promotion to ensure Airmen advance based on merit and performance, not
preference or discrimination. All career fields are open to individuals
who meet established qualifications and standards. The Air Force
maintains rigorous criteria for every position, ensuring selection and
advancement are based on operational necessity and individual
capability.
Ms. Sherrill. Following the Department of Defense's decision to
disband DACOWITS, a committee that has provided over 70 years of
bipartisan, expert advice on issues affecting women in uniform - What
specific mechanisms has the Air Force put in place to ensure that the
unique perspectives, needs, and challenges of women service members are
still being identified, analyzed, and incorporated into into policy?
General Allvin. The Department of the Air Force is committed to
addressing the needs and challenges of all members. This includes
integrating issues into broader, merit-based, governance structures,
conducting periodic policy reviews with subject matter experts, and
using direct feedback channels such as surveys and town halls to inform
senior leader decision-making and policies that support the ability of
Airmen and Guardians to serve effectively in all operational
environments, directly contributing to force readiness.
Ms. Sherrill. Please provide how many DACOWITS and Women's
Initiative Teams recommendations specific to the Air Force have been
implemented in the last 5 years, and what impact those recommendations
had on readiness, retention, and recruitment. Are there any plans to
establish a new internal or external advisory board that can provide
the same level of transparency, rigor, and accountability that the Air
Force Women's Initiative Teams once offered? If not, why not?
General Allvin. The direct impact of these Defense Advisory
Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) and the Women's
Initiative Team recommendations on readiness, retention and recruitment
is still under study. There are currently no plans to establish a new
internal or external advisory board specifically focused on immutable
characteristics. We will focus on promoting lethality and meritocracy
for all Airmen and Guardians.
Ms. Sherrill. What lessons has the Department of the Air Force
learned from the ongoing war in Ukraine regarding the survivability and
utility of manned aircraft operating in contested or denied airspace
characterized by integrated and layered air defense systems?
General Allvin. The critical lesson learned from the Ukraine war is
that achieving air superiority still matters to ensure joint force
success. Taking these lessons learned and the evolving character of
war, we seek to procure and operate with asymmetric capabilities to
ensure the Joint Force is able to execute future operations.
Ms. Sherrill. How is the Air Force adapting its current fighter,
bomber, and ISR concepts of operations in response to the demonstrated
challenges of operating in environments with advanced air defense
systems?
General Allvin. In support of the Joint Force and in accordance
with the new Joint Warfighting Concept, the United States Air Force
will be contributing to all seven joint-functions inside increasingly
long-range adversary air defense systems-to be clear: avoidance will
not be a feasible option for Joint Force success. To manage both risk
to mission and risk to force, the Air Force is increasing integration
across the service and throughout the Joint Force while furthering
effects across all domains to enhance survivability and create
permissive windows of opportunity at a chosen time and place in support
of Joint Force objectives. To aid in our concept development, we have
positive real-world examples from Ukraine and the Middle East that
demonstrate the continued viability, as well as the necessity, of
suppressing or destroying enemy air defense systems at an acceptable
level of risk and cost.
Ms. Sherrill. As a veteran and advocate for women in national
security, I remain concerned about retaining and promoting talented
women in the Air Force. How does the FY26 budget support leadership
development, career progression, and retention of women in the Air
Force-particularly in operational and technical roles? What data is the
Air Force tracking to ensure women are advancing equitably in combat
and command positions?
Dr. Meink. The Air Force retains and promotes Airmen to promote
lethality, meritocracy, accountability, standards, and readiness. This
framework ensures that all Airmen, regardless of sex, can contribute
their maximum potential to the mission.
We collect and analyze data on recruitment, retention, and
promotion to ensure Airmen advance based on merit and performance, not
preference or discrimination. All career fields are open to individuals
who meet established qualifications and standards. The Air Force
maintains rigorous criteria for every position, ensuring selection and
advancement are based on operational necessity and individual
capability.
Ms. Sherrill. Following the Department of Defense's decision to
disband DACOWITS, a committee that has provided over 70 years of
bipartisan, expert advice on issues affecting women in uniform - What
specific mechanisms has the Air Force put in place to ensure that the
unique perspectives, needs, and challenges of women service members are
still being identified, analyzed, and incorporated into into policy?
Dr. Meink. The Department of the Air Force is committed to
addressing the needs and challenges of all members. This includes
integrating issues into broader, merit-based, governance structures,
conducting periodic policy reviews with subject matter experts, and
using direct feedback channels such as surveys and town halls to inform
senior leader decision-making and policies that support the ability of
Airmen and Guardians to serve effectively in all operational
environments, directly contributing to force readiness.
Ms. Sherrill. Please provide how many DACOWITS and Women's
Initiative Teams recommendations specific to the Air Force have been
implemented in the last 5 years, and what impact those recommendations
had on readiness, retention, and recruitment. Are there any plans to
establish a new internal or external advisory board that can provide
the same level of transparency, rigor, and accountability that the Air
Force Women's Initiative Teams once offered? If not, why not?
Dr. Meink. The direct impact of these Defense Advisory Committee on
Women in the Services (DACOWITS) and the Women's Initiative Team
recommendations on readiness, retention and recruitment is still under
study. There are currently no plans to establish a new internal or
external advisory board specifically focused on immutable
characteristics. We will focus on promoting lethality and meritocracy
for all Airmen and Guardians.
Ms. Sherrill. As a veteran and advocate for women in national
security, I remain concerned about retaining and promoting talented
women in the Space Force. How does the FY26 budget support leadership
development, career progression, and retention of women in the Space
Force-particularly in operational and technical roles? What data is the
Space Force tracking to ensure women are advancing equitably in combat
and command positions?
General Saltzman. The Space Force is in compliance with Executive
Order 14185, "Restoring America's Fighting Force," which bans
preferential treatment for any individual or group within the Armed
Forces on the basis of sex, race, ethnicity, color, or creed. The Space
Force prioritizes readiness and lethality, by ensuring fair and equal
leadership development opportunities, career progression and retention
opportunities for all Guardians across the Space Force, regardless of
sex. Thus, the resulting merit-based system of career advancement and
progression best serves all Space Force Guardians, including female
Guardians.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JACKSON
Mr. Jackson. Given the recent breakthroughs by DeepSeek and other
Chinese AI teams, it is imperative that the Department of Defense take
great care to protect its systems and AI capabilities from Chinese
influence. What LLMs have ever been used by the Air Force on NIPRGPT?
Have any foreign LLMs or LLMs with ties to foreign contributors been
used?
Dr. Meink. NIPRGPT has only used commercial or open-source LLMs
developed by U.S. companies or close U.S. allies. No Chinese or
adversarial LLMs have ever been used. All current models in use are
from Google, Meta, Anthropic, and OpenAI (via Microsoft). One past
model, Mixtral 8x22B, was developed by Mistral AI (France) and hosted
internally with no external connectivity.
NIPRGPT previously used jina-embeddings-v2-base-en, a sentence
transformer model-not a generative model-for backend text vectorization
in a RAG pipeline. Developed by JinaAI, a Germany-based company with
U.S. operations, the model was trained on public English-language data
(C4) and did not transmit any user data externally. It has since been
removed and replaced with an alternative embedding model following a
full code and model inventory.
The Air Force takes AI security very seriously and is committed to
protecting its systems and data from foreign influence. We carefully
vet all LLMs used in NIPRGPT to ensure they meet our security
requirements and do not pose an unacceptable risk. We have established
strict guidelines for the use of LLMs, including restrictions on the
use of foreign LLMs or LLMs with ties to foreign contributors. More
information is available at higher classifications.
