[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SECURING GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS: AN EXAM-
INATION OF FOREIGN ADVERSARY THREATS
TO SUBSEA CABLE INFRASTRUCTURE
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 20, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-28
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-706 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Chair Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Eric Swalwell, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida J. Luis Correa, California
August Pfluger, Texas Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Tony Gonzales, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Elijah Crane, Arizona Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Member
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Gabe Evans, Colorado Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia
Brad Knott, North Carolina Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Vince Fong, California Al Green, Texas
Vacant
Keighle Joyce, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas LaMonica McIver, New Jersey,
Elijah Crane, Arizona Ranking Member
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Hannah Hagen, Subcommittee Staff Director
Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee, Chairman
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Eric Swalwell, California, Ranking
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Member
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Vince Fong, California LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Roland Hernandez, Subcommittee Staff Director
Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable LaMonica McIver, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Andrew Ogles, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Tennessee, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Protection:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable James R. Walkinshaw, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Virginia:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Witnesses
Mr. Matthew Kroenig, Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for
Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Timothy Stronge, Chief Research Officer, TeleGeography:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Alexander Botting, Senior Director, Global Security and
Technology Strategy, Venable LLP:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Mr. Kevin Frazier, AI Innovation and Law Fellow, University of
Texas School of Law:
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
Appendix
Supplemental Material Submitted by Matthew Kroenig............... 61
Supplemental Material Submitted by Timothy Stronge............... 97
Supplemental Material Submitted by Kevin Frazier................. 122
SECURING GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS: AN EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN ADVERSARY
THREATS TO SUBSEA CABLE INFRASTRUCTURE
----------
Thursday, November 20, 2025
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Maritime Security, and the
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m.,
in room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos A.
Gimenez [Chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation and
Maritime Security] presiding.
Present from the Subcommittee on Transportation and
Maritime Security: Representatives Gimenez, Crane, Biggs,
McIver, Kennedy, and Carter.
Present from the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Protection: Representatives Ogles, Gimenez,
Luttrell, Magaziner, McIver, and Walkinshaw.
Also present: Representatives Mackenzie and Fong.
Mr. Gimenez. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security and
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection
will come to order.
Without objection, the Chair may declare the committee in
recess at any point.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine the potential
national security, economic, and resilience risks associated
with subsea cables--crucial telecommunications infrastructure.
We will also evaluate how foreign actors, particularly
China and Russia, could leverage subsea cable infrastructure
for espionage, coercion, and sabotage and explore legislative
and policy options to strengthen subsea cable resilience,
enhance public-private partnerships, and ensure continuity of
global communications amid physical or cyber disruptions.
I would like to thank our colleagues from the Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee for partnering with
us for this joint hearing.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for an opening
statement.
Good morning. Good morning, and thank you all for being
here today. After the longest Government shutdown in American
history, it is great to be back in Congress.
First off, I want to begin by congratulating Chairman Ogles
on his recent appointment to the Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection.
Congratulations.
Mr. Ogles. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gimenez. I also want to thank the Cybersecurity
Subcommittee for partnering with us to hold this important
hearing on a matter critical to U.S. national security.
Resting quietly on the ocean floor, submarine
telecommunications cables commonly known as ``subsea cables''
are among the most strategically significant and increasingly
vulnerable components of the world's digital infrastructure.
Right now, roughly 750,000 miles of undersea cables
traverse the world's oceans, forming a complex and
interconnected network that enables the rapid flow of large
data sets across continents.
These fiber-optic cables are the arteries of our global
telecommunications network, connecting nearly every corner of
the world to the internet. Without subsea cables, we would not
have the digital network we so desperately rely on today.
Although largely invisible and unknown to most Americans,
subsea cables carry more than 99 percent of international
communications. They not only support global commerce and
technological innovation but serve as the operational systems
for U.S. intelligence and defense. Protecting their integrity
is essential to safeguarding both our economy and our national
security.
