[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SURVEYING THE THREAT OF AGROTERRORISM,
PART II: ASSESSING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
EFFORTS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 11, 2026
__________
Serial No. 119-39
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-778 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Chair Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Eric Swalwell, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida J. Luis Correa, California
August Pfluger, Texas Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Member
Gabe Evans, Colorado Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Brad Knott, North Carolina James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia
Vince Fong, California Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Al Green, Texas
Vacant
Keighle Joyce, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY
Dale W. Strong, Alabama, Chairman
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York,
Gabe Evans, Colorado Ranking Member
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Julie Johnson, Texas
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Staff Director
Lauren McClain, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Dale W. Strong, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Management and Technology:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Timothy M. Kennedy, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emergency Management and Technology:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Mrs. Suzette P. Kelly, Acting Executive Director, Agriculture
Programs and Trade Liaison, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Matt Allen, Director, Office of Homeland Security, U.S.
Department of Agriculture:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Jeff Cooper, Program Manager, Probabilistic Analysis for
National Threats Hazards and Risks, Science and Technology
Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Dr. Ashley Grant, Senior Health Security and Biodefense Advisor,
Office of Health Security, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
For the Record
The Honorable Timothy M. Kennedy, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emergency Management and Technology:
Letter......................................................... 4
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Suzette Kelly......... 29
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Matt Allen............ 30
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Jeff Cooper........... 30
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Ashley Grant.......... 31
SURVEYING THE THREAT OF AGROTERRORISM, PART II: ASSESSING
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EFFORTS
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Wednesday, February 11, 2026
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Management
and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dale W. Strong
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Strong and Kennedy.
Also present: Representative Van Epps.
Chairman Strong. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Emergency Management Technology will come to
order. Without objection, the Chair may declare the
subcommittee in recess at any point. The purpose of this
hearing is to review Federal efforts in preparing for and
responding to threats facing our Nation's food and agriculture
sector. Without objection, the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.
Van Epps, is permitted to sit on the dais and ask questions to
the witnesses. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Good afternoon and thank you for joining this Subcommittee on
Emergency Management and Technology. Today we have a Federal
panel of witnesses from the Department of Homeland Security and
the United States Department of Agriculture to discuss the
Federal Government's efforts to prepare for, mitigate, respond
to, and recover from acts of agroterrorism.
The subcommittee previously met in September to examine
this threat, during which academic experts outlined the risk
that agroterrorism poses to our food and agriculture system and
its potential to destabilize the United States economy and
agriculture supply chain. Terrorists who target our food supply
have a variety of tools and methods at their disposal. They can
directly target our agriculture by deploying chemical and
biological agents. As our critical infrastructure becomes
increasingly connected, they could also carry out cyber attacks
on technology that the farms depend on. Our adversaries,
particularly the PRC, have also exploited research security
gaps to steal the intellectual properties tied to agriculture
technologies and genetically modified organisms. This theft
could cause significant economic harm and raise concerns that
these technologies could be manipulated or weaponized against
U.S. crop systems. The reality of this threat was a full--on
full display last year when the Department of Justice charged
three Chinese nationals with attempts to smuggle biological
agents into the United States, agents capable of causing severe
harm to crop and livestock. Any serious effort to prepare for
these threats must begin with preventing deadly pathogens and
harmful species from entering the country through our borders
and ports of entry.
I'm grateful to Customs and Border Protection work in
detecting and intercepting these dangers, but prevention cannot
stop at the border. We must also deny adversaries opportunities
to position themselves inside the United States in ways that
could facilitate harm. The PRC has acquired farmland across the
United States, including land near critical infrastructure and
sensitive military installations. This proximity creates
vulnerabilities that could be exploited to surveil, disrupt, or
compromise our food and agriculture systems, undermining
prevention efforts long before threat is detected. Addressing
these risks requires strong oversight, transparency, and
coordination to ensure that our agriculture sectors do not
become a staging ground for hostile activities. Even with
strong prevention measures in place, we must be prepared for
the possibility that these efforts could fail. It is important
that the stakeholders and decision makers across all levels of
Government and the private sector receive adequate training to
detect, report, and respond to these threats.
Equally important is robust information sharing across the
national laboratories, Government partners, and industries to
enable rapid and effective responses. We saw the value of this
partnership last week when law enforcement recovered and
identified biological material from a lab in Las Vegas and sent
it to the National Bio Forensic Analysis center for immediate
analysis. That rapid response capability is essential to
defending our homeland against biological threats, whether they
originate from the criminal actors, terrorists, or hostile
foreign adversaries. This is exactly the type of capability we
must sustain and strengthen, which is why I've led bipartisan
efforts to improve DHS biodefense readiness and advanced
legislation to counter China's efforts to undermine our
homeland security. I also applaud President Donald Trump and
his administration for issuing the National Farm Security
Action Plan to enhance our Nation's preparedness for these
dangers. This effort reflects the reality that the threat of
agroterrorism is not just a possibility. It is real, evolving,
and demands action across the Federal Government.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
the steps they have taken to implement the proposals outlined
in this plan, the challenges that they face, and opportunities
to enhance collaboration amongst Federal agencies. I also
welcome any suggestions on how Congress can support these
efforts. I thank our witnesses for appearing before the
subcommittee today, and I hope their testimony will inspire a
bipartisan effort to strengthen and defend against the
significant threats.
[The statement of Chairman Strong follows:]
Statement of Chairman Dale W. Strong
Good afternoon and thank you for joining the Subcommittee on
Emergency Management and Technology.
Today, we have a Federal panel of witnesses from DHS and USDA who
will discuss the current efforts and programs of the Federal Government
to prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of
agroterrorism.
The subcommittee previously met in September to consider this
serious threat, where witnesses from academia spoke about the risks to
food and agriculture posed by agroterrorists and the startling ways in
which they could influence the stability of the United States' economy
and agricultural supply chain.
Agroterrorists have a variety of tools and methods at their
disposal. They can target our agriculture directly by deploying
chemical and biological agents.
With the greater interconnectedness of our critical infrastructure
systems, agroterrorists can also initiate cyber attacks against the
digital technologies our farms rely on.
And notably, our Nation's adversaries, especially affiliates of the
People's Republic of China, have exploited gaps in research security to
commit acts of intellectual property theft of genetically-modified
organisms and agricultural technologies.
This type of theft not only has the potential to cause economic
distress to the United States, but these advanced technologies have the
potential to be manipulated and weaponized against our crop systems.\1\
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\1\ China's Interests in U.S. Agriculture.
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The potential for the threat of agroterrorism was on full display
last year when the DOJ charged 3 Chinese nationals with attempts to
smuggle biological agents into the United States--biological agents
that have the potential to cause significant harm to crops and
livestock.
Any effort to seriously and effectively prepare for agroterrorist
threats must include stopping deadly pathogens and invasive species as
they come across our borders and ports of entry, and I am grateful to
CBP in their work in detecting and intercepting the threats uncovered
last year.
But we must also be ready if our efforts at prevention fail.
Ensuring that stakeholders and decision makers across all levels of
government and the private sector receive adequate training to detect,
report, and respond to these threats is paramount in securing our
Nation's food and agriculture.
Furthermore, coordinating information-sharing efforts between our
various national laboratories, executive agencies, State and local law
enforcement, emergency managers, and stakeholders will be critical to
enabling rapid response to any emerging threats.
I was pleased to see these collaborative efforts in action just
last week, when law enforcement collected samples of unidentified
biological materials at the scene of a bio lab in Las Vegas to send to
the National Bioforensic Analysis Center for immediate diagnostic
testing.\2\
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\2\ Bio lab found in Las Vegas is similar to scene discovered in
California, raising questions from officials--CBS News.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This center plays an important role in our national security and is
one of two components of the National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasures Center, the first national laboratory created by DHS. I
am proud to say that I am hard at work on legislation to authorize this
national laboratory to ensure that we can continue to stay on top of
biological threats for years to come.
I applaud President Trump and his administration for issuing the
National Farm Security Action Plan to enhance our Nation's preparedness
for these dangers.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today regarding the
steps they have taken to implement the proposals outlined in this plan,
the challenges they encounter in securing our Nation from agroterrorist
threats, and the opportunities for enhanced interagency collaboration.
I also welcome any suggestions on how Congress can be helpful in
these endeavors.
I appreciate the work that our partners in the Executive branch do
every day, and I hope that the testimonies we hear will inspire a
bipartisan effort to enhance solutions to counter this significant
threat.
Chairman Strong. I now recognize the Ranking Member of this
subcommittee, Mr. Kennedy, for his opening statement.
Mr. Kennedy. Good afternoon. Thank you very much, Chairman,
and thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I want to
begin by saying that I appreciate the Chairman for bringing
officials from the administration before this subcommittee. I
want to see more of these hearings with administration
witnesses in the future. I'd be remiss if I didn't acknowledge
the greatest threat to our Nation currently. With all due
respect to our witnesses, is not agroterrorism. We're seeing a
Department of Homeland Security that's killing our own
citizens, terrorizing communities, ignoring court orders,
rejecting due process, and advancing an extreme immigration
enforcement agenda that's stoking fear, creating chaos, and
degrading our democratic institutions. The Trump administration
is also dismantling FEMA before our eyes, refusing to
distribute critical counterterrorism grant funding, and moving
forward with plans to cut half of FEMA's work force. Mr.
Chairman, yesterday I sent a letter to your office to formally
request that this subcommittee turns its focus to FEMA issues,
including delays in preparedness and counterterrorism grants,
work force challenges, and areas for improvement in disaster
recovery. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to insert this
letter into the record.
Chairman Strong. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
February 10, 2026.
The Honorable Dale Strong,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology,
Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Strong:
I write to request that you, in your capacity as Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology, immediately
convene an oversight hearing on the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA).
In March 2025, you began your term as Chairman of our subcommittee
with an oversight hearing on FEMA. In the year since the hearing,
serious and concerning changes have emerged regarding the Trump
administration's actions at FEMA. There are reports that Secretary of
Homeland Security Kristi Noem is withholding nearly $17 billion in
disaster relief funding.\1\ At the same time, FEMA's administration of
counterterrorism and preparedness grant programs has resulted in
unprecedented delays and interruptions in the release of grant funding
that States, localities, Tribes, and territories rely on to prepare for
disasters and emergencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Scott Dance, Extra Scrutiny of FEMA Aid to States Has Created a
$17 Billion Bottleneck, NY TIMES (Jan. 27, 2026), https://
www.nytimes.com/2026/01/27/climate/fema-aid-kristi-noem.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary Noem also reportedly delayed funding for search and
rescue teams and call centers in the aftermath of flooding in Central
Texas in July 2025--an event that killed 135 people, including 35
children.\2\ \3\ More recently, Secretary Noem pushed forward her plans
to cut half of FEMA's workforce even as nearly half of U.S. States
struggled to recover from winter storms that killed over 100 people.\4\
These significant workforce reductions and staffing instability raise
questions about the Agency's capacity to meet its statutory
responsibilities during a period of increasing disaster frequency and
severity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Gabe Cohen, FEMA's response to Texas flood slowed by Noem's
cost controls, CNN (July 10, 2025), https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/09/
politics/fema-texas-flood-noem.
\3\ Maxine Joselow, FEMA Didn't Answer Thousands of Calls From
Flood Survivors, Documents Show, NY TIMES (July 11, 2025), https://
www.nytimes.com/2025/07/11/climate/fema-missed-calls-texas-floods.html.
