[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
BEFORE THE WHISTLE: ASSESSING INFORMATION
SHARING AND SECURITY COLLABORATION
AHEAD OF MAJOR EVENTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 24, 2026
__________
Serial No. 119-40
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-779 WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Chair Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Eric Swalwell, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida J. Luis Correa, California
August Pfluger, Texas Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Member
Gabe Evans, Colorado Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Brad Knott, North Carolina James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia
Vince Fong, California Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Al Green, Texas
Vacant
Keighle Joyce, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
Honorable Andrew R. Garbarino, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 1
Honorable Nellie Pou, a Representative in Congress From the State
of New Jersey.................................................. 3
Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. Mike Sena, President, National Fusion Center Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. Raymond A. Martinez, Chief Operating Officer, FIFA World Cup
2026 Miami Host Committee:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. Joseph Mabin, Deputy Chief, Kansas City Missouri Police
Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Mr. Travis Nelson, Deputy Chief of Staff and Homeland Security
Advisor, Office of the Governor, State of Maryland:
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
For the Record
Honorable Andrew R. Garbarino, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Letter From Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino....................... 6
Letter From Honorable Steve Scalise............................ 7
BEFORE THE WHISTLE: ASSESSING INFORMATION SHARING AND SECURITY
COLLABORATION AHEAD OF MAJOR EVENTS
----------
Tuesday, February 24, 2026
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Andrew R.
Garbarino [Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Garbarino, McCaul, Gimenez,
Pfluger, Strong, Crane, Biggs, Evans, Van Epps, Thompson,
Correa, Hernandez, Pou, Carter, Green, and Walkinshaw.
Also present: Representative Alford.
Chairman Garbarino. Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order. Without objection, the Chair may declare the
committee in recess at any point.
Without objection, I seek unanimous consent that the
gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Alford, be permitted to sit with
the committee and ask questions of the witnesses.
The purpose of today's hearing is to assess the
information-sharing environment and the security operations
among our Federal, State, local, and nongovernment partners
ahead of a record number of major national events. The Chair
reminds all Members that the Chair will enforce the rules of
decorum at all times and urges all Members to be mindful of
their remarks.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Good morning. I want to start by thanking our witnesses for
appearing before the committee today. The United States is
preparing to host a mega decade of mass gathering events
starting this summer with the 2026 FIFA World Cup and
nationwide celebrations to mark the 250th anniversary of our
Nation. These events are an incredible opportunity to showcase
the best of America, but they also will be--will also require
unprecedented collaboration between leaders at the Federal,
State, and local levels to secure the events and keep the
public safe. Today we will hear directly from some of those
leaders about the security preparations already under way to
ensure that we already meet this moment.
The 2026 FIFA World Cup will be held throughout North
America in June and July and will include more than 70 matches
played in 11 different cities across the United States. With 5
million fans traveling to the United States and as many as 6
billion viewers expected worldwide, this will be the largest
sporting event in history.
At the same time, America 250 celebrations will be held in
communities across the country this summer to commemorate the
250th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of
Independence. Recognizing the years of planning that have
already gone into these efforts, the committee established its
Task Force on Enhancing Security for Special Events in the
United States last spring to ensure continued prioritization of
these events by Congress, Federal agencies, and State, local,
and private-sector partners. I want to thank the task force
Chairman, Mr. McCaul, and Ranking Member Ms. Pou for their
leadership, and all Members of the committee for their
consistent engagement on these security preparations through
the many briefings, hearings, and roundtables that have
convened.
Over the last year, Congress has taken concrete action to
ensure the United States will be well-equipped and well-
prepared for the months and years ahead. I am proud of the role
that this committee has played and will continue to play in
moving these critical priorities forward.
One of the greatest security risks facing our Nation today
is the malicious use of unmanned aircraft systems or drones.
The prospect of weaponized drones being used to attack mass
gatherings in open-air stadiums is a scenario that keeps policy
makers and law enforcement professionals up at night. In
response to these threats, I was proud to work with the Trump
administration and lead efforts to pass vital counter-UAS
authorities to for State and local law enforcement in the 2026
National Defense Authorization Act, which will help support
real-time mitigation efforts and counter the adversarial use of
this technology.
Republicans of Congress also provided historic security
investments to the enactment of the One Big Beautiful Bill last
summer, which included $625 million for the 2026 FIFA World Cup
security and $500 million for State and local investments in
counter-UAS capabilities.
As we approach the 25th anniversary of the September 11
terrorist attacks later this year, the solemn milestone
reemphasizes the importance of our collective mission in the
face of constantly-evolving threats. The Department of Homeland
Security and this committee were both created after 9/11 to
ensure that a similar attack on the United States would never
happen again. In just the last 3 months, this committee has
heard directly from Secretary Noem and leaders from several DHS
components, including TSA, CBP, and CISA, whose agencies will
play critical roles in safeguarding these events.
Twenty-five years later, the threat landscape has not
diminished. It has intensified, diversified, and evolved in
ways that demand constant vigilance and decisive action. But
DHS and the Federal Government cannot achieve this mission
alone. Close collaboration, communication, and information
sharing between Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial
governments, along with industry stakeholders and private-
sector partners, is essential. These games and festivities
designed to bring people together, enjoy in celebration also
present an array of targets from nefarious actors who seek to
carry out violent attacks or exploit these gatherings for other
illicit purposes.
It is not an even playing field. The dedicated men and
women who protect our communities every day must overcome these
threats every single time. Those who seek to inflict harm only
need to be right once. But that doesn't mean we give up. It
means we must be prepared for every possibility and ready to
combat any threat.
The goal of today's hearing is to engage directly with
representatives from law enforcement, host cities, and fusion
centers that serve on the front lines of this whole-of-society
security effort. Our shared objective is to ensure these
partners are receiving the timely intelligence, resources, and
coordination they need to carry out their responsibilities
effectively and safeguard the communities they serve. If there
are challenges, we have a collective responsibility to identify
them and work together to find actionable solutions.
Protecting public safety is not a partisan issue. It is
imperative that we work together to do so. As Chairman, I am
committed to ensuring that all partners in this effort are
receiving the support they need to succeed. I look forward to
the witnesses' testimony today and to a productive discussion
on how we can all work together on these efforts moving
forward.
I now recognize the gentlelady from New Jersey, Ms. Pou,
for her opening statement.
Ms. Pou. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good
morning. Good morning to all.
Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this very
important hearing and welcome to our witnesses. I want to thank
you for your valuable testimony that I know we are all going to
be receiving from you today. I am stepping in for Ranking
Member Thompson, who will be joining us momentarily.
I serve as the Ranking Member of this committee's Task
Force on Enhancing Security for Special Events in the United
States. Our task force has a deeply important mission as our
country prepares to host some of the world's largest gatherings
and celebrations over the next 3 years. Events like the 250th
anniversary of America's founding, the 78 matches of the 2026
FIFA World Cup, and the 2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games will
put the United States on display for the entire world to see. I
am particularly proud that the final match of the 2026 World
Cup will be held in my district in Northern New Jersey.
While the hospitality and the camaraderie of these events
are exciting, it is essential that we ensure the safety and
security of these mass gatherings. Both Congress and the
Executive branch have a responsibility to make certain that our
State, our local, Tribal, and territorial partners have all the
resources that they need to get the job done. That is why
today's hearing is so, so very important.
While conducting oversight as Ranking Member of the task
force, I have seen first-hand how this administration's actions
are jeopardizing our security preparedness. Over the last year,
the Trump administration has dismantled security cooperation at
all levels of government, reduced counterterrorism personnel
and resources, politicized FEMA funding and grants, and has
openly refused to work with States run by Democratic Governors
and elected officials. Now the Trump administration is choosing
to withhold $625 million in security funding that Congress has
already appropriated for the 2026 FIFA World Cup. This is money
meant to help cities and States keep their games safe. These
funds are just sitting there collecting dust, waiting for FEMA
approval and to be disbursed. States, host cities, and local
law enforcement are begging FEMA to release this money to be
able to prepare for and secure the World Cup games.
The time for action is short. This isn't competency. It is
chaos. I urge my Republican colleagues to join me and my
Democratic colleagues in calling for the administration to
release these funds now. These communities must have the
resources needed to ensure the events are safe for everyone.
As we go forward, we must keep in mind that it is not just
stadiums and parking lots we must protect. It is fan festivals,
entertainment districts, bars, and gathering spaces where
countless people will be celebrating. Still, New Jersey will do
whatever we can to provide safe and fun activities for the
World Cup. In doing so, we will ensure that all people and
spaces are adequately protected.
I want to be clear. Everyone, everyone deserves to be free
and safe at the upcoming games. Whether it is my constituents
traveling from Paterson to East Rutherford or fans arriving
from the other side of the world, all fans and players deserve
to enjoy the games and know that our Federal Government is
doing everything imaginable to make these events safe and
secure.
I have repeatedly stated concerns about Secretary Kristi
Noem's out-of-control and unlawful enforcement actions. We have
all seen dangerous DHS violent immigration tactics which were
especially apparent during the recent outrageous operations in
Minnesota. DHS personnel killed 2 American citizens and harmed
countless others. So when Director Lyons refused to rule out
conducting ICE enforcement at and around the World Cup events,
when I asked him this very question, chaos ensued.
Countries have issued travel advisories. Groups and
businesses are raising alarms. Residents and fans are
expressing fear for their safety. All while local officials
report minimum communication by ICE about what exactly it plans
to do. These tactics pose an unacceptable risk not just to
Americans, but all foreign visitors seeking to enjoy the World
Cup and other events.
Make no mistake, security planning cannot succeed amid
complete uncertainty, opaque planning, and unilateral decision
making. We need to explore these issues further and conduct
real oversight of DHS's out-of-control immigration enforcement
policy to ensure the World Cup is safe for everyone.
I have seen first-hand the amazing work that men and women
at the State and local level are doing to make these the most
secure games we have ever seen. Fusion centers in New Jersey
are working. Police departments in my districts are planning.
Governor Sherrill's office are coordinating together. These are
groups that are getting ready before the first whistle blows.
The question is whether or not DHS will do the same.
This committee has the responsibility to ensure that
Homeland Security's policy is not driven by politics or
retaliation, but by risk assessment, operational realities, and
Federal and State coordination. Because when millions gather in
my district in New Jersey or Miami or Kansas City, the American
people will not care about the interagency turf battles or
grant paperwork backlog. Americans will expect that their
Government works together because security is a shared
responsibility. But leadership starts at the top, and it is
time for DHS to lead.
I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to hear from our witnesses
today and about how we can ensure that this agency can improve
and do just that because time is really running out.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Garbarino. Other Members of the committee are
reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
February 24, 2026
I welcome the opportunity to discuss information sharing and
security collaboration for upcoming events like the America 250
celebration, 2026 FIFA World Cup, and 2028 Los Angeles Summer Olympics
and Paralympics. Democratic Members of the committee represent
communities that will host these events, and we all have a vested
interested in ensuring their security for local residents and visitors
alike.
Rep. Nellie Pou, who serves as the Democratic lead on the
committee's ``Task Force on Enhancing Security for Special Events in
the United States'' and whose district will host the World Cup final,
is an outstanding leader on this issue.
Several of our other Members from New Jersey, New York, and
California represent districts that will host or are located near World
Cup and LA 2028 events. They, too, are championing robust Federal,
State, and local partnerships to ensure successful events.
The Federal Government has a critical role to play to support State
and local governments that are hosting these events, which will draw
millions of visitors from across the country and around the world.
Historically, administrations of both parties have collaborated
with communities hosting major events like these.
Their relationships may have not always been perfect, but everyone
worked from the premise that a safe, successful event was good for the
host communities and the country as a whole.
Unfortunately, that has not been the case with the Trump
administration. In fact, the Trump administration's record when it
comes to supporting communities through information sharing, law
enforcement collaboration, and necessary Federal funding is--in a
word--atrocious.
President Trump has politicized the Federal Government's
relationship with States and cities. He has called Governors and mayors
he disagrees with names, sent troops and secret police to their
streets, and blocked State and local law enforcement from
investigations in their own jurisdictions.
The Trump administration has even withheld Congressionally-
appropriated funding based on whether communities are ``red'' or
``blue.'' Apparently, this President thinks that only those Americans
who voted for him deserve support from the Federal Government. That's
not how our country is supposed to work.
His petulant, punitive behavior toward communities he doesn't like
is a warning sign about whether his administration will fulfill its
responsibilities to World Cup and LA 2028 communities and stakeholders.
Right now, I am extremely concerned that the Federal Government is
withholding critical financial support to communities that will soon
play host to World Cup events.
Congress appropriated $625 million last year to help World Cup host
cities bolster security and ensure the safety of everyone associated
with the matches and fan events. It is FEMA's job to provide these
funds through the State Homeland Security Program, but DHS is weeks
overdue awarding the money.
Kristi Noem has no problem wasting taxpayer money to buy herself
multiple new jets, but she can't manage to get this money to
communities where it is desperately needed. It's outrageous.
States and host cities--who are already laying out huge sums of
their own taxpayer dollars and have dedicated untold local resources
for these events--are getting worried--and rightfully so. Time is
running out to finalize security preparations. Congress has already
appropriated this money--there is no excuse for DHS to stick local
taxpayers with the tab. It must be released without further delay.
To make matters worse, several States are already suffering under
Republican cuts to the State Homeland Security Grant Program, Urban
Area Security Initiative, and Emergency Management Preparedness Grants.
The Trump administration needs to stop playing politics with
security. Today I hope to hear from our witnesses about what the lack
of Federal support means for their communities--and what keeps our
witnesses up at night as they think about the events later this year.
And finally, to the Governors, mayors, and public safety
professionals across the country working to make America 250, the World
Cup, and LA 2028 safe and successful--Democrats see your hard work and
are doing everything we can to ensure the White House fulfills its
responsibilities to you. I hope my Republican colleagues in Congress
will do the same.
Chairman Garbarino. I would now like to formally introduce
our witnesses.
Mr. Mike Sena serves as president of the National Fusion
Center Association and executive director of the Northern
California High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area and the
Northern California Regional Intelligence Center. He brings 28
years of law enforcement experience, including serving as the
veteran investigator at the State and local level.
Mr. Ray Martinez serves as the chief operating officer of
the 2026 FIFA World Cup Miami Host Committee. He has 35 years
of law enforcement experience, beginning his career in 1979 in
the Miami Police Department, where he rose to the ranks from
police officer to assistant chief of police. He later served as
assistant chief and subsequently chief of police for the Miami
Beach Police Department.
A limited exception was made today due to unforeseen
circumstances and inclement weather disrupting travel to allow
Mr. Martinez to appear before this committee virtually. Without
objection, I will enter into the record two letters: the first
requesting this exception be made under those circumstances,
and the second from the Majority leader permitting this virtual
testimony today.
[The information follows:]
Letter From Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino
February 23, 2026.
The Honorable Steve Scalise,
Majority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives, H-107 Capitol,
Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Majority Leader Scalise: On Tuesday, February 24, 2026, the
Committee on Homeland Security (Committee) will hold a hearing titled,
``Before the Whistle: Assessing Information Sharing and Security
Collaboration Ahead of Major Events.'' This hearing will allow the
Committee to examine operational and strategic considerations involved
in the collection, analysis, and sharing of information among Federal,
State, local, tribal, territorial and private sector partners in
preparation for major events scheduled to take place in the United
States, including the 2026 FIFA World Cup.
One of the witnesses scheduled to testify is Mr. Raymond A.
Martinez, Chief Operating Officer for the FIFA World Cup 2026 Miami
Host Committee. Mr. Martinez's travel has been disrupted because of
inclement weather. Despite his best efforts, he is unable to get to
Washington, D.C. before the hearing. Mr. Martinez's perspective is
vital to the Committee's understanding of the preparation, needed
resources, and multi-entity coordination required to carry out various
major mass gathering events safely.
The Committee formally requests that Mr. Martinez be permitted to
testify virtually using Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) approved
software from a remote location.
Should you require any further information, please contact Keighle
Joyce, Staff Director with the Committee at 202-281-5786. Thank you for
your consideration, the Committee looks forward to your response.
Sincerely,
Andrew R. Garbarino,
Chairman.
______
Letter From Honorable Steve Scalise
February 24, 2026.
The Honorable Andrew R. Garbarino,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Garbarino: This letter serves as written approval for
the Committee on Homeland Security to receive remote participation from
committee witness Mr. Raymond A. Martinez, Chief Operating Officer for
the FIFA World Cup 2026 Miami Host Committee, during the February 24,
2024 hearing titled, ``Before the Whistle: Assessing Information
Sharing and Security Collaboration Ahead of Major Events.''
Your February 23, 2026 letter requesting the remote participation
of Mr. Martinez affirms that his travel was disrupted due to inclement
weather and that his testimony is necessary to inform the Committee of
preparations for the upcoming 2026 FIFA World Cup. I have determined
that Mr. Martinez's inability to travel due to the winter storm passing
through Washington, DC on February 22-23, 2026 constitutes an
``exceptional circumstance'' under the 119th Congress' ``Regulations
for the Remote Participation of Committee Witnesses.''
Please ensure that Mr. Martinez's remote participation adheres to
the requirements described in the 119th Congress' ``Regulations for the
Remote Participation of Committee Witnesses.'' Further, please ensure
that your February 23, 2026 letter and this response letter are entered
into the official hearing record.
Sincerely,
Steve Scalise,
Majority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives.
Chairman Garbarino. I appreciate----
Ms. Pou. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Garbarino. Yes, the gentlelady is recognized.