Yet, despite their vital role, subsea cables remain
vulnerable to malicious attacks from our greatest foreign
adversaries--and none other than Russia and China. These
adversaries will stop at nothing to track, control, and exploit
vulnerabilities in our subsea cable networks to advance their
economic, technological, and strategic goals.
In particular, the Chinese Communist Party mobilizes its
state-backed companies to pursue coercive economic tactics and
aggressive cyber espionage on subsea cables. As we know, China
will stop at nothing to tap, disrupt, or dominate subsea cable
systems across the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
This is not speculation. It is strategic intent, openly
stated through China's civil-military policies and reflected in
its global push to build and operate key segments of the
world's data network.
As such, the subsea environment is an increasingly critical
front of the U.S. competition with China. These targeted
attacks inflict costly damage not only on our maritime
transportation system but upon the foundation of our global
communications network.
Subsea cable management has faltered not just through the
Indo-Pacific but across key areas around the globe. If Congress
fails to act, we risk allowing an authoritarian adversary
gaining unprecedented access to the data flows underpinning our
markets, our alliances, and our national defense. That is a
risk we cannot accept.
Today's discussion will focus on how the United States must
lead, not follow, in securing this critical infrastructure. We
will hear from expert witnesses on these evolving subsea cable
threats and discuss the gaps in U.S. regulatory and national
security posture.
In this hearing, we should evaluate how the Department of
Homeland Security, apart from other Federal agencies, could
best serve as the lead agency to protect and secure subsea
cable infrastructure.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I look
forward to hearing your insights as to what Congress should
consider to best protect this increasingly critical yet
vulnerable network of infrastructure.
[The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]
Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez
November 20, 2025
Good morning, and thank you all for being here today. After the
longest Government shutdown in American history, it's great to be back
in Congress.
First off, I want to begin by congratulating Chairman Ogles on his
recent appointment to Chairman of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Protection. I also want to thank the Cybersecurity
Subcommittee for partnering with us to hold this important hearing on a
matter critical to U.S. national security.
Resting quietly on the ocean floor, submarine telecommunications
cables, commonly known as subsea cables, are among the most
strategically significant and increasingly vulnerable components of the
world's digital infrastructure.
Right now, roughly 750,000 miles of undersea cables traverse the
world's oceans, forming a complex and interconnected network that
enables the rapid flow of large data sets across continents. These
fiber-optic cables are the arteries of our global telecommunications
network, connecting nearly every corner of the world to the internet.
Without subsea cables, we would not have the digital network we so
desperately rely on today.
Although largely invisible and unknown to most Americans, subsea
cables carry more than 99 percent of intercontinental communications.
They not only support global commerce and technological innovation but
serve as the operational systems for U.S. intelligence and defense.
Protecting their integrity is essential to safeguarding both our
economy and our national security.
Yet, despite their vital role, subsea cables remain vulnerable to
malicious attacks from our greatest foreign adversaries, and none other
than Russia and China. These adversaries will stop at nothing to track,
control, and exploit vulnerabilities in our subsea cable networks to
advance their economic, technological, and strategic goals.
In particular, the Chinese Communist Party mobilizes its state-
backed companies to pursue coercive economic tactics and aggressive
cyber-espionage on subsea cables. As we know, China will stop at
nothing to tap, disrupt, or dominate subsea cable systems across the
Indo-Pacific and beyond. This is not speculation--it is strategic
intent, openly stated through China's civil-military policies and
reflected in its global push to build and operate key segments of the
world's data network.
As such, the subsea environment is an increasingly critical front
of the U.S. competition with China. These targeted attacks inflict
costly damage not only to our maritime transportation system, but upon
the foundation of our global communications network.
Subsea cable management has faltered not just through the Indo
Pacific, but across key areas around the globe. If Congress fails to
act, we risk allowing an authoritarian adversary gaining unprecedented
access to the data flows underpinning our markets, our alliances, and
our national defense. That is a risk we cannot accept.