\4\ Gabriela Aoun Angueira, FEMA will resume staff reductions that
were paused during winter storm, managers say, AP NEWS (Feb. 6, 2026),
https://apnews.com/article/fema-staff-cuts-kristi-noem-winter-storm-
fern-1b3a4ea77c6f299abda3f5046a6b24e5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An oversight hearing would provide the subcommittee with an
opportunity to hear directly from FEMA leadership about the impacts of
delayed or withheld preparedness and disaster relief funding, workforce
cuts, and how these challenges may affect emergency management
capabilities at all levels of government.
I appreciate your consideration of this request and look forward to
working with you to ensure the subcommittee continues to exercise
strong oversight in support of FEMA's critical mission to keep
communities safe and resilient.
Sincerely,
Timothy M. Kennedy,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency Management and
Technology.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you. Last year, I introduced a bill,
H.R. 6507, the Department of Homeland Security Grants
Accountability Act, which would require increased transparency
and oversight of FEMA's Counterterrorism Grant programs. I hope
that's something we'll have an opportunity to discuss on the
subcommittee in the coming months. Turning to today's hearing,
I agree that our Nation must strengthen its biodefense,
including better preparing for potential attacks on our
agricultural systems. This includes ensuring that we have
enough agricultural specialists at our borders to detect
harmful pathogens, investing in research and development at
U.S. institutions through USDA, and strengthening our supply
chains to ensure they're resilient against potential bad
actors. But the way to do this is not by closing the Department
of Homeland Security Centers of Excellence or freezing funding
for USDA university partnerships, including those that directly
support agrosecurity. One of these closed Centers of Excellence
directly supported agrosecurity by researching and educating
Federal partners on how to detect and eliminate biological
threats that cross our borders.
In my home State of New York, the administration halted
funding for Cornell University's Animal Health Diagnostic
Center, which tests livestock for diseases that could devastate
agricultural sectors and our economy. This significantly
impacts their ability to survey for high-consequence animal
diseases. All of that's to say, the Chairman and I are in full
agreement that we must strengthen our Nation's capabilities
against threats of agroterrorism, whether they be foreign or
domestic. I believe we do so by bolstering Federal investment
and resources rather than gutting them. This also means
ensuring our Customs facilitators have the resources needed to
survey biological threats. I have four bridges in my district
in western New York into Canada. I represent some of CBP's
agricultural specialists who report to work at U.S. ports of
entry and contribute every single day to our collective
biosecurity. So I understand the importance of ensuring our
Nation is hardened against any biological threats, and I
appreciate the Chairman's work in this space.
I want to thank our witnesses for participating in today's
hearing, and I look forward to your testimony as we assess DHS
and USDA's preparedness in keeping our communities safe. I
yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Kennedy follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Timothy M. Kennedy
February 11, 2026
I want to begin by saying that I appreciate the Chairman for
bringing officials from the administration before our subcommittee. I
hope to see more hearings with administration witnesses in the future.
I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the greatest threat to
our Nation currently, and with all due respect to our witnesses, it's
not agroterrorism.
We are seeing a Department of Homeland Security that is killing our
own citizens, terrorizing communities, ignoring court orders, rejecting
due process, and advancing an extreme immigration enforcement agenda
that is stoking fear, creating chaos, and degrading our democratic
institutions. The Trump administration is also dismantling FEMA before
our eyes, refusing to distribute critical counterterrorism grant
funding and moving forward with plans to cut half of FEMA's workforce.
Mr. Chairman, yesterday, I sent a letter to your office to formally
request that this subcommittee turn its focus to FEMA issues, including
delays in preparedness and counterterrorism grants, workforce
challenges, and areas for improvement in disaster recovery. Mr.
Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to insert this letter into the
record.
Last year, I introduced a bill, H.R. 6507, the DHS Grants
Accountability Act, which would require increased transparency and
oversight of FEMA's counterterrorism grant programs, and I hope that's
something we will have an opportunity to discuss on this subcommittee
in the coming months.
Turning to today's hearing, I agree that our Nation must strengthen
its biodefense, including better preparing for potential attacks on our
agricultural systems.
This includes ensuring we have enough agricultural specialists at
our borders to detect harmful pathogens, investing in research and
development at U.S. institutions through USDA, and strengthening our
supply chains to ensure they're resilient against potential bad actors.
But the way to do this is not by closing DHS's Centers of Excellence or
freezing funding for USDA university partnerships, including those that
directly support agrosecurity.
One of these closed Centers of Excellence directly supported
agrosecurity by researching and educating Federal partners on how to
detect and eliminate biological threats that cross our borders. And in
my home State of New York, the administration halted funding for
Cornell University's Animal Health Diagnostic Center, which tests
livestock for diseases that could devastate agriculture sectors and our
economy. This significantly impacts their ability to survey for high-
consequence animal diseases. All of that is to say, the Chairman and I
are in full agreement that we must strengthen our Nation's capabilities
against threats of agroterrorism, whether they be foreign or domestic,
and I believe we do so by bolstering Federal investments and resources
rather than gutting them. This also means ensuring our customs
facilitators have the resources needed to survey biological threats.
I have four bridges that connect my district in Western New York to
Canada. I represent some of CBP's agricultural specialists who report
to work at U.S. ports of entry and contribute every single day to our
collective biosecurity. So, I understand the importance of ensuring our
Nation is hardened against any biological threats, and I appreciate the
Chairman's work in this space. I want to thank our witnesses for
participating in today's hearing, and I look forward to your testimony
as we assess DHS and USDA's preparedness in keeping our communities
safe.
Chairman Strong. Thank you, Ranking Member Kennedy. Other
Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
For my home State of Mississippi, agriculture is the
lifeblood of the economy. The vulnerability of our community to
biological threats is not theoretical, but rather an
existential threat to the livelihoods of thousands of families.
As our farmers already struggle with rising input costs and
market volatility created by Donald Trump's tariffs, the added
risk of agroterrorism could lead to irreversible, catastrophic
economic damage. And while we recognize the threats posed by
agroterrorism, it is important for today's hearing to also face
the fact that the Trump administration continues to degrade our
national security infrastructure, which has also affected our
ability to detect and prevent biological threats.
The proposed budget cuts and on-going staffing cuts to the
Department of Health and Human Services and the Centers for
Disease Control represent a dangerous retreat from our Nation's
biodefense infrastructure and significantly weaken our ability
to detect and respond to agroterrorism before they can
devastate our food supply. By gutting the very surveillance and
emergency programs designed to monitor zoonotic diseases and
agricultural pathogens, we are essentially leaving the gates
open to those who would use biological agents to destabilize
our economy and threaten public safety.
This vulnerability is compounded by Donald Trump's decision
to withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO) and
hastily close the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). Both actions further exacerbate the risk
of biological diseases spreading by dismantling the
international early warning systems that provide us with
critical intelligence on emerging global threats.
In the context of agroterrorism, our safety depends on
global cooperation and the ability to stop an outbreak at its
source. Without these partnerships, we are creating blind spots
that put our domestic livestock and crops at unneccesary risk
of intentional contamination. Lastly, I want to say that the
Trump administration is actively dismantling the very agency we
rely on when disasters, including biological events, happen:
FEMA.
The administration is firing FEMA personnel and plans to
eliminate half of the agency's workforce. They are refusing to
distribute critical counterterrorism grants and have injected
an unprecedented level of chaos into the grants process. In
doing so, they are effectively abandoning our State, local,
Tribal, and territorial partners, leaving them defenseless
because the White House would rather settle political scores
than save lives. This systematic dismantling of our domestic
response capabilities is not an isolated failure; it is a
symptom of a broader, more dangerous agenda: Trump's
degradation of our national security.
What's more, our Congressional colleagues are pushing
legislation that rips FEMA out of DHS with no consideration of
the detrimental effects on the Department, including fracturing
FEMA's counterterrorism responsibilities and crippling of the
agency's mandate for continuity of government. This committee
should be taking an active role in the conversation on FEMA's
future and the Trump administration's on-going harm to our
Nation's security. I hope it will do so immediately.
Chairman Strong. I'm very pleased to have such an important
panel of witnesses before us today. Ms. Suzette Kelly is the
deputy executive director of Agriculture Programs and Trade
Liaison for the CBP's Office of Field Operations at DHS. In
this role, Ms. Kelly provides leadership and expertise while
guiding collaboration and partnerships to safeguard our
agriculture and Nation's food supply. Mr. Matt Allen is the
director of the Office of Homeland Security for the United
States Department of Agriculture. He has served in this
capacity since 2020 and oversees Department-wide efforts in
radiation safety emergency programs, personnel and document
security, national security programs and policies,
communication security and operations sustainment. Mr. Jeff
Cooper serves as program manager for DHS Science and Technology
Directorates' PANTHR Program. PANTHR provides technical
information on CBRN hazards to help leaders make informed
decisions on preparedness and response to weapons of mass
destruction events. Dr. Ashley Grant is the senior health
security and biodefense advisor in DHS's Office of Health
Security, which leads DHS's effort in medical, work force
health and safety and public health. In this role, Dr. Grant
helps to mitigate the impact of biological threats. I thank you
all again for being here today.
Pursuant to the committee's rule VII(C), I ask that the
witnesses please rise and raise your right hand. Do you
solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this
Committee of Homeland Security of the U.S. House of
Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Strong. Thank you. Please be seated. Let the
record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the
affirmative. I now recognize Mr. Kelly for 5 minutes to
summarize her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF SUZETTE P. KELLY, ACTING EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
AGRICULTURE PROGRAMS AND TRADE LIAISON, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mrs. Kelly. Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection's role in protecting
the United States from agroterrorism and biological threats. I
am honored to represent CBP's Office of Field Operations,
Agriculture Programs, and Trade Liaison. Every day, our front-
line personnel work tirelessly to safeguard American
agriculture, natural resources, and our communities by
preventing the introduction and spread of dangerous pests,
animal diseases, and biological agents. Agricultural and
biological materials, including animal products, genetic
materials, and infectious substances, are routine imports that
sustain our food supply and support scientific research and
medical advancements.
However, these imports also pose significant risks. The
accidental or deliberate introduction of a pest, pathogen, or
disease could have significant adverse effects on domestic
agriculture and natural resources. For example, CBP recently
intercepted illicit shipments from the People's Republic of
China sent to U.S. researchers at academic institutions. These
shipments contained a dangerous fungal pathogen, harmful
genetic materials, and E. Coli concealed to evade CBP detection
and circumvent U.S. laws. To mitigate these types of threats,
CBP integrates agricultural inspection into its multi-layered
border security strategy that includes highly-trained
personnel, advanced targeting and detection capabilities, and
close collaboration with Federal partners and industry
stakeholders. Using their scientific and law enforcement
expertise, agriculture specialists work alongside CBP officers
and trade specialists to process and inspect millions of
shipments and traveler luggage at air, sea, and land ports of
entry. The work we do is vital. In fiscal year 2025 alone, CBP
agriculture specialists interdicted approximately 1.7 million
prohibited plant materials, animal byproducts, and meat items.
They also intercepted more than 100,000 actionable pests
identified as potentially dangerous to U.S. agriculture.
Recognizing the complexity of agroterrorism and biological
threats, CBP established the Biological Threat Exclusion
Program to strengthen our efforts and ensure a consistent
approach across the agency.
