[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING BEST PRACTICES FOR
STRENGTHENING ELECTION SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 20, 2026
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
www.govinfo.gov
www.cha.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-819 WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin, Chairman
LAUREL LEE, Florida, Vice Chair JOSEPH MORELLE, New York,
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia Ranking Member
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
GREG MURPHY, North Carolina NORMA TORRES, California
STEPHANIE BICE, Oklahoma JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
MARY MILLER, Illinois
MIKE CAREY, Ohio
Mike Platt, Staff Director
Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS
LAUREL LEE, Florida, Chair
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama,
GREG MURPHY, North Carolina Ranking Member
MARY MILLER, Illinois JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Opening Statements
Chair Laurel Lee, Representative from the State of Florida....... 1
Prepared statement of Chair Laurel Lee....................... 3
Ranking Member Terri A. Sewell, Representative from the State of
Alabama........................................................ 3
Prepared statement of Ranking Member Terri A. Sewell......... 5
Witnesses
Honorable Thomas Hicks, chairman, U.S. Election Assistance
Commission..................................................... 6
Prepared statement of Honorable Thomas Hicks................. 9
Honorable Christy McCormick, vice chair, U.S. Election Assistance
Commission..................................................... 22
Prepared statement of Christy McCormick...................... 24
Honorable Benjamin Hovland, commissioner, U.S. Election
Assistance Commission.......................................... 31
Prepared statement of Benjamin Hovland....................... 33
Honorable Donald Palmer, former commissioner, U.S. Election
Assistance Commission, and Senior Legal Fellow, The Heritage
Foundation..................................................... 108
Prepared statement of Donald Palmer.......................... 110
Submissions for the Record
Southern Poverty Law Center and The Leadership Conference letter. 118
EXAMINING BEST PRACTICES FOR
STRENGTHENING ELECTION SECURITY
----------
May 20, 2026
Subcommittee on Elections,
Committee on House Administration,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:17 p.m., in
room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Laurel Lee
[Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Lee, Murphy, Miller, and Sewell.
Staff present: Michael Platt, Staff Director; Abby Salter,
Deputy General Counsel; Kristen Monterroso, Director of
Operations and Legislative Clerk; Josh Weber, Counsel; Libby
Sippel, Deputy Director of Member Services; Sage Dobbs,
Professional Staff; Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director;
Khalil Abboud, Minority Deputy Staff Director; Samuel
Iacobellis, Minority Senior Advisor; and Nikolas Youngsmith,
Minority Policy Director.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LAUREL LEE, CHAIR OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ELECTIONS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM FLORIDA
Chair Lee. The Subcommittee on Elections of the Committee
on House Administration will come to order.
The title of today's hearing is ``Examining Best Practices
for Strengthening Election Security.''
I note that a quorum is present.
Without objection, the Chair may declare a recess at any
time.
Also, without objection, the hearing record will remain
open for 5 legislative days so Members may submit any materials
they wish to be included therein.
Thank you, Ranking Member Sewell, Members of the Committee,
and our witnesses, for participating in today's hearing.
Today, the Subcommittee on Elections will discuss the
different ways that States can strengthen election security.
The best practices that we will cover today include
enhancements to physical security and to cybersecurity.
Addressing potential vulnerabilities improves voter
experience and voter confidence. Preparation and resilience
strengthens the integrity of our election systems, because it
prevents an issue before it arises.
I look forward to discussing best practices for securing
elections and how Congress can be supporting those efforts.
I would first like to highlight the different resources the
Federal Government makes available to elections administrators
for election security. The resources include Federal grants,
testing programs, and guidance from the Election Assistance
Commission.
One great example is the EAC's Election Supporting
Technology Evaluation Program, or ESTEP. This program offers
voluntary security standards and evaluations for nonvoting
systems like poll books, election day reporting systems, or
other election supporting systems not covered by the Voluntary
Voting System Guidelines.
The EAC's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines serve as a
baseline certification for new voting systems to evaluate
functionality, accessibility, and security.
There is also great work that many States and localities
are doing on their own to enhance security and protect against
threats to their elections.
For example, in 2024, the University of South Florida
hosted a cyber tabletop exercise with county supervisors of
elections, the FBI, and local law enforcement to strategize
responses to potential threats to election cybersecurity.
To quickly disseminate information about cyber threats,
North Dakota uses a whole-of-government approach, which allows
agencies, cities, counties, and localities to have access to
the same statewide system.
In North Carolina, the National Guard and State Emergency
Management Agency work collaboratively to monitor and respond
to cyber threats.
To respond to physical threats, several States have
implemented common-sense integrity measures like tamper seals
for ballots, monitoring systems, and backup power sources at
polling locations.
What is great about these physical-security upgrades is
that HAVA grants can be used for this exact purpose. I am very
interested in hearing more about how these grants are
administered and what the results of past grants have been in
States across America.
Another important measure that increases voter experience
and voter confidence is access for election observers. The
Committee on House Administration deploys congressional staff
to serve as election observers for U.S. House races and ensure
elections are run in a secure manner. State parties and
individual candidates also deploy observers, because their
presence at polling places builds trust with voters and allows
for the rapid flow of information to necessary parties.
While no two States administer their elections the exact
same way, one thing should be universal: Election officials
must take a comprehensive approach to administering secure
elections. They should consider every factor to minimize
security risks.
By implementing strong risk management approaches, they not
only strengthen election systems, they also build trust and
transparency. When voters feel confident in elections, turnout
increases. That is a good thing for our democracy.
The best practices we will discuss today can help every
State improve their election security efforts. I want to thank
our witnesses for being here today, and I look forward to our
conversation.
With that, I yield to Ranking Member Sewell for an opening
statement.
[The prepared statement of Chair Lee follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIR OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS
LAUREL LEE
Today, the Subcommittee on Elections will discuss the
different ways that States can strengthen election security.
The best practices that we will cover today include
enhancements to physical security and to cybersecurity.