Today's discussion will focus on how the United States must lead--
not follow--in securing this critical infrastructure. We will hear from
expert witnesses on these evolving subsea cable threats and discuss the
gaps in U.S. regulatory and national security posture. In this hearing,
we should evaluate how the Department of Homeland Security, apart from
other Federal agencies, could best serve as the lead agency to protect
and secure subsea cable infrastructure.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today, and I look
forward to hearing your insights as to what Congress should consider to
best protect this increasingly critical yet vulnerable network
infrastructure.
Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs. McIver, for her opening
statement.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much, Chairman.
Good morning to everyone, and thank you to our witnesses
for joining us today.
Subsea cables are critical to U.S. national security, the
global economy, and the daily lives of people around the globe,
as they carry approximately 99 percent of the world's
intercontinental internet traffic.
The extent to which we all rely on the data traveling
through these cables is almost hard to fathom. For example,
every day, an estimated $22 trillion of financial transactions
are processed through subsea cables.
Internet traffic is only expected to increase in the coming
decades, as the global economy turns increasingly digital. The
demand of increased internet capacity will require the
installation of hundreds of thousands of miles of new subsea
cables, which must be protected from both accidental damage and
intentional sabotage.
Failing to invest in subsea cable infrastructure could cede
market control to global competitors and adversaries. Likewise,
failing to adequately protect these cables could lead to
significant adverse impacts to the U.S. economy and national
security.
Already, Russia, China, and other actors have shown a
willingness and ability to target subsea cables, as several
cable breaks have been attributed to them over the past few
years.
In addition, the development of undersea vehicles may
decrease the cost of attacks, while the cost of cable repairs
remains high.
As the United States formulates strategies to mitigate
threats posed to subsea cables, the Department of Homeland
Security must play a critical role. The Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency, or CISA, serves as the sector
risk management agency for both the communications and
information technology sectors, each of which play a role in
the subsea cable environment. Additionally, the U.S. Coast
Guard maintains responsibilities for maritime law enforcement
and domain awareness in U.S. waters.
DHS and the U.S. Government as a whole must seek
opportunities to increase its ability to deter, detect, and
respond to threats to these cables. I look forward to hearing
proposals from our witnesses for how the United States can
address these pressing security issues.
I thank the witnesses again for joining us.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member McIver follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member LaMonica McIver
November 20, 2025
Subsea cables are critical to U.S. national security, the global
economy, and the daily lives of people around the globe, as they carry
approximately 99 percent of the world's intercontinental internet
traffic.
The extent to which we all rely on the data traveling through these
cables is almost hard to fathom. For example, every day, an estimated
$22 trillion of financial transactions are processed through subsea
cables. Internet traffic is only expected to increase in the coming
decades, as the global economy turns increasingly digital.
The demand for increased internet capacity will require the
installation of hundreds of thousands of miles of new subsea cables,
which must be protected from both accidental damage and intentional
sabotage. Failing to invest in subsea cable infrastructure could cede
market control to global competitors and adversaries. Likewise, failing
to adequately protect these cables could lead to significant adverse
impacts to the U.S. economy and national security.
Already, Russia, China, and other actors have shown a willingness
and ability to target subsea cables, as several cable breaks have been
attributed to them over the past few years. In addition, the
development of autonomous undersea vehicles may decrease the costs of
attacks, while the costs of cable repairs remains high. As the United
States formulates strategies to mitigate threats posed to subsea
cables, the Department of Homeland Security must play a central role.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, or CISA,
serves as the Sector Risk Management Agency for both the communications
and information technology sectors, each of which play a role in the
subsea cable environment.
Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard maintains responsibilities for
maritime law enforcement and domain awareness in U.S. waters. DHS--and
the U.S. Government as a whole--must seek opportunities to increase its
ability to deter, detect, and respond to threats to these cables.
