    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                PIER PRESSURE: REGULATION AND COMPETITION
                        IN MARITIME SHIPPING
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                      SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE,
                       REGULATORY REFORM, AND ANTITRUST

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 2026

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 119-59

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                   Available via: http://judiciary.house.gov

                                   __________

                     U.S. GOVERMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    63-145                  WASHINGTON : 2026
    =======================================================================

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                            JIM JORDAN, Ohio, Chair

    DARRELL ISSA, California             JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland, Ranking
    ANDY BIGGS, Arizona                      Member
    TOM McCLINTOCK, California           JERROLD NADLER, New York
    THOMAS P. TIFFANY, Wisconsin         ZOE LOFGREN, California
    THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
    CHIP ROY, Texas                      HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
    SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin              Georgia
    BEN CLINE, Virginia                  ERIC SWALWELL, California
    LANCE GOODEN, Texas                  TED LIEU, California
    JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey       PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
    TROY E. NEHLS, Texas                 J. LUIS CORREA, California
    BARRY MOORE, Alabama                 MARY GAY SCANLON, Pennsylvania
    KEVIN KILEY, California              JOE NEGUSE, Colorado
    HARRIET M. HAGEMAN, Wyoming          LUCY McBATH, Georgia
    LAUREL M. LEE, Florida               DEBORAH K. ROSS, North Carolina
    WESLEY HUNT, Texas                   BECCA BALINT, Vermont
    RUSSELL FRY, South Carolina          JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
    GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin            SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
    BRAD KNOTT, North Carolina           JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    MARK HARRIS, North Carolina          DANIEL S. GOLDMAN, New York
    ROBERT F. ONDER, Jr., Missouri       JASMINE CROCKETT, Texas
    DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas
    BRANDON GILL, Texas
    MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington
                                     ------

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE,
                        REGULATORY REFORM, AND ANTITRUST

                       SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin, Chair

    DARRELL ISSA, California             JERROLD NADLER, New York, Ranking
    BEN CLINE, Virginia                      Member
    LANCE GOODEN, Texas                  J. LUIS CORREA, California
    HARRIET HAGEMAN, Wyoming             BECCA BALINT, Vermont
    MARK HARRIS, North Carolina          JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
    DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas                ZOE LOFGREN, California
    MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington      HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
                                             Georgia

                   CHRISTOPHER HIXON, Majority Staff Director
                    ARTHUR EWENCZYK, Minority Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                            Tuesday, March 17, 2026

                               OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                       Page
    The Honorable Scott Fitzgerald, Chair of the Subcommittee on the
      Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust from the
      State of Wisconsin.............................................     1
    The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee
      on the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust
      from the State of New York.....................................     3
    The Honorable Jamie Raskin, Ranking Member of the Committee on
      the Judiciary from the State of Maryland.......................     5

                                   WITNESSES

    Erika M. Douglas, Associate Professor of Law, Temple University
      Oral Testimony.................................................     8
      Prepared Testimony.............................................    11
    Tony Rice, Senior Director, Trade Policy, National Milk Producers
      Federation
      Oral Testimony.................................................    26
      Prepared Testimony.............................................    28
    Richard Sicotte, Professor of Economics, University of Vermont
      Oral Testimony.................................................    38
      Prepared Testimony.............................................    40
    Diana Moss, Vice President, Director, Competition Policy,
      Progressive Policy Institute
      Oral Testimony.................................................    42
      Prepared Testimony.............................................    44

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC. SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    All materials submitted for the record by the Subcommittee on the
      Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust are
      listed below...................................................    65

    Materials submitted by the Honorable Becca Balint, a Member of
      the Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory
      Reform, and Antitrust from the State of Vermont, for the record
        An article entitled, ``NY Fed report says Americans pay for
            almost all of Trump's tariffs,'' Feb. 12, 2026, Reuters
        An article entitled, ``One-Third of Americans Cut Back to
            Cover Healthcare Expenses,'' Mar. 12, 2026, Gallup
        An article entitled, ``Oil Rises, Bringing Gains to 40% Since
            the Start of the War,'' Mar. 12, 2026, The New York Times

                                    APPENDIX

    Materials submitted by the Honorable Scott Fitzgerald, Chair of
      the Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory
      Reform, and Antitrust from the State of Wisconsin, and the
      Honorable Jerrold Nadler, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on
      the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust from
      the State of New York, for the record
        A document entitled, ``Ocean Freight Shipper Bill of
            Rights,'' Mar. 2025, The National Industrial
            Transportation League
        A statement from The National Industrial Transportation
            League, Mar. 25, 2026

                     QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD

    Questions and response for Tony Rice, Senior Director, Trade
      Policy, National Milk Producers Federation, submitted by the
      Honorable Ben Cline, a Member of the Subcommittee on the
      Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust from the
      State of Virginia, for the record

         PIER PRESSURE: REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN MARITIME SHIPPING

                                  ----------

                            Tuesday, March 17, 2026

                            House of Representatives

                   Subcommittee on the Administrative State,

                        Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust

                           Committee on the Judiciary

                                 Washington, DC

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
    Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Scott
    Fitzgerald [Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
        Members present: Representatives Issa, Gooden, Harris,
    Nadler, Raskin, Balint, Lofgren, and Johnson.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee will come to
    order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a
    recess at any time.
        We welcome everyone to today's hearing. Happy St. Patrick's
    Day.
        This hearing on regulation and competition in the maritime
    shipping industry is a Subcommittee hearing we have wanted to
    tackle for some time.
        I will now recognize myself for an opening statement.
        Today, we are here to examine the statutory antitrust
    exemption granted under the 1916 Shipping Act and its impact on
    competition and consumers. Since the earliest day of maritime
    shipping, ocean carriers have entered into cooperative
    agreements to coordinate freight capacity and global shipping
    routes. This was to ensure space abroad; a vessel didn't go
    unused, and ships would not be arriving at the same ports at
    the same time.
        Recognizing that these cooperative agreements, known as
    ``conferences,'' could act to restrict or eliminate competition
    between rival shippers, Congress began studying the issue. What
    Congress concluded was that, while there were certainly
    anticompetitive aspects of these conferences, the benefits seem
    to outweigh any potential harm.
        In the words of a 1914 Alexander report, quote,

            To terminate the existing agreements would bring about two
            results. The steamship lines would either engage in rate wars,
            or to eliminate a costly struggle, they would consolidate
            through common ownership.

