[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEEPSEEK AND UNITREE ROBOTICS: EXAMINING THE NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS
OF PRC ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ROBOTICS, AND AUTONOMOUS
TECHNOLOGIES AND BUILDING A SECURE U.S. TECHNOLOGY BASE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 17, 2026
__________
Serial No. 119-42
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
64-201 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Chair Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Eric Swalwell, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida J. Luis Correa, California
August Pfluger, Texas Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Member
Gabe Evans, Colorado Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Brad Knott, North Carolina James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia
Vince Fong, California Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Al Green, Texas
Vacant
Keighle Joyce, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee, Chairman
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Eric Swalwell, California, Ranking
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Member
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Vince Fong, California LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Roland Hernandez, Subcommittee Staff Director
Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Vince Fong, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable James R. Walkinshaw, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Virginia:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Witnesses
Mr. Max Fenkell, Global Head of Policy and Government Relations,
Scale AI:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. Matthew Malchano, Vice President of Software, Boston
Dynamics:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Michael Robbins, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
Mr. Rush Doshi, Ph.D., C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia Studies
and Director of the China Strategy Initiative, Council on
Foreign Relations:
Oral Statement................................................. 31
Prepared Statement............................................. 34
DEEPSEEK AND UNITREE ROBOTICS: EXAMINING THE NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS
OF PRC ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ROBOTICS, AND AUTONOMOUS
TECHNOLOGIES AND BUILDING A SECURE U.S. TECHNOLOGY BASE
----------
Tuesday, March 17, 2026
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Vince Fong [Acting
Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives: Fong and Walkinshaw.
Mr. Fong. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee
on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure will come to order. Without
objection, the Chairman can declare the committee in recess at
any point.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine the national and
economic security risks to the United States by artificial
intelligence, robotics, and autonomous sensing technologies
developed by companies affiliated with the People's Republic of
China. This hearing will also evaluate whether existing Federal
guidance and supply chain security practices sufficiently
address the risks posed by China as these classes of emerging
technologies are rapidly adopted and our adversaries try to
keep pace with American innovation.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Good afternoon and thank you all for being here. Today,
this subcommittee is examining a national security challenge
that is currently unfolding inside the United States. The
People's Republic of China is moving aggressively to dominate
the technologies that are reshaping the global economy and
security, including artificial intelligence, robotics, and
autonomous systems. This competition is already present on
American campuses, in American police departments, on American
smartphones, and increasingly within systems connected to our
critical infrastructure.
The pattern behind this expansion should look familiar.
Chinese companies replicate or acquire American innovation,
benefit from large-scale state support, undercut competitors on
price, and then use the growing market presence to collect data
and expand Beijing's strategic reach. Washington saw this
pattern before in industries such as solar panels, drones, and
electric vehicles. We are now seeing it again in artificial
intelligence and robotics.
I want to start with DeepSeek because what happened during
the past year represents something genuinely alarming that we
have not fully reckoned with. In January 2025, a Chinese
artificial intelligence company called DeepSeek released a
model that rivaled the best systems produced by leading
American AI innovators at a claimed cost that was a fraction of
what American companies invested. The technology world and the
market was shocked. Observers called it an AI Sputnik moment.
But the real story was not just what DeepSeek built. It was
how. Within weeks of its release, American AI companies raise
serious concerns that DeepSeek used their proprietary models
without consent to train its own through a process known as
model distillation. Rather than investing years of effort and
billions of dollars in frontier research, DeepSeek appeared to
have fed outputs from leading American AI systems into its
training pipeline, illicitly reverse engineering the
capabilities those companies had developed through legitimate
investment.
More recently, in February 2026, DeepSeek, along with
Chinese AI firms MiniMax and Moonshot AI, had reportedly
orchestrated an industrial-scale campaign to extract
capabilities to distillation attacks. Further reporting
suggested that DeepSeek employees used third-party routers and
networks of unauthorized resellers to circumvent existing
safeguards and may have sought to override safety protections
around biological and chemical weapons research.
Let me be clear about what that means. DeepSeek did not
simply out-compete American companies. According to these
disclosures, it stole from them.
DeepSeek is not just a competitive concern. It is also a
data and influence concern sitting on millions of American
devices. The application is available today in the Apple App
Store. Every interaction is stored on servers located in the
People's Republic of China, where authorities can demand access
to that data under Chinese law. Researchers have also
documented that DeepSeek censors questions related to issues
sensitive to Beijing and frequently produces responses that
align with official Chinese Communist Party positions.
The same concerns apply to Unitree Robotics. Unitree has
become a dominant global supplier of robotic dogs and humanoid
robots, supported by Chinese manufacturing scale and State
subsidies that allow its products to be sold at a fraction of
the price of American systems. As a result, these robots are
already appearing in police departments, universities, and even
parts of the Federal Government here in the United States.
Researchers have discovered vulnerabilities in Unitree systems
that could allow unauthorized access to live camera feeds or
even remote control of the devices. Additional research has
identified weaknesses that could allow one compromised robot to
spread attacks to others nearby. Some of these systems have
also been observed transmitting operational data back to
servers located in China.
American companies are innovating and competing seriously
in robotics and artificial intelligence, and this subcommittee
strongly supports their work. The answer is not to retreat from
these technologies. It is to invest in trusted American
alternatives, strengthen cybersecurity practices, and prevent
Federal funds from supporting platforms that put American data
and infrastructure at risk and give China an economic and
military advantage.
The witnesses before us today have direct knowledge of
these threats and the larger dynamics at play across these
industries. I look forward to their testimony. Thank you.
[The statement of Chairman Fong follows:]
Statement of Chairman Vince Fong
March 17, 2026
Good morning and thank you all for being here.
Today, this subcommittee is examining a national security challenge
that is currently unfolding inside the United States.
The People's Republic of China is moving aggressively to dominate
the technologies that are reshaping the global economy and security,
including artificial intelligence, robotics, and autonomous systems.
This competition is already present on American campuses, in American
police departments, on American smartphones, and increasingly within
systems connected to our critical infrastructure.
The pattern behind this expansion should look familiar. Chinese
companies replicate or acquire American innovation, benefit from large-
scale state support, undercut competitors on price, and then use their
growing market presence to collect data and expand Beijing's strategic
reach.
Washington saw this pattern before in industries such as solar
panels, drones, and electric vehicles. We are now seeing it again in
artificial intelligence and robotics.
I want to start with DeepSeek, because what happened during the
past year represents something genuinely alarming that we have not
fully reckoned with.
In January 2025, a Chinese artificial intelligence company called
DeepSeek released a model that rivaled the best systems produced by
leading American AI innovators at a claimed cost that was a fraction of
what American companies invested. The technology world, and the market,
was shocked. Observers called it an AI Sputnik moment.
But the real story was not just what DeepSeek built. It was how.
Within weeks of its release, American AI companies raised serious
concerns that DeepSeek used their proprietary models, without consent,
to train its own through a process known as model distillation. Rather
than investing years of effort and billions of dollars in frontier
research, DeepSeek appeared to have fed outputs from leading American
AI systems into its training pipeline, illicitly reverse-engineering
the capabilities those companies had developed through legitimate
investment.
More recently, in February 2026, DeepSeek, along with Chinese AI
firms MiniMax and Moonshot AI, had reportedly orchestrated an
industrial-scale campaign to extract capabilities through distillation
attacks.
Further reporting suggested that DeepSeek employees used third-
party routers and networks of unauthorized resellers to circumvent
existing safeguards, and may have sought to override safety protections
around biological and chemical weapons research.
Let me be clear about what that means. DeepSeek did not simply
outcompete American companies. According to these disclosures, it stole
from them.
And DeepSeek is not just a competitive concern. It is also a data
and influence concern sitting on millions of American devices. The
application is available today in the Apple App Store. Every
interaction is stored on servers located in the People's Republic of
China, where authorities can demand access to that data under Chinese
law. Researchers have also documented that DeepSeek censors questions
related to issues sensitive to Beijing and frequently produces
responses that align with official Chinese Communist Party positions.
The same concerns apply to Unitree Robotics. Unitree has become a
dominant global supplier of robotic dogs and humanoid robots, supported
by Chinese manufacturing scale and state subsidies that allow its
products to be sold at a fraction of the price of American systems. As
a result, these robots are already appearing in police departments,
universities, and even parts of the Federal Government here in the
United States.
Researchers have discovered vulnerabilities in Unitree systems that
could allow unauthorized access to live camera feeds or even remote
control of the devices. Additional research has identified weaknesses
that could allow one compromised robot to spread attacks to others
nearby. Some of these systems have also been observed transmitting
operational data back to servers located in China.
American companies are innovating and competing seriously in
robotics and artificial intelligence, and this subcommittee strongly
supports their work. The answer is not to retreat from these
technologies. It is to invest in trusted American alternatives,
strengthen cybersecurity practices, and prevent Federal funds from
supporting platforms that put American data and infrastructure at risk
and give China an economic and military advantage.
The witnesses before us today have direct knowledge of these
threats and the larger dynamics at play across these industries. I look
forward to their testimony.
Thank you.
Mr. Fong. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman
from Virginia, Mr. Walkinshaw, for his opening statement.
Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon,
everyone. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the national
security risks posed by technological advances in the People's
Republic of China.
We are living through a period of rapid technological
transformation. AI, advanced computing, and digital
technologies are reshaping our economy and our national
security landscape. The implications are profound and the
United States must be prepared. Maintaining leadership and
technological innovation is not simply an economic priority. It
is a national security imperative.
To succeed, we must pursue policies that both drive
innovation at home and mitigate the risks posed by adversaries.
That requires a clear-eyed understanding of the PRC's strategy.
We have known for many years that the PRC views its
industrial policy as a critical tool to reshape the world order
and emerge as the economic leader in global superpower. With
extensive State investment in technology companies and laws
that enlist private companies to serve the interests of the
government, the PRC's military-civil fusion is a serious threat
to our own national security.
Historically, Congress has recognized this threat. There
has been bipartisan consensus around reducing supply chain
vulnerabilities, restricting the use of certain PRC
technologies, limiting exports of sensitive U.S. technologies,
and strengthening secure supply chains with trusted partners.
Unfortunately, policies of the Trump administration have
undermined that progress.
Upon taking office, President Trump took his DOGE chainsaw
to the Federal work force, weakening agencies essential to our
national security and scientific leadership. The Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, has lost nearly a
third of its work force because the Trump administration fired
people, reassigned people, or bullied people into quitting. At
the very moment our adversaries are expanding their cyber
arsenals, the administration is cutting our own defenses.
From the PRC to Russia to Iran, our adversaries leverage
cyber space and related technologies to fight international
conflicts on our homeland. We have seen Iran do this already.
Just last week, a pro-Iran Iran-connected hacker group caused
global disruptions at a major medical device manufacturer,
Stryker, in response to the President's war with Iran. The PRC
is a far more capable cyber actor than Iran, and the potential
consequences of a future conflict with the PRC are far more
severe.
Yet instead of strengthening our technological and
cybersecurity defenses, the administration has weakened the
agencies responsible for securing our networks and advancing
our scientific leadership. Key institutions, like the National
Science Foundation and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, NIST, have also seen major work force cuts. At a
time when technological competition is intensifying,
dismantling our technical expertise is incomprehensible to me.
The administration also launched a chaotic trade war that
fails to distinguish between allies and adversaries. Rather
than building trusted supply chains with our partners, these
erratic policies alienate allies and inject uncertainty into
the global economy.
Even more troubling, in the fall last year, the Trump
administration announced that it would allow for the export of
advanced semiconductors, Nvidia H200 chips, to the PRC. With
access to more advanced chips, the risk of a more rapid
frontier AI development in China increases. Imagine you were in
a race and only you had access to high-octane fuel that let you
drive 10 miles per hour faster than your opponent. Would you
give that high-octane fuel to your opponent, your opponent who
is determined to leave you in the dust and crush you? That is
what President Trump did. It was weak.
Finally, we should recognize a fundamental truth about
American innovation. The United States leads the world in
technology because we attract the best talent from around the
globe. Immigrants have played an outsized role in building our
technology sector. Policies and statements that target
immigrants do not strengthen America. They weaken our ability
to compete with our adversaries. We could spend all day naming
the immigrants who have played a critical role in developing
technologies that advance American economic and national
security. I will name just a few.
Sal Khan, the son of a Bengali Muslim immigrant, created
Khan Academy, household name, and in 2023, launched Khanmigo,
an AI-powered personal tutor and teaching assistant now offered
free to every teacher in every classroom in the United States.
Rana el Kaliouby, an Egyptian-American who founded
Affectiva, which built AI that understands human emotions and
cognitive states by analyzing facial and voice expressions. She
cohosts a PBS NOVA series on AI.
Dina Katabi, an immigrant from Syria, who is one of MIT's
most decorated scientists, the winner of every science award
there is to win. She developed an AI-powered device that can
detect Parkinson's based on how a patient breathes at night.
Mr. Chairman, these are some of the people that Chairman
Ogles and other Republicans in this body recently said don't
belong in America. Sal Khan's father came to this country from
Bangladesh, Rana el Kaliouby from Egypt, Dina Katabi from
Syria, all happened to be Muslim. Together, along with many
others, they are helping America win the AI race, win the
robotics race, win the technology race. Our adversaries, China,
Russia, Iran, would love nothing more than for us to drive out
the scientists, engineers, innovators, and entrepreneurs who
help make this country the most advanced and, yes, the greatest
nation on Earth.
So I beg my colleagues, I beg you, Chairman Ogles, stop
doing their work for them. With that, I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses.
I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Walkinshaw follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member James Walkinshaw
March 17, 2026
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the national security risks
posed by technological advances in the People's Republic of China.
We are living through a period of rapid technological
transformation. Artificial intelligence, advanced computing, and
digital technologies are reshaping our economy and our national
security landscape. The implications are profound, and the United
States must be prepared. Maintaining leadership in technological
innovation is not simply an economic priority, it is a national
security imperative.
To succeed, we must pursue policies that both drive innovation at
home and mitigate the risks posed by adversaries. That requires a
clear-eyed understanding of the PRC's strategy. We have known for many
years that the PRC views its industrial policy as a critical tool to
reshape the world order and emerge as an economic leader and global
superpower. With extensive state investment in technology companies and
laws that enlist private companies to serve the interest of the
government, the PRC's military-civil fusion is a serious threat to our
own national security.
Historically, Congress has recognized this threat. There has been
bipartisan consensus around reducing supply chain vulnerabilities,
restricting the use of certain PRC technologies, limiting exports of
sensitive U.S. technologies, and strengthening secure supply chains
with trusted partners. Unfortunately, the policies of the Trump
administration have undermined that progress.
Upon taking office, President Trump took his DOGE chainsaw to the
Federal workforce, weakening agencies essential to our national
security and scientific leadership. The Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency--CISA--has lost nearly a third of its
workforce because the Trump administration fired people, reassigned
people, or bullied people into quitting. At the very moment our
adversaries are expanding their cyber arsenals, the Trump
administration is cutting our own defenses.
