[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SMARTER BORDERS, SAFER NATION: EXPANDING
THE USE OF NON-INTRUSIVE INSPECTION TECH-
NOLOGY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
BORDER SECURITY
AND ENFORCEMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 22, 2026
__________
Serial No. 119-36
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-556 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Chair Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Eric Swalwell, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida J. Luis Correa, California
August Pfluger, Texas Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Member
Gabe Evans, Colorado Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Brad Knott, North Carolina James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia
Vince Fong, California Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Al Green, Texas
Vacant
Keighle Joyce, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT
Michael Guest, Mississippi, Chairman
Tony Gonzales, Texas J. Luis Correa, California,
Elijah Crane, Arizona Ranking Member
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Julie Johnson, Texas
Brad Knott, North Carolina James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex Al Green, Texas
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Natasha Eby, Subcommittee Staff Director
Brieana Marticorena, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Michael Guest, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Border
Security and Enforcement:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border Security and Enforcement................................ 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Ms. Diane J. Sabatino, Acting Executive Assistant Commissioner,
Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Ms. Hilary M. Benedict, Director, Science, Technology
Assessments, and Analytics, U.S. Government Accountability
Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Michael Guest for Diane J. Sabatino...... 33
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Diane J.
Sabatino....................................................... 34
Questions From Ranking Member J. Luis Correa for Diane J.
Sabatino....................................................... 35
Questions from Chairman Michael Guest for Hilary M. Benedict..... 42
SMARTER BORDERS, SAFER NATION: EXPANDING THE USE OF NON-INTRUSIVE
INSPECTION TECHNOLOGY
----------
Thursday, January 22, 2026
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael Guest
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Guest, Crane, Biggs, Correa,
Johnson, Walkinshaw, and Green.
Also present: Representatives Thompson and Magaziner.
Mr. Guest. Good morning. Welcome to the Subcommittee on
Border Security and Enforcement's hearing on U.S. Customs and
Border Protection's use of non-intrusive technology, or NII, at
our borders. The committee will come to order. Without
objection, the Chair may declare the committee in recess at any
point.
Without objection, the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.
Magaziner, will be permitted to sit on the dais and ask
questions today.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine U.S. Customs and
Border Protection's Non-Intrusive Inspection Systems Program,
including its crucial role in detecting and preventing the
entry of contraband into the country. Additionally, we will
discuss the challenges and roadblocks in the deployment of NII
equipment as evidenced in the fall of 2025 Government
Accountability Office report that concluded the program must be
strengthened to achieve Congressional-mandated scan rates.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
CBP's non-intrusive inspection equipment uses technology to
locate concealed items such as drugs, weapons, or people in
vehicles and cargo. As cartels and other smuggling
organizations develop more sophisticated means of concealing
drugs and contraband, the Government must adapt to stay ahead
of these evolving threats, and the expansion of the NII program
will play a critical role in that effort. CBP managed the front
lines in our efforts to keep threats out of our country, and
NII has been an integral tool for CBP's mission. NII enables
CBP to detect and interdict contraband while minimizing the
impact to the flow of lawful trade and travel at our borders.
Pursuant to the Securing America's Port Act of 2021, CBP
was tasked to develop a plan to reach a 100 percent high
through NII scan rate at land ports of entry by 2027. As of
fiscal year 2024, CBP fell short of that goal, using NII to
examine approximately only 8 percent of passenger vehicles and
27 percent of commercial vehicles. These low scan rates can be
attributed partially to poor planning and mismanagement, from
acquisition to installation and the deployment of the NII
equipment. Reports from both the Department of Homeland
Security Office of Inspector General and the Government
Accountability Office have raised concerns with, No. 1, program
management and, No. 2, future outlook. NII program leaders have
assured oversight bodies that they have made changes to their
structure, staffing, management, and standards to ensure scan
rates reflect the amount of taxpayer dollars that the program
has received.
Ultimately, regardless of the prior shortcomings in the NII
program, the capabilities NII affords to our front-line
officers keeping our ports secure are invaluable. We must
continue to invest responsibly in this technology as we see
that this technology has a proven track record in facilitating
CBP's ability to protect and prevent smuggling into our
country.
Additionally, having just entered a year with record-low
illegal border crossings, CBP has the opportunity to invest
resources in developing and the deployment of security measures
along our border. Those measures include NII, which will
further strengthen our national security.
To aid in this effort, Congress provided a historic
investment in the budget reconciliation bill to enhance and
improve NII at our borders. With the appropriations of these
additional funds, Congress must provide additional oversight to
ensure this investment in the NII program is wisely and
efficiently allocated. I am cautiously optimistic that prudent
decisions from NII leadership within CBP, oversight from
Congress, and technological advances in industry will allow CBP
to achieve 100 percent scanning rates.
I would like to thank our witnesses for their participation
and for briefing Ranking Member Correa and myself prior to this
hearing. I look forward to working with my colleagues to
enhance and prioritize CBP's Non-Intrusive Inspection Program.
[The statement of Chairman Guest follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael Guest
January 22, 2026
Good morning! Welcome to the Subcommittee on Border Security and
Enforcement hearing on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's use of non-
intrusive inspection technology--or NII--at our borders.
CBP's non-intrusive inspection equipment uses technology to locate
concealed items such as drugs, weapons, or people in vehicles and
cargo. As cartels and other smuggling operations develop more
sophisticated means of concealing drugs and contraband, the Government
must adapt to stay ahead of these evolving threats, and the expansion
of the NII program will play a crucial role in this effort.
CBP mans the front line in our efforts to keep threats out of our
country, and NII has been an integral tool for CBP's mission. NII
enables CBP to detect and interdict contraband while minimizing the
impact to the flow of lawful trade and travel at our borders.
Pursuant to the ``Securing America's Ports Act of 2021,'' CBP was
tasked to develop a plan to reach a 100 percent high throughput NII
scanning rate at land ports of entry by 2027. As of fiscal year 2024,
CBP fell short of that goal, using NII to examine approximately only 8
percent of passenger vehicles and 27 percent of commercial vehicles.
These low scan rates can be partially attributed to poor planning
and mismanagement, from acquisition, to installation and deployment of
the NII equipment. Reports from both the Department of Homeland
Security's Office of Inspector General and the Government
Accountability Office have raised concerns with both (1) program
management and (2) outlook.
NII program leaders have assured oversight bodies that they have
made changes to their structure, staffing, management, and standards to
ensure scan rates reflect the amount of taxpayer dollars the program
has received.
Ultimately, regardless of the prior shortcomings in the NII
program, the capabilities NII affords to our front-line CBP officers
keeping our ports secure are invaluable. We must continue to invest
responsibly in NII technology. This technology has a proven track
record in facilitating CBP's ability to detect and prevent smuggling
into our country.
Additionally, having just ended a year with record-low illegal
border crossings, CBP has the opportunity to invest resources in
developing/deploying of security measures along our borders, including
NII, to further strengthen our national security.
To aid in this effort, Congress provided a historic investment in
the ``Budget Reconciliation Bill'' to enhance and improve NII at our
borders. With the appropriation of these additional funds Congress must
provide additional oversight to ensure this investment in the NII
program is wisely and efficiently allocated.
I am cautiously optimistic that prudent decisions from NII
leadership within CBP, oversight from Congress, and technological
advancements in industry, will allow CBP to achieve 100 percent
scanning.
I would like to thank our witnesses for their participation today,
and for briefing Ranking Member Correa and myself prior to this
hearing. I look forward to working with my colleagues to enhance and
prioritize CBP's non-intrusive inspection program.
Mr. Guest. I now recognize the Ranking Member, my friend,
the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa, for his opening
statement.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, my good
friend. Ms. Sabatino, Ms. Benedict, thank you for being here
today.
As a Member of this committee, I have had the opportunity
to visit all the ports of entry South border of the U.S. of New
Mexico. In those visits, I have had the opportunity to begin to
understand the job, the task that you have, the challenges. So
I have sat there, stood there with your agents in blue uniforms
and asked them about their challenges on an everyday basis.
One thing stood out clear to me, which is when you have a
car, when you have a vehicle coming across the border, the
challenge is you don't know who is in that car. You don't know
if it is a friendly, you don't know what that individual may
have in mind, which poses a lot of challenges for the
individuals in blue uniform. I think it is important that we
appreciate that it is not only your blue uniforms at the
border, but rather it is the result of working with other
agencies to make sure that you have the intel to know who is
coming to the border at that moment. That is the challenge that
we have today.
Ms. Sabatino, I want to talk to you about non-intrusive
inspection technology. I think I can speak for both the
Chairman and myself, but Democrats and Republicans support this
technology implemented at our border. But I think we have to
address a bigger picture issue, which is DHS, CBP, and ICE are
being deployed to the interior of our country and not doing the
job that they are supposed to do, which is protect our country
from things that are coming across the border and from foreign
terrorists, foreign elements that may pose a threat to our
Nation.
We recently had Renee Nicole Good shot and killed by an ICE
agent in Minnesota. I have had many stories from my district
about American citizens, some being blinded because of the
behavior of some of these agents. Today, Ms. Sabatino, the
administration is focused on mass deportations, in my opinion,
at the expense of our national security. So much focus on
deportations. I have spoken to many folks that work with you,
other departments within the U.S. Government that tell me right
now the focus is deportations and not what DHS was supposed to
focus on.
As you know, DHS was created after 9/11. The goal was to
protect Americans from future terrorist attacks. Thousands of
Americans died 9/11. I remember that day. I couldn't believe it
was happening in front of my eyes. DHS was created to stop one
of those attacks from happening.
Back home I check with my local law enforcement. One of the
individuals I check with is my local sheriff, Don Barnes, who
runs a local Orange County Fusion Center. He has told me many,
many times that his concern is the focus on deportations has
left a lot of empty doors--a lot of open doors in our national
security that could be exploited by those that want to do our
Nation harm.
Not only are we leaving doors open, so to speak, in our
national security picture, a lot of those agents are now
terrorizing our communities, immigration agents going after not
only immigrants, but American citizens now. Last night, I got
another phone call from the district, another challenge. This
administration has essentially redirected thousands of agents
from Homeland Security, from the mission of protecting our
country, to deportations. Not only Homeland, but FBI, DEA, CBP,
all are now converging on deportations.
As you know, the President of the United States promised
that he would be going after the worst of the worst. That is
not the case today. He is going after immigrants, hardworking
immigrants, nannies, construction workers, anybody they can get
their hands on, people that essentially are providing valuable
services and work to this great country. The administration is
no longer arresting criminals. They are sadly arresting U.S.
citizens. I see this on a daily basis.
I have young people in my district asking me, should we
carry a passport? I think the fact that they even have to ask
me that question is a sad testament to the situation in our
country. Some of those that actually carry the passport makes
no difference. They have been apprehended, taken in to double-,
triple-check their citizenship status.
It pains me to see what is going on in my district. Every
night I get phone calls. Not only undocumented, but American
citizens now being arrested, held, charges, alleged charges
dropped, but nonetheless, American citizens being held for a
number of days in custody.
Ms. Sabatino, I support what you do at the border. I have
worked with you for a number of years. I think you have a
tremendously hard job keeping drugs from coming into the
country, making sure that trade and commerce, good stuff,
continues to flow. We support non-intrusive technology. But
when I think of all the resources that should be focused on
helping you do your job, and instead they are focused on
American citizens, on undocumented immigrants that don't even
have a traffic ticket to their name, this is bothersome. As
people back home who voted for President Trump tell me this is
not what we thought we were going to get. We voted for an
individual that was supposed to deport criminals, not our
neighbors that have lived among us for so many years.
I am hoping that as we move forward, this committee, my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle, as well as we do an
investigation of what is really going on. Ms. Sabatino, you
have been in uniform for 30 years-plus. I trust that you have
essentially put into place good practices at the border, how to
manage the border, how to treat American citizens. But I am sad
to report that today in the United States, American citizens
are being terrorized. I look forward to hearing your testimony
today, ma'am.
Ms. Benedict, I look forward to hearing from you as well.
But as we focus on a certain technology, we got to pull back
and look at the big picture. As General Kelly, former Homeland
Security Secretary, used to say, border security does not end
or begin at the border. It is a holistic approach to protecting
this great country.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield.
Mr. Guest. Thank you.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full committee
from the great State of Mississippi, Congressman Thompson, to
give an opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
welcome our panel of witnesses here this morning. I look
forward to your testimony.
I am particularly pleased to see CBP here to answer
questions. With the violent immigration enforcement activities
occurring in communities, I expect Members will have plenty of
questions for you, Ms. Sabatino, today. I understand you
oversee some of the officers participating in these activities.
In fact, we have a photo of your officers participating in a
raid in Massachusetts.
The notice topic today is about non-intrusive inspection
equipment. I want to be clear, I have long pushed for the full
deployment of these scanners at our ports of entry to prevent
dangerous drugs and other illicit goods from entering the
country. There are real concerns with the acquisition and
rollout of that equipment and I will continue to engage with
CBP on that. We need to make sure taxpayers dollars are
invested effectively.
However, right now, the American people are demanding
answers about what is happening in our cities. They want to
know what immigration agents are being instructed to do. We
have all seen the horrific videos from Minnesota, Chicago, Los
Angeles, New Orleans, and other areas. The Trump administration
is occupying and terrorizing American communities in the name
of immigration enforcement. That is what needs to be our focus
today. I do not understand how my Republican colleagues can sit
here and pretend it isn't happening.
It has been 1 year since President Trump was sworn into
office. It is clear that he, along with his corrupt crew, don't
care about public safety or national security. President Trump
and his administration have not made us safer or stronger as a
Nation. In fact, he has done the opposite. Just look at
Minneapolis. I can't believe anyone could claim those violent
actions are making the city safe. Most citizens there will
probably tell you they have never felt more unsafe.
Masked Federal agents are roaming the streets asking people
of color for their papers to prove their citizenship, including
young children in Minneapolis who are walking home alone just
yesterday. If they don't have them or don't respond quickly,
they are violently arrested and whisked away to unknown
locations.
That same thing is happening to those who dare to film
them, even though that is a protected activity. This is an
assault on everyone's civil rights and civil liberties. I still
can't quite believe that my Republican colleagues, who were
appalled about wearing a mask during COVID, are just fine being
told that their constituents must carry their passports on them
at all times. Because if an immigration officer can detain a
citizen in Minneapolis who doesn't have their passport on them,
they can just as easily detain any one of us in this room or
any one of the people we are here representing. This is not OK.
None of us should think of it as acceptable.
Citizens and non-citizens alike are being harmed by this
administration. We saw an ICE agent shoot and kill a mother of
3 in broad daylight. An immigration agent, including CBP, have
shot at least 11 other people since the start of this Trump
administration.
