[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WINTER STORM FERN LESSONS: SUPPLYING
RELIABLE POWER TO MEET PEAK DEMAND
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 17, 2026
__________
Serial No. 119-64
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Published for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
govinfo.gov/committee/house-energy
energycommerce.house.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
64-303 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
Chairman
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia Ranking Member
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia DORIS O. MATSUI, California
GARY J. PALMER, Alabama KATHY CASTOR, Florida
NEAL P. DUNN, Florida, Vice PAUL TONKO, New York
Chairman YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
DAN CRENSHAW, Texas RAUL RUIZ, California
JOHN JOYCE, Pennsylvania SCOTT H. PETERS, California
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan
RICK W. ALLEN, Georgia MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
RUSS FULCHER, Idaho NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California
AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas DARREN SOTO, Florida
DIANA HARSHBARGER, Tennessee KIM SCHRIER, Washington
MARIANNETTE MILLER-MEEKS, Iowa LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
KAT CAMMACK, Florida LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
JAY OBERNOLTE, California ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, New York
JOHN JAMES, Michigan JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts
CLIFF BENTZ, Oregon TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana
ERIN HOUCHIN, Indiana ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RUSSELL FRY, South Carolina KEVIN MULLIN, California
LAUREL M. LEE, Florida GREG LANDSMAN, Ohio
NICHOLAS A. LANGWORTHY, New York JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
THOMAS H. KEAN, Jr., New Jersey
MICHAEL A. RULLI, Ohio
GABE EVANS, Colorado
CRAIG A. GOLDMAN, Texas
JULIE FEDORCHAK, North Dakota
------
Professional Staff
MEGAN JACKSON, Staff Director
SOPHIE KHANAHMADI, Deputy Staff Director
TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Energy
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
Chairman
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas, Vice KATHY CASTOR, Florida
Chairman Ranking Member
GARY J. PALMER, Alabama SCOTT H. PETERS, California
RICK W. ALLEN, Georgia ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio KEVIN MULLIN, California
AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
DIANA HARSHBARGER, Tennessee DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
MARIANNETTE MILLER-MEEKS, Iowa DORIS O. MATSUI, California
JOHN JAMES, Michigan PAUL TONKO, New York
CLIFF BENTZ, Oregon MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
RUSSELL FRY, South Carolina KIM SCHRIER, Washington
LAUREL M. LEE, Florida LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
NICHOLAS A. LANGWORTHY, New York ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, New York
MICHAEL A. RULLI, Ohio JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts
GABE EVANS, Colorado FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
CRAIG A. GOLDMAN, Texas officio)
JULIE FEDORCHAK, North Dakota
BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky (ex
officio)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hon. Robert E. Latta, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Ohio, opening statement..................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Hon. Scott H. Peters, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, opening statement............................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Hon. Brett Guthrie, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, opening statement.................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey, opening statement......................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Witnesses
James B. Robb, President and Chief Executive Officer, North
American Electric Reliability Corporation...................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Answers to submitted questions............................... 137
Brett Mattison, President and Chief Operating Officer,
Southwestern Electric Power Company............................ 31
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Answers to submitted questions............................... 144
Michael Goggin, Executive Vice President, Grid Strategies LLC.... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Answers to submitted questions............................... 147
Jose Costa, President and Chief Executive Officer, Northeast Gas
Association.................................................... 53
Prepared statement........................................... 55
Answers to submitted questions............................... 149
Submitted Material
Inclusion of the following was approved by unanimous consent.
List of documents submitted for the record....................... 98
Letter of March 16, 2026, from Michelle Bloodworth, President and
Chief Executive Officer, America's Power, to Mr. Guthrie, et
al............................................................. 99
Article of March 2, 2026, ``America's Electricity Price Shock
Absorber,'' by Rich Nolan, DC Journal.......................... 101
Letter of March 16, 2026, from Paul N. Cicio, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Industrial Energy Consumers of America, to
Mr. Latta and Ms. Castor....................................... 104
Letter of March 13, 2026, from Matthew J. Agen, Chief Regulatory
Counsel, Energy, American Gas Association, to Mr. Latta and Ms.
Castor......................................................... 107
Report of Always On Energy Research, ``The Financial Fallout From
Winter Storm Fern: How Disappearing Wind and Solar Generation
Cost Texans an Additional $766 Million,'' March 2026........... 117
Report of the National Petroleum Council, ``Reliable Energy:
Delivering on the Promise of Gas-Electric Coordination,'' 2025
\1\
----------
\1\ The report has been retained in committee files and is included in
the Documents for the Record at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/
IF03/20260317/119077/HHRG-119-IF03-20260317-SD003.pdf.
Letter of March 17, 2026, from Lane Wilson, Senior Vice President
and General Council, The Williams Companies, to Mr. Guthrie, et
al............................................................. 129
Report of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, ``Report on
the North American Electric Reliability Corporation:
Interregional Transfer Capability Study,'' February 2026 \1\
Article of February 3, 2026, ``Winter Storm Fern Highlights the
Need for More Resilient Transmission,'' by Sarah Toth Kotwis,
et al., RMI.................................................... 134
----------
\1\ The report has been retained in committee files and is included in
the Documents for the Record at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/
IF03/20260317/119077/HHRG-119-IF03-20260317-SD003.pdf.
WINTER STORM FERN LESSONS: SUPPLYING
RELIABLE POWER TO MEET PEAK DEMAND
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 2026
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Energy,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in
the John D. Dingell Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building,
Hon. Robert E. Latta (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Latta, Palmer,
Harshbarger, Miller-Meeks, Bentz, Fry, Lee, Evans, Goldman,
Fedorchak, Guthrie (ex officio), Peters, Menendez, Mullin,
McClellan, Matsui, Veasey, Schrier, and Pallone (ex officio).
Staff present: Ansley Boylan, Director of Operations;
Christian Calvert, Press Assistant; Jessica Donlon, General
Counsel; Andrew Furman, Professional Staff Member, Energy;
Sydney Greene, Director of Finance and Logistics; Calvin
Huggins, Policy Analyst, Energy; Megan Jackson, Staff Director;
AT Johnson, Special Advisor; Brayden Lacefield, Special
Assistant; Joel Miller, Chief Counsel; Ben Mullaney, Press
Secretary; Seth Ricketts, Clerk, Energy/Environment; Chris
Sarley, Member Services/Stakeholder Director; Peter Spencer,
Senior Professional Staff Member, Energy; Timothy Trimble,
Staff Assistant; Matt VanHyfte, Communications Director;
Giancarlo Ceja, Minority Staff Assistant; Waverly Gordon,
Minority Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel; Tiffany
Guarascio, Minority Staff Director; Serena Klebba, Minority
Intern; Kristopher Pittard, Minority Professional Staff Member;
Emma Roehrig, Minority Staff Assistant; Kylea Rogers, Minority
Policy Analyst; Medha Surampudy, Minority Professional Staff
Member; Kyle Wolf, Minority Press Intern; and Tuley Wright,
Minority Staff Director, Energy.
Mr. Latta. Well. Good morning. I want to thank our guests
for being with us today, making it. Some of our Members,
unfortunately, are stuck at their home airports right now and
are--some of them are on their way, and unfortunately some
might not be able to get in this morning, but really appreciate
you all making the effort to be here today.
So the Subcommittee on Energy will come to order, and the
Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes for an opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT E. LATTA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO
Again, good morning and welcome to today's hearing to
examine the performance of our electric grid through the
duration of Winter Storm Fern.
Starting on January the 23rd, a significant winter storm
brought widespread snow, sleet, and freezing rain from New
England to the Rockies and down to the Gulf of America. This
storm was followed by an Arctic front that kept stubbornly low
temperatures across the country and additional snowstorms. As
expected, American families bundled up, staying indoors to
avoid the inclement weather and dangerous road conditions. When
they were at home they relied on our Nation's complex energy
system to keep the lights on, their homes warmed, and their
refrigerators stocked.
Just like any other day, families expected their lights to
come on with a flick of a switch. While seemingly routine, an
exhaustive amount of preparation, coordination, and real-time
decision making occurred behind the scenes to make sure
American communities had power. While some outages occurred,
the grid held up because of the important work of some of the
witnesses we have before us today.
The Southwest Electric Power Company, or SWEPCO, is an
electric utility across Arkansas, Texas, and Louisiana. The
Northeast Gas Association represents natural gas utilities
across 11 northeastern States. Grid Strategies developed public
policies that support a clean energy transition, and the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation, or NERC, is the
regulatory authority that ensures reliability and security of
our Nation's bulk power system today.
Today these witnesses will provide critical insights into
how the Nation's electric grid remained resilient through the
duration of the significant weather event. While I'm looking
forward to today's opportunity to learn more about the grid's
performance through the storm, one thing remains clear:
baseload and dispatchable resources saved the day. Generation
from coal, natural gas, and fuel oil skyrocketed while
intermittent resource generation, unfortunately, plummeted.
Nuclear has always remained steady and reliable.
Without access to these affordable and reliable supplies of
baseload generation, the setting of this hearing would be and
would look much different. Power outages that occur in freezing
temperatures cause billions in economic damage and, even more
importantly, tragic deaths in our vulnerable communities.
Our New England States illustrate an interesting example.
Through the storm the fuel mix in New England was carried by
natural gas, fuel oil, and nuclear power. In spite of generous
subsidies and favorable public policy choices, intermittent
resources were nowhere to be found when New England needed
power the most. Because limited gas pipeline capacity in New
England regions restrict supply and raise prices, power plants
had to opt for more expensive and less efficient fuel oil. It's
important to recognize fuel oil plants for their predominant
source of generation 70 years ago. Importantly, outages across
the country were limited, but the success of the grid through
the Winter Storm Fern should serve as a warning.
That brings us to the present day. How should policymakers
and regulators consider the operation of our future bulk power
system? We stand on the precipice of tremendous growth in our
Nation's electricity demand. The Energy and Commerce Committee
has held several hearings and passed legislation to shore up
the reliability crisis caused by the Biden administration to
power next-generation industries. Now we are considering the
implications of a generation resource mix that can
appropriately meet the needs of households at one--at all times
of the year while simultaneously ensuring America leads in the
future economy.
The answer is clear: Our Nation needs more dispatchable
power, and it needs a lot more of it. Given the military
activity taking place in Iran and the implications of energy
markets throughout the Strait of Hormuz, now more than ever we
need to utilize the bountiful resources we have here, right in
the United States. The lessons of Winter Storm Fern should
illustrate that common sense must rule the day. American energy
dominance and independence must be achieved so we can keep our
communities safe at home.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Latta follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Latta. With that, I yield back the balance of my time,
and at this time the Chair recognizes the gentleman from
California's 50th District for 5 minutes for an opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SCOTT H. PETERS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing. Ranking Member Castor was delayed by the
weather today, so I am stepping in for her to give an opening
statement.
At nearly every hearing this year, we have talked about the
significant growth in energy demand every region in the United
States will face. And even though that growth is very exciting,
it comes with real challenges that everyone in this room is
grappling with. Americans are feeling the strain of these
challenges on their wallet. Electricity costs are 8 percent
higher today than they were a year ago. Some projections show
residential utility rates climbing as much as 18 percent in the
coming years, and no region has been spared.
We have also been saying it every--nearly every hearing
this Congress that we are running out of time. I and every
utility grid operator and developer I talk to do not think we
are ready to meet the current moment. Right now we are on track
to lose our competitive edge to nations like China. So far in
the 2020s China has completed more than 8,200 miles of high-
voltage, long-range transmission lines, while the U.S. has
built only 375.
European utilities are also rapidly increasing the minimum
transfer capacity between countries to move power back and
forth. Over 125,000 miles of advanced conductors, which can
help us get the most out of the grid, have been installed in
India, Europe, and China. The United States has installed less
than 10 percent of that. By focusing only on building the kinds
of generation one party likes or by keeping old, inefficient,
and expensive coal plants online, we are holding our country
back.
Every witness before us has been clear: We need more of
everything, whether it be transmission pipelines, solar, wind,
or gas. But that doesn't mean we need to keep every asset that
is uneconomic or inefficient. Now, instead of focusing on how
to develop a long-term plan and holistic energy strategy which
has proven--which has been proven to decrease costs and improve
reliability for everyone, we are constantly talking about
short-term fixes that will increase costs, steamroll State
regulators, and negatively affect reliability in the long run.
Look at Texas, which is slated to receive roughly half of
U.S. industrial electricity demand growth through 2030. When
the natural gas system failed and people died from cold in
Superstorm Uri, did Texas exclusively turn to more natural gas
or keeping coal plants open? No. Texas reduced its risk of
blackouts and brownouts from 10 percent to 1 percent by
deploying all resources, including solar energy and batteries
for storage. Now they are primed to dominate this area of
sustained load growth because they built new generation to meet
new demand instead of only holding on to the past.
To confront this challenge, we as a country must build more
generation, make it easier to connect that generation to the
grid, and increase regional and interregional access to that
energy. Right now there are over 2,500 gigawatts worth of
energy projects in the interconnection queue, which is the
number-one barrier to connecting resources. It is insufficient
grid capacity or too much congestion in a given area.
So you can build all the generation you want, but if you
can't connect it, you can't use it. In 2024 that transmission
congestion, our inability to move power around the grid, cost
customers over $12 billion, and it happened during Winter Storm
Fern.
We need to build a better grid nationwide, which will
increase competition, reduce congestion, and ensure customers
can access the next cheapest electron. That is our North Star.
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation,
represented by one of our witnesses today, has said clearly
that an additional 35 gigawatts of interregional transfer
capacity across the country would make the grid more resilient,
lower costs, and enable us to better meet load growth.
I agree with my colleagues in the majority that the Federal
Government needs to take a somewhat stronger hand in planning
and permitting in collaboration with State partners to make
sure we can keep the lights on. But we need to stop looking
backwards. It is difficult to reach consensus, but doing
nothing is costing us money, hurting the reliability of the
grid, and making us less competitive. We need everyone at the
table, and we will not meet this moment if our approach is
business as usual.
I look forward to hearing about some potential solutions
from our witnesses, and working with my colleagues on both
sides of the aisle to find some as well.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Peters follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Peters. Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much. The gentleman yields back
the balance of his time.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, the
chairman of the full Committee of Energy and Commerce, for 5
minutes for an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRETT GUTHRIE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate the
recognition. I appreciate our witnesses being here today.
The massive winter storms have put our vital energy and
power delivery systems to the test this year. Today's focus on
Winter Storm Fern helps direct attention to what really matters
for designing our electric system: making sure energy systems
provide the power Americans need when they need it. Fern and
other recent major storms like Elliott in 2022 and Uri in 2021
represent consistent lessons to discuss this morning.
First, reliable generation resources matter. When power
demand spikes during major winter storms, 80 to 90 percent of
additional electricity needed is supplied by dispatchable
fossil generation: natural gas, coal, and even oil. Nuclear
consistently provides baseload power, and these dispatchable
resources step into the breach. Wind power may supply
additional energy in some regions, but despite its enormous
capacity it cannot be relied upon during these storms. Solar
energy can be relied upon even less so.
Second, preparation and planning matters. Vast, multiday
deep freezes challenge fuel and grid systems across large
regions. This requires planning and coordination to make sure
power will be available as demand spikes. The Storm Elliott
caused the highest single-day electricity demand on record
during the winter months. It also caused 90 gigawatts of cold-
weather-related generation outages, more than other recent
storms. Operators underestimated the demand and the extent of
the freeze, which reduced gas supplies and gas generation.
The storm was so large, southeastern States could not
import sufficient power from other regions, which were short
excess power themselves. This caused rolling blackouts,
including in Kentucky on Christmas Eve. Authorities said a
longer freeze would have been catastrophic for the New York
City gas supplies.
How past lessons informed preparation for last month's
storm will be useful to examine today. The Trump administration
leaned in effectively on coordination, gas generators withstood
winter impacts better than in past storms, and there was much
more energy to dispatch as demand spiked.
Third, what we do in the future matters. Expanding
generation in a grid to meet massive new energy demand requires
a focus on policies that ensure reliable, affordable power
delivery. Storms like Fern show us the generation mix that we
can depend upon when it matters most.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Guthrie follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank our witnesses
for being here, and I will yield back.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much. The gentleman yields back
the remainder of his time, and the Chair now recognizes the
gentleman from New Jersey, the ranking member of the full
committee, for 5 minutes for an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today's hearing addresses an important topic. But given
that this committee has jurisdiction over the reliability and
affordability of all energy, not just electricity, we should
really be addressing skyrocketing oil prices, all the result of
Trump deciding to wage an irresponsible war in Iran. The war is
throwing the region and gas prices into chaos.
Two weeks ago President Trump threw the Middle East into
chaos with his irresponsible war. And in the weeks since it has
become clear that no one in the Trump administration had a plan
for what to do about oil prices, let alone any plans on how to
end a war that should never have happened. And the level of
incompetence, to me, is astounding. Oil prices have been
extraordinarily volatile while gasoline prices have increased
by nearly 75 cents per gallon since the start of the year. Some
analysts think that oil could reach over $200 per barrel, and
it is clear that the Trump administration has no idea how to
fix it.
In fact, Trump does not actually consider this a problem.
Just last week he said, and I quote, ``When oil prices go up,
we make a lot of money.'' I don't know about you, but when oil
prices go up my constituents feel it with their wallets.
American families feel it as they sit around their kitchen
table trying to figure out how they are going to make ends
meet. It is once again crystal clear that the President only
cares about making big oil CEOs a buck, and that is who he is
talking about when he said we make a lot of money. And once
again American families suffer. They are left paying the bill.
Now, the President and congressional Republicans are not
only driving up oil prices, their policies are also driving up
monthly power bills, which gets to the topic of today's
hearing. Just under 2 months ago much of the southern and
eastern parts of the country were under a blanket of snow.
Temperatures plummeted, winds whipped, and many of us feared
the worst. However, the bulk power system endured. That is not
to say there weren't localized issues. Local distribution
systems suffered with freezing rain and wind taking down power
lines and causing blackouts. Utility crews worked around the
clock to restore power, and all of us are thankful for their
hard work. But at the end of the day, unlike in Texas during
Winter Storm Uri or the southeast during Winter Storm Elliott,
there was enough supply of electricity to meet demand.
Grid reliability is a team sport. Every resource, including
wind, solar, and storage, has a role to play. These resources
were especially vital during Winter Storm Fern, as renewables
in general exceeded expectations. They were able to take on
more of a role than the grid operators required, but that was
not the case for every resource. The weather knocked roughly 20
gigawatts of largely fossil fuel resources offline in the Mid-
Atlantic alone, due in part to freeze-offs at gas wellheads.
Unfortunately, transmission constraints harmed the grid
during the winter storm and helped bring us close to the brink.
Within PJM, power in Chicago was bottled up and couldn't reach
the East Coast to help lower prices. In the middle of the
country Southwest Power Pool had to curtail nearly 10 gigawatts
of wind energy at one point because it didn't have the
transmission capacity to take that power to where it was needed
most.
A 2024 study by the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation found that our country needs over 35 gigawatts of
new interregional transmission for its reliability needs alone,
and that is before taking into account the tremendous growth in
data centers fueling artificial intelligence applications that
were seen following that study. So if Republicans are serious
about wanting to make our grid more resilient to extreme
weather, we should be talking about how to build more large,
interregional power lines.
Now, finally, Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not
acknowledge a central irony of what some of my colleagues are
advocating for today. We all agree that severe weather events
stress the grid unlike anything else. But the increase in
severe weather events is fueled by the same polluting coal
power plants that many Republicans want to be the solution to
severe weather events. Forcing every coal plant in this country
to stay online will further exacerbate climate change in the
coming decades, so we must invest in real, durable reliability
for the power grid.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Pallone. And with that I thank you and yield back, Mr.
Chairman, the balance of my time.
Mr. Latta. Well, thank you very much. The gentleman yields
back the balance of his time. This concludes Member opening
statements. The Chair reminds Members that, pursuant to the
committee rules, all Members' opening statements will be made
part of the record.
And again, we want to thank our witnesses for appearing
today and taking time to testify before the subcommittee. Each
witness will have the opportunity to give an opening statement
followed by a round of questions from the members of the
subcommittee.
And just real quick, if I--housekeeping--you want to pull
those mics up close to you when you speak.
With the lights there, just a quick explanation. They will
be green for 4 minutes. That turns yellow at the--for the last
minute, and turns red when your time is up.
So our witnesses today are Mr. James Robb, the president
and CEO of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation,
NERC; Mr. Brett Mattison, president and CEO of Southwestern
Electric Power Company; Mr. Michael Goggin, the executive vice
president of Grid Strategies; and Mr. Jose Costa, the president
and CEO of Northeast Gas Association. Again, we appreciate you
all being here today.
And Mr. Robb, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your
opening statement.
Mr. Robb. Terrific.
STATEMENT OF JAMES B. ROBB, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION; BRETT
MATTISON, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, SOUTHWESTERN
ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY; MICHAEL GOGGIN, EXECUTIVE VICE
PRESIDENT, GRID STRATEGIES LLC; AND JOSE COSTA, PRESIDENT AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NORTHEAST GAS ASSOCIATION
STATEMENT OF JAMES B. ROBB
Mr. Robb. Good morning, Chairman Latta, Representative
Peters, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for letting
me set the table for today's hearing. I am speaking here today
on behalf of NERC, the independent, nonpartisan, FERC-certified
electric reliability organization structured by Congress
through the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
So here is the top line: Even though many metrics show
strong grid performance, risk is growing more acute. Nearly
two-thirds of the country is at elevated or high risk of energy
shortfall over the next 5 years.
Winter Storm Fern was a severe, long-duration event that
significantly stressed the grid. During Fern the industry
showed commendable improvement in cold-weather performance.
However, the system ran very close to the edge, leaving no room
for error. Operators needed every tool at their disposal, and
extraordinary actions by government played an important role.
Fern was a classic near-miss event that reinforces concerns
documented in our recent LTRA. That report assesses risk of
energy shortfall over a 10-year horizon and, importantly, it is
a risk assessment, not a prediction. It shows where the system
is exposed. In a space filled with single-issue advocates,
NERC's LTRA is unique because it is the only independent and
transparent assessment of this type, rigorously peer reviewed
with geographic and temporal consistency. Congress was quite
wise in how they conceived the model of the ERO.
So three trends explain why two-thirds of the Nation risks
energy shortage. These include unprecedented demand growth, a
changing resource mix with increasingly unfamiliar reliability
characteristics, and lagging supply additions that are not
keeping up with growth and planned retirements.
Let me start with demand.
Over the next 10 years electricity demand projections are
higher than we have ever seen at any point in the last 2
decades. These trends are driven by the proliferation of large
industrial loads, particularly but not exclusively data
centers, and expanding use of electric heating and electric
vehicles. The rate of increase is staggering. Summer peak
demand is projected to rise by over 200 gigawatts, with winter
demand growing faster. That is 70 percent higher than what we
projected at this time last year.
Next, the generation base is changing. As older generators
retire and get replaced by power electronics-based renewables
and batteries, the resource mix is becoming increasingly
variable and weather-dependent, and there is a decline in the
essential reliability services that are necessary to support
voltage, frequency, and ramping needs. Over the next 10 years
coal and natural gas generation is projected to decline from 62
percent to 48 percent, while renewables and batteries will grow
from 12 to 34 percent on peak. These renewable resources work
very, very well in the summer but are frequently challenged to
perform during winter events.
Finally, energy supply is just falling short. Winter growth
is projected to exceed resource additions by over 60 gigawatts.
Projects need to get out of the queue and into the ground much
more quickly. A recent Berkeley Lab study finds that even
projects with interconnection agreements are taking longer to
reach operation, and many projects, including those with strong
sponsorship, never get built at all.
Let me turn back to Fern. The storm brought long-duration
cold, widespread snow, sleet, and freezing rain across the
eastern two-thirds of the country. Demand forecasts surged and
industry activated an extensive array of operating procedures
to manage the reliability risk. DOE stepped in with emergency
orders. During the event natural gas, coal, and nuclear
resources provided most of the generation.
However, renewables did contribute. In New England fuel oil
and liquefied natural gas kept the lights on. And in general,
the natural gas system performed better than in previous
storms, and gas storage withdrawals were essential. However,
this storm was not as cold as initially forecast, and
widespread closures of schools and businesses alleviated
pressure on the combined systems.
This outcome reflects years of sustained and ongoing
winterization efforts following Winter Storms Uri and Elliott,
industry preparation and collaboration, and extensive outreach
by NEC and its regional entities. Nevertheless, the widespread
use of emergency procedures and extraordinary government
actions are powerful warnings that we should not ignore. A
system bordering on the edge during winter extremes should not
be normalized. A larger, colder, longer storm would have had
far more consequence.
We have four primary recommendations to address these
challenges: First, we just got to get off the dime and
effectively address siting and permitting reform at the
Federal, State, and local levels; we need to accelerate efforts
to speed resource addition; we need to reliably--figure out how
to reliably integrate large loads; and we need to accelerate
efforts to better coordinate the increasingly interdependent
gas and electric systems that serve this country.
So thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robb follows:]
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Mr. Latta. Well, thank you very much for your statement.
And Mr. Mattison, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF BRETT MATTISON
Mr. Mattison. Thank you, sir. Chairman Latta and
Congressman Peters and members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify today. My name is Brett Mattison,
and I serve as the president and chief operating officer of
Southwestern Electric Power Company, known as SWEPCO, a
subsidiary of American Electric Power.
SWEPCO has provided electricity, reliable electricity, for
more than a century and today serves approximately 558,000
customers across Louisiana, Arkansas, northeast Texas, and the
Texas panhandle. With nearly 1,400 employees, we operate a
diverse generation portfolio that includes coal, natural gas,
wind, and purchased power.
Winter Storm Fern brought extreme cold across our service
territory, with temperatures dripping--dipping to negative 2 in
Fayetteville, Arkansas, and 17 degrees in Shreveport,
Louisiana. More than 200,000 customers were impacted and
restored thanks to the dedication of our SWEPCO team, including
IBEW frontline employees who worked in truly difficult
situations.
Our experience during Winter Storm Fern and other recent
winters reaffirm a core principle: Reliability depends on being
able to call on a resource when it is needed for as long as it
is needed, regardless of the weather. During the storm, coal
supplied more than half of SWEPCO-owned generation, supported
by on-site fuel that ensured steady performance. Natural gas
units provided essential flexibility and ramped as demand
increased but remains tied to pipeline delivery--which can and
does tighten during extreme weather and when resources
contributed and supported the system--but their output varies
with weather conditions and cannot substitute for around-the-
clock resources.
Since Winter Storm Uri in 2021, SWEPCO has made substantial
reliance improvements. As we plan the system needed for this
new era, I would like to emphasize five points:
First, new natural gas plants will be indispensable. The
unit SWEPCO planned to build will include robust cold-weather
enhancements and must be paired with reliable pipeline
capacity.
