    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                 FRONTLINE DEFENDERS: HOW THE COAST GUARD'S
           DEPLOYABLE SPECIALIZED FORCES COMBAT NARCOTERRORISTS AND
                  OTHER MARITIME THREATS ON THE HIGH SEAS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                      TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY

                                     of the

                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                FEBRUARY 3, 2026

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 119-37

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

                   [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   ______

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    63-776 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2026

                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                    Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman

    Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice       Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
        Chair                                Ranking Member
    Michael Guest, Mississippi           Eric Swalwell, California
    Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           J. Luis Correa, California
    August Pfluger, Texas                Shri Thanedar, Michigan
    Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
    Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Daniel S. Goldman, New York
    Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
    Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
    Elijah Crane, Arizona                LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
    Andrew Ogles, Tennessee              Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking
    Sheri Biggs, South Carolina              Member
    Gabe Evans, Colorado                 Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
    Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania         Nellie Pou, New Jersey
    Brad Knott, North Carolina           James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia
    Vince Fong, California               Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
    Matt Van Epps, Tennessee             Al Green, Texas
    Vacant
                         Keighle Joyce, Staff Director
                      Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                           Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk

                                     ------

              SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY

                      Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman

    Elijah Crane, Arizona                LaMonica McIver, New Jersey,
    Sheri Biggs, South Carolina              Ranking Member
    Matt Van Epps, Tennessee             Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
    Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex    Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
        officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
                                             (ex officio)

                   Hannah Hagen, Subcommittee Staff Director
               Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   Statements

    The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
      Transportation and Maritime Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     1
      Prepared Statement.............................................     3
    The Honorable Troy A. Carter, a Representative in Congress From
      the State of Louisiana:
      Oral Statement.................................................     3
      Prepared Statement.............................................     5
    The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
      Homeland Security:
      Prepared Statement.............................................     5

                                   Witnesses

    Rear Admiral David C. Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations
      Policy and Commander, United States Coast Guard:
      Oral Statement.................................................     7
      Prepared Statement.............................................     8
    Ms. Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
      Team, Government Accountability Office:
      Oral Statement.................................................    11
      Prepared Statement.............................................    12

                                 For the Record

    The Honorable Elijah Crane, a Representative in Congress From the
      State of Arizona:
      Article, CNN...................................................    27

                 FRONTLINE DEFENDERS: HOW THE COAST GUARD'S
           DEPLOYABLE SPECIALIZED FORCES COMBAT NARCOTERRORISTS AND
                  OTHER MARITIME THREATS ON THE HIGH SEAS

                                  ----------

                           Tuesday, February 3, 2026

                 U.S. House of Representatives,
                        Committee on Homeland Security,
                            Subcommittee on Transportation and
                                             Maritime Security,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
    room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez
    (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Gimenez, Crane, Biggs, Van Epps,
    and Carter.
        Mr. Gimenez. Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee
    on Transportation and Maritime Security will come to order.
    Without objection, the Chair may declare the subcommittee in
    recess at any point.
        The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the
    capabilities, readiness and operational demands of the Coast
    Guard's Deployable Specialized Forces as they confront
    increasingly complex maritime, narcotrafficking, smuggling, and
    other homeland security threats on the high seas.
        I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
        Good morning everybody, and thank you to our witnesses for
    joining us today. I appreciate you both being here despite a
    partial shutdown, including Department of Homeland Security. I
    am hopeful that we can reach a deal this week to reopen DHS so
    they can return to their important work protecting and serving
    the American people.
        Today's hearing will focus on the Coast Guard's Deployable
    Specialized Forces, and particularly, their role in halting
    maritime narcotrafficking, smuggling of illicit goods, and
    related threats from communist dictatorships.
        For far too long, Venezuela's export of sanctioned oil and
    drug cartels has prolonged the regime of Nicolas Maduro, arming
    both the Venezuelan people and the security of the United
    States. On January 3, Operation Absolute Resolve marked a
    turning point in dismantling Venezuela's regime with the swift
    capture of Nicolas Maduro and his wife.
        This powerful operation begins to restore democracy for the
    people of Venezuela and upholds the rule of law. I commend
    President Trump, our military, and diplomatic leaders for their
    coordinated efforts to complete this successful operation. This
    decisive action sent a clear message to adversaries worldwide.
    The United States must not be trifled with.
        This operation is personally significant to me, as my
    family fled to America from the Cuban communist regime over 70
    years ago--actually, 65 years ago. The United States is the
    shining light of democracy, and through its operation, can
    support a future of democracy in Venezuela. America is a leader
    in peace through strength and must continue to confront threats
    around the world.
        Cuba must be considered next. Just the other day, I echo
    President Trump's Executive Order to impose strict tariffs on
    all countries that--and--or send oil to Cuba's dictatorships to
    end the Castro's regime once and for all. I have called for the
    immediate end of oil shipments to Cuba that fund the corrupt
    communist regime and crush the Cuban people.
        It's why I'm eager to hold today's hearing on the Coast
    Guard's role in protecting our homeland from Venezuela's
    actions which helped pave the way for the success of Operation
    Absolute Resolve. Securing our maritime front by halting and
    disrupting these sanctioned oil tankers from Venezuela is key
    to unlocking security and freedom in our corner of the Western
    Hemisphere.
        We are grateful for the Coast Guard's bravery and
    exceptional tactical operations to properly conduct these wide
    visitation boardings and seize vessels found in violation of
    U.S. and international law.
        This hearing will highlight the Deployable Specialized
    Forces historic drug interdiction results, seizing nearly
    510,000 pounds of cocaine in fiscal year 2025. We have also the
    opportunity to hear how the Deployable Specialized Forces have
    become one of the most tactically capable maritime forces of
    the United States and what their future holds amid an ever-
    increasing maritime threat landscape.
        We appreciate GAO for being here to testify to its review
    of the Coast Guard Deployable Specialized Forces and areas for
    improvement. Congress should consider GAO's recommendations and
    provide further direction with a future of the Coast Guard.
        We should also consider the initiatives laid out in the
    Coast Guard's recently released Force Design 2028 which calls
    for a Deployable Specialized Forces command. We are grateful to
    have witnesses here today to discuss this important topic and
    also appreciate the Coast Guard's willingness to work with us
    in order to continue this dialog in a Classified setting in the
    near future so Members can learn more about the specifics of
    these oil tanker seizures off the coast of Venezuela.
        Hearing directly from operational leaders from the Joint
    Interagency Task Force South would be beneficial for Members to
    receive further details on operational impacts, emerging
    threats, and any on-going challenges.
        Thank you.
        [The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]
                    Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez
                                February 3, 2026
        Good morning, everyone, and thank you to our witnesses for joining
    us today. I appreciate you both being here despite a partial shutdown,
    including for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I am hopeful
    we can reach a deal this week to reopen DHS so they can return to their
    important work protecting and serving the American people.
        Today's hearing will focus on the Coast Guard's Deployable
    Specialized Forces, and particularly their role in halting maritime
    narcotrafficking, smuggling of illicit goods, and related threats from
    Communist dictatorships.
        For far too long, Venezuela's export of sanctioned oil and drug
    cartels has prolonged the regime of Nicolas Maduro, harming both the
    Venezuelan people and the security of the United States.
        On January 3, Operation Absolute Resolve marked a turning point in
    dismantling Venezuela's regime with the swift capture of Nicolas Maduro
    and his wife. This powerful operation begins to restore democracy for
    the people of Venezuela and upholds the rule of law. I commend
    President Trump, our military, and diplomatic leaders for their
    coordinated efforts to complete this successful operation. This
    decisive action sent a clear message to adversaries worldwide: The
    United States must not be trifled with.
        This operation is personally significant to me, as my family fled
    to America from the Cuban Communist regime over 70 years ago. The
    United States is the shining light of democracy, and through this
    operation, can support a future of democracy in Venezuela. America is a
    leader in peace through strength and must continue to confront threats
    around the world.
        Cuba must be considered next: Just the other day, I echoed
    President Trump's Executive Order to impose strict tariffs on all
    countries that send oil to Cuba's dictatorship, to end the Castro
    regime once and for all. I have called for the immediate end of oil
    shipments to Cuba that fund the corrupt communist regime and crush the
    Cuban people.
        It's why I am eager to hold today's hearing on the Coast Guard's
    role in protecting our homeland from Venezuela's actions, which helped
    pave the way for the success of Operation Absolute Resolve. Securing
    our maritime front by halting and disrupting these sanctioned oil
    tankers from Venezuela is key to unlocking security and freedom in our
    corner of the Western Hemisphere. We are grateful for the Coast Guard's
    bravery and exceptional tactical operations to properly conduct these
    right-of-visitation boardings and seize vessels found in violation of
    U.S. and international law.
        This hearing will highlight the Deployable Specialized Force's
    historic drug interdiction results, seizing nearly 510,000 pounds of
    cocaine in fiscal year 2025. We also have the opportunity to hear how
    the Deployable Specialized Forces have become one of the most
    tactically capable maritime forces of the United States, and what their
    future holds amid an ever-increasing maritime threat landscape.
        We appreciate GAO for being here to testify to its review of the
    Coast Guard's Deployable Specialized Forces and areas for improvement.
    Congress should consider GAO's recommendations and provide further
    direction for the future of the Coast Guard. We should also consider
    the initiatives laid out in the Coast Guard's recently released Force
    Design 2028, which calls for a Deployable Specialized Forces Command.
        We are grateful to have the witnesses here today to discuss this
    important topic, and also appreciate the Coast Guard's willingness to
    work with us in order to continue this dialog in a Classified setting
    in the near future, so Members can learn more about the specifics of
    these oil tanker seizures off the coast of Venezuela. Hearing directly
    from operational leaders from the Joint Interagency Task Force South
    would be beneficial for Members to receive further details on
    operational impacts, emerging threats, and any on-going challenges.
        Thank you, and now I recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
    Carter, sitting in for Ranking Member McIver today, for his 5 minutes
    for an opening statement.

        Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana,
    Mr. Carter, sitting in for Ranking Member McIver today, for his
    5 minutes for an opening statement.
        Mr. Carter. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
    convening this hearing. Thank you for also recognizing me to
    provide opening remarks as Ranking Member McIver, regrettably,
    could not be here today.
        I also would like to thank our witnesses for joining us
    today. Rear Admiral Barata, I recognize you are joining us amid
    a shutdown affecting the Coast Guard and other branches of the
    Armed Forces. Thank you for your incredible service.
        To state the obvious, our military service members deserve
    to be paid for their service, and I hope you can come--we can
    come together quickly to pass funding for the Coast Guard,
    along with reforms desperately needed at the Department of
    Homeland Security.
        Today we are here to discuss Coast Guard's Deployable
    Specialized Forces. These specialized forces compromise--
    comprise some of the Coast Guard's most elite, highly-trained
    units. Their activities exemplify the Coast Guard's wide range
    of critical missions as they deploy to conduct some of the most
    important services at high-risk operation across a variety of
    challenging environments.
        Specialized forces missions vary from advanced interdiction
    and boarding against hostile targets to responding to oil
    spills and hazardous material releases. These specialized
    forces dive underwater to repair ships in harsh environments of
    remote polar regions, chase down narcotic traffickers on the
    high seas, and help protect national security events, like
    United Nations General Assembly.
        Last year maritime safety and security terms were among the
    most--the Coast Guard forces that deployed to my home city of
    New Orleans to help protect Super Bowl LIX. I want to thank you
    and the hard-working Coast Guard personnel who helped make that
    event safe and successful, along with all of the work you do
    for Louisiana to ensure the community of maritime commerce and
    the safety of my constituents are always held at its highest.
        Most recently, the Coast Guard's Deployable Specialized
    Forces have conducted a series of high-profile, high-risk
    boardings of sanctioned oil tankers near the coast of
    Venezuela. While I strongly disagree with the Trump
    administration's operation last month to deploy forces on land
    in Venezuela without Congressional authorization, as well as
    his bombing of alleged drug boats, which are not only illegal
    but undermine the Coast Guard's efforts to encourage
    international maritime cooperation, in contrast, these oil
    tanker boardings represent a legal and effective way to enforce
    sanctions, enforce international maritime laws, and exert U.S.
    influence.
        The Coast Guard should be commended for conducting these
    high-risk boardings without incident, demonstrating the skill
    and training of the service's specialized forces.
        The Deployable Specialized Forces are critical to the Coast
    Guard's success as a service. We must ensure that the Coast
    Guard has the resources, personnel, training, and strategies,
    and authorities to utilize these units effectively.
        The Government Accountability Office has done vital
    research to help the Coast Guard grow smarter, leaner, and more
    effective across its many missions. I look forward to hearing
    from both of our witnesses about the capabilities of the Coast
    Guard's specialized forces and how our committee can help the
    services come to grow to fruition and give you the absolute
    most state-of-the-art tools to do your jobs.
        I thank the witnesses for joining us. Mr. Chairman, I
    yield.
        [The statement of Honorable Carter follows:]

                     Statement of Honorable Troy A. Carter

                                February 3, 2026

        Rear Admiral Barata, I recognize you are joining us amid a
    shutdown affecting the Coast Guard and other branches of the
    armed forces. To state the obvious, our military service
    members deserve to be paid for their service, and I hope we
    will be able to come together quickly to pass the reforms and
    funding our country desperately needs.
        Today, we are here to discuss the Coast Guard's Deployable
    Specialized Forces. These specialized forces comprise some of
    the Coast Guard's most elite, highly-trained units. Their
    activities exemplify the Coast Guard's wide range of critical
    missions, as they deploy to carry out some of the service's
    highest-risk operations within a variety of challenging
    environments.
        Specialized forces' missions vary from advanced
    interdictions and boardings against hostile targets, to
    responding to oil spills and hazardous material releases.
    Specialized forces dive underwater to repair ships in the harsh
    environment of remote polar regions, chase down narcotics
    traffickers on the high seas, and help protect National Special
    Security Events like the United Nations General Assembly.
        Last year, Maritime Safety and Security Teams were among
    the Coast Guard forces that deployed to my home city of New
    Orleans to help protect Super Bowl 59. I expect some of these
    teams will deploy again this weekend to help ensure another
    safe and successful Super Bowl. Most recently, the Coast
    Guard's Deployable Specialized Forces have conducted a series
    of high-profile, high-risk boardings of sanctioned oil tankers
    near the coast of Venezuela. I strongly disagree with the Trump
    administration's operations last month to deploy forces on land
    in Venezuela without Congressional authorization, as well as
    its bombings of alleged drug boats, which are not only illegal
    but undermine the Coast Guard's efforts to encourage
    international maritime cooperation. In contrast, these oil
    tanker boardings represent a legal and effective way to enforce
    sanctions, enforce international maritime laws, and exert U.S.
    influence.
        The Coast Guard should be commended for carrying out these
    high-risk boardings without incident, displaying the skill and
    training of the service's specialized forces. The Deployable
    Specialized Forces are critical to the Coast Guard's success as
    a service. We must ensure the Coast Guard has the resources,
    personnel, training, strategies, and authorities to utilize
    these units effectively.
        The Government Accountability Office has done important
    work to help the Coast Guard grow smarter, leaner, and more
    effective across its many missions.

        Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Carter.
        Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
    statements may be submitted for the record.
        [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
                 Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                                February 3, 2026
        Coast Guard service members carry out a broad range of critical
    missions every day, from search-and-rescue activities to drug
    interdictions and maritime security. The Coast Guard helps respond to
    disasters, protect maritime commerce, defend seaports and other
    critical infrastructure, and secure National Special Security Events.
    In each of these missions, the Coast Guard's efforts are enhanced by
    its Deployable Specialized Forces.
        These elite teams represent some of the service's most skilled and
    highly-trained units. With 11 statutory missions and a global
    footprint, the Coast Guard relies on the readiness and expertise of its
    specialized forces to deploy quickly and respond to crises effectively.
        If a cutter is stuck in ice in the Arctic or Antarctic and requires
    repair, the Coast Guard will call upon its specialized forces. If an
    oil spill threatens environmental disaster, the Coast Guard will call
    upon its specialized forces. If an advanced tactical team is needed to
    conduct a high-risk interdiction of a suspected drug trafficking
    vessel, the Coast Guard will call upon its specialized forces--at
    least, that is, if it is allowed to do so. Under the Trump
    administration, the Coast Guard is not getting enough calls.
        The Trump administration has chosen to illegally and immorally bomb
    alleged drug boats instead of allowing the Coast Guard's specialized
    forces to safely interdict narcotics traffickers and turn them over for
    prosecution. These attacks fly in the face of international law, and
    though they may deter drug trafficking in the short term, they
    undermine the Coast Guard's long-term efforts to advance international
    maritime cooperation and law enforcement.
        How can the Coast Guard convince international partners and allies
    to assist with maritime law enforcement and information sharing when
    other branches of the U.S. military are illegally blowing boats out of
    the water? The administration must cease these war crimes immediately.
    Accountability is coming.
        The administration has shown that at least some of its lawyers do
    in fact understand maritime law, as the Coast Guard's specialized
    forces have been deployed to conduct a series of successful boardings
    of sanctioned oil tankers off the Venezuelan coast. These operations
    stand in contrast to the illegal drug boat attacks--as well as the
    illegal deployment of U.S. armed forces into Venezuela to depose its
    president--as the boardings are at least rooted in internationally
    recognized rules and practices.
        The Coast Guard's specialized forces deserve significant credit for
    carrying out these difficult and dangerous operations without incident.
    As the Coast Guard works to build upon the successes of its specialized
    forces, Congress must ensure the service supports its personnel and
    mission needs with capable vessels and aircraft.
        Recently, through their One Big Ugly Bill, Republicans gifted the
    Coast Guard with $25 billion--a much-needed investment that
    unfortunately was paid for by gutting Medicaid. This money was provided
    with few strings attached, and the Coast Guard has not yet shared its
    spend plan with Congress.
        In the past, the Coast Guard has struggled to manage large
    acquisitions programs efficiently and effectively. As the Coast Guard
    works to support its specialized forces and other units with this large
    investment, the service must act as responsible stewards of taxpayer
    dollars and ensure money is not wasted.
        I look forward to working with GAO and my colleagues in Congress to
    hold the Coast Guard accountable as it invests in its Deployable
    Specialized Forces and other units.

        Mr. Gimenez. I am pleased to have a distinguished panel of
    witnesses before us today on this critical topic. I ask that
    our witnesses please rise and raise their right hands.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Gimenez. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have
    answered in the affirmative. Thank you, and please be seated.
        I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. Rear
    Admiral David Barata serves at deputy commandant for operations
    policy and as commander, 8th Coast Guard District overseeing
    Coast Guard operations across 26 States, including the Gulf of
    Mexico, adjacent offshore waters, and major inland waterways,
    such as the Mississippi and Ohio River systems. Previously, he
    served as commander, Coast Guard Personnel Services Center,
    where he led human resource policy and work force management
    for nearly 45,000 active-duty and reserve members.
        A 1993 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, Rear
    Admiral Barata holds a Master of Arts in national security and
    strategic studies from the Naval War College and served as
    senior military fellow at the Center for a New American
    Security.
        I also misstated something. You are overseeing Coast Guard
    operations across 26 States, including the Gulf of America.
    Right? OK.
        Heather MacLeod is the director in the Homeland Security
    and Justice team for the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
        Ms. MacLeod joined GAO in 2002. During the last 22 years,
    Ms. MacLeod has worked on a range of public policy issues at
    GAO. She currently leads the Coast Guard in maritime security
    issues portfolio in conducting a variety of reviews addressing
    issues such as Coast Guard work force and strategic planning
    efforts and maritime port and supply chain cargo security.
        Prior to joining the Homeland Security and Justice team,
    Ms. MacLeod led reviews covering a broad range of topics in
    transportation policy, including aviation safety, airline
    competition, transit programs, and highway bridge management.
        Ms. MacLeod has a master's degree in public administration
    from the University of Washington and a bachelor's degree in
    international relations from American University.
        I thank each of our distinguished witnesses for being here
    today. I now recognize Rear Admiral Barata for 5 minutes to
    summarize his opening statement.

     STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL DAVID C. BARATA, DEPUTY COMMANDANT
     FOR OPERATIONS POLICY AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

        Admiral Barata. Good morning, Chairman, Ranking Member, and
    distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
    opportunity to testify today.
        I request that my written testimony be submitted for the
    record.
        Mr. Gimenez. Without objection.
        Admiral Barata. Thank you.
        The United States is a maritime nation, and the Coast Guard
    stands as a vital instrument of national power, a military
    service, a Federal law enforcement agency, and a member of the
    intelligence community, tasked with controlling, securing, and
    defending our maritime borders and their approaches,
    facilitating commerce vital to economic prosperity, and
    responding to crises and contingencies that often arise with
    little or no warning.
        Our Nation faces significant and evolving threats,
    including narcoterrorists and transnational criminal
    organizations that smuggle deadly drugs, traffic people, bring
    violence to our communities, and use illicit cash through
    sanctioned oil to buy influence throughout the hemisphere.
        The Coast Guard is on the front line of these fights,
    pushing our borders out and targeting these networks where they
    are most vulnerable. The dedicated men and women of the Coast
    Guard are at the forefront of our efforts to defend our
    homeland. At the tip of the spear are the service's Deployable
    Specialized Forces. These highly-skilled teams provide
    operational commanders with a versatile and rapidly-deployable
    toolkit to address ever-changing and asymmetric threats.
        For instance, our maritime security response teams provide
    the Nation's only Federal maritime counterterrorism capability,
    and our tactical law enforcement teams embed with naval
    partners to execute dangerous drug interdictions. Our
    Deployable Specialized Forces are prepared for the most
    demanding missions.
        Their rigorous training, often with the Department of War
    colleagues, ensures that they can deploy globally at a moment's
    notice, bringing unparalleled skills to bear against terrorism,
    weapons proliferation, piracy, transnational crime, and other
    domestic contingencies.
        Most recently, our operators conducted several law
    enforcement boardings aboard dark fleet tankers to enforce
    sanctions at sea and uphold international law. These highly
    capable units are a crucial and adaptable force, ensuring the
    Coast Guard cannot only patrol our waters but dominate the
    maritime environment where the Nation needs them most.
        Employing well-organized force packages in fiscal year
    2025, the Coast Guard achieved the largest annual maritime drug
    interdiction results in service history, seizing over 511,000
    pounds of narcotics valued at more than $3.8 billion. This
    stopped over 193 million potentially lethal doses from reaching
    American communities.
        Over the past year, the Coast Guard has hardened and
    sustained our border to control and secure and defend that
    border and our maritime approaches starting with the Southern
    Border where the President declared a national emergency. For
    example, along the Rio Grande Valley, Operation River Wall has
    already supported the apprehension or deterrence of over 300
    individuals illegally trying to cross since it began in October
    of 2025, and Operation Border tried--increased interdictions of
    aliens along the Southwest Border by 44 percent over the
    previous year.
        Our enhanced enforcement presence at our borders and
    maritime approaches protects the country against transnational
    criminal organizations and illegal aliens attempting to
    unlawfully enter the country, upholding our national
    sovereignty. To effectively meet these dynamic threats, the
    Coast Guard is pursuing a bold modernization of its people,
    assets, and capabilities through Force Design 2028.
        Coupled with the historic investments made through the One
    Big Beautiful Bill Act and the support of this subcommittee, we
    are transforming our service into a more agile, capable, and
    responsive fighting force to protect the American people and
    advance our national security.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and allowing
    me to speak on behalf of the Coast Guard's men and women who
    have volunteered to serve the Nation. I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Barata follows:]
               Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral David C. Barata
                                February 3, 2026
                                  introduction
        Good morning, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and
    distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am honored to be here
    today to discuss the U.S. Coast Guard's efforts to deliver peace
    through strength to control, secure, and defend America's borders.
        The United States is a maritime nation. With more than 95,000 miles
    of shoreline, 361 commercial ports, and 25,000 miles of navigable
    waterways, the maritime domain fortifies our national security and
    economic prosperity. Over 90 percent of overseas trade enters or leaves
    the United States by sea, facilitating more than $5.4 trillion in
    maritime commerce annually. The security of this domain is not
    optional--it is foundational to our national and economic security. The
    Coast Guard is the Nation's leading agency in this domain.
        In the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard serves as
    the Nation's finest maritime fighting force. We are one of the six
    Armed Services, a Federal law enforcement agency, and a member of the
    intelligence community. The Coast Guard controls, secures, and defends
    the U.S. border and maritime approaches; ensures the safe and secure
    flow of commerce vital to economic prosperity; and responds to crises
    and contingencies that often come with little or no warning.
        Under the leadership of President Trump and Secretary Noem, the
    Coast Guard is changing and growing to meet the needs of Americans.
    This effort is Force Design 2028, a bold blueprint to build a stronger,
    more agile, and responsive fighting force. Under the leadership and
    vision of Secretary Noem, this effort directly enhances our ability to
    enforce the law, secure maritime approaches, protect commerce, and
    respond to crises. By expanding our workforce and deploying advanced
    assets and technologies, the Coast Guard is better postured to secure
    our Nation's maritime borders and sovereign interests against these
    persistent threats.
                         deployable specialized forces
        Coast Guard Deployable Specialized Forces are elite teams capable
    of rapid worldwide deployment and a wide array of missions. These teams
    are trained for high-risk scenarios such as direct action; counter-
    narcotics; operations in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
    environments; and disaster response--providing specialized capabilities
    to the Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security, Department of War,
    and other interagency partners.
        Maritime Security Response Teams are the Coast Guard's premier
    units for counterterrorism and high-risk law enforcement. Trained in
    conducting direct action and advanced interdiction missions, they
    specialize in opposed boardings against hostile targets, including in
    chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear environments. They also
    possess canine explosives-detection teams and can conduct counter-
    unmanned aircraft systems operations.
        Tactical Law Enforcement Teams are the Coast Guard's law
    enforcement experts specializing in counter-trafficking operations at
    sea. They provide highly-skilled, deployable teams for counter-
    narcotics and maritime interdiction from U.S. and allied vessels. Their
    mission set also includes alien migration interdiction. These teams can
    conduct both compliant and non-compliant vessel boardings.
        Maritime Safety and Security Teams are anti-terrorism and force
    protection units responsible for safeguarding strategic shipping, high-
    interest vessels, and critical port infrastructure. Their capabilities
    are focused on waterborne security, non-compliant vessel pursuits, and
    the use of canine teams for explosive detection. As a rapid response
    force, these teams can be deployed globally to meet evolving maritime
    security threats.
        Port Security Units are expeditionary security units, primarily
    comprised of reservists, that provide sustained force protection for
    seaports of disembarkation and critical infrastructure. They can deploy
    within 96 hours of a crisis and establish full operations within 24
    hours of arrival, offering both waterside and shoreside security.
        The National Strike Force is a highly specialized rapid response
    unit equipped to handle major oil discharges, hazardous material
    releases, and Weapons of Mass Destruction incidents. The National
    Strike Force provides technical expertise, specialized equipment, and
    incident management support for complex environmental and security
    crises. The force is a critical national asset, capable of worldwide
    deployment to mitigate threats, manage containment and clean-up
    efforts, and provide crucial technical support to Federal on-scene
    coordinators.
        Regional Dive Lockers provide full-time diving capabilities for a
    variety of missions, including the security of ports and waterways,
    maintaining aids to navigation, and conducting ship husbandry and
    repair, often in extreme environments like remote polar regions.
        In a complex and evolving maritime environment, Coast Guard
    Deployable Specialized Forces are critical to America's national and
    economic security. Most recently, these forces, supported by the
    Department of War, are combatting the threat of ``dark fleet tankers,''
    used to illegally transport sanctioned oil. In these high-stakes, at-
    sea operations, these forces are prepared to execute complex opposed
    boardings.
        In the Western Hemisphere, these teams are also leaders in drug
    interdiction, a mission that accounts for a significant portion of
    their operational focus. Teams frequently deploy on U.S. and allied
    naval vessels to intercept a variety of drug-smuggling conveyances.
    These range from high-speed ``go-fast'' boats to sophisticated, hard-
    to-detect, self-propelled semi-submersibles. The interdiction of these
    vessels is a core component of the effort to dismantle the powerful
    transnational criminal organizations and foreign terrorist
    organizations that threaten American communities.
                           maritime drug interdiction
        Maritime drug trafficking remains one of the most direct threats to
    U.S. homeland security and public safety. As directed by the President,
    the Coast Guard is on the front lines securing the global supply chain
    against drug trafficking and reducing the availability of illicit drugs
    that devastate American communities. Narco-terrorists exploit maritime
    routes to move drugs, generate enormous profits, and fuel violence,
    instability, and crime. These revenues are increasingly leveraged by
    hostile actors and transnational networks to fund human trafficking,
    weapons smuggling, sanctions evasion, and other malign activities that
    destabilize regions and drive illegal migration. The Coast Guard is
    often the only agency with the authority, capability, and presence to
    act at sea. The Coast Guard interdicts more illicit drugs than all
    other Federal law enforcement agencies combined.
        Since January 2025, the Coast Guard seized over 511,000 pounds of
    cocaine from the maritime domain--representing over 189 million
    potentially lethal doses. This all-time historic high more than doubles
    the amount of cocaine removed in fiscal year 2024 and nearly triples
    the removals from fiscal year 2023. These seizures save American
    taxpayers over $10 billion in social programs, including over $2.3
    billion in health care costs from cocaine interdictions alone.
        Combating fentanyl and its illegal precursor chemicals remains one
    of the administration's top priorities, and the Coast Guard has taken
    significant action in this effort. Fentanyl is the leading cause of
    U.S. drug-related deaths since 2016, accounting for approximately 70
    percent of drug overdose deaths in 2023. Mexican narco-terrorists are
    the primary source of the synthetic opioid flow into the United States.
    Accordingly, the Coast Guard leverages its broad authorities to seek
    out and interdict both fentanyl and its precursor chemicals. On January
    31, 2025, Commandant Admiral Lunday directed immediate action to
    bolster these operations, focusing on interdicting precursor chemicals
    and disrupting the revenue streams that fund fentanyl trafficking.
                               illegal migration
        The Coast Guard also secures 220 river miles along the Rio Grande,
    from the Gulf of America to West Texas, part of the U.S. Southern
    Border, and the maritime approaches to San Diego. These areas continue
    to experience a sustained and above-average rate of illegal maritime
    migration. This vector presents a persistent threat characterized by
    continuous smuggling attempts and is targeted through the Coast Guard's
    Operation Border Trident, on the southwest maritime border, and
    Operation River Wall, along the Rio Grande in Texas, both of which seek
    to achieve 100 percent control of the southern maritime border.
    Trafficking organizations in this region primarily utilize high-speed
    boats, jet skis and other personal watercraft, and additional makeshift
    watercraft. Although a variety of nationalities are encountered, the
    overwhelming majority of those interdicted are Mexican nationals.
        The maritime approaches to the southeastern United States are also
    a leading vector for illegal maritime migration. Most of the migrants
    encountered originate in Cuba, Haiti, Mexico, or the Dominican
    Republic, utilizing established transit corridors. Cuban and Haitian
    migrants typically journey toward Florida, either directly or through
    the Bahamas. Meanwhile, Dominican and some Haitian groups often cross
    the Mona Passage to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. They
    attempt these journeys on a wide array of vessels, from coastal
    freighters and high-speed ``go-fast'' boats to dangerously crude,
    homemade rafts.
        The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy have a
    parallel focus to control migration, stop drug flows, and strengthen
    stability and security on land and sea in the Western Hemisphere. Under
    the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard
    maintains a robust and forward-leaning posture to combat illegal
    immigration. In 2025 we interdicted, deterred, or transported 11,713
    aliens illegally attempting entry. This was 120 percent more than in
    2024. Our persistent presence both serves to deter departures from
    countries of origin and enables a rapid response to suspicious vessels,
    in close coordination with our international, Federal, State, and local
    partners. To enhance this posture, we utilize advanced unmanned
    systems, such as long-range unmanned aerial systems, surface drones,
    and small aerial drones launched from our over-the-horizon boats, to
    provide persistent surveillance and support shore patrols.
                                   conclusion
        Maritime drug trafficking, illegal migration, and dark fleet
    tankers are distinct challenges, but they share a common feature: each
    exploits the maritime domain to evade law enforcement and
    accountability. Through its unique and enduring law enforcement
    authorities, the Coast Guard directly confronts these threats--securing
    and defending the Nation's borders and maritime approaches every day.
        These threats are evolving, and the demands placed on the Coast
    Guard continue to increase. The Coast Guard's layered security model--
    leveraging forward presence, elite capabilities, an exceptional
    workforce, and unmatched legal authorities--allows us to address risks
    far from U.S. shores before they reach our homeland.
        The changes under way through Force Design 2028 are already
    accelerating enduring change and showing measurable results. By
    empowering our workforce and enhancing the ways we conduct our patrols
    and inspections, recent operations resulted in the seizure of more than
    511,000 pounds of cocaine valued at more than $3.8 billion. These
    outcomes demonstrate both the effectiveness of our authorities and the
    return on investment they provide.
        Since 1790, in peace and in war, a ready Coast Guard has been an
    indispensable element of national security. With continued
    Congressional support, the Coast Guard will remain prepared to meet
    today's challenges and build a more resilient and capable Service for
    decades to come.
        I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and look forward to
    your questions. Semper Paratus.

        Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Admiral Barata.
        I now recognize Ms. MacLeod for 5 minutes to summarize her
    opening statement.

    STATEMENT OF HEATHER MAC LEOD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
             JUSTICE TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. MacLeod. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Carter, and
    Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    be here today to discuss GAO's work, examining Coast Guard
    maritime security operations.
        These operations may be carried out by specialized forces
    units which have the training and capabilities needed to handle
    drug interdiction, terrorism, and other threats. My testimony
    today focuses on persistent challenges Coast Guard faces in
    carrying out missions, including those involving specialized
    forces units and actions that GAO's work has identified to help
    Coast Guard address them.
        We have made dozens of recommendations to the Coast Guard
    to help address key challenges, like staffing shortfalls,
    declining availability of vessels and aircraft, and acquisition
    issues.
        Regarding Coast Guard staffing shortfalls, in recent years
    the Coast Guard has raised concerns that its mission workload
    has outpaced its work force levels. Staffing gaps, particularly
    in specialized units like tactical law enforcement teams, can
    hinder drug interdiction efforts, counterterrorism operations,
    and missions.
        While the service recruited more enlisted service members
    than it lost in 2024, that had not been the case in years
    prior. In April 2025, we reported that, even with the increase
    in recruiting, the service remained short of its enlisted work
    force target. As a result, the Coast Guard was operating below
    the work force level it deemed necessary.
        We made three recommendations to help address these
    challenges, including that the Coast Guard develop a clear plan
    to support its retention initiatives. Specific to specialized
    forces, in 2019 we reported that the Coast Guard has taken
    steps to create a maritime law enforcement career path which
    helped them retain qualified personnel.
        We also reported that the Coast Guard might not have the
    right mix and number of specialized forces to meet mission
    demands. For example, we reported that officials from some
    specialized forces units were underused, while others were so
    busy that they had to turn down operations.
        In November 2024, the Coast Guard acknowledged that
    significant overlap in mission and mission capabilities related
    to specialized forces exist. Continued analysis remains
    important, as the Coast Guard needs to establish a Deployable
    Specialized Forces command as part of Force Design 2028.
        Another challenge I would like to highlight is vessel and
    aircraft availability, assets that specialized forces are often
    deployed from. The condition of Coast Guard assets has been in
    a state of decline for decades. Our work has shown a concerning
    trend that the cost of maintaining these assets is increasing
    at the same time that their availability is decreasing.
        For example, in June we reported that operation
    availability of cutters that the Coast Guard relies on for its
    maritime security operations declined. We also reported that
    increasing maintenance challenges have led to cutters missing
    patrol obligations. These readiness challenges are not limited
    to cutters.
        In a separate report, we found that Coast Guard aircraft
    were not available for missions as often as the service deemed
    necessary. We made 10 recommendations in these reports to
    address cutter and aircraft challenges.
        Finally, our work has noted that acquisition program delays
    have been a long-standing challenge for the service and
    continue to affect the availability of Coast Guard assets.
        For example, the Coast Guard's newest cutters, the offshore
    patrol cutter and the polar security cutter, are intended to
    support maritime security operations. But we found that
    combined these two programs are years behind schedule and
    billions of dollars over their initiative cost estimates. We
    have made dozens of recommendations on how Coast Guard can
    better manage acquisition programs.
        In conclusion, the Coast Guard specialized forces units
    include a range of capabilities that are vital to the service's
    ability to fulfill its missions. However, the Coast Guard faces
    significant challenges that can hinder its maritime security
    operations.
        Addressing our recommendations in these areas will help to
    ensure the Coast Guard is effectively and efficiently using
    available resources to carry out these operations and support
    national interests.
        This completes my prepared statement, and I would be
    pleased to answer any questions you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. MacLeod follows:]
                     Prepared Statement of Heather MacLeod
                           Tuesday, February 3, 2026
    coast guard.--actions needed to address challenges that hinder maritime
                              security operations
                                 gao-26-108901
        Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and Members of the
    Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's work
    examining Coast Guard maritime security operations and challenges. The
    U.S. Government has identified transnational and domestic criminal
    organizations as a significant threat to the public, law enforcement,
    and national security. The Coast Guard--a multi-mission, maritime
    military service within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--is
    the Nation's lead Federal maritime law enforcement agency. To help
    carry out certain maritime security missions, the Coast Guard maintains
    Deployable Specialized Forces (Specialized Forces) units with the
    capabilities needed to handle drug interdiction, terrorism, and other
    threats to the U.S. maritime environment.\1\ These units deploy from
    their home locations, such as major U.S. port areas, to conduct
    operations in U.S. coastal waters and internationally. Certain units
    can carry out operations from vessels, such as Coast Guard cutters and
    Navy ships, or air assets, such as Coast Guard helicopters.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ See 6 U.S.C.  468(a) (Coast Guard missions).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        According to the Coast Guard, its presence--vessels, aircraft, and
    Specialized Forces--serves as an enforcement mechanism and deterrent to
    illicit activity that contributes to instability throughout the Western
    Hemisphere. Figure 1 shows Coast Guard personnel conducting a drug
    interdiction operation that included a Specialized Forces member
    boarding a foreign, semi-submersible vessel, which resulted in seizing
    17,000 pounds of cocaine.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        My statement today discusses challenges the Coast Guard faces
    related to its maritime security operations and actions that could help
    address those challenges. This statement is based primarily on seven
    GAO reports published from November 2019 to January 2026.
        For the reports we cite in this statement, among other
    methodologies, we analyzed Coast Guard policies, documentation, and
    data, and interviewed officials from agency headquarters and selected
    field units. More detailed information on our scope and methodology,
    including analyzing data and determining a sufficient level of
    reliability for our reporting, can be found in the reports we cite in
    this statement. For this statement, we also reviewed information on the
    status of agency implementation of selected recommendations through
    January 2026. (See appendix I for related open recommendations as of
    January 2026.)
        We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
    accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
    standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
    sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
    findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
    the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
    conclusions based on our audit objectives.
     several challenges hinder coast guard efforts to conduct its maritime
        security operations, which the service has yet to fully address
        Our prior work has identified several longstanding challenges that
    have hindered the Coast Guard's ability to meet its mission demands,
    including those conducted by Specialized Forces. These include: (1)
    staffing shortfalls and workforce planning, (2) availability of vessels
    and aircraft, and (3) acquisition of new assets.\2\ The Coast Guard
    received nearly $25 billion in supplemental funding in fiscal year 2025
    for various acquisitions and in support of efforts to modernize
    operations and capabilities and faces the difficult decision of
    determining how best to invest these resources.\3\ We have made
    recommendations to help the Coast Guard address these challenges and
    effectively and efficiently use its resources.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Persistent
    Challenges Hindering Efforts to Counter Illicit Maritime Drug
    Smuggling, GAO-24-107785 (Washington, DC: Sept. 19, 2024). GAO,
    Offshore Patrol Cutter: Coast Guard Should Gain Key Knowledge Before
    Buying More Ships, GAO-26-107583 (Washington, DC: Nov. 25, 2025).
        \3\ Pub. L. No. 119-21, tit. IV,  40001, 139 Stat. 72, 127 (2025).
    These funds are available for obligation through fiscal year 2029.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Staffing Shortfalls and Workforce Planning
        Our prior work has shown that staffing shortfalls and poor
    workforce planning have affected the Coast Guard's ability to meet its
    mission needs, including for maritime security missions that
    Specialized Forces support. While the service recruited more enlisted
    service members than it lost in fiscal year 2024, it experienced net
    enlisted staffing losses from fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year
    2023. In April 2025, we reported that even with the increase in
    recruiting, the service remained approximately 2,600 service members,
    or 8.5 percent of its total enlisted workforce, short of its enlisted
    workforce target at the end of fiscal year 2024.\4\ As a result, the
    Coast Guard was operating below the workforce level it deemed necessary
    to meet its operational demands. We made 3 recommendations, including
    that the Coast Guard develop a clear plan to support its retention
    initiatives. The Coast Guard agreed with our recommendations, and we
    continue to monitor their implementation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ GAO, Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address
    Service Member Retention Issues, GAO-25-107869 (Washington, DC: Apr.
    23, 2025).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Specific to Specialized Forces, in November 2019 we reported that
    the Coast Guard had taken steps to improve retention of these
    personnel.\5\ Prior to a 2007 reorganization, active-duty Coast Guard
    personnel working in Specialized Forces units could not remain in those
    units and be competitive for promotions, according to Coast Guard
    officials we interviewed for that review. Officials told us that this
    was because the Coast Guard has certain requirements for career
    progression, including personnel working in various assignments within
    a given career path. After the reorganization, the Coast Guard created
    a maritime law enforcement career path within Specialized Forces in
    response to challenges the service faced in retaining law enforcement
    personnel. Coast Guard officials we spoke with told us that the career
    path has helped them retain qualified Specialized Forces personnel.
    According to the Coast Guard's Force Design 2028 plan, retention of
    Specialized Forces remains a priority.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ GAO, Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces'
    Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap
    or Gaps in Capabilities, GAO-20-33 (Washington, DC: Nov. 21, 2019).
        \6\ U.S. Coast Guard, Force Design 2028 Execution Plan Summary
    (July 2025). Force Design 2028 is a U.S. Coast Guard strategic
    initiative aimed at modernizing the service into a more agile, capable,
    and responsive maritime force to meet evolving operational demands by
    2028. It focuses on 4 key areas--People, Organization, Technology, and
    Contracting/Acquisition.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Further, we have previously reported that the Coast Guard might not
    have the right mix and number of personnel relative to the mix and
    number of operations where Specialized Forces are needed to meet
    mission demands. For example, in November 2019 we reported that
    officials from some Specialized Forces units we interviewed indicated
    that they experienced periods of underutilization.\7\ An official at
    one unit described efforts to increase the number of operations the
    unit conducted by asking other Coast Guard units to request them for
    specialized assistance. Officials at another unit conducted similar
    outreach, including passing out flyers describing Specialized Forces
    capabilities and contact information should the other Coast Guard units
    need assistance. In contrast, similar units turned down operations
    because of a lack of available personnel. For example, officials from a
    different Specialized Forces unit described instances where they had to
    decline operations because they did not have enough personnel to meet
    the demand.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ GAO-20-33.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As a result, we made two recommendations. We recommended that the
    Coast Guard conduct a comprehensive analysis of its Specialized Forces'
    workforce needs and that it assess the extent to which unnecessary
    overlap or duplication exist. We reported that without an analysis of
    the Specialized Forces units as a whole, the Coast Guard did not have
    reasonable assurance that it has the requisite number of personnel in
    the right units to conduct the required missions. While the Coast Guard
    agreed with the recommendation to conduct a comprehensive analysis of
    its workforce, it did not agree to assess the extent to which
    unnecessary overlap or duplication exists. Nevertheless, the Coast
    Guard contracted a study in 2022 to conduct an analysis of Specialized
    Forces' ports, waterways, and coastal security mission. This addressed
    both of our recommendations by providing the service with better
    information for that mission priority.\8\ However, in November 2024 the
    Coast Guard acknowledged that its study did not address all missions or
    Specialized Forces units, and that significant overlap in mission and
    mission capabilities exist. Such continued analysis remains important,
    particularly as the Coast Guard moves to establish a Deployable
    Specialized Forces Command to optimize Specialized Forces' unique
    capabilities as part of Force Design 2028.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ RAND Corporation, Mission Analysis of U.S. Coast Guard
    Deployable Specialized Forces (Dec. 2022).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Regarding Specialized Forces' deployment with Coast Guard cutters
    and helicopters, we have also identified gaps in cutter and aircraft
    workforce planning. Figure 2 shows Specialized Forces conducting
    vertical deployment training from a Coast Guard helicopter.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        In June 2025, we reported that cutters often deploy without a full
    crew due to personnel shortages.\9\ We recommended that the Coast Guard
    collect and assess data on staff availability for the cutter workforce.
    DHS did not agree with this recommendation, but we maintain that it
    remains valid and could help ensure the Coast Guard is fully
    considering the workload faced by cutter crews and support personnel
    when making decisions on personnel assignments. We also previously
    reported on Coast Guard resource shortfalls and incomplete workforce
    planning for its aviation workforce. As a result, we recommended that
    the Coast Guard assess and determine the aviation workforce levels it
    requires to meet its mission needs. DHS concurred with this
    recommendation and stated that the Coast Guard would conduct workforce
    analyses for its air stations by June 2026.\10\ Until such analysis is
    completed, the Coast Guard will not fully understand the resources it
    requires for its aviation units.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ See GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Cutter and
    Maintenance Workforce Challenges, GAO-25-107222 (Washington, DC: Jun.
    25, 2025). Specifically, our analysis showed that 1,104 cutter crew and
    support positions were vacant (about 13 percent) in fiscal year 2024.
    This is an increase from fiscal year 2017, in which 401 cutter crew and
    support positions were vacant (about 5 percent).
        \10\ GAO, Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce
    Assessments Needed, GAO-24-106374 (Washington, DC: Apr. 9, 2024). The
    Coast Guard agreed with our recommendation. We also made four other
    recommendations in the report and the Coast Guard concurred with all
    four. As of August 2025, four of the five recommendations remain open.
    We will continue monitoring Coast Guard's efforts to address these
    recommendations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Vessel and Aircraft Availability
        The Coast Guard's vessels and aircraft have faced availability
    challenges and have been in a state of decline for decades, which can
    limit the ability of Specialized Forces to conduct their missions.\11\
    Overall, the total number of operational hours generally decreased, and
    the total estimated operating expenses generally increased from fiscal
    year 2017 through fiscal year 2024, as shown in figure 3.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ Vessel and aircraft availability challenges hinder the Coast
    Guard's ability to meet mission demands. For example, in January 2026,
    we reported that during fiscal years 2015 through 2024, the Coast Guard
    generally did not meet its drug or migrant interdiction goals. We also
    found that the service did not fully share information about lessons
    learned from maritime migrant interdiction with Federal partners. We
    made two recommendations to DHS to address these issues and will
    monitor Coast Guard actions to fully address them. See, GAO, Coast
    Guard: Actions Needed to Improve Maritime Interdictions, GAO-26-107440.
    (Washington, DC: Jan. 13, 2026).

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        In June 2025, we reported that the operational availability of the
    Coast Guard's Medium Endurance Cutters, which the Coast Guard relies on
    for its law enforcement missions, declined from fiscal year 2020
    through fiscal year 2024.\12\ We also reported that the Coast Guard was
    experiencing increasing cutter maintenance challenges, and that those
    increasing challenges, such as equipment failure and resulting
    unplanned maintenance, have led to cutters missing patrol obligations.
    For example, Coast Guard operational reporting documents indicated that
    unplanned maintenance, among other things, had significantly reduced
    the capacity of Medium Endurance Cutters to conduct missions. Further,
    due to delays in receiving critical parts needed for repairs, the Coast
    Guard cannibalized cutters by moving working parts between cutters.
    According to Coast Guard data, there were 194 cannibalizations
    completed across the cutter fleet from February 2022 to September 2024;
    145 of these involved National Security Cutters--which mostly support
    the drug interdiction mission. As a result, in June 2025 we made five
    recommendations to address cutter maintenance and workforce challenges.
    For example, we recommended that the Coast Guard systematically collect
    and assess data on instances where previously deferred maintenance may
    have caused cutter equipment failures and develop mitigation strategies
    as appropriate. DHS agreed with this recommendation and described steps
    the Coast Guard plans to take to improve its processes to document,
    develop, and validate the efficacy of a new cutter maintenance metric,
    which it plans to use to develop the recommended assessment. DHS
    estimates completing these efforts by June 2027. We will continue to
    monitor the status of this and the other recommendations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ GAO-25-107222.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Coast Guard's asset readiness challenges are not limited to its
    cutters. In April 2024, we reported that the Coast Guard's aircraft
    generally did not meet its 71 percent availability target during fiscal
    year 2018 through fiscal year 2022.\13\ Coast Guard officials
    attributed the aircraft fleet generally not meeting availability
    targets to maintenance and repair challenges. As a result, we made five
    recommendations, including that the Coast Guard assess the type and
    number of helicopters, and aviation workforce size, needed to meet its
    mission demands. In response, in August 2025, the Coast Guard told us
    an analysis of alternatives and a fleet mix analysis are being ordered.
    It anticipates completing these steps by December 2027. We will
    continue monitoring Coast Guard's efforts to address these
    recommendations, as well as the other recommendation that remains
    unaddressed.\14\ See appendix 1 for more information on open GAO
    recommendations to DHS pertaining to Coast Guard personnel and assets,
    as of January 2026.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ GAO-24-106374. We further reported that the Coast Guard was
    embarking on a significant operational change from a largely short-
    range helicopter fleet to a medium-range fleet. However, we reported
    that its related planning efforts raised serious questions, including
    how the medium-range helicopters will interact with cutters for its
    drug interdiction operations.
        \14\ The Coast Guard has addressed one of the five recommendations.
    In April 2024, we found that the Coast Guard's air stations do not have
    complete data for the Coast Guard to assess service-wide readiness. We
    recommended that the Coast Guard should establish procedures to
    uniformly collect and maintain air station readiness data. The Coast
    Guard concurred with this recommendation and in April 2025 updated its
    operational reporting manual to, among other things, help standardize
    the collection of air station readiness data. The manual requires air
    stations to report periods when they cannot meet readiness requirements
    and provides examples on how to do so. By issuing updated guidance
    requiring air stations to uniformly collect and maintain aircraft
    readiness data, the Coast Guard can help ensure it has complete and
    accurate information on Coast Guard-wide air station readiness.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Acquisition Programs
        We have previously reported that the Coast Guard's declining asset
    availability is exacerbated by persistent challenges it faces managing
    its planned $40 billion acquisition programs to modernize its vessels
    and aircraft. For example, in September 2024 we reported on the
    declining availability of the Coast Guard aircraft fleet and found that
    the Coast Guard's cutter program faces persistent challenges including
    capability gaps from schedule delays.\15\ Furthermore, officials told
    us that they would not be able to increase mission activity without
    acquiring more assets, but acquisition delays have been a long-standing
    challenge for the service. Furthermore, according to officials, the
    acquisition process is lengthy, as it can take several years from
    initial request to final delivery of an asset.\16\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ GAO-24-107785.
        \16\ GAO-26-107440.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        One of the Coast Guard's highest-priority programs--the Offshore
    Patrol Cutter--has experienced delays that will exacerbate maritime
    capability gaps.\17\ According to the Coast Guard, it urgently needs
    Offshore Patrol Cutters to replace aging cutters that conduct law
    enforcement and search-and-rescue operations.\18\ However, in November
    2025, we reported that the Coast Guard's plan to acquire 25 Offshore
    Patrol Cutters was delayed by more than 5 years.\19\ Notwithstanding
    delays, ship design remains incomplete, and continued delays and cost
    overruns are likely.\20\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ In June 2023, we found that the Coast Guard's management of
    its Offshore Patrol Cutter acquisitions continued to face challenges we
    had previously identified. We made five recommendations to the Coast
    Guard, including that it develop a technology maturation plan and
    update its acquisition policy to require programs to complete routing
    of distributive systems as part of functional design prior to lead ship
    construction. Two of the recommendations have not yet been fully
    addressed. See, GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter
    Program Needs to Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805
    (Washington, DC: Jun. 20, 2023).
        \18\ Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard,
    testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland
    Security, 118th Cong., 2d sess., July 24, 2024.
        \19\ GAO-26-107583. We also reported that the program is at risk of
    not meeting its cost goals, in part, because the program used outdated
    cost information to establish them.
        \20\ The Coast Guard plans to acquire the 25 Offshore Patrol
    Cutters in four phases. In July 2025, the Coast Guard terminated two of
    four ships from the first phase contract for default.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As a result, we made four recommendations in November 2025,
    including that the program stabilizes design before starting
    construction of additional ships. Incorporating the knowledge gained
    from testing--as well as other shipbuilding leading practices--into the
    procurement process could help the Coast Guard make better investment
    decisions. It could also improve the timeliness of future ship
    deliveries. While the agency agreed with two of the four
    recommendations, we maintain that all four recommendations are
    warranted and will continue to monitor their implementation.
        In summary, the Coast Guard's Specialized Forces units include a
    range of specialized capabilities that are vital to the service's
    ability to fulfill its missions, including those pertaining to maritime
    security operations. The Coast Guard received nearly $25 billion in
    supplemental funding in fiscal year 2025 for various acquisitions and
    in support of efforts to modernize operations and capabilities and
    faces the difficult decision of determining how best to invest these
    resources.\21\ We have identified long-standing challenges with the
    Coast Guard's management of its programs and tradeoff decisions among
    its mission priorities and have made recommendations to help address
    these challenges. Addressing our 20 open recommendations pertaining to
    the Coast Guard's workforce and assets would help ensure that the
    service efficiently uses its resources to carry out its maritime
    security operations--including those carried out by Specialized
    Forces--and support national interests.\22\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ Pub. L. No. 119-21, tit. IV,  40001, 139 Stat. 72, 127
    (2025). These funds are available for obligation through fiscal year
    2029.
        \22\ We made 26 recommendations in the reports covered by this
    statement. The Coast Guard implemented four of these recommendations,
    20 remain open, and two were closed as no longer valid.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and Members of the
    subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
    to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
                   Appendix I.--Related Open Recommendations
    Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Improve Maritime Interdictions. GAO-26-
            107440. Washington, DC: January 13, 2026.
       Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should
            ensure the Commandant of the Coast Guard implements performance
            measures for the migrant interdiction mission that effectively
            measure the service's efforts.
       Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should
            ensure the Operation Vigilant Sentry task force implements a
            process to identify and address lessons learned following real-
            world events and exercises with all relevant Federal partner
            agencies, and shares relevant information with those partners.
    Offshore Patrol Cutter: Coast Guard Should Gain Key Knowledge Before
            Buying More Ships. GAO-26-107583. Washington, DC: November 25,
            2025.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            ensure that the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program
            demonstrates that the stage 2 design is stable prior to
            authorizing construction of additional stage 2 OPCs by (1)
            completing basic and functional design, including routing of
            major distributive systems that affect multiple zones of the
            ship, in a 3D model with reliable vendor-furnished information
            and (2) successfully testing an integrated prototype of the
            davit in a realistic environment, consistent with shipbuilding
            leading practices.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard, in
            collaboration with the Navy, should develop a memorandum of
            agreement to clarify and document agreement on how the
            evaluation of deficiencies and on-going surveillance of
            Austal's EVM system will be coordinated between the Coast Guard
            and SUPSHIP throughout the duration of the OPC program.
       Recommendation.--The DHS Secretary should ensure that the
            DHS Under Secretary for Management directs the Coast Guard to
            revise the OPC acquisition program baseline to include cost
            goals for each stage.
       Recommendation.--The DHS Secretary should ensure that the
            DHS Under Secretary for Management directs the Coast Guard to
            document a plan for acquiring stage 3 OPCs that identifies (1)
            how results from operational testing of OPC stages 1 and 2 will
            be incorporated into stage 3 procurement activities, such as
            developing the request for proposals, and contingency plans if
            this testing is delayed; and (2) how leading practices for ship
            design will be incorporated into stage 3.
    Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Cutter Maintenance and Workforce
            Challenges. GAO-25-107222. Washington, DC: June 25, 2025.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            systematically collect and assess data on instances where
            previously-deferred maintenance may have caused cutter
            equipment failures and develop mitigation strategies as
            appropriate.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            complete Ship Structure and Machinery Evaluation Boards for all
            cutter types at the intervals prescribed by policy.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            systematically collect and assess data on which parts and
            systems across the cutter fleet are or will become obsolete and
            develop mitigation strategies as appropriate.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            systematically collect and assess data on cutter days lost due
            to unplanned maintenance issues.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            regularly collect and analyze data on staff availability for
            cutter crew and support personnel positions, including which
            cutter workforce positions are temporarily empty across the
            cutter fleet, and use this information to inform personnel
            assignments.
    Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address Service
            Member Retention Issues. GAO-25-107869. Washington, DC.: April
            23, 2025.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            ensure that the Office of Workforce Requirements, Systems, and
            Analytics implements additional mechanisms to increase response
            rates for its Career Intention Survey.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            ensure that the Office of Workforce Requirements, Systems, and
            Analytics analyzes the potential for nonresponse bias in its
            Career Intention Survey results.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            ensure that the Talent Management Transformation Program
            Integration Office develops a clear plan, including how
            retention initiatives align with strategic objectives and time
            frames and milestones for implementation, to track progress and
            gauge program performance.
    Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce Assessments Needed.
            GAO-24-106374. Washington, DC: April 9, 2024.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            establish a process to regularly evaluate Coast Guard-wide air
            station readiness data.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            assess the type of helicopters the Coast Guard requires to meet
            its mission demands, as part of an analysis of alternatives.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            assess the number of helicopters the Coast Guard requires to
            meet its mission demands, as part of a fleet mix analysis.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            assess and determine the aviation workforce levels it requires
            to meet its mission needs.
    Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to
            Mature Technology and Design. GAO-23-105805. Washington, DC:
            June 20, 2023.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            ensure that OPC program officials develop a technology
            maturation plan for the davit prior to builder's trials. This
            plan should identify potential courses of action to address
            davit technical immaturity, including assessing technology
            alternatives should the current davit continue to face
            development challenges, and a date by which the Coast Guard
            will make a go/no-go decision to pursue such a technology
            alternative.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            ensure that OPC program officials test an integrated prototype
            of the davit in a realistic environment prior to stage 1
            builder's trials.
                              Related GAO Products
        Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Improve Maritime Interdictions. GAO-
    26-107440. Washington, DC: January 13, 2026.
        Offshore Patrol Cutter: Coast Guard Should Gain Key Knowledge
    Before Buying More Ships. GAO-26-107583. Washington, DC: November 25,
    2025.
        Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Cutter Maintenance and
    Workforce Challenges. GAO-25-107222. Washington, DC: June 25, 2025.
        Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address Service
    Member Retention Issues. GAO-25-107869. Washington, DC: April 23, 2025.
        Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Challenges
    Hindering Efforts to Counter Illicit Maritime Drug Smuggling. GAO-24-
    107785. Washington, DC: September 19, 2024.
        Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce Assessments
    Needed. GAO-24-106374. Washington, DC: April 9, 2024.
        Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to
    Mature Technology and Design. GAO-23-105805. Washington, DC: June 20,
    2023.
        Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces' Workforce
    Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap or Gaps in
    Capabilities. GAO-20-33. Washington, DC: November 21, 2019.

        Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ms. MacLeod.
        Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their
    5 minutes of questioning. I will recognize myself for 5 minutes
    of questioning.
        Ms. MacLeod, your report is quite troubling, and so I would
    like to get to the root causes of this on staffing. Are you
    saying that the Coast Guard--the Coast Guard has a number of
    authorized positions, right? I mean, this is the number of
    people you should have, and are we short on the authorized
    positions, or do we need more authorized positions or both?
        I mean, what is your estimate of what we need in order to
    get the Coast Guard up to its strength, the strength that is
    needed in order to carry out its mission? More authorized
    positions or we just need to fill the ones that we have?
        Ms. MacLeod. At the time of our review, the Coast Guard was
    short of its authorized positions. Since then, in Force Design
    2028, the Coast Guard has plans to increase authorized
    positions, which we envision would have--they would have the
    same challenges in recruiting and retention with even more
    positions to fill.
        Mr. Gimenez. Are they short right now recruiting up to
    their authorized positions?
        Ms. MacLeod. At the time of our review, yes.
        Mr. Gimenez. Do you know that is still the case?
        Ms. MacLeod. The Coast Guard reported its highest
    recruiting numbers last year, and then it's on track to meet
    its targets.
        Mr. Gimenez. Which means filling every authorized position?
        Ms. MacLeod. Correct.
        Mr. Gimenez. OK. So now if we have the number of people
    that we need, the problem then becomes to the assets that they
    need in order to carry out their mission, which are the ships
    and the aircraft of the Coast Guard, correct?
        Ms. MacLeod. Yes.
        Mr. Gimenez. Right. So you're talking about ships and
    aircraft. Is it due to age? Is it due to the ships and the
    construction of them themselves? Is it due to the fact that we
    don't have enough maintenance personnel?
        What is causing the deficiency in the readiness of these
    assets?
        Ms. MacLeod. Our work has shown more recently the
    maintenance challenges facing these older cutters and aircraft
    are increasing.
        Mr. Gimenez. Because we don't have enough people or it's
    just a matter they're old and they're just breaking down more
    often?
        Ms. MacLeod. The age of the cutters. Some of the parts are
    unavailable, obsolete parts and things like that.
        Mr. Gimenez. And the--you're saying that the plan to
    replace these assets is way behind schedule and billions of
    dollars over?
        Ms. MacLeod. Yes.
        Mr. Gimenez. OK. That calls for another hearing, I guess.
        All right. So, Admiral--I got a couple of minutes left--
    what percentage of the sanctioned oil vessels that are out
    there, what percentage of them do you think that you actually,
    you know, interdict?
        Admiral Barata. Chairman, good morning. A very small
    percentage, frankly. We estimate that there is probably about
    6- or 800 sanctioned dark fleet vessels in and about--between
    Iran and Venezuela, China and Russia. We have interdicted about
    7, 8 over the last 2 months.
        Some other countries are starting to chip in. I think over
    in the Mediterranean, we've seen the British and the French do
    some things, but it's a very small percentage. They operate out
    of the rule of law and on a consistent basis.
        Mr. Gimenez. Six-to-eight hundred of these ghost ships?
        Admiral Barata. That's what we estimate operating around
    the world.
        Mr. Gimenez. Wow. OK. What makes it so difficult to spot,
    interdict, et cetera? Just assets or can you spot them or are
    they just completely off the radar?
        Admiral Barata. It's a combination of things, Chairman.
    They are--they obfuscate their position a lot of times. You
    know, all of our large commercial foreign vessels are required
    to use an automatic identification system. Many of these
    vessels have the means to easily have two or three sets of AIS
    aboard and kind-of project their position somewhere else.
        They use false documents, they use false ownership. They
    claim the numbers of vessels that have already been destroyed
    and taken apart in other places so that they look like they're
    another vessel. So even when we contract them, though, they are
    very hard to interdict.
        For instance, some of these vessels that we've seen in
    Venezuela, if they're coming from the Middle East or the Far
    East, they'll go around the south--the southern tip of Africa
    and go right into Venezuela.
        So without the right assets and the reasoning to board them
    on the high seas, it's very hard to get aboard. I think you've
    seen us do a lot of counter drug interdictions on smaller
    vessels and even in dhows over in the Middle East.
        You know, some of the vessels we're going on right now are
    1,100 feet long, very large crude carriers, very hard to
    interdict at sea without some support from the Department of
    War or other assets.
        Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. Thank you. I yield now.
        I now recognize Mr. Carter from Louisiana for his 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Barata, let's discuss the recent boardings of oil
    tankers. First, I want to note that this committee has
    requested a Classified briefing on these operations, and we
    haven't received one yet. I hope we can work to make that
    happen in the near future.
        My question concerns the video that administration has
    posted on some of these operations. I understand it may be good
    PR, but I want to make sure that we're not broadcasting
    sensitive tactics or the identities of our special operators to
    our enemies, putting them in harm's way.
        Is the Coast Guard being given the opportunity to review,
    and, if necessary, redact or block any of these videos before
    they share it with the world?
        Admiral Barata. Ranking Member, good morning. We see a lot
    of this footage before it goes out, not all of it. It depends.
    Some of it is Department of War footage, some of it is
    Department of Homeland Security, but it's all being processed
    through the White House.
        I think they are taking a close look at protecting the
    identity and the tactics that our teams use.
        Mr. Carter. I think the best way to do that, obviously, is
    to have you guys involved. I won't put you in the middle of
    that, but, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we, where possible,
    request that the administration has heightened sensitivity of
    the protection of our men and women who are carrying out these
    highly-sensitive operations, just to be sure that in our haste
    to bring public awareness that we don't put our service men and
    women in harm's way.
        As you know, one of the oil tankers the Coast Guard
    recently targeted, the Bella 1, later renamed the Marinera, was
    able to bypass U.S. forces and escape into the Atlantic. While
    the Coast Guard--while the Coast Guard pursued it, Russian
    military reportedly began repositioning naval assets as a
    submarine to protect the ship from seizure.
        Thankfully, U.S. forces eventually intercepted the tanker
    without incident, but the episode raises some questions about
    the potential impacts of these boardings. While enforcing
    sanctions is important--and we all can agree we do not want to
    inadvertently escalate into direct hostilities with nations,
    including Russia--what contingency plans are in place when the
    Coast Guard is pursuing these vessels and might encounter
    foreign military vessels?
        What are the rules of engagement your forces are operating
    under, and would you please, if you run out of time, if we can
    back this up with some written documentations on the actual
    policies that we have for the rules of engagement?
        Admiral Barata. Ranking Member, thanks for the question
    there.
        I--as far as the risks and the protocols and the
    contingencies in place, we put stringent security measures,
    stringent contingency measures in place. In the case of the
    Bella 1, we worked closely with our Department of War partners
    over at EUCOM. You know, as far as Russian assets--Russian
    military assets, deployers, we ensured that we weren't at risk
    of anything happening there. We were never, you know, concerned
    at the risk level with Russian deployers impacting our ability
    to conduct those law enforcement activities.
        We can give you a little bit more--you mentioned a
    Classified briefing, sir. We'd be happy to do that, and we've
    prepared that, and we can set up a time; we'd like to come over
    and talk to you a little bit more about it.
        Mr. Carter. That would be great.
        So without going into anything that might be confidential
    or might be--that we should do in a more secure setting, the
    contingency plan of what happens in the case of meeting some
    other resurgence that may have bigger power or anticipated--
    maybe even an ambush, we should always, obviously--and I'm
    preaching to the choir, but talking from a Member of Congress'
    standpoint. We want to make sure that we're giving you all the
    tools that you need in our quest to capture these illegal
    vessels, that we never put at risk our men and women in uniform
    who are out doing an incredible job.
        I can't thank you enough for the incredible work that you
    do, not just when the cameras are rolling, as they've been
    doing most recently, but when no one is watching. Rather, it is
    search and rescue or capturing these tankers, we know that the
    work of the Coast Guard is vast. You guys have been phenomenal
    partners for us in Louisiana, particularly in the aftermath of
    these horrific storms that we continue to have facing our
    communities.
        You're sitting before Congress. Tell us, what can we do--
    and my time is already up. But if you could just finish, tell
    us what we can do to arm you better. If you had a magic wand
    that you could wave today, recognizing that this committee,
    particularly this one in a bipartisan vein, wants to give you
    the tools that you need to carry out your functions safely.
        Admiral Barata. Ranking Member, I think the No. 1 thing
    that you can give us is resources. I think under the
    Reconciliation Act, we have tried to get after some of the
    things that Ms. MacLeod highlighted, assets.
        What we need on an annual basis is the O-E money, the
    operating funds to hire more personnel to operate these ships
    to do our Deployable Specialized Forces missions and also
    sustain those assets as we move forward. We really appreciate
    your support.
        Mr. Carter. Thank you, Rear Admiral.
        Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired.
        I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.
        Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank the witnesses for showing up to this
    subcommittee on front-line defenders, how the Coast Guard's
    Deployable Special Forces combat narcoterrorists and other
    maritime threats on high seas.
        Admiral, when we talk about Deployable Specialized Forces,
    are we primarily talking about VBSS?
        Admiral Barata. We're talking about a group of teams, which
    includes our Maritime Security Response Team, our--both forces
    team that deploy domestically and internationally, our Port
    Security Units that do expeditionary. There's a number of units
    that fall under that category for us.
        Mr. Crane. OK. Thank you, Admiral. I have a little bit of
    experience with VBSS myself. I was on a VBSS team on the USS
    Gettysburg a couple decades ago. My last job in the Navy was in
    the SEAL teams. My job was to train and coach SEALs on the West
    Coast on how to do VBSS. So a little bit of experience with
    what you guys are doing, and I appreciate--I know that's a very
    complicated mission set, and I appreciate all the hard work
    that you guys do.
        Admiral, I want to ask you if you believe that the
    President of the United States, the Commander in Chief, under
    Article II of the Constitution has broad Executive powers for
    maritime security? Do you recognize that, sir?
        Admiral Barata. Yes. Yes, I recognize that.
        Mr. Crane. Do you recognize that the President made direct
    maritime interdictions when enforcing sanctions or national
    security measures, Admiral?
        Admiral Barata. Yes, I do. We follow that.
        Mr. Crane. OK. So one of the things that's concerned me as
    a former service member myself is a video that was made by
    Senator Mark Kelly and several other Senators who just a couple
    months ago, they made a video to tell service members that they
    don't need to follow unlawful orders.
        Admiral, are you familiar with this video?
        Admiral Barata. I have not seen the video itself. I was
    following the news story, obviously, and the escalation of the
    dissension.
        Mr. Crane. It made national news, did it not, Admiral?
        Admiral Barata. It did, indeed.
        Mr. Crane. Did you or any of the other high-ranking Coast
    Guard officers that you work with fear that a video like that
    might undermine your chain of command?
        Admiral Barata. From my standpoint, I have found that our
    service members will follow lawful orders if they--you know, as
    given.
        Mr. Crane. You know, I find it interesting, Admiral, that I
    didn't see any videos made like that from Members of Congress
    during the Biden administration.
        I want to submit an article for the record. This is from
    CNN. ``Biden finalizes new rules for U.S. drone strikes.''
    President Joe Biden assigned a long-awaited Classified policy
    tightening the rules for the CIA and Pentagon to carry out
    deadly drone strikes and commando raids conducted outside of
    traditional war zones, U.S. officials said on Friday. This was
    October 7, 2022.
        Did you notice that no Members of Congress, including
    Senator Kelly, made any videos during this time, Admiral?
        Admiral Barata. I was--I'm not familiar with that article.
        Mr. Crane. But you didn't see any videos, did you? I
    didn't.
        Admiral Barata. Not that I recall, no.
        Mr. Crane. As service members, we tend to follow these
    types of things, right?
        Admiral Barata. Yes.
        Mr. Crane. I found that very interesting, that they weren't
    making videos during that time frame about whether or not
    service members follow lawful orders or not.
        I think we all know that, right, Admiral? Don't we get that
    training in basic training, that we are not supposed to follow
    unlawful orders?
        Admiral Barata. Absolutely. At all the session sources,
    that is what we train our personnel.
        Mr. Crane. So did you find that video a little bit odd,
    knowing that we all know that?
        Admiral Barata. I find that it's--you know, for me, as I
    reflect on it, I think it's unnecessary. I think our personnel
    will know to follow lawful orders and to question unlawful
    orders.
        Mr. Crane. Yes. That's what I thought, too.
        Admiral, you guys--Congress delivered for you guys in a
    pretty big way during the reconciliation package. Is that
    correct?
        Admiral Barata. That is absolutely correct.
        Mr. Crane. We gave you about $25 billion. Is that correct?
        Admiral Barata. Yes. Generational change for the Coast
    Guard, Congressman.
        Mr. Crane. You guys had about $7 billion in maintenance
    backlog for infrastructure. Is that correct?
        Admiral Barata. Yes, that's correct.
        Mr. Crane. How do you see the Coast Guard deploying that
    money to make sure that the Coast Guard is ready to carry out
    the Nation's national security and homeland security needs in
    the next couple years?
        Admiral Barata. We--under Force Design 2028, Congressman,
    we have reorganized to ensure that the Coast Guard can obligate
    all of those funds quickly. We're not waiting for the 5 years
    that they are available to us. We want to spend those right
    away on maintenance, on shore infrastructure to get after the
    problems that we have.
        Mr. Crane. Thank you. My last question for you, Admiral, is
    do you feel in the last couple months with the boat strikes and
    everything else going on, do you feel like you have given
    orders to your men to carry out any of these--any of these
    strikes, any of these interdictions that have been deemed
    unlawful?
        Admiral Barata. The Department of War has had to lead for
    these kinetic strikes. The Coast Guard has not been involved
    with them. So I can answer that we have not. I have not felt
    that way at all.
        Mr. Crane. Thank you, Admiral.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Gimenez. I thank the gentleman from Arizona. Are you
    submitting that report for the record?
        Mr. Crane. Yes.
        Mr. Gimenez. Without objection.
        [The information follows:]
                 Biden Finalizes New Rules for US Drone Strikes
    Oct 7, 2022
    By Katie Bo Lillis
        President Joe Biden has signed a long-awaited classified policy
    tightening the rules for the CIA and the Pentagon to carry out deadly
    drone strikes and commando raids conducted outside of traditional war
    zones, US officials said on Friday.
        With only Iraq and Syria still considered by the US to be so-called
    areas of active hostilities--or conventional war zones--the new policy
    is geared toward countries like Somalia, Yemen and now, Afghanistan,
    where the US continues to carry out counterterrorism strikes from afar.
        In practice, the new policy signals that the US is limiting its
    reliance on drone strikes, once a ubiquitous counterterrorism tool that
    has drawn increased criticism in recent years in the wake of a series
    of high-profile revelations about civilian casualties.
        The new policy requires the president's approval before a lethal
    drone strike or commando raid can be launched on a particular
    counterterrorism target, according to a senior administration
    official--and that individual must be named, although the policy does
    allow the president to waive that and other requirements at his
    discretion. The president must also approve which groups in which
    countries are considered to have potential targets as members.
        The New York Times first reported on the new rules.
        It also institutionalizes a series of standards for taking action
    against a target, including that counterterrorism operators must
    establish with ``near certainty'' that there will be no civilian
    casualties in the strike, and that the target poses a continuing,
    imminent threat to the United States.
        The policy also requires operators to obtain permission from the
    State Department's chief of mission in the country in question, the
    senior administration official said.
        White House Homeland Security adviser Liz Sherwood-Randall, who
    spearheaded the nearly 2-year review which led to the new policy, said
    in a statement that the guidance ``directs [the Biden] Administration
    to be discerning and agile in protecting Americans against evolving
    global terrorist challenges'' and ``requires that U.S. counterterrorism
    operations meet the highest standards of precision and rigor, including
    for identifying appropriate targets and minimizing civilian
    casualties.''
        In Syria and Iraq, where the US maintains a military presence,
    commanders in the field will continue to have more discretion on
    operational decisions.
        Biden had quietly put in place many of the limitations that the new
    policy now formalizes when he took office. The policy now officially
    reverses a loosening of Obama-era rules under then-President Donald
    Trump, which had pushed authority for approving lethal strikes down the
    chain of command.
        ``I think this is overwhelmingly a return to a rigorous process, to
    an intel-heavy consideration of targets and [an] intense role for the
    president himself in approving the use of this particular tool,'' the
    senior administration official told CNN.
        Some counterterrorism operators and analysts have likely chafed at
    the tightened restrictions, sources familiar with the deliberations
    over the new rules say. But the broader shift in US priorities away
    from counterterrorism and toward competition with China and Russia--and
    the increased political scrutiny on civilian casualties--to a certain
    degree makes the changes inevitable, these people said.
        The new policy follows a separate Pentagon initiative announced in
    August designed to help reduce the number of civilians killed and
    injured by US military operations, particular drone strikes.
        The US military has been criticized for years for killing civilians
    in drone strikes but came under increased scrutiny after the military
    conducted a botched strike during the chaotic withdrawal from
    Afghanistan last August that killed 10 civilians, seven of them
    children.
        The department also faced criticism over a 2019 airstrike in Syria
    that killed multiple civilians. The military acknowledged the deaths in
    that strike in November 2021, after The New York Times reported them.
    The department ultimately held no one accountable for the 2019 strike.
        The Pentagon action plan is tasked with building a framework that
    will put people who are trained to consider civilian harm issues
    throughout the military, both in combatant commands and at more senior
    levels of the Defense Department.
        US military drone strikes have dramatically decreased in recent
    years in many of the countries that the new policy impacts. According
    to data maintained by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies,
    there have been no US drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen since 2018
    and 2019, respectively. In Somalia, US drone strikes in Somalia have
    dropped precipitously since Biden took office.
        But although the military is required by Congress to disclose data
    about its counterterrorism strikes, including civilian casualties, the
    CIA is not--making it much more difficult to judge how its operations
    have shifted over time.
        Some former intelligence officials take it a step further, claiming
    that CIA drone strikes kill far fewer civilians that the military's--
    but because the agency's figures aren't public, and outside groups that
    track drone strike casualties say the US military routinely undercounts
    its collateral deaths, an accurate comparison is difficult to draw.

        Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the gentlewoman from South
    Carolina, Mrs. Biggs, for her 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much. Thank you to our witnesses
    for being here today.
        I'll direct my first question to Admiral Barata. So Force
    Design--and I may overlap a little bit with Congressman Crane,
    but hopefully it will kind-of go in a different direction.
        So the Force Design 2028 outlines a plan to modernize the
    Coast Guard and to expand deployable capabilities. So how does
    Force Design 2028 aim to expand the recruitment of DSF
    personnel and set up training centers to equip the future of
    the DSF work force? For instance, some--does the Special
    Mission Training Center have the capacity to support that
    growth?
        Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, good morning. So under Force
    Design 2028, we do intend to expand our work force by 15,000
    personnel. That will include personnel to man the ships that
    you've helped us acquire, the aircraft, but it will also be
    operators for our unmanned systems and also our Deployable
    Specialized Forces.
        So we intend to grow, and we envision a very agile,
    adaptable work force that includes a lot of Deployable
    Specialized Forces. The Special Missions Training Center is a
    real valuable part of that. Our MLEA Academy in Charleston is
    also a big part of that for our baseline law enforcement, and
    then the FMTC is more of our advanced tactics.
        You know, we'll--we plan to make some investments there. We
    need some assistance with the infrastructure there, the number
    of personnel who are training, the type of training that we do,
    some of these vertical insertion tactics that we use for VBSS.
        So those type of things are the ones that we need,
    Congresswoman.
        Mrs. Biggs. Thank you. My second question, what are the
    details on the Coast Guard's standup of a DSF command, and why
    is it necessary and what value does it add?
        Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, I appreciate that question.
        For us--and in response to Ms. MacLeod's work at GAO and
    her colleagues, we have taken a look at DSF, and we think we
    need to unify the command structure for all of our forces
    there. We have seen functional commands work over in Department
    of War, like SOCOM and JSOC and some of these other functional
    commands. We have seen it work for us as well for our Coast
    Guard Cyber Command.
        So we think that unifying these elements will help us man,
    train, equip, deploy our specialized forces in a better way,
    equip them in a better way, you know, whether that's, you know,
    travel money, whether that's funding for weapons, specialized
    tactics, all of those things.
        We think that putting that under one header will help us be
    a lot more efficient.
        Mrs. Biggs. Great. I'll go a little bit further. What is
    the anticipated size of the command, and where might it be
    located?
        Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, we're still early in that.
    We are hoping by October to have a location.
        We do have a team put together that's making some
    proposals, and we're going to base some of the factors on, you
    know, can we deploy out of there, can we command out of there,
    can we support the operational commander, but we have not
    narrowed that down.
        The exact size still is to be determined. We don't plan to
    move any of our current units, any of our Deployable
    Specialized Forces, the units themselves. What we do expect is
    a command element that can focus on the training, that can
    focus on the funding and the equipping, and how we deploy them.
        Mrs. Biggs. Well, I'll just end since my time is about to
    expire. But I thank you for your service and for what you do. I
    have a huge respect for you and am very grateful. So thank you.
        Admiral Barata. Thank you, Congresswoman.
        Mrs. Biggs. I'll yield back.
        Mr. Gimenez. The gentlewoman yields back.
        I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Van Epps.
        Mr. Van Epps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral
    Barata and Director MacLeod, for being here today.
        The United States has the best Armed Forces in the world,
    and as we've heard already, the Coast Guard's Deployable
    Specialized Forces are one of the most agile. Seeing their work
    in the public eye recently has been gratifying, and I want to
    thank you, Admiral Barata, for the part the Coast Guard has
    played in making our country and the waters around us safer.
        The DSF is often the tip of the spear in actions that can
    quickly become interagency operations. When a DSF unit boards a
    vessel, for example, the service members may need to quickly
    loop in interagency partners as they find illegal cargo.
        Admiral, can you walk us through the maritime operational
    threat response process used to manage the moving pieces of
    interagency coordination between the Coast Guard, Department of
    Justice, State, and the Department of War and others?
        Admiral Barata. Congressman, good morning. Yes. So the--our
    process there for counter drug for these dark shadow fleets are
    very similar.
        Once we get aboard, the first thing we do is we want to
    establish the nationality of the vessel, and we then have to
    call back to the motor process. The motor process, what that
    involves is the entirety of the interagency, Department of
    State, Department of Justice, other elements, maybe even in the
    case of the tankers, Department of Energy, up to the White
    House. So that we ensure that we are following international
    law and that we are able to exercise U.S. law and authorities
    aboard the vessel.
        So, for instance, when we board a drug vessel, we'll call
    back to the motor process, and we'll either engage one of our
    bilateral agreements that we have or we will go back to the
    Department of State to call that individual country and assess
    whether or not they agree, concur with the vessel's claim, or
    they're allowing us to operate on a vessel that's under their--
    subject to their authority.
        So on the tankers we're doing something similar. Once we do
    that, we know we're in a good position to follow the law.
        Mr. Van Epps. Great. Thank you. Are there gaps that exist
    between the Coast Guard and these interagency partners when
    conducting operations, and is there anything we can do in
    Congress to help close any of those gaps?
        Admiral Barata. We've found that it's been very successful
    in practice. As I've said, we had our largest counter drug year
    last year in fiscal year 2025, 511,000 pounds over 3 times some
    of our previous years. Our tanker operations, I will tell you
    the motor process has been vital for us--for our success here.
        But there's no gaps that I can see right now, Congressman.
        Mr. Van Epps. Great. Thanks. Thanks, Admiral. Pivoting
    here, the Trump administration has prioritized Western
    Hemisphere security and law enforcement, such as enforcing
    sanctioned Venezuelan oil, and the Coast Guard has been a
    crucial part of the overall approach. In the past year, it has
    seized huge amounts of illicit substances and disrupted
    criminal networks.
        Admiral, can you talk about how criminal organizations are
    adapting to increased law enforcement operations in the
    Caribbean and East Pacific?
        Admiral Barata. Congressman, I can give you a couple
    examples. We've talked about the dark fleet tanker operations.
    You know, the use of those--of those that have--the funds and
    revenue that come from the oil that's being sold overseas is
    then replicated back in and put into the organizations. So we
    have seen that.
        We've seen that revenues from illegal fishing, from illegal
    arms sales, human smuggling. Those are all being used to feed
    drug networks. They're being used to then come back and rearm
    and re-resource some of the traffickers for semi-submersibles
    and those type of assets that are--that they know are really
    hard to find at sea. So we've had to adjust our tactics as we
    go.
        Mr. Van Epps. One follow-up to that. How are the Coast
    Guard's maritime on your--to that note, how are your maritime
    drug interdiction operations changing, and what do you need to
    continue adapting to new trends?
        Admiral Barata. I think what we need is exactly what
    Congress has given us, and we need to obligate those funds. We
    need more cutters, we need more unmanned systems, we need more
    intelligence programs.
        You know, I think what last year showed us, you know, for
    Operation Pacific Viper over in the Eastern Pacific, that when
    we have a cutter like a national security cutter that has a
    hitch arm, a helicopter on the back with precision marksmen and
    the right small bullets over the horizon, the right
    intelligence, and the right tactical teams aboard to gather the
    evidence that we need, we are very effective in stopping the
    drug traffickers.
        Mr. Van Epps. Admiral, thank you so much. Thank you for
    what you do.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields back.
        I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony. The
    Members having no further questions, the Members of the
    subcommittee may have some additional questions for the
    witnesses, and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these
    in writing pursuant to Committee Rule VII(E). The hearing
    record will be held open for 10 days without objection.
        The subcommittee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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