[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FRONTLINE DEFENDERS: HOW THE COAST GUARD'S
DEPLOYABLE SPECIALIZED FORCES COMBAT NARCOTERRORISTS AND
OTHER MARITIME THREATS ON THE HIGH SEAS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 3, 2026
__________
Serial No. 119-37
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-776 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Chair Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Eric Swalwell, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida J. Luis Correa, California
August Pfluger, Texas Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Member
Gabe Evans, Colorado Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Brad Knott, North Carolina James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia
Vince Fong, California Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Al Green, Texas
Vacant
Keighle Joyce, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman
Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey,
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Ranking Member
Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Hannah Hagen, Subcommittee Staff Director
Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Troy A. Carter, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Louisiana:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Rear Admiral David C. Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations
Policy and Commander, United States Coast Guard:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Ms. Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Team, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
For the Record
The Honorable Elijah Crane, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Arizona:
Article, CNN................................................... 27
FRONTLINE DEFENDERS: HOW THE COAST GUARD'S
DEPLOYABLE SPECIALIZED FORCES COMBAT NARCOTERRORISTS AND
OTHER MARITIME THREATS ON THE HIGH SEAS
----------
Tuesday, February 3, 2026
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Gimenez, Crane, Biggs, Van Epps,
and Carter.
Mr. Gimenez. Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee
on Transportation and Maritime Security will come to order.
Without objection, the Chair may declare the subcommittee in
recess at any point.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the
capabilities, readiness and operational demands of the Coast
Guard's Deployable Specialized Forces as they confront
increasingly complex maritime, narcotrafficking, smuggling, and
other homeland security threats on the high seas.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Good morning everybody, and thank you to our witnesses for
joining us today. I appreciate you both being here despite a
partial shutdown, including Department of Homeland Security. I
am hopeful that we can reach a deal this week to reopen DHS so
they can return to their important work protecting and serving
the American people.
Today's hearing will focus on the Coast Guard's Deployable
Specialized Forces, and particularly, their role in halting
maritime narcotrafficking, smuggling of illicit goods, and
related threats from communist dictatorships.
For far too long, Venezuela's export of sanctioned oil and
drug cartels has prolonged the regime of Nicolas Maduro, arming
both the Venezuelan people and the security of the United
States. On January 3, Operation Absolute Resolve marked a
turning point in dismantling Venezuela's regime with the swift
capture of Nicolas Maduro and his wife.
This powerful operation begins to restore democracy for the
people of Venezuela and upholds the rule of law. I commend
President Trump, our military, and diplomatic leaders for their
coordinated efforts to complete this successful operation. This
decisive action sent a clear message to adversaries worldwide.
The United States must not be trifled with.
This operation is personally significant to me, as my
family fled to America from the Cuban communist regime over 70
years ago--actually, 65 years ago. The United States is the
shining light of democracy, and through its operation, can
support a future of democracy in Venezuela. America is a leader
in peace through strength and must continue to confront threats
around the world.
Cuba must be considered next. Just the other day, I echo
President Trump's Executive Order to impose strict tariffs on
all countries that--and--or send oil to Cuba's dictatorships to
end the Castro's regime once and for all. I have called for the
immediate end of oil shipments to Cuba that fund the corrupt
communist regime and crush the Cuban people.
It's why I'm eager to hold today's hearing on the Coast
Guard's role in protecting our homeland from Venezuela's
actions which helped pave the way for the success of Operation
Absolute Resolve. Securing our maritime front by halting and
disrupting these sanctioned oil tankers from Venezuela is key
to unlocking security and freedom in our corner of the Western
Hemisphere.
We are grateful for the Coast Guard's bravery and
exceptional tactical operations to properly conduct these wide
visitation boardings and seize vessels found in violation of
U.S. and international law.
This hearing will highlight the Deployable Specialized
Forces historic drug interdiction results, seizing nearly
510,000 pounds of cocaine in fiscal year 2025. We have also the
opportunity to hear how the Deployable Specialized Forces have
become one of the most tactically capable maritime forces of
the United States and what their future holds amid an ever-
increasing maritime threat landscape.
We appreciate GAO for being here to testify to its review
of the Coast Guard Deployable Specialized Forces and areas for
improvement. Congress should consider GAO's recommendations and
provide further direction with a future of the Coast Guard.
We should also consider the initiatives laid out in the
Coast Guard's recently released Force Design 2028 which calls
for a Deployable Specialized Forces command. We are grateful to
have witnesses here today to discuss this important topic and
also appreciate the Coast Guard's willingness to work with us
in order to continue this dialog in a Classified setting in the
near future so Members can learn more about the specifics of
these oil tanker seizures off the coast of Venezuela.
Hearing directly from operational leaders from the Joint
Interagency Task Force South would be beneficial for Members to
receive further details on operational impacts, emerging
threats, and any on-going challenges.
Thank you.
[The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]
Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez
February 3, 2026
Good morning, everyone, and thank you to our witnesses for joining
us today. I appreciate you both being here despite a partial shutdown,
including for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I am hopeful
we can reach a deal this week to reopen DHS so they can return to their
important work protecting and serving the American people.
Today's hearing will focus on the Coast Guard's Deployable
Specialized Forces, and particularly their role in halting maritime
narcotrafficking, smuggling of illicit goods, and related threats from
Communist dictatorships.
For far too long, Venezuela's export of sanctioned oil and drug
cartels has prolonged the regime of Nicolas Maduro, harming both the
Venezuelan people and the security of the United States.
On January 3, Operation Absolute Resolve marked a turning point in
dismantling Venezuela's regime with the swift capture of Nicolas Maduro
and his wife. This powerful operation begins to restore democracy for
the people of Venezuela and upholds the rule of law. I commend
President Trump, our military, and diplomatic leaders for their
coordinated efforts to complete this successful operation. This
decisive action sent a clear message to adversaries worldwide: The
United States must not be trifled with.
This operation is personally significant to me, as my family fled
to America from the Cuban Communist regime over 70 years ago. The
United States is the shining light of democracy, and through this
operation, can support a future of democracy in Venezuela. America is a
leader in peace through strength and must continue to confront threats
around the world.
Cuba must be considered next: Just the other day, I echoed
President Trump's Executive Order to impose strict tariffs on all
countries that send oil to Cuba's dictatorship, to end the Castro
regime once and for all. I have called for the immediate end of oil
shipments to Cuba that fund the corrupt communist regime and crush the
Cuban people.
It's why I am eager to hold today's hearing on the Coast Guard's
role in protecting our homeland from Venezuela's actions, which helped
pave the way for the success of Operation Absolute Resolve. Securing
our maritime front by halting and disrupting these sanctioned oil
tankers from Venezuela is key to unlocking security and freedom in our
corner of the Western Hemisphere. We are grateful for the Coast Guard's
bravery and exceptional tactical operations to properly conduct these
right-of-visitation boardings and seize vessels found in violation of
U.S. and international law.
This hearing will highlight the Deployable Specialized Force's
historic drug interdiction results, seizing nearly 510,000 pounds of
cocaine in fiscal year 2025. We also have the opportunity to hear how
the Deployable Specialized Forces have become one of the most
tactically capable maritime forces of the United States, and what their
future holds amid an ever-increasing maritime threat landscape.
We appreciate GAO for being here to testify to its review of the
Coast Guard's Deployable Specialized Forces and areas for improvement.
Congress should consider GAO's recommendations and provide further
direction for the future of the Coast Guard. We should also consider
the initiatives laid out in the Coast Guard's recently released Force
Design 2028, which calls for a Deployable Specialized Forces Command.
We are grateful to have the witnesses here today to discuss this
important topic, and also appreciate the Coast Guard's willingness to
work with us in order to continue this dialog in a Classified setting
in the near future, so Members can learn more about the specifics of
these oil tanker seizures off the coast of Venezuela. Hearing directly
from operational leaders from the Joint Interagency Task Force South
would be beneficial for Members to receive further details on
operational impacts, emerging threats, and any on-going challenges.
Thank you, and now I recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Carter, sitting in for Ranking Member McIver today, for his 5 minutes
for an opening statement.
Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana,
Mr. Carter, sitting in for Ranking Member McIver today, for his
5 minutes for an opening statement.
Mr. Carter. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
convening this hearing. Thank you for also recognizing me to
provide opening remarks as Ranking Member McIver, regrettably,
could not be here today.
I also would like to thank our witnesses for joining us
today. Rear Admiral Barata, I recognize you are joining us amid
a shutdown affecting the Coast Guard and other branches of the
Armed Forces. Thank you for your incredible service.
To state the obvious, our military service members deserve
to be paid for their service, and I hope you can come--we can
come together quickly to pass funding for the Coast Guard,
along with reforms desperately needed at the Department of
Homeland Security.
Today we are here to discuss Coast Guard's Deployable
Specialized Forces. These specialized forces compromise--
comprise some of the Coast Guard's most elite, highly-trained
units. Their activities exemplify the Coast Guard's wide range
of critical missions as they deploy to conduct some of the most
important services at high-risk operation across a variety of
challenging environments.
Specialized forces missions vary from advanced interdiction
and boarding against hostile targets to responding to oil
spills and hazardous material releases. These specialized
forces dive underwater to repair ships in harsh environments of
remote polar regions, chase down narcotic traffickers on the
high seas, and help protect national security events, like
United Nations General Assembly.
Last year maritime safety and security terms were among the
most--the Coast Guard forces that deployed to my home city of
New Orleans to help protect Super Bowl LIX. I want to thank you
and the hard-working Coast Guard personnel who helped make that
event safe and successful, along with all of the work you do
for Louisiana to ensure the community of maritime commerce and
the safety of my constituents are always held at its highest.
Most recently, the Coast Guard's Deployable Specialized
Forces have conducted a series of high-profile, high-risk
boardings of sanctioned oil tankers near the coast of
Venezuela. While I strongly disagree with the Trump
administration's operation last month to deploy forces on land
in Venezuela without Congressional authorization, as well as
his bombing of alleged drug boats, which are not only illegal
but undermine the Coast Guard's efforts to encourage
international maritime cooperation, in contrast, these oil
tanker boardings represent a legal and effective way to enforce
sanctions, enforce international maritime laws, and exert U.S.
influence.
The Coast Guard should be commended for conducting these
high-risk boardings without incident, demonstrating the skill
and training of the service's specialized forces.
The Deployable Specialized Forces are critical to the Coast
Guard's success as a service. We must ensure that the Coast
Guard has the resources, personnel, training, and strategies,
and authorities to utilize these units effectively.
The Government Accountability Office has done vital
research to help the Coast Guard grow smarter, leaner, and more
effective across its many missions. I look forward to hearing
from both of our witnesses about the capabilities of the Coast
Guard's specialized forces and how our committee can help the
services come to grow to fruition and give you the absolute
most state-of-the-art tools to do your jobs.
I thank the witnesses for joining us. Mr. Chairman, I
yield.
[The statement of Honorable Carter follows:]
Statement of Honorable Troy A. Carter
February 3, 2026
Rear Admiral Barata, I recognize you are joining us amid a
shutdown affecting the Coast Guard and other branches of the
armed forces. To state the obvious, our military service
members deserve to be paid for their service, and I hope we
will be able to come together quickly to pass the reforms and
funding our country desperately needs.
Today, we are here to discuss the Coast Guard's Deployable
Specialized Forces. These specialized forces comprise some of
the Coast Guard's most elite, highly-trained units. Their
activities exemplify the Coast Guard's wide range of critical
missions, as they deploy to carry out some of the service's
highest-risk operations within a variety of challenging
environments.
Specialized forces' missions vary from advanced
interdictions and boardings against hostile targets, to
responding to oil spills and hazardous material releases.
Specialized forces dive underwater to repair ships in the harsh
environment of remote polar regions, chase down narcotics
traffickers on the high seas, and help protect National Special
Security Events like the United Nations General Assembly.
Last year, Maritime Safety and Security Teams were among
the Coast Guard forces that deployed to my home city of New
Orleans to help protect Super Bowl 59. I expect some of these
teams will deploy again this weekend to help ensure another
safe and successful Super Bowl. Most recently, the Coast
Guard's Deployable Specialized Forces have conducted a series
of high-profile, high-risk boardings of sanctioned oil tankers
near the coast of Venezuela. I strongly disagree with the Trump
administration's operations last month to deploy forces on land
in Venezuela without Congressional authorization, as well as
its bombings of alleged drug boats, which are not only illegal
but undermine the Coast Guard's efforts to encourage
international maritime cooperation. In contrast, these oil
tanker boardings represent a legal and effective way to enforce
sanctions, enforce international maritime laws, and exert U.S.
influence.
The Coast Guard should be commended for carrying out these
high-risk boardings without incident, displaying the skill and
training of the service's specialized forces. The Deployable
Specialized Forces are critical to the Coast Guard's success as
a service. We must ensure the Coast Guard has the resources,
personnel, training, strategies, and authorities to utilize
these units effectively.
The Government Accountability Office has done important
work to help the Coast Guard grow smarter, leaner, and more
effective across its many missions.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Carter.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
February 3, 2026
Coast Guard service members carry out a broad range of critical
missions every day, from search-and-rescue activities to drug
interdictions and maritime security. The Coast Guard helps respond to
disasters, protect maritime commerce, defend seaports and other
critical infrastructure, and secure National Special Security Events.
In each of these missions, the Coast Guard's efforts are enhanced by
its Deployable Specialized Forces.
These elite teams represent some of the service's most skilled and
highly-trained units. With 11 statutory missions and a global
footprint, the Coast Guard relies on the readiness and expertise of its
specialized forces to deploy quickly and respond to crises effectively.
If a cutter is stuck in ice in the Arctic or Antarctic and requires
repair, the Coast Guard will call upon its specialized forces. If an
oil spill threatens environmental disaster, the Coast Guard will call
upon its specialized forces. If an advanced tactical team is needed to
conduct a high-risk interdiction of a suspected drug trafficking
vessel, the Coast Guard will call upon its specialized forces--at
least, that is, if it is allowed to do so. Under the Trump
administration, the Coast Guard is not getting enough calls.
The Trump administration has chosen to illegally and immorally bomb
alleged drug boats instead of allowing the Coast Guard's specialized
forces to safely interdict narcotics traffickers and turn them over for
prosecution. These attacks fly in the face of international law, and
though they may deter drug trafficking in the short term, they
undermine the Coast Guard's long-term efforts to advance international
maritime cooperation and law enforcement.
How can the Coast Guard convince international partners and allies
to assist with maritime law enforcement and information sharing when
other branches of the U.S. military are illegally blowing boats out of
the water? The administration must cease these war crimes immediately.
Accountability is coming.
The administration has shown that at least some of its lawyers do
in fact understand maritime law, as the Coast Guard's specialized
forces have been deployed to conduct a series of successful boardings
of sanctioned oil tankers off the Venezuelan coast. These operations
stand in contrast to the illegal drug boat attacks--as well as the
illegal deployment of U.S. armed forces into Venezuela to depose its
president--as the boardings are at least rooted in internationally
recognized rules and practices.
The Coast Guard's specialized forces deserve significant credit for
carrying out these difficult and dangerous operations without incident.
As the Coast Guard works to build upon the successes of its specialized
forces, Congress must ensure the service supports its personnel and
mission needs with capable vessels and aircraft.
Recently, through their One Big Ugly Bill, Republicans gifted the
Coast Guard with $25 billion--a much-needed investment that
unfortunately was paid for by gutting Medicaid. This money was provided
with few strings attached, and the Coast Guard has not yet shared its
spend plan with Congress.
In the past, the Coast Guard has struggled to manage large
acquisitions programs efficiently and effectively. As the Coast Guard
works to support its specialized forces and other units with this large
investment, the service must act as responsible stewards of taxpayer
dollars and ensure money is not wasted.
I look forward to working with GAO and my colleagues in Congress to
hold the Coast Guard accountable as it invests in its Deployable
Specialized Forces and other units.
Mr. Gimenez. I am pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today on this critical topic. I ask that
our witnesses please rise and raise their right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Gimenez. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have
answered in the affirmative. Thank you, and please be seated.
I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. Rear
Admiral David Barata serves at deputy commandant for operations
policy and as commander, 8th Coast Guard District overseeing
Coast Guard operations across 26 States, including the Gulf of
Mexico, adjacent offshore waters, and major inland waterways,
such as the Mississippi and Ohio River systems. Previously, he
served as commander, Coast Guard Personnel Services Center,
where he led human resource policy and work force management
for nearly 45,000 active-duty and reserve members.
A 1993 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, Rear
Admiral Barata holds a Master of Arts in national security and
strategic studies from the Naval War College and served as
senior military fellow at the Center for a New American
Security.
I also misstated something. You are overseeing Coast Guard
operations across 26 States, including the Gulf of America.
Right? OK.
Heather MacLeod is the director in the Homeland Security
and Justice team for the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
Ms. MacLeod joined GAO in 2002. During the last 22 years,
Ms. MacLeod has worked on a range of public policy issues at
GAO. She currently leads the Coast Guard in maritime security
issues portfolio in conducting a variety of reviews addressing
issues such as Coast Guard work force and strategic planning
efforts and maritime port and supply chain cargo security.
Prior to joining the Homeland Security and Justice team,
Ms. MacLeod led reviews covering a broad range of topics in
transportation policy, including aviation safety, airline
competition, transit programs, and highway bridge management.
Ms. MacLeod has a master's degree in public administration
from the University of Washington and a bachelor's degree in
international relations from American University.
I thank each of our distinguished witnesses for being here
today. I now recognize Rear Admiral Barata for 5 minutes to
summarize his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL DAVID C. BARATA, DEPUTY COMMANDANT
FOR OPERATIONS POLICY AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
Admiral Barata. Good morning, Chairman, Ranking Member, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
I request that my written testimony be submitted for the
record.
Mr. Gimenez. Without objection.
Admiral Barata. Thank you.
The United States is a maritime nation, and the Coast Guard
stands as a vital instrument of national power, a military
service, a Federal law enforcement agency, and a member of the
intelligence community, tasked with controlling, securing, and
defending our maritime borders and their approaches,
facilitating commerce vital to economic prosperity, and
responding to crises and contingencies that often arise with
little or no warning.
Our Nation faces significant and evolving threats,
including narcoterrorists and transnational criminal
organizations that smuggle deadly drugs, traffic people, bring
violence to our communities, and use illicit cash through
sanctioned oil to buy influence throughout the hemisphere.
The Coast Guard is on the front line of these fights,
pushing our borders out and targeting these networks where they
are most vulnerable. The dedicated men and women of the Coast
Guard are at the forefront of our efforts to defend our
homeland. At the tip of the spear are the service's Deployable
Specialized Forces. These highly-skilled teams provide
operational commanders with a versatile and rapidly-deployable
toolkit to address ever-changing and asymmetric threats.
For instance, our maritime security response teams provide
the Nation's only Federal maritime counterterrorism capability,
and our tactical law enforcement teams embed with naval
partners to execute dangerous drug interdictions. Our
Deployable Specialized Forces are prepared for the most
demanding missions.
Their rigorous training, often with the Department of War
colleagues, ensures that they can deploy globally at a moment's
notice, bringing unparalleled skills to bear against terrorism,
weapons proliferation, piracy, transnational crime, and other
domestic contingencies.
Most recently, our operators conducted several law
enforcement boardings aboard dark fleet tankers to enforce
sanctions at sea and uphold international law. These highly
capable units are a crucial and adaptable force, ensuring the
Coast Guard cannot only patrol our waters but dominate the
maritime environment where the Nation needs them most.
Employing well-organized force packages in fiscal year
2025, the Coast Guard achieved the largest annual maritime drug
interdiction results in service history, seizing over 511,000
pounds of narcotics valued at more than $3.8 billion. This
stopped over 193 million potentially lethal doses from reaching
American communities.
Over the past year, the Coast Guard has hardened and
sustained our border to control and secure and defend that
border and our maritime approaches starting with the Southern
Border where the President declared a national emergency. For
example, along the Rio Grande Valley, Operation River Wall has
already supported the apprehension or deterrence of over 300
individuals illegally trying to cross since it began in October
of 2025, and Operation Border tried--increased interdictions of
aliens along the Southwest Border by 44 percent over the
previous year.
Our enhanced enforcement presence at our borders and
maritime approaches protects the country against transnational
criminal organizations and illegal aliens attempting to
unlawfully enter the country, upholding our national
sovereignty. To effectively meet these dynamic threats, the
Coast Guard is pursuing a bold modernization of its people,
assets, and capabilities through Force Design 2028.
Coupled with the historic investments made through the One
Big Beautiful Bill Act and the support of this subcommittee, we
are transforming our service into a more agile, capable, and
responsive fighting force to protect the American people and
advance our national security.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and allowing
me to speak on behalf of the Coast Guard's men and women who
have volunteered to serve the Nation. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Barata follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral David C. Barata
February 3, 2026
introduction
Good morning, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am honored to be here
today to discuss the U.S. Coast Guard's efforts to deliver peace
through strength to control, secure, and defend America's borders.
The United States is a maritime nation. With more than 95,000 miles
of shoreline, 361 commercial ports, and 25,000 miles of navigable
waterways, the maritime domain fortifies our national security and
economic prosperity. Over 90 percent of overseas trade enters or leaves
the United States by sea, facilitating more than $5.4 trillion in
maritime commerce annually. The security of this domain is not
optional--it is foundational to our national and economic security. The
Coast Guard is the Nation's leading agency in this domain.
In the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard serves as
the Nation's finest maritime fighting force. We are one of the six
Armed Services, a Federal law enforcement agency, and a member of the
intelligence community. The Coast Guard controls, secures, and defends
the U.S. border and maritime approaches; ensures the safe and secure
flow of commerce vital to economic prosperity; and responds to crises
and contingencies that often come with little or no warning.
Under the leadership of President Trump and Secretary Noem, the
Coast Guard is changing and growing to meet the needs of Americans.
This effort is Force Design 2028, a bold blueprint to build a stronger,
more agile, and responsive fighting force. Under the leadership and
vision of Secretary Noem, this effort directly enhances our ability to
enforce the law, secure maritime approaches, protect commerce, and
respond to crises. By expanding our workforce and deploying advanced
assets and technologies, the Coast Guard is better postured to secure
our Nation's maritime borders and sovereign interests against these
persistent threats.
deployable specialized forces
Coast Guard Deployable Specialized Forces are elite teams capable
of rapid worldwide deployment and a wide array of missions. These teams
are trained for high-risk scenarios such as direct action; counter-
narcotics; operations in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
environments; and disaster response--providing specialized capabilities
to the Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security, Department of War,
and other interagency partners.
Maritime Security Response Teams are the Coast Guard's premier
units for counterterrorism and high-risk law enforcement. Trained in
conducting direct action and advanced interdiction missions, they
specialize in opposed boardings against hostile targets, including in
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear environments. They also
possess canine explosives-detection teams and can conduct counter-
unmanned aircraft systems operations.
Tactical Law Enforcement Teams are the Coast Guard's law
enforcement experts specializing in counter-trafficking operations at
sea. They provide highly-skilled, deployable teams for counter-
narcotics and maritime interdiction from U.S. and allied vessels. Their
mission set also includes alien migration interdiction. These teams can
conduct both compliant and non-compliant vessel boardings.
Maritime Safety and Security Teams are anti-terrorism and force
protection units responsible for safeguarding strategic shipping, high-
interest vessels, and critical port infrastructure. Their capabilities
are focused on waterborne security, non-compliant vessel pursuits, and
the use of canine teams for explosive detection. As a rapid response
force, these teams can be deployed globally to meet evolving maritime
security threats.
Port Security Units are expeditionary security units, primarily
comprised of reservists, that provide sustained force protection for
seaports of disembarkation and critical infrastructure. They can deploy
within 96 hours of a crisis and establish full operations within 24
hours of arrival, offering both waterside and shoreside security.
The National Strike Force is a highly specialized rapid response
unit equipped to handle major oil discharges, hazardous material
releases, and Weapons of Mass Destruction incidents. The National
Strike Force provides technical expertise, specialized equipment, and
incident management support for complex environmental and security
crises. The force is a critical national asset, capable of worldwide
deployment to mitigate threats, manage containment and clean-up
efforts, and provide crucial technical support to Federal on-scene
coordinators.
Regional Dive Lockers provide full-time diving capabilities for a
variety of missions, including the security of ports and waterways,
maintaining aids to navigation, and conducting ship husbandry and
repair, often in extreme environments like remote polar regions.
In a complex and evolving maritime environment, Coast Guard
Deployable Specialized Forces are critical to America's national and
economic security. Most recently, these forces, supported by the
Department of War, are combatting the threat of ``dark fleet tankers,''
used to illegally transport sanctioned oil. In these high-stakes, at-
sea operations, these forces are prepared to execute complex opposed
boardings.
In the Western Hemisphere, these teams are also leaders in drug
interdiction, a mission that accounts for a significant portion of
their operational focus. Teams frequently deploy on U.S. and allied
naval vessels to intercept a variety of drug-smuggling conveyances.
These range from high-speed ``go-fast'' boats to sophisticated, hard-
to-detect, self-propelled semi-submersibles. The interdiction of these
vessels is a core component of the effort to dismantle the powerful
transnational criminal organizations and foreign terrorist
organizations that threaten American communities.
maritime drug interdiction
Maritime drug trafficking remains one of the most direct threats to
U.S. homeland security and public safety. As directed by the President,
the Coast Guard is on the front lines securing the global supply chain
against drug trafficking and reducing the availability of illicit drugs
that devastate American communities. Narco-terrorists exploit maritime
routes to move drugs, generate enormous profits, and fuel violence,
instability, and crime. These revenues are increasingly leveraged by
hostile actors and transnational networks to fund human trafficking,
weapons smuggling, sanctions evasion, and other malign activities that
destabilize regions and drive illegal migration. The Coast Guard is
often the only agency with the authority, capability, and presence to
act at sea. The Coast Guard interdicts more illicit drugs than all
other Federal law enforcement agencies combined.
Since January 2025, the Coast Guard seized over 511,000 pounds of
cocaine from the maritime domain--representing over 189 million
potentially lethal doses. This all-time historic high more than doubles
the amount of cocaine removed in fiscal year 2024 and nearly triples
the removals from fiscal year 2023. These seizures save American
taxpayers over $10 billion in social programs, including over $2.3
billion in health care costs from cocaine interdictions alone.
Combating fentanyl and its illegal precursor chemicals remains one
of the administration's top priorities, and the Coast Guard has taken
significant action in this effort. Fentanyl is the leading cause of
U.S. drug-related deaths since 2016, accounting for approximately 70
percent of drug overdose deaths in 2023. Mexican narco-terrorists are
the primary source of the synthetic opioid flow into the United States.
Accordingly, the Coast Guard leverages its broad authorities to seek
out and interdict both fentanyl and its precursor chemicals. On January
31, 2025, Commandant Admiral Lunday directed immediate action to
bolster these operations, focusing on interdicting precursor chemicals
and disrupting the revenue streams that fund fentanyl trafficking.
illegal migration
The Coast Guard also secures 220 river miles along the Rio Grande,
from the Gulf of America to West Texas, part of the U.S. Southern
Border, and the maritime approaches to San Diego. These areas continue
to experience a sustained and above-average rate of illegal maritime
migration. This vector presents a persistent threat characterized by
continuous smuggling attempts and is targeted through the Coast Guard's
Operation Border Trident, on the southwest maritime border, and
Operation River Wall, along the Rio Grande in Texas, both of which seek
to achieve 100 percent control of the southern maritime border.
Trafficking organizations in this region primarily utilize high-speed
boats, jet skis and other personal watercraft, and additional makeshift
watercraft. Although a variety of nationalities are encountered, the
overwhelming majority of those interdicted are Mexican nationals.
The maritime approaches to the southeastern United States are also
a leading vector for illegal maritime migration. Most of the migrants
encountered originate in Cuba, Haiti, Mexico, or the Dominican
Republic, utilizing established transit corridors. Cuban and Haitian
migrants typically journey toward Florida, either directly or through
the Bahamas. Meanwhile, Dominican and some Haitian groups often cross
the Mona Passage to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. They
attempt these journeys on a wide array of vessels, from coastal
freighters and high-speed ``go-fast'' boats to dangerously crude,
homemade rafts.
The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy have a
parallel focus to control migration, stop drug flows, and strengthen
stability and security on land and sea in the Western Hemisphere. Under
the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard
maintains a robust and forward-leaning posture to combat illegal
immigration. In 2025 we interdicted, deterred, or transported 11,713
aliens illegally attempting entry. This was 120 percent more than in
2024. Our persistent presence both serves to deter departures from
countries of origin and enables a rapid response to suspicious vessels,
in close coordination with our international, Federal, State, and local
partners. To enhance this posture, we utilize advanced unmanned
systems, such as long-range unmanned aerial systems, surface drones,
and small aerial drones launched from our over-the-horizon boats, to
provide persistent surveillance and support shore patrols.
conclusion
Maritime drug trafficking, illegal migration, and dark fleet
tankers are distinct challenges, but they share a common feature: each
exploits the maritime domain to evade law enforcement and
accountability. Through its unique and enduring law enforcement
authorities, the Coast Guard directly confronts these threats--securing
and defending the Nation's borders and maritime approaches every day.
These threats are evolving, and the demands placed on the Coast
Guard continue to increase. The Coast Guard's layered security model--
leveraging forward presence, elite capabilities, an exceptional
workforce, and unmatched legal authorities--allows us to address risks
far from U.S. shores before they reach our homeland.
The changes under way through Force Design 2028 are already
accelerating enduring change and showing measurable results. By
empowering our workforce and enhancing the ways we conduct our patrols
and inspections, recent operations resulted in the seizure of more than
511,000 pounds of cocaine valued at more than $3.8 billion. These
outcomes demonstrate both the effectiveness of our authorities and the
return on investment they provide.
Since 1790, in peace and in war, a ready Coast Guard has been an
indispensable element of national security. With continued
Congressional support, the Coast Guard will remain prepared to meet
today's challenges and build a more resilient and capable Service for
decades to come.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and look forward to
your questions. Semper Paratus.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Admiral Barata.
I now recognize Ms. MacLeod for 5 minutes to summarize her
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HEATHER MAC LEOD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. MacLeod. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Carter, and
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
be here today to discuss GAO's work, examining Coast Guard
maritime security operations.
These operations may be carried out by specialized forces
units which have the training and capabilities needed to handle
drug interdiction, terrorism, and other threats. My testimony
today focuses on persistent challenges Coast Guard faces in
carrying out missions, including those involving specialized
forces units and actions that GAO's work has identified to help
Coast Guard address them.
We have made dozens of recommendations to the Coast Guard
to help address key challenges, like staffing shortfalls,
declining availability of vessels and aircraft, and acquisition
issues.
Regarding Coast Guard staffing shortfalls, in recent years
the Coast Guard has raised concerns that its mission workload
has outpaced its work force levels. Staffing gaps, particularly
in specialized units like tactical law enforcement teams, can
hinder drug interdiction efforts, counterterrorism operations,
and missions.
While the service recruited more enlisted service members
than it lost in 2024, that had not been the case in years
prior. In April 2025, we reported that, even with the increase
in recruiting, the service remained short of its enlisted work
force target. As a result, the Coast Guard was operating below
the work force level it deemed necessary.
We made three recommendations to help address these
challenges, including that the Coast Guard develop a clear plan
to support its retention initiatives. Specific to specialized
forces, in 2019 we reported that the Coast Guard has taken
steps to create a maritime law enforcement career path which
helped them retain qualified personnel.
We also reported that the Coast Guard might not have the
right mix and number of specialized forces to meet mission
demands. For example, we reported that officials from some
specialized forces units were underused, while others were so
busy that they had to turn down operations.
In November 2024, the Coast Guard acknowledged that
significant overlap in mission and mission capabilities related
to specialized forces exist. Continued analysis remains
important, as the Coast Guard needs to establish a Deployable
Specialized Forces command as part of Force Design 2028.
Another challenge I would like to highlight is vessel and
aircraft availability, assets that specialized forces are often
deployed from. The condition of Coast Guard assets has been in
a state of decline for decades. Our work has shown a concerning
trend that the cost of maintaining these assets is increasing
at the same time that their availability is decreasing.
For example, in June we reported that operation
availability of cutters that the Coast Guard relies on for its
maritime security operations declined. We also reported that
increasing maintenance challenges have led to cutters missing
patrol obligations. These readiness challenges are not limited
to cutters.
In a separate report, we found that Coast Guard aircraft
were not available for missions as often as the service deemed
necessary. We made 10 recommendations in these reports to
address cutter and aircraft challenges.
Finally, our work has noted that acquisition program delays
have been a long-standing challenge for the service and
continue to affect the availability of Coast Guard assets.
For example, the Coast Guard's newest cutters, the offshore
patrol cutter and the polar security cutter, are intended to
support maritime security operations. But we found that
combined these two programs are years behind schedule and
billions of dollars over their initiative cost estimates. We
have made dozens of recommendations on how Coast Guard can
better manage acquisition programs.
In conclusion, the Coast Guard specialized forces units
include a range of capabilities that are vital to the service's
ability to fulfill its missions. However, the Coast Guard faces
significant challenges that can hinder its maritime security
operations.
Addressing our recommendations in these areas will help to
ensure the Coast Guard is effectively and efficiently using
available resources to carry out these operations and support
national interests.
This completes my prepared statement, and I would be
pleased to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. MacLeod follows:]
Prepared Statement of Heather MacLeod
Tuesday, February 3, 2026
coast guard.--actions needed to address challenges that hinder maritime
security operations
gao-26-108901
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and Members of the
Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's work
examining Coast Guard maritime security operations and challenges. The
U.S. Government has identified transnational and domestic criminal
organizations as a significant threat to the public, law enforcement,
and national security. The Coast Guard--a multi-mission, maritime
military service within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--is
the Nation's lead Federal maritime law enforcement agency. To help
carry out certain maritime security missions, the Coast Guard maintains
Deployable Specialized Forces (Specialized Forces) units with the
capabilities needed to handle drug interdiction, terrorism, and other
threats to the U.S. maritime environment.\1\ These units deploy from
their home locations, such as major U.S. port areas, to conduct
operations in U.S. coastal waters and internationally. Certain units
can carry out operations from vessels, such as Coast Guard cutters and
Navy ships, or air assets, such as Coast Guard helicopters.
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\1\ See 6 U.S.C. 468(a) (Coast Guard missions).
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According to the Coast Guard, its presence--vessels, aircraft, and
Specialized Forces--serves as an enforcement mechanism and deterrent to
illicit activity that contributes to instability throughout the Western
Hemisphere. Figure 1 shows Coast Guard personnel conducting a drug
interdiction operation that included a Specialized Forces member
boarding a foreign, semi-submersible vessel, which resulted in seizing
17,000 pounds of cocaine.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
My statement today discusses challenges the Coast Guard faces
related to its maritime security operations and actions that could help
address those challenges. This statement is based primarily on seven
GAO reports published from November 2019 to January 2026.
For the reports we cite in this statement, among other
methodologies, we analyzed Coast Guard policies, documentation, and
data, and interviewed officials from agency headquarters and selected
field units. More detailed information on our scope and methodology,
including analyzing data and determining a sufficient level of
reliability for our reporting, can be found in the reports we cite in
this statement. For this statement, we also reviewed information on the
status of agency implementation of selected recommendations through
January 2026. (See appendix I for related open recommendations as of
January 2026.)
We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
several challenges hinder coast guard efforts to conduct its maritime
security operations, which the service has yet to fully address
Our prior work has identified several longstanding challenges that
have hindered the Coast Guard's ability to meet its mission demands,
including those conducted by Specialized Forces. These include: (1)
staffing shortfalls and workforce planning, (2) availability of vessels
and aircraft, and (3) acquisition of new assets.\2\ The Coast Guard
received nearly $25 billion in supplemental funding in fiscal year 2025
for various acquisitions and in support of efforts to modernize
operations and capabilities and faces the difficult decision of
determining how best to invest these resources.\3\ We have made
recommendations to help the Coast Guard address these challenges and
effectively and efficiently use its resources.
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\2\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Persistent
Challenges Hindering Efforts to Counter Illicit Maritime Drug
Smuggling, GAO-24-107785 (Washington, DC: Sept. 19, 2024). GAO,
Offshore Patrol Cutter: Coast Guard Should Gain Key Knowledge Before
Buying More Ships, GAO-26-107583 (Washington, DC: Nov. 25, 2025).
\3\ Pub. L. No. 119-21, tit. IV, 40001, 139 Stat. 72, 127 (2025).
These funds are available for obligation through fiscal year 2029.
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Staffing Shortfalls and Workforce Planning
Our prior work has shown that staffing shortfalls and poor
workforce planning have affected the Coast Guard's ability to meet its
mission needs, including for maritime security missions that
Specialized Forces support. While the service recruited more enlisted
service members than it lost in fiscal year 2024, it experienced net
enlisted staffing losses from fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year
2023. In April 2025, we reported that even with the increase in
recruiting, the service remained approximately 2,600 service members,
or 8.5 percent of its total enlisted workforce, short of its enlisted
workforce target at the end of fiscal year 2024.\4\ As a result, the
Coast Guard was operating below the workforce level it deemed necessary
to meet its operational demands. We made 3 recommendations, including
that the Coast Guard develop a clear plan to support its retention
initiatives. The Coast Guard agreed with our recommendations, and we
continue to monitor their implementation.
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\4\ GAO, Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address
Service Member Retention Issues, GAO-25-107869 (Washington, DC: Apr.
23, 2025).
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Specific to Specialized Forces, in November 2019 we reported that
the Coast Guard had taken steps to improve retention of these
personnel.\5\ Prior to a 2007 reorganization, active-duty Coast Guard
personnel working in Specialized Forces units could not remain in those
units and be competitive for promotions, according to Coast Guard
officials we interviewed for that review. Officials told us that this
was because the Coast Guard has certain requirements for career
progression, including personnel working in various assignments within
a given career path. After the reorganization, the Coast Guard created
a maritime law enforcement career path within Specialized Forces in
response to challenges the service faced in retaining law enforcement
personnel. Coast Guard officials we spoke with told us that the career
path has helped them retain qualified Specialized Forces personnel.
According to the Coast Guard's Force Design 2028 plan, retention of
Specialized Forces remains a priority.\6\
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\5\ GAO, Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces'
Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap
or Gaps in Capabilities, GAO-20-33 (Washington, DC: Nov. 21, 2019).
\6\ U.S. Coast Guard, Force Design 2028 Execution Plan Summary
(July 2025). Force Design 2028 is a U.S. Coast Guard strategic
initiative aimed at modernizing the service into a more agile, capable,
and responsive maritime force to meet evolving operational demands by
2028. It focuses on 4 key areas--People, Organization, Technology, and
Contracting/Acquisition.
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Further, we have previously reported that the Coast Guard might not
have the right mix and number of personnel relative to the mix and
number of operations where Specialized Forces are needed to meet
mission demands. For example, in November 2019 we reported that
officials from some Specialized Forces units we interviewed indicated
that they experienced periods of underutilization.\7\ An official at
one unit described efforts to increase the number of operations the
unit conducted by asking other Coast Guard units to request them for
specialized assistance. Officials at another unit conducted similar
outreach, including passing out flyers describing Specialized Forces
capabilities and contact information should the other Coast Guard units
need assistance. In contrast, similar units turned down operations
because of a lack of available personnel. For example, officials from a
different Specialized Forces unit described instances where they had to
decline operations because they did not have enough personnel to meet
the demand.
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\7\ GAO-20-33.
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As a result, we made two recommendations. We recommended that the
Coast Guard conduct a comprehensive analysis of its Specialized Forces'
workforce needs and that it assess the extent to which unnecessary
overlap or duplication exist. We reported that without an analysis of
the Specialized Forces units as a whole, the Coast Guard did not have
reasonable assurance that it has the requisite number of personnel in
the right units to conduct the required missions. While the Coast Guard
agreed with the recommendation to conduct a comprehensive analysis of
its workforce, it did not agree to assess the extent to which
unnecessary overlap or duplication exists. Nevertheless, the Coast
Guard contracted a study in 2022 to conduct an analysis of Specialized
Forces' ports, waterways, and coastal security mission. This addressed
both of our recommendations by providing the service with better
information for that mission priority.\8\ However, in November 2024 the
Coast Guard acknowledged that its study did not address all missions or
Specialized Forces units, and that significant overlap in mission and
mission capabilities exist. Such continued analysis remains important,
particularly as the Coast Guard moves to establish a Deployable
Specialized Forces Command to optimize Specialized Forces' unique
capabilities as part of Force Design 2028.
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\8\ RAND Corporation, Mission Analysis of U.S. Coast Guard
Deployable Specialized Forces (Dec. 2022).
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Regarding Specialized Forces' deployment with Coast Guard cutters
and helicopters, we have also identified gaps in cutter and aircraft
workforce planning. Figure 2 shows Specialized Forces conducting
vertical deployment training from a Coast Guard helicopter.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In June 2025, we reported that cutters often deploy without a full
crew due to personnel shortages.\9\ We recommended that the Coast Guard
collect and assess data on staff availability for the cutter workforce.
DHS did not agree with this recommendation, but we maintain that it
remains valid and could help ensure the Coast Guard is fully
considering the workload faced by cutter crews and support personnel
when making decisions on personnel assignments. We also previously
reported on Coast Guard resource shortfalls and incomplete workforce
planning for its aviation workforce. As a result, we recommended that
the Coast Guard assess and determine the aviation workforce levels it
requires to meet its mission needs. DHS concurred with this
recommendation and stated that the Coast Guard would conduct workforce
analyses for its air stations by June 2026.\10\ Until such analysis is
completed, the Coast Guard will not fully understand the resources it
requires for its aviation units.
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\9\ See GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Cutter and
Maintenance Workforce Challenges, GAO-25-107222 (Washington, DC: Jun.
25, 2025). Specifically, our analysis showed that 1,104 cutter crew and
support positions were vacant (about 13 percent) in fiscal year 2024.
This is an increase from fiscal year 2017, in which 401 cutter crew and
support positions were vacant (about 5 percent).
\10\ GAO, Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce
Assessments Needed, GAO-24-106374 (Washington, DC: Apr. 9, 2024). The
Coast Guard agreed with our recommendation. We also made four other
recommendations in the report and the Coast Guard concurred with all
four. As of August 2025, four of the five recommendations remain open.
We will continue monitoring Coast Guard's efforts to address these
recommendations.
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Vessel and Aircraft Availability
The Coast Guard's vessels and aircraft have faced availability
challenges and have been in a state of decline for decades, which can
limit the ability of Specialized Forces to conduct their missions.\11\
Overall, the total number of operational hours generally decreased, and
the total estimated operating expenses generally increased from fiscal
year 2017 through fiscal year 2024, as shown in figure 3.
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\11\ Vessel and aircraft availability challenges hinder the Coast
Guard's ability to meet mission demands. For example, in January 2026,
we reported that during fiscal years 2015 through 2024, the Coast Guard
generally did not meet its drug or migrant interdiction goals. We also
found that the service did not fully share information about lessons
learned from maritime migrant interdiction with Federal partners. We
made two recommendations to DHS to address these issues and will
monitor Coast Guard actions to fully address them. See, GAO, Coast
Guard: Actions Needed to Improve Maritime Interdictions, GAO-26-107440.
(Washington, DC: Jan. 13, 2026).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In June 2025, we reported that the operational availability of the
Coast Guard's Medium Endurance Cutters, which the Coast Guard relies on
for its law enforcement missions, declined from fiscal year 2020
through fiscal year 2024.\12\ We also reported that the Coast Guard was
experiencing increasing cutter maintenance challenges, and that those
increasing challenges, such as equipment failure and resulting
unplanned maintenance, have led to cutters missing patrol obligations.
For example, Coast Guard operational reporting documents indicated that
unplanned maintenance, among other things, had significantly reduced
the capacity of Medium Endurance Cutters to conduct missions. Further,
due to delays in receiving critical parts needed for repairs, the Coast
Guard cannibalized cutters by moving working parts between cutters.
According to Coast Guard data, there were 194 cannibalizations
completed across the cutter fleet from February 2022 to September 2024;
145 of these involved National Security Cutters--which mostly support
the drug interdiction mission. As a result, in June 2025 we made five
recommendations to address cutter maintenance and workforce challenges.
For example, we recommended that the Coast Guard systematically collect
and assess data on instances where previously deferred maintenance may
have caused cutter equipment failures and develop mitigation strategies
as appropriate. DHS agreed with this recommendation and described steps
the Coast Guard plans to take to improve its processes to document,
develop, and validate the efficacy of a new cutter maintenance metric,
which it plans to use to develop the recommended assessment. DHS
estimates completing these efforts by June 2027. We will continue to
monitor the status of this and the other recommendations.
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\12\ GAO-25-107222.
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The Coast Guard's asset readiness challenges are not limited to its
cutters. In April 2024, we reported that the Coast Guard's aircraft
generally did not meet its 71 percent availability target during fiscal
year 2018 through fiscal year 2022.\13\ Coast Guard officials
attributed the aircraft fleet generally not meeting availability
targets to maintenance and repair challenges. As a result, we made five
recommendations, including that the Coast Guard assess the type and
number of helicopters, and aviation workforce size, needed to meet its
mission demands. In response, in August 2025, the Coast Guard told us
an analysis of alternatives and a fleet mix analysis are being ordered.
It anticipates completing these steps by December 2027. We will
continue monitoring Coast Guard's efforts to address these
recommendations, as well as the other recommendation that remains
unaddressed.\14\ See appendix 1 for more information on open GAO
recommendations to DHS pertaining to Coast Guard personnel and assets,
as of January 2026.
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\13\ GAO-24-106374. We further reported that the Coast Guard was
embarking on a significant operational change from a largely short-
range helicopter fleet to a medium-range fleet. However, we reported
that its related planning efforts raised serious questions, including
how the medium-range helicopters will interact with cutters for its
drug interdiction operations.
\14\ The Coast Guard has addressed one of the five recommendations.
In April 2024, we found that the Coast Guard's air stations do not have
complete data for the Coast Guard to assess service-wide readiness. We
recommended that the Coast Guard should establish procedures to
uniformly collect and maintain air station readiness data. The Coast
Guard concurred with this recommendation and in April 2025 updated its
operational reporting manual to, among other things, help standardize
the collection of air station readiness data. The manual requires air
stations to report periods when they cannot meet readiness requirements
and provides examples on how to do so. By issuing updated guidance
requiring air stations to uniformly collect and maintain aircraft
readiness data, the Coast Guard can help ensure it has complete and
accurate information on Coast Guard-wide air station readiness.
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Acquisition Programs
We have previously reported that the Coast Guard's declining asset
availability is exacerbated by persistent challenges it faces managing
its planned $40 billion acquisition programs to modernize its vessels
and aircraft. For example, in September 2024 we reported on the
declining availability of the Coast Guard aircraft fleet and found that
the Coast Guard's cutter program faces persistent challenges including
capability gaps from schedule delays.\15\ Furthermore, officials told
us that they would not be able to increase mission activity without
acquiring more assets, but acquisition delays have been a long-standing
challenge for the service. Furthermore, according to officials, the
acquisition process is lengthy, as it can take several years from
initial request to final delivery of an asset.\16\
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\15\ GAO-24-107785.
\16\ GAO-26-107440.
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One of the Coast Guard's highest-priority programs--the Offshore
Patrol Cutter--has experienced delays that will exacerbate maritime
capability gaps.\17\ According to the Coast Guard, it urgently needs
Offshore Patrol Cutters to replace aging cutters that conduct law
enforcement and search-and-rescue operations.\18\ However, in November
2025, we reported that the Coast Guard's plan to acquire 25 Offshore
Patrol Cutters was delayed by more than 5 years.\19\ Notwithstanding
delays, ship design remains incomplete, and continued delays and cost
overruns are likely.\20\
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\17\ In June 2023, we found that the Coast Guard's management of
its Offshore Patrol Cutter acquisitions continued to face challenges we
had previously identified. We made five recommendations to the Coast
Guard, including that it develop a technology maturation plan and
update its acquisition policy to require programs to complete routing
of distributive systems as part of functional design prior to lead ship
construction. Two of the recommendations have not yet been fully
addressed. See, GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter
Program Needs to Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805
(Washington, DC: Jun. 20, 2023).
\18\ Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard,
testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland
Security, 118th Cong., 2d sess., July 24, 2024.
\19\ GAO-26-107583. We also reported that the program is at risk of
not meeting its cost goals, in part, because the program used outdated
cost information to establish them.
\20\ The Coast Guard plans to acquire the 25 Offshore Patrol
Cutters in four phases. In July 2025, the Coast Guard terminated two of
four ships from the first phase contract for default.
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As a result, we made four recommendations in November 2025,
including that the program stabilizes design before starting
construction of additional ships. Incorporating the knowledge gained
from testing--as well as other shipbuilding leading practices--into the
procurement process could help the Coast Guard make better investment
decisions. It could also improve the timeliness of future ship
deliveries. While the agency agreed with two of the four
recommendations, we maintain that all four recommendations are
warranted and will continue to monitor their implementation.
In summary, the Coast Guard's Specialized Forces units include a
range of specialized capabilities that are vital to the service's
ability to fulfill its missions, including those pertaining to maritime
security operations. The Coast Guard received nearly $25 billion in
supplemental funding in fiscal year 2025 for various acquisitions and
in support of efforts to modernize operations and capabilities and
faces the difficult decision of determining how best to invest these
resources.\21\ We have identified long-standing challenges with the
Coast Guard's management of its programs and tradeoff decisions among
its mission priorities and have made recommendations to help address
these challenges. Addressing our 20 open recommendations pertaining to
the Coast Guard's workforce and assets would help ensure that the
service efficiently uses its resources to carry out its maritime
security operations--including those carried out by Specialized
Forces--and support national interests.\22\
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\21\ Pub. L. No. 119-21, tit. IV, 40001, 139 Stat. 72, 127
(2025). These funds are available for obligation through fiscal year
2029.
\22\ We made 26 recommendations in the reports covered by this
statement. The Coast Guard implemented four of these recommendations,
20 remain open, and two were closed as no longer valid.
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Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Appendix I.--Related Open Recommendations
Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Improve Maritime Interdictions. GAO-26-
107440. Washington, DC: January 13, 2026.
Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should
ensure the Commandant of the Coast Guard implements performance
measures for the migrant interdiction mission that effectively
measure the service's efforts.
Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should
ensure the Operation Vigilant Sentry task force implements a
process to identify and address lessons learned following real-
world events and exercises with all relevant Federal partner
agencies, and shares relevant information with those partners.
Offshore Patrol Cutter: Coast Guard Should Gain Key Knowledge Before
Buying More Ships. GAO-26-107583. Washington, DC: November 25,
2025.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
ensure that the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program
demonstrates that the stage 2 design is stable prior to
authorizing construction of additional stage 2 OPCs by (1)
completing basic and functional design, including routing of
major distributive systems that affect multiple zones of the
ship, in a 3D model with reliable vendor-furnished information
and (2) successfully testing an integrated prototype of the
davit in a realistic environment, consistent with shipbuilding
leading practices.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard, in
collaboration with the Navy, should develop a memorandum of
agreement to clarify and document agreement on how the
evaluation of deficiencies and on-going surveillance of
Austal's EVM system will be coordinated between the Coast Guard
and SUPSHIP throughout the duration of the OPC program.
Recommendation.--The DHS Secretary should ensure that the
DHS Under Secretary for Management directs the Coast Guard to
revise the OPC acquisition program baseline to include cost
goals for each stage.
Recommendation.--The DHS Secretary should ensure that the
DHS Under Secretary for Management directs the Coast Guard to
document a plan for acquiring stage 3 OPCs that identifies (1)
how results from operational testing of OPC stages 1 and 2 will
be incorporated into stage 3 procurement activities, such as
developing the request for proposals, and contingency plans if
this testing is delayed; and (2) how leading practices for ship
design will be incorporated into stage 3.
Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Cutter Maintenance and Workforce
Challenges. GAO-25-107222. Washington, DC: June 25, 2025.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
systematically collect and assess data on instances where
previously-deferred maintenance may have caused cutter
equipment failures and develop mitigation strategies as
appropriate.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
complete Ship Structure and Machinery Evaluation Boards for all
cutter types at the intervals prescribed by policy.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
systematically collect and assess data on which parts and
systems across the cutter fleet are or will become obsolete and
develop mitigation strategies as appropriate.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
systematically collect and assess data on cutter days lost due
to unplanned maintenance issues.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
regularly collect and analyze data on staff availability for
cutter crew and support personnel positions, including which
cutter workforce positions are temporarily empty across the
cutter fleet, and use this information to inform personnel
assignments.
Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address Service
Member Retention Issues. GAO-25-107869. Washington, DC.: April
23, 2025.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
ensure that the Office of Workforce Requirements, Systems, and
Analytics implements additional mechanisms to increase response
rates for its Career Intention Survey.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
ensure that the Office of Workforce Requirements, Systems, and
Analytics analyzes the potential for nonresponse bias in its
Career Intention Survey results.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
ensure that the Talent Management Transformation Program
Integration Office develops a clear plan, including how
retention initiatives align with strategic objectives and time
frames and milestones for implementation, to track progress and
gauge program performance.
Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce Assessments Needed.
GAO-24-106374. Washington, DC: April 9, 2024.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
establish a process to regularly evaluate Coast Guard-wide air
station readiness data.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
assess the type of helicopters the Coast Guard requires to meet
its mission demands, as part of an analysis of alternatives.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
assess the number of helicopters the Coast Guard requires to
meet its mission demands, as part of a fleet mix analysis.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
assess and determine the aviation workforce levels it requires
to meet its mission needs.
Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to
Mature Technology and Design. GAO-23-105805. Washington, DC:
June 20, 2023.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
ensure that OPC program officials develop a technology
maturation plan for the davit prior to builder's trials. This
plan should identify potential courses of action to address
davit technical immaturity, including assessing technology
alternatives should the current davit continue to face
development challenges, and a date by which the Coast Guard
will make a go/no-go decision to pursue such a technology
alternative.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
ensure that OPC program officials test an integrated prototype
of the davit in a realistic environment prior to stage 1
builder's trials.
Related GAO Products
Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Improve Maritime Interdictions. GAO-
26-107440. Washington, DC: January 13, 2026.
Offshore Patrol Cutter: Coast Guard Should Gain Key Knowledge
Before Buying More Ships. GAO-26-107583. Washington, DC: November 25,
2025.
Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Cutter Maintenance and
Workforce Challenges. GAO-25-107222. Washington, DC: June 25, 2025.
Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address Service
Member Retention Issues. GAO-25-107869. Washington, DC: April 23, 2025.
Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Challenges
Hindering Efforts to Counter Illicit Maritime Drug Smuggling. GAO-24-
107785. Washington, DC: September 19, 2024.
Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce Assessments
Needed. GAO-24-106374. Washington, DC: April 9, 2024.
Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to
Mature Technology and Design. GAO-23-105805. Washington, DC: June 20,
2023.
Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces' Workforce
Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap or Gaps in
Capabilities. GAO-20-33. Washington, DC: November 21, 2019.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ms. MacLeod.
Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their
5 minutes of questioning. I will recognize myself for 5 minutes
of questioning.
Ms. MacLeod, your report is quite troubling, and so I would
like to get to the root causes of this on staffing. Are you
saying that the Coast Guard--the Coast Guard has a number of
authorized positions, right? I mean, this is the number of
people you should have, and are we short on the authorized
positions, or do we need more authorized positions or both?
I mean, what is your estimate of what we need in order to
get the Coast Guard up to its strength, the strength that is
needed in order to carry out its mission? More authorized
positions or we just need to fill the ones that we have?
Ms. MacLeod. At the time of our review, the Coast Guard was
short of its authorized positions. Since then, in Force Design
2028, the Coast Guard has plans to increase authorized
positions, which we envision would have--they would have the
same challenges in recruiting and retention with even more
positions to fill.
Mr. Gimenez. Are they short right now recruiting up to
their authorized positions?
Ms. MacLeod. At the time of our review, yes.
Mr. Gimenez. Do you know that is still the case?
Ms. MacLeod. The Coast Guard reported its highest
recruiting numbers last year, and then it's on track to meet
its targets.
Mr. Gimenez. Which means filling every authorized position?
Ms. MacLeod. Correct.
Mr. Gimenez. OK. So now if we have the number of people
that we need, the problem then becomes to the assets that they
need in order to carry out their mission, which are the ships
and the aircraft of the Coast Guard, correct?
Ms. MacLeod. Yes.
Mr. Gimenez. Right. So you're talking about ships and
aircraft. Is it due to age? Is it due to the ships and the
construction of them themselves? Is it due to the fact that we
don't have enough maintenance personnel?
What is causing the deficiency in the readiness of these
assets?
Ms. MacLeod. Our work has shown more recently the
maintenance challenges facing these older cutters and aircraft
are increasing.
Mr. Gimenez. Because we don't have enough people or it's
just a matter they're old and they're just breaking down more
often?
Ms. MacLeod. The age of the cutters. Some of the parts are
unavailable, obsolete parts and things like that.
Mr. Gimenez. And the--you're saying that the plan to
replace these assets is way behind schedule and billions of
dollars over?
Ms. MacLeod. Yes.
Mr. Gimenez. OK. That calls for another hearing, I guess.
All right. So, Admiral--I got a couple of minutes left--
what percentage of the sanctioned oil vessels that are out
there, what percentage of them do you think that you actually,
you know, interdict?
Admiral Barata. Chairman, good morning. A very small
percentage, frankly. We estimate that there is probably about
6- or 800 sanctioned dark fleet vessels in and about--between
Iran and Venezuela, China and Russia. We have interdicted about
7, 8 over the last 2 months.
Some other countries are starting to chip in. I think over
in the Mediterranean, we've seen the British and the French do
some things, but it's a very small percentage. They operate out
of the rule of law and on a consistent basis.
Mr. Gimenez. Six-to-eight hundred of these ghost ships?
Admiral Barata. That's what we estimate operating around
the world.
Mr. Gimenez. Wow. OK. What makes it so difficult to spot,
interdict, et cetera? Just assets or can you spot them or are
they just completely off the radar?
Admiral Barata. It's a combination of things, Chairman.
They are--they obfuscate their position a lot of times. You
know, all of our large commercial foreign vessels are required
to use an automatic identification system. Many of these
vessels have the means to easily have two or three sets of AIS
aboard and kind-of project their position somewhere else.
They use false documents, they use false ownership. They
claim the numbers of vessels that have already been destroyed
and taken apart in other places so that they look like they're
another vessel. So even when we contract them, though, they are
very hard to interdict.
For instance, some of these vessels that we've seen in
Venezuela, if they're coming from the Middle East or the Far
East, they'll go around the south--the southern tip of Africa
and go right into Venezuela.
So without the right assets and the reasoning to board them
on the high seas, it's very hard to get aboard. I think you've
seen us do a lot of counter drug interdictions on smaller
vessels and even in dhows over in the Middle East.
You know, some of the vessels we're going on right now are
1,100 feet long, very large crude carriers, very hard to
interdict at sea without some support from the Department of
War or other assets.
Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. Thank you. I yield now.
I now recognize Mr. Carter from Louisiana for his 5
minutes.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Barata, let's discuss the recent boardings of oil
tankers. First, I want to note that this committee has
requested a Classified briefing on these operations, and we
haven't received one yet. I hope we can work to make that
happen in the near future.
My question concerns the video that administration has
posted on some of these operations. I understand it may be good
PR, but I want to make sure that we're not broadcasting
sensitive tactics or the identities of our special operators to
our enemies, putting them in harm's way.
Is the Coast Guard being given the opportunity to review,
and, if necessary, redact or block any of these videos before
they share it with the world?
Admiral Barata. Ranking Member, good morning. We see a lot
of this footage before it goes out, not all of it. It depends.
Some of it is Department of War footage, some of it is
Department of Homeland Security, but it's all being processed
through the White House.
I think they are taking a close look at protecting the
identity and the tactics that our teams use.
Mr. Carter. I think the best way to do that, obviously, is
to have you guys involved. I won't put you in the middle of
that, but, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we, where possible,
request that the administration has heightened sensitivity of
the protection of our men and women who are carrying out these
highly-sensitive operations, just to be sure that in our haste
to bring public awareness that we don't put our service men and
women in harm's way.
As you know, one of the oil tankers the Coast Guard
recently targeted, the Bella 1, later renamed the Marinera, was
able to bypass U.S. forces and escape into the Atlantic. While
the Coast Guard--while the Coast Guard pursued it, Russian
military reportedly began repositioning naval assets as a
submarine to protect the ship from seizure.
Thankfully, U.S. forces eventually intercepted the tanker
without incident, but the episode raises some questions about
the potential impacts of these boardings. While enforcing
sanctions is important--and we all can agree we do not want to
inadvertently escalate into direct hostilities with nations,
including Russia--what contingency plans are in place when the
Coast Guard is pursuing these vessels and might encounter
foreign military vessels?
What are the rules of engagement your forces are operating
under, and would you please, if you run out of time, if we can
back this up with some written documentations on the actual
policies that we have for the rules of engagement?
Admiral Barata. Ranking Member, thanks for the question
there.
I--as far as the risks and the protocols and the
contingencies in place, we put stringent security measures,
stringent contingency measures in place. In the case of the
Bella 1, we worked closely with our Department of War partners
over at EUCOM. You know, as far as Russian assets--Russian
military assets, deployers, we ensured that we weren't at risk
of anything happening there. We were never, you know, concerned
at the risk level with Russian deployers impacting our ability
to conduct those law enforcement activities.
We can give you a little bit more--you mentioned a
Classified briefing, sir. We'd be happy to do that, and we've
prepared that, and we can set up a time; we'd like to come over
and talk to you a little bit more about it.
Mr. Carter. That would be great.
So without going into anything that might be confidential
or might be--that we should do in a more secure setting, the
contingency plan of what happens in the case of meeting some
other resurgence that may have bigger power or anticipated--
maybe even an ambush, we should always, obviously--and I'm
preaching to the choir, but talking from a Member of Congress'
standpoint. We want to make sure that we're giving you all the
tools that you need in our quest to capture these illegal
vessels, that we never put at risk our men and women in uniform
who are out doing an incredible job.
I can't thank you enough for the incredible work that you
do, not just when the cameras are rolling, as they've been
doing most recently, but when no one is watching. Rather, it is
search and rescue or capturing these tankers, we know that the
work of the Coast Guard is vast. You guys have been phenomenal
partners for us in Louisiana, particularly in the aftermath of
these horrific storms that we continue to have facing our
communities.
You're sitting before Congress. Tell us, what can we do--
and my time is already up. But if you could just finish, tell
us what we can do to arm you better. If you had a magic wand
that you could wave today, recognizing that this committee,
particularly this one in a bipartisan vein, wants to give you
the tools that you need to carry out your functions safely.
Admiral Barata. Ranking Member, I think the No. 1 thing
that you can give us is resources. I think under the
Reconciliation Act, we have tried to get after some of the
things that Ms. MacLeod highlighted, assets.
What we need on an annual basis is the O-E money, the
operating funds to hire more personnel to operate these ships
to do our Deployable Specialized Forces missions and also
sustain those assets as we move forward. We really appreciate
your support.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Rear Admiral.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired.
I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for showing up to this
subcommittee on front-line defenders, how the Coast Guard's
Deployable Special Forces combat narcoterrorists and other
maritime threats on high seas.
Admiral, when we talk about Deployable Specialized Forces,
are we primarily talking about VBSS?
Admiral Barata. We're talking about a group of teams, which
includes our Maritime Security Response Team, our--both forces
team that deploy domestically and internationally, our Port
Security Units that do expeditionary. There's a number of units
that fall under that category for us.
Mr. Crane. OK. Thank you, Admiral. I have a little bit of
experience with VBSS myself. I was on a VBSS team on the USS
Gettysburg a couple decades ago. My last job in the Navy was in
the SEAL teams. My job was to train and coach SEALs on the West
Coast on how to do VBSS. So a little bit of experience with
what you guys are doing, and I appreciate--I know that's a very
complicated mission set, and I appreciate all the hard work
that you guys do.
Admiral, I want to ask you if you believe that the
President of the United States, the Commander in Chief, under
Article II of the Constitution has broad Executive powers for
maritime security? Do you recognize that, sir?
Admiral Barata. Yes. Yes, I recognize that.
Mr. Crane. Do you recognize that the President made direct
maritime interdictions when enforcing sanctions or national
security measures, Admiral?
Admiral Barata. Yes, I do. We follow that.
Mr. Crane. OK. So one of the things that's concerned me as
a former service member myself is a video that was made by
Senator Mark Kelly and several other Senators who just a couple
months ago, they made a video to tell service members that they
don't need to follow unlawful orders.
Admiral, are you familiar with this video?
Admiral Barata. I have not seen the video itself. I was
following the news story, obviously, and the escalation of the
dissension.
Mr. Crane. It made national news, did it not, Admiral?
Admiral Barata. It did, indeed.
Mr. Crane. Did you or any of the other high-ranking Coast
Guard officers that you work with fear that a video like that
might undermine your chain of command?
Admiral Barata. From my standpoint, I have found that our
service members will follow lawful orders if they--you know, as
given.
Mr. Crane. You know, I find it interesting, Admiral, that I
didn't see any videos made like that from Members of Congress
during the Biden administration.
I want to submit an article for the record. This is from
CNN. ``Biden finalizes new rules for U.S. drone strikes.''
President Joe Biden assigned a long-awaited Classified policy
tightening the rules for the CIA and Pentagon to carry out
deadly drone strikes and commando raids conducted outside of
traditional war zones, U.S. officials said on Friday. This was
October 7, 2022.
Did you notice that no Members of Congress, including
Senator Kelly, made any videos during this time, Admiral?
Admiral Barata. I was--I'm not familiar with that article.
Mr. Crane. But you didn't see any videos, did you? I
didn't.
Admiral Barata. Not that I recall, no.
Mr. Crane. As service members, we tend to follow these
types of things, right?
Admiral Barata. Yes.
Mr. Crane. I found that very interesting, that they weren't
making videos during that time frame about whether or not
service members follow lawful orders or not.
I think we all know that, right, Admiral? Don't we get that
training in basic training, that we are not supposed to follow
unlawful orders?
Admiral Barata. Absolutely. At all the session sources,
that is what we train our personnel.
Mr. Crane. So did you find that video a little bit odd,
knowing that we all know that?
Admiral Barata. I find that it's--you know, for me, as I
reflect on it, I think it's unnecessary. I think our personnel
will know to follow lawful orders and to question unlawful
orders.
Mr. Crane. Yes. That's what I thought, too.
Admiral, you guys--Congress delivered for you guys in a
pretty big way during the reconciliation package. Is that
correct?
Admiral Barata. That is absolutely correct.
Mr. Crane. We gave you about $25 billion. Is that correct?
Admiral Barata. Yes. Generational change for the Coast
Guard, Congressman.
Mr. Crane. You guys had about $7 billion in maintenance
backlog for infrastructure. Is that correct?
Admiral Barata. Yes, that's correct.
Mr. Crane. How do you see the Coast Guard deploying that
money to make sure that the Coast Guard is ready to carry out
the Nation's national security and homeland security needs in
the next couple years?
Admiral Barata. We--under Force Design 2028, Congressman,
we have reorganized to ensure that the Coast Guard can obligate
all of those funds quickly. We're not waiting for the 5 years
that they are available to us. We want to spend those right
away on maintenance, on shore infrastructure to get after the
problems that we have.
Mr. Crane. Thank you. My last question for you, Admiral, is
do you feel in the last couple months with the boat strikes and
everything else going on, do you feel like you have given
orders to your men to carry out any of these--any of these
strikes, any of these interdictions that have been deemed
unlawful?
Admiral Barata. The Department of War has had to lead for
these kinetic strikes. The Coast Guard has not been involved
with them. So I can answer that we have not. I have not felt
that way at all.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Admiral.
I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. I thank the gentleman from Arizona. Are you
submitting that report for the record?
Mr. Crane. Yes.
Mr. Gimenez. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Biden Finalizes New Rules for US Drone Strikes
Oct 7, 2022
By Katie Bo Lillis
President Joe Biden has signed a long-awaited classified policy
tightening the rules for the CIA and the Pentagon to carry out deadly
drone strikes and commando raids conducted outside of traditional war
zones, US officials said on Friday.
With only Iraq and Syria still considered by the US to be so-called
areas of active hostilities--or conventional war zones--the new policy
is geared toward countries like Somalia, Yemen and now, Afghanistan,
where the US continues to carry out counterterrorism strikes from afar.
In practice, the new policy signals that the US is limiting its
reliance on drone strikes, once a ubiquitous counterterrorism tool that
has drawn increased criticism in recent years in the wake of a series
of high-profile revelations about civilian casualties.
The new policy requires the president's approval before a lethal
drone strike or commando raid can be launched on a particular
counterterrorism target, according to a senior administration
official--and that individual must be named, although the policy does
allow the president to waive that and other requirements at his
discretion. The president must also approve which groups in which
countries are considered to have potential targets as members.
The New York Times first reported on the new rules.
It also institutionalizes a series of standards for taking action
against a target, including that counterterrorism operators must
establish with ``near certainty'' that there will be no civilian
casualties in the strike, and that the target poses a continuing,
imminent threat to the United States.
The policy also requires operators to obtain permission from the
State Department's chief of mission in the country in question, the
senior administration official said.
White House Homeland Security adviser Liz Sherwood-Randall, who
spearheaded the nearly 2-year review which led to the new policy, said
in a statement that the guidance ``directs [the Biden] Administration
to be discerning and agile in protecting Americans against evolving
global terrorist challenges'' and ``requires that U.S. counterterrorism
operations meet the highest standards of precision and rigor, including
for identifying appropriate targets and minimizing civilian
casualties.''
In Syria and Iraq, where the US maintains a military presence,
commanders in the field will continue to have more discretion on
operational decisions.
Biden had quietly put in place many of the limitations that the new
policy now formalizes when he took office. The policy now officially
reverses a loosening of Obama-era rules under then-President Donald
Trump, which had pushed authority for approving lethal strikes down the
chain of command.
``I think this is overwhelmingly a return to a rigorous process, to
an intel-heavy consideration of targets and [an] intense role for the
president himself in approving the use of this particular tool,'' the
senior administration official told CNN.
Some counterterrorism operators and analysts have likely chafed at
the tightened restrictions, sources familiar with the deliberations
over the new rules say. But the broader shift in US priorities away
from counterterrorism and toward competition with China and Russia--and
the increased political scrutiny on civilian casualties--to a certain
degree makes the changes inevitable, these people said.
The new policy follows a separate Pentagon initiative announced in
August designed to help reduce the number of civilians killed and
injured by US military operations, particular drone strikes.
The US military has been criticized for years for killing civilians
in drone strikes but came under increased scrutiny after the military
conducted a botched strike during the chaotic withdrawal from
Afghanistan last August that killed 10 civilians, seven of them
children.
The department also faced criticism over a 2019 airstrike in Syria
that killed multiple civilians. The military acknowledged the deaths in
that strike in November 2021, after The New York Times reported them.
The department ultimately held no one accountable for the 2019 strike.
The Pentagon action plan is tasked with building a framework that
will put people who are trained to consider civilian harm issues
throughout the military, both in combatant commands and at more senior
levels of the Defense Department.
US military drone strikes have dramatically decreased in recent
years in many of the countries that the new policy impacts. According
to data maintained by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies,
there have been no US drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen since 2018
and 2019, respectively. In Somalia, US drone strikes in Somalia have
dropped precipitously since Biden took office.
But although the military is required by Congress to disclose data
about its counterterrorism strikes, including civilian casualties, the
CIA is not--making it much more difficult to judge how its operations
have shifted over time.
Some former intelligence officials take it a step further, claiming
that CIA drone strikes kill far fewer civilians that the military's--
but because the agency's figures aren't public, and outside groups that
track drone strike casualties say the US military routinely undercounts
its collateral deaths, an accurate comparison is difficult to draw.
Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the gentlewoman from South
Carolina, Mrs. Biggs, for her 5 minutes.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much. Thank you to our witnesses
for being here today.
I'll direct my first question to Admiral Barata. So Force
Design--and I may overlap a little bit with Congressman Crane,
but hopefully it will kind-of go in a different direction.
So the Force Design 2028 outlines a plan to modernize the
Coast Guard and to expand deployable capabilities. So how does
Force Design 2028 aim to expand the recruitment of DSF
personnel and set up training centers to equip the future of
the DSF work force? For instance, some--does the Special
Mission Training Center have the capacity to support that
growth?
Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, good morning. So under Force
Design 2028, we do intend to expand our work force by 15,000
personnel. That will include personnel to man the ships that
you've helped us acquire, the aircraft, but it will also be
operators for our unmanned systems and also our Deployable
Specialized Forces.
So we intend to grow, and we envision a very agile,
adaptable work force that includes a lot of Deployable
Specialized Forces. The Special Missions Training Center is a
real valuable part of that. Our MLEA Academy in Charleston is
also a big part of that for our baseline law enforcement, and
then the FMTC is more of our advanced tactics.
You know, we'll--we plan to make some investments there. We
need some assistance with the infrastructure there, the number
of personnel who are training, the type of training that we do,
some of these vertical insertion tactics that we use for VBSS.
So those type of things are the ones that we need,
Congresswoman.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you. My second question, what are the
details on the Coast Guard's standup of a DSF command, and why
is it necessary and what value does it add?
Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, I appreciate that question.
For us--and in response to Ms. MacLeod's work at GAO and
her colleagues, we have taken a look at DSF, and we think we
need to unify the command structure for all of our forces
there. We have seen functional commands work over in Department
of War, like SOCOM and JSOC and some of these other functional
commands. We have seen it work for us as well for our Coast
Guard Cyber Command.
So we think that unifying these elements will help us man,
train, equip, deploy our specialized forces in a better way,
equip them in a better way, you know, whether that's, you know,
travel money, whether that's funding for weapons, specialized
tactics, all of those things.
We think that putting that under one header will help us be
a lot more efficient.
Mrs. Biggs. Great. I'll go a little bit further. What is
the anticipated size of the command, and where might it be
located?
Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, we're still early in that.
We are hoping by October to have a location.
We do have a team put together that's making some
proposals, and we're going to base some of the factors on, you
know, can we deploy out of there, can we command out of there,
can we support the operational commander, but we have not
narrowed that down.
The exact size still is to be determined. We don't plan to
move any of our current units, any of our Deployable
Specialized Forces, the units themselves. What we do expect is
a command element that can focus on the training, that can
focus on the funding and the equipping, and how we deploy them.
Mrs. Biggs. Well, I'll just end since my time is about to
expire. But I thank you for your service and for what you do. I
have a huge respect for you and am very grateful. So thank you.
Admiral Barata. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Mrs. Biggs. I'll yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentlewoman yields back.
I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Van Epps.
Mr. Van Epps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral
Barata and Director MacLeod, for being here today.
The United States has the best Armed Forces in the world,
and as we've heard already, the Coast Guard's Deployable
Specialized Forces are one of the most agile. Seeing their work
in the public eye recently has been gratifying, and I want to
thank you, Admiral Barata, for the part the Coast Guard has
played in making our country and the waters around us safer.
The DSF is often the tip of the spear in actions that can
quickly become interagency operations. When a DSF unit boards a
vessel, for example, the service members may need to quickly
loop in interagency partners as they find illegal cargo.
Admiral, can you walk us through the maritime operational
threat response process used to manage the moving pieces of
interagency coordination between the Coast Guard, Department of
Justice, State, and the Department of War and others?
Admiral Barata. Congressman, good morning. Yes. So the--our
process there for counter drug for these dark shadow fleets are
very similar.
Once we get aboard, the first thing we do is we want to
establish the nationality of the vessel, and we then have to
call back to the motor process. The motor process, what that
involves is the entirety of the interagency, Department of
State, Department of Justice, other elements, maybe even in the
case of the tankers, Department of Energy, up to the White
House. So that we ensure that we are following international
law and that we are able to exercise U.S. law and authorities
aboard the vessel.
So, for instance, when we board a drug vessel, we'll call
back to the motor process, and we'll either engage one of our
bilateral agreements that we have or we will go back to the
Department of State to call that individual country and assess
whether or not they agree, concur with the vessel's claim, or
they're allowing us to operate on a vessel that's under their--
subject to their authority.
So on the tankers we're doing something similar. Once we do
that, we know we're in a good position to follow the law.
Mr. Van Epps. Great. Thank you. Are there gaps that exist
between the Coast Guard and these interagency partners when
conducting operations, and is there anything we can do in
Congress to help close any of those gaps?
Admiral Barata. We've found that it's been very successful
in practice. As I've said, we had our largest counter drug year
last year in fiscal year 2025, 511,000 pounds over 3 times some
of our previous years. Our tanker operations, I will tell you
the motor process has been vital for us--for our success here.
But there's no gaps that I can see right now, Congressman.
Mr. Van Epps. Great. Thanks. Thanks, Admiral. Pivoting
here, the Trump administration has prioritized Western
Hemisphere security and law enforcement, such as enforcing
sanctioned Venezuelan oil, and the Coast Guard has been a
crucial part of the overall approach. In the past year, it has
seized huge amounts of illicit substances and disrupted
criminal networks.
Admiral, can you talk about how criminal organizations are
adapting to increased law enforcement operations in the
Caribbean and East Pacific?
Admiral Barata. Congressman, I can give you a couple
examples. We've talked about the dark fleet tanker operations.
You know, the use of those--of those that have--the funds and
revenue that come from the oil that's being sold overseas is
then replicated back in and put into the organizations. So we
have seen that.
We've seen that revenues from illegal fishing, from illegal
arms sales, human smuggling. Those are all being used to feed
drug networks. They're being used to then come back and rearm
and re-resource some of the traffickers for semi-submersibles
and those type of assets that are--that they know are really
hard to find at sea. So we've had to adjust our tactics as we
go.
Mr. Van Epps. One follow-up to that. How are the Coast
Guard's maritime on your--to that note, how are your maritime
drug interdiction operations changing, and what do you need to
continue adapting to new trends?
Admiral Barata. I think what we need is exactly what
Congress has given us, and we need to obligate those funds. We
need more cutters, we need more unmanned systems, we need more
intelligence programs.
You know, I think what last year showed us, you know, for
Operation Pacific Viper over in the Eastern Pacific, that when
we have a cutter like a national security cutter that has a
hitch arm, a helicopter on the back with precision marksmen and
the right small bullets over the horizon, the right
intelligence, and the right tactical teams aboard to gather the
evidence that we need, we are very effective in stopping the
drug traffickers.
Mr. Van Epps. Admiral, thank you so much. Thank you for
what you do.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields back.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony. The
Members having no further questions, the Members of the
subcommittee may have some additional questions for the
witnesses, and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these
in writing pursuant to Committee Rule VII(E). The hearing
record will be held open for 10 days without objection.
The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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