[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DIGITAL G.I. BILL UNDELIVERED:
CONTRACTING CHALLENGES AND THE
NEED FOR ACQUISITION REFORM
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY MODERNIZATION
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2026
__________
Serial No. 119-47
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-304 WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS
MIKE BOST, Illinois, Chairman
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, MARK TAKANO, California, Ranking
American Samoa, Vice-Chairwoman Member
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan JULIA BROWNLEY, California
NANCY MACE, South Carolina CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
MARIANNETTE MILLER-MEEKS, Iowa SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK,
GREGORY F. MURPHY, North Carolina Florida
DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin MORGAN MCGARVEY, Kentucky
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas DELIA RAMIREZ, Illinois
JUAN CISCOMANI, Arizona NIKKI BUDZINSKI, Illinois
KEITH SELF, Texas TIMOTHY M. KENNEDY, New York
JEN KIGGANS, Virginia MAXINE DEXTER, Oregon
ABE HAMADEH, Arizona HERB CONAWAY, New Jersey
KIMBERLYN KING-HINDS, Northern KELLY MORRISON, Minnesota
Mariana Islands
TOM BARRETT, Michigan
Jon Clark, Staff Director
Matt Reel, Democratic Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY MODERNIZATION
TOM BARRETT, Michigan, Chairman
NANCY MACE, South Carolina NIKKI BUDZINSKI, Illinois, Ranking
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas Member
SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK,
Florida
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin, Chairman
JUAN CISCOMANI, Arizona CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire,
ABE HAMADEH, Arizona Ranking Member
KIMBERLYN KING-HINDS, Northern MORGAN MCGARVEY, Kentucky
Mariana Islands DELIA RAMIREZ, Illinois
TOM BARRETT, Michigan TIMOTHY M. KENNEDY, New York
Pursuant to clause 2(e)(4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, public
hearing records of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs are also
published in electronic form. The printed hearing record remains the
official version. Because electronic submissions are used to prepare
both printed and electronic versions of the hearing record, the process
of converting between various electronic formats may introduce
unintentional errors or omissions. Such occurrences are inherent in the
current publication process and should diminish as the process is
further refined.
C O N T E N T S
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2026
Page
OPENING STATEMENTS
The Honorable Tom Barrett, Chairman, Subcommittee on Technology
Modernization.................................................. 1
The Honorable Nikki Budzinski, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Technology Modernization....................................... 2
The Honorable Derrick Van Orden, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Economic Opportunity........................................... 4
The Honorable Chris Pappas, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Economic Opportunity........................................... 5
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Kenneth Smith, Executive Director at Education Service,
Veterans Benefits Administration, U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs........................................................ 7
Accompanied by:
Mr. Raymond Tellez, Executive Director, Office of Business
Integration, Veterans Benefits Administration, U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs
Mr. Jeffrey Neill, Associate Executive Director, Office of
Procurement, Acquisition and Logistics, Technology
Acquisition Center, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
Mr. Robert Orifici, Executive Director of Benefits and
Memorial Services, Office of Information Technology, U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs
Panel II
Mr. Justin Parke, Managing Director, Digital GI Bill Program
Manager, Accenture Federal Services............................ 22
Mr. Troy Mueller, Managing Director, Integrated Benefits
Operations & Technology Division, MITRE........................ 24
Mr. William Hubbard, Vice President for Veterans & Military
Policy, Veterans Education Success............................. 25
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements Of Witnesses
Mr. Kenneth Smith Prepared Statement............................. 35
Mr. Justin Parke Prepared Statement.............................. 37
Mr. Troy Mueller Prepared Statement.............................. 38
Mr. William Hubbard Prepared Statement........................... 41
APPENDIX--continued
Statements For The Record
National Association of Veterans Programs Administrators Prepared
Statement...................................................... 49
Student Veterans of America Prepared Statement................... 74
DIGITAL G.I. BILL UNDELIVERED:
CONTRACTING CHALLENGES AND THE
NEED FOR ACQUISITION REFORM
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2026
Subcommittee on Technology Modernization,
Subcommittee on Economic Opportunity,
Committee on Veterans' Affairs,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
room 360, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Tom Barrett
[chairman of the subcommittee on Technology Modernization]
presiding.
Present from the Subcommittee on Technology Modernization:
Representatives Barrett, Budzinski, and Cherfilus-McCormick.
Present from the Subcommittee on Economic Opportunity:
Representatives Van Orden, HAMADEH, King-Hinds, Pappas,
Ramirez, and Kennedy.
OPENING STATEMENT OF TOM BARRETT, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TECHNOLOGY MODERNIZATION
Mr. Barrett. Good afternoon. The joint committee hearing
will come to order.
Today we are here to talk about the most important promises
our Nation makes to those who have served. Veterans make a
commitment to our country. They make the sacrifice. When our
veterans come home, America needs to help them build the next
chapter in their life, which is why we are here today.
For millions of veterans and families, the GI Bill is not
just a benefit. It is the bridge from military service to
civilian life. It gives veterans a fair shot at building a
future. It ensures veterans have the tools they need to get the
education or job training they want, where they want it, and
without a bunch of bureaucracy standing in the way, so that
they can eventually be competitive in the American economy.
That promise should be simple and it should be reliable.
Over several years, the Digital GI Bill (DGIB) has
struggled to meet that standard. The system was meant to
modernize how education benefits are delivered. It is supposed
to replace outdated systems, reduce paperwork, make payments
safer. Instead, what we have seen are delays, confusion, and
multimillion-dollar rising costs to contracts. That is
unacceptable.
The Digital GI Bill system began with unclear requirements,
moved forward without the right subject matter experts at the
table. For years, it lacked basic project management discipline
and a reliable schedule. This is not a modernization mistake.
This is a mismanagement, plain and simple.
The Digital GI Bill contract was awarded 5 years ago, in
2021. It was expected to cost hundreds of millions of dollars.
Today, that cost has more than doubled, with a full life cycle
price now reaching into the billions. Meanwhile, veterans are
missing housing payments. We have seen delays that have been
unnecessary. Schools are being left in the dark without clear
guidance. There is not a single technical error--this is not
about a single technical error. It is an accumulation of
multiple errors. It is about leadership decisions, contracting
strategy, and it ties back to a lack of accountability.
The benefit system itself should never become a barrier to
the benefits they are set to give. Veterans earn the GI Bill
through years of service and sacrifice. They should not have to
re-earn it by waiting in call queues, navigating backlogs, or
praying the system works this time, or contacting their Member
of Congress to work through the problem with them. Today's
hearing is about understanding what went wrong and, just as
importantly, what must change going forward because this
problem is not unique to the Digital GI Bill.
Across the entire Department, large technology programs
continue to struggle under vague requirements, weak oversight,
contracts that balloon and cost taxpayers more, while delaying
the delivery of U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
services to our veterans. When accountability is unclear, the
costs always end up going up, schedules slip and get delayed,
and the veterans and their families these systems are meant to
serve pay the price. That is why this hearing is also about
acquisition reform. If we do not fix how these systems are
procured and awarded, we will repeat the same mistakes at the
expense of veterans and taxpayers.
I chair the Subcommittee on Technology and Modernization. I
know my friend and fellow subcommittee chairman, Representative
Van Orden, shares this message that this does not work for us.
The status quo is not cutting it. President Trump and Secretary
Collins share that commitment.
Thank you again for all being here today. I look forward to
a productive discussion on how we can move forward to create
more permanent changes.
I just want to say that I personally have benefited from
the GI Bill. Used that in my own personal life and I know
countless other veterans who have as well, and it stands out as
one of the biggest pillars of economic opportunity that our
country has undertaken.
Before I yield, please be advised that the chairman may
declare a recess at any time. With that, I want to yield to
Ranking Member Budzinski for her opening statement as well.
OPENING STATEMENT OF NIKKI BUDZINSKI, RANKING MEMBER,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY MODERNIZATION
Ms. Budzinski. Thank you very much, Chairmen Barrett and
Van Orden and Ranking Member Pappas. I value the oversight work
our two subcommittees have done on the Digital GI Bill program
in recent Congresses.
As I mentioned back in December, it is unfortunate that the
program's relative success has been impaired by recent missed
payments and a lack of communication by the Department. Even
more unfortunate is that many have pointed the finger at
Information Technology (IT) hiccups or tech glitches when it
appears that policy decisions, a lack of planning, and poor
contract management were actually to blame, issues that plagued
too many of VA's modernization efforts.
While I appreciate our conversation today on the
intricacies of government contracting and project management
challenges within the Digital GI Bill program, these are
systemic issues that we see across VA modernization efforts,
like supply chain modernization, electronic health record
modernization, the integrated financial and management system,
or IFAMS, just to name a few. To this end, I would like to
insert VA's Office of the Inspector General's recent report
here analyzing VA's major management and performance challenges
into the record and specifically highlighting its section
addressing challenges to the information systems and
innovation.
Mr. Barrett. Continue.
Ms. Budzinski. Thank you. The report highlights the
critical work VA employees do to provide world-class veteran
healthcare, disability payments, education and survivor
benefits, memorial services, and more. However, VA's Office of
Inspector General (OIG) notes significant challenges in
effectively deploying IT products within the same implements--
impediments rearing their heads over and over again. Inadequate
planning, insufficient resource development, limited
stakeholder engagement, and failures to promptly fix known
problems, these are all issues that OIG has identified in their
August 2024 report about contract management failures within
DGIB, and there are topics we discussed in September 2024
hearing about that report.
Despite the recommendations from that report being closed,
I have two major concerns. First, I worry about the status of
these recommendations and the applied resolution in light of
the significant personnel, contractual, and procedural changes
that have occurred under Secretary Collins. Second, in light of
this recent report on management challenges and our continued
oversight, has VA systemically--systematically addressed these
issues with contract management and can they apply them to
future contracts even with a depleted workforce?
While I highlight this one report from OIG, there are
dozens of more just like it from OIG, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), and other oversight watchdogs
assessing VA's capacity for modernization. Many of these
reports highlight that when these controls and processes break
down, small errors turn into large losses and erode the public
trust. Siloed conversations about how VA manages one contract
will not improve the issues OIG or GAO raised. I believe our
time would be better spent taking a holistic view at the high-
level systemic issues that plague VA's IT modernization efforts
rather than playing whack-a-mole on each individual contract.
Last, I look forward to hearing from VA, Accenture, and
Veterans Education Success (VES) today on VA's progress in
processing beneficiary claims and delivering timely payments.
While I believe the delays were caused by structural challenges
in intentional policy decisions within the VA rather than
contractor performance, I look forward to hearing how VA can
improve its planning, execution, and communication and prevent
added confusion, frustration, and further delays in benefits.
Thank you and I yield back.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you, Ranking Member Budzinski.
I now yield to our Subcommittee on Economic Opportunity
chairman, my friend, Chairman Van Orden, for his opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF DERRICK VAN ORDEN, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
Mr. Van Orden. Thank you, Chairman. Thanks for everybody
for being here. I mean, I also want to thank the VA for finally
sending the actual witness that we wanted instead of taking
their pick. That is our pick, not yours.
I believe that this topic can and needs to be approached in
a nonpartisan manner and I appreciate your comments, ma'am. The
ultimate goal of this hearing is to get down to brass tacks and
figure out how the VA can continue its efforts to keep the
Digital GI Bill program--excuse me, I need to correct that. It
is not keep the Digital GI Bill on program or on track. It is
get the Digital GI Bill on track.
As chairman of the Subcommittee of the Economic
Opportunity, I am committed to providing our veterans with the
resources that they need to pursue the education or employment
opportunities. Veterans earn their educational benefits through
their service to this great country and it is our obligation to
ensure these benefits are delivered reliably and on time.
Now, the Digital GI program was supposed to be a
multimillion-dollar VA effort. It has now turned into a
multibillion-dollar effort. It is supposed to--intended to
streamline the education claims processing by consolidating
out--excuse me, outdated legacy IT systems and automating
adjudication of most claims. This should make it easier, not
harder for veterans to access and receive their educational
benefits. However, the delays in benefit payments continue to
impact student veterans.
I swear it was like 2 days ago it was Groundhog Day. This
is like Groundhog Committee with you guys.
I will be very clear. The Veterans Affairs Administration
has a zero, zero, success rate of creating their own
infrastructure like this. Zero. Have not got one right at all.
That goes into the health record and everything. It is a
disaster.
We are also going to hear about the real-world impacts of
these delayed payments on students. Today's hearing is going to
examine how contracting issues and lack of program oversight
led to these delays, delays in payments, and how we move
forward.
The purpose of this hearing is to focus on the solicitation
and contract administration of the GI Bill, Digital GI Bill.
Specifically, how contracting decisions made in the early
stages of this program have impacted delivery of the platform
that has only ballooned the cost of contracting to over $2
billion. Imagine what we could do with a billion and a half.
Let us say you needed $500 million for this. Imagine what we
could do with the other $1.5 billion to provide services to our
veterans. It is inexcusable.
The cost of this project has increased over billions of
dollars compared to the original estimates. During today's
hearing, you have got to take responsibility. You have to take
responsibility for the continued delays and the skyrocketing
costs on behalf of the American taxpayers. Student veterans
deserve a reliable modern system and taxpayers deserve
assurances that their investment is worthwhile, period.
Today we have witnesses from the Veterans Benefits
Administration (VBA) and the Office of Information and
Technology (OIT) and the Office of Business Integration. With
these different departments within the VA present, sorry, I
look forward to seeing how all of you can work together to
ensure the Digital GI Bill is in good hands and finally take
accountability for the massive years-long failures.
I want to end with a quote from General Omar Bradley. We
are dealing with veterans, not procedures. It is their
problems, not ours. Meaning when you are focused internally on
your own problem sets, you cannot focus externally to the
veterans. Again, that is unacceptable.
With that, I yield to Ranking Member Pappas for an opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHRIS PAPPAS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
Mr. Pappas. Well, thank you very much to both of our
chairmen and I would also like to echo the comments of Ranking
Member Budzinski.