Ms. Pou. I am reserving the right to object. Mr. Chairman,
I will not object. But I would like to get your assurance that
witnesses invited by the committee Democrats will be afforded
the same opportunity to participate remotely in committee
proceedings. On behalf of the Ranking Member Thompson, can I
get your commitment to work with our side in the future when
remote participation is required by our witnesses?
Chairman Garbarino. Yes, and I will--as I was saying, this
was a very limited exception. It is in the rules and it was a
very difficult lift. I am happy that the Majority Leader
agreed. It took a lot of convincing, but because of the weather
and the gentleman not being able to make it up here, we were
granted this very late last night to allow him to do this.
So I will work with you if same situation arises. You have
my word I will do what I can to get the same cooperation from
the Majority Leader in the future again. But as I was told by
the Majority leader, this is a very limited circumstance due to
the weather that--and how the District of Columbia doesn't
really know how to handle a snowstorm, which we didn't get
anyway. But I will do my best in the future. You have my
commitment.
Ms. Pou. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Although it is 55
degrees----
Chairman Garbarino. Yes, I know.
Ms. Pou [continuing]. In Florida, I might add.
Chairman Garbarino. Well, I am pretty sure Mr. Martinez
just didn't want to come up and leave the beautiful weather
that is down in Florida. We should have done a field hearing
down there.
Ms. Pou. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Garbarino. So I do appreciate the Majority
Leader's willingness to grant this rare exception in order to
ensure the committee can hear Mr. Martinez' valuable and time-
sensitive testimony as the beginning of the World Cup games are
only months away.
Deputy Chief Joe Mabin serves as commander of the Patrol
Bureau for Kansas City Missouri Police Department. He
previously served as interim chief for the police and deputy
chief of the Investigations Bureau. He has progressed steadily
through the ranks, serving as sergeant, captain, major, and
ultimately deputy chief with nearly half the department's
personnel under his command.
Mr. Travis Nelson serves as the deputy chief of staff and
homeland security advisor for the Maryland Office of the
Governor, officially assuming the role in June 2025, after
serving as acting director for over a year. He has over 20
years' experience in the public safety, emergency management,
and law enforcement, including 19 years with the Maryland State
Police.
I thank all the witnesses for being here today. Pursuant to
committee rule VII(C), I ask that the witnesses please rise and
raise their right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Garbarino. Let the record reflect that the
witnesses have all answered in the affirmative. Thank you very
much and please be seated.
I now recognize Mr. Sena for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MIKE SENA, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL FUSION CENTER
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Sena. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Pou, and
Members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to testify
today. My name is Mike Sena and I am the president of the
National Fusion Center Association, which represents the 80
designated fusion centers across America.
Fusion centers are the backbone of the Homeland Security
information-sharing enterprise. Every day, over 3,200 analysts
and officers from every level of government work side-by-side
with the private sector to identify threats, share
intelligence, and coordinate operations. During major events we
collaborate with real-time crime centers, High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas, regional information-sharing system, watch
centers, intelligence commanders with the major county sheriffs
and major city chiefs, the U.S. Attorney's Offices, the FBI's
Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the Homeland Security Task Forces,
and the Center for Internet Security to ensure actionable
intelligence reaches decision makers.
Two weeks ago, we wrapped up security operations at Super
Bowl LX, which happened to be in my area of responsibility. I
want to share a few examples of how we worked together and how
things played out in real time and why it is so important for
Congress to continue supporting us.
In Sacramento, law enforcement mitigated a potential drone
threat to the Super Bowl based on a tip from the Central
California Intelligence Center days before the game. The night
before the Super Bowl, CISA and DHS I&A briefed our team on the
passenger rail sabotage threats that occurred the previous day
at the Winter Olympics in Italy. Our analysts quickly
identified the tactics and patterns, developed a Threat
Bulletin that we sent out to first-line responders across the
Bay Area before the crowds arrived the next morning.
We also helped law enforcement and nongovernment
organizations in their fight against human trafficking,
contacting 73 adults and 10 juvenile human trafficking victims,
including a 12-year-old child. Law enforcement arrested 29
suspected human traffickers and our fusion center analysts
played an important role supporting the Santa Clara County
Human Trafficking Task Force.
That level of collaboration was made possible by our use of
technology that combined mapping, communication, and
collaboration in a single platform. We were able to integrate
tips, share on-line indicators of human trafficking, analyze
field reports, and receive investigative requests from multiple
agencies.
While we're proud of the accomplishments, and I want to
point out that we do have gaps that I believe Congress can help
us address, we must address the ability to integrate the many
threat reporting systems that remain fragmented today. Upcoming
major events will test our ability to coordinate across
jurisdictions under very compressed time lines. There are
multiple systems which are not fully integrated with State and
local platforms, creating delays and, more importantly,
operational risk.
We also must strengthen the field presence of DHS's Office
of Intelligence and Analysis. I&A is the only element in the
intelligence community required by law to share intelligence
with State and local partners. We appreciate this committee for
including the NFCA for discussions on how I&A can be improved.
Any reform must strengthen I&A's presence at all AD fusion
centers while keeping a strong core component at headquarters.
Regarding drones, we are grateful that Congress gave State
and local law enforcement the legal authority to mitigate drone
threats by passing the Safer Skies Act last year. Now Congress
must provide the resources to expand the counter-UAS training
we are required to complete to use the authorities. Congress
should also provide dedicated resources for first responders to
integrate drones for our daily operations.
Congress should continue to provide robust support for the
State Homeland Security Grant Program, SHSGP, and the Urban
Area Security Initiative, UASI. These programs support
analysts, training, and technology that make information
sharing and threat analysis possible at every level every day.
Without those two grants, fusion centers cannot fully
contribute to the security of major events or the overall
Homeland Security mission.
Congress should also help resolve on-going uncertainty
around FEMA grant guidance and restrictions. The ability to
carry out missions like ours at the fusion centers should not
be penalized for policy decisions we do not control. When
eligibility requirements shift and when disbursements are
delayed it doesn't just affect local budgets, it derails
national priority projects designed to prevent major threats.
Cyber threats may present the greatest risks surrounding
major events. A cyber attack of power, water, or transportation
during the World Cup would create cascading failures that
overwhelm response. Congress should require Federal cyber
partners to better integrate with and provide cyber analytical
training to State and local partners.
Congress should provide DHS the resources to accelerate
security clearance processing for fusion center personnel.
Clearance delays can lock out people from secure coordination
spaces at the moment they are needed most. That is a gap in
coverage we cannot afford.
Finally, reliable public safety communications are an
absolute requirement at major events. FirstNet has been an
essential partner and Congress should ensure it continues by
reauthorizing the FirstNet authority this year.
In closing, planning for threat analysis and information
sharing around major events is not optional. It is mission-
critical. When information sharing is timely and properly
resourced, threats can be mitigated before harm occurs.
We appreciate this committee's leadership and I appreciate
your invitation to testify today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sena follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mike Sena
February 24, 2026
introduction
Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
information sharing, intelligence coordination, and security
preparations for major national events--where timely, accurate
intelligence and effective coordination are essential to public safety.
My name is Mike Sena, and I serve as president of the National
Fusion Center Association (NFCA), representing the 80 State and major
urban area fusion centers that make up the National Network of Fusion
Centers nationwide. I also serve as executive director of the Northern
California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) and the Northern
California High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (NC HIDTA), where our
team works daily with Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and
private-sector partners on threat identification, intelligence
analysis, investigative support, information sharing, and operational
coordination in collaboration with Real-Time Crime Centers (RTCCs),
Fusion Centers, High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs), the
Regional Information Sharing Systems' (RISS) Watch Centers, and the
Center for Internet Security (CIS).
I want to thank Members of this committee, including Subcommittee
on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Chairman Pfluger and Ranking
Member Magaziner and Chairman Strong and Ranking Member Kennedy, for
including NFCA and our law enforcement association partners in broader
discussions on major event security, information sharing, and proposed
reforms to DHS intelligence and field operations at the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). These discussions are critical as we
all recommit to securing the homeland from a wide range of threats.
Decisions about intelligence reform, field engagement, investigative
tools, training, and information-sharing systems directly affect how
fusion centers and State and local agencies identify threats and
respond in real time--especially during major events, where time lines
are compressed and consequences are immediate.
Across the National Network of Fusion Centers, more than 3,200
personnel from State, local, Federal, and private-sector partners
collaborate every day to analyze threats, share intelligence, and
support operational coordination, while safeguarding privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties. Since 2001, fusion centers have become a
cornerstone of the homeland security enterprise, complementing Federal
partners such as the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the Homeland
Security Task Forces, as well as other DOJ and DHS components. During
major national events in particular--such as the upcoming FIFA World
Cup, America 250 celebrations, and the 2028 Olympic and Paralympic
Games--fusion centers function as the primary hubs for consolidating
threat information, coordinating across jurisdictions, and ensuring
that actionable intelligence reaches decision makers and front-line
agencies when it matters most. There is no substitute for the National
Network of Fusion Centers--they fill a unique role that cannot be
replicated by any one entity. Working together with the Intelligence
Commanders Groups of the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA) and the
Major County Sheriffs of America (MCSA), and in collaboration with
State-wide investigative agencies that are part of the Association of
State Criminal Investigative Agencies (ASCIA), fusion centers play an
essential role helping to protect America.
Today, I will focus on how information sharing should function
during major events, what we have seen work well in recent large-scale
security operations, and where gaps remain--particularly in threat
reporting, real-time coordination, staffing, training, and access to
intelligence. I will also discuss the role of DHS I&A and other Federal
partners in supporting fusion centers in both steady-state operations
and during major events, including the resources and authorities needed
to ensure this system functions effectively in the years ahead.
major event preparation
Major events such as the FIFA World Cup, America 250 celebrations,
and the Olympic Games place extraordinary demands on the homeland
security enterprise. These events are not single venue or single
jurisdiction challenges. They extend across multiple cities, counties,
and States well beyond the secured perimeter.
Threats associated with major events often emerge far from the
venue and long before the event itself, surfacing through routine law
enforcement encounters, on-line activity, and tips from the public. The
scale and duration of these events test how well our information-
sharing systems work in practice, making real-time, multi-
jurisdictional coordination mission-critical. Fusion centers exist to
meet this challenge by consolidating tips and leads, integrating
intelligence from multiple sources, identifying patterns across
jurisdictions, and ensuring actionable information reaches the right
partners in time to act.
what is working
When Federal, State, and local partners are aligned in the field,
our Nation's information-sharing apparatus works the way it was
intended by the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report. When
Federal partners deploy alongside fusion center analysts and threat
liaison officers with a shared mission and real-time access to
disparate sources of information, communication improves immediately.
Intelligence products become more timely and relevant, questions are
resolved more quickly, and operational decisions move faster.
The collaboration that occurred in my area of responsibility during
and preceding Super Bowl LX, which happened in the city of Santa Clara,
Santa Clara County, and included NFL events in the city and county of
San Francisco, is a clear example of how the information-sharing
environment approach was intended to work. Sustained planning and real-
time coordination between the FBI, HSI, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and
other Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security
components, including the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), along with
fusion centers, the Bay Area Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI),
Center for Internet Security (CIS), and State and local public safety
agencies, enabled integrated threat reporting and shared situational
awareness. That coordination allowed partners to identify risks early,
align protective measures, and respond quickly as conditions evolved.
For example, days before the Super Bowl, the Central California
Intelligence Center (CICC) in Sacramento identified a subject that had
shared on-line content indicating his intention to violate restricted
air space during the game at Levi's Stadium with an Unmanned Aircraft
System (UAS). The significance of the threat was that the subject had
been convicted of violating the same restricted air space and dropping
objects from a drone after entering Levi's Stadium on November 26,
2017. Thanks to CICC's swift action in passing the lead to the NCRIC,
all the personnel that were protecting the venue were aware of the
threat and law enforcement partners in Sacramento were able to mitigate
the planned drone incursion by seizing the drone.
The night before the Super Bowl, the NCRIC team and our public
safety intelligence and transportation security partners were briefed
in the Super Bowl Regional Coordination Center (RCC) in the city of San
Jose, on passenger rail sabotage threats related to the 2026 Winter
Olympics in Italy by our CISA and I&A partners. The tactics,
techniques, and patterns were quickly identified and a team of local,
State, and Federal analysts worked with our fusion center personnel to
develop a bulletin that was quickly disseminated to front-line
personnel from multiple agencies around the San Francisco Bay Area to
increase awareness and improve the ability to detect and mitigate
potential threats to the public.
During the weeks ahead of this month's Super Bowl, law enforcement
and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) worked together to fight
against human trafficking and contacted 73 adult and 10 juvenile human
trafficking victims, including a 12-year-old child, and offered the
victims of sex trafficking support to escape their traffickers. Law
enforcement also arrested 29 suspected human traffickers by the time
the first whistle was blown on Super Bowl Sunday. The Santa Clara
County Human Trafficking Task Force spearheaded the collaboration with
over 60 partner agencies in 11 counties, with the support of NCRIC
analysts.
By consolidating human trafficking data sources through an
information-sharing environment that combined the technologies from a
common public safety Geographic Information System (GIS) analysis tool
with a commonly-used chat, video, and file-sharing technology, analysts
and officers were able to integrate tips, on-line threat indicators,
field reporting, and investigators' requests for information across
multiple jurisdictions. The fusion center analysts were able to
identify patterns and support the joint investigative effort of the
partner agencies with real-time analysis that would not have been
possible through isolated reporting or other information-sharing
platforms.
persistent gaps in threat reporting and coordination
Despite these successes, it is imperative that we improve how
information sharing, information access, and analytical collaboration
function when those functions must operate at scale and speed ahead of
and during major events.
Threat reporting overall, despite improvements, remains fragmented.
Tips and leads enter the system through multiple pathways--including
local agencies, Federal partners, private entities, venue security, and
the public. But there is no single, reliable workflow to rapidly
consolidate, deconflict, and disseminate that information across
jurisdictions. During fast-moving events, this fragmentation can
undermine shared messaging and situational awareness.
At the same time, Federal systems used by DHS and the FBI are not
fully interoperable with State and local platforms. Agencies are often
working from partial information, and critical data does not always
reach the right analysts or decision makers in time, which means that
front-line personnel who are best positioned to recognize, report, and
respond to potential threats are less aware. During major events, these
gaps are not theoretical, as during the Super Bowl, we had several
information-sharing platforms that operated at the same time. This
creates an operational risk at large-scale events and creates stress on
an already overtaxed network of analysts and officers.
The upcoming FIFA World Cup highlights these challenges in very
real ways. In some host regions, State and local law enforcement
agencies are facing significant security responsibilities without clear
coordination or operational alignment across all partners involved in
the sprawling events from practice locations, team hotels, to official
and unofficial events for fans. As a result, local agencies are not as
connected as they should be for planning, staffing, coordination, and
real-time information sharing for a complex, multi-jurisdictional
event.
For events of this scale, that approach means serious risks may go
unaddressed. World Cup security is not confined to a single venue or
jurisdiction; it extends across host cities and surrounding
communities. Without clear coordination, defined roles, and aligned
support, information sharing becomes more difficult, and local agencies
whose resources are already stretched too thin, are left to manage
complex, multi-jurisdictional threats under significant time pressure.
These challenges underscore why major international events require
a coordinated, multi-jurisdictional approach that aligns Federal,
State, local, and private-sector partners around shared information,
shared expectations, data security, and shared responsibility.
dhs office of intelligence and analysis
Within the broader information-sharing framework, the DHS Office of
Intelligence and Analysis plays a unique and irreplaceable role. I&A is
the only element of the U.S. intelligence community statutorily charged
with facilitating intelligence sharing with State, local, Tribal, and
territorial partners, including the National Network of Fusion Centers,
regarding terrorism and other threats to the homeland.
From our perspective in the field, I&A is most effective when it is
forward-deployed with access to Federal information and the authority
to appropriately share it with State and local partners. I&A personnel
embedded in fusion centers enable a timely two-way flow of information
and the collaborative analysis and development of intelligence--
increasing the likelihood that the reporting of threats reaches State
and local partners quickly, while insights developed at the local level
inform the national intelligence picture. During major events, this
field presence can determine whether threat-related information and
intelligence arrives in time to help personnel on the ground recognize
and prevent an incident, or whether it is too late to be useful.
In major urban areas that host major events, a single I&A
representative is insufficient. Effective support requires that field
teams have access to the right information and the authority to share
that information and develop joint intelligence products with State and
local partners. I was lucky enough to have the highest tier of support
possible from DHS I&A during the Super Bowl, as they sent 14 members of
their team from their Field Intelligence Directorate and Special Events
Program to assist the NCRIC. Those forward-deployed intelligence
analysts and officers must also be supported by a headquarters
structure at I&A that is capable of sustaining and scaling those
efforts for future major events and daily fusion center operations.
For these reasons, we are grateful that the committee has included
NFCA and our law enforcement partners in discussions on proposed
legislative reforms to strengthen I&A's ability to support State and
local law enforcement and all our communities. Stakeholder input is
essential. Decisions about staffing, authorities, release processes,
and coordination mechanisms directly affect whether intelligence
sharing works under the compressed time lines and heightened risk of
major events. Any reform effort should strengthen--not weaken--I&A's
field presence and ensure it is backed by a robust headquarters
enterprise with access to relevant information from other Federal
partners and the intelligence community and the authority to share
appropriately with State and local partners including fusion centers.
drone threats at major events
Unmanned aircraft systems present a growing threat to both major
events and everyday public safety. We appreciate Congress's action in
December 2025 through the Safer Skies Act, which passed as part of the
fiscal year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, which granted
State and local law enforcement and correctional agencies the authority
to detect, track, and mitigate malicious and unauthorized drones,
subject to appropriate training and equipment requirements.