I look forward to hearing proposals from our witnesses for how the
United States can address these pressing security issues.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ranking Member McIver.
I now recognize the Chairman for the Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, the gentleman from
Tennessee, Mr. Ogles, for his opening statement.
Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez, for convening this
joint hearing and for your leadership on these critical issues.
This is my first hearing as Chairman of the Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee, and I appreciate
the opportunity to begin this work with a topic that carries
enormous consequences for our national security and for the
ability of the modern economy that we depend on.
Today, we are examining the security of the subsea cable
systems that carry the vast majority of the world's
international data. These subsea cables stretch across the
ocean floor in nearly every corner of the globe. They deliver
the connectivity that supports the daily operations of the U.S.
Government, global financial markets, cloud services used by
businesses and families, and the data that powers an expanding
artificial-intelligence ecosystem. Without them, the modern
world would slow to a crawl.
Yet they often receive the attention only after something
goes wrong. Recent events have shown how exposed the
infrastructure truly is.
Some disruptions were the result of accidents involving
fishing vessels, anchoring, or natural events. Others occurred
in areas where foreign-adversary vessels were present under
questionable circumstances, where investigations raised
concerns about possible nation-state involvement. We have seen
this pattern not only in the Baltic Sea but also near Taiwan
and in high-traffic chokepoints from the Red Sea to West
Africa.
Even when incidents are unintentional, they reveal
structural weakness in a system the world depends on.
At the same time, the United States is entering a period of
extraordinary growth and bandwidth demand. Major technology and
cloud providers are building new subsea cables on a historic
scale. Yet the number of ships and crews capable of repairing
damaged cables remains extremely limited. Many regions depend
on a single route for critical connectivity. Repairs can take
weeks or months. These delays are more than a simple
inconvenience. They represent serious vulnerabilities for
countries and companies that rely on uninterrupted access to
global networks.
Foreign adversaries are watching these dynamics closely.
The Chinese Communist Party is expanding its footprint in the
construction, maintenance, and oversight of global cables in
ways that raise serious national security concerns. Russian
vessels have engaged in repeated and suspicious activity near
key subsea cable routes, raising a clear question about their
intent.
Both governments have repeatedly used gray-zone aggression
to intimidate their neighbors and probe Western defenses
without triggering open conflict. Subsea cables present a
strategic vulnerability tailor-made for this type of coercion,
and the United States cannot afford to treat the threat
lightly.
This hearing is also an opportunity to examine the role of
the Department of Homeland Security in addressing the
challenges. DHS should be working with industry to identify
risks, share threat information, and support efforts to
strengthen resilience.
Private companies own and operate nearly every subsea cable
that serves the United States. That reality demands close
coordination between Government and industry and a clear
understanding of roles and responsibilities.
Today, we will hear from experts who understand the
technical, geopolitical, and operational realities of securing
this infrastructure. We will examine what the Federal
Government is doing and where improvements are required.
We will also seek to determine whether industry has the
support and information it needs to protect its networks, and
we will consider what actions Congress should take to
strengthen resilience, promote trusted supply chains, and
ensure that American data is not placed at risk by foreign
adversaries.
As I begin my time as Chairman, I want to be clear that
safeguarding the digital infrastructure of the United States
will be a central focus of the subcommittee. This issue cannot
be pushed aside or left to future Congresses. The security of
subsea cables is tied directly to our national strength, our
economic resilience, and our ability to operate in an
increasingly competitive world.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here, for your work
on this critical issue. I look forward to your testimony and a
thoughtful discussion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Chairman Ogles follows:]
Statement of Chairman Andrew Ogles
Thank you, Chairman Gimenez, for convening this joint hearing and
for your leadership on these critical issues.
This is my first hearing as Chairman of the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee, and I appreciate the
opportunity to begin this work with a topic that carries enormous
consequences for our national security and for the ability of the
modern economy that we depend on.