I am glad that we are here talking about VA education
benefits, but I am confused a little bit about the approach. If
we are discussing contracting issues, then VA's OIG should be
at the table as a witness. Our Oversight and Investigation
Subcommittee should be represented at this hearing, too. If we
are going to be discussing VA management decisions, failure to
communicate, and failure to pay benefits on time last fall,
then we should have witnesses representing veterans, families,
survivors impacted by these decisions who can testify to tell
their lived experiences, as well as VA political appointees to
take accountability for these decisions. Instead we have a
weird hybrid setup today. I wish that the majority staff had
engaged with the minority staff before last Friday so that
these issues could have been worked through and we could have
had an even more productive hearing today.
When I look at what happened in the fall with Chapter 35
benefits, I do not see a contract or a contractor failure. No
one in VA has accused Accenture of not delivering what they
were asked to when they were asked to. The issue that sparked
the delays was the decision to have a human reconcile
beneficiary data between the old Benefits Delivery Network
(BDN) and the new VA corporate data bases used by the Digital
GI Bill.
That being said, I acknowledge the fact that there were
legitimate concerns about data integrity and processing of
claims. VA's failure was not validating the assumption that
this data reconciliation would only take about 5 minutes per
beneficiary. In reality, it took up to 3 hours per file.
A planning failure that compounded this mistake was VA's
decision to roll out this change before the fall semester, the
busiest time for VA Education Services and the largest number
of veterans and survivors applying for education benefits.
Previous reports and reviews of how VA implements IT upgrades
have recommended that VA test changes at a small scale first
and then roll out the full scale change in nonpeak months. VA
did not do that here.
I understand why VA made that decision. Education Services
was trying to get the last group of beneficiaries off BDN
before the end of the Fiscal Year so that the system could be
retired and the government would not have to continue to pay
the contract to sustain it. Nevertheless, we now see the
consequences of doing it that way.
Finally, the most impactful and inexcusable decision VA
made was the failure to communicate with beneficiaries, with
the public, and with Congress. Again, this was a decision made
by the administration. Nothing prevented VA from communicating
what was happening in real time. Saying that the lapse in
appropriations and government shutdown prevented VA from
communicating this critical information to beneficiaries is not
true. Plenty of VA staff were at work. The Secretary was
tweeting. It was a political decision to hide veterans--to hide
this information from veteran survivors and the public and from
Congress in terms of what was going on. That is unacceptable
and it should be unacceptable to everyone on this bipartisan
committee.
Oftentimes, when we discuss events like these, we usually
say VA did this or VA did that. VA is the organization. The
decisions are made by individuals. I do not think that people
who made the decisions that directly led to the failures last
fall that I have outlined are in the room today. That, too, is
unacceptable, especially for a committee that prides itself on
a reputation for focusing on real solutions to help our
veterans without the partisanship that is seen elsewhere in
Congress. Even if we want to say that Mr. Smith is the
responsible decision-maker as the head of Education Services, I
think Chairman Van Orden will agree with me from his time in
the service that responsibility can be delegated down, but
accountability cannot be.
For the record, we have exactly zero administration
officials take accountability for these failures to date. I
have been on this committee since 2019. I have seen all eight
DGIB releases. I saw the issues with the original contract and
VA's failure to understand their requirements and write the
contract correctly under the first Trump administration. I saw
the issues overseeing the contract under the Biden
administration, the transition to Accenture, and the growth in
the scope of the contract. I saw the massive failure to pay
beneficiaries last fall. I can tell you that VA could have
absolutely written this contract better to start.
I can point out that VA has had to re scope the contract
several times because they did not understand their needs up
front and did not plan correctly. I can say that the cost
estimates have been way off as a result. I can also confidently
say, and I want to underscore this, that the issues in the fall
were not due to the contract. The issues were a result of
decisions that VA made and veterans' families and survivors
were the ones who suffered.
When are we going to have someone take accountability for
the decisions that cause harm to veterans? When are we going
to, as a committee, practice what we preach, rise above the
partisanship, regardless of who is in the White House, and
insist on some accountability? When are we going to force that
accountability? I hope we can hear a little bit more about that
today.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you, Ranking Member Pappas.
We now move on to introduce our witnesses. From the
Department of Veterans Affairs we have Mr. Kenneth Smith,
executive director of Education Services, Veteran Benefits
Administration. Mr. Smith is accompanied by Mr. Raymond Tellez
from VBA's Office of Business Integration; Mr. Jeffrey Neill
from VA's Technology Acquisition Center (TAC); Mr. Robert
Orifici, did I say it correctly or is there a long E in there?
Orifici from VA's Office of Information and Technology.
I ask the witnesses please stand and raise your right
hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Barrett. Thank you and let the record reflect that all
witnesses have answered in the affirmative.
Mr. Smith, you are now recognized for 5 minutes to deliver
your testimony and opening statement on behalf of VA.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH SMITH
Mr. Smith. Thank you and good afternoon, Chairmans Barrett
and Van Orden, Ranking Members Budzinski and Pappas, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity today to discuss Digital GI Bill's program
management and contract. Joining me today are Mr. Raymond
Tellez, executive director, Veterans Benefits Administration,
Office of Business Integration; Mr. Jeffrey Neill, associate
executive director, Technology Acquisition Center in VA's
Office of Acquisition, Logistics, and Construction (OALC); and
Mr. Robert Orifici, executive director, Benefits and Memorial
Service, Office of Information Technology.
VA's efforts to implement transformational changes through
the DGIB platform have enabled VA to deliver benefits faster,
enhance customer service, and strengthen compliance and
oversight activities. VA has made tremendous advancements
toward streamlining and automating systems and processes to
increase efficiency and drive outcomes for veterans and their
families.
DGIB was envisioned as a fully integrated solution to
restructure both claims processing for all education benefits
programs and to enhance customer service for beneficiaries and
external partners. To date, the program has successfully met
mission milestones to maximize service delivery through end-to-
end automation for millions of education benefits claims.
Additionally, VA has exceeded initial goals by replacing
and decommissioning several legacy IT systems, including the
near half-century old Benefits Delivery Network and the long-
term solution for Chapter 33, both replaced by DGIB. Along the
road, VA has also addressed many other unplanned functionality
changes as required by congressional action and court mandates.
The progress was not without challenges. The original
contract underestimated complexity, particularly transitioning
from legacy Common Business-Oriented Language (COBOL) as
systems. Delays occurred during integration issues and testing
environment shortages, and VA acknowledged this in a hearing on
September 26, 2024.
Increased scope equals increased costs. For example,
legislated changes, such as the Johnny Isakson and David P. Roe
Act, the Elizabeth Dole Act, and court decisions, like Rudisill
v. McDonough and Perkins v. Collins, each require significant
work and technical reprioritization within the DGIB program.
Since implementation of the DGIB project, the MITRE
Corporation has assisted VA with acquisition, planning, and
program support. To ensure full multiyear understanding of
costs and the strategic impact of both delay and external
factors, MITRE prepared a Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE). The
LCCE enables education service to consider tradeoff decisions,
such as new claims processor functionality versus greater
automation. VA monitors these costs closely and prioritizes
increased service delivery for veterans while ensuring good
stewardship for taxpayer dollars.
Since 2021, VA has processed 37 percent more claims and as
of December 2025, VA is automating and delivering 65 percent of
all claims without any human action in a day, reducing costs
and improving service delivery. As of January 22, 2026, the
average days to complete education claims was 5.6 days. For
Chapter 33 and 35 claims completed through automation, accuracy
was 97 percent, which is on par with human processing.
VA has taken further steps to improve program management.
First, VA moved from a fixed schedule to a scope-driven
priority process called the Agile Software Methodology. Second,
since VA has consistently processed more claims than originally
forecast, VA was forced to add additional funding annually to
its claims processing contract, but has now shifted to a fixed
cost per month to improve predictability.
Finally, since 2021, the DGIB initiative has successfully
implemented eight major releases and hundreds of minor
releases. Our focus has always been on the veteran delivering
benefits easier and faster through simplified application
interfaces and increased automation.
Thank you for your continued support and collaboration as
we work to honor the service and sacrifice of veterans. My
colleagues and I are prepared to answer any questions you or
other members of the subcommittee may have.
[The Prepared Statement Of Kenneth Smith Appears In The
Appendix]
Mr. Barrett. Thank you, Mr. Smith. The written statement of
Mr. Smith will be entered into the hearing record and I assume
your opening statement stands for the rest of the panelists
with you today, so we will be able to move on to questions.
I am now going to recognize myself for 5 minutes for
questions.
Mr. Smith or Mr. Orifici, the Program Management Office is
tasked with requirements planning and developing cost
assessments prior to solicitations for these contracts. Do you
believe it would be beneficial if VA established an independent
office to provide expertise in cost estimates and program
evaluations for large modernization efforts, like the one
undertook by the Digital GI Bill?
Mr. Smith. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. If the
question is whether Program Management Office should be outside
of the business line, I would say no, because the subject
matter expertise to deliver that benefit is within the program,
which is education service.
Mr. Barrett. Would you say that the program--I mean, what I
am looking at is the actual implementation of an IT system
agnostic to the actual area under which it is going to be
covering, but covering the actual implementation of the
program, the program management, and the implementation of that
technology. You know, the computer does not know if it is
processing education benefits or health benefits. Yet it feels
like we have drifted from actually getting these things
implemented in a reasonable amount of time for a cost we can
anticipate at the beginning.
To Chairman Van Orden's point, there has not been a
successful launch of an IT system in a large scale in as far
back as we can remember. Perhaps part of that is due to the
localized effort of those that are managing it versus those
that may have the expertise in implementing systems regardless
of what they are used for.
Mr. Orifici. Thank you for that question. In general, we
believe that we have the necessary support between IT and the
business program offices as IT works to partner with the
business on integrated roadmaps, on making sure that we have
the outcomes that the business needs identified as we enter
into these. Of course, there is never going to be perfect as we
look at requirements, as we look at toward schedule, but we
want to make sure that we do work toward good enough to be able
to move forward and drive outcomes for veterans.
Mr. Barrett. Yes, I do not think any of us on this
committee have perfect as our expectation. We want, you know,
we want outcomes that are going to benefit the veterans that we
serve at costs that are not two to three times more than our
advertiser and sometimes even greater than that with serving
the people that have earned these benefits. You know, we have
seen chronic issues within this and it seems to all come back
to IT systems that are an overhaul, a massive overhaul of a
legacy system, moving to an IT system, or an accumulation of a
bunch of different systems in the Digital GI Bill to put this
under one umbrella and then implement it, and it just seems to
chronically have issues that arise from that. Moving it out
into an office dedicated to this purpose perhaps would bring
about a better result. It sounds like you disagree with that
though.
Mr. Smith. Sir, the program has delivered tremendous
results for veterans. We are currently automating 65 percent of
all of our claims. This was originally envisioned as a managed
service contract. This is a managed service contract. It is not
an IT contract. While we work closely with IT on integration
with VA systems to issue things like payments and ensure that
we have integrity across our environment, we work with our
acquisition staff to make sure that contract has strong
oversight and we are fair and equitable with the contractor.
Then the Program Management Service is also responsible for
making sure that we achieve those outcomes in terms of the
number of claims that we processed, as well as we have
decommissioned eight legacy systems and have addressed
countless other unplanned requirements in our--with it since
2021.
Mr. Barrett. Okay. With the 1 minute I have left on my
time, can you help me understand? You know, a lot of these
things are siloed between the parts of the Department that they
are contained within. Is there any collaborative effort or
sharing of information, best practices, lessons learned? I
mean, in the Army, we had a whole safety center that shared,
hey, this thing happened, and now we are going to change our
protocols. The next time we go and do a scenario or an exercise
this way. Is that happening within the VA or are there really
siloed offices and practices going about this that may make the
same mistake as another office did 2 years ago or 10 years ago?
Mr. Smith. I would like to ask Mr. Neill or Mr. Orifici to
respond.
Mr. Orifici. Sir, thank you for that question. We
definitely have lessons learned that we share up through the IT
organization as we work with this effort.
Mr. Barrett. Is that a formal process or just like a, you
know, you call somebody you know in the other office and tell
them?
Mr. Orifici. It is more of an informal process, but it
happens where we share lessons learned. We have regular
meetings between the program offices and portfolios that work
on these efforts, and there is lessons learned shared across
these groups.
Mr. Barrett. Okay. My timing is up. I want to make sure I
go through the proper protocol of who I am supposed to
recognize.
Is it Chairman Van Orden next or Chairman--Ranking Member
Budzinski? Okay, go ahead, Ranking Member.
Ms. Budzinski. Actually, I am going to pick up where you--I
think you left off, Chairman Barrett.
I just wanted to put a finer maybe point on, I think, his
questioning. One of the things I am still kind of confused by,
by your responses, is who is actually leading this acquisition?
You know, I can understand that VBA, the business line, OIT is
involved, the Office of Acquisitions, Logistics, and
Construction. I think what Chairman Barrett might have been
asking, and I am also still curious about, is that work being
siloed, who is kind of overarching in charge of the acquisition
itself?
Mr. Smith. In terms of the actual acquisition and the DGIB
system, I, as the executive director for Education Service, I
am the responsible official.
Ms. Budzinski. Okay. I think just asking kind of again, for
you to maybe further elaborate on, you know, the confusion that
did seem to have occurred here between these multiple different
entities that led to some of these issues. In looking back on
this, was there anything in retrospect you would have handled
differently that could have mitigated some of the confusions?
Mr. Smith. I am not sure which confusions you are referring
to, ma'am. I would say that, as I said in my opening statement,
there were unclear expectations around the timeline and level
of effort for decommissioning legacy systems and coming out of
the COBOL system into a modern data base, as well as unplanned
scope. We had to address new requirements within the same
budget.
Ms. Budzinski. Yes. I guess what I mean is like cost
overruns, issues with delays, those kind of confusions. If
there was anything that you might have done differently
specifically.