From the field perspective, the challenge now is implementation.
Access to the FBI's required counter-UAS training is severely limited,
and demand already far exceeds available capacity. As a result, many
State and local agencies--particularly those preparing for major
events--do not yet have trained personnel in place to operationalize
this authority in a meaningful way. We are encouraged by the
administration's intent to consult closely with State and local law
enforcement and corrections as implementation of the Safer Skies Act
begins this year. We encourage Congress to allocate the funding
necessary to increase availability of FBI training for State and local
agency personnel so we can take quick action to mitigate drone threats
to our major events and every-day community safety.
Under the Safer Skies Act Congress also authorized the use of
existing Justice Department grant programs, specifically Byrne JAG and
COPS grants, to support the acquisition of drones for public safety
missions and also counter-UAS systems. In addition, funding provided in
the One Big Beautiful Bill Act through FEMA's State Homeland Security
Grant Program supports law enforcement activities that include counter-
UAS and other capabilities relevant to major event security. These
tools are critically important, but they are not sufficient on their
own. Counter-UAS capabilities require sustained investments in
training, staffing, equipment, and operational integration that exceed
what these programs can support. I urge Congress to consider how the
Federal Government can support State and local efforts to build and
maintain robust drone first-responder capabilities and counter-drone
operations to protect the public.
Addressing these gaps will require additional, flexible Federal
resources. Without that support, State and local agencies will continue
to face challenges translating the new authority that Congress has
provided into effective protection for our communities.
grants and resources
Federal grant programs play a critical role in enabling State and
local agencies to contribute to the national security mission every day
and to scale those capabilities for major events. These resources
support the personnel, training, technology, and coordination that make
timely information sharing and threat detection possible across
jurisdictions.
Fusion centers and our State and local partners use programs such
as the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and the Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI) to support analysts, training, analytical
technology, and multi-jurisdictional exercises and coordination. These
programs are central to local, regional, and national threat prevention
efforts, yet agencies continue to take on expanding responsibilities
and increasingly complex threat environments while planning and
execution have been complicated by uncertainty around grant guidance,
eligibility requirements, and the timing of fund disbursements that if
not resolved soon, will hinder or derail national priority projects
that have been designed to prevent and mitigate major threats to our
Nation.
Information-sharing capacity does not scale up on demand without
dedicated planning and resourcing. The analytical workforce and
coordination mechanisms required for major events such as the FIFA
World Cup, America 250 celebrations, and the Olympic Games must be
built and sustained over time. Because threat actors routinely cross
State lines and international borders, and because each part of
Federal, State, and local governments may have information,
capabilities, or resources, the Federal Government has a responsibility
to contribute funding and personnel to supplement and help sustain
State and local capabilities. Delayed guidance or funding time lines
directly affect readiness across the system.
As this committee considers homeland security and public safety
priorities, it should ensure that FEMA preparedness grant programs
provide predictable funding, timely guidance, and sufficient
flexibility to support sustained information-sharing capabilities
across jurisdictions. These investments enable fusion centers and our
partners to fully contribute to the homeland security and national
security missions and ensure coordinated readiness for major national
and international events.
cyber threats
Cyber threats may represent the greatest vulnerability surrounding
major events because adversaries do not necessarily need physical
proximity to cause harm. A successful cyber attack against power,
water, communications, or transportation systems during a major event
could create cascading effects that overwhelm response capabilities.
For major events, cyber threats underscore the need for real-time
information sharing well beyond the event's geographic footprint.
Fusion centers often lack timely access to cyber threat indicators and
trend data, and despite progress in recent years there is no fully
integrated national approach to State and local cyber threat response.
Fusion center and partner agency analysts also need continued DHS ITA
Cyber Analyst Seminar and Webinar training, as well as advanced cyber
analyst training.
Strengthening information sharing in this area will require better
integration between Federal cyber partners, fusion centers, and other
State and local officials. It will also require clearer pathways for
sharing actionable cyber threat information from Federal entities to
State and local agencies, and sustained investment in analytic capacity
at the State and local levels. Without these connections in place,
cyber risks associated with major events will continue to outpace our
ability to detect and respond in time.
law enforcement tools and investigative technology
Effective information sharing for major event security depends on
access to a range of lawful tools and data--not a single technology.
Fusion centers and their partners rely on investigative technologies,
including commercially-available data, to identify potential threats
early, connect disparate data points, and support timely operational
decisions before and during large-scale public events.
Tools such as automated license plate recognition (LPR), facial
recognition, and social media open-source intelligence analysis support
threat detection and situational awareness for planned and unplanned
events. These tools help identify patterns and emerging risks early
enough to share information across jurisdictions, enabling coordinated
prevention and response efforts before harm occurs.
As Congress considers consumer data privacy frameworks, it is
critical that any approach be developed in consultation with State and
local law enforcement and account for the real-world public safety
needs. Data privacy proposals could have a major impact on
investigative efforts given the ubiquity of data across our world
today. One of those proposals--the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act
(FANFSA)--would force analysts and investigators who are trying to
prevent harm and protect the public to be blind to information that
others can readily access. That makes no sense from a public safety or
homeland security standpoint. Efficient, timely, and privacy-protective
sharing of digital evidence is essential. Legislative frameworks must
preserve lawful access necessary for timely information sharing while
maintaining strong privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties
protections.
communications and information access
Effective information sharing for major event security depends on
reliable communications and timely system access. Fusion centers
require access to local, regional, State, and Federal information at
both the Classified and unclassified levels, including law enforcement
records, criminal intelligence databases, the Homeland Security
Information Network, the Homeland Security Data Network, FBI Criminal
Justice Information Services systems, DHS law enforcement and screening
systems, and tip and lead intake platforms.
This access allows fusion centers to add critical local context to
national intelligence and support coordinated, multi-jurisdictional
threat prevention efforts. During major events, delays or barriers to
system access directly undermine situational awareness and slow
decision making for personnel responsible for public safety on the
ground.
Current Federal platforms offer some functionality, but they remain
limited in their ability to support real-time, large-scale coordination
across agencies and jurisdictions. As Congress considers legislative
reforms to DHS I&A and other Federal components, any legislative or
policy changes should ensure fusion centers retain timely, operational
access to necessary systems and prioritize interoperability and real-
time communications across jurisdictions that allow analysts and
officers to enter the data once, instead of the several times that they
have to enter the same data today into multiple systems. Without these
capabilities, fusion centers are far less able to support major event
security or rapidly share threat information before harm occurs.
security clearances
Timely security clearances are essential to effective information
sharing during major events. On-going delays limit fusion center
personnel's ability to access critical intelligence and fully
participate in secure coordination with Federal, State, and local
partners.
During major events, personnel without timely clearances may be
unable to access or share threat information or participate in secure
coordination spaces, directly undermining joint situational awareness
and response planning.
As Congress and the administration consider reforms to personnel
security and information-sharing policies, I urge you to prioritize
timely clearance processing and access for State and local fusion
center personnel, including appropriate use of reciprocity and
provisional access to meet time-sensitive operational needs.
closing
The upcoming World Cup, America 250 celebrations, and Olympic Games
will test the homeland security enterprise in ways we have not
experienced in decades. Threat-related analysis and information sharing
is not a supporting function for these events--it is an essential
mission that must be developed and exercised routinely to protect our
communities.
Fusion centers sit at the center of that mission, connecting
Federal intelligence with State and local operational response. When
information sharing is timely, integrated, and properly resourced,
threats can be identified and mitigated before they reach the public.
We appreciate the committee's engagement and its inclusion of the
NFCA in discussions on major event security, information sharing, and
I&A reform. We stand ready to continue working with you to ensure our
analytical and information-sharing systems and practices are prepared
for the challenges ahead.
Chairman Garbarino. Thank you, Mr. Sena.
I now recognize Mr. Martinez for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF RAYMOND A. MARTINEZ, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, FIFA
WORLD CUP 2026 MIAMI HOST COMMITTEE
Mr. Martinez. Thank you, Commissioner Garbarino, Ranking
Member Pou, and distinguished Members of this committee. Thank
you for the opportunity to testify regarding public safety and
security preparations for the FIFA World Cup.
My name is Ray Martinez and I serve as the chief operating
officer for the Miami Host Committee. As stated previously,
I've served for 35 years in local law enforcement, my last 2\1/
2\ years as the chief of police of the Miami Beach Police
Department. Upon my retirement from law enforcement, I moved
into the event world and have worked on several large-scale
international events, including music festivals, the college
football playoffs in 2021 and just last month here in Miami. I
also served as the president and CEO of the Super Bowl Host
Committee for the 2020 game, which was held in Miami.
Working with me on the Host Committee are several law
enforcement executives with similar, if not more impressive,
backgrounds. Those experiences and lessons learned from the--
learned informed the approach we are taking with World Cup
planning.
The FIFA World Cup 2026 will be the largest sporting event
ever conducted globally. Miami is one of 16 host cities across
3 countries and North America hosting matches. We will host 7
matches, including a quarterfinal and the bronze medal final
match. The Miami Host Committee is planning on producing a 23-
day fan festival where we expect hundreds of thousands of
international visitors. This presents a tremendous opportunity,
but also a historic operational challenge.
On behalf of the 11 U.S. World Cup committees, I want to
thank this committee for providing the $625 million in security
funding to the host cities. Those resources are critical to
ensuring that host committees have capabilities necessary to
execute a safe and secure tournament across multiple weeks and
venues.
In Miami, our security framework is built on three pillars:
unified command; integrated local, State, and Federal
partnership; and intelligence-driven operations.
First, a unified command. Public safety operations in Miami
are led by the Miami-Dade Sheriff's Office under a unified
command structure that integrates municipal police, fire and
rescue, emergency management, and State agencies across
multiple jurisdictions.
Second, integrated Federal partnership with State and local
agencies. The White House Task Force on the World Cup has
played a central role in aligning Federal agency support with
local agencies and host committee planning. We are grateful to
the White House Task Force and Executive Director Andrew
Giuliani's efforts to support and partner with the FIFA World
Cup host committees. Federal partners, including the FBI,
Secret Service, FEMA, CISA, DHS, provide threat assessments,
intelligence integration, cybersecurity protection, contingency
planning. This coordination ensures access to national
capabilities and support if threat conditions evolve.
Third, intelligence-driven operations. The South Florida
Fusion Center, working with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force
and Federal intelligence partners, lead to proactive
information sharing and threat monitoring. Both the Miami
Stadium and Bayfront Park will operate with layered security
perimeters, credential and entry screening, dedicated emergency
access lanes, and a Joint Operations Center that provide real-
time situational awareness and coordinated decision making.
One of the most significant emergency threats is
unauthorized drone activity. Malicious or reckless drone
operation presents risks ranging from surveillance to
operational disruption. In coordination with Federal partners,
we will be implementing temporary flight restrictions,
detection capabilities, and counter-UAS planning integrated
into our overall security posture. We appreciate the
Congressional support, and particularly this committee as well
as President Trump's administration, for dedicated counter-UAS
funding to support these efforts.
The Department of Homeland Security has assigned elevated
Special Assessment--Special Event Assessment Ratings to the
Miami matches, including a SEAR 1 designation for the Bronze
Medal final match. These designations reflect the scale into
international visibility of the event and reinforce the
importance of robust Federal, State, and local coordination,
which is well under way.
Miami's preparedness reflects the on-going coordinated
efforts of all 11 U.S. host committees as we work each day to
ensure a safe and secure and successful FIFA World Cup.
Together we are committed to demonstrating that no nation is
better equipped to host and deliver a World Cup than the United
States of America.
I thank you for this opportunity to appear for you today
and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Martinez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Raymond A. Martinez
February 24, 2026
introduction
Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today regarding public safety and security preparations
associated with the FIFA World Cup 2026TM and, specifically,
Miami's role as one of the official host cities. I appreciate the
committee's leadership and continued oversight in ensuring that major
international events hosted in the United States are conducted safely,
securely, and in a manner that reflects the highest standards of
intergovernmental coordination and operational readiness.
overview of the fifa world cup 2026 in miami and operational
environment
The FIFA World Cup 2026TM represents the largest
sporting event ever conducted globally. Miami has been designated as
one of 16 host cities for the FIFA World Cup 2026TM, and
will host 7 official matches at Hard Rock Stadium in Miami Gardens,
which will be rebranded as Miami Stadium for the duration of the
tournament. These matches will include group stage matches, a Round of
32 match, a quarterfinal match, and the bronze, or third-place, game.
The tournament will run from June 11 through July 19, 2026, and will
also include a 23-day FIFA Fan Festival in downtown Miami's Bayfront
Park, which will serve as a major public gathering and celebration
site.
This global event is expected to attract hundreds of thousands of
international visitors, and the Miami metropolitan area faces both an
extraordinary opportunity and a historic operational challenge. Public
safety planning encompasses law enforcement, fire rescue, emergency
management, health care infrastructure, transportation, cybersecurity,
and community engagement components to ensure coordinated and resilient
operations across all venues and activation zones. We thank the
committee for providing $625 million in security funding in Pub. L.
119-21. These funds will be vital to support the complex safety
operations associated with an event of this scale.
To support State-level preparation, the South Florida Regional
Multi-Agency Coordination Group (MAC) was formally established to
ensure unified planning, coordinated response capabilities, and
strategic policy alignment across jurisdictions. At the Federal level,
the White House Task Force on the FIFA World Cup has been established
to coordinate nationwide interagency support, accelerate security and
infrastructure readiness, and align host city preparations with Federal
capabilities, intelligence resources, and operational support
frameworks. We are grateful for the White House Task Force and
Executive Director Giuliani's efforts to support and partner with the
FIFA World Cup.
The MAC structure is designed to coordinate executive-level policy
decisions, resource prioritization, and strategic guidance for complex
incidents or major planned events. It serves as the bridge between
executive leadership and operational Incident Command, ensuring unity
of effort across multiple jurisdictions and disciplines. Public safety
planning for the World Cup in Miami is centered on a unified command
structure led by the Miami-Dade Sheriff's Office. The Sheriff's Office
is responsible for stadium security, perimeter control, and crowd
safety operations, working in close coordination with Miami-Dade Fire
Rescue, which provides emergency medical support, fire safety services,
specialized rescue capabilities, and on-site incident response. The
city of Miami Police Department and Fire Rescue Department provide
operational support for downtown venues, including festival operations
and transportation hubs. State law enforcement and transportation
agencies support traffic management, surge staffing, and specialized
operational needs.
Federal partners, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
United States Secret Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and the Department of
Homeland Security, play critical roles in threat assessment,
intelligence integration, cybersecurity protection, and contingency
planning. The White House Task Force on the FIFA World Cup has played
an essential role in ensuring that Federal partnerships are maximally
leveraged to create a safe environment for fans to enjoy the event.
The United States Department of Homeland Security classifies
special events using Special Event Assessment Ratings (SEAR) Levels 1
through 5 with SEAR 1 events being the most significant. These
designations reflect factors such as the presence of high-profile
attendees, international media interest, geopolitical considerations,
and the level of Federal coordination required. The 7 matches scheduled
in Miami carry significant SEAR designations, with the first 6 matches
classified as SEAR 2 events and the Bronze Medal match classified as a
SEAR 1 event. The concurrent FIFA Fan Festival is rated as a SEAR 2
event. These ratings necessitate elevated interagency coordination at
the Federal, State, and local levels.
The Miami-Dade Department of Emergency Management has hosted
several full-scale and tabletop exercises available for all public
safety agencies during the past year. In January 2026, a multi-agency
Region 4 World Cup tabletop exercise was conducted to test emergency
response protocols, evacuation procedures, intelligence sharing, cyber
disruption scenarios, and incident command coordination under the
National Incident Management System framework. These exercises
strengthen interagency coordination, validate operational
communications, and enhance preparedness for complex and evolving
threat scenarios.
information-sharing framework and operational integration
The South Florida Fusion Center, in coordination with its regional
intelligence partners--including the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force--
continues to conduct proactive intelligence collection, comprehensive
threat assessments, and robust information sharing across local, State,
Federal, Tribal, and international agencies.
This effort includes close collaboration with FIFA's Safety and
Security Intelligence Group to ensure unified situational awareness and
operational alignment. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's
Office of Intelligence and Analysis provides weekly intelligence
briefings to support planning and decision making. The Intelligence
Operations Center serves as the regional clearinghouse for intelligence
matters, maintaining direct liaison with Federal agencies and host city
fusion centers nationwide. Sensitive information is disseminated to all
participating partners through the Department of Homeland Security's
Homeland Security Information Network.
venue security, public safety operations, and emerging threat
preparedness
Security planning at Miami Stadium incorporates lessons learned
from prior high-attendance events and international best practices.
These measures include multi-layered security perimeters, early ticket
verification and credential screening, expanded screening capacity
including bag checks and X-ray systems, hardened fencing and engineered
pedestrian flow corridors, and rapid deployment crowd control units.
Operational readiness is supported through real-time situational
awareness platforms and joint operations centers, enabling continuous
coordination and rapid decision making among participating agencies.
These capabilities support proactive threat identification and
coordinated operational responses.
Bayfront Park will serve as the official FIFA Fan Festival site,
accommodating up to 30,000 daily visitors over 23 days. Public safety
measures at this location include secured perimeters with controlled
entry and exit points, magnetometer screening, dedicated emergency
access lanes, and coordinated ingress and egress management. On-site
public safety infrastructure includes emergency medical services, fire
suppression capabilities, rapid medical transport access, and
coordinated law enforcement and private security staffing. High-
visibility patrols and a robust volunteer program will support
situational awareness, public safety, and visitor assistance.