Second, new nuclear energy will be crucial for long-term
zero-carbon baseload power. SWEPCO is currently evaluating
opportunities in Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana to support the
advancement of nuclear technologies.
Third, existing baseload resources, especially coal,
continue to provide vital reliability during extreme
conditions. Federal policy must avoid premature retirements
until new, equally dependable resources are available.
Fourth, a resilient future requires modern transmission.
Policies at FERC and regional planning bodies such as the
Southwest Power Pool must support strong, interregional
transmission, including 765 kV lines to enhance both
reliability and affordability.
Finally, across all of this, affordability must be
maintained as a priority. Existing customers cannot be asked to
shoulder the cost of integrating new large loads. Long-term
arrangements, innovative rates, and coordinated regional
planning are helping to ensure that growth benefits all
customers.
Our grid is facing extraordinary challenges, but with the
right policies and the right investments we can ensure the
system remains reliable, affordable, and resilient.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mattison follows:]
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Mr. Latta. Well, thank you for your opening statement.
Mr. Goggin, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL GOGGIN
Mr. Goggin. Chair Latta, Mr. Peters, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. My
testimony reviews the data from Winter Storm Fern and other
recent events to make five main points:
First, wind and solar resources performed well during
Winter Storm Fern and other recent events, while fossil
generation did not.
Second, in all recent cold snap events natural gas
accounted for the majority of generator outages, followed by
coal.
We also saw natural gas prices spike during Winter Storm
Fern and these other events, costing consumers billions of
dollars.
Fourth, I recommend that a diverse generation mix increases
resilience. Each resource type has distinct outage risks, so a
diverse mix reduces the economic and reliability risk to
ratepayers.
And finally, expanding transmission increases resilience by
providing Americans with more affordable and reliable power and
tapping into diversity among regions in the timing of peak
demand and generator outages.
First let's look at generator performance. Wind and solar
provided around 20 to 25 percent of the power during Winter
Storm Fern's peak demand periods in Texas and the 2 other large
grid operators in the middle of the country, the Southwest
Power Pool and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator. At
the Southwest Power Pool, MISO and PJM regions experienced peak
demand during Winter Storm Fern. Wind and solar provided over
38,000 megawatts, nearly twice the 21,000 megawatts of output
they are compensated to provide and are expected to provide
during peak demand events. By exceeding grid operators'
expectations by over 17,000 megawatts, wind and solar picked up
some of the slack as gas underperformed its accredited capacity
by 52,000 megawatts and coal by 7,000 megawatts.
Gas and coal generators fell short of grid planners'
expectations during Winter Storm Fern, largely because they
experienced outages at many times higher--rates higher than
renewable generation. This is consistent with performance
patterns during other recent extreme weather events like Winter
Storms Uri and Elliott, when gas generators accounted for 63
percent and 55 percent of outages, respectively. Coal and gas
generators depend on fuel deliveries and access to cooling
water, while wind and solar do not.
Retiring coal generators that the Department of Energy has
mandated remain online also performed poorly during Winter
Storm Fern, consistently delivering only 29 to 42 percent of
their capacity, according to the Department of Energy's own
numbers. In contrast, the largely complete Vineyard Wind
project, which the administration has repeatedly attempted to
halt by retroactively revoking its permits, operated at a 75
percent capacity factor during Winter Storm Fern, delivering
more than 400 megawatts into New England. Land-based wind and
solar powered tens of millions of homes as the central and
eastern U.S. experienced peak demand during Winter Storm Fern,
just as they did during other recent winter storms. Intruding
on State authority and impeding market forces, which are
replacing uneconomic and unreliable old power plants with
modern resources, only results in higher costs and less
reliability for ratepayers.
During Winter Storm Fern and other recent winter storms,
gas's performance problem was partially caused by gas wells
freezing. This happened in winter--in Texas during Winter Storm
Uri and in the Marcellus Shale area during Winter Storm
Elliott. Each took offline about 20 percent of total U.S. gas
production, which played a major role in kickstarting the
cascading failures that led to rolling blackouts in Texas and
parts of the southeast in those events.
Winter Storm Fern was less cold, and it caused about a 10
percent drop in gas production, which led to gas prices spiking
to 60 to 90 times normal in many parts of the eastern U.S.,
costing consumers billions of dollars. Domestic natural gas
prices are also increasingly tethered to global prices due to
liquefied natural gas exports. By diversifying our generation
mix with wind and solar, which will always have a fuel cost of
zero, we can protect consumers from both short-term gas price
volatility during extreme weather as well as long-term
uncertainty due to global geopolitical events like the ongoing
closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
A stronger transmission grid also would have provided
Americans with more affordable and reliable power during these
extreme weather events. Expanded transmission between Texas and
the southeast could have kept the heat on for millions of
Texans during Winter Storm Uri while the same ties could have
kept the lights on for customers in the southeast during Winter
Storm Elliott, providing more than $1 billion in value. In
Winter Storm Fern modest transmission expansion between western
and eastern PJM would have saved ratepayers in the eastern U.S.
around $90 million. Customers across the Midwest similarly
could have saved tens of millions of dollars with stronger
transmission ties among those grid-operating areas.
Transmission provides these benefits by tapping into diversity
in the timing of peak demand and generator outages among
regions.
Extreme weather events don't hit the entire country at
once, and they move over time. So imports from neighboring
regions are a key tool for cost-effective resilience. In short,
a diverse generation mix and transmission that taps into
regional diversity are the best solutions for ensuring
Americans have affordable and reliable power in the face of
extreme weather, wars, and other uncertainties.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Goggin follows:]
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Mr. Latta. Well, thank you very much for your opening
statement.
And Mr. Costa, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JOSE COSTA
Mr. Costa. Chairman Latta, Mr. Peters, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today. My name is Jose Costa. I am president of the
Northeast Gas Association, and I represent the natural gas
industry in the northeast. I appreciate the chance to share
insights from Winter Storm Fern and the extended cold that
followed. This event tested our energy systems and underscored
a reality: Our infrastructure is operating at maximum capacity,
and we need to invest in new natural gas infrastructure and
storage.
I would like to first highlight how the industry performed
before discussing some of the significant stresses experienced.
To begin, during Fern, Appalachian producers performed
exceptionally well. They deserve recognition for their
winterization efforts. Moving upstream, pipeline operators and
gas utilities ensured that gas was delivered to where it was
needed. During and after Fern, northeast pipelines recorded
some of the highest flow days ever, and utilities met record-
setting customer demand. This is only possible because of the
maintenance and preparations they do in advance and the
dedicated efforts of their workforce.
Fern clearly showed just how reliable the gas industry is.
However, the northeast natural gas infrastructure is
significantly constrained. As demand peaked and New England's
pipelines reached their max flows, the region turned to LNG
import facilities and on-system LNG storage to provide
additional supply to the region. Across the northeast, natural
gas is typically the dominant fuel for electric generation.
As supplies tightened, the pipelines continued to move
significant volumes of gas to their firm gas utility customers.
However, eventually they reached points where they could no
longer supply gas to power plants that do not hold firm
contracts. During this period natural gas remained the
essential baseline fuel supporting the region's electric grid,
supplying at least a quarter of the generation in New England.
For several days gas-fired generation in New England relied on
LNG imports to maintain operations.
It should also be noted that this event went as well as it
did due to significant industry coordination and communication
with our partners in the electric sector and in government.
NGA's Gas Supply Task Force was activated throughout the event,
and NGA closely coordinated with broader industry through the
Electric Gas Operations Committee, which we cochair with ISO
New England. However, while we weathered the storm, this event
tested the northeast. An earlier arrival to the blizzard of
2026 could have been the tipping point.
As I said, this extended cold led to extreme demand across
the region. All three regional ISOs reported elevated and
sustained demand for the duration. As available pipeline gas
tightened, the region became increasingly dependent on fuels
delivered by truck and barge. This required State and Federal
agencies to issue waivers, including allowing drivers to drive
extended hours in sometimes dangerous conditions. Further
complicating supply chain, oil fuel depots experienced delivery
disruptions. This is not reliable, sustainable, or cost
effective.
And all this led to some of the highest volume--wholesale
energy prices the northeast has ever seen. Gas spot prices for
New York and Connecticut were 17 times higher than prices just
across the State line in northeast Pennsylvania. Power prices
in New England and New York also spiked to record levels. Gas
utilities take steps to mitigate price spikes, including buying
firm transportation supply contracts, implementing financial
hedges, and utilizing storage. Yet despite these efforts it is
impossible to protect customers completely from market
volatility like we saw this winter.
It is important to note that we support an all-energy-
source solution. However, during Fern, weather-dependent
resources failed to meet the moment. Many generators in New
York and New England switched to oil, with oil becoming New
England's leading fuel source for power generation. This
immediately led to emissions increases. In fact, according to
ISO New England, CO2 emissions in New England this
January were up an estimated 24 percent compared to January
2025.
Finally, a better path is available. Thoughtful investment
and more natural gas infrastructure can improve reliability,
reduce costs, and cut reliance on higher-emitting fuels.
Thank you for your time, and I look forward to answering
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costa follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Latta. Well, thank you all for your opening statements.
We really appreciate it.
And this does conclude the opening statements from our
witnesses, and we will now begin with questions from our
Members. And I will begin the questioning and recognize myself
for 5 minutes.
First, the question I ask everyone that comes before us in
this subcommittee: Do we need to have more energy or less
energy in this country?
Mr. Robb. More.
Mr. Mattison. Much more.
Mr. Goggin. More and more diverse.
Mr. Costa. Much more.
Mr. Latta. Well, thank you very much. I know that when we
had the RTOs and ISOs and ERCOT in last year, they all said the
exact same thing. We have to have more. And they also added
that we have to make sure that we are not taking off--any
existing generation offline, and that is where I am going to
start with my questions with you, Mr. Robb, because, you know,
you in your statement mentioned about the premature thermal
retirements going offline in the next 5 years. What is going to
happen?
Mr. Robb. So the loss of those resources is--it creates
multiple problems for the grid. You know, the first is you lose
the energy production. Many of those facilities aren't
extremely large producers of energy, but they are strategically
located.
And one of the things that is very important about
traditional generation is it provides what we call essential
reliability services. They can be controlled within very tight
parameters. They provide support for the frequency of the grid,
the voltage of the grid, and they can be ramped up and down to
accommodate changes in load or changes in the performance of
other generating resources. So they are absolutely essential to
the reliable performance of the grid.
Mr. Latta. Well, thank you.
Mr. Mattison, if I could ask this question--because you are
talking about the reliability out there, and also that coal is
50 percent of the power during the storm, if I understood that
correctly--what would happen if we didn't have that generation
at this time?
Mr. Mattison. Quite honestly, if we didn't have that
dispatchable resource that is reliable and dependable and it
was 50 percent of our load during that storm, unfortunately, we
would have had customers' lights go out.
Mr. Latta. OK, thank you.
Mr. Costa, being up in the northeast you were talking about
the LNG storage. If you could have one number-one ask to
Congress, what would it be?
Mr. Costa. Can you repeat that again? I am sorry.
Mr. Latta. If you had one number-one ask to Congress, what
would it be?
Mr. Costa. I think we need more. The permitting reform, the
work you are doing on permitting reform, is critical to bring
more supplies from Marcellus Shale to the region.
Mr. Latta. Well, and, you know, that is important because,
you know, from the beginning of this Congress the first thing
that we have heard, pretty much on an even scale, we have to be
producing that energy but we also have the permitting reform.
Because what good is getting the--having energy if you can't
move it from point A to point B? And so that is an important
thing that we are talking and trying to get done in this
committee. And it is at the top of the list, when it comes
right down to it.
Mr. Robb, how--you know, when you talk about the energy
supply, how can we speed up the process, especially on
permitting? How would you see it done?
Mr. Robb. I am not sure I have--excuse me--a good
prescription for the answer here. I think it is, you know,
clear that we have seen, you know, some agencies, you know,
reduce the amount of time it takes to produce the environmental
impact statement. FERC has made some very strong progress in
that area.
But at the end of the day, we are not getting stuff built
quickly, right? You know, I--the most recent interstate
transmission lines took 15 to 20 years to get built. A natural
gas plant might take 7 years to get built. And the problem is
that we can add a data center, which is an enormous consumer of
power, as everyone has noted, you know, in 18 to 24 months. And
we want those data centers to get built.
So all these timeframes need to be compressed. And whether
that is done through permitting reform, other actions to speed
the development of resources, unclogging supply chains,
speeding interconnection queues--all those are part of the
solution and need to be pursued.
Mr. Latta. Thank you.
Mr. Mattison, in your five points that you laid out, one of
the things that you talked about, again, is really on our
modernization of that transmission and the, you know,
permitting and, really, the supply chain.
In my last about 50 seconds, how can we make sure we can
live up to that? Because it is taking so long to get these
things done. So----
Mr. Mattison. I think on a State basis that--we have got
each of our three States--Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas have
really done a good job in clearing the way. But we need Federal
policy to--the gentleman, Mr. Robb, to my right, is stating
that we can get things accelerated with policies that allow us
to build transmission a lot faster, a lot quicker than we are
today.
Mr. Latta. Well, and again, that is one of the things that
this subcommittee has been looking at because, again, we all
recognize the absolute need. When we have seen a flat-lining
out there of electricity usage over a good number of years, and
how it has just skyrocketed up, we have got to get this thing
done.
My time has expired, and I recognize the gentleman from
California's 50th District for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I really enjoyed being a trial lawyer when I did
environmental law and--but I always thought that if you went to
trial it was because someone misunderstood their leverage. And
really, a good lawyer serves his or her client best by finding
where there is agreement and trying to settle the case ahead of
time. And this strikes me as something where we should not be
going to trial. We seem to have violent agreement among
everyone. There is not disagreement about what you are talking
about. Everyone is talking past each other.
We need new natural gas facilities. Sure, we understand
that. We also understand it takes 7 years and there is no way
to connect them.
New nuclear. There is virtually unanimous support in this
room for new nuclear. Virtually unanimous.
Regarding the existing baseload, the premature retirement,
of course we understand we don't want to retire things
prematurely. I think Democrats object to propping them up
artificially when the market wants to retire them.
Every single person talks about transmission here. This
committee has done nothing on transmission, but everyone says
interregional transmission is important for reliability, for
cost control, for competition. We know we need it for
interconnection. You could build a gas plant tomorrow at PJM.
There is no way to connect it because there is no capacity on
the grid. We agree on that.
We agree that affordability is a priority, as Mr. Mattison
said.
We understand that a diverse mix compensates for the
defects in each particular form of energy because none of it is
perfect. You love natural gas; it is not perfect. You love
wind; it is not perfect. We understand that. And the market is
driving us to more diversity, the kinds of things that Mr.
Goggin was talking about.
We understand fuel oil in New England is bad, and we want
to get rid of that. That is dumb, right? We all understand
that.
And we all know that--I think increasingly--everyone
understands the need for permit reform and speed.
So I look at this as a lawyer. I think that this case
should be settled. We should do it now, and we should move on.
And the fights we are fighting, like, you know, Mr. Latta
always asks, do we need more power? We all know we need more
power. So it is very frustrating for me, who used to litigate
cases, to say why we should not take this to trial. Everyone--
and to see everyone agree from up here, and agree over the
course of the last year and a half, the same thing.
I would like to introduce for the record this article,
``Winter Storm Fern Highlights the Need for More Resilient
Transmission,'' talking about how regions across the country
are exporting and importing all types of energy over that four-
day period during Fern.
Mr. Latta. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Peters. I guess I wanted to ask Mr. Robb. Last year
NERC released a study that said an additional 35 gigawatts of
interregional transfer capability, which are grid connections
among regions, would make the grid more resilient against
extreme weather, lower costs, and enable us to meet load
growth. I understand we need more generation and reforms to the
permitting process as part of the solution here.
Can you talk about how those grid connections help--on the
transmission help resources like coal and natural gas, not just
renewables?
Mr. Robb. Well, the whole premise of interregional
transmission is to be able to move power from a region that has
excess into a region that has deficit. And you cited the study
that we conducted, and it showed 35, 37 gigawatts. The
important thing to note about that is it is not evenly
distributed, right? There are certain areas of the country
where that transmission would be valuable from a reliability
perspective, and it would benefit all resources whether it is
wind, solar, coal, natural gas, nuclear, what have you, because
it would expand market opportunities and access.
It would also improve reliability for those areas that find
themselves at times in reserve deficit----
Mr. Peters. That is regardless of the generation source,
right?
Mr. Robb. Pardon?
Mr. Peters. That is regardless of how the power is----
Mr. Robb. Irrespective of the generation source.
Mr. Peters. Mr. Goggin, I know folks have done analysis
about how during the Storm Fern there was sufficient generation
available that couldn't be transmitted to where it was needed
because of transmission congestion.
Can you give us a brief example of that happening, and
whether it had an impact on customer costs?
Mr. Goggin. Absolutely. There were a number of points of
congestion on the grid, and it shows that we do need these not
just for reliability but for economics. And we need to expand
our grid and allow these flows from region to region as well as
within regions.
One example is within PJM. Consumers in this area in
eastern PJM paid about $90 million more than they should have
because there was abundant low-cost generation in the western
part of PJM in northern Illinois and places like that that
could not make it here. We suddenly saw wind generation being
curtailed in the southwest power pool. That would have been
worth over $30 million if it could have been delivered into the
Midcontinent Independent System Operator area, also in the
Midwest, as they experienced peak demand. So tens of millions
of dollars left on the table.
Mr. Peters. And I would just say, look, I am willing to
work with everyone in this committee room to do this. Part of
the Federal Government--reason we are a Federal Government is
we should be forcing these connections across State lines to
serve all of our constituents in all of the States. And I think
we got to get about the business of doing that.
I yield back.
Mr. Latta. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and the
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, the Chair of
the full committee, for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate the
recognition.
I appreciate you all for being here, and I just want to
make sure--it seems like there is a sort of a disconnect in
some of the testimony. You know, clearly, dispatchable energy
provided the bulk of power during the storm. Yet we hear wind
outperformed gas and coal in terms of accredited capacity,
which, as I understand it, basically just means it performed
higher than expected.
So, for example, if it was only budgeted for 2 percent but
performed at 4 percent, proponents would claim that is a major
increase or major performance. But it pales in comparison to
dispatchable power. So, for example, the MISO system during the
storm, variable wind power ranged from 20 percent supply to 3
percent supply, while gas and coal dispatched from 78 percent
to 62 percent of the power, depending on what was needed.
So Mr. Mattison, as an operator, do you rely more on gas
and coal or wind when a major storm is approaching?
Mr. Mattison. Thank you for your question. We do have a
diverse mix in our portfolio. However, whenever we know that
there is a winter storm like Fern approaching, we need to make
sure that our resources that are dispatchable are ready at any
moment's notice because they are dependable, reliable, and
dispatchable is the key. Our wind assets performed decent
during Fern, unlike in Winter Storm Heather earlier in the
year, where there was a lot of icing, they did not.
So I want everyone on the committee to understand that our
North Star is our customer. That is what we focus on. And we
have to keep their lights on, irregardless of policies, et
cetera. We want to make sure our units are running, so we spent
about $7.5 million winterizing our units as a result of--Winter
Storm Uri taught us a lesson--to make sure they are ready and
available. So we put a lot of emphasis on that dispatchable
resource when a winter storm is coming.
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you. So it is--wind and solar works when
the wind is blowing steady, not fast, and when the sun is
shining. But that is--somebody told me, he said, ``Well, that
was an unusual day. That is why you can see that wind and solar
didn't perform the way it was supposed to.'' I said, ``Well,
you need power on the unusual--that is when you need it the
most.'' So you can't dismiss that.
So Mr. Robb, you say that various emergency actions during
Fern should serve as a warning. What do you mean by that?
Mr. Robb. Thank you for the question. I get very worried
when we normalize risk. And, you know, the--for--as everyone
has noted, an uninterruptible supply of power in the 21st
century is absolutely essential to every aspect of our lives.
And when we run close to the edge like we did during Fern, that
should serve as a wake-up call and be viewed for what it is,
you know, a near-miss situation.
This storm could have been much worse, right? What bailed
the system out was the fact it wasn't as cold as projected, and
we saw a lot of loadshed occur because businesses and schools
were shut down, and that is not a societal outcome that we
want.
So the system is losing margin. That is driving operators
to have to go to more and more extreme operating measures, and
they need every tool. They needed every tool in their tool kit
to keep the lights on across the country. That is not the way
we want to run the electric grid that is so essential to our
life.
Mr. Guthrie. So--thank you. So question--my next question.
So huge, multiday storms can limit help from other regions.
During Christmas 2022, when Winter Storm Elliott hit, two
Kentucky utilities were unable to get enough power from PJM to
keep their lights on. During Fern, despite a brand-new large
transmission line, Hydro-Quebec sent power meant for New
England to its own Canadian customers.
So Mr. Costa, what does this say about the importance of
ensuring dependable resources within regions?
Mr. Costa. Thank you for the question, Congressman. The--
you are correct that what we saw during Fern was that we
actually had wood burning and trash incineration produced more
electricity at that time than we did with the--with weather-
dependent energy sources.
Mr. Guthrie. Yes, I saw that. I kept checking back to--this
has to be some trick on the internet, but it is absolutely true
that in New England you burn--by burning wood and refuse you
created more energy than wind and solar.
Mr. Costa. That was per ISO New England's own website
details.
And so, as I have been saying, I think the dispatchable
fuels we have been hearing today as well--dispatchable fuels
are critical to our region, and it is just a shame that we have
the Marcellus Shale so close to us that could bring us cost-
effective energy to the northeast if we were able just to----
Mr. Guthrie. What would happen if you did--so every time we
talk about this we get accused sometimes in this committee of--
we are just here defending polluters, is what they say. Well,
these people aren't there to produce pollution. They are there
to produce energy. What if you didn't have dispatchable power?
The wind and--I mean the fossil fuels last Fern.
Mr. Costa. Yes----
Mr. Guthrie. What would have happened?
Mr. Costa. I mean, when you talk about pollution, if you
look at natural gas, natural gas----
Mr. Guthrie. But if you didn't have natural gas, what would
have happened?
Mr. Costa. If we didn't have natural gas?
Mr. Guthrie. If you didn't have that option.
Mr. Costa. It is--the generation there, just oil or--most
likely at this point we would actually have outages.
Mr. Guthrie. Well, you wouldn't have oil either. So you
would have outages if you didn't have any of this, right?
Because wind and solar--if you were 100 percent wind and solar,
it wouldn't have performed.
Mr. Costa. That is correct.
Mr. Guthrie. Yes, thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much. The gentleman yields back,
and the Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, the
ranking member of the full committee, for 5 minutes for
questions.
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My questions are of
Mr. Goggin.
Over the last 16 months the Republicans keep repeating
their claims that wind and solar are unreliable when the grid
needs them most. But your testimony based on actual data kind
of tells a different story.
So can you talk about how renewables help keeping the grid
going during Winter Storm Fern, and talk about how they
performed relative to expectations?
Mr. Goggin. Absolutely. In terms of total performance, wind
and solar in the Southwest Power Pool region, we are about 20
to 27 percent during the peak demand periods. In ERCOT it was--
in the Texas grid operating area it was 15 to 24 percent. And
in MISO on the two peak days they had there during the peak
hours, it was 23 percent. So very strong performance over 20
percent on most of those days and most of those large markets.
This also was well above the expected capacity, and that is
really, I think, the important metric of what we are looking
at. The grid is a product of decades of planning. And when
those grid planners think about what generation will be there
when power demand is high, that is the relative metric, is how
did you perform relative to what is expected of you, and what,
importantly, you are compensated to provide. Regions like PJM,
MISO have capacity markets where resources get paid for the
capacity they provide, and wind and solar outperformed that by
a large margin, as I outlined. It was nearly twice--if you look
across the SBP, MISO, and PJM areas, roughly twice what they
were expected to provide and what they are compensated to
provide. In contrast, gas and coal fell well below that, what
it is compensated--
Mr. Pallone. Well, that was my second question about, you
know, this isn't just about renewables outperforming
expectations. It is also about gas and coal-fired power plants
underperforming.
So talk a little more. Did thermal power plants--that is,
gas and coal--underperform during this extreme winter weather?
And will they likely continue to struggle during future cold
weather events?
Mr. Goggin. Yes, they did, and we have seen this repeatedly
in the events over the last several years and even over the
last decade or more. There have been repeated correlated
outages of fossil-generation coal and gas. For many of the coal
units as well as some of the gas units, this is simply
equipment failures: Things breaking, things freezing, water
pipes freezing like it might at your house when it is really
cold. You know, as I mentioned, these thermal resources need
cooling water and they use water to produce steam. In many
cases, that just creates more things that can freeze and break
when it gets really cold.
We also--you know, the gas supply issues are also a very
real factor and were a major impact. You know, in Fern it
wasn't large enough to cause rolling blackouts like we had in
Uri and Elliott, but they still happened. It was 10 percent of
production, natural--U.S. natural gas production in Winter
Storm Fern versus 20 percent in Winter Storms Elliott and Uri.
And so we have these correlated risks because of those
dependencies on a certain type of fuel or, you know,
dependencies on, you know, things that we use, water, and
therefore have the--are prone to certain types of failures. And
so having more diversity, bringing in wind and solar that don't
need fuel, that don't need water gives you more diversity that
protects against those risks.
Mr. Pallone. All right. And then my last question is about
your work on Winter Storm Fern. Throughout last year Energy
Secretary Wright, in my opinion, has illegally abused emergency
authorities under the Federal Power Act repeatedly to force
coal plants to stay online long after they were slated to
retire. And so can you talk about how these so-called emergency
orders drive up energy costs for ratepayers, and are they
actually necessary for reliability?
Mr. Goggin. Absolutely. So these are plants that, as part
of that, you know, decade-old planning process, were slated for
retirement. And that was a decision by the owner, by the
utility, by the utility's regulators in many of these markets,
and by the market forces that were sending a price signal to
those units that you are no longer economic, you are--the
services you are providing are no longer valued. Basically,
your cost is greater than your value, and you should retire and
you should be replaced with new, more economic, more reliable
resources.
And we saw that during this event. The performance of these
coal units by DOE's own numbers was extremely poor. The numbers
DOE put on its website showed 29 to 42 percent consistent
output from--as a share of those resources' capacity during
Winter Storm Fern. That is well below what, you know, the
offshore wind and many of the land-based wind resources were
providing. And it is certainly well below what grid operators
expect from a coal----
Mr. Pallone. And so would you say--I am just interrupting
because we are running out of time--do you think that these
emergency orders are necessary for a reliable----
Mr. Goggin. Absolutely not. The markets and the existing
State regulatory processes are working well. They are providing
the right price signals to bring market entry and replace these
uneconomic, unreliable resources with new, more reliable
resources. Intruding on that market and those regulatory
processes is not going to benefit consumers.
Mr. Pallone. I thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Latta. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and the
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama's 6th District
for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Robb, I am trying to think back to the 1950s, 1960s,
1970s, when we had some pretty severe winter storms. My
recollection is that most of the power outages that came from
those were the result of trees or other things taking down the
lines. But it wasn't catastrophic grid failure, is it? Do you
have any knowledge of our past history and how our grid held up
under winter storm conditions?
Mr. Robb. I have some, but I don't have personal experience
all the way back to the 1950s.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Robb. However, I would say that, in general, it is very
unusual to see resource-driven outages. Most outages have
always been because of problems on the distribution system due
to icing on lines, people running into telephone poles, that
sort--or utility poles, that sort of thing. We are in a very
unique period of time where we are seeing resource deficiency.
Mr. Palmer. Why do you think it--that we are seeing that
now? Is it because of the, as NERC pointed out----
Mr. Robb. Well, I----
Mr. Palmer [continuing]. A couple of years ago, the change
in resource mix is the number-one threat to the grid?
Mr. Robb. I think it is driven by a few things. I think the
change in the resource mix is clearly one of the issues that we
are seeing. We are just--we don't have the same fuel security
we had in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.
I think the weather systems that we are seeing are more
extreme and more routinely extreme than what we have seen in
the past.
Mr. Palmer. I don't know that they are more extreme,
because we have known about polar vortexes since the 1850s, and
it was first identified as a polar vortex in a magazine that
was--the editor was Charles Dickens. The most extreme event we
had was in the early 1900s, and we--actually, the event that
took place in Texas was predicted weeks in advance because
atmospheric scientists identified atmospheric conditions above
the North Pole, very similar to what happened in the 1920s when
we had the super vortex.
So I don't know that we have got more extreme events, and I
just think that we have changed the fuel mix, the resource mix,
and we are--we have become reliant on things that I am not sure
are totally reliable.
The question I would like to ask, Mr. Mattison: Would
reopening some of the facilities that have been closed,
particularly the coal-fired facilities, and reopening those,
empowering those with small modular reactors mitigate some of
the issues with reliability? Because the transmission lines are
still there. You don't have the issue with transmission lines
that you do with trying to build solar or wind.
Mr. Mattison. Yes, thank you for the question. And I would
like to make a point. When we talk about coal plants during
winter events, we have long-term secured coal contracts. We
have on-site fuel sitting on the ground.
I have heard a number of times that the cost to the
customer on those coal-fired plants went up. I don't know how
they calculate those numbers, but----
Mr. Palmer. They make them up.
Mr. Mattison. They did not go up. And so that fuel price is
consistent. So I wanted to make sure that I noted that.
If there is an area where you have an interconnection,
where you have retired a plant, putting a plant back in that
place, the interconnection still exists. Yes, sir, to your
question, that would be very helpful.
Mr. Palmer. But the issue isn't just extreme weather
events. It is the fact that we have gone so whole-hog toward
renewables in certain areas of the country that they are now
high-risk, just based on demand.
Mr. Mattison. Well, and I think it is math, and it is a
proper--you know, physics as well. We are not opposed to wind.
If you look at our portfolio, we have a large portion of wind.
We have a diversified portfolio, and it complements and acts
well at times.
But ask--Mr. Guthrie asked about dependability and
reliability. I can rely on those dispatchable sources, and they
hedge as an insurance policy. But again, our goal is to always
keep the lights on for the consumer. That is what I am tasked
with as an operator.
Mr. Palmer. Mr. Costa, you discussed the importance of gas
reliability. What happens if the gas supply can't meet demand?
And what does a gas outage look like?
Mr. Costa. So in the northeast, with the gas supply, it
is--you have gas utilities that have firm contracts. And as a
result, at this point, if you take, you know, Winter Storm
Fern, their customers weren't protected with the--it is really
the power plants that do not have firm contracts, and they are
the ones that would suffer, and then you would have lights out.
Mr. Palmer. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Latta. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and the
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey's 8th
District for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Chairman.
Today's hearing is on an important topic, but it is being
held at a time when Congress and this committee should be
laser-focused on the affordability crisis that the Trump
administration has exacerbated with the President's
unauthorized war with Iran, a war that the American people have
overwhelmingly opposed since its start, a war that goes
directly against Trump's America First promise and pledge that
he wouldn't start any new wars.
Since the start of the year our military operations have
extended into Iran and Venezuela. It is only March, and this is
actively making life more expensive for Americans. Last week
oil prices spiked to over $110 a barrel, the highest since the
start of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the past month oil prices
have increased by almost 52 percent. Natural gas costs have
increased 13 percent since the start of the--Trump's second
term, and gasoline prices are up over 25 percent since the
start of this year. This comes when the President--asked about
his performance on the economy and affordability, gave himself
an ``A-plus-plus-plus-plus-plus,'' no room for improvement.
Let's also remember that to mitigate this spike the
administration announced plans last week to tap into the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve. This is a strategy that both, yes,
Republicans and Democratic administrations have used in the
past. But when President Biden tapped into the reserve in
response to rising oil prices following Russia's invasion of
Ukraine--a war that he did not start, by the way--Republicans
were outraged.
Speaking about Russia, last week the administration
announced a temporary waiver on U.S. sanctions on Russian oil,
which means that Russia is now a direct beneficiary of the
President's war on Iran. That is not an America First policy.
Let's also rewind back to when the President--when
President Biden was making these decisions. Colleagues on this
committee, including the gentleman from Alabama, were in--up in
arms, saying, ``President Biden has drained our SPR to the
lowest level since the 1980s. Instead of draining our reserves
for political motives, Biden should focus on reversing his
administration's disastrous policies that have caused energy
prices to skyrocket.''
Just once again, energy prices, natural gas costs have
increased 13 percent since the start of Trump's term, and
gasoline prices are up over 25 percent since the start of this
year. I doubt you will see a Tweet like this addressed to
President Trump and his disastrous policies that are hurting
the American people when they need relief from their government
and an America First focus.
We should be having the Secretary of Energy, Secretary
Wright, before this committee, but he is tied up in Venezuela,
which is, by the way, not the U.S. He is tied up on Iran,
which, again, is not the U.S. Everything that this
administration is doing is running counter to all the promises
that President Trump and Republicans on this committee ran on
in 2024.
So let's recap. Republicans were upset that President Biden
tapped into the reserve. Now President Trump is doing it.
Republicans had the opportunity and President Trump had the
opportunity to replenish that reserve. They failed to do so at
an adequate level, and now that the Strait of Hormuz is closed
because of a war that Trump started, we are tapping into that
reserve again to lower prices that have increased exponentially
since the start of the war.
By the way, the Strait of Hormuz was something that was
obvious to anyone who studied the Middle East, that this would
be a response by the Iranian Government, but not so much this
administration.
I say all this because this is an important issue in terms
of what we have seen this year in storms and being prepared for
it, our energy production in this country. Incredibly
important. But when we sit here and our colleagues across the
aisle pretend it is business as usual and we are not in this
trying moment and the American people are not in this trying
moment, it gets extremely frustrating, especially because so
much of the time spent on this committee by my colleagues
across the aisle are in constant critique of the prior
administration. But when they see things that are hurting the
American people being done by this administration, the lack of
accountability of this administration, they are often silent.
So I appreciate you all being here, and I yield back.
Mr. Latta. Thank you. The gentleman yields back the balance
of his time. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from
Tennessee's 1st District for 5 minutes for questions.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for being here today and for your testimony.
Winter Storm Fern was a real-world test of our electric
grid. For my home State I am proud of the men and women at TVA
and our rural electric co-ops who worked around the clock in
dangerous, icy conditions to swiftly restore our power.
And I am sure you know the TVA's board recently announced
it will continue operations at the Cumberland and Kingston coal
plants. That decision didn't just happen in a vacuum. As shared
in Mr. Robb's testimony, NERC has sounded the alarm about early
retirements in its 2025 Long-Term Reliability Assessment. And
Winter Storm Fern showed us exactly why those warnings deserve
our attention. When the other resources underperformed during
the storm, it was dispatchable generation that kept the lights
on. And in the Tennessee Valley, coal alone provided 14 percent
of our power generation at peak demand. Solar and wind combined
just provided 1 percent.
So Mr. Mattison, what does Winter Storm Fern tell us about
the role of dispatchable infrastructure, especially coal, in
maintaining grid reliability, sir?
Mr. Mattison. Thank you for your question. I think it is
very important. And when you look at how our assets performed
during Winter Storm Fern, coal, they were at 81 percent of
their capacity factor. When you look at wind, it was around 42
percent, and natural gas was about 31 percent. So that
dispatchable coal unit is the workhorse. It is the baseload
unit----
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes.
Mr. Mattison [continuing]. And--subject to check, but I
believe I am right here--AEP SWEPCO built the last coal plant
that has been built in the United States. It is called the Turk
plant in Fulton, Arkansas. It came online in 2012. It is an
ultra-super-critical plant, which just means the temperatures
are higher and it, when built, complies with the current CCR,
ELG rules, and all the environmental rules that are available
today. And it is one of the workhorses in our fleet, and that
plant performed perfectly during Winter Storm Fern.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Fantastic. I also want to mention how
much our electric grid and pipeline network rely on significant
preparation scenario analysis and real-time communications and
coordination during these extreme weather events. Forecasting
for severe weather and all possible outcomes can be very time-
consuming and burdensome. I know I talked to the CEO of TVA
when we had Hurricane Helene, and I asked about AI projections
and things of that nature.
So Mr. Mattison, I will go to you again. With the advent of
AI and advanced computing, how can these tools be used to
forecast potential supply shortfalls and demand increases and
help respond to these events?
Mr. Mattison. Well, thank you for your question.
One thing I want to mention about AI. In northwest
Louisiana we just landed an Amazon data center that is going to
be 1.2 gigs.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes.
Mr. Mattison. And we have got power plants in the offing to
be built to support that. That will be fueled by natural gas.
And I think it is early in the game to be precise on what AI
can do, but it will be a game changer in predicting algorithms
and forecasting fuel needed, weather patterns.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes.
Mr. Mattison. The one thing about a Winter Storm Fern is--
like a hurricane, they can be devastating----
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes.
Mr. Mattison [continuing]. But we have notice of when it is
happening so we can begin to gear up. But I see a future with
AI. When you put that data into an AI system, it will tell you
exactly what you need to do, when to do it, how to do it.
Kind of comical, watching these driverless cars. I was in
Austin yesterday, and they were telling me that once they
learned an algorithm----
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes.
Mr. Mattison [continuing]. Then they start driving more
aggressively like those around them. So it is amazing, I think,
what AI will be able to do for us.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes. Remind me not to take one of those----
Mr. Mattison. Yes, exactly.
[Laughter.]
Mrs. Harshbarger. I am pretty aggressive myself.
Let's see. Mr. Robb, as more intermittent generation is
added to the system, how important will reliable natural gas
infrastructure be to maintaining grid stability during severe
weather events?
Mr. Robb. Yes, it is going to be critical to be able to
balance the uncertainty in renewable production.
One of the issues with renewables is that, while they tend
to perform well in the summer, they don't perform well in the
winter in general. You know, the winter peaks typically happen
at 6 in the morning and 8 at night, right----
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes.
Mr. Robb [continuing]. When the sun doesn't shine.
Batteries can help alleviate some of that, but not all of that,
at least with the technologies we have today.
So right now we need something to balance those resources,
and the only real fuel we have to do that that has the
flexibility and ubiquity is natural gas. So it is an essential
fuel for reliability.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Mattison, you have talked about Amazon working--we
have--I guess TVA has partnered with Google to do some
innovative things for their data centers, and it won't cost the
ratepayers any more. And, you know, we are going to be checking
on that, but this is going to happen all over the country.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much. The gentlelady yields back,
and the Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California's
7th District for 5 minutes for questions.
Ms. Matsui. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want
to thank the witnesses for being here today.
I want to be 100 percent clear: Maintaining the reliability
of the electric grid is our number-one priority. When it comes
to extreme cold or extreme heat, keeping the AC or heat running
is a matter of life or death.
Republicans want to accuse Democrats and clean-energy
advocates of undermining reliability, so I want to set the
record straight. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Climate change and extreme threat to the grid--not to mention
every other aspect of our lives.
Wildfires are the biggest threat in California. They are
also the biggest driver of electricity prices. And it is well
established that the severity and frequency of wildfires is
increasing because of climate change. Hurricanes, another
massive threat to grid reliability, are becoming stronger
because of climate change. Extreme heat is becoming more common
because of climate change. Even extreme cold like Winter Storm
Fern can be linked to climate change. As climate change
destabilizes Arctic weather patterns, extreme cold air can be
pushed down into lower latitudes.
Mr. Robb, NERC has acknowledged the impact of climate
change on reliability in the 2021 Long-Term Reliability
Assessment and the 2022 State of Reliability Report. NERC
stated that climate change is increasingly increasing the
severity and frequency of extreme weather, which is threatening
reliability.
Yes or no, is that correct?
Mr. Robb. I would have to go back and look at the reports,
but I don't doubt that.
Ms. Matsui. OK. NERC's mission is to conduct reliability
assessments and establish reliability standards. Do you
consider the role of fossil fuels in exacerbating the extreme
weather that is threatening the grid?
Mr. Robb. I don't have an opinion on that.
Ms. Matsui. OK. It is not NERC's mission to stop climate
change at all?
Mr. Robb. No, our mission is to preserve the reliability----
Ms. Matsui. OK.
Mr. Robb [continuing]. Of the bulk power system.
Ms. Matsui. OK. Our responsibility on this committee is to
see the bigger picture and implement a long-term strategy to
stop climate change while still maintaining everyday grid
reliability. That is our job, and we are failing. These storms,
heat waves, wildfires, hurricanes, and floods are only going to
get worse if we don't do something about it. So how can we meet
demand during winter storms without burning fossil fuels?
Twenty-twenty-six was the coldest winter in decades for
parts of the South and east coast, but it was unusually warm
for much of the West.
Mr. Goggin, what was solar output like in the western U.S.
during Winter Storm Fern?
Mr. Goggin. It was extremely good, and power prices, as you
noted, were quite low throughout the West during this event.
And that reflects it was just not that cold there, so there was
abundant supply. Electricity demand was not that high----
Ms. Matsui. Sure.
Mr. Goggin [continuing]. And the solar output was very
strong. And so if we did have stronger transmission ties
between the eastern and the western U.S. and between Texas and
the East and the West, some of that surplus solar power and
just general low-cost power in the West could have kept rates
low, could have helped keep the lights on in the eastern U.S.
and Texas when those areas needed it.
Ms. Matsui. 0K. Well, you----
Mr. Goggin. And we did see solar----
Ms. Matsui [continuing]. You answered my next question
right now.
Mr. Goggin. Yes, sorry.
Ms. Matsui. So----
Mr. Goggin. OK.
Ms. Matsui. I will continue here.
Mr. Goggin. Yes.
Ms. Matsui. In Sacramento we don't get winter storms,
snowstorms like Fern, but we do deal with extreme heat waves
that put serious strain on the grid. Six years ago, in 2020,
extreme summer heat pushed California's grid to the breaking
point, and we saw rolling blackouts across the State. But since
then California has dramatically improved the reliability of
our grid, despite facing similar heat waves.
Mr. Goggin, can you talk about how California has achieved
this stunning turnaround?
Mr. Goggin. Absolutely. A big part of it is a diverse mix
of resources and facilitating the transmission expansion that
is necessary for that. And California has been procuring wind
resources both in-state as well as from more distant areas
where there is less diversity in the correlations of the
profiles from those areas. So they are buying New Mexico wind,
they are buying Wyoming wind. And this is building a diverse
generation mix.
In the State, obviously, there is a lot of solar
investment, there is a lot of battery storage----
Ms. Matsui. Sure.
Mr. Goggin [continuing]. Investment, and that is playing a
key role. These three resources--wind, solar, batteries--work
together extremely well to provide dependable capacity,
flexibility, and to work with the existing resources as well as
imports to meet reliability. And we are seeing the same thing
play out in Texas and other areas where this is the winning
solution, is these--this diverse mix of----
Ms. Matsui. Mr. Goggin, you are answering my next question.
Mr. Goggin. Sorry.
Ms. Matsui. So we are going through this very quickly.
Mr. Goggin. OK.
Ms. Matsui. But I just want to say since previous winter
storms, Texas and other States have taken steps to winterize
their grids and improve reliability safeguards. And 2 weeks ago
this committee passed the SECURE Grid Act, which I coauthored
with Chairman Latta, to strengthen States' ability to assess
and prepare reliability risks.
Mr. Robb, how important are State energy programs for
driving reliability improvements?
Mr. Robb. Yes, they are absolutely critical because the
States have the responsibility for the resource mix.
Ms. Matsui. OK, thank you, and I have run out of time.
I yield back.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much. The gentlelady yields back,
and the Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oregon's 2nd
district for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Bentz. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank all of you for
being here.
I think I want to start by focusing on the most simple
approach, Mr. Robb, to the problems that we are facing and what
we here in Congress can do about it. So you already mentioned
that we have a shortage of generation.
In the northwest--I am from Oregon--we anticipate a
shortage of--a massive amount of shortage for our area, about--
we need about as much power in the future as we have today, and
we need it really soon. So that means we have to double the
amount that we have in the northwest. So we have a real
shortage there.
Is this true across the Nation, or is this just a northwest
problem?
Mr. Robb. It is not ubiquitous, but you are not alone. A
lot of places are facing enormous load growth and the need to
get new generation and supporting infrastructure in place.
Mr. Bentz. Right. So let's--I was going to go to
infrastructure next, and that would be transmission. And so
when we just heard Mr. Goggin talking about the movement of
wind and solar out of the southwest up into California, into
Oregon and so forth, that takes transmission. And we have an
incredible problem with our transmission in the northwest, a
problem in the sense that it is too small, it is full up.
There is no more capacity. Is that correct across the
Nation?
Mr. Robb. Again, not ubiquitous, but that problem is fairly
common.
Mr. Bentz. And so now we are getting to it. How do we solve
these two problems, one on the generation side and one on the
transmission side? What is it going to take to solve these two
problems?
Mr. Robb. The main thing is we got to figure out how to get
stuff built, right? I mean, grid planners understand where
there is need for more transmission, they understand where
there is need for resources. The issue is getting permits to
build it, getting through the interconnection queues where that
is an obstacle, dealing with supply chain bottlenecks to get
the equipment to build the stuff. But we got to be able to get
it put in place, and we got to get it put in place very----
Mr. Bentz. Yes, we do. And let's focus on those obstacles
again because you are here in front of Congress, the idea is
that you will tell us what it is we need to do to try to
address the very obstacles that are standing between us and
getting that generation and that transmission. So let's talk
about transmission first.
Is it the environmental work that we have to do to put a
power line in that is the problem, or is there some other--or
additional problem? Because certainly the EIS and everything
else is a problem.
Mr. Robb. That question would probably be better addressed
by one of the people who actually build transmission, because
we don't, but the issue is permitting and siting.
Mr. Bentz. Of the three we have here, who should I ask?
Mr. Robb. I would ask Mr. Mattison.
Mr. Bentz. Mr. Mattison, you are up.
Mr. Mattison. I am going to throw him a question in a
minute.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Mattison. But that is OK.
No, we do build transmission lines. And I agree with Mr.
Robb, we do need to streamline the process. As I said earlier,
the States have done a very good job of expediting permitting.
But when you start going across, you know, transmission lines
interstate, if we would have a more robust Federal policy----
Mr. Bentz. So--this is good. Every time I hear the word
``robust,'' I start to nod off.
Mr. Mattison. Yes.
Mr. Bentz. Let me just say that it is--we just had a vote
on the SPEED Act. And the SPEED Act vote was 221 to 196. Eleven
Democrats joined the rest of all but 1 Republican voting for
that. It hasn't gone anywhere over in the Senate.
If that were to pass, would that help?
Mr. Mattison. Yes. Let's interchange the word for
``robust'' to ``speed.''
Mr. Bentz. OK, right.
Mr. Mattison. And that would help us from expedited, and
that is what we need.
Mr. Bentz. You know, and we--so if we are going to actually
solve these problems that we have heard about for the last
several hours, we actually need to do something to reduce the
amount of time it is going to take to get generation, to get
transmission.
So you are saying the SPEED Act would help?
Mr. Mattison. Yes.
Mr. Bentz. And yet it is not moving in the Senate.
Mr. Mattison. Yes.
Mr. Bentz. So you are telling Congress, do something with
the SPEED Act. Is that what I am hearing?
Mr. Mattison. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bentz. And so if the SPEED Act were to pass, would that
help us address these almost existential problems that we are
facing without having enough power to bring about artificial
intelligence?
Mr. Mattison. It would build a highway. I like to look at
it like--this transmission system that we are talking about in
Oregon--as a two-lane highway. We need a 10-lane highway to be
able to move bulk power. No matter what the generation source
is, we can't move it right now.
Mr. Bentz. And we have created these laws and requirements
and studies and standards and everything else that are standing
between us and actually getting done what has to be done to
help protect this Nation and--as we go into this electrically
driven future.
Thank you so much, all, for being here.
Mr. Mattison. Sure.
Mr. Bentz. I yield back.
Mr. Latta. Well, thank you very much. The gentleman yields
back, and the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas's 33rd
District for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Veasey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Now that we know that extreme weather is no longer just an
occasional stress test for our grid, that it is becoming sort
of a routine operating condition, you know, we need to be
cognizant of that. I know that Winter Storm Fern was the third
major winter event in as many years, and it forced grid
operators across much of the country to manage simultaneous
spikes in electricity demand, fuel constraints, and
infrastructure stress.
The encouraging news is that the bulk power system has
pretty much held together. Grid operators learned a lot of
lessons--I know we did in Texas, ERCOT, with Winter Storm Uri
and Elliott--like improved weather forecasting and better
coordination and more clear-eyed planning to help keep flowing
during peak demand.
But Fern also reinforced something that is also, I think,
equally important, and that is there is no single resource or
technology that guarantees reliability. Cleaner energy provided
meaningful generation and helped limit operating costs during
periods of extremely high fuel prices, and natural gas supplies
face price spikes and delivery challenges, and local outages
were often caused by distribution infrastructure failures
rather than generation shortages.
And so we have to move beyond fuel-versus-fuel debates. I
think that that has, unfortunately, become almost sort of
comical here. But every resource type definitely has distinct
outage risks during extreme weather.
And I want to focus my questions on what policies actually
reduce risk and lower cost going forward. Mr. Goggin, analysis
shows that cleaner energy helped reduce operating costs during
Winter Storm Fern when fuel prices surged.
And so I wanted to ask you, to what extent can renewable
generation act as a hedge against fuel price shocks that
ultimately show up in consumer bills?
Mr. Goggin. Absolutely. It is an extremely powerful hedge
because wind and solar have no fuel cost. They will always be
free, and that is something that you can't get with other
resources. Gas is obviously mostly traded on the spot market,
and so the price can be extremely volatile during short-term
emergencies like we saw with Winter Storm Fern, as well as long
term, just with geopolitical and other macroeconomic factors
that are uncertain. And so wind and solar does not have that
risk, and it gives you a valuable hedge as a ratepayer that
some of your fuel price is known and locked in at zero.
So that is extremely valuable, and I think it has been a
big part of the solution in Texas with the massive amount of
wind, solar, and batteries they have built, particularly over
the last several years.
Mr. Veasey. Yes. Does overreliance on a single fuel create
affordability and reliability risk at the same time?
Mr. Goggin. Absolutely. You see these correlated risks.
Each fuel has, you know, some types of risks. Some are
economic, some are reliability. And the solution to those risks
is to have a diverse portfolio so that if one resource is
unavailable or is too expensive, you can use the other
resources. And that diversity, I think, not putting all your
eggs in one basket, is an extremely smart way to plan a
generation system.
And you need the transmission system that also enables
that, it allows you to access diverse resources within your
region as well as from neighboring regions. And so----
Mr. Veasey. Yes.
Mr. Goggin [continuing]. Generation and transmission
diversity is really key.
Mr. Veasey. Yes. No, thank you very much. And I want to ask
Mr. Robb.
I know that Winter Storm Fern saw some natural gas prices
spike nearly 10 to 35 times at major hubs. And given the gas-
electric coordination risk identified by NERC, how can we
better align the two--these two industries to ensure that fuel
is available when the grid needs it most?
Mr. Robb. That is a great question.
First of all, we need to recognize that these two systems
are two sides of the same coin, right? Natural gas now supplies
45 percent of power generation fuel, and power generation
consumes about 45 percent of natural gas. So the first thing I
would say is we need to figure out how to plan these two
systems together. Right now they are planned independently on
different bases.
Second, we need to address the disconnects between the
realities of fuel procurement for the power sector, which are
very, very different than the fuel procurement needs of a local
distribution company for home heating. One of the issues we ran
into in Fern was just the duration from when the operators
needed to make their gas buy versus when they actually
purchased the gas. It was 5 or 6 days. That is an eternity.
That needs to be addressed.
Third, we need better coordinating mechanisms between the
two sectors. That is being addressed in some ways voluntarily
by the initiatives that Jose discussed in the northeast. We see
similar things in other parts of the country.
And then finally, the gas system needs to be able to
perform during extreme weather to the same degree that we
require the electric system to perform. That is going to
require more infrastructure, both pipelines and storage, and
probably some requirements on the pipelines and the upstream
production to make sure that they can continue to operate
during extreme cold events.
Mr. Veasey. Yes. No, thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Latta. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and the
Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Florida's 15th
District.
[Pause.]
Mr. Latta. I will take that back. The Chair now recognizes
the gentlelady, the at-large Member from North Dakota, for 5
minutes for questions.
Mrs. Fedorchak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
my colleague from Florida for allowing me to jump ahead of her
for these questions.
This is like the Super Bowl of hearings for me. I am a
former utility regulator. These issues that we are talking
about today are what drove me to run for Congress, because I
saw the reliability risks front and center as president of
NARUC, as a State utility regulator for 12 years, and was
frustrated that we weren't shining enough light on these issues
and paying enough attention to them.
So Mr. Robb and I have worked together for years. I
appreciate your focus on this. I want to highlight something
that you said, Mr. Robb. Fern was a classic near-risk event,
near-risk event. I wonder how different the room would be today
if it wasn't a near-risk event, if things had gone just a
little bit differently. I can estimate what it would be like in
here. It would be packed, and all of us would be really mad at
all of you because somebody else, not us, would be to blame.
That is what happens with this. The engineers come through
like champs in the hour of our greatest need, and they figure
it out--until they don't.
But guess what? We have been warned. Your report, time and
time again, year after year from NERC, has been warning this
country that we are at risk of not having enough power to meet
demand. Two-thirds of the country is at risk of not having
enough power to meet demand. That is not acceptable. We have to
do better. So I appreciate you guys being here today and
sharing some of your wisdom on what we should be doing better.
Mr. Mattison, you mentioned that you would like the Federal
Government--I am paraphrasing--you would like the Federal
Government to pay more attention to reliability and to demand
more of the system as it relates to reliability through our
policies.
What would you like us to do?