From the PRC to Russia to Iran, our adversaries leverage cyber
space and related technologies to fight international conflicts on our
homeland. We've seen Iran do this already. Just last week, a pro-Iran
hacker caused global disruptions at a major medical device
manufacturer--Stryker--in response to the President's war with Iran.
The PRC is a far more capable cyber actor, and the potential
consequences of a future cyber conflict with the PRC are far more
severe.
Yet instead of strengthening our technological and cybersecurity
defenses, the administration has weakened the agencies responsible for
securing our networks and advancing our scientific leadership.
Key institutions like the National Science Foundation and the
National Institute of Standards and Technology have also seen major
workforce cuts. At a time when technological competition is
intensifying, dismantling our Government's technical expertise is
incomprehensible.
The Trump administration has also launched a chaotic trade war that
fails to distinguish between allies and adversaries. Rather than
building trusted supply chains with our partners, these erratic tariff
policies alienate allies and inject uncertainty into the global
economy. Even more troubling, in the fall, the Trump administration
announced that it would allow for the export of advanced
semiconductors--NVIDIA H200 Chips--to the PRC.
With access to more advanced chips, the risk of more rapid frontier
AI development in China only increases. Imagine you were in a race and
only you had access to high-octane fuel that let you drive 10 mph
faster than your opponent. Would you give that high octane fuel to your
opponent? Your opponent who is determined to leave you in the dust and
then crush you? That's what Trump did. It was weak.
Finally, we should recognize a fundamental truth about American
innovation. The United States leads the world in technology because we
attract the best talent from around the globe. Immigrants have played
an outsized role in building our technology sector. Policies that
target immigrants do not strengthen America--they weaken our ability to
compete with our adversaries.
We could spend all day naming the immigrants who have played a
critical role in developing technologies that advance American economic
and national security. I'll name just a few. Sal Khan, the son of a
Bengali-Muslim immigrant, created Khan Academy and in 2023 launched
Khanmigo, an AI-powered personal tutor and teaching assistant now
offered free to every teacher in the United States.
Rana el Kaliouby, an Egyptian-American who founded Affectiva, which
built AI that understands human emotions and cognitive states by
analyzing facial and voice expressions. She co-hosts a PBS NOVA series
on AI. And Dina Katabi, an immigrant from Syria, who is one of MIT's
most decorated scientists, winner of every science award there is to
win, who developed an AI-powered device that can detect Parkinson's
based on how a patient breathes at night.
Mr. Chairman, these are the people you recently said don't belong
in America. Sal Khan's father came to this country from Bangladesh,
Rana el Kaliouby came from Egypt. Dina Katabi came from Syria. All
happen to be Muslim. And together, along with many, many others, they
are helping America win the AI race, win the robotics race, win the
technology race.
Our adversaries--China, Russia, Iran--would love nothing more than
for us to drive out the scientists, engineers, innovators, and
entrepreneurs who make this country the most advanced--and, yes, the
greatest--nation on Earth. I beg you . . . Stop doing their work for
them.
Mr. Fong. Thank you, Ranking Member Walkinshaw. Other
Members of the committee are reminded that opening statements
may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
March 17, 2026
Before I begin, I would like to address disparaging comments about
immigrants and America's Muslim community made by my Republican
colleagues on social media. As Members of Congress, our job is to
advocate vigorously for policy positions that make the Nation more
secure, more prosperous, and more just. Maligning entire groups of
people while parroting bigoted stereotypes does nothing to achieve any
of those ends.
When I began my work in the civil rights movement in the 1960's,
there were people in this country who thought Black people didn't
belong in schools, didn't belong in certain jobs, and didn't belong at
polling places, much less on the ballot. Americans across the political
spectrum worked hard to dismantle entrenched beliefs that certain types
of people were less deserving of being American or enjoying the full
benefits of citizenship.
I'm disturbed that today, in 2026, Republicans in Congress are
devoting so much energy to undoing the progress we made and
perpetuating such ugly divisions. As Members of the Homeland Security
Committee, our job is to keep the homeland secure--and that requires
uniting Americans, not dividing them. I urge my colleagues to stop
their divisive rhetoric about their fellow Americans and immigrants--
you are putting entire populations of people at risk.
Turning to the subject of today's hearing, we have known for well
over a decade that the United States would need to work aggressively to
maintain its dominance in technology. Our most formidable competitor--
the People's Republic of China--is willing to do things the United
States will not in pursuit of innovation. Notably, the PRC has a
notorious track record of engaging in intellectual property theft.
As we've seen with DeepSeek, the PRC entities will devote
significant resources to stealing U.S. AI models, as it is has done
with Anthropic and Open AI. The PRC has also invested significant
government resources in tech innovation, through which it intends to
gain global influence economically and politically. Although the United
States would not and should not engage in the kind of intellectual
property theft supported by the PRC, we can and should certainly be
investing in tech innovation.
Unfortunately, the Trump administration has gutted investment in
agencies that support research and development. Moreover, the
administration has decimated agencies responsible for mitigating the
national security risks associated with the emerging dual-use
technologies that will define the 21st Century. This committee oversees
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.
Bipartisan Members of this committee established CISA to empower
the United States Government to harness the potential of emerging
technology securely while defending against the malicious use cases our
adversaries might pursue.
Over the past 8 years, CISA has taken on that mantle, building
programs to advise critical infrastructure owners and operators on how
to deploy security technologies to defend against modern threats and
helping tech companies build security into their products so that they
are safe for the digital ecosystem out of the box. Unfortunately, the
Trump administration harassed one-third of CISA's staff into leaving
their jobs, leaving United States less secure as the PRC more
aggressively pursues its tech innovation agenda. The President has also
recklessly ceded America's competitive edge in AI by permitting the
sale of high-powered AI chips to the PRC.
If the President is sincere in his commitment to pursuing ``America
first'' policies, he has a funny way of showing it. I look forward to
discussing what the United States can do--on our own and with our
allies--to facilitate innovation and preserve our competitive edge in
tech innovation.
Mr. Fong. I am pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today on this important topic. Pursuant to
committee rule VII(C), I ask that our witnesses please rise and
raise their right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Fong. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have
answered in the affirmative. Thank you. Please be seated.
I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses.
First, Mr. Max Fenkell is the global head of policy and
government relations at Scale AI, where he leads the company's
global engagement on AI governance, data policy, and emerging
technology strategy to shape frameworks that ensure U.S.
technological leadership and national security while promoting
innovation. Prior to joining Scale, he most recently held jobs
and roles at Joby Aviation and the Aerospace Industries
Association.
Next, Mr. Matthew Malchano is the vice president of
software at Boston Dynamics, where he has worked for 22 years,
contributing to projects on advanced robotics technologies, AI,
and autonomy. He also currently holds the role of Boston
Dynamics' security officer. Mr. Malchano holds degrees from MIT
in computer science and electrical engineering, and prior to
Boston Dynamics, worked in software development and engineering
roles at Akamai Technologies and Google.
Mr. Michael Robbins is the president and CEO at the
Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International, an
association representing uncrewed systems, robotics, and
autonomous companies in both the commercial and defense
sectors. Mr. Robbins also currently serves as the MITRE
Corporation's Aviation Advisory Committee and the National
Advanced Mobility Consortium's Advisory Committee, and is an
officer in the United States Naval Reserve. Thank you for your
service.
Dr. Rush Doshi is the C.V. Starr senior fellow for Asia
studies and director of the China Strategy Initiative at the
Council on Foreign Relations, and is an assistant professor at
Georgetown's School of Foreign Service. His expertise includes
China's foreign policy, U.S. strategy toward China, cross-
strait issues, and Indo-Pacific security. Prior to joining CFR,
Dr. Doshi most recently served on the National Security
Council's China Directorate.
I thank each of our distinguished witnesses for being here
today.
I now recognize Mr. Fenkell for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MAX FENKELL, GLOBAL HEAD OF POLICY AND GOVERNMENT
RELATIONS, SCALE AI
Mr. Fenkell. Chairman Fong, Ranking Member Walkinshaw,
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today. My name is Max Fenkell and I lead
global policy and government relations at Scale AI.
Since 2016, we have worked with nearly every major AI lab,
powered Fortune 500 companies and the most ambitious government
AI programs, and are now at the frontier of physical AI and
robotics. We do this across two main lines of effort: providing
high-quality data to train, improve and evaluate AI models; and
building applications to help our customers bring AI into
production. Let me start with a reflection of where things
stand today.
Last month, Chinese viewers rang in the Lunar New Year
watching AI-powered humanoid robots perform coordinated martial
arts on live television. The video went viral not because it
was impressive, but because of what happened when people
compared it to last year. Twelve months ago, those same robots
could barely shuffle through a dance routine. This year they
were doing karate. That is the speed of this competition.
The United States is winning on the dimensions Washington
tracks: the models and the chips. But we are losing where the
future will be decided: data and implementation. We are seeing
two different races play out. I fear right now the United
States may be winning the wrong one.
Nowhere is that gap more alarming than in physical AI and
robotics. Unlike large language models, which train on data
scraped from the internet, robots have no such resource. A
robot learns by doing in the physical world. That requires
thousands of hours of real-world data collected, labeled, and
ready to train on. This is why autonomous vehicles spend months
driving city streets before launch. Every mile is training
data.
For robotics think warehouse-scale facilities filled with
machines running around the clock not to move goods, but to
generate the fuel that trains the next generation of AI. China
has industrialized that process. We have not. According to
Scale's internal estimates, China owns roughly 90 percent of
the commercially-available robotics AI data market today. They
produce that data at 60 percent lower cost than U.S. companies
can match.
The U.S. Government invests roughly $100 million a year in
AI data. China invests 1 to 1.5 billion, 10 to 15 times more.
They have 7 government-directed data labeling hubs and
warehouses with robots running 17 hours a day solely to
generate training data. By all accounts, this is a state-
directed campaign to win.
That structural advantage has direct national security
consequences. The same platforms training on Chinese data today
are candidates for deployment in American ports, hospitals,
defense facilities, and homes tomorrow. The data that trains
these systems shapes how they behave, what they optimize for,
and where they are vulnerable. Ceding the robotics data layer
to China is not a technology policy concern. It is a critical
infrastructure risk and the window to address it is closing
fast.
Winning requires a whole-of-Government approach and 4 key
actions. First, investigate Chinese robotics data as a national
security threat and treat U.S. data as a national asset.
Congress should ask the national security apparatus to study
this dependency and require U.S. Government data assets be made
AI-ready.
Second, establish one national regulatory framework for
artificial intelligence. This should govern outputs, not
inputs. A patchwork of state rules is not a regulatory system.
It is a competitive liability.
Third, mandate government AI deployment. The Department of
War has transitioned one AI program--to program of record since
2016. China deployed 81 large language models into their
People's Liberation Army in the first half of 2024 alone, 1
versus 81. That is not a technology gap. It is a failure of
will. Congress should direct every agency to launch at least 5
flagship agentic AI programs by 2028 to start to fill the gap.
Fourth, export the AI technology stack to our allies before
China does. China won on 5G because America didn't show up with
a competitive alternative. We are at that same fork in the road
on AI right now today. The Exporting the American AI Tech Stack
Executive Order is a great first step, but Congress must codify
and resource it.
This is not the first time America has faced a defining
technological competition and is not the first time the outcome
looked uncertain. We have every asset required to win: the
talent, the capital, and the allies. The variable is urgency,
and the time to act is now. Scale is fully committed to
supporting the United States in this race. We look forward to
working with Congress and the Trump administration to find ways
to do just that.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fenkell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Max Fenkell
March 17, 2026
Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member Swalwell, and Members of the House
Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Protection, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today. My name is Max Fenkell, and I serve as Scale AI's
(Scale) global head of policy and government relations. This hearing
comes at a critical time for the future of United States leadership in
artificial intelligence (AI), and I appreciate the chance to discuss
the steps necessary to ensure the United States wins the global AI
race.
introduction
Over the past 5 years, no topic has captured global attention more
than AI and since our founding in 2016, Scale has been at the forefront
of AI innovation. Every day, our company works to build reliable AI
systems for the world's most important decisions. We work across the
entirety of the AI ecosystem, supporting customers from AI labs
developing frontier models, to governments and enterprises looking to
implement AI solutions. We do this in two main ways: first, by building
high-quality, frontier data to develop, improve, and evaluate AI
models; and second, by building applications to deliver solutions.
In the earliest days of our company, we started by building the
Data Engine to power the autonomous vehicle industry. Later, that same
Data Engine matured to serve as the foundational infrastructure to
power the generative AI (GenAI) revolution; it now powers leading AI
companies working to bring the technology into the physical world
through robotics and autonomous systems. Our expertise in data has also
enabled us to understand how to best implement our AI solutions across
leading enterprises and governments, placing us at the forefront of AI
deployment. Today, our Data Engine has powered the most ambitious
Government AI programs, shaped the frontier of industry, and is
actively working to power the next generation of agentic and physical
AI platforms.
AI has always been powered by a data foundation, and winning on
data will contribute to the United States winning on AI. Scale directly
enables this to occur.
winning starts with the right strategy
To start, it is useful to understand the AI tech stack. Across
almost all use cases, AI fundamentally boils down to four parts:
compute, model, data, and applications. Compute refers to the chips
that power AI development and implementation; models are the engine
that powers the AI to be useful; data is what makes the AI robust and
intelligent; and applications leverage the rest of the tech stack to
deliver high-quality AI solutions.
Understanding the state of the AI race requires examining
leadership across each element of the tech stack. While the United
States maintains an advantage on models and compute, China has
established significant advantages in data and large-scale deployment.
China continues to invest aggressively across the entire tech stack
through an approach that fundamentally differs from the United States.
The United States is chasing technological superiority, whereas China
is looking to win on implementation \1\ and diffusion of its technology
across the world.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-vows-
accelerate-technological-self-reliance-ai-push-2026-03-05/.
\2\ See, https://www.index.dev/blog/chinese-open-source-ai-models-
statistics.
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As the AI industry continues to advance from a model-first approach
to applications and embodied AI platforms, it is clear that the country
that best implements AI solutions will reap the biggest benefit.
Leadership in chips and models alone will not be sufficient. Without a
stronger focus on implementation and deployment, the United States
risks falling behind and never catching up.
robotics is the next frontier, but the united states is not currently
in the race
Since the public release of generative AI systems in November
2022,\3\ they have garnered much of the world's attention. However,
this represents only the beginning of the AI transformation. AI
capabilities are already evolving beyond conversational systems toward
agentic workflows, and the next wave of AI will see models shift from
text-based to physical, powering real-world systems such as robotics.
Winning on these systems requires a fundamentally different approach
from the ground up, starting with how you train the models.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChatGPT.
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Training a Large Language Model (LLM) requires two foundational
steps. The first is pre-training: training on publicly-available data.
The second is post-training: augmenting a pre-trained model with high-
quality, human decisions to fine-tune and evaluate it. Once completed,
that AI model is deployed through a user interface and constantly
improved based on real-world feedback.