One of the most significant emerging threat vectors associated with
this event involves Unmanned Aerial Systems, commonly referred to as
drones. Recent threat assessments indicate a significant rise in
malicious or unauthorized drone activity at large-scale events
worldwide. These systems present risks including aerial surveillance of
security operations, delivery of hazardous payloads, unauthorized
incursions that could disrupt operations or create panic, air space
conflicts with law enforcement and emergency aircraft, coordinated
swarm activities, and signal interference affecting communications
systems.
Mitigation measures include the implementation of Temporary Flight
Restrictions coordinated with Federal aviation authorities, deployment
of counter-UAS detection technologies such as radio frequency sensors
and radar systems, joint counter-drone coordination with Federal
technical teams, public awareness and enforcement campaigns, rapid
interdiction protocols, and specialized response team training.
Counter-UAS planning is fully integrated into operational planning and
emergency response exercises. We appreciate this committees' support
for $500 million in C-UAS grant funding through the Department of
Homeland Security and the Trump administration's efforts to prioritize
the first half of that funding for FIFA World Cup 2026TM
host cities.
In addition, the Miami-Dade State Attorney's Office leads proactive
human trafficking prevention initiatives, including enforcement
operations, victim services coordination, public awareness campaigns,
and reporting mechanisms. Regional transportation agencies are
implementing adaptive signal timing, expanded transit operations,
managed ride-share staging, pedestrian safety corridors, and
coordinated traffic management strategies to ensure safe and efficient
movement of visitors and residents.
federal coordination, community engagement, and operational support
The White House Task Force on the FIFA World Cup serves as the
central Federal coordination body supporting World Cup Host Committees.
The Task Force assists host cities synchronizing Federal agency support
across security, transportation, border operations, and infrastructure
protection, facilitating intelligence sharing and threat assessments,
coordinating Federal grant pathways and resource allocations, and
aligning national counterterrorism and cybersecurity capabilities with
local operational planning. This coordination enhances host city access
to Federal intelligence streams, specialized technical capabilities,
and rapid Federal surge support if threat conditions evolve. We are
grateful for the good relationship between Host Committees and the Task
Force. In particular, Executive Director Giuliani and his team have
been extremely helpful and attentive to addressing Host Committee
issues as they arise. This relationship has been fundamental in
ensuring that Federal resources are leveraged to enhance our security
operations.
Community engagement and public communication are essential
components of World Cup preparation. Pre-event outreach includes
presentations to community organizations, businesses, and local
stakeholders. During the event, a large-scale volunteer deployment will
support multilingual visitor assistance, safety messaging, crowd flow
management, and emergency reporting awareness. Public communications
will emphasize entry procedures, prohibited items, drone restrictions,
emergency contacts, and transportation guidance.
conclusion
Miami's World Cup preparedness reflects a layered, intelligence-
driven, and Federally-integrated public safety framework. Unified
command leadership by the Miami-Dade Sheriff's Office, supported by
municipal police departments, fire rescue agencies, Federal partners,
counter-UAS capabilities, and coordinated Federal support through the
White House Task Force on the FIFA World Cup, positions Miami to
deliver a secure, resilient, and globally-credible tournament
environment.
These efforts ensure the safety of participants, visitors, and
residents while establishing a model for interagency coordination and
public safety operations for future major international events hosted
in the United States.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look
forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Garbarino. Thank you very much, Mr. Martinez.
I now recognize Deputy Chief Mabin for 5 minutes to
summarize his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH MABIN, DEPUTY CHIEF, KANSAS CITY MISSOURI
POLICE DEPARTMENT
Mr. Mabin. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Pou, and
distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on information sharing and
security collaboration ahead of major events.
My name is Deputy Chief Joseph Mabin and I command the
Patrol Bureau of the Kansas City Missouri Police Department,
which is a member of the Major City Chiefs Association. KCPD
has a current staffing of over 1,100 sworn law enforcement
officers serving a city of more than half a million residents.
In less than 16 weeks, Kansas City is projected to welcome
more than 650,000 visitors during the 2026 FIFA World Cup.
Kansas City has hosted major events in the past, including
championship parades and iconic American sporting events, such
as the MLB All-Star Game and the NFL Draft. However, this event
will require the largest coordinated deployment of mutual aid
partners in our city's history.
The 2026 FIFA World Cup is the single largest sporting
event in the world. For the Kansas City metropolitan area, it
represents both an extraordinary opportunity and a historic
challenge. Kansas City is the smallest market among the 11 U.S.
host cities, yet we will operate one of the largest overall
footprints. We'll host 6 matches and 4 team base camps. In
addition, Kansas City is planning a FIFA fan festival that will
operate for 18 days throughout the tournament.
Our tournament footprint spans 10 counties across 2 States,
Missouri and Kansas. This bipartisan--excuse me, bi-State
effort requires a unified approach to emergency preparedness,
response, and recovery. Crossing State line adds complexity to
communication and coordination, making seamless information
sharing essential. The scope and visibility of this event
require thoughtful, comprehensive planning. Safety and security
remain our top priorities. Our goal is to deliver a safe,
seamless, and welcoming experience for residents and visitors
alike.
As with any event of this scale, we are preparing for a
range of potential public safety considerations, including
unauthorized UAS, cyber disruptions, routine criminal activity,
and increased demand on emergency and health care services.
Central to our approach is timely, actionable information
sharing with local, State, Federal, and international partners.
Since 2003, Federal Homeland Security grants, particularly
the Urban Area Security Initiative and State Homeland Security
Grant Program, have allowed our region to build a mature,
multidisciplinary preparedness framework. These investments
helped establish and continue to sustain the Kansas City
Regional Fusion Center, our primary intelligence hub. Through
this Federal support, we have built interoperable radio
communications and strengthened intelligence sharing. We have
enhanced specialized response capabilities, including HAZMAT,
EOD, and tactical WMD response teams. We conduct thousands of
hours of training each year through tabletop functional and
full-scale exercises. All of this allows for real-time
situational awareness and response across jurisdictions.
These capabilities are the direct result of sustained
Federal and local partnerships, which are critical to our
success. They are the foundations on which we are building our
World Cup security posture.
The challenges facing Kansas City are driven primarily by
the scale and complexity of the tournament's footprint within
the region. This is not a single venue or single-day event. It
involves coordination of operations across multiple sites,
jurisdictions, and several weeks. At the same time, we must
operate with finite resources. Law enforcement personnel,
specialized teams, and critical equipment are limited not only
locally, but also nationally. Host cities will draw from the
same pool of Federal resources and specialized capabilities.
We are grateful for this committee's work and support
toward World Cup safety and security. The counter-UAS
authorities under the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act
provide critical resources to detect, track, and mitigate UAS
threats. The FIFA World Cup Security Grant Program is necessary
to fund the personnel, equipment, and operational needs
required to deliver a safe event. We appreciate the continued
support and partnership as we approach this historic
tournament.
Kansas City's investments, backed by Federal homeland
security grants and State and local commitments enhance not
only our regional readiness, but our Nation's preparedness for
high-profile international events. Before the first whistle
blows later this year, we want to ensure that information flows
faster than threats, that partnerships are stronger than
vulnerabilities, and that everyone experiences a safe and
secure World Cup.
Thank you for your continued partnership and support. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mabin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph Mabin
February 24, 2026
Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today on ``Information Sharing and Security Collaboration Ahead of
Major Events.''
My name is Deputy Chief Joseph Mabin, and I command the Patrol
Bureau of the Kansas City Missouri Police Department, which is a member
of the Major Cities Chiefs Association. I lead the Department's largest
bureau within an agency of over 1,100 sworn law enforcement officers
serving a city of more than half a million residents.
In less than 16 weeks, Kansas City is projected to welcome more
than 650,000 visitors during the 2026 FIFA World Cup. Kansas City has
hosted major events in the past--including championship parades and
iconic American sporting events such as the MLB All-Star Game and the
NFL Draft. However, this event will require the largest coordinated
deployment of mutual aid partners in our city's history.
The 2026 FIFA World Cup is the single-largest sporting event in the
world. For the Kansas City metropolitan area, it represents both an
extraordinary opportunity and a historic operational challenge.
Kansas City is the smallest market among the 11 U.S. host cities,
yet we will operate one of the largest overall footprints. We will host
6 matches and 4 team base camps, including 3 of the top 10 ranked teams
in the world. In addition, Kansas City is planning an ambitious FIFA
Fan Festival that will operate for 18 days throughout the tournament.
Our tournament footprint spans 10 counties across 2 States--
Missouri and Kansas. This bi-State effort requires a unified approach
to emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. Crossing State lines
adds complexity to communication and coordination, making seamless
information sharing essential.
The scope and visibility of this event require thoughtful,
comprehensive planning. Safety and security remain our top priorities.
Our goal is to deliver a safe, seamless, and welcoming experience for
residents and visitors alike. As with any event of this scale, we are
preparing for a range of potential public safety considerations,
including unauthorized unmanned aircraft systems, cyber disruptions,
routine criminal activity, and increased demand on emergency and health
care services. Central to our approach is timely, actionable
information sharing with local, State, Federal, and international
partners to ensure coordinated and effective operations.
Since 2003, Federal homeland security grants--particularly the
Urban Area Security Initiative and the State Homeland Security Grant
Program--have allowed our region to build a mature, multi-disciplinary
preparedness framework. These investments helped establish and continue
to sustain the Kansas City Regional Fusion Center, our primary
intelligence hub.
Through this Federal support, we have built interoperable radio
communications and strengthened intelligence sharing. We have enhanced
specialized response capabilities--including hazmat, explosive ordnance
disposal, and tactical WMD teams--that train together and can deploy
region-wide. We conduct thousands of training hours each year through
tabletop, functional, and full-scale exercises. All of this allows for
real-time situational awareness and response across jurisdictions.
These capabilities are the direct result of sustained Federal-local
partnerships, which are critical to our success. They are the
foundations on which we are building our World Cup security posture.
The challenges facing Kansas City are driven primarily by the scale
and complexity of the tournament's footprint within our region. This is
not a single-venue or single-day event--it involves coordination of
operations across multiple sites, jurisdictions, and weeks, requiring
sustained planning and collaboration at every level.
At the same time, we must operate with finite resources. Law
enforcement personnel, specialized teams, and critical equipment are
limited not only locally, but nationally. Host cities will draw from
the same pool of Federal resources and specialized capabilities.
Additionally, Federal funding time lines create uncertainty in
operational planning, staffing, and logistics.
We have strengthened communications across agencies, but at the
scale of a global event, this remains a challenge. The World Cup
requires coordination not only locally, but nationally and
internationally. Beyond connected systems, the greater challenge is
identifying and communicating actionable intelligence to support real-
time decision making.
We are grateful for this committee's work and support toward World
Cup safety and security. The counter-UAS authorities under the 2026
National Defense Authorization Act provide critical resources to
detect, track, and mitigate UAS threats. The FIFA World Cup Security
Grant Program is necessary to fund the personnel, equipment, and
operational needs required to deliver a safe event. We appreciate
continued support and partnership as we approach this historic World
Cup tournament.
Kansas City's investments--backed by Federal homeland security
grants, and State and local commitments--enhance not only our regional
readiness, but our Nation's preparedness for high-profile international
events. These capabilities represent thousands of hours of planning,
training, and coordination among public safety partners.
Before the first whistle blows later this year, we want to ensure
that information flows faster than threats, that partnerships are
stronger than vulnerabilities, and that everyone experiences a safe and
secure World Cup.
Thank you for your continued partnership and support. I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Garbarino. Thank you, Chief.
I now recognize Mr. Nelson for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF TRAVIS NELSON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF AND HOMELAND
SECURITY ADVISOR, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, STATE OF MARYLAND
Mr. Nelson. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Pou, and
distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
I serve as the deputy chief of staff and homeland security
advisor for Wes Moore, Governor of Maryland. I receive public
safety and homeland security for Governor Moore with direct
oversight of State departments, including the Department of
Emergency Management, State Police, Department of Public
Safety, Office of Homeland Security, and others representing
first responders, emergency managers, and law enforcement
professionals who work tirelessly to secure our communities. I
am deeply grateful for and appreciate the essential work of our
local, State, and Federal public servants who continue to do
their duties in a constantly evolving world.
As all of you know, our Nation is entering a time of major
special events that we have not encountered in decades, from
the celebrations of America 250 to the multicity hosting of the
2026 FIFA World Cup and 2028 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles.
While these events are proud moments for our Nation, they can
also strain local resources and come with an increased threat
to our critical infrastructure. However, as the threat profile
expands and the demand on our State and local resources
increases, the financial support provided by the Federal
Government to State and local partners is diminishing.
The events of September 11, 2001, underscore the critical
need for seamless collaboration between local, State, and
Federal agencies during major events. This realization drove
the development of coordinated planning and preparedness
strategies. With crucial Federal financial assistance,
standardized and interoperable plans, training, and equipment
were adopted nationwide. The foundational work, centered on the
Incident Command System and the National Response Framework,
ensures that limited resources can be rapidly deployed and
integrated across the country as personnel share a common
operating framework.
Advisory councils composed of subject-matter experts from
local jurisdictions have guided policies and procedures based
on unique experiences. FEMA training centers allow first
responders, hospital clinicians, and emergency managers to
learn alongside their colleagues from across the country. This
model empowers Federal field office personnel from local
offices to become familiar with their Government counterparts,
developing trusting relationships and collaborating. Maryland's
CCTV Situational Awareness platform, MView, networks 399
Federal, State, and local first responder agencies to over
40,000 cameras used to prepare for, prevent, and respond to
major events or incidents. The program supports first
responders in Virginia, the District of Columbia, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. This includes over 950 Federal
first responders from 44 agencies.
Many of the Federal users of the platform are directly
responsible for the security of Federal assets. The MView
platform is a proven tool, having been deployed for hundreds of
major planned events, including Fleet Week, inauguration, and
professional sporting competitions. It has also been vital
during emergency response, such as the aircraft collision over
the Potomac River and the Key Bridge collapse. The MView team
is currently collaborating with organizers for the upcoming
FIFA World Cup to integrate Delaware and New York into the
platform. Furthermore, MView is scheduled for use as a force
multiplier to assist in monitoring potential threats for
tonight's State of the Union address. A large portion of this
program is directly dependent upon UASI funding, but,
unfortunately, the dramatic reduction in the NCR allocations
left the future of the program uncertain.
The Maryland License Plate Reader Program is another
initiative that directly supports criminal investigations,
critical infrastructure security, and major event security
throughout the region. The program is carefully managed to
uphold citizens' civil rights and civil liberties, exclusively
focusing its support on criminal investigations. In recent
years, this program has directly contributed to thousands of
Federal partner criminal investigations, including security
operations.
Following the sudden reduction of Federal funds from the
State Homeland Security Grant Program, Emergency Preparedness
Grant, and the Urban Area Security Initiative has left several
States, including Maryland, very vulnerable and faced with no
option but to reduce personnel and capabilities. The
cancellation of the Targeted Violence Terrorism Program on July
21, 2025, is deeply concerning in regards to the rising threats
against local officials. Between the Federal fiscal year 2024
and 2025, we saw a reduction of over 1.3 million in SHSGP and
UASI's funding was cut by 44 percent, a total of 21 million.
Then with the fiscal year 2026 grant notification, the NCR was
further decreased from 25.5 million to 4.4 million, a 90
percent reduction.
The administration and Congress deserves praise for their
efforts in tackling the threat posed by unmanned aerial
systems. This response highlights the readiness of local and
State officials to collaborate seamlessly with Federal agencies
to address this complex threat, which spans multiple
jurisdictions. Maryland is eager to continue working with the
National Security Council and others.
Failure to address the funding shortfalls jeopardizes the
safety of upcoming special events regardless of their size and
scope. Thank you for your leadership and commitment to our
safety in our homeland. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Travis Nelson
February 24, 2026
Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today. I serve as the deputy chief of staff and homeland security
advisor for Wes Moore, Governor of Maryland. I oversee public safety
and homeland security for Governor Moore, with direct oversight of
State departments including the Maryland Department of Emergency
Management, Maryland State Police, Maryland Department of Public Safety
and Correctional Services, the Governor's Office of Homeland Security,
and others representing first responders, emergency managers, and law
enforcement professionals who work tirelessly to secure our
communities. I am deeply grateful for and appreciate the essential work
of our local, State, and Federal public servants, who continue their
duties in a constantly-evolving environment.
As you all know, our Nation is entering a time of major special
events that we have not encountered in decades--from the semi-
quincentennial celebrations of America 250 to the multi-city hosting of
the 2026 FIFA World Cup and 2028 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles,
California. While these events are proud moments for our Nation, they
also can strain local resources and come with an increased threat to
our critical infrastructure. However, as the threat profile expands and
the demand on State and local resources increases, the financial
support provided by the Federal Government to State and local partners
is diminishing.
The events of September 11, 2001, underscored the critical need for
seamless collaboration between local, State, and Federal agencies
during major incidents. This realization drove the development of
coordinated planning and preparedness strategies. With crucial Federal
financial assistance, standardized and interoperable plans, training,
and equipment were adopted nationwide. This foundational work, centered
on the Incident Command System and the National Response Framework,
ensures that limited resources can be rapidly deployed and integrated
across the country, as personnel share a common operational framework.
Advisory councils composed of subject-matter experts from local
jurisdictions have guided policies and procedures based on unique
experiences. FEMA training centers allow first responders, hospital
clinicians, and emergency managers to learn alongside their colleagues
from across the country. This model empowers Federal field office
personnel from local offices to become familiar with their local
government counterparts, developing trusting relationships to share
information and plan collaboratively for upcoming events. It has also
helped us to adapt to the constantly-evolving threats that we are faced
with.