Mr. Jackson. What assessments has the Air Force performed on
NIPRGPT to measure its vulnerability to cyberattack? Are any standard
operating procedures for DOD systems not being followed?
Dr. Meink. NIPRGPT has undergone multiple security audits,
including an Authorization and Assessment review, an independent cyber
assessment, and a red team test by the NSA-certified 177th Information
Aggressor Squadron, a Department of the Air Force team that tests cyber
defense capabilities by attempting to hack into sensitive information
systems. NIPRGPT has an Authority to Operate at Impact Level 5. All
assessments found NIPRGPT's cybersecurity posture to meet or exceed DoD
standards. No standard procedures are being bypassed.
The program also conducted voluntary audits beyond DoD requirements
to ensure best practices. Additionally, we conduct regular
vulnerability assessments on NIPRGPT to identify and mitigate potential
cyber threats. These assessments include penetration testing, code
reviews, and security audits. We adhere to all applicable DoD standard
operating procedures for system security. We are continuously working
to improve the security posture of NIPRGPT and other AI systems.
Mr. Jackson. Have any other Services within the Department of
Defense banned the use of NIPRGPT by its employees and servicemen? If
so, why?
Dr. Meink. The Department of the Army blocked NIPRGPT as well as
their own CamoGPT to consolidate to a single GenAI platform for
operational and office environments. Each Service sets its own access
policies. NIPRGPT currently has users from across the DAF and DoD with
over 483,000 registered users. The platform has been adopted at scale
due to its demonstrated value in accelerating tasks like document
drafting, research, and code generation. Users report that tasks which
previously took days are now completed in hours, and that NIPRGPT is
filling critical knowledge and staffing gaps. The DAF has actively
shared all cybersecurity audit results and the NIPRGPT Authority to
Operate package with other Services to support transparency and
adoption. Collaboration across the DoD continues to expand as other
services set their own access policies.
Mr. Jackson. Has the Air Force evaluated commercial off the shelf
products that are able to perform the same or similar capabilities as
NIPRGPT? If so, which products were evaluated and what were the
criteria of those evaluations?
Dr. Meink. Yes. Through active market research under an ongoing DAF
pathfinder, NIPRGPT itself uses COTS components including Google
Gemini, Meta LLaMA, Anthropic Claude, OpenAI, and other COTS and open-
source software models. Additionally, NIPRGPT is currently hosted on a
commercial cloud environment approved and provisioned by Defense
Information Systems Agency for government use. Evaluations include
cost-per-user (licenses as well as compute and store), security
posture, integration feasibility, and user utility based on mission
needs and user feedback. An acquisition evaluation is forthcoming to
establish a sustainable enterprise GenAI capability. This will create a
responsible and efficient framework for deploying GenAI across the
department - balancing scale, flexibility, and risk management - while
enabling components and mission owners to securely integrate GenAI into
operational workflows.
Mr. Jackson. How much money has been spent developing NIPRGPT, and
what has been the source of funding? What color of money? How many
FTEs/airmen involved? How much does the Air Force plan to spend on
NIPRGPT in FY25 and FY26?
Dr. Meink. In FY24, approximately $14.6M was spent on NIPRGPT.
Funding came from multiple customers, including SAF/CN, OSD CDAO, AFRL,
USCYBERCOM, AFLCMC, and others. $7.85M from O&M (3400) $6.7M from RDT&E
(3600)
In FY25, the projected spend is $3.7M, entirely from RDT&E sources.
In FY26, there is no funding currently allocated. This effort is
supported by a small team of civilian and military personnel providing
COTS tools with in-house system integration, aligning with the DoD memo
on EO 14222 by leveraging internal resources when available to deliver
capability efficiently while minimizing reliance on integrators and
consultants.
Mr. Jackson. What steps is the Air Force taking to comply with the
Executive Order mandating the use of commercial products instead of
using custom built software, especially if comparable commercial
products exist?
Dr. Meink. In line with recent Executive Orders, the DAF's
longstanding direction has been to use commercial products wherever
possible. COTS solutions are heavily integrated into Cloud One,
Platform One, DAF Cloudworks and other DAF enterprise cloud and
DevSecOps service offerings. These Enterprise Services provide
government-led integration of commercial software into standardized
service offerings. This enables the DAF to empower mission owners by
providing maximum flexibility to adapt commercial technologies to
mission requirements while complying with cybersecurity mandates and
regulations. As more USAF and USSF customers leverage common Enterprise
Services to integrate commercial technology, the DAF will accelerate
migration from custom-developed government off the shelf to
continuously updated systems based on modern software practices which
assures that these systems have the flexibility to rapidly adopt
changing technology and mission requirements.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STRICKLAND
Ms. Strickland. The E-3 AWACS has been in service since 1977 and
desperately needs to be replaced. The system that is available today is
the E-7 Wedgetail. I understand from public reporting that some believe
that space-based assets can do the job, but the reality is that space-
based capabilities aren't ready. With only 18 legacy AWACS remaining -
and mission-capable rates in steep decline - how concerned are you
about a gap in airborne warning and control coverage if E-7 procurement
is delayed?
General Allvin. The Department believes we need a layered, multi-
domain capability to ensure robust, resilient and global Air Moving
Target Indication (AMTI) and Battle Management System. The Department
cancelled the E-7 Wedgetail program based on programmatic delays,
rising costs and alternate solutions. Space-based solutions for
airborne early warning could be a better alternative and the Department
of Defense is heavily investing in these alternatives. It is currently
uncertain whether and when Space Based-AMTI will enable the full range
of necessary information needed to prosecute a future conflict. The
Department is procuring four additional E-2Ds in FY26 and keeping
options open for potential future investments.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RYAN
Mr. Ryan. General Allvin, on Tuesday, you called Ukraine's drone
attacks on Russia a wake-up moment. My constituents had a wake-up
moment of their own 6 months ago - Stewart ANGB in my district faced a
SERIES of controlled airspace drone incursions in December 2024 -
including some that flew within 25 feet of C-17s. The installation and
guardsmen were limited by a lack of capability and questions about the
authorities granted to base commanders for this threat. Some of my
other colleagues on this panel have faced similar situations in their
districts, and yet there has been no acknowledgement or plan from the
Department. How is the Air Force working to secure US airspace,
installations, and assets and address these issues?
General Allvin. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) is deeply
concerned by the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and the
ability of adversaries to use them. The Air Force approach to this
problem is to use government reference architecture and modular, open-
systems design to create scalable and tailorable solutions across a
variety of operating locations. The DAF is working closely with OSD to
prioritize these rapidly developing needs against all other
requirements levied upon the Air Force. Fully funding Replicator II
efforts will field Counter-UAS capabilities to additional covered
locations. Additionally, DAF is working to enhance training,
organizational structures, and processes to mitigate UAS threats using
both passive and active measures. Installation commanders retain the
inherent right to self-defense in accordance with the Standing Rules
for Use of Force.
We recognize the evolving nature of the threat requires agility,
and we assess that updating 130i authorities to close critical gaps in
DOD's ability to address threats posed by an unmanned aircraft system
or unmanned aircraft will enable better protection of DoD assets. Title
10 USC section 130i provides for the protection of certain facilities
and assets from unmanned aircraft. The "certain facilities" described
in the title are commonly referred to as "covered facilities". The
section describes the DoD missions that would constitute a "covered
facility or asset", applies to locations in the United States
(including territories and possessions), but does not explicitly
specify all facilities within the United States that are under the
jurisdiction, custody, or control of DOD. Proposed changes to 130i
authorities would provide a critical clarification by deeming DOD
property and grounds to be a "covered" entity. Additionally, the
proposed changes would streamline the essential interagency
coordination processes primarily between DoD and DoT, which enable
timely actions to mitigate threats at covered facilities and reduce
risk to mission and collateral damage/interference when an intrusion
occurs.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. KIGGANS
Ms. Kiggans. Secretary Meink and General Saltzman, resiliency in
our launch enterprise is critically important as our country faces a
myriad array of threats in a dangerous world. Further, it is not lost
on me that that the Eastern and Western ranges, though critically
important, historically have been sites of single point failure for
equatorial and polar insertion. However, the states of Virginia and
Alaska have built multi-user orbital spaceports that now actively
support national security missions for small and medium class launch
and payloads. What is the Space Force doing to invest in these sites so
that they can continue to grow and support the Space Force's assured
access to space mission and when should we expect to see the
President's Budget Request reflect these investments?
Dr. Meink. The Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport (MARS) and the
Pacific Spaceport Complex - Alaska (PCSA) are strategic national assets
and have supported national security space missions for decades.
Through its Spaceport Enhancements Program, the U.S. Space Force has
invested $110.5M million in MARS and PCSA since Fiscal Year 2018 with
support from Congress. The Spaceport Enhancements Program invests in
U.S.-based, state-owned spaceport capabilities and enhancements focused
on increasing the military utility of these installations in support of
future Department of Defense launch services.
Ms. Kiggans. Secretary Meink and General Saltzman, resiliency in
our launch enterprise is critically important as our country faces a
myriad array of threats in a dangerous world. Further, it is not lost
on me that that the Eastern and Western ranges, though critically
important, historically have been sites of single point failure for
equatorial and polar insertion. However, the states of Virginia and
Alaska have built multi-user orbital spaceports that now actively
support national security missions for small and medium class launch
and payloads. What is the Space Force doing to invest in these sites so
that they can continue to grow and support the Space Force's assured
access to space mission and when should we expect to see the
President's Budget Request reflect these investments?
General Saltzman. The Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport (MARS) and
the Pacific Spaceport Complex - Alaska (PCSA) are strategic national
assets and have supported national security space missions for decades.
Through its Spaceport Enhancements Program, the U.S. Space Force has
invested $110.5M million in MARS and PCSA since Fiscal Year 2018 with
support from Congress. The Spaceport Enhancements Program invests in
U.S.-based, state-owned spaceport capabilities and enhancements focused
on increasing the military utility of these installations in support of
future Department of Defense launch services.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TOKUDA
Ms. Tokuda. During the last administration, Secretary Kendall
initiated a sweeping reorganization entitled "Reoptimization for Great
Power Competition," which Secretary Hegseth has put on pause pending
further review. That pause was initiated back in February and remains
in place. Do you have any concerns with continued delays and the lack
of clarity on reoptimization?
General Allvin. I fully support Secretary Meink as he thoroughly
reviews the Air Force's re-optimization efforts. My priority is to
assist with this comprehensive review, ultimately ensuring the Air
Force's efforts are aligned with the DoD strategic vision and
priorities.
Ms. Tokuda. In 2004, the Air Force completed a full Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) for the closure of Johnston Atoll following
decades of nuclear testing and chemical weapons storage. That exit
process took years and involved extensive interagency and stakeholder
coordination. Now, as the Air Force moves to reactivate the site for
the Rocket Cargo Vanguard Program, we're seeing far less rigor. An
Environmental Assessment promised for public comment in April is now
delayed until the fall. If a full EIS was necessary just to close the
site, why isn't one being done now to reopen it-especially given the
ecological sensitivity, the long-term risks, and the growing public
concern around Johnston? And given SpaceX's role in this project, is
the Air Force factoring in the company's environmental track record-
particularly incidents like those at Boca Chica-when evaluating the
environmental risks in this assessment?
Dr. Meink. As of June 2025, the Department of the Air Force (DAF)
is holding the Environmental Assessment (EA) for the proposed Rocket
Cargo landing demonstration on Johnston Atoll in abeyance, during which
time the Air Force Research Laboratory will explore if there are
available options for conducting the demonstration at a location other
than Johnston Atoll. The DAF will continue to ensure full compliance
with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other applicable
laws on this activity regardless of where it occurs. When the DAF makes
a decision on the way ahead for the demonstration, a decision about the
appropriate level of environmental analysis will be made.
Ms. Tokuda. The Air Force and NOAA have a vital partnership through
Hurricane Hunter flights, which collect lifesaving data to support
storm forecasting, evacuation planning, and disaster response. But a
recent GAO report found that both agencies are struggling to meet
growing demand due to aircraft maintenance issues, staffing shortages,
and poor coordination. That strain is now compounded by the
administration's decision to slash NOAA's budget and layoff two of its
eight flight directors and an engineer, reducing mission capacity by
over 25 percent. Do these reductions concern you? And what steps is the
Air Force taking to respond to the GAO's findings and ensure both the
continued accuracy of our storm forecasts and the strength off your
partnership with NOAA-especially as storm risks rise and NOAA faces the
threat of further staffing and funding cuts.
Dr. Meink. The Department of the Air Force values its partnership
with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the
critical role our weather reconnaissance missions play in enhancing
storm forecasting, supporting the National Hurricane Center's (NHC)
ability to produce accurate, timely predictions, and strengthening
emergency preparedness. The Air Force Reserve Command's (AFRC) 53rd
Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (53 WRS) "Hurricane Hunters" supports
this mission through storm-penetrating flights into extreme weather
events to collect atmospheric data that feeds real-time decision-
making. This data is essential to NHC models used to determine storm
track, intensity, and timing, enabling public officials to make
informed decisions on evacuations and emergency response. This
complements NOAA's capabilities, which support both operational
forecasting and research, used by the Department of Defense to
safeguard forces and assets at home and abroad. This reflects the close
coordination essential to national storm response efforts.
The recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report highlights
a few challenges related to Hurricane Hunter operations, including
increased mission demand, aircraft maintenance, and staffing pressures
across both NOAA and AFRC. The 53 WRS will continue to meet mission
demands by adjusting maintenance schedules around peak storm periods,
managing aircrew availability to support forecast-driven taskings. AFRC
is also taking steps to improve coordination with NOAA to ensure clear
communication and strategic and operational alignment, consistent with
the GAO's recommendations. While I am not in a position to comment on
decisions made regarding NOAA's internal staffing or budget, the Air
Force remains committed to supporting this important mission and
maintaining the close operational partnership with NOAA that supports
national preparedness and homeland defense efforts.
Ms. Tokuda. During the last administration, Secretary Kendall
initiated a sweeping reorganization entitled "Reoptimization for Great
Power Competition," which Secretary Hegseth has put on pause pending
further review. That pause was initiated back in February and remains
in place. Do you have an update on where these reviews stand and when
we can expect a clear decision on the Department's path forward on the
reoptimization effort?
Dr. Meink. I am reviewing the Reoptimization for Great Power
Competition initiative and I anticipate providing a recommendation to
the Secretary of Defense soon.
Ms. Tokuda. During the last administration, Secretary Kendall
initiated a sweeping reorganization entitled "Reoptimization for Great
Power Competition," which Secretary Hegseth has put on pause pending
further review. That pause was initiated back in February and remains
in place. Do you have any concerns with continued delays and the lack
of clarity on reoptimization?
General Saltzman. The USSF has three activities paused pending the
completion of reviews. First, the activation of Space Futures Command
is paused. Second, further activations of service components are
paused. Third, the USSF has paused the declaration of full operational
capability for the Officer Training Course. The USSF continues to
consult with Secretary Meink on these efforts.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOYLAN
Mr. Moylan. What investments are being made to grow and sustain a
Space Force presence in Guam, and what role does the Indo-Pacific
theater play in Guardian talent development and operational training?
General Saltzman. USSF has $13M in FY25 funding to replace a
narrowband antenna on Guam that was lost during Typhoon Mawar.
Additionally, there are several investments through classified
acquisition programs that we can provide in a closed setting. The Space
Force is focused on training and force development activities that
prepare our Guardians for the Indo-Pacific theater. Exercises such as
the Valiant Shield, Resolute Space, and Bamboo Eagle and our own
service training like Flashpoint and the crew Space Force Generation
construct provide intense threat-based training and force development
opportunities designed to give our young Guardians the experience
needed for a potential fight in space in the Indo-Pacific region.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. DAVIS
Mr. Davis. To solve both a potential capability gap as bases like
Selfridge transition to new platforms while bringing on -229 F-15Es at
Seymour Johnson Air Force Base from RAF Lakenheath, would the Air Force
consider transferring the excess -220 aircraft at Seymour once the -
229s come to Seymour to Guard or Reserve units that are losing their
fighter missions? Doing so not only solves the problems of two reserve
component squadrons losing their aircraft but also keeps two highly
capable squadrons in the total force.
General Allvin. The F-15E Block-10 aircraft the Air Force plans to
divest are the oldest, least capable portion of the F-15E Fleet. Most
of these aircraft are beyond their usable service life and their
aircraft availability rate of 49% is among the lowest in the DAF
fighter enterprise. The approximate $3.2B needed to modernize these
aircraft is better used to procure new advanced capabilities such as
the F-35A, the F-15EX, and the F-47.
Mr. Davis. To address the alarmingly low 55 percent mission-capable
rate for F-15Es, would the Air Force support Congress adjusting the
mission readiness formula to reduce the Ready Aircrew Program so we can
prioritize repairs and depot maintenance?
General Allvin. The Air Force advocates for stable, consistent, and
enduring resourcing, as included in the President's Budget, for both
the Flying Hour (FHP) and Weapon System Sustainment (WSS) programs to
address the F-15E mission-capable rate issue. The Ready Aircrew Program
(RAP) and WSS are both critical and interconnected levers for
generating and preserving readiness. Reducing one to bolster the other
is a suboptimal approach that will not translate to increased long-term
readiness across the enterprise.
Mr. Davis. Can you confirm for me that all F-15Es have, or are
receiving, APG-82 active electronically scanned array radars and that
these are the most advanced radars currently in operation, along with
other avionics upgrades, including the APG-82, that total approximately
$13 million per aircraft?
General Allvin. Out of the 217 F-15E aircraft, 211 have been
modified with the APG-82 radar. The installation plan was aligned to
the Air Force's Future Force Structure and is complete with the 211
aircraft. The APG-82 is one of the most advanced Active Electronically
Scanned Array (AESA) radars ever installed in a fighter aircraft and
the most advanced radar ever installed in an F-15.
Mr. Davis. Where on the funding curve is there the greatest return
on investment from prioritizing spare parts over flying hours, and how
can Congress optimize the maintenance formula?
General Allvin. Congress can optimize Weapon System Sustainment
(WSS) by providing stable, consistent, and enduring resourcing included
in the President's Budget. Long-term funding stability, especially for
spare parts, clearly signals our requirements to the Defense Industrial
Base (DIB), offering greater opportunity to achieve those requirements.
This can enable long-term return on investment within the sustainment
portfolio.
Mr. Davis. What is the plan to adapt Seymour Johnson's training
mission for an F-15EX schoolhouse, and do you agree that an effective
schoolhouse is only maximally effective with F-15EXs physically present
on base, since otherwise airmen would not get exposure to the new
EPAWWS system and other capabilities unique to the upgraded aircraft?
General Allvin. The F-15 formal training unit (FTU) utilizes a
common syllabus for the F-15C, F-15E, and F-15EX. The combined fleet
size does not currently support the F-15EX at the schoolhouse, which
would slow the fielding of combat capability to operational squadrons.
There is a differences trainer that teaches the new capabilities of the
F-15EX, which is completed partly at the schoolhouse and partly at the
operational unit. The syllabus identifies several sorties to fly solo
(pilot only) for pilots that have been identified as going to F-15EX.
Additionally, the USAF plans to place F-15EX simulators at Seymour
Johnson to teach F-15EX unique capabilities and avionics. EPAWSS is
being fielded to the F-15E, and students graduating to both F-15E/EX
will receive EPAWSS training in mission qualification training at their
first operational unit.
Mr. Davis. To solve both a potential capability gap as bases like
Selfridge transition to new platforms while bringing on -229 F-15Es at
Seymour Johnson Air Force Base from RAF Lakenheath, would the Air Force
consider transferring the excess -220 aircraft at Seymour once the -
229s come to Seymour to Guard or Reserve units that are losing their
fighter missions? Doing so not only solves the problems of two reserve
component squadrons losing their aircraft but also keeps two highly
capable squadrons in the total force.
Dr. Meink. The F-15E Block-10 aircraft the Air Force plans to
divest are the oldest, least capable portion of the F-15E Fleet. Most
of these aircraft are beyond their usable service life and their
aircraft availability rate of 49% is among the lowest in the DAF
fighter enterprise. The approximate $3.2B needed to modernize these
aircraft is better used to procure new advanced capabilities like the
F-35A, the F-15EX, and the F-47.
Mr. Davis. To address the alarmingly low 55 percent mission-capable
rate for F-15Es, would the Air Force support Congress adjusting the
mission readiness formula to reduce the Ready Aircrew Program so we can
prioritize repairs and depot maintenance?
Dr. Meink. The Air Force advocates for stable, consistent, and
enduring resourcing for both the Flying Hour (FHP) and Weapon System
Sustainment (WSS) programs, as included in the President's Budget, to
address the F-15E mission-capable rate issue. The Ready Aircrew Program
(RAP) and WSS are both critical and interconnected levers for
generating and preserving readiness. Reducing one to bolster the other
is a suboptimal approach that will not translate to increased long-term
readiness across the enterprise.
Mr. Davis. Can you confirm for me that all F-15Es have, or are
receiving, APG-82 active electronically scanned array radars and that
these are the most advanced radars currently in operation, along with
other avionics upgrades, including the APG-82, that total approximately
$13 million per aircraft?
Dr. Meink. Out of the 217 F-15E aircraft, 211 have been modified
with the APG-82 radar. The installation plan was aligned to the Air
Force's Future Force Structure and is complete with the 211 aircraft.
The APG-82 is one of the most advanced active electronically scanned
array (AESA) radars ever installed in a fighter aircraft and the most
advanced radar ever installed in an F-15.
Mr. Davis. Where on the funding curve is there the greatest return
on investment from prioritizing spare parts over flying hours, and how
can Congress optimize the maintenance formula?
Dr. Meink. Congress can optimize Weapon System Sustainment (WSS) by
providing stable, consistent, and enduring resourcing as requested,
balanced with the required readiness activities generated by the Flying
Hour Program (FHP). Long-term funding stability, especially for spare
parts, clearly signals our requirements to the Defense Industrial Base,
offering greater opportunity to achieve those requirements. This can
enable long-term return on investment within the sustainment portfolio.
Mr. Davis. What is the plan to adapt Seymour Johnson's training
mission for an F-15EX schoolhouse, and do you agree that an effective
schoolhouse is only maximally effective with F-15EXs physically present
on base, since otherwise airmen would not get exposure to the new
EPAWWS system and other capabilities unique to the upgraded aircraft?
Dr. Meink. The F-15 formal training unit (FTU) utilizes a common
syllabus for the F-15C, F-15E, and F-15EX. The combined fleet size does
not currently support F-15EX aircraft to be located at the schoolhouse,
which would slow the fielding of combat capability to operational
squadrons. There is a differences trainer that teaches the new
capabilities of the F-15EX, which is completed partly at the
schoolhouse and partly at the operational unit. The syllabus identifies
several sorties to fly solo (pilot only) for pilots that have been
identified as going to F-15EX. Additionally, the USAF plans to place F-
15EX simulators at Seymour Johnson to teach F-15EX unique capabilities
and avionics. EPAWSS is being fielded to the F-15E, and students
graduating to both F-15E/EX will receive EPAWSS training in mission
qualification training at their first operational unit.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GOODEN
Mr. Gooden. The 149th Fighter Wing in Texas is comprised of pre-
block F16s, which are due to be retired no later than 2028. Currently,
there are no aircraft forecasted for fielding to replace them, causing
a strategic capability gap and potential loss of experienced personnel
upwards of 7 years. What security risks are created through the failure
to program replacement fighters in the reserve component before
divestiture?
General Allvin. The DAF has no plans to retire the formal training
unit F-16s at the 149 FW in 2028. The aircraft are a critical part of
the F-16 formal training enterprise.
As outlined in the 2025 Sustainment and Recapitalization of the Air
National Fighter Fleet Congressional Report delivered to Congress in
March 2025, the 149 FW/182 FS is planned for recapitalization with F-16
Block 40 aircraft in FY31. The Block 40 F-16 is expected to remain in
service into the 2040s.
Mr. Gooden. Considering that National Guard fighter wings currently
conduct 94% of homeland defense and are 21% of the total Air Force
fighter capability, they are only 6% of the Air Force budget, and RAND
reports there is an almost 50% reduction in costs to maintain fighters
in the national guard. This pre-mature divesture without a plan in
place is a risk to our national security posture countering China and
the American homeland. In the previous NDAA, we required the Air Force
to develop a plan for fighter recapitalization while also authorizing
substantial resources for the Air Force. Despite this, the Air Force
has not created a plan to prevent this serious capability gap and
backfill these units. Why are we divesting fighter units from the Air
National Guard that provide cost savings to taxpayers, conduct homeland
defense missions, and provide an avenue to help retain fighter pilots
who no longer wish to serve in the active component? What are the
forecasted costs associated with training entire new wings to replace
these fighter squadrons, and will they be placed back in the National
Guard to help decrease costs?
General Allvin. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) balances
Active Duty and Air National Guard (ANG) fighter requirements through
inputs from each service component, MAJCOM, and CCMD.
Aircraft sustainment along with new fighter procurement must be
balanced throughout the budget process. The DAF prioritized recapping
the ANG pre-block F-16 fleet with either upgraded F-16 B40 or B50
aircraft or the F-35.
Mr. Gooden. The 149th Fighter Wing in Texas is comprised of pre-
block F16s, which are due to be retired no later than 2028. Currently,
there are no aircraft forecasted for fielding to replace them, causing
a strategic capability gap and potential loss of experienced personnel
upwards of 7 years. What security risks are created through the failure
to program replacement fighters in the reserve component before
divestiture?
Dr. Meink. The DAF has no plans to retire the formal training unit
F-16s at the 149 FW in 2028. The aircraft are a critical part of the F-
16 formal training enterprise.
As outlined in the 2025 Sustainment and Recapitalization of the Air
National Fighter Fleet Congressional Report delivered to Congress in
March 2025, the 149 FW/182 FS is planned for recapitalization with F-16
Block 40 aircraft in FY31. The Block 40 F-16 is expected to remain in
service into the 2040s.
Mr. Gooden. Considering that National Guard fighter wings currently
conduct 94% of homeland defense and are 21% of the total Air Force
fighter capability, they are only 6% of the Air Force budget, and RAND
reports there is an almost 50% reduction in costs to maintain fighters
in the national guard. This pre-mature divesture without a plan in
place is a risk to our national security posture countering China and
the American homeland. In the previous NDAA, we required the Air Force
to develop a plan for fighter recapitalization while also authorizing
substantial resources for the Air Force. Despite this, the Air Force
has not created a plan to prevent this serious capability gap and
backfill these units. Why are we divesting fighter units from the Air
National Guard that provide cost savings to taxpayers, conduct homeland
defense missions, and provide an avenue to help retain fighter pilots
who no longer wish to serve in the active component? What are the
forecasted costs associated with training entire new wings to replace
these fighter squadrons, and will they be placed back in the National
Guard to help decrease costs?
Dr. Meink. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) has no plans to
retire the formal training unit F-16s at the 149 FW in 2028. The
aircraft are a critical part of the F-16 formal training enterprise.
HAF/A8 balances Active Duty and Air National Guard (ANG) fighter
requirements through inputs from each service component, MAJCOM, and
CCMD.
Aircraft sustainment along with new fighter procurement must be
balanced throughout the budget process. The DAF prioritized recapping
the ANG pre-block F-16 fleet with either upgraded F-16 B40 or B50
aircraft or the F-35.
Mr. Gooden. In response to the F-47 award, Lockheed Martin's
proposal has been to create a new F-35 model that could compete for
this award. Is the AF considering the viability of this proposal?
General Saltzman. On March 21, 2025, after a robust evaluation of
proposals, the DAF awarded an Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD) contract, with competitively priced options for Low-Rate Initial
Production (LRIP), to Boeing for the F-47 program. Additional EMD and
LRIP proposals for F-47 are not being considered. The DAF is now
focused on executing the EMD phase, and then the production phase, of
the F-47 program. Additionally, the Air Force, DoD, and Lockheed Martin
are focused on developing and delivering the next iteration of F-35
capabilities -- Block 4.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GOODLANDER
Ms. Goodlander. Secretary Meink, New Hampshire is home to the Pease
Air National Guard Base. The 157th Air Refueling Wing at Pease is
currently the only Air National Guard Unit equipped with twelve KC-46A
Pegasus Tankers, and is strategically located to support multiple
combatant commands.
What is your position on supporting military construction ramp
restoration projects at air bases like Pease to support the United
States Transportation Command's current and future needs?
Dr. Meink. DAF resources projects to repair and rehabilitate
airfield ramp infrastructure necessary to support the Nation's current
and future requirements. Air bases like Pease Air National Guard Base
are critically important to the flexibility required to execute
logistical operations of combatant commands. Programming of military
construction requirements to support air bases is managed through an
annual, detailed prioritization process matched against Departmental
guidance. In the case of Pease ANGB, there is currently airfield ramp
capacity that is excess to the requirement for the 12 ANG KC-46
aircraft.
Ms. Goodlander. General Saltzman, over the past few years, there
have been concerning reports about potential risks to the resiliency of
our defense infrastructure and military installations, including those
associated with extreme weather, encroachment from shell company
developers, and adversary attacks on the energy grid, for example.
My home state of New Hampshire hosts the New Boston Space Force
Station in Hillsborough County. This station provides critical, around-
the-clock satellite command and control capabilities for the United
States and its allies. It also supports the nation's GPS system,
serving millions of Americans every day.
What is the Space Force doing to ensure our infrastructure
installations like the New Boston Space Force Station are protected
from potential vulnerabilities?
General Saltzman. The Space Force's ability to conduct critical 24/
7 operations from our home stations relies on resilient installation
systems and infrastructure. We maintain resilient energy and water
through a comprehensive approach to security, multi-source system
redundancy, and risk management to ensure our systems remain
operationally capable across the entire spectrum of conflict. Guardians
train to ensure mission continuity by identifying utility disruptions,
ensuring their systems seamlessly transfer to backup power, and
implementing procedures to return to main power as appropriate. We also
have Field mission-continuity exercises at the command-level-similar to
Department of the Air Force-level Energy Resilience Readiness Exercise
(ERREs)-and we intend to exercise utility disruptions to ensure
operators identify their shortfalls, are prepared to survive first
contact, and grow confidence in their weapon system infrastructure
(WSI).
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ELFRETH
Ms. Elfreth. My understanding is that a Site Survey conducted in
June 2023 assessed that facilities at the 175th Wing, Martin State
Airport, Maryland are completely suitable to receive C-130J aircraft.
Why has the Air Force made the decision to close a flying unit given
the current shortage of pilots and maintainers across the Air Force and
not capitalize on existing personnel and infrastructure ready to accept
a C-130J mission?
General Allvin. All of the C-130J aircraft programmed for the Air
National Guard (ANG) already have basing assignments. In FY14, the
175th Wing was offered the option to recapitalize with a C-130 mission.
The offer was declined and instead the unit maintained the A-10 mission
until the 2025 transition to a Cyberspace Wing.
Warfield ANG Base is ideally situated to transition to a Cyberspace
Operations Wing due to the inherent capabilities in the current cyber
mission and its proximity to the National Capital Region. Warfield's
access to a highly qualified and technical workforce, combined with the
unique cyber expertise already resident at the 175th Wing, allows the
Air Force to leverage this operational advantage vital to our homeland
defense.
Ms. Elfreth. My understanding is that a Site Survey conducted in
June 2023 assessed that facilities at the 175th Wing, Martin State
Airport, Maryland are completely suitable to receive C-130J aircraft.
Why has the Air Force made the decision to close a flying unit given
the current shortage of pilots and maintainers across the Air Force and
not capitalize on existing personnel and infrastructure ready to accept
a C-130J mission?
Dr. Meink. All of the C-130J aircraft programmed for the Air
National Guard (ANG) already have basing assignments. In FY14, the
175th Wing was offered the option to recapitalize with a C-130 mission.
The offer was declined and instead the unit maintained the A-10 mission
until the 2025 transition to a Cyberspace Wing.
Warfield ANG Base is ideally situated to transition to a Cyberspace
Operations Wing due to the inherent capabilities in the current cyber
mission and its proximity to the National Capital Region. Warfield's
access to a highly qualified and technical workforce, combined with the
unique cyber expertise already resident at the 175th Wing, allows the
Air Force to leverage this operational advantage vital to our homeland
defense.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCGUIRE
Mr. McGuire. Secretary Meink, the Air Force continues to prioritize
modernization across its missile enterprise, including next-generation
missile propulsion, advanced tactical and air defense systems, space
launch, and nuclear modernization, all of which depend on solid rocket
motors. Concerns have been voiced about the domestic supply chain and
increasing domestic demand signals for these critical Air Force needs.
How is the Air Force working to ensure a stable and competitive
domestic supply of solid rocket motors to meet program requirements, to
include addressing current industrial base constraints and production
bottlenecks?
Has the Air Force considered supporting a campus-style solid rocket
motor production model that would leverage proven private-sector
expertise, co-located manufacturing, and commercial capital to rapidly
scale capacity?
Dr. Meink. The Air Force is partnering with industry, academia, and
DoD stakeholders to ensure a robust, resilient, responsive, and
competitive domestic solid rocket motors (SRM) industrial base that can
meet the current and future needs of the Nation's defense. We are
investing in expanding and modernizing domestic SRM production
facilities to include infrastructure upgrades at our existing
government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities and investments
in advanced manufacturing technologies. The Air Force is committed to
working with DoD and SRM industry partners to review existing
acquisition processes and explore all opportunities to expand the
number of qualified sources for key SRM components and systems.
Mr. McGuire. General Saltzman, President Trump's Golden Dome
executive order calls for the "development and deployment of non-
kinetic capabilities to augment the kinetic defeat of advanced cruise
missiles." Some of these capabilities include lasers and particle-beam
weapons, technologies that require a large amount of power to operate.
I'd expect the Space Force to fully explore deploying these
capabilities into the interceptor architecture. Since I've entered
Congress, I've been a big proponent of deploying advanced nuclear
reactor technology like small modular reactors (SMRs) and micro nuclear
reactors (MNRs) on orbit. Nuclear energy has 1,000 times the power
density of solar and will power not just lasers, but our communications
and data collections as well.
General Saltzman, is the Space Force looking into the adoption of
nuclear technology into our next-gen space architecture?
General Saltzman. On January 27, 2025, President Trump signed
Executive Order 14186, directing the Secretary of Defense to plan,
develop, and deploy a next-generation missile defense shield. To
fulfill this mission, the DoD is developing the Golden Dome for
America, which will provide technologically advanced capabilities to
defend the United States against ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise
missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks from peer, near-
peer, and rogue adversaries. The DAF is awaiting further guidance from
OSD and looks forward to supporting this important effort.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HAMADEH
Mr. Hamadeh. Luke Air Force Base Importance As I previously
mentioned in my questioning, we received notice that Luke Air Force
Base was being downgraded in command from 1 Star General to Colonel. As
you are well aware, Luke Air Force Base trains 75% of all F-35 pilots
and is the world's largest fighter wing. While it is more common for
colonels to command training, Luke's 1 Star General command is of
utmost importance for its structure, image, and location in the Western
United States.
Question 1: May this considered downgrade of Luke AFB be due to its
mission realignment to training F-35 pilots?
General Allvin. Thank you for your continued interest in Luke Air
Force Base (AFB) and the 56th Fighter Wing. We deeply appreciate your
advocacy and commitment to our Airmen.
Currently, the Air Force is adhering to the Secretary of Defense's
directive to temporarily pause all planning related to any potential
wing restructuring. Luke AFB and the mission of the 56th Fighter Wing
are extremely valuable to the Air Force, and we believe our foreign
partners share this sentiment. While the rank of the individual leading
the base is important, we also believe the true value lies in the
quality of our instructor pilots and ensuring our students are trained
by the best pilots in the world. We are committed to maintaining this
exceptional quality at Luke AFB and will ensure any decision made in
the future will not lower our standards.
We will certainly keep you updated as this process advances and
decisions are finalized.
Mr. Hamadeh. As I previously mentioned in my questioning, we
received notice that Luke Air Force Base was being downgraded in
command from 1 Star General to Colonel. As you are well aware, Luke Air
Force Base trains 75% of all F-35 pilots and is the world's largest
fighter wing. While it is more common for colonels to command training,
Luke's 1 Star General command is of utmost importance for its
structure, image, and location in the Western United States.
Question 2: Could you provide a report of the monetary effects,
spending-wise, that this possible downgrade would create?
General Allvin. The Air Force is adhering to the Secretary of
Defense's directive to temporarily pause all planning related to any
potential wing restructuring. We are also complying with the Secretary
of Defense's ongoing review of General Officer positions throughout the
Department of Defense.
We are not tracking any spending implications or monetary effects,
and we will keep you updated as this process advances and decisions are
finalized. Your continued support is invaluable, and we look forward to
engaging with you further once the review is complete.
Mr. Hamadeh. Luke Air Force Base Security While many of my
colleagues in Congress have raised concerns about the new threat of
drone technology, many have neglected to comment on China's influence
and land purchases near key United States military bases. Majority
Leader Janae Shamp of the Arizona State Senate has raised awareness of
China's attempts to purchase land near Glendale, Arizona near Luke Air
Force Base. Only three days ago, our Democrat Governor Katie Hobbs
vetoed legislation that would bar Chinese companies from making land
purchases so close to Arizona's vital military bases.
Question 1: In light of this action by Governor Katie Hobbs, can
you provide what plans the Air Force has to secure its bases from
Chinese espionage, given the People's Republic of China's apparent
ability to purchase land nearby?
General Allvin. In April 2024, the joint memo "Elevating Foreign
Investment Risk Concerns Near DAF Installations and Assets" was co-
signed by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Energy,
Installations, and Environment (SAF/IE) and the Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (SAF/AQ). The
memo was distributed to commanders of all Major Commands, Field
Commands, and Department of the Air Force (DAF) installations. The memo
directed all DAF stakeholders to familiarize themselves with the tools
and mechanisms available to elevate foreign investment concerns to the
appropriate DAF chain of command.
Because DAF does not oversee private land transactions,
installation leaders must foster an open and inclusive relationship
with community stakeholders to identify and elevate foreign investment
concerns as early as possible. Installation Commanders should work with
local leaders and the local Air Force Office of Special Investigations
to assess if there is a threat to their mission and develop a
mitigation plan, if required.
Depending on the risk posed by foreign investment or ownership,
there are different paths to address and mitigate risk. One of the
paths that may be available is a review by the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Installations should also be
aware that the CFIUS process limits what can be shared regarding active
investigations. Public disclosure of information filed with CFIUS is
prohibited.
Mr. Hamadeh. While many of my colleagues in Congress have raised
concerns about the new threat of drone technology, many have neglected
to comment on China's influence and land purchases near key United
States military bases. Majority Leader Janae Shamp of the Arizona State
Senate has raised awareness of China's attempts to purchase land near
Glendale, Arizona near Luke Air Force Base. Only three days ago, our
Democrat Governor Katie Hobbs vetoed legislation that would bar Chinese
companies from making land purchases so close to Arizona's vital
military bases.
Question 2: What are the National Security risks of allowing China
to purchase land near our military installations, including, but not
limited to, those which train fighter pilots like Luke Air Force Base?
General Allvin. The Department of the Air Force's (DAF) Foreign
Investment Assessment Playbook references guidance from the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center states, "In partnering with any
foreign entity, U.S. state and local leaders should exercise vigilance,
conduct due diligence, and ensure transparency, integrity, and
accountability are built into the partnership to guard against
potential foreign government exploitation." Foreign proximity to
certain installations may provide opportunity to observe or collect
information on Tactics & Training Procedures, and other activities such
as schedules, personnel, equipment, or any changes to DAF
installations.
Mr. Hamadeh. While many of my colleagues in Congress have raised
concerns about the new threat of drone technology, many have neglected
to comment on China's influence and land purchases near key United
States military bases. Majority Leader Janae Shamp of the Arizona State
Senate has raised awareness of China's attempts to purchase land near
Glendale, Arizona near Luke Air Force Base. Only three days ago, our
Democrat Governor Katie Hobbs vetoed legislation that would bar Chinese
companies from making land purchases so close to Arizona's vital
military bases.
Question 3: Will you follow up with the extraneous materials and
briefings that were committed to during the hearing, such as a briefing
for the Arizona delegation?
General Allvin. Yes, the Department of the Air Force commits to
following up with a briefing for the Arizona delegation.
Mr. Hamadeh. Luke Air Force Base Importance As I previously
mentioned in my questioning, we received notice that Luke Air Force
Base was being downgraded in command from 1 Star General to Colonel. As
you are well aware, Luke Air Force Base trains 75% of all F-35 pilots
and is the world's largest fighter wing. While it is more common for
colonels to command training, Luke's 1 Star General command is of
utmost importance for its structure, image, and location in the Western
United States.
Question 1: May this considered downgrade of Luke AFB be due to its
mission realignment to training F-35 pilots?
Dr. Meink. Currently, the Air Force is adhering to the Secretary of
Defense's directive to temporarily pause all planning related to any
potential wing restructuring. Luke Air Force Base (AFB) and the mission
of the 56th Fighter Wing are extremely valuable to the Air Force, and
we believe our foreign partners share this sentiment. While the rank of
the individual leading the base is important, we also believe the true
value lies in the quality of our instructor pilots and ensuring our
students are trained by the best pilots in the world. We are committed
to maintaining this exceptional quality at Luke AFB and will ensure any
decision made in the future will not lower our standards.
Mr. Hamadeh. As I previously mentioned in my questioning, we
received notice that Luke Air Force Base was being downgraded in
command from 1 Star General to Colonel. As you are well aware, Luke Air
Force Base trains 75% of all F-35 pilots and is the world's largest
fighter wing. While it is more common for colonels to command training,
Luke's 1 Star General command is of utmost importance for its
structure, image, and location in the Western United States.
Question 2: Could you provide a report of the monetary effects,
spending-wise, that this possible downgrade would create?
Dr. Meink. The Air Force is adhering to the Secretary of Defense's
directive to temporarily pause all planning related to any potential
wing restructuring. We are also complying with the Secretary of
Defense's ongoing review of General Officer positions throughout the
Department of Defense.
We are not tracking any spending implications or monetary effects,
and we will keep you updated as this process advances and decisions are
finalized. Your continued support is invaluable, and we look forward to
engaging with you further once the review is complete.
Mr. Hamadeh. Luke Air Force Base Security While many of my
colleagues in Congress have raised concerns about the new threat of
drone technology, many have neglected to comment on China's influence
and land purchases near key United States military bases. Majority
Leader Janae Shamp of the Arizona State Senate has raised awareness of
China's attempts to purchase land near Glendale, Arizona near Luke Air
Force Base. Only three days ago, our Democrat Governor Katie Hobbs
vetoed legislation that would bar Chinese companies from making land
purchases so close to Arizona's vital military bases.
Question 1: In light of this action by Governor Katie Hobbs, can
you provide what plans the Air Force has to secure its bases from
Chinese espionage, given the People's Republic of China's apparent
ability to purchase land nearby?
Dr. Meink. In April of 2024 the joint memo "Elevating Foreign
Investment Risk Concerns Near DAF Installations and Assets" was co-
signed by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Energy,
Installations, and Environment (SAF/IE) and the Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (SAF/AQ). The
memo was distributed to commanders of all Major Commands, Field
Commands, and DAF installations. The memo directed all DAF stakeholders
to familiarize themselves with the tools and mechanisms available to
elevate foreign investment concerns to the appropriate DAF chain of
command.