        Congress' compromise came in the Shipping Act of 1916. As
    part of that compromise, ocean carriers could enter into
    collective agreements, so long as those agreements were filed
    with and overseen by a Federal regulator, which today is known
    as the Federal Maritime Commission, or the FMC.
        The industry today, however, looks very different from the
    one Congress confronted in 1916. In 1998, the top 20 ocean
    carriers controlled approximately 50 percent of the world's
    container slot capacity. By 2018, that number had almost
    doubled to nearly 90 percent. Today, three global shipping
    alliances together control nearly all transatlantic and
    transpacific trade.
        The intent behind the Shipping Act was also to advance the
    interests of American shippers. As one scholar had put it,
    ``Both the original statute and the 1961 amendments are
    designed to protect and foster a strong American flag merchant
    marine.'' In other words, Congress wanted to protect American
    interests against discrimination by foreign shippers.
        Yet, today, the largest ocean shipping companies are all
    foreign-owned and controlled. In the list of the top 20
    container shipping companies by market cap, there is not a
    single U.S. company.
        The United States depends on foreign flag vessels for 97
    percent of its maritime trade. COSCO Shipping, one of the
    largest container shipping companies by market share, is owned
    and controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. That presents
    its own national security risks, which the House Committee on
    Homeland Security and the China Select Committee have been
    investigating.
        This concentration and coordination can exacerbate supply
    chain disruptions that would otherwise be more resilient when
    competition is robust. For example, during the COVID pandemic,
    freight rates for a container increased from $1,300 to as much
    as $11,000.
        When geopolitical crises have struck, such as the Russia-
    Ukraine conflict, or more recently, the ongoing air strikes
    against the Iranian regime, ocean carriers have leveraged their
    monopoly power to charge detention and demurrage fees,
    surcharges, and other fees that should, instead, be charged by
    marine terminal operators.
        What would otherwise be unreasonable business practices in
    a competitive environment; it appears to be routine under these
    anticompetitive alliances. The result of the Shipping Act, as
    we have seen, may have, unfortunately, been precisely what
    Congress was hoping to avoid--concentration of foreign shipping
    companies, to the detriment of American businesses and
    consumers.
        When Congress granted the antitrust exemption, it tasked
    the Federal Maritime Commission with subjecting these ocean
    carrier agreements to antitrust scrutiny. However, as one of
    our witnesses will explain today, the FMC has never once
    brought a case against the powerful ocean shipping carriers
    that dominate shipping markets. Despite having the statutory
    authority to seek a judiciary remedy or monetary penalties, the
    FMC has never taken an enforcement action to challenge an
    agreement. Some will call this ``underenforcement.'' It could
    be called a dereliction.
        Over the years, the FMC has maintained the position that
    competition was vigorous among ocean carriers and their three
    major shipping alliances. Even after the COVID pandemic, in
    which the United States faced some of its greatest supply chain
    challenges, the FMC reported to Congress that, ``Competition
    among ocean common carriers, among the three major alliances,
    and among the members in each of these alliances is vigorous.''
        That argument is in tension with the position taken by
    Congress and the DOJ in recent years. When Congress passed the
    Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 2022, it did so to alleviate
    concerns among businesses that ocean-carrying alliances were,
    quote, ``able to wield excessive power to prevent
    competition.'' Yet, despite Congress giving the FMC more
    authority to police the carriers in the terms of their
    agreements, it appears the agency is still sitting on its
    hands.
        The DOJ, meanwhile, has long maintained the position that
    antitrust exemption for ocean shipping is no longer justified,
    and has repeatedly submitted comments to the FMC expressing
    antitrust concerns over ocean carrier alliances.
        In 2016, for example, the DOJ submitted comments urging the
    FMC to oppose the proposed Ocean Alliance Agreement. In their
    comments, the DOJ stated that the agreement ``contemplates
    extensive cooperation among members and would grant the parties
    the ability to broadly coordinate service between routes,
    including the unfettered exchange of competitively sensitive
    information.''
        Additionally, the DOJ stated, ``The increase in
    concentration in the transpacific shipping market is presumed
    likely to enhance market power under the antitrust laws.''
    Despite this warning, the FMC authorized the Ocean Alliance in
    2016, and has continued to extend the agreement, most recently,
    until March 2032.
        An economy based on vigorous competition protected by the
    antitrust laws does the best job of promoting consumer welfare
    and a vibrant, growing economy. Statutory antitrust exemptions
    are antithetical to those principles.
        As the bipartisan Antitrust Modernization Commission
    stated,``Statutory exemptions from the antitrust laws
    undermine, rather than upgrade, the competitiveness and
    efficiency of the U.S. economy.''
        When Congress grants immunity from antitrust scrutiny, we
    must do so selectively and with consumers in mind. When
    compelling evidence suggests consumers no longer benefit from
    an antitrust exemption, it is appropriate for Congress to
    reexamine whether it is still in the public interest to allow
    otherwise anticompetitive behavior to continue unchecked.
        That is why we are here today, to better understand the
    history of the Shipping Act and whether, after nearly 100
    years, it is still in the consumers' best interests.
        We will also hear today whether other government
    regulations, such as environmental regulations in international
    shipping, or restrictions in domestic maritime shipping, like
    the Jones Act, are negatively impacting shipping prices and
    harming consumers.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and hearing
    what they have to say today. Thank you.
        I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Nadler, for an
    opening statement.
        Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, in this
    senseless war, there is no defined goals and no end in sight.
    With gas prices skyrocketing and with an affordability crisis
    that is draining Americans' pocketbooks, and is only getting
    worse, a hearing to examine maritime shipping rules does not
    exactly meet the moment.
        The affordability crisis touches nearly every aspect of our
    lives. Staple grocery costs have risen more than three percent
    over the last year--causing many Americans to struggle just to
    put food on the table. The rent and mortgage payments are
    stretching families' budgets, with many young people priced out
    of the housing market altogether. Utilities are up an average
    of 12 percent from last year, and health insurance premiums
    have gone through the roof, especially after Republicans let
    critical subsidies expire. On top of all this, gas prices have
    risen sharply since Trump attacked Iran, and are climbing
    higher by the day.
        It is no wonder that consumer confidence is the lowest it
    has been since 2014. Americans are feeling the freeze, but
    Republicans have done nothing to ease their pain and many of
    their policies are only making it worse.
        The increased costs faced by consumers have been fueled in
    large part by the global trade war launched by President Trump
    last year, which has taken aim at friends and enemies alike.
    Instead of taking a targeted and thoughtful approach to trade
    that would protect American industries, workers, and consumers,
    Trump has taken a scattershot approach--imposing steep tariffs
    across the board that are driving up prices for American
    consumers and businesses, while doing very little to bring
    investment to our shores.
        By one estimate, American consumers have paid more than
    $230 billion in tariff costs since the Trump Administration
    began. That's more than $1,700 per family. Even though the
    Supreme Court has struck down some of the tariffs, significant
    others remain, and the refunds mandated by the courts will go
    to businesses, not consumers.
        At the same time, President Trump has taken this country to
    war with Iran--without making the case to the American public
    or seeking congressional authorization. Iran has now retaliated
    by shutting down the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth
    of the world's oil supply travels--a response that comes as a
    surprise to no one, except Donald Trump. As a result, the price
    of oil is already over $100 a barrel and gas prices are
    skyrocketing.
        Rigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws could be a
    powerful tool in the effort to address the affordability
    crisis, but instead, this administration has corrupted the
    antitrust process--rewarding their political allies, punishing
    their perceived enemies, and firing the career professionals
    and other officials who have refused to cater to industry
    lobbyists or to carry out a toothless enforcement scheme.
        The ask of the senior leadership in the DOJ's Antitrust
    Division appears to have cleared the path for one of the most
    egregious examples of lax enforcement--the government's
    sweetheart deal with Live Nation-Ticketmaster. The monopolistic
    power of this company has been known ever since Live Nation and
    Ticketmaster first proposed merging in 2009. At the time, I
    urged my colleagues--I joined my colleagues in warning about
    the impact it would have on consumers. Although the merger was
    approved, I am sad to say that our concerns turned out to be
    well-founded.
        The millions of Americans have felt the effects of Live
    Nation-Ticketmaster's anticompetitive practices. When they
    bought a ticket to a concert, performed in a local production,
    or worked at an auditorium, they saw how the company drove up
    ticket prices, limited tour dates, or prevented other companies
    from entering the market.
        Given this awful record, I sought reexamination of the
    merger by the antitrust enforcers in 2021. Thankfully, in 2024,
    the Biden Administration and 40 State Attorneys General sued
    Live Nation-Ticketmaster for monopolizing markets across the
    live entertainment industry.
        At the time, I said, quote,

            Since its merger in 2010, Live Nation-Ticketmaster has engaged
            in boldly anticompetitive practices at the expense of
            consumers, entertainers, venues, and vendors. Instead of
            cooperating with the terms of its consent decree with the
            Department of Justice, the company has only grown more brazen
            in its tactics to corner the primary and secondary ticket
            markets.

