[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
.
[H.A.S.C. No. 119-12]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FY26 STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE HEARING
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 9, 2025
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-934 WASHINGTON : 2026
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DON BACON, Nebraska SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California,
DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
MARK B. MESSMER, Indiana GEORGE WHITESIDES, California
JEFF CRANK, Colorado WESLEY BELL, Missouri
ABRAHAM J. HAMADEH, Arizona
Whitney Verett, Professional Staff Member
Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
Austin Richards, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
DesJarlais, Hon. Scott, a Representative from Tennessee,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces..................... 1
Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
WITNESSES
Hill, John, Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Space Policy....................................... 5
Cotton, Gen Anothony J., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. 5
Whiting, Gen Stephen N. USSF, Commander, U.S. Space Command,..... 6
Guillot, Gen Gregory M., USAF, Commander, U.S. Northern Command.. 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
DesJarlais, Hon. Scott....................................... 33
Hill, John................................................... 35
Cotton, Gen Anothony J....................................... 66
Whiting, Gen Stephen N....................................... 96
Guillot, Gen Gregory M....................................... 116
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 143
Mr. Bacon.................................................... 144
Mr. Wilson................................................... 143
FY26 STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE HEARING
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 9, 2025.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Scott DesJarlais
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SCOTT DESJARLAIS, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Dr. DesJarlais. Today's hearing will come to order.
Pursuant to Rule 4(b)(3), members of the House Armed Services
Committee who are not members of the subcommittee are allowed
to participate in today's hearing and will be recognized after
all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask
questions.
Good afternoon and welcome to the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee's first hearing of the 119th Congress. And, of
course, we are probably going to be interrupted by votes, but
we are going to power on as much as we can and pick up as soon
as they conclude.
First I want to recognize the new majority members of our
subcommittee, Mr. Van Orden from Wisconsin, who is not here
yet, Mr. Messmer from Indiana, Mr. Crank from Colorado, and Mr.
Hamadeh from Arizona, and also we have Mr. Bell from Missouri,
and Mr. Whitesides from California. So welcome to the best and
most important subcommittee.
We look forward to working with all of you as we prepare
for fiscal year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act.
Next, I would like to than our witnesses for appearing
before us today. With us we have General Anthony Cotton,
commander of Strategic Command, General Stephen Whiting,
commander of U.S. Space Command, General Gregory Guillot,
commander of U.S. North Command, and Mr. John Hill, who is
currently performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Space Policy within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
While the President's budget request for the upcoming
fiscal year continues to be finalized, we look forward to
hearing from each of our witnesses on your areas of
responsibilities and changes you are seeing to the threat
environment.
I think it is worth noting that the three officers in front
of us today represent different combatant commands with
different missions and different priorities, but they each face
a common problem.
All of you are responsible for mission areas where the
United States once enjoyed superiority, but we are now
increasingly confronted by adversaries.
Space and homeland were once sanctuaries for the United
States beyond the reach of our adversaries and from which our
nation could project decisive power. That is no longer the
case.
Nuclear competition, thought by many in this country to be
a relic of the cold war is back with adversaries expanding
their nuclear arsenals in developing new and destabilizing
nuclear systems designed to hold our nation at risk.
Our adversaries recognize the foundational role that each
of these mission areas plays in our defense strategy. They
cannot compete with our conventional forces so they have chosen
to target our homeland, hold our space systems at risk, and
expand our nuclear arsenals to challenge our deterrent.
These threats have been building for some time, but the
pace is accelerating. I look forward to hearing more from our
witnesses about how we are responding to these developments. I
am concerned we have taken too long to come to terms with the
new competitive environment. I am afraid that our response thus
far has been inadequate.
These growing threats and how we, as a nation, choose to
respond to them is why I really do believe this is the most
important subcommittee in Congress.
Before turning to Ranking Member Moulton for his remarks, I
want to recognize General Cotton as this will likely be his
last appearance before the subcommittee. Thank you for your 39
years of service to our nation.
We have particularly appreciated your leadership of United
States Strategic Command and the candor you have had in your
interactions with this subcommittee over the last three years.
You have certainly earned some peace and quiet. But you've got
one last hearing to get through first.
With that, I will turn it over to my good friend and
Ranking Member Seth Moulton for any remarks he would like to
make.
[The prepared statement of Dr. DesJarlais can be found in
the Appendix on page 33.]
STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Moulton. Thank you Chairman DesJarlais. Congratulations
on your first Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing as
chairman.
I also want to thank you for beginning this session with a
very bipartisan series of briefings to bring us all up to speed
on some of the most consequential issues before our Congress
today. I completely agree with your assessment of the role of
this subcommittee in Congress.
Let me also echo your welcome to Representatives Bell from
Missouri, Crank from Colorado, Hamadeh from Arizona, Messmer
from Indiana, Van Orden from Wisconsin, and Whitesides from
California.
Lastly, welcome to our witnesses. And thank you for your
continued service to our country during this difficult time
when many general officers are under attack.
General Cotton, thank you for your dedicated service to our
nation for the last 39 years. Your particular focus on helping
us understand the strategic dynamics of deterring two near-peer
adversaries will have lasting impact.
As we sit here today, I cannot ignore the fact that this
administration has put our national security at risk. The
Secretary of Defense broke the law when he put operational
details classified top secret according to DOD guidelines that
could not be more clear on an unclassified platform
specifically targeted by China and Russia.
What a boon it would have been to either adversary had they
gotten those time on target details to the Houthis in time to
use their extensive antiaircraft missile arsenal against our
American pilots.
When Pete Hegseth left Fox & Friends to become the most
unqualified Secretary of Defense in history by the narrowest
vote margin in history, he said, I quote, "Accountability is
back." Any of us who have served know that there is nobody more
despised in the military than those who lead by the opposite of
example, of enforcing rules they don't follow themselves and
having zero accountability for their own actions and behavior.
When Secretary Austin made a mistake far, far less serious
by not properly notifying the top of his chain of command about
his surgery, I did not hesitate in saying publicly that
President Biden should fire him.
It is worth noting that Secretary Austin's transgression,
while serious, did not put any of our troops in immediate
danger, while improper, did not violate the law, and he didn't
lie about it. He told the truth. He answered questions before
Congress. And he put new procedures in place to ensure it would
never happen again.
Secretary Hegseth has done none of that. And to be clear
about what Democrats are saying publicly, and many Republicans
are saying privately, he should be fired.
Of course, rather than fire a criminal, the President has
fired the head of the National Security Agency, who has
received tremendous bipartisan praise from this very committee.
Don't think for a second, Mr. Chairman, that our witnesses
aren't sitting here today trying hard to do their jobs
wondering if they will be next.
While U.S. stocks are cratering--I am sorry. I wrote that
20 minutes ago and now they are back up. The President can't
make up his mind. While U.S. stocks are all over the place, our
adversary stocks of nuclear weapons are increasing at an
alarming rate.
The Chinese Communist party's Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile fleet has exceeded U.S. intelligence estimates. And
they have deployed several hypersonic weapons that can carry
nuclear warheads. Russia is developing a treaty violating
space-based nuclear weapon that would destroy nearly all of the
satellites we rely on for Global Positioning System and
communications every day.
And despite Trump's promise to end the war in Ukraine
within 24 hours, war criminal Putin continues his criminal war
using nuclear brinkmanship on the offense for the first time in
history. North Korea and Iran are comparative side shows in the
nuclear realm, yet they still have the potential to kill
millions of people. We know their leaders would like to be
Americans.
All that is to say the mission of this subcommittee is
growing in scope, importance, and urgency. I sometimes ask my
Democratic colleagues what is the greatest existential threat
to America because they often say climate change. I am no
denier of science, but let's be clear. Our greatest most
existential threat is nuclear war. Yet it has been a long time
since most Americans gave it a second thought. Trump's Golden
Dome for America is the most significant change to the
strategic landscape the U.S. has proposed since the cold war.
And it merits careful consideration.
If he wants to replace the Doctrine of Mutually Assured
Destruction, he and his team need to propose an alternative.
Otherwise, his Golden Dome could instigate a further nuclear
arms race, bankrupt Department of Defense, and be about as
strong as the gold leaf glittering atop various capitol domes,
which flakes off regularly at great expense.
Missile defense has a mixed legacy. President Bush's
withdrawal from the antiballistic missile threat, which Trump
thoughtlessly touts in his order, actually helps disprove his
case. As a result of that decision, Russia and China began an
arms race to get around our interceptors, which is why we are
struggling to catch up on hypersonic and other novel delivery
methods today, all of which make us strategically less safe.