In addition to the shootings, we have seen aggressive and
violent tactics by ICE and CBP depicted in over-the-top action
movies. A military-style raid in Chicago targeted residents in
an apartment building in the middle of the night. Beyond the
flashbang grenades and agents rappelling from helicopters,
witnesses saw children in their underwear zip-tied together in
vans. Other residents, including U.S. citizens and military
veterans, were also zip-tied for hours. This is not what our
country stands for. The American people are taking notice. They
see the Trump administration and DHS is more focused on an
anti-immigrant agenda than improving the lives of our citizens.
I heard the Ranking Member, Mr. Correa, and his passionate
comments. You know, as a person of color, I had to go through
some things in Mississippi as a young Black boy and I thought
those kinds of activities were past. But what I see occurring
with people of color, Black, Brown, whatever, is not who we are
as a country.
I want law enforcement to follow the law. I now find out
that you can just break into somebody's house now without a
warrant. We are a better country than this. I was brought up to
respect law enforcement and I want law enforcement to do their
job, but respect civil rights and civil liberties of anyone in
this country.
So I think we are at a juncture in this country that is
concerning to a lot of us. I hope as we pursue some remedy for
this endeavor, we can all get back on the same page.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
January 22, 2026
I'm particularly pleased to see CBP here to answer questions. With
the violent immigration enforcement activities regularly occurring in
communities, I expect Members will have plenty of questions for you,
Ms. Sabatino, today. I understand you oversee some of the officers
participating in these activities.
The noticed topic today is about non-intrusive inspection
equipment. I want to be clear--I have long pushed for the full
deployment of these scanners at our ports of entry to prevent dangerous
drugs and other illicit goods from entering the country. There are real
concerns with the acquisition and rollout of that equipment. And I will
continue to engage with CBP on that--we need to make sure taxpayer
dollars are invested effectively. However, right now the American
people are demanding answers about what is happening in our cities.
They want to know what immigration agents are being instructed to do.
We've all seen the horrific videos from Minnesota, Chicago, Los
Angeles, New Orleans, and other cities. The Trump administration is
occupying and terrorizing American communities in the name of
immigration enforcement. That is what needs to be our focus today. I do
not understand how my Republican colleagues can sit here and pretend it
isn't happening.
It's been 1 year since President Trump was sworn into office. It's
clear that he, along with his corrupt crew, don't care about public
safety or national security. President Trump and his administration
have not made us safer or stronger as a Nation. In fact, he's done the
opposite.
Just look at Minneapolis. I can't believe anyone could claim those
violent actions are making the city safe. Most citizens there will
probably tell you they've never felt more unsafe. Masked Federal agents
are roaming the streets asking people of color for their papers to
prove their citizenship. And if they don't have them or don't respond
quickly, they are violently arrested and whisked away to unknown
locations.
The same thing is happening to those who dare to film them. Even
though that is a protected activity. This is an assault on everyone's
civil rights and civil liberties. And I still can't quite believe that
my Republican colleagues who were appalled about wearing a mask are
just fine being told that their constituents must now carry their
passports on them at all times.
Because if an immigration officer can detain a citizen in
Minneapolis who doesn't have their passport on them, they can just as
easily detain any one of us in this room. Or any one of the people we
are here representing. This is not ok. None of us should think it is
acceptable.
Citizens and non-citizens alike are being harmed by this
administration. We saw an ICE agent shoot and kill a mother of 3 in
broad daylight. And immigration agents--including CBP--have shot at
least 11 other people since the start of this Trump administration. In
addition to the shootings, we've seen aggressive and violent tactics by
ICE and CBP usually depicted in over-the-top action movies.
A military-style raid in Chicago targeted residents in an apartment
building in the middle of the night. Beyond the flashbang grenades and
agents rappelling from helicopters, witnesses saw children in their
underwear zip-tied together in vans. Other residents, including U.S.
citizens and military veterans, were also zip-tied for hours.
This is not what our country stands for. The American people are
taking notice. They see the Trump administration and DHS is more
focused on an anti-immigrant agenda than improving the lives of our
citizens.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Ranking Member Thompson.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
I am pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
before us today on this important topic. Pursuant to committee
rule VIII(C), I would ask that our witnesses please rise and
raise their right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Guest. Thank you. Let the record reflect that the
witnesses have answered in the affirmative. Please be seated.
I would now like to take a moment to formally introduce our
witnesses. First, Ms. Diane Sabatino serves as the acting
executive assistant commissioner within the Field Office
operations at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. We also
have with us Ms. Hilary Benedict, who serves as the director of
the science technology assessments and analytics director
within the Government Accountability Office. I would like to
thank each of our witnesses for being here today.
Ms. Sabatino, I recognize you for 5 minutes to make an
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF DIANE J. SABATINO, ACTING EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION
Ms. Sabatino. Chairman Guest, Ranking Member Correa,
Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
how U.S. Customs and Border Protection uses non-intrusive
inspection technology, or NII, to secure our Nation's ports of
entry while enforcing lawful trade and travel. I'm honored to
represent the more than 35,000 men and women of CBP's Office of
Field Operations stationed at 328 ports of entry across the
Nation, with more than 800 men and women serving in 48
countries overseas.
Our front-line personnel work tirelessly to protect the
homeland. On a typical day they process more than 1 million
travelers and enable $10 billion in imported goods. At the same
time, they prevent the entry of inadmissible individuals, seize
illicit drugs, intercept contraband, illuminate and deliver
consequences to bad actors in the supply chain, prevent
biological threats from harming our communities and natural
resources, all while ensuring the efficient flow of lawful
trade and travel.
The Office of Field Operations plays a critical role in
national security. Our Nation's ports of entry are not only
gateways for lawful commerce and travel, they are also prime
targets for transnational criminal organizations and other bad
actors seeking to exploit the immense volume of cross-border
activity. In fiscal year 2025, for example, 75 percent of
illicit drugs seized by Customs and Border Protection at the
Southwest Border were intercepted at ports of entry.
NII is one of many tools that we use to secure our borders.
It's complementary to intelligence, K-9 teams, and targeting
systems, among many others in support of our most valuable
resource, which is our front-line personnel. All of these tools
relieve administrative burdens from our personnel, enabling
them to do what they do best, which is to determine intent and
increase situational awareness.
In fiscal year 2025 alone, CBP officers used NII systems to
scan more than 17 million sea containers, rail cars, and
vehicles. These inspections led to the interdiction of 110,000
pounds of narcotics, the seizure of 2.2 million in unreported
U.S. currency, and the apprehension of 66 undeclared
passengers.
While NII technology is a proven and powerful tool,
deploying these systems is not without challenges. Constraints
related to port infrastructure, real estate availability, and
the need to avoid interference with other detection systems can
be limiting as to where and how the systems are placed. To
address these challenges, we're continually reevaluating port
facilities, exploring opportunities for alternative placement
of the systems, and prioritizing deployments in areas with the
greatest operational impact.
From the beginning of our NII deployments, we have
deliberately gathered lessons learned and incorporated them
into a long-term comprehensive resource strategy. This strategy
strengthens acquisition planning, improves contract support,
and ensures systems are deployed where they will deliver the
greatest benefit to border security and trade enforcement.
With the support of Congress, we've made significant
progress in deploying our and enhancing our NII capabilities.
As of December 2, we had deployed 405 large-scale NII systems
at air, sea, and land ports of entry, including 67 new systems
added over the past 2 fiscal years. We're also enhancing our
NII operations through the integration of artificial
intelligence, which helps automate the analysis of the scanned
images, reduces the time needed for manual image review, and
allows us to focus our resources on the greatest risks.
Looking ahead, we remain committed to expanding our NII
capabilities and with funding provided by Congress, we plan to
deploy 38 additional systems by the end of this fiscal year.
These drive-through systems will allow United States to scan 40
percent of privately-owned vehicles and up to 70 percent of
commercial vehicles at Southwest Border land ports of entry,
significantly enhancing our ability to detect and interdict
threats.
As I mentioned earlier, NII is one of the critical
components of CBP's broader multilayered border security
strategy. With investments authorized through the Big Beautiful
Bill Act, we will enhance scanning capabilities and
recapitalize many of the existing mobile and fixed technologies
in the field today.
Our continued approach prioritizes the indispensable
expertise of our front-line personnel, including officers,
skilled trade specialists, and agriculture specialists, and
integrates all of the specialized tools and capabilities
available to us. Through the combined use of advanced
technology, canine teams, skilled personnel, as well as strong
partnerships with Federal, State, and international
stakeholders, CBP maintains a comprehensive and agile security
posture. This integrated approach not only enhances our ability
to address evolving and emerging security threats, but also
supports the efficient movement of lawful trade and travel
across our borders.
Thank you for your continued support of CBP's mission and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sabatino follows:]
Prepared Statement of Diane J. Sabatino
January 22, 2026
introduction
Chairman Guest, Ranking Member Correa, and distinguished Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) use of non-intrusive
inspection technology. This critical capability strengthens our ability
to continue securing our Nation's borders while facilitating the flow
of lawful trade and travel.
Under President Trump and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Secretary Noem's leadership, the CBP Office of Field Operations plays a
central, critical role in securing our Nation's borders. With nearly
34,000 highly-trained personnel, the Office of Field Operations is
CBP's largest component and oversees 328 ports of entry and 15
preclearance locations domestically and abroad, performing complex
customs, immigration, agriculture, and trade activities. Every day,\1\
the Office of Field Operations processes more than 1 million passengers
and pedestrians, facilitates the importation of nearly $10 billion in
goods, and collects nearly $600 million in duties and taxes. At the
same time, on average, we prevent the entry of nearly 1,200
inadmissible persons, seize more than 1,300 pounds of drugs, confiscate
$165,000 in illicit currency, and intercept 3 counterfeit documents.
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\1\ Average daily enforcement actions based on preliminary fiscal
year (FY) 2025 data.
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CBP's Office of Field Operations employs a dynamic, intelligence-
driven, law enforcement strategy that integrates advanced data
analysis, information sharing, and coordination with Federal, State,
and international partners to identify and disrupt threats. By
leveraging cutting-edge technologies such as non-intrusive inspection
systems, artificial intelligence, and facial biometrics, the Office of
Field Operations enhances its ability to detect contraband, verify
identities, and streamline inspections, all while maintaining the flow
of lawful trade and travel.
Today, I will provide an overview of CBP's non-intrusive inspection
technology, its role within CBP's broader security strategy, and the
progress made in deploying these critical assets. I will also discuss
the deployment and operational challenges we face and outline our plans
to address them as we continue to enhance our border security
capabilities and protect our communities from transnational threats.
border security threats at u.s. ports of entry
As CBP reasserts control of our borders in accordance with
President Trump's directives, transnational criminal organizations and
foreign terrorist organizations continue their efforts to smuggle
people, contraband, and other potentially harmful materials into the
United States. These organizations possess immense resources and
sophisticated capabilities and can adjust their concealment tactics to
evade detection by law enforcement.
Most illicit drugs seized by CBP, including fentanyl, are seized
during smuggling attempts at Southwest Border land ports of entry. In
fact, last fiscal year, approximately 75 percent of the total weight of
illicit drugs seized by CBP at the Southwest Border were seized at
ports of entry.\2\ Drug cartels and other transnational criminal
organizations conceal these drugs in passenger vehicles, commercial
vehicles, mail, and even on pedestrians.
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\2\ Of the 255,243 pounds of drugs CBP seized at the Southwest
Border in fiscal year 2025, 192,701 pounds were seized at land ports of
entry. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-seizure-statistics.
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To counter these threats, CBP's Office of Field Operations
continues to integrate law enforcement intelligence, data analysis, and
advanced detection technologies to enhance its ability to intercept
contraband and other potential threats. Among these capabilities, CBP's
non-intrusive inspection technology remains one of CBP's most effective
tools for detecting radiological materials as well as anomalies that
may indicate concealed contraband.
non-intrusive inspection technology as part of cbp's multi-layered
strategy
CBP employs a diverse range of non-intrusive inspection systems
tailored to the unique needs of our operational environments. Large-
scale systems are used at sea and land ports of entry to scan passenger
vehicles, commercial trucks, rail cars, and cargo containers. Small-
scale systems are used to scan baggage, mail, and parcels. Together,
these technologies provide a versatile and effective detection
capability across all operational environments.
Simply put, non-intrusive inspection allows CBP to ``see'' inside
vehicles, packages, cargo containers, and other conveyances without
physically opening or unloading them. Using advanced imaging
technologies, such as X-ray and gamma-ray, these systems detect
anomalies that may indicate the presence of illicit drugs, contraband,
or other threats.
The key advantage of non-intrusive inspection technology is its
ability to conduct thorough inspections quickly, efficiently, and
safely. This enables CBP to detect and interdict suspected dangerous
materials without causing unnecessary delays to lawful trade and travel
that physical inspections would cause.
Most of CBP's large-scale non-intrusive inspection systems are
deployed in secondary inspection operations at ports of entry, where
they are used to examine targeted or referred vehicles or shipments.
CBP leverages advance electronic shipping information, actionable law
enforcement intelligence, and CBP's Automated Targeting System to
identify high-risk shipments for inspection before they arrive at ports
of entry. This proactive approach allows CBP to allocate resources
efficiently and focus on the highest-priority threats, while
facilitating the critical flow of lawful goods into the United States.
To further advance the efficiency of our operations, CBP
prioritizes the implementation of drive-through operational concepts.
New non-intrusive inspection systems are positioned in pre-primary
inspection areas, allowing for a greater capacity of vehicles to be
scanned without interrupting traffic flows. The scans are transmitted
to remote command centers, where officers review the images in real
time for anomalies and flag those requiring secondary inspection. This
approach streamlines the vehicle inspection process and allows more
vehicles to be scanned.
The effectiveness of CBP's non-intrusive inspection systems is
clear. In fiscal year 2025, CBP officers used large-scale non-intrusive
inspection systems to scan over 17 million sea containers, rail cars,
and vehicles, resulting in the interdiction of 110,000 pounds of
narcotics, approximately $2.2 million in unreported U.S. currency, and
the apprehension of 66 undeclared passengers. Just this past November,
CBP officers at the Laredo-Colombia Solidarity International Bridge in
Laredo, Texas intercepted nearly 2,000 pounds of methamphetamine with a
street value of $16 million concealed in a commercial truck hauling
decorative items.\3\ These enforcement results underscore the critical
role of non-intrusive inspection technology in combating the smuggling
of illicit drugs.
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\3\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/cbp-officers-
seize-more-16-million-methamphetamine-colombia-solidarity.
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While non-intrusive inspection technology is a powerful tool, it is
just one component of CBP's broader multi-layered enforcement strategy.
This strategy provides our skilled personnel with advanced technology,
law enforcement intelligence, and partnerships to create a
comprehensive approach to border security.
A key example of this integrated approach is the work of CBP's
National Targeting Center, which integrates law enforcement
intelligence and data analysis to identify potential high-risk
shipments for inspection. Skilled trade specialists and CBP officers,
trained to operate and interpret non-intrusive inspection systems, play
a critical role in identifying suspect shipments. In addition, CBP
canine teams further enhance our detection capabilities and often work
alongside officers conducting inspection activities. These specially-
trained dogs can detect undeclared passengers, narcotics, unreported
currency, prohibited agricultural items, and other contraband.