Today, we are examining the security of the subsea cable systems
that carry the vast majority of the world's international data. These
subsea cables stretch across the ocean floor in nearly every corner of
the globe. They deliver the connectivity that supports the daily
operations of the U.S. Government, global financial markets, cloud
services used by businesses and families, and the data that powers an
expanding artificial intelligence ecosystem. Without them, the modern
world would slow to a crawl.
Yet they often receive the attention only after something goes
wrong. Recent events have shown how exposed the infrastructure truly
is.
Some disruptions were the result of accidents involving fishing
vessels, anchoring, or natural events. Others occurred in areas where
foreign adversary vessels were present under questionable
circumstances, where investigations raised concerns about possible
nation-state involvement. We have seen this pattern not only in the
Baltic Sea but also near Taiwan and in high-traffic chokepoints from
the Red Sea to West Africa.
Even when incidents are unintentional, they reveal structural
weakness in a system the world depends on.
At the same time, the United States is entering a period of
extraordinary growth and bandwidth demand. Major technology and cloud
providers are building new subsea cables on a historic scale. Yet the
number of ships and crews capable of repairing damaged cables remains
extremely limited. Many regions depend on a single route for critical
connectivity. Repairs can take weeks or months. These delays are more
than a simple inconvenience. They represent serious vulnerabilities for
countries and companies that rely on uninterrupted access to global
networks.
Foreign adversaries are watching these dynamics closely. The
Chinese Communist Party is expanding its footprint in the construction,
maintenance, and oversight of global cables in ways that raise serious
national security concerns. Russian vessels have engaged in repeated
and suspicious activity near key subsea cable routes, raising a clear
question about their intent.
Both governments have repeatedly used gray zone aggression to
intimidate their neighbors and probe Western defenses without
triggering open conflict. Subsea cables present a strategic
vulnerability tailor made for this type of coercion, and the United
States cannot afford to treat the threat lightly.
This hearing is also an opportunity to examine the role of the
Department of Homeland Security in addressing the challenges. DHS
should be working with industry to identify risks, share threat
information, and support efforts to strengthen resilience.
Private companies own and operate nearly every subsea cable that
serves the United States. That reality demands close coordination
between Government and industry and a clear understanding of roles and
responsibilities.
Today, we will hear from experts who understand the technical,
geopolitical, and operational realities of securing this
infrastructure. We will examine what the Federal Government is doing
and where improvements are required.
We will also seek to determine whether industry has the support and
information it needs to protect its networks, and we will consider what
actions Congress should take to strengthen resilience, promote trusted
supply chains, and ensure that American data is not placed at risk by
foreign adversaries.
As I begin my time as Chairman, I want to be clear that
safeguarding the digital infrastructure of the United States will be a
central focus of the subcommittee. This issue cannot be pushed aside or
left to future Congresses. The security of subsea cables is tied
directly to our national strength, our economic resilience, and our
ability to operate in an increasingly competitive world.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here, for your work on this
critical issue. I look forward to your testimony and a thoughtful
discussion.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Chairman Ogles.
I want to welcome the two newest Members of the Committee
on Homeland Security.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Fong, welcome.
The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Walkinshaw, welcome.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
November 20, 2025
Subsea cables serve as the backbone for nearly all global commerce
and communication, carrying 99 percent of the world's data traffic.
For the United States, this infrastructure is vital to national
security and economic interests, supporting an estimated $9 trillion
worth of trade every day. Dependency on subsea cables continues to
increase as demand for internet traffic capacity grows. Despite their
important function, subsea cables are a vulnerable component of our
infrastructure.
While most damage to subsea cables is accidental, caused primarily
by fishing and anchoring, the threat of deliberate sabotage by state
and non-state actors is of growing concern due to recent incidents and
geopolitical tensions.
The past few years have seen China and Russia investing in
capabilities required to target subsea infrastructure, and each has
been implicated in recent incidents in which subsea cables were
sabotaged.