Mr. Smith. In terms of cost overrun, it technically was not
an overrun. It was a cost expansion. We added costs because we
added scope to the contract to address new functional
requirements. These functional requirements were, as I said,
the Isakson-Roe Act, the Dole Act, Rudisill, and Perkins, to
name a few.
Ms. Budzinski. Okay. I will move on. I think one of the
issues, though, is getting the scope right is so important so
that we do not see these projects continue to balloon in cost
and so confusion and a lack of communication so that the scope
gets done right the first time and it does not continue to
expand and taxpayers continue to pay for a larger price tag for
implementation. I will move on from there.
Mr. Smith, MITRE, who is joining us on our second panel,
has been a contractor to conduct the VA's Life Cycle Cost
Estimate for the DGIB program since 2021. I understand that the
VA ended that contract after MITRE delivered its last estimate
in April. How does the VA plan to perform these estimates
without this contract?
Mr. Smith. Thank you for the question. We are looking at
ways to manage that, either to in-house it or find another
solution.
Ms. Budzinski. Okay. It seems like a big part of the cost
growth with the DGIB program has not been fully understanding
what you need, again, as I mentioned before, one of the surest
ways to underestimate acquisition costs. Are you confident the
VA understands all the elements of your requirements so they
will stop growing?
Mr. Smith. Yes, I think we do have an understanding of our
scope. We do understand that there are new requirements that we
still need to work in while also executing the final components
of--that we had actually planned in the original contract.
Ms. Budzinski. Okay. My next question is, who will be
responsible for revising the cost estimates going forward? Is
that you?
Mr. Smith. It would be under the direction of my office.
You know, the actual whether we contract it out or do it in-
house is something we will have to decide still.
Ms. Budzinski. Okay. Are you confident that whoever that
will be will have the expertise to actually come up with that
robust estimate and get it right the first time?
Mr. Smith. We will come up with a cost estimate, and we
will be happy to share it with you and the subcommittee.
Ms. Budzinski. Okay. How did VA come to decide that taking
this task in-house is the most appropriate considering numerous
reports about VA's inability to accurately and reliably perform
LCCEs?
Mr. Smith. We believe that having worked with MITRE over a
number of years, that we should be able to transition some of
that work. While, again, it may not be perfect the first time
with government personnel taking over, we would be looking
forward to, you know, getting that correct.
Ms. Budzinski. Okay. I will go ahead and yield back.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you, Ranking Member Budzinski.
I want to recognize Representative Hamadeh for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hamadeh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to also thank
my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, too. I think we
have got a lot of bipartisan support in trying to make sure
that the veterans are taken care of here today.
The Trump administration has prioritized dismantling the
bureaucratic paralysis and, quote, ``contractor entitlement.''
Both bureaucratic paralysis and contractor entitlement have
stalled progress during the previous term. Now these reform
efforts face a critical test with the Digital GI Bill. Despite
VA's reported backlog reductions, the program's rollout remains
a flashpoint for mismanagement and systemic payment failures
that continue to affect veterans. Secretary Collins has been
doing a commendable job carrying out President Trump's mandate,
and I appreciate the VA's timely submission of their written
testimony by Monday morning for today's oversight hearing.
Now, Mr. Smith, thank you for being here today. I want to
focus on August 2024. The VA's Office of Inspector General
issued a report on the Digital GI Bill platform that found the
VA did not effectively manage the contract and all of these
problems started during the planning stages for the project.
The VA awarded the contract before it understood exactly what
was needed. This resulted in subsequent contract changes that
more than doubled its cost.
Now, going off of what Congresswoman Budzinski was talking
about, what steps has the VA taken to ensure its cost as
estimate is accurate, reliable, and complete? Did you rely on
the Government Accountability Office's estimating guide for
your determination?
Mr. Smith. Thank you for the question. MITRE completed the
last version of the Life Cycle Cost Estimate and, yes, they did
follow the GAO's guide for that.
Mr. Hamadeh. It was just inaccurate?
Mr. Smith. The Life Cycle Cost Estimate has--is a range
estimate, so there should be an upper bound and lower bound,
and the DGIB actual costs are within that range.
Mr. Hamadeh. What part of that range?
Mr. Smith. I would have to get back to you.
Mr. Hamadeh. Would it be on the higher end of that range
for the range that you were discussing?
Mr. Smith. I cannot recall exactly. I just know it was in
range, sir.
Mr. Hamadeh. Please get back to me on that. Now, what steps
have you taken to ensure all requirements have been identified?
Mr. Smith. We use an Agile software development methodology
to ensure that the high-level functional requirements are
captured and we work in 3-month increments to develop and
deploy functionality and ensure that we have good integration
across our system.
Mr. Hamadeh. Is there a risk that the requirements can keep
growing?
Mr. Smith. There always is, particularly as new legislation
is developed or court cases are found against the VA, and we
have to make adjustments to systems to account for those
changes.
Mr. Hamadeh. In August 2024, the VA OIG report also laid
out how the VA has repeatedly not been ready to support the
work of the contractor. Now this includes failing to finalize
system requirements on time, not developing the test
environments needed by the contractor, not doing their due
diligence to make sure the system worked. Can you confirm
whether any outstanding payments to the VA contractors are
preventing the release of new capabilities or improvements that
would directly benefit veterans?
Mr. Smith. I am sorry, are you asking if there is--if we
have withheld payment from the vendor?
Mr. Hamadeh. Yes.
Mr. Smith. No, we have not.
Mr. Hamadeh. Does that--for the contractors, so you pay
them before and the requirements are being delivered on time?
Mr. Smith. No, we always pay contractors in arrears.
Mr. Hamadeh. Do you have the staff and expertise you need
in the Office of Information Technology and the Program Office
to manage and support the program?
Mr. Smith. I have high confidence with Mr. Orifici and his
staff.
Mr. Orifici. Thank you for that question. We have an
adequate staff that is supporting this team who is dedicated to
support the Digital GI Bill for IT infrastructure and related
concerns.
Mr. Hamadeh. I know you say that you have adequate staff,
but it has been delayed, it is over cost. How could you say
that right now to the committee?
Mr. Orifici. As we look at the program and where it is
gone, we have successfully decommissioned BDN, which was this
50-year-old legacy system. It was a big lift. As we went
through that implementation, we faced challenges. We worked
with VBA to adjust for those and we made some adjustments to
the contract as we went through to make sure we delivered.
As Mr. Smith said, through this cycle there has been
expansion of scope in terms of new features that were being
delivered and were delivered on time. There is also been an
expansion of claims that are processed underneath this contract
and that this contract is a managed service contract, which is
playing for claims outcome, which also goes--accounts for the
cost increases.
Mr. Hamadeh. Something seems wrong. If it is on--it is not
on time, it is over budget. There seems to be an issue.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you, Mr. Hamadeh.
I now recognize Ranking Member Pappas for 5 minutes. Go
ahead, sir.
Mr. Pappas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Smith, I have
behind me a slide that VA provided to Congress that shows a
timeline of the payment issues last fall. We have placed sticky
notes on that that show the times that VA communicated with
beneficiaries specifically. As you can see, a lot of Post-its
for August, many Post-its for November, and in between we want
to get into that area where we saw a lack of communication with
veterans.
It is clear that you and VA as a whole understood that
there was a significant issue with Chapter 35 payments in early
September because you were taking action to speed up the
process, like waiving enrollment verification requirements on
the 7th of September, the BDN authoritative data memo on the
17th, and the reconciliation automation requirements being
improved on the 23d of September. Yet the only communication
from VA to beneficiaries that entire month was the GI Bill
newsletter that hit on December--or that was sent out on
September 9.
The next communication does not occur until October 29, and
even that communication did not address the processing delays.
It was not until November 14 that VA chose to publicly
acknowledge the payment delays.
In September and October, did you want to communicate with
beneficiaries to explain what was happening?
Mr. Smith. Thank you for the question. Yes, we would have
always preferred to communicate, but we were prohibited from
doing so because of the Anti-Deficiency Act.
Mr. Pappas. You clearly knew something was wrong back in
early September, before the shutdown. It took 70 days to
communicate with veterans, more than halfway through the fall
semester. What prevented you from communicating the issue to
the public any earlier? Were you directed not to?
Mr. Smith. In September, we--as I--as you indicated, we
developed requirements to automate and reverse the manual
processing requirement. We thought we would have that solution
in hand and delivered, and the government shutdown happened and
we were unable to deliver that. We thought we would be able to
basically remediate the problem and avoid any payment delays.
Mr. Pappas. Do you dispute those dates at all? September
9--I am sorry, September 7, when waiving enrollment
verification happened through the 17th and the 23d, when other
steps were taken by the Department to understand this problem
and work to address it? Do you accept those dates?
Mr. Smith. The decision to waive enrollment verification
was not related to the reconciliation process. That was related
to the unavailability of a web application called Verify Your
Enrollment. Because that was not available, I made the decision
to waive verification of enrollment at that time and on that
basis. We continued to get more information about the
difficulties of processing due to that manual reconciliation
requirement. We were prepared to brief Congress when the
government shutdown happened and that prevented us----
Mr. Pappas. You fully were aware that there was a problem
in September and there was not communication that was happening
from VA. I do not accept the claim that VA could not
communicate during the shutdown. Number one, the White House's
own guidance said that employees supporting funded programs
like VA education benefits were to be considered exempted
employees and working. Second, the Secretary was communicating,
he was tweeting during this time. All of that is publicly
available and I can put that out with the timestamps if you
want to dispute that fact. Third, VA communicated with veterans
and beneficiaries during previous shutdowns. The difference was
a different leadership that was in place.
I want to know which VA senior leader told you not to
communicate with veterans' families and survivors?
Mr. Smith. As I indicated, we were following the anti-
deficiency provisions required of us by the Anti-Deficiency
Act. We were only providing information and doing work directly
tied to protection of life and property.
Mr. Pappas. This caused a lot of issues with veterans,
families, beneficiaries. We heard about this directly in our
office and they are still, frankly, confused about this and the
direction that VA has taken. I think it has broken trust. We
have heard from beneficiaries and service organizations about
widespread confusion around the implementation of enrollment
verification requirements for Chapter 35. I am wondering what
is the current requirement and are students receiving their
benefits? Can you provide us with an update?
Mr. Smith. Yes, sir. We did enact verification of
enrollment processes for Chapter 35 starting this month. Those
communications went out and so far we have had 142,000
responses out of about 170. Just this week, in fact yesterday,
we sent notes to help students remember that they have an
obligation to verify their enrollment. We let 37,000
individuals know that they needed to verify their enrollment
still, but we stand ready to verify it for them this month so
that we can ensure that they adapt to that change.
Mr. Pappas. Thank you. You said in your testimony our focus
is on the veterans. You are not focused on veterans when you
are not communicating with veterans. I appreciate the work that
goes on in the Department, but I cannot get over this lack of
communication. It is inexcusable.
I yield back.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you, Ranking Member Pappas.
I now recognize Representative King-Hinds from the Northern
Mariana Islands. I assume the weather is much better there than
it is here today.
Ms. King-Hinds. It is gorgeous. I wish I was back home.
Thank you for that.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you.
Ms. King-Hinds. Thank you for the opportunity to have
conversation about this issue today because the GI Bill
represents access to opportunities for so many of the veterans
in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI).
I was going over your written testimony, Mr. Smith, and,
you know, I think there were outright admission, but there were
some things that was not immediately addressed. Right? I think
from what I read, the requirements were not matured at the time
of award. Schedule discipline did not exist. Scope was allowed
to grow without governance. The BDN was decommissioned before
the replacement was complete. Right? In your testimony, your
testimony describes DGIB as exceptionally successful, yet it
also acknowledges underestimated complexity, missing systems,
and displays functionality.
I just want to know, at what point did the VA acknowledge
internally that this program was at risk? At what point was
Congress notified? I am new into the conversation.
Mr. Smith. I would like to ask Mr. Orifici to assist me
with that question.
Mr. Orifici. Thank you for that question. We have had a
number of hearings and testimonies on this since 2018, when we
first did the Colmery Act. We have had regular engagements. We
also meet monthly with staffers and provide them updates on the
status of the Digital GI Bill and other issues surrounding the
education service area.
Through this process, there have been a number of times
when issues have been raised to staffers, and we have discussed
this at numerous hearings around this topic.
Ms. King-Hinds. Okay. Just for me, because I am new to the
conversation, as I stated, the contract more than has doubled
in cost. What you are basically saying, it has not doubled in
cost. You are adding components to the system itself. Right?
Just for clarity's sake.
Mr. Smith. We have undoubtedly added costs from the initial
base contract, but it is due to both complexity of converting
and decommissioning legacy products, as well as new scope
related to both congressional initiatives as well as court
requirements.
Ms. King-Hinds. Hmm. I guess it is curious to me that the
decision-making process, right, at which point do you basically
consider pausing the program rather than engaging in
renegotiation? I--because that is a significant amount that we
are talking about. I mean, we are talking about 479 million. In
addition, that could build the CNMI, a whole new hospital
system, a whole new police department, and a whole new
community college. That is a huge amount of money.
I know that there is an OIG report that was issued with
regards to this issue. Has the recommendations been fully
addressed?
Mr. Smith. Yes, we have closed all the IG's
recommendations.
Ms. King-Hinds. Okay. Where are we at in terms of the full
implementation of the program itself now?
Mr. Smith. We have just recently implemented Release 8,
which removed us from dependency on the legacy BDN system. We
are now working to increase our automation outcomes while also
making the veteran facing services better so that veterans can
get the information they need and communicate with us through
that My Education Benefits program.
Ms. King-Hinds. At what point can you say that this program
has been fully implemented where our veterans are not going to
see the disruptions in these services? I was reading through
some of the testimonies and, you know, there has been
complaints to certain members that folks are getting notices of
eviction because they rely on this money to be able to support
not just their tuition, but, you know, their cost of living.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. That is a great question. This is why
we continue to press automation. Currently, we are at 65
percent automation. We are looking to further increase that. We
have got planned work this year to continue to drive----
Ms. King-Hinds. I guess, the timeline, Mr. Smith, because
it seems that some of these rollouts are happening right when
school starts. I am just kind of wondering, right, like, what
full implementation looks like and how we ensure that we do not
disrupt these benefits from getting to where it needs to go.