Together, these resources form a multi-layered approach that
ensures that no single tool or capability is relied upon exclusively.
By combining technology, intelligence, and specialized personnel, CBP
adapts to emerging threats while maintaining the balance between
security and the facilitation of lawful trade and travel.
non-intrusive inspection technology investments and deployment plans
Congressional funding is instrumental in advancing CBP's non-
intrusive inspection system program. As of December 2, 2025, CBP has
deployed 405 large-scale non-intrusive inspection systems at air, sea,
and land ports of entry, including 67 fixed systems added during fiscal
year 2024, fiscal year 2025, and fiscal year 2026 to date. By the end
of fiscal year 2026, CBP plans to deploy 38 additional systems
currently under construction or in an active construction planning
phase. These drive-through non-intrusive inspection system deployments
are part of a multi-year effort to close the vehicle scanning capacity
gap and address high-priority threats.
Looking ahead, CBP has allocated more than $1 billion from the One
Big Beautiful Bill Act for the procurement and integration of new non-
intrusive inspection systems, artificial intelligence, and other
mission support capabilities.\4\ The President's fiscal year 2026
budget also requests $137 million to procure more systems and to
enhance non-intrusive inspection capabilities. These investments will
enable CBP to expand pre-primary non-intrusive inspection operations,
integrate systems, and implement artificial intelligence to reduce
manual image analysis to further increase security and enhance the flow
of legitimate trade and travel through ports of entry.
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\4\ Public Law 119-21.
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CBP's non-intrusive inspection system program represents a
tremendous investment in our border security capabilities, and we are
committed to maximizing the impact of these systems. CBP has ambitious
plans to expand the use of non-intrusive inspection technology and
increase scanning rates at our ports of entry. With current deployment
plans, CBP aims to scan 40 percent of passenger vehicles and 70 percent
of commercial vehicles at Southwest Border land ports of entry by the
end of fiscal year 2026.
CBP also has a recapitalization plan to replace aging non-intrusive
inspection systems, ensuring the continued functionality and
availability of this critical technology to support port of entry
operations. Replacing this equipment with the latest cutting-edge
technology is expected to increase our scanning capacity and improve
our ability to detect anomalies.
Despite its benefits, non-intrusive inspection technology faces
deployment challenges, including limited real estate at some ports of
entry and placement constraints to avoid interference with radiation
detection systems. CBP addresses these challenges by evaluating
facilities and infrastructure at ports of entry and exploring
innovative solutions to increase and improve scanning at these
locations.
conclusion
Non-intrusive inspection technology is an essential component of
CBP's layered enforcement strategy. It enables our front-line personnel
to focus on their critical border security mission, facilitate lawful
trade and travel, and protect American communities by disrupting
transnational criminal organizations that attempt to smuggle contraband
through ports of entry.
CBP will continue to implement President Trump's policies to
enforce the law, prevent criminals from entering our country, and
strengthen border security.
I want to take this opportunity to thank Congress for its
unwavering support of CBP's mission. Specifically, your commitment to
funding advanced technologies, such as non-intrusive inspection
systems, is instrumental in addressing the complex challenges we face
at our Nation's ports of entry. With your support, CBP will further
expand its non-intrusive inspection capabilities, enhance and modernize
data systems, and address infrastructure and technology challenges.
These advancements will enhance our ability to detect and interdict
threats, disrupt criminal and terrorist networks, and safeguard the
American people.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Ms. Sabatino.
I now recognize Ms. Benedict for 5 minutes to summarize her
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HILARY M. BENEDICT, DIRECTOR, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENTS, AND ANALYTICS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Ms. Benedict. Thank you. Chairman Guest, Ranking Member
Correa, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to talk about
CBP's non-intrusive inspection systems. My statement is based
on GAO's report on the topic issued in September 2025.
CBP has received more than $2 billion to deploy non-
intrusive inspection systems at land ports of entry. These
systems generally use X-rays to scan vehicles. Officers review
the images from these scans to identify anomalies and indicate
the presence of contraband. In 2021, the Securing America's
Ports Act directed CBP to develop a plan to scan 100 percent of
commercial and passenger vehicles and rail containers by 2027
using these systems.
CBP has made progress in deploying systems in pre-primary
inspection areas. For example, CBP determined it needed a total
of 434 systems and procured 153 systems for these areas; 52
were operational at the time of our review.
CBP's deployment of these systems has increased its rate of
scanning passenger and commercial vehicles at the Southwest
Border. Specifically, scanning rates for passenger vehicles
have increased from 2 percent in 2020 to 8 percent in 2024 for
passenger vehicles. For commercial vehicles, scanning increased
from 16 percent to 27 percent during this time.
However, 3 issues have prevented CBP from meeting the
requirement to scan 100 percent of commercial and passenger
vehicles and rail containers by 2027. The first issue is
planning. CBP's scanning plan does not include all land ports
of entry. Specifically, the plan does not include 9 Southwest
Border crossings. These 9 crossings together account for 40
percent of passenger vehicle crossings at the Southwest Border
and include 3 of the biggest border crossings: San Ysidro, Otay
Mesa, and Nogales. CBP officials said these sites are not
included in the current plans because they are still
determining how to overcome space issues at these sites.
In our September 2025 report, we recommended that CBP
determine how to include systems at all border crossings in its
deployment plans. CBP agreed with our recommendation and plans
to implement it by the end of fiscal year 2028.
The second issue that has prevented CBP from meeting the
scanning requirement is cost. CBP developed cost estimates for
deploying systems, but costs have exceeded those estimates.
These cost increases are due to a variety of factors such as
not accounting for all deployment costs in the original
estimates and unique construction challenges at each site. CBP
officials said they have received the funding they needed to
deploy the systems they have procured to date. However, CBP
will need additional funding to meet the 100 percent scanning
requirement because CBP needs to procure additional systems to
achieve its current plans and the estimate does not include
systems at the 9 border crossings that are not included in
CBP's plans.
The third issue that has prevented CBP from meeting the
scanning requirement is the schedule. Deployment of non-
intrusive inspection systems has taken longer than expected. At
the time of our review, CBP planned to complete deployment of
the systems it had procured for passenger and commercial
vehicles by the end of 2026 and for rail containers by the end
of 2029. However, it will take longer to achieve the 100
percent scanning requirement because the schedule does not
include the system CBP has not yet procured or the systems
needed for the 9 biggest crossings that are not included in
CBP's plan.
CBP officials told us that various factors have caused
schedule delays. For example, major upgrades were needed at
some sites, vendors have been slow to resolve deployment
issues, and site conditions such as interference with scanning
systems have required additional time to resolve. During our
review, CBP officials told us they were aware of these issues
and were working to resolve them. It will be important for CBP
to continue to address these issues as it deploys and operates
additional systems.
Moving forward, GAO will monitor CBP's implementation of
the recommendations we made in our September 2025 report. We
believe that addressing our recommendations would strengthen
CBP's management of its non-intrusive inspection systems and
its interdiction efforts to help achieve its mission.
This concludes my statement. I'm happy to answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Benedict follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hilary M. Benedict
Thursday, January 22, 2026
border security.--improvements needed to increase vehicle scanning at
land ports of entry
gao-26-108767
Chairman Guest, Ranking Member Correa, and Members of the
Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) non-intrusive inspection (NII)
systems. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), CBP is the
lead Federal agency charged with a dual mission of facilitating the
flow of legitimate travel and trade at U.S. borders while also keeping
terrorists and their weapons, criminals and their contraband, and
inadmissible people out of the country. As part of its
responsibilities, CBP coordinates the inspection and processing of
pedestrians, passengers, and cargo at land, air, and sea ports of entry
(POE).\1\
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\1\ POEs are facilities that provide for the controlled entry into
or departure from the United States. Specifically, a POE is any
officially-designated location (seaport, airport, or land border
location) where CBP officers or employees are assigned to clear
passengers, merchandise, and other items, collect duties, and enforce
customs laws; and where CBP officers inspect persons seeking to enter
or depart, or apply for admission into the United States, pursuant to
U.S. immigration and travel controls. A single land POE may be composed
of one or more crossings.
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Land POEs are a key drug smuggling route for transnational criminal
organizations. According to CBP, most illicit drugs, including
fentanyl, enter the United States through Southwest Border POEs hidden
in passenger vehicles or belongings, concealed in commercial vehicles,
and carried by pedestrians.\2\ To help detect illegal drugs and other
contraband, CBP uses large- and small-scale NII systems, like X-ray
machines, at land POEs to enable officers to inspect travelers and
their belongings, and vehicles and their contents, without the need for
unloading or disassembly.\3\
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\2\ James Mandryck, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Intelligence, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Protecting the U.S. Homeland: Fighting the Flow of
Fentanyl from the Southwest Border, testimony before the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border
Security and Enforcement (Washington, DC: July 12, 2023).
\3\ CBP officers use large-scale NII systems to scan entire
vehicles. The process produces an image that CBP officers review to
identify anomalies that may be an indication of contraband or hidden
people. CBP officers use small-scale NII systems to localize those
anomalies, among other things.
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Since 2019, CBP's NII program has received over $2 billion for NII
systems, which it has used to enhance inspections of commercial and
passenger vehicles and trains, and to increase the number of vehicles
that are scanned using large-scale NII systems as they enter the United
States. In 2021, the Securing America's Ports Act required CBP to
develop a plan to achieve 100 percent scanning of commercial and
passenger vehicles and freight rail entering the United States at land
POEs by 2027 using large-scale NII systems.\4\
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\4\ Securing America's Ports Act, Pub. L. 116-299, 134 Stat. 4906
(2021), codified at 6 U.S.C. 211 note.
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My statement today discusses: (1) how CBP assesses large-scale NII
system performance, (2) the status of large-scale NII system
deployment, and (3) CBP's plans for future large-scale NII system
deployments. This statement is based primarily on a report we published
in September 2025 in response to a request to review the implementation
and effectiveness of CBP's NII program.\5\
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\5\ GAO, Land Port Inspections: CBP Should Improve Performance Data
and Deployment Plans for Scanning Systems, GAO-25-107379 (Washington,
DC: Sep. 15, 2025).
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To inform that report, GAO analyzed NII program documentation,
including inspection procedures, performance data, and deployment
plans, and interviewed program officials. GAO also interviewed and
observed CBP officers conducting inspections at land POEs where large-
scale NII systems had been deployed in preprimary inspection areas.
More detailed information on the objectives, scope, and methodology for
that work can be found in the report. Our work was performed in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards.
background
CBP began using large-scale NII systems to scan vehicles in 1996
and has generally deployed them in secondary inspection areas at land
POEs. When deployed in secondary inspection areas, they are only used
to scan vehicles that were referred by CBP officers in primary
inspection. In 2020, CBP began deploying new large-scale NII systems in
preprimary inspection areas--before a traveler is interviewed by a CBP
officer, where vehicles are scanned before they reach the primary
inspection booth (see fig. 1). Previously, NII systems were generally
used only when an officer determined that further inspection was
required after the interview. Placing NII systems in preprimary
inspection areas significantly increases the number of vehicles scanned
because all vehicles approaching a primary inspection booth that do not
choose to go through an opt-out lane are scanned, rather than only
those referred for secondary inspection.\6\
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\6\ According to CBP officials, travelers may opt out of undergoing
a scan by an NII system in preprimary inspection by using an opt-out
lane to drive to the primary inspection booth, and officials at the
POEs have discretion as to how vehicle inspections are handled when
drivers choose to opt out.
As part of its overall inspection process, CBP uses large-scale NII
systems to scan vehicles. These scans produce images that are reviewed
by officers to identify any anomalies that might be contraband or
hidden people. If officers identify any anomalies, the vehicles undergo
further inspection, which can include the use of detection canines;
small-scale NII systems such as videoscopes to look into hard-to-reach
areas of vehicles or baggage scanners to scan vehicle contents to
localize the anomalies; and manual inspection procedures.
cbp assesses large-scale nii performance, but has not clearly defined
all key performance parameters
CBP collects and uses performance data to help ensure that its
large-scale NII systems are operational and available for use to scan
vehicles. For example, these data include a daily list of system
outages, and operational availability, which is the percentage of time
systems are available for use.
CBP uses performance data to inform actions it takes to improve NII
system performance. For example, CBP's fiscal year 2024 target for
system performance was for individual large-scale NII systems, and for
the average across all large-scale NII systems, to have an operational
availability of 95 percent or greater. However, in fiscal year 2024
just over half of individual large-scale systems met this target, while
the average across all large-scale NII systems was 90 percent. CBP
officials told us that CBP included penalty clauses in its new
maintenance contracts in September 2024, which are intended to improve
contractors' accountability for maintaining the targeted level of
operational availability.
In 2015, CBP established 3 key performance parameters for NII
systems. These include (1) meeting an average NII imaging system
operational availability of 95 percent, (2) inspecting 100 percent of
all designated high-risk commercial vehicles and containerized cargo,
and (3) maintaining 100 percent inspection of targeted containers,
cargo, and international mail. According to DHS guidance, key
performance parameters reflect the most important and non-negotiable
requirements that NII systems must meet to fulfill their purpose.
CBP collects data for operational availability and reports the
results in its annual operational analysis reports. However, as we
found in our September 2025 report, CBP has not clearly defined its
other two key performance parameters or reported their results in
operational analysis reports. Specifically, CBP has not clearly defined
what ``high-risk'' means for the inspection rate key performance
parameter or what maintaining 100 percent inspection of targeted
containers, cargo, and international mail means for the examination key
performance parameter. CBP officials said that because they are unclear
how CBP intended to define or measure these key performance parameters,
they have not reported data related to them.
Clearly defining its key performance parameters and using them for
reporting would enable CBP to determine whether large-scale NII systems
are working as intended. Doing so would also help CBP identify any
system deficiencies or possible cost savings, achieve its objectives
more efficiently and effectively, and help inform future procurement
decisions. In our September 2025 report, we recommended that CBP should
clearly define all NII key performance parameters and report
performance using them. The agency concurred with the recommendation
and said that its NII program will capture and clearly define system-
level key performance indicators and reporting requirements for NII
systems within new contract statements of work.
cbp has made progress deploying large-scale nii systems, but has
encountered increased costs and schedule delays
As part of its efforts to increase vehicle scanning at land POEs,
CBP is deploying additional large-scale NII systems in preprimary
inspection areas. Specifically, CBP is deploying low-energy portals
(LEP) in passenger vehicle preprimary inspection areas and multi-energy
portals (MEP) in commercial vehicle preprimary inspection areas. These
systems will allow CBP to scan vehicles prior to primary inspection to
identify potential anomalies and assist in determining whether to refer
vehicles for secondary inspection, rather than only scanning vehicles
referred for secondary inspection.
Beginning in fiscal year 2020, CBP awarded contracts to procure and
deploy 153 large-scale NII systems to land POEs. As of February 2025,
52 of these 153 systems CBP planned to deploy were fully operational,
nearly all located at preprimary inspection areas. An additional 101
systems were in preplanning, design, or construction phases (see table
1). These systems include 12 high-energy NII rail systems that CBP
plans to deploy to replace existing gamma-ray systems that they are
retiring.
As a result of the deployment and use of LEPs and MEPs, CBP has
increased its scanning of passenger vehicles from 2 percent in fiscal
year 2020 to 8 percent in fiscal year 2024, and scanning of commercial
vehicles from 16 percent to 27 percent during this same time frame.
Some factors have limited the use of the systems, such as limited staff
and system outages. For example, when these systems are deployed in
preprimary inspection areas at land POEs, they require additional staff
to operate them and to review the images from the vehicle scans. CBP
officials we met with at all 4 field offices with land POEs where
large-scale NII systems had been deployed in preprimary inspection
areas told us they did not always have sufficient staff to fully use
the systems. CBP headquarters officials said they are discussing ways
to mitigate staffing challenges, such as reviewing images at regional
command centers rather than at the POEs, which could improve
efficiency. Additionally, CBP officials at these POEs said that system
outages, which were sometimes frequent or lengthy, have affected their
operations.
In our September 2025 report we found that, although CBP has made
progress deploying large-scale NII systems, it has encountered
significant challenges that have led to deployments costing more and
taking longer than expected.
CBP has developed and updated cost estimates for deploying MEP,
LEP, and high-energy NII rail systems, but costs have exceeded those
estimates. One reason for higher costs than anticipated are substantial
increases in the costs for civil works and construction. For example,
the estimated costs to install each MEP increased from $1.3 million in
fiscal year 2020 to $4.1 million in fiscal year 2023. Further, in
October 2024 CBP estimated the cost to complete installation of each
remaining planned MEP system would range from $4.2 million to $9.7
million.
As a result, CBP has requested and received additional funding to
deploy its large-scale NII systems and to meet its initial goals to
increase vehicle scanning rates. According to CBP officials, in fiscal
years 2019 through 2024, CBP received over $2.1 billion for the NII
program (see table 2).\7\ Most of these funds were intended for the
deployment of large-scale NII systems in preprimary inspection areas.
In October 2024, CBP reported that it had sufficient funds to finish
deploying most of the large-scale NII systems but needed an additional
approximately $173 million to complete deployment for 31 of the
systems.
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\7\ In July 2025, Congress passed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act,
which included an appropriation of funds available to CBP for, among
other things, NII. See Pub. L. 119-21 Title IV, Subtitle A, 90004,
139 Stat. 72, 359.
Large-scale NII system deployments have also taken longer than
originally planned. The Securing America's Ports Act required CBP to
develop a plan to achieve 100 percent scanning of commercial and
passenger vehicles and freight rail entering the United States at land
POEs by 2027 using large-scale NII systems. As of February 2025, CBP
did not expect to complete all of its planned large-scale NII
deployments until December 2029. CBP's original time lines to complete
system deployments ranged from 12 to 24 months. However, some
installations have taken longer than expected.
CBP officials identified various factors that have contributed to
system deployments taking longer than expected. For example, some POEs
require major site upgrades to enable NII systems to be installed in
preprimary inspection, including the construction of command centers or
installation of power and data connections to the new systems. In other
instances, vendors have taken longer than expected to resolve issues
encountered during system deployment, such as during site acceptance
testing. CBP said they are aware of these issues and are taking actions
to address them, such as considering future NII system installation
needs when making infrastructure improvements at POEs along the
Northern Border.
cbp's deployment plans do not include all ports of entry along the
southwest border, including three of its highest-traffic locations
In response to the Securing America's Ports Act, in January 2022
CBP submitted its plan to Congress to increase vehicle scanning with
these large-scale NII systems at land POEs.\8\ In its January 2022
scanning plan, CBP estimated that it would need 434 large-scale NII
systems to achieve 100 percent scanning of vehicles and rail containers
along the Southwest and Northern Borders (see table 3). While the plan
described how CBP intended to deploy large-scale NII systems to both
the Southwest and Northern Borders, CBP has focused its initial efforts
on the Southwest Border because most CBP contraband seizures have
occurred there.
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\8\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, Large Scale Non-Intrusive Inspection Scanning Plan Fiscal
Year 2021 Report to Congress (Washington, DC: January 18, 2022).
CBP submitted its fiscal year 2022 update in March 2023 including
the steps it had taken to increase scanning.\9\ Specifically, in its
March 2023 scanning plan update, CBP reported procuring 129 large-scale
NII systems for scanning passenger and commercial vehicles to be
deployed at POEs along the Southwest Border, which, once fully
deployed, would give CBP the capacity to scan up to 40 percent of
passenger vehicles and 70 percent of commercial vehicles.
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\9\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, Large Scale Non-Intrusive Inspection Scanning Plan--Annual
Update Fiscal Year 2022 Report to Congress (Washington, DC: March 31,
2023). In November 2025, CBP issued its fiscal year 2024 update to its
scanning plan.
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As we stated in our September 2025 report, however, the CBP
scanning plan does not include NII system deployments needed to scan
passenger vehicles at 9 POEs along the Southwest Border. This includes
3 of its highest-traffic locations that together accounted for almost
24 percent of passenger vehicle crossings at all land border POEs in
fiscal year 2024 (see table 4). Combined, these 9 POEs comprised about
30 percent of total passenger vehicle traffic entering the United
States and almost 40 percent of passenger vehicle traffic entering the
United States at the Southwest Border in fiscal year 2024.
CBP officials told us they have not included the 3 high-traffic
crossings because there is not enough space to install the large-scale
NII systems in preprimary inspection areas (see fig. 2). While CBP has
not determined how it will overcome the lack of space at these POEs,
they are considering some possible solutions, including working with
the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to develop LEPs that could
be installed where space constraints and interference with radiation
detectors make deployment of large-scale NII systems difficult. Other
solutions they are considering include deploying the systems after the
primary inspection booth, which they have done at other POEs;
redeveloping the border crossings so there is enough space in
preprimary; or installing the equipment across the international
border, as they have done on the Northern Border, although this may not
be possible on the Southwest Border.
While CBP's scanning plan states its intent to scan 100 percent of
passenger and commercial vehicles and rail containers entering the
United States at land POEs, the plan does not include the deployment of
large-scale NII systems to some of CBP's highest passenger traffic POEs
along the Southwest Border. Without these crossings in its plan, CBP
risks entry of many unscanned passenger vehicles, hampering its ability
to prevent illegal drugs and other contraband from entering the United
States.
In our September 2025 report, we recommended that CBP determine how
to include deployment of large-scale NII systems to all Southwest
Border land POEs in updates to its deployment plans. CBP concurred with
GAO's recommendation and said it is collaborating with the DHS Science
and Technology Directorate to address the radiation interference
between the large-scale NII systems and the radiation detection
equipment, which could allow for placement of NII large-scale systems
within limited real estate constraints.
We will continue to monitor CBP's efforts to address our
recommendations. Addressing our recommendations would strengthen CBP's
management of the NII program and its interdiction efforts to help it
achieve its mission.
Chairman Guest, Ranking Member Correa, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Mr. Guest. Thank you.
I would now recognize myself for 5 minutes to ask
questions. Questions will be asked by order of seniority. As I
mentioned earlier to each of our witnesses, we will have to
break shortly as votes have been called, but I do believe that
we have an opportunity.
Would you like to go ahead and break now, Mr. Ranking
Member?
Mr. Correa. Let's keep it going, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Guest. All right. We are going to get through maybe the
first questions by myself and the Ranking Member and then we
will break for us to vote and return quickly. So I will begin.
Ms. Sabatino, I know we had a chance to meet and visit, and
you do a great job of setting forth in your written testimony
the importance of what we are here for today. You talk about 55
tons of narcotics being seized, that 75 percent of all
narcotics that are seized are seized at ports of entry. So you
make a very compelling case for the importance of this
technology.
I will tell you that as a former prosecutor, I have seen
first-hand the impact that this type of technology has on us
being able to stop the flow of illegal drugs. I know that this
makes our borders more secure and our agents more effective.
We have heard statistics put out by GAO talking about where
we are on scan rates. We know that in 2021, the Securing
America's Ports Act said that by next year, by 2027, that we
wanted to have 100 percent scan rates of all passenger,
commercial, and rail. We started off in 2020 with 2 percent
passenger, 16 percent commercial. By 2024, that rate had
increased to 8 percent passenger, 27 percent commercial. Ms.
Sabatino, I think you say the goal for fiscal year 2026 is 40
percent passenger, 70 percent commercial.
Then we heard just in the opening statement of Ms. Benedict
that there are 9 Southwest Border crossings that have not been
included in the planning phase. So clearly it does not appear
to me that we are going to be able to meet that 2027 deadline.
We are getting closer and we are getting better and we are
moving in the right direction, but we are not getting there
quick enough. We are not getting there fast enough. Americans
are dying because fentanyl and methamphetamine and cocaine and
other drugs continue to float into our country, because we are
not doing an adequate job of screening that.
So I understand, Ms. Sabatino, when we have met, that there
are, at certain border crossings, there are infrastructure
issues that we are having to deal with. There are interference
issues where we have got different types of scanners looking
for different things and sometimes those scanners interfere
with one another. But I also know that there is different types
of non-intrusive inspection technology. There is the fixed
permanent sites, which do have to have infrastructure. There is
mobile scanning technology, there is handheld scanning
technology. So I want to make sure that we are including, when
we talk about this inspection technology, that we are not just
focused on the fixed technology, which is great and which we
want to have in every port, but we know that some of the ports
weren't designed for this type of equipment. I do believe that
the mobile and handheld will at least provide us some sort of
scanning capabilities as we are working toward that 100 percent
scan rate that Congress instructed DHS to get to.
So my question to both of you, and I have got about a
minute and a half, is how do we get there and how quickly can
we get there? What do you need from Congress other than money?
We have funded this technology. I think we will continue to
fund this technology. This is a bipartisan issue. We can argue
about other things in the DHS arena. But I don't think there is
anybody that is going to question either of you here today that
are going to say that we don't need to continue to make this
investment. So what do you need from us to make sure that we
can get to the 100 percent scan rate as quickly as possible?
Ms. Sabatino, I will start with you and if there is any
time left, Ms. Benedict, I will let you have the remainder of
that time.
Ms. Sabatino. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I
certainly would say that continued accountability and holding
us accountable for meeting those goals is critical for us to
get there with the deployments; I think continuing to support
our work with the vendors to identify additional or enhanced or
emerging technology. We have--we're very optimistic about some
tests that are going on now, working with the Department of
Homeland Security Science and Technology Office, to address the
radiation portal monitor interference at a place like San
Ysidro. That would significantly increase the scan rates, being
the largest border crossing for vehicles on the Southwest
Border. Certainly continuing to engage with us, you know, with
our needs with respect to addressing the civil works and
funding and very much appreciate the funding that was available
to us in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act.
Mr. Guest. Ms. Benedict, I know I am almost over time, but
I want to give you a real brief opportunity to answer as well.
Then I will turn the questioning over to Mr. Correa.
Ms. Benedict. Absolutely. I think a first good step--a good
first step will be CBP including those 9 border crossings that
are not currently in the plans, in their plans and how they
plan to address the non-intrusive inspection systems of those
sites. Ms. Sabatino and I have talked and it sounds like that's
in progress and we look forward to seeing their progress on
that as we follow up on our recommendations. I look forward to
working with you and your committee staff on the updates to our
recommendations.
Mr. Guest. Again, thank you all both for being here. Thank
you for what you do. We want you to be successful.
At this time I recognize the Ranking Member for his 5
minutes of questioning.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me follow up the
witnesses on the Chairman's line of thought, questioning. The
thought that San Ysidro, 1 of the 9 ports is not even being
looked at in the plan, biggest probably border crossing in the
world, massive. We have got fentanyl coming into this country.
Lives being lost. You can't get this technology out there.
Ms. Benedict, you talked about cost. The Big Beautiful Bill
has $170 billion, massive investment in this part of our
Government. Want to work with you to make sure that these non-
intrusive technology, these marvels of technology are put into
place as quickly as possible.
Ms. Sabatino, I am concerned because the technology is
still not implemented, yet it is my understanding that
currently you have essentially reassigned or been asked to
reassign some of your personnel from the border for ICE
deportation enforcement in the interior of the United States.
Is that correct?
Ms. Sabatino. We have assigned personnel to surge
operations. That's not new or unique for us.
Mr. Correa. Yet we continue to have this issue at the
border. OK. It is not unique to you, but I believe every agency
at the Federal level is reassigning the personnel for
deportations away from their stated purpose. Is this correct?
Ms. Sabatino. I can say I'm familiar with the personnel
that we have deployed. I don't know that I could speak for the
other Federal agencies.
Mr. Correa. OK. Fair enough. If I can, your officers that
you essentially deploy to immigration enforcement, is this job
different from stopping or apprehending people at ports of
entry?
Ms. Sabatino. Again, when it comes to surging law
enforcement support to our Federal, State, or local partners,
that is something that we plan for for periods of time.
Mr. Correa. It was reported that Border Patrol recently
sent out a legal refresher on the use of force. Have you sent
out something similar to your officers?
Ms. Sabatino. We do quarterly training with respect to use
of force. We have done refresher training in First Amendment
and Fourth Amendment rights. Again, that is not unique to any
single deployment. That is----
Mr. Correa. I might have 2 minutes. But, you know, just
hours after Jonathan Ross, ICE officer, shot Renee Nicole Good,
Secretary of Homeland Security Ms. Noem stood at a podium and
said the officer did exactly what he was taught to do. So let
me ask you, if I can and if you have the answers, do you
instruct officers to approach a vehicle from the front to
prevent them from fleeing?
Ms. Sabatino. While I am familiar with the incident itself,
I'm not familiar with exactly what happened and didn't really
assess videos of that.
Mr. Correa. But in general, would you instruct your
officers to approach a vehicle from the front to prevent it
from fleeing?
Ms. Sabatino. The direction that officers are trained in is
to approach in as safe a manner as possible.
Mr. Correa. Do you authorize officers to use--to shoot at
fleeing vehicles if they are not immediately in harm's way?
Ms. Sabatino. In our use-of-force training, it is related
to the threat that the individual themselves face or to the
public.
Mr. Correa. Ms. Sabatino, within the refresher, it states
that passive resistance alone is not conduct under 18 U.S.C.
Section 111 to constitute Federal crime as long as there is no
assault, resisting arrest, or impeding Federal officers from
doing the job. The Border Patrol in the refresher course stated
that it is not a violation of Section 18-111, noncompliance,
refusal to cooperate with an officer's commands, disobeying
commands without fighting back, and taking photographs or
videotapes of an officer operating in public, again, does not
constitute a crime. Have you sent out a similar refresher
instructions to your officers?