Disruptions to subsea cables can have wide-spread impacts on
internet traffic capacity. Subsea cable disruptions are also very
costly to repair, with costs ranging from $1.5 million to $24 million
per repair.
As the United States seeks to compete in the increasingly digital
global economy, we must ensure subsea cables are secure and disruptions
are minimized. The United States must develop a strategic approach to
protecting subsea cables that addresses both cyber and physical
security threats.
Mr. Gimenez. I am pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today on this critical topic.
Pursuant to committee rule VIII(C), I ask that our
witnesses please rise and raise their right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Gimenez. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have
answered in the affirmative.
Thank you, and please be seated.
I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses.
Dr. Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director
of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the
Atlantic Council. He is currently a professor at Georgetown
University and a commissioner on the Congressional Commission
on the Strategic Posture of the United States. Previously, he's
served in the Department of Defense and the intelligence
community under the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations.
Tim Stronge is the chief research officer at TeleGeography,
an industry-leading telecommunications data provider known for
independent analysis. His responsibilities span across
TeleGeography's research practices, including network
infrastructure, bandwidth demand modeling, cross-border data
flows, and pricing of telecommunications services.
Alexander Botting is an international policy expert with
experience leading technology and cybersecurity advocacy
efforts in more than 50 countries across 5 continents. He
previously served as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce director for
global regulatory cooperation, where he led initiatives on
cybersecurity, emerging technology, and digital trade
practices.
Kevin Frazier is an AI innovation and law fellow at the
University of Texas School of Law, focusing on artificial
intelligence, technological innovation, and regulatory
structures. His publications appear in leading law journals and
major policy outlets, such as Lawfare, Reason, and the MIT Tech
Review.
I thank each of our distinguished witnesses for being here
today.
I now recognize Dr. Kroenig for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW KROENIG, SENIOR DIRECTOR, SCOWCROFT CENTER
FOR STRATEGY AND SECURITY, ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Mr. Kroenig. Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Ogles, Ranking
Member McIver, distinguished Members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify on the important topic of
foreign-adversary threats to subsea cable infrastructure.
I want to assist your work by sharing insights gleaned in
my more than two decades of experience working on national
security policy at the Central Intelligence Agency, Department
of Defense, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic
Posture of the United States, and now as a professor at
Georgetown and vice president and senior director at the
Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center.
I lead a center responsible for global security and
strategy, so I'll focus my remarks on the geopolitical and
national security dimensions of this challenge.
My message today is simple: China and Russia's threats to
subsea cables present a serious challenge to the global
communications and energy systems that underpin U.S. and allied
security, prosperity, and way of life, and the United States
needs a more effective strategy to deter and defeat adversary
threats to subsea cables.
Since World War II, the United States and its allies have
built an international system that has led to unprecedented
peace, prosperity, and freedom for the United States and its
allies. The design of the global undersea cable infrastructure
was established in a more peaceful time, in which it was
assumed that major powers had shared interest in cooperation
and would behave responsibly.
Unfortunately, the global security environment has greatly
deteriorated in recent years. The People's Republic of China
may pose the greatest threat the United States has ever faced.
It's a comprehensive challenge that includes economic,
technological, ideological, diplomatic, and military
dimensions. Moreover, China is working closely with an axis of
aggressors including Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela.
China seeks to dominate the digital infrastructure of the
21st Century, including in subsea cables, to provide it with
economic espionage and geopolitical advantages. China and
Russia wage gray-zone warfare to coerce vulnerable U.S. allies
and partners and to induce caution in Washington about
intervening on their behalf.
Tactics in this war include Russia's likely involvement
with the bombing of a rail line in Poland just earlier this
week, China's almost-daily military incursions into Taiwan's
territorial waters and air space, and, increasingly, the
possible cutting of subsea cables.