Early detection of threats is essential. At the CBP
National Targeting Center, agriculture specialists use advanced
data systems to identify high-risk travelers and shipments
before they arrive at our borders. Our specialized detection
capabilities deployed to ports of entry further enhance our
efforts. For example, our agriculture canine teams screen
luggage and cargo for prohibited items quickly and effectively.
CBP is also expanding its use of mobile technology enabling
remote inspections real-time cargo release by enhancing
efficiency and enforcement. Collaboration is central to our
approach. CBP enforces laws on behalf of dozens of Federal
entities and works closely with partners such as Department of
Agriculture, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These partnerships enable
coordinated responses to emerging threats.
In closing, CBP's agricultural inspection capabilities are
a critical component of our Nation's defense against
agroterrorism and biological threats. Working in coordination
with our partners, we will continue to identify and intercept
these threats, protect our national and economic security,
preserve our agricultural resources and safeguard our
communities.
Thank you for your continued support of CBP's mission. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Kelly follows:]
Prepared Statement of Suzette P. Kelly
February 11, 2026
introduction
Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to
discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP's) vital role in
protecting the United States from agroterrorism and other biological
threats as part of our border security mission.
Under the leadership of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
CBP Commissioner, CBP's Agriculture Programs and Trade Liaison office
within the Office of Field Operations continues to strengthen the
Nation's ability to detect and intercept agricultural and biological
threats. This office is at the forefront of a multi-layered process
that safeguards American agriculture, the economy, and communities from
the risks associated with the entry, establishment, or spread of pests,
pathogens, and harmful agents which can affect human, animal, and crop
health, and leads or performs activities to defend against threats of
bio- and agroterrorism.
Biological materials, including diagnostic specimens, genetic
materials, human and veterinary products, infectious substances,
microorganisms, and disease vector hosts such as ticks and mosquitoes,
are frequently imported into the United States to support critical
research and medical activities. However, these imports can carry
significant risks. The introduction of an invasive pest or a biological
agent, such as a virus, bacteria, or fungus, could devastate U.S.
agriculture, threaten public health, and disrupt food supply chains.
For example, the introduction of pests and diseases such as New World
screwworm and African swine fever virus could severely impact the U.S.
livestock population and have a significant economic impact.
Agricultural and biological threats are dynamic and increasingly
complex. A traveler may accidentally bring in a prohibited item
forgotten at the bottom of a suitcase, or an importer may ship an
unnoticed pest in a wooden shipping crate. However, some travelers and
importers may attempt to smuggle materials into the United States to
circumvent inspections, permits, and other import requirements. CBP's
role in safeguarding the Nation from agricultural and biological
threats becomes even more crucial as agroterrorism threats continue to
evolve and challenge traditional security measures. For example, CBP
recently intercepted individuals from the People's Republic of China
who attempted to smuggle biological samples of a dangerous fungal
pathogen into the University of Michigan.\1\ The violators in this case
attempted to ship potential harmful genetically-modified seeds and
genetic materials. These items, imported as de minimis shipments
through express consignment facilities, were artfully concealed in
documents and magazines in an apparent attempt to avoid CBP detection.
Through extensive coordination and collaboration with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, these individuals were charged with smuggling
and other charges, resulting in the removal of one defendant from the
United States and a felony conviction with a sentence of time served
for the other defendant. In another example, on December 19, 2025,
Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Kash Patel posted on X that a
post-doctoral researcher and J-1 visa holder from China, Youhuang
Xiang, was charged with smuggling Escherichia coli (E. coli) into the
United States.\2\ The biological materials encountered in this case
were hidden in a shipment of clothing in an attempt to circumvent U.S.
laws and CBP detection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/chinese-national-pleads-
guilty-and-sentenced-smuggling-dangerous-biological-pathogen.
\2\ Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Kash Patel
[@FBIDirectorKash]. 2025, December 19. Youhuang Xiang, a post-doctoral
researcher and J-1 visa holder from China was charged with smuggling
Escherichia coli (E. coli) into the United States and making false
statements about it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adversaries may also pursue agroterrorism--the deliberate attack
upon the U.S. agricultural sector--knowing that the introduction of a
deadly pathogen, virus, seed, or bacteria could devastate crops,
livestock, and natural resources, and have cascading, long-term effects
on our economy.
Recognizing these risks, and as part of the enactment of the
Homeland Security Act establishing the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) in 2003, Congress transferred agricultural quarantine and
inspection duties from the Department of Agriculture to DHS, thereby
integrating agricultural security into DHS's border security mission.
Today, CBP uses risk-based traveler and trade targeting, data
intelligence, scientific and law enforcement expertise, Federal and
private-sector partnerships, and advanced detection capabilities to
protect the Nation against unintentional entries as well as those
seeking to deliberately bring dangerous biological or agricultural
materials into the United States.
Furthermore, President Trump's Executive Order 14324, suspending
the de minimis exemption for low-value shipments, further strengthens
CBP's efforts to enforce trade laws and screen imports for potentially
dangerous biological materials.\3\ This regulatory change ensures that
all shipments, regardless of value, are subject to appropriate
inspection and enforcement, reducing vulnerabilities and enhancing
CBP's ability to intercept threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/Presidential-actions/2025/07/
suspending-duty-free-de-minimis-treatment-for-all-countries/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
intercepting agricultural and biological threats as part of cbp's
border security mission
CBP Agriculture Specialists are the Nation's front-line defense
against threats to the U.S. agricultural sector. These highly-trained
professionals, with expertise in biological sciences and agricultural
inspections, diligently inspect international passenger baggage, cargo,
and conveyances to determine the admissibility of agricultural
commodities. Their work is essential in preventing the entry of
transboundary pests and diseases and maintaining the vitality and
security of the Nation's approximately $1.53 trillion agricultural
economy.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aqi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP's efforts to counter agricultural and biological threats are
fully integrated into its mission to secure U.S. borders, while
facilitating lawful travel and trade through air, sea, and land ports
of entry. Leading these efforts are CBP's Agriculture Specialists, who
work closely with CBP Officers to process more than 88,000 cargo
containers, millions of mail and express shipments, and more than 1.1
million travelers every day.\5\ CBP Agriculture Specialists use
scientific and law enforcement expertise, automated targeting systems,
X-ray technology, predictive analytics tools, and comprehensive
information sharing to ensure the safe facilitation of international
trade and travel while upholding the integrity of America's
agricultural sector and natural environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ https://www.cbp.gov/document/stats/cbp-snapshot.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the additional danger of agroterrorism, the role of CBP
Agriculture Specialists at our ports of entry is more crucial than
ever. Agriculture Specialists complete rigorous training in plant pest
identification, quarantine procedures, and law enforcement, with port-
specific instruction to address local challenges. They seize prohibited
or infested items, oversee remediation actions like treatment and
disinfection, and provide guidance on threat analysis and interdiction.
With more than 2,800 CBP Agriculture Specialists deployed nationwide
and at select Pre-Clearance locations, CBP maintains a robust front-
line defense against both accidental and deliberate introduction of
biological threats to the United States.
Each year, CBP Agriculture Specialists intercept thousands of
``actionable pests,'' those identified through scientific risk
assessment as being dangerous to the health and safety of U.S.
agricultural resources. In fiscal year 2025, CBP Agriculture
Specialists interdicted approximately 1.7 million prohibited plant
materials, meat, and animal byproducts at ports of entry, while also
intercepting more than 100,000 pests from entering the United States.
Recognizing the evolving nature of agroterrorism and biological
threats, CBP's Agriculture Programs and Trade Liaison office
established the Biological Threat Exclusion branch to enhance CBP's
capability to defend against biological threats to the United States.
The branch is comprised of Biological Threat Exclusion Coordinators,
who provide guidance to field personnel for the clearance, analysis,
and inspection of biological materials and ensure that policies,
procedures, and best practices are appropriately implemented throughout
the agency. The branch provides programmatic management of its 37
Biological Threat Operations Specialist positions, strategically
situated throughout the Agency's workforce. Biological Threat
Operations Specialists provide operational responses to biological
threats at ports of entry and serve as front-line technical advisors
for the targeting, risk analysis, inspection, adjudication, and
intelligence or informational reporting of biological materials.
advanced targeting capabilities
CBP uses many of the same tools that support its anti-terrorism
activities to target potentially harmful agricultural items approaching
U.S. borders via shipments or individual travelers. Analysts at the
National Targeting Center use sophisticated data systems to proactively
analyze passenger and cargo information before departure from foreign
ports. These critical decision-support tools assist CBP Officers and
Agriculture Specialists in identifying shipments or travelers that
warrant comprehensive screening or inspection upon arrival. To further
enhance agriculture targeting, CBP has integrated Agriculture
Specialists within the infrastructure of its National Targeting Center,
allowing for a heightened focus on identifying high-risk entities that
may attempt to import shipments with pests, prohibited products,
contaminants, or smuggled goods. Agriculture Specialists at the
National Targeting Center also serve as a conduit for agriculture
information and intelligence collection at the national level. Working
alongside CBP Officers and other agency partners at the National
Targeting Center, Agriculture Specialists develop, coordinate, and
implement intelligence and information capabilities that support the
execution of CBP's primary mission to secure America's borders.
specialized detection capabilities and mobile technology
Complementing its targeting activities, CBP deploys specialized
canine teams, one of the agency's most effective assets within the
Agriculture Quarantine and Inspection Program. These highly-trained
dogs can screen luggage or cargo for hidden or forgotten fruits, meats,
and other prohibited items in seconds, saving human time and resources.
Today, approximately 175 CBP agriculture canine teams operate in
airports, seaports, mail and express consignment facilities, and at
land border ports of entry, providing a critical detection capability
for prohibited agricultural products.
CBP is also leveraging technology to transform and improve business
operations by expanding the Automated Targeting System Mobile Exam
Findings application. By equipping Agriculture Specialists at sea, air,
and land ports with portable tools, CBP can remotely complete
inspections and release cargo in real time. This mobile solution speeds
up cargo processing, enhances trade facilitation and enforcement, and
allows front-line personnel to perform inspections efficiently without
being tied to a fixed location.
collaboration with government and private-sector partners
CBP's front-line expertise, targeting programs, and detection
capabilities are further strengthened by extensive partnerships with
other Federal agencies and industry stakeholders. CBP enforces laws on
behalf of 47 Federal entities and works closely with partners such as
the Department of Agriculture, Food and Drug Administration, Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, Fish and Wildlife Service, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. These partnerships enable coordinated
responses to emerging agricultural and biological threats and ensure
that regulations and policies are harmonized across agencies.
The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, for example,
collaborates with CBP to develop agriculture rules, regulations,
policies, and training based on pest risk assessments. CBP, in turn,
implements internal policies to operationalize those regulations,
including how Agriculture Specialists identify shipments for exams and
what safeguards to institute in response to pest detection. CBP also
works directly with the Secretary's Office of Health Security to ensure
operational realities inform Government-wide discussions, led by Office
of Health Security, regarding the protection of food and agriculture.
Furthermore, recent CBP collaboration with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and other Federal partners resulted in the successful
establishment of an interagency agreement specific to the importation
of biological materials. This agreement serves as a force multiplier,
significantly enhancing U.S. safety and security by delineating each
agency's roles and responsibilities, including the sharing of
information regarding noncompliant importation of biological materials.