Ms. Sabatino. Again, with respect to the use of force, it
is something we do recurring training on.
Mr. Correa. But would you agree then that taking a photo,
videotaping, a person standing on the sidelines as situations
are developing is not a violation of the law?
Ms. Sabatino. Again, our officers are trained to identify
threats and take in the totality of circumstances, you know,
when it comes to threats to themselves or the public.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Ms. Sabatino. I am out of time, but
I will ask you these questions again in writing and I hope we
can get clearer answers.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.
At this time, pursuant to committee rules, the Chair will
call a recess. We will reconvene as soon as votes occur. So the
committee stands in recess at this time.
[Recess.]
Mr. Guest. The hearing is reconvened.
At this time I call on the gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
Crane, for 5 minutes for his questioning.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
panelists for showing up today to give us your thoughts on non-
intrusive inspection technology at the border.
For those Americans that might be watching this hearing,
would it make sense to compare this type of technology to, you
know, the machine at the airport that scans our bags to look
inside in using X-ray technology, Ms. Sabatino?
Ms. Sabatino. Yes, it identifies anomalies in the images.
Mr. Crane. We recently went down to the border as a part of
this committee and I got to see some of the technology in
action. It is pretty amazing that this technology is being
deployed. Obviously, it is not going nearly as quick as we want
it to. I believe you said you had over 400 units deployed
around the country, is that correct?
Ms. Sabatino. Four hundred and five units deployed, both
mobile and fixed.
Mr. Crane. Ms. Benedict from GAO said that a part of your
plan, there were 9 major ports of entry that this technology is
not in your plans to deploy this technology to, is that
correct?
Ms. Sabatino. The technology that's been procured. But we
are actively working on plans to identify technology with
vendors for beating kind-of the physical constraints and the
RPM interference in locations where we don't currently have
technology deployed.
Mr. Crane. One thing that I found a little disturbing when
looking through the committee prep for this hearing today was
that the DHS IG put out a report saying that a lot of the
equipment, I think $96 million worth of equipment, was sitting
in storage containers. Can you unpack that for us, Ms.
Sabatino, and what the issue there is?
Ms. Sabatino. Well, as of today, we currently have 89
systems that are operational of the technology that was
procured. We have 24 systems under construction and 44 in
active planning. With respect to the systems that are in
storage, 11 of them are high-energy rail systems. We currently
have NII technology at the sites. Currently these would be
replacing with new technology.
For the 29 other pieces of technology, there are MEPs and
LEPs, 2 sites specifically make up 15 of those that are in
storage. They've been in storage about a year. In March and May
of this year, it's 9, I believe, to Calexico and 6 to San Luis.
Following the construction, they'll be deployed, which will
shrink the number that's currently in storage.
Mr. Crane. So it is not that those units that were
delivered aren't working. You are just working at implementing
the deployment of them, is that correct?
Ms. Sabatino. Yes.
Mr. Crane. For these sites that don't have the capacity at
this time to accommodate these units, are you guys using
portable and handheld technology at those entry points?
Ms. Sabatino. We do have some type of NII system available
at all our land ports of entry, and that ranges from mobile
technology to handheld technology.
Mr. Crane. How many vendors are you working with to
accomplish the goal of 100 percent of all vehicles coming
through ports of entry being scanned?
Ms. Sabatino. We deal with different vendors all the time.
I would say there's between 4 and 5 that we're regularly in
communication with for the specific types of technology that
we're looking at.
Mr. Crane. Have you found any of the vendors to be superior
in the product they deliver?
Ms. Sabatino. I think all have benefits, the types of
technology, and it really is unique to the type of deployment
that we're doing and the distinctions between mobile or fixed
or the handheld.
Mr. Crane. Which systems are more susceptible to have
malfunction and breakdown?
Ms. Sabatino. A number of reasons for outages, but the
primary one is the age of the equipment and the availability of
parts. That's where the funding for the recapitalization from
the One Big Beautiful Bill Act is going to be prioritized.
Mr. Crane. We have obviously talked today in this hearing
about, you know, what the percentage is that we are currently
hitting on pedestrian and commercial vehicles that are actually
being scanned at the port of entry. Do you believe you will be
able to hit the goals that you guys have laid out?
Ms. Sabatino. So we have increased the scan rates already
to 13 percent for passenger vehicles and 37 percent for
commercial vehicles. The goal in 2026 is to have it at 40
percent for POVs and 70 percent for commercial vehicles. But we
are very, you know, welcome to continue keeping you updated as
these deployments roll out and certainly let you know of any
road blocks or challenges that we hit that would prevent us
from achieving that goal.
Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the Ranking
Member as well. Thank the witnesses for appearing today.
Ms. Sabatino, I would like to ask you a few questions, if I
may, please. You are currently hiring persons who are working
in the interior of the country, is that correct, ma'am?
Ms. Sabatino. Well, we do have people stationed at ports of
entry, airports, land border ports, maritime. But we do have
people surged to support Immigration and Customs Enforcement
and other partners, yes.
Mr. Green. Would that include--other partners include ICE?
Ms. Sabatino. Yes.
Mr. Green. So you have persons who are actually in the
field and they are with ICE when they are raiding. Well, let's
not use that term, excuse me, when they are making arrests?
Ms. Sabatino. We support in a number of ways, we do----
Mr. Green. Excuse me. Is making arrests one of the ways?
Ms. Sabatino. Yes.
Mr. Green. OK, thank you. These persons who are doing this,
have they been trained to the same extent that the ICE officers
have been trained?
Ms. Sabatino. I'm not personally familiar with the ICE
training. I imagine it's comparable, but we do recurring use of
force training for all of our armed law enforcement officers.
Mr. Green. If I told you that someone associated with
antifa is working with these ICE officers who happens to be
someone associated with your area, would that concern you?
Ms. Sabatino. If I had more context. Like ``working with,''
like employed by?
Mr. Green. Well, let's take the example of a prosecutor in
Dallas, Texas, who has some affiliation with persons who are
known to be dastards. This person was a prosecutor and seems to
have a white supremacist account, makes or posts statements
about Adolf Hitler, indicated we should make America white
again, that sort of thing does that. That sort of thing would
offend you, wouldn't it, if you knew that some of your officers
were doing something like that?
Ms. Sabatino. Well, we would certainly investigate any
allegations.
Mr. Green. Good. The best way to deal with this kind of
circumstance is to prevent it from ever happening. You wouldn't
want a person who is doing these kinds of things within your
ranks, right? If the person is actually doing it.
Ms. Sabatino. It's important to ensure----
Mr. Green. I believe your answer would be yes or no.
Anything less than a yes, I would assume is no. So you would
not want a person in your ranks, right?
Ms. Sabatino. No.
Mr. Green. OK, good. So if you want to avoid it, the best
way to prevent it from happening is to avoid it by good vetting
from the outset. So what are you doing to vet people who are
new to this work with ICE or new to you? What are you doing to
vet them? How do you vet?
Ms. Sabatino. Speaking specifically to Customs and Border
Protection, we do background investigations. They're subject to
polygraph examinations and interviews.
Mr. Green. What does it take to trigger a Professional
Responsibilities investigation?
Ms. Sabatino. I would have to defer you to our Office of
Professional Responsibilities on how they triage allegations
that are made, but investigations could be conducted by the
Inspector General, by OPR, or by local management. But again,
the nature of the allegation would determine that.
Mr. Green. But you do agree that you would not want someone
who is affiliated with some sort of white supremacist movement
to be associated with your officers or in your core of
officers, would you?
Ms. Sabatino. I would agree in theory.
Mr. Green. In theory? Well, that is fair enough. I am going
to just ask you if you would do this. Please give some
additional thought to how persons are being vetted, and I may
have more to say about it at a later time. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Guest. Thank you.
I would now like to recognize Mrs. Biggs from South
Carolina for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Trump
administration has made great strides to secure our borders and
to stem the tide of illegal immigrants. Encounters at the
Southwest Border are down from a high of over 300,000 under
President--I am sorry. Encounters at the Southwest Border are
down from a high of over 300,000 under President Biden to under
8,000 in July 2025. This is a historic achievement, but now is
not the time to let our guard down or to rest on our laurels.
We ensure that our ports of entry are equipped with the
proper technology and personnel needed to ensure the
accomplishment of their mission. Smugglers often go through
ports of entry. Commercial containers and personal vehicles
alike are modified to have spaces to hide illicit cargo such as
cocaine and fentanyl. Contraband cargo is often in locations
that are not immediately obvious to the naked eye or even older
detection technology. This is where modern NII technology is
important. Vehicles and containers can be thoroughly examined
without having to be torn apart. Full implementation of the
newest and best non-intrusive inspection technology across all
ports of entry will save time and lives by catching more
illicit drugs and staying one step ahead of criminal elements.
So my question is to Ms. Sabatino. What new and novel
technologies is the CBP innovation team investigating and
fielding at ports of entry through initial research and pilot
programs? How will these new technologies complement the
existing fleet of NII machines?
Ms. Sabatino. Thank you for the question. There's a number
of emerging technologies that we are looking at. I think
certainly in complement to the image scans, the artificial
intelligence, machine learning, that's going to help identify
anomalies. We have a number of algorithms deployed along the
Southwest Border today that are in training that we hope will
be able to actually peel back resources as the NII--the
algorithms will help officers streamline identifying those
anomalies.
I think in terms of other technology, in our mail and
express consignment facilities, leveraging CT scanners
complemented by artificial intelligence machine learning to
help our officers, again, increase the efficiency in the work
that they do. Looking at millimeter and ThruWave technology and
working with vendors to help kind-of build their repository
because, frankly, we have the types of substances to help them
identify and build the information kind of database.
Mrs. Biggs. OK, great. Thank you. How can current and
future implementations of NII technology be improved and
streamlined to ensure that our borders remain secure in an
evolving threat environment?
Ms. Sabatino. Certainly with the deployment of the pre-
primary technology, which is the technology that has
experienced delays and challenges in moving out because of the
interference, we have a number of lessons learned, including
contracting and engineering firm to assist with those initial
site surveys that, frankly, when they were first done were not
substantive enough and didn't address some really critical
engineering issues, including like ground penetration with
radar. But happy to provide, you know, a more fulsome briefing
on all of the different lessons learned, how we've incorporated
them into our resource strategy moving forward, and what the
outcomes of those lessons learned in implementing have been.
Mrs. Biggs. OK, great. Thank you so much.
I yield back.
Mr. Guest. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman for Virginia for his
5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
and Ranking Member Correa for convening today's hearing and our
witnesses for joining us.
Last week, I and 27 other Members of the House visited
Minnesota and we saw first-hand the negative impacts of the
mass deportation, the mass destruction machine that the Trump
administration has assembled. American citizens and our law-
abiding immigrant neighbors are terrified. Businesses and
schools in Minnesota are closed. American citizens again are
staying home because they don't want to be the next person
pulled through the streets, put in a chokehold, or, God forbid,
fatally shot by a Federal agent, maybe ICE, maybe CBP, dressed
and armed as if they are in a war zone.
Reported this week that local law enforcement leaders in
Saint Paul and Minnesota have shared that their officers, off-
duty officers, have been stopped and detained and harassed by
ICE. The masked and, in many cases, minimally-trained officers
have dragged pregnant mothers, pepper-sprayed children, placed
their knees on the necks of American citizens, and recently
they detained a 5-year-old, a 5-year-old, and then used that 5-
year-old, you might not be able to see it, this is him, this is
Liam Ramos, 5 years old, detained him, used him as bait to lure
his family members out of their home. Then they shipped him to
a detention facility a thousand miles away, 5 years old.
In city after city, CBP Commander Greg Bovino has strutted
around spreading terror: L.A., Chicago, Charlotte, New Orleans,
Minneapolis. This Congress must take immediate action to rein
in the outrageous abuses we are seeing by ICE and CBP officers.
We need to end the masking, end the secret police, require use
of force standards and enforce them, and withdraw the thousands
of Federal agents from Minnesota. Secretary Noem and the
leadership of these agencies must be held accountable for the
egregious abuses that we have seen.
Ms. Sabatino, I have a 5-year-old. I dropped him off at
preschool this morning. I won't ask you if you have children.
It is not my business, not the committee's business. You have
had an honorable career in law enforcement. You are highly
trained. You have been a leader in your field. I just want to
ask you a simple question. Were you ever trained to use a 5-
year-old in a law enforcement operation in the way that Liam
Ramos was used? Were you ever trained to use a 5-year-old as
bait to get his family members to open the door? Were you
trained to do that? Would you countenance one of your officers
doing that?
Ms. Sabatino. I'm not familiar with that case.
Mr. Walkinshaw. I am not asking you about this situation. I
am saying were you trained and would you allow a child to be
used in a law enforcement operation? Would you allow your
officers to do it?
Ms. Sabatino. I'm not familiar with that case. It's not
part of our training.
Mr. Walkinshaw. What would you do if one of your officers
at a port of entry perhaps did that, used a 5-year-old to get
their parents or a family member to open their car door? What
would you do to one of those officers if they used a child in a
law enforcement operation like that?
Ms. Sabatino. Any allegation of unprofessional behavior or
use of force would be investigated by the appropriate third
party.
Mr. Walkinshaw. OK. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.
At this point, we would like to do a second round of
questioning, but after consulting with Mr. Correa, we would
like to do a lightning round, so not 5 minutes of questioning,
but 3. So we would like for all Members to have an additional 3
minutes to ask questions. If there are other Members who have
not come in, they will also be included in the queue, but would
like to explore this just a little bit further. So if we could
set the clock at 3 minutes.
So, Ms. Sabatino, my question will just be, you know, we
have heard testimony that there will be, at least at certain
ports of entry, there will be some period of time before we are
able to get fixed permanent scanners there at those locations.
We know that there is infrastructure issues, there is
interference issues. We have talked about some of the
challenges that CBP faces. So I guess my question is, in the
interim, what is the plan? What is the possibility, again, to
use mobile scanners, handheld scanners, so that we will have
coverage at those ports of entry?
Again, the coverage may not be to the same level. We may
not be able to screen as many vehicles as we would like. But is
there a plan within CBP to use those handheld scanners, those
mobile scanners, to supplement some of the deficiencies that we
may see, particularly at the 9 ports of entry that Ms. Benedict
has made us aware of?
Ms. Sabatino. Yes, we're going to continue to use all of
the technology that's available to us, as well as additional
technology that we'll be procuring with funding from the One
Big Beautiful Bill Act. That's in complement to also our canine
assets, our targeting models, and the intelligence available to
us.
Mr. Guest. I do want to say, look, you have got some
incredible men and women who work at the ports of entry. They
do a great job of identifying individuals for secondary
screening. You all do an amazing job of stopping a large number
of narcotics that come across. But we want to make sure through
the use of artificial intelligence, through the use of
technology, that we are making those agents more efficient,
more effective, and that we are doing everything that we can on
behalf of the American public to stop the flow of drugs coming
into the country. So please, when you return, please tell the
men and women that you serve with, that we have great respect
for the work that they do and we thank them for their
commitment and dedication to serving this great Nation.