Russian-linked vessels have cut undersea cables in the
Baltic Sea in recent years. On Christmas day last year, for
example, an oil tanker crossed the Gulf of Finland, damaging 4
cables. In 2023, Chinese-registered ships severed 2 undersea
cables, forcing Taiwan's Matsu Islands off line. The islands'
14,000 residents spent weeks with limited connectivity. Sending
a simple text message, for example, took hours.
The United States is not immune. As tensions escalate with
Venezuela, a Maduro-linked vessel could drag an anchor off the
U.S. coast, cutting cables in shallow water. There's nothing
technologically difficult about this scenario.
Moreover, as tensions escalate, there is a risk of major
conflict with China or Russia or both simultaneously. In the
event of such a conflict, China and Russia could undertake a
more systematic and deliberate campaign to sever cables to the
United States or its more vulnerable allies.
As you mentioned in your opening statements, more than 95
percent of global internet traffic relies on undersea cables.
Attacks on these cables disrupt connectivity and, with it, the
functioning of modern society, including communications,
financial and business transactions, energy supplies, global
supply chains, military operations, and daily life in general.
Currently, the United States and its allies lack a
coordinated and effective strategy to deal with this threat. As
a starting point, Congress could task the Executive branch with
developing a strategy to secure subsea cables. It could also
designate the Department of Homeland Security as a single hub
to coordinate and manage undersea cable protection.
Such a strategy could include 3 pillars.
The first pillar is resilience. The United States and its
allies need to develop a more resilient subsea cable
infrastructure. This could include de-risking from Chinese-
owned or -maintained cables and cables that route to mainland
China. This could include building redundancy by laying
additional cables and by establishing back-up sources of
connectivity, such as satellite and microwave links. This could
also include enhanced repair capacity to bring damaged cables
back on line more quickly.
A more effective approach to resilience cannot only limit
the negative impact from severed cables but also contribute to
deterrence by signaling to adversaries that we can bounce back
from any attack.
The second pillar is monitoring. The United States and its
allies need to maintain presence near vulnerable cables to
monitor, attribute, interdict, and deter potential attacks. If
adversaries understand that attacks are likely to be
interdicted or attributed, they're less likely to make the
attempt in first place.
NATO's new ``Baltic Sentry'' mission and Taiwan's stepped-
up Coast Guard patrols show the value of increased presence.
Finnish authorities took physical control of the above-
mentioned oil tanker in December, preventing additional damage.
The Coast Guard could likewise step up patrols. This could be
multidomain and include new technology such as unmanned
systems.
The third pillar is accountability. If foreign commandos
were to sabotage infrastructure in the United States, we
wouldn't just repair the infrastructure; we'd hold them
accountable. The same logic applies to attacks on subsea
cables. The United States and its allies must find creative
ways to impose costs on states that attack subsea cables as a
tool of statecraft and those who help them carry out attacks.
I'm honored that the Committee on Homeland Security has
invited me to share my views on these challenges, and I look
forward to taking your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kroenig follows:]
Prepared Statement of Matthew Kroenig
November 20, 2025
Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member McIver, Ranking
Member Swalwell, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify on the important topic of foreign adversary
threats to subsea cable infrastructure.
I want to assist your work by sharing insights gleaned from my more
than two decades of experience working on U.S. national security policy
at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States,
and now as a professor at Georgetown University, and vice president and
senior director of the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy
and Security.
I lead a center responsible for global strategy and security, so I
will focus my remarks on the geopolitical and national security
dimensions of this challenge.
My message today is simple: China's and Russia's threats to subsea
cables present a serious challenge to the global communications and
energy systems that underpin U.S. and allied security, prosperity, and
way of life. The United States needs a more effective strategy to deter
and defeat adversary threats to subsea cables.
Since World War II, the United States and its allies have built and
defended an international system that has delivered unprecedented
peace, prosperity, and freedom to the American people. The design of
global undersea cable infrastