[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ARCTIC SECURITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBAL COM-
PETITION: SAFEGUARDING U.S. INTERESTS IN
FRIGID WATERS
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM AND
INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 26, 2026
__________
Serial No. 119-44
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
64-203 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Chair Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Eric Swalwell, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida J. Luis Correa, California
August Pfluger, Texas Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Nick LaLota, New York Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Member
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Gabe Evans, Colorado Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia
Brad Knott, North Carolina Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Vince Fong, California Al Green, Texas
Matt Van Epps, Tennessee
Keighle Joyce, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman
Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey,
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Ranking Member
Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Hannah Hagen, Subcommittee Staff Director
Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
August Pfluger, Texas, Chairman
Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island,
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Ranking Member
Gabe Evans, Colorado J. Luis Correa, California
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex Nellie Pou, New Jersey
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Natalie Hurst, Subcommittee Staff Director
Brittany Carr, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable LaMonica McIver, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable August Pfluger, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Ms. Heather A. Conley, Nonresident Senior Fellow, American
Enterprise Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Bryan Clark, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Defense
Concepts and Technology, Hudson Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Ms. Marisol Maddox, Senior Arctic Fellow, Institute of Arctic
Studies, Dartmouth College:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez for Heather A. Conley.. 39
Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Heather A. Conley..... 40
Questions From Honorable Matt Van Epps for Heather A. Conley..... 44
Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Bryan Clark........... 45
Questions From Honorable Matt Van Epps for Bryan Clark........... 46
ARCTIC SECURITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBAL COMPETITION: SAFEGUARDING U.S.
INTERESTS IN FRIGID WATERS
----------
Thursday, March 26, 2026
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Maritime Security, and the
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 3:35 p.m., in
room 360, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez
[Chairman of the Subcommittee of Transportation and Maritime
Security] presiding.
Present from the Subcommittee on Transportation and
Maritime Security: Representatives Gimenez, Crane, McIver, and
Kennedy.
Present from the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence: Representatives Pfluger and Pou.
Chairman Gimenez. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order. Without objection the Chair may declare the
committee in recess at any point. First of all, let me
apologize for being here so late and we were waiting for votes
to happen and you know, we don't run like, you know, like the
trains in Europe, I guess, are right on time. So we, we're in
the United States. We don't, we don't do that. But first of
all, again, apologize for everybody that's here and also the
witness, especially the witnesses for, you know, indulging us
for the 90 minutes. The purpose of today's hearing is to
examine the current readiness of U.S. arctic forces, evaluate
interagency capabilities and account for strategic investments
in Arctic security assets. I recognize myself for an opening
statement.
Good afternoon, everybody, and thank you to our witnesses
for joining us today. Today's hearing will focus on the
importance of Arctic security and the urgent need for the
United States to strengthen its presence, coordination, and
defense capabilities in this challenging yet vital region. The
Arctic, long considered a strategic frontier for the United
States, has become a competitive tundra with melting ice
opening new shipping routes and expansive new access to
critical minerals. Given these developments, Russia has stepped
up its Arctic posture. Despite its on-going war with Ukraine,
Russia has quietly expanded its military footprint in the High
North and reactivated its Cold War-era bases to deploy more
advanced air and missile defense systems and increase complex
naval operations across the region.
Over the years, Moscow has built up the world's largest
fleet of heavy icebreakers and increased investment in northern
ports, airfields, nuclear-powered vessels, and critical energy
infrastructure. This allows Russia to strengthen its projection
of maritime power and close in on critical maritime corridors
along the Northern Sea Route.
At the same time, China is positioning itself as a quote,
``near-Arctic State'' and steadily expanding its presence along
the region. Beijing has invested in Arctic infrastructure and
pursued what it claims to be scientific research, activities to
gain greater access to critical minerals and natural resources.
China is actively integrating the Arctic into its broader
global strategy, leveraging investments in dual-use
capabilities that could support future military and
intelligence-gathering activities.
These aggressive tactics by Russia and China demonstrate a
clear intent by two of our greatest adversaries to expand their
Arctic domain and put pressure on the United States. Meanwhile,
as our adversaries plot in the Arctic, the United States has
limited operations in the region. To support our national
security priorities we must re-engage as an Arctic nation and
harness the power of the High North. Last year, Congressional
Republicans bestowed the Coast Guard with unprecedented
resources through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act signed into
law by President Trump. This $25 billion investment, including
tens of billions directed toward the procurement of new ice
breaking, polar security, and national security, and Arctic
security cutters, gives the United States an unprecedented
opportunity to deploy the Coast Guard's Arctic assets and exert
greater dominance.
As such, the Coast Guard has commissioned the building of a
new medium polar icebreaker called Storis in addition to its
one medium icebreaker, the Healy. The Coast Guard's only
operational heavy icebreaker, the Polar Star, just completed
its 29th Antarctic tour despite being long past its intended
service life. This widening gap in U.S. Arctic capability is
unacceptable and the United States cannot afford to fall behind
Russia and China. We must implement this historic investment
expeditiously to expand U.S. presence, capability, and
commitment to Arctic security.
For years, the Coast Guard has been plagued by delays, cost
overruns and contract mismanagement, and this subcommittee has
sounded the alarm. These are not just acquisition challenges,
they are growing national security vulnerabilities. While these
investments act as a down payment on Coast Guard readiness,
Congress must also consider future opportunities and challenges
on the frozen frontier, including through improving
international partnerships and hardening our intelligence-
gathering methods to improve our Arctic strategy on all fronts.
We must recognize that the Arctic is a challenging but
promising frontier and the competition to dominate it is
increasing day by day.
The Trump administration is appropriately considering how
to leverage strategic vantage points such as Greenland to
improve U.S. military readiness in the Arctic. Today we should
explore those opportunities and examine why the Arctic matters,
where the U.S. stands with our Arctic allies, and what must be
done to prepare and protect our interests. Thank you again to
our witnesses for appearing in today's hearing and I look
forward to your testimony.
[The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]
Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez
Good afternoon, everybody, and thank you to our witnesses for
joining us today. Today's hearing will focus on the importance of
Arctic security and the urgent need for the United States to strengthen
its presence, coordination, and defense capabilities in this
challenging yet vital region. The Arctic, long considered a strategic
frontier for the United States, has become a competitive tundra with
melting ice opening new shipping routes and expansive new access to
critical minerals. Given these developments, Russia has stepped up its
Arctic posture. Despite its on-going war with Ukraine, Russia has
quietly expanded its military footprint in the High North and
reactivated its Cold War-era bases to deploy more advanced air and
missile defense systems and increase complex naval operations across
the region.
Over the years, Moscow has built up the world's largest fleet of
heavy icebreakers and increased investment in northern ports,
airfields, nuclear-powered vessels, and critical energy infrastructure.
This allows Russia to strengthen its projection of maritime power and
close in on critical maritime corridors along the Northern Sea Route.
At the same time, China is positioning itself as a quote, ``near-
Arctic State'' and steadily expanding its presence along the region.
Beijing has invested in Arctic infrastructure and pursued what it
claims to be scientific research, activities to gain greater access to
critical minerals and natural resources. China is actively integrating
the Arctic into its broader global strategy, leveraging investments in
dual-use capabilities that could support future military and
intelligence-gathering activities.
These aggressive tactics by Russia and China demonstrate a clear
intent by two of our greatest adversaries to expand their Arctic domain
and put pressure on the United States. Meanwhile, as our adversaries
plot in the Arctic, the United States has limited operations in the
region. To support our national security priorities we must reengage as
an Arctic nation and harness the power of the High North. Last year,
Congressional Republicans bestowed the Coast Guard with unprecedented
resources through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act signed into law by
President Trump. This $25 billion investment, including tens of
billions directed toward the procurement of new ice breaking, polar
security, and national security, and Arctic security cutters, gives the
United States an unprecedented opportunity to deploy the Coast Guard's
Arctic assets and exert greater dominance.
As such, the Coast Guard has commissioned the building of a new
medium polar icebreaker called Storis in addition to its one medium
icebreaker, the Healy. The Coast Guard's only operational heavy
icebreaker, the Polar Star, just completed its 29th Antarctic tour
despite being long past its intended service life. This widening gap in
U.S. Arctic capability is unacceptable and the United States cannot
afford to fall behind Russia and China. We must implement this historic
investment expeditiously to expand U.S. presence, capability, and
commitment to Arctic security.
For years, the Coast Guard has been plagued by delays, cost
overruns and contract mismanagement, and this subcommittee has sounded
the alarm. These are not just acquisition challenges, they are growing
national security vulnerabilities. While these investments act as a
down payment on Coast Guard readiness, Congress must also consider
future opportunities and challenges on the frozen frontier, including
through improving international partnerships and hardening our
intelligence-gathering methods to improve our Arctic strategy on all
fronts. We must recognize that the Arctic is a challenging but
promising frontier and the competition to dominate it is increasing day
by day.
The Trump administration is appropriately considering how to
leverage strategic vantage points such as Greenland to improve U.S.
military readiness in the Arctic. Today we should explore those
opportunities and examine why the Arctic matters, where the United
States stands with our Arctic allies, and what must be done to prepare
and protect our interests. Thank you again to our witnesses for
appearing in today's hearing and I look forward to your testimony. I
now recognize a Ranking Member, McIver, the gentlewoman from New
Jersey, to deliver her opening statements.
Chairman Gimenez. I now recognize a Ranking Member, McIver,
the gentlewoman from New Jersey, to deliver her opening
statements.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you, Chair. Good afternoon and thank you
to our witnesses for being here today and for your patience.
The Arctic is no longer a remote or frozen frontier. It is
rapidly emerging as a central arena of geopolitical
competition, economic activity, and national security risk. As
sea ice recedes and access to the region increases, so too does
the urgency for the United States to define and defend its role
in the Arctic.
Russia has significantly expanded its military footprint
and China is actively attempting to position itself as a global
Arctic stakeholder. The reality is simple. The Arctic is
becoming more contested, more accessible, and more significant
to our national security. Unfortunately, at the very moment
when strategic focus and coordination are most needed, the
United States is falling behind. We are operating with limited
icebreaking capacity, underdeveloped infrastructure, and
significant gaps in domain awareness. The Coast Guard, which
serves as the primary Federal presence in the Arctic, continues
to face workforce strain, aging assets, and increasing mission
demands. This is not suitable.
We cannot expect the Coast Guard to carry out complex and
expanding missions in one of the most challenging environments
on Earth without the tools, personnel, and resources necessary
to do so. But capability gaps are only part of the problem. Our
strength in the Arctic has always depended not just on our
presence, but on partnership. Cooperation with allies like
Canada and our border Arctic partners is essential to
maintaining a stable and secure region. Yet recent actions by
Trump and his administration have placed unnecessary strain on
those relationships at a time when unity is critical.
Trump has threatened to invade Greenland, an insane
proposition that has angered and made our NATO allies very
weary. Trump has launched a reckless, illegal war in Iran
without attempting to build support among NATO allies, only to
then call upon those allies to place their service members in
harm's way to assist the United States. These actions have
increased terrorist threats to the homeland and our allies,
generated a growing energy crisis, and emboldened our
adversaries around the globe, including the Arctic.
When we undermine trust with our closest partners, we do
not strengthen our position, we weaken it. The United States
cannot lead in the Arctic alone, and we cannot afford to create
conditions where our allies question our trustworthiness. When
we fail to lead with clarity, purpose, and credibility, we risk
ceding influence in a region that is increasingly vital to our
national security and economic future. I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses today on how we can close these
gaps, strengthen our partnerships, and ensure that the United
States is prepared to meet the challenges of a rapidly-changing
Arctic. With that, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member McIver follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member LaMonica McIver
March 26, 2026
The Arctic is no longer a remote or frozen frontier. It is rapidly
emerging as a central arena of geopolitical competition, economic
activity, and national security risk. As sea ice recedes and access to
the region increases, so too does the urgency for the United States to
define and defend its role in the Arctic. Russia has significantly
expanded its military footprint, and China is actively attempting to
position itself as a global Arctic stakeholder.
The reality is simple: the Arctic is becoming more contested, more
accessible, and more consequential to our national security.
Unfortunately, at the very moment when strategic focus and coordination
are most needed, the United States is falling behind. We are operating
with limited icebreaking capacity, underdeveloped infrastructure, and
significant gaps in domain awareness. The Coast Guard, which serves as
the primary Federal presence in the Arctic, continues to face workforce
strain, aging assets, and increasing mission demands. This is not
sustainable. We cannot expect the Coast Guard to carry out complex and
expanding missions in one of the most challenging environments on Earth
without the tools, personnel, and resources necessary to do so. But
capability gaps are only part of the problem.
Our strength in the Arctic has always depended not just on
presence, but on partnership. Cooperation with allies like Canada and
our broader Arctic partners is essential to maintaining a stable and
secure region. Yet recent actions by President Trump and his
administration have placed unnecessary strain on those relationships at
a time when unity is critical. President Trump has threatened to invade
Greenland, an insane proposition that has angered and bewildered our
NATO allies.
And Trump has launched a reckless, illegal war in Iran without
attempting to build support among NATO allies--only to then call upon
those allies to place their service members in harm's way to assist the
United States.
These actions have increased terrorist threats to the homeland and
our allies, generated a growing energy crisis, and emboldened our
adversaries around the globe--including in the Arctic. When we
undermine trust with our closest partners, we do not strengthen our
position. We weaken it.
Let me be clear: the United States cannot lead in the Arctic alone.
And we cannot afford to create conditions where our allies question our
reliability and trustworthiness. When we fail to lead with clarity,
purpose, and credibility, we risk ceding influence in a region that is
increasingly vital to our national security and economic future. I look
forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how we can close these
gaps, strengthen our partnerships, and ensure that the United States is
prepared to meet the challenges of a rapidly-changing Arctic.
Chairman Gimenez. I want to thank the Ranking Member, and I
recognize Chairman Pfluger, the gentleman from Texas, and the
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence to deliver his opening statements.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, our apologies
for holding up this hearing today. Thank you for your patience
and for being here, and especially as we consider the security
of the Arctic, the newest frontier, I think, for great power
competition.
The witnesses that we have here with us this afternoon each
bring a deep knowledge of the Arctic and the operating
environment and our readiness to confront emerging threats. I'm
grateful to them and to Chairman Gimenez for bringing this
forum together. Until recently, the Arctic was really only a
peripheral place in our strategic guidance, and understandably
so. But limited navigability constrained our access to its sea
lanes. With NORAD, established at the height of the Cold War,
North America air space remained well-protected. Arctic
security at that time was largely unquestioned.
Today, however, the strategic landscape has shifted
dramatically. New sea lanes and rapid advances in military
capabilities have expanded the region's operational
significance. While our capacity to detect, monitor, and
mitigate these threats has really largely stayed the same. This
widening gap demands a renewed and more deliberate approach to
that security, it can no longer be viewed as a safe haven or a
peripheral theater. Complacency severely reduces our
competitive advantage. ODNI's annual threat assessment,
released just last week, underscores the ambitions of our
adversaries. They assess that Russia seeks to leverage its
Arctic presence as a pillar of its broader efforts to reshape
the global balance of power, relying on persistent military
activity and assured access to the region's natural resources.
China, for its part, continues to pursue dual-use scientific
and commercial investments that could advance its own strategic
aims.
The challenge for the United States now is to ensure that
we can detect and defeat threats to the homeland in a way that
keeps pace with the environment and the tools that adversaries
are using. Aside from sustained investments in polar-capable
ships and aircraft, vulnerabilities below the surface,
especially surrounding subsea cable infrastructure, should
inform our posture to prevent any actor from being able to
exploit or disrupt everyday service used by Americans. Like the
Arctic itself, the space domain presents new challenges and
opportunities. As ground-based assets start to wear and provide
a soft target for our adversaries, space-based assets can help
complete our operational picture and enhance our defense
posture.
But beyond physical assets, we must ensure the U.S.
security interests in the Arctic are not a casualty
interagency--are not a casualty of interagency silos. The
intelligence community, the Department of Homeland Security and
Department of War, and many of our NATO allies are all Arctic
stakeholders. A spirit of partnership and cohesive information
sharing should characterize this security. Relationships do
serve as force multipliers, and if that's not the case now,
then our job as policy makers are to engage the experts and
create the needed efficiencies.
As this committee knows well, threats to our interest in
our homeland are pervasive, and it's through dedication of the
service members, the skill of our intelligence analysts, and a
consistency in our homeland workforce that we remain proactive
and agile in confronting these threats. Today's Arctic may
remain a forum for great power competition for the foreseeable
future, but we have a small window of opportunity to prevent it
from becoming exploited and weaponized by bad actors. With
that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Chairman Pfluger follows:]
Statement of Chairman August Pfluger
Thank you all for being here today as we consider the security of
our Arctic homeland--the newest frontier for great power competition.
The witnesses we have with us this afternoon each bring with them
deep knowledge of the Arctic operating environment and our readiness to
confront emerging threats there. I'm grateful to them, and to Chairman
Gimenez, for holding this hearing, and I'm hopeful that we all leave
this conversation with a clearer understanding of the path forward in
this strategically vital region.
Until recently, the Arctic was only a peripheral place in our
strategic guidance--and understandably so. Limited navigability
constrained our access to its sea lanes, and with NORAD established at
the height of the Cold War, North American air space remained well-
protected. Arctic security, at the time, was largely unquestioned.
Today, however, the strategic landscape has shifted dramatically.
New sea lanes and rapid advances in military capabilities have expanded
the region's operational significance, while our capacity to detect,
monitor, and mitigate threats has largely stayed the same. This
widening gap demands a renewed and more deliberate approach to Arctic
security.
The Arctic can no longer be viewed as a safe haven or a peripheral
theater. Complacency in our posture risks diminishing our comparative
advantage.
ODNI's Annual Threat Assessment, released just last week,
underscores the ambitions of our adversaries. ODNI assesses that Russia
seeks to leverage its Arctic presence as a pillar of its broader
efforts to reshape the global balance of power--relying on persistent
military activity and assured access to the region's natural resources.
China, for its part, continues to pursue dual-use scientific and
commercial investments that could advance its strategic aims.
The challenge for the United States now is to ensure that we can
detect and defeat threats to the homeland in a way that keeps pace with
the environment and the new tools at our adversaries' disposal.
As it relates to the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S.
Coast Guard will continue to be an essential piece of our collective
efforts in the Arctic. Last summer, Republicans provided the Coast
Guard with billions of dollars through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act
to improve the force's capabilities, including funding for Polar
Security Cutters and Arctic Security Cutters capable of operating in
this dynamic region.
Aside from sustained investments in polar-capable ships and
aircraft, vulnerabilities below the Arctic surface--especially
surrounding subsea cable infrastructure--should also inform our
posture, preparing us to prevent any actor from being able to exploit
or disrupt everyday services used by Americans.
Like the Arctic itself, the space domain presents new challenges
and opportunities. As ground-based assets start to age and provide a
soft target for our adversaries, space-based assets can help to
complete our operational picture and enhance our defense posture.
But beyond physical assets, we must also ensure that U.S. security
interests in the Arctic are not a casualty of interagency siloes. The
intelligence community, the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of War, and many of our NATO allies are all Arctic
stakeholders. A spirit of partnership and cohesive information sharing
should characterize Arctic security. Relationships should serve as
force multipliers. If that's not the case now, then it is our job as
policy makers to engage the experts, evaluate the problems, and create
the needed efficiencies.
As this committee knows well, threats to our interests and our
homeland are pervasive. It is through the dedication of our service
members, the skill of our intelligence analysts, and professionalism of
our homeland security workforce that we can consistently remain
proactive and agile in confronting those threats.
Today's Arctic may remain an arena for great power competition for
the foreseeable future--but we have a window of opportunity to prevent
it from being exploited and weaponized by bad actors.