Following the Paris Attacks of 2015, when 9 terrorists launched
coordinated shootings and suicide bombings in Paris and Saint-Denis--
killing 130 people and injuring over 400--I chaired a work group in the
National Capital Region focused on ensuring we could quickly share
resources and information across jurisdictional boundaries with little
notice. This identified the need for dedicated liaisons embedded within
State and local organizations for speedy assessments and to prevent
cascading incidents. Effective public safety preparedness for special
events relies heavily on Emergency Management and fusion center
personnel and programs. This approach builds upon the established
success of our fusion centers, which are significantly bolstered by
Federal grant funding and personnel. They dedicate themselves to months
and years of advanced planning to dramatically reduce risk and ensure
adequate resources are efficiently positioned and utilized. Based on my
experience participating in the planning and execution of numerous
special events, our most significant vulnerabilities and oversights
have consistently stemmed from rushed or inadequate planning due to
insufficient resources. The tools we have developed over the years are
now essential to our success.
Maryland's CCTV situational awareness platform, MView, networks 399
Federal, State, and local first responder agencies to over 40,000
cameras used to prepare for, prevent, and respond to major events or
incidents. The program supports first responders in Virginia, DC,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. This includes over 950 Federal
first responders from 44 agencies. Many of the Federal users of the
platform are directly responsible for the security of Federal assets.
The MView platform is a proven tool, having been deployed for hundreds
of major planned events, including fleet weeks, inaugurations, and
professional sporting competitions. It has also been vital during
emergency responses, such as the aircraft collision over the Potomac
River and the Key Bridge collapse. The MView team is currently
collaborating with organizers for the upcoming FIFA World Cup to
integrate Delaware and New York onto the platform. Furthermore, MView
is scheduled for use as a force multiplier to assist in monitoring
potential threats during tonight's State of the Union Address. A large
portion of this program is directly dependent upon the National Capitol
Region (NCR) Urban Area Security Initiative funds.
Unfortunately, the dramatic reduction in the NCR allocation has
left the future of the program uncertain. Although nearly all of the
National Special Security Events that Maryland supports within the
National Capital Region are located in the District of Columbia, we
understand the significant risk and impact and the need to be a part of
the process.
Recent incidents, such as the 2024 France railway arson attacks
during the Summer Olympics Opening Ceremony and the suspected network
attack that recently disrupted Italian rail service during the 2026
Winter Olympics, highlight the vulnerability of critical
infrastructure. These events underscore the urgent need for robust
cyber resilience, demonstrating how quickly and with little warning
operations and services can be significantly disrupted.
The Maryland License Plate Reader program is another initiative
that directly supports criminal investigations, critical infrastructure
security, and major event security throughout the region.
The program is carefully managed to uphold citizens' civil rights
and civil liberties, exclusively focusing its support on criminal
investigations. In recent years, this program has directly contributed
to thousands of Federal partner criminal investigations, including
national security cases. For instance, in 2025 alone, the Maryland
Fusion Center responded to over 670 requests from Federal partners
related to criminal cases. Unfortunately, the program has received only
partial financial support through UASI grant funding.
The sudden reduction of Federal funds from the State Homeland
Security Grant Program, Emergency Management Preparedness Grant and
Urban Area Security Initiative has left several States, including
Maryland, very vulnerable and faced with no option but to reduce
personnel and capabilities, which our neighboring States and Federal
partners have relied heavily upon. The cancellation of the Targeted
Violence and Terrorism Program on July 21, 2025, is deeply concerning,
especially given the unprecedented level of threats currently facing
local and State elected officials. This program was vital for assisting
States with early detection and intervention concerning individuals
showing a pathway to violence.
Between Federal fiscal year 2024 and 2025, we saw a reduction of
over $1.3 million in the State Homeland Security Grant Program. The NCR
UASI grant was cut by 44 percent, a total of over $21 million. Then,
with the FFY26 grant notification, the NCR was further decreased from
$25.5 million to $4.4 million, a 90 percent reduction. Following a
catastrophic flood in Western Maryland, which significantly exceeded
the minimum State threshold for FEMA assistance, the much-needed
Federal funding was ultimately denied despite having bipartisan support
from Maryland's Congressional Delegation. This decision forced the
State and local jurisdictions to independently manage the devastating
financial burden on the rural community. The inability to rely on
Federal FEMA funds further complicates budgeting for preparedness
activities when there is such a high level of uncertainty for Federal
support following a disaster.
While we would welcome working with the Department of Homeland
Security to reimagine grant distribution in the interest of being more
efficient; this sudden reduction has left us with no choice but to
decrease capabilities. Due to the upcoming special events, maintaining
the service level of previous years will be extremely challenging.
Information sharing is one of the most basic and fundamental
services the Federal Government can provide to States to enhance
preparedness. In June 2025, the United States Fire Administration
discontinued the EMR-ISAC. The EMR-ISAC shared unclassified
intelligence products with a significant distribution list of over
187,000 police officers, emergency managers, firefighters, and EMTs.
Currently, this resource is unmanaged. In March 2025, at the direction
of FEMA Headquarters, the U.S. Fire Administration stopped hosting
monthly Fire Service Intelligence Exchange calls. This regularly
scheduled call was canceled without discussion or input from any of the
participating agencies. Recognizing the importance of information
sharing among this community, the Maryland Fusion Center has managed
the calls since then and has been working to expand its reach. Multiple
agencies, including the FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster
Preparedness appreciate the value of these calls and their role in
continuing to protect the homeland. Currently, 123 unique agencies from
27 States and D.C. are represented.
The administration and Congress deserve praise for their efforts in
tackling the threat posed by Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). This
response highlights the readiness of local and State officials to
collaborate seamlessly with Federal agencies to address this complex
threat, which spans multiple administrative jurisdictions. Maryland is
eager to continue working with the National Security Council, FAA, US-
DOT, DHS, DOW, and our neighboring jurisdictions to establish a leading
model for Counter-UAS programs.
Failure to address these funding shortfalls jeopardizes the safety
of upcoming special events, regardless of their size or scope. The
impact, though not immediately apparent, will certainly be felt by our
already over-extended, hard-working public safety professionals. This
moment offers the United States a chance to demonstrate our national
strength and resilience. Thank you for your leadership and for your
commitment to the safety of our homeland. I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Garbarino. Thank you, Mr. Nelson.
Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their
5 minutes of questioning. I will be--well, maybe not today. I
will be strictly keeping to the 5-minute rule, but if we go
over, it is OK today.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Martinez, can you explain what goes into the planning?
You are the head of the World FIFA World Cup Miami Committee.
Can you explain what goes into the planning for the city of
Miami?
Mr. Martinez. Sure. Thank you. Obviously, it's very intense
and very detailed, obviously, working collaboratively through
the Miami-Dade Sheriff's Office. As I indicated in my opening,
the sheriff's office is the lead law enforcement agency here at
the local level. We have recently created a regional committee
to cross jurisdictional lines. The multi-agency committee
includes agency directors and representatives from across four
counties, not only Miami-Dade County, but Broward County, Palm
Beach County, and Monroe County to our south, bringing together
stakeholders, public safety agencies to coordinate on the
planning and coordination of the activities that are going to
be taking place here in South Florida.
Chairman Garbarino. It is not just the games, though. There
are other things that you are planning for, festivals and like
watch parties, those things like that?
Mr. Martinez. Yes, sir.
Chairman Garbarino. How much planning for security goes
into that? How much--I mean, it takes quite a bit, correct?
Mr. Martinez. It's immense. I mean, we've never handled
anything like this even though we are used to working on major
events here in South Florida and Miami. But a 23-day fan
festival in downtown Miami in a city park is something that has
never been tried and never been done. But, you know, we're
expecting, you know, as I indicated, hundreds of thousands of
people to come to South Florida to be part of the game and
understanding that, you know, not everybody's going to get into
the stadium. So, you know, the fan fest is going to be the
location where people are going to go to enjoy the matches, to
see the matches, to be with their, you know, fellow countrymen,
and to be able to celebrate hopefully their victories.
Then on top of that there will be regional watch parties
across the three counties and really across the State of
Florida. So you know, that coordination is critical and making
sure that these, the information is shared and you know, goes
across jurisdictional lines.
Chairman Garbarino. So the money we--the One Big Beautiful
Bill had--the reconciliation bill had $625 million in FEMA
grants for measures. I think Miami was supposed to get around
$70 million of that. I think that is what you all applied for.
Has any of those funds been received yet?
Mr. Martinez. No, sir, they have not.
Chairman Garbarino. Now, let me ask you a question. What
happens when--I mean, I am sure you put it into your budget,
these FEMA grants, what happens if you don't get that money? So
when is the drop-dead date for you to start having to cancel
things if you don't get that money in?
Mr. Martinez. I mean we're quickly approaching that. We're
107 days out from the tournament, but, more importantly, we're
about 70-something days out from starting to build the fan
fest. These decisions have to be made, I mean, generously I'd
say within the next 30 days is the drop-dead date. I know that
the local agencies are very anxious, but without receiving this
money it could be catastrophic for our planning and
coordination.
Chairman Garbarino. So if you don't get the FEMA grants in
the next 30 days, the city of Miami, is going to have to start
canceling because you can't prepare for the security of those
sites.
Mr. Martinez. That is correct. We have to start making some
really tough decisions and it starts with our fan festival.
Obviously, the matches up at the stadium, you know, will take
place but, you know, preparing for all of the impromptu events
and, you know, watch parties that we're expecting to see will
become--will be in jeopardy as we continue.
Chairman Garbarino. I appreciate that answer. I am running
out of time so I want to move over.
Mr. Sena, we heard about Special Assessment Ratings, SEAR,
and these events are getting SEAR 1 or SEAR 2 events, so extra
resources are made available following those designations. We
are currently experiencing a partial Government shutdown,
specifically Homeland, the Department of Homeland, and I want
to know has the shutdown negatively affected information-
sharing networks that you deal with? You know, being with the
fusion centers, head of fusion centers, are you seeing a
negative effect from the shutdown or do you expect to see if
this lasts longer a negative effect from the shutdown?
Mr. Sena. Currently, we're not seeing a major issue with
the shutdown, but as time progresses, I definitely believe that
we will. We rely heavily on our coordination with our partners
in the Department of Homeland Security. If any of their
resources are available, one of the primary ones is, you know,
that coordination with FEMA on the grant process. I mean, we're
already dealing with many delays, which we don't know if and
when we're going to get funding to continue operations. So the
longer they are not around and not at their desk and not
working on this process, the longer we don't know what's going
to happen with the money we need to execute for these World Cup
games.
Chairman Garbarino. Thank you very much. My time has
expired.
I now recognize the Ranking Member for today, Ms. Pou, for
5 minutes of questions.
Ms. Pou. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you to all
the witnesses for testifying today.
I just want to make sure to mention once again that, you
know, we all understand that recent DHS enforcement has raised
some serious alarms about its impact on public safety. Polls
show that most Americans believe that actions have gone too far
and makes us less safe. As we prepare to host the World Cup in
my district, including the title game, which we cannot have
roaming packs of masked ICE agents harassing fans and players.
At our last hearing, I directly asked Director Lyons about
ICE plans at the World Cup. He confirmed ICE presence and
refused to rule out immigration raids. His refusal raised
concerns, grave concerns, within my district and sent
shockwaves across America and the world.
Mr. Martinez, has DHS directly briefed you regarding the
ICE plan at the World Cup matches in Miami, yes or no?
Mr. Martinez. No.
Ms. Pou. OK. ICE publicly stated that it would have a key
role at that World Cup. Are you concerned about that, yes or
no?
Mr. Martinez. Not at the moment, no.
Ms. Pou. Mr. Martinez, are you aware that conversations
between FIFA and DHS regarding ICE enforcement activity at the
World Cup, yes or no, sir?
Mr. Martinez. Yes.
Ms. Pou. Has FIFA specifically asked DHS to suspend
immigration enforcement actions at the official World Cup venue
or events--and events?
Mr. Martinez. I am not aware of whether FIFA has made that
request or not.
Ms. Pou. What is the point of giving President Trump a
Peace Prize if we cannot keep his masked agents from
terrorizing fans and players? It is absolutely absurd.
Mr. Martinez, if a fan is detained by ICE at a Miami World
Cup game or FIFA fan event, have you and DHS set a process to
inform family members or legal counsel?
Mr. Martinez. We have been in constant communication with
our Federal partners and we have received no indication of
immigration enforcement that will be taking place during the
tournament. We are laser-focused here at the Miami Host
Committee and providing a safe and secure event. The only thing
I can base on is in recent experience during the last year of
our major events, which includes the College Football National
Championship, Formula One, and the Club World Cup, which was
held this past summer, and we did not experience any ICE
enforcement activity as described.
Ms. Pou. OK. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Martinez. Mr.
Martinez, with only roughly 4 months to go, some cities still
reports that they have not received this funding. I think you
have just--the Chairman just asked you that very question and
you have indicated that you have not received that. This is
completely unacceptable and certainly close to kickoff. As you
have pointed out, you have a drop-dead date of time of 30
minutes. Officials in Foxborough, Massachusetts, for example,
are still waiting for $1 million. They say they cannot hold
games if they do not receive the money.
Mr. Martinez and Deputy Chief Mabin, have either of you
received Federal funding? I know, Mr. Martinez, you indicated
that you have not. Mr. Chief--Deputy Chief Mabin, can you tell
me if you have received any information with regards to the
actual funding that you are expected to receive? Have you
received that or not?
Mr. Mabin. No, ma'am, we have not.
Ms. Pou. What kind of delays or impact will that have if
you do not get that and, similar to what the Chairman asked,
what your drop-dead time frame in order to do that? I have like
34 seconds, so let's do real quick.
Mr. Mabin. The drop-dead date is immediate. We need
commitments from mutual aid partners to help supplement our
officers just because of the scope, scale, and duration of the
games, and they need assurances that they will get reimbursed
for overtime, for travel expenses, for lodging. So we need that
information right now.
Ms. Pou. Is there any concern on the overtime of your
personnel as a result of not having the wherewithal to do that?
Mr. Mabin. Yes, ma'am. That is a consideration for our
budget. We definitely need an answer on that and to release the
funds as soon as possible.
Ms. Pou. Thank you, Deputy Chief and Mr. Martinez. My time
has run off. Thank you so very much. I yield back.
Chairman Garbarino. The gentlelady yields back.
I now recognize the Chairman of the task force and the
former Chairman of this committee, Mr. McCaul from Texas, for 5
minutes of questions.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start out by
saying I remember back when I chaired this committee, the
Boston Marathon bombing, just really a sporting event that went
really bad and it was avoidable. It was preventable had
Federal, State, and local been sharing information. The FBI had
information about Mr. Tamerian's trip to Dagestan where he
radicalized, came back. They did not share that adequately with
the Joint Terrorism Task Force. Specifically, the Commissioner
of Boston didn't have any of that information, even though he
had 2 agents or 2 officers on the task force. We changed that
by law. But it is all about connecting the dots.
Mr. Sena, you are in charge of the fusion center, which
sometimes comes under criticism. We formed the fusion centers
to share--you know, everybody talks about connecting the dots
after 9/11. That is exactly what you are doing. What do you see
as one of the biggest threats as you look at the environment
out there and the threat matrix? What keeps you up at night the
most?
Mr. Sena. It's a combination of things. You know, the first
thing in the back of my head always right now is the financial
piece, because we do need the resources to get things going.
Mr. McCaul. I will get to that in a minute, yes. Big
threat.
Mr. Sena. It's a threat because if we don't have the right
people in place----
Mr. McCaul. Correct.
Mr. Sena [continuing]. To do the job, it won't get done.
The other thing is the multimodal communication systems that
we've got right now, the lack of getting that tip and lead,
that piece of information. We do a lot of work educating our
law enforcement, public safety, private-sector partners on what
we need as far as those tips and leads, those suspicious
activity reports. But we have a lot of different places those
go right now, multiple Federal systems, multiple private-sector
parties that take tips and leads. The problem is when you have
so many silos, how do you connect them all? Then when it comes
to game day and those operations ahead of time, how do you
bring people together?
For example, during Super Bowl we had 7 different systems
up. So that worries me tremendously, merging those
technologies.
Mr. McCaul. Well, the Super Bowl is a test.
Mr. Sena. It's a test for us because we're having a--FIFA's
coming to town, so that was a test.
Mr. McCaul. Yes.
Mr. Sena. I can tell you that came up in the after-action
when people were talking, you know, how do I watch 7 systems
that I'm having to put data into 7 different platforms, my own
people especially? But how do we merge those? Technology is
there. It's policy and practice and training.
Mr. McCaul. Well, the technology is there. Is it policy and
practice prohibiting that?
Mr. Sena. It is. Everyone has their own silo, so everyone
has their own policy.
Mr. McCaul. OK. That is a real problem because we only
have--it is going to be March and they start in June. You got
100 games----
Mr. Sena. Yep.
Mr. McCaul [continuing]. Over 100 games in 3 countries, you
know, Mexico, Canada, United States. Let me ask you quickly. We
were down in Mexico and got a joint training program with our
military, both respective United States and Mexico, passed by
their parliament. We saw the recent events in Mexico. They have
drones, the violent uptick after the Jalisco cartel member was
taken out. I know this is not in your purview, but you have to
learn from those mistakes. How concerned are you about the
games in Mexico?
Mr. Sena. The big concern I've got, especially with drone
activity, is that--and for that example, I had a person that
was planning on flying a drone right into the Super Bowl. So
that part of that is that we can and have countermeasures
there, but there are so many other locations that we don't have
people trained and equipment in place for countermeasures, that
they can go anywhere a crowd is at and immediately hit those
targets and cause mass destruction. We don't have the
capability across the board to fight every drone threat.
Mr. McCaul. That is a great segue to my next point and that
is under the Safer Skies Act the Chairman introduced and my
task force recommended, we got that passed in the National
Defense Authorization. That gives the ability to share with
State and local as the counter drone authorities, which is
critically important. I am surprised we had any opposition to
that.
However, about $625 million, we passed a continuing
resolution out of the House on DHS funding. That was already
authorized and appropriated by Congress to go forward and be
implemented under FEMA to security for the FIFA games. However,
the Senate is playing politics with this and had decided to
shut down the Federal Government. I would argue it is going to
be on their head if they don't get this Government back open
and get this money directly to your fusion centers and these
State and locals here. If something bad happens, it is going to
be on their head, you know. I urge them to get this thing done
and stop playing games because at the games we are talking
about, you are going to see another Boston bombing if we don't
get that money out the door.
I think all of you have testified how important that grant
funding is. I know the Chairman and Ranking Member here were
both very vigilant about staying, you know, on top of that.
Final minute on--well, I will talk to you off the record
later about your drone mitigation at the Super Bowl, but I
think that is really the threat here.
I yield back.
Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our
witnesses today being here and sharing your intel.
A little history, 9/11 we had silos, information on one
hand, information on the other hand, they could have been
shared, maybe
9/11 could have been prevented. That's why Homeland Security
was created, sharing information.
Mr. Mabin, you talk about the fact that FIFA will be the
single largest sporting event in the world. That is impressive
and that is also a big target. Mr. Sena, you mentioned that
shared info is the backbone of intel.
A few months ago, we had my good Sheriff Don Barnes from
Orange County here, 8 months ago, and he was talking about the
withholding of billions of dollars of FEMA funding for fusion
centers. He said, and I quote him, ``stepping back from our
posture in our fusion centers.'' I think Sheriff Barnes is
trying to say that not getting that FEMA funding is going to
hurt your posture defending our citizens, preventing a major
catastrophe. God knows we have a lot of frenemies out there
right now.
So your fusion center in Northern California is 100 percent
funded through FEMA preparedness grants. How long has it been
since you have gotten these grants?
Mr. Sena. Actually, we've been receiving these grants for
our center since 2004.
Mr. Correa. Lately?
Mr. Sena. Well, we have not gotten our last 2025
allocation, so we are going to be short this year if it doesn't
show up.
Mr. Correa. So right now you are beginning to feel the
challenges of not being properly funded in order to defend our
citizenry with this FIFA coming up and the Olympics coming up
and so on and so forth.
Mr. Sena. Absolutely, sir. Without the personnel to do the
analysis, without the threat liaison officers to do the
outreach and training on suspicious activity report, without
the technology in place, and some of the technology we have
built is actually supporting all of FIFA for the entire Nation.
So without that, those resources and capabilities, we will, you
know, be blinded to the threats.
Mr. Correa. Well, I just wanted to thank you for being here
today. I am in concurrence with my colleagues. We got to stop
playing politics with this stuff, with these funds that are so
critical to defending our country. We had a lesson, 9/11. I
don't want to relive that lesson.
Sheriff Don Barnes, who I think you know very well, he has
got to protect Disneyland. We are a very high target on
people's lists. We have the Anaheim Angels, the Anaheim Ducks,
a lot of things going on in Southern California. I guess I am
going to ask you to help us get the message out.
In Washington, there are a lot of things that we get caught
up with that are supposed to be important, but heaven forbid we
have another 9/11 coming at us. It will change us again in ways
we can't even imagine. So I would ask you to continue to come
up here and talk to my colleagues and myself, both sides of the
aisle, remind people how important it is to protect our
citizens through proper funding and hopefully we get that FEMA
funding up and running so that you can do your job.
Fusion centers, love what you do out there. Very
impressive, good intel, and, God knows, there is a lot of
information out there you got to sift through to get to the
bottom. So thank you very much and I just wanted to, again,
invite you to come back and let us know what is important at
the end of the day.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gimenez,
for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I am sitting here
listening to some of my colleagues on the other side of the
aisle complaining about ICE enforcement and apparently ICE
enforcement is the issue that has caused us to shut down DHS.
The problem is that ICE is funded like through 2027. So what it
is that they are all complaining about and shutting the
Government down, it doesn't affect the thing that they are
complaining about. So this is all political theater and,
unfortunately, you are going to be paying the price because the
people that are supposed to be processing the grants are
nonessential, therefore, they are not working. So those folks
that you are relying on to get the money for the FEMA grants,
it is not coming until the Government reopens. I hope that that
doesn't mean that there is going to be some kind of tragedy
happening in the United States because the Government and DHS
itself is closed.
Now, the facts are there are some jurisdictions that are
going to be able to absorb this a little bit better than
others. I know that you are all going to do what you have to do
in order to protect the public regardless if we give you the
money. We will give you the money. Eventually you will get it.
OK? The question is your capacity to float, you know, that
until you finally get the money. Because we are notorious here
for saying we are going to give you stuff and we won't give it
to you for about 5 years. OK? So just think about that.
Chief Martinez, good to see you. I mean, I know you are in
Miami, you are smart guy just stayed there. My concern for--my
main concern, a big concern I have is drones and the usage of
drones and as a potential terrorist threat. Do you feel that
you have the authorities needed in order to handle that threat
now?
Mr. Martinez. Well, certainly with the changes that have
been made, we feel more confident. Local representatives from
the major agencies, including Miami-Dade Sheriff, city of Miami
Police, Broward County, Florida Highway Patrol, have either
attended or are scheduled to attend the required training. So
we feel confident that we will be able to deploy teams to these
critical sites, both at the stadium and the fan fest. The issue
is being able to cover other areas that may be popping up, you
know, impromptu celebrations, watch parties that could hold,
you know, 500, 1,000, 2,000 people across the region. So, you
know, we don't have the resource to cover every spot, but we do
feel confident that we will have the resources and the
technology to cover the main ones, which are the stadium and
the fan fest.
Mr. Gimenez. Do you feel that you have the technology that
will allow you to actively incapacitate any drone that may be a
threat to, you know, to the population?
Mr. Martinez. Well, I know the agencies are in the process
of obtaining and procuring those resources and those
technologies. They have not been received yet. So, you know,
we're hope, obviously we're piggybacking on the Federal
Government to be able to source those technologies. So, you
know, again, yes, we do feel confident if everything comes to
fruition and we feel that, you know, we're moving in the right
direction to support that.
Mr. Gimenez. Will you require Federal resources for that?
Are they going to be the only ones that have the authority to
do something about that or has that authority been delegated
also down to the local law enforcement agencies?
Mr. Martinez. Some of it has been delegated down to a
limited scope, and that's what the required training is for.
But we also will be depending on our Federal partners to assist
us in those matters, especially at the stadium.
Mr. Gimenez. Are you comfortable with that or would you
feel more comfortable and also getting additional authority to
be able to handle the situation as you see fit?
Mr. Martinez. I mean, certainly having additional
authority, you know, would be beneficial, no question. You
know, understanding the difficulty in doing that, you know,
we're thankful for what we have, but certainly we would
welcome, you know, increased authority, especially, you know,
as it relates to these international type of games and matches
where, you know, obviously the crowd size and the target and
the threat, you know, is significant.
Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. Thank you very much. I yield
back.
Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
witnesses for joining us today.
I proudly represent New Orleans, the greatest city in the
world to host major events, like last year's Super Bowl. The
allure of the city means we are responsible for protecting
countless mass gatherings throughout the year: Mardi Gras, Jazz
Fest, Essence Fest, the Sugar Bowl, Taylor Swift concerts, the
list goes on and on. The terrorist attack last year on the
early hours of New Year's Day on Bourbon Street served as a
stark reminder of how terrorist tactics are evolving and the
importance of enhanced coordination between our Federal, State,
and local security agencies during these events.
However, the administration has repeatedly obstructed FEMA,
politicizing the agency in delaying disaster preparedness and
response. Last week, it reportedly told FEMA to halt all
travel, seemingly to create fallouts from DHS's funding lapse,
despite FEMA's testimony to Congress that it will continue
disaster response use of funds unaffected by the shutdown. The
politicization of FEMA makes America less secure every day,
especially while preparing for large-scale events when
communities are most vulnerable to security threats.
Mr. Nelson, Maryland is no stranger to the Trump
administration's politicization of disaster aid. When historic
flooding hit Western Maryland in 2025, did Maryland meet the
criteria for receiving Federal assistance? Do you feel that
President Trump made an objective, nonpolitical decision when
he rejected Governor Moore's request for assistance?
Mr. Nelson. Well, thank you for that question and, yes, we
did meet the threshold. We are currently at $34 million in
damage for the $13 million minimum and was really not given any
true reason for why it was denied.
Mr. Carter. For each of our other speakers, would you agree
that the disbursement of emerging emergency funds should not, I
underscore not, be decided by politics or party?
Mr. Sena. For me, sir?
Mr. Carter. Just yes or no?
Mr. Sena. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carter. Thank you.
Mr. Mabin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Nelson. Yes.
Mr. Martinez. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carter. Thank you very much. Has there been or could
there have been in the future a fiscal impact on Maryland's
taxpayers or local government if DHS continues to delay these
reimbursements?
Mr. Nelson. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. Carter. We have witnessed an increase in attacks on
religious institutions recently, including an arsonist who set
fire of a synagogue in Ranking Member Thompson's district in
Mississippi. Despite this heightened threat environment, DHS
has not released nearly $300 million in nonprofit security
grants that Congress appropriated almost a year ago.
Mr. Nelson, are you concerned that delays in disbursing
funding for nonprofit security grant programs could further
jeopardize the security of houses of worship in Maryland?
Mr. Nelson. Yes, I am.
Mr. Carter. Can you expound on that?
Mr. Nelson. Absolutely. So the instability, these are funds
that are directly distributed to places of worship, so it's
difficult for them to be able to budget and to balance in the
security needs. If we can't commit to them, the funding that is
going to be passed down to them, they have to make difficult
decisions on what they are going to invest in with their places
of worship, ultimately opening up to vulnerabilities.
Mr. Carter. Thank you. Let the record reflect, Mr.
Chairman, that all of the witnesses said affirmatively that the
disbursement of funds for natural disasters that happen not by
party, not by race, not by socioeconomic standards, but by
Mother Nature, by acts of perhaps the issues of mankind with
climate change, should not be withheld for political party,
political purpose, political theater. They should be given
according to meeting the minimal thresholds of a natural
disaster or an emergency declaration, which Maryland did. We
are hopeful that we will not see further cases where resources
are withheld because it wasn't my party, wasn't my president,
not my problem. We are Americans. Natural disaster and FEMA and
the resources should be given as needed, regardless of any
politics.
Mr. Chairman, I yield.
Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Strong, for
5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member
Thompson.
As we prepare to host the FIFA World Cup, Olympics, America
250, and even college sporting events, we face an unprecedented
mix of security challenge. It is past time to unleash counter-
UAS to defend America and its citizens from drone attacks. Much
of that technology is developed in my district. Our ability to
protect fans, athletes, and host communities will depend on how
well we are prepared, trained, and share information and
respond under pressure.
I am proud to represent Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville,
Alabama, where the FBI recently opened the National Counter
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Training Center, America's premier
hub for training law enforcement and security professionals to
counter the threat posed by drones, all under one roof.
Deputy Chief Mabin, the threat posed by rogue unmanned
aircraft systems to stadiums and fan venues may represent one
of the greatest security challenges we face in hosting these
large-scale events. Congress recently extended authorities to
State and local law enforcement to mitigate these drone
threats. How do you anticipate these expanded authorities will
help your officers secure World Cup sites, stadiums, and fan
festivals, which is, you think about the World Cup itself, it
is equivalent to 7 Super Bowls at the same time?
Mr. Mabin. Absolutely. It's a question of scale. We will
get Federal support, counter-UAS support, but it's limited. By
expanding these authorities to local police departments, we're
able to cover down on the other areas. It's more than just the
stadium. It's also the FIFA fan festival areas. So once we get
the training and procure the resources, then we'll be able to
be better positioned to counter any kind of UAS threats.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. Has anyone from your department
coordinated with or received training through the FBI's
Counter-UAS Training Center at Redstone Arsenal?
Mr. Mabin. Yes, sir. We have individuals scheduled to go
down for the training right now.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. Mr. Martinez, building on that
point, how have organized committees been working with Federal,
State, and local partners to ensure strong counter-UAS
mitigation procedures in place?
Mr. Martinez. So we've been making sure, obviously, that
the, you know, responsible agencies, as I mentioned earlier,
from the Miami-Dade Sheriffs, the city of Miami Police
Department, Broward County Sheriffs, and across the State from
the Florida Highway Patrol are able to receive that training.
As I indicated, many have already received it, and those that
have not are scheduled to receive it in the next month or two.
So working with our Federal partners, you know, to ensure that
those trainings are provided for those jurisdictions is
critical. We're continuing to work, obviously, with our Federal
partners in communicating, you know, what our overall drone
plan will be and, you know, collaborating with them on the
deployment of these resources.
Mr. Strong. Do you see any gaps in preparedness as we
approach summer?
Mr. Martinez. Well, the gaps for us is really in the
funding as been highlighted. You know, it is absolutely
critical to be able to get this funding. You know, as
Congressman Gimenez indicated, you know, the agencies will step
up and provide, you know, the resources that are needed. But
our fear is that decisions will be made on budget instead of
threat assessment, especially as we get closer and the actual
scale of it starts to show itself. So that's why we feel it's
absolutely essential to be able to get that money released so
the agencies have the comfort in knowing that they will be
reimbursed.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. Switching gears, with over 36 years'
experience as an emergency medical technician and 40 years as a
firefighter, I take emergency response and public safety
extremely serious. When we host events of this scale, it is
critical that fire and EMS officials are not only present, but
fully trained, equipped, and integrated into security planning.
Mr. Martinez, what are the greatest areas of need for fire
and EMS officials ahead of these games? How are you ensuring
they are fully prepared to respond if the unthinkable occurs?
Mr. Martinez. Absolutely. We've been working very closely
with the major fire and emergency management agencies here,
including the Miami-Dade Fire Department and the Miami-Dade
Department of Emergency Management. We have held already
several large-scale, full-scale exercises, as well as numerous
tabletop exercises to develop responses and capabilities and
understanding of what those capabilities are for all of the
agencies involved. The Miami-Dade Fire Department is taking the
lead and coordinating with local municipal fire departments,
including city of Miami, Miami Beach, Coral Gables, for mutual
aid and as well as coverage in their jurisdictions. So we feel
we have a very strong, you know, assessment of our capabilities
as well as training, on-going training that has been taking
place over the last year-and-a-half, and it will continue on
leading up to the games themselves.
Mr. Strong. I want to thank all of our witnesses. Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full committee,
Mr. Thompson, 5 minutes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome
all our witnesses today.
According to several States and stakeholders, the Trump
administration continues to withhold over $1.2 billion in FEMA
counterterrorism funding that should have been provided to
communities almost 6 months ago for programs such as Urban Area
Security Initiative and Nonprofit Security Grant Program. The
Trump administration is even challenging court orders that
would make this funding available immediately to first
responders, nonprofits, and other local partners. In many
communities, this lack of funding is jeopardizing security
preparations for upcoming large events, such as the FIFA World
Cup, America 250 celebrations, and 2028 Olympic Games. As my
colleague Mr. Carter mentioned, we had a synagogue bombed in my
district recently, and the money that identified the culprit
was the Nonprofit Security Grant Program, that the cameras
caught him, and subsequently he has admitted to the cause.
So if this money is not available or delayed as it
currently is, Mr. Nelson, can you discuss those impacts on
Maryland's preparedness when DHS delays and fight court orders
to provide necessary counterterrorism funding going to
nonprofits, first responders, and other local partners?
Mr. Nelson. Thank you, Ranking Member Thompson. So in
response to that, we recognize that it's critical and, in fact,
the State was deeply concerned that the Federal Government
would not provide the funds and actually found a way to
supplement some State funding because of our increased concern
around this risk area. So in that sense, we are deeply
concerned about the sustainability of the nonprofit security
grant and distributing those funds efficiently down to the
places of worship and other eligible applicants to better
protect those vulnerable populations.
Mr. Thompson. So your testimony is that those programs are
not only essential, but pretty much required if we are going to
protect houses of worship and other places like that?
Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir. As much as Governor Moore has
dedicated State funding to back up that fact.
Mr. Thompson. Well, another comment that, Mr. Chairman, we
come in contact with is right now, the Secretary is signing
each grant award of $100,000 or more.
Chief Martinez, do you--right now are you applying for
monies in excess of $100,000?
Mr. Martinez. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Would a delay in this execution of those
contracts create a problem for your agency?
Mr. Martinez. Yes, sir, they would. It could be
catastrophic for us.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Mabin.
Mr. Mabin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Would that be a problem for you, too?
Mr. Mabin. Yes, it would, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Well, and as I think a lot of us have already
indicated, that is for the third-largest Government agency to
get down to the 100,000 contract signing, that slows down the
process. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to us trying to work with
the Secretary to unblock the backlog of contracts on her desk
because that creates a problem.
Now, the other question, Mr. Nelson, UASI is a good
program, and do you see any dangers in not funding those UASI
cities in a timely manner?
Mr. Nelson. Absolutely. To the point that the response
today for the State of the Union address, some of those
capabilities will be diminished in future years if we don't
receive the funding.
Mr. Thompson. Yes, and that is for the big cities. You
know, it is not for the little folk. But we created a special
program for those large areas because they need the assistance.