Demonstrating the importance of interagency cooperation in
addressing emerging threats, CBP--through its Agriculture Programs and
Trade Liaison office--has a critical role in the whole-of-Government
response to the threat of the New World screwworm.\6\ As an active
member of the One Health Coordination Unit-New World Screwworm
Interagency Working Group, CBP provides border security expertise and
shares intelligence to help prevent this harmful pest from entering the
country. Collectively, the Working Group enhances awareness of the New
World screwworm threat by conducting stakeholder outreach and
strengthening engagement between Federal partners and trade
stakeholders. To date, CBP has provided New World screwworm training to
more than 23,000 front-line personnel at ports of entry, ensuring
thorough awareness of this harmful pest and the Federal efforts to
mitigate the threat to U.S. agricultural resources. CBP is also
partnering with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on efforts to train
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service canine teams to identify and
respond to New World screwworm, facilitate importations of sterile
insect fly pupae, and prepare outreach material to educate the
traveling public and trade community.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ https://www.screwworm.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP's mitigation strategy for agricultural and biological security
threats involves staying aware of current and emerging agricultural and
biological threats. It also includes regular training of CBP
Agriculture Specialists and Officers through programs conducted or
endorsed by Federal partners such as the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This
continuous training approach ensures CBP's front-line personnel are
equipped with the most recent threat intelligence and detection methods
to prevent the introduction of prohibited, invasive, or potentially
dangerous pests, agricultural products, or biological materials.
CBP's commitment to information sharing goes beyond internal
training, extending to key industries and academic communities to
strengthen awareness and compliance. Working with partner agencies, CBP
engages not only with trade and transportation communities, but also
with academic, research, and biopharmaceutical institutions to educate
these sectors on agricultural and biological threats, share required
import and export compliance measures, and promote best practices. For
example, CBP maintains robust pest exclusion programs centered on some
of the most devastating pests, including the Flighted Spongy Moth
Complex or Spongy Moth \7\ and Khapra Beetle,\8\ as well as risks
associated with pests in wood packaging material and other
contaminants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ U.S. Department of Agriculture National Invasive Species
Information Center, https://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/terrestrial/
invertebrates/flighted-spongy-moth-complex.
\8\ U.S. Department of Agriculture National Invasive Species
Information Center, https://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/terrestrial/
invertebrates/khapra-beetle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summary, by building and maintaining strong relationships across
Federal agencies and industry stakeholders, CBP helps ensure that both
Government and private-sector partners are equipped to address the
complex and evolving nature of agricultural and biological threats.
conclusion
CBP's multi-layered approach to protecting the United States from
agricultural and biological threats is actively implemented at ports of
entry every day. This daily vigilance helps protect our national and
economic security, preserve our natural and agricultural resources, and
safeguard our communities. By combining front-line expertise, advance
targeting and detection capabilities, and strong Federal and industry
partnerships, CBP effectively detects and intercepts dangerous
materials, preventing potentially harmful pests and biological threats
from entering the United States.
Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I
look forward to your questions.
Chairman Strong. Thank you, Ms. Kelly. I recognize Mr.
Allen for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MATT ALLEN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Mr. Allen. Good afternoon, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member
Kennedy, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon. I
have the privilege of leading the USDA Office of Homeland
Security. the Office coordinates across the Department to
mitigate risk, provide safeguards to USDA personnel and
information by leading Government-wide initiatives in
championing USDA's equities in homeland and national security.
I very much appreciate the opportunity to discuss these
important topics with you today. As you know, agriculture
contributes over 1.5 trillion to the U.S. Gross Domestic
Product each year. It underpins our society and is one of the
most important pillars that feeds, fuels, and clothes the
entire world. This past summer, the Department launched the
National Farm Security Action Plan, a first-of-its-kind
comprehensive strategy to acknowledge agriculture as a key
pillar of national security. The plan focuses on protecting
U.S. farmland from foreign adversaries, strengthening food
supply chains, ending fraud in nutrition programs, safeguarding
plant and animal health, and bolstering research security. The
National Farm Security Action Plan enables USDA to begin this
critical work to address the imperative for agriculture
security in America. The Action Plan serves as a launching
point for USDA to work in continued unison with Government and
other partners to fully integrate agriculture into broader
national security enterprise.
Continuing the implementation of the plan. In January, USDA
launched a new on-line portal to streamline the reporting of
transactions involving U.S. agriculture land by foreign persons
under the Agriculture Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of
1978, or AFIDA, the new on-line portal's broader effort to
strengthen the AFIDA enforcement and protect American farmland.
We enjoy a strong working relationship with our partners across
USDA and the U.S. Interagency with USDA's Animal Plant Health
Inspection Service which is Department's lead under the
National Response Framework, Emergency Support Function 11 for
safeguarding animal and plant health, provide critical
connections to threat intelligence resources which APHIS uses
to mitigate operational and strategic risk. As the committee is
likely aware, we're facing the threat of the northward creep of
the New World screwworm toward our border. That poses a
potential risk to livestock industry and pets. While we've not
seen indications of intentional spread, there's well-recognized
involvement of cartels designated as foreign terrorists
organizations in transboundary cattle smuggling that is likely
exacerbating the problem.
The on-going security situation south of the border also
complicates effective control pest surveillance and places
personnel responsible for addressing this pest at risk. I
present this as an example to highlight the complexity of our
global connected agriculture supply chains and emphasize the
risk present in this critical infrastructure sector. OHS works
hand-in-hand with both USDA agencies like APHIS and Federal
partners to include CBP to ensure that we have the best and
most up-to-date information for strategic decision making.
As just mentioned, we collaborate with the FBI and CBP on
many--to identify threats of suspected acts of agroterrorism.
Just a few months ago, Director Kash Patel of the FBI commented
on the recent Michigan case involving foreign graduate students
who illicitly brought fusarium. An agricultural pathogen in the
United States is a persistent and enduring threat. U.S.
agriculture and American farmers are faced with this and many
other persistent enduring threats. Our Department leans on our
partners to assist us investigating remedying these issues and
that's why I'm delighted to have our colleagues from DHS here
with us today. They have abundant authorities, resources, and
personnel to assist us in detecting, defending the most
tenacious threats to U.S. agriculture, the economy, and
national security.
Those situations in Michigan underscore the importance of
knowing that Federally-funded agriculture research and
development is being done in conjunction with trusted partners.
Just this morning, USDA announced the creation of an office
dedicated to enhancing research security within USDA,
continuing to implement National Security Presidential
Memorandum 33 and educate USDA partners of why research
security matters. It is easy to forget the food on our plates,
the clothes on our backs, the warmth of our fires are all
predicated on somewhere, somewhere transforming living or once
living things into something that sustains us as individuals,
families, communities, and a nation. The foundational place of
agriculture in our overall well-being as American people and
perhaps more importantly, the source for might in the Nation,
cannot be understated. Safeguarding agriculture is something we
take very seriously at the Department.
Chairman Strong and Ranking Member Kennedy, distinguished
Members of subcommittee, thank you again for holding this
hearing, the opportunity to testify on this important topic. I
would also like to thank my colleagues that are joining me
today, our partners in the interagency. As this is a whole-of-
Government effort, none of us could do this independently, so
our continued cooperation and collaboration is essential and I
look forward to answering any questions you may have. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Matt Allen
February 11, 2026
Good afternoon, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. My name is Matt Allen, and I
have the privilege of leading the USDA Office of Homeland Security. Our
six divisions coordinate across the Department to mitigate risk and
provide safeguards to USDA personnel and information by leading
Government-wide initiatives and championing USDA's equities in homeland
and national security. To protect U.S. agriculture, OHS executes these
critical Departmental functions across our emergency operations,
continuity of operations, personnel security, classified
communications, safety of ionizing radiation, and homeland and national
security policy, planning, and preparedness activities for USDA. I very
much appreciate the opportunity to discuss the important topic of farm
security as national security with you today.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was established in 1862. Our
seal states ``Agriculture is the Foundation of Manufacturing and
Commerce.'' This is as true today as it was then. Agriculture
contributes over $1.5 trillion to the U.S. Gross Domestic Product each
year. It underpins our society and is one of the most important pillars
that feeds, fuels, and clothes the entire world.
This past summer, the Department launched the National Farm
Security Action Plan: a first-of-its-kind comprehensive strategy to
acknowledge agriculture as key pillar of national security. This plan
focuses on protecting U.S. farmland from foreign adversaries,
strengthening food supply chains, ending fraud in nutrition programs,
safeguarding plant and animal health, promoting ``America First'' in
all USDA programs, and bolstering research security. It includes key
elements like tougher AFIDA enforcement for foreign land purchases and
working with our Federal partners like U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) to ensure that pests and pathogens don't enter the
United States, threatening our herds and crops.
The National Farm Security Action Plan enables USDA to begin this
critical work to address the imperative for agriculture security in
America. This Action Plan serves as the launching point for USDA to
work in continued unison with governmental and other partners to fully
integrate agriculture into the broader national security enterprise in
the coming months and years. Working together, we can and must protect
and expand the resilience and durability of the U.S. food supply and
all associated value chains.
Continuing the implementation of the Farm Security Action Plan, in
January, USDA launched a new on-line portal to streamline reporting of
transactions involving U.S. agricultural land by foreign persons, which
can include businesses and governments, under the Agricultural Foreign
Investment Disclosure Act of 1978 (AFIDA). The new on-line portal is
part of a broader effort to strengthen AFIDA enforcement and protect
American farmland. This on-line portal will enable USDA to better share
data with our interagency partners, address a GAO audit finding, as
well as reduce the burden on filers, streamlining the process for
electronic submission and retention of AFIDA disclosure records.
In addition to the National Farm Security Action Plan, at the end
of last year the Secretary issued a memorandum on research and
development priorities. Continued pest and disease incursions continue
to threaten U.S. farmers and ranchers. For example, continued New World
screwworm infestations in Mexico, the continued westward expansion of
the Spotted Lanternfly, persistence of Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza, and the decimation of our domestic citrus industry due to
citrus greening are just a few instances of how invasive pests and
diseases threaten American agriculture and our natural resources.
Research and development focused on new and effective methods for
preventing, detecting, controlling, and eradicating these threats is a
top priority for USDA and the security of U.S. agriculture. This
memorandum helps address the priorities for research, as well as
knowing who we are collaborating with, ensuring tax dollars are funding
priorities for American producers.
USDA's Office of Homeland Security enjoys a strong working
relationship with our partners in USDA and across the U.S. interagency.
With USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), which
is the Department's lead under the National Response Framework
Emergency Support Function (ESF) No. 11 for Safeguarding Animal and
Plant Health, we provide critical connections to threat intelligence
resources which APHIS uses to mitigate operational and strategic risk.
As the committee is likely aware, the continuing northward creep of
New World screwworm toward our borders poses a potential risk to our
livestock industry, pets, and wildlife. While we've not seen
indications of intentional screwworm spread, the well-recognized
involvement of cartels--recently designated as foreign terrorist
organizations--in transboundary cattle smuggling is likely exacerbating
the natural spread of this pest. The on-going security situation south
of our border also complicates effective control, pest surveillance,
and places our personnel responsible for addressing this pest at risk.
I present this example to highlight the complexity of our globally-
connected agricultural supply chains, and to emphasize the risk present
in this critical infrastructure sector. The USDA Office of Homeland
Security works hand-in-hand with both USDA Agencies, like APHIS, and
Federal partners, including CBP, to ensure we have the best, most up-
to-date information to aid in strategic decision making.