Mr. Smith. Absolutely. We would absolutely prefer to avoid
high enrollment. You know, like fall enrollment was not our
design. It was not something we wanted to do. We would look to
avoid that.
Ms. King-Hinds. Thank you. I am out of time.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you.
I now recognize Mrs. Ramirez for 5 minutes. Go ahead.
Ms. Ramirez. Thank you. I want to thank the chairs and
ranking members for holding today's hearing and the very
familiar faces I have just seen recently. Let me start by
saying that today's hearing feels a little misdirected. I will
tell you why. Asking us to look in one place while something
important is happening elsewhere feels misdirected.
My colleagues claim they want to conduct oversight, but we
have not even had a Oversight Committee hearing since July 22d.
That was 90 degrees, and it is about 20 degrees now. Right?
They will not invite the Government Accountability Office, the
GAO, or the VA Office of Inspector General, the OIG, who are
directly responsible for providing oversight of the VA.
You see, my colleagues want us to believe that the only
problem is contracting, but we are not addressing the
previously identified patterns of failures stemming from
staffing issues, from acquisition governance, and fragmented
oversight, and also from a lack of sustained capacity building.
Look, I think we should be seeking to learn from and correct
systemic failures that harm veterans and that rob them of their
benefits, not keep passing around the blame like it is a hot
potato of some sort.
As ranking member of the Oversight and Investigation
Subcommittee, it is my priority to ensure that the VA is
fulfilling its mission to support our veterans and provide them
with the benefits that they have earned. I want to get into
some of these questions.
First, I will tell you, modernization only really works if
the institution itself is ready. There are some really serious
questions about whether the VA meets that basic threshold. A
January OIG report formally identified systemic staffing
vacancies and weak conduct oversight across the VA, even as the
Department was pushing forward with the Digital GI Bill, the
DGIB we call it, modernization. At the same time, the VA
experienced workforce disruptions through Deferred Resignation
Program, the DRP, Voluntary Early Retirement Authority, the
VERA, attrition, and furlough decisions during the shutdown.
Mr. Smith, hi. Good seeing you again. What concrete steps
did the VA take to confirm it had the staffing and the
institutional readiness to execute a $2 billion IT
modernization effort without harming the beneficiaries?
Mr. Smith. Thank you for the question. You know, obviously,
staffing was increased. I believe in 2024, we testified that
they were adding 15 additional people. We do have 15--those 15
people still on a term assignment. Clearly, we have about 25
people managing the project.
Ms. Ramirez. How many?
Mr. Smith. About 25 people managing the project, but also
supported by our IT colleagues and, you know, the acquisitions
team.
Ms. Ramirez. You think that is enough?
Mr. Smith. I do, with our contractor support.
Ms. Ramirez. You said your contractor support is 15 people
that you have added?
Mr. Smith. Contractors, no. That would include both MITRE,
who assists us with acquisitions and planning and project
management, but also the assistance from the Accenture team.
Ms. Ramirez. Mr. Smith, you are saying that the tangible
actions you took is to add some staffing to be able to help
with the rollout. Let me keep going.
I want to talk about Strategic Acquisition Management
Initiative, SAMI. It was created within the Office of
Acquisition, Logistics, and Construction to build acquisition
and cost-estimating capacity across the VA itself. We now
understand that SAMI has been dissolved during this
reorganization.
This question is for you, Mr. Neill. Why was an office
created to address a known GAO finding eliminated before its
mission was complete?
Mr. Neill. Thank you for the question, ma'am. I am not
familiar with the rationale for eliminating that office, but I
can say that----
Ms. Ramirez. It does not make sense.
Mr. Neill. It may make sense if I know the explanation for
it, but I think I can take that back and I can get an answer to
that question for you.
Ms. Ramirez. Yes, I think it is really important, and I do
want to make sure. I know there are some questions that I have
asked in the past that we are going to follow up with, but this
one certainly is one of those.
I want to also make clear the DGIB is not an isolated
failure. It reflects systemic acquisition weaknesses. In these
last 30 seconds, Mr. O, I am sorry, what roles does oversight
investigation now play in ensuring major IT programs have
credible cost estimates before acquisition decisions are made?
How has this changed after SAMI's dissolution?
Mr. Orifici. Thank you for that question. We still work
closely with the TAC when we are putting together cost
estimates, and the TAC helps us validate to make sure that
those estimates are accurate according to industry standards
and the expectations around the programs and the acquisitions.
Ms. Ramirez. We will follow up. I know my time is up, so,
Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Van Orden. [Presiding.] The gentlelady yields back.
The chair now recognizes Cherfilus-McCormick for 5 minutes.
Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
guys so much for being here.
Our oversight, when it comes to IT, is something that has
been near and dear because for the last 4 to 5 years, we have
been trying to get it right, and it has not been right. That is
why we are really hunkering down on how can we make sure that
when we are going through acquisitions, that we are actually
thinking it through and making sure we are following steps to
make sure that we are not going to have systems that are in
place forever that we cannot get up and running, that are
hurting our veterans having access, and making sure that no one
is hurt at the end of the day? Because although we are having
this conversation about making sure all the procedures are
here, we know that if we get it wrong, veterans get hurt.
I wanted to talk more about your Digital GI Bill and the
oversight that you guys have taken or the steps you have taken
to make sure that there are not going to be issues that we have
seen before. Have you guys been using the Acquisition Lifestyle
Framework when it came to acquiring this contract? That is for
anybody who can answer it.
Mr. Smith. Yes, we did.
Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Please tell me more about it. The
whole design between the Acquisitions Lifetime Framework is to
make sure that there is a system in place. When you applied it
to this specific GI Bill platform, what did it change in how
you were going to apply it? Did it have any significant
improvement to what you were doing?
Mr. Smith. I would like to ask Mr. Neill to help me with
that question. Obviously, the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework
is something that is across the entire organization and I think
he would be best able to address the details of that.
Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Mr. Neill.
Mr. Neill. Well, thank you for the question. That is
something that is in progress. It is being developed currently
within OALC. If I could speak generally about what the
Acquisition Lifecycle Framework does.
Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Before we go into it generally, we
wanted to make sure that before the acquisition that this was
actually--the framework was applied. Is there a reason why the
framework was not applied beforehand?
Mr. Neill. I would have to go back--thank you for the
question first, but I would have to go back and understand not
knowing because the TAC actually did not participate in this
acquisition. I am not sure how it was coordinated with respect
to the acquisition life cycle.
Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. That is very important because a
lot of times we have different frameworks and we realize that
they are not working after we apply the next time around. If
there is any reason why it was not being applied earlier on, I
think we would want to know that to see if there is anything we
would want to change.
In the sense of the actual development of the framework, it
was to prevent us going into systems, specifically spending a
whole bunch of money on different platforms or technology that
was not able to become compatible to the VA. Could you tell me
more about where you are in steps of the application of this
framework?
Mr. Smith. We are actively developing the system right now.
Some of it is obviously into sustainment, but it is very much
an active development process right now.
Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. If you did not use this framework,
what framework did you actually use to make sure that there was
basic--which created a well-defined milestone and
accountability? What framework were you using? I am assuming
Mr. Neill is going to take that question since you reached for
it.
Mr. Neill. Thank you for the question. I was actually
muting myself, but I do not know the answer. I would like to
let, you know, Mr. Smith answer that question.
Mr. Smith. The General Project Management Framework for
acquisition planning, acquisition development. We worked on the
requirements. We are in development phase right now, and then
we will look to move into full-time sustainment and maintenance
for that application.
Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Now, is there a reason why you
chose that framework? That framework has not had success in the
past of helping us avoid putting a whole bunch of money into
different programs that did not fit the VA. Is there a reason
why you chose that framework instead of using the acquisition
framework?
Mr. Smith. Perhaps I am misunderstanding something, ma'am,
but I would certainly be happy to get back to you.
Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Okay, thank you. If there is
anything else that you wanted to--well, let us get back to Mr.
Neill. You said that you want to talk about it in general. Now,
if you talk about it in general, can you tell us how you are
planning on applying it? You are planning on applying it,
correct?
Mr. Neill. Yes, thank you for the question. We are
intending to apply it to, you know, major programs, and it
covers a lot of the things that you mentioned where the
requirements can be better understood, the estimates related to
those requirements can be more thoroughly explored, and it
allows greater engagement and consideration of alternatives for
these services.
Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Do you have any of those
quantifiable matrices for the framework that you used before
acquiring this platform?
Mr. Neill. Again, thank you for the question, but I was not
a participant in the acquisitions, so I do not know what was
utilized.
Mr. Smith. I am certain that that documentation is
maintained in both the files for the contracting officer as
well as our contracting officer's representatives.
Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. We look forward to receiving it.
My time is running out, but we would like to see that just to
make sure we could compare the two.
Mr. Van Orden. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you.
Mr. Van Orden. You are welcome. I now recognize myself for
5 minutes.
Ok. What was the original budget for this supposed to be,
Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith. At 453 million.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay. From the time you said you were told
you had $453 million to develop a Digital GI Bill, how long was
it from you got that email to you awarded a contract?
Mr. Smith. I am not certain what the timeline was on that,
sir.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay. I want--I am not asking, I am telling
you. You are going to give me that answer because you guys have
a 0, zero, percent record of doing this stuff on time. Here is
what you did again at the VA: you got a ton of money available
to you and you said, oh, my gosh, I got to spend this money, so
let us pretend like we did actual mission planning and then
crap on the American taxpayers. That is exactly what happened.
You failed to plan again. The American taxpayer and the
veterans who earn these benefits are paying the price for your
guys basic inability to do mission planning.
You mentioned that you there is legislation and some court
cases that made you have to change what you are doing, correct?
Mr. Smith. That is correct.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay. What was the first one?
Mr. Smith. The Isakson-Row Act.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay. What was the goal prior to that
passing?
Mr. Smith. The goal for the DGIB managed service contract
is to deliver claims faster to veterans.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay. Then so you changed that after this
act?
Mr. Smith. We had----
Mr. Van Orden. Was the goal the same?
Mr. Smith. We had to change how we paid the monthly housing
allowance.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay. Then that came into play and you are
like, oh, okay, we better think of a new thing that we have to
do or a new goal. What was the goal following the Isakson's
legislation?
Mr. Smith. It has always been to replace the benefit----
Mr. Van Orden. What was the next piece of legislation or
court action that made you change?
Mr. Smith. We implemented the Veteran Employment Through
Technology Education Courses (VET TEC) 1 capability.
Mr. Van Orden. I think you see what I am--so I do not
believe that you actually had any type of metric of success. I
do not think that you did. Then you are pawning this off on
Congress and the courts because you again failed to do mission
planning and set attainable, quantifiable goals for this
program. This has happened again and again and again.
What is the goal right now? Can you put it on a piece of
paper other than it is we are going to speedy service?
Mr. Smith. Again, we are working to deliver claims in 1
day.
Mr. Van Orden. I am working to get my hair back, and
neither one of this is turning out properly, Okay? That is
unacceptable.
Now, listen, do you know what this is?
Mr. Smith. I cannot read that from here, sir.
Mr. Van Orden. This is the current Veterans Health
Administration (VHA) organization chart. You have a little bit
in all of these little things. You are all over the place. You
are contracting officers, all sorts. All through here, all
these little noes.
Now, these guys are moving this to this. See that? Can
everybody see the difference between the two? Okay. Where is
your line and block chart?
Mr. Smith. Sir, I believe we sent that over to your office.
Mr. Van Orden. I believe I do not have it. No, we need
theirs. Yes. No, we do not have it. I want to see this because
everybody here, you know, hey, Bob, I got six bosses. You guys
got six bosses. We need one boss or maybe two at the most. You
are never, ever going to get this right until you actually have
a clean line, until you have a line and block chart where
everybody knows exactly what they are doing and when they are
supposed to do it and who they report to and who can be held
accountable by who. I mean, this is a fundamental issue that we
have.
Mr. Tellez, who is responsible for not including the Office
of Acquisition, Logistics, and Construction into the original
contract negotiation? Who?
Mr. Tellez. Thank you for your question, sir. I was not--I
am not--as my role as executive director for the Office of
Business Integration, I have a small role in the Digital GI
Bill. I provide support to them.
Mr. Van Orden. Does anybody know the answer to this
question? Who is responsible for not including the Office of
Acquisition, Logistics, and Construction into the original
contract?
Mr. Smith. Sir, the Office of Acquisitions was involved in
that we leveraged their contract vehicle, the Transformation
Twenty-One Total Technology-Next Generation (T4NG) contract.
VBA's acquisitions team actually managed the task order.
Mr. Van Orden. Who put together the team? Who invited
people to the table?
Mr. Smith. The team would have been led by the Education
Service director.
Mr. Van Orden. That is not leading. I ask you, who put the
actual team together?
Okay. My time has expired and out of respect for my
colleagues here, you are dismissed, this panel, please. If you
want to stick around, it would be awesome. Then let us have the
second panel come up. We will readjourn in 7 minutes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Van Orden. The committee will come to order.
On our second panel, we are going to be hearing from the
following witnesses. Our first witness is Mr. Justin Parke,
managing director, Digital GI Bill program manager, Accenture
Federal Services. Our next witness is Mr. Troy Mueller,
managing director, Integrated Benefits Operations and
Technology Division at MITRE. Our final witness is Mr. William
Hubbard, vice president for Veterans and Military Policy,
Veterans Education Success.
Please, all rise and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Van Orden. Very well. Let the record reflect that the
witnesses have answered in the affirmative.
Mr. Parke, you are now recognized for 5 minutes to deliver
your testimony on behalf of Accenture Federal Services.