Mr. Mattison. Well, as I was talking to Mr. Bentz, I
think--and Mr. Robb said it many times--we need to build stuff.
At the end of the day we need to build transmission lines, bulk
transmission lines. We need to expedite that. It is needed
today.
We need to win at this AI game. We really do as the United
States. They are happening all over the place. They will go
somewhere else. We want them here. To me it is a matter of
national security.
So to be able to build out to that demand, we can't haggle
around with policies--it ought to be this way, that way--we
need to--to me it ought to be a bipartisan solution because the
whole country is dependent on building out the infrastructure
that we need, because the reality is--it is pretty simple--the
lights will go out if we don't do this.
Mrs. Fedorchak. Right. I agree with you. It should be
bipartisan.
Mr. Robb, how are premature retirements of baseload
resources such as natural gas and coal making matters worse
when we have increased demand?
Mr. Robb. Thanks for the question. It makes matters worse
in a number of different ways when you lose the energy
production associated with those facilities.
And we saw in Winter Storm Fern a number of facilities that
were operating under 202(c) orders did perform and were
required to keep the lights on. There is no question about
that.
The second thing is that those facilities create the
special sauce that keeps the grid operating. They create
frequency, they create voltage, they create the ability to
control those within very tight parameters, which is what
allows the high-voltage transmission system to operate. Without
that kind of generation, we don't have the ability to operate a
transmission system of the scale that we have. We may
eventually be able to do that with grid-forming inverters and
other technologies, but those aren't ready for prime time yet.
So they play a very, very essential role in the reliability of
the grid.
Mrs. Fedorchak. Thank you. In the past I have heard you say
that one of the easiest things that we should be doing in the
country to address our current urgent needs is to stop retiring
things that are already connected to the grid and working. Do
you still believe that that would be a good first step?
Mr. Robb. I think the way to get out of a hole is to stop
digging. And to the extent that some of these plants have
remaining valuable life, they should be continuing to operate.
That is not to say that there aren't some plants that probably
need to go, right, because they haven't been maintained and
they are not ready to operate. But that is not the
characteristic of the entire fleet.
Mrs. Fedorchak. Thank you. I thank you all for what you are
doing.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Latta. The gentlelady yields back, and the Chair now
recognizes the gentlelady from Virginia's 4th District for 5
minutes for questions.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the witnesses for being here for this very important hearing.
The reliability of the Nation's grid and our ability to
maintain a stable and robust supply of energy during extreme
weather events and disasters, both natural and man-made, is
extremely important to our overall national security.
Unfortunately, what I have heard from my colleagues on the
other side of the aisle is the same myth that only fossil fuels
can serve as reliable sources of energy, and that renewable
energy does not have a place in ensuring the stability of our
grid. But that is simply not true.
As painfully demonstrated by President Trump's unauthorized
war of choice in Iran, conflict in one part of the globe can
dramatically disrupt the movement of fossil fuels everywhere
and send the price of oil and natural gas into the
stratosphere. This fossil fuel reliance undermines our national
security and threatens the stability of our grid.
As things are now, in order to recklessly balance his
addiction to fossil fuels with his duty to the American people
to keep energy costs affordable, President Trump has eased
sanctions on Russia just to try and keep energy prices from
continuing their meteoric rise. And Secretary Bessent has said
that the Trump administration is fine with Iran exporting
almost 1 billion barrels of oil, while other oil traffic
through the Strait of Hormuz remains paralyzed.
In other words, we are now funding the world's largest
exporters of global instability and chaos just to maintain a
semblance of energy stability.
This is only exacerbated by the actions of my colleagues
across the aisle who have sat idly by while the administration
zealously undermined the clean-energy transition and worked to
kill dozens of clean=energy projects and hundreds of billions
in clean-energy tax credits that would have made our grid more
resilient to the current supply disruptions that are affecting
the globe because of the President's senseless war.
Now, Mr. Goggin, in your testimony you note that natural
gas--I am sorry, that question has actually already been
answered, so I am going to skip.
You highlighted in your testimony that renewable energy
projects account for 92 percent of power generation resources
that are trying to interconnect to the grid. Can you discuss
how we should work to expedite that interconnection process and
what the benefits of doing so would be for the reliability and
stability of the grid?
Mr. Goggin. Absolutely. Transmission is one of the key
bottlenecks in getting new generation of all types onto the
grid. And we do see, as you mentioned, a large amount of wind,
solar, and battery capacity is stuck in this interconnection
logjam. And moving transmission forward is--you know, building
things, as I think everybody here has said, is really the key
solution.
And we talked about the three P's in terms of driving
transmission: planning, paying, and permitting. Planning is
easy. You can, like, draw lines on a map. Figuring out who pays
for transmission, developing regional, workable cost allocation
methods to pay for transmission, is a key impediment in most
regions.
And then finally, permitting is obviously something that,
you know, the Federal Government, as well as State governments,
can work together to achieve. And that allows transmission
lines to be built and permitted in an expeditious way. And that
will give us this--basically, open up the market, let these
resources that are trying to get onto the grid move forward.
And when solar batteries can be deployed very quickly, you can
build them in a year or less, much faster than any other form
of generation. And so they are extremely valuable as we have
this large load growth going on now.
Ms. McClellan. And speaking of permitting, I guess it
doesn't help, once permits are awarded, if the administration
pauses the construction of a wind project for no apparent
reason.
Mr. Goggin. That does not help.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you. And Mr. Goggin, previous
witnesses to this committee have highlighted that increased
renewable energy generation provides an opportunity to
significantly update aging and outdated parts of the grid as we
seek to ensure that these new sources of energy are able to
seamlessly integrate into the grid.
Could you speak to the necessity of updating aging grid
infrastructure?
Mr. Goggin. Absolutely. It is something we need to be
investing in anyway. Most of our power grid was built 40-plus
years ago. It is now reaching the end of its life, and there's
opportunities to rebuild that at higher capacity using modern
technology, advanced conductors, and other things that give you
a lot more capacity with a similar, you know, profile and, you
know, land use.
And so there's a lot of opportunities to do that, and that
is why we talk about we need proactive, multivalue
transmission, recognizing that transmission is not just needed
to bring new generation on, it is not just needed for new
loads. It provides economic value, it provides reliability
value. It provides--FERC has identified seven benefits,
distinct categories of benefits of transmission. And so we need
to be thinking, as we are replacing our aging assets on the
grid, how can we maximize those seven categories of benefits
across--you know, economics, reliability, resilience, all of
that, all ultimately flows to the ratepayers.
And so, yes, we need to be thinking about all of that and
investing at a level that is commensurate with those benefits.
We are woefully short of that today.
Ms. McClellan. Perfect timing.
I yield back.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Florida's 15th
District for 5 minutes for questions.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
During Winter Storm Fern, Florida saw snow flurries as far
south as my district in Hillsborough County, with temperatures
dropping down into the 30's--that is unusual for us back home--
destroying over 3.1 billion worth of crops across Florida.
[Pause.]
Mr. Latta. OK, the gentlelady will informally pass, and we
will come back to the gentlelady. And the Chair will recognize
the gentleman from South Carolina's 7th District for 5 minutes
for questions.
Mr. Fry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses for being here today.
Reliable energy is essential to every aspect of our modern
life, especially to public health and our welfare, yet power
outages have cost the American people $44 billion each year.
Winter Storm Fern highlighted the importance of grid
reliability, leaving more than 1 million customers without
power at its peak, including 70,000 in my home State of South
Carolina. These disruptions make it clear that reliability must
remain a top priority, particularly during severe weather
events that place extraordinary strain on the electric system.
Winter Storm Fern also demonstrated the critical importance
of dispatchable energy sources. During the storm, peak coal
generation rose by 25 percent and peak natural gas generation
rose by 47 percent. Across all impacted regions dispatchable
energy significantly outperformed wind and solar generation.
The grid's performance during severe weather depends not only
on these baseload and dispatchable resources, but also on real-
time coordination among grid operators, generators,
transmission owners, marketers, and other market participants.
Analyzing how the bulk power system performs during these
events is essential, I think, to strengthening reliability and
ensuring the continued delivery of electric power that
Americans depend on every day.
Mr. Costa, during Winter Storm Fern natural gas generation
played a significant role--where are you at? Played a
significant role at meeting peak electricity demand.
Importantly, natural gas storage infrastructure is necessary to
protect against potential capacity constraints or pipeline
failures that limit supply.
Can you discuss how your areas utilized natural gas storage
to ensure fuel delivery and availability during the storms?
Mr. Costa. Yes. So thank you for the question, Congressman.
One thing I want to note is that--also to your question--is
that in the northeast, in the power generation sector we--over
20 percent--and Mr. Robb will probably have the exact number--
of generators are actually natural gas. Those generators went
offline, and that is the reason we saw the hike.
But when we did have--the Marcellus Shale performed
extremely well this winter with the winterization efforts, but
we did see some of the areas with that, and storage was a big
player this year. And being able to--and those are firm
contracts that utilities have to be able to pull from when
needed, and storage was a big player this year in making sure
that we were able to get the supply we needed.
Mr. Fry. Yes, there was a lot of preparation and
coordination leading up to and during the storm among members
of the power and gas sectors. This included the administration
taking proactive steps to issue 202(c) orders to enable maximum
availability of dispatchable coal and gas and backup generation
if it was needed. It also included longer-term adjustments like
winterization, obviously.
To the--to Mr. Robb and Mr. Mattison and Mr. Costa, how did
planning and actions taken during Fern reflect lessons from
past storms?
Additionally, can you all speak to any existing
coordination practices between pipelines, generators, and grid
operators that could expand to further strengthen that
reliability during extreme weather?
We will start--we will go down here. Yes, sir.
Mr. Robb. So following a 2018 cold-weather event we started
the process of developing mandatory reliability standards
related to winterization. Those were approved by FERC last
year, will be mandatory and enforceable next year. Many of the
power generating units kind of leaned in and have gotten ahead
of the enforcement date and have taken steps to winterize their
equipment against very, very extreme cold temperatures, which
is, again, one of the things we defined with FERC.
I think the efforts around coordination--and that helped.
That is one of the reasons why we did--we believe that is one
of the reasons we didn't see the same number of generation
outages in Fern that we did in Elliott and Uri, is because of
those winterization requirements.
In terms of coordination between the two sectors, the AGA,
the American Gas Association, last year initiated a series of
regional forums to drive better situational awareness between
the two sectors, better understand the vulnerabilities. I
participated in one of those events in the Pacific Northwest,
and those are desperately needed relationships that need to be
automated and activated in realtime so that the grid operators
know what is going on in the gas system and vice versa, because
they are so interdependent.
Mr. Fry. Mr. Mattison?
Mr. Robb. Brett?
Mr. Mattison. Well, one thing we did is what Mr. Robb said,
is we prepared for winter--especially Uri taught us a lesson,
with putting heat tracing and things of that nature in our gas
power plants. We did winterization of our coal plants to meet
those requirements.
And the second thing that we did is we always practice any
type of weather event. And so in October we went through a
full-blown, two-day practice session. And it is ironic, it
basically mirrored what Fern did. So everybody was on point,
and we had practiced, rehearsed, so that helped us
tremendously.
Mr. Fry. Mr. Costa, you are off the hook because----
Mr. Latta. I am sorry, the gentleman's time has expired.
And if you want to respond to him written, we would greatly
appreciate that.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California's
15th district for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Mullin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As of yesterday the cost of crude oil had gone up 50
percent in less than 2 weeks. The average price of gas hit
$3.72 a gallon. Americans are already paying the price for
Trump's reckless and chaotic war in Iran, so it is
disappointing to hear the same tired arguments about tying our
electric system to these volatile markets.
When gas pipelines froze during Winter Storm Uri a few
years ago, energy prices spiked in Texas and some families were
hit with catastrophic electric bills of over $10,000. Today we
are faced with similar unpredictability, although this time of
our own making, as a result of an unnecessary war. If we double
down on fossil fuels, Americans will continue to be at the
mercy of foreign wars and industry price-gouging.
So Mr. Goggin, your testimony notes that in every recent
winter storm the natural gas accounted for the majority of the
generator outages. Can you describe how diverse sources of
power, including renewables, protect consumers from the massive
oil price spikes we are seeing, not least due to this war?
Mr. Goggin. Absolutely. There is both the reliability and
resilience benefit as well as an economic benefit. And Winter
Storm Fern, luckily, was not--did not appear--did not result in
a reliability event. We did not have rolling blackouts like we
did during Winter Storms Elliott and Uri. However, the risk is
still there. If it was a colder event, I think we could have
seen, you know, the loss of gas generation at the levels that
we saw in those previous events, and that could have pushed
things over the edge.
Fern was, however, an economic event. We will see rates go
up dramatically for ratepayers to cover those fuel costs, you
know, the billions of dollars that were expended particularly
on natural gas when it spiked to, you know, over 100 times
normal in some places. These are extreme pricing events, and
they are going to have a large impact on ratepayers.
And so having a diverse mix of wind and solar and battery
resources that do not have that fuel price exposure, do not
have that exposure to the fuel supply delivery interruptions,
that is extremely valuable for both economics and reliability.
Mr. Mullin. Thank you for that.
And Mr. Robb, your organization's 2024 report found that
America needs 35 gigawatts of new interregional transmission to
keep the grid reliable. Can you elaborate on that finding and
describe how it may have shifted, given increasing energy
demand since that study was finalized?
Mr. Robb. Yes, that is a great question.
So the 35 gigawatts was identified as opportunities to
better use the reserve base of the country by sharing reserves
during extreme events. It did not examine every opportunity to
do that. It looked at transmission as the solution to that.
That is just important to note.
The question as to how things have evolved given the demand
forecast, the load growth that has happened--because that study
was vintage to 2023 data--is a great one. I honestly can't tell
you how it changes because areas that were deficient, that
showed deficiency, probably are showing more deficiency. Areas
that might have been able to export may also be in deficiency
now because of the load growth. Really, the analytics would
have to be done to ascertain whether that number is higher or
lower today.
Mr. Mullin. Worthy of further exploration. So thank you all
for your testimony today.
And with that, I yield back.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much. The Chair will again
recognize the gentlelady from Florida's 15th District for 5
minutes for questions.
Ms. Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I am going
to try this again.
Thank you all so much for being here with us today. During
Winter Storm Fern, Florida saw snow flurries as far south as my
district in Florida, which had really damaging impacts on our
agriculture industry. And during the storm the Department of
Energy issued seven emergency orders to mitigate the risk of
blackouts in Florida. Backup generation was leveraged to
stabilize the grid, ensuring more than 100 different local
entities, including critical services, could maintain power.
While today's hearing focuses on Winter Storm Fern, the
lesson is broader. In Florida we tend to face hurricanes rather
than winter storms, but the challenge is the same: ensuring
that our grid can withstand extreme events and deliver reliable
power when Americans need it most.
Mr. Robb, I would like to start by coming back to you.
NERC's reliability assessments have warned about growing
risks to the bulk power system as demand increases and
dispatchable resources retire. In Florida our utilities spent
significant resources hardening the grid for hurricanes,
strengthening poles, putting lines underground, preparing for
rapid restoration. But generation reliability is just as
critical for us during these extreme events.
Based on NERC's analysis of Winter Storm Fern and other
severe weather events, what lessons should policymakers be
keeping in mind to ensure the grid maintains sufficient
dispatchable generation and reliability during extreme weather
events like hurricanes?
Mr. Robb. Yes, that is a super question.
You know, one of the things that is very unique about
Florida that we really admire is the fact that your natural gas
generation fleet and the natural gas system in Florida is
purpose built, largely for the generation business. We think
there is a really important lesson learned there relative to
the dual-purpose gas system we have in the rest of the country,
where it has to serve both local distribution load for home
heating as well as the power sector.
I think the planning of the grid, both the power sector and
the natural gas sector in Florida, have significantly improved
the resilience of that system for the benefit of Floridians.
Ms. Lee. And are you seeing any particular reliability
concerns in regions experiencing rapid population growth where
electricity demand increases? I know my district has three of
the fastest-growing counties in the country. Does that affect
your assessment and issues related to reliability?
Mr. Robb. Yes, absolutely, because as the population
migrates, so does load, right? And we have seen big migration
into Florida and into Texas in particular. And it is one of the
drivers of the--our characterization of Texas as an elevated or
high-risk area of the country.
Ms. Lee. Thank you.
And Mr. Costa, you said something earlier during the
hearing. You noted that during Winter Storm Fern the weather-
dependent sources failed to meet the moment. Tell us a little
bit more about that failure to meet the moment and what we
should be thinking about to ensure that we prevent that type of
situation in the future.
Mr. Costa. Well, thank you for the question. And I think it
has been said earlier today--and we agree--that all energy
sources have a place. But when it came to Winter Storm Fern, it
was evident that renewable sources weren't there. It was the
dispatchable fuels like natural gas, nuclear, and, in this
case, oil that really took the moment and ensured that we kept
the lights on.
Ms. Lee. And Mr. Mattison, Secretary Wright has argued that
a more levelized demand profile, where electricity demand is
kept stable throughout the day, could help reduce costs by
minimizing the need to ramp power plants up and down throughout
the day.
From an operator's perspective, could you explain how
policies that encourage more consistent electricity demand
might help reduce prices for consumers?
Mr. Mattison. Yes. Well, right now what we have is--I think
what he is talking about and you are referring to is when
there's peak demands it is usually between, in our service
territory, 1 p.m. and 7 p.m. Like, in the summertime or
wintertime, that is when the most consumption is. We have a
very good energy efficiency program in all three of our
jurisdictions to encourage a better use and utilization of the
energy dollar that a customer spends. That is that is one way.
Also making sure that you have a diversified mix in your
portfolio, I think, is important. You are not putting all your
eggs in one basket. So I look at our portfolio--and it is done
this way on purpose--where we have coal, we have natural gas,
we also have wind resources. And so at any point in time during
the day, one of those is going to be a little less expensive
than the other. So we use what is called economic dispatch
through our regional transmission organization, and I think
that is something that has proven to be very cost conscious for
our consumers and we need to continue with that.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Iowa's 1st
District for 5 minutes for questions.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member Castor, for holding this important hearing on
the lessons learned from recent Winter Storm Fern, which was
one of the few winter storms that did not affect Iowa to the
degree it affected the southeast.
But Winter Storm Fern showed us an uncomfortable truth
about our grid: This is not a picture of a confident, well-
planned system, it is a picture, as Mr. Robb has said, of a
system boxed in by infrastructure decisions made years ago.
Prolonged coal, high demand, and regional fuel constraints all
arrived at once, and in many ways the grid performed better
than in past events because of years of winterization and hard
lessons from Uri and Elliott.
The lesson from Fern is that we are asking more of the grid
in every region and increasingly relying on emergency tools and
extraordinary coordination to navigate conditions that are
becoming more common, not more rare. And at the same time, we
have layered on emergency orders, special directives, and broad
must-run orders that in some regions effectively overprocure
generation and crash prices. Those tools helped us through
Fern, but they are not a sustainable business model for a grid
that is about to serve even larger loads.
Data centers, advanced manufacturing, and electrification
on many levels of our economy are driving demand up quickly,
yet building the infrastructure to serve that demand--modern
gas plants and nuclear storage, new pipelines, transmission
lines, or any renewable source, which Iowa does have--takes
years longer than it should because technology--not because
technology is unproven, but because our permitting pathways are
slow, fragmented, and unpredictable.
When we fail to build, everyone in the system has less room
to maneuver when the weather turns. My aim today is to connect
those dots. If we want a grid that can meet historic load
growth without lurching from one emergency order to the next,
we need to reform permitting so that necessary projects can be
built on timelines that match the needs of households,
businesses, and critical institutions.
Mr. Robb, during Fern we saw heavy use of emergency
authorities and operator alerts. From your perspective, are we
beginning to normalize emergency actions because we have
underbuilt the system?
Mr. Robb. I certainly hope not, but I believe in the
situations that we found in Fern and will probably find in the
next two or three winters, we are probably going to have to
rely on those kinds of actions until we get the grid up to
scratch to deal with the situations on their own.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. And looking back at Winter Storm Fern,
if the projects currently stuck in interconnection queues and
permitting processes had been in service, how different would
the system's risk profile have been?
Mr. Robb. It would have been better, but I couldn't say by
how much.
You know, one of the issues we are seeing is that, even
when things clear the queue, the interconnection queue, it
still takes a long time for them to get built, and in many
cases they don't get built at all. And that is true for
projects that have strong State sponsorship as well. So the
interconnection queue is increasingly a hurdle, but it is not
sufficient to count on that generation showing up in a certain
timeframe.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. So it is difficult to quantify how much
of our near-miss problem is a build-out problem.
Mr. Robb. Yes. That was said much more eloquently.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Mr. Costa, you note that pipelines were
issuing customer-specific operational flow orders to generators
during Fern. Can you walk us through what those OFOs look like
in practice, who got curtailed first, how much notice they had,
and what that meant for gas-only generators versus dual-fuel
units in New England and New York?
Mr. Costa. Yes, there was constant--and thank you for the
question--and there was constant communication going on, and
that is part of the collaboration that took place during Winter
Storm Fern, especially with the pipelines, with the producers,
ISOs, all the way down to the generators. And their goal was to
ensure--to keep them on as long as they could without them
taking more than they should so it wouldn't hurt the home
heating customers.
It just got to a point where they ended up shutting down
the--especially the oil, the dual-fuel ones that can go on oil,
but unfortunately also the gas-only generators who could get
gas from Marcellus Shale if we put pipelines in the ground. We
are not able to get gas.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. There are so many questions we could
certainly ask about this, but in a State that has a myriad of
generation of electricity and power from numerous sources, and
having visited MISO, let me just ask you, Mr. Robb, as the FERC
representative. So when we have rules or legislation that is
taking generation offline without addressing the need for how
we are bringing generation online--and I am referring
specifically to Power Plan 2.0 under the past administration
and the tailpipe admission rule which is rapidly developing
electric vehicles--so we are taking energy offline and
increasing demand for energy, and that is even without data
centers and advanced manufacturing. How much stress does that
put on the grid?
Mr. Latta. Well and I am sorry----
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. And reliability.
Mr. Latta [continuing]. To say that the gentlelady time has
expired. But if you could answer written--in a written
statement back to the gentlelady, we would appreciate that.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado's 8th
District for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Evans. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member. Thank
you, of course, to all of the witnesses for coming today.
As my colleagues on this committee and my constituents back
in Colorado's 8th congressional district know, I am a strong
advocate for all-of-the-above energy because we have it all.
Four percent of U.S. crude comes out of my district, but we
also have one in two wind generators were made in my district,
some of the biggest solar projects, geothermal, battery, the
last vestiges of what used to be nuclear generation in
Colorado. So we need to have that because we know what the
statistics say: We are going to need more power on the grid. I
think it is 165 gigawatts more in the next 4 years than we
currently generate right now.
There is a right way to do wind and solar and variables.
And unfortunately, what the ruling Democrats in my home State
in Colorado have done is the absolute wrong way to do it, which
is one-size-fits-all, heavyhanded government mandates. They
have declared war on coal and oil and gas production in pursuit
of their truly unattainable net-zero goals. And as States
around the country have been investing in growing their
generation, Colorado has actually declined in how much
electricity they are producing. We made 2,000 gigawatt hours
less electricity last year than the year before that. And as we
all know, when the supply goes down, the costs go up.
And so my first question--this is just going to be a yes-no
question to the entire panel: Do State mandates that remove
dispatchable energy from generation portfolios build more
reliable and affordable grids or less reliable and affordable
grids?
So I guess yes is more reliable and no is it is less
reliable. So a yes-or-no question. We will just start at the
left.
Mr. Robb. I would say no.
Mr. Mattison. No.
Mr. Goggin. It depends on what you are replacing it with.
Mr. Costa. No.
Mr. Evans. Thank you. And Mr. Goggin, thank you for the
answer. I just want to point you to a previous quote that you
have, which is, ``a diverse generation mix increases
resilience,'' which I would assume includes oil, gas, coal?
Mr. Goggin. It depends on what you have already. If you
have a lot of that, then more diverse would be less of that.
You would be bringing in other things. It depends on what you
have.
Mr. Evans. So there is a place for oil, gas, and coal.
Mr. Goggin. It depends on what you have on your generation
mix. And if you have--you know, some places have----
Mr. Evans. So if you have----
Mr. Goggin [continuing]. Abundant hydro.
Mr. Evans. So there is a place for oil and gas and coal on
that generation mix.
Mr. Goggin. It depends on what resources you have.
Mr. Evans. 0K. Well, I think a diverse generation mix
includes oil, gas, and coal. So thank you for that.
To Mr. Robb: NERC's Long-Term Reliability Assessment
mentions the significant consequences of retiring fossil fuel
generation at a pace that energy providers and the supply chain
can't keep up with. In 2025 Colorado was responsible for
retiring 10 percent of the country's dispatchable baseload
power despite producing only 2 percent and, actually, as we
just heard, declining in producing 2 percent of the Nation's
power.
And so my question to you: What impact does the premature
retirement of coal plants and other baseload dispatchable
energy like natural gas--what does that have on electricity
costs for ratepayers?
Mr. Robb. So we don't do the economic analysis of what it
means for rates. So be clear on that. But it doesn't bode well
because we are replacing generally older depreciated assets and
bringing on, you know, high-fixed-cost assets at a time of
relatively high interest rates. So I can't do the math in terms
of--in my head as to whether it is higher or lower, but it is
certainly putting pressure on affordability.
Mr. Evans. What about reliability? Can you speak to
reliability?
Mr. Robb. I can definitely speak to reliability. The
benefits of having what I call spinning mass generation, stuff
that kind of generates power the old-fashioned way, from a
reliability perspective, based on the grid we have right now,
is absolutely essential. And one of the things that concerns us
about the retirements is that we are losing spinning mass
generation and we are replacing it with power electronic-based
generation that doesn't behave the same way.
Mr. Evans. Got it. That makes perfect sense to me because
of what we have seen happen in Colorado. Fortunately, we--I
have some statistics that I can mention about reliability.
The ruling Democrats in Colorado and their drive for this
net-zero variable-power-only is going to cost our State $61
billion. That is not my statistic. That is the Colorado Energy
Office's statistic. And we know that if utility providers have
to go funnel $61 billion into these failed policies, they can't
upgrade the grid, they can't invest in reliable generation.
We have seen the results in Colorado. Just this week we had
to do our fourth power shutoff because we don't have a reliable
grid in Colorado. Not the fault of the utilities. That is the
fault of the mandates coming from the ruling State Democrats.
And I am out of time, so I will yield back to the Chair.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much. The gentleman yields back
and the Chair, seeing no other Members wishing to ask
questions, I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before
us today.
And our Members may have additional questions for you, and
I remind Members that they have 10 business days to submit
additional questions for the record. And I ask the witnesses to
do your best to respond within 10 business days in receipt of
those questions.
I ask unanimous consent to insert in the record the
documents included on the staff hearings documents list.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Latta. And without objection, the subcommittee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
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