USDA also works cooperatively and collaborates with FBI and CBP to
identify threats or suspected acts of agroterrorism and carry out
effective and coordinated investigations and response, including multi-
layered interagency enforcement. USDA supports FBI investigations by
sharing information, assisting in investigatory activities, and
pursuing concurrent administrative action. USDA participates in FBI
agroterrorism training, as well as localized law enforcement meetings
and discussions to ensure close working relationships and readiness
across agencies.
Just a few months ago, FBI's Director Kash Patel commented on the
recent Michigan case involving the foreign graduate students who
illicitly brought Fusarium--an agricultural pathogen--into the United
States as a ``persistent and enduring threat.'' U.S. agriculture and
American farmers are faced with this--and many other--persistent and
enduring threats. The Department of Agriculture leans on our partners
to assist in investigating and remedying these issues. That's why I'm
delighted to have our colleagues from the Department of Homeland
Security here with us today as they have additional authorities,
resources, and personnel to assist us in detecting--and defending--
against the most tenacious threats to U.S. agriculture, our economy,
and national security.
Situations like those that happened last year in Michigan
underscore the importance of knowing that Federally-funded agricultural
research and development at universities is being done in conjunction
with trusted partners. Today, USDA announced the creation of an office
dedicated to enhancing research security within the USDA Office of the
Chief Scientist. This new office will be tasked with helping USDA
continue to implement NSPM-33 and educate USDA partners about why
research security matters when it comes to agriculture.
The U.S. Government has traditionally viewed ``agroterrorism''
through the lens of potentially dangerous pests or diseases
intentionally operationalized by state or non-state actors to damage
American agriculture and inflict harm on the U.S. populace. However, it
is important that we do not over-index on just ``biothreats.'' As the
``foundation of manufacturing and commerce'', the threats against
agriculture are so much more than the threat of contagion in one crop
or several species. Agriculture is the absolute core of rural American
livelihoods and well-being. If our producers cannot grow and sell their
food, fuel, or fiber products at markets either domestically or abroad,
rural America cannot thrive. Disruption to those delicate systems of
systems such as interruptions to viable and reliable germplasm;
position, navigation, and timing; labor for harvesting and processing;
cold-chain storage; transportation logistics and enduring port access;
or reliable and real-time market information--each or all can spell
cascading disaster to our Nation's heartland. As we think about
`agroterrorism' as a Nation, I respectfully ask the committee to
encourage a wider, more holistic potential appreciation for the problem
set we collectively face as we look at agriculture as fundamental to
our national security.
It is often easy to forget that the food on our plates, the clothes
on our backs, and the warmth of our fires are all predicated upon
someone somewhere transforming a living or once living thing into
something that sustains us as individuals, families, communities, and a
Nation. The foundational place of agriculture in our overall well-being
as American people and--perhaps more or most importantly--source of
might for the Nation cannot be understated. Safeguarding agriculture is
something we take very seriously at the Department of Agriculture. If
we do our work in silos individually, we collectively will fail
together. We must stay vigilant against any risks and threats to
agriculture on a continuous basis.
Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee--thank you again for holding this hearing and the
opportunity to testify on this important topic. I would also like to
thank my colleagues that are joining today and our partners in the
interagency, as this is a whole-of-Government effort. None of us could
do this independently so our continued cooperation and collaboration is
essential. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Chairman Strong. Thank you, Mr. Allen. I now recognize Mr.
Cooper for his 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JEFF COOPER, PROGRAM MANAGER, PROBABILISTIC
ANALYSIS FOR NATIONAL THREATS HAZARDS AND RISKS, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Cooper. Good afternoon, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member
Kennedy, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the
Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology
Directorate. The risks to the food and agricultural sector and
supply chain are varied and serious. The Nation's food and
agricultural systems are designated critical infrastructure.
The disruption, whether naturally-occurring, accidental, or
intentional, can result in cascading impacts to public health,
economic stability, and confidence in the Government. As global
supply chains become more interconnected, they become
increasingly vulnerable to biological threats and understanding
and managing these potential risks is more important than ever.
DHS has the Federal authority to assess and manage threats to
critical infrastructure, serving as a coordinator for the
whole-of-Government effort that includes all levels of
government and industry owners and operators within DHS, the
Science and Technology Directorate that supports this mission
by providing technical threat analysis, risk analysis and
decision support to inform preparedness and response efforts
across the Homeland Security enterprise.
Under National Security Memorandum 16, DHS was tasked with
conducting risk assessments related to threat against the food
and agriculture, working in coordination with the Secretary of
Agriculture and the Secretary of Health and Human services and
others. DHS's role is to ensure that leaders at the Federal,
State, and local levels have clear science-based understanding
of the threats they face, the potential consequences of those
threats and the trade-offs associated with different
preparedness and response options. S&T contributes to DHS's
risk assessment mission by delivering technically-defensible
analysis and user tools to help decision makers prioritize
actions and resources. One way that S&T executes this mission
is through the Probabilistic Analysis of National Threats,
Hazards and Risks Program or PANTHR. PANTHR provides analytical
capabilities that integrate threat information, hazard data and
consequence modeling to support risk-informed decision making
across chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive,
and cyber threat areas. These capabilities are designed to
inform policy and operations, not to execute or set them.
Rather, they help answer fundamental questions decision makers
face, including which threats pose the greatest risk, where
vulnerabilities exist and where investments can most
effectively reduce that risk.
Risks to the food and agricultural system are complex. They
vary by agent, commodity geography and response capacity, and
the consequences of disruption can extend well beyond the
agricultural sector. Through PANTHR, S&T develops and applies
risk and computational analytics that support strategic
operational and tactical planning. These efforts help decision
makers to compare risks across various scenarios and assess how
different interventions may reduce the likelihood or
consequences of those events. Risk assessments depend on
reliable data. For many agricultural threat agents, including
emerging and reemerging diseases, experimental data is limited
or incomplete. To address this gap, S&T also conducts the
Agricultural Threat Characterization Research Project that
examines properties and impacts of biological threats relevant
to agricultural such as high-pathogenic avian influenza and
African swine fever. This research produces science-based
knowledge products that inform hazard awareness, analytical
modeling, and preparedness planning.
In addition to analysis and threat characterization, S&T
conducts applied research and development to inform future
capabilities and enhance agricultural biosecurity. This
includes work to improve screening and sensing technologies at
ports of entry as well as methodologies and decision support
tools for depopulation disposal and decontamination. These
efforts are designed to inform capability development and
transition to our operational partners such as USDA and CBP.
S&T works closely with DHS components and interagency partners
including the Department of Agriculture to ensure analytical
capabilities address real-world needs. Through tailored
analysis, reach-back support and scenario development, S&T
provides decision support to planning exercises and
preparedness activities. S&T supports the USDA's National Farm
Security Action Plan by providing the technical risk assessment
framework needed to inform sound policy and operational
decisions. In this way, S&T's contributions align with DHS's
responsibilities under the National Security Memorandum 16 and
complement USDA's leadership on agricultural policy compliance
and enforcement. The Science and Technology Directorate is
committed to helping the Nation understand and manage these
risks to the food and agricultural sector through rigorous
science-based analysis and decision support. These complex
risks require disciplined coordination across Federal, State,
and local partners. With continued support from Congress, S&T
will continue to provide the analytical foundation that informs
preparedness and protects the American people, our food supply,
and our economy.
Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to testify
before you today. Thank you for your support of the Science and
Technology Directorate. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeff Cooper
February 11, 2026
Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and Members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today
on behalf of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science
and Technology Directorate (S&T).
The risks to the food and agriculture sector and supply chain are
varied and serious. The Nation's food and agriculture systems are
designated critical infrastructure, and their disruption, whether
intentional, accidental, or naturally-occurring, can result in
cascading impacts to public health, economic stability, and confidence
in government. As global supply chains grow more interconnected and
biological threats become easier to exploit, understanding and managing
these risks is more important than ever.
DHS has the Federal authority to assess and manage threats to
critical infrastructure, serving as coordinator of a whole-of-
Government effort that includes all levels of government and industry
owners and operators. Within DHS, the Science and Technology
Directorate supports that mission by providing technical threat
analysis, risk assessment, and decision support to inform preparedness
and response efforts across the Homeland Security Enterprise.
dhs's role in addressing risks to the nation's food and agriculture
sector
Under National Security Memorandum-16, DHS was tasked with
conducting risk assessments related to threats against the food and
agriculture sector. Working in coordination with the Secretary of
Agriculture and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and others,
DHS's role is to ensure that leaders at the Federal, State, and local
levels have a clear, science-based understanding of the threats they
face, the potential consequences of those threats, and the trade-offs
associated with different preparedness and response options.
s&t's contribution to risk-informed decision making
S&T contributes to DHS's risk assessment mission by delivering
technically defensible analysis and tools that help decision makers
prioritize actions and resources.
One way S&T executes this mission is through the Probabilistic
Analysis of National Threats, Hazards, and Risks (PANTHR) program.
PANTHR provides analytical capabilities that integrate threat
information, hazard data, and consequence modeling to support risk-
informed decision making across chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and explosive threat areas.
These capabilities are designed to inform policy and operations,
not to set or execute them. Rather, they help answer fundamental
questions decision makers face: which threats pose the greatest risk,
where vulnerabilities exist, and where investments can most effectively
reduce risk.
risk and computational analytics for food and agriculture
The risks to food and agriculture systems are complex. Threats vary
by agent, commodity, geography, and response capacity, and the
consequences of disruption can extend well beyond the agricultural
sector.
Through PANTHR, S&T develops and applies risk and computational
analytics that support strategic, operational, and tactical planning.
These efforts help decision makers compare risks across scenarios and
assess how different interventions may reduce the likelihood or
consequences of an event.
Tools such as the Tools for Integrated Evaluation of Risk (TIGER)
support this work by enabling modeling and analysis tailored to the
food and agriculture sector. Recent improvements have focused on
increasing efficiency and timeliness through modernized data management
and cloud-based capabilities, allowing analysts to provide more
responsive support to DHS components and interagency partners.
agricultural threat characterization
Risk assessment depends on reliable data. For many agricultural
threat agents, including emerging and re-emerging diseases, critical
empirical data are limited or incomplete.
To address this gap, S&T conducts Agricultural Threat
Characterization research that examines the properties and impacts of
biological threats relevant to agriculture, such as Highly Pathogenic
Avian Influenza and African Swine Fever. This research produces
science-based knowledge products that inform hazard awareness,
analytical modeling, and preparedness planning.
These products are shared with DHS components and interagency
partners, including USDA and FDA, to support coordinated preparedness
and response efforts, while respecting the distinct authorities and
responsibilities of each department.
supporting detection, screening, and response readiness
In addition to analysis and characterization, S&T supports applied
research and development to inform future capabilities that enhance
agricultural biosecurity.
This includes work to improve:
Screening and sensing technologies to help identify
prohibited agricultural products at ports of entry
Methodologies and decision support tools for depopulation,
disposal, and decontamination that facilitate rapid response
and prevent disease spread while minimizing waste,
environmental impact, and negative public perception.
These efforts are designed to inform capability development and
transition to operational partners.
decision support and interagency collaboration
S&T works closely with DHS components and interagency partners,
including the Department of Agriculture, who leads the food and
agriculture sector, to ensure analytical capabilities address real-
world needs. Through tailored analysis, reach-back support, and
scenario development, S&T provides decision support for planning,
exercises, and preparedness activities.