Addressing potential vulnerabilities improves voter
experience and voter confidence. Preparation and resilience
strengthens the integrity of our election systems, because it
prevents an issue before it arises.
I look forward to discussing best practices for securing
elections and how Congress can be supporting those efforts.
I would first like to highlight the different resources the
Federal Government makes available to elections administrators
for election security. The resources include Federal grants,
testing programs, and guidance from the Election Assistance
Commission.
One great example is the EAC's Election Supporting
Technology Evaluation Program, or ESTEP. This program offers
voluntary security standards and evaluations for nonvoting
systems like poll books, election day reporting systems, or
other election supporting systems not covered by the Voluntary
Voting System Guidelines.
The EAC's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines serve as a
baseline certification for new voting systems to evaluate
functionality, accessibility, and security.
There is also great work that many States and localities
are doing on their own to enhance security and protect against
threats to their elections.
For example, in 2024, the University of South Florida
hosted a cyber tabletop exercise with county supervisors of
elections, the FBI, and local law enforcement to strategize
responses to potential threats to election cybersecurity.
To quickly disseminate information about cyber threats,
North Dakota uses a whole-of-government approach, which allows
agencies, cities, counties, and localities to have access to
the same statewide system.
In North Carolina, the National Guard and State Emergency
Management Agency work collaboratively to monitor and respond
to cyber threats.
To respond to physical threats, several States have
implemented common-sense integrity measures like tamper seals
for ballots, monitoring systems, and backup power sources at
polling locations.
What is great about these physical security upgrades is
that HAVA grants can be used for this exact purpose. I am very
interested in hearing more about how these grants are
administered and what the results of past grants have been in
States across America.
Another important measure that increases voter experience
and voter confidence is access for election observers. The
Committee on House Administration deploys congressional staff
to serve as election observers for U.S. House races and ensure
elections are run in a secure manner. State parties and
individual candidates also deploy observers, because their
presence at polling places builds trust with voters and allows
for the rapid flow of information to necessary parties.
While no two States administer their elections the exact
same way, one thing should be universal: Election officials
must take a comprehensive approach to administering secure
elections. They should consider every factor to minimize
security risks.
By implementing strong risk management approaches, they not
only strengthen election systems, they also build trust and
transparency. When voters feel confident in elections, turnout
increases. That is a good thing for our democracy.
The best practices we will discuss today can help every
State improve their election security efforts. I want to thank
our witnesses for being here today, and I look forward to our
conversation.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TERRI A. SEWELL, RANKING MEMBER OF
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA
Ms. Sewell. Good afternoon, everyone. I want to thank
Chairwoman Lee and those witnesses who are gathered here today
for your testimony.
As Ranking Member of the Elections Subcommittee, I take
very seriously the responsibility that Congress holds to our
constituents and to the Constitution to ensure that our
elections are fair and secure.
Our elections are the foundation of public trust in self-
government. Every American, regardless of race, religion,
party, or ideology, deserves confidence that their votes will
be counted accurately and that their election will be
administered fairly.
Yet the threats facing our elections are growing at an
alarming pace. Voters at home see their right to vote targeted,
whether by hostile State legislatures or really aggressive
courts, while all election officials face targeted threats from
radical groups at home and abroad.
Moreover, our President and his allies have widely spread
debunked conspiracy theories and false claims that are designed
to undermine our collective belief in democracy.
Now the conservative Supreme Court recent decision in
Louisiana v. Callais has ignited a five-alarm fire to the
voters of this country. As this hearing occurs, Republican
State legislatures like mine in Alabama and across the South
are franticly redrawing Jim Crow-era maps that will erase Black
political representation at all levels of government.
As this administration continues to perpetuate that the lie
that the 2020 Presidential election was stolen, voter
suppression and discrimination is at a fever pitch.
Just this week, President Trump created a taxpayer-financed
slush fund for January 6th insurrectionists who violently tried
to overturn the results of the 2020 election. I think this is
hypocrisy at its highest degree.
We are here today doing important work to guarantee that
election workers have the financial resources they need to do
their jobs effectively, all while this President is paying out
to people who committed heinous crimes money out of taxpayers'
dollars.
During a moment of incredible political turmoil, election
officials across the country are being asked to administer
elections while Republican State legislatures change the rules
of the game in their scramble to consolidate power. Our
election officials must navigate these changes while also
suffering from inconsistent and often inadequate funding
streams.
In my home State of Alabama, local election administrators
and county officials are responsible for running elections
across 67 counties, often with constrained budgets and outdated
equipment that must still meet modern security standards.
Federal support through the Help America Vote Act has
helped Alabama and other States improve voting systems,
strengthen cybersecurity, and modernize election
administration. Since Congress passed that Act, billions of
dollars have been distributed nationwide to support election
administration improvements.
Even that funding has not been enough. Additional sustained
Federal funding would provide Alabama and other States with
much-needed assistance to better support county elections.
Congress has the responsibility to act before
vulnerabilities become crises. The cost of prevention is far
lower than the cost of repairing public trust.
Our democracy is one of the most important institutions we
have, not just as Members of Congress but as American citizens.
Future generations will judge whether we meet this moment in
American history with resolve. As primary elections are
currently underway and we are getting closer to the midterm
elections, Americans must know that our elections will be fair
and secure.
Let us stand up for democracy. Let us stand up for the
truth. Voters and the power of the ballot depend upon it. Let
us provide every State with the tools, resources, and sustained
Federal support necessary to protect the sacred right to vote.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, as well
as the work that this Committee, this important Subcommittee,
will continue to provide.
I want to thank Chairwoman Lee, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Ranking Member Sewell follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ELECTIONS TERRI A. SEWELL
Good afternoon, everyone. I want to thank Chairwoman Lee
and those witnesses who are gathered here today for your
testimony.
As Ranking Member of the Elections Subcommittee, I take
very seriously the responsibility that Congress holds to our
constituents and to the Constitution to ensure that our
elections are fair and secure.