With that, I would yield 3 minutes to the Ranking Member,
Mr. Correa.
Mr. Correa. Thank you again, Ms. Sabatino and Ms. Benedict.
Thank you for being here today.
Let me say that I know San Ysidro quite well. I have
traveled that place. I have been with you with your officers.
Sixty to 70 percent, 60 to 70 percent, of all the fentanyl
coming into the United States goes through San Ysidro. Yet we
are not scheduled to put any of these high-tech scanners there,
not scheduled to even begin to plan to put them there. So it
becomes extra critical to have the personnel there.
Ms. Sabatino, I kind-of asked you, are you fully staffed? I
will ask it again. Are you fully staffed?
Ms. Sabatino. I can provide you what our target on-board
number is as a follow-up specifically for San Ysidro, but we're
actively hiring 5,000 officers.
Mr. Correa. We have been trying to hire thousands of
officers for years. As you know, the background checks are very
tough. Polygraph tests are almost impossible to pass. They are
tougher than for the folks applying for the FBI. It is very
hard to hire people. This is my concern. When you have officers
at the border stopping fentanyl deployed into the interior of
the country, it concerns me we are not doing the job of
protecting Americans from fentanyl. These officers are now
deployed into my district.
Southern California is the manufacturing capital of the
United States, do a lot of economic activity. A lot of these
immigrants are the workers there. So I look at this as a lose-
lose policy. We are not doing the best we can to stop the
fentanyl and we are missing out on common-sense economic
activity, economic growth that we have in Southern California
that is done by these immigrants.
I am not going to belabor this issue. But what I would like
to do, I am going to submit some questions to you in writing.
But essentially I want to know how many folks are you down, how
many open slots do you have? Is this something that just
happened?
You use the words to describe that this is something that
you do on a regular basis, which is redeploy officers off the
border to the interior of the country. I would like to have the
data from the last 5 years. Have you really deployed them, how
many numbers over the last 5 years? Because I believe my
citizens, American citizens, want to make sure that fentanyl is
not getting into this country.
Again, I have been to San Ysidro. I have spoken to your
folks over there. Wonderful individuals that have these skills.
I don't know how they do it, sixth sense. But they can figure
out where this fentanyl is at. When you transfer them to
somewhere in the United States, they are not doing their job
that we hired them to do.
Thank you very much. I look forward to getting your data
from you. Thank you.
Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously my colleagues
on the other side of the aisle continue to attack Homeland
Security ICE agents. Their newest attack is ICE just detained a
5-year-old child. Right? We keep hearing that on the panel
today. It is all over social media. That would be atrocious if
true, but it is not.
This is exactly what Homeland Security put out officially:
ICE did not target a child. The child was abandoned. On January
20, ICE conducted a targeted operation to arrest Adrian
Alexander Conejo Arias, an illegal alien from Ecuador, who was
released into the United States by the Biden administration. As
agents approached the driver, Adrian Alexander Conejo Arias
fled on foot, abandoning his child. For the child's safety, one
of our ICE officers remained with the child while the other
officers apprehended Conejo Arias.
Parents are asked if they want to be removed with their
children or ICE will place them--place the children with a safe
person that the parent designates. This is consistent with past
administrations' immigration enforcement. Parents can take
control of their departure and receive a free flight and $2,600
with the CBP Home app. By using the CBP Home app, illegal
aliens reserve the chance to come back the right and legal way.
I just wanted to clarify that with all the outrage on the left
and, you know, trying to generate, you know, hysteria in these
chambers right now. That is not the truth of what happened. I
am glad that officials at ICE made sure that the real story was
made public----
Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields?
Mr. Crane [continuing]. To the American people.
Thank you and I yield back.
Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. Walkinshaw. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. I am OK.
Actually, I will yield to the Ranking Member.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much. To my colleague from
Arizona, you make an interesting point, which is what are
exactly the facts? Because it is not only one 5-year-old. I
have heard a number of stories about young individuals being
left when their parents are apprehended, some with orders of
deportation, others essentially picked up randomly off the
streets and children left to their own. I would welcome the
opportunity with my colleague to do an investigation to study
what exactly is the truth.
As you have said, sir, this has been an issue for a number
of administrations, not just one. I say to do a study because
we want to have the truth. Somewhere the truth is there. It is
probably in the middle somewhere. But we all have an interest
in making sure children are taken care of. So I would like to
look under the hood, so to speak, and look at the facts and see
what the policy is when a child's parents are apprehended,
because that child is an American citizen most likely. So I
think we do need to look at this issue a lot closer.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Walkinshaw. Reclaiming my time. I appreciate the
gentleman's comments. What he didn't address and what the DHS
statement didn't address is a question I posed to Ms. Sabatino,
and that is the use of a 5-year-old child in a law enforcement,
immigration enforcement operation. That doesn't seem to be in
dispute whether the agents on the ground used that child to
ring the doorbell to lure his family members who were inside
the home out.
There should be an impartial investigation of that and the
hundreds of other allegations of abuses, violations of policy
from ICE, and, as Ms. Sabatino is here today, CBP officers. The
American people don't trust that this administration and this
Secretary of Homeland Security will conduct that kind of fair
and impartial investigation in the case of Liam Ramos or
others.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas for 3
minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I thank you and
the Ranking Member and the witnesses.
Ms. Sabatino, you and I were talking earlier about
unacceptable character information being reported. I think we
concluded that it can be reported to your Office of
Professional Responsibility. Is that correct?
Ms. Sabatino. Yes.
Mr. Green. Can anyone report to this office, Ms. Sabatino?
Ms. Sabatino. I believe there's a publicly-available number
and email.
Mr. Green. Does anyone include you, ma'am?
Ms. Sabatino. If I could report allegations?
Mr. Green. Does anyone include you when I say anyone?
Ms. Sabatino. Yes.
Mr. Green. OK. Now let's talk about criminal activity. Is a
similar circumstance available for persons who are aware of
something that may be criminal in nature?
Ms. Sabatino. If we had allegations of criminal behavior,
yes, that would be called in.
Mr. Green. Do you recall that Ms. Renee Nicole Good was
shot by an officer?
Ms. Sabatino. I did see the media attention to it, yes.
Mr. Green. Has that been reported to the Office of
Professional Responsibility?
Ms. Sabatino. I think, because the agent that was involved
would be--was with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, I'm not
aware of any specific call into either our or ICE's Office of
Professional Responsibility.
Mr. Green. But there is an Office of Professional
Responsibility for these kinds of things. It is sort-of
internal affairs, is that correct?
Ms. Sabatino. Yes.
Mr. Green. You have the ability to report these things, do
you not?
Ms. Sabatino. Everyone in the public can report.
Mr. Green. Does everyone include you?
Ms. Sabatino. Yes.
Mr. Green. So you have the ability to report, do you not?
Ms. Sabatino. If I believe that there was criminal activity
or misconduct.
Mr. Green. Did you--you said you saw the video. There was
statements made that--by the wife of Ms. Good that we had
whistles, they had guns. You saw what happened. You can report
this as something that should be investigated by the Office of
Professional Responsibility, can't you?
Ms. Sabatino. I don't think it would be appropriate for me
as I was not there and I saw clips of videos on the news.
Mr. Green. Excuse me. Excuse me. The question is, if you
wanted to, you could, couldn't you?
Ms. Sabatino. Anyone who believes that there's criminal----
Mr. Green. Are you a part of the anyone?
Ms. Sabatino. Yes.
Mr. Green. So you can report it. How can you, ma'am, see
what happened on that video and not report it to the Office of
Professional Responsibility, just ask them to look into it?
This woman lost her life and no investigation is said to be
taking place and you won't report it to the Office of
Professional Responsibility.
Mr. Guest. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Green. I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Guest. I would like to thank the witnesses for being
here today. I would like to thank the Members for their
participation in this hearing. Members of the subcommittee may
have additional questions for the witnesses and we would ask
the witnesses to respond in writing. Pursuant to committee Rule
VII(E), this hearing and the record for the hearing will--the
record for this hearing will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank
you.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X I
----------
Questions From Chairman Michael Guest for Diane J. Sabatino
Question 1. Ms. Sabatino, historically, CBP has submitted project
funding requests that are considerably lower than the actual costs of
project installation. For example, when DHS Office of Inspector General
(OIG) assembled their 2025 OIG-25-27 report, 3 high-energy rail units
were in storage because CBP underestimated installation costs by about
$43 million.
How is CBP working to create accurate cost estimations across their
installation plans?
Answer. Cost estimations across installations are difficult
particularly regarding the scope of required site preparation and civil
works, largely due to the unique characteristics of each port including
geography and infrastructure variations and the range of environmental
impacts along the Southwest and Northern Borders. To assist U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with mitigating these challenges,
CBP has secured the services of an engineering firm to perform a
reasonableness check on vendor construction cost estimates and
installation plans before and during the contract modification process.
CBP solicits quarterly vendor Estimate to Complete (ETC) numbers for
active installation projects. ETC are used to identify cost variances
early during the construction process. CBP obtains justifications of
potential cost increases early in the planning and construction cycle
of each project. CBP regularly performs an analysis of cost at contract
award, funding required for the completion of projects, and ultimately
the final cost upon system acceptance. This data, in addition to
collaboration with the CBP Office of Acquisition's Cost and Schedule
Management Branch, has led to significant improvements in the program's
cost estimations.
Question 2a. Ms. Sabatino, given the issues where large-scale NII
systems are interfering with existing Radiation Portal Monitors when
placed near each other, what innovative solutions have CBP explored to
mitigate this issue?
Question 2b. Have any contracts been awarded to mitigate
interference?
Answer. CBP has been actively pursuing solutions to the radiation
interference issues to effectively deploy the fixed pre-primary
scanners funded by Congress in 2020. In calendar year 2023, CBP
convened a working group comprised of its operations and scientific
subject-matter experts along with subject-matter experts from the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction Office (CWMD) to develop potential solutions to the
interference issue. As a result of the working group, some solutions
were approved that mitigated a portion of the radiation interference
issue. Additionally, the working group convened a session later in
calendar year 2023 with the contracted vendors and allowed them to
present potential solutions to the radiation interference issue. One of
the solutions was accepted for development by the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T). S&T has been working collaboratively with
CBP and with the vendor to develop the solution, with a successful
factory test completed in December 2025. S&T and CBP will conduct an
operational test at the Port of San Ysidro in mid-calendar year 2026
for further evaluation and assessment.
Question 3. Ms. Sabatino, the 2025 OIG-25-27 report, states that
several years of staffing challenges led to decisions within the NII
program being made on ``immediate needs rather than developing a
structured, long-term plan.''
What steps besides offering hiring and retention bonuses have been
taken to hire and retain qualified and committed individuals?
Answer. Through assistance from CBP's National Recruitment
Division, the Office of Field Operations (OFO) has expanded targeted
recruitment campaigns, leveraged partnerships, expanded engagement with
military transition programs, utilized social media and digital
platforms, and participated in career fairs and webinars nationwide to
increase visibility and engagement. Additionally, OFO utilizes targeted
recruiting efforts to attract candidates for specific hard-to-fill
locations as well as individuals that are involved in specific clubs or
organizations that have a nexus to areas and activities that correlate
with law enforcement or physical fitness. For retention, OFO invests in
employee engagement and formal recognition through awards and programs
for employee achievements. In addition, OFO focuses on mentoring and
leadership development opportunities while also providing career-
enhancing trainings that include resume and interview training to
provide employees opportunities for career advancement and career
mapping. Furthermore, for the non-intrusive inspection (NII) program in
particular, CBP has strategically aligned personnel resources with the
specialized skills needed to improve CBP's ability to assess
operations, identify the right technology, equip the ports of entry,
and quickly deploy NII equipment. In concert with OFO's recruitment and
retention efforts, this alignment of resources has supported the growth
of the NII program team from approximately 15 full-time employees to 39
full-time employees.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Diane J. Sabatino
Question 1a. Ms. Sabatino, on January 14, CBP sent out a directive
requiring all CBP officers to complete Mandatory Mobile Field Force
Certification. According to the directive, MFF-trained teams will
provide CBP with a flexible and scalable response for incidents such as
civil disturbances, protests, natural disasters, or any event requiring
an enhanced law enforcement presence. These CBP officer teams can be
deployed quickly at both the local and national levels to assist field
offices, ports of entry, or to support other law enforcement agencies
as needed.
As you know, CBP officers' mission is to facilitate lawful trade
and travel while protecting the national security at the ports of
entry. The Nation's ports are already facing severe staffing shortages,
stretching officers thin at the ports. Reassigning CBP Office of Field
Operations personnel for non-port missions exacerbates these shortages
and undermines the security and efficiency of our Nation's ports.
It is critical that the Homeland Security Committee ensure CBP
officers are not used in ways that Congress never intended and that
place both officers and the public at unnecessary risk.
How specifically does CBP intend to use mandatory MFF-trained CBP
officers?
Answer. CBP intends to use Mobile Field Force (MFF)-trained CBP
officers as a standardized, rapidly-deployable capability to manage
large groups, protect CBP personnel and facilities, and support partner
agencies when directed, consistent with existing law and CBP policy.
Officers who receive MFF training continue to perform their primary
duties at ports of entry and are assigned to MFF operations only as
needed.
More specifically, CBP intends to use MFF-trained officers to:
Manage crowds and civil disturbances at CBP locations.
Deploy to respond to large groups, demonstrations, or
disturbances at ports of entry and other CBP-controlled
facilities, to maintain safety and security and preserve the
orderly flow of lawful travel and trade.
Provide rapid, organized responses to emergent incidents.
Serve as a quickly-mobilized, organized force package that can
be deployed on short notice to address incidents that exceed
the capabilities of routine staffing, such as unrest or other
public-order situations at or near CBP facilities.
Augment CBP during contingency or surge operations. Support
CBP operations during periods of unusually high operational
demands such as mass migration events or other significant
surges--where additional, specially-trained personnel are
needed to manage large groups safely and effectively.
Protect CBP facilities and personnel. Reinforce security at
CBP facilities and related infrastructure during elevated
threat conditions or active incidents, to help ensure
continuity of operations and the safety of officers, other
Federal personnel, and the public.
Support the Federal Protective Service (FPS). Support FPS
under established authorities, provide force protection and
crowd-management support to FPS for the protection of
designated Federal buildings, personnel, and property.
Participate in interagency operations, when authorized and
directed. Operate alongside other Federal, State, or local law
enforcement agencies during joint operations or nationally
significant events, when such support is formally requested and
approved through DHS and CBP operational channels.
These uses are intended to ensure that CBP maintains a disciplined,
properly-trained capability for public-order and facility-protection
missions, rather than relying on ad hoc responses by untrained
personnel.
Question 1b. What legal authority is CBP using to deploy CBP
Officers outside of the port of entry environment?