Thank you again to our witnesses for being here, and I look forward
to the conversation that we're about to have.
Chairman Gimenez. I want to thank the Chairman Pfluger for
your opening statements. Other Members of the committee are
reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. Ms.
Heather Conley is a non-resident senior fellow at the American
Enterprise Institute, where she focuses on transatlantic
security, Europe, Eurasia, and Arctic geopolitics. She
previously served as president of the German Marshall Fund of
the United States and held senior leadership roles at the
center for Strategic and International Studies. Earlier in her
career, she worked at the U.S. State Department, including as
deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian
affairs. She is widely recognized as an expert on security
policy regarding Russia, Europe, and NATO security.
Mr. Bryan Clark is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute,
serving as the director of its Center for Defense Concepts and
Technology, specializing in naval operations and autonomous
systems. He was also previously a senior fellow at the Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, leading studies for
the Department of War on emerging technologies. Before that,
Mr. Clark served in the U.S. Navy, including as special
assistant to the chief of naval operations and in strategic
planning roles, with experience as both an officer and
submariner.
Ms. Marisol Maddox is a senior arctic fellow at the
Institute of Arctic Studies at Dartmouth College, where her
work focuses on geopolitics in the Arctic. Through her
research, Ms. Maddox assessed how emerging threats and
strategic competition in the Arctic intersect with national and
international security. Previously, she taught Arctic security
at institutions such as the Ted Stevens center for Arctic
Security Studies and was an adjunct professor at Syracuse
University's Maxwell School.
I would like to thank all of the witness for being here
today. Pursuant to committee rule VII(C), I ask that the
witness please rise and raise their right hand. Do you solemnly
swear that the testimony that you will give before the
Committee on Homeland Security of the U.S. House of
Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God? Let the record reflect that the
witnesses have answered in the affirmative. Thank you so much
and please be seated.
[Witnesses sworn.]
I now recognize Ms. Conley for 5 minutes to summarize her
opening statements.
STATEMENT OF HEATHER A. CONLEY, NON-RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW,
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Ms. Conley. Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Pfluger, Ranking
Member McIver, thank you. This was very worth the wait, so we
appreciate your time. Thank you for convening this hearing,
despite the many serious and pressing priorities this committee
currently addresses. However, if we do not maintain a sustained
focus on strengthening America's Arctic security, we will have
failed in our duty to protect the United States.
I would just like to offer 3 observations, and I look
forward to your questions and comments. First, I believe it's
extremely important to acknowledge a significant shift in
policy by the United States. The United States has moved away
from its post-Cold War concept of a circumpolar Arctic that is
a separate and distant region where long-term security
challenges and new economic opportunities are managed cheaply
and from a distance. We have recentered that the Arctic region
within Homeland Defense and as part of an integrated defense
strategy of the Western Hemisphere.
The on-going modernization of our Arctic-based missile
defense architecture, as well as developing a persistent
presence in the maritime Arctic with overdue investments in our
icebreaker fleet are critical components of this shift. In
response, our Arctic allies have also shifted their policies to
one of homeland security. Canada has committed U.S. $29 billion
to substantially increase its military force presence across
the Canadian Arctic. The Kingdom of Denmark has committed over
$6 billion in 2 new agreements to improve Arctic security in
Greenland. After much delay, NATO has now embraced a more
active deterrence and defense role in the Arctic. It is an
important first step.
But I also want to acknowledge this shift came at a cost of
the loss of trust between our NATO allies. But the response of
our NATO allies is important as the United States will be
unable to secure and defend the homeland effectively from the
north without the strong cooperation and integration and
coordination with our Arctic allies. The Arctic, the ice pack,
the new allied defense procurement model to help us develop
those Arctic security colors are really a leadership model to
rapidly develop interoperable platforms to strengthen allied
defense and deterrence.
This is why I believe that we need to create an allied
Arctic shield, working closely together with our 6 NATO Arctic
allies and those who wish to be part of that shield. We do this
because Russia and China are advancing their interest in the
Arctic. Your opening statements framed this perfectly.
I'm particularly concerned about China's scientific and
economic activity that's focusing on the future biodiversity
and fishing opportunities of the Central Arctic Ocean, the
testing of future shipping routes in the high sea area and
seabed mining. We need to make sure we have a persistent
presence to ensure that that in no way hinders freedom of
navigation for the United States.
Combined, Russia and China are certainly solidifying their
military, their joint military operations, specifically in the
Pacific Arctic. We've seen that increase over the last several
years. Just as of August 2025, there were 5 joint maritime
patrols between Russia and China. They've had a joint bomber
patrol entering the Alaskan Air Defense identification zone. In
2024. It was the first time that both aircrafts were detected
simultaneously in our ADIZ.
So the challenge is great. We have a new approach and now
it's time to shift our policy and rethink our organizational
structure. U.S. Arctic Policy as homeland defense requires a
very different, a high-level and purpose-driven strategic
coordination effort at the highest levels of government, the
Department of Homeland Security, the Pentagon, the Interior and
the Energy Departments, as well as the State of Alaska. The
private sector also must be meaningfully engaged to develop
dual-use infrastructure and build greater resiliency to Russian
and Chinese military and hybrid tactics.
This new coordination effort will likely require new
command-and-control arrangements for the U.S. military, as well
as new lines of civilian authority. For example, this new,
wonderful icebreaker fleet must be integrated into an
overarching new national defense strategy. It is critical that
America's Arctic science agenda is fully integrated into this
national strategy, as science is the underlying foundation for
all future activities in the Arctic, particularly the sea floor
and the high seas area. With this new policy approach, with an
Arctic allied shield and a new organizational structure, I
believe the United States will be well-prepared to enhance
Arctic security. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Conley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Heather A. Conley
Thursday, March 26, 2026
Chairmans Pfluger and Gimenez, Ranking Members Magaziner and
McIver, thank you for holding this joint hearing to better understand
the long-term Arctic threat picture. Understanding this threat can
ensure that the United States, in close cooperation with its Arctic
allies, can protect and defend the northern flank of our homeland and
its two Arctic avenues of approach via the Pacific and the Atlantic.
Changes in the Arctic Great Powers.--There are 3 Arctic great
powers: The United States along with its NATO allies, Russia, and
China, which aspires to be a great polar power by 2030. Over the past
14 months, the United States has significantly shifted its Arctic
policies and its security posture. This has, in turn, dramatically
shifted the Arctic security stances of Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark,
and NATO. As the international system accelerates its transition from
the post-1945 order, sovereignty and maritime access will be
increasingly challenged by the great powers as they compete for
increased access and control across the Arctic region.
Arctic America. The United States has moved away from its post-Cold
War concept of the circumpolar Arctic as a separate and distant region
where long-term security challenges and new economic opportunities are
managed cheaply. Washington has returned ``home'' to the Arctic as it
centers the region within homeland defense as part of an integrated
defense strategy for the Western Hemisphere. The United States has
prioritized modernizing its Arctic-based missile defense architecture
and begun to develop a persistent presence in the maritime Arctic with
long-overdue investments in its icebreaker fleet. The most notable step
in this direction is the construction of up to 11 Arctic Security
Cutters in cooperation with Canada and Finland through the Icebreaker
Collaborative Effort (ICE Pact), with the first deliveries scheduled
for 2028.\1\ In addition to the Arctic Security Cutters to be built
through ICE Pact, 3 heavy Polar Security Cutter icebreakers will
replace the only aging heavy icebreaker in the U.S. inventory and
ensure access thick year-round ice in the Arctic and Antarctica, with
the first vessel anticipated to be completed by 2030.\2\ This
forthcoming icebreaker fleet must play a vital role in detecting and
deterring Arctic threats, protecting America's territorial waters and
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and ensuring Freedom of Navigation in
increasingly ice-free waters in the high seas area of the Central
Arctic Ocean (CAO). However, today, the integrated mission for these
new security cutters is unclear. It is important to note that an
icebreaker alone does not provide Arctic security--it is a tool to
detect, deter, and defend sovereignty and freedom of navigation when
required while being able to conduct a range of activities to advance
American interests. America's new icebreaking fleet must be accompanied
by a suite of Arctic capabilities that are able to develop a common
operating picture with our Arctic allies through data integration of
seafloor sensors, polar orbital and navigational satellites, as well as
autonomous systems. These capabilities must be accompanied by new dual-
use infrastructure and operating bases to increase the American and
allied physical presence in the Arctic. The Trump administration has
persuasively outlined this wider suite of Arctic capabilities in
America's Maritime Action Plan's Arctic Waterways Security Strategy,
yet it is unclear what (and from where) new budgetary resources will be
identified to implement this waterways strategy and who will ensure its
implementation.
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\1\ United States Coast Guard News, ``U.S. Coast Guard completes
the President's contract awards for 11 Arctic Security Cutters.''
February 11, 2026: https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/
4403354/us-coast-guard-completes-the-presidents-contract-awards-for-11-
arctic-security/.
\2\ Mike Schuler, ``Bollinger Shipyards Secures Full Funding for
Troubled Polar Security Cutter Program.'' gCaptain. August 5, 2025:
https://gcaptain.com/bollinger-shipyards-secures-full-funding-for-
troubled-polar-security-cutter-program/.
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America's Arctic allies have responded to this shift in America's
Arctic strategy, specifically motivated by President Trump's challenge
to the sovereignty of America's Arctic neighbors, Canada and the
Kingdom of Denmark. In response, Canada has committed $29 billion (USD)
to substantially increase its military force presence across the
Canadian Arctic. This includes the establishment of 3 Forward Operating
Locations (FOLs) in the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, upgrading
and modernizing Arctic airports, and connecting the territory of
Nunavut with Canada's national highway system.\3\ Ottawa has made
overdue investments in upgrading NORAD early warning capabilities,
pledging $28 billion (USD) for the Arctic-Over-the-Horizon radar
project.\4\ To enhance domain awareness in its distant northern
regions, Canada has also announced plans to strengthen the Canadian
Forces military satellite communications capabilities.\5\ As a partner
alongside Finland and the United States in ICE Pact, Canadian
shipbuilder Seaspan Shipyards will provide the design specifications
for the our Arctic Security Cutters that are to be built in Finland,
Houma, Louisiana,\6\ and Galveston, Texas.\7\ Canada has also recently
completed a class of 6 Arctic and offshore patrol ships, further
enhancing Ottawa's ability to police its territorial waters.\8\ Canada
and the 5 Nordic countries (Arctic 6) have recently participated in a
first of its kind summit in Oslo, Norway where they have announced new
defense industrial partnerships.\9\
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\3\ Prime Minister of Canada, ``Prime Minister Carney announces
ambitious new plan to defend, build, and transform the North.'' March
12, 2026: https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2026/03/12/prime-
minister-carney-announces-ambitious-new-plan-defend-build-and.
\4\ Government of Canada, ``National Defence announces progress on
the Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar project.'' July 17, 2025: https://
www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2025/07/national-
defence-announces-progress-on-the-arctic-over-the-horizon-radar-
project.html.
\5\ Government of Canada, ``Government of Canada announces
strategic partnership to strengthen military communications in the
Arctic.'' December 9, 2025: https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services-
procurement/news/2025/12/government-of-canada-announces-strategic-
partnership-to-strengthen-military-communications-in-the-arctic.html.
\6\ Mike Schuler, ``Canadian Icebreaker Design Picked for U.S.
Coast Guard Arctic Security Cutters.'' gCaptain. January 7, 2026:
https://gcaptain.com/canadian-icebreaker-design-picked-for-u-s-coast-
guard-arctic-security-cutters/.
\7\ Mike Schuler, ``U.S. Coast Guard Awards Arctic Security Cutter
Contracts to Davie Defense, Closing Out 11-Ship Program.'' gCaptain.
February 11, 2026: https://gcaptain.com/u-s-coast-guard-awards-arctic-
security-cutter-contracts-to-davie-defense-closing-out-11-ship-
program/.
\8\ Naval News, ``Canada Launches Sixth and Final Arctic and
Offshore Patrol Ship.'' November 12, 2024: https://www.navalnews.com/
naval-news/2024/12/canada-launches-sixth-and-final-arctic-and-offshore-
patrol-ship/.
\9\ Prime Minister of Canada, ``Prime Minister Carney deepens
cooperation with Nordic countries in defence, Arctic security, and
critical minerals.'' March 16, 2026: https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-
releases/2026/03/15/prime-minister-carney-deepens-cooperation-nordic-
countries-defence.
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The Kingdom of Denmark has committed over $6 billion \10\ dollars
in 2 agreements,\11\ to improve Arctic security in Greenland. This new
funding includes the addition of 3 Arctic patrol vessels, long-range
drones, additional funding for coastal radars, and the establishment of
a new Joint Arctic Command Headquarters in Nuuk with a new military
unit affiliated with the command to be stationed in Greenland. For well
over a decade, the United Kingdom has taken a leadership role in the
defense and security of Northern Europe through its Joint Expeditionary
Forces (JEF), collaborating with Norway on the purchase of
interoperable anti-submarine warfare frigates \12\ and taking a leading
role in responding to threats to underseas cables.\13\ The United
Kingdom has announced it will deploy forces from the Royal Marines to
northern Norway.\14\
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\10\ Danish Ministry of Defence, ``First agreement on the Arctic
and North Atlantic,'' https://www.fmn.dk/globalassets/fmn/dokumenter/-
fact-sheet-first-agreement-on-the-arctic-and-north-atlantic-.pdf.
\11\ Danish Ministry of Defence, ``The Second Agreement on the
Arctic and North Atlantic strengthens the operational effectiveness of
the Danish Armed Forces with new acquisitions totalling DKK 27.4
billion.'' October 10, 2025: https://www.fmn.dk/en/news/2025/the-
second-agreement-on-the-arctic-and-north-atlantic-strengthens-the-
operational-effectiveness-of-the-danish-armed-forces-with-new-
acquisitions-totalling-dkk-27.4-billion.
\12\ Fatima Bahtic, ``UK and Norway sign major defense deal,
establish interchangeable Type 26 fleet.'' Naval Today. December 5,
2025: https://www.navaltoday.com/2025/12/05/uk-and-norway-sign-major-
defense-deal-establish-interchangeable-type-26-fleet/.
\13\ Tinshui Yeung, ``UK and Norway form naval alliance to hunt
Russian submarines.'' BBC. December 4, 2025: https://www.bbc.com/news/
articles/c3v152ep9l0o.
\14\ Clara Bullock, ``Marines arrive in Norway as part of new
agreement.'' BBC. January 26, 2026: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/
cgl8ddy18yno.
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After much delay, NATO has embraced a more active Arctic deterrence
and defensive role. Pressed into action by the transatlantic crisis
over Greenland, NATO has increased defenses of Greenland under the
umbrella of the Arctic Sentry mission and the Arctic Endurance exercise
by committing additional air, sea, and ground assets.\15\ NATO has also
developed a permanent NATO presence through a Forward Land Forces (FLF)
Multinational Staff Element (MNSE) in Rovaniemi, Finland. Sweden is the
lead nation in NATO's enhanced forward presence in Finland.\16\ Finland
and Norway this month hosted land, sea, and air exercises involving
32,500 participants from the United States and 13 other allied nations
for NATO's Cold Response 26 exercises.\17\
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\15\ Danish Defence, ``Arctic Endurance continues throughout
2026.'' January 23, 2026: https://www.forsvaret.dk/en/news/2026/arctic-
endurance-fortsatter-i-hele-2026/.
\16\ NATO, ``Strengthening NATO's eastern flank.'' October 23,
2025: https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/
strengthening-natos-eastern-flank.
\17\ Dzirhan Mahadzir, ``NATO Forces Wrap Arctic Warfare Cold
Response 26 Drills.'' USNI News. March 19, 2026: https://news.usni.org/
2026/03/19/nato-forces-wrap-arctic-warfare-cold-response-26-drills.
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American and allied Arctic security investments are long overdue
and very welcome. NATO's role will be particularly important as Arctic
allies implement their regional defense plans, exercise cold-weather
fighter capabilities and work on greater interoperability and a common
operating picture. ICE Pact is a new allied defense procurement model
which not only benefits all 3 countries' shipyards but produces more
rapidly interoperable platforms to strengthen allied deterrence and
defense. However, to optimize collective defense and deterrence in the
Arctic, it is vital that the 7 NATO allies and the United Kingdom
integrate their new Arctic capabilities to create an Allied Arctic
shield.
Sino-Russian Pursuits in the Arctic. Russia is an undisputed
superpower in the Arctic with its nuclear deterrent housed above the
Arctic Circle on the Kola Peninsula and its long-term economic
ambitions in the region. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
February 2022, Russia's elite Arctic special forces have sustained
significant losses following deployments to Ukraine but it continues to
modernize its Borei- and Yasen-class strategic nuclear submarines as
well as enhance its hypersonic missile and autonomous capabilities,
such as the Zircon cruise missile and Oreshnik ballistic missile (used
twice in Ukraine, with a range of 3,500 miles.) These systems, designed
to evade U.S. missile defenses, are tested in and fired from the
Arctic. Russia's re-deployment of its deep-sea nuclear-powered
submarine, the Losharik, designed for special intelligence missions, is
capable of cutting transatlantic undersea cables or launching
devastating weapons. Moscow's advanced hybrid warfare capabilities will
also shape the future Arctic landscape. Russia's use of aerial and
underwater drones, accelerated adaptation, production and electronic
jamming capabilities are and will continue to be used against NATO
Arctic bases and allied capabilities. We see these tactics revealed in
the cutting of undersea cables, suspicious drone activity near civilian
airports and NATO bases, economic coercion to sponsor arson attacks,
and other sabotage campaigns.
Through its ``unlimited'' partnership with China, Russia has
facilitated the PRC's increased access to the Arctic as it advances its
dual-use economic and scientific presence. China's focus in the Arctic
centers on resource extraction, maritime infrastructure development,
satellite communications and military and coast guard cooperation that
include joint exercises and patrols between the Russian Federal
Security Services and the China Coast Guard along the Northern Sea
Route (NSR) and on the high seas. The PRC is also increasing its Arctic
satellite tracking and monitoring capabilities with a recently
established ground station near Avacha Bay in the Russian Far East, co-
located with a Russian submarine base which also serves as an access
point to the NSR. Rosatom, which operates Russia's icebreaker fleet,
increasingly relies on Chinese satellite data to facilitate navigation
and ice forecasts along the NSR.
Chinese scientific and economic activity prioritizes the future
biodiversity and fishing opportunities of the Central Arctic Ocean and
the testing of future shipping routes in the Central Arctic high seas
area. Its icebreakers are able to penetrate the deepest reaches of the
Central Arctic and Pacific Arctic. In an unprecedented display of its
growing Arctic capabilities, in the summer of 2025, 5 Chinese
icebreakers were present in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, in some
instances only 200 miles off the Alaskan coast.\18\ Beijing's Arctic
scientific research is concentrated around the Chukchi Borderland, a
region that extends northward from Alaska's Beaufort and Chukchi Shelf
into the deep Arctic Ocean. This is likely to advance the PRC's
knowledge of the Arctic seabed for future submarine activity and
fisheries. The PRC has also focused its scientific research on the
Atlantic Arctic seabed, specifically near the Gakkel and mid-Atlantic
Ridges, where its manned submersibles have probed the seafloor and
could be applied to future sonar detection systems to detect American
submarines and undersea cables as well as exploit future seabed mining
and fisheries. Chinese science drives the underlying data that will
shape future Arctic governance through multilateral mechanisms such as
the High Seas Treaty and the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement
(CAOFA).
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\18\ James Brooks, ``U.S. Coast Guard intercepts two Chinese
research ships in disputed portions of the Arctic Ocean.'' Alaska
Beacon. September 5, 2025: https://alaskabeacon.com/2025/09/05/u-s-
coast-guard-intercepts-two-chinese-research-ships-in-disputed-portions-
of-the-arctic-ocean/.