This includes development of targeted analytical products,
scenarios, and injects that help leaders test assumptions, identify
gaps, and strengthen coordination before an incident occurs. These
efforts support whole-of-Government preparedness and complement USDA-
led policy and programmatic initiatives.
relationship to the usda national farm security action plan
S&T supports the USDA National Farm Security Action Plan by
providing the technical risk assessment foundation needed to inform
sound policy and operational decisions. In this way, S&T's
contributions are aligned with DHS's responsibilities under National
Security Memorandum-16 (NSM-16) and complement USDA's leadership on
agricultural policy, compliance, and enforcement.
The risks to the food and agriculture sector are complex and
evolving and require disciplined coordination across Federal, State,
and local partners. With continued support from Congress, S&T will
continue to play a critical role in helping the Nation understand and
manage agroterrorism risks by providing rigorous, science-based
analysis and decision support that protect the American people, our
food supply, and our economy.
conclusion
Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and Members of the
subcommittee, it is a privilege to testify before you today.
I thank you for your support of S&T and look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Strong. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. I now recognize Dr.
Grant for 5 minutes to summarize her opening statement. Dr.
Grant.
STATEMENT OF ASHLEY GRANT, SENIOR HEALTH SECURITY AND
BIODEFENSE ADVISOR, OFFICE OF HEALTH SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Grant. Thank you. Thank you so much, Chairman Strong.
Ranking Member Kennedy and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. I'm honored to be here to speak today about the
Department of Homeland Security's effort to defend against
agroterrorism and other biological threats. I have spent my
entire career focused on trying to make sure our Nation is
better prepared for biological incidents. As a senior health
security and biodefense advisor at the Department of Homeland
Security's Office of Health Security, I am honored to share our
approach to protecting America's food and agriculture sector.
Advances in biotechnology as well as artificial intelligence
have made it easier for nefarious actors to develop and deploy
biological agents that could devastate our crops, livestock,
and food production. These threats jeopardize not only economic
stability, but also our national security. At DHS, we recognize
that farm security is national security. Along with USDA, the
Office of Health Security leads and coordinates efforts across
the Department to protect our Nation's food and agriculture
sector from high-consequence threats. Our mission is rooted in
statutory responsibility and key directives, including the
Securing our Agriculture and Food Act. We oversee activities
related to the Department's food defense, agriculture security,
and lead policy initiatives for preparedness, detection, and
response. Today, I will cover 4 core areas of our work.
First, coordination and policy leadership. The Office of
Health Security works closely with DHS components such as
Customs and Border Protection, as well as the Science and
Technology Directorate. We also coordinate with our interagency
partners such as USDA as well as the Health and Human Services.
Together, we ensure that DHS and the U.S. Government efforts
are unified, efficient, and responsive to evolving threats.
Second, risk assessment and intelligence integration. The
Office of Health Security partners with DHS Science and
Technology Directorate to assess risks to our food and
agriculture sector. We integrate technical threat analysis and
risk modeling with policy and operational planning, a key
element of our support to health analysts embedded in State and
local fusion centers nationwide. These analysts gather and
disseminate health security information, ensuring actionable
intelligence reaches decision makers and front-line responders.
Third, preparedness exercises and training. The Office of
Health Security designs and executes complex exercises to test
and strengthen our ability to prevent, detect, and respond to
biological threats. For example, last month we held a complex
exercise--tabletop exercise down in El Paso, Texas. This
exercise focused on a potential New World screwworm incursion
in the United States through three different mechanisms. No. 1
through illicit cattle trading; No. 2, through our livestock;
and a potential human case. This is a severe pest that can
affect our economy as well as our livestock. The exercise
brought over 250 participants from Federal, State, local,
county, Tribal, different agencies and highlighted the
importance of an integrated response and identified gaps in
planning and capability.
Our fourth core function is innovation and continuous
improvement. The Office of Health Security invests in data
analytics and technology solutions to enhance early warning
detection and response. Early detection and rapid response is
critical to making sure we are prepared for threats to our food
and agriculture. Through initiatives like the Integrated
Consortium of Laboratory Networks, we are advancing our
collaborative ability to prepare for and mitigate from emerging
threats. In conclusion, threats against our food and
agriculture sector are significant and evolving. DHS, the
Office of Health Security, and our partners are committed to
safeguarding the Nation's food and agriculture system through
collaboration, innovation, and readiness.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Grant follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ashley Grant
February 11, 2026
Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to defend the
United States from agroterrorism and related biological threats. As the
senior health security and biodefense advisor at the DHS Office of
Health Security (OHS), I am honored to share the Department's approach
to protecting our Nation's food and agriculture sector and systems.
With extensive experience in biosafety and biosecurity, including
leading technical audits and serving as a subject-matter expert on
chemical and biological programs across multiple Federal agencies--I
have first-hand knowledge of the potential threats to our Nation's food
and agriculture systems and the resources available to protect them.
Advances in biotechnology and artificial intelligence (AI) have
made it easier for state and non-state actors to develop and deploy
biological agents that could devastate crops, livestock, and food
production, threatening economic stability and national security.
Strengthening biosurveillance, biosecurity, and response capabilities
is essential to protect America's agricultural sector from these
evolving threats. As emphasized in the USDA National Farm Security
Action Plan, farm security is national security. At DHS, OHS supports
this principle by leading and coordinating DHS's efforts to protect the
Nation's food and agriculture sector from agroterrorism and other high-
consequence threats. OHS ensures that the security and resilience of
American agriculture remain at the forefront of our homeland security
mission.
ohs authorities and mission
OHS serves as the Department's principal medical, workforce health
and safety, and public health authority. Under the Securing Our
Agriculture and Food Act, OHS has responsibility to coordinate DHS
efforts to defend the Nation's food, agriculture, and veterinary
systems against terrorism and other high-consequence threats, whether
intentional or naturally-occurring. This responsibility includes
oversight of the Department's activities related to veterinary public
health, food defense, and agricultural security and leading the
Department's policy initiatives relating to preparedness, detection,
response, and recovery activities for agroterrorism and intentional
biological threats. OHS also has responsibilities to defend against
agriculture and food threats through the National Security Memorandum-
16 (NSM-16), the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
and Response Act of 2002, the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act,
the Food Safety Modernization Act, the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act, and the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
ohs's role and activities in managing risks to food and agriculture
1. Coordination and Policy Leadership
OHS leads the Department's policy initiatives and provides
coordination for DHS's food, agriculture, and veterinary defense
activities. In order to do so, we work closely with DHS components,
such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T), as well as with the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Food and Drug Administration, and other Federal, State,
local, Tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners. OHS ensures
that DHS's efforts are postured, unified, efficient, and responsive to
evolving agroterrorism threats.
2. Risk Assessment and Intelligence Integration
OHS leads and coordinates the Department's overall risk assessment
activities in partnership with S&T. While S&T provides technical threat
analysis, risk modeling, and scientific data to characterize and
quantify risks to the food and agriculture sector, OHS integrates S&T's
analytical products through a policy, preparedness, and operational
planning perspective for biological, chemical, and radiological hazards
affecting food and agriculture. For example, a key element of our
strategy is maturing and augmenting a network of fusion center health
analysts at the local level that are embedded in state-run fusion
centers across the country. These analysts play a critical role in
gathering, analyzing, and disseminating health security intelligence,
ensuring that actionable information reaches State and local decision
makers, industry stakeholders, and front-line responders. Through
regular engagement and technical assistance, OHS supports the fusion
center health analyst community in identifying emerging threats and to
better prepare our communities for rapid responses.
3. Preparedness, Exercises, and Training
OHS effectuates statutory responsibilities, Executive Orders, and
the USDA National Farm Security Action Plan to ensure coordination and
connection to protect the national food systems and agriculture
industry. As an integral part of this multi-layered approach, OHS
designs and executes complex exercises based on scenarios that test and
strengthen the Nation's ability to prevent, detect, and respond to
potentially catastrophic threats to U.S. food and agriculture sector,
including agroterrorism incidents. Recently, on January 14, 2026, OHS
led a comprehensive tabletop exercise in El Paso, Texas, focused on
strategic preparedness and response to potential New World screwworm
(NWS) infestations. NWS is a parasitic insect that presents a severe
threat to livestock, wildlife, and a more limited threat to human
health, with the potential to disrupt agricultural livestock
production, and make impacts to trade, and public health.
OHS worked across the Federal interagency and with State, local,
and Tribal partners to convene over 250 participants including
operational decision makers from Federal, State, local, and Tribal
agencies, representing law enforcement, public health, agriculture,
environmental response sectors, and other critical partners. The
scenario explored three unique NWS introduction pathways, challenging
participants to coordinate incident response, communication, and
contingency planning for cascading impacts.
Key outcomes included strengthened coordination and identification
of planning and capacity gaps, including the need for targeted
education and outreach to a broader set of stakeholders. The exercise
also highlighted trade implications, laboratory bottlenecks, and the
importance of an approach that integrates clinical, public health,
food, agriculture, and veterinary sectors. This event is just one
example of exercises that OHS has developed and hosted that have
improved understanding of agency roles, preparedness, and opportunities
for new partnerships, preparing participants for stronger coordination
to prevent and respond to agricultural and biological threats.
4. Innovation and Continuous Improvement
OHS invests in data analytics, and technology solutions to enhance
early warning, detection, and response capabilities. Through
initiatives such as the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks,
OHS is advancing the Nation's ability to collaboratively prepare for,
respond to, and mitigate emerging agroterrorism threats.
conclusion
The risks to food and agriculture are significant and evolving.
Food security is national security. DHS, the Office of Health Security,
and our partners are committed to safeguarding the Nation's food and
agriculture systems, by fostering collaboration, driving innovation,
and ensuring the readiness of our homeland to meet the challenges
ahead.
Thank you for your support and the opportunity to testify. I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Strong. Thank you, Dr. Grant. Members will be
recognized by order of seniority for their 5 minutes of
questioning. An additional round of questioning may be called
after all Members have been recognized. I now recognize myself
for 5 minutes of questioning.
The actions of agroterrorism could become even more
dangerous if they had access to farmland near U.S. military
bases. Redstone Arsenal is in my district and I understand
first-hand the threat this could pose to our service members
and our homeland security. This is why I'm concerned by a 2024
GAO report which found gaps in Federal reporting requirements
that could allow it to happen. Fortunately, the Trump
administration's National Farm Security Action Plan has called
for stronger USDA reporting and disclosure requirements for
foreign farmland purchases near military bases and other
sensitive sites. Mr. Allen, how is the USDA seeking to
implement the National Farm Security Action Plan's proposal to
tighten these reporting requirements? What steps has the
Department taken so far?
Mr. Allen. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question and
your support of this. Right now, the Department is in the
process of moving the Agriculture Foreign Investment Disclosure
Act Program from the Farm Production Conservation Mission area
to my office to have a more national security focus. Also, as I
mentioned, in January we opened an on-line portal that will
have as a database getting us away from the 1978 paper-based
process to modernize the AFIDA's system. We have also issued at
the end of last calendar year an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking to update the form, the process of the entire
program to gather more pertinent information than we have in
the past to share with our partners, especially at Homeland
Security, Department of War, and the Treasury to integrate with
the CFIUS process.
Chairman Strong. Thank you. Switching gears, Ms. Kelly's
CBP plays an important role at our Nation's borders and ports
of entry to detect and intercept harmful pathogens and
biological materials from entering our Nation. How have blind
foreign actors exploited vulnerabilities at ports of entry to
introduce threats to our Nation's agriculture? How can CBP
harden its screening of these materials?