Perhaps a better time proven approach is to follow in the
footsteps of Reagan and Kennedy and use our economic power to
drive negotiations to reduce nukes on all sides. Although it is
far in the future and only achieved through mutual agreement,
the day when nobody has active nuclear weapons is the day that
it is least likely they will be used against us.
General Cotton and General Guillot, we have discussed
privately and publicly how we think--of how we should think
about a world with two near-peer nuclear adversaries and how
that might adjust your requirements.
We might be strategically stronger by building more new
Sentinels than interceptors while the administration is
proposing the opposite. But the underlying point is that we
should only spend hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars
based on a serious strategic doctrine, not the whims of someone
who always wants the golden version of things his friends
already have.
Our subcommittee's other major concern is space. And while
we can't say much publicly, I will continue to press the
department to make sure that we can explain to our constituents
why we must invest billions in space because it could not be
more critical.
America's strategic defense, the bedrock of our national
security, must remain a top priority despite everything else
going on in Washington these days. Even the right weapons with
the wrong policy can be destabilizing, weakening our national
security.
I look forward to working closely with the members of the
subcommittee and our witnesses to make America stronger and
more secure. We often say that our nuclear arsenal must be
safe, secure, and reliable. Our country should be the same.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Ranking Member. We will now move
into opening statements from our witnesses. I would note that
your prepared statements will be made part of the record. And
because of respect for your time and votes, we are going to
reduce the time to two minutes to make your opening remarks.
And we will start with Mr. Hill and then we will just move down
the line from there.
Mr. Hill, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN HILL, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY
Mr. Hill. Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton,
thank you for inviting me to testify before you on the
Department of Defense's strategic posture. I will omit my
threat portion of my opening statement. It is in the record.
Moving straight to the nation's strategic posture is the
foundation of deterrence and defense against these growing
threats to the homeland that you have described in the opening
statements and to our enduring interests abroad.
Nuclear forces and our nuclear command, control, and
communication systems remain the centerpieces of strategic
posture while missile defenses make ever more crucial
contributions, both as complements to nuclear forces and as
indispensable denial elements of our conventional defense
posture.
No less important, space systems and spectrum enable our
nuclear forces, our nuclear command, control, and
communications, our strategic warning, our missile defenses,
and indeed the entire joint force.
This makes assured access to space and spectrum, the
ability to establish superiority in space when needed in the
domain and the means to deny hostile uses of space, crucial
components of our strategic posture.
Increasingly, the proliferation of chemical and biological
weapons adds to this complexity, making our ability to counter
such weapons of mass destruction an additional element of
strategic posture.
The department is firmly committed to making the necessary
investments in our strategic posture to deter our adversaries
and, if deterrence fails, prevail in conflict.
This mission requires sufficient and consistent funding and
support. Uniquely within the Department of Defense, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy has oversight
responsibility for all of these interconnected and mutually
supporting elements of strategic posture.
It has been my privilege and honor to oversee this office
since August 2024 and to work with this committee on these
matters of strategic importance to the nation. Thank you for
the opportunity to testify today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hill can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Hill, for your testimony.
General Cotton, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL ANTHONY J. COTTON, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Cotton. Good afternoon, Chairman DesJarlais,
Ranking Member Moulton, and the distinguished members of this
committee. It is an honor for Sergeant Major Kreamer and me to
appear before you today with Mr. Hill, General Whiting, and
Chief Master Sergeant Simmons, General Guillot, and Chief
Master Sergeant Storms.
In my third and final year as commander, representing the
men and the women of the United States Strategic Command, it
continues to be an absolute privilege. And I have submitted my
final posture statement for the record.
First let me be clear, America's nuclear forces, the
bedrock of our national security, is, and continues to be safe,
secure, effective, and credible.
In today's deteriorating security environment, our mission
has never been more critical. To effectively deter in this
complex environment, we must maintain both our existing
capabilities and accelerate the ongoing modernization of our
nuclear deterrent, all three legs of the triad, and its
critical nuclear command control and communication systems.
Investing in modernization will ensure that U.S. strategic
weapons continue to deter aggression, assure our allies and
partners and allows us to achieve national objectives if
deterrence fails.
Thank you again for your support, leadership, and attention
to this mission. And I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Cotton can be found in
the Appendix on page 66.]
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, General.
General Whiting, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN N. WHITING, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SPACE COMMAND
General Whiting. Chairman DesJarlais and Ranking Member
Moulton, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for your
support and the opportunity to represent the warfighters of the
U.S. Space Command.
At U.S. Space Command, our guiding principle is clear. To
secure peace, we must be well-prepared for conflict in space,
and if deterrence fails, we will fight and win.
U.S. Space Command is upholding this principle in the face
of operational threats, which continue to expand at a
breathtaking pace, and which are being fielded deliberately and
specifically to challenge the United States, the American way
of life, and to hold the joint force at risk.
Despite the growing threats, the United States maintains
advantages in space thanks to the unified mission focus of our
superb joint warfighters, our unmatched commercial space
sector, and our expansive and more empowered alliances and
partnerships.
That said, these advantages and our ability to deter
potential adversaries cannot be taken for granted. Deterrence
in space is consistent with other domains. It requires a keen
understanding and clear communication of what we are deterring
against, credible, acknowledged capabilities to impose costs on
those who attack us, and resilient architectures to dissuade
attack by making any effort futile.
U.S. Space Command requires stable funding as well as
effective and efficient acquisition programs, delivering
advanced space capabilities to enable a balanced space
deterrence force structure.
Most pressing are the delivery of integrated space fires,
enhanced battle space awareness and integrated command and
control capabilities to achieve space superiority to defend the
homeland and protect and enable the joint force.
By investing superiority capabilities, we send a clear
message the U.S. has the advantage, and we remain committed
that space will be safe, secure, and stable. We are ready to
repel all challengers and any attempt to defeat the U.S. in
space will fail.
Mr. Chairman, I have submitted my posture statement for the
record, and I look forward to your and the committee's
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Whiting can be found in
the Appendix on page 96.]
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, General.
General Guillot, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT, UNITED STATES NORTHERN
COMMAND
General Guillot. Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member
Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is a
tremendous honor to command and represent the men and women of
North American Aerospace Defense Command and the United States
Northern Command.
I am also pleased to appear alongside General Cotton,
General Whiting, and ASD John Hill.
The global security environment is growing increasing
volatile, characterized by intensifying competition among major
powers and mounting threats to U.S. national interests.
Cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea remain
significantly concerning to North American Aerospace Defense
Command and U.S. Northern Command.
To counter such adversary cooperation, the commands rely on
realistic planning, targeted investments, and forward-looking
policies that ensure the command's ability to detect, track,
and defeat potential threats in all domains.
Establishing a layered domain awareness network to detect
and track threats approaching North America from seabed to
space is critical to immediate and future mission requirements
because we can't defeat what we can't see.
Specific to this subcommittee, I appreciate the department
and congressional support for fielding all domain capabilities
such as airborne moving target indicator satellites, over the
horizon radars, the E-7 Wedgetail, and integrated undersea
surveillance system. These capabilities support longstanding
North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern
Command requirements and will serve as a foundation for the
Golden Dome construct.
The challenges facing our nation are real, but there should
be no doubt about North American Aerospace Defense Command and
U.S. Northern Command's resolve to deter aggression and if
necessary, defeat threats to our nations and our citizens.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear this
afternoon. And I look forward to your questions. We have the
watch.
[The prepared statement of General Guillot can be found in
the Appendix on page 116.]
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you all and votes were called so I
think we will forego questions for now. We will recess until
approximately 4:10 to 4:15.
[Whereupon, at 3:47 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to
reconvene at 4:28 p.m., the same day.]
Dr. DesJarlais. The committee will come back to order. I
will now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning and
start with our outgoing General Cotton.
As you know, the Fiscal Year 2024 Defense Authorization
Bill required the Department of Defense to establish a program
of record to develop the nuclear sea launch cruise missile or
SLCM-N. I noticed in your written open statement, you referred
to this as ``much needed'' capability.
Can you elaborate on the importance of this system and its
relevance to some of the theater deterrence challenges we are
concerned about today?