STATEMENT OF JUSTIN PARKE
Mr. Parke. Chairman Barrett, Mr. Van Orden, Ranking Members
Budzinski and Pappas, distinguished members of both
subcommittees, thank you for inviting me to testify at today's
hearing. I am Justin Parke, Managing Director at Accenture
Federal Services, and a member of the Accenture Federal
Leadership Team. I am also the program manager of our Digital
GI Bill engagement, leading the implementation and operations
of Accenture Federal DGIB Systems. I am honored to serve
veterans and their families in my role on this important
program.
Accenture's work with VA education began in 2019, when VA
decided to reset after a failed Colmery implementation attempt
with a different vendor. This reset included the release of a
competitive outcome-based Request for Proposal (RFP) that
Accenture won. In partnership with VA, we delivered Colmery on
time and on budget.
After this, VA released another full and open competitive
RFP for the Digital GI Bill implementation and operations.
Accenture won this competition and, since March 2021, we have
supported VA's efforts to make it faster, and easier for
veterans to access and reliably receive life-changing education
benefits.
We have achieved the main objectives of this contract: to
process claims uninterrupted and to develop new capabilities
based on requirements defined by VA while enabling the
retirement of VA legacy systems. For example, DGIB has retired
VA's nearly 50-year-old BDN mainframe, which has improved VA's
operational resilience, and for the first time in GI Bill's 80-
year history, has enabled fully automated claims processing for
originals and new chapters.
Through our DGIB automation efforts with VA, this January
more than 64 percent of all education claims were processed
automatically same day, with the vast majority of these in
seconds with no veteran claim examiner effort. Chapter 35 is
now running at 69 percent same-day automated claims processing,
radically improving VA's posture for spring enrollment. Since
March 2021, DGIB has processed over 16 million claims,
delivering more than $43 billion in veteran benefits to 2.3
million unique beneficiaries.
There have been challenges to overcome. As previously
detailed by the OIG, additional requirements, like new
legislative mandates, new judicial interpretations, and
additional systems integrations, expanded the scope from the
original contract, and non-DGIB dependencies delayed the BDN
retirement. During this BDN delay, VA reprioritized several
other efforts including VET TEC 1.0 and My Education Benefits,
and we delivered those capabilities ahead of schedule, ensuring
that new advancements were still delivered to veterans despite
the BDN retirement delay. Most recently, the DGIB system was
instrumental in automating one-time BDN claim reconciliation to
address the fall Veterans Claims Examiner (VCE) Manual Chapter
35 backlog.
The DGIB program's Life Cycle Cost Estimate details the
baseline costs expected for the overall VA program across
multiple contracts with multiple vendors and other VA expenses.
A smaller portion of this estimate is for the managed service
vendor costs, that is Accenture contract costs. The total
Accenture contract ceiling is currently 1.08 billion inclusive
of increased scope. Accenture contract cost is squarely within
the baseline cost range for the scope and schedule ultimately
required.
Moreover, DGIB results in significant cost avoidance,
including an estimated 250 million for the BDN retirement, 400
million for other VA legacy systems, and 400 million from the
reduced need for claims processing staff over 10 years. Without
DGIB, VA would need to spend more on claims processing staff to
keep up with the increased claim volume. All of these savings
compound year over year and in total far exceed the 1 billion
in managed service contract ceiling. As one of VA's most
successful IT transformations, DGIB has overcome challenges and
delivered on its commitments.
Some conclusions to consider. One, VA can achieve ambitious
transformation even when previous attempts over past decades
have failed. Two, baseline Life Cycle Cost Estimates should
include known unknowns, like future legal mandates and other
future fact-of-life changes that do not exist at program
inception. Three, procurement organizations can tackle big
business needs with veteran outcome focused based contracts,
like DGIB. With the right procurement strategy, VA leadership
can drive critical mission objectives.
[The Prepared Statement Of Justin Parke Appears In The
Appendix]
Mr. Van Orden. The gentleman's time is expired.
Mr. Parke. Thank you.
Mr. Van Orden. Mr. Parke, you are recognized for 5
minutes--oh, excuse me. Should probably put these on. Mr.
Mueller, you are recognized for 5 minutes to deliver your
testimony.
Mr. Parke, your testimony will be entered into the written
record.
Mr. Parke. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF TROY MUELLER
Mr. Mueller. Chairman Barrett, Chairman Van Orden, Ranking
Members Budzinski and Pappas, and other members of the
subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to testify before
you today on matters relating to the VA's Digital GI Bill
program. Successful modernization of legacy it is critical to
improving the veteran experience. MITRE very much appreciates
the opportunity to testify today.
MITRE is a not-for-profit systems engineering, applied
research, and advanced technology organization that operates
federally funded research and development centers for multiple
Federal agencies, including the Department of Veterans Affairs.
Currently, I am the managing director responsible for our
support to modernization of benefits and service delivery
across all VBA lines of business, the VA's Office of
Information and Technology, and the Social Security
Administration. MITRE's role is focused on providing strategic
advice, guidance, and assistance in the areas of systems
engineering, program integration, and organizational change.
Our work included completing the annual update of the Life
Cycle Cost Estimate for the DGIB program from 2021 with Version
1 through 2025 Version 5.0, which was delivered in April 2025.
The LCCE calculates the total cost of the government for
acquiring and owning a system throughout its lifetime, far
beyond any specific contract, and is updated annually per the
GAO recommendations and their guidance to reflect changes in
technical, economic, and programmatic assumptions and fact-of-
life changes, such as new legislation and court decisions
impacting the agency, veterans, servicemembers, and
beneficiaries. It supports financial decision-making and
informs future budgetary needs.
As of April 2025, with updated Version 5.0, the program has
an estimated total cost of 2.3 billion in base year Fiscal Year
2021 constant dollars over a 10-year period, rising to
approximately 2.6 billion when adjusted for inflation or then-
year dollars. The program is large and complex and,
accordingly, has inevitably encountered challenges,
unanticipated complexities, the realization of risk. Over the
past 5 years it has also had many accomplishments, delivering
eight successful releases, migration of all benefits to the--
chapters to the platform, and retiring of the BDN 1970's
mainframe system, and additional automation capabilities that
result in dramatically faster claims processing.
Recognizing that there will always be challenges,
complexity, and risk, I have two recommendations to share with
you today. First, a dedicated enterprise-level cost estimating
capability at VA would give Congress and VA leadership
consistent, independent, and defensible Life Cycle Cost
Estimates that strengthen budget information, formulation, and
major investment decisions. By validating program office
estimates, establishing authoritative cost baselines, and
providing transparent affordability analysis, the organization
would reduce cost and schedule risk while improving oversight
readiness and ensuring resources are aligned to outcomes that
matter for veterans.
Second, the cost estimating capability should be paired
with a streamlined early acquisition model that accelerates
delivery of capability while generating the structured data
needed for credible cost estimation. Rapid operational need
definition, minimum viable requirements, early risk scans, and
lightweight architecture work would shorten pre-award timelines
and produce clear inputs, such as preliminary requirements,
solution concepts, and early cost drivers that feed the
enterprise cost estimating organization capability. Together,
these reforms enable VA to deliver modern capabilities faster
while grounding every major investment in transparent data-
driven analysis.
In closing, let me just note that MITRE's roughly 6,500
personnel, over 1,100 are veterans, including myself. Few
duties feel more noble to our employees in honoring the service
and sacrifice of our Nation's men and women in uniform through
the support that we provide to the VA. On behalf of the entire
MITRE team, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to come before
you today and look forward to your questions.
[The Prepared Statement Of Troy Mueller Appears In The
Appendix]
Mr. Van Orden. Thank you, Mr. Mueller. The written
statement of Mr. Mueller will be entered into the hearing.
Mr. Hubbard, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM HUBBARD
Mr. Hubbard. Chairmen Van Orden and Barrett, Ranking
Members Budzinski and Pappas, and members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of
Veterans Education success and thank you for your continued
oversight of VA on issues that directly affect veterans'
survivors and their families.
It is our organization's mission to advance higher
education success for veterans, servicemembers, and military
families, and to protect the integrity and the promise of the
GI Bill and other Federal education programs. It is with this
perspective that we approach today's hearing with focuses on
the Digital GI Bill contracts and payment disruptions.
Modernization at VA is necessary. Nobody disputes that.
Modernization that fails to deliver benefits on time is not
progress, it is disruption. The people who pay the price are
students who plan their lives around the benefits that they
were told they could rely on. The Digital GI Bill was intended
to replace aging systems with a more efficient, unified
platform. Instead, it has joined a long list of technology
rollouts that VA launched without proper safeguards or
contingency planning, and the result was all too predictable.
Recently, housing payments were delayed or reduced without
warning, leaving thousands of students scrambling to cover
rent, food, and basic expenses. This pattern has plagued VA's
technology transformations since the beginning of the post 9-11
GI Bill, when tens of thousands of veterans went months without
payments. Then, during the Forever GI Bill rollout in 2018,
nearly 180,000 students experienced delays to their housing
payments. In 2023, another modernization effort resulted in
more than 280,000 students receiving late payments, and VA
resorted to mailing paper checks to process some of those.
As you can plainly see, last fall's failures were not an
anomaly. One student told us that her benefits were missing for
nearly 3 months, her car was repossessed, and she was facing
eviction while attending school out of State with no family
support nearby. Another student received less than $900 for the
month, barely enough to cover rent, leaving him with almost
nothing for food and transportation. These are real
consequences of leadership decisions.
Adding to the stress of missed payments was the noticeably
loud silence from VA. VA was aware of the possibility of these
issues before students felt the impact, yet there was no
proactive warning and no reliable channel for students to get
answers. During the government shutdown, the GI Bill hotline
was classified as nonessential, leaving students unable to ask
for help.
It is also important to note the timing of these major
technology updates, which were inexplicably scheduled to start
at the beginning of the academic term, when even short
disruptions can quickly snowball into housing issues or
enrollment challenges. We implore VA to stop doing significant
technology deployments at the beginning of major academic
periods.
Based on what we have heard from veterans, their families,
and survivors, we offer the following practical solutions to
mitigate these issues moving forward. First, education benefits
delivery must be treated as an essential function. Second, VA
should be required to conduct rigorous testing and independent
certification before any update goes live. Third, when VA
identifies a risk to on-time payments, it should be required to
notify students, schools, and Congress in plain language.
Fourth, major system changes should not be scheduled during
critical academic windows. Fifth and finally, we encourage
Congress to mandate transparent performance metrics that
reflect the veteran experience, not VA's internal processes.
Student veterans and survivors do not view these benefits
as optional. They plan their lives around them. When payments
fail, trust in the system erodes. Once lost, that trust is
difficult to restore.
Thank you for your attention to these issues and your
continued oversight. I look forward to your questions.
[The Prepared Statement Of William Hubbard Appears In The
Appendix]
Mr. Van Orden. Thank you, Mr. Hubbard. The written
statement of Mr. Hubbard will be entered into the hearing
record.
Now we are going to proceed to questionings. The chair now
recognizes Ranking Member Budzinski for 3 minutes.
Ms. Budzinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mueller, thank you for joining us today. I appreciate
your recommendation that VA should work to strengthen its
internal enterprise level cost estimating capability. However,
with VA losing at least 405 contract specialists in Fiscal Year
2026 so far, I worry the VA does not have the skills in-house
right now to perform these estimates accurately and reliably.
What are the dangers of not having enough highly trained staff
to perform these estimates?
Mr. Mueller. The need for qualified staff, which are not
contracting officers for this, these are true professional cost
estimators, that is a critical need. I think, that it would
have to be planned and resourced for in order to actually bring
those in. I cannot speak to what capability exists there today.
I do not directly support that particular part of the VA
organization.
Ms. Budzinski. Okay. Let me move to Mr. Hubbard. Mr.
Hubbard, we heard at our hearing in December the VA has not
held a monthly stakeholder call for the DGIB program since
December 2024. Is that accurate?
Mr. Hubbard. That is correct.
Ms. Budzinski. What concerns do you have regarding the lack
of engagement from the VA with veteran stakeholders as it
continues to modernize the DGIB program?
Mr. Hubbard. Thank you for the question. We have
significant concerns about that. The lack of communication in
general is--only exacerbates any issue that comes up. As an
example, this past fall, when we saw these payment delays with
Chapter 35 and others, if there was an exchange of information,
organizations that support veterans could have anticipated
that, planned accordingly, worked with schools even to make
sure that these students were not, for example, facing
eviction. Unfortunately, there was no exchange. This year to
date, there have been zero of these calls.
Ms. Budzinski. Okay. Let me try to fit in one more quick
question. Mr. Hubbard, your testimony also highlights numerous
times that the burden to work around VA contracting and IT
failures has fallen on veterans and beneficiaries. This is
simply unacceptable. As I mentioned in my opening, these
seemingly small errors often result in large losses and
degraded veteran trust. Can you share more about the impact of
these delays on your membership and how we as Congress can
better support veterans and their family members who receive
these benefits?
Mr. Hubbard. Thank you for the question. Historically,
there is a lack of trust when it comes to veterans coming to VA
for, for example, their mental health needs. Imagine if you are
a student who does not even get your payment on time when VA's
got your Social, they have got your home address, your phone
number, your blood type, probably your favorite color, and yet
they cannot even deliver the benefits that you deserve and
earned.
Mr. Van Orden. The gentlemen's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes Representative King-Hinds for 3
minutes.
Ms. King-Hinds. My question is to Mr. Mueller. You made a
couple of recommendations, one of which is the creation of a
sufficiently resource enterprise-level cost-estimating
capability, and, second, the development of a streamlined early
acquisition model. For the vets who are listening in, who do
not speak your language, can you please explain that in
layman's terms?
Mr. Mueller. Sure. When you stand up--before you stand up a
program, there is a certain amount of analytical activity that
should happen prior to that. That is where you understand your
mission need, you start to understand your requirements, and
look at your options of how do you fulfill this need. Part of
that is you want to obviously determine what is going to be the
cost to do this, an initial understanding of that cost
estimate. You need this analytical activity paired with the
capability to complete those estimates.