Because the DAF does not oversee private land transactions,
installation leaders must foster an open and inclusive relationship
with community stakeholders to identify and elevate foreign investment
concerns as early as possible. Installation Commanders should work with
local leaders and the local Air Force Office of Special Investigations
to assess if there is a threat to their mission and develop a
mitigation plan, if required.
Depending on the risk posed by foreign investment or ownership,
there are different paths to address and mitigate risk. One of the
paths that may be available is review by the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Installations should also be
aware that the CFIUS process limits what can be shared regarding active
investigations. Public disclosure of information filed with CFIUS is
prohibited.
Mr. Hamadeh. While many of my colleagues in Congress have raised
concerns about the new threat of drone technology, many have neglected
to comment on China's influence and land purchases near key United
States military bases. Majority Leader Janae Shamp of the Arizona State
Senate has raised awareness of China's attempts to purchase land near
Glendale, Arizona near Luke Air Force Base. Only three days ago, our
Democrat Governor Katie Hobbs vetoed legislation that would bar Chinese
companies from making land purchases so close to Arizona's vital
military bases.
Question 2: What are the National Security risks of allowing China
to purchase land near our military installations, including, but not
limited to, those which train fighter pilots like Luke Air Force Base?
Dr. Meink. The Department of the Air Force's (DAF) Foreign
Investment Assessment Playbook references guidance from the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center states, "In partnering with any
foreign entity, U.S. state and local leaders should exercise vigilance,
conduct due diligence, and ensure transparency, integrity, and
accountability are built into the partnership to guard against
potential foreign government exploitation." Foreign proximity to
certain installations may provide opportunity to observe or collect
information on Tactics & Training Procedures, and other activities such
as schedules, personnel, equipment, or any changes to DAF
installations.
Mr. Hamadeh. While many of my colleagues in Congress have raised
concerns about the new threat of drone technology, many have neglected
to comment on China's influence and land purchases near key United
States military bases. Majority Leader Janae Shamp of the Arizona State
Senate has raised awareness of China's attempts to purchase land near
Glendale, Arizona near Luke Air Force Base. Only three days ago, our
Democrat Governor Katie Hobbs vetoed legislation that would bar Chinese
companies from making land purchases so close to Arizona's vital
military bases.
Question 3: Will you follow up with the extraneous materials and
briefings that were committed to during the hearing, such as a briefing
for the Arizona delegation?
Dr. Meink. Yes, the Department of the Air Force commits to
following up with a briefing for the Arizona delegation.
Mr. Hamadeh. Luke Air Force Base Importance As I previously
mentioned in my questioning, we received notice that Luke Air Force
Base was being downgraded in command from 1 Star General to Colonel. As
you are well aware, Luke Air Force Base trains 75% of all F-35 pilots
and is the world's largest fighter wing. While it is more common for
colonels to command training, Luke's 1 Star General command is of
utmost importance for its structure, image, and location in the Western
United States.
Question 1: May this considered downgrade of Luke AFB be due to its
mission realignment to training F-35 pilots?
General Saltzman. I will defer to SecAF and CSAF to respond to this
question.
SecAF answered this in question 111. CSAF answered this in question
106.
Mr. Hamadeh. As I previously mentioned in my questioning, we
received notice that Luke Air Force Base was being downgraded in
command from 1 Star General to Colonel. As you are well aware, Luke Air
Force Base trains 75% of all F-35 pilots and is the world's largest
fighter wing. While it is more common for colonels to command training,
Luke's 1 Star General command is of utmost importance for its
structure, image, and location in the Western United States.
Question 2: Could you provide a report of the monetary effects,
spending-wise, that this possible downgrade would create?
General Saltzman. I will defer to SecAF and CSAF to respond to this
question.
SecAF answered this in question 112. CSAF answered this in question
107.
Mr. Hamadeh. Luke Air Force Base Security While many of my
colleagues in Congress have raised concerns about the new threat of
drone technology, many have neglected to comment on China's influence
and land purchases near key United States military bases. Majority
Leader Janae Shamp of the Arizona State Senate has raised awareness of
China's attempts to purchase land near Glendale, Arizona near Luke Air
Force Base. Only three days ago, our Democrat Governor Katie Hobbs
vetoed legislation that would bar Chinese companies from making land
purchases so close to Arizona's vital military bases.
Question 1: In light of this action by Governor Katie Hobbs, can
you provide what plans the Air Force has to secure its bases from
Chinese espionage, given the People's Republic of China's apparent
ability to purchase land nearby?
General Saltzman. I will defer to SecAF to answer this question:
Sec Meink Response:
In April of 2024 the joint memo "Elevating Foreign Investment Risk
Concerns Near DAF Installations and Assets" was co-signed by the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Energy, Installations, and
Environment (SAF/IE) and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (SAF/AQ). The memo was
distributed to commanders of all Major Commands, Field Commands, and
Department of the Air Force (DAF) installations. The memo directed all
DAF stakeholders to familiarize themselves with the tools and
mechanisms available to elevate foreign investment concerns to the
appropriate DAF chain of command.
Because the DAF does not oversee private land transactions,
installation leaders must foster an open and inclusive relationship
with community stakeholders to identify and elevate foreign investment
concerns as early as possible. Installation Commanders should work with
local leaders and the local Air Force Office of Special Investigations
to assess if there is a threat to their mission and develop a
mitigation plan, if required.
Depending on the risk posed by foreign investment or ownership,
there are different paths to address and mitigate risk. One of the
paths that may be available is a review by the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Installations should also be
aware that the CFIUS process limits what can be shared regarding active
investigations. Public disclosure of information filed with CFIUS is
prohibited.
Mr. Hamadeh. While many of my colleagues in Congress have raised
concerns about the new threat of drone technology, many have neglected
to comment on China's influence and land purchases near key United
States military bases. Majority Leader Janae Shamp of the Arizona State
Senate has raised awareness of China's attempts to purchase land near
Glendale, Arizona near Luke Air Force Base. Only three days ago, our
Democrat Governor Katie Hobbs vetoed legislation that would bar Chinese
companies from making land purchases so close to Arizona's vital
military bases.
Question 2: What are the National Security risks of allowing China
to purchase land near our military installations, including, but not
limited to, those which train fighter pilots like Luke Air Force Base?
General Saltzman. I will defer to SecAF to answer this question:
Secretary Meink response:
The Department of the Air Force's (DAF) Foreign Investment
Assessment Playbook references guidance from the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center that states, "In partnering
with any foreign entity, U.S. state and local leaders should exercise
vigilance, conduct due diligence, and ensure transparency, integrity,
and accountability are built into the partnership to guard against
potential foreign government exploitation." Foreign proximity to
certain installations may provide the opportunity to observe or collect
information on Tactics & Training Procedures and other activities such
as schedules, personnel, equipment, or any changes to DAF
installations.
Mr. Hamadeh. While many of my colleagues in Congress have raised
concerns about the new threat of drone technology, many have neglected
to comment on China's influence and land purchases near key United
States military bases. Majority Leader Janae Shamp of the Arizona State
Senate has raised awareness of China's attempts to purchase land near
Glendale, Arizona near Luke Air Force Base. Only three days ago, our
Democrat Governor Katie Hobbs vetoed legislation that would bar Chinese
companies from making land purchases so close to Arizona's vital
military bases.
Question 3: Will you follow up with the extraneous materials and
briefings that were committed to during the hearing, such as a briefing
for the Arizona delegation?
General Saltzman. Yes, the DAF commits to following up with a
briefing for the Arizona delegation.
[all]