Our elections are the foundation of public trust in self-
government. Every American, regardless of race, religion,
party, or ideology, deserves confidence that their votes will
be counted accurately and that their election will be
administered fairly.
Yet the threats facing our elections are growing at an
alarming pace. Voters at home see their right to vote targeted,
whether by hostile State legislatures or really aggressive
courts, while all election officials face targeted threats from
radical groups at home and abroad.
Moreover, our President and his allies have widely spread
debunked conspiracy theories and false claims that are designed
to undermine our collective belief in democracy.
Now the conservative Supreme Court recent decision in
Louisiana v. Callais has ignited a five alarm fire to the
voters of this country. As this hearing occurs, Republican
State legislatures like mine in Alabama and across the South
are franticly redrawing Jim Crow era maps that will erase Black
political representation at all levels of government.
As this administration continues to perpetuate that the lie
that the 2020 Presidential election was stolen, voter
suppression and discrimination is at a fever pitch.
Just this week, President Trump created a taxpayer financed
slush fund for January 6th insurrectionists who violently tried
to overturn the results of the 2020 election. I think this is
hypocrisy at its highest degree.
We are here today doing important work to guarantee that
election workers have the financial resources they need to do
their jobs effectively, all while this President is paying out
to people who committed heinous crimes money out of taxpayers'
dollars.
During a moment of incredible political turmoil, election
officials across the country are being asked to administer
elections while Republican State legislatures change the rules
of the game in their scramble to consolidate power. Our
election officials must navigate these changes while also
suffering from inconsistent and often inadequate funding
streams.
In my home State of Alabama, local election administrators
and county officials are responsible for running elections
across 67 counties, often with constrained budgets and outdated
equipment that must still meet modern security standards.
Federal support through the Help America Vote Act has
helped Alabama and other States improve voting systems,
strengthen cybersecurity, and modernize election
administration. Since Congress passed that Act, billions of
dollars have been distributed nationwide to support election
administration improvements.
Even that funding has not been enough. Additional sustained
Federal funding would provide Alabama and other States with
much needed assistance to better support county elections.
Congress has the responsibility to act before
vulnerabilities become crises. The cost of prevention is far
lower than the cost of repairing public trust.
Our democracy is one of the most important institutions we
have, not just as Members of Congress but as American citizens.
Future generations will judge whether we meet this moment in
American history with resolve. As primary elections are
currently underway and we are getting closer to the midterm
elections, Americans must know that our elections will be fair
and secure.
Let us stand up for democracy. Let us stand up for the
truth. Voters and the power of the ballot depend upon it. Let
us provide every State with the tools, resources, and sustained
Federal support necessary to protect the sacred right to vote.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, as well
as the work that this Committee, this important Subcommittee,
will continue to provide.
Chair Lee. Without objection, all other Members' opening
statements will be made part of the hearing record if they are
submitted to the Committee clerk by 5 p.m. today.
Today, we have one witness panel. I will now introduce our
witnesses.
First, we have Election Assistance Commission Chairman
Thomas Hicks. Next, we have EAC Vice Chair Christy McCormick.
We also have a third EAC Commissioner, Benjamin Hovland.
Finally, we have former EAC Commissioner Don Palmer.
Each witness will have 5 minutes to provide an opening
statement.
I now recognize Chairman Hicks for the purpose of giving an
opening statement.
STATEMENTS OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS HICKS, CHAIRMAN, U.S.
ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; THE HONORABLE CHRISTY
MCCORMICK, VICE CHAIR, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; THE
HONORABLE BENJAMIN HOVLAND, COMMISSIONER, U.S. ELECTION
ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; AND THE HONORABLE DONALD PALMER, FORMER
COMMISSIONER, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, AND SENIOR
LEGAL FELLOW, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS HICKS
Mr. Hicks. Thank you, Chairwoman. I ask that my full
statement be accepted into the record.
Chair Lee. So ordered.
Mr. Hicks. Chairwoman Lee, Ranking Member Sewell, and
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you to discuss the election security work of the
United States Election Assistance Commission.
As an independent, bipartisan agency, the EAC offers
trusted sources grounded in Federal law and responsive to the
practical realities of State and local election officials.
We appreciate the Subcommittee's important oversight and
your close engagement with the EAC.
Election officials have been the first line of defense
against escalating security threats and cannot be expected to
defend their election systems alone. These are our neighbors,
PTA members, and part of our congregations, armed not with guns
or bullets but with the law and the Constitution.
Many officials describe their work as increasingly
technical and security-focused, even though they do not have
dedicated cybersecurity personnel and their budgets have
remained stagnant. In recent years, the demand for assistance
has grown significantly.
Since the establishment of the agency under the Help
America Vote Act, the EAC has engaged with officials from
jurisdictions of all sizes to support ongoing election security
work spanning four core areas: physical security,
cybersecurity, personal security, and contingency management.
Election officials work daily to meet the demands of an
increasingly complex security environment. As the public
profile of elections have grown, election infrastructure has
become an active target for a broad range of bad actors.
Physical-security and cybersecurity measures focus on the
protection of infrastructure and are the backbone of election
security. These measures include chain of custody, bipartisan
teams, and protections against phishing and other cybersecurity
attacks.
Election officials across the country have also faced a
growing number of threats to their personal safety, including
swatting incidents, suspicious packages, and bomb hoax threats
targeting election officials and polling places--even
yesterday, with the incident that happened in Pennsylvania.
A 2024 national survey of election officials found a third
have experienced harassment in connection to their work, while
half knew of someone who had left the profession due to safety
concerns.
The EAC has helped to facilitate a sharing of best
practices between State, local, and Federal Government partners
to improve the overall security of U.S. elections. These
efforts promote safe, secure, accurate, and accessible
elections for every voter.
While we offer online and in-person training on topics such
as chain of custody, physical security of election facilities,
and contingency planning, for many jurisdictions, especially
smaller and rural offices, these trainings are the only source
of nationally recognized, nonpartisan election security
guidance.