Just to go back to that analytical activity, that would be
made up of users that use the system, be it your contracting
people, your contracting professionals, the business leaders
that are responsible for operating it, the IT organization. All
these different skill sets come together to help bring this
program to life in an informed way, so decision-makers can make
an informed decision and have an idea of what the cost is going
to be. All of this contributes to a better contract, a better
acquisition activity as well.
In the most layman's terms I can put it is you are bringing
people that understand the ingredients to bring to a great meal
so you can have a good meal.
Ms. King-Hinds. I asked that question, right, because we
are talking about how do we look at contract reforms and
acquisitions reform. I think I was reading Mr. Parke's
testimony and he suggests that baseline estimates should
include known and unknowns. Right? In this process, right, to
include future legal mandates, because the VA has pointed out
that there are different components that needs to be tinkered
with given all these lawsuits, and that has to be all accounted
for. Where does that fit in with regards to just the
contracting process and who should bear that risk? Some of this
cost inflation is directly attributed to that.
Mr. Mueller. Sure. The early analytical activity will give
you what the requirements are known in that moment and what is
the objective for that system. Where this issue--where what Mr.
Parke brought up comes into play, the known unknowns is
actually in a cost estimate--you develop an LCCE. I want to be
clear about an LCCE, not an independent government cost
estimate for a contract. For the bigger program LCCE, you
account for that in the range and sensitivity analysis.
However, you can only account for so much. There are just some
of those unknowns you are not going to know.
It comes down to how much do you budget for if you think
about the range? If we say that we have a confidence level of
$1 value and we have a range, do you have to budget more on the
other side? Normally, GAO says budget at the 50 percent
confidence level to account for some of that, but you are still
going to have things come up along the way, especially when you
are thinking----
Mr. Van Orden. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes Ranking Member Pappas for 3
minutes.
Mr. Pappas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Parke, did Accenture provide DGIB Release 8 on time and
on budget?
Mr. Parke. Thank you for the question. The original
deadline for BDN retirement, which is equivalent to Release 8,
was September 2022. We delivered it in August 2025 for the
reasons that I think you have heard in a number of testimonies.
Mr. Pappas. How quickly did Accenture respond to VA's
requests for assistance in automating the data reconciliation
last September?
Mr. Parke. If we are talking about September 2025?
Mr. Pappas. That is right.
Mr. Parke. As soon as VA was aware that there was an issue
in the amount of time it was taking to manually reconcile or
validate BDN data coming into Chapter 35, we were, with the VA,
taking new requirements for automation. We were able to then
build that and have it ready for deployment in October. Of
course, there were some mitigating circumstances that prevented
folks from validating that it was working as expected.
Mr. Pappas. It could not go live right away because some of
the employees VA needed were furloughed. Do you know how long
the release was delayed while VA waited to get those employees
back in the office?
Mr. Parke. The eventual deployment of that improvement to
automate was November 14th, as I recall, 2 days after, you
know, November 12th.
Mr. Pappas. When did you or Accenture writ large become
aware of the backlog issues with Chapter 35 beneficiaries?
Mr. Parke. I do not know the exact day, but essentially as
soon as VA was aware, they came and notified us that we would
need to be ready to address it with some form of automation.
That was the best idea we had. As you can see, it worked.
Mr. Pappas. Mr. Hubbard, in previous hearings, I have
shared some of the stories that our office has received from
impacted Chapter 35 beneficiaries from payments being delayed.
I appreciate you giving voice to that as well. I know you ran
out of time on a previous answer. I did not know if you want to
add anything else just to the impacts on veterans' families and
survivors and the stresses that some of these issues at VA
cause them. I appreciate you talking about prioritizing the
veteran experience.
Mr. Hubbard. Yes, thank you for the question, Mr. Ranking
Member. The reality is when VA asks you to come to them for
mental health, but they cannot even--which is a big thing for
your well being, your existence, and they cannot even get the
small things right, like getting your payment on time that you
have already earned and already deserve, how do you expect
veterans to have that trust in the institution? That is a real
loss for America and, frankly, it is a disservice to taxpayers
as well.
Mr. Pappas. Thank you very much for those comments. I yield
back.
Mr. Van Orden. The gentleman yields.
The chair now recognizes Mrs. Ramirez for 3 minutes.
Ms. Ramirez. Thank you, Chairman.
We know that the VA is still struggling to meet
expectations on delivery of the Digital GI Bill we talked about
in the previous panel. I want to look at the facts a little
closer. Despite millions of dollars and ample opportunities for
the Digital GI Bill to be implemented smoothly and efficiently,
a backlog remains and rollout continues to be a problem. It is
especially concerning because we know that many veterans rely
on these GI Bill benefits to remain housed and to access these
basic necessities. We know this clear, any delay in receiving
these funds could prove to be dire.
You know, I find it unacceptable that the public and
Congress do not have better insights into why the Digital GI
Bill program continues to face challenges. It is also
unconscionable that in the face of those challenges, veterans'
families and survivors were left in the dark facing financial
instability. Look, I know that setbacks happen, failures are
learning opportunities, but continuing to allow this program to
falter when veterans rely on it for stability is not an option.
I want to talk a little bit about contractor oversight,
since we have talked about it here quite a bit. The key to
addressing the challenges that DGIB is facing is by listening
to the perspectives of all those involved in its modernization
and integration.
This question is for you, Mr. Parke. Did Accenture flag
risks related to release timing, testing capacity, or manual
reconciliation to the VA? If so, how did the VA respond to you?
Mr. Parke. Thank you for the question. Certainly, we
collaborate with VA to identify risks and issues. These types
of risks and issues were flagged. I think, you know, as an
overall institution, VA is balancing many different priorities
and, in some cases, certainty as to whether a risk will be
realized is not clear.
You know, as you heard, we did go live in August. It was
August 4, 2025. The assessment at the time was that that was
early enough.
Ms. Ramirez. Is your assessment that the VA responded as
best as it could to the red flags that you flagged?
Mr. Parke. Based on the information they had, I think they
made a reasonable decision. Obviously, with 20-20 hindsight,
you know, more time would have been helpful. That would have
pushed the go-live a whole year based on what we were hearing
from finance.
Ms. Ramirez. Got it. Let me ask you one last question, I
have 35 seconds left. Do you believe the process in which you
communicate the issues you find with the VA is working as it
should, given the hindsight? In considering how to advance
acquisition reform, what are the specific areas that you offer
that have the greatest potential for improvement?
Mr. Parke. I would say that the process had issues in the
past. It has improved. There has been, you know, new engagement
with new leadership, Ken Smith. As you heard, Mr. Ken Smith
came in recently. I think this has drastically improved some of
that.
As it relates to acquisition----
Mr. Van Orden. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The chair--I now recognize myself for 3 minutes.
Mr. Parke, what is the average amount of time where a
veteran was not paid?
Mr. Parke. In general, I think the last statistic we have
is it is an average of 5.6 days to complete each claim. I do
not have more information than that.
Mr. Van Orden. Hold on one sec. We are going to do some
quick enlisted math up here.
Mr. Parke. Okay.
Mr. Van Orden. This is going to be really exciting. No
pressure. How much does the VA spend on education benefits a
month?
Mr. Parke. I think it averages to about $1.0 billion.
Mr. Van Orden. 1.2 billion?
Mr. Parke. In terms of benefits to veterans.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay. 1.2 billion divided by 30 is what?
Mr. Parke. I would have to get a calculator and make sure I
do it right in terms of public math.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay. Check me out. If the average amount of
time is 5 days where vets are not getting paid, and I
understand what Mr. Hubbard was saying, there has been
catastrophic things, but so why cannot the VA have moneys set
aside for when inevitably you guys screw this up again? It is
going to happen. Why cannot there be money here to pay to our
veterans so they do not have to wring their hands? Again, the
VA has a 0 percent record of getting something done like this
on time and on budget.
Mr. Parke. Is the suggestion that there might be some
contingency money set aside that could be used?
Mr. Van Orden. Yes, that is exactly what I am saying. Then
I do not care if it goes, you know, electronically. Mail them a
check because, hopefully, by the time the check gets there, the
system is back online again. If that is--we were just talking,
Ranking Member Budzinski and I, you know, if we need to, we can
legislate that, because, I mean, this is just dumb. We keep
doing it again. Again, what, 2 days ago it was Groundhog Day.
We keep doing the same thing over and over again, expecting a
different result. That is the definition of insanity. I want
you from your side to look at that and from our side we will
look at that.
I do have to say that there is a potential for success,
however small it is. We have seen on the VHA side a 57 percent
reduction in the claims under Secretary Collins' leadership.
That is in a year. Within 1 year, there is almost a single 60
percent reduction in claims. These things are attainable, but
you need to have the right people working.
One of the things, just take this for what it is, who the
hell has been held accountable for any of this? Who has lost a
job? Who lost a contract? The first guys? What about you guys?
You know what I mean? The cost overruns, I think, are
exponentially greater under your purview than it was under the
first guys that got fired. I mean, if a civilian company ran
this like you guys have been running this, they would be out of
business. Maybe some people need to get out of business in this
business.
My time has expired. I want to thank you all for coming,
being here today. Ms. Budzinski has waved her closing comments,
and which I thank you very much for coming, everybody.
We can agree that there is an absolute accountability
problem. Until people start, you know, worrying about whether
or not they are going to have a paycheck, our veterans are
going to have to worry about whether or not they have a
paycheck. I will remind you, and I am echoing the comments of
our current Secretary, Mr. Collins, it ain't about you. It is
about the veteran. That every time you put the bureaucracy
above the veteran, which has happened consistently since I have
been in Congress for 25 minutes, it is unacceptable. We are
going to do everything we can to help the Secretary root out
this bureaucratic inertia so that our vets get what they
deserve.
With that, this hearing is closed.
[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statement of Witnesses
----------
Prepared Statement of Kenneth Smith
Good morning, Chairmen Barrett and Van Orden, Ranking Members
Budzinski and Pappas, and distinguished members of the Subcommittees. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the Digital GI Bill's
(DGIB) program management and contracts. Joining me today is Mr. Robert
Orifici, Executive Director for Benefits and Memorial Service, Office
of Information Technology, Mr. Jeffrey Neill, Associate Executive
Director Office of Acquisition, Logistics, and Construction, and Mr.
Ray Tellez, Executive Director, Office of Business Integration
VA's efforts to implement transformational changes through the DGIB
platform have enabled the Department to deliver benefits faster,
enhance customer service, and strengthen compliance and oversight
activities. Our top goals include delivering the highest standards of
world-class customer service; improving oversight and accountability;
expanding opportunities for Service members, Veterans and eligible
family members to pursue their academic and career goals; enhancing the
Nation's economic vitality with innovative programs; and enriching
lives by giving beneficiaries the tools and resources they need to
further their education and achieve their career aspirations. VA has
made tremendous advancements toward streamlining and automating systems
and processes to increase efficiency and drive outcomes for Veterans
and their families and will continue to strive to reach the highest
level of excellence for our Nation's Veterans.
The DGIB modernization initiative was envisioned as a fully
integrated solution to restructure both claims processing for all
education benefits programs and enhance customer service for
beneficiaries and external partners by providing direct, online, one-
stop access to GI Bill benefits and information. To date, the program
has been exceptionally successful in meeting mission milestones to
maximize performance through an updated processing platform that has
delivered end-to-end automation for millions of education benefits
claims. The success of this initiative has addressed many high risks to
Veterans and survivors who depend on these benefits. Additionally, the
initiative has exceeded our initial goals by delivering functionality
to replace and decommission the near half-a-century-old Benefits
Delivery Network (BDN) along with many other unplanned functionality
changes necessary due to both congressional action (new laws passed)
and court mandates (precedent opinions with monumental impact on claims
adjudications).
Historical Program Management
On September 26, 2024, VA testified before the House Committee on
Veterans' Affairs' Subcommittee on Economic Opportunity to discuss DGIB
progress at that time. VA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) also
presented testimony to outline its audit of the DGIB program dated
August 28, 2024. I am pleased to report that VA has satisfied all of
OIG's recommendations. VA acknowledged that the original 2020-2021
contract underestimated the complexity of the work, which included
transitioning from legacy systems created in an obsolete programming
language known as the Common Business-Oriented Language (COBOL). The
program experienced delays related to integration requirements with
external systems that did not deliver on schedule and the need for
additional VA testing environments that were not delivered, which
forced prolonged testing cycles. The reasons for these delays were
prioritization and lack of an integrated approach to governance, which
have been solved through close communication with external systems and
a strengthened, VA-level enterprise governance structure.
In written testimony, VA acknowledged increased contract costs at
that time, driven by increased scope, which led to a full review and
restructuring of the contract at the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2023.
Costs increased due to the integration and testing challenges outlined
earlier. They also increased because VA received more claims from
Veterans than anticipated.
Since initial implementation of the DGIB project, the MITRE
Corporation has assisted VA with acquisition planning and program
support. To ensure full, multi-year understanding of cost and the
strategic impact of both delay and exogenous factors such as higher
claim volumes, MITRE prepared a Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE). An
LCCE is a best practice described in the Government Accountability
Office's (GAO) Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (GAO-20-195G).
Separate from the program budget, which tracks planned versus actual
expenses in the budget execution cycle, the LCCE helps forecast all
program costs over a longer period.
Covering actuals and projections for the period 2021-2030, the LCCE
enabled VBA's Education Service to consider tradeoff decisions, such as
new claims processor functionality versus greater automation, and the
impact of Fact of Life changes, including new legislation and court
mandates. Examples of these changes include Coronavirus disease
provisions in P.L. 116-128, 116-140, 116-159, and 116-315, which forced
VA to deprioritize planned development for basic claims processing
functionality. Additionally, the program had to adjust implementation
plans to account for the numerous provisions of the Johnny Isakson and
David P. Roe, M.D. Veterans Health Care and Benefits Improvement Act of
2020 (P.L. 116-315). Additional costs were added to the contract to
support legacy data migration from BDN to the new system and an
analytical data warehouse to support workload and program management
needs.