If, for whatever reason, those funds are not made available,
then those communities become susceptible to potentially any
kind of danger. So I look forward to trying to unblock the log
jam and get the monies to the communities where they need it.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane, for
5 minutes of question.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
committee. Thank you to our witnesses for showing up today.
You know, it is just unbelievable to me that we sit here in
this hearing today, which is about security and intelligence
sharing for these large events coming up in the United States
of America, like the FIFA World Cup, the Olympics, et cetera,
and my Democrat colleagues continue to blast the Trump
administration for not funding the Department of Homeland
Security and all of our efforts that are designed to keep these
people, our citizens, foreign travelers, and these events safe
from attack. Yet not one single one of them voted for the
Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill.
People ask me all the time, is Washington, DC, as bad as we
think it is? This committee hearing right here is a perfect
example of how bad it really is. They will sit here and talk
about the Trump administration and how they are not
distributing funds for these events and to keep our communities
safe, and yet not one of them voted for the Department of
Homeland Security appropriations. That covers the Coast Guard,
it covers CISA, cybersecurity, it covers ICE, Department of
Homeland Security, all of it. They didn't vote for any of it.
Mr. Sena, what are your thoughts on that?
Mr. Sena. From my perspective, you know, what we're able to
do and capable of doing right now has been built up over 20-
plus years, and we're still not quite where we need to be as
far as the information sharing and overcoming the silos. I
think on the funding piece that----
Mr. Crane. No, that's not what I asked you, sir, with all
due respect.
Mr. Sena. Yes, sir.
Mr. Crane. I know, I get it. I get it. You are trying to be
a nice guy in here. I asked you, when you hear all these
comments from people that voted against funding the Department
of Homeland Security, is there a part of you that is like,
really? This is political theater. That is what it really is.
Mr. Sena. I do think that the impasse that we have right
now with the grant funding and with the support of the
Department overall, I can tell you that on a daily basis, we
work with partners from all of the DHS components and without
their resources in place, we can't be successful. So without
them being fully open and operational, it causes problems for
us in fighting the threats from transnational organized crime
to human trafficking to counterterrorism. They need the
resources as much as possible to get, and that includes DHS
Office of Intelligence & Analysis. Without their backbone
supporting us, that's a problem.
Mr. Crane. How about TSA? Right?
Mr. Sena. Huge.
Mr. Crane. The folks that, you know, work in airports every
day to make sure that folks coming into these events are going
to be able to get here and attend these events. Is that open
right now? Is that funded?
Mr. Sena. That's a problem. Especially the support that we
get from the Federal Air Marshal Services on counter-drone
activities and detection. I mean, they are great partners in
this. So there's a lot of components with the DHS that the
longer that they don't have funding, the longer we have huge
gaps that we will see.
Mr. Crane. I want to read some quotes that I heard just in
this hearing today from some of our Democrat members. ``This
admin has jeopardized Homeland Security efforts. The time for
action is short. Release these funds now. Everyone deserves to
be safe and free at these events. Security planning cannot take
place during insecurity. We are Americans. Funding should be
given regardless of politics.'' Did you guys hear those?
I just want to make the point again, if you are a Democrat
on this dais and you voted to fund the Department of Homeland
Security, please raise your hand.
That is what I thought. So, you know, it is just too hard
to sit here and listen. They are hoping that nobody calls them
out on their gaslighting. They are hoping that nobody does and
that we all just play nice in here. I am not going to do it.
That is not why my constituents sent me to Washington, DC.
Chief Mabin, if you guys don't get the funding that you
need, how is it going to impact Americans that not just in
their regular lives, but if they are going to trying to go to
the FIFA World Cup?
Mr. Mabin. Specifically with FIFA, our security plans rely
on mutual aid partners, and they need assurances that they will
be refunded or be able to seek overtime and travel funds. So
that would negatively impact our security posture.
Mr. Crane. Mr. Sena, I do want to hear more about this
droning attempt with the NFL. Did that drone have a payload?
Mr. Nelson. It was intended to have something, but it
turned out to be flyers. But it could have been anything
attached to it.
Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Pfluger [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the Ranking
Member as well. I say sincerely that I am most appreciative for
this hearing.
I did not vote to support many of the things that I find
onerous within Homeland Security. But that is a discussion that
I will be willing to debate at another time with a Member who
is appropriately ready to debate.
Now, moving on to today's hearing, I don't have any gotcha
questions. I really want to find out what we are doing in the
area of human trafficking. I want to find out because my
county, Harris County, is one of the leading counties in the
country when it comes to human trafficking. I am interested in
knowing what is our approach, how will we deal with recovery
and response, rehabilitation to a certain extent, how will we
deal with prevention?
These are some serious questions that we need to answer
because with human trafficking being more than $200 billion in
terms of an enterprise globally, more than $200 billion, we
have got to concern ourselves about the young ladies, the
children who are going to be trafficked at an event such as
what we will have in Houston, Texas. I am concerned about the
entire country, but I just want to make sure that we protect
people who are going to be at this event.
Chief, if I may ask you, Deputy Chief, what are your
thoughts in terms of where we are with human trafficking in
terms of preparedness to deal with it? Because we know that it
will occur and it will occur in a huge, massive way in Houston,
Texas, if we are not careful. So how do we deal with it?
Mr. Mabin. I'm glad you raised that issue, a very important
issue. Major sporting events around the world are known to have
human trafficking occur when they happen. So we're educating
our front-line officers and teaching them to recognize the
signs of human trafficking. We're partnered with the FBI on
different task forces that target human traffickers and
internet crimes against children crimes. We're also reaching
out to our private partners, hotels, to let them know what the
signs are, and the airport. We're really doing a broad
education campaign so that people can report these signs and we
can respond appropriately.
So I think we are positioned well to combat human
trafficking, and we know it is a major concern. Thank you.
Mr. Green. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate you
saying it is a major concern and where you are positioned. But
it is my understanding that you need money to facilitate and to
activate the necessary people power to make the difference.
Ms. Sena, is that correct?
Mr. Sena. That's correct, sir. Without the resources, I
mean, we have analysts that are working every day to fight this
issue. I have to compliment, you know, Mike McDaniel, the HIDTA
director for Houston, who's been at the forefront of this in
this human trafficking effort. But one of the things that we do
is bring together technology, bringing together our Microsoft
Teams and ESRI platform, which we used successfully at the
Super Bowl. Thanks to, you know, the task force there, led by,
you know, our team from Santa Clara County, we were able to
bring together over 60 agencies and identify----
Mr. Green. Let me intercede just a moment and ask this
question, please. We are less than 4 months away from this
activity actually being initiated. So with this limited amount
of time, at some point you can receive dollars and you cannot
use them efficaciously because time is not on your side. Do you
not need to have the funds now?
Mr. Sena. We needed them 6 months ago, actually, but we do
need them now. We've got--and the other part of this is that
there are gaps in this. As you mentioned earlier, once we
contact victims, getting them the support that they need, it's
horrendous the situation we're in right now with no place to
put people, no housing, not having Child Protective Services
folks available and others to help out in that situation.
Mr. Green. You said Child Protective Services. Children.
We're talking about children as old--as young as what, sir?
Mr. Sena. At the Super Bowl? Twelve years old.
Mr. Green. Twelve years old being trafficked.
Mr. Sena. Being trafficked.
Mr. Green. Well, and you can prevent much of this if you
have the funds that you need for recovery and response, which
means to help them through the trauma that they are suffering.
This is a part of it, is it not?
Mr. Sena. Absolutely, sir. Without those resources, we
can't get the victims to help and they can get pulled back into
being trafficked again.
Mr. Green. Thank you for the time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes myself for 5 minutes.
I thank you all for being here. We have a lot of activities
that are going to be on-going in the next 2 to 3 years:
America's 250th birthday, the World Cup, the Olympics, not to
mention the normal pace that we keep up with just normal events
around the country. So I will start by saying thank you. The
work that you do is incredibly important.
I have visited several fusion centers, and, Mr. Sena, I
appreciate just how nuanced it is and agree with my colleague,
Mr. Crane, that if this is not bipartisan, if we can't move in
a bipartisan way to fund the security of our homeland, then
what are we doing? You know, let's get to some of those
questions about just how important it is.
So given the activity that we have seen from the cartels
recently that have happened in Mexico in the last 3 to 4 days,
what kind of threat are we looking at, at the possibility? Is
this something that you are concerned about?
Mr. Sena, I will ask you, what can the fusion centers be
doing? What are they doing to mitigate that threat?
Mr. Sena. Transnational organized crime groups out there
are a tremendous threat to our country. You know, fusion
centers and the HIDTAs and risk partners have worked for a long
time to fight those threats. But every day we see this increase
in rhetoric. Not only that now we see, you know, violence south
of our border. They are not that far away to cause problems
here. Our country is a location where they raise funds and we
are the source of their income. But we don't know how they will
react to whatever threat they perceive from anyone, whether it
be Mexico or the United States, and what harm they may cause.
I mean, right now with fentanyl trafficking, and I think
we've discussed this, you know, privately, is that, you know, I
had and still have over 500 Hondurans that have been operating
in our region, at one point all selling dope in a square mile
area in San Francisco. We have fought back on that thanks to
the support the city and county of San Francisco, the mayor's
office, the district attorney, the police chief, and the
sheriff, as well as the United States Attorney's Office and our
DAs from around the region, the sheriffs and other chiefs of
police.
We are going to be receiving an award for the HIDTA program
for our San Francisco Metro Task Force because we have pushed
back on that. The city is much cleaner place. It's a much safer
place. People are not dying in the numbers and droves that they
were in that city before. But we cannot turn our backs on these
groups because they continue to be a major threat.
When we talk about special events, those folks are there to
sell fentanyl, to sell dangerous drugs, and to sell human
beings. And there's no reason they can't turn to violence while
they're there, depending on what the geopolitical environment
is at the time.
Mr. Pfluger. Well, thank you for that.
Chief Mabin, thank you for being here. From the local and
State level, how important is it to have qualified I&A
personnel for deployed to the fusion centers? What kind of
information do you need? How do you work together? Give us a
sense of what we just heard mitigating these threats.
Mr. Mabin. Thank you. It's absolutely important to have
them work in the fusion center. We can't just show up one day
in the middle of a critical incident and start working
together. So we have to have them embedded in the fusion center
real time, for months in advance, years in advance, to
establish those relationships. They act as a critical bridge
between other cities, between the IC community, and local law
enforcement, to be able to push out intelligent products and
safely secure these events. So it is critical.
Mr. Pfluger. Let's talk about drones. That was a previous
discussion. Just looking at the rapid expansion, I know there
is many, many drone incursions that happen on the Southwest
Border. We saw one in El Paso recently, or I think alleged that
it was a drone activity. What can we be doing? How do the
fusion centers react and what is the threat that we are worried
about mitigating at the major events in the next year, Mr.
Sena?
Mr. Sena. For me, it's, (A), you know, having State and
local partners, not just with the authorities, but the tools
and resources to prevent the threat. Without those, we're lost.
The other piece of this is that the ability for drones to
carry a payload, even if it's a small payload, can cause panic.
If it's a white powder dropped, well, who knows what that is?
The stampede alone will injure people. Even worse if it's, you
know, some type of, you know, poison that could harm people,
like fentanyl. You know, there are a lot of threats out there,
but we need the resources, early detection, and that
integration like we see in Las Vegas, where we have Federal Air
Marshal Service personnel in the fusion center. We need the
people in the center. That's the whole purpose of a fusion
center, is to bring people together.
So without those Federal, State, and local resources in the
same place at the same time, looking for the same threats,
we're going to miss things.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you. My time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Walkinshaw.
Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening
today's hearing and to our witnesses for joining us.
I represent Fairfax County, a proud part of the national
capital region, largest jurisdiction in the National Capital
Region. As Mr. Nelson knows, our region is designated as a
high-threat, high-density area, which permits us, and I know
this has been discussed by the Ranking Member and others, to
receive Urban Area Security Initiative Grant funding, which
enhances our regional preparedness, strengthens public safety,
helps fund and refund terrorist response training, camera
networks, emergency alert systems, and coordination tools, all
of the tools that keep our national capital region in our
Nation's Capital safe.
But as the threat levels remain very high for our region as
we prepare for major events, America 250, the World Cup, the
administration moved last year to slash $40 million in Homeland
Security funding from our region, cutting preparedness grant
funding by 90 percent. I know there has been some conversations
around the DHS funding situation and the shutdown at DHS right
now, which we need to work together to resolve. But it is
important to note that the administration has been shutting
down elements of DHS throughout this term, and this grant
program is one of them.
So State and local entities in Virginia and across our
region have served as reliable partners in emergency response
efforts. We sent law enforcement and first responders to help
recovery efforts after the tragic and deadly collision near
National Airport. I was just at an event with the families of
those who lost their lives in that tragic collision. Fairfax
County police officers were here at the Capitol on January 6,
2021, working to repel the insurrectionists. But these drastic
cuts to grants would erode Fairfax County's and, I think, other
jurisdictions in our region overall emergency preparedness and
response capabilities. National security--national special
security events occur frequently in our region. It is not a
rare thing. It is a weekly thing.
It would also hinder our ability to conduct training and
obtain new equipment that might no longer be able to be paid
for by local funding and reimbursed. It is defunding the police
is what it is when the administration cuts these grant programs
that help to fund local law enforcement. It jeopardizes safety
of Americans in our region all across the country. I think
Virginians and all residents of our region deserve clear
answers as to why the administration believes they don't need
the resources to protect against terrorist threats and other
incidents.
I want to ask Mr. Nelson, in the past year, in your view,
has the threat level to our region, the national capital
region, increased or decreased, the overall threat level?
Mr. Nelson. Increased and also in regards to at the local
and State level. So the Federal threat has always been high
here. However, we're seeing an increase in threats at the State
and local level that is also increasing now, which is making it
even more complex.
Mr. Walkinshaw. OK. Can you just speak specifically how
these grant cuts, the cuts to these Homeland Security grants,
UASI and others, would hinder the District of Columbia,
Maryland, and Virginia State and local law enforcement from
working collaboratively to respond to incidents? You know,
there is a lot of conversation with nationally right now about
the need for Federal law enforcement and local law enforcement
to cooperate and partner. How do these cuts or would these cuts
make that cooperation more difficult?
Mr. Nelson. It would make it much more difficult. Following
the Paris attacks in 2015, I actually chaired the National
Capital Region Complex Coordinated Attack Working Group where
we built systems, information-sharing platforms, and resource
management programs to address the complex threats in this
region. Those programs will likely erode and be demobilized as
a result of the decrease in funding.
Mr. Walkinshaw. Maybe specifically, how would it or will it
hinder our ability to prepare for America 250, 4th of July
celebrations, big upcoming events like that?
Mr. Nelson. In addition to breaking down the products such
as the CCTV program or other types of information-sharing
platforms, it also--there's other existing programs outside the
grant program, such as the information-sharing platform that
was run by DHS that has also been sunsetted that we had to pick
up as a State and begin running for the Nation to try to ensure
that that information flow still occurs.
Mr. Walkinshaw. OK. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Garbarino [presiding]. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Van Epps, for
5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Van Epps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing and to our witnesses for joining us. Thank you for your
efforts to keep Americans safe.
Like many Americans, I am excited for the America 250
celebrations and the World Cup matches. I also recognize the
huge security concerns that these events bring with them and
our law enforcement's significant work to ensure the United
States hosts the most successful and peaceful events in the
world. Among them, DHS I&A is specifically and uniquely
equipped to manage threat response during national special
security events. But the threats are always changing. Modern
UAS and generative AI means nearly anyone anywhere can disrupt
these events with serious consequences. We must ensure that
never happens.
Sticking with the theme of interagency coordination and
information sharing, Mr. Sena, what real-time intelligence-
sharing mechanisms are there to ensure all threats are reported
accurately during these events? I know you talked about the 7
systems and some of the synchronization challenges, but if you
would care to expound upon any of that.
Mr. Sena. No, definitely. At the Classified level we have
the Homeland Security Data Network, HSDN, which fusion centers
have within their operations to connect with DHS intel and
what's available within that platform. But on the FBI side you
also have their own separate high-side systems as well, and
JWICS and military-side technologies.
We also have the Homeland Security Information Network,
which has a SharePoint site which is, you know, Microsoft-based
technology, along with an Adobe Connect system. Those two
systems don't actually talk to each other.
We also have within our partners at the FBI, within their
CJIS Division, they also manage the LEEP, Law Enforcement
Enterptise Portal, Virtual Command Center, VCC. We also have a
number of partners at the State and local level that are using
everything from Microsoft to Slack to Signal to communicate. We
also have local emergency operations channels and various EOC-
type communication areas.
The problem we have with much of these technologies is that
none of them connect to each other. Many of them have similar
tools and resources. But ultimately, because folks don't want
to pick a favorite and everyone has their own, it's hard for
people to communicate.
That's why a lot of work's been done over the last 4 years
to do that direct integration between Microsoft Teams and ESRI
because most of government has Microsoft and most of government
has ESRI technology. So that was what really helped us out
tremendously on our human trafficking effort during Super Bowl.
But, you know, ultimately we've got to figure out bridges
between technology, otherwise they fall into pockets.
As far as the reporting of threats, we have the National
Threat Operations Center, the NTOC, which is at CJIS Division
in West Virginia. They handle about 1.3 to 1.6 million tips and
leads per year. I have to tell you, that's overwhelming.
We also have various hotlines for human trafficking. So
those go into those pots of information. But the ultimate issue
we have is with all these multiple pots of tips and leads
information, they all aren't consolidated. So we don't know
what we're missing until bad things happen.
Even during the Super Bowl, there was a belief that we were
missing some tips and leads from one source party. One of our
partners actually called in a tip to see if somebody would send
us the tip, and it never came in.
So those are the types of issues we have trying to make
sure that there is a constant flow of communication. Fusion
centers were designed to help facilitate that and to help move
the data. But as, you know, technology has not progressed with
the issues we have today, we have these silos of excellence
that don't connect anybody.
Mr. Van Epps. So building off of that, could you, and maybe
this is for Mr. Martinez as well, but could you walk us through
what the intelligence-sharing process would look like if there
was an active threat at one of the World Cup events? You know,
what are the crucial communicating tools and the potential gaps
there as well?
Mr. Sena. Absolutely. Unfortunately, each of those systems
I mentioned would be one of those things that analysts probably
have to enter data into. But the real thing is people in the
room talking to each other.
So what we've done and built in the past and which every
location will have is a regional collaboration, coordination,
and communication centers. There will be ops centers, but I can
tell you that we had about 6 operation centers just during the
Super Bowl. So I can only imagine that there'll be many more
based on how spread out the FIFA operations are to bring
information together.
But if there's a critical threat it's going to be
communication between people in the room and then the ability
to bring people in, most oftentimes in that Microsoft Teams
environment, to host a call very quickly to say, this is the
threat. That's what I've done in the past in my own center. If
something escalates to a point where we've got to get general
information out, people are not always tied to their email.
They're not always tied to even their text messages. But if you
get the alert out and bring people together physically and
virtually, brief them on the threat as quickly as possible.
The only problem comes in if the threat is Classified and
then trying to get the classification down. That's where
clearances become important for especially our State and
locals. We have had that, you know, that effort to try to get
people as many clearances as possible to bring them into a room
and tell them this is the threat. But not everyone has remote
communications at a Classified level. So there are urgencies
that we have to get information out.
I can tell you, years ago, we had that same problem in San
Francisco. Ultimately, they built a room that we could hold 300
people to get them briefed. That's a rarity. Not many cities,
locations have a place that is reasonable to get to in a
Classified space to get briefed up on urgent threats.
But ultimately, when there's a crisis, we communicate
because we work together, we train together, we have tabletop
exercises, and we plan out and get to know each other before
the event, before the big game day. Then we work on these are
the communications channels we will use, but we make sure that
that happens. Everyone in my region has my cell phone number
and I have theirs, so we can talk to each other if all else
fails.
Mr. Van Epps. Thank you. Thank you, sir. My time has
expired. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Garbarino. That was a great answer. That is why I
let you go long, because it was very important to get on the
record.
I recognize the gentleman from Puerto Rico, Mr. Hernandez,
for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Hernandez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing is
about security preparedness. What concerns me the most is that
DHS has shown a consistent pattern of failing American
citizens, the United States, the 50 States, the commonwealths,
and the territories in securing their reconstruction after
natural disasters, after major events, and in securing their
citizens and their residents from their policies. Now, this is
a direct failure of leadership and policy at the DHS level.
We have in place what I have to call a stupid policy that
requires the DHS Secretary to approve any expense over
$100,000, and that is delaying the reconstruction and the
projects in Puerto Rico and in many States that will prepare us
to better handle major events or major natural disasters. I
have received outreach from constituents. Projects like the
Hector Sola Coliseum in Caguas or projects like the back-up
generators from Fundacion Comunitaria that give power and water
to over 37,000 residents in Puerto Rico are stalled because of
this stupid policy. I am concerned that as we speak of major
events, like the World Cup, like the Olympics, we are not ready
to meet the demands of these events if we have not been able to
meet the lesser demands of previous events.
So, Mr. Nelson, it is my understanding that DHS owes
Maryland nearly $1 billion in disaster-related expenses,
including for costs that the Federal Government approved years
ago. Can you describe the types of projects currently stalled
because of the delays?
Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question because there
has been an extreme delay. What this also is causing is not
just for these projects to be completed, similar to as they are
in Puerto Rico, where we've had projects that are started, but
we are uncertain if we'll be able to continue them because of
the policy of the $100,000, but it's also the local time that
these employees are investing into trying to manage these
projects. Those are a lot of the same employees who are
dedicated to special event planning and doing other emergency
management activities that are now bogged down with the
administrative--just administrative burden of trying to manage
this unpredictable nature.
Mr. Hernandez. Can you speak to how the time line for
disbursement has changed since this new policy was implemented?
Mr. Nelson. Certainly. Well, there--I think it's fair to
say that we don't know what the time line is. There's
consistent holds that are put for administrative review and
there's no real certainty on when the funds would be released.
So we're still trying to rectify, you know, 2025 and 2024
funds. The future is really uncertain if we don't even know
when those funds will be released.
For example, we're on a deadline to accept awards by the
end of 27 February. However, those funds haven't been released,
so we don't even know how can we accept them if there's an
administrative hold? It gives us a very tight window by which
we can do anything if we're not even notified in time to react.
Mr. Hernandez. So if another major disaster were to strike
tomorrow in Maryland, would your State be in a weaker position
because of these funding delays?
Mr. Nelson. Maryland will always lean in and take care of
their people first. The Governor is committed to doing that.
However, it has greatly changed our posture and put more stress
on our local governments and our State budget of trying to
always put public safety first and ensuring that. But other
critical programs will likely have to sacrifice as a result.
Mr. Hernandez. So by extension, other States,
commonwealths, and territories would also face, due to these
policies, more strains, more risks, more adversity in accessing
disaster funding and prevention capabilities?
Mr. Nelson. Maryland also realizes that we're in a position
where we often lend assistance to other States and territories
in a time of need. We'll be less positioned to do that because
of decreasing capabilities and personnel. So it doesn't just
impact Maryland. It impacts our ability to support other States
and the regions because of our limited capability and needing
to maximize our resources.
Mr. Hernandez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back.
I recognize the gentlelady from South Carolina, Mrs. Biggs,
for 5 minutes of questions.
Ms. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
witnesses for being here today.
This year, it is a special year for the United States.
Between the America 250 celebration and the FIFA World Cup, our
country will host over 70 major events across more than a dozen
States. Each event will need varying levels of security with
millions of Americans and foreign tourists and athletes
traveling around the country.
As we go into an eventful year, we must contend with a new
potential avenue for threats, which is drones, which we have
already talked about a little bit. The 2026 NDAA expanded the
drone mitigation, and the counter-UAS authority is given to
State and local authorities. I know we talked a little bit with
my friend from Alabama about the training and what is going to
be required and even with technology. But I would like to hear
a little bit more on how you think the Federal, State, and
local authorities will work together to mitigate those threats
of drones to the major events in dozens of cities across the
United States. Is there any way that counter-UAS authorities
could be improved for quicker and more efficient response to
threats?
I will leave that open to anyone who wants to respond.
Mr. Nelson. If I may start, Mrs. Biggs. The area that we're
currently in, the national capital region, has the most complex
air space of anywhere in the country. So the ability for us to
deal with countering UAS is extremely important. However, I
would just say that in addition to the capabilities, which has
been--it's been great and moving at a great pace. However, we
need to ensure that the plans and procedures are there and the
network of which we're sharing information about the threats
and our policies.
During the Army-Navy game in Baltimore just this past
December, there were several occasions where different Federal
agencies were mitigating drones. We're not properly
communicating that with our State and local partners to know
what other risks may be at play. So I would just again
highlight the importance of good planning and coordination
between all levels in addition to training and capabilities.
Mr. Mabin. I'll echo that. We have a wonderful working
relationship with our Federal partners in Kansas City. So one
aspect is to detect, identify, mitigate, but we also have to
have boots on the ground to go to interdict the operators. So
we're working to train together so that we're ready and
prepared for a World Cup.
Mr. Sena. For the last few years, across the world, people
have been expanding drone capabilities to implement attacks. At
the same time, we've been fighting to get those resources at
the State and local level. Now that we finally have the
authorities to implement, now it's getting the training and
technology in place.
The problem is that we have to defend large perimeters,
large areas that need coverage, not just the game day facility,
but the practice fields, the fan fest areas, the official ones,
and the unofficial ones. How do we cover all those places with
mitigation technology? It's very difficult because we're way
behind.
I feel that, you know, if we had been having this
conversation 2 years ago, we'd be in better shape. But today as
we're approaching these games, we're nowhere near the
capability we need. But we continue to have to press forward
with the technology and the training and getting it out to the
largest group of people possible from the law enforcement side
so we can cover all those simultaneous events that you were
talking about that are spread across a huge geographical area.
It's something that we have not dealt with in a long time to
cover this much area in such a very short period of time with
limited resources.
Ms. Biggs. If there is one thing that you could ask
Congress to step in and help with right now, what would that be
to help you be prepared?
Mr. Sena. That prioritization of funding to train the
personnel and get them to that training site. We need that
immediately.
Mr. Mabin. The release of the FIFA funding would be
critical for our staffing and our mutual aid partners to come
in and assist because we just don't have enough officers within
my own department to cover down on all the threats. But we're
going to be relying on those mutual aid partners and
connections.
Mr. Nelson. Yes to both their comments. In addition to the
personnel that are working on these plans and coordination are
the same limited personnel that are doing the other special
event planning and that are also--many of their salaries are
contingent on the funds that have not been released. So we are
at a pivotal time where we may not just lose that capability,
but the block from Jenga is about to cause the whole thing to
come down.
Ms. Biggs. Well, thank you so much for the work that you
do. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Garbarino. Mr. Martinez, look like you might be
about to say something. Did you want to just say anything?
Mr. Martinez. No, I just like to echo what the other
witnesses stated. You know, the release of the funds that have
already been approved is absolutely critical.
Chairman Garbarino. The gentlelady yields back.
I now recognize the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Evans, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Evans. Thank you, Chairman, and, of course, our Ranking
Member, for this important hearing. Want to thank the witnesses
for being here today and for all of your on-going work and
everything that you do to keep our Nation and our communities
safe.
We are, unfortunately, all aware right now that we are in a
partial Government shutdown because my Democrat colleagues want
to hold the Federal Government hostage and hold that funding
hostage for vital national security and law enforcement
agencies. Just in case we need a reminder, ICE has already been
funded under provisions we secured last year in the Working
Families Tax Cut. By refusing to pass the DHS funding bill, ICE
isn't being defunded. What is being defunded is FEMA and TSA
and the Coast Guard and FLETC, Federal Police Academy, and
multiple other safety measures that are absolutely necessary
ahead of massive events like the World Cup.
In my home State of Colorado, let's talk about FEMA. There
have been historically low amounts of snowfall this winter,
which sets us up for a very dry season accompanied by very high
wildfire risk. FEMA support is absolutely vital to the safety
of my constituents, even before a wildfire begins. I know this
because I served in the U.S. Army and the Colorado Army
National Guard for 12 years. I was a Black Hawk helicopter
pilot. I have flown on, dropped water on, and commanded
National Guard soldiers assigned to fighting type 1, so
national priority, incidents in the State of Colorado.
To prepare for that, we would always do, typically in
April, a pre-operation planning conference just to make sure
everybody is on the same page. Multiple different agencies, you
know, 15, 20 agencies, Federal, State, and local, are on the
same page to support and strengthen that collaboration in
preparation for the wildfire season ahead. Without adequate
funding for DHS, for agencies like FEMA, this interagency
coordination is jeopardized and more communities, more lives
are at risk, to say nothing of the environmental damage that
happens if we can't respond to things like wildfires.
In addition to being in the National Guard, Mr. Mabin, my
first question will be to you, I was also a local cop for 10
years, city of Arvada, first ring suburb, just to the northwest
of Denver, which is another major city's agency. So I wanted to
ask you about, from your perspective, working for a major
cities but local government agency, what lapses in funding are
you seeing as a host city for the World Cup? What information
and what resources and capabilities do you see potentially
lacking to close any information sharing or other planning gaps
as you prepare to be a host city?
Mr. Mabin. As far as information sharing, we are seeing,
you know, the regional Kansas City Fusion Center is our major
intelligence-sharing hub and we haven't seen any lapses with
regard to that. The information is flowing. We're sharing with
our Federal partners, our other State and local partners. We
chip in and help each other to cover down on those kind of
incidents.
But just more broadly, we do need to see a release of the
FIFA funds so that we can get staffing for officers. Because
when it comes to the end of the day, we need X-number of
officers in these point positions, control positions, to
execute our planning for World Cup.
Mr. Evans. Thank you. So, again, I was a cop for 10 years
and so I kind-of know how to read between the lines. So when
you say ``chip in and help each other,'' that makes it sound
like there is probably some Band-Aids that are being applied.
Obviously, we are in an open forum here. We don't want to
forecast any mission-critical shortfalls. People would be
surprised to know how many cops I often didn't have when I was
trying to keep a city of 125,000 people peaceable and getting
along. So I appreciate you commenting about chipping in and
helping each other and the implications that go along with
that.
I am also glad to hear you talk about fusion centers. My
next question will be to Mr. Sena. Again, I mentioned 12 years
in the National Guard, Black Hawk helicopter pilot. So rotary
wing, low-level aviation operations, things like drones,
counter-drone technology, super important to me both as a
rotary wing aviator, also a police officer, and everything that
happens typically between 0 and 3,000 feet AGL. So here, in my
remaining about 30 seconds here, can you just comment on what
is needed in this information-sharing space to be able to
effectively counter the emerging UAS threat?
Mr. Sena. The detection equipment, the personnel in place,
the threat liaison officers to get the information out there on
suspicious activity reporting. We need tips and leads. That
Central California Intelligence Center threat to the Super Bowl
that we received regarding drones, it's tips and leads. That's
the bottom line.
So we need people that can do the outreach, we need people
that can do the training. We also have field intelligence team
members that are out there on the ground looking for those
threats and working with teams to mitigate them as quickly as
possible. Without the funding, without the resources, those
teams aren't there, those analysts aren't there, those tips and
lead processes are not there.
Mr. Evans. I think as we have seen, this is a game-changing
threat that we need to be able to counter.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Alford,
for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Alford. Well, thank you, Chairman Garbarino, for
allowing me to waive on to this important hearing today.
Kansas City is proud to serve, as you all know, as one of
the host cities of the World Cup in Missouri's 4th
Congressional District. Across the Kansas City region, local,
State, and Federal partners have been working diligently to
prepare for the influx of visitors and the complex security
environment that comes with an event like this. That is why
today's hearing is so important.
Strong, timely intelligence sharing between Federal, State,
and local and Tribal territories and private-sector partners is
essential for preventing threats, managing crowds, and ensuring
public safety. When that information flow works well, it
enhances situational awareness and allows our local law
enforcement to act quickly and confidently. I am particularly
interested in ensuring that host cities like Kansas City are
receiving the support, intelligence, and resources they need to
execute security missions effectively.
Deputy Chief Mabin, good to see you here in the swamp.
Mr. Mabin. Thank you.
Mr. Alford. Yes. Thank you for appearing before this
committee today. The funding is not coming through from the
Federal Government due to the hold-up. What does that mean to
Kansas City? Because the Kansas City budget is in trouble as it
is. In fact, Chief Stacey Graves, who has done a wonderful job
of managing the great Kansas City Missouri Police Department,
is now having to cut costs severely to ensure just basic
services. How is this hold-up in funding affecting our plans to
keep Americans safe in Kansas City this summer?
Mr. Mabin. We began planning, full-time planning, for this
probably 2 years ago. We've taken into account multiple
different contingencies. We have planning at the stadium, at
the different hotel venues, at the fan fest, equipment,
intelligence, and just operationally. As we have those plans in
place, if we do not have people to execute those plans, then
those plans are ineffective. So right now we're in a critical
stage where we need those funds committed and released so that
our mutual aid partners have assurances and they can come in
and assist us with just boots on the ground for those plans.
Mr. Alford. For those who don't know, Kansas City is in the
heart of America, Heart of Missouri, Heart of America. It sits
at the intersection of I-49 and I-70, which before now was
already a hub for human trafficking. I know that is a huge
concern for your department and those also dealing with the
safety talk about that.
Mr. Mabin. We are aware that on major sporting events it's
also always a concern of human trafficking. So we're trying to
get that message out to our local partners. We're working with
hotels and the airport to recognize signs of human trafficking.
We've trained our officers to recognize signs and to be able to
respond and get folks resources. We're also working with the
FBI on task forces so we can combat human trafficking. It is a
major concern and that--it features heavily in our plans for
the World Cup.
Mr. Alford. Of course, the border is shut down a lot better
than it was under President Biden, but fentanyl,
methamphetamine, cocaine are still big issues in the Kansas
City region.
Mr. Mabin. Yes, they are as they are with other large
cities. So we work closely with our Federal partners on task
forces to combat drug trafficking organizations, human
trafficking, and other violent criminal organizations.
Mr. Alford. Well, Deputy Chief, thank you again for being
here. To all of our partners in Kansas City, thank you as well.
It is going to be a fabulous turnout. We are expecting some
600,000 people to converge on Kansas City for this, to show off
Kansas City once again.
I will say to the Democrats out there listening now, we
have fully funded ICE through the One Big Beautiful Bill, so
that fight is not a good fight for you to take up right now.
What you are putting in jeopardy is the safety of American
citizens that rely on FEMA, that rely on the Coast Guard, that
rely on the Secret Service, that rely on cybersecurity to keep
us safe in America. It is time to end the partial shutdown led
by the Democrats.
With that, I yield back.
Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back.
I want to thank the witnesses all for traveling here today.
One thing clear, got to get you all the money. So that is our
job. So thank you all again for being here.
I want to--I have additional questions that I will be
submitting in writing and the Members of the committee may have
some additional questions for you. We would ask that you all
respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(E),
the hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, this committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[all]