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The threat from Russia and China in the Arctic, separately and
combined, is real and it is growing, particularly in the Pacific
Arctic. Russia and China have conducted 10 joint air patrols since 2019
(as of December 2025)\19\ and 5 joint maritime patrols (as of August
2025.)\20\ The tempo and scope of these patrols have increased, with a
joint bomber patrol entering the Alaskan Air Defense Identification
Zone (ADIZ) in 2024, the first time that both countries' aircraft were
detected simultaneously entering the ADIZ.\21\ The NSR is increasingly
becoming a preferred route for Russia's sanctioned shadow fleet and a
new diversified source of liquid natural gas (LNG) for China,
originating from Russia's LNG facilities located on the far northern
Yamal Peninsula. China began receiving LNG shipments from the
sanctioned Arctic LNG-2 project in the summer of 2025 and has steadily
increased the rate of delivery.\22\ Already 8 LNG shipments Arctic LNG-
2 have been delivered to China this year alone.\23\ Since 2023, the
Russian government has given Beijing extensive access to Russia's
largest Far East port of Vladivostok as it becomes a transit hub for
Chinese goods that will traverse the narrow Bering Strait to the NSR.
This is the first time the port has been opened to Chinese shipping
since the Qing Dynasty 163 years ago, codifying Beijing's aspiration to
be a ``near-Arctic'' state.\24\ This was the same year that China
participated in a naval exercise with Russia in the North Pacific.\25\
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\19\ Liu Xuanzun and Guo Yuandan, ``China, Russia hold 10th joint
strategic air patrol over E. China Sea, western Pacific Ocean;
simultaneous operation with carrier Liaoning possible: expert.'' Global
Times. December 9, 2025: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202512/
1350124.shtml.
\20\ USNI News, ``Russia, China Wrap Fifth Annual Joint Patrol,''
https://news.usni.org/2025/08/25/russia-china-wrap-fifth-annual-joint-
patrol.
\21\ Chris Gordon, ``NORAD Fighters Intercept Russian, Chinese
Bombers Near Alaska.'' Air and Space Forces Magazine. July 24, 2024:
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/norad-fighters-intercept-russian-
chinese-bombers-near-alaska/.
\22\ Stephen Stapczynski, ``US-Sanctioned Russian LNG Lands in
China for First Times.'' Bloomberg. August 28, 2025: https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-28/us-sanctioned-russian-lng-
shipment-docks-in-china-for-first-time.
\23\ Reuters, ``China receives eighth LNG cargo from Russia's
sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 this year.'' March 13, 2026: https://
www.bairdmaritime.com/shipping/tankers/gas/china-receives-eighth-lng-
cargo-from-russias-sanctioned-arctic-lng-2-this-year.
\24\ Wong Siew Fong, ``Russia opening Vladivostok port to China
after 163 years.'' ThinkChina. May 16, 2023: https://www.thinkchina.sg/
economy/russia-opening-vladivostok-port-china-after-163-years.
\25\ Erdem Lamazhapov, Andreas Osthagen, ``Alaska, not Greenland,
should worry the United States in the Arctic.'' October 28, 2025:
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/alaska-greenland-should-worry-the-
united-states-arctic/.
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Safeguarding U.S. Interests. The United States and its NATO allies
have begun to reorient their Arctic policy approaches based on improved
territorial, regional, and collective defense. This reorientation
however came at an enormous cost: there has been a significant loss of
trust between the United States and its allies, particularly with
Denmark and the people of Greenland, that will take time to repair, and
it will not be the same transatlantic security relationship moving
forward.
We have a brief window of opportunity to get this right as China
and Russia advance their interests while challenging U.S. and allied
interests. U.S. Arctic policy as homeland defense requires a very
different, high-level and purpose-driven strategic coordination effort
at the highest levels of government at the Department of Homeland
Security (Coast Guard) and the Pentagon as well as the Interior and
Energy Departments, and the State of Alaska. The private sector also
must be meaningfully engaged to develop dual-use infrastructure and
build greater resiliency to Russian and Chinese military and hybrid
tactics. This new coordination effort will likely require new command-
and-control arrangements for the U.S. military and new lines of
civilian authority. For example, the new icebreaker fleet must be
integrated into an overarching national defense strategy, or it will be
a fleet searching for a mission, providing Washington with a false
sense of security. It is also essential that this strategy is
seamlessly integrated with the new capabilities of our NATO allies in
order to create an enduring Allied Arctic shield. It is also critical
that America's Arctic science agenda is fully integrated into this
national strategy as science is the underlying foundation for all
future activities in the Arctic. The Arctic seafloor and Central Arctic
high seas must be given greater priority in our scientific agenda and
the United States and its allies must demand greater transparency and
accountability from Beijing for the science it conducts in the Arctic.
Nothing is more important than protecting the homeland and
revitalizing the defense of our northern flank must remain an urgent
priority. But to do so, we must organize ourselves differently, both
internally and externally. The United States can only strengthen its
air and maritime northern shield in close coordination with its NATO
allies--not by challenging their sovereignty. The United States no
longer has the luxury of time; in fact, we have wasted the past 15
years in a paper avalanche of studies and strategies that did not
create capabilities. Unfortunately, we wasted those 15 years not
reconstituting our icebreaker fleet or developing a deep-water port in
Nome, Alaska that could have been available to the national command
authority today had we acted with urgency. China will continue to
advance its interests through governance and scientific avenues, areas
the United States has now largely abandoned. Russia will seek to
maintain great power parity with the United States through its nuclear
deterrent and hypersonic capabilities based in the Arctic and its
dependent relationship with China. Together, they will continue to work
against American and allied security interests in the region. As the
conflict in the Middle East today demonstrates, we must anticipate a
potential future contested maritime chokepoint in the Bering Strait. We
must also understand the national security implications of the demand
for greater diversification of international maritime routes as well as
energy, mineral, and protein sources that only a more-accessible Arctic
region can provide. This is why it is essential that the United States
prioritizes developing an allied Arctic shield to better defend the
homeland. And because of the enormous challenges of operating in the
Arctic, the future we must prepare for is now.
Chairman Gimenez. Thank you Ms. Conley. I now recognize Mr.
Clark for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF BRYAN CLARK, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR, CENTER
FOR DEFENSE CONCEPTS AND TECHNOLOGY, HUDSON INSTITUTE
Mr. Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Gimenez,
Chairman Pfluger, and Ranking Member McIver. Thank you very
much for the opportunity to testify today. You've all laid out
the challenges that we face, I think very effectively. Heather
did a great job of identifying kind-of the strategic overview
of where we stand with regard to Arctic security. After having
served in the military for 25 years, I can tell you we went 20
years by developing new road maps and strategies and plans for
the Arctic and never really translated any of those into
improved Arctic security.
Now we see how much more important the Arctic is becoming
because climate change is making it more available. Our
adversaries are beginning to operate there much more, much more
consistently than they have in the past. Obviously commerce is
taking off in the Arctic region. So we need to pay attention to
it. We need to start translating our aspirations into something
real on the ground and in the air. I'm going to identify 3
major areas where we need to improve our efforts with regard to
Arctic security.
So, the first is air and missile defense. Since the Cold
War, we've been trying to protect the homeland from ballistic
missile threats emanating from Russia, Soviet Union before
that, and then now China, as well as North Korea. But we really
have only focused on the ballistic missile threat. Our new
golden dome that we're developing to try to protect the
homeland is still primarily focused on that ballistic missile
threat.
But as we look at what's happening right now in Iran,
what's happening in Ukraine, drones are now the newest air
threat that we're going to face. Drones can be deployed from
uncrewed vessels of their own or they can be deployed from
civilian vessels that merge into the background traffic. We
could find ourselves facing significant air and missile threats
via the Arctic that have nothing to do with ballistic missiles
and at a scale that our existing defenses would not be able to
handle. We could easily find ourselves overwhelmed and
surprised by what an adversary, whether it's a non-state actor
or an actor like Russia or China, might be able to do using
drone technology and other uncrewed system technology via the
Arctic.
So plugging these holes in the golden dome will require a
different set of surveillance mechanisms and targeting
mechanisms, and also interdiction methods which might have
involved more consistent presence with our own uncrewed systems
up in the Arctic region to complement our existing radars.
The other thing we--the second area I want to talk about is
undersea. You've all mentioned the threat to undersea
infrastructure that's posed in the Arctic. We depend on the
Arctic to run communications between here and Asia or Europe.
We also depend on the GIUK gap, or Greenland Iceland UK gap, as
the main choke point between our North Atlantic waters and
Russia. Today, Russia's been mapping the undersea
infrastructure along the GIUK gap. It has been looking for our
undersea sonar arrays, looking for our undersea cables. We
surmise they probably have the ability to break some of those
or interdict them and even destroy them unnecessary in
conflict, leaving us potentially unable to communicate with
Europe and also unable to find their submarines at the kind of
scale we need to successfully defend the homeland. Having the
ability to both augment that capability and then respond to the
undersea threat that China and Russia might pose in the Arctic
will involve new investments in uncrewed systems to augment our
existing submarine force.
The third area I'll note is presence an Arctic presence.
Since my time in the Navy, we treated the Arctic as kind of
flyover country, right? So stuff would fly at us from the
Arctic. We might fly over the Arctic to the other guy, but
nobody really lived there. Well, now there's a lot of people
operating there full-time. We need to think about having Arctic
presence in the same way that we maintain presence in other
areas of the homeland. The investment in icebreakers is a great
way to start, but if you want to buy 17 icebreakers and give
those to the Coast Guard, you need the people to crew them, the
investment and the maintenance to keep them up, and the
infrastructure to have them somewhere close to the Arctic to
deploy.
That infrastructure investment will be sizable and could
also redound to the benefit of our other military forces,
especially if we use more uncrewed systems in the Arctic.
Making that investment, though, will be a consistent level of
spending that has to happen each year rather than a one-time
infusion of cash like we had with reconciliation. So keeping
that investment up will be necessary for us to be able to treat
the Arctic as a destination in the future rather than as
flyover country.
So I think these 3 areas are ones we need to focus on as we
think about how to make changes to improve our Arctic security.
I'm looking forward to the discussion and your questions. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Clark follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bryan Clark
March 26, 2026
Chairmen Gimenez and Pfluger and Ranking Members McIver and
Magaziner, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the
subcommittees on the topic: Arctic Security in an Era of Global
Competition: Safeguarding U.S. Interests in Frigid Waters.
a destination or ``fly-over country?''
The arctic is becoming more militarily relevant and accessible for
commerce. U.S. Government leaders recognized this trend during the last
2 decades with strategies, action plans, statements, and testimonies.
However, these aspirations never translated into substantial changes to
America's security posture. As a result, the United States faces
growing risks of air or undersea attack, damage to information and
energy infrastructure, or loss of its natural resources.
The Trump administration's recent threat to annex or seize
Greenland highlighted the U.S. Government's arctic say-do gap. The
rising interest of Russia and China in resource exploration, military
operations, and shipping across arctic waters led the President and
senior officials to seek greater control or outright sovereignty over
Greenland. In addition to its significant mineral deposits, Greenland
sits astride key arctic crossroads including the Greenland-Iceland-
United Kingdom (G-I-UK) gap and Northwest Passage.
However, the U.S. military's lack of arctic capacity made the
threat of seizure a hollow one. The U.S. Navy's only ice-hardened ships
are submarines, which are in short supply and needed to deter Chinese
aggression in the Western Pacific. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps
include units trained and experienced in cold weather operations, but
do not have enough aircraft or support equipment to mount battalion or
larger operations during the arctic winter. And while U.S. Air Force
can operate in the arctic, it does not have the ground equipment to
sustain year-round flight operations there.\1\
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\1\ Sonner Kehrt, ``US Military Can't Sustain Arctic Operations,
`Let Alone Dominate,' Experts Say,'' The War Horse, January 18, 2024,
https://thewarhorse.org/us-military-cant-sustain-arctic-operations-
experts-say/.
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If the U.S. Government is serious about protecting America's arctic
interests it should focus on improving the U.S. military's ability to
operate in the High North, especially the supporting physical and
digital infrastructure. New technologies can help. Since the Cold War,
robotic and autonomous systems, low-earth orbit and small satellites,
and artificial intelligence (AI) have changed modern life and military
operations. They can also help solve America's arctic dilemma.\2\
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\2\ For a more detailed analysis on these needs, see Liselotte
Odgaard, ``Closing the Arctic Gaps: NATO Allies and Partners Can
Protect Their Homelands by Updating Their Defense Force Postures,''
(Washington DC: Hudson Institute, 2026), https://www.hudson.org/
national-security-defense/closing-arctic-gaps-nato-allies-partners-can-
protect-their-homelands-liselotte-odgaard.
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The United States does not depend on the arctic-like other nations
with territory above the Arctic Circle. For example, nearly all of
Russia's gas fields and more than half of its oil reserves are in the
arctic, which together fund about one-quarter of the government's
budget.\3\ Canada relies on arctic mineral extraction for 5 percent of
its GDP.\4\ And oil and gas production in the arctic provides about 20
percent of Norway's GDP.\5\ In contrast, Alaska North Slope oil
production is only about 5 percent of total U.S. output and other
Alaskan arctic industries such as fisheries are essentially self-
sustaining.\6\
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\3\ Sergey Vakulenko, ``A Tight Spot: Challenges Facing the Russian
Oil Sector Through 2035,'' (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment Eurasian
Center, March 20, 2026), rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/
commentary/stalking-seabed-how-russia-targets-critical-undersea-
infrastructure.
\4\ Jason Moyer, ``Prioritizing Canada's investment in Arctic
infrastructure,'' (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, December 23,
2025), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-
brief/prioritizing-canadas-investment-in-arctic-infrastructure/.
\5\ Arief Rahman, David Wadley, Paul Dargusch, ``The contested
political economy of Norway's oil and gas industry,'' Energy Research &
Social Science, Volume 131, 2026, 104510, https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.erss.2025.104510.
\6\ See Energy Information Agency (EIA), ``EIA forecasts Alaska
crude oil production to grow 13% in 2026,'' EIA, November 19, 2025,
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=66664#; and EIA, ``EIA
adjusts forecast for U.S. oil production as producers set a record in
July 2025,'' https://www.eia.gov/pressroom/releases/press577.php.
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For decades, the U.S. military has treated the arctic as ``fly-over
country.'' Its main concern was the ability of enemy bombers or
ballistic missiles to attack America from the north. Almost all of the
Department of War's (DoW) infrastructure and systems in the High North
are designed to detect and intercept these threats, from the COBRA DANE
surveillance radar at Eareckson Air Station in the Aleutian Islands to
the Upgraded Early Warning Radar at Pituffik Space Base, Greenland.\7\
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\7\ Ian Williams, ``Cobra Dane,'' Missile Threat, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, April 14, 2016, last modified June
7, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/cobra-dane/; U.S. Space
Force, ``Pituffik Space Base, Greenland,'' U.S. DoW, https://
www.petersonschriever.spaceforce.mil/pituffik-sb-greenland/.
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figure 1: arctic region, including relevant u.s. military
installations.\8\
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\8\ Map created by Hudson Institute with sea ice data from ``2025
Arctic Sea Ice Minimum Squeezes into the Ten Lowest Minimums,''
National Snow and Ice Data Center, September 17, 2025, https://
nsidc.org/sea-ice-today/analyses/2025-arctic-sea-ice-minimum-squeezes-
ten-lowest-minimums. Note: Minimum sea ice is based on the sea ice
extent on September 10, 2025. GIUK = Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom.
The DoW's arctic basing, capabilities, and exercises largely
reflect the expectation U.S. military forces may need to engage at most
a few hundred air or missile threats at once, given the size of the
Russian, North Korean, and Chinese intercontinental bomber and
ballistic missile arsenals. Ground operations would be confined to
Europe, where U.S. troops would back up better-equipped and -trained
European forces. And naval operations would be almost entirely undersea
and conducted primarily by submarines like during the Cold War.
Today, climate change and technology are making the arctic a
destination. Ice is covering less of the Arctic Ocean each year,
creating opportunities for new transportation routes, resource
exploration and extraction, and military campaigns. Technologies for
satellite communications and autonomous systems are allowing companies
and governments to operate in harsh polar environments without risks to
humans and at a scale surpassing what is possible with crewed systems.
These trends are upending some of the U.S. military's traditional
assumptions around arctic security. For example, an attacker like
Russia could combine bombers launching dozens of land-attack cruise
missiles (LACM) with hundreds of UAS launched from autonomous vessels
or cargo aircraft. As they have in the invasion of Ukraine, Russian
commanders could use these large, complex salvos to confuse or
overwhelm U.S. arctic sensors and air defenses designed to track
smaller numbers of ballistic missiles.\9\
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\9\ Associated Press, ``Russian strike on Kyiv region kills 4 and
wounds 15, with peace talks stalled,'' NPR, March 14, 2026, https://
www.npr.org/2026/03/14/nx-s1-5747959/russian-strike-kyiv-region.
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The U.S. Government faces similar changes across each domain.
Warming arctic waters and rapidly proliferating and commercialized
technologies are enabling a new set of arctic security concerns.
However, these same changes also create opportunities for the U.S. DoW
and Government more broadly to improve America's arctic security before
a crisis emerges.
plugging holes in the golden dome
Even before it is built the U.S. military's Golden Dome program is
springing leaks. Drone and missile threats are rapidly improving and
proliferating as commercial technologies for targeting, navigation,
communication, sensing, and guidance make their way into the arsenals
of aggressor nations and stateless groups. Forces from Iran, Ukraine,
Russia, and the Houthis can now use these components to assemble
diverse weapons at scale, enabling structured attacks that exploit the
capacity or sensor limitations of U.S. air defense systems and tactics.
The same technology proliferation is also enabling more capable
opponents to improve the lethality and survivability of the ballistic
missiles that have traditionally been the focus of U.S. arctic-based
air defenses. This will raise the difficulty of countering ballistic
missile attacks and create capacity or sensor gaps that will demand
increased investment. Two developments are most concerning with regard
to protecting America's northern approaches:
Decoys and electronic countermeasures in ballistic missile
warheads that could confuse U.S. early warning and tracking
sensors. The DoW has long assessed that Russian and Chinese
ballistic missiles incorporate ``penetration aids'' like decoys
to confuse defenders' sensors or consume air defense
interceptors.\10\ Analysts believe these opponents are
improving their on-board countermeasures and that North Korea
is also including these capabilities on its ballistic
missiles.\11\
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\10\ Defense Intelligence Agency, ``CHINA MILITARY POWER:
Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win,'' (Washington, DC: US DoW, 2019),
https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/
Military_Powers_Publications/China_Military_Power.pdf.
\11\ Missile Defense Project, ``Hwasong-15 (KN-22),'' Missile
Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 7,
2017, last modified April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/
missile/hwasong-15-kn-22/.
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Long-range one-way attack (OWA) drones that can be deployed
at scale and overwhelm U.S. missile defenses. Iran's Shahed
drone and its derivatives helped Russia regain an edge in its
war against Ukraine. Drones like these can travel 1000 nm,
carry a 200 lb. warhead, and be launched from containers on a
ship or uncrewed surface vessel (USV). At a cost of around
$100,000 each, an aggressor could buy hundreds for the cost of
one ICBM and use a converted merchant ship to launch dozens at
a time across America's unguarded arctic approaches.\12\ As the
arctic becomes more of a destination, higher shipping levels
could make these drone carriers harder to detect.
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\12\ Uzi Rubin, ``Russia's Iranian-Made UAVs: A Technical
Profile'', Commentary, 13 January 2023, RUSI https://www.rusi.org/
explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-iranian-made-uavs-
technical-profile.