A physical AI system follows a different path. These systems
require the collection of thousands of hours of real-world data prior
to the labeling process. Once collected, that data is labeled, tagged,
and annotated to build a high-quality Vision Language Action Model, and
once deployed in a real-world environment, it is augmented by real-
world data to continuously improve.
This is why autonomous vehicles spend months driving city streets
before launch--every mile is training data. For robotics, the
equivalent is warehouse-scale facilities filled with machines running
around the clock, not to move goods, but to generate the data that
trains the next generation of AI systems. China has industrialized this
process in a way the United States has not. According to Scale's
internal estimates, China owns roughly 90 percent of the commercially-
available robotics AI data industry today and produces it at 60 percent
lower cost than U.S. companies can match. More investment alone will
not close that gap. The advantage China has built is structural, state-
directed, and years in the making.
The reason for this lies in China's approach. For many years, China
has viewed data dominance as a key pillar of its AI Master Plan. While
the U.S. Government directly invests roughly $100 million a year in AI
data, China invests between 10x and 15x more, or roughly between $1
billion and $1.5 billion annually.\4\ However, the difference extends
beyond the investment levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ These statistics are based on Scale's internal analysis of
publicly-available sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China currently has 7 data-labeling hubs \5\ across the country,
provides government tax credits and subsidies for AI data,\6\ and
operates multiple of the world's largest warehouses with robots working
up to 17 hours per day for the sole purpose of data collection.\7\ This
is not organic industrial development: it is a state-directed campaign
to leverage the entirety of state capacity to control the foundational
inputs of AI before the United States recognizes the threat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202404/1309974.shtml.
\6\ See, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202501/14/
content_WS67859ba1c6d0868f4e8eeca- 1.html.
\7\ See, https://robotsbeat.com/china-closes-robotics-gap-physical-
ai/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The national security implications are clear. The same AI models
being integrated into platforms and trained on Chinese data today are
candidates for deployment in American homes, ports, hospitals,
warehouses, and defense facilities tomorrow. The data that trains these
systems shapes how they behave, what they optimize for, and where they
are vulnerable. Ceding the robotics data layer to China is not an
abstract technology policy concern, it is a critical infrastructure
risk.
If the United States wants to win, we must recognize that the race
is not just about platforms or technology superiority: we must also win
on data. As with every form of AI, winning comes down to having a data
advantage. Beyond global leadership, relying on Chinese data to train
American companies' AI platforms carries significant security risks:
supply chain issues, data poisoning,\8\ backdooring,\9\ and more.
Unless we change our approach quickly, we will be almost entirely
reliant on China to build America's robotics industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See, https://www.knostic.ai/blog/ai-data-
poisoning?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
\9\ See, https://cybernews.com/security/dji-robot-vacuum-backdoor/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
winning requires four key actions
Given the state of the global AI race and China's clear strategic
advantage, the United States must act with urgency. The United States
is winning the AI race on the dimensions we can see--the models and the
chips. We are losing it on the dimensions that will ultimately decide
the outcome: data and implementation. Winning is not just about
building the best technology; it is also about successfully deploying
these systems across real-world applications. To achieve this, 4
actions are necessary:
First, investigate Chinese robotics data as a national security
threat and treat U.S. data as a national asset.--China's growing
dominance in the robotics AI data raises significant national security
concerns for U.S. industry, and an over-reliance on China to provide
our leading companies with AI-ready data carries risks that should be
carefully examined and mitigated. Further, we should explore how the
U.S. Government's best-in-class data could be better leveraged as a
strategic asset for AI leadership. Multiple National AI Strategies have
called AI-ready data vital to advancing AI, and while progress has been
made, more must be done to translate these commitments into action.
China is taking a whole-of-government approach to winning on data. The
United States must be prepared to match that intensity--and where
possible, surpass it.
Recommendation.--Congress should immediately ask the National
Security apparatus to study the risks associated with an over-
reliance on Chinese robotics data. Additionally, Congress
should require Federal data assets be made AI-ready and put in
place Government-wide AI-ready data infrastructure to harness
it.
Second, establish the right regulatory framework that maximizes
innovation while putting in place guardrails where needed.--The right
framework will lay the groundwork for global leadership. Scale strongly
believes that this system starts with a use-case-based approach that
leverages the existing regulatory system, finding and filling gaps if
they exist. The right model governs outputs, not inputs--just as the
Government does not regulate a laptop, it regulates the malicious use
of a laptop. AI should be governed the same way. Where a regulation is
sufficient, it requires clear implementation and compliance guidance,
as well as third-party testing to verify compliance. Regulation that
handicaps American AI companies is not sound policy; it is a strategic
concession to Beijing.
Recommendation.--Congress should work to pass a legislative package
that sets one national framework for AI governance and codifies
the regulatory gap analysis approach.
Third, shift to an implementation-first mindset.--As previously
stated, the United States is pursuing technology superiority whereas
China has an implementation-first mindset. This is most visible in
government adoption for defense use cases. Since 2016, the Department
of War has successfully transitioned only one AI program to a Program
of Record. In contrast, China implemented 81 LLMs into People's
Liberation Army operations in the first half of 2024 alone.\10\ This is
true across the private sector as well. Recent studies show that only
roughly 1 in 20 enterprise AI pilots reach production.\11\ If we want
to win, we must shift to an implementation-first approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See, https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-trends/article/3267866/
chinas-public-sector-accelerates-ai-adoption-2024-zhipu-and-iflytek-
emerge-winners.
\11\ See, https://fortune.com/2025/08/18/mit-report-95-percent-
generative-ai-pilots-at-companies-failing-cfo/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation.--Congress should require Federal departments and
agencies to stand up at least 5 flagship agentic AI programs,
or programs that leverage frontier AI capabilities to solve for
individual use cases, no later than the end of 2028. The over
1,700 AI use cases already identified across the Federal
Government make clear that agencies know where AI can be most
effective--the barrier is not imagination, it is execution.
Additionally, they should set up an interagency working group
tasked and empowered to break down all barriers to Government
AI implementation and use every tool at their disposal to
encourage private-sector adoption of agentic AI solutions.
Fourth, export the AI tech stack to our allies and partners.--For
too long, the United States has allowed China to dominate global tech
exports through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and
Digital Silk Road,\12\ which saw China win on 5G. This has led to
China's technology becoming the global standard around the world and
this cannot happen on AI. Countries around the world, or AI
geopolitical swing states, will soon be forced to choose between
deploying Western or Chinese technology. The Trump administration has
taken critical steps to counter China's exports around the world
through the ``Promoting the Export of the AI Technology Stack''\13\
Executive Order, but this must only be a starting point. It is critical
that Congress codifies key provisions from this Executive Order and
ensures that the Departments of State and Commerce are resourced to
effectively carry out their mandates. Global leadership on AI starts
with becoming the global standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ See, https://www.cfr.org/china-digital-silk-road/.
\13\ See, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/
promoting-the-export-of-the-american-ai-technology-stack/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation.--Congress should immediately work to codify this
Executive Order and ensure adequate funding for the agencies
tasked with implementing it.
conclusion
The AI race will not be won in a laboratory or manufacturing plant
alone. It will be won through the strategic decisions we make today.
This is not the first time America has faced a defining technological
competition, and we have every asset required to win: the talent, the
capital, and the allies. The variable is urgency.
Despite years of strong rhetoric, a clear-eyed understanding of
where this race is actually being run has been missing. It is being run
on data and implementation, and without direct action, we will lose.
The window to act is open, but it will not remain open
indefinitely.
Scale is fully committed to supporting the United States in the
global AI race. We look forward to working with this committee to find
ways to do just that.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here and I look forward
to your questions.
Mr. Fong. Thank you very much.
I now recognize Mr. Malchano for 5 minutes to summarize
your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW MALCHANO, VICE PRESIDENT OF SOFTWARE,
BOSTON DYNAMICS
Mr. Malchano. Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee,
I am the vice president of software at Boston Dynamics and I
serve as the company's security officer, responsible for
overseeing our cybersecurity and data sovereignty protocols.
At Boston Dynamics, our mission has always been to create a
future in which humans and machines work together to improve
everyone's safety, productivity, and quality of life. Our
robots are in use in manufacturing facilities, semiconductor
fabrication, energy plants, and by first responders. Our robots
are used by the Secret Service to protect the President and by
military agencies to neutralize the threat of IEDs. One of our
robots has taken bullets in the line of duty, keeping police
and bystanders safe from harm. We have a growing work force of
over 1,000 employees and proudly design and manufacture our
robots in the United States.
There are at least 4 reasons why robotics should be a top
policy priority for Congress. First, advanced robots are the
physical manifestation of AI. Robots leverage AI techniques
such as computer vision and reinforcement learning to perform a
wide range of useful tasks. In order to win the AI race, we
must also win the robotics race.
Second, robots are increasingly crucial in manufacturing.
Humanoids allow for automated physical operations and work
spaces designed and built for humans. The countries that build
and deploy robots will be the ones that will manufacture on
their own shores and address demographic challenges. Robotics
will be crucial to economic security.
Third, robots present new and unique classes of
cybersecurity risk and beyond AI and computer systems. The
combination of hardware, software, sensors, mobility, and
communications makes advanced mobile robots higher risk than
other IoT technologies. Attackers could sabotage those systems
to interfere with manufacturing lines or halt security patrols.
Robots are becoming a potent threat vector to crucial
infrastructure.
Fourth, robotic technologies are dual-use. Robots with
enhanced mobility and AI-powered capabilities will become
increasingly important in military applications. We have seen
how aerial robotics, namely drones intended for consumer use,
can become a pivotal technology in warfare. Robots increasingly
will become part of national defense strategies.
The Chinese government understands this. This is why China
just released a new 5-year plan that identifies robotics as
their top new industry tracks. The plan envisions transforming
virtually every major industry in China by integrating AI-
powered robots. It unlocks access to funding and implements
policies that drive adoption across industries, creating a
flywheel effect for robot AI. As one analyst remarked, this is
less an industrial policy for robots than an industrial policy
through robots.
This government support isn't new. Previous government
plans from the past decade outline the many mechanisms and
policies that have supported Chinese robotics industry. These
plans are already working. China last year adopted and
installed 10 times more robots in factories than the United
States.
China also uses its little giant designation to provide
companies with government funding and support. One of the
companies designated as a little giant is Unitree, the most
visible Chinese company selling legged robots in the United
States. Unitree is rapidly capturing market share in the U.S.
university, research, and law enforcement markets. Researchers
have reported crucial Unitree cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
Unitree's products have also been seen in PLA military
exercises and its ties to Chinese military have been noted by
the House Select Committee on China as well as the Department
of War. So it's not surprising that Unitree has captured the
attention of this committee and the U.S. Government.
However, there are dozens of other Chinese companies
working to develop advanced robotics technologies powered by
AI. At the recent CES Las Vegas show, Chinese robots on
display, humanoids, outnumbered American humanoids by 5 to 1.
While Unitree deserves close scrutiny, a broad whole-of-
Government strategic approach is what's truly needed. This is
why we are asking for the development and launch of a national
robotics strategy consistent with a broad set of policies
designed to support the growth and success of the industry.
Time is running out for policy efforts to have an impact.
The recently-introduced National Robotics Commission Act, H.R.
7334, would kick-start the process of developing such a
strategy. We urge Congress to pass this bill.
We also respectfully ask this subcommittee to direct CISA
to swiftly undertake a security evaluation of foreign robots.
Independent researchers have already revealed crucial
vulnerabilities, but a more comprehensive Government-directed
study would provide broader guidance to users and Government
about the risk of foreign robotics projects.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. I
welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Malchano follows:]
Prepared Statement of Matthew Malchano
March 17, 2026
Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member Swalwell, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this
very important and timely topic. I am vice president of software at
Boston Dynamics, the world's leading developer of advanced mobile
robots. I also serve as the company's security officer, responsible for
overseeing our cybersecurity and data sovereignty protocols. Having
worked for the company for 22 years in leadership and technical roles,
on both commercial products and Government projects, I have witnessed
our industry's transition from its initial era of academic
experimentation, to Government-funded research projects, to early
commercial deployment and, now, to a company that is engaged in one of
the most consequential global competitions in advanced technology.
Our company, founded over 30 years ago by a Massachusetts Institute
of Technology professor and his students, is at the forefront of an
industry which will result in advanced mobile robots becoming common in
industrial, public safety, entertainment, defense and security
applications. Advanced mobile robots are still a new technology, but
our robots are already in use in manufacturing facilities,
semiconductor fabrication plants,\1\ energy plants,\2\ as well as in
police departments. One of our robots has even taken bullets in the
line of duty.\3\ Our robots are used by the United States Secret
Service to protect the President,\4\ and by military agencies to
investigate and neutralize the threat of improvised explosive
devices.\5\ We are headquartered in Massachusetts, with a growing
workforce of over 1,000 employees, and we proudly design and
manufacture our robots in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Global Foundries Case Study, available at https://
bostondynamics.com/case-studies/globalfoundries/.
\2\ See Meet Chevron's New Energy Watchdog, available at https://
bostondynamics.com/case-studies/meet-chevrons-new-energy-watchdog/.
\3\ See ``Robotic police dog shot multiple times, credited with
avoiding potential bloodshed,'' Associated Press, March 27, 2024,
available at https://apnews.com/article/massachusetts-cape-cod-robot-
dog-polic-f63586d5286750702f396109c9a81836.
\4\ See ``Robotic dogs are patrolling Mar-a-Lago to help protect
Trump, Secret Service confirms,'' FOX 59, November 8, 2024, available
at https://fox59.com/news/national-world/robotic-dogs-are-patrolling-
mar-a-lago-to-help-protect-trump-secret-service-confirms/.
\5\ See ``Boston Dynamics Awarded Contract to Supply Spot to the
Dutch Ministry of Defence,'' available at https://bostondynamics.com/
blog/boston-dynamics-awarded-contract-to-supply-spot-to-the-dutch-
ministry-of-defence/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exciting recent advances in AI are already accelerating the
development of a new generation of mobile robots. Computer vision
enables robots to perceive their environment, recognize objects, and
offer contextually relevant services. Vision and natural language
processing will enable us to more easily communicate with robots using
language and gestures. Motion control software, created by machine
learning and reinforcement learning, increasingly drives the robots,
accelerating their development. Robots now learn tasks using AI
technologies to observe and analyze the movements of people or other
robots doing that task.\6\ But these advances in AI also enable
competitors, including those headquartered in foreign adversarial
nations, to quickly close the gap in capabilities. Their robots and
ours can now be built and programmed in 30 months to do what our
company once took 30 years to develop.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ For a recent explanation from our robotics AI team of how we
are using AI to make robots more capable than ever before, with
accompanying illustrative videos, please see ``Large Behavior Models
and Atlas Find New Footing,'' Boston Dynamics, available at https://
bostondynamics.com/blog/large-behavior-models-atlas-find-new-footing/.
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the new generation of robotics raises economic security and national
security risks
The types of products or machines that could be described as a
``robot'' are very broad. I focus my testimony on what I call advanced
robotic technologies. Advanced robotic technologies consist of highly-
agile mobile robots designed to be put to work in a variety of
environments and applications, and whose functionality is trained by,
or enhanced by, artificial intelligence methodologies. These types of
robots raise heightened economic security interests and national
security risks, and therefore should most squarely be the focus of
Federal policy, for the following reasons:
1. Advanced robotic technologies are dual-use.--A robot developed
to navigate complex environments, using legs or other methods providing
enhanced agility and dexterity, will eventually be useful in the
battlefield. Just in the past few months, we have seen Chinese-made
quadrupeds exhibited during China's military parade,\7\ and videos of
Chinese humanoids training to fight in hand-to-hand combat.\8\ There
have also been reports of quadrupeds, developed by Chinese robotics
companies including the company identified in the title of this
hearing, armed with machine guns and used in joint military training
exercises in Cambodia.\9\ And of course, U.S. forces have been using
mobile robots for years to investigate and mitigate IEDs. Robots with
enhanced mobility and AI-powered capabilities will be even more
important in military applications, and we have seen in recent years
how aerial robotics (drones), including those designed and intended for
commercial or consumer use, can become consequential, or even outcome-
determinant, in warfare.\10\ Therefore, ensuring the success and growth
of the domestic advanced robotics industry, including ground robotics
systems designed and developed for commercial and industrial
applications, is of national security importance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See ``Weaponised `robot wolves' make cameo at China military
parade,'' The Guardian, September 5, 2025, available at https://
www.theguardian.com/world/video/2025/sep/04/weaponised-robot-wolves-
make-cameo-at-big-china-military-parade-video.
\8\ See ``China Just Held the First-Ever Humanoid Robot Fight
Night,'' Vice.com, May 27, 2025, available at https://www.vice.com/en/
article/china-just-held-the-first-ever-humanoid-robot-fight-night/.
\9\ See ``Meet the Chinese army's latest weapon: the gun-toting
dog,'' The Guardian, May 30, 2024, available at https://
www.theguardian.com/science/article/2024/may/30/chinese-armys-latest-
weapon-gun-toting-dog.
\10\ ``Ukraine Says More Than 80 percent of Enemy Targets Now
Destroyed by Drones,'' Defense News, January 28, 2026, available at
https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/01/28/ukraine-says-more-
than-80-of-enemy-targets-now-destroyed-by-drones/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Advanced robotic technologies are increasingly crucial in the
manufacture, production, and supply chain of other goods.--These
technologies will help address workforce shortages of the future due to
demographic inevitabilities arising from diminishing birth rates in the
United States and elsewhere. Humanoids and similar form factors allow
for automated physical operations in work spaces designed and built for
humans, allowing existing infrastructure and factories to remain in
operation even during labor shortages. The countries that build and
deploy these advanced robots will be the ones that are best poised to
manufacture on their own shores efficiently, and to protect their
supply chains in other industries including automobiles, ships, defense
materiel, and rail cars. Manufacturing in these other sectors has
already been recognized by the Federal Government as being of national
security importance to the United States. The robots that enable and
sustain such manufacturing are a matter of economic security as well.
Fast, agile manufacturing is, in turn, a key flywheel for advanced
research and development. It is likely that robot acceleration may
create a run-away amplification effect for technology development and
industrial dominance.
3. Advanced robotic technologies are the physical embodiment of
artificial intelligence.--Various officials in the United States
Government have rightfully emphasized the need for the United States to
win the AI race. Advanced robots are the physical manifestation of AI,
leveraging everything from computer vision and reinforcement learning
to visual language action and large behavior models--to learn how to
interface with the real world and perform a wide range of useful tasks.
Some of these tasks will have national security importance. Even if the
United States leads on software AI, the potential for dominance of
robotic hardware by foreign adversaries will create national security
vulnerabilities. If U.S.-sourced software can only be deployed in
machines that have been produced elsewhere because of the erosion of
the domestic robotics industry, AI-only security will be insufficient.
To win the AI race, the United States must win the robotics race.
4. Using foreign advanced robotics technology in critical roles
creates a risk of interference, access, and denial of service.--The
unique combination of hardware, software, sensors, mobility, and
communication mechanisms makes advanced mobile robots higher risk than
other internet-of-things technologies, and it can be practically
impossible to rule out tampering by adverse interests if done by the
manufacturer. As robots become a critical part of key infrastructure,
they become a potential and potent threat vector to that
infrastructure.
other nations, including u.s. adversaries, are prioritizing robotics
The economic, strategic and national security importance of
robotics is evident from efforts made by other nations to support and
promote their domestic robot industries. Nations that have implemented
some form of national strategy initiative for robotics include Japan,
South Korea, Singapore, Germany, France, the Netherlands, India, and
China. See ``A Time to Act: Policies to Strengthen the US Robotics
Industry,'' Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, July 18,
2025, available at https://itif.org/publications/2025/07/18/time-to-
act-policies-to-strengthen-us-robotics-industry/.
Recent events demonstrate that China, especially, has recognized
the national security implications of its advanced robotic technologies
sector. In February 2025, the CEO of prominent Chinese robotics company
Unitree, which develops and manufactures quadrupeds and humanoids, was
seated prominently across from Chinese President Xi at a summit of tech
executives. See ``What did China's tech entrepreneurs tell Xi Jinping
at the symposium?'' South China Morning Post, February 21, 2025,
available at https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3299599/what-
did-chinas-tech-entrepreneurs-tell-xi-jinping-symposium. China also
recently hosted a humanoid half-marathon and humanoid ``Olympics.'' See
``China's robots race against humans--and their U.S. counterparts,''
NBC News, April 23, 2025, available at https://www.nbcnews.com/news/
world/china-robots-race-humans-half-marathon-rcna195586; ``Tesla
Optimus rival Unitree shines at the `World Humanoid Robot Games' in
China,'' CNBC, August 18, 2025, available at https://www.cnbc.com/2025/
08/18/world-humanoid-robot-games-china-tesla-unitree.html.
The elevation of China's robotics community onto its national stage
is not accidental. Instead, it is a direct consequence of comprehensive
government support of China's robotics industry and AI-driven
innovations. For example, we note the PRC's ``Fourteenth Five-Year Plan
for the Robotics Industry'' (2021-2025), Central People's Government,
December 21, 2021, available at https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/
2021-12/28/content_5664988.htm as well as its ``Implementation Plan for
the `Robotics Plus' Application Special Operation,'' PRC Central
People's Government, January 18, 2023, available at https://www.gov.cn/
zhengce/zhengceku/2023-01/19/content_5738112.htm. These documents
outline the many mechanisms and policies that have supported the
Chinese robotics industry, ranging from government-funded R&D, to tax
deductions, to government acting as first adopters to SOE robot
procurement prioritization. See also China M.I.I.T. ''Guiding Opinions
on the Innovative Development of Humanoid Robots,'' Center for Science
and Technology Innovation (Beijing), November 3, 2023, available at
https://www.ncsti.gov.cn/zcfg/zcwj/202311/t20231103_140346.html.
Commentators and experts have evaluated the impact of these
policies on the industry. See, e.g., ``America Is Missing The New Labor
Economy--Robotics,'' SemiAnalysis, March 11, 2025, available at https:/
/semianalysis.com/2025/03/11/america-is-missing-the-new-labor-economy-
robotics-part-1/ (indicating that there is ``an existential threat to
the US as it is outcompeted in all capacities''); ``The Humanoid 100:
Mapping the Humanoid Robot Value Chain,'' Morgan Stanley, available at
https://advisor.morganstanley.com/john.howard/documents/field/j/jo/
john-howard/The_Humanoid_100_Mapping_the_Humanoid_Robot_Value_-
Chain.pdf (``Our research suggests China continues to show the most
impressive progress in humanoid robotics where startups are benefiting
from established supply chains, local adoption opportunities, and
strong degrees of national government support.''); ``How Innovative Is
China in the Robotics Industry?,'' Information Technology & Innovation
Foundation, available at https://itif.org/publications/2024/03/11/how-
innovative-is-china-in-the-robotics-industry/ (``China had 12 times the
rate of robot use in manufacturing than did the United States.'');
Testimony of Sunny Cheung, Jamestown Foundation, before the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, February 6, 2025, available at
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/
Sunny_Cheung_Testimony.pdf (``The results of these sustained efforts
are evident in the rapid rise of leading Chinese robotics companies
such as UBTech, Fourier Intelligence, Unitree Robotics, and major tech
giants like Xiaomi and XPeng, which have expanded into humanoid
robotics development. These companies are increasingly competitive in
global markets, not just as adopters of automation but as innovators
producing cutting-edge robotic systems with intelligent AI
integration.''); Embodied Intelligence: The PRC's Whole-of-Nation Push
into Robotics, Sunny Cheung, Jamestown Foundation, August 9, 2025,
available at https://jamestown.org/program/embodied-intelligence-the-
prcs-whole-of-nation-push-into-robotics/ (``The rise of the PRC's
robotics industry represents a tightly-coordinated, whole-of-nation
campaign driven by national strategy, regional policy alignment, and
deep industrial integration.'').
National strategies in Chinese industry policy are often executed
via government subsidies at the local or provincial level. See Far From
Normal: An Augmented Assessment of China's State Support, Rhodium
Group, March 17, 2025, available at https://rhg.com/research/far-from-
normal-an-augmented-assessment-of-chinas-state-support/ (``China spends
more through direct grants and tax benefits than any other major
economy, both in absolute amounts and as a share of GDP''). ``China's
industrial policy spending is enormous, totaling at least 1.73 percent
of GDP in 2019. This is equivalent to more than $248 billion at nominal
exchange rates and $407 billion at purchasing power parity exchange
rates.'' See ``Red Ink: Estimating Chinese Industrial Policy Spending
in Comparative Perspective,'' Center for Strategic & International
studies, available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/red-ink-estimating-
chinese-industrial-policy-spending-comparative-perspective. According
to Jamestown Foundation's research, state-sponsored overproduction is
another policy-driven approach that will have an impact on the robotics
sector. See, e.g., Beyond overcapacity: Chinese-style modernization and
the clash of economic models, Mercator Institute for China Studies,
April 1, 2025, available at https://merics.org/en/report/beyond-
overcapacity-chinese-style-modernization-and-clash-economic-models
(indicating that ``advanced industrial machinery and components'' is
one of the sectors most likely to see overcapacities emerge due to
Chinese government policy). China has used state-backed financing to
boost its intelligent robotics industry, offering tens of millions of
dollars in subsidies, loans, and other financial support. ``[P]rovinces
and cities [in China] are engaged in a de facto `subsidy race,' each
vying to foster the next national robotics champion within their
jurisdiction.'' Id.
One example of Chinese government support that we have been able to
trace is the ``little giant'' designation. Enterprises that secure a
national designation from China's Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology (MIIT) as specialized, refined, distinctive, and innovative
``little giant'' firms are eligible for provincial funding, reduced
corporate income tax rates, accelerated depreciation of R&D equipment,
and matching grants for innovation projects. Our research of sources in
China indicates that various leading Chinese robotics companies have
received the so-called ``little giant'' designation, including Unitree
but also DEEP, Fourier, Leju, Qiteng, and Tianlian. This designation
signals their ability to access a wide range of government funding and
support. Indeed, a recent Guangdong province policy document, ``Notice
on Organizing the Project Entry of Specialized, Refined, Distinctive,
and Innovative `Little Giant' Enterprises in the Field of Artificial
Intelligence and Robotics'' (September 2, 2025), outlines subsidies for
designated ``little giant'' enterprises specifically in the field of AI
and robotics. It is evident that China's robotics producers have been
the beneficiaries of state subsidies and support.
China is proceeding expeditiously with its government-sponsored
industrial strategy. As just one example, in November 2025, the Chinese
government formed an advisory committee on humanoid robotics, overseen
by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and appointed
the CEOs of Unitree and AgiBot as co-chairs.\11\ By March 2026, barely
3 months later, working together with 120 research institutions, the
committee had already developed and released a six-pillar national
standard for humanoid robotics, described as the ``first comprehensive,
top-level design covering the entire industrial chain and full life
cycle of humanoid robotics and embodied intelligence.''\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ ``Unitree, AgiBot founders, China's robotics stars, join panel
to shape industry standards,'' South China Morning Post, November 25,
2025, available at https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3333964/
unitree-agibot-founders-chinas-robotics-stars-join-panel-shape-
industry-standards.
\12\ ``China's first national standard system for humanoid robotics
poised to spur industry development,'' Xinhua, March 3, 2026, available
at https://english.news.cn/20260303/0e51ac8- f66c542c5bacf2af3f80b3a40/
c.html .
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China's strategy for advanced robotic technologies mimics the same
approaches that it has used in other technology sectors: marketing
products at prices which can only be possible by government support,
intentionally over-produced and/or sold below cost. If left unchecked,
over time, the impact of China's state support will echo in robotics
the results seen in unmanned aircraft systems (drones): producers in
the United States will struggle to compete, lose sales due to price
differentials, and eventually many of them may be forced to drop out of
the market.
Due to the nascent nature of the advanced robotic technologies
industry, these impacts have yet to be felt in the U.S. industrial
sector, but they have become evident in research universities and
academic institutions, who are typically the early adopters of such
technologies. Boston Dynamics' Spot robot dominated this research
market from 2020-2022. However, in only the past 12-18 months, advanced
robotic technology uses in that market have become dominated by the
less-expensive and less-featured Chinese brands, particularly Unitree.
This rapid shift in the academic/research market foreshadows the
potential future dominance of foreign producers of advanced robotic
technologies across other sectors worldwide, such as manufacturing,
energy, logistics, security patrol, law enforcement, and even defense.
Indeed, we are already seeing a notable increase in adoption of Chinese
quadruped robot ``dogs'' by domestic law enforcement agencies, similar
to the early years of Chinese drone adoption by law enforcement
agencies.\13\ Additionally, network effects here mean that as a
platform becomes dominant in the new market, new capabilities and
applications will favor that platform, leading to a substantial first
mover advantage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ U.S. police departments and public safety agencies that have
recently adopted Chinese ``robot dog'' models include Brawley Police
Department (California), Charles County DES (Maryland), Topeka Police
Department (Kansas), Pullman Police Department (Washington), and Port
St. Lucie Police Department (Florida).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The role of robotics across key industrial sectors, and the extent
of the Chinese government's support for robotics, are starkly revealed
by the Chinese government's new 5-year plan, released earlier this
month in Beijing. Robotics ``now commands its own dedicated inset box
among the plan's top ten `new industry tracks.' '' China's New Five-
Year Plan Prioritizes Robotics. The World Should Pay Attention, The
Diplomat, March 14, 2026.
``[R]obotics is not treated as a standalone sector but as an enabler
woven across chapters on manufacturing, digital transformation, elderly
care, national security, and even cultural development. This is less an
industrial policy for robots than an industrial policy through robots.
``Id. (emphasis in original).''
This new plan makes clear that the full support of the Chinese
government now stands behind its robotics sector, including ``access to
the 60 billion RMB ($8.2 billion) National AI Industry Investment Fund,
provincial matching funds, and the full apparatus of state-backed
venture capital.'' Id. These efforts are currently unmatched by any
policy efforts in the United States to support its domestic robotics
industry.
the nature of the cybersecurity threat
Robots that are not secure and that contain cyber vulnerabilities,
especially those produced by adversarial actors, pose a variety of
serious risks to the facilities and/or agencies that deploy them.
Advanced mobile robots present new and unique classes of
cybersecurity risk beyond AI and computer systems. These robots are
complex systems made of software and hardware. When produced by
adversarial nations they carry larger probabilities of being
compromised with backdoors and remote access allowing nation-state
attackers (intelligence or military) to take control. If compromised
robots become critical components of in-turn security critical systems,
attackers can sabotage those systems, interfere with a manufacturing
line or halt a security patrol. As robot capabilities approach those of
humans in terms of seeing, moving, and manipulation, a compromised
robot gives attackers eyes and hands throughout sensitive facilities.
Growing autonomy lets these robots take actions on their own.
Public security researchers have additionally demonstrated clear
gaps in Chinese manufactured robot security. Even in the absence of
specific attack intent, these vulnerabilities open users of these
systems to potential third-party attacks.
Securing systems that are used in high-value or sensitive
operations should be a priority for both engineers and nations. Boston
Dynamics has set out our approach to securing robots in a white paper
describing how we maximize the security of our products, including the
features and design considerations which enable these platforms to be
trusted parts of customer IT integrations. See https://
bostondynamics.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/spot-and-site-hub-
security-white-paper.pdf.
unitree: one of many companies raising concerns
This hearing's title calls out Chinese robotics company Unitree
specifically. To be sure, Unitree has been the most visible company
marketing and selling its legged robots in the United States, and also
appears to have been chosen by the government of China as a national
champion. News media have reported cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the
company's products, including data exfiltration exploits and remote-
control backdoor access.\14\ Additional security research relating to
Unitree robots that did not receive wide press coverage include a
reported exploit that enables a network-based takeover of the robot and
the discovery of a reported Unitree AI/LLM cloud service that could
cause arbitrary commands to be executed on the robot.\15\ The company
also seems to be widely engaged in white labeling products that appear
in the United States under different brand names.\16\ A few weeks ago,
following earlier reports of connections between Unitree and the
PLA,\17\ Unitree was placed on the Department of War's Section 1260H
list of Chinese Military Companies, before that list was withdrawn
(apparently, temporarily and not for reasons related to Unitree).\18\
Most recently, 49 Unitree humanoids performed at a high-profile Spring
Festival spectacular, dancing rhythmically, vaulting, breakdancing, and
mock sword fighting, showing a high degree of confidence in placing
fast-moving robots next to child performers before a live audience.
Unitree is also moving forward with an initial public offering this
year. Given its market penetration, reported security vulnerabilities,
and apparent ties to the Chinese government and military, it is not
surprising that Unitree has earned the focus and attention of the U.S.
Government, security analysts, and policy makers. Scrutiny by this
subcommittee is certainly warranted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See ``Exploit Allows for Takeover of Fleets of Unitree
Robots,'' IEEE Spectrum, Sept 25, 2025, available at https://
spectrum.ieee.org/unitree-robot-exploit and ``Unitree humanoid robots
send data to China every 5 minutes, raising security fears,''
Interesting Engineering, October 1, 2025, available at https://
interestingengineering.com/innovation/security-flaw-unitree-humanoids-
china.
\15\ For the original research reporting these issues, see: ``The
Jailbroken Unitree Robot Dog ,'' available at https://www.darknavy.org/
darknavy_insight/the_jailbroken_unitree_- robot_dog/; ``39C3_Skynet
Starter Kit: From Embodied AI Jailbreak to Remote Takeover of Humanoid
Robots,'' available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qjA_5-Bybs;
``Skynet Starter Kit--Researchers control humanoid robots via radio &
AI,'' available at https://www.heise.de/en/background/39C3-Skynet-
Starter-Kit-Researchers-control-humanoid-robots-via-radio-AI-
11125615.html.
\16\ One example is a flamethrower-equipped quadruped robot sold by
a company called Throwflame, which is obviously a white-labelled
Unitree robot. https://throwflame.com/products/thermonator-robodog/.
Another company, Robot.com, is using rebranded Unitree robots for urban
delivery. https://www.robot.com/.
\17\ `` `The Robot Dog's Time to Kill': At China's Star Robotics
Firm, the Military Ties Keep Mounting,'' Kharon The Brief, July 17,
2025, available at https://www.kharon.com/brief/unitree-robotics-china-
pla.
\18\ ``U.S. Briefly Adds Alibaba, BYD and Other High-Profile Firms
to List of Chinese Military Companies,'' Kharon Research, February 13,
2026, available at https://www.kharon.com/brief/us-china-news-alibaba-
byd-defense-department-1260h. (Source: https://x.com/Robo_Tuo/status/
1991882471156457894).
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However, there are literally dozens of other Chinese companies
making rapid progress with government support, particularly in the
humanoid space. At the 2026 Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas,
where we debuted the new version of our Atlas humanoid robot, Chinese
companies displaying humanoid robots appeared to outnumber U.S.
companies by a factor of 5 to 1. On social media, industry observers
are tracking dozens of Chinese humanoid companies, compared to just a
handful in the United States:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
This wide set of actors means that, although Federal policy can and
should target specific companies that are of concern to national
security, a broader all-of-government strategic approach is needed to
support the U.S. robotics industry and to provide greater assurance of
economic security.
recommendations
We respectfully make the following recommendations to this
subcommittee, to Congress, and to the broader United States Government:
1. Direct the Department of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to expeditiously undertake a
national security evaluation of the use of foreign adversarial robots
in American industry and governmental operations.
Although private researchers have raised alarm by uncovering
backdoors and vulnerabilities in specific Chinese robotics products on
the market, these are one-off studies and we are not aware of any
comprehensive Government-led study of this issue. Such a study would
provide clear guidance to private industry, Government contractors,
public safety agencies, and other stakeholders regarding the security
of advanced robotics products acquired from foreign companies. The
examination would be informative to both important end-users and policy
makers and is, we believe, overdue.
2. Pass the National Robotics Commission Act, as a Step Toward a
National Robotics Strategy.
Recently, a bipartisan bill was introduced in the House that would
establish a National Robotics Commission, H.R. 7334. Modeled on the AI
and Biotech Commissions that were so useful to those industries and to
Government stakeholders, a Robotics Commission would bring experts,
industry, and Government together to recommend the policies that would
support the growth and success of the industry.
Our company began calling for the development of a national
robotics strategy in 2023. While Chinese advisory committees have
already made quick progress on collaborative standards and strategies,
and another 5-year plan emerges from the Chinese government that
elevates robotics even more than the prior plans, and while about a
dozen other counties have their own robotics strategies, the United
States Government has yet to move forward with establishing a
deliberative body or tasking an agency to begin developing its own
national strategy. Time is running short and we urge Congress to move
forward as soon as possible with this legislation and related policy
efforts to kick-start the development of a national robotics strategy.
Boston Dynamics is grateful for the opportunity to share our
perspectives with you on this important topic. I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Fong. Thank you very much.
I now recognize Mr. Robbins for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL ROBBINS, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, ASSOCIATION FOR UNCREWED VEHICLE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Robbins. Chairman Fong, Ranking Member Walkinshaw,
distinguished Members of the committee, thank you so much for
the invitation to testify today. My name is Michael Robbins. I
am the president and CEO of AUVSI, the trade association for
the autonomous systems, drones, and robotic industry. Our
members, including Boston Dynamics, are at the leading edge of
the transformation where AI, robotics, and autonomy are
converging to create a new frontier of cyber physical systems.
Today, we are at the precipice of a new era defined by the
convergence of AI and physical machines, and it holds immense
promise for American productivity and competitiveness. But also
introduce unprecedented national security vulnerabilities when
these systems are developed within adversarial-controlled
technology ecosystems.
Modern robots are highly networked physical cyber systems.
A compromised laptop can expose data, but a compromised robot
can expose data and map, move, surveil, or physically disrupt
operations in the real world. We are here today because our
adversaries, specifically the People's Republic of China, are
methodically executing a centrally planned playbook to hollow
out the U.S. robotics industrial base and install Trojan horses
within our critical infrastructure. Unfortunately, we have seen
this exact threat before and we cannot ignore the lessons
learned from the commercial drone industry.
Over the last decade, the PRC leveraged massive state
subsidies, IP theft, and deliberate market dumping to drive
many American drone manufacturers out of business by flooding
the global market with artificially cheap systems. This
deliberate market capture engineered a profound national
security crisis here in America, exposing sensitive U.S. data
to Chinese state intelligence and leaving our Nation
dangerously dependent on adversary-built technologies.
Today, the PRC is aggressively executing the exact same
playbook in the advanced robotics sector. Fueled by over $137
billion in state subsidies and initiatives, like Made in China
2025, PRC robotics firms are systematically undercutting
American companies, starving U.S. firms of the revenue needed
to scale domestic capacity and maintain our technological
leadership. If we fail to act, the U.S. robotics and autonomy
industrial base will be hollowed out, leaving us dangerously
dependent on adversarial-linked technology to run our economy.
Furthermore, we must address this vulnerability in the
upstream supply chain, where PRC's dominance of rare earth
minerals and the threat of export controls could effectively
decapitate American robotics manufacturing before a single
system is even built. This aggressive market capture is not
just an economic issue, it is a profound national security
threat. The PRC is actively weaponizing advanced civilian
robotics to enhance its military capabilities. Recent footage
released by the People's Liberation Army features a video
ominously titled ``The Robot Dog's Time to Kill Has Come,''
depicting a unitary robotics quadruped equipped with an
automatic rifle, striking targets with precision. Because of
Beijing's military-civil fusion strategy, PRC robotics firms
flooding our markets are directly serving as R&D extensions of
the PLA.
Even more alarming, PRC companies pair their robots with
subsidized LiDAR from firms like Hesai and DJI's Livox,
companies our Department of Defense designates as Chinese
military companies. These sensors generate precise 3D maps and
persistent spatial awareness, thereby handing the CCP a
persistent digital map of our Nation.
Furthermore, PRC AI firms like DeepSeek are accelerating
this threat, illicitly extracting the capabilities of advanced
U.S. AI models to rapidly and cheaply build the brains for
these subsidized robotic platforms. The PRC's national
intelligence and cybersecurity laws create a homeland security
crisis, compelling all Chinese commercial entities to provide
state intelligence unfettered access to their systems.
Allowing PRC market dominance is a national security
nightmare for America. Allowing the CCP to install Trojan
horses within U.S. critical infrastructure, exposing our Nation
to severe risks of data exfiltration, remote operational
disruption, and the weaponization of our supply chains. We
simply cannot allow this dangerous erosion of American
industrial capacity and national security to happen.
Recognizing this, AUVSI recently launched our Partnership
for Robotics Competitiveness. Securing our future requires both
carrots and sticks. We must pair aggressive restrictions on
adversary technology with bold incentives for domestic
production to restore a level playing field and ensure American
technological leadership. We urge Congress to pass a
coordinated national robotics strategy and update trade
enforcement mechanisms to counter PRC dumping.
We must address risk-based restrictions on PRC technologies
in sensitive environments, including bans on PRC UGVs and on
the importation of 1260H companies, while also deploying robust
economic incentives, like production, tax credits, loan
guarantees, and employing advanced market commitments to
stimulate domestic manufacturing and derisk private investment.
We must learn from the past to protect our future. The
window to ensure American dominance and autonomy in robotics is
closing and the stakes could not be higher. By acting today, we
ensure that the next generation of autonomous systems bolsters
rather than threatens the security and resilience of the United
States.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robbins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Robbins
March 17, 2026
Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member Swalwell, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
My name is Michael Robbins, and I am the president and chief
executive officer of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems
International, or AUVSI, the world's largest industry association
representing robotics, uncrewed systems, and autonomous technologies.
Our members develop and deploy advanced systems that operate in the
air, on the ground, and in the maritime domain across commercial,
public safety, and defense applications.
Advanced technologies can transform society for the better,
improving safety, strengthening resilience, and expanding opportunity.
However, these same technologies can also become a direct threat to
freedom when serving authoritarian power. The technologies examined in
today's hearing, particularly artificial intelligence systems and
robotics platforms associated with companies based in the People's
Republic of China (PRC) such as DeepSeek and Unitree Robotics,
illustrate how emerging technologies can introduce new national
security risks when developed within adversary-controlled technology
ecosystems. Robotics systems of today are not simply software tools,
nor are they the simple robots of the past executing a scripted task.
They are networked machines capable of sensing, communicating, and
acting in the physical world. When vulnerabilities exist in these
systems, the consequences can extend beyond data exposure to
surveillance, disruption of infrastructure, and physical operational
risk.
While consumer-facing, `chat-based' AI has attracted much of the
public's attention, physical applications of AI-enabled robotics
represent the next frontier. This integration of artificial
intelligence technology in modern robotics and autonomous platforms
allows for significant leaps in perception, navigation, and decision
making.
Here in the United States as well as among our allies, AUVSI's
members, including Boston Dynamics, testifying with me here today, are
at the leading edge of this transformation across the entire robotics
technology stack. However, our adversaries--specifically the People's
Republic of China--are methodically executing a centrally-planned
playbook to capture global market dominance at the direct expense of
American industry. Backed by initiatives like ``Made in China 2025''
and fueled by over $137 billion in state investment funds, the PRC is
deliberately flooding the global market with artificially cheap,
subsidized robotic platforms. This aggressive dumping is designed to
systematically undercut U.S. producers--offering systems at a fraction
of the cost of American-made counterparts--which starves U.S. companies
of the revenue needed to scale domestic industrial capacity and stifles
private-sector investment in research and development. Ultimately, this
concerted national effort aims to hollow out the U.S. robotics
industrial base, creating entrenched technological and industrial
dependency while embedding structural cyber-physical vulnerabilities
across our critical infrastructure.
This convergence between artificial intelligence and robotics is a
major technological development. But it also introduces a new category
of risk. When AI software systems are embedded in connected physical
machines, the result is a cyber-physical system whose vulnerabilities
can affect both digital networks and real-world operations.
Furthermore, documented vulnerabilities and software back doors, such
as those in Unitree Robotics' Go1 robot and DJI's robot vacuums and
drones, underscore how real this threat is: these vulnerabilities are
not hypothetical, but a real and present threat to homeland
security.\1\ \2\ \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sam Sabin, ``Chinese Robotics Manufacturer Left Backdoor in
Product,'' Axios, April 1, 2025, https://www.axios.com/2025/04/01/
threat-spotlight-backdoor-in-chinese-robots-future-of-cybersecurity.
\2\ Eric Berger, ``Spanish Engineer Reports Flaw in `Smart' Vacuums
After Gaining Control of 7,000 Devices,'' The Guardian, February 24,
2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/24/spanish-engineer-
smart-vacuums-remote-control.
\3\ Fortress Information Security, Securing the Skies: Case Study
(v1.1), DJI Mini 2 Drone Teardown Exposes Security Risks, 2024, https:/
/8759415.fs1.hubspotusercontent-na1.net/hubfs/8759415/
Securing%20the%20Skies%20%20Case%20Study_v1.1.pdf.
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Further underscoring the risk to U.S. national security, the PRC is
aggressively weaponizing advanced civilian robotics to enhance its
military capabilities, a reality that demands immediate Congressional
attention. Recent footage released by the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) starkly illustrates this threat, including a video ominously
titled ``The Robot Dog's Time to Kill Has Come,'' which depicts a
Unitree Robotics quadruped equipped with an automatic rifle striking
targets with precision. Chinese state media has broadcast joint
military exercises featuring these robotic dogs operating alongside
armed quadcopters and human troops in urban assault simulations, while
recent university-led military training exercises have even deployed
robot dogs capable of launching rockets.\4\ To enable the autonomous
navigation, terrain mapping, and off-road mobility of these platforms,
the PLA frequently pairs these military robots with LiDAR sensors
produced by subsidized Chinese firms, including Hesai, a company on the
U.S. Department of Defense's 1260H designation as a Chinese military
company, but still with deep penetration into the U.S. market.\5\ This
rapid battlefield integration is the direct result of Beijing's
Military-Civil Fusion strategy, which systematically funnels ostensibly
commercial technology through defense-linked universities into the
hands of the PLA.
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\4\ Jane Tang, `` `The Robot Dog's Time to Kill': At China's Star
Robotics Firm, the Military Ties Keep Mounting,'' The Brief (Kharon),
July 16, 2025, https://www.kharon.com/brief/unitree-robotics-china-pla.
\5\ U.S. Department of Defense, ``Notice of Designation of Chinese
Military Company,'' Federal Register 89, no. 205 (October 23, 2024):
84547-84548, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/23/2024-
24723/notice-of-designation-of-chinese-military-company.
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Crucially, the Chinese commercial robotics firms supplying these
systems--such as Unitree--are bolstered by massive state subsidies and
protective industrial policies deliberately designed to capture the
global market at the direct expense of U.S. industry. By flooding the
international market with artificially cheap robotic platforms, the PRC
systematically undercuts American producers, starving U.S. companies of
the revenue needed to invest in R&D and scale domestic industrial
capacity. As these subsidized Chinese firms drive American competitors
out of business, they are simultaneously functioning as critical
research and development extensions of the PLA. As the PLA advances to
the next phase of modern warfare by integrating artificial intelligence
into these unmanned systems, we must recognize that allowing PRC
dominance in the commercial robotics sector directly underwrites their
military modernization, hollowing out U.S. industrial capacity and
presenting a profound national security threat.
Unfortunately, we have seen this in the United States before in
another segment of the autonomous systems industry. The PRC is
executing the exact same centrally-planned playbook in the advanced
robotics sector that it used to decimate the U.S. commercial drone
industry: leveraging massive state subsidies to flood the market with
below-cost systems and deliberately drive American manufacturers out of
business.\6\ Propelled by initiatives like ``Made in China 2025'' and
over $137 billion in state investment funds, subsidized Chinese
robotics firms are artificially suppressing prices, starving U.S.
companies of the revenue needed to scale domestic capacity, and
maintain technological leadership.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI),
Partnership for Drone Competitiveness White Paper (Arlington, VA:
AUVSI, 2025), https://www.auvsi.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/AUVSI-
Partnership-for-Drone-Competitiveness-White-Paper.pdf.
\7\ Keith Bradsher, ``China Has an Army of Robots on Its Side in
the Tariff War,'' The New York Times, April 23, 2025, https://
www.nytimes.com/2025/04/23/business/china-tariffs-robots-
automation.html.
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This aggressive economic market capture transforms into a dire
national security threat when combined with the PRC's sweeping legal
framework--including its National Intelligence, Cybersecurity, and Data
Security laws--which legally compels all Chinese commercial entities to
provide state intelligence services with unfettered access to their
data and systems. Because modern robotic platforms are highly-connected
cyber-physical systems embedded across our logistics, manufacturing,
and defense sectors, allowing PRC market dominance effectively installs
Trojan horses, or embedded vulnerabilities, within U.S. critical
infrastructure, exposing our Nation to severe risks of data
exfiltration, remote operational disruption, and the weaponization of
our supply chains during times of conflict.
Furthermore, the systematic expropriation of U.S. technology
extends beyond hardware into the very foundation of artificial
intelligence through industrial-scale ``distillation attacks''. Leading
Chinese AI laboratories--including DeepSeek, Moonshot, and MiniMax--are
illicitly extracting the capabilities of advanced U.S. models to train
their own systems.\8\ By utilizing proxy networks and fraudulent
accounts to farm millions of interactions from American models like
Anthropic's Claude and OpenAI's ChatGPT, these PRC firms acquire
frontier AI capabilities at a fraction of the time and cost required
for independent development. This theft presents a severe and immediate
national security risk: illicitly-distilled Chinese models bypass the
critical safety guardrails embedded in U.S. systems, directly enabling
authoritarian governments to deploy frontier AI for offensive cyber
operations, mass surveillance, and disinformation campaigns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Anthropic, ``Detecting and Preventing Distillation Attacks,''
Anthropic News, February 23, 2026, https://www.anthropic.com/news/
detecting-and-preventing-distillation-attacks.
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Furthermore, as highlighted by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, this accelerated development allows China to
aggressively export its artificially cheap, open-weight models
globally, securing future tech ecosystems in developing economies and
fostering international dependence on PRC technology.\9\ DeepSeek is
emblematic of how rapidly these capabilities can proliferate when
illicit extraction, open weights, and state-driven incentives converge.
When these unregulated, illicitly-trained AI ``brains'' are combined
with the heavily-subsidized robotics platforms currently flooding the
market, they create an unprecedented cyber-physical threat to U.S.
national security and economic leadership.
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\9\ Richard Gray and Michael H. Gary, ``Hedged Bets on the U.S.-
China AI Race,'' Charting Geoeconomics (Center for Strategic and
International Studies), January 20, 2026, https://www.csis.org/blogs/
charting-geoeconomics/hedged-bets-us-china-ai-race.
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We simply cannot allow this dangerous erosion of American
industrial capacity and national security to happen, and AUVSI commends
the committee for holding this vital hearing to confront these urgent
threats and ensure U.S. leadership in advanced robotics.
Recognizing both the critical importance of these technologies to
the United States' economic competitiveness and national security, as
well as the risks associated with insecure or adversary-linked systems,
AUVSI recently launched our Partnership for Robotics Competitiveness,
an industry initiative focused on strengthening U.S. leadership in
robotics and physical artificial intelligence while addressing
cybersecurity, supply chain, and national security risks associated
with connected robotics systems.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International
(AUVSI), Partnership for Robotics Competitiveness: Securing U.S.
Leadership in Robotics and Physical Artificial Intelligence (Arlington,
VA: AUVSI, 2026), https://www.auvsi.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/
AUVSI-PFRC-Whitepaper.pdf.
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robotics and physical ai as a homeland security issue
As AI-enabled robotics systems become more capable and more widely
deployed, they are increasingly operating in highly-sensitive
environments with significant implications for homeland security. These
include logistics hubs, ports, warehouses, manufacturing facilities,
transportation systems, energy infrastructure, public safety
operations, and emergency response environments.
In these settings, robotics systems are not isolated machines. They
are connected cyber-physical platforms that combine sensors, software,
networking, cloud connectivity, and physical actuation. They collect
data from the surrounding environment, transmit and receive information
across networks, and in many cases can be monitored, updated, or
controlled remotely. That combination of digital connectivity and real-
world physical action is what makes robotics in this context such a
pressing homeland security issue.
That is what makes the risk posed here so significant: A
compromised laptop exposes data; a compromised robot can expose data
and move, map, surveil, disrupt operations, or create physical hazards.
With advanced sensors used in these systems, including Light Detection
and Ranging (LiDAR) sensors, the data exposed itself presents a unique
risk: data vulnerabilities might mean a highly-detailed three-
dimensional map of critical infrastructure or other sensitive sites.
Moreover, because these systems interface with the physical world, a
compromised robot could present a physical threat in myriad ways:
cyber-physical risk in connected robotics systems
Modern robotics systems should be understood as connected cyber-
physical platforms that combine software, communications networks,
sensors, and physical machines capable of interacting directly with
real-world environments. As these systems become more advanced, they
increasingly rely on cloud connectivity, remote monitoring, over-the-
air software updates, and continuous data collection to support
performance improvements, predictive maintenance, and adaptive
learning. While these capabilities provide important operational
benefits, they also expand the attack surface associated with robotics
systems and introduce new forms of cyber-physical risk.
In practical terms, these risks generally fall into 3 categories:
First, robotics systems create data exposure risks.
Connected robots routinely collect detailed operational data
from the environments in which they operate. This can include
facility layouts, movement patterns, environmental sensing
data, workflow information, and records of human-machine
interaction. Over time, aggregated data from these systems can
reveal sensitive insights about infrastructure operations,
logistics networks, and industrial processes.
Second, robotics platforms create remote disruption risks.
If vulnerabilities exist in software, firmware, communications
links, or cloud management tools, these systems may be
susceptible to unauthorized observation, manipulation, or loss
of control. Because robotics platforms operate in the physical
world, a cyber compromise can translate directly into physical
consequences, including disruption of operations or
interference with safety-critical environments.
Third, connected robotics systems can create persistent
access risks through update and support pathways. Many systems
rely on remote software updates, cloud services, and vendor-
managed diagnostics throughout their life cycle. When those
pathways remain accessible after deployment, they can create
long-term dependencies on external software environments and
provide on-going access points into operational systems.
Recent incidents illustrate these risks in concrete terms. Security
researchers identified an undocumented access pathway in a Unitree Go1
quadruped robot that allowed remote access to camera feeds and control
functions without user authorization, demonstrating how hidden
vulnerabilities in connected robotics platforms can enable both
surveillance and system takeover.\11\
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\11\ Dave Lawler, ``Threat Spotlight: Backdoor Found in Chinese
Robots,'' Axios, April 1, 2025, https://www.axios.com/2025/04/01/
threat-spotlight-backdoor-in-chinese-robots-future-of-cybersecurity.
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The potential implications of these technologies have also drawn
bipartisan concern in Congress. In 2025, members of the House Select
Committee on the Chinese Communist Party warned that robotics
platforms, such as those produced by Unitree, could present
surveillance and national security risks if deployed within sensitive
U.S. institutions and infrastructure environments. The committee also
urged that Unitree be accordingly designated as Chinese Military
Companies under 1260H of the fiscal year 2021 National Defense
Authorization Act.\12\ It is notable that when the Department of
Defense briefly updated the 1260H list in February 2026, Unitree
Robotics was listed, however the list was rapidly taken down after
posting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ U.S. House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition
Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, ``Trojan
Horse Tech: Select Committee Sounds Alarm on CCP Robots Inside U.S.
Institutions,'' press release, May 7, 2025, https://
chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/media/press-releases/trojan-horse-tech-
select-committee-sounds-alarm-on-ccp-robots-inside-us-institutions.
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sensor risk, lidar, and sensitive infrastructure mapping
Modern robotics and autonomous systems rely on integrated sensing
suites that may include cameras, radar, and LiDAR to perceive and
navigate their environments. These sensing technologies allow machines
to identify obstacles, understand spatial relationships, and operate
safely alongside people and other equipment.
Among these technologies, LiDAR merits particular attention because
of its ability to generate high-resolution, three-dimensional
representations of physical environments. In robotics and autonomous
systems, LiDAR supports localization, mapping, obstacle detection, and
coordinated autonomous behavior. These capabilities allow robotic
systems to move through complex environments, build detailed maps of
their surroundings, and perform tasks with increasing levels of
autonomy.\13\
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\13\ Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International
(AUVSI), Partnership for Robotics Competitiveness: Securing U.S.
Leadership in Robotics and Physical Artificial Intelligence (Arlington,
VA: AUVSI, 2026), https://www.auvsi.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/
AUVSI-PFRC-Whitepaper.pdf.
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However, the same capabilities that make LiDAR valuable for
robotics applications can also introduce security concerns when
deployed in sensitive environments. It is almost certainly for this
reason that a LiDAR sensor was used by Chinese intelligence in an
attempt to map a U.S. military installation in the Philippines.\14\
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\14\ Jack Burnham and Johanna Yang, ``Philippines Busts Chinese Spy
Ring Targeting U.S. and Allied Military Infrastructure,'' Foundation
for Defense of Democracies, February 3, 2025, https://www.fdd.org/
analysis/2025/02/03/philippines-busts-chinese-spy-ring-targeting-u-s-
and-allied-military-infrastructure/.
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Because LiDAR sensors continuously generate precise spatial data,
they can produce highly-accurate digital maps of the environments in
which they operate. In industrial or infrastructure settings, this may
include facility layouts, equipment locations, operational workflows,
and patterns of movement within a site. Over time, aggregated data from
these sensors can provide detailed insight into how facilities function
and how sensitive environments are structured.
Where LiDAR-enabled systems are deployed in factories, ports,
logistics hubs, transportation nodes, energy infrastructure,
warehouses, or public safety environments, they can generate persistent
spatial awareness of locations that may be commercially sensitive,
operationally sensitive, or nationally sensitive.\15\
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\15\ Foundation for Defense of Democracies Action, ``Policy Alert:
Urgent U.S. Response Needed to Counter China's Strategic Use of LiDAR
Technology,'' September 23, 2025, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/09/
23/urgent-us-response-needed-to-counter-chinas-strategic-use-of-lidar-
technology/.
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These concerns are not hypothetical. In June 2025, AUVSI wrote to
New York State and city officials warning about potential security
risks associated with LiDAR sensors manufactured by Livox, a Chinese
company owned by DJI, after such sensors were observed deployed at JFK
International Airport and Penn Station in New York City.\16\
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\16\ Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International
(AUVSI), Letter Regarding Security Risks of Livox LiDAR Deployments at
JFK Airport and Penn Station, March 2026, https://www.auvsi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2026/03/AUVSI-Livox_JFK_PennStation.pdf.
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As described in that letter, LiDAR sensors can collect detailed
real-time spatial data that could reveal sensitive information about
transportation infrastructure, security postures, and crowd flow
patterns if compromised or accessed by adversaries. In this case, these
sensors were deployed in a static setting, affixed to certain points at
these facilities; deployed in a dynamic setting, such as on a robotic
platform, further compounds the threat.
structural and jurisdictional risk in networked robotics systems
Cyber-physical risk in robotics systems cannot be evaluated solely
through the lens of individual software vulnerabilities or hardware
components. Instead, these risks must be understood within a broader
geopolitical and legal context of supply chains, software dependencies,
and data flows.
Modern robotics platforms are not stand-alone machines. They are
networked cyber-physical systems that often rely on cloud services,
data streams, remote diagnostics, and software updates delivered
throughout the operational life of the system. These features provide
important operational benefits but also create on-going connections
between deployed machines and the vendors responsible for maintaining
them, such as on-going software and firmware updates, data storage, and
even remote access.
Accordingly, China's legal and regulatory framework governing
technology companies must be considered when evaluating the security
implications of connected robotics platforms. Unitree Robotics and
DeepSeek, like any Chinese company, operate within the legal system of
the People's Republic of China. Under China's national security laws,
these companies can be, and are, compelled to operate functionally as
an instrument of Chinese Communist Party (CCP).\17\ \18\
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\17\ Chun Han Wong, ``China Adopts Sweeping National Security
Law,'' The Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/
articles/china-adopts-sweeping-national-security-law-1435757589.
\18\ Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity Guideance:
Chinese-Manufactured Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), January 17, 2024,
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/Cybersecurity%20-
Guidance%20Chinese-Manufactured%20UAS.pdf
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A series of national security and data governance laws, including
the National Intelligence Law, Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law,
and Personal Information Protection Law, collectively establish an
environment in which companies operating within China's technology
sector may be required to cooperate with state intelligence and
security authorities and provide access to relevant data, systems, or
technical capabilities.\19\ The National Intelligence Law mandates that
all citizens and organizations must assist and cooperate with national
intelligence work when requested. This provision establishes a legal
obligation for companies to comply with intelligence-related directives
issued by state authorities whatever they may be. This is further
entrenched by China's Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, and
Personal Information Protection Law which establish mechanisms through
which government authorities may require access to data, technical
systems, or other information under the control of companies operating
within China's technology ecosystem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International
(AUVSI), Partnership for Robotics Competitiveness: Securing U.S.
Leadership in Robotics and Physical Artificial Intelligence (Arlington,
VA: AUVSI, 2026), https://www.auvsi.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/
AUVSI-PFRC-Whitepaper.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These legal obligations create structural pathways through which
operational data or system access could become available to the Chinese
state. As a result, risks associated with connected robotics platforms
are not limited to technical vulnerabilities alone; they are also
shaped by the legal jurisdiction governing the companies that design,
manufacture, and maintain those systems. In this case, the laws
promulgated by the CCP. In the context of connected robotics systems,
where cloud services, telemetry data, remote diagnostics, software
updates, and continuous data collection are core operational features,
these authorities create structural pathways through which operational
data or system access could be obtained by the state.
Cyber-physical risk exposure in robotics systems is not neutral
across suppliers but rather is greatly shaped by the legal framework
governing the companies that develop, maintain, and support the
technology. Accordingly, the risks posed here are not normal
cybersecurity risks but rather a potential vector for nation-state-
level cyber warfare enabled by Chinese law and civil-military fusion.
Knowing this, it is therefore crucial that policy action be taken to
address the serious and unique threat posed by PRC-based companies
across the entire robotics technology stack.
economic competition and supply chain risk in robotics
Beyond cybersecurity considerations, robotics must also be
understood through the lens of global economic competition and
industrial policy. Advanced robotics systems depend on complex supply
chains that include rare-earth magnets, electric motors, batteries,
precision actuators, sensors, semiconductors, and specialized software
systems. These components are deeply integrated into robotics platforms
and are not easily interchangeable.
Over the past 2 decades, the People's Republic of China has pursued
a coordinated national strategy to build dominance across many of these
enabling technologies. Through unprecedented subsidies, preferential
financing, industrial planning, and coordinated investment, Chinese
firms have rapidly expanded production capacity across multiple layers
of the robotics technology stack. At the national level, China's top
economic planning agency announced a 1 trillion yuan (roughly $137
billion) venture capital fund dedicated to robotics, artificial
intelligence, and advanced technologies. This is compounded at the
local level by municipal governments and state-backed hedge funds,
including a $14 billion robotics and AI fund in Beijing and a $77
million embodied AI fund in Shanghai. Furthermore, China's government-
controlled banks have increased industrial lending by a staggering $1.9
trillion over the past 4 years to bankroll factory construction and
robotic automation.\20\
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\20\ Keith Bradsher, ``China Has an Army of Robots on Its Side in
the Tariff War,'' The New York Times, April 23, 2025, https://
www.nytimes.com/2025/04/23/business/china-tariffs-robots-
automation.html.
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These efforts are closely tied to China's Military-Civil Fusion
strategy, which explicitly seeks to integrate civilian technological
innovation with national defense and intelligence objectives. State-
backed firms operating with this massive, multi-tiered financial
backing can aggressively dump products at artificially suppressed
prices, placing market-based American companies at a severe structural
disadvantage.
Over time, this deliberate strategy leads to market capture, supply
chain concentration, and dangerous technological dependency. We have
seen this exact centrally-planned playbook executed before in the
commercial drone industry, where sustained dumping by heavily-
subsidized Chinese firms like DJI decimated the U.S. drone
manufacturing base and left our Nation dangerously dependent on
adversary-linked technology.
Fortunately, we still have a critical window of opportunity to stop
this from happening to the robotics industry. However, if we fail to
act before PRC market dominance hardens into structural dependence,
U.S. and allied companies will be forced out of the global market by
these unfair trade practices, leading to the wide-spread deployment of
unsecure robotic systems that amount to a global back door into our
critical infrastructure.
policy steps congress can take now
As robotics and autonomous systems become increasingly embedded in
infrastructure, logistics, manufacturing, and public safety
environments, policy makers must consider how these technologies
intersect with cybersecurity, supply chain integrity, and
infrastructure protection.
Accordingly, AUVSI urges Congress to consider several policy
priorities:
Congress should support the development of a coordinated
national strategy for robotics and physical artificial
intelligence. Robotics is rapidly becoming foundational
infrastructure for modern economies and future military
operations, yet the United States lacks a comprehensive Federal
strategy guiding policy across research, manufacturing,
deployment, workforce development, and supply chain security.
Bipartisan legislation introduced this Congress, such as the
National Robotics Commission Act (H.R. 7334), introduced by
Congressman Jay Obernolte (CA-23) and Congresswoman Jennifer
McClellan (VA-03), would take crucial steps toward a national
strategy by working to align Federal efforts, set measurable
goals, and ensure sustained U.S. leadership in this
strategically important technology domain.
Leadership in advanced robotics is essential for sustaining
the American workforce. Rather than replacing human labor,
robotics augment our workforce, addressing persistent labor
shortages, improving occupational safety by taking over
hazardous tasks, and keeping U.S. manufacturing globally
competitive. AUVSI explicitly calls for a comprehensive
National Robotics Strategy that prioritizes robust workforce
development programs. By pairing these initiatives with
workforce development tax credits, we can offset the costs of
training workers for the robotics age, transitioning the
American workforce toward higher-skilled programming, system
integration, and maintenance roles that command higher wages.
Congress should build on recent work addressing adversary-
linked uncrewed ground vehicles, including robotics, in Federal
procurement. AUVSI was active in supporting the inclusion of a
provision in House version of the fiscal year 2026 National
Defense Authorization Act which would have prohibited Federal
procurement of uncrewed ground vehicles produced by foreign
countries of concern, such as the PRC. This would have
restricted government procurement of any uncrewed ground
system--from small multipurpose robots to large autonomous
vehicles. Beyond managing the serious risks posed by deployment
of these systems by the Federal Government, Federal procurement
policies play a powerful role in shaping emerging technology
markets. Accordingly, we urge Congress to take up this measure
again as a stand-alone bill as well as in this year's National
Defense Authorization Act.
Congress should continue advancing risk-based restrictions
on adversary-linked technologies deployed in infrastructure
environments. Legislation such as the Securing Infrastructure
from Adversaries Act (H.R. 4802/S. 4000) reflects serious risks
posed by foreign-adversary made LiDAR sensors embedded within
sensitive operational environments. Robotics systems, sensors,
and related technologies produced within adversary-controlled
ecosystems introduce surveillance vulnerabilities, data
exposure risks, and persistent access pathways into critical
infrastructure systems. Establishing clear authorities to
evaluate and restrict the deployment of adversary-linked
technologies in critical infrastructure environments represents
an important step toward protecting the security and integrity
of the Nation's operational systems.
Policy makers should continue examining the security
implications of key enabling technologies used in robotics and
autonomous systems. Technologies such as advanced sensing
systems, including LiDAR, are foundational to the operation of
modern robotics platforms. At the same time, their ability to
generate detailed spatial and environmental data raises
important security considerations when deployed in sensitive
environments. The SAFE LiDAR Act (H.R. 6576) represents an
important effort to address these risks by evaluating the
national security implications associated with certain LiDAR
technologies and by promoting greater transparency into the
supply chains behind these systems. Beyond this, we urge
Congress to consider similar measures across the robotics
technology stack.
Addressing the cyber-physical risks requires not only
restricting unsafe technologies but also accelerating the
growth of trusted alternatives. Congress should prioritize
strengthening the U.S. robotics industrial base and building
secure allied supply chains for critical technologies. Congress
should support policies that expand U.S. robotics
manufacturing, use Federal procurement and demand signals to
support trusted systems, and encourage private investment in
domestic production to build resilient supply chains for
critical robotics components; including sensors, batteries,
rare earth magnets, and advanced electronics.
Taken together, these efforts represent important early steps
toward developing a broader policy framework for addressing cyber-
physical risk in robotics and autonomous systems. By proactively
addressing these issues now, Congress can help ensure that robotics
technologies strengthen U.S. infrastructure, economic competitiveness,
and national security rather than introducing new vulnerabilities into
the systems that underpin the Nation's economy and public safety
operations.
conclusion
The issues raised by companies such as DeepSeek and Unitree
Robotics reflect a broader challenge as robotics, artificial
intelligence, and autonomous systems become increasingly embedded
across the U.S. economy and critical infrastructure. These technologies
are rapidly becoming foundational to logistics networks, manufacturing
systems, transportation infrastructure, energy operations, and public
safety environments. While they offer significant benefits in
productivity, efficiency, and safety, their growing integration into
the physical world also means that vulnerabilities in these systems, or
in the ecosystems that produce them, can introduce serious risks to
both national security and economic resilience.
The threat posed by PRC-linked robotics companies must be
understood within this broader context. These firms operate within a
state-directed system that combines aggressive industrial policy,
supply chain consolidation, and legal obligations to cooperate with
state intelligence authorities. When robotics platforms produced within
this ecosystem are deployed in sensitive environments, the risks extend
beyond ordinary cybersecurity concerns to include potential
surveillance, exposure of sensitive operational data, and persistent
access to critical infrastructure systems. At the same time, sustained
subsidies and coordinated industrial strategies can enable these
companies to capture global markets, creating technological
dependencies that are difficult to reverse once systems are widely
deployed.
For the United States, the challenge is therefore both a security
issue and a strategic economic one. Ensuring that robotics systems
deployed across our infrastructure and industries are secure, trusted,
and developed within resilient supply chains will be essential to
protecting both national security and long-term technological
leadership. By recognizing the strategic implications of robotics and
taking proactive steps to address the risks posed by adversary-linked
technologies, Congress can help ensure that the next generation of
robotics strengthens, rather than undermines, the security, resilience,
and competitiveness of the United States. AUVSI and our members stand
ready to work with Congress and Federal agencies to support that
effort.
Mr. Fong. Thank you, Mr. Robbins.
I now recognize Dr. Doshi for 5 minutes to summarize your
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF RUSH DOSHI, PH.D., C.V. STARR SENIOR FELLOW FOR
ASIA STUDIES AND DIRECTOR OF THE CHINA STRATEGY INITIATIVE,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr. Doshi. Thank you. Chairman Fong, Ranking Member
Walkinshaw, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify today.
My core argument today is simple: AI and robotics are
changing the global balance of power. China has moved faster
and achieved more than most Americans realize, but we still
have advantages. The question before this subcommittee is
whether we will use them before China pulls too far ahead. I'd
like to structure my testimony to answer 4 questions.
First, what are China's objectives in AI and robotics? The
Chinese Communist Party aims to catch up and surpass the West.
It believes there have been 4 industrial revolutions that
determine the fate of nations. The first was steam power, which
brought British dominance. The second was electrification. The
third was mass manufacturing, which brought American dominance.
Now we're in the fourth, quantum, biotech, and, of course,
robotics and AI, which China is determined to win, not just for
the sake of prosperity, but for the sake of relative power.
That brings me to a second question. How is China doing? In
robotics, China increasingly is winning. In 2024, Chinese
factories installed roughly 300,000 new industrial robots.
American factories installed 30,000. Today there are now more
than 2 million industrial robots working in Chinese factories.
In the United States, the number is one-fifth that. China is
investing in the future. It's pulling ahead in research
publications and patent filings and pouring hundreds of
billions of dollars into the robotics sector. Just 10 years
ago, China imported three-quarters of its industrial robots.
So how did all this happen so quickly? Part of it is
because China is the world's greatest manufacturer, with 2
times our share of global manufacturing. But a lot of it is
because of sustained government focus. China acquired robotics
know-how from German companies like KUKA. It protected its home
market. It then launched a decade of industrial policy
programs, like Made in China 2025, to dominate the sector. This
year alone, China may spend $400 billion on industrial policy.
The U.S. CHIPS and Science Act, by comparison, provided $50
billion over multiple years.
In AI the story is more complex. China has made AI an
industrial policy priority for more than a decade. It's the
only country that rivals the United States. Many of its open-
source models are on top lists for key benchmarks and it's
diffusing those models throughout society. But America is still
ahead at the frontier. Unlike in robotics, where China's
manufacturing advantages pay rich dividends, China's progress
in AI relies on access to compute. That is access to advanced
AI chips. China's own AI companies openly admit this and
reports show that U.S. chips are 4 to 5 times better. They may
soon be 17 times better in the next 2 years that the United
States has a growing share of global compute. If we surrender
this advantage, we will probably fall behind. China has more
energy. It added 8 times more power to the grid last year than
we did. It has more talent. But for now, it has less compute.
That leads me to a third question. What are the risks of
falling behind in robotics and AI? Let me offer 3. First,
robotics will be critical to manufacturing. If we lose robotics
the way we lost solar panels and batteries and EVs, we will
hollow out our American manufacturing ecosystem and become even
more dependent on China. We've seen that in rare earth minerals
and magnets. It's not wise to put ourselves in that position of
dependency.
Second, China's National Intelligence Law, its
counterespionage law, require Chinese companies to cooperate
with Chinese intelligence and not disclose that fact to others.
That creates espionage risks. These robots are equipped with
LiDAR systems, microphones, and cameras that make them mobile
surveillance platforms. Already, Unitree's quadruped robots
have been shown to have back-door camera access. Its humanoid
robots transmit data back to China every 5 minutes.
But espionage is not the only risk. Last year I testified
before this committee on how China was pre-positioning for
destructive cyber attack on American power, gas, water,
telecom, and transportation infrastructure. We simply cannot
employ robots in sensitive facilities from the very country
that is targeting those facilities.
A third and final risk is that AI and robotics are dual-
use. China is using American AI tools to launch cyber attacks.
It's incorporating armed robots into military exercises. If we
fall behind, it means our deterrence will be less effective.
Which leads me to the question of what we should do. First,
we should extend the ICTS framework that we apply to connected
vehicles to cover PRC robots. That limits their importation
unless China addresses key vulnerabilities.
Second, we should direct CISA to audit where robots and AI
models are deployed in critical infrastructure so we know the
risks that we face.
Third, we should prohibit Federal agencies and Federal
contractors from procuring PRC robotic systems or AI systems.
We currently treat American AI companies, like Anthropic, with
more regulatory scrutiny than we treat Chinese ones, like
DeepSeek.
Fourth, we should maintain and strengthen semiconductor
export controls, the one advantage we retain in AI, and limit
remote access and smuggling.
Finally, we should build allies' scale to rival China's
scale in the sector. That means better terms for allies and
partners than for Beijing. It gives us a chance to bring down
costs and reduce China dependence.
China believes this is a pivotal moment. They're probably
right. We should believe it, too.
With that, thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Doshi follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Fong. Thank you, Dr. Doshi.
Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their
5 minutes of questioning. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes
of questioning.
My first question goes to you, Mr. Fenkell. Many American
start-ups and developers are beginning to build on Chinese open
models, like DeepSeek, because they appear highly capable and
are offered at extremely low costs. We have seen this strategy
before. Chinese companies, like DJI, use aggressive pricing and
rapid deployment to dominate the global drone market, which
made it extremely difficult for American companies to compete.
Unlike the drone sector, however, the United States already has
leading AI developers that are building highly-capable frontier
models. Do you see Chinese AI companies attempting to follow a
similar strategy with models like DeepSeek by rapidly expanding
global adoption in order to capture market share before trusted
alternatives can compete?
Mr. Fenkell. Thank you for that question. Yes, simply, I
think as we've seen play out in AI, the diffusion of the
technology will ultimately win out. I think for the last year
or so we've believed it's been a model-based adoption. I think
we're shifting into a belief of a tech stack-based adoption. So
when you look at the AI tech stack, it fundamentally is made up
of compute, data, model, and applications. I think we've seen
people begin to recognize in order to really win on AI, you
have to win on the tech stack, which ultimately solves a hard
problem.
We've seen China look to imitate their Belt and Road
Initiative, their Digital Silk Road Initiative to ensure that
their models are winning across the world. It's imperative, and
we spoke about it in our testimony, that the United States not
only counters this, but wins on it. That's why we feel really
strongly that the Exporting American AI Tech Stack Executive
Order is a critical path forward on this that must be codified
and resourced. Then we as industry have to do everything we can
to bring our technology to the world.
Mr. Fong. So as a follow-up question, but in terms of
censorship and information control by DeepSeek, researchers and
journalists have found that DeepSeek censors its own answers in
real time, deleting responses and related topics, like
Tiananmen Square, Taiwan, or criticism of the Chinese Communist
Party. In some cases, the model initially generates accurate
information, but then erases it and replaces it with a
different answer. What risks arise when an AI system that may
reflect the information controls and propaganda narratives of
an authoritarian government become widely used around the
world?
Mr. Fenkell. I believe there are a number of different
risks associated with it. What we've seen is that in order to
release a model in China, you have to pass a test, essentially
adhering to those laws that you referenced. I think Scale as a
company is now doing more AI evaluations than nearly anyone
else and we evaluate all of the world's leading models to
better understand their capabilities. AI evaluation is an
amazing tool for this.
It's really important, though, that we're putting models
out to the world that we believe have democratic values and
ideals and uphold American values. That's, again, why it's
important that we not only match, but exceed China's intensity
in diffusing our tech globally.
Mr. Fong. Thank you.
Mr. Malchano, unlike traditional internet of things
devices, robots are not just collecting data. They are physical
machines capable of movement and interaction with the
environment. If a malicious actor gained control of a connected
robot operating in a sensitive environment, such as a research
laboratory, industrial facility, or transportation hub, what
kinds of physical or operational risks could arise?
Mr. Malchano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Those risks are very
similar to the kinds of risks that would happen if you allowed
someone into your environment that was a hostile person. Right?
So that robot could go around, manipulate things, look at
things. To make that very realistic, if you had an assembly
line, that robot could destroy the assembly line or otherwise
take malicious photos of materials going through. So in many
ways, a robot represents a kind of risk that is beyond the
passive risks of IoT devices if compromised.
Mr. Fong. Thank you.
Mr. Robbins, we have already seen what can happen when
Chinese technology rapidly dominates critical markets, like I
mentioned with DJI drones. What lessons should policy makers
take from that experience when thinking about AI systems,
robotics platforms, and autonomous technologies developed by
Chinese companies?
Mr. Robbins. Yes, thank you for that question, Mr. Fong.
The No. 1 lesson is don't wait 'til the problem is upon us and
we get behind. Take action now to level the playing field for
U.S. robotics and AI companies and autonomy companies so they
can compete globally on a level playing field now instead of
having to fight from behind like American drone companies are
doing today. There are policy actions Congress can take,
there's actions the Executive branch can take now with existing
authorities to level the playing field. We spell those out in
our partnerships for robotics competitors' white paper.
Mr. Fong. Let me throw this out to everyone. But in terms
of procurement, should Congress consider a policy similar to
existing restrictions on Huawei or DJI, where certain Chinese
technologies are prohibited from procurement by Federal
agencies? I got 15 seconds, so maybe I just open it up to
everybody.
Mr. Doshi. Absolutely, yes.
Mr. Robbins. Yes.
Mr. Malchano. Yes, in line with the things that is done in
the past with DJI.
Mr. Fenkell. Yes.
Mr. Fong. Thank you.
With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Walkinshaw, for his 5 minutes of
questions.
Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses. Really powerful opening statements.
I want to start just on international collaboration and
supply chains. We know and you all ably outlined the ways in
which the PRC's threats pose a significant challenge not just
to the United States, but to our allies around the world. While
we have significant resources and capabilities that perhaps we
need to do a better job of bringing to bear, our allies also
have resources and manufacturing capabilities and supply chain
capabilities that could help us in this effort.
Dr. Doshi, your testimony discusses the importance of
working with allies like Japan to develop alternative supply
chains to avoid reliance on the PRC. Can you just elaborate on
the importance and maybe the opportunity of international
collaboration in combating PRC supply chain risk? How can we
ensure that our policies are implemented in conjunction with
key allies and partners around the globe?
Mr. Doshi. Well, thank you very much for the question,
Ranking Member Walkinshaw. Let me begin with one quick point,
which is that China outscales the United States when it comes
to manufacturing. They are two times American manufacturing
value-added. How do you deal with a competitor that outscales
you in manufacturing? The only way is to add up American
manufacturing with allied manufacturing. Collectively, that
block completely outscales China.
So what I'd like to see is a preferential system, a trading
block, if you will, among allies, where we lowered the barriers
to each other and raise them against China, so that we have
that chance to sell to each other and build scale within our
own collective market. Right now, there are allies like Japan
which dominate key inputs for the robotics industry. We should
help those companies succeed. Maybe they can set up plants in
the United States, but either way, if those companies
disappear, then the only game left in town for the robotics
supply chain is China, which we simply cannot allow.
Mr. Ranking Member, we've seen this story in industry after
industry. We're seeing it in cars, we're seeing it in
pharmaceuticals, we're seeing it in biotech. We don't want to
see it in robotics because it is a critical enabling
technology. So one way we could do this kind of collaboration,
in addition to tariff-based or trade-based policy, is
regulatory policy. We have a tool, the ICTS tool, which
basically allows us to prohibit or import control certain
finished products from foreign countries that are threats and
connected to our networks. We can align that regulatory tool
with our allies and partners and create a bit of a wall that
keeps certain Chinese products out and gives ourselves and our
friends time to rebuild.
Mr. Walkinshaw. OK. Anyone else with a thought on that? Mr.
Robbins, you looked antsy there.
Mr. Robbins. No, I gave a speech last May where I quoted a
very smart individual where I noted that if our authoritarian
rivals can work together to undermine democracy, then
democratic rivals must work together to protect democracy, and
that person was Dr. Rush Doshi. So I completely agree with what
Rush said.
We have an I at the end of our name. We work very
aggressively to enhance partnerships with international
democratic allies, like Taiwan, like Japan, and Europe, and
throughout the world. That is really the key to the future of
the robotics and autonomy and AI industry, is ensuring that
American leads and that Western values are driving this
technology forward. But as Rush said, we're stronger when we do
that together and we work with our Western allies on this
front.
Mr. Walkinshaw. Dr. Doshi, your written statement
referenced extending export controls to inference chips. I want
to give Mr. Fenkell and Mr. Malchano a quick opportunity to
describe for us, why are inference chips so critical when it
comes to robotics relative to training chips? What is the
distinction? Why is it relevant to robotics?
Mr. Malchano. So training chips are relevant to robotics in
order to train, but in terms of what is deployed inside the
robot is a different kind of chip, an embedded processor
designed to be able to run ML applications quickly at a low
power state inside of a robot. Those chips are just as
important and exist one per each robot that you build. So
although America is doing a good job of thinking about the
plans with regards to the chips used for training, we would
encourage also thinking about inference chips as are
distributed in a vended context.
Mr. Walkinshaw. OK. Mr. Fenkell, anything on that, training
versus inference chips?
Mr. Fenkell. Nothing to add specifically. I think he
covered it. I do think, getting back to the allies point,
there's two sides where ally cooperation is very important. One
is diffusion of the technology stack, and we've spoken about
that already. The second is on standards collaboration. I think
we look at the Center for AI Standards and Innovation, the U.S.
CAISI, which is housed at the Department of Commerce. There are
also AI safety institutes and security institutes around the
world. It's critical that we're working together on the
measurement science for these technologies because, ultimately,
what we saw in 5G is China began to win that race when they won
on standards. On AI, those standards are currently being
written and it's critical that they're being written by America
and Western ideal countries.
Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fong. Thank you very much. Maybe we will do one more
round of questions then before we conclude this hearing.
I wanted to follow up on the last question I asked in terms
of procurement. You certainly all answered in the affirmative
that we should have a policy restricting certain technologies
from procurement by Federal agencies. I wanted to ask about the
supply chain then in that aspect.
China has spent years positioning itself at key points in
global technology supply chains. In a geopolitical crisis, what
technology supply chain choke points could China potentially
exploit to pressure the United States or our allies? How do we
go about this? I will open that question to all of the
panelists and leave that to you, Jay, how you guys want to
answer it.
Mr. Fenkell. Yes, maybe I'll start with the data portion of
it. Obviously, Scale is one of the leading companies working on
providing training and evaluation data to nearly every frontier
AI lab, as well as the robotics industry today. We work with a
number of robotics companies and have done over 250,000 hours
of robotics data to those companies. What we've seen today,
though, is still China owns 90 percent of the commercially-
available AI data market for robotics. Obviously the cost is
much higher at about 60 percent. So that is a massive
dependency on the Chinese supply chain. Obviously, during a
geopolitical context, that can become an issue.
Mr. Fong. You said 90 percent?
Mr. Fenkell. That's based off our internal estimates, yes.
So what we've seen is that a geopolitical context, that's a big
issue. So in our testimony, we've asked the national security
apparatus to begin to look into this dependency and then also
not only counter, but exceed their intensity on data.
They're outspending us tremendously. They value this far
greater. So as we look at it, every Federal data asset should
be made AI-ready. Every asset that can be open-source should be
open-source. Then, ultimately, we have to value data as a
critical part of the supply chain.
Mr. Robbins. Yes. I'll just add, sir, that in my--as I said
in my opening statement, it has to be a policy of both carrots
and sticks. You asked previously about the restrictions, and
that's an absolutely critical piece of the, getting this right.
There also have to be incentives to scale domestic
manufacturing to break some of those critical chokeholds.
One good example where there is some good work being done
right now is in the area of rare earth magnets. We experienced
this in real time in our industry last year, in May, when China
began throttling export controls on rare earth magnets as part
of the broader trade war with China and the United States. That
was sending shock waves through our industry because, as I
mentioned in my critical statement, without those rare earth
magnets, we're not building robots, we're not building drones.
We're also not building Columbia class submarines or F-35s. It
is a critical dependency on China.
So in the United States, companies like Vulcan Elements
have worked with the U.S. Government to leverage existing
tools, like the Office of Strategic Capital and leftover funds
from the CHIPS Act, to drive scaling manufacturing here in the
United States. We need to double down on that in a significant
way, both in that industry as well as other industries as well,
including in batteries, in lithium and graphite, some of the
critical minerals that make up batteries as well.
Mr. Fong. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Doshi. Mr. Chairman, I'll just add one quick point. I
agree with what Mr. Robbins said. Right now, if we were to just
do a blanket prohibition on Chinese robots, it would be
effective in securing elements of our national security. Of
course, those robots are cheaper than the ones that we make
here at home. So the question then is, what do we do about that
price differential? That is where the government has to step in
and provide a solid industrial policy framework to help drive
this industry.
Let's just look at the historical record. Again, 10 years
ago, China was not a leader in robotics. They did not have--
they were importing most of their industrial robots, more than
65 percent. Today they produce those robots at home. The way
they did that was a careful combination of market restrictions
and market access protection combined with industrial policy.
So some combination of those tools will have to be in our
toolkit going forward.
Mr. Malchano. I'd just like to add that the supply chain
for robotics is very broad and involves many high-tech areas,
which is all a reason for us to consider the national strategy
as a way to create a central point of contact for both sides of
that supply chain to interact with the U.S. Government and
figure out the best ways to make that move forward on American
soil.
Mr. Fong. Then on that note, is it possible then, I mean
the phrase ``decouple,'' but is it possible to nearshore or
decouple from China in the context of supply chain?
Mr. Robbins. It is possible. It will take time and it
requires, as the other witness said, a concerted national
strategy. If we go about this in a sort-of one-off way here and
there, we won't get there. We won't get there in time.
Mr. Doshi. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add one point.
China still has its own dependencies in its robotic supply
chain, dependencies not just on our chips, but on certain
products manufactured in Japan. So when we think about the
overall supply chain, we should think where do we have
advantages and choke points that we can harness? Where do the
Chinese have choke points and how do we mitigate those choke
points?
Mr. Fong. Any of the other two, do you have anything to
add? You want to jump in?
Mr. Fenkell. I think the only thing I'd add to that is as
we look at the supply chain, we have to recognize all aspects
of it. We typically focus on the platform-based aspects of it.
Obviously from the scale side, we definitely would recommend
that we also include the data supply chain in there, just given
that AI, ultimately, is only as good as the data that it's
trained on.
Mr. Malchano. I'd also just add that in terms of a national
strategy, demand-side activities, like encouraging the
additional use of robots in the Federal Government as well as
incentivizing people to adapt robots and adopt their industries
for the coming high-tech future, are all key ways for us to
push that supply chain to produce on American soil.
Mr. Fong. Thank you. Well, I want to thank the witnesses
for your testimony and for the questions from the Ranking
Member. Critically important short-term, long-term challenges
that we need to address and we need to take care of these
issues in real time. So thank you for your expertise.
Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to
respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(E),
the hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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