        Despite having a slam-dunk case, days into trial, the Trump
    Administration suddenly settled the case for practically
    nothing--leaving venues, performers, and consumers out in the
    cold. The case was settled so abruptly that the judge even
    admonished the government and Live Nation-Ticketmaster for
    their quote, ``absolute disrespect for the court, the jury, and
    the entire process.''
        This case is not only the most recent, but also one of the
    most damning examples of how corrupt the Republican-controlled
    DOJ is. As one former antitrust official noted, ``You really
    couldn't send a clearer message that antitrust is dead at the
    Federal level than settling this particular case.''
        Thankfully, most of the State Attorneys General involved in
    the case dejected the settlement and vowed to continue the
    litigation. The Trump Administration, on the other hand,
    appears content to allow consumers to pay more for less.
        Such a sorry state of affairs cries out for congressional
    oversight, but the Republican majority has been silent, while
    the Trump Administration guts the antitrust enforcement
    agencies that should be protecting consumers, not companies.
        Mr. Chair, market consolidation, unpredictable tariffs, and
    the war in Iran are all driving prices up, but this hearing is
    designed to address none of these pressing issues. By all
    means, we should examine the maritime shipping industry at some
    point, but the affordability crisis is urgent right now, and it
    is growing worse. That is where our attention should lie today.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back. We are waiting
    for Chair Jordan. I will now recognize the Ranking Member of
    the Full Committee, Mr. Raskin, for his opening statement.
        Mr. Raskin. Mr. Chair, thank you very much. Thanks to the
    witnesses for joining us today.
        A majority of Americans feel like they're getting priced
    out of Donald Trump's new gilded age in America. A third of
    Americans, around 82 million people, are skipping meals or
    basic healthcare to pay for utilities. Prices for food staples
    like eggs, sugar, and meat jumped up in 2025 and are climbing
    every day.
        Whether you rent or own, housing is becoming more
    unaffordable for the working middle class, while Donald Trump
    bulldozes the White House and throws ``Great Gatsby parties''
    at Mar-a-Lago for his billionaire Cabinet and the fellow stars
    of the Epstein files.
        Forget owning a house, when three-quarters of Americans say
    that buying a new car is out of reach. If you have got a car,
    driving it is becoming ludicrously expensive, as gas prices
    have shot up 25 percent just in the last few weeks--with
    Trump's ``war of choice'' in the Middle East. Gas prices are
    soaring every day, as the theocrats of Iran retaliate by
    shutting down the shipment of oil through the Strait of Hormuz,
    and Donald Trump spends $2 billion a day on this war that we
    never declared and didn't even debate--putting it on America's
    imaginary credit card and driving up our deficit and our
    national debt.
        President Trump's impulsively stupid policies and the
    invertebrate response of Republicans in Congress have made life
    even more expensive and difficult for our people. Republicans
    refuse to address the healthcare crisis, and instead, chose to
    cut Medicaid and the tax credits that help make healthcare
    affordable and accessible to millions of people.
        Meantime, monopolies and corporate giants rule in Trump's
    economy. The MAGA-controlled agencies have waved through giant
    mergers in the real estate market, which means that you pay
    more for a home and have fewer options for buying one. They
    also settled slam-dunk rent price-fixing cases, where major
    landlords across America conspire to set the rent that you pay
    for your home, ensuring that they will get richer while you
    spend more on rental housing.
        Just last week, the DOJ OKed an obviously corrupt
    settlement of the Live Nation-Ticketmaster suit, which may
    appease MAGA's big business campaign funders, but will do
    nothing to lower the exorbitant prices that people pay to see
    live entertainment. The government originally accused Live
    Nation-Ticketmaster, a multibillion-dollar live-event business,
    of stifling competition, coercing artists and venues into using
    its services, and driving up ticket prices for millions of
    fans, while pocketing bloated profits. Under the Trump
    Administration, this years-long case has been quietly settled
    with no changes for the millions of American consumers,
    artists, venues, and competitors that this business injured and
    overcharged.
        President Trump promised that foreign countries, not
    Americans, would pay for his giant and illegal tariffs, and he
    promised that those tariffs would create jobs. Both promises
    turned out to be empty. President Trump's tariffs, which he
    applied unilaterally, haphazardly, and unevenly, of course,
    unconstitutionally--failed to create new jobs, and instead,
    effectively, taxed every American more than $2,500. A study by
    the Fed shows that 90 percent of these costs were paid by
    American companies and American consumers, not by China or any
    other foreign country.
        The resulting brutal affordability squeeze has landed most
    heavily on people who also lost critical social services, like
    SNAP food stamp benefits, children's health insurance, Medicaid
    and Medicare, and funding for rural hospitals--when House
    Republicans passed their One Big Ugly Class Warfare Bill.
        Our government actually has the agency tools needed to
    address the Trump affordability crisis, but Trump has either
    totally dismantled them or corrupted them. He has broken the
    agencies that protect us against fraud, scams, and financial
    conspiracies.
        He has fired any antitrust official who has disagreed with
    his policy of giving political allies a green light to swallow
    up their competitors. Last month, he abruptly dismissed
    Assistant Attorney General Gail Slater, who was often the only
    dissenting voice, as lobbyists in backrooms and White House
    insiders pushed mergers that are terrible for consumers and
    driving us toward an economy run by oligarchs.
        The Majority has conducted zero oversight of these
    antitrust corruption debacles--leaving it to the Democrats to
    invite as a witness Gail Slater's Deputy, Roger Alford, who was
    fired for raising concerns about rank pay-to-play corruption
    and self-dealing in the GOP-controlled antitrust agencies.
    Alford implored us in this room to conduct oversight of the
    Antitrust Division before it is too late for America. A two-
    term Trump official, thus, begged us to do our jobs to protect
    the American people, but it has fallen on deaf ears among our
    colleagues.
        President Trump's policies and Republican inaction mean
    that today Americans cannot afford daily life, but Trump and
    the billionaire class are getting richer every day. Just four
    tech billionaires--Elon Musk, Mark Zuckerberg, Jeff Bezos, and
    Jensen Huang--all whom donated to Trump's inauguration, they
    made $288 billion in less than one year. By contrast, the
    American people paid $2,500, on average, last year for higher
    prices, thanks just to the tariffs alone.
        The President has said that the affordability crisis is,
    quote, ``a hoax, a con job, a scam,'' but his illegal tariffs
    were the hoax. His claim to support release of the Epstein
    files is the con job, and his illegal unilateral war in Iran,
    which is costing us more than a billion dollars a day, and 13
    American lives already, and more than a thousand Iranian lives,
    including children, is the scam.
        The real fraud is President Trump's personal net worth
    going up $1.4 billion in his first year of his second term, and
    his son-in-law Jarad Kushner raking in $2 billion from the
    Saudis and more than $1.5 billion from Qatar, while exercising
    a lot more decision over the decision to go to war than any of
    the Members in this room did combined.
        What are we here today to discuss? An esoteric antitrust
    exemption about shipping. Now, in normal times, I might
    appreciate an examination of this or any other antitrust
    exemption, but these aren't normal times and this Majority
    isn't even prepared to reform the exemption in any event--
    something I would certainly be open to discussing.
        The millions of Americans literally cannot afford now to
    get medicine or pay for housing or for groceries in Trump's
    economy. We must do everything we can to try to help the people
    now with the tools that are actually at our disposal. Instead,
    our Republican colleagues have called us here to discuss a
    niche antitrust exemption unlikely to change anytime soon.
        The ship of State is taking on water rapidly every day and
    starting to sink, but our colleagues want to have a debate
    about diversionary things. Count me out.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back.
        I would just make the comment that, as a namesake of Scott
    Fitzgerald, I thought it was a cheap shot that you brought up
    the ``Great Gatsby-style parties.''
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Raskin. I meant it only as the highest form of
    flattery. Right?
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
    Without objection, all other opening statements will be
    included in the record. We will now introduce today's
    witnesses.
        Professor Erika M. Douglas. Ms. Douglas is an Associate
    Professor of Law at Temple University's Beasley School of Law.
    Her scholarship focuses on antitrust, data privacy, and
    intellectual property law. Professor Douglas previously worked
    in private practice, where she focused on antitrust and
    technology-related matters.
        Mr. Tony Rice. Mr. Rice is senior director of trade policy
    at the National Milk Producers Federation, an association of
    dairy producers and cooperatives. Mr. Rice focuses on matters
    relating to U.S. dairy exports.
        Professor Richard Sicotte. Mr. Sicotte is an Assistant
    Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of
    Vermont. Professor Sicotte, his work focuses on economic
    history, industrial organization, political economy, and
    international economics.
        Ms. Diana Moss. Ms. Moss is a Vice President and the
    Director of Competition Policy at the Progressive Policy
    Institute. Her work focuses on antitrust enforcement and sector
    regulation.
        We welcome our witnesses and thank them for appearing
    today. We will begin by swearing you in. Would you please rise
    and raise your right hand?
        Do you swear or affirm under penalty of perjury that the
    testimony you are about to give is true and correct, to be the
    best of your knowledge, information, and belief, so help you
    God?
        Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in
    the affirmative. You can take your seat, please.
        Please know that your written testimony will be entered
    into the record in its entirety. Accordingly, we ask that you
    summarize your testimony in five minutes.
        Professor Douglas, you may begin.

                     STATEMENT OF ERIKA M. DOUGLAS

        Ms. Douglas. Thank you, Chair Fitzgerald, Ranking Member
    Nadler, and the distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.
        My name is Erika Douglas. I'm an Associate Professor of Law
    at Temple University in Philadelphia. I've been dedicated to
    antitrust law for over 15 years--first, in private practice,
    then at major law firms, and now, as a professor and leader at
    organizations like the ABA.
        My research examines how antitrust interacts with
    regulation. Ordinarily, antitrust law applies across the
    economy to prevent anticompetitive agreements among rivals.
    That is not the case in international ocean shipping. Antitrust
    law is blocked by Section 4307 of the Consolidated Shipping
    Act. This section shields certain agreements among rivals that
    are filed with the Federal Maritime Commission. This ocean
    shipping exemption is one of the oldest in antitrust law. It's
    not clear that it was ever justified, and it certainly is not
    today.
        Congress created this exemption based on the mistaken view
    that ocean shipping had special economics; that free
    competition would cause the industry to fall apart from
    overcapacity and rate wars. We've known for decades that this
    is not true.
        From the 1990s onward, ocean shipping has been increasingly
    deregulated. It has not led to industry collapse. Antitrust
    courts have long rejected the concept of ruinous competition.
    This German act rightly assumes that competition benefits the
    consumers that we're concerned about here today. Antitrust
    should coexist with ocean shipping regulation, just as it does
    with regulation in other industries, like airlines,
    telecommunications, and securities.
        The second reason for this exemption was to even the
    playing field for American carriers in international shipping
    competition. This rationale also no longer makes sense. There
    are no major American carriers left. The European Union has
    repealed its own shipping exemption. Today, the U.S. exemption
    serves only to shield foreign carriers from our antitrust
    laws--at the expense of American shippers and consumers.
        It's important to understand that, in place of the usual
    antitrust laws, ocean shipping has a partial substitute that is
    not being used. The FMC holds the exclusive statutory power to
    challenge ocean carrier agreements that result in an
    unreasonable reduction in service or increase in cost.
        My research shows that the FMC has never brought such a
    case, despite holding this power for over 40 years. This record
    suggests that the FMC tolerates greater competitive risk than
    would antitrust law, although the agency's analysis often lacks
    transparency.
        This legal landscape is concerning to me as an antitrust
    scholar because the ocean shipping industry bears at least
    three classic hallmarks of antitrust risk.
        First, it's highly concentrated. The industry is dominated
    by three major alliances which account for up to 95 percent of
    ocean shipping. As recently as 2011, this figure was only 30
    percent. Concentration increases the risk of antitrust
    violations by making collusions easier.
        Second, ocean shipping has an unusual web of agreements
    among competitors. The FMC has over 360 agreements on file. The
    big three alliance agreements allow rivals to decide jointly on
    the volume of cargo they ship and when vessels are deployed.
    The First Circuit recently confirmed that a similar agreement
    between airlines violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
        Finally, there's recent collusion in this industry. Where
    antitrust jurisdiction remains, the DOJ has been vigilant in
    bringing criminal charges. Carriers have colluded in the
    shipment of vehicles and farm equipment, and price-fixed in
    food and medicine shipped to Puerto Rico. These cartels harm
    any American consumer who buys goods that travel by ship. These
    factors create a perfect storm for anticompetitive conduct. If
    there's consensus around one issue in antitrust trust, it's
    that these sorts of exemptions are rarely justified.
        I would encourage you to consider the repeal of the arcane
    ocean shipping exemption to free antitrust law to protect
    American shippers, ports, and consumers from these risks.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Douglas follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, Professor Douglas. Mr. Rice, you
    may begin.

                         STATEMENT OF TONY RICE

        Mr. Rice. Chair Fitzgerald, Ranking Member Nadler, and the
    Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify before you today on the maritime supply chain
    challenges faced by the U.S. dairy industry. Having spent 18 or
    so years milking cows on my Pennsylvania dairy farm that my
    family runs today, this is a true honor.
        My name is Tony Rice, and I serve as the Senior Director of
    Trade Policy for the U.S. Dairy Export Council and the National
    Milk Producers Federation, where I lead supply chain policy
    development for both organizations.
        America's dairy farmers and the communities they support
    depend on reliable access to global markets--with roughly 17
    percent of production reaching international customers last
    year in the form of cheese, whey proteins, or other dairy
    ingredients.
        As most dairy products are perishable, maintaining product
    integrity throughout the global supply chain is critical.
    Shipping disruptions risk compromising product quality and
    eroding the confidence that overseas customers play in U.S.
    dairy products.
        While North America is our most important market, a growing
    volume of our exports is reaching overseas customers via
    oceangoing vessels. With the U.S.-flagged oceangoing fleet
    representing only 2.3 percent of global shipping capacity, U.S.
    dairy exporters are almost wholly dependent on foreign entities
    to transport their products.
        Today, less than a dozen shipping companies dominate the
    industry, and most operate within just three large carrier
    alliances. While these alliances can create operational
    efficiencies for carriers, this also means that exporters have
    fewer options when selecting shipping services and less
    leverage when negotiating service terms.
        To counter this trend, we support efforts to strategically
    invest in the domestic maritime sector, including enhancing
    capacity for American shipbuilding to strengthen the resilience
    of our supply chains by offering exporters more options.
        Simultaneously, Congress should consider permitting reform
    to expedite new shipyard capacity and investments in mariner
    workforce education and training.
        Conversely, U.S. dairy exporters are very concerned that
    foreign ocean carriers are likely to pass through costs
    associated with proposed port fees on foreign-flagged, owned,
    or operated ships. In a normal supply environment, additional
    fees would incentivize dairy exporters to select U.S.-flagged
    carriers instead. Unfortunately, U.S. dairy exporters have
    little choice than to contract with a foreign carrier and
    likely assume responsibility for any penalty fees--putting them
    at a competitive disadvantage to other global suppliers. We
    urge the U.S. Government to carefully evaluate the effects of
    these penalties on U.S. agricultural exporters.
        The pandemic exposed structural imbalances in international
    shipping networks, that shippers face extremely limited
    container availability, high-port congestion, and unpredictable
    vessel schedules. In 2021 alone, our industry lost over $1.5
    billion due to missed sales opportunities, reduced product
    values, and sharply higher costs associated with unreliable
    shipping services.
        Frankly, the worst of these issues have abated, but some
    underlying problems remain. The persistent issue of unreliable
    ocean carrier schedules and limited accountability is an
    ongoing source of frustration. While the delays are due to a
    number of factors, including weather and port congestion, a
    shrinking number of carrier options exacerbates the situation--
    with exporters rarely receiving sufficient information about
    why a booking was rolled or delayed.
        Ocean carriers also maintain control of containers and set
    limits on the availability and use of chassis which adds costs
    and constrains trucking, drayage, and scheduling options for
    export shippers.
        We commend the FMC for launching an investigation in
    January into whether the ocean carriers have been unreasonably
    restricting truckers and shippers from their choice of chassis
    providers. Continued FMC oversight is critical to provide a
    fairer market for U.S. exporters.
        Dairy farmers milk their cows 365 days a year. For a
    producer in Wisconsin, these supply chain challenges are not
    abstract policy concerns. When export shipments are delayed,
    canceled, or become expensive to move, the disruptions ripple
    back through the supply chain and, ultimately, affect farm
    income.
        To ensure competitiveness now, we urge the FMC to maintain
    strong oversight over foreign ocean carriers and alliances, and
    to enforce the law with respect to reasonable service, and
    ensure adequate transparency, particularly regarding schedule
    changes and equipment availability. To enable more options, we
    support efforts to restore an American maritime industry.
        As Congress deliberates these important issues, we
    encourage focus on how the ocean carrier market is meeting the
    needs of U.S. exporters. Since foreign-owned ocean carriers
    receive antitrust exemptions, it is only reasonable that they
    treat U.S. exporters fairly.
        I appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on these
    important issues, and I look forward to your questions. Thank
    you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rice follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, Mr. Rice. Professor Sicotte, you
    may begin.

                      STATEMENT OF RICHARD SICOTTE

        Mr. Sicotte. Thank you. Chair Fitzgerald, Ranking Member
    Nadler, and the Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
    inviting me to testify today on regulation and competition in
    ocean shipping.
        I'm a Professor of Economics at the University of Vermont,
    areas of specialization in industrial organization and economic
    history. Drawing on my experience researching the shipping
    industry and its regulation, my goal is to bring an economic
    perspective to the matters before the Committee today.
        The Shipping Act of 1916 authorized the predecessor of the
    Federal Maritime Commission to approve cartel conference
    agreements in ocean shipping, and those agreements so approved
    would be immune from the antitrust laws--conference agreements,
    fixed rates, coordinated capacity, and sometimes the firms
    pooled revenues. Subsequent amendments to the Shipping Act,
    effectively, prohibited rate-fixing, but still permit firms to
    cooperate intensively in matters of capacity and operations.
        Shipping agreements must be submitted to the Federal
    Maritime Commission, which, quoting to its 2024 report,
    ``analyzes these agreements for potential anticompetitive
    effects.'' The FMC reported that, at the end of Fiscal Year
    2024, there were 360 agreements, 50 of which were subject to
    staff monitoring.
        From the perspective of U.S. foreign commerce, one could
    argue that the most important kinds of agreements are the space
    charter agreements, vessel-sharing agreements, and shipping
    alliances. First, the space charter agreements, are when one
    firm rents space on another firm's ships. Vessel-sharing
    agreements are between two or more firms that use space on one
    another's vessels and they coordinate capacity. Alliances are
    described by the FMC as ``large VSAs'' which are nearly global
    in scope.
        These agreements provides the backdrop for the adoption of
    very large capacity container ships, frequently more than
    10,000 20-foot equivalent units on a ship, sometimes twice that
    amount. The trend in the industry is toward ever-larger ships.
        According to the FMC, Fiscal Year 2024, nearly 90 percent
    of U.S. transatlantic and transpacific water-borne commerce was
    carried by members of these three shipping alliances. There has
    been some realignment among these firms over the past 18
    months, so that MSC, a former alliance member, is no longer in
    alliance, and another firm joined in a new alliance that was
    approved.
        These are challenging economic questions--there are
    challenging economic questions surrounding these agreements and
    their effects.
        First, if agreements jointly fix capacity, then they can
    exercise market power, even though they do not explicitly
    collude on rates.
        Second, such close cooperation and information-sharing can
    facilitate collusion, tacit or otherwise. A commonly shared
    view among the industry, in particular, is that alliances and
    vessel-sharing agreements enable firms to achieve economies of
    scale and enjoy cost savings that might be passed on, at least
    in part, to consumers.
        Measuring the efficiency gains that might exist and
    quantifying the potential market power or exercise of market
    power are really within the expertise of industrial
    organization economists. In the context of other industries,
    these same issues are analyzed by economists at the Department
    of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, whether in the
    context of mergers, cartels, or vertical restraints.
        There is very little in the public record that sheds light
    on the kinds of analysis being conducted by FMC staff on these
    agreements. I don't really understand what kind of economic
    analysis they're engaged in. We know that they're monitoring;
    we don't know what that entails.
        I think that the other witnesses have already spoken to
    some of the--for example, Professor Douglas spoke about the
    FMC's lack of enforcement of antitrust. They have yet to block
    or enjoin any carrier agreement. They acknowledge competitive
    concerns, but it's unclear what's actually being done about
    them.
        Reasonable reform, in my view, would be that the review of
    interfirm agreements in ocean shipping be carried out by
    professionals at the DOJ or FTC, and that they are able to
    access essential data that only the FMC has access to, so that
    they can carry out that kind of analysis.
        I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Sicotte follows:]
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        Mr. Fitzgerald. Mr. Sicotte, thank you so much. Dr. Moss,
    you may begin.

                        STATEMENT OF DIANA MOSS

        Ms. Moss. Thank you. Chair Fitzgerald, Ranking Member
    Nadler, and the Members of the Subcommittee, it's an honor to
    be here today.
        PPI advocates for pragmatic competition policies that
    champion the economic prospects and outlook for working
    Americans. Any conversation about the importance of the U.S.
    antitrust laws or exemptions to those laws would be incomplete
    without considering the broader role or competition in
    antitrust enforcement as a major tool for protecting consumers.
        Consumers are the backbone of the U.S. economy. Almost 70
    percent of spending in the economy in the first quarter of 2024
    was attributable to personal consumption expenditures. Sensible
    competition policy and strong antitrust enforcement are major
    tools for protecting those consumers from the exercise of
    market power that drives up prices, lowers quality, stifling
    innovation, and limits choice and market access.
        The U.S. antitrust laws protect consumers by ensuring that
    they are not harmed by anticompetitive mergers, and business
    practices that squeeze out smaller rivals, and fixing prices or
    dividing up markets. The importance of those laws is widely
    acknowledged by both Democrats and Republicans.
        The bipartisan Antitrust Modernization Commission
    established by Congress in 2002 explained that, ``The rule of
    laws stand as a bulwark to protect free market competition''
    and ``prohibit anticompetitive restraints that harm consumer
    welfare.''
        In legislating antitrust exemptions, Congress has weighed
    the harm to competition and consumers against the benefits of
    achieving broader economic, social, or regulatory goals. The
    evidence on the benefits of immunities and exemptions is
    increasingly negative, because most of the markets that are
    immunized from liability under the antitrust laws are now
    highly concentrated. For example, the top four container
    shippers control 60 percent of the global market, but the three
    big alliances or conferences control up to 90 percent of the
    global market.
        In airlines, domestic mergers have, similarly, increased
    the global control of immunized international alliances. At
    these levels of concentration, anticompetitive consolidation
    and conduct would be considered presumptively illegal under the
    antitrust laws.
        The benefits of exemptions accrue to a few powerful
    companies, but their costs affect a wide swath of consumers.
    Sixty percent of the world's commodities pass through global
    shipping lanes, and transportation costs, more generally,
    highly impact the final prices of consumer commodities shipped
    into the United States.
        Suffice it to say that Congress has the power to revisit
    antitrust exemptions, especially for the Shipping Act--to roll
    them back; to narrow them, or to make sure that they sunset
    rapidly.
        Let me finish with two other developments that, much like
    antitrust exemptions, raise concerns that antitrust enforcement
    can't or isn't doing enough for consumers.
        First, a recent PPI report finds that, in food, healthcare,
    housing, transportation, and insurance, merger enforcement has
    historically been at levels that are far below the all-sector
    average. This needs to change.
        Second, more recently, premature settlements in antitrust
    cases have become the norm. Fully litigated trials and strong
    remedies, like injunctions and breakups for restoring
    competition, would have served consumers far better in lowering
    prices, but settlements we are seeing could even harm consumers
    more, including in the Hewlett Packard-Juniper Networks merger;
    the Live Nation-Ticket-master monopolization case, and the
    RealPage anticompetitive price-fixing case.
        Finally, the ability of U.S. companies to compete globally
    is at risk. Aside from directly raising prices to consumers to
    the tune of billions and billions of dollars over the last
    year, IEEPA tariffs on imported commodities raise the costs of
    U.S. companies, making their goods less competitive relative to
    foreign alternatives. Retaliatory tariffs have decimated
    certain sectors, like soybeans, by eliminating markets for
    exports that U.S. farmers rely on for long-term income security
    and stability.
        The foregoing policies undermine competition and consumers.
    Congress has the power to revoke outdated and harmful antitrust
    exemptions and ensure that the DOJ and FTC uphold due process
    and the rule of law; that competition remains healthy; that the
    laws rein-in market power, and we keep the cost of living down
    for millions of American workers and consumers.
        I appreciate the opportunity to submit testimony for this
    hearing, and I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Moss follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, Dr. Moss. We will now proceed
    under the--minute rule with questions.
        I want to recognize the gentleman from Texas for five
    minutes.
        Mr. Gooden. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Professor Douglas, it has
    been pointed out that the FMC hasn't done a great job of
    regulating anticompetitive practices. Would it benefit if we
    consolidated more of those functions--enforcement functions
    rather--into the DOJ or the FTC?
        Ms. Douglas. If you repealed the exemption, the DOJ and FTC
    would have those enforcement functions that the FMC is not
    using.
        Mr. Gooden. Do you have a position on that?
        Ms. Douglas. Yes. That the repealed exemption is something
    that a lot of people would support, and I definitely support.
        If I can dig in a bit more to what you're asking, I'm not
    necessarily saying that the FMC's power has to change, but the
    additive power from the DOJ and FTC by repealing the exemption
    would be beneficial here, because we're not seeing a lot of
    enforcement.
        Mr. Gooden. Are there current policies or regulatory
    loopholes that the big three alliances are using or exploiting
    that you're aware of?
        Ms. Douglas. It's not a loophole, in that it's permitted
    under the Shipping Act right now. Under 4307, antitrust law
    does not apply to these big three shipping companies. In that
    sense, it's a matter of the law permitting it right now because
    of the exemption.
        Mr. Gooden. Thank you. Mr. Rice, going back to the issue of
    collusion, how do these issues affect every day American
    households?
        Mr. Rice. Sure. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
        As we've seen for our dairy producers and exporters, the
    highly consolidated nature of the shipping industry creates
    headaches for us, due to inefficiencies that arise. It's not
    wholly the fault of carriers, as we see port congestion and
    weather delays, but the shrinking number, as Mr. Sicotte has
    pointed out, the shrinking number of available options just
    limits the availability of carriers for our exporters and our
    producers to move their product overseas.
        Mr. Gooden. Mr. Sicotte, what changes to the current
    regulatory framework would you propose, short of a full removal
    of the antitrust exemption?
        Mr. Sicotte. Short of a full removal, I would recommend
    that the FMC be required to share its confidential service
    contract data with the DOJ or FTC, and if the DOJ reviews an
    agreement, which they should have the right to do, that those
    objections have to be responded to publicly in a way that we
    can understand what the FMC is doing. That would be a minimum.
        Mr. Gooden. It also doesn't seem like they are lots of
    American ship companies banging down our doors asking for this.
        Mr. Sicotte. Well, there are, in terms of ocean shipping
    carriers, zero, right? They were absorbed into foreign shipping
    companies over the past 30 years, 40 years--30 or 40 years.
    There used to be two very large ones, but that's true.
        Mr. Gooden. I will close with you, Dr. Moss. My
    constituents aren't banging down my door about this issue. I
    suspect my colleagues on the Left would say the same thing. Do
    you have anything you would add? It seems like everyone's
    getting toward the same page here.
        Ms. Moss. I do think consumers care significantly about
    their cost of living.
        Mr. Gooden. Sure, absolutely.
        Ms. Moss. We know this to be a serious problem.
        Consumers are smart enough to understand that their
    commodities, especially the big-spend items in their budget, on
    food and commodities, anything that goes into building or
    construction, are really affected by immunities and exemptions.
    They drive up the cost, and they drive up the final prices to
    consumers.
        I've talked to a lot of consumers all the time and they are
    aware of these policies. When I say, ``Did you know that the
    antitrust laws don't apply in this particular sector?'' they
    get very angry.
        Mr. Gooden. It sounds crazy, right? Yes.
        Thank you. I appreciate you all. I yield back to the Chair
    my time.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back. We now
    recognized Mr. Nadler from New York for five minutes.
        Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Professor Douglas, we have read countless stories about
    reported corruption in the DOJ. This Subcommittee heard
    testimony from the former second-in-command of the Antitrust
    Division, Roger Alford, after he was fired for pushing back
    against this corruption, about how mergers and settlements in
    the Trump Administration increasingly involve backroom deals,
    creating a pay-to-play system. What effect does this kind of
    corruption of the rule of law have on the market, and what does
    that mean for consumers?
        Ms. Douglas. Thank you for this important question.
        I am gravely concerned by reports of political influence
    peddling in antitrust agencies. I work on the rule of law, and
    I don't think it should ever be displaced by political
    favoritism in antitrust law, or otherwise. I want to commend
    the Subcommittee from hearing from Roger Alford and important
    voices on this issue.
        That's all that I can say on it for right now. Thank you.
        Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
        Dr. Moss, can you answer the same question? What is the
    impact on the market and consumers of this kind of pay-to-play
    corruption? Is there anything that Professor Douglas missed?
        Ms. Moss. Professor Douglas summed it up quite nicely. We
    are in a troubling new era where antitrust enforcement has been
    politicized and weaponized. There appear to be two channels.
    One is to go directly to the White House with your deal to
    grease the skids for antitrust review. The other channel is for
    what appears to be political interference to swoop in and to
    commandeer cases to create premature settlements that reward
    companies, powerful companies, and harm consumers and workers
    in the markets that are affected.
        Antitrust is a key tool, as I've stated, for protecting