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The DoW's collection of long-range ground-based radars are well-
suited to counter ballistic missiles and aircraft. Ballistic missiles
are fast and the doppler shift they create in radar returns makes them
easier to detect and track. Their speed also means they generate heat
in the atmosphere and can be detected using space-based infrared (IR)
sensors like the U.S. Space Force's new Hypersonic and Ballistic
Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) satellites.\13\ But these sensors will
have difficulty tracking slower and lower-altitude cruise missile or
drone salvos that do not generate significant heat or doppler shifts.
And unlike ballistic missiles that come from known launch locations,
drones and cruise missiles can come from unexpected directions if they
are deployed by a USV or merchant vessel.
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\13\ Unshin Lee Harpley, ``Pentagon to Deploy Discriminating Space
Sensor for Ballistic Threat as Part of Golden Dome,'' Air and Space
Forces Magazine, May 14, 2025, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/
discriminating-space-sensor-golden-dome/.
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The DoW could pursue a common portfolio of solutions to address
these threats. AI-enabled sensor processing has shown its value during
the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, identifying hidden targets such as
drone or missile storage and launch facilities.\14\ These analytic
capabilities, such as those used in the Maven Smart System or a growing
range of DoW intelligence programs, could help existing arctic sensors
identify new threats like drones or discern real warheads from decoys
and other penetration aids.
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\14\ Tara Copp, Elizabeth Dwoskin and Ian Duncan, ``Anthropic's AI
tool Claude central to U.S. campaign in Iran, amid a bitter feud,'' The
Washington Post, March 4, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2026/03/04/anthropic-ai-iran-campaign/.
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But AI-enabled algorithms still need data. Tuning the DoW's
existing arctic missile defense sensors to better detect cruise
missiles or drones may make them less able to detect ballistic missiles
with the resolution needed to differentiate warheads from decoys. The
U.S. military will need additional sensors that can better detect and
track airborne threats across the North American arctic. The DoW
intends to eventually provide this capability at continental scale
using air moving target indication (AMTI) processing on satellites.
However, this technology is years from maturation and will likely take
a decade to field.\15\
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\15\ Theresa Hitchens, ``With funding flush, Space Force hopes to
speed satellites to track aircraft, missiles,'' Breaking Defense,
February 26, 2026, https://breakingdefense.com/2026/02/with-funding-
flush-space-force-hopes-to-speed-satellites-to-track-aircraft-missiles/
#:?:text=Senior%20Space
%20Force%20officials%20have,mobile%20missile%20launchers%20and%20'ships.
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The DoW should pursue an affordable sensor architecture for arctic
air space in the near- to mid-term, and as a backup in case AMTI fails
to deliver. For example, stratospheric balloons or ultra-long-endurance
UAS that cost $1-2 million could carry passive radiofrequency (RF) or
IR sensors to detect incoming threats.\16\ They could be purchased at
scale, stored at bases around the country, and deployed when conditions
warrant. Unlike space-based IR sensors that are looking down at
missiles and drones whose bodies are not dramatically hotter than the
earth underneath, balloons would look horizontally for aircraft against
the cooler sky where their engines could be discerned.
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\16\ RanjithKumar Dharma, ``Unmanned Long-Endurance Tactical
Reconnaissance Aircraft (ULTRA), USA,'' Air Force Technology, June 28,
2024, https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/unmanned-long-
endurance-tactical-reconnaissance-aircraft-ultra-usa/?cf-view; Jerod
MacDonald-Evoy, ``Army surveillance balloons spotted over Tucson raise
privacy concerns from advocates,'' Arizona Mirror, June 3, 2025,
https://azmirror.com/2025/06/03/army-surveillance-balloons-spotted-
over-tucson-raise-privacy-concerns-from-advocates/.
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U.S. forces have been challenged to affordably or sustainably
defeat combined missile and drone attacks in the Middle East. In many
cases, fighter aircraft proved to be the most cost-effective defenses
against OWA drones like the Shahed and slower cruise missiles.\17\
Given its much larger area, defending U.S. arctic air space from slower
cruise missiles or drones using crewed fighters is not scalable or
sustainable given personnel and equipment limitations. However, U.S.
forces have experimented with using MQ-9B Reaper medium altitude long-
endurance (MALE) UAS to shoot down drones and cruise missiles.\18\
Moreover, MALE UAS also carry passive sensors that could detect air
threats and radars that would allow tracking drones or cruise
missiles.\19\
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\17\ Jake Epstein, ``US fighter jets used cheap laser-guided
rockets for nearly half the drone kills during Operation Rough Rider,''
The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2025, https://
www.businessinsider.com/us-fighter-jets-used-laser-guided-rockets-
houthi-drone-kills-2025-6.
\18\ Savannah Bray, ``ABMS Onramp 2 sees second MQ-9 AIM-9X shot
and other CMD tactics development,'' US Air Force, September 11, 2020,
https://www.creech.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2343561/abms-
onramp-2-sees-second-mq-9-aim-9x-shot-and-other-cmd-tactics-
development/#:?:text=The%20Advanced%20Battle%20Management%20System%20(AB
MS)%20- Onramp,%20The%20422d%20Test%20and%20Evaluation%20Squadron.
\19\ Thomas Newdick, Tyler Rogoway, ``MQ-9B Airborne Early Warning
Variant Could Fill Major Aerial Surveillance Gaps,'' The War Zone, June
17, 2025, https://www.twz.com/air/mq-9b-airborne-early warning-variant-
could-fill-major-aerial-surveillance-gaps.
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With a cost per flight hour about one-tenth that of an F-35, MALE
UAS would be a sustainable way to expand air defense capacity across
America's arctic approaches.\20\ Because they are modular, the U.S. Air
Force could purchase MALE UAS for multiple applications. For example,
MQ-9s are providing a large fraction of air strikes during the current
war against Iran.\21\ The Air Force could replace these aircraft with
MALE UAS that can support future strike or reconnaissance missions and
be reconfigured to support air surveillance or defense when needed. And
in contrast to crewed fighters, UAS operators can remain proficient
using simulators or be contractors who are activated on demand.
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\20\ Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), ``Fiscal Year (FY)
2025 Department of Defense (DoD) Fixed Wing and Helicopter
Reimbursement Rates effective October 1, 2024,'' (Washington, DC: US
Department of Defense, 2024), https://comptroller.war.gov/Portals/45/
documents/rates/fy2025/2025_b_c.pdf.
\21\ Stephen Losey, ``MQ-9s Over Iran: Striking and Finding
Targets--But Taking Some Losses,'' Air and Space Forces Magazine, March
11, 2026, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/mq-9s-over-iran-striking-
and-finding-targets-but-taking-some-losses/.
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New fleets of uncrewed sensors and engagement platforms will
increase the complexity for operators who need to verify threats, match
defensive weapons against appropriate threats, sequence actions to
ensure they engage threats in time to allow follow-up engagements and
assess if engagements succeeded. Air defenders are increasingly using
AI-enabled decision support tools to help with these tasks in Ukraine
and the Middle East.\22\ They could help operators in North American
Air Defense Command (NORAD) coordinate disparate sensor feeds or
defensive actions from a growing portfolio of ground, space, and
airborne sensors and weapons.
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\22\ Tal Shahaf, ``Seconds that save lives: how the IDF's `digital
brain' uses AI to reshape the battlefield,'' Y-Net Global, March 23,
2026, https://www.ynetnews.com/tech-and-digital/article/syjhyhp5bg.
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winning the adaptation competition
The challenges of 21st century air and missile defense highlight
how adaptation is quickly becoming central to military competition.
During the war in Ukraine, both sides are changing their tactics, drone
configurations, and electronic waveforms almost every week. In
response, manufacturers have to design drones and other weapons for
rapid adaptation, sometimes on the battlefield.\23\
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\23\ Sinead Baker, ``Arms Makers Say That the Fast-Moving War in
Ukraine Is Changing How They Design and Upgrade Weapons,'' Business
Insider, January 15, 2026, https://www.businessinsider.com/speed-
ukraine-battlefield-development-pushes-weapons-makers-modular-software-
first-2026-1.
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Houthi rebels have also used a changing combination of drones and
missiles to impose new dilemmas on the Yemeni government and the U.S.
Navy in the Red Sea.\24\ Houthi and Iranian tactical and technical
innovations compelled the U.S. Navy to stand up a rapid response cell
in concert with industry to keep up through changes to the Aegis Weapon
System.\25\ The Navy is now adopting this model more broadly in its new
acquisition structure to enable adaptation at scale.\26\
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\24\ Luca Nevola and Valentin d'Hauthuille, ``Six Houthi drone
warfare strategies: How innovation is shifting the regional balance of
power,'' ACLED, August 6, 2024, https://acleddata.com/report/six-
houthi-drone-warfare-strategies-how-innovation-shifting-regional-
balance-power.
\25\ Megan Eckstein, ``US Navy making Aegis updates, training
changes based on Houthi attacks,'' Defense News, March 21, 2024,
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2024/03/21/us-navy-making-aegis-
updates-training-changes-based-on-houthi-attacks/.
\26\ U.S. Department of the Navy, ``Navy Reshapes Warfighting
Acquisition System,'' U.S. Department of the Navy, March 16, 2026,
https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/
Article/4435370/navy-reshapes-warfighting-acquisition-system/.
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Robotic and autonomous systems are generally more adaptable than
their crewed counterparts because they can be more modular and
numerous. Operators can change an uncrewed system's sensors, radios,
weapons, or autonomy algorithms in minutes or hours. Although a crewed
fighter or bomber can also adopt new tactics and update its mission
programs, these changes may take days or weeks to approve due to their
impact on safety of flight. Moreover, the DoW will field uncrewed
systems in larger numbers than crewed platforms and treat them as
expendable, enabling a wider variety of operational concepts than are
possible with crewed systems.
staying connected
Fielding a larger, more distributed arctic force of uncrewed
systems and their support units will create new communication
challenges for U.S. military forces. Improving polar commercial or
military satellite communications (SATCOM) are increasing their
coverage in polar areas. The U.S. military's larger uncrewed systems
such as MALE UAS or medium USVs (MUSV) could use SATCOM systems to stay
connected with operators and provide data for analysis or decision
making.
However, the ground crews supporting larger uncrewed systems will
need connectivity in remote areas. And smaller uncrewed systems that
larger uncrewed systems deploy may not have the space or weight
available to host SATCOM terminals. The DoW and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
will need to field tactical communication systems able to operate in
polar environments and over dozens of miles that can connect these
disaggregated vehicles and operators to SATCOM hubs.
neutralizing russia's undersea ``trump card''
Although its submarine force is smaller today compared to its Cold
War heyday, Russia continues fielding quiet nuclear attack submarines
(SSN) that prove challenging for U.S. and allied forces to detect and
track.\27\ In the decades since the Cold War ended, the Russian
Federation Navy (RFN) also expanded its undersea reconnaissance program
and developed new uncrewed undersea vehicles (UUV). The most concerning
of these new vehicles is the Status-6 ultra-large UUV (ULUUV), which
can carry a nuclear warhead and travel thousands of miles underwater
using nuclear power.\28\
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\27\ Ellie Cook, ``The New Hunt for Red October: How NATO Keeps Up
With Russian Submarines,'' Newsweek, September 25, 2025, https://
www.newsweek.com/2025/08/29/new-hunt-red-october-how-nato-keeps-
russian-submarines-2115307.html.
\28\ Vikram Mittal, ``Russia Showcases Poseidon UUV To Revive Its
Military Tech Reputation,'' Forbes, November 6, 2025, https://
www.forbes.com/sites/vikrammittal/2025/11/06/russia-showcases-poseidon-
uuv-to-revive-its-military-tech-reputation/.
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In the arctic, Russian military intelligence organizations are
surveying and mapping undersea infrastructure, including transatlantic
communication cables and sonar arrays of the U.S. fixed distributed
system (FDS), which is the successor to the Cold War-era Sound
Surveillance System (SOSUS). At significant cost, the RFN has developed
and fielded a family of special purpose SSNs and UUVs to support these
missions.\29\
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\29\ Sidharth Kaushal, ``Stalking the Seabed: How Russia Targets
Critical Undersea Infrastructure,'' (London, UK: Royal United Services
Institute, 2023), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/
publications/commentary/stalking-seabed-how-russia-targets-critical-
undersea-infrastructure.
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During a conflict, Russia could use this intelligence to attack
U.S. and allied seabed sensor and communication networks. By degrading
or damaging FDS arrays, Russian leaders would hope to prevent the U.S.
Navy from detecting RFN SSNs in time to intercept them at the
Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. If RFN submarines make it
past the gap undetected, U.S. and allied navies would be hard-pressed
to locate them in the open ocean. Russian leaders could use these
unlocated SSNs to threaten conventional or tactical nuclear attacks
against the U.S. East Coast of Western Europe. This was the scenario
used in a recent series of Hudson Institute wargames. The results of
one are depicted in Figure 2.
Overall, these wargames found that U.S. and allied navies will need
robotic and autonomous systems, supported by AI-enabled C2 and sensor
processing, to fill likely anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capacity gaps.
During the vignette shown in Figure 2, the team used several dozen
temporary seabed sonar systems, similar to those already in NATO
inventories, to detect Russian SSNs. They also used 6 new MUSVs and 6
new MALE UAS with sonobuoys to detect and track SSNs north of the GIUK
gap. To trail and potentially engage Russian SSNs, the team used 2 NATO
SSNs, 2 P-8A patrol aircraft, a guided missile destroyer (DDG), and a
NATO multimission frigate (FFM). As figure 2 shows, even this
substantial force was unable to maintain track on 2 Russian SSNs (Red
Sub 1 and 4 in the figure) past the GIUK gap.
Figure 2 highlights several challenges facing U.S. naval forces to
achieving arctic undersea superiority. These include:
Lack of track and trail capacity.--Even with the addition of
a dozen MUSVs and MALE UAS not currently in DoW plans, the team
had difficulty tracking Russian SSNs past the GIUK gap. Today,
the DoW would address this challenge by deploying more SSNs,
DDGs, and P-8As to retain custody of SSN tracks once detected.
However, Russia is only likely to simultaneously deploy 4 SSNs
or ULUUVs during a conflict. In that case, the U.S. Navy is
unlikely to have multiple surface combatants and SSNs available
for GIUK ASW operations. U.S. and allied militaries will need
them for missile defense, strike operations, or coastal defense
of the United States or Europe.
The DoW could address this shortfall using uncrewed systems
hardened for arctic operations. The scenario in figure 2 used
MUSVs and MALE UAS mainly to detect and track Russian SSNs
north of the GIUK gap. If used south of the gap after SSNs were
already detected, these platforms could retain track using
active sonobuoys or towed sonars at longer ranges--and
potentially more effectively--than SSNs or DDGs using passive
sonar arrays.
Few engagement platforms.--The U.S. Navy's ASW approach
emphasizes attacking submarines at chokepoints or other areas
away from defended forces or territory and where the submarine
is constrained in its ability evade.\30\ But the U.S. Navy's
most lethal ASW platform, its SSNs, are likely to be short
supply or out of position to engage a large Russian arctic SSN
deployment when and where ASW attacks would be most effective.
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\30\ William Toti, ``The Hunt for Full-Spectrum ASW,'' USNI
Proceedings, June 2014, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/
2014/june/hunt-full-spectrum-asw.
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Although the lightweight torpedoes MUSVs and MALE UAS could launch
are less lethal than an SSN's heavyweight torpedoes, these
uncrewed systems could remain persistently on station to
intercept Russian SSNs that they or other uncrewed systems are
already tracking. MALE UAS and MUSV attacks would force the
target SSN to evade, creating a noisier signature for continued
tracking. And through successive attacks, either the uncrewed
systems could herd Russian SSNs into kill boxes for U.S. SSNs
to engage or drive them away from defended forces or territory.
Vulnerable undersea infrastructure.--The United States and
its allies depend on fiber optic communication cables along the
seabed from North America to Greenland, Iceland, and Europe to
carry more than 95 percent of internet and telephone traffic
across the Atlantic Basin. Russian intelligence ships have been
mapping these cables and the likely locations of FDS using
remotely-operated vehicles (ROV) and UUVs for decades. Russia
could attack this infrastructure to impact NATO countries
economically or to enable easier access for its SSNs and UUVs
to open ocean.
The U.S. Navy has few counters to Russian threats against undersea
infrastructure. FDS arrays may initially detect Russian
undersea operations but could quickly go dark when cut by an
ROV or UUV, damaged by a dragging anchor or net, or struck with
an explosive charge. Additional deployed sonar sensors could
help by allowing continued tracking of Russian operations and
uncrewed systems could deploy ASW weapons against the attacking
platform or host vessel. The U.S. Navy's planned Ocean Explorer
ULUUV could be used in this mission, where its long endurance
would allow it to stand sentry for months at a time while its
relatively high speed would allow it to engage threats when
they emerge. Although an ULUUV will likely cost $60 to $80
million, it would be more economical than using a $3 billion
SSN that would only be able to be on station for a few weeks
before moving on to other missions.\31\
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\31\ Office of Naval Research, ``Special Program Announcement for
Office of Naval Research Research Opportunity: Ocean Explorer (OEX)
Large Underwater Vehicle Demonstrator Industry Day,'' (Washington, DC:
US Department of the Navy, May 28, 2025), https://www.onr.navy.mil/
assets/2025-05N0001425SBC04.pdf.
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Russian leaders see their undersea capabilities as a trump card
that they can employ to gain escalation dominance against the United
States and NATO. The allies' lack of naval presence in the arctic
creates an opportunity for Russia to prepare these capabilities for use
during wartime and reduces NATO's ability to guard its arctic
approaches. Using uncrewed systems, especially MUSVs and MALE UAS, the
allies could establish the sensing and targeting needed for indications
and warning of Russian aggression as well as ways to initially respond
to attacks.
virtual presence is actual absence
Uncrewed systems can help solve the U.S. military's operational
problems in the arctic, but they will not address the strategic
challenge of exerting U.S. arctic sovereignty. The United States
already benefits economically from being 1 of only 6 nations with
territory above the Arctic Circle, but those gains could increase
substantially as the region becomes more accessible due to climate
change.\32\ This will enable more mining, oil and gas extraction, and
fishing as well as increased vessel traffic.
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\32\ James Halsell, ``The Future of Sovereignty in the Deep Sea,''
USNI Proceedings, January 2026, https://www.usni.org/magazines/
proceedings/2026/january/future-sovereignty-deep-sea.
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Government agencies project substantial mineral and energy deposits
in the arctic. However, most are likely to be within at least one
nation's exclusive economic zone (EEZ).\33\ During the last decade,
China's businesses and government have ramped up deep-sea robotic
mining technology development and operations. Their operations are
currently focused on mid-latitude zones with large known deposits, but
Chinese companies will eventually need new opportunities, which could
include areas adjacent to or within America's arctic EEZ.\34\
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\33\ European Economic Agency, ``Arctic Resources,'' September 17,
2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/maps-and-charts/arctic-
resources.
\34\ Lily Kuo, ``China is set to dominate the deep sea and its
wealth of rare metals,'' The Washington Post, October 19, 2023, https:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/china-deep-sea-mining-
military-renewable-energy/; Darshana M. Baruah, ``Uncharted territory:
deep-sea mining and the underwater domain,'' International Institute
for Strategic Studies, March 25, 2025, https://www.iiss.org/online-
analysis/online-analysis/2025/03/uncharted-territory-deep-sea-mining-
and-the-underwater-domain/.
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Arctic fisheries like those in the Bering Sea are also becoming
more attractive to outside actors. As waters in lower latitudes warm
up, cold-water fish are moving north, making arctic fisheries more
lucrative.\35\ China has already aggressively deployed its maritime
militia and fishing fleets to other countries' EEZs to illegally
harvest fish for economic and strategic purposes.\36\ It could employ
this technique against U.S. arctic fisheries.
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\35\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, ``Tracking Climate-
Driven Shifts in Fish Populations Across International Boundaries,''
NOAA, June 5, 2023, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/feature-story/
tracking-climate-driven-shifts-fish-populations-across-international-
boundaries.
\36\ Alexander Goodno, ``Combating IUU Fishing in the South
American Pacific: An Opportunity to Counter Chinese Influence Closer to
Home,'' Joint Force Quarterly, January 9, 2026, https://
ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/4364800/
combating-iuu-fishing-in-the-south-american-pacific-an-opportunity-to-
counter-c/#:?:text=In%202016%2C%20an%20-
Argentine%20coast,as%20well%20as%20with%20China.
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Arctic shipping traffic will likely increase as summers become
nearly ice-free across the northern Canadian, Russian, and U.S. coasts.
The Northern Sea Route above Russia is the most navigable arctic path
from Europe to Asia, and access is essentially controlled by Russia's
government. The route's exit passes through the Bering Strait, which is
jointly controlled by the United States and Russia. The Northwest
Passage above Canada provides an alternative path. Although it is more
geographically-constrained, shipping companies may prefer the Canadian
route if Russia proves an unpredictable host.
The U.S. Navy and USCG need ice-capable crewed ships to protect
U.S. access to waterways like the Bering Strait and prevent illegal
exploitation of resources within America's EEZ. Although the waters
where these activities happen will likely be ice-free during the
summer, U.S. Navy and USCG vessels will need the ability to transit
icier waters to ensure they can enforce U.S. sovereignty during seasons
when ice floes may be prevalent.
The USCG's 3 icebreakers are insufficient for this task, especially
since one--the USCGC Polar Star--is dedicated to the annual Antarctic
resupply mission. The USCG's capacity will improve with the addition of
3 Polar Security Cutters (PSC) and 11 Arctic Security Cutters (ASC)
currently under contract. Overall, the U.S. Government has budgeted to
build at least 17 new icebreakers total, including 4 or more light
icebreakers.\37\ This fleet should be sufficient to patrol U.S. EEZs
and provide search and rescue in U.S. arctic waters, based on
government and our own estimates.\38\
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\37\ Tabitha Reeves, ``Details Foggy as Coast Guard Expands
Icebreaker Fleet,'' National Defense, November 18, 2025, https://
www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/11/18/details-foggy-as-
coast-guard-expands-icebreaker-fleet.
\38\ Bryan Clark and Jesse Sloman, ``Securing the Frontier:
Challenges and Solutions for U.S. Polar Operations,'' (Washington, DC:
Hudson Institute, 2017), https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/
CSBA6303-Securing_the_Frontier_WEB.pdf.
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However, implementing the USCG's icebreaker vision will be
challenging. The associated shipbuilding effort is larger than any
previous USCG program and will require effective oversight. For
example, the PSC program was delayed significantly under its original
yard, which has since been acquired by a larger shipbuilder.\39\
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\39\ Justin Katz, ``Coast Guard awards nearly $1B contract mod to
Bollinger for heavy icebreaker design, construction,'' Breaking
Defense, March 26, 2025, https://breakingdefense.com/2025/03/coast-
guard-awards-nearly-1b-contract-mod-to-bollinger-shipyards-for-heavy-
icebreaker-design-construction/.
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More important, growing the icebreaker fleet from 3 to 17 will
place new demands on USCG personnel, infrastructure, and sustainment.
The USCG is upgrading facilities in Seattle to host PSCs, but ASCs and
light icebreakers should be homeported closer to operational areas in
the northeast United States and Alaska.\40\ These areas lack the
infrastructure for icebreakers, USVs, or small Navy combatants.
Moreover, the USCG already faces a $7 billion infrastructure
maintenance backlog that will only be exacerbated by the need to
support new ships.\41\
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\40\ Caitlyn Burchett, ``Coast Guard Commits $323M to Modernizing
Future Polar Security Icebreaker Homeport,'' USNI News, February 3,
2026, https://news.usni.org/2026/02/03/coast-guard-commits-323m-to-
modernizing-future-polar-security-icebreaker-homeport.
\41\ Heather MacLeod, ``Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Project
Backlogs Reportedly Exceed $7 Billion,'' (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2025), https://www.gao.gov/
products/gao-25-108064.
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The USCG is also falling short in ship maintenance. For example, in
fiscal year 2024 the USCG Surface Forces Logistics Center could only
complete about half of its planned maintenance periods on USCG ships
due to a combination of funding shortfalls and schedule
constraints.\42\ The USCG will exacerbate this problem by adding new
icebreakers to an already overburdened maintenance enterprise.
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\42\ Grayson Glivar, ``How to Modernize the Coast Guard Fleet,''
USNI Proceedings, October 2025, https://www.usni.org/magazines/
proceedings/2025/october/how-modernize-coast-guard-fleet.
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The USCG does not currently have enough personnel for its new
icebreakers and is not on a path to obtain them. The service missed its
recruiting goals 5 of the last 6 years and fell behind its retention
goals each of the last 6 fiscal years. As a result, the UCSG is losing
members faster than it can replace them. Today, the service is about
2,000 personnel understaffed, or about 5 percent of its total end
strength. Recent efforts to boost recruiting and retention may help but
require dedicated assessments to determine which measures are most
effective.\43\ The USCG will be challenged to staff its 14 additional
icebreakers, each of which have crews of 85 to 135 personnel.\44\
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\43\ Heather MacLeod, ``U.S. Coast Guard Left Short Staffed Amidst
Recruitment and Retention Challenges,'' May 20, 2025, https://
www.gao.gov/blog/u.s.-coast-guard-left-short-staffed-amidst-
recruitment-and-retention-challenges.
\44\ Ronald O'Rourke, ``Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) and
Arctic Security Cutter (ASC) Icebreaker Programs: Background and Issues
for Congress,'' (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2025),
https://www.Congress.gov/crs-product/RL34391.
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The solution to the USCG's infrastructure, maintenance, and
personnel shortfalls is generally money. The service needs investment
to build piers, buildings, and utilities to host additional
icebreakers, some of which will need to be in relatively remote
locations. The USCG will need to augment its Government-owned shipyard
by conducting more overhauls at private ship repair yards, which
demands increased annual operations and maintenance funding. And the
USCG will need to augment its existing financial incentives for
recruiting and retention and consider improvements to housing for Coast
Guardsmen stationed in remote areas. The generational investment
provided by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act puts the service on course
to better protect U.S. arctic security, but sustained support will be
required to keep these ships at sea.
The U.S. Navy is even less well-prepared to secure U.S. arctic
interests. Other than submarines, it has no ice-hardened crewed ships.
The service could use USVs and MALE UAS to make up shortfalls in
surveillance and strike capacity but lacks the infrastructure to host
them close enough to arctic operating areas. However, Navy USVs or MALE
UAS could use civilian or USCG piers or airfields, if properly
outfitted and provisioned with prepositioned maintenance and logistics
support equipment. Notably, Greenland could be a useful location for
some of these U.S. Navy or USCG dual-use facilities. The current
agreements between the United States and Norway regarding the use of
Greenland's territory for military facilities allows the U.S.
Government to expand its footprint as needed.
Uncrewed platforms lack the strategic impact of a crewed ship or
aircraft countering gray-zone operations like maritime militia
interference or illegal fishing. The USCG's growing ice-capable cutter
fleet will help address these threats. However, the Navy could create
capacity for military support to the USCG by by incorporating features
into the new patrol frigate--funded as part of the same budget that
bought the USCG's new icebreakers--that would allow it to support
military responses in the High North.
reclaiming the american arctic
The U.S. Government has budgeted and operated for decades as if the
arctic was ``fly-over country.'' Threats could come and U.S. military
forces could move via the pole. But other than a small cadre of
intrepid oil and gas workers, the American arctic was not a
destination.
The arctic's role is quickly changing as warning waters and
migrating people and wildlife transform the region's economic and
strategic value. To protect America's interests in the High North, the
U.S. Government needs to invest in capabilities that can plug holes in
the emerging Golden Dome missile defense system, take away Russia's
undersea trump card, and establish a continuous U.S. presence in the
arctic. Some specific recommendations include:
Procure and field modular MUSVs, MALE UAS, and ULUUVs that
can support undersea surveillance and response, air and missile
tracking and defense, and maritime domain awareness.
Invest in infrastructure to support icebreaker and uncrewed
system deployment closer to arctic operating areas.
Restore USCG readiness to field new icebreakers through
sustained budget increases for maintenance and improved
incentives for recruiting and retention.
Field tactical communication systems that can bridge between
commercial or military SATCOM and the tactical needs of smaller
uncrewed systems or ground troops.
The fiscal year 2026 budget provided a good start on the
procurement needed in icebreakers and uncrewed vehicles. Future budgets
need to continue the investment in autonomous systems and prepare U.S.
air maritime forces to operate, maintain, and crew a polar force that
can protect America's arctic.
Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Clark, and I recognize Ms.
Maddox for 5 minutes to summarize your opening statements.
STATEMENT OF MARISOL MADDOX, SENIOR ARCTIC FELLOW, INSTITUTE OF
ARCTIC STUDIES, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
Ms. Maddox. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Pfluger,
Ranking Member McIver, distinguished Members of the
subcommittee, thank you so much for the opportunity to testify
before you today. My name is Marisol Maddox and I'm a senior
arctic fellow at the Institute of Arctic Studies at Dartmouth.
Today I am testifying in my personal professional capacity and
the views expressed are my own. The 3 pillars I will speak
about today provide an overview of the strategic environment.
This includes Russia and China's Arctic activities and
interests, why the alliance is our strategic advantage, and why
environmental change matters for security. Despite the massive
expenditure of missiles used in the war against Ukraine,
experts estimate in early 2026 that Russia's stockpile includes
about 3 times as many cruise ballistic and quasi ballistic
missiles as they had at the beginning of 2022, and that their
military will likely reconstitute once the war is over.
Particularly, if the war against Ukraine does not end in a
just way, Russia is likely to expand their aggression in the
Arctic and beyond, especially if the U.S. commitment to Article
5 is at all in doubt. China has invested in Arctic-capable
platforms to gain domain awareness, operational capability, and
to position themselves as an indispensable provider of key data
to understanding changes in the fastest warming region on
Earth. China is interested in the Arctic as it relates to the
larger vision they hold for themselves as a great power,
including as an arena for power projection.
It is important for the United States to meet presence with
presence, so it is really encouraging to see the U.S. Coast
Guard as the U.S. primary surface presence in the region
finally receive an historic level of appropriations. Now it
will be important for Congress to have tight oversight to keep
the service on time and on budget and to ensure that Coast
Guard has the necessary pipeline of expertise and staffing.
Programs like Evergreen are also important to resource as they
play important roles in developing robust strategic foresight
amidst significant environmental change.
The Department of Defense's 2024 Arctic Strategy update
identified a significant increase in collaboration between
China and Russia, and that trend has only continued. However,
this relationship is at its heart a transactional one, and it
doesn't have the longevity of a true alliance. NATO is the
greatest strategic enabler of U.S. interests in the Arctic
region. One of the biggest challenges in the Arctic is the
pursuit of all domain awareness from space to the seabed so as
to detect, track, and defend against any threats. The
complexity of this task requires allied cooperation from
innovation to leveraging strategic geography.
In 2024, for instance, Space Norway's Arctic Satellite
Broadband Mission launch marked the first time an Allies space
vehicle hosted an operational U.S. military payload. This
allows us to fill a gap in vital secure communication
capabilities for Arctic operations until a more advanced
platform can come on-line in the early 2030's. The United
States does not need to acquire new territory in the Arctic in
order to implement the Golden Dome or any type of highly-
coordinated continental defense architecture.
Language from the United States indicating a desire to
acquire an ally against their will, such as the repeated
statements about buying Greenland or making Canada the 51st
State, is counterproductive and harmful. Our competitors
benefit when trust between America and her allies erodes and it
is damage not easily repaired. At Munich Security Conference,
China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointedly stated China will be
a reliable force for stability. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov used the rationale given for a U.S. acquisition of
Greenland to justify the 2014 annexation of Crimea.
Forums like the Arctic Council are crucial in stabilizing
forces in the Arctic region as well as platforms for
demonstrating interagency leadership by the U.S. Government.
Geopolitical and security dynamics can change, but geography
doesn't, and the Arctic remains a region strongly characterized
by trans-boundary challenges and opportunities. The growing
risk of wildland fire in the Arctic puts our assets, personnel,
and readiness at risk. Permafrost underlines 15 percent of the
northern hemisphere and increasingly is thawing.
In a 2023 report to Congress, Pituffik Space Base in
Greenland was identified as having moderate to considerable
levels of risk because it is entirely underlaid by permafrost.
Growing powers such as India point to Arctic climate change as
an acute security threat because of how it affects their
monsoon precipitation and therefore their economic and food
security.
Our planet is composed of complex systems, so systems-level
analysis is necessary to understand the consequential systems
at play when referencing significant environmental change, and
for this reason I recommend referencing the Planetary
Boundaries framework to appreciate the complexity of changes
under way.
Last, robust international cooperation on scientific
research and the incorporation of different types of knowledge
systems are essential for understanding these changes so as to
mitigate risk and eliminate blind spots. The complexity of the
threat environment requires unprecedented levels of cooperation
for successful risk mitigation and opportunity realization. I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Maddox follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marisol Maddox
March 26, 2026
introduction
Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Pluger, Ranking Member McIver, Ranking
Member Magaziner, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees, thank
you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
My name is Marisol Maddox and I am a senior arctic fellow at the
Institute of Arctic Studies at Dartmouth, where I study the Arctic
interplay between security, geopolitical, and environmental change
dynamics. Today I am testifying in my personal professional capacity,
and the views expressed are my own.
The three pillars I will speak about today provide an overview of
the strategic environment. This includes Russia and China's Arctic
activities and interests, why the Alliance is our strategic advantage,
and why environmental change matters for security.
strategic competition
Russia is the largest Arctic state, and the region features
prominently in their core strategic security and economic priorities.
Russia prioritizes military investments in the Arctic--strengthening
their ability to enforce the vision they hold for what they perceive to
be the rightful Russian Arctic--including by controlling access to it.
Despite the massive expenditure of missiles used in the war against
Ukraine, experts estimate in early 2026 that Russia's stockpile
includes about 3 times as many cruise, ballistic, and quasiballistic
missiles as they had at the beginning of 2022, and that their military
will likely rapidly reconstitute once the war is over.\1\ Particularly
if the war against Ukraine does not end in a just way, Russia will
likely expand its aggression elsewhere, including heightened levels of
brinksmanship toward NATO members in the Arctic and beyond, if the
United States' commitment to Article 5 is perceived to be in doubt.\2\
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\1\ Michael Kofman, ``NAA Speakers Series: North American Arctic
Defense Cooperation,'' Dickey Center for International Understanding
Youtube Channel, January, 8, 2026. https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=kQ7Crd9BaR4.
\2\ Eugene Rumer, ``Belligerent and Beleaguered: Russia After the
War with Ukraine,'' Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March
19, 2026. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/03/russia-
ukraine-postwar-divided-european-security.
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Since 2018 when China declared itself to be a ``near-Arctic state''
and launched the Polar Silk Road extension of the Belt and Road
Initiative, they have invested in Arctic-capable platforms to gain
domain awareness, operational capability, and to position themselves as
an indispensable provider of data key to understanding changes in the
fastest-warming region on earth.
China is interested in the Arctic region as it relates to the
larger vision they hold for themselves as a great power, including as
an arena for power projection. China's military views the Arctic Ocean
as a potential region of future contestation and strategic interest. It
is important for the United States to meet presence with presence, so
it is encouraging to see the USCG--as the United States' primary
surface presence in the Arctic--finally receive an historic level of
appropriations to fund icebreakers, sensors, C-130's, and more. Now
that this money has been appropriated it will be important for Congress
to have tight oversight to keep the service on time and on budget, and
to ensure that Coast Guard has the pipeline of expertise and staffing
necessary to support these platforms as they come on-line. Programs
like Evergreen are also important to resource as they play important
roles in developing robust strategic foresight amidst significant
environmental change.
The Department of Defense's 2024 update to its Arctic Strategy
identified a significant increase in collaboration between the People's
Republic of China and Russia,\3\ and that trend has only continued.
China has benefited from Russia's relative isolation after 2022, but
there are limitations and tensions in the relationship and the longer
term is likely to be less rosy than the ``partnership without
limits''\4\ image they project. The threat of sanctions has been
effective in deterring China from even further levels of commercial
alignment. This relationship is at its heart a transactional one, that
doesn't have the reliability, longevity, trust, and confidence of a
true alliance.
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\3\ ``2024 Arctic Strategy,'' Department of Defense, June 21, 2024.
https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-
STRATEGY-2024.PDF.
\4\ ``Moscow-Beijing partnership has `no limits,' '' Reuters,
February 4, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/moscow-beijing-
partnership-has-no-limits-2022-02-04/.
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allies are key to securing u.s. interests in the arctic
The NATO Alliance is the greatest strategic enabler of U.S.
interests in the Arctic region. Exercising and embedding with our
allies who have expertise in Arctic survival and warfighting allows us
to relearn skills and instincts that are essential to survive and
thrive in extreme and austere Northern environments.
It is because of these trusted relationships that an agreement like
ICE-PACT with Finland and Canada is possible, and for a waiver to allow
Finland to construct 4 badly-needed icebreakers for us on an
accelerated time line. As close allies and neighbors, the United States
and Canada share the world's only bi-national military command, NORAD.
Canada recently changed their position on non-participation in the U.S.
Ballistic Missile Defense system, which creates even greater potential
for integration and alignment.
One of the biggest challenges in the Arctic is the pursuit of all
domain awareness, from space to the seabed, so as to detect, track, and
defend against any threats. The complexity of this task requires allied
cooperation from innovation to leveraging strategic geography. Cross-
sector all-domain awareness includes ideas such as higher levels of
coordination with allies on investment screening to protect against
predatory investments, and refinement of concerns regarding dual-use
research.
In 2024, Space Norway's Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission (ASBM)
launch marked the first time an ally's space vehicle hosted an
operational U.S. military payload. This allowed us to more easily get a
payload up into space to fill a gap in ``vital secure communication
capabilities''\5\ for Arctic operations until a more advanced platform
can come on-line in the 2030's. Norway, as Russia's immediate coastal
neighbor in the North, provides crucial intelligence on Russian
submarine activity on the way toward the GIUK Gap.
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\5\ USSF Combat Forces Command Public Affairs, ``US Space Force's
EPS-R achieves operational acceptance, extending secure Arctic SATCOM
capabilities into the 2030's,'' U.S. Space Force, March 20, 2026.
https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4439987/us-
space-forces-eps-rachieves-operational-acceptance-extending-secure-
arctic-s/.
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There is no indication that Russia or China have the desire or
intention to invade Greenland.\6\ Greenland, as part of the Kingdom of
Denmark, is a member of NATO so if they were attacked Article 5 would
be triggered, and Allies would respond just as they unhesitatingly
responded after 9/11 when the United States activated Article 5.
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\6\ Richard Milne, ``Nordic diplomats reject Donald Trump's claim
of Chinese and Russian ships around Greenland,'' Financial Times,
January 11, 2026.
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As we approach the 25th anniversary of 9/11 it is important to
recall that our alliance is tested and proven. Our own military
describes Canada as ``unsung heroes of 9/11''\7\ because they accepted
hundreds of international flights that could no longer enter U.S. air
space, and even provided shelter for Americans in their homes. Denmark
suffered the highest per-capita rate of casualties among coalition
forces because they would accept the most dangerous missions. Both
Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark are exemplary allies.
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\7\ Airman 1st Class Cody R. Miller, ``Canada: Unsung Heroes of 9/
11,'' 325th Fighter Wing Public Affairs, Tyndall Air Force Base,
September 9, 2015. https://www.tyndall.af.mil/News/Features/Display/
Article/669731/canada-unsung-heroes-of-911/.
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The United States does not need to acquire new territory in the
Arctic in order to implement the golden dome or any type of highly-
coordinated continental defense architecture. Language from the United
States indicating a desire to acquire an ally against their will--such
as the repeated statements about buying Greenland or making Canada the
51st State--is counter-productive and harmful. Our allies view us as
increasingly unreliable, unstable, and as a potential aggressor.
U.S. language about the desire to acquire Greenland has also
created an opportunity for China to assert itself as a responsible
actor.\8\ At Munich Security Conference this past February, China's
Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointedly stated, ``China will be a reliable
force for stability.''\9\ Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
pointed to the rationale given for a U.S. acquisition of Greenland to
justify the 2014 annexation of Crimea.\10\ Our competitors benefit when
trust between America and her allies erodes, and it is damage not
easily repaired.
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\8\ ``China distances itself from Greenland issue but warns against
US dependence,'' Reuters, January 21, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/
world/china/china-distances-itself-greenland-issue-warns-against-us-
dependence-2026-01-21/.
\9\ Wang Yi, ``Joining Hands to Set the Ship of History on the
Right Course,'' People's Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
February 14, 2026. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202602/
t20260215_11860435.html.
\10\ Charles Maynes and A Martinez, Trump's Greenland demand has
been a gift to U.S. geopolitical foes like Russia, NPR, January 21,
2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/01/21/nx-s1-5683070/trumps-greenland-
demand-have-been-a-gift-to-u-s-geopolitical-foes-like-russia.
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The most prominent intergovernmental forum for Arctic regional
cooperation is the Arctic Council, which the Kingdom of Denmark--led by
Greenland--chairs until May 2027. Although the Arctic Council excludes
matters of military security, it serves our security interests as a
stabilizing force within the region, as a unique forum for pursuing
cooperation on areas of mutual interest, and as a significant
demonstration of interagency leadership by U.S. Government
representatives from the Department of State, the U.S. Coast Guard,
NOAA, and others. This is a critical forum for centering the 8 Arctic
states and the Permanent Participants as the primary decision makers
for the region, while allowing for common-sense cooperation and
engagement with non-Arctic states that have interests and equities in
the region.\11\ Geopolitical and security dynamics can change but
geography doesn't, and the Arctic remains a region strongly
characterized by transboundary challenges and transboundary
opportunities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Marisol Maddox and Julia Nesheiwat, ``The Arctic Council
requires reform, not a funeral,'' Arctic Today, October 15, 2025.
https://www.arctictoday.com/the-arctic-council-requires-reform-not-a-
funeral/.
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the growing prominence of actorless threats
The growing risk of wildland fire in the Arctic puts our assets,
personnel, and readiness at risk. Permafrost underlies 15 percent of
the Northern Hemisphere and increasingly is thawing. In a 2023 Report
to Congress, Pituffik Space Base in Greenland was identified as having
``moderate to considerable'' levels of risk because it is entirely
underlaid by permafrost.\12\ The loss of land-fast ice exposes our
coastal infrastructure to threats from storm surge and erosion. There
is greater demand for our military to provide defense support for civil
authorities.\13\ Growing powers such as India point to Arctic climate
change as an acute security threat because of how it affects their
monsoon precipitation and therefore their economic and food
security.\14\ What happens in the Arctic doesn't stay in the Arctic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ ``REPORT TO CONGRESS: Permafrost Thaw on Infrastructure,
Facilities, and Operations of the Department of Defense,'' Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, May
2023. https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/imr/mc/Downloads/2023_Report_to-
_Congress_on_Permafrost_Thaw.pdf.
\13\ ``Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of
Defense,'' Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment, January 2019. https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/01/sec_335_ndaa-report_effects_of_a_-
changing_climate_to_dod.pdf.
\14\ Zerin Osho & Eoin Jackson, ``The Polar Tiger: Climate Change,
India, and US Arctic Security Policy in a Multipolar World,'' The Ted
Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies Journal of Arctic Security,
Volume 2, 2025. https://tedstevensarcticcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/
2025/02/JAS_Vol-2_Osho_Jackson_Polar-Tiger.pdf.
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Our planet is composed of complex and highly interactive systems,
so systems-level analysis is necessary to understand the changes under
way. I recommend referencing the Planetary Boundaries Framework \15\ to
understand the consequential systems at play, which demonstrate a need
to break out of siloed thinking. This framework articulates 9
components of the Earth System that promote stability for life on
Earth. Seven of the 9 components are in the red (unsafe) zone, and only
one of these is climate change.
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\15\ ``Planetary Boundaries,'' Stockholm Resilience Centre. https:/
/www.stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-boundaries.html
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Robust international cooperation on scientific research and the
incorporation of different types of knowledge systems are essential for
understanding the changes under way, and the tools we have to mitigate
risk.\16\ Underinvesting in data collection and scientific research
threatens to create blindspots in our analysis, which needs to project
forward since there is not historical analog for the conditions we
encounter today.
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\16\ ``Wildland Fire,'' The Arctic Council. https://arctic-
council.org/explore/topics/climate/wildland-fire/
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The threat environment is becoming more complicated. There is an
inclination to have tunnel vision and focus on the actor-based threats
we are more accustomed to, but it is the duty of security professionals
to appropriately account for all factors that bear upon the threat
environment. Especially in the presence of significant global
conflict--which only furthers the release of emissions and degrades the
environment--this task become more essential. And the complexity of
this task requires allied cooperation, where we can leverage each
others' strengths to more efficiently mitigate risk and develop
solutions that benefit us all.
Thank you very much. I am happy to answer any questions you may
have.
Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, Ms. Maddox. I now recognize
myself for 5 minutes for questioning. Ms. Conley, you stated
that Canada recently stated that they're going to increase
their defense spending or spending in that region by, was it
$29 billion?
Ms. Conley. Yes, sir.
Chairman Gimenez. When did they make that statement?
Ms. Conley. The statement was this year. It's a combine of
2 significant packages, in part, modernization of NORAD, as
well as an enhanced Arctic security package to create 4 forward
operating locations, northern operational support hubs, as well
as their continued satellite Arctic patrol vessels and assorted
packages.
Chairman Gimenez. You said Denmark also put an addition $5
billion?
Ms. Conley. Yes, $6 billion. Six billion--through 2
packages.
Chairman Gimenez. Is that for Greenland?
Ms. Conley. It is primarily, yes. For Greenland it is.
Sensors, patrol vessels, additional presence to strengthen
Danish Arctic command.
Chairman Gimenez. This was done after President Trump said
that he would like to acquire Greenland and then--and after he
said about 51st State of Canada. Is that what happened?
Ms. Conley. It was certainly motivated by President Trump's
comments, but I will say senior leadership of both governments
have also been clear to say they were behind. They needed to do
this. This was long overdue. So it was a motivating factor.
It's also the acknowledgement by both countries that they have
to protect their sovereignty and their territorial integrity in
the area.
Chairman Gimenez. Correct. Do you think that maybe that's
exactly what President Trump wanted them to come to that
conclusion? Would they have come to that conclusion on their
own?
Ms. Conley. I don't believe we would have seen the
substantial investments without the President's comments.
That's the upside.
Chairman Gimenez. Exactly.
Ms. Conley. The downside is it's a different security
relationship moving forward, and we'll have to reckon with
that.
Chairman Gimenez. Well, the different security relationship
is actually that Denmark and Canada are footing more of the
bill, which I think is exactly what the President wanted to
happen. Also to acknowledge the fact that there is a problem up
there and that they needed to invest more in securing their
territory and becoming partners. All right.
So--but the President has an interesting way of trying to
push our allies, OK, into doing what he thinks they should be
doing. I don't think there's any threat to the alliance, to be
honest with you. It's just his way of getting them to do things
that they should have been doing all along.
So, Mr. Clark, do you agree with that assessment?
Mr. Clark. That they're doing things they should have been
doing all along? Absolutely. This is--the United States is
obviously behind in its investment in the Arctic and our allies
were even further behind, arguably in their investment. This is
sort-of them trying to catch up.
Chairman Gimenez. The same thing happens with the war in
Ukraine that the President, by saying that they needed to spend
more, is that Europe needs to spend more in its defense because
they have a bear in their backyard. OK? While we may still be
there, and we will be there and we will answer the call, they
also need to show a little bit more of the burden of defending
their homeland, right, from Russia.
Russia needs to understand that it's not just the United
States that they're going to be facing. They're going to facing
a much more potent Germany, a much more potent Poland, a much
more potent France. All of them will be much more potent. Then
the United States will always be there. We'll always be there.
It is the greatest alliance, and it's the one that keeps the
world safe. But they needed to step up.
So, yeah, some people may not agree with the way it's done.
You know, some people. Oh, God. But at the end, at the end, we
actually got the world--is a safer place because they are
making those investments. I doubt those investments would have
been made by saying, gee, please could you do this? Because
we've been asking them to do that for a long time, and they
haven't done that for a long time.
Now going to--we've had issues with our, the procurement
and the design and the construction of our icebreaker. So I
don't know which one of you would answer this question. If you
do have the answer, where are we on the design and construction
of our new heavy icebreaker?
Mr. Clark. So the Polar Security Cutter program, which was
the first out of the gate, had significant issues with the
initial builders of VT Halter down in Pascagoula. They were way
behind on the design. They were having difficulty starting up
the manufacturing process. They ended up getting bought out by
another shipbuilder, Bollinger, who now owns the company, is
now restructuring the program with the Coast Guard.
So it's getting back on track, but it's years behind now as
a result of poor decisions made early on with regard to how
you're going to manage the program. They started to do
construction before they completed the design. All practices
that we kind-of know from history are bad things to do when
you're trying to start a shipbuilding program.
Chairman Gimenez. In fact, it should already have been
launched?
Mr. Clark. Yes.
Chairman Gimenez. It's not even--the draws, the drawing is
not even completed. Right.
Mr. Clark. Correct. Right. Detail design is not complete.
There's----
Chairman Gimenez. Yeah, I think we need to look at that
entire program. Anyway, my 5 minutes are up and I recognize a
Ranking Member for 5 minutes of question.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you. There has been, first of all, thank
each of you for your testimony and your expertise. It's truly
appreciated. I just want to thank you again for your patience
because I know what that's like waiting around for us twofold.
There has been growing discussion about how the United
States engages with key partners in the region, including
Denmark and Greenland, and whether certain approaches may be
creating friction at a time when cooperation is increasingly
important. Ms. Maddox, if you can elaborate a little bit what
you talked about in your statement. How critical are alliances
to achieving U.S. objectives in the Arctic?
Ms. Maddox. The alliance is our critical strategic enabler
for being able to realize U.S. interests in the Arctic, both
because of the strategic geography that our allies hold and we
have different defense cooperation agreements that allow us to
pre-position assets to be able to exercise so that we can
regain our war fighting capabilities for the Arctic to not just
survive where, you know, you hear about the operators in the
region, they talk about, you know, that the environment is the
No. 1 enemy trying to kill you.
You need to have that ability to survive. Then to be able
to be, you know, a capable war fighter amidst all of that is no
easy task. So our allies are critical in teaching us that. I
would just say that there are ways that we can be very clear
that there are certain things that need to change, but in a
way, that's rooted in the respectful cooperation that has
characterized the alliance and that does not in any way
threaten their sovereignty.
Because what happens there is it erodes trust, which is
really at the heart of, you know, is the United States a
credible ally? If that's not perceived to be so, it emboldens
Russia and that leads to a whole slew of other issues.
Mrs. McIver. Yeah, I would agree. In your opinion, how has
the Trump administration's actions, the way they do things and
statements with respect to Greenland alone impacted those
alliances?
Ms. Conley. So again, I think that the language that we've
seen has really demonstrated a high level of personalization.
So when President Trump has said things like he would
psychologically feel better about owning Greenland, the letter
that he sent to the Norwegian Prime Minister saying that
because he didn't get the Nobel Peace Prize, that there's not a
value in him being peaceful, so he's going to pursue an
acquisition of Greenland one way or another. You know, after
the Venezuela invasion, then saying that he doesn't need
international law, he's only kind-of constrained by his own
morality and that he wants to own Greenland.
So these repeated statements make the Greenlanders think it
sounds like he wants us and he is the commander-in-chief. You
know, for a small nation that is rising in strategic
importance, you know, where we've had such a great
relationship, it's really harmful, the approach because they
fear us now and they look at our presence where they used to
see it as positive, it's seen with the same level of skepticism
as Chinese offers of presence. That's not good for being able
to pursue the opportunities that we want.
Mrs. McIver. Yeah, thank you so much for that. Ms. Conley,
if trust among our partners is weakened, does that make it more
difficult for the United States to effectively lead in the
Arctic?
Ms. Conley. So I think we have some repairing to be done
and I'll just take the, the relationship with the Kingdom of
Denmark, but I think we are in a much better place post the
crisis over Greenland. We have strong agreements. The 1951 U.S.
Kingdom of Denmark defense agreement. Testimony earlier this
week by the commander of NORTHCOM suggests we are now thinking
about opening new military bases on Greenland. This is how
partners work. There is a strong relationship with our
military, our intelligence sharing. We need that political,
that top-level political dialog to support and nurture that.
But I think we're repairing it. To Chairman Gimenez's
question, look, we're rebalancing this relationship. It is
painful to rebalance a relationship that has been out of
balance for 2 decades. Europe is having some painful decisions
and I think President Trump just discovered that if you don't
have our allies there at the beginning of an operation, it's
harder to fit them in afterwards. We're learning to rebalance
this critical relationship so we keep it on repair.
Our Arctic allies understand the critical nature of Arctic
security. We have to be there together and we have to create
the mechanisms to make sure the United States is at the center
of it, not having our Arctic allies coordinate outside of us.
That's what we have to focus on.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much for each of you, your
expertise. With that, I yield back.
Chairman Gimenez. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you guys for
coming today. Ms. Conley, you talked in your opening statement
about eroded trust with our allies in NATO. Can you unpack that
a little bit for the committee?
Ms. Conley. Yes, Congressman. So the question of many of
our NATO allies regarding the President's comments about Canada
and Greenland would be, would the United States respect the
sovereignty of our NATO allies? They interpreted the
President's comments as calling that into question and our NATO
allies began to respond to protect that sovereignty.
I believe the worst of this crisis is over. We need to
begin to repair and rebuild that trust. We have a ways to go.
It's also a new relationship moving forward. The old NATO is
gone. The new NATO is arriving. I think this is new security
that the substantial Arctic security packages that both the
governments of Canada and Denmark have responded. That's where
we build the future and hopefully put this crisis behind us and
build that future.
Mr. Crane. I do find it interesting, ma', am, when I listen
to your response to my question, that you only covered one side
of the, of that trust issue. Do you know how many countries
within NATO were paying the 2 percent benchmark of defense
spending before the war in Ukraine?
Ms. Conley. Yes, sir. Before, well, 2014, before the Wales
Declaration was pledged, there were only 7 NATO members that
were paying a 2 percent.
Mr. Crane. Out of how many countries?
Ms. Conley. Well, in 2014 that would have been before some
of the 26. Yes, thank you. But here's the good news,
Congressman. Today NATO released their annual report. You now
have.
Mr. Crane. Yeah, I understand that, ma'am. I understand
that they have started spending more now with the war in
Ukraine. I think that's a great thing. I think part of that has
to do with what we were talking about earlier and the language
and rhetoric that came from the President, because as Mr.
Gimenez pointed out, hey, please pay the 2 percent that you're
required to pay per our agreement. They hadn't done it for a
long time. So clearly what the President was doing in his first
term and even now has had some effect. I know the war has had
some effect.
But I think it's interesting when you testify before this
Congress and this committee that you point out both sides of
it, because I could can tell you right now that a lot of my
constituents that I represent up here and a lot of Americans I
talk to, they do feel like NATO is a paper tiger and they feel
like NATO often--many of the countries in NATO ride the
coattails of the United States and hope the United States is
going to come and bail them out. That's why they don't pay
their fair share in defense per the agreement. Do you think
that's fair, ma'am?
Ms. Conley. I think that's certainly a fair, fair public
perception. I think what's vital though, for the American
people to understand. A new NATO with our allies increasing
their defense spending and making a contribution keeps the
United States safer. It's not a one-way street. It is a two-way
street. As I said, I wish the more American people understood
the value of that alliance.
But your points are absolutely correct, that they have
underspent. It has taken threats of sovereignty to get them
moving in the right direction. That's not what we want to see.
But let's hope we are in a better place, because allies are
important. We understand the cost. When we go in it by
ourselves, we can do it. We have massive strength, but we are
better and stronger with overwhelming force, with as many
partners on our side. That's the vision we'd like to see.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Ms. Conley.
Ms. Maddox, in your opening testimony, you talked about, as
we're talking about the Arctic, the importance for
environmental change. Can you unpack that a little bit for us?
Ms. Maddox. Yeah. So a lot of times when people talk about
Arctic change, they really reference the Arctic ice cap
shrinking and thinning, so facilitating new maritime routes.
But it's much more complex than that. Like I said, 15 percent
of the northern hemisphere is underlaid by permafrost that is
thawing. This is about 60 percent of Russia, 80 percent of
Alaska, 40 percent of Canada. So we're having lots of
infrastructure that's being impacted, runways, roads.
So the maintenance that goes into infrastructure in the
Arctic, where there's permafrost involved, adds to the enormous
costs of maintaining it. But we're also seeing things like, you
know, we had billions of snow crabs that died off the coast of
Alaska because of a marine heat wave that, that gutted the
industry and collapsed it. Right.
So in terms of being able to understand the changes that
are occurring and how do we understand looking ahead to advise
industry on what should they be investing and what are the
economic opportunities and where should they not be putting
investment? Right. So both from the economic security side, the
food security side, we have harmful algae blooms that are
activating in the warmer water at higher latitudes. So this is
compromising, again, the fisheries from a subsistence as well
as an economic harvesting perspective.
Then the wildland fire, as these fires are becoming more
intense because there's prolonged droughts and then more
extreme temperatures, and there's actually more lightning
occurring in the Arctic. So this is creating the conditions for
these extreme fires that pose an acute threat to human health,
but also to our military infrastructure. There's questions
about how sensors and military infrastructure is impacted by
prolonged smoke exposures. There's knowledge gaps here, and
there are solutions as well, but we need to draw from different
types of knowledge.
Mr. Crane. Thank you. I'd like to get to those solutions at
some point. I have run out of time for my questioning, so thank
you, and I yield back.
Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, gentlemen from Arizona. Now I
recognize the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Ms. Pou.
Ms. Pou. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez and Ranking
Member McIver, for calling this hearing. Thank you to the
witnesses that are here today.
The Arctic region is of great consequence to both America's
national security and our domestic interests. While we have
maintained a presence in the region for nearly 150 years, today
we face a new challenge from--from challenge from both China as
well as Russia, as well as from actor-less threats like climate
change.
You were just speaking about that, Ms. Maddock. Russia
controls over 50 percent of the Arctic Ocean coastline and has
the largest fleet of icebreakers in the world. Meanwhile, China
is aggressively expanding its presence in the region with its
Polar Silk Road Initiative and collaborating more closely with
Russia than ever before. The United States must work with our
allies to combat these threats. But instead, we are actually
straining our relationships. Our degraded relationship
undermines joint planning, information sharing, and cooperation
at a critical point.
For example, the Trump administration repeated threats
toward the Greenland has badly damaged our relationship with
Denmark and Europe and has long been critical to Arctic
cooperation. For months, the President has publicly stated his
intent to annex Greenland by force. He has threatened tariffs
on our European allies. In January, Trump stated that the only
constraint in his power is ``own morality.''
Ms. Maddox, if the United States uses economic and military
coercion to achieve our goals in the Arctic, how do you think
China and Russia will act toward us and other smaller nations
in the region? Is coercion the best way to achieve our aim in
the region?
Ms. Maddox. Thank you for the question. So the way that I
think, Russia and China are kind-of looking at what the United
States is doing and trying to kind-of figure out, because there
is a certain level of unpredictability associated with the
strategy that President Trump employs. But there's also, it's
kind-of figuring out, how do you have that balance of effective
deterrence and effective signaling? Right. There are concerns
about the ability, especially as China's seeking, to become a
nuclear peer of the United States and Russia.
How does that signaling work out? How do we prevent
unintentional escalation or misinterpretation? But like I said
in my initial remarks, we've seen that China has really been
quiet, fairly quiet, when seeing how the United States is
speaking about Greenland, kind-of within the context of the
idea that you don't interrupt your adversary when they're
making a mistake. Then with Russia having Sergei Lavrov
specifically, you know, pointing to the language that the
United States uses to justify Greenland annexation to justify
their annexation of Crimea. So it's about that whole spheres of
influence approach and might makes right and the ways that if
the United States is not abiding by the rules-based order
doesn't signal or demonstrate a regard for international law.
There's some challenges with that.
Ms. Pou. I know that my time is running out very quickly. I
do want to put on the record and perhaps if we can get some
response, if not through the Chair, I'd like to perhaps be able
to get those answers in writing.
One of the, the 2 questions, the other 2 questions I wanted
to talk about was in fact some of what has occurred with the
reduction in NOAA workforce and the proposed budget cuts of how
is it affecting America's ability to address the impact on
climate change and develop strategies in the Arctic? The other
question is, is it important for the Coast Guard to maintain an
understanding of climate change to comprehend the ice coverage
and sea level in the Arctic? I know that many of you are well-
versed in that area and certainly can help to respond to those
questions.
I have like 6 minutes, right? Oh, actually I--it looks like
I've ran out of time. But please, if you would through the
Chair, Mr. Chairman, I would love for the opportunity to get
those responses if through you sir. I yield back.
Chairman Gimenez. I want to thank the gentlelady from New
Jersey. Without objection, if you could respond to those
questions in writing, we would appreciate it. The Members of
the committee may have some additional questions for the
witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these in
writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the hearing record
will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, this
committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X I
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Questions From Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez for Heather A. Conley
Question 1a. In the context of growing competition with Russia and
China in the Arctic, how critical is speed to delivery for U.S.
icebreaking capability?
Question 1b. Does adopting a proven, in-production design, like the
icebreakers already built by Davie Shipbuilding, offer a meaningful
advantage in delivering the Arctic Security Cutters faster and making
them operational sooner?
Answer. The need for rapid U.S. icebreaking capability has now
reached a critical threshold, particularly for heavy icebreakers.
Because the United States' icebreaker fleet has been woefully under-
resourced for the past 20 years, the Coast Guard struggles to meet
simultaneous operational requirements in Antarctica and the Arctic.
Should America's only heavy icebreaker, the 50-year-old Polar Star,
experience a catastrophic mechanical failure and be unable to conduct
operations, the United States would not have heavy icebreaking
capabilities available until its replacement is available, at the
earliest, by 2030.\1\ Fortunately, the planned medium icebreaking
Arctic Security Cutters through the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort
(ICE Pact) with the participation of Canadian and Finnish firms and
shipyards, will be able to deliver greater icebreaker capability and
redundancy for the Healy and Storis while ensuring greater
interoperability with NATO members Canada and Finland.
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\1\ Caitlyn Burchett, ``Coast Guard Commits $323M to Modernizing
Future Polar Security Icebreaker Homeport.'' USNI News. February 3,
2026: https://news.usni.org/2026/02/03/coast-guard-commits-323m-to-
modernizing-future-polar-security-icebreaker-homeport.
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Question 2. The Coast Guard currently has a budget of $3.5 billion
for ASCs from the OBBBA, but more will be necessary to build out the 11
currently under contract.
How critical is it for the administration and Coast Guard to ensure
adequate funding is available for the entire fleet?
Answer. It is essential that the U.S. administration provide multi-
year funding for the entire icebreaking ecosystem to include not only
the vessel itself but the recruitment and training of a new generation
of Coast Guard icebreaking pilots and crew, sustainment and maintenance
costs, infrastructure and port improvements, modularization,
integration of autonomous systems, and data integration. The
icebreaking fleet requires a permanent line-item in the Coast Guard
budget.
Question 3a. OBBBA provided funding for $266 million ``for
procurement and acquisition of long-range unmanned aircraft and base
stations . . . to provide for security of the maritime border.'' This
funding was initially requested by Congress from the Coast Guard to
procure the MQ-9B Sea Guardian, a medium-altitude, long-endurance
aircraft that is specifically designed for the maritime domain
awareness mission, including the Arctic. Coast Guard participates in a
joint program on an earlier variant of the MQ-9 with CBP. The MQ-9B is
now being deployed by Canada, Denmark, and Japan because of its ability
to operate in the Arctic. It is unmatched in this space.
Ships (and other manned systems) can't be everywhere in the arctic.
Therefore, do you believe unmanned, long-endurance (36-hour) aircraft
could serve to support arctic security and provide maritime domain
awareness?
Question 3b. Are you aware of any NATO allies procuring this kind
of capability?
Answer. Unmanned aerial and underwater systems will be critical to
achieving greater Arctic domain awareness. It will also be essential
for these uncrewed systems to be interoperable with our allies to
develop an integrated, common operating picture.
Along with Canada, Denmark and Japan, Germany has procured 8 MQ-9B
Sea Guardians of its own.\2\ In addition, Greece operates 3 MQ-9Bs to
patrol its maritime space.\3\ The MQ-9B was used in the 2023 Arctic
Edge exercise.\4\
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\2\ General Atomics Aeronautical, ``Germany Buys Eight MQ-9B
SeaGuardian RPA Through NSPA.'' January 12, 2026: https://www.ga-
asi.com/germany-buys-eight-mq-9b-seaguardian-rpa-through-nspa.
\3\ Inder Singh Bisht, ``Greek Parliament Approves $400M MQ-9B
SeaGuardian Drone Purchase.'' The Defense Post. July 8, 2022: https://
thedefensepost.com/2022/07/08/greece-mq-9b-purchase/.
\4\ General Atomics Aeronautical, ``GA-ASI SeaGuardian Supports
Northern Edge 2023.'' June 7, 2023: https://www.ga-asi.com/ga-asi-
seaguardian-supports-northern-edge-2023.
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Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Heather A. Conley
Question 1. For years, China has characterized itself as a ``near-
Arctic'' state, formally publicizing its intent to govern in the region
through its Arctic Policy paper, released in 2018. Since then, China
has carried out both scientific and commercial exploration and has been
granted permanent observer status by the Arctic Council.
What is the end-state that China would like to achieve and how
close would you say China is to reaching that goal?
Answer. Xi Jinping has declared that China will be a great polar
power by 2030.\5\ Although Beijing has not established any specific
metrics by which to measure whether it has achieved this goal or not,
the PRC has made substantial advancements since the release of its
first Arctic White Paper in 2018 (the only Arctic policy paper
published by the country to date.) The PRC views the Arctic (polar
regions) as 1 of 4 new strategic frontiers, alongside space, cyber
space, and the deep sea.\6\ Of course, all 4 of these domains are
highly complementary in the Arctic. Beijing also views the Arctic
region as ungoverned space where the great powers will ``focus on the
struggle over and of global public spaces'' and the use of force cannot
be ruled out in the ``scramble'' for these new strategic spaces. China
seeks unfettered access to the Arctic's considerable resources (energy,
minerals, and protein) and long-term strategic military advantage.\7\
It will be able to do so through its ``unlimited partnership'' with
Russia, its military-civil fusion of dual-use applications from its
scientific and economic presence, the growing reliance on China's
navigational system (BeiDou), and ability to shape future Arctic
governing structures such as the High Seas Treaty, the International
Seabed Authority and the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement
(CAOFA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Rush Doshi, et al, ``Northern expedition: China's Arctic
activities and ambitions.'' Brookings Institution. April, 2021: https:/
/www.brookings.edu/articles/northern-expedition-chinas-arctic-
activities-and-ambitions/.
\6\ Helena Legarda, ``The Arctic, outer space and influence-
building: China and Russia join forces to expand in new strategic
frontiers.'' Mercator Institute for China Studies. October 22, 2025:
https://merics.org/en/report/arctic-outer-space-and-influence-building-
china-and-russia-join-forces-expand-new-strategic.
\7\ Rush Doshi, et al, ``Northern expedition: China's Arctic
activities and ambitions.'' Brookings Institution. April, 2021: https:/
/www.brookings.edu/articles/northern-expedition-chinas-arctic-
activities-and-ambitions/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2a. It is clear that China sees itself as an important
stakeholder in the Arctic region and is determined to actively
participate in Arctic governance.
To that end, what tools does the United States have at its disposal
to limit Chinese presence in the Arctic?
Answer. As General Guillot of U.S. Northern Command has stated in
Congressional testimony, you cannot defend what you cannot see.\8\ The
United States must improve its ability to detect Chinese presence in
the Arctic. Today, the United States and its allies have insufficient
Arctic domain awareness to detect threats and lack persistent presence
to deter an adversary's encroachment of American sovereignty in the
Arctic. A more significant U.S. icebreaker fleet will increase both
domain awareness and persistent presence as well as serve as a data
integration platform for unmanned systems and satellite coverage to
alert the United States to adversarial presence. Limiting Chinese
presence in the Arctic may not be possible when allowed by
international maritime law and through its partnership with Russia, but
the U.S. administration should demand greater transparency of its
scientific and economic activities. Washington could pursue a
transparency code of conduct within the Arctic Council for all Arctic-
related science by members and observer countries. This transparency
code would include how China is influencing indigenous communities as
well as researchers and organizations.
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\8\ U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, ``Open/Closed: Hearing
to receive testimony on the posture of United States Northern Command
and United States Southern Command in review of the Defense
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2026 and the Future Years Defense
Program.'' February 13, 2025: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
hearings/to-receive-testimony-on-the-posture-of-united-states-northern-
command-and-united-states-southern-command-in-review-of-the-defense-
authorization-request-for-fiscal-year-2026-and-the-future-years-
defense-program.
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Question 2b. Is it possible, through NATO partnerships or
otherwise, to discourage the other Arctic nations from engaging with
China?
Answer. America's Arctic allies--Canada and the Nordic countries--
have a clear-eyed view of the security challenges that the PRC poses.
Over the past decade-plus, Canada, Norway, and Sweden have been
impacted by Chinese trade sanctions due to national human rights
decisions. These countries have increased vigilance when Chinese shell
companies seek Arctic infrastructure, energy, and mining opportunities.
However, the more that the United States challenges their allies
economically and questions their sovereignty, the more susceptible our
allies become to China's message of international stability. U.S.
allies also see Washington pursuing its own stable economic agenda with
Beijing and will not seek to economically disadvantage themselves
despite their awareness of the dangers of IP theft, overcapacity, and
state-owned subsidies.
Question 2c. As it relates to constraining China in the Arctic, in
the long-term, would it be more effective to strengthen our
coordination within existing international partnerships and Arctic
governance frameworks or to expand U.S. presence and manpower in the
region?
Answer. All of the above. The United States should expand its
presence and manpower across the diplomatic, economic, scientific and
security spheres throughout the Arctic region in close coordination
with its 6 Arctic allies, the United Kingdom, NATO, and the European
Union. New organizational structures may be needed to support these
arrangements, particularly those that bridge the security needs of
America's Indo-Pacific allies with its Euro-Atlantic allies as the
United States restores the Arctic as a homeland defense requirement.
Question 3. Relations between Russia and the 7 other Arctic nations
have been strained since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
What impact has Russia's invasion of Ukraine had on the engagement
between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Russian Border Guard?
Answer. The United States Coast Guard and the Russian Federal
Security Bureau (FSB) continue to communicate via the North Pacific
Coast Guard Automated System to facilitate daily information exchange,
vessel tracking, and secure communication to manage the Bering Strait.
Occasionally, there are scheduled, highly-scripted conversations at the
staff level. It is my understanding that all senior leadership
engagement and in-person professional exchanges ended following
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\9\ It does
not appear that the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) has been active
since February 2022. There could be interaction with the FSB (if a part
of the Russian delegation) at the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) related to implementation of the IMO Polar Code. Although there
was prior Coast Guard interaction with Russia at the North Atlantic
Coast Guard Forum (NACGF), it appears that Russia has not participated
in the NACGF since its first invasion and annexation of Ukraine in
2014.\10\ The most recent interaction at the North Pacific Coast Guard
Forum (NPCGF) was in September 2025 when officials from the United
States, Russia, Canada, Japan, and Korea met with Chinese officials in
Shanghai.\11\
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\9\ Information sourced from private conversations.
\10\ Information sourced from private conversations.
\11\ Arab News Japan, ``Russia, US participate in North Pacific
Coast Guard Forum.'' September 27, 2025: https://www.arabnews.jp/en/
japan/article_155937/.
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Question 4a. Since 2011, the United States has been part of the
Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement with the other 7 Arctic states. Part
of the United States' area of responsibility under the Agreement
borders the area Russia is responsible for.
What have we seen regarding the level of coordination between the
Coast Guard and the Russian Border Guard in fulfilling this Agreement?
Question 4b. How does that level of coordination compare with the
Coast Guard's work with their counterparts in Canada, Norway, and
Denmark, whose areas of responsibility under the Agreement also border
the United States?
Answer. Under the auspices of the ACGF, the U.S. Coast Guard and
the Russian FSB participate in tabletop exercises and participate in
seminars that focus on fulling both the search-and-rescue agreement and
the marine oil pollution preparedness and response agreement. As noted
above, it appears the ACGF has not functioned since 2022. Also, as
noted above, the FSB and Coast Guard continue to communicate and
monitor their maritime demarcation agreement (1990 Baker-Shevardnadze
Agreement.)\12\
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\12\ Information sourced from private conversations.
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In absence of a functioning ACGF, the U.S. Coast Guard's close
coordination and cooperation with its NATO partners becomes even more
essential and is not comparable in any way to the USCG's technical
interaction with the FSB. Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United
States have decades of experiencing working together, whether through
the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, through NATO channels or
bilaterally. The U.S. Coast Guard has a particularly strong partnership
with the Royal Canadian Coast Guard, where the Coast Guard operates in
Canadian waters, and coordinates icebreaking and buoy tending
operations in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River as well as SAR
activities in the Arctic.\13\ The Norwegian coast guard, part of the
Royal Norwegian Navy, also works closely with the U.S. Coast Guard and
U.S. Navy. In 2023, the U.S. medium icebreaker Healy, sailed alongside
the Norwegian icebreaker, the KV Svalbard, to conduct exercises in
Northern Norway and the Barents Sea, sailing near Franz Joseph
Land.\14\ The Healy has docked in Troms, Norway. Similarly, the Royal
Danish Navy is responsible for maritime operations with its coast guard
element under the command of Danish Armed Forces. For its operations in
Greenland, the Danish Joint Arctic Command has primary
responsibilities. As founding members of NATO, Canada, Norway, and the
Kingdom of Denmark have strong bilateral defense relationships.
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\13\ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, ``Canada-U.S. Shiprider.'' July
31, 2025: https://rcmp.ca/en/federal-policing/border-integrity/canada-
us-shiprider.
\14\ United States Coast Guard News, ``U.S. Coast Guard Cutter
Healy departs Troms, Norway following engagements with Norwegian Coast
Guard, maritime government officials.'' October 6, 2023: https://
www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/article/3549076/us-coast-guard-cutter-
healy-departs-troms-norway-following-engagements-with-nor/.
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Question 5a. In 2023, Russia submitted a claim to the United
Nations for an extended continental shelf over the Gakkel Ridge, which
is over 500,000 square nautical miles of the Arctic seabed. If the
United Nations ultimately accepts Russia's 2023 evidence to include the
Gakkel Ridge region, it will formalize Russia's rights to exploit
Arctic seabed resources, such as oil and natural gas. Russia would also
then control any seabed installations, pipelines, observation stations,
and sensors.
Could recognition of seabed claims translate into de facto control
over shipping lanes, such as the Northern Sea Route, even though UNCLOS
is meant to protect freedom of navigation?
Question 5b. Are there mechanisms outside UNCLOS for the United
States to assert its interests if adversaries continue to use it to
justify strategic expansion?
Question 5c. Should the United States consider alternative or
supplementary agreements to UNCLOS to ensure Arctic security and
maintain operational freedom for military and commercial activities?
Answer. The U.N. Article 76 Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS) has stated that Russia did not provide
sufficient scientific data to make a legal determination that the
Gakkel Ridge was an extension of the Russian outer continental shelf.
Should the Article 76 Commission eventually rule in Russia's favor,
Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark have submitted competing claims which
would require a trilateral diplomatic mechanism for resolution. Thus
far, the Russian government has closely hewed to UNCLOS parameters in
the Arctic with the exception of treating the Northern Sea Route as a
national waterway rather than an international passage. The seabed
falls under the authority of the International Seabed Authority (ISA)
and would not necessarily impact the international maritime legal
issues surrounding the Northern Sea Route, such as Article 234
addressing icy waters and the IMO's Polar Code.
The Gakkel Ridge, which represents between 5-6 percent of the
Central Arctic Ocean, falls under Article 136 of UNCLOS which considers
the ridge to be the ``common heritage of mankind.'' At present,
companies from 10 countries have submitted their intent to mine the
seabed, to include China. As noted in my written testimony, Chinese
scientific research has concentrated on the seafloor along the Gakkel
Ridge, a volcanic ridge that could be rich in critical minerals in its
seafloor sulfide deposits. The Russian government has also expressed
concerns about the extensive Chinese scientific activity in the area of
the ridge. A senior official with the Russian Academy of Sciences has
described the ridge as a ``zone of blood right interest'' to
Russia.\15\ Moscow's concern however has not inhibited Chinese manned
submersibles to continue their sonar and acoustical mapping of the
region. China will continue to exploit the ``common heritage'' nature
of the Gakkel Ridge to advance its interests in the absence of coastal
state clarity on its extended continental shelf.
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\15\ Vyacheslav Terekhov, ``A new challenge to expand Russia's
Arctic shelf.'' Interfaks. December 16, 2024: https://www.interfax.ru/
russia/997801.
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The United States could attempt to manage its UNCLOS interests
through its geographically-closest Arctic allies, Canada and the
Kingdom of Denmark, but the administration would have to restore trust
with both allies and work constructively with them. The United States
could work closely with the United Kingdom and Norway to potentially
extend in its Atlantic Bastion mission (a joint operation to protect
North Atlantic undersea cables from Russia submarines and manned
intelligence gathering submersibles) to create an Arctic Bastion
mission to track Russian and Chinese intelligence and ``scientific''
vessels near the Gakkel Ridge and Chukchi Borderland to the north of
Alaska. The United States could work with Arctic allies and partners to
insist on greater transparency for all science conducted on the Arctic
seafloor.
The most straightforward approach of course would be for the U.S.
Senate to ratify UNCLOS which would allow the United States to receive
the full benefits of the Convention from extending its outer
continental shelf to maximizing its influence at the International
Seabed Authority. Short of this, the United States may choose to work
outside UNCLOS (e.g., deep sea mining in the Pacific) and submit its
extended outer continental shelf claims, which could encourage other
states, such as Russia and China, to work outside UNCLOS as well.
Repeated violations by Iran, China, and non-state actors of freedom of
navigation as well as unilateral maritime claims in the South China Sea
have already damaged international maritime law.
The Arctic region has enjoyed a series of supplemental maritime
agreements--such the IMO Polar Code, the Arctic Search and Rescue
Agreement, International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness,
Response and Co-operation (OPRC), and the Central Arctic Ocean
Fisheries Agreement signed by the 5 Arctic maritime states and China,
Iceland, Japan, Korea, and the European Union. As noted above, there
could be bespoke agreements for the Gakkel Ridge and Chukchi Borderland
seafloor related to scientific and economic exploration.\16\
Militarily, NATO's 7 Arctic members could develop greater Arctic
capabilities to strengthen deterrence and defense through the rapid
implementation of NATO's regional defense plans and additional
exercises and training.
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\16\ Lars Kullerud and Oran R. Young, ``Adding a Gakkel Ridge
Regime to the Evolving Arctic Ocean Governance Complex.'' Marine Policy
122 (2020.) 1-s2.0-S0308597X20309167-main.pdf.
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Question 6. Russia and China have collaborated to enhance their
respective Arctic capabilities, including icebreaker production and
joint military exercises.
Do you anticipate that this collaboration will remain mutually
beneficial for the foreseeable future or are there diverging interests
within their Arctic relationship?
Answer. For the foreseeable future, the Russian and Chinese
governments have a mutually beneficial relationship in the Arctic.
Beijing gains greater access and experience working in the Arctic
environment while Russia receives financial benefit from Chinese
purchases of its Arctic LNG and select infrastructure investments, such
as in the port of Vladivostok. Their joint military exercises in the
Russian Far East and the East China Sea test the readiness and
capabilities of U.S. aviation assets from the First Island Chain to the
Third Island Chain.
Question 7. Monitoring Russian and Chinese intelligence operations
in the Arctic requires robust information sharing and multilateral
coordination.
How can the United States work with strategic partners in the
Arctic to ensure effective situational awareness and deter potential
threats?
Answer. Creating a common allied operating picture across the
circumpolar Arctic that knits together U.S. and allied domain awareness
from the seafloor to space will be essential to detect, deter, and
ultimately to defend territorial integrity and strengthen collective
defense. While the United States and its allies must be prepared for a
potential nuclear and conventional missile attack from Russia or, in
the future, China, which originates from the Arctic, it is more likely
that Russia and China will use hybrid warfare tactics (e.g., drones on
sanctioned oil tankers) and dual-use infrastructure to test American
and allied resolve and exploit weaknesses in the seam between civilian
and military capabilities. To construct this allied operating picture,
the 7 Arctic allies must be highly interoperable and develop systems
that integrate wide-ranging data sets derived from military,
scientific, economic, and climate sources and are able to efficiently
relay that information to the warfighter.
Questions From Honorable Matt Van Epps for Heather A. Conley
Question 1. The Department of War, the Department of Homeland
Security, the U.S. intelligence community, and our Arctic allies all
play a role in shaping the Arctic theater.
How does the number of actors involved complicate our ability to
have a cohesive picture of the environment?
Answer. U.S. interagency as well as State and Federal coordination
of Arctic policy has always been its Achilles heel. During the Cold
War, security and defense considerations were paramount and
international science cooperation was considered a positive channel to
be protected for communication and dialog with the Soviet Union. In the
post-Cold War environment, defense and security needs became a
secondary consideration and the scientific and environmental agenda was
prioritized. Today, the United States and its allies have only just
begun to re-prioritize the Arctic security agenda while struggling to
address China and Russia's weaponization of its science, economic, and
governance agendas. To address this, the United States must prioritize
developing a persistent physical presence in the Arctic and develop
allied Arctic domain awareness and highly interoperable military
capabilities and dual-use infrastructure.
Question 2a. Considering that Chinese technological investments in
the Arctic focus on both commercial and scientific sectors, should U.S.
Arctic policy differentiate between purely scientific projects and
those with dual-use potential?
Question 2b. What legal or diplomatic tools are available to
respond to gray zone maritime incidents in the Arctic without
escalating to open conflict?
Answer. Science underpins every element of power the United States
and its allies possess in the Arctic, making policy differentiation
impossible. It is science that helps geo-engineer repairs to runways or
pipelines damaged by permafrost thaw, acoustical modeling of the
seafloor for submarine activity and ensures the survivability of the
warfighter in extremely cold climates. The U.S. Arctic Research
Commission has realigned its science agenda to support U.S. security
and economic interests in the Arctic. What the Arctic science agenda
lacks is transparency and a code of conduct that is applied to all
countries which engage in scientific research in the Arctic.
Greater efforts could be made to enforce the International Maritime
Organization's Polar Code and enforcing stiff financial penalties on
the firms and nations of flagged vessels that traverse the Arctic in
violation of the code, reflagging in mid-course or turning off or
obstructing their Automated Information System (AIS). Enforcement would
fall on the shoulders of the Arctic coastal states. The United States
and Arctic nations could seek stronger inspection regimes for nations
that repeatedly violate the Polar Code and utilize sanctioned vessels.
The Ted Stevens Center could also serve as a focal point for U.S. and
allied agencies to simulate and respond to hybrid activities through
wargaming and tabletop exercises that would include the private sector.
Question 3a. When discussing Arctic security and cooperation with
our allies, the conversation often focuses on the European Arctic
maritime domain, but Chinese ambitions largely come from the Pacific
and Bering Sea.
How does the threat environment differ in the Pacific Arctic?
Question 3b. How should the U.S. leverage the Aleutian Islands to
deter Chinese traffic?
Answer. There remains institutional and defense ``muscle memory''
to conduct robust anti-submarine warfare, improve domain awareness, and
protect the North Atlantic strategic lines of communication within NATO
and by individual NATO members. The United Kingdom and Norway's recent
operation in the North Sea which detected and deterred Russian
intelligence activity around transatlantic undersea cables is a notable
example of this.\17\ The United States and its NATO allies may not have
sufficient persistent air and maritime presence, but active steps are
being taken to secure maritime domain in the Atlantic Arctic via Arctic
Sentry and enhanced security measures in the Greenland-Iceland-United
Kingdom-Norway (GIUK) gap.\18\
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\17\ Jill Lawless, ``UK and Norway led a military operation to
deter Russian submarines in the North Atlantic.'' Associated Press.
April 9, 2026: https://apnews.com/article/britain-norway-russian-
submarines-atlantic-7aa163bc29266504dd1d4c9949aeafde.
\18\ Dzirhan Mahadzir, ``NATO Launches Arctic Sentry in High North
in Response to Russian Activity.'' USNI News. February 16, 2026:
https://news.usni.org/2026/02/16/nato-launches-arctic-sentry-in-high-
north-in-response-to-russian-activity.
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This institutional security framework and security muscle memory
does not exist in the Pacific Arctic. The U.S. military is not
organized for command-and-control success in the Pacific Arctic as
USINDOPACOM does not have operational oversight for the Arctic in the
Unified Command Plan--this despite the fact that the Army's elite 11th
Airborne Division and Arctic Aviation Command (activated in 2024) is
under INDOPACOM. The regional coast guards are aligned in the NPCFG
(which includes Japan, South Korea, and Canada) but this is largely for
law and fisheries enforcement purposes, not national security and
defense requirements. Ideally, a new unified command plan for the
Arctic region would include an operational role for INDOPACOM in the
Arctic and Alaskan based naval and air exercises would include Korea,
Japan, and Canada. Modernizing the naval and air facilities at Adak
would create an interoperable Forward Operating Location that would
allow for increased maritime reconnaissance and provide a persistent
presence to monitor vessel traffic and violations of U.S. territorial
waters or the U.S. EEZ prior to entering the narrow Bering Straits. A
more streamlined command that includes INDOPACOM and additional
facilities, such as Adak, a deep-water port in Nome and a persistent
(rather than seasonal) Coast Guard presence in the Aleutians and along
the Alaskan coast would improve Arctic security.
Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Bryan Clark
Question 1. China has characterized itself as a ``near-Arctic''
state since 2018 and has since carried out both scientific and
commercial exploration, as well as military collaboration with Russia.
Where are there opportunities for the Coast Guard and DHS to
counter the growing influence of the People's Republic of China in the
Arctic and in Antarctica?
Answer. In the Arctic, the U.S. Government should expand its Arctic
presence beyond annual research deployments and biennial submarine ice
exercises. With a larger icebreaker fleet, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
could maintain a continuous presence in the U.S. Arctic nearly year-
round. To prevent other countries from eroding the protections
associated with the U.S. EEZ, USCG cutters will need to be in the
Arctic to enforce U.S. and international law.
In the Antarctic, the United States should work with allies such as
Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and France to prevent China
from expanding its existing footprint on the continent. These U.S.
allies are among the 7 which are recognized in the Antarctic Treaty as
having territorial claims. Other claims are not recognized while the
treaty remains in force. China has established several research
stations on Antarctica inside the claims of Australia and New Zealand.
These allies could ramp up inspections of the Chinese stations to
ensure they are engaged in peaceful research.
The USCG could also increase its deployment tempo in the Antarctic.
Currently, the Polar Sea deploys there annually to resupply McMurdo
Station. With a larger icebreaker fleet, the USCG could support U.S.
and allied operations around the continent through a longer period. As
U.S. allies with claims in Antarctica lack substantial icebreaker
fleets, this could be a way for the USCG to improve collaboration on
efforts to curb Chinese activity there.
Question 2. The U.S. Air Force has maintained a presence in Alaska
for decades and regularly flies in Arctic skies to intercept incursions
into U.S. air space by Russian military planes. The Air Force also has
an extensive array of sensors in Alaska to help support its homeland
defense mission.
As DHS and the Coast Guard work toward improving domain awareness
capabilities, are there opportunities to work together with the Air
Force or Pentagon as a whole to jointly develop and deploy cutting-edge
domain awareness assets that fulfill both defense and homeland security
missions?
Answer. Yes, the USAF and USCG could cooperate on establishing an
airborne layer of surveillance to address smaller air threats such as
balloons, drones, and cruise missiles that may not be easily detected
by ground-based radars optimized for ballistic missile defense. For
example, the USCG could deploy medium-altitude long-endurance UAS like
the MQ-9B over the Arctic for maritime and air surveillance using
surface search radar and passive electronic sensors.
The USCG could also deploy high-altitude balloons like those used
by China against the United States to conduct passive surveillance of
Arctic air space. Using AI-enabled algorithms, passive electro-optical
and radiofrequency sensors could find and track adversary aircraft that
would be too small for ground-based BMD radars to detect.
Question 3. As the United States considers the future of Arctic
resourcing, how should Congress prioritize investments across
icebreakers, unmanned systems, satellite coverage, and domain
awareness?
Answer. The most urgent threats facing the U.S. Arctic are
adversary efforts to access resources in the U.S. EEZ and potential
attacks by uncrewed surface and air systems. More satellite coverage
and domain awareness only improve monitoring of these threats without
the ability to gather intelligence on them or respond. Icebreakers and
long-endurance UAS can provide the ability to both gather detailed
intelligence and intervene to stop threats. Therefore, they should be
the Government's top Arctic investment priorities.
Question 4a. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act provided over $8
billion for icebreaker procurement.
What measurable capability gains should Congress expect by fiscal
year 2027?
Answer. Unfortunately, there is unlikely to be a noticeable
improvement by 2027. The USCG is behind on its initial icebreaker
program, the Polar Security Cutter, and it will probably not deliver
until 2030. The first Arctic Security Cutter, since it is being built
to an existing design by an established icebreaker builder, should be
done before then, in 2028.
Question 4b. How should Congress structure fiscal year 2027
appropriations to avoid a ``boom-bust'' shipbuilding cycle following
this one-time funding spike?
Answer. The one-time investment will provide a full order book to
the relevant shipyards through this decade. The two key items in 2027
appropriations will be ensuring personnel and maintenance budgets are
rising to accommodate the growing USCG fleet. Right now, the USCG lacks
the personnel to crew its incoming icebreakers and its cutter fleet is
already behind on maintenance.
Question 5. Both China and Russia are known to surveil and linger
near sensitive subsea cables.
Given the vulnerability of subsea cable infrastructure in the
Arctic, what are the potential economic and military consequences
should Russia or China interfere with their operation?
Answer. Chinese or Russian undersea reconnaissance operations could
tap into cables to extract data or disrupt cables to cut off access
between Europe and the United States or between Europe, Greenland, and
Iceland.
Question 6a. As referenced in your testimony, your experience in
wargaming the Arctic theater suggests that U.S. and allied forces would
struggle to detect and defeat incoming threats from peer competitors.
In your experience, in what ways are our adversaries most likely to
hold the homeland at risk?
Answer. The most likely approaches are by using cyber operations or
undersea drones to attack critical infrastructure. These attacks could
come from U.S. territory using capabilities smuggled into the country
or built here by agents acting on an adversary's behalf. They could
also deploy from adversary territory or ships.
The Arctic is important because adversaries could use the lack of
surveillance in the region to deploy uncrewed vehicles close to U.S.
territory, such as the Russian Status-6 long-endurance undersea
vehicle. Adversaries could also attack U.S. undersea cables to achieve
large-scale disruption of telecommunication and internet traffic.
Question 6b. How should we prioritize investments to alleviate
those vulnerabilities and effectively deter potential aggression?
Answer. The United States has an extensive surveillance
architecture along portions of the East and West Coast for air and
undersea threats, but it is concentrated around U.S. military
installations. The U.S. complements this network with undersea
surveillance systems like the Fixed Distributed System that operate
around the G-I-UK gap and other areas. Recent Russian operations
suggest they are attempting to map this surveillance infrastructure,
potentially as a preclude to disrupting it in conflict.
The United States should expand its homeland surveillance networks
undersea around areas of critical infrastructure such as cable nodes or
ports, and invest in back-up surveillance capacity using uncrewed
surface and air systems that can fill in when fixed systems are
degraded or to track threats after they are detected until they can be
neutralized.
Question 6c. Based on your results, how should our underlying
operational approach and military assumptions about the Arctic change
to reflect the threat environment?
Answer. Overall, the United States should ensure it has more
uncrewed mobile surveillance and tracking capacity that can back up
fixed or space-based systems when they fail or are degraded. In
addition to providing redundancy, these uncrewed vehicles can enable
more precise identification of targets and determination of their
activities compared to wide-area sensors.
Questions From Honorable Matt Van Epps for Bryan Clark
Question 1a. In your view, what statutory authorities does the
Coast Guard currently lack to operate effectively in a contested Arctic
environment?
Question 1b. Should Congress expand the Coast Guard's role as a
military service in Arctic deterrence, or keep its primary law
enforcement and safety missions?
Answer. Yes, the Congress should expand the USCG's responsibilities
in the Arctic, given its expanding icebreaker fleet and the need for it
to help monitor for threats to the homeland well beyond U.S.
territorial waters or EEZs.
Question 2. U.S. infrastructure in the Arctic remains severely
outdated: insufficient rail networks make resource transportation
difficult, runways are incapable of sustained air travel, and radar and
communication sites date back to the Cold War.
In what ways have these infrastructure-related challenges
diminished the United States' advantage in the Arctic?
Answer. The lack of port facilities and airfields in the Arctic
reduces the presence U.S. forces can maintain in the region and
constrains their responsiveness to crises or emergencies. As
adversaries increase their operations in the Arctic, the inability of
U.S. forces to detect and interdict threats will create risks for the
U.S. homeland. The U.S. Government should encourage commercial
investment in the Arctic to create opportunities for dual-use
infrastructure that can support naval or Coast Guard operations.
Question 3a. One of our best opportunities to prepare for the
Arctic environment is through joint exercises like Cold Response 2026
and Joint Viking. But these are limited to certain military forces, and
our broader Arctic forces need increased opportunities to adapt to the
harsh environment.
Compared to their counterparts in other theaters, what differences
in capabilities and training, if any, are required for U.S. personnel
operating in the Arctic?
Answer. U.S. forces need to train on potential combat situations at
sea and in the air, like they do in other regions. Most U.S. Arctic
exercises currently center on ground troops, as they are a holdover
from the Cold War when U.S. forces expected to join their European
counterparts to defend against Soviet invasions.
For example, the DoW's Northern Edge exercise is a multi-domain,
large-scale combat demonstration and training event held annually in
Alaska. However, it is conducted during the summer and primarily
simulates a China-Taiwan conflict. U.S. forces can conduct electronic
warfare in the remote environment, and the sea/land interface provides
a useful backdrop for practicing counter-invasion operations. U.S.
forces should also conduct some air and maritime exercises in the Joint
Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) during the winter to exercise
cold-weather combat capabilities.
Question 3b. What challenges must they be prepared to overcome?
Answer. The main operational challenges are use and maintenance of
equipment in cold weather and addressing unique environmental aspects
of operating in the Arctic such as low ceilings, high winds, and poor
visibility. Additional challenges are communications and sensing in the
High North, because satellite networks provide less coverage there.
But the larger strategic issues are how forces are deployed to and
sustained in Arctic operating areas. Because it is intended to assess
readiness for a Western Pacific contingency, Northern Edge does not
test specific aspects of operating in and around Alaska. And other
exercises such as Arctic Edge do not include substantial air or any
naval operations. The U.S. Military needs to conduct realistic Arctic
combat exercises that address all domains, including space.
Question 4. Chinese investments in the Arctic increasingly include
dual-use technologies (i.e. satellite ground stations, undersea fiber-
optic cables, maritime domain awareness sensors, polar research
facilities) that can be used for military purposes.
How can the United States anticipate and mitigate risks from dual-
use technologies in Arctic waters?
Answer. The United States cannot eliminate or mitigate these
efforts by China but should seek to compete in these areas by making
commensurate investments in its own dual-use infrastructure.
Question 5a. Combatant commands, NATO members, and Departments
across the Federal Government operate on distinct communications
platforms and at different levels of classification.
What are the implications, and deficiencies, for the information-
sharing environment around Arctic security?
Answer. The lack of interoperable information management systems
creates seams that can result in threats being missed as they pass from
one domain or region to another. For example, the Navy manages the
Fixed Distributed System that surveils underwater areas in the north
Atlantic, along the U.S. coasts, and elsewhere. This system may not
interface directly with command-and-control systems being used by U.S.
Northern Command or DHS for homeland defense. As a result, undersea
threats like submarines or long-range underwater drones could be lost
as they move between regions or surveillance systems.
Question 5b. What opportunities exist to strengthen information
sharing in the region?
Answer. New command and control (C2) software suites like the Maven
Smart System (MSS) incorporate software tools that enable multi-level
security and integration of information from multiple disparate
intelligence and surveillance sources. By shifting the locus of
information sharing from networks to data, C2 systems like MSS allow
for greater interoperability between information sources and can more
easily share outputs with other C2 systems
Question 6a. Given the Arctic's huge area, harsh conditions, and
limited infrastructure, what kinds of emerging technologies such as
satellites, unmanned systems, or new sensing capabilities could help
the Coast Guard maintain better awareness while easing some of the
strain on its cutters?
Answer. The Coast Guard should expand its capacity for responsive
reconnaissance using long-endurance uncrewed air systems (UAS) that
could provide the ability to monitor large swaths of Arctic waters with
greater persistence and resolution compared to satellite systems. This
would ease the strain on cutters by allowing better identification of
threats and emergencies and prioritization of Coast Guard resources.
Another important for the Coast Guard is using AI in concert with
existing and new surveillance technologies. The Coast Guard could use
AI-enabled software packages that can evaluate recent sensor data and
predict where emergencies or adversary actions are likely to occur. The
Coast Guard could then prioritize cutter deployments to those areas.
Question 6b. How should the Coast Guard strategically invest in
these technologies to avoid strain on its current priority investments?
Answer. The Coast Guard should pursue more service-type contracts
for surveillance operations and analysis. Multiple companies can
operate long-endurance UAS and associated analytic processes as a
service. This would reduce the personnel and maintenance burden on the
Coast Guard, which is already undermanned and behind on cutter
maintenance.
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