Unsurprisingly, claims processing labor is a significant driver of
LCCE cost. VA's claims processing environment has historically rested
on human labor to process millions of claims for Veterans and
survivors. Since the 2021 baseline through 2025, VA processed 37
percent more claims, at a significant savings, when compared to the
cost of employing new staff. As of December 2025, VA is automating and
delivering 65 percent of all claims without any human interaction,
reducing costs and improving service delivery. 53 percent of the LCCE
10-year cost estimate is VA human labor to complete claims, which does
not account for recent improvements in automation.
To support the ultimate goal of automation as well as reduce risk
of catastrophic failure of the 50-year-old BDN system, VA
decommissioned the decades-old legacy system, in September 2025. The
decommissioning involved coordinated development in VA's new payment
delivery tool as well as replacement for the BDN claims processing
functionality. The decision to decommission BDN on this timeline
required VA to re-prioritize functional and automation improvements. It
cannot be understated just how significant the retirement of the BDN
mainframe was. The prioritization of the BDN Retirement was a strategic
move not just to reduce the risk to the enterprise in security
compliance and cost savings but also as a critical enabler to future
functionality. For example, any systemic changes to implement Dole and
Rudisill-compliant features were not technically feasible in the
previous BDN mainframe ecosystem.
In 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Rudisill v.
McDonough, which expanded eligibility for GI Bill benefits and
necessitated rework on significant processes already encoded in DGIB
with the intent to automate adjudications. In April 2025, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in Perkins v. Collins further
expanded eligibility for GI Bill benefits, which required rework of
previously decided claims and further reprioritization of functionality
for DGIB claims processing. Additionally, Congress enacted the Senator
Elizabeth Dole 21st Century Veterans Healthcare and Benefits
Improvement Act (P.L. 118-210) (Dole Act) in January 2025, which
contained 15 separate provisions that impacted education benefits and
rules concerning adjudications.
Recent Actions and Future
VA has taken further steps to improve program management. VA
recognizes the high likelihood of new scope due to changes in law and
court decisions. To implement these new requirements without protracted
contract negotiations, VA implemented two modifications in 2025. First,
VA moved from a waterfall-schedule-driven process to a scope-driven
priority process called Agile software methodology. This will allow VA
to quickly reprioritize to address new requirements, but it does not
change the basic project management principle known as the Golden
Triangle--there can be no change to scope, cost, or schedule
independently. If any one item is changed, at least one other element
must also change. Second, since VA has consistently processed more
claims than originally forecasted, additional funding was needed
annually for its claims processing contract on T4NG during the year of
execution--a fact reflected in the LCCE, which projected a decrease of
only 38 claims examiners. VA shifted this task order to a fixed rate,
representing the fact that additional claims processed each year
through improvements to automation generally should not increase costs
to the vendor. VA has reduced claims processing staff through attrition
without replacement, illustrating the high benefit of automation while
simultaneously improving service delivery.
While VA has successfully implemented most Dole Act provisions, we
are still working to implement sections 208, 210, and 212 (VET TEC
2.0). VA has committed to VET TEC 2.0 (section 212) implementation in
the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2026, but as described earlier, this
has necessitated an offset to the scope of planned improvements this
year. For example, VA has yet to develop functionality to automate
Rudisill (and now Perkins) cases to replace the aging workload
management system (The Image Management System or TIMS) for improved
functionality for field managers and claims processors or to replace
the legacy school approval system (Web-Enabled Approval Management
System or WEAMS), which would integrate data on school approvals for
quicker school approvals and fraud detection. Prioritization of these
requirements always entails a cost-benefit analysis of priorities and
agile adjustments based on the dynamic world of law, policies, and the
limits of time-scope-and-funding. Nonetheless, the DGIB initiative has
successfully implemented eight major releases and hundreds of minor
releases.
Our focus has always been on the Veteran: delivering benefits
easier and faster to the Veteran through simplified application
interfaces and increased automation. Our aspirational, strategic goal
is an automated, 1-day decision for 90 percent of claims received.
While this was once a ``pie-in-the-sky'' goal, we are well on our way
to achieving it: as of January 15, 2026, 69 percent of Chapter 35
supplemental claims are fully automated. Just 4 months prior, no
Chapter 35 claims were automated. VA has now automated 58 percent of
all claims for Chapter 33 originals and supplementals, Chapter 35
supplementals, and Chapter 30 supplementals for a grand total of more
than 1,000,000 claims year to date.
Finally, our performance reflects a return on investment from the
perspective of the student Veterans we serve. As of January 22, 2026,
the average days to complete education claims are 5.6 days. While this
average is similar to prior years, VA has been able to achieve this
outcome with fewer staff and increasing automation to deliver 43
percent more within 1 day. All of this was done while maintaining high
accuracy--for claims completed in November, automation accuracy was 97
percent, which is comparable to claims processors at 98 percent.
Conclusion
Chairmen Barrett and Van Orden and Ranking Members Budzinski and
Pappas, this concludes my statement. We appreciate the opportunity to
speak before you today and welcome any questions you or other Members
of the Subcommittees may have.
Prepared Statement of Justin Parke
Chairmen Barrett and Van Orden, Ranking Members Budzinski and
Pappas, and distinguished members of both Subcommittees, thank you for
inviting me to testify at today's hearing. I am Justin Parke, a
Managing Director at Accenture Federal Services and a member of the
Accenture Federal Leadership team. I am also the Program Manager of our
Digital GI Bill engagement, leading the implementation and operations
of Accenture Federal DGIB systems. I am honored to serve Veterans and
their families in my role on this important program.
Accenture's work with VA Education began in 2019, when VA decided
to reset after a failed Colmery implementation attempt with a different
vendor. This reset included the release of a competitive, outcome-based
RFP that Accenture won. In partnership with VA, we delivered Colmery on
time and on budget. After this, VA released another full and open
competitive RFP for the Digital GI Bill (DGIB) implementation and
operations. Accenture won this competition and since March 2021, we
have supported VA's efforts to make it faster and easier for Veterans
to access and reliably receive life-changing education benefits.
We have achieved the main objectives for this contract: to process
claims uninterrupted and to develop new capabilities based on
requirements defined by VA, while enabling the retirement of VA legacy
systems. For example, DGIB retired VA's nearly 50-year-old BDN
mainframe which has improved VA's operational resilience and for the
first time in the GI Bill's 80-year history, has enabled fully
automated claims processing for originals and new chapters.
Through our DGIB automation efforts with VA, this January more than
64 percent of all education claims are processed same-day, the vast
majority of these in seconds, with no Veteran Claim Examiner (VCE)
effort. Chapter 35 is now running at 69 percent same-day automated
claims processing, radically improving VA's posture for spring
enrollment. Since March 2021, DGIB has processed over 16 million
claims, delivering more than 43 billion dollars in Veteran benefits to
2.3 million unique beneficiaries.
There have also been challenges to overcome. As previously detailed
by the OIG: additional requirements like new legislative mandates, new
judicial interpretations, and additional system integrations expanded
the scope from the original contract and non-DGIB dependencies delayed
the BDN retirement. During this BDN delay, VA re-prioritized several
other efforts, including VET TEC 1.0 and My Education Benefits, and we
delivered those capabilities ahead of schedule, ensuring that new
advancements were still delivered to Veterans despite the BDN
retirement delay.
The DGIB program's lifecycle cost estimate details the baseline
costs expected for the overall VA program across multiple contracts
with multiple vendors and other VA expenses. A smaller portion of this
estimate is for the managed service vendor costs - that is, Accenture
contract costs. The total Accenture contract ceiling is currently $1.08
billion, inclusive of increased scope. Accenture contract cost is
squarely within the baseline cost range for the scope and schedule
ultimately required.
Moreover, DGIB results in significant cost avoidance, including an
estimated $250 million for BDN, $400 million for other VA legacy
systems, and $400 million of claims processing staff time over 10
years. Without DGIB, VA would need to spend more on claims processing
staff time to keep up with increased claim volumes. All of these
savings compound year over year and in total, far exceed the $1 billion
in managed service contract ceiling.
As one of VA's most successful IT transformations, DGIB has
overcome challenges and delivered on its commitments. Some conclusions
to consider:
1. VA can achieve ambitious transformation, even when previous
attempts over past decades have failed;
2. Baseline lifecycle cost estimates should include ``known
unknowns'' like future legal mandates and other future fact-of-life
changes that do not exist at program inception; and
3. Procurement organizations can tackle big business needs with
Veteran outcome-based contracts like DGIB. With the right procurement
strategy, VA leadership can drive critical mission outcomes in
partnership with contractors.
With these lessons in mind, we look forward to working with VA to
provide even more same-day experiences while complying with legal
mandates--delivering education benefits faster, easier, and more
reliably, which is what our Veterans have earned and deserve. Thank
you, I look forward to your questions.
Prepared Statement of Troy Mueller
Chairman Van Orden and Chairman Barrett, Ranking Members Pappas and
Budzinski, and other Members of the Subcommittees, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today on matters relating to the
Department of Veteran's Affairs (VA) Digital GI Bill program.
Successful modernization of legacy IT is critical to improving the
Veteran experience. MITRE very much appreciates the opportunity to
share our insight from our work on this critical program.
MITRE is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit systems engineering, applied
research, and advanced technology organization that operates federally
Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) in support of Federal
agencies spanning national security, homeland security, law
enforcement, cybersecurity, health, transportation, and economic
competitiveness, including the Department of Veterans Affairs. MITRE's
technical and subject matter experts have had the privilege of
supporting many modernization efforts across the Federal enterprise.
Our workforce of approximately 7,000 is headquartered at campuses in
McLean, VA, and Bedford, MA.
Currently, I am a Managing Director in MITRE's Center for
Government Effectiveness and Modernization, responsible for directing
our support to modernization of benefits and service delivery across
all Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) lines of business, the VA's
Office of Information & Technology, and the Social Security
Administration.
A Trusted Partner
MITRE has been a partner with the VA's Education Service since
2008, having supported multiple projects focused on improving delivery
of education benefits, such as the implementation of The Post-9/11
Veterans' Educational Assistance Act of 2008 (Post-9/11 GI Bill), Harry
W. Colmery Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2017 (Forever GI
Bill), and the Digital GI Bill program.
MITRE's role has focused on providing strategic advice, guidance,
and assistance in the areas of systems engineering, program
integration, and organizational change. Our work included completing
the annual update of the life cycle cost estimate (LCCE) for the
Digital GI Bill (DGIB) program from 2021 (version 1.0) through 2025
(version 5.0)., which was delivered in April 2025.
Life Cycle Cost Estimate
The Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) calculates the total cost to
the Government for acquiring and owning a system throughout its
lifetime, far beyond any contracts. It establishes a program cost
baseline, aiding resource planning, program justification, and
decision-making. Required for programs exceeding $50 million\1\, the
LCCE aligns with the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Capital
Planning and Investment Control (CPIC) framework, as outlined in the
Capital Programming Guide and OMB Circulars A-11 and A-94.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The White House--OMB Circular A-11. Retrieved from: a11.pdf
(whitehouse.gov)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The LCCE is updated annually per GAO recommendations to reflect
changes in technical, economic, and programmatic assumptions, and fact-
of-life changes such as new legislation or court decisions impacting
the agency, Veterans, service members, and beneficiaries. It supports
financial decision-making and informs future budgetary needs. Developed
using GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (CEAG) \2\, the LCCE
functions as an input-output model, with inputs capturing technical,
economic, and programmatic parameters and assumptions, ultimately
producing a point estimate and a range estimate to establish
contingency reserves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide--GAO-20-195G,
Published: Mar 12, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The initial version of an LCCE is considered the baseline and
typically exhibits a higher level of uncertainty, with the point
estimate having an approximate 25 percent confidence level based on
empirical studies\3\. Version 1.0 of the DGIB LCCE reflected a point
estimate of $1.295 billion (then-year dollars) at the 25 percent
confidence level, meaning there is a 75 percent probability of the
point estimate increasing. GAO recommends using the estimated value at
a 50 percent confidence level for budget projections in mature programs
to establish contingency reserves. With each subsequent iteration, the
uncertainty should decrease, and the point estimate confidence level
should increase. The program cost team diligently tracks changes to the
programmatic and technical environments and associated assumptions to
inform annual updates and provide input to decision-makers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Journal of Cost Analysis and Parametrics--Enhanced Scenario-
Based Method for Cost Risk Analysis: Theory, Application, and
Implementation. Retrieved from: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/
10.1080/1941658X.2012.734757.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of the April 2025 update (version 5.0), the DGIB Program has an
estimated total cost of $2.38 billion in base year Fiscal Year 2021
constant dollars over a 10-year period, rising to approximately $2.68
billion when adjusted for inflation (then-year dollars). At a 50
percent confidence level, the program's estimated life cycle cost
reaches $2.76 billion in then-year dollars, including a contingency
reserve of $93 million.
The Digital GI Bill program is large and complex and accordingly
has inevitably encountered challenges, unanticipated complexities, and
the realization of risks that have led to schedule delays and increased
costs. Replacing extremely old legacy IT systems that rely on outdated
software languages and hardware, such as the VA's 1970's-era mainframe
Benefits Delivery Network (BDN) among others, presents a multitude of
challenges. As expected, this effort has required re-engineering that
yields issues that are difficult to anticipate and necessitate
extensive testing and validation to minimize disruption to business
operations such that access to benefits is not delayed.
The impact of challenges associated with modernizing legacy IT
systems that are this dated, as well as updates to assumptions
regarding claims volume, automation, the number of required Veterans
Claim Examiners (VCE) post full implementation, and alignment of DGIB
with dependent legacy systems and other large-scale modernization
programs schedules and roadmaps to minimize the disruption of services
resulted in the point estimate increase from LCCE version 1.0
(conducted in 2021) to version 5.0 (delivered in April 2025). The
primary areas of cost increase over the lifecycle are the VCE
assumption and timing of required automation targets ($747M), and the
transition to the GSA Alliant 2 contract, which has higher rates, to
extend the platform configuration by 4 years to accommodate schedule
impacts ($485M).
VBA's active executive leadership and ongoing evolution of program
processes, tools, and experienced staff will enable the program to
continue identifying challenges, crafting options, and proposing
adjustments and improvements that will increase the probability of
future success.
A Record of Accomplishment
Over the past 5 years, the Digital GI Bill program has had many
accomplishments delivering eight successful major releases, including
the migration of all benefits chapters to the platform, retiring of the
Benefits Delivery Network (BDN) 1970's mainframe, and additional
automation capabilities resulting in dramatically faster claims
processing.
The integrated DGIB team is extremely sensitive to the impact of
time on Veterans and beneficiaries. Delays in processing could drive a
semester or entire academic year-long delay for some students as some
degree completion or accelerated graduate programs only start once a
year. These delays are not just start dates for school, they are delays
in pursuing dreams and achieving life goals.
Recommendations
Two closely aligned recommendations can strengthen VA's ability to
deliver modern services while improving the transparency and
credibility of major investments. The first is the creation of a
sufficiently resourced enterprise-level cost estimating capability, and
second, the development of a streamlined early acquisition model that
produces the data required for informed cost estimates. Together, they
improve both the speed and rigor of VA's modernization efforts.
A dedicated, enterprise-level cost estimating capability at VA
would give Congress and VA leadership consistent, independent, and
defensible lifecycle cost estimates that strengthen budget formulation
and major investment decisions. By validating program office estimates,
establishing authoritative cost baselines, and providing transparent
affordability analysis, this organization would reduce cost and
schedule risk while improving oversight readiness and ensuring
resources are aligned to outcomes that matter for Veterans.
This capability should be paired with a streamlined early
acquisition model that accelerates delivery of benefits, healthcare,
and services while generating the structured data needed for credible
cost estimation. Rapid operational need definition, minimum viable
requirements, early risk scans, and lightweight architecture work would
shorten pre-award timelines and produce clear inputs such as
preliminary requirements, solution concepts, and early cost drivers
that feed the enterprise cost estimating organization.
Together, these reforms enable VA to deliver modern capabilities
faster while grounding every major investment in transparent, data-
driven analysis.
In closing, let me just note that of MITRE's roughly 6,500
personnel, over 1,100 are Veterans. There are few duties that our
employees consider more noble and consequential than honoring, through
our support for the VA, the service and sacrifice of our Nation's men
and women in uniform. On behalf of the entire MITRE team, I greatly
appreciate the opportunity to come before you today, and I look forward
to your questions.
Prepared Statement of William Hubbard
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Statements for the Record
----------
Prepared Statement of National Association of Veterans Programs
Administrators
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Prepared Statement of Student Veterans of America
Chairman Barrett and Van Orden, Ranking Member Budzinski and
Pappas, and Members of the Subcommittees: Thank you for inviting
Student Veterans of America (SVA) to submit a statement for the record
on this important hearing titled ``Digital G.I. Bill Undelivered:
Contracting Challenges and the Need for Acquisition Reform'' today.
With a mission focused on empowering student veterans, SVA is
committed to providing an educational experience that goes beyond the
classroom. Through a dedicated and expansive network of on-campus
chapters across the country, SVA aims to inspire yesterday's warriors
by connecting student veterans with a community of like-minded chapter
leaders. Every day these passionate leaders work to provide the
necessary resources, network support, and advocacy to ensure student
veterans, military-connected students, their families, caregivers, and
survivors can effectively connect, expand their skills, and ultimately
achieve their greatest potential.
SVA thanks the Subcommittees for considering this issue that would
impact student veterans, military-connected students, their families,
caregivers, and survivors in higher education.
Introduction
In 2026, the GI Bill remains one of the most powerful tools for
veteran success, offering pathways to higher education, economic
mobility, and long-term well-being. For many transitioning service
members, the GI Bill serves as their first interaction with Department
of Veterans Affairs (VA), making it a defining moment that shapes their
trust in the whole of VA. A smooth, transparent experience encourages
veterans to explore the full range of VA services, from mental health
care to career resources, while systemic hurdles discourage engagement.
If fully optimized, the GI Bill can serve as the ``front door'' to VA,
ensuring that veterans not only achieve the economic mobility promised
by their service and education but also remain engaged in the broader
network of programs designed to support them throughout their lives.
The past several years have seen significant advancements in the
administration of the GI Bill, including investments in information
technology modernization, automation of benefit processing, and
customer service reform within the Veterans Benefits Administration
have reduced delays and improved reliability.\1\ These improvements are
significant precisely because they reduce visibility, in that education
benefits are most effective when they recede into dependability rather
than demand constant management by the beneficiary. Such gains,
however, are not self-sustaining. They require continued oversight to
ensure that modernization efforts remain responsive to veteran
experience rather than driven solely by system efficiency. A direct
example of this oversight happened on December 16, 2025, when the
Subcommittee on Economic Opportunity had a hearing titled ``Detrimental
Delays: Reviewing Payment Failures in VA's Education Programs.'' This
hearing explored the impact that the interruption of Federal funding
had on our beneficiaries utilizing their Chapter 31 Veteran Readiness
and Employment or Chapter 35 Survivors and Dependents educational
benefits starting on October 1, 2025. Chapter 35 beneficiaries
throughout the Nation started off their Fall 2025 semester without
receiving their Monthly Housing Allowance (MHA) due to various
technological issues. These students turned to the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA) Education Service for help through their
counselors or through the GI Bill Hotline. GI Bill users were
unwillingly placed into a state of uncertainty after having to rely
heavily on these critical operations to stay enrolled and housed.
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\1\ U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. (n.d.). Transforming the
GI Bill experience. Digital VA. Retrieved February 19, 2025, from
https://digital.va.gov/delightful-end-user-experience/transforming-the-
gi-bill-experience/.
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GI Bill Hotline
As of February 2024, nearly 840,000 students were receiving some GI
Bill benefits, with almost 600,000 of them enrolled at campuses with an
SVA chapter. \2\, \3\ The GI Bill Hotline (GIBH) is the only
place where a student can speak with a live representative about any
question they have regarding their GI Bill education benefits. The GIBH
is open Monday through Friday between 8 a.m. to 7 p.m. ET by dialing
888-GIBILL-1 (888-442-4551).\4\ By calling that hotline, a student can
speak with a VA representative, knowledgeable in education benefits, to
verify payments, fix billing errors, and get real-time benefit guidance
when they are unable otherwise. When the interruptions of Federal
funding forced the GIBH to close on October 1, 2025, it had potentially
left roughly 840,000 students using VA education benefits with nowhere
to turn when their monthly benefits were delayed - risking eviction,
dis-enrollment, or withdrawal. Students utilizing Chapter 31 Veteran
Readiness & Employment (VR&E) were impacted even further to the hotline
closing when all Vocational Rehabilitation Counselors (VRC) were also
furloughed on October 3, 2025.\5\ Direct communication with VA on
education benefits came to a halt, leaving AskVA.gov as the sole
channel. Responses were significantly delayed and often failed to
provide useful or actionable information.
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\2\ According to the VBA Annual Benefits Report Fiscal Year 2023,
updated February 2024, there were 843,135 recipients combined of the
Post-9/11 GI Bill (chapter 33), MGIB-AD (chapter 30), MGIB-SR (1606),
DEA (chapter 35), and VEAP (chapter 32).
\3\ The number of those receiving GI Bill benefits reported by
campus in the VA's GI Bill Comparison Tool dataset were cross-
referenced with campuses present in the SVA system of record as having
an SVA chapter.
\4\ U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Benefit
Administration Education and Training Contact Us, https://
www.benefits.va.gov/gibill/contact_us.asp.
\5\ U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Human Capital Contingency
Plan, last updated Oct. 3, 2025, https://department.va.gov/contingency-
planning/human-capital-contingency-plan/#table-3-va-functions-to-be-
suspended-by-administration-or-staff-office.
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Vocational Rehabilitation Counselors
The VR&E program has continually evolved to better serve veterans
and service members with service-connected disabilities. This unique
program is designed to help them prepare for, secure, and sustain
meaningful and suitable employment to obtain economic mobility post-
service. VRCs are responsible for approving academic plans, authorizing
reimbursement stipends for educational supplies, and guiding employment
readiness.
In December 2024, SVA testified on the crucial role that VR&E plays
in workforce reintegration and how its inconsistencies in service
delivery have often left veterans in precarious financial and academic
situations.\6\ SVA conducted a survey of its members about their
experiences with the VR&E program,\7\ and a majority of respondents
said they would recommend the program to other service-connected
disabled veterans seeking to prepare for, find, and maintain
employment.\8\ However, the most significant barrier identified was
communication, nearly one-third reported they could rarely reach their
VRC, and three-in-four had inconsistent access.\9\ These gaps have led
to delayed approvals, interrupted stipends, and stalled economic growth
and career progress.\10\ What was once already a strained system had
reached a standstill amidst the lapse in Federal funding, and was
further exacerbated by the closing of the GIBH. This left many disabled
student veterans uncertain about their ability to continue their
training, secure meaningful employment, and provide for their families.
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\6\ Student Veterans of America, EXAMINING the EFFECTIVENESS of the
VETERANS READINESS and EMPLOYMENT (VR&E) PROGRAM, December 11, 2025.
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/VR/VR10/20241211/117750/HHRG-118-VR10-
20241211-SD003.pdf.
\7\ Student Veterans of America, 2024 VR&E Exploration Survey.
\8\ Id.
\9\ Id.
\10\ Id.
Chapter 35 Survivors' and Dependents' Educational Assistance (DEA)
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Beneficiaries
GI Bill beneficiaries utilizing their Chapter 35 VA Educational
Benefits include children and spouses of veterans or service members
who have died, been captured or are missing, or are totally disabled
from a service-connected disability.\11\ The payments help eligible
students pay for school or cover expenses while training for a job.
Full-time students enrolled in this program receive nearly $1,600 each
month from VA. SVA, as well as many other veteran and military serving
organizations, has heard an increasing number of issues among
membership on VA system failures that have compounded in light of the
funding pause causing nationwide delays in education payments for
dependents and survivors relying on Chapter 35 benefits.\12\
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\11\ U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Survivors' and
Dependents' Educational Assistance, last updated Aug. 4, 2025, https://
www.va.gov/family and-caregiver-benefits/education-and-careers/
dependents-education-assistance/.
\12\ Linda Hersey, Computer `glitch' delays higher-ed payments for
veterans' dependents and survivors, Oct. 15, 2025, https://
www.stripes.com/veterans/2025-10-16/veterans-gi-bill-payments-shutdown-
19448904.html.
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One family reached out to SVA about their communications via the
GIBH throughout the month of September with the goal of resolving their
issue before their daughter started their term in November. VA
instructed the family to continuously check in using the GIBH
throughout the following weeks of October. However, their calls went
unanswered once the GIBH halted, resulting in impact to the dependent's
enrollment. It is without question that these delays have created real
financial strain and uncertainty; many are now struggling to cover
basic living expenses such as rent, utilities, and transportation.
Others are facing the difficult prospect of taking on additional debt
or withdrawing from classes to avoid falling further behind
financially.
Recommendations
With the GIBH closed and VRC furloughed, students had no direct
path to resolve payment issues or confirm their benefit status. This
led to uncertainty, financial strain, and the risk of dis-enrollment or
withdrawal of students across the country. Even while these services
were suspended, campuses remained open, classes continued, and student
veterans pressed forward in pursuit of their education and career
goals. Below are several recommendations from SVA to improve processes
and prevent similar disruptions in the future.
First, it is imperative that VA designate all VRC roles and at
least a portion of staffing for the GI Bill Hotline as ``essential
service'' providers and protect these services from future funding
interruptions. This would ensure that students retain access to support
services and do not go without the education benefits they earned or
that were earned for them. Second, SVA urges VA to provide timely
communications in a transparent and plain manner to students, schools,
Congress, and veteran/military serving organizations when the risk of
payment delays are known in advance. Last, SVA recommends VA adopt an
IT rollout plan that avoids the start of a new academic term and add/
drop class period. Although not every school's calendar is aligned,
there are times throughout the year that are high-traffic in terms of
enrollment, graduation, etc., and VA should understand when these
periods fall throughout the year. The beginning of a term poses the
highest risk to students if that system does malfunction. The add/drop
period are when school certifying officials can confirm a students'
course enrollment for the term. Implementing changes at a different
time would allow VA to fully test and stabilize its systems before they
are implemented to the larger user base.
These recommendations will ensure that students will continue to
get their benefits in a timely manner and have a trusted VA resource to
assist them when they are in a significant time of need. It would
additionally build trust for VA service users and ensure that the
``front door'' is not a barrier to entry. Transparency and
accountability must be held to the highest standard when the livelihood
of student veterans, military-connected students, family members,
caregivers, and survivors are at risk. Modern technology can be used to
make VA benefits easier, faster, and more reliable to access and
process. If these upgrades are implemented properly, student veterans
can focus on their education and career goals rather than spending time
navigating a broken, outdated system.
SVA welcomes any communication with VA to assist in disseminating
timely information to students when an issue arises. Additionally, SVA
would request that the GI Bill Stakeholder meetings return to their
regular cadence. These meetings have historically been a valuable and
effective forum for veteran-and military-serving organization
engagement and an important tool for highlighting educational benefit
issues early.
The continued success of veterans in higher education in the Post-
9/11 era is no mistake or coincidence. In our Nation's history,
educated veterans have always been the best of a generation and the key
to solving America's most complex challenges. Today's student veterans
carry this legacy forward.
We thank the Chairmen, Ranking Members, and the Members of the
Subcommittees for your time, attention, and devotion to the cause of
veterans, military-connected students, their families, caregivers and
survivors.
[all]