General Cotton. Chairman, thank you for the question. And
as it is in my written statement, the reason I say--there are
two pieces to that because I think it has a strategic
capability, but even more so, there is an opportunity for
regional capability. Geographic combatant commanders are all in
support of being able to hold folks at risk from a regional
level as well. That's why I think that nuclear sea launch
cruise missile is something that can fill that void.
Dr. DesJarlais. General Whiting, General Saltzman testified
last week that our police framework hasn't kept pace with the
rising threats in space specifically from China saying we have
to go to very high levels of approval for testing and training.
We do all training in simulation. We don't do live training due
to policies.
As the combatant commander, how important is it for you to
have people in systems that are supported by accurate training?
General Whiting. Thank you, Chairman. It is incredibly
important that we have well-tested capabilities so that we have
confidence on how they will perform under various scenarios and
conditions. And then it is important that the guardians and the
warfighters that operate those systems are very well-trained on
how to use them in those same scenarios and conditions. So
investment in the training and test infrastructure as well as
having the right policies are vital for us.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. And Mr. Hill, how are you and
your team working to change these policies?
Mr. Hill. Thank you, Chairman. Most of the training does
not have to go to high levels. There are a few things that we
can still do. And so we are looking to see--as space has become
more normalized as part of the joint force, what are those
remaining things that really require, because of a sensitivity,
that they might require something hard. But for the most part,
we are trying to move things out of that requirement.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. And General Guillot, you
discussed the importance of the spectrum with the chairman when
you appeared before the full committee last month. But I would
like to revisit this issue.
Specifically in the President's vision of the Golden Dome
for America, is it achievable without access to lower 3 and
portions of 7 and 8 gigahertz bands the department currently
utilizes?
General Guillot. Chairman, I don't see how we can have an
effective homeland defense system without full use of the 3 to
3/5 spectrum, and the higher numbers you mentioned will be
challenging as well.
Dr. DesJarlais. And Generals Cotton and Whiting, if the
department was forced to vacate from these spectrum bands, how
would this impact your missions?
General Cotton. Well, sir, from our perspective, you know,
missile defense determination and missile warning determination
would be something that would close the decision space for the
President of the United States in which I am supposed to
protect.
General Whiting. And Mr. Chairman, in the lower three we
have several important tracking radars that we use for space
domain awareness and missile defense. And then in the 7/8
bands, we have important satellite communications links that we
use in those bands. So those are again vital for our successful
mission accomplishment.
Dr. DesJarlais. And, again, thank you all for you testimony
today and setting a good precedence. I am yielding back a
minute and 20 seconds and recognizing Ranking Member Moulton
for five minutes.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
leadership by example. And without reasking the question, I
just want to echo my concerns about the spectrum. So thank you
very much for raising that.
It is important that the rest of Congress hears these
concerns as well.
Mr. Hill, based on my math, the Secretary of Defense owed a
response on options to implement what the executive order
termed the Iron Dome for America Program is on March 28. What
can you share about what that 60-day study period accomplished
and what the recommendations to the President were?
Mr. Hill. Well, in terms of what the recommendations were,
that will be for the Secretary and the President to update.
What the executive order said is provide the President a
reference architecture that the President could incorporate
into the President's budget.
So when that budget is presented, that is when the
specifics would come out. At this stage, it is a discussion at
the level between the Secretary and the President.
Mr. Moulton. Okay. So has the Secretary provided a response
yet? Do you know?
Mr. Hill. Like I said, that is between the Secretary and
the President. I am not going to get into the specifics what
they are discussing.
Mr. Moulton. Do you know if the study will explore the
question of how this affect strategic stability or what our
peer adversaries are going to do?
Mr. Hill. Certainly. As it said in the executive order, we
look at the issues related to the surety of our nuclear second
strike response for example. We looked at the protection of the
American homeland. We looked at the regional aspects. It's the
architecture, and it is the broader implications for strategic
stability, all part of that.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you. General Guillot, what guidance have
you received with regards to the overall goal of this proposed
system and what threats are you writing those requirements to?
General Guillot. Congressman, the direct responsibilities I
have are to provide to my recommended way to approach defending
the homeland from ballistic missile threats, hypersonic threats
as well as cruise missile and air threats. And in doing so, I
have provided our command's recommendation of a three dome
approach with the first dome being a domain awareness dome, the
second to handle Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, and the
third to handle the air threat to include cruise missiles,
knowing that depending on what part of the profile, hypersonics
would be addressed either in the Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles dome or in the air dome.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you. And General Cotton, in your role as
the commander of a strategic command, you spend all day
thinking about maintaining nuclear deterrence and strategic
stability around the world.
Have you been involved in thinking through the potential
impacts a Golden Dome could have on the strategic stability
that is increasingly precarious because of Russia and China's
novel delivery systems?
General Cotton. Thank you, Ranking Member Moulton. At this
time, Strategic Command actually is looking, as we had in our
office call, we are looking at some of the things that came
from the Strategic Defense Initiative initiative, some of the
talking points, some of the op eds and analysis and the
theories that happened then just to kind of capture what that
looks like. And we are still in the middle of doing that.
Mr. Moulton. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. The chair now recognizes Mr.
Turner for five minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. General Whiting, in reading your
testimony on the issue of the Russian space antisatellite
nuclear weapon, I got to tell you, I was very disappointed in
the language that you used and the impression I think that
people would get in reading it, especially in light of--in
contrast to your recent remarks at a recent space symposium
where you noted the importance of the United States deploying
offensive space weapons, orbital interceptors in space.
Specifically your testimony says, most concerning--with you
there--Russia is pursuing the possible placement of a nuclear
weapon on orbit. Detonating a nuclear weapon on orbit would
have indiscriminate effects potentially disrupting the global
use of space for security, economic, and scientific purposes.
U.S. Space Command has prepared our vital national security
satellites for such a threat.
First off, let's dissect what you have just said. There is
no statement in your statement that this is a treaty violation.
It is not potentially disrupting the global use of space. In
this committee, Assistant Secretary John Plumb testified the
detonation of a nuclear weapon in space would render low earth
orbit unusable for up to a year.
General Saltzman testified and has stated that the
placement of a nuclear weapon on orbit in space as an
antisatellite nuclear weapon would be day zero because the very
next day we would not be able to count on the use of space for
national security, economic, or scientific purposes. The very
next day, we would have to assume that the use of space is no
longer secure. So trillions of dollars in technology that we
don't have would have to be expended assuming that space is no
longer available to us.
Now do you disagree with Assistant Secretary John Plumb's
testimony that the detonation would render low earth orbit
unusable for up to a year?
General Whiting. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. Turner. Then why did you say potentially disrupting the
global use of space? What does potentially mean? I mean, he
says render.General Whiting. So I do agree. This is the single
most threatening potential weapon to our space architecture.
Mr. Turner. Right. Because my belief, and I think the
belief of this committee, and I mean, the entire Armed Services
Committee, not subcommittee, is that this cannot be permitted
to go into space. That our position as a committee bipartisan
has to be that this is the Cuban Missile Crisis in space, and
this cannot be permitted to go in space.
So the next portion of your testimony, which is the next
part that is most disturbing, is that you give people the
impression that U.S. Space Command has prepared our vital
national security satellites for such a threat. No, you
haven't. It is not possible.
General Whiting. So I think my--
Mr. Turner. Not only have you not, by giving people the
impression that you have, you have given people the impression
that supposedly for economic and scientific purposes that if
this should occur, that this detonation should happen, that
apparently rendering low earth orbit indiscriminately
unavailable for up to a year isn't going to mean that the use
economically, communications, and national security that we
expect from space on this planet is going to be, as General
Saltzman has indicated, significantly different the next day.
General Whiting. So I absolutely agree with you. The most
important space systems I was talking about were our nuclear
command and control systems that support General Cotton and
General Guillot. Those have been hardened against an on orbit
nuclear detonation, and they were specifically designed for
what could potentially be the worst day in American history. So
those were the specific systems I was referring to.
Mr. Turner. Are they in lower earth orbit?
General Whiting. No, sir, they are not.
Mr. Turner. So when you are saying that you prepared them
for that, they are not in low earth orbit?
General Whiting. No, sir.
Mr. Turner. So I just want to be clear. You have not taken
actions for the vital national security satellites to be
prepared for such a threat. And we still have to be working so
that this never happens.
I yield back.
Dr. DesJarlais. The gentleman's time has expired. Would you
like to respond?
General Whiting. I agree with the congressman's last
statement that we need to continue to take actions. Yes, sir.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. And the chair now recognizes the
gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, for five minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman, you and I had a conversation
on the floor that was really one of the more purposeful that I
have had on the issue of the Sentinel. And you suggested that
since General Cotton is retiring that his retirement gift ought
to be the termination of my opposition to the Sentinel. Would
that make you happy, General Cotton?
General Cotton. Congressman Garamendi--
Mr. Garamendi. What kind of a going away present do you
really want?
General Cotton. That would be an incredible going away
present.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, it ain't going to happen. We really do
value your extraordinary service and your tenacity on making
sure that we are prepared in every possible way.
In a more maybe important way, I terminated my conversation
on the floor with the chairman on the floor saying, you know,
we really need to have a full review of our nuclear deterrence.
All of the pieces of it--things have changed. You just heard
from Mr. Turner about some of the ongoing--new, actually not
new. We looked at nuclear weapons in space almost 35 years ago.
Decided it wasn't particularly useful at that time. Things have
changed.
So what I am really looking at here is at some in the very
near future, we take the commission and say, guys, don't just
tell us what we have done for the last 60 years, but where are
we today? Many, many things have changed. They have all been
talked about here. So I am going to push for that along with
the removal of your going away present.
So in any case, we are going to have to get one with it.
There is a whole series of things. I am just going to let those
questions go, and we will come back to them.
In your testimony, Mr. Hill, and thank you. I hope you are
sticking around for a while because you do have a lot of
experience here. There is much more to this issue than the
nuclear weapons themselves. And this committee has talked from
time to time about arms control strategies.
It may be--well, it's not maybe. It is definitely in our
interest that we employ greater attention to arms control. A
very, very difficult international situation right now, but
nonetheless, we need to power through. And could you tell me or
tell all of us where we are with arms control efforts in your
domain?
Mr. Hill. So my domain on the nuclear is space. And the
missile defense pieces, certainly the legacy arms control, the
new start, expires next year. I don't see anything on the
horizon, the actual verification activities have been suspended
under that.
The real challenge with arms control now as has been noted
in many cases is you really have to deal with three countries
in this environment. China is a key part of that. And they have
not shown interest in this. Their trend seems to be achieve
parity before even considering the idea.
So the environment for putting together successful talks is
not good. It doesn't mean you don't try. The talks themselves
can be valuable from a strategic stability perspective even if
they don't produce.
So that is definitely part of the considerations of one of
the things we can do to create more of an incentive for Russia
and China to at least want to have a constructive conversation.
Mr. Garamendi. President Trump earlier in, I guess, a
couple months ago, said there is no reason for us to be
building brand new nuclear weapons. We have so many. We are all
spending a lot of money that we could be spending on a lot of
things that are, actually, hopefully, much more productive.
Statements like that generally cause the--in this case,
Russia and China to go what is he talking about? I would take
that as an opening to start not at the top, but some things
that are mutually beneficial to us and to China and just to
begin the process. Start at probably the lowest possible level
and then go from there.
I don't know how long you are going to be around in your
job. I would hope for some time. But I would recommend that we
spend a great deal of our effort on the arms control piece of
this. Otherwise, we are going to continue to build, and Cotton
will have his Sentinel. And the question is whether we are
safer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. DesJarlais. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate all
four of you being here. We appreciate your leadership. I have
had the honor of working with two of you. And I look forward to
working with all of you in the months and years ahead.
I have two questions for General Cotton. I will widen them
out. I did have General Guillot here last week. So I have
already posed a few questions to you. But I would like to start
out with the Looking Glass mission. I was one of the guys who
flew on it back in the day. And I think a couple of you have
done the same.
I first want to ask, is it still a viable need? And I am
just going to tag onto this. Most people may not know it here
on the committee that we used to have this mission for 29
years. It was airborne 24/7, Air Force aircraft, and 1991, I
think it was, we took it to a ground alert for 15 minutes and
eventually turned it over to the Navy for the aircraft of
flight crew. It is a lot of U.S. Strategic Command battle crew.
I have been concerned that we don't have a 24/7 capability
number one concern.
But then number two, now the Navy is walking away from
using their aircraft. And I think this is a concern for the Air
Force. The Air Force needs to look at this. Do we need to pick
this mission back up?
So the question to General Cotton is, is this still a
viable need, the Looking Glass mission, and what do you see as
the future here?
General Cotton. Thank you for the question, Congressman
Bacon. So there is a need. And in the middle of--as we look
through our NC-3 (Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications)
roadmap, there is an active trade space study that is underway
right now, and the conclusions are to be released in a June
time frame.
One of the options is what is a follow-on to the airborne
piece? Because as you also know, part of that mission set is
the air launch capability for the ground base leg for the
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, the airlines capability.
That being said, the E-6B, of which you are referring to,
that is TACAMO (Take Charge and Move Out), that is--should be
around. And it is supposed to be around until the 2036 time
frame as the Navy replaces that aircraft with their E-JJ or E-
XX C-130 variant.
You are correct right now. That will not have the Airborne
National Command Post platform on it. So we are under
discussions right now on what does that look like moving
forward? But right now one of the options is to still continue
to have an airborne leg. Whether or not it belongs to the Air
Force to the Navy as the services, they have to fight that one
out.
Mr. Bacon. If I could say it with a subliminal suggestions,
I think it is Air Force and an Offutt. I will just throw that
out there.
General, I got a hypersonic question for you and then I
will go to our other two generals. We can detect a hypersonic
launch. We don't know where it is going, and we don't know
exactly when it is going to hit. How does that make your
mission more hard for nuclear command and control?
General Cotton. Well, two things, because what I am
supposed to do is I am supposed to maximize the decision space
for the President to make a decision. So it tightens up the
ability to be able to let the President know when the strike is
inbound and when it might hit, which then, you know, really
kind of closes the timelines in regards of having decision
space for the President.
Mr. Bacon. General Whiting and Guillot, what is the one or
two things you need to track hypersonic weapons? I am repeating
this question from last week, but I think it is important.
General Whiting. Congressman, thank you for the question.
In the Golden Dome executive order, it talks about accelerating
the tracking layer from space. And those layers are being built
today and those investments have begun. And those are vital for
us to track hypersonic weapons.
And then we also want to modernize our ground base radars
that were built really for the traditional ballistic missile
threat, and we identify what those requirements are to improve
those radars to be able to track hypersonics as well.
General Guillot. Congressman, in support of General
Whiting, I agree. The most crucial step, I think, is to get to
HBTSS (Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor) robustly
fielded. That would allow us to detect, contract in ways that
we cannot right now.
Mr. Bacon. So I have got you on the record twice saying
that. That is good.
I want to support you with these efforts. I want to work on
funding and getting this done. This is critical to our national
security in my view.
One more question for General Cotton. What would be your
preferred number for the B-21 fielding?
General Cotton. I am on the record that it is a minimum of
100, which is the program of record. But I am on the record
saying about 145. That would give us about 220 total bombers,
once the modernization of the B-52s take place as well as of
the flyout of the B-21. So 145 is what I am thinking.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. It sounds like a good number, and I
yield back.
Dr. DesJarlais. The gentleman yields. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I wasn't kidding
earlier when I made that flippant remark that not all panels
are created equal and certainly having a panel of such
qualified individuals is really confidence building. So I am
really glad you are here.
General Cotton, thank you for your distinguished service to
our country. I hope you will also continue to find a way to
contribute in your retirement. And I don't want you to hold
your breath about Mr. Garamendi. You might get some ailments if
you hold your breath waiting for Mr. Garamendi to change his
position.
We need to fully embrace the commercial space industry to
maintain space superiority. Space Command's commercial
integration strategy is certainly a step in the right direction
and sends a strong demand signal to the industry.
But the military needs to really put its money where its
mouth is with these commercial integration strategies. To me
this seems easier to do from the service perspective since they
own procurement and acquisitions.
General Whiting, can you speak to how you have been
implementing your commercial integration strategy and what more
specific areas do you want the Space Force to focus on when it
comes to leveraging commercial capabilities?
General Whiting. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
In our commercial integration strategy, we identified three
lines of effort that aligned to our responsibilities as a
combatant command. And the first was to identify and advocate
for commercial solutions so we are out scanning what those
capabilities are and then trying to elevate those for the Space
Force's and other's consideration.
Secondly, we want to incorporate and operationalize those
commercial capabilities as they come online and then third to
inform and protect our commercial partners. And as you are
aware, Congressman, at Vandenberg in the commercial integration
cell, we have 17 commercial companies there that we share
classified information with to help them protect their
constellations as well.
So the area I think I would like to continue to make
progress in, and I think we are going to see that this year, is
in the Space Force's commercial augmented space reserve, the
CASR, as they are now starting to initiate the first pilot
contracts of being able to leverage capability faster in a
conflict or crisis, and we now are beginning to write what
those triggers are for when those contracts would be initiated.
And that is modeled on a U.S. Transportation Command effort
called the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. And that is an area I want
to make progress in this year.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Our entire military, every
combatant command relies on space to carry out their functions.
Our nation's launch range infrastructure, is fragile,
expensive, and aging.
General Whiting, as a combatant commander, how are you
working with the entire Department of Defense to ensure we will
have the ability to have a responsive launch in the future?
General Whiting. Thank you, Congressman, for that question.
We think this is one of the elements of victory of how the
United States continues to be ultimately successful in space as
we have to have the ability to rapidly regenerate and
reconstitute our space capabilities.
So we are identifying those requirements with the Space
Force and with commercial industry and to look at our capacity
on our launch ranges to make sure that its commercial industry
ramps. And this is an area we have a massive lead over our
competitors that the launch ranges themselves never become the
chokepoint and limit the United States in that regard.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. General Cotton, I want to extract
some wisdom from you before you leave us. As you know Minuteman
III tests have been out of Vandenberg Space Force Base in my
District.
As this system continues to age, you can discuss the role
that test launches play in establishing confidence in Minuteman
III systems. And what is the calculation you make in continuing
test launches? First is conserving the supply of test bodies.
General Cotton. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
And you are absolutely right. So the western range is
incredibly important for us and especially when we are talking
about legacy systems with the Minuteman III.
That test, the results and analysis of that test, is for
U.S. Strategic Command for us to understand the reliability of
that weapons system. We are in the midst of trying to figure
out how do we balance continuing, since we know that there is a
delay of Sentinel, of how we can balance making sure we have
enough missile bodies to still have testing in the future until
we find a Sentinel sitting in the hole as a replacement for the
Minuteman.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Dr. DesJarlais. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman
from Colorado, Mr. Crank, is now recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Crank. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. I
want to start by asking each of our witnesses to quickly answer
the following question. In your opinion, is the space-based
threat from Russia and China greater, weaker, or the same
compared to four years ago. Mr. Hill?
Mr. Hill. Greater.
Mr. Crank. General Cotton?
General Cotton. Greater.
Mr. Crank. General Whiting?
General Whiting. Sir, it is greater.
Mr. Crank. General Guillot?
General Guillot. Sir, it is greater.
Mr. Crank. Great. General Guillot and General Whiting, can
you tell me how Northern Command, NORTHCOM, and Space Command
work together to defend the homeland?
General Guillot. Congressman, in a wide variety of ways,
every day. Probably the most relevant for this subcommittee
would be the fact that U.S. Space Command operates and manages
the systems that give us the earliest and, you know, first
detection of intercontinental ballistic threats to the United
States that we use to assess and determine one, if it is a
threat to the United States, and two, to predict where it will
go, and three, they have systems that help us guide our ground
based interceptors to defeat these threats if it comes from
Norther Korea of potentially Iran.
Mr. Crank. Okay. And quickly, General Whiting.
General Whiting. That was a great answer from General
Guillot, Congressman. I would just would add that in addition
our satellite communications and the global positioning signal
we provide to provide positioning, navigation, and timing are
also foundational to many of the efforts that we know Northern
Command is executing every day to defend the homeland.
Mr. Crank. And do you both feel like you have clear and
efficient lines of communication between the two commands to
fulfill the mission and defend the homeland?
General Guillot. I absolutely think so, sir.
General Whiting. And I agree, Congressman.
Mr. Crank. And do you believe that this collaboration helps
you ensure that Golden Dome will be successfully deployed?
General Whiting. We are partnering with Northern Command,
Congressman, to write the requirements document. And we have a
very close partnership on that.
Mr. Crank. Thank you. You know, honestly, I am perplexed by
discussions of combatant command realignment of any kind. This
week at the House Armed Services Committee, we have had the
combatant commanders for Europe, the Indo-Pacific, North
America, our strategic forces, and our space forces all testify
that the space-based threat from Russia and China are more
dangerous after four years of President Biden's weak rule. And
we know that the China 2027 date is rapidly approaching.
We have also heard how important it is that U.S. Northern
Command and Space Command have maximum collaboration and
communication with each other to make Golden Dome successful.
President Trump very boldly proposed Golden Dome. And we
must do, as a Congress and as a nation, we must do everything
we can to make it successful. This maximum collaboration is
only possible, and it is currently occurring, at Peterson Space
Force Base where Northern Command and Space Command literally
share a parking lot together. We need to give the President the
most capable and lethal military to meet the Chinese threat.
Space Command has achieved full operational capability at
Peterson. We cannot afford to weaken the President's hand and
to risk delaying Golden Dome while our adversaries are moving
at full speed. This is a matter of great national security and
importance.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Dr. DesJarlais. The gentleman yields, the chair now
recognizes the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Vasquez.
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and to the witnesses
for your service and your time today. General Cotton, thank you
for your legacy of honorable service to our country.
I represent New Mexico's Second District, home to White
Sands Missile Range, the Department of Defense's premiere
research development test and evaluation facility and the
department's largest open air test range.
I also have the privilege of representing Holloman Air
Force Base, home to the Holloman High Speed Test Track, the
world's longest test track of its kind.
From birthing the Atomic Age in World War II to cutting
edge testing for hypersonic weapons today, our state has been
an integral part of the department's tests and evaluation
capabilities. I can confidently say that without New Mexico,
our military strength would be nowhere to where it is today.
General Cotton and General Guillot, for the past 80 years,
the department has made significant investments in New Mexico's
test and evaluation infrastructure. Would you agree that those
investments have paid dividends in our critical--have paid
critical returns for national security?
General Guillot. Yes, Congressman, I would agree.
General Cotton. And I second that, absolutely.
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you. General Cotton and General Guillot,
given the unique and advanced testing capabilities that are
located in my district, what would be the strategic risk to
U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Northern Commad if those
resources were diminished or lost?
General Guillot. Congressman, the first thing that would
concern me would be the lack of development and confidence in
systems that we are trying to employ to defend the homeland.
General Cotton. It would absolutely stall research and
development on trying to figure out what we are going to--what
we are trying to do as far as the new capabilities moving
forward.
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you so much. And for General Whiting and
Mr. Hill, beyond our invaluable testing capacity, New Mexico
hosts some of the most advanced and innovative small businesses
that today are leading the charge on the next generation of
space technology. New Mexican businesses can be credited for
providing power for a significant portion of satellites
currently deployed in space and for designing the next
generation of space-based assets to ensure that we have the
best strategic advantage for our adversaries for decades to
come.
Would you agree that the Department of Defense depends on
innovations of small businesses to advance U.S. space
capabilities at the rate necessary to compete with our
adversaries like China and Russia?
Mr. Hill. Congressman Vasquez, we depend on that more and
more.
General Whiting. And Congressman, I agree. I think U.S.
commercial space industry is one of our nation's most massive
advantages. And we need to continue to foster that innovation.
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you. And I highlight that because of the
importance of making sure that small businesses are included in
our defense industrial base I think at much higher levels than
we have seen them in the past.
And so, Mr. Hill, how does the department plan to more
effectively tap into the innovative ideas of small businesses
like those in New Mexico?
Mr. Hill. Congressman, I think one of the ways it has been
most emblematic has been through the Defense Innovation
University. They reach out with many companies that are doing
many innovative things. That is probably the most well-known
example. There are others in the acquisition system, but yes.
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you. We would like to count on you as
advocates to make sure that those small businesses get a chance
to both commercialize their technology and, of course, support
our national security efforts of the modern age.
Like everything in the 21st Century, military and space
technology is advancing exponentially. No state is better
equipped to support that technological advancement than New
Mexico. We are innovative and I have always said that if we can
design it and test it in New Mexico, we can also build it in
New Mexico.
And so as we discussed today, every dollar the department
spends and invests in our state pays off dividends to
strengthen American security.
So I remain committed to supporting the integral work being
done by our brave service members at White Sands Missile Range
and at Holloman Air Force Base. And I implore the department to
harness the full potential of New Mexico's small businesses
that are working to ensure that we remain the premiere military
power in the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Dr. DesJarlais. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. No, no.
Dr. DesJarlais. South Carolina. I did that just to pick on
you.
Mr. Wilson. No, but I am going to say something nice about
General Cotton. So you are right. Okay?
But, hey, I would like to begin by thanking the chairman
also, thanking each of you for your service. It is so important
and it is so important at this time in history. And I am very
grateful to represent the Second Congressional District of
South Carolina, which is the home of Savannah River site in the
future, Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility. We are
looking forward to supporting and contributing to the
congressionally mandated goal to produce 80 plutonium pits per
year in 2030.
And General Cotton, indeed, we appreciate your service from
our sister state of North Carolina and your Reserve Officers'
Training Corps background and 39 years of service, how
meaningful that is to our country. Thank you for that.
In your testimony, you mentioned that reestablishing a
credible plutonium pit manufacturing capability remains the top
stockpile priority as we look to sustain our long-term
strategic deterrence.
With that in mind, what is your assessment of the
importance of a two site strategy for plutonium pit production
and how does it provide for resilience to mitigate the impact
of possible production outages at either Los Alamos National
Laboratory or the Savannah River site?
General Cotton. Congressman Wilson, first of all thank you
for the compliment. Incredibly important as you know. So I look
at Savannah River as being kind of the cornerstone of pit
production moving forward. It is going to be the cornerstone
for National Security Agency as well as what we are seeing at
the lab on their dime and stamp pit that they were able to
accomplish last year.
But being able to have two sites as opposed to one, that is
the opportunity for us to get to the numbers that we need. And
it also provides an ability to have different locations where
we are not yielding to one. If something was to happen to one
location, then we can still produce.
Mr. Wilson. I'm really grateful that I just last week was
meeting with so many of the site personnel, and they are so
enthusiastic about the progress they are making on plutonium
pit production. And it is important to me because I am the only
member of Congress who has ever actually worked there. So I
know of the capabilities of the personnel.
Additionally, the American people need to know why it is so
important to fund nuclear modernization and recapitalization
efforts to all components of the U.S. nuclear enterprise. And
so General Cotton, why is this so important?
General Cotton. Because nuclear deterrence for us is
foundational to national security. It is foundational to
everything that every other combatant commander that would be
before you. I mean, a committee would actually have a
conversation. Being able to be able to continue to hold our
adversaries at risk, I think, is paramount.
The only way we do that is one, we sustain the legacy
systems that we currently have. And what is even more important
to be able to modernize the three legs of the triad to ensure
that we can continue to do that in the future, especially with
two nuclear peer adversaries.
Mr. Wilson. And indeed, we appreciate your success. And
General Whiting, in your testimony you mentioned that Russia's
use of electromagnetic warfare systems to disrupt services to
the Baltic and Black Sea and Mediterranean regions. Also Russia
is desirous of developing the capability of a nuclear weapon in
orbit.
With that in mind, what we are into is a conflict we didn't
choose between dictators with rule of gun invading democracy's
rule of law. And Russia in particular, war criminal Putin is
trying hard to recreate the failed Soviet Union. And so with
that in mind, does the United States possess or do we currently
have an ability to mitigate such threats as we have seen with
electromagnet warfare?
General Whiting. Congressman, thank you for the question.
There has been a lot of work to develop tactics, techniques,
and procedures to mitigate those threats and indeed we work to
execute those each and every day.
Mr. Wilson. And then additionally, what about the potential
of a nuclear weapon in orbit?
General Whiting. It is the most concerning threat we
potentially face. And so absolutely, Congressman, we are
looking at all options on the table to how to make sure that
such a device would not threaten our space capabilities.
Mr. Wilson. And indeed, it is so serious because war
criminal Putin is trying so hard to recreate his Soviet Union
back again as we see the invasion of Ukraine, as we see fixing
the elections in Georgia, the legitimate election President
Salome Zourabichvili. Sadly, Putin rigged that election. And so
over and over again we see the threat. And so thank you for
what you are doing. I yield back.
Dr. DesJarlais. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Whitesides.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you
generals for being here today.
General Cotton, I am glad to have you here for many
reasons, not least because it gives me a bit of an opportunity
to brag about my district. As you probably know, I am proud to
represent Plant 42 in Palmdale, California, home of the B-21
Raider.
In something that is perhaps rare for some Department of
Defense programs, in their development, the Raider program is
currently meeting expected cost, schedule, and performance
criteria. That puts me in the welcome position to credibly
argue that we could actually move faster and save money on the
program without sacrificing quality or lethality by potentially
investing at the front end in increased production capacity.
Sir, can you describe the ways in which the ability to move
to more quickly to produce the necessary 100 aircraft and
potentially more as you state in the fleet could act as an
effective deterrent to our adversaries?
General Cotton. So thank you for that question because you
are absolutely right. Plant 42 is building the world's only
sixth generation aircraft at this moment. And the things that
Northrup Grumman are doing with that aircraft is absolutely
remarkable.
So to your point in how I have stated to be able to have
more than 100 in the fleet is my desire. Moving that to the
left to increase production rates as a combatant commander is
only goodness for me.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, sir. General Guillot, it is good
to see you again. I have really appreciated your candor with me
and the committee.
Last week we discussed the necessity of a layered approach
for domain awareness combining robust earth, air, and space-
based sensing capabilities. And I couldn't agree with you more
on this point. Robust and comprehensive domain awareness is
absolutely critical if we are going to maintain projection
force capabilities, lethality, and cover our warfighters back.
Sir, could you discuss why that layered approach is essential
to the national security of our nation and what do we gain by
tackling that program or that problem first?
General Guillot. Congressman, I think the--thank you. And I
think the domain--what I call the domain awareness dome, is the
most important because no matter capable our interceptors or
defeat mechanisms are, they can't defeat what they can't see.
And so they have to have a domain awareness layer that detects,
tracks, queues, and feeds the defeat systems.
And that domain awareness layer is--the dome is a series of
layers starting with the undersea, with undersea detection to
ensure that we can detect submarines that are becoming more and
more quiet each day as they approach our continent, to a land-
based layer with probably over-the-horizon radars to give us
long deep looks. An air layer with an aircraft like the E-7
that can take targets like a cruise missile and feed that
information directly to a fighter or a defeat mechanism. And
then into space with space-based Air Moving Target Indicators,
for example, the hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor
that we previously discussed as well as the warning systems.
All of those need to feed the defeat mechanisms to defeat
intercontinental ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and
aircraft.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, sir. And General Whiting, I
don't have too much time, but last week it was reported
publicly that the three Russian Cosmos satellites launched
earlier this year released an object into orbit. In March, it
looked like satellites were conducting proximity operations. We
have a bunch of different things going on, and the People's
Republic of China is doing stuff as well.
Can you discuss in brief as much as you are able to in this
setting, the threats posed by our adversary's space
capabilities to our space domain awareness and the ways in the
department can better leverage commercial capabilities to
overcome that threat?
General Whiting. Yeah, thank you for the question,
Congressman. We continue to see Russia invest in their
counterspace capabilities despite the challenges that they have
had in Ukraine. And you identified some on orbit testing that
we have found problematic and that we are, you know, making
sure that we understand as carefully as possible. We do think
that commercial space domain awareness data is a key part of us
understanding what is happening on orbit.
And through an initiative we have called the Joint
Commercial Office, we take data from 17 different companies and
infuse that in a way that we can tip and queue in our
government systems to help understand those unique events and
circumstances that are happening on orbit. So we think those
commercial systems are vital for us, sir.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Dr. DesJarlais. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Van Orden.
Mr. Van Orden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
recognize the e-Dogs in the back there. So thanks for coming
out. Semper fi and aim high, I think.
Hey, so we have to remember a couple things. We got to use
knowledge here, right, about such and make these critically
important decisions. I am going to read a headline to you.
Senate Dems rip Space Force. No Republican is willing to tell
Trump it is a dumb idea. Democrats file bills to abolish
flagrantly wasteful Trump-formed Space Force.
Now, sir, I don't think you are wasteful. I don't think you
are dumb. I think you are the cutting edge of defense. And we
have clearly identified that. Your service and the fact that
President Donald J. Trump established it and was openly mocked
by the Democrats in the House and the Senate needs to be
remembered by people in the House and the Senate and people
wearing uniforms because I have found that when people make
such incredibly grievous errors, maybe we shouldn't weigh their
opinions as high as others. I am just saying that.
That Star Wars program, that shut down the Soviet Union,
right? And it didn't work. And we didn't have the technologies
to do it. It didn't work. And so this can work.
I have been to Israel several times, and they have the Iron
Dome. And I think it is incredibly important that we work for
the Golden Dome. And I don't share some of my colleagues
concern that this will start a nuclear war. I think that it
will prevent it, and it will also help bring down, as my friend
Mr. Wilson calls him, the war criminal Vladimir Putin. He is
absolutely right.
I would like to say one thing. So being in Israel, they
have these Iron Dome batteries all over the place. At one
point, if you remove the golden heights, Israel is like eight
miles across the entire country. Obviously, the continental
United States is much bigger.
So I would like to tell you right now when you are working
on this Golden Dome, and I trust that you will, I have Volk
Field, and I also have Fort McCoy in the State of Wisconsin.
And if we are going to be talking about putting these
batteries, which are going to have to be around the country, I
would like to encourage you to come look at that Volk Field is
amazing as is Fort McCoy. So I am offering--I probably should
have asked them first. But if we are going to put these around,
I would like them there.
Okay. What, in your opinion, sir, General Cotton, is the
most effective leg of the nuclear triad?
General Cotton. All three.
Mr. Van Orden. Which one has the greatest potential to get
more heads on foreheads without being detected?
General Cotton. Well, that would be either the submarine-
launched ballistic missile leg or the interconnectional
ballistic missile leg, not the air leg.
Mr. Van Orden. Correct. And so the Ohio class is supposed
to be replaced by the Columbia class, correct?
General Cotton. That is correct.
Mr. Van Orden. All right. So that is what I am talking
about. That is the most stealthy leg of the nuclear triad, and
I think has the greatest chance of survivability of a first
strike against us, and then a retaliatory strike, which is how
they should go down. I don't think we should be doing
preemptive nuclear strikes.
So what is the status of our Ohio fleet and the Columbia's
replacement? Where are we at?
General Cotton. So right now, we have 14 Ballistic Missile
Submarines, Ohio class boats, still that are commissioned. We
are about 16 months delayed on the Columbia class.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay.
General Cotton. So right now what the Navy owes me is a
project in which they will take what is known as pre-
inactivation restricted availability and that is an acronym
that basically what we are really talking about is how do you
do a Shelf Life Extension Program, or a life extension program,
on the five best hulls to extend out, to cover down the
shortfalls of--
Mr. Van Orden. I want to offer you or your replacement--by
the way, thank you for your service. Have fun with retiring. It
is going to take two years to figure out you are retired. It
took me that long. I would like to offer you my letterhead and
my loud mouth to talk to the Navy if they are not getting those
responses back to you immediately because this is critical.
And then what is the stats of the AUKUS Agreement right
now?
General Cotton. I am not part of the AUKUS Agreement,
though, sir. So I don't know.
Mr. Van Orden. So that is providing some nuclear submarines
to Australia, right? We are pairing with the United Kingdom and
Australia. So it is in the same realm.
General Cotton. It is true. But it is not Ballistic Missile
Submarines. Those are Ship Submersible Nuclears.
Mr. Van Orden. They are? Okay.
General Cotton. They are Virginia class so that might more
relevant for Mr. Hill to answer that.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay. So Mr. Hill, my time has expired here.
And I will get you after about that. So these are critically
important weapon systems.
So thank you very much, gentlemen. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Dr. DesJarlais. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes Mr. Bell from Missouri.
Mr. Bell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member.
Hello to the witnesses. Thank you for being here.
General Whiting, low earth orbit hosts thousands of
satellites offering benefits like reduced costs and easier
access. However, the growing congestion and space debris in low
earth orbiting increased the risk of satellite collisions.
Additionally, the competition between the United States,
Russia, and China exacerbates these problems. Can you outline
the steps Space Command is taking to protect critical
infrastructure and address these challenges?
General Whiting. Congressman, thank you for the question.
We think this issue is so significant that each and every day
we have a Space Force unit that is assigned to U.S. Space
Command that looks at all active satellites from all countries.
And we run predictions to see if we think it is going to run
into any pieces of debris, any of those satellites.
And if we see that that is a potential, we notify the
owners of those satellites. That includes satellites from
Russia or China because we don't want any satellite to hit a
piece of debris and create more debris. So we think it is vital
that all countries act responsibly in space, not to generate
additional debris.
Mr. Bell. In your testimony, you specifically mentioned
examples of China's use of international partnerships and
advanced projects to challenge U.S. leadership in space.
Given recent concerns from our allies about a perceived
retreat of U.S. global leadership under the current
administration, what additional steps can the U.S. take
internationally to counter China's expanding influence in
space?
General Cotton. Congressman, thank you for the question. On
the military side, I think we will continue to build enduring
relationships with our closest partners in space. Yesterday at
a space conference, I announced that our operation Olympic
Defender, which is our named operation in space that includes
six other countries that we have achieved initial operational
capability. And we will continue to look for those
opportunities to bring other allies closer to us as they
develop additional space capabilities.
Mr. Bell. Okay. And General Cotton, thank you again for
your service. It was great meeting your team. I don't think
Rep. Garamendi is moving on that gift so maybe a tie or
something you can settle for.
But in your testimony, sir, you mentioned the importance of
U.S. allies and partners being a critical component of
deterrence, providing an advantage that our adversaries cannot
match. Given that our biggest adversaries, Russia, China, Iran,
and North Korea have formed closer, more integrated
relationships, what more can U.S. Strategic Command do to
enhance combined force interoperability and promote U.S. global
presence?
General Cotton. Congressman, thank you for the question.
So, you know, we are doing it right now. We have bomber task
forces right now that are showing assurance and extended
assurance missions, bringing together our allies and partners
that actually befuddle, you know, the Russian Federation as
well as the Chinese Communist Party. So I think continuing
those relations are incredibly healthy for us.
There are opportunities for us to continue to have
collaboration in joint exercises from a U.S. Strategic Command
perspective that I think really does still show the commitment
to assurance and extended deterrence.
Mr. Bell. General Guillot, sir, can you expand on the
threats posed by Iran in the cyber domain?
General Guillot. Congressman, at this time, North America,
the United States, is threatened in all domains from all avenue
of approach, so the air domain, the sea, the land, but the most
present and persistent threat that we face every day is in the
cyber domain where we have thousands upon thousands of attacks,
or attempted attacks, on our networks across the entire
Department of Defense.
Iran is a big part of that. They have significant presence
in cyber warfare. And I am very grateful that through cyber
command and other efforts in the inter-agency, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Department of Justice have some great
capabilities that keep them out of our networks.
Mr. Bell. And additionally given that many of their
terrorist proxies have been significantly weakened in the past
year and a half, do they possess similar capabilities that
might impact our cybersecurity?
General Guillot. Well, I think they have capability to
threaten our cybersecurity. And it requires the utmost
vigilance by all members.
Mr. Bell. Thank you. I yield my time.
Dr. DesJarlais. The gentleman yields. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Messmer.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to
thank all of the witnesses for your service and for being here
today.
General Cotton, it is good to see you again. It was nice to
meet with you yesterday. I appreciate your support that you
mentioned earlier about the support of the Nuclear-Armed Sea-
Launched Cruise Missile program.
How are you approaching the various design options to meet
U.S. Strategic Command requirements specifically with respect
to survivability versus time to field?
General Cotton. Congressman, thank you for the question.
And it was great talking with you yesterday. I think part of
that is some of the work that we are actually seeing in your
state in the work that is being done when it comes to Nuclear-
Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile and the work that is being
done by Crane, for example, is a good example of that.
As far as being able to outline and continue to flush out
tactics, techniques and procedures for the Department of Navy
is going to be incredibly important. I think that is part of
the shortfalls that we have been facing so far in regards to
having something move forward that is a little more than a
program of record. So that is what we are tackling this year
for my last year here is to make sure that we can get those
moving along.
As I mentioned to your yesterday, I really want to see that
accelerate and not, you know, languish to the right.
Mr. Messmer. Do you think the Navy is moving fast enough to
implement that program?
General Cotton. I would always love to see them move
faster.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you. Also, General Cotton, I wanted to
follow up on our conversation regarding conventional prompt
strike, CPS. This program is currently planned to be deployed
on the Zumwalt Destroyer and Virginia submarines. Given the
rapidly deteriorating security environment we face, do you
think we can afford any delays to conventional prompt strike
deployment on the Navy platform?
General Cotton. Absolutely not.
Mr. Messmer. If the Navy were to decide not to deploy
conventional prompt strike on Zumwalt, how important would it
be to get it deployed as quickly as possible on a Virginia
class sub?
General Cotton. It would be incredibly important.
Mr. Messmer. Okay. Also, General Cotton, in my district,
Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center is the largest Navy
installation in the world or in the country--third largest in
the world--and a leader in hypersonics in order to combat our
adversaries, specifically China, who has a functional
hypersonic vehicle. How important is the investment,
production, and eventually delivery to the warfighter of a
hypersonic weapon?
General Cotton. I think it is incredibly important. It can
complement the weapon systems that we currently have.
Mr. Messmer. Okay. Thank you. As a follow-up with
hypersonics, Crane is also a leader in microelectronic testing.
Can you speak to the importance of microelectronic testing
capabilities and how they are a key to naval technology for
missile defense, nuclear modernization, and space missions?
General Cotton. Well, Crane, as you know, sir, they are
doing incredible work for us and my Navy component at this very
moment when it comes to microcomponents. So as we see the
modernization, to be frank, of all three legs of the triad,
that they are key to doing that work.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you. General Whiting, as a follow-up to
the Golden Dome for America executive order, how important is
it for the Department of Defense to expand the number of space-
based interceptors in our arsenal to effectively implement this
executive order?
General Whiting. Thank you, Congressman. For the Golden
Dome to truly be global, and if you are going to be able to
hold at-risk missiles in the boost phase and mid-course, you
are really going to have to have space-based interceptor
capability to do that on the timelines that will be necessary.
So we think it is an important part of the layered approach
of the Golden Dome.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you. That is all my questions. I yield
back my time.
Dr. DesJarlais. The gentleman yields back. Thank you all
for your testimony in the open session. We will now move
upstairs for the closed session. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 9, 2025
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 9, 2025
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 9, 2025
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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Hill, our adversaries continue to expand their
capabilities across all domains. You stated in your testimony that
China and Russia are rapidly fielding space and counterspace systems to
hold US assets at risk. Do you believe our ability to deter conflict
from extending into space is strengthened if adversaries know the U.S.
possesses both the means and resolve to protect and defend its space
assets? How is the department communicating that resolve?
Mr. Hill. Our ability to deter conflict extending to space is a
function of our ability to demonstrate that aggression in space will
fail or lead to unacceptable costs. The Department communicates this
resolve through our investments in resilient architectures, space
control capabilities that can be employed offensively or defensively,
and through efforts to shape the strategic environment in a way that
deters malign and coercive behavior. At the same time, the Department
also believes there is deterrence value in ambiguity. What is not - and
has not been - ambiguous is that we will protect our national security
interests in space and our men and women on the ground.
Mr. Wilson. General Guillot, in your testimony, you mentioned our
adversaries are rapidly increasing their capabilities in strategic
weapons systems. For example, you referenced North Korea's interest in
the rapid production and fielding of systems like solid-propellent
ICBMs. This increase in inventory could create a dilemma for our
ground-based midcourse defense system.
Are you confident today that our homeland missile defense system
remains ahead of North Korean threats? What do you need to ensure the
Next-Generation Interceptor remains on track for implementation by
2028?
General Guillot. While I remain confident against the current
intelligence-assessed threat, North Korea remains eager to transition
their strategic weapons program from research and development to serial
production and fielding. Once they make that transition, they could
rapidly expand North Korea's ICBM inventory and would narrow my
confidence in the sufficiency of USNORTHCOM's ballistic missile defense
capacity until the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) is fielded. Any
delay in not fielding incurs the risk of falling behind to defeat a
rogue nation ICBM attack. This has my highest level of attention and
concern, and I remain in close contact with the Missile Defense Agency
regarding the development and fielding of NGI and continue to express
the urgency to field more lethal and reliable interceptors.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
Mr. Moulton. General Cotton, recent reports indicate that the
National Nuclear Security Administration is targeting an almost 20%
reduction in civilian workforce through Elon Musk's DOGE team embedded
at the Department of Energy. Are you concerned about those personnel at
a time when NNSA is trying to dramatically increase their mission to
meet your future requirements?
General Cotton. Defer to NNSA for specifics on implications of DOGE
actions.
Reductions in NNSA's civilian workforce could potentially impact
its ability to deliver the weapons USSTRATCOM relies on to accomplish
the strategic deterrence mission. NNSA must be able to attract and
retain the required workforce to accomplish this vital mission.
Mr. Moulton. Have you been asked to prepare any plans for the use
of Greenland if Greenland is acquired by the United States?
General Guillot. I have not been directed to prepare any plans
contingent on United States acquisition of Greenland. However, the
island is part of NORAD's and USNORTHCOM's considerations for North
American defense. NORAD and USNORTHCOM forces routinely conduct
homeland defense operations and exercises out of Pituffik Space Base in
Greenland, including recent deployments in January and February 2025.
Mr. Moulton. Have you been asked to prepare, or have you prepared,
any military plans for a military invasion of Greenland?
General Guillot. No, I have not.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
Mr. Bacon. Maintaining awareness in the electromagnetic spectrum is
a critical operational capability, especially as adversaries further
develop their ability to conduct electronic warfare and GPS-denial
operations. Sec. 1053 of the FY2019 NDAA (PL 115-232) first established
a requirement for DoD to develop an electromagnetic battle management
capability to support effective joint electromagnetic spectrum
operations (JEMSO). The Electromagnetic Battle Management Joint
Situational Awareness (EMBM-J-SA) program is an enabler of such
capability and has been utilized to great effect across the Joint Force
for predictive analysis, situational awareness, and command and control
functions to streamline and automate joint electromagnetic spectrum
operations. I was recently made aware that Defense Information Systems
Agency Program Executive Office-Spectrum put forth an issue paper to
USSTRATCOM requesting additional funding for EMBM-J-SA in the Fiscal
Year 2026 budget, and that the issue paper was not approved. I am also
aware that the program, which has cost nearly $41 million to develop,
has two more years of RDT&E funding and three years of O&M funding
planned for further development and fielding. Given the operational
need for the program and the inability of other platforms provide
similar capability, please provide answers to the following questions:
1. What is the current status of development, fielding and utilization
of EMBM capabilities across the Joint Force? 2. What is USSTRATCOM's
rationale for the denial of additional funding for EMBM-J-SA in FY26?
3. Without additional funding, how does USSTRATCOM plan to provide an
operational EMBM capability across the Joint Force? 4. Will this
reduction in funding create a capability gap or delay the fielding of
spectrum awareness tools? 5. What is USSTRATCOM's long-term plan for
the EMBM-J-SA program in the absence of increased funding?
General Cotton. 1. EMBM-J SA has been deployed in the operational
environment at Combatant Command Joint EMSO Cells since December 2023.
Iterative development continues with each successive capability release
delivered quarterly. The next EMBM-J SA release is scheduled for May
2025. The EMBM-J Decision Support (EMBM-J DS) prototype was delivered
in February 2025 and the first Minimum Viable Capability Release was
deployed to the operational environment in April 2025. The program
office plans to continue iterative releases of the EMBM-J DS module.
2. USSTRATCOM listed EMBM-J as one of its top five priorities in
both the FY25 and FY26 Strategic Priority Memos. While EMBM-J was not
funded through the Department's FY25 program decision discussions,
USSTRATCOM values the program and will continue to advocate for the
prioritization of EMBM-J funding in the budget process.
3. As the operational sponsor for EMBM-J, USSTRATCOM will continue
to work with the EMBM-J Program Office led by DISA's PEO-Spectrum to
maximize the success of the program. USSTRATCOM will continue to engage
with the user community to gather essential mission needs and feedback
to ensure the program office prioritizes and fields critical
capabilities as quickly as possible. We are also working with DOD CIO
to prioritize EMBM-J.
4. In the near term, the funding shortfall will delay EMBM-J
deployment to the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
and will slow refinement of existing capabilities, resulting in less
capability included in subsequent incremental version releases.
Continued funding shortfalls will delay the integration of EMBM-J with
service systems and other battle management systems and decision
support tools, which will prevent the joint force from realizing the
operational benefits of fully integrated and synchronized planning,
direction, and execution of electromagnetic spectrum fires and
maneuver.
5. USSTRATCOM will continue to work with the EMBM-J Program Office
led by DISA's PEO-Spectrum to maximize the success of the program.
USSTRATCOM will continue to engage with the user community to gather
essential mission needs and feedback to ensure the program office
prioritizes and fields critical capabilities as quickly as possible. We
are also working with DOD CIO to prioritize EMBM-J.
[all]