    competition, consumers, workers, paychecks, and pocketbooks, if
    you will. If it does not function, if we lose due process, and
    if we sacrifice the rule of law, we are harming millions and
    millions of American workers and consumers, and we are going to
    decimate our economy in the process.
        Mr. Nadler. Can you give us some examples?
        Ms. Moss. Absolutely. Of course, the worst, which has
    already been referenced, is the Live Nation-Ticketmaster deal.
    A very surprised and angry judge, a very surprised and angry
    set of 40 States plus D.C., who were locked out of a
    settlement. The settlement does nothing--nothing--to reduce the
    market power of Live Nation-Ticketmaster in ticketing, in
    concert promotion, in exclusive contracts with venues.
        The bad conduct will continue. We have a long history of
    bad conduct and violation of past decrees by the company. This
    will do nothing to lower the monopoly ticket fees to millions
    of fans. It will steer everybody back to the Live Nation-
    Ticketmaster platform for 20 more years of monopolistic
    conduct.
        The same thing with Hewlett Packard. Under Gail Slater, she
    was prepared to--DOJ--go to court to enjoin that merger, which
    would have created a duopoly and local area networks. Another
    premature settlement, ineffective remedy, that will do nothing
    to keep costs down for American businesses.
        I could go on. I could go on, but those are two very
    leading examples.
        Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
        Dr. Moss, this hearing has been called to examine
    competition in the maritime shipping industry. Can you compare
    the impact of reforms in this area to the impact of addressing
    the cost of Trump's tariffs, the doubling of healthcare
    premiums, or the recent surge in gas prices?
        Ms. Moss. I would say the issue of immunities and
    exemptions is very important. Any abstention or exception or
    immunity from enforcing the antitrust laws and holding
    companies liable under the antitrust laws does an enormous
    disservice to competition, to our market economy, to our
    consumers and workers.
        In the broader scheme of things, we are probably talking
    about a drop in the bucket relative to the over $400 billion of
    additional costs that Americans have absorbed as a result of
    tariffs within an incredibly compressed, short period of time.
        We are really looking at a very macropicture in terms of
    adverse impact of policies on consumers and a very, very micro,
    surgical policy through repealing or rolling back the shipping
    exemption. The two really do not compare. We need a more
    holistic approach to how to protect our consumers and our
    workers.
        Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Dr. Moss. I yield back.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back. We now recognize
    the gentleman from North Carolina for five minutes.
        Mr. Harris. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to all of you
    on the panel for your presence and your expertise today.
        Mr. Rice, as someone who represents a district where
    agriculture is a prominent industry in North Carolina, I'm
    always worried about ways in which this anticompetitive
    behavior in the ocean shipping industry can harm producers, as
    I know you have expressed as well. Can you take just a few
    moments and explain the impact that the alliance system is
    having on agricultural exporters?
        Mr. Rice. Well, certainly, thank you, Congressman.
        To give you a bit of an example, the worst of these supply
    chain issues happened during the pandemic. As I mentioned
    before, our exporters are wholly dependent on foreign ocean
    carriers. While the Shipping Act prevents them from
    unreasonably refusing to deal with us, it doesn't prevent them
    from rolling a booking, moving it onto the next ship, not
    giving transparency into why a shipping was rolled.
        For example, one of our exporters had a container destined
    for Asia. It was rolled so many times that the original ship
    that it had been scheduled to sail on had went to Asia and came
    back, and that's the one that picked up the container.
        There's one piece of this that, yes, some of these
    alliances, they do create some operational efficiencies, but at
    the same time, Congress saw fit, when passing the Shipping Act,
    that if these carriers are to receive antitrust exemptions,
    they have to provide reasonable access for U.S. exporters and
    ensure efficiency.
        It's hard to reconcile when we saw 70 percent of some of
    these carriers carrying--70 percent of the ship would be empty
    containers, while our exports would be left on the dock during
    the height of the pandemic. Now, those, thankfully, have abated
    since then, but we do see these issues with transparency, and a
    lack thereof, into why decisions are made; why sailings are
    canceled or blanked. It creates a ton of logistical issues for
    our industry who is exporting perishable products that need to
    get to an end consumer in a timely fashion.
        Mr. Harris. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Rice, while we are there, in April 2025, the Trump
    Administration released a Maritime Action Plan with a goal of
    really restoring America's maritime dominance. The plan seeks
    to really revitalize U.S. shipbuilding and rebuild the maritime
    workforce. Can you give us your thoughts on how this plan would
    help to address the problems that the American, particularly
    American dairy exporters and other agricultural exporters, are
    currently facing with the ocean shipping?
        Mr. Rice. Certainly. Investment in the U.S. shipbuilding
    industry, as I mentioned, is sorely overdue. For example,
    Chinese shipbuilders build 230 times the number of ships per
    year as the United States. It's very troublesome that we just
    don't have an industry here in the United States to produce
    these container ships that we need.
        Yes, supporting investment in the shipbuilding capacity,
    streamlining the permitting, and reforms at shipyards and
    ports--there's a long backlog of maintenance and expansion
    issues at the ports themselves that need to be addressed.
        The one thing I mentioned in my remarks as well, in
    developing a plan to fund these programs, we just think it
    warrants careful consideration of any penalty fees that are put
    on foreign ships to make sure that the people who are actually
    paying it aren't American exporters.
        Mr. Harris. Well, thank you.
        Ms. Douglas, as you note in your testimony, the Federal
    Maritime Commission, or FMC, rarely brings cases against the
    ocean shipping carriers that dominate shipping markets, despite
    having the legal authority to do so. Can you kind of help us
    dive into that, of how lack of transparency over the FMC's
    competitive analysis of ocean shipping agreements could be
    contributing to the FMC's lack of challenges to ocean carrier
    agreements?
        I'll follow that up and give you the rest of my time. What
    would be the possible effects of having the DOJ work with the
    FMC to scrutinize ocean shipping agreements?
        Ms. Douglas. Right. The lack of challenges seems to suggest
    that there's either not analysis happening or analysis that's
    happening that tolerates greater anticompetitive harm than
    antitrust law.
        What Professor Sicotte and I are both saying is it's not
    clear how the FMC is coming to these conclusions. Because from
    the outside perspective, it's a concentrated industry that,
    we've heard from industry here, is dominated by a few
    companies, and has had a number of cartels that have been
    prosecuted where the exemption doesn't apply.
        We would need to know how these agreements are being
    implemented in fact. That's something that antitrust law can
    get at. If DOJ could do an investigation, the rule of reason
    looks carefully at these sorts of claims that maybe there's
    some efficiencies here; maybe there isn't. There are a lot of
    different provisions in these agreements, but as written, we
    can't really tell what's going on.
        Mr. Harris. All right. Thank you very much. Mr. Chair, I
    yield back.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize
    the Ranking Member of the Full Committee, Mr. Raskin, for five
    minutes.
        Mr. Raskin. Thank you, Chair Fitzgerald.
        Dr. Moss, President Trump promised to lower prices on day
    one. What has actually happened since day one, and how are
    American families faring?
        Ms. Moss. Thank you for the question.
        Nothing has happened. In fact, things have gone the other
    way. The promise to lower prices on day one was really lip
    service to a broader political strategy.
        Consumers have been under assault for years by growing
    concentration in really critical consumer-facing sectors.
    Consumers spend 75 percent of their budgets on food,
    transportation, housing, healthcare, and insurance. Those are
    highly concentrated industries that needed direct attention and
    support for very, very strong enforcement, which we have not
    gotten under this current administration.
        Consumers are really buckling under the burden of high
    prices from excessive market power, from supply chain
    instability, from inflation. That should be a No. 1 goal.
    Consumers support the economy. They are the backbone of the
    economy. Without them, we will not have a robust, functioning
    economy.
        Mr. Raskin. People instinctively understand the way that
    corruption and insider political influence end up harming
    consumers and driving up prices. I wonder, is it also the case
    that, when we allow combinations to form and conglomerates to
    take over the economy, that this increases corruption and it
    increases political inequality and injuries to democracy.
        Ms. Moss. Yes. The purpose of the antitrust laws, of
    course, is to promote competition in the economy; to prevent
    the concentration of market power. The antitrust laws really
    address directly the economic effects of high concentration and
    a lack of competition.
        What you're getting at is a really important connection
    between economic power and political power. There is a direct
    link there. The importance of antitrust enforcement in
    controlling economic power, excessive economic power, does link
    directly into controlling excessive political power. Of course,
    political power can lead down a number of different pathways.
    That's what we're seeing right now.
        Mr. Raskin. You can get into a vicious cycle where economic
    concentration increases political concentration of power, and
    then, that further deepens the ability to manipulate the
    economy for particular groups?
        Ms. Moss. That is correct. I would just add a really
    important point. These precedents are now being set for the
    first time in the United States, this type of weaponization and
    politicization of the antitrust process.
        This administration will not be here forever. There will be
    other administrations. The setting of those precedents as they