Answer. CBP's deployment of officers outside ports of entry is
legally supported by Federal statutes granting enforcement authority
within the border region and customs territory, as well as broader DHS
and Executive authorities for national security and emergency response.
These authorities allow CBP to conduct enforcement, respond to
emergencies, and assist other agencies as required to keep the American
people safe. CBP's legal authority to deploy CBP officers outside of
the port of entry environment is primarily derived from several
statutes and regulations, most notably:
Title 6 U.S.C. 211 establishes CBP and outlines its
mission, including border security and enforcement of customs
and immigration laws.
Title 8 U.S.C. 1103 grants authority to direct employees
to perform or exercise any of the power, privileges, or duties
conferred or imposed, or regulations issued upon any other
employee of the service.
Title 8 U.S.C. 1357 grants immigration officers (including
CBP officers) authority to interrogate, arrest, and enforce
immigration laws from any external boundary of the United
States.
Title 19 U.S.C. 1401(i) and authorizes CBP officers to
perform their duties not only at ports of entry but also within
the ``customs territory'' and in areas where customs laws are
enforced.
Title 19 U.S.C 1589a authorizes CBP officers to make an
arrest without a warrant for any offense against the United
States committed in the officer's presence or for a felony.
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) provides
broad authority for DHS components, including CBP, to protect
the Nation's borders and respond to threats.
Title 31 U.S.C. 1535 authorizes agencies to enter into
agreements to obtain supplies or services from another agency.
Additionally, CBP officers may be deployed outside ports of entry
to assist other Federal, State, or local agencies to provide assistance
where there is legal authority to do so.
CBP may act under Executive Orders or DHS directives that outline
operational scope for national security, emergency response, or public
safety.
Question 1c. What legal authority is CBP using to deploy CBP
officers more than 100 miles from the border?
Answer. As outlined above, CBP's deployment of officers outside
ports of entry is legally supported by Federal statutes granting
enforcement authority within the border region and customs territory,
as well as broader DHS and Executive authorities for national security
and emergency response. CBP has facilities that they work at, and
inherently protect, which are more than 100 miles from the border. CBP
officers have the authority to deploy to conduct interior enforcement
operations to enforce immigration law pursuant to the authority
accorded to the CBP Commissioner under Title 6 U.S.C 211(c)(8).
Questions From Ranking Member J. Luis Correa for Diane J. Sabatino
Question 1a. Ms. Sabatino, under the Trump administration, DHS
shifted thousands of officers and agents away from their regular duties
to focus on immigration enforcement operations in the interior of the
United States. My understanding is that you currently have personnel
detailed to or supporting Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and
the Federal Protective Service (FPS) in our cities.
How many personnel from CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO) have
been detailed to support immigration enforcement actions in the
interior of the United States since January 20, 2025? Please further
break this out by the agency they are supporting, the city to which
officers are deployed, the ports of entry they are deployed from, and
the lengths of their deployments.
Answer. Since January 20, 2025, OFO has supported interior
immigration enforcement actions across the United States alongside
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). OFO personnel have been
deployed to a range of locations to assist in these operations. As of
January 22, 2026, a total of 610 CBP officers (CBPOs) from 15 Field
Offices have been assigned to support efforts in 61 ICE offices located
throughout the United States, for an average period between 60 to 180
days.
The following OFO locations provided support: Anchorage; Ashtabula;
Atlanta; Baltimore; Baltimore Field Office; Birmingham; Blaine;
Brownsville; Buffalo; Calexico; CBP Headquarters; Charleston;
Charlotte; Chicago; Cincinnati; Cleveland; Columbus; Dallas; Del Rio;
Denver; Detroit; Detroit Airport; Dulles International Airport; Durham;
Eagle Pass; El Paso; Erie; Ft. Lauderdale; Gramercy Park; Gulfport;
Hidalgo; Honolulu; Houston Airport; Houston Seaport; San Luis; San
Ysidro; Santa Teresa; Savannah; SeaTac Airport; Seattle Seaport; St.
Croix; St. Louis; St. Thomas; Sweetgrass; Tampa; Toledo; West Palm
Beach; Huntsville; Indianapolis; Jacksonville; John F. Kennedy Airport;
Los Angeles/Long Beach Seaport; Laredo; Los Angeles International
Airport; Logan Airport; Louisville; Memphis; Miami Field Office; Miami
International Airport; Miami Seaport; Milwaukee; Minneapolis; Mobile;
Morgan City; Nashville; National Targeting Center; New Orleans; New
York Field Office; New York/Newark; Nogales; Norfolk; Oakland; Oakland
Seaport; Orlando; Otay Mesa; Philadelphia; Pittsburgh; Port Canaveral;
Portland; Raleigh; San Diego; and San Francisco Airport.
OFO support was provided to the following ICE locations: Alamosa,
CO; Louisville, KY; Indianapolis, IN; Atlanta, GA; Charlotte, NC;
Charleston, SC; Roanoke, VA; Harrisonburg, VA; Baltimore, MD;
Birmingham, AL; Honolulu, HI; Bakersfield, CA; Milwaukee, WI; Houston,
TX; Buffalo, NY; Nashville, TN; Memphis, TN; Cary, NC; Chicago, IL;
Columbus, OH; Cincinnati, OH; Dallas, TX; Fresno, CA; Richmond, VA;
Centennial, CO; Glenwood Springs, CO; Craig, CO; Casper, WY; Grand
Junction, CO; Cheyenne, WY; Sacramento, CA; Detroit, MI; Pittsburgh,
PA; Miami Broward, FL; Salt Lake City, UT; New Orleans, LA; Yuma, AZ;
St. Paul, MN; Norfolk, VA; Savannah, GA; Seattle, WA; St. Louis, MO;
St. Thomas, USVI; Tampa, FL; Stuart, FL; Jacksonville, FL; Stockton,
CA; Central Islip, NY; New York City, NY; Santa Ana, CA; San
Bernardino, CA; Burlington, MA; Newark, NJ; Tucson, AZ; Morgan Hill,
CA; Orlando, FL; Philadelphia, PA; Mount Laurel, NJ; Portland, OR; San
Diego, CA; and San Francisco, CA.
During this period, OFO has periodically provided limited temporary
duty and detail support to interior operations led by other DHS
components, primarily ICE, based on operational need and subject to
resource availability at ports of entry. Furthermore, OFO also
periodically provided support to U.S. Border Patrol (USBP), Federal
Protective Service (FPS), and to fellow OFO field offices.
Question 1b. For each of the last 5 years, how many of your
officers have supported surge immigration enforcement operations in the
interior of the United States? How many of these details or support
have been to ICE?
Answer. The number of OFO officers who supported these operations
in each of the last 5 calendar years, and how many of those assignments
were to ICE is as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total OFO officers
supporting
interior surge Total OFO officers
CY immigration detailed/
enforcement supporting ICE
operations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2021............................ 3,582 2
2022............................ 3,410 2
2023............................ 4,232 2
2024............................ 1,190 2
2025............................ 4,573 2,905
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2a. Ms. Sabatino, there are countless instances of Federal
officers using aggressive tactics against people peacefully refusing to
cooperate with unlawful commands or are simply videotaping officers'
interactions.
Are CBP officers trained to tackle and restrain individuals who
videotape them?
Answer. No.
Question 2b. Does every use of force instance get investigated?
Answer. The Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)
Investigative Operations Directorate (IOD) personnel respond to,
investigate, coordinate, report, review, and resolve use of force (UoF)
incidents. As part of the process, a Use of Force Review Board (UFRB)
shall review all use of force incidents to determine compliance with
policy and best law enforcement practices for training, tactics, and
equipment.
Use of force incident reviews are an administrative inquiry,
conducted by IOD personnel under standard investigative protocols, to
gather facts and prepare an investigative package for the appropriate
UFRB. The UFRBs, comprised of CBP, DHS and other representatives,
independently reviews CBP UoF incidents to determine whether the UoF
was reasonable and in accordance with the DHS Use of Deadly Force
Policy, CBP Use of Force Policy, Guidelines and Procedures Handbook,
and the relevant legal authorities. The UFRBs also serve to provide
information to the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division to
assist in their determination as to whether the pursuit of criminal
prosecution is warranted in relation to the UoF. Finally, the UFRB
process is designed to inform the affected CBP component senior
management, and other appropriate CBP personnel of any findings or
recommendations from an operational, administrative, tactical, and
training perspective. Please reference below links.
Links:
Use of Force Policy and Administrative Guidelines and Procedures
Handbook/U.S. Customs and Border Protection
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Update on the CBP National Use
of Force Review Board/U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Question 2c. Have you received any direction or guidance indicating
that officers can engage in use of force without fear?
Answer. No.
Question 2d. Are all CBP OFO officers up-to-date with use-of-force
training? If not, when will they be?
Answer. OFO officers are required to complete use of force training
on a quarterly basis in accordance with CBP policy and Federal
standards. CBP actively monitors compliance and works to ensure any
outstanding training requirements are addressed promptly.
Question 3a. Ms. Sabatino, in Massachusetts, CBP officers and ICE
agents used an undocumented mother's child and grandchild as bait to
get her to come outside--where they promptly arrested the mother in
front of her kids. The CBP officers at the scene were filmed wearing
OFO jackets.
Who in the Trump administration authorized using children as bait?
How was this communicated to CBP?
Answer. Under this administration DHS has never used children as
``bait'' when conducting immigration enforcement operations. ICE is
committed to conducting immigration enforcement operations in a manner
that prioritizes the safety and well-being of all individuals,
including aliens, officers, and agents. ICE personnel follow strict
guidelines, receive on-going training, and adhere to established
policies and procedures to minimize risk and prevent harm during
operations. ICE regularly reviews its practices to ensure compliance
with legal and ethical standards. To frame this case in any other way
is a fabrication of the truth.
Question 3b. Do you support this tactic of using children and
babies to lure immigrants out of their homes?
Answer. Please see response above.
Question 4a. Ms. Sabatino, over the past year, CBP officers have
been detailed to or otherwise supported ICE, Border Patrol, and FPS
during interior enforcement operations.
What training, if any, do your officers receive before these
deployments. Does it include use of force training specific to
interacting with individuals engaged in protected First Amendment
activities?
Answer. All OFO officers receive use of force training each quarter
along with receiving refresher training on 1st and 4th Amendment
Rights.
non-intrusive inspection (nii) program
Question 5a. Ms. Sabatino, CBP has received billions of dollars for
its Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) program, going back to 2019. It has
been reported that NII equipment is still sitting in warehouses despite
receiving this money. CBP must better manage taxpayer dollars to secure
our Nation.
What steps are you taking to improve the management of this
program?
Answer. CBP has taken tangible steps to strengthen the NII program
and ensure that it delivers results as evidenced by increasing scan
rates along the Southwest Border (SWB). Changes to equipment
requirements including the strengthening of software and
interoperability features were made as a result of critical analysis.
Initial pre-primary projects were tested in locations where
infrastructure costs were determined prior to an overall assessment of
what was needed to upgrade infrastructure. Each location has unique
geography, infrastructure, traffic demographics (both passenger and
cargo), and threats that impact how the technology will be most useful
at individual crossings. Most CBP ports were not designed to handle the
current traffic flows or for this cutting-edge technology.
CBP has refined vendor requirements to include more detailed
construction designs including the planning for land agreements,
shoring requirements, and environmental impacts. The implementation of
tailored site design reviews also further mitigates challenges and
delays.
In addition, CBP has strategically aligned personnel resources with
the specialized skills needed to support the program, improve CBP's
ability to assess operations, identify the right technology, equip the
ports of entry, and quickly deploy. For example, the NII program team
has grown from approximately 15 full-time employees to 39 full-time
employees. CBP has also worked to ensure that the new scanning
equipment is integrated into our CBP holdings to best leverage the
tools that are currently in place. As a result of the changes that CBP
has made, as of February 13, 2026, 94 NII deployed systems were
operational at 30 sites, including 66 Low-Energy Portals (LEPs), 27
Multi-Energy Portals (MEPs), and 1 High-Energy (HE) Rail.
In fiscal year 2024, 29 systems at 11 locations became
operational.
In fiscal year 2025, 36 systems at 15 locations became
operational.
As of February 13, 2026, construction is under way for 19
systems at 9 locations (9 LEPs, 7 MEPs, and 3 HE Rail).
Additionally, scan rates have improved, and as of March 30, 2026,
the SWB scan rates for commercial vehicles is 38 percent and passenger
vehicles is 14 percent.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2026
FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024 FY 2025 (as of 3/
Type Scan Rate Scan Rate Scan Rate Scan Rate 30/26)
Scan Rate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SWB Passenger Vehicles................................... 3% 3% 8% 13% 14%
SWB Commercial Vehicles................................. 15% 19% 21% 35% 38
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Through all of these actions, CBP has advanced the NII program to
improve management and ensure that operations are more successful.
Question 5b. When can we expect to see all of that equipment moved
out of warehouses?
Answer. CBP has successfully deployed 94 fixed, large-scale systems
as of February 11, 2026. There are an additional 19 systems currently
under construction. Past delays in deployments were primarily due to
shortfalls in civil works funding. Projects were moved as far as
feasible pending appropriation of civil works funding; however, final
design and construction kick-off required application of civil works
funds. Funding needs to finalize deployments were assessed in fiscal
year 2023. A portion was received in fiscal year 2024 (April 2024),
with final funding received in fiscal year 2025 (September 2025).
Long-term storage of equipment primarily impacted the HE Rail
projects, where initial contracting required equipment manufacturing
and sites and civil works costs were assessed after the fact. This was
done because funding was expiring and needed to be applied quickly to
the procurement of equipment. With MEP and LEP systems, equipment
manufacturing is generally concurrent with site preparation and
construction. Individual vendors can request that funding be applied to
manufacturing, in some cases, to ensure that systems are ready for
delivery when construction is completed. Delays in the deployment of
some systems were also impacted by radiation interference testing and
the need to build shield walls as well as unanticipated facility
issues.
CBP projects deployments of all LEPs and MEPs by the end of fiscal
year 2026. Additionally, due to significant challenges and complexities
in the rail environment, CBP is estimating the full deployment of the
HE Rail systems by the end of calendar year 2028.
Question 6. Ms. Sabatino, some of the issues with deploying NII
systems are longstanding, such as interference with secondary screening
systems and space concerns. How is CBP planning to address these
issues? Why were they not resolved before?
Answer. To mitigate the challenges that CBP encounters when
deploying NII scanning capabilities at ports of entry due to limited
physical real estate, CBP deploys fixed scanning systems in post-
primary areas where there is sometimes more operationally available
space or deploys NII mobile systems. In the pre-primary environment at
some ports of entry, CBP will encounter radiation interference when
deploying NII scanning systems near Radiation Portal Monitors because
of the lack of proper distancing between the two systems. This is
primarily due to the real estate footprint in that area not allowing
for enough necessary space to properly deploy these two systems
together. CBP has been actively pursuing solutions to the radiation
interference issues to effectively deploy the fixed pre-primary
scanners. In calendar year 2023, CBP convened a working group comprised
of its operations and scientific subject-matter experts along with
subject-matter experts from the CWMD to develop potential solutions to
the interference issue. As a result of the working group, some
solutions were approved that allowed for a portion of the radiation
interference issue to be mitigated. Additionally, the working group
convened a session later in calendar year 2023 with the contracted
vendors and allowed them to present potential solutions to the
radiation interference issue. One of the solutions was accepted for
development by S&T. S&T has been working collaboratively with CBP and
with the vendor to develop the solution, with a successful factory test
completed in December 2025. S&T and CBP will conduct an operational
test at the Port of San Ysidro, California, in mid-calendar year 2026
for further evaluation and assessment.
Question 7. Ms. Sabatino, based on the data in the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) report, GAO-25-107379, CBP has procured
about one-third of the systems it needs. What is CBP's schedule for
procuring and deploying these remaining systems?
Answer. As of February 11, 2026, CBP deployed 94 NII systems, 19
are under construction, and 44 NII systems are in the planning phase.
CBP has made steady progress on developing a solution to mitigate
radiation interference which will offer CBP the opportunity to deploy
scanning equipment at some locations, most significantly the San Ysidro
Port of Entry which accounts for a significant percentage of traffic.
Once implemented, this solution will allow for placement of equipment
within a certain distance from the radiation portal monitors and will
allow plans for pre-primary deployment to be developed. Some sites--for
example, most ports of entry in Arizona--do not have the requisite
footprint, distance, etc. to allow placement of pre-primary systems.
For remaining sites, where pre-primary is not an option, an evaluation
will be conducted to determine post-primary placement and types of
systems that will increase scan rates and deployment schedules will be
updated accordingly.
Question 8a. In September 2025, GAO reported that CBP has not
included some of the largest ports of entry in its scanning plans,
including San Ysidro, Otay Mesa, and Nogales.
Why were these ports of entry excluded?
Answer. While the ports of San Ysidro, Otay Mesa, and Nogales do
have fixed scanning technology in the post-primary environment that
allows for the scanning of passenger vehicles that have been referred
by primary officers for further inspection, CBP recognizes that the
ports of San Ysidro, Otay Mesa, and Nogales represent a significant
portion of passenger vehicle traffic volume along the SWB. The primary
reason for the lack of the deployment of fixed pre-primary scanners at
this time has been due to the lack of real estate in the pre-primary
areas at these ports of entry that would allow for the scanning of the
passenger vehicles and to passively scan for radiation simultaneously
creating a radiation interference issue.
Question 8b. How effective is CBP's program if it excludes about
one-third of the traffic at Southwest Border crossings?
Answer. NII is valuable tool used by front-line personnel to screen
cargo, baggage, and conveyances for potential threats. NII is part of
CBP's layered enforcement strategy which also includes advanced vetting
through trusted traveler and trader programs that offer prioritized
processing for trusted entities, intelligence-driven targeting to
identify high-risk shipments and crossing behaviors, enforcement and
canine teams observing for suspicious indicators throughout operations,
and our front-line personnel using their knowledge, skills, and
experience to conduct primary and secondary inspections. Where fixed
systems are not available, front-line personnel have mobile and
handheld NII technology to support them in primary and secondary
inspections.
CBP will obligate $1.038 billion from the Working Families Tax Cut
Act (WFTC) to replace outdated technology, procure new technology for
locations where technology does not exist, integrate data from vendor
systems into CBP holdings, and develop algorithms. CBP actively works
with industry and S&T to evaluate new technologies to determine the
best technology for CBP operations. The legacy systems are being
replaced with newer technology that can scan at higher capacity and
with increased image quality. While CBP has evaluated new technologies
that would provide scanning of specific signatures and allow for a
better capability, this technology is not currently able to scale to
the size, speed, and footprint of CBP operations. WFTC funding is being
applied to the best equipment to meet operational needs.
While fixed, large-scale scanning systems are an important part of
the CBP enforcement strategy, CBP relies on a layered approach to
security that includes advanced targeting and intelligence; canine
assets; trade partner initiatives, such as Customs Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism and Free and Secure Trade programs; officer primary
and secondary inspections; and utilization of secondary scanning
systems and hand-held technology. CBP's vast targeting and law
enforcement intelligence holdings provide the front line with
indications of high-risk individuals and/or shipments as they interact
with them. The screening provided through NII is another layer of
information that is provided and while useful, only our front-line
personnel can determine whether a shipment, conveyance, or individual
can be allowed to proceed into the United States.
Additional considerations include the following:
Due to existing requirements in U.S. law and radiation
standards, the public must be given the opportunity to ``opt-
out'' of NII scanning which requires CBP to have at least one
primary lane without equipment. With natural traffic flow, a
percentage of vehicles will always go through that lane, even
if they are not concerned about the radiation.
Fixed NII systems have set dimensions. For both passenger
and commercial vehicles, oversized cargo vehicles and vehicles
that are pulling a trailer are too large to pass through the
scanners and must instead be inspected in the ``opt-out''
lanes.
Not all ports of entry have enough real estate to
accommodate a fixed system in pre-primary areas. Where there is
not enough space, scanning takes place in secondary areas.
Question 9. How could advanced 3D X-ray and computed tomography
systems improve CBP's ability to discriminate between legitimate cargo
and concealed threats--especially when dealing with complex or
cluttered freight?
Answer. A computed tomography (CT) scan produces a series of X-ray
images taken at different angles, processed into a 3-D image. The
images can be rotated as 3-D images, sliced and layers removed, each
process theoretically providing an opportunity for the operator to view
and identify an anomalous concealed threat. CT scanners can also aid in
the quantification of object densities, through measurements of the
attenuation of X-rays as they pass through the material. A 3-D image
eliminates the overlap between the layers, which is one of the issues
that obscures contraband with the traditional two-dimensional X-ray
image.
CBP has begun to deploy CT scanners in the mail/express consignment
vectors and has collected data with vendors utilizing real interdicted
threats to support the development of automated threat detection
algorithms for fentanyl and other dangerous materials.
Question 10. What progress has CBP made developing anomaly
detection algorithms to improve the detection of contraband? How would
the use of such technology shift CBP's resource needs, such as staffing
levels and officer training?
Answer. CBP is actively developing, training, and implementing
anomaly detection algorithms as a tool for CBP officer use to enhance
the identification of contraband. These advancements leverage
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning to analyze non-
intrusive inspection images.
The agency is developing specific algorithms to detect anomalies
within commercial vehicles and passenger vehicles, alongside comparison
models designed to reduce human workload.
The three use cases that CBP is focused on are described below:
Empty Truck Low-Risk Historical Comparison.--This algorithm
validates an empty truck by comparing its current X-ray image
with previously cleared X-ray images from prior entries.
Passenger Vehicle Model.--This model assists CBP officers in
detecting anomalies within the structure of passenger vehicles.
Commercial Vehicle Model.--This model helps CBP officers
detect anomalies in the cab and parts of the trailer structure.
To date the ``Empty Truck Low-Risk Historical Comparison'' model
developed is the only model that has been successfully tested at a high
enough level of confidence to expand beyond the initial deployment
location.
Following successful model development, field deployment of each
use case is dependent on appropriate technical infrastructure,
including appropriate X-ray machine technology, unified file format
conversion by the vendors, and a common integrated platform deployment.
Technical infrastructure projects are currently under way at 12
different CBP facilities and are scheduled for completion by end of
fiscal year 2026.
The integration of anomaly detection technology may one day allow
CBP to shift its resource needs, particularly for staffing and officer
training.
Staffing Levels.--While these technologies assist officers,
their full implementation could lead to personnel reallocation.
The goal is to increase throughput and efficiency, potentially
allowing officers to focus on higher-risk situations rather
than routine inspections.
Officer Training.--The widespread introduction of AI-powered
anomaly detection tools would necessitate updated training for
CBP officers. Officers would need training to interpret
algorithm outputs, understand limitations, and make informed
decisions based on AI recommendations.
staffing
Question 11a. Ms. Sabatino, regarding staffing at the San Ysidro
Port of Entry: How many OFO staff are needed to fully staff the San
Ysidro port of entry per the Workforce Staffing Model?
Answer. The Workload Staffing Model (WSM) is a decision support
tool and is the initial, data-driven, step in the process of
quantifying workload at ports of entry (POEs). The WSM considers all
business processes required of CBPOs, the workload associated with
those business processes, and the true level of effort required to
carry out daily missions effectively. The fiscal year 2025 WSM, which
uses fiscal year 2024 data and projects staffing needs through fiscal
year 2026, shows the need for a total of 2,961 CBPOs in the San Diego
Field Office.
Question 11b. How will the money given to CBP from reconciliation
address the staffing needs at San Ysidro?
Answer. OFO has identified 500 positions from the reconciliation
funding that will be allocated to the San Diego Field Office. Of those,
around 100 were identified by the Field Office to be utilized in San
Ysidro.
Question 11c. How many open vacancies are there right now at the
San Ysidro Port of Entry?
Answer. As of pay period 01 ending January 24, 2026, San Ysidro had
105 vacant CBPO positions (approximately 10 percent of allocated).
Question 11d. How many individuals have you hired for the San
Ysidro Port of Entry in the last year?
Answer. One hundred thirty-nine (77 in fiscal year 2026)
individuals have been hired for the San Ysidro Port of Entry in the
last year with an additional 47 pending their enter on duty date within
the next month.
Question 11e. What is the average length of time it takes to hire
an individual for the San Ysidro Port of Entry?
Answer. The average time to hire a CBPO across all POEs is
approximately 399 days; however, OFO has continued to maintain a
healthy pipeline and ``ready to hire'' list. San Ysidro is considered a
hard-to-fill location and candidates are offered incentives for San
Ysidro and several other ``hard-to-fill'' locations.
Question 12a. Ms. Sabatino, regarding CBP OFO staffing overall: How
many additional officers does OFO require per its Workforce Staffing
Model? How will the money given to CBP from reconciliation address
these staffing needs?
Answer. The WSM is a decision support tool and is the initial,
data-driven, step in the process of quantifying workload at POEs. The
WSM considers all business processes required of CBPOs, the workload
associated with those business processes, and the true level of effort
required to carry out daily missions effectively. The fiscal year 2025
WSM, which uses fiscal year 2024 data and projects staffing needs
through fiscal year 2026, shows the need for an additional 6,193 CBPOs
across the POEs nationwide. OFO was provided 5,000 new CBPO billets in
WFTC, for distribution throughout its ports of entry based on
operational demands and facility expansions.
Question 12b. A significant portion of OFO's workforce plans to
retire over the next few years. What are your plans to address this
wave of retirements?
Answer. OFO has implemented a hiring strategy based on operational
needs, anticipated attrition, and mission-critical priorities to ensure
sustainable staffing alignment. This strategy includes:
Staffing for increased operational demands, projected
traffic surges, and planned facility expansions to maximize
efficiency and readiness.
An aggressive recruitment strategy that resulted in a 35.5
percent increase in applicant volume when comparing fiscal
year 2025 to fiscal year 2024.
Leveraging technology to automate pre-employment
processing to reduce time to hire and meet hiring targets.
Fiscal year 2026-2029 hiring goals include annual
attrition hiring and additional appropriated CBP officer
positions through the WFTC.
OFO was provided 5,000 new CBPO billets in the 2025 WFTC
for distribution throughout its ports of entry based on
operational demands and facility expansions.
Increased training seats at the Field Operations Academy
to meet future hiring demands (fiscal year 2026-fiscal year
2029).
Remaining flexible with filling additional allocations
based on a strong CBPO pipeline and ability to pulse and
surge quickly.
Utilization of recruitment and retention incentives for
locations that are typically hard to fill and/or hard to
retain based on the remote nature of the facility or a high
cost of living in the location.
Questions from Chairman Michael Guest for Hilary M. Benedict
Question 1. Ms. Benedict, based on the observations your team has
made in reviewing this program, is CBP assigning appropriate resources
to addressing the issue of ``sufficient space'' at San Ysidro, Otay
Mesa, and all other ports of entry along the Southwest Border that are
not in their plan?
Answer. Based on information obtained during our review, CBP is
investigating solutions for deploying large-scale non-intrusive
inspection (NII) systems to the ports of entry along the Southwest
Border with limited space, including working with the Department of
Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate to develop and
deploy low-energy portals that could be installed where space
constraints and interference with radiation detectors make deployment
of these systems difficult. According to CBP, factory testing of this
technical solution will be completed by June 30, 2026, followed by
conducting operational testing, selecting a solution, and beginning
deployment in fiscal year 2028. We will continue to monitor CBP's
progress toward deploying NII systems to all ports of entry along the
Southwest Border and expect CBP to provide an update of its progress in
March 2026.
Question 2a. Ms. Benedict, in the GAO-25-107379 report on the NII
program, your team suggested that CBP: Should clearly (1) define all
NII key performance parameters and report performance using them and
(2) determine how to include deployment of large-scale NII systems to
all Southwest Border land ports of entry in updates to its deployment
plans.
Can you elaborate on the recommendations and how GAO identified
them as the most pressing issues with CBP's NII program?
Question 2b. Were there any other areas of concern that GAO
identified, which did not rise to the level of a recommendation that
Congress should be aware of?
Question 2c. Have you had any meetings with CBP post release of the
report? If so, have you seen progress within CBP to execute on the
recommendations?
Answer. CBP collects and uses performance data to help ensure that
its large-scale non-intrusive inspection (NII) systems are available
for use to scan vehicles and inform actions it takes to improve NII
system performance. We made our first recommendation because we
determined that clearly defining the performance parameters used to
collect and report on NII system performance would help CBP identify
deficiencies and potential cost savings, achieve its objectives more
efficiently and effectively, and inform future procurement decisions.
To address our recommendation, CBP planned to define system-level key
performance parameters for NII systems in the statement of work for its
new contract statements of work, to include maintenance and
availability requirements and reporting.
Additionally, in our review, we found that CBP did not have plans
to deploy large-scale NII systems at 9 ports of entry, which accounted
for 30 percent of passenger vehicle crossings at all land ports of
entry in fiscal year 2024. We made our second recommendation because
only vehicles selected for secondary inspection are scanned at these
ports of entry so CBP risks entry of many unscanned vehicles entering
the United States, hampering its ability to prevent entry of illegal
drugs and other contraband.
In our review, we identified and discussed in our report several
challenges CBP's NII program is facing. Some of these challenges have
limited CBP's ability to use the systems, such as staff shortages and
system outages. Some challenges have led to deployments costing more
due to factors such as substantial increases in costs for civil works
and construction. Other challenges have led to system deployments
taking longer such as the need for major site upgrades to enable system
installation and vendors taking longer than expected to resolve issues
encountered during deployment.
We have not formally met with CBP to discuss its progress on our
recommendations since the release of our report in September 2025.
However, we expect CBP to provide an update on its progress in March
2026.
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