Mrs. Kelly. Thank you for the question, Chairman. What
we've seen, not even specific to one particular pathway, but
across many of the pathways where we are continuing to harden
our processes, is are these numerous artful attempts to evade
our detection capabilities. We're seeing varying levels of
concealment practices such as utilizing public media comic
books to obfuscate the presence of biological materials. We're
also observing that there are attempts to transport these
materials on their person or hidden into personal items such as
bedroom slippers. To ensure that we continue to advance our
inspection capabilities, we are launching efforts to modernize
our infrastructure. We're making strategic investments in our
non-intrusive inspection technology, and we are also working
with the industry to ensure that there are sustained awareness
of biological threats and the numerous attempts by which
individuals and malicious actors may attempt to introduce these
items.
Chairman Strong. Thank you. Turning to Mr. Cooper, the
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, also
known as NBAC is a DHS Science and Technology-operated national
laboratory. Through its two centers, NBAC provides expertise to
help DHS understand biological threats and the capabilities of
our adversaries. As I mentioned earlier, recent news reports
indicated that the unidentified biological samples from an
incident in Las Vegas were sent to the center for texting--or
for testing. Mr. Cooper, what is the scale and scope of NBAC's
cooperation with law enforcement and how does this partnership
support DHS's mission?
Mr. Cooper. Chairman, thank you for that question. So as
you mentioned, S&T does own and operate the National Biodefense
Analysis and Countermeasure center, NBAC. The forensic center
however, is operated by the FBI. So I would defer to my FBI
colleagues on what--how they are participating in the
investigation and supporting the State and locals for that.
S&T's role is to ensure the facility has the necessary
capabilities in order for the FBI to pursue its investigations.
Chairman Strong. Thank you. My time has expired. I now
recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Kennedy, for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Chairman. Our Nation's ability to
recover from some of the most significant emergencies is
largely thanks to one agency, FEMA. For example, during COVID-
19, FEMA led the Nation's pandemic response efforts,
distributing personal protective equipment, ventilators, and
testing supplies across the country. If a large-scale
agroterrorism attack occurred, FEMA's resources and authorities
would be indispensable for minimizing human casualties and
economic impacts. However, Trump and Secretary Noem have both
stated they want to completely get rid of FEMA. As of just days
ago, there are credible reports that Secretary Noem is planning
to cut FEMA's remaining work force in half. So Dr. Grant is a
senior advisor for DHS office responsible for mitigating the
impact of biological threats. Do you believe that gutting
FEMA's work force improves our Nation's ability to respond to
large-scale agroterrorism attack or not?
Ms. Grant. Thank you for your question, Ranking Member
Kennedy. I believe there's an important mission of FEMA,
including the different missions that you describe. I think our
office works across not only industry, but also across the
Department to make sure that we're prepared as we can be for
agricultural terrorism threats. I would have to get with our
FEMA representatives to talk about specific grants that you
brought up in terms of cutting. So we can take that as a get-
back to answer your question about the specific grants you're
referring to.
Mr. Kennedy. If FEMA employees were cut in half, basically
gutting the agency, do you believe that that would have a
negative impact on your ability to do your work?
Ms. Grant. Again, I'm not really--so in terms of the impact
that FEMA can have, we work with them on annexes as well as
other documents, but not directly in terms of responding to
different incidents like this.
Mr. Kennedy. Would a drastic work force reduction at FEMA
compromise the Office of Health Security's ability to protect
American people from the impacts of a biological attack?
Ms. Grant. I believe that we should take that back and get
with our colleagues at DHS to look at the complete impact that
could have across our department.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you. Ms. Kelly, I represent, as I
mentioned earlier, northern border community in western New
York. The over 200 agricultural specialists who work at our
ports of entry are essential in ensuring inbound goods crossing
our Northern Border are free of dangerous pathogens. As you
have testified today, what are some of the unique challenges
that these agricultural specialists face at the Northern
Border?
Mrs. Kelly. Thank you. The evolving threat landscape is, I
would offer not specific to a region or a particular port, and
that is because of the movement of trade. The complexities of
this landscape are taken into consideration. The--certainly the
trade and travel industry and that specific characterization of
movement, but also the way in which an agricultural threat may
impact the specific sector. As we look at a more granular
level, such as the ports, then staffing levels, detection
capabilities, infrastructure, all of these varying factors may
characterize the complexity of that specific landscape.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you. I understand the CBP Port of
Buffalo has a biological threat operations specialist. Will
Buffalo receive a biological threat exclusion coordinator
anytime soon?
Mrs. Kelly. Thank you for that question as well. We're very
excited about the Biological Threat Exclusion Program and
really appreciate the support of the program from Congress as
well. With regards to our staffing models, they're informed by
our resource allocation and work force staffing models which
predict and take into consideration the type of operational
needs.
Whether a particular port may have a threat exclusion
coordinator or threat operations specialist is strictly
determined or the decision, I should say, is informed by our
staffing models.
Mr. Kennedy. Understood. Ms. Kelly, are there gaps in
current Federal law that could improve biosurveillance at our
northern ports of entry?
Mrs. Kelly. There are certainly opportunities for the
regulations to be updated to ensure that we can continue to
deliver our mission and execute in an efficient and effective
manner. Regulations that encourage accountability with regards
to information sharing and collection can certainly ensure that
we continue to make robust decisions at the ports of entry.
Mr. Kennedy. I'm out of time. Chairman, if I could just
add, Ms. Kelly, if there are opportunities for you to inform
myself and the Chairman of legislation that could in fact
improve this bio-surveillance, we are open to that. Thank you.
Chairman Strong. Ranking Member's time has expired. I now
recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Van Epps, for 5
minutes of questioning.
Mr. Van Epps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
very important hearing. Thank you to the witnesses for being
here today. Thank you to the Trump administration and your work
to keep our country safe. The food and agriculture sector is
one of America's 16 designated critical infrastructure sectors.
Because nearly 95 percent of U.S. farms are family-owned
operations, our farmers are especially vulnerable. An attack
can rapidly cascade from farms to processors, distributors, and
ultimately to grocery shelves nationwide. Agroterrorism isn't
just an abstract threat. It is the deliberate introduction of
plant or animal pathogens to cause economic damage, food
shortages, panic, and strategic disruption.
We know this threat is real because agriculture is
biologically vulnerable. Many high-consequence livestock
diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease do not occur in the
United States today. That means our herds lack natural immunity
and an outbreak could rapidly--could spread rapidly before
detection.
USDA has estimated that a major foot-and-mouth disease
outbreak could cost the United States tens of billions of
dollars in economic losses, devastate exports, and require the
mass culling of animals to contain spread. A pathogen does not
need to be weaponized in a sophisticated lab to cause
catastrophic damage. It only needs to be introduced into a
dense livestock or processing environment.
The modern threat environment compounds this risk.
Terrorist networks, transnational criminal organizations, or
state-linked actors could attempt to smuggle pathogens through
ports of entry, mail systems, research collaborations, or
contaminated feed and biological materials. Agriculture is
uniquely exposed because farms are geographically dispersed,
biosecurity practices vary, and the supply chain depends on
continuous movement of animals, feed, and products. A
coordinated biological attack on livestock or crops could
simultaneously trigger food shortages, economic shock, and
strain on military logistics, particularly in districts like
mine that host Fort Campbell.
This is why the Trump administration's National Farm
Security Action Plan is so important. It recognizes that
preparedness is paramount. It requires robust bio-surveillance,
real-time data sharing between USDA, DHS, FBI, and State
officials.
Strong screening at ports of entry, laboratory capacity for
rapid pathogen identification, and joint exercises that
simulate deliberate biological introduction. If an adversary
wants to undermine the United States without firing a shot,
targeting our food supply is a strategic pathway. We cannot
afford to treat that risk as secondary.
Ms. Kelly, what screening protocols are in place at ports
of entry to detect intentionally concealed livestock or crop
pathogens? How do those protocols differ from routine
inspections designed to catch accidental pest or food
violations?
Mrs. Kelly. Thank you for the question. Our capabilities
start really at the National Targeting Center, where we are
harmonizing our law enforcement data holdings with information
that is collected and/or provided by our partners at the United
States Department of Agriculture Animal Plant Health Inspection
Service. Excuse me.
This information is then shared with our front-line
personnel to ensure that we can continue to strike the balance
between facilitating trade and enforcing import regulations in
a manner in which we can deliver meaningful consequences as
well. With regards to malicious attempts, we have varying
levels of operational policies and interagency agreements with
several of our internal and external partners. These policies
are underpinned by the National Incident Management System as
well as the National Response Framework.
Mr. Van Epps. Thank you. Dr. Grant, when DHS or FBI
identifies credible intelligence suggesting an adversary may
target U.S. agriculture, how quickly does that information
translate into heightened inspection posture at ports of entry?
Ms. Grant. Thank you so much for that question. We work
with our CBP colleagues through the National Targeting Center
to disseminate that information to them. In addition, we would
work with our State and locals through our health fusion
centers to disseminate that information to the localities. So
throughout those both mechanisms, we would get that information
to the people that need it.
Mr. Van Epps. Great. Thank you. This is both for Mr. Allen
and Ms. Kelly. How are Federal agencies ensuring that State
agriculture departments and producers receive timely threat
intelligence without creating unnecessary alarm?
Mr. Allen. Thank you for the question, sir. Our Animal
Plant Health Inspection Service through our National
Veterinarian Office works directly with State departments of
agriculture to pass information on a regular and timely basis,
including just last week we had the National State Directors of
Agriculture here in the District of Columbia, and had days of
face-to-face meetings with them.
Mr. Van Epps. Great. Thanks. Mr. Chairman, I'm out of time,
so I yield back.
Chairman Strong. I want to thank the witnesses for their
valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. The
Members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions
for the witnesses. We would ask the witnesses to respond to
these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the
hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:49 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Suzette Kelly
Question 1a. At a previous hearing of this subcommittee devoted to
this topic, witnesses noted that there is no consolidated resource
addressing vulnerabilities and more importantly, mitigation tactics,
pertaining to food security practices and threats to agriculture.
What current information-sharing practices do your agencies employ
with other relevant agencies and especially with private-sector
stakeholders, including academia and industry, and do you believe that
a single vetted resource of information could help to improve best
practices on the ground?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employs a multi-
faceted approach to information sharing with other relevant agencies
and private-sector stakeholders, including academia and industry. CBP
has provided proactive briefings to other relevant agencies, including
Fusion Center Health Analysts, to enhance awareness of biological
threats and share information on the deceptive tactics used to import
biological materials. Furthermore, CBP proactively engages with
academia and industry to mitigate agricultural and biological threats
by offering essential import and export compliance guidance, promoting
best practices to enhance regulatory awareness, and disseminating
comprehensive education on current and emerging risks. CBP's National
Targeting Center (NTC) maintains global partnerships to identify and
dismantle illicit networks before they reach U.S. borders. The NTC
fulfills a critical role in improving situational awareness among
international and industry stakeholders through on-site liaison
officers. CBP also maintains a cadre of liaisons embedded with select
State agricultural offices in California, Texas, and Florida that
foster awareness of threats to the agricultural sector, ensuring the
interests of the various organizations are met. CBP provides
operational perspective as an active participant and member of the New
World screwworm One Health Coordination Unit. In an effort to
proactively ensure the safety of high-interest events, such as 2026
FIFA World Cup, CBP is proactively engaging with appropriate
representatives to provide import guidance for blood and urine samples,
thereby strengthening compliance measures in preparation for the 2026
FIFA World Cup. A singular vetted resource or streamlined information-
sharing mechanism intended to enable robust sharing of information and
sustain awareness of biological threats can enhance situational
awareness, improve decision making, standardize best practices, enable
efficient response times and support training and education. CBP
currently leverages the Homeland Security Information Network to
securely disseminate immediate operational information amongst a vast
network of Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, international,
and private-sector partners, thereby enhancing border security,
supporting collaborative efforts against illicit activities, and
fostering interagency cooperation.
Question 1b. In your opinion, if such a resource were to exist,
what would be the best way to go about creating it, and how could
relevant departments and agencies cooperate with each other to assemble
this document or database?
Answer. Existence of such a resource or mechanism relies upon
defining the scope and content for development of this resource or
mechanism, technology platform, governance and maintenance, and
interagency cooperation. Holding the agencies accountable for
information sharing through appropriate legislation, resources, and
funding may enable delivery of this resource.
Question 2. Ms. Kelly, CBP plays an important role at our Nation's
borders and ports of entry to detect and intercept harmful pathogens
and biological materials from entering our Nation.
How does CBP work with its partners in national laboratories,
including the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center
and Plum Island Animal Disease Center which are operated by DHS S&T, as
well as other regional animal and plant diagnostic laboratories, to
conduct testing of biological threats which CBPAS detect and interdict?
Answer. The role of CBP Agriculture Specialists (CBPAS) is to
prevent the entry of plant and animal pests, pathogens, and diseases.
Interceptions of pests and noncompliant biological materials are
transferred to the custody of the responsible regulating agency, such
as the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service, or an investigating agency, such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. CBP does not directly facilitate the transfer
of interceptions to diagnostic laboratories or conduct testing of
biological threats which CBPAS detect and interdict. CBP defers to DHS
Science & Technology for specific details related to National
Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center and Plum Island Animal
Disease Center.
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Matt Allen
Question 1. At a previous hearing of this subcommittee devoted to
this topic, witnesses noted that there is no consolidated resource
addressing vulnerabilities and more importantly, mitigation tactics,
pertaining to food security practices and threats to agriculture.
What current information-sharing practices do your agencies employ
with other relevant agencies and especially with private-sector
stakeholders, including academia and industry, and do you believe that
a single vetted resource of information could help to improve best
practices on the ground?
Answer. USDA, as the ``People's Department,'' has maintained a
proud tradition of working closely with academia and producers to
promote the latest scientific understandings and agricultural practices
that keep U.S. agriculture the most productive in the world and
protects it from intentional and unintentional threats.
USDA carries out its information-sharing activities primarily
through its role as Co-Sector Risk Management Agency for the Food and
Agriculture Critical Infrastructure sector, and co-chair for the Food
and Agriculture Sector Government Council (GCC) a responsibility shared
with the Food and Drug Administration. The GCC includes academia,
State, local, Tribal and territorial members as well as Federal
partners. The GCC acts as the counterpart and partner to the private
industry-led Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) in
the planning and coordination of activities to ensure the resilience of
the Nation's food and agriculture system.
USDA has not found the lack of a single vetted resource of
information addressing vulnerabilities and mitigation tactics
preventing the implementation of mitigations across the sector.
Question 2. In your opinion, if such a resource were to exist, what
would be the best way to go about creating it, and how could relevant
departments and agencies cooperate with each other to assemble this
document or database?
Answer. USDA does not currently recommend an additional database,
as we currently coordinate across the Federal departments and agencies
to address the most pressing threats to the Food and Agriculture
Sector. An effective, whole-of-Government effort to secure all 16
critical infrastructure sectors and interdependences happens with CISA
as the National coordinator, providing strategic guidance and assessing
cross-sector risk and vulnerabilities.
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Jeff Cooper
Question 1a. At a previous hearing of this subcommittee devoted to
this topic, witnesses noted that there is no consolidated resource
addressing vulnerabilities and more importantly, mitigation tactics,
pertaining to food security practices and threats to agriculture.
What current information-sharing practices do your agencies employ
with other relevant agencies and especially with private-sector
stakeholders, including academia and industry, and do you believe that
a single vetted resource of information could help to improve best
practices on the ground?
Answer. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T) shares data, information on modeling and
characterization capabilities, and knowledge products on threats and
risks to the food and agriculture sector with relevant DHS components
(e.g., Office of Health Security, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency) and interagency government stakeholders (e.g., the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration, the
Environmental Protection Agency) to support planning and preparation
efforts. S&T shares the modeling and characterization information
through annual information sessions, monthly newsletters, and ad-hoc
presentations of new data and modeling results with stakeholders and
subject-matter experts. The data, information, and modeling are
generated by S&T activities as well as integrated from sources across
the departments, agencies, academia, and industry. Additionally, the
Probabilistic Analysis for National Threats Hazards and Risk team
operates an on-line Hazard Knowledge Management System, that enables
the sharing of data, model results, and software tools--providing
partners with access to the most recent technical information that S&T
has related to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials
threats to both human health and the food and agriculture sector. There
are currently For Official Use Only and Classified versions which are
available to authorized users within the U.S. Government. S&T
contributes updates on on-going research and relevant risk models in
biannual joint meetings, as appropriate, of the Food and Agriculture
Sector coordinating councils. The meetings facilitate information
exchanges between the Government Coordinating Council and the Sector
Coordinating Council, which includes industry and academic
representatives.
Single vetted resource of information: There is certainly some
benefit to establishing a single, centralized resource that would
enhance information sharing among multiple partners, but it also may
present unintended consequences like delays in disseminating
information. By centralizing data, modeling results, and technical
updates into one platform, stakeholders across government, academia,
and industry could access timely and relevant information more
efficiently, improving coordination, reducing redundancies, and
supporting collective preparedness and response efforts. This idea
merits additional study and coordination with the interagency and the
Office of Management and Budget. To ensure proper information security,
the system would need to provide tiered access, allowing users to view
only information appropriate to their clearance level and demonstrated
need to know. Any centralized resource would be implemented consistent
with applicable Federal research security, and foreign investment risk-
management frameworks, in coordination with the appropriate interagency
partners. This approach would safeguard Classified and Sensitive data
while facilitating effective information sharing among authorized
stakeholders.
Question 1b. In your opinion, if such a resource were to exist,
what would be the best way to go about creating it, and how could
relevant departments and agencies cooperate with each other to assemble
this document or database?
Answer. Should such a resource exist, we recommend creating a
working group to develop a plan for implementing consolidated
information sharing across appropriate agencies. This group could
inventory and leverage existing solutions, enabling efficient access to
data, modeling results, and technical resources for all stakeholders.
By coordinating efforts through this working group, we could enhance
collaboration and ensure timely dissemination of critical information.
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Ashley Grant
Question 1a. At a previous hearing of this subcommittee devoted to
this topic, witnesses noted that there is no consolidated resource
addressing vulnerabilities and more importantly, mitigation tactics,
pertaining to food security practices and threats to agriculture.
What current information-sharing practices do your agencies employ
with other relevant agencies and especially with private-sector
stakeholders, including academia and industry, and do you believe that
a single vetted resource of information could help to improve best
practices on the ground?
Answer. The Office of Health Security (OHS) shares information with
Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, private-sector, and
academic organizations by participating in established food,
agriculture, and public health forums, supporting the integration of
State and local health intelligence analysts into their State and local
fusion centers, and sponsoring training and exercises focused on
threats to the food, agriculture, and public health sectors.
For example, OHS participates in the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention's ``U.S. One Health Coordination Unit,'' which
launched in 2024 as a Federal-level coordination mechanism focused on
zoonotic diseases. OHS also regularly participates in Government
Coordinating Councils and corresponding Sector Coordinating Councils,
including those related to the food and agriculture sector, managed
through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency.
OHS also supports the integration of State and local health
analysts into their fusion centers. This includes hosting a long-
standing monthly meeting for these officials to share best practices,
resources, and actionable information related to health security
threats. OHS also sponsors individual security clearances for
appropriate State and local officials to access relevant, Classified
health and medical intelligence information through these fusion center
networks.
OHS has developed and sponsored discussion-based exercises focused
on agroterrorism and other threats to food and agriculture supply chain
for State and local, Tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners.
These tabletop exercises include participants from industry and
academia to ensure all relevant parties are engaged in the
conversation. For example, OHS, in coordination with the U.S.
Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and Health and Human Services'
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, recently hosted a tabletop
exercise in El Paso, Texas, focused on a coordinated whole-of-
Government response to New World screwworm. OHS has also delivered
training to private-sector partners on the lawful importation of
biological substances to thwart the illegal transfer of dangerous
pathogens or genetically-modified organisms into the United States.
There is benefit to establishing a single resource of information.
However, it is important to be mindful of any unintended impacts such
as delays in production and/or distribution of that information. This
concept should be analyzed further including through engagement with
Federal interagency partners.
Question 1b. In your opinion, if such a resource were to exist,
what would be the best way to go about creating it, and how could
relevant departments and agencies cooperate with each other to assemble
this document or database?
Answer. This concept should be researched further across the
interagency. In addition to ensuring that it does not inadvertently
delay distribution of information, it should not duplicate or integrate
any existing structures. Currently, Federal and non-Federal partners
communicate and cooperate routinely on defending the Nation from
threats to the U.S. food and agriculture sector.
Question 2a. Dr. Grant, OHS recently led a joint food security
exercise pertaining to New World screwworm with USDA, Department of the
Interior, and CDC.
What findings has OHS gleaned from this exercise, and what steps
will it take to harden our Nation's defenses against this disease after
having completed the joint exercise?
Answer. While the formal after-action report of key findings is
still in development, exercise participants did identify several
preliminary findings from the New World Screwworm Tabletop Exercise
held in El Paso, TX, in January 2026.
Both multi-agency and cross-sectoral coordination is
critical to prepare for and defend against agricultural
threats.
Established plans, protocols, and structured notification
processes support collaboration among Federal, State, Tribal,
and local agencies.
Expanding education and outreach beyond traditional
veterinary and health care partners and consistent public
messaging would improve the coordinated response to New World
screwworm.
Question 2b. At this time, are you aware if this exercise will
inspire future interagency and interdepartmental exercises to combat
other threats to food and agriculture beyond New World screwworm, and
what lessons has OHS learned from conducting this exercise in
formulating potential future exercises, including with regards to
enhancing State, local, and private-sector outreach?
Answer. OHS heard from several attendees of the tabletop exercise
that they are planning or intend to conduct a food and agriculture
threat-related exercise in their own jurisdiction. Some participants
mentioned this was their first agricultural threat exercise despite
their relevant roles in responding to such an event, and the exercise
highlighted the importance of practicing a coordinated response to such
events.
The Federal Government has an important role in inspiring and
appropriately supporting such exercises. As an additional resource, OHS
is finalizing a cross-sector catastrophic exercise scenario catalog
that should help State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners more
efficiently plan and execute their own food, agriculture, and health
care-related exercises to enhance preparedness. These exercise
scenarios provide an opportunity to practice response roles, define
shared responsibilities, and explore unique interdependencies that that
may not be present in other exercise scenarios.
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