    exist now can--it really spells a very, very dismal and
    concerning future for our antitrust establishment and law
    enforcement in the U.S.
        Mr. Raskin. The shipping antitrust exemption which we are
    discussing today has actually been studied and debated
    extensively, and even reformed repeatedly, as recently as 2022.
    Can you name some of the other anticompetitive policies and
    problems today orchestrated by the Trump Administration that
    are doing a lot more damage to American consumers than the
    shipping exemption?
        Ms. Moss. Sure. One thing that the Trump Administration
    did, as part of its order to realign regulation, to eliminate
    anticompetitive relation--anticompetitive regulations, was to
    really gut the ability of the U.S. Department of Agriculture to
    collect data, to do analysis that would have really supported
    competition initiatives in our food supply chains.
        We see independent cattle ranchers, for example, being
    pushed out, priced out of the market by large, industrialized
    players and the packer cartel.
        The inability of USDA to collect data has completely
    undercut the agency's important authority to police competition
    and--
        Mr. Raskin. Was the purpose of elimination of the data
    collection function?
        Ms. Moss. I believe the--eliminating the data collection
    was designed, potentially, to undercut the ability of the
    agency to function properly and support competition in our food
    and--
        Mr. Raskin. Is that happening in other agencies and
    departments, too?
        Ms. Moss. It absolutely is. In housing--I referenced the
    Real-
    Page settlement--we really needed a court decision on what
    constitutes algorithmic price-fixing on a digital platform. We
    didn't get that because that case was settled.
        Mr. Raskin. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back. I recognize
    myself for five minutes.
        Ms. Douglas, you list several examples in your testimony of
    how the ocean carrier agreements could raise significant
    anticompetitive risks. Can you talk about that a little bit
    more?
        Ms. Douglas. Yes. We understand what these agreements look
    like as written. My written testimony talks about what they
    might look like as implemented.
        If carriers can't agree on scheduling, that means they
    could also allocate different markets to each other. That's a
    classic antitrust law violation.
        It's also possible that there could be an exercise of
    monopsony or buyer power against ports in the United States,
    because these agreements allow these companies to collectively
    negotiate, where previously they would have been individual
    buyers.
        Particularly, on the idea of scheduling, enabling market
    allocation, we have a close parallel in the airline industry,
    right? Another transportation industry where we have seen that
    a scheduling agreement in U.S. v. American Airlines, which is a
    2024 case, a scheduling agreement caused a decrease in
    capacity. It caused the competitors who made that agreement to
    decide to fly less planes.
        What I'm saying is you would have to look at how these
    agreements are being implemented in shipping to figure out if
    that is also occurring here, if there's a capacity reduction
    here, or if there's market division happening here.
        The other big risk that I highlight in my written testimony
    is that these companies are allowed to share extensively
    competitively sensitive information. Normally, rivals don't
    share with each other their future plans for the market. These
    agreements allow alliances to engage in that sort of sharing.
    It's not itself a violation, but it's a classic factor that in
    antitrust law we look at to say that, if companies can talk
    with each other about their competitive plans, that's likely to
    reduce their rivalry in the market and lead to higher prices.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Let me just followup then. How should DOJ
    view these agreements? What should they be looking for? What
    would prompt them to take action on some of these agreements?
        Ms. Douglas. Right. If the DOJ were to look at these
    agreements under the rule of reason, they would be looking at
    whether they unreasonably limit competition relative to a free
    and fair open market without the agreements.
        They would want to look at how these companies are
    scheduling their services relative to how they might be
    scheduled if the market was competitive, if it didn't have
    those agreements in place. They might look, for example--and
    this is purely something that's taken from the airline case--
    are these companies sending as many ships as close in time as
    they would if they didn't have this agreement? Are they sending
    fewer ships or ships with less capacity? Is there this capacity
    reduction or market allocation, which are, again, classic
    violations of antitrust law under the Sherman Act? The DOJ
    would have to look at how these agreements are being
    implemented in practice to make that fact-specific evaluation.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good. Thank you.
        Mr. Rice, so given that the top three alliances control
    over 80 percent of the market, as you spoke about earlier, do
    you think that provides ocean carriers with market power over
    importing and exporting companies? Is this simply another fact
    or a piece of data that doesn't necessarily have that effect?
    Where do you think that falls?
        Mr. Rice. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Yes, certainly the consolidation within the ocean carrier
    industry does create challenges in the power that they amass.
    For example, there might be a dairy exporter from Wisconsin
    sending only three or four containers a month, and they have
    little to no leverage in those negotiations with one of three
    alliances. That component is concerning.
        The other component is, to some of the other witnesses who
    have testified about this, is the ability for these alliances
    to coordinate on overcapacity now that there's new ships coming
    online. Limiting capacity creates problems for exporters as
    well in the number of options that we have to get the
    containers to their end destination.
        It's a number of factors, but the amassing, and it
    continues to accumulate. This is not a static thing. These
    alliances continue to consolidate and create additional market
    power that our exporters have struggled to gain any leverage in
    negotiations with.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good. My time has expired. We will go
    to the gentlewoman from Vermont for five minutes.
        Ms. Balint. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Yup.
        Ms. Balint. Competition brings down prices, right? When we
    don't have real competition, then executives and investors get
    to reap more profits, and everyone else gets sticker shock.
    That is partly why this area of the law is so interesting to
    me.
        Because lack of competition in all industries impacts
    people in their bottom line. Dr. Moss, you spoke to that really
    directly. This includes maritime shipping.
        Although this may be a small aspect of what is increasing
    cost, it is important for us to look at this. It is why
    antitrust law matters.
        I know that antitrust law can seem dry; it can seem
    complicated, and I get that. To your point, Dr. Moss, American
    consumers understand that, when there are only a few big
    players, regardless of the industry, they pay the price for
    that. It is at the heart of what I think we are trying to do on
    this Committee, is translate that for everybody.
        Dr. Sicotte, I appreciate that we have a Catamount in the
    room today from the University of Vermont. Nice to see you.
        I would like to go to you first. Am I right that about 80-
    90 percent of ocean shipping is actually controlled by just
    three major shipping alliances?
        Would you mind putting on your mic?
        Mr. Sicotte. I apologize.
        Ms. Balint. No, that's all right.
        Mr. Sicotte. I'm not used to this.
        Yes, that was the Fiscal Year 2024 figure in the FMC
    report. There's one very large company that has subsequently
    removed itself from the alliance, but the most--by any stretch,
    you would call this quite a concentrated industry.
        Ms. Balint. We talk about alliances. We will talk about
    conferences. Again, I'm trying to translate it for people back
    home. From where I sit, this looks a lot like cartels.
        Tell me why these ocean shippers form these cartels. Why
    does this advantage them?
        Mr. Sicotte. Well, the advantage--there could be two
    possible advantages from an economic perspective, right?
        One is that it enables them to use very large container
    ships that they wouldn't be able to fill on their own. That is
    one--that's their logic for an efficiency defense.
        Ms. Balint. OK.
        Mr. Sicotte. OK? The other logic would be the market power,
    the exercise of market power. To actually evaluate the merits
    of those arguments is really--it needs to be done. That's what
    is missing in that.
        Ms. Balint. I agree with you, and I think we can't just
    take their word for it around efficiency. We have to actually
    kick the tires and see if this holds water.
        I want to get to what you were talking about, market power.
    Tell me what they can do collectively as a cartel that they
    can't do separately.
        Mr. Sicotte. Well, if it's a full cartel--now, they--
    cartels--
        Ms. Balint. I'm using that word. I understand you may not
    be comfortable with that word.
        Mr. Sicotte. Yes, because, technically, they're not
    permitted to fix rates jointly, right? That would be one
    stretch. If you can fix capacity jointly, you can, potentially,
    have the same impact. OK?
        Ms. Balint. Do you think it is fair to say that these
    massive ships with mountains of containers that carry,
    basically, everything that Americans see on their shelves, they
    are owned by these three alliances/cartels. They are actually
    impacting Americans directly every time that they go to the
    store and take something off the shelf. Is that fair to say?
        Mr. Sicotte. Yes, absolutely. Not only that, it's all the
    American farmers. Much of what's traded are inputs as well and
    intermediate goods. It hurts companies. It raises the costs of
    doing business.
        Ms. Balint. Yes. Actually, that is a great segue into
    talking with you, Mr. Rice.
        I'm a Vermonter. I understand the importance of the dairy
    industry. I'm wondering, how does this directly--again, I'm
    using the word ``collusion'' because that is what I think it
    is. It is a cartel involved in collusion. How does this impact
    American dairy farmers?
        Mr. Rice. Well, thank you, Congresswoman. Vermont has some
    great cheeses and other dairy products.
        Ms. Balint. Thank you for noticing.
        Mr. Rice. For cheeses, for example, perishability is a real
    concern. When these carriers aren't beholden to the interests
    of U.S. agriculture or dairy exporters, those products may not
    reach customers in time, and then, you have shelf-life issue at
    the East Coast.
        Ms. Balint. Exactly. Absolutely. I see that I'm almost--
    well, I am out of time.
        If I could just say, if you will indulge me just for a
    moment, Mr. Chair--I know that this is an issue that we can
    come together on as Democrats and Republicans. It is one of the
    reasons why I love being on this Subcommittee, where we can
    actually do some bipartisan work. I hope that this is something
    that we will dive into--not just on the shipping industry, but
    all the industries in which Americans are getting screwed
    because we are not actually holding their feet to the fire and
    actually enforcing antitrust law.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentlewoman yields back. Now, I will
    recognize the gentleman from California for five minutes.
        Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Ms. Douglas, as a researcher, how do prices paid by our
    similar importers or exporters compare here to other countries
    around the world?
        Ms. Douglas. That's an excellent question that I would look
    to my economics colleagues to answer when it comes to specifics
    on price.
        Mr. Issa. OK. Who has got the proof that somebody else gets
    a better price than us? Is this a monopoly that screws the
    whole world or is it just a monopoly that is screwing the
    United States?
        Yes, sir?
        Mr. Sicotte. Well, that's such a great economics question.
    That's precisely the information that we don't know the answer
    to the question. Because that's actually a surprisingly
    difficult thing to come up with; is to actually measure the
    degree of market power that's being exercised.
        There's a good reason to be suspicious, based on the
    contours of the agreements, right, for sure. If they can't
    actually--I've never seen someone using the data and actually
    answering your question. I don't know the answer.
        Mr. Issa. OK. Well, let's explore this direction. Because
    we are asserting here today that there is a monopoly at work;
    that it is Chinese-based, and that it is using its market
    power.
        Is it fair to say the Chinese don't just own ships, they
    own the ports here and around the world, including, but not
    limited to both sides of the Panama Canal?
        Mr. Sicotte. It's my understanding that the port ownership
    is that they--that COSCO was forced to divest partially.
    Certainly, in terms of their agreements and their operations,
    they're a very large player.
        Mr. Issa. If they were transparent in some ways, they are
    opaque in some of the transfer cost?
        Mr. Sicotte. A lot of the data would be available to the
    Federal Maritime Commission to investigate that, yes.
        Mr. Issa. OK. Let's go the other way. Ms. Douglas, I'm
    going back to you. I'm not going to quit until you give me an
    answer to something--not that you are not trying to.
        Is it fair to say that, if the group of companies
    together--nine companies--with the kind of market power they
    have--and some of them specifying more in one country versus
    another--if you were looking at a merger and acquisition, you
    would turn this one down?
        Ms. Douglas. That's absolutely fair to say because the
    market shares, as we've mentioned, would be at least above 60-
    95 percent. For mergers, we typically look at a 30-percent-or-
    above share. So, yes.
        Mr. Issa. From a pure U.S. standpoint, we can agree that we
    created a monopoly in 1916 and thereafter. We allowed it to
    continue. Now, we have allowed this trust/monopoly--and
    ``trust'' is probably even a better word--to, in fact, be
    opaque and to operate in a way that we really just don't know
    whether they are gouging us or not? We don't know whether they
    are getting a fair price? Even more importantly, if they
    decided not to service us, we would have very little recourse
    because we don't own enough ships to take care of ourselves.
    All those are vulnerabilities based on the current trust, if
    you will. Is that fair to say?
        Ms. Douglas. That's fair to say. I just want to make sure
    we're being clear that what we're talking about is agreements
    among competitors. Regardless of whether there is monopoly
    power, agreements can still be unlawful. That's what we're
    seeing in this space, and that's why it should have antitrust
    oversight.
        Mr. Issa. Well, as someone in San Diego who watched former
    CEO Smisek collude with the other airline companies to screw
    San Diego out of its direct flight from DCA, it is not just
    price. Sometimes it is service. We found ourselves with less
    choice. We were not without power.
        If we, essentially, set aside or partially set aside this
    law in bipartisan legislation, then the dismantling or the
    regulating or the holding accountable could begin. Is that fair
    to say?
        Ms. Douglas. Then the scrutiny from antitrust law would be
    applied and would likely find that there's problems in this
    industry, if this were repealed. We've seen around the edges
    where DOJ retains its jurisdiction, where the exception doesn't
    apply, there have been a number of cartel cases that have been
    successfully provided.
        Mr. Issa. OK. Last question in closing, is there a solution
    less than setting aside the 1916 law that would effectively
    require transparency before making the decision, but trigger an
    invalidation of this law if they failed to meet that
    requirement? Is that a possible solution to get the answers to
    your questions before we decide how much to break up these
    agreements? I'm just wondering if, from a legislative
    standpoint, if we have a middle ground here that we could come
    together on. Quickly.
        Mr. Sicotte. I think so. If you amend the law to require,
    or FMC to take into account DOJ's input more explicitly, that
    could be a middle ground.
        Mr. Issa. I thank you, Mr. Chair, and I appreciate the
    extra time and I yield back.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back. I would
    recognize the gentleman from Georgia for five minutes.
        Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        There is a well-known theory around here that nothing comes
    before this Committee that has not been approved in advance by
    Donald Trump, or directed by him to occur. Today, we are
    talking about competition between ocean carriers on the high
    seas, while here at home Americans are catching hell trying to
    pay their bills.
        He is wanting us to be talking about what is happening on
    the high seas, but there are a lot of people at home watching
    C-SPAN. I'm always surprised at how many people do.
        There are people at home wondering, what is this MAGA
    Republican Congress doing to address the fact that competition
    between predatory Wall Street private equity and venture
    capital firms are swallowing up the single-family home market?
    They are crowding out homebuyers, controlling the market,
    concentration in the market, driving up the cost of real estate
    beyond what people can pay--while at the same time getting a
    stranglehold on the apartment market and raising rents up at
    will, using algorithms and other predatory processes to soak
    the American people of their money.
        Yes, the rent in America is too damn high. Yes, the price
    of groceries in America is too damn high. The cost of gas in
    America--and across the world now--is too damn high.
        The cost of medical care is too damn high. We have got
    venture capital and private equity firms swallowing up medical
    practices and hospitals, getting a lock on the medical care
    market, while at the same time insurance companies are doing
    the same thing.
        Costs continue to go up for Americans due to market
    concentration into the hands of the super-wealthy billionaires
    who were seated behind Trump at his inauguration--the same ones
    who will be frolicking in the new White House ballroom that is
    being built to replace the West Wing of the White House.
        They are getting richer and richer, and Americans trying to
    make an honest day's pay are paying more and more.
        Can any of you witnesses think of one single thing that
    MAGA Republicans have done in Congress to make life more
    affordable for the American people? Can any of you cite one
    thing that they have done? I'm with you; I can't, either.
        Let me ask someone, are tariffs taxes? Dr. Moss, what do
    you say?
        Ms. Moss. The answer is the answer that we all know, and
    even your average American consumer knows, that the tariffs are
    taxes. They are paid by consumers. They raise the prices for
    essential commodities, where Americans, workers and consumers
    spend most of their money. That is just Economics 101. That is
    the economic reality. It is also the political reality.
        Those consumers vote. They are going to turn out in droves
    because cost of living is such a top-of-mind issue for them. If
    anything galvanizes consumers in the upcoming election cycles,
    it will be that issue.
        Mr. Johnson. Well, I tell you, it is $175 billion in taxes
    due to tariffs that have been levied on the American people
    over the last year by this Trump Administration--with the
    complicity of Members of Congress here in control, MAGA
    Republicans. Americans will, indeed, be looking at it in
    November.
        The high cost of housing, food, medical care, and energy is
    what the American people are concerned about. This Committee
    appears to be focused on competition between ocean carriers on
    the high seas. I think that is a shame.
        With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back.
        Ms. Balint. Mr. Chair, I have a couple of UCs to enter into
    the record.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentlewoman is recognized.
        Ms. Balint. First, from Reuters, February 12, 2026, ``NY
    Fed report says Americans pay for almost all of Trump's
    tariffs.''
        Second, Gallup, March 2026, ``One-Third of Americans Cut
    Back to Cover Healthcare Expenses.''
        Third, finally, from The New York Times, ``Oil Rises,
    Bringing Gains to 40% Since the Start of the War.''
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Without objection.
        Ms. Balint. Thank you.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. That concludes today's hearing. Thank you
    to our witnesses for appearing before the Committee today.
        Without objection, all Members will have five legislative
    days to submit additional written questions for the witnesses
    or additional materials for the record.
        Without objection, the hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

        All materials submitted for the record by Members of the
    Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform,
    and Antitrust can be found at: https://docs.house.gov/
    Committee/
    Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=119042.

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