So far, more than 7,000 officials who serve more than 100
million voters have participated in EAC training. This direct,
no-cost support represents about $1.6 million in savings for
local offices.
One of our most popular resources is the Election Scenario
Test Deck, which provides real-world scenarios to election
officials that they can use to participate in training and
evaluate their incident response. To date, more than 5,500
decks have been distributed nationwide.
The common thread through all the work is the human
element. Election officials are the best tool for ensuring
elections are secure.
While HAVA was enacted with security in mind, the threat
landscape and the presence of malicious actors has grown.
Today, State and local officials are incorporating
cybersecurity protections and physical-security measures into
nearly every aspect of election administration, even under
significant staffing and funding constraints.
For the United States to continue to be a world leader in
election best practices, the Federal Government must support
and invest in our election infrastructure.
I have full faith and confidence in election officials to
carry out their duties. The EAC will remain a dedicated Federal
partner through 2026 and beyond.
Thank you for convening this important hearing and for your
ongoing support. I look forward to continuing our work for the
American people, and I am here to answer questions you may
have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hicks follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS HICKS
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chair Lee. I now recognize Vice Chair McCormick for the
purpose of giving an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTY MCCORMICK
Ms. McCormick. Chairwoman Lee, Ranking Member Sewell, and
Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today.
I welcome the chance to highlight the ongoing work of the
Election Assistance Commission, the EAC, to bolster election
security. This hearing demonstrates your commitment to election
integrity across America, and we thank you for your efforts.
The EAC partners with States to support secure, effective
administration of Federal elections. Strong election security
depends on proven practices like pre-election testing,
auditing, and paper ballots, along with constant vigilance
against evolving threats.
Through practical tools, best practices, and direct
support, the EAC helps election administrators protect the
systems and processes that sustain public confidence in our
democracy during the 2026 midterms and beyond.
HAVA funds help States in this endeavor by allowing them to
invest in security resources that strengthen election
infrastructure. Grant reports show that States use funds to
support sustainable security practices such as network
monitoring, endpoint protection, multi-factor authentication,
automatic system backups, physical security, and cybersecurity
efforts.
Over the past year, the EAC's Election Technology Office
modernized the Nation's voting system infrastructure by
certifying two voting systems to the latest Voluntary Voting
System Guidelines, VVSG 2.0, and we have five additional
systems under test.
Some of the enhanced security requirements of VVSG 2.0
include use of paper ballots, increased support for auditing,
improved cybersecurity requirements like air gap systems,
enhanced access controls, and secure system updates; upgraded
physical standards limiting unauthorized access and what can be
connected to the systems; and preventing undetectable changes
in the software that could alter results.
VVSG 2.0 also emphasizes transparency, reflecting what
election officials are already doing to secure systems, and
managing risk through measures like tamper-evident seals, two-
person integrity, chain-of-custody procedures, and continuity
planning.
The Testing and Certification Division has also drafted
VVSG 2.1. This initiative reflects the agency's commitment to
continual improvement of election systems and the modernization
of guidance centered around election integrity.
Realizing the value that the VVSG certification process has
provided to States, the EAC launched the Election Supporting
Technology Evaluation Program, or ESTEP, in 2023. This started
a focused EAC effort to research best practices around
election-supporting technologies that are used year-round, such
as electronic poll books, electronic ballot delivery, voter
registration, and election-night reporting systems.
In May 2024, the EAC launched the Nation's first Federal
Voluntary Electronic Poll Book Certification Program. The
program has already certified three systems, with two more
systems under test. The value of this process is proven by the
fact that, just weeks after certifying the first electronic
poll book system, North Carolina adopted the agency's
certification requirements for its own certification program.
As jurisdictions continue to modernize their equipment, the
EAC is analyzing emerging election technologies and translating
those findings into practical guidance, such as list
maintenance, grants, and physical security.
In all of this, we strive to be transparent while ensuring
the safety of all involved in the electoral process, from
administrators to poll workers, to observers.
With security top of mind for election officials, the EAC
will continue to move forward in our work to protect the
election infrastructure that supports America's representative
democracy. We are a small agency but one exclusively devoted to
fulfilling the promise of the Help America Vote Act and meeting
the evolving needs of election administration across the
country.
Thank you for your support of the EAC and your tireless
commitment to State and local election officials and to
election integrity. We look forward to collaborating with you
on these and other important matters, and I would be pleased to
respond to any questions that you have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McCormick follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTY MCCORMICK
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chair Lee. I now recognize Commissioner Hovland for the
purpose of giving an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN HOVLAND
Mr. Hovland. Thank you. Thank you, Chairwoman Lee, Ranking
Member Sewell, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you to discuss this important
topic and the work of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.
When Congress created the EAC with the Help America Vote
Act of 2002, it charged the agency with a clearinghouse
function to look at best practices across the Nation. The EAC
has embraced this part of our mission in recent years,
particularly as election administration has evolved.
My colleagues and I work with State and local election
officials from all 50 States, 5 territories, and the District
of Columbia. From that experience, I can confidently say that
no one cares more about the security and integrity of our
elections than the Americans who run them.
The challenges faced by election officials today would have
seemed nearly unimaginable to the officials serving when HAVA
passed. The reality is that administering elections is harder
and more expensive than it has ever been before.
Our State and local election officials do an amazing job
with limited resources. In the years since HAVA, Congress has
provided significant funding, which helps support essential
aspects of elections, such as secure and accessible voter
registration, accurate ballot tabulation, auditable results,
and safe and secure election facilities.
Federal funding, however, has covered less than 5 percent
of the estimated total cost of running elections during that
time.
Similarly, the EAC tries to help fill some of those gaps
but is often limited by our level of funding. Last fiscal year,
the EAC saw a 15-percent reduction in agency funding, at a time
when demand has only increased.
We have been doing our best to respond by sharing best
practices, creating resources that help election officials, and
offering technical assistance where possible. In fact, this
past month, we held meetings with our advisory boards, made up
of election officials from across the country and other key
stakeholders. We heard resounding enthusiasm for the EAC's work
and the direction we are heading.
The agency is nearing a point where funding cuts will
impact what we can accomplish and the support we can provide
election officials, especially related to election security.
My colleagues spoke about our election technology and field
services team. They are doing amazing work, but they are a team
of only 10 people. With over 8,000 election jurisdictions in
the United States, there are limits to our capacity, but not to
our desire or our commitment.
We continue to work creatively and thoughtfully to respond
to election officials' needs. We are piloting a number of
efforts, including those to enhance election security and
technology in a way that informs future programs and allows for
rapid scaling if appropriate funding is provided.
This is also part of why we designed the EAC's Learning
Lab, to release new content on a rolling basis and provide
asynchronous trainings accessible to election officials
anywhere in the country at no cost.
Additionally, one of the agency's most significant
accomplishments was the development and adoption of the 2.0
version of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. As Vice
Chair McCormick noted, there are now two systems certified to
this standard and five more in the testing process.
A report that we shared with Congress this week notes that
much of the voting equipment in use is nearing the end of their
recommended lifespans and conservatively estimates a cost of
$2.7 billion for jurisdictions across the country to make this
transition.
I mention this because we must consistently invest in our
election administration infrastructure. Too often, we are
bailed out by the innovation and hard work of the public
servants that run our elections. Many seasoned election
officials have left the profession, taking with them valuable
institutional knowledge. To fully meet the challenges of this
moment and ensure our elections remain secure, there needs to
be greater support for elections at the local, State, and
Federal levels.
We know this investment matters. Since 2018, States report
using HAVA security grants to replace paperless voting systems,
harden statewide voter registration databases, increase
cybersecurity training, and enhance physical security. Many of
these improvements to election security were made possible
because of the Federal funding and congressional support.
At the EAC, we are committed to continuing to do everything
we can to ensure elections are safe, secure, accurate, and
accessible.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify about our work and
the challenges facing election officials. I am happy to answer
any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hovland follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN HOVLAND
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chair Lee. I now recognize former Commissioner Mr. Palmer
for the purpose of giving an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD PALMER
Mr. Palmer. Thank you. Thank you, Chairwoman Lee and
Ranking Member Sewell.
As you know, I have recently moved to The Heritage
Foundation as a senior legal fellow for election integrity, and
the views expressed today are my own and should not be
reflected on The Heritage Foundation.
I really do appreciate the opportunity to talk about
cybersecurity and the election security of the voting systems
and the election systems that we use--election officials use.
We want them to be able to concentrate on administering the
election, not worried about the back-end security of those
systems. That is why I really appreciate the work that my
colleagues to my right have done over the last decade.
As I sit back and I think about, you know, since I have
moved on, what are some of the recommendations that I would
provide to the Committee, I have a few.
I would, No. 1, support the existing SECURE IT concept that
would add a formal vulnerability testing program. There is
great work that is done on the testing of voting systems, but
there needs to be--we need to add to that concept.
The SECURE IT Act was made a part of the National Defense
Authorization Act. It required penetration testing, and it was
the first step to simulate real-world attacks on election
systems and voting systems where you tabulate votes.
Unfortunately, there was no appropriation attached, and,
obviously, that is going to slow the work. In my mind, things
need to be going quicker, not slower. The work is way too slow
to stay ahead of our adversaries in this area.
The window to secure elections and increase voter
confidence is urgent on your mind. That window could be
closing. That is why this is the most rapid approach, using a
vulnerability testing program to do that.
I think there should be a fully funded vulnerability
testing program, that it should be the highest priority, and
that every voting machine needs to go through that process.
The second recommendation is that--we heard a lot of great
information on the ESTEP program, both from the Chair and from
the EAC Commissioners. That is a very positive program that
really should be expanded--the Congress should look at
expanding that.
There are huge success stories with the certification of
electronic poll books. That has been a concern of the Congress
for a number of years. Now there is actually a functioning
program, with systems being reviewed, and that should be
expanded.
The third recommendation I would make is that we prioritize
voter registration system security and modernization.
As the Committee is aware, the voter registration system is
really one of the core functions of the Help America Vote Act.
It holds all of the voter registration data of the citizens
that will vote, and we want to make sure that is secure and it
is accurate.
There has been bipartisan concern over the years over the
security of those voter registration systems, both from the
Congress and from outside groups. Even more so, there have been
documented instances of vulnerabilities being identified and
those vulnerabilities being exploited.
Now, we know that breaches of a voter registration system
that is outward-facing to the internet does not necessarily
mean results are going to be changed, but the impact on the
public could be very negative.
We need to do everything we can--I say ``we''--the country
needs to do everything we can to secure those voter
registration systems. I can tell you right now, we are not
doing everything we can. We should be doing everything we can,
but we are not doing everything we can.
My next recommendation is that we encourage coordination
between the Federal partners and the EAC. That just makes a lot
of sense, that there be a sharing of responsibilities on
coordination. That would save taxpayer money.
CISA has reduced its footprint in elections, but election
officials want more election focus on the products. I think the
EAC realizes that and has tried to step up to the plate and
provide scenario training, in coordination with other Federal
partners.
I think that targeted funding to the EAC which would allow
additional coordination would be helpful and to provide
additional cybersecurity offerings that are election-related.
My last recommendation is: Obviously, local governments and
local law enforcement are the most critical aspect of physical
security of local election officials. The FBI has really
stepped up with the trainings and--and significant trainings,
particularly on bomb threats, for example.
How can Congress help? I would just give you one example.
Targeted assistance to increase the accessibility of polling
places, that was a congressional initiative, and I think the
same can be done for the physical security of polling places
and election offices.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Palmer follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD PALMER
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chair Lee. Thank you.
I will now begin our questions today, followed by the
Ranking Member. I now recognize myself for the purpose of
witness questions.
Chairman Hicks, I will begin with you.
From 2020 to 2023, the largest share of Election Security
Grants were disbursed for cybersecurity. Can you share with us
some of the uses of those grant funds and your assessment of
whether that investment in cybersecurity was valuable?
Mr. Hicks. Thank you, Chairwoman.
I do believe that that investment was valuable. The one
criticism I would have is that it was not enough.
The fact is that most of these jurisdictions use this money
to protect IT systems against foreign attacks. I do not want to
remind the Committee how we are in conflict now with a very
dangerous adversary, and that adversary attacked our systems
back in 2016, 2020, and 2024. That is nothing that is secretive
to anyone. There are also other foreign actors that are out
there who want to do the U.S. harm.
We provided the jurisdictions with money to strengthen and
harden their systems, but that was not enough. They have
updated their voting systems in certain jurisdictions, and they
have improved the accuracy of their voting rolls, and other
activities as well. I do believe that, in order to ensure that
we combat this foreign threat over and over again, more
resources will be needed.
Thank you.
Chair Lee. In 2024, the EAC authorized the use of HAVA
grants for physical security. Can you share with us some of the
expenses that would be covered under that new guidance?
Mr. Hicks. We also authorized things in 2022 for the
personal safety of election officials overall, similar to what
Congress did to ensure that their Members remain secure and
safe.
In 2024, we basically offered more trainings for election
officials, but we also ensured that they can use this to
upgrade systems that they have, basically harden those systems,
whether or not that is two-step authentication or other aspects
as well.
Chair Lee. Vice Chair McCormick, you discussed VVSG 2.0
during your testimony. Would you share with us some of the key
distinctions between 2.0 and 1.0?
Ms. McCormick. Yes. Thank you for the question, Chairwoman.
VVSG 2.0 includes major improvements to cybersecurity
guidelines, including requiring air-gapping from any kind of
public network. We have prohibited wireless technology in the
machines. We have also provided that there must be multi-factor
authentication for all the systems.
Another thing we have done is that we have required
physical-security and data-protection requirements. Those are
strengthened significantly to make sure that there is no
intrusion on the systems that cannot be detected.
As well, that goes to our software independence, which is
now required. Software independence helps us identify whether
there has been any compromise to the systems.
We also now are requiring penetration testing before the
systems even come in for test.
We have done a number of upgrades to the VVSG 2.0. As I
said, we have two systems that have gone through this process
and have been certified by the EAC now. Those are now hitting
the market for the first time. We have five systems under test.
We are also looking to upgrade from 2.0 to 2.1 and looking
at things such as barcodes and wireless technology and other
ways we might be able to continue to strengthen the security
aspects of our guidelines.
Chair Lee. Mr. Palmer, you just mentioned during your
testimony--you gave several really interesting recommendations,
but one related to helping State and local officials with
cybersecurity.
You touched on the evolving role of CISA, where CISA has a
reduced footprint in the elections arena. Is there another
agency--is it the EAC? Do you think there is another entity
that could step up to help? Or would your recommendation be
that CISA reengage in a different way?
Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I think that CISA is reducing its footprint, and the EAC,
because it is the agency that focuses on elections, primarily,
or solely in its core mission, that we have a responsibility to
provide services across the board to election officials. Many
of those services have been picked up by the EAC. Sometimes it
is the Federal agency coordination or it is trainings that have
been going on across the country.
In discussions with CISA that I have had, those services
are still available. Sometimes I think the EAC could serve as a
translator and work with CISA, in coordination with CISA, to
provide those services, because election officials like it;
they like to have election-centric services.
The EAC has former election officials that serve on it.
Many of its Commissioners have been involved in elections. A
very professional group of former election officials that can,
you know, sort of translate for the rest of the Federal
Government what they want from the Federal Government. So----
Chair Lee. Thank you, Mr. Palmer.
Mr. Palmer. Thank you.
Chair Lee. We are out of time.
I now recognize the Ranking Member for 5 minutes.
Ms. Sewell. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Again, I want to thank all of our witnesses for your
testimony.
You know, I truly believe, and we hear over and over again
in this Subcommittee, that we are not funding the Election
Assistance Commission and election-security and--integrity
infrastructure enough.
I wanted to ask you, Chair Hicks: I know that administering
the Federal Election Security Grants is one of the biggest
responsibilities that you all have. Am I correct that the
Congress has gone from providing a high of $425 million in
recent years to a low of $15 million in 2025 in those grants?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, you are correct, Ranking Member.
Ms. Sewell. How has that decrease--and that is a big
decrease--how has it manifested itself in our States? What are
you seeing in terms of what is not going funded that should be
going funded because of this reduction?
Mr. Hicks. States are basically trying to make sure that
the Federal Government pays its fair share, in terms of having
the biggest footprint on the ballot and so forth for elections
overall.
I believe that election--the officials that I have talked
to have said that they are going to have to cut back on a few
things in order to ensure that things remain safe and secure
for the elections moving forward.
Ms. Sewell. Ms. McCormick, I know that we appropriated
about $45 million in 2026. I am hearing from lots of
secretaries of state that that simply is not enough and
directly from election administrators that that is simply not
enough.
What do you see is going undone because of the decrease in
the amount of funding?
Ms. McCormick. $45 million has to be distributed between
the 50 States and the territories, and so we hardly even----
Ms. Sewell. That turns out to be about, what, $200,000 per
State?
Ms. McCormick. I am sorry.
Ms. Sewell. That $45 million turns out to be about $250,000
per State. I mean, the total is $45 million, right?
Ms. McCormick. Right. It is a minimum amount of money.
Ms. Sewell. Yep.
Ms. McCormick. States cannot use that money to do things
like purchase new voting systems--which a lot of them are in
the position of needing to do at this point--to strengthening
the systems that they already have, to provide training for
their personnel.
They need to do physical security as well--physical
barriers, cameras, card readers, secure transportation for
voting systems and ballots--cybersecurity risk assessments,
incident response, threat testing, threat monitoring on social
media, and, again, securing their voter registration system.
Ms. Sewell. All of that costs money, right?
Ms. McCormick. Yes, it does. The Federal----
Ms. Sewell. Right now we are not funding that.
Ms. McCormick [continuing]. Government is just a drop in
the bucket.
Ms. Sewell. Yes.
You know, Mr. Palmer, I know you are a former Commissioner,
but I think hindsight is 20/20 vision, right? What would you
recommend to this Committee and to Congress in terms of
funding, adequately funding, the Commission? What do you see as
the biggest threat?
Mr. Palmer. Well, if we are talking about the Commission, I
think that many of the programs that we have talked about, like
the ESTEP program and the vulnerability testing program, there
is already a framework to do that. The Congress has set that
up. I mean, I know the EAC----
Ms. Sewell. Are we funding it?
Mr. Palmer. No, it is not being funded, and it is coming
out of the nickels and dimes that the EAC is finding in the
sofa, trying to keep that alive.
I just think that that is a critical piece of national
security--vulnerability testing. It just makes a lot of sense.
It is an investment for the rest of the election community, a
very small investment, that would have huge dividends.
Ms. Sewell. Absolutely.
Commissioner Hovland, what would you say is the most
essential function that the Commission runs? How do you see the
reduced funding affecting that mission?
Mr. Hovland. Thank you for the question, Ranking Member.
I think that, you know, again, we have our four core
mission areas, but as we look to expand the clearinghouse
function as well as our election technology initiatives, there
is really a need. Again, we have provided information to
Congress, to Appropriations, on how many of these programs are,
sort of, ready and turnkey because we have done pilots, because
we have done the work to see how best to spend this money and
how it can have an immediate impact.
Again, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, when you look
at the 8,000 jurisdictions across the country, really, the
scale that we are talking about is significant. Right now----
Ms. Sewell. Do you think that $250,000 is enough per State
to be able to adequately fund elections?
Mr. Hovland. On the grant side, again, I do not think that
is sufficient. I know from election officials that every dollar
matters, but, again, when you are talking about capital
purchases, whether that is replacing voting equipment or
upgrading the security of statewide voter registration
databases, you know, one of the things that we often hear about
from Congress is the unspent funds----
Ms. Sewell. Yep.
Mr. Hovland [continuing]. and, often, when the amounts are
lower, they are waiting--the States are waiting to make those
capital purchases, like replacing their statewide voter
registration database, or making those significant investments.
Ms. Sewell. Madam Chair, thanks for indulging me for going
a little over.
I would like to request unanimous consent to submit for the
record a letter from 84 voting, civil-rights, faith, labor,
environmental, and disability-rights organizations, led by the
Southern Poverty Law Center and The Leadership Conference, that
call on Congress to allocate considerably more funding for
election administration in Fiscal Year 2027.
Chair Lee. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Sewell. Thanks.
[The Southern Poverty Law Center and The Leadership
Conference letter follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chair Lee. I now recognize the gentleman from North
Carolina, Dr. Murphy, for 5 minutes.
Dr. Murphy. Thank you, Madam Chair.
They gave me a cheat sheet for your names, because I am too
old and I cannot read everybody's name down there.
Thank you very much for convening this Subcommittee
hearing.
Obviously, this is a bipartisan issue. We want people to
have access to what is a tremendous right that we are given
here in the United States to vote, and we want to make sure
that they are safe and secure.
I was just reading--I was not aware of what happened in
Pennsylvania. Thankfully nobody was injured.
I would like to go just a little bit, quick, off-script to
ask Mr. Palmer about what is the deal going on with Maryland.
My understanding is, they sent out 500 wrong mail-in ballots.
Oops?
Mr. Palmer. Well, I mean, I saw some of the conversation
about that, sir, and I would say that, you know, it is a
mistake that just cannot happen. That type of mistake cannot
happen.
Dr. Murphy. Five hundred thousand.
Mr. Palmer. It is a lot, sir. It is a very--it is a huge
mistake. I know the people that--you know, and then, obviously,
you can point at the vendor and say, well, the vendor made the
mistake, but the buck stops with the election officials. I----
Dr. Murphy. That is exactly right.
Mr. Palmer. I--you know, I have sympathy for them. I have
been in a position where one mistake can have an impact on an
election. It is that type of thing that hurts confidence.
I have hope that continued training and professional
training will, you know, sort of----
Dr. Murphy. This is where, again, this Committee and
Congress, you know, one way or the other, is supposed to
provide oversight. Their response is, ``Well, we will send
another 500,000 out.'' What could go wrong there?
It just shows that there are problems with our election
system, and it is OK for us to question it, and it is OK for us
to do due diligence on these type of things.
That just amazed me. I have known some patients of mine who
have come in and said they got mail-in ballots and they got
them for people that lived in their residence 3 and 4 years or
5 years before. There are obviously problems that go on with
this.
I want to talk a little bit about cybersecurity. We live in
a digital world where now there is AI, there is quantum physics
that are pushing out insane amount of data and really
jeopardizing our systems. We live in a dangerous time. There
are enemies that want to destabilize, divide us at home. We
have seen this in so many different instances.
Commissioner Hovland, I just want to ask about the EAC. How
does it work to stay informed to the constantly evolving cyber
threats? What does it do to not only figure these out but also
to communicate to, you know, State and local levels to make
sure that people know what is going on?
Mr. Hovland. Thank you for the question.
You know, it is a real challenge. Often, one of the biggest
challenges, when you talk about the scope and scale of 8,000-
plus jurisdictions across the country, is communicating to that
last mile.
One of the ways that we have been doing that--we
communicate a number of things, but really so much on
cybersecurity is about the basics. You know, even when we look
at threats from artificial intelligence and AI, so much of the
prevention comes down to being good at the basics.
That is why we address that with both resources that we
provide, various, you know, training guides, et cetera, but
also pieces of our Learning Lab. Some of the trainings in that
platform walk through best practices, and it can help----
Dr. Murphy. Do you guys communicate, State and local, as
literally as--currently, how often do you guys do that? What is
your relationship with those folks?
Mr. Hovland. We have regular contact with election
officials all across the country and----
Dr. Murphy. What does ``regular contact'' mean?
Mr. Hovland. Every day.
Dr. Murphy. OK.
Mr. Hovland. You know, again, it depends. We have a monthly
newsletter dedicated to election officials. We have a platform
to communicate with election officials. Our board meetings that
I mentioned earlier have State and local officials from every
State and territory in the country.
Through those processes, we get very widespread feedback--
small jurisdictions, large jurisdictions, State officials,
local officials--and that really helps inform our work and
makes it better.
Dr. Murphy. OK. Great.
Mr. Hicks, just one question, because I never understand--I
do not know what the answer to this is, when people say ``pay
their fair share.'' I have never had an idea when, you know,
taxation--this, that, and the other stuff.
How much, in your opinion, should the Federal Government be
paying versus what should the State be paying as far as
elections? What is the fair-share number?
Mr. Hicks. That is a hard question to answer, Congressman--
--
Dr. Murphy. Well, you are the one that brought it up.
Mr. Hicks. Yup, yup, I agree, I agree. I would say that
elections, overall, cost close to $6 billion per election
cycle. I think adding--2 years ago for the Congress to
appropriate $15 million is not enough.
If I had my druthers, I would say the Federal Government
should pay 100 percent of Federal elections. That is not for me
to decide. That is for Congress to decide.
Dr. Murphy. OK.
Mr. Hicks. So ``fair share,'' I think, is a significant
amount.
Dr. Murphy. OK. All right.
Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Chair Lee. I now recognize the gentlelady from Illinois,
Mrs. Miller, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you, Chairwoman Lee, for hosting this
important hearing and to the witnesses for taking time to be
here.
American citizens deserve secure elections and to know that
their votes are guaranteed. They are tired of fraud, and their
faith in our elections is dwindling.
We all know the Democrats want to cheat by not passing the
SAVE America Act, but I will continue to fight every day to get
that piece of legislation to the President's desk.
In this Committee, we passed H.R. 8721, the Preventing
Foreign Interference in American Elections Act, that makes
important changes to our election laws by prohibiting foreign
nationals from funding ballot-harvesting and ballot-collection
efforts.
This common-sense bill put forth by my colleague will help
the American people gain confidence in their elections while
curbing foreign influence that seeks to undermine our
institutions.
I look forward to the continuing good work that this
Committee is doing.
My first question is for Mr. Hicks.
What steps has the EAC taken in an effort to mitigate
illegal voting by non-citizens?
Mr. Hicks. Congresswoman, States run the elections. It is
illegal for non-citizens to vote. What we do is, we do not play
an active role into who can vote and who cannot vote. The
eligibility of voters relies on the States.
Mrs. Miller. Right. It is illegal for them to vote.
Mr. Hicks. Correct.
Mrs. Miller. It is illegal for illegals to vote. My
question is, what steps has the EAC taken to make sure that
illegals are not voting in our elections, non-citizens are not
voting in our elections?
Mr. Hicks. The EAC does not run elections. We cannot do
anything to ensure that. That is a State issue.
Mrs. Miller. You should be taking steps, though, to
mitigate illegal voting by non-citizens.
Also, if you want the Federal Government to pick up the tab
for elections, then maybe the Federal Government could say, you
have to have a photo ID and you have to be a U.S. citizen.
Mr. Palmer, how does poll-worker training contribute to
election integrity and voter confidence? What does poll-worker
training look like?
Mr. Palmer. Poll-worker training is--I mean, that is the
front lines of helping voters cast the ballot. That poll-worker
training is imperative.
What it really means is, officials at the county office, as
well as other poll workers who are long-term--served a long
time, they provide guidance on the different missions that take
place inside a polling place, if it is confirming the identity
of someone, if it is giving them the right ballot, making sure
that there is calm and no chaos in a polling place. That is the
importance of a poll worker.
Mrs. Miller. I am just curious, how do you train a poll
worker to keep non-citizens from voting when they do not have
to show an ID?
Mr. Palmer. Well, poll workers, they are going to follow
the rules of the jurisdiction. It is up to us, as the
policymakers, it is up to the Congress to set the rules--the
State legislatures--set the rules of the eligibility of who is
going to be casting a ballot.
We expect the poll workers to follow the instruction of the
legislature. In some ways, I do not want to put that onus on
them. They will follow the rules and procedures that are
provided to them.
Mrs. Miller. Which is why it is so important that we pass
the SAVE America Act.
Ms. McCormick, as jurisdictions modernize their elections,
what steps can they take to proactively ensure the security of
their systems?
Ms. McCormick. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman
Miller.
There are a number of things that election officials can
do.
The first thing that they can do is rigorous testing of the
election equipment both before, during, and after an election.
They can also engage in stringent auditing practices. All
States now require the elections to be audited, and we now have
98 percent of the country using paper ballots. The best way to
do that is to do an eye exam--hand examination of the ballots
to make sure that they match the results.
I agree with you that we have a crisis in election
confidence right now, and we need to be able to assure our
voters that our election outcomes are accurate, they are fair,
and they are secure. Part of that is to the allow observers
into the polling places to be as transparent as possible.
Those are some things that election officials can do to
strengthen the security and the transparency of our elections.
Mrs. Miller. I have to say, across the country, Democrats
and Republicans want--they election integrity. They want people
to show voter ID and proof of citizenship. We have to pass our
legislation here to require States and local governments to
prove that you are a U.S. citizen before you are voting.
With that, I will yield back.
Chair Lee. I would like to thank our witnesses for
appearing before us today and sharing your experience, your
expertise, and your insight.
Members of the Committee may have some additional questions
for you, and we ask you to please respond to those questions in
writing.
Without objection, each Member will have 5 legislative days
to insert additional material into the record or to revise and
extend their remarks.
If there is no further business, I thank the Members for
their participation.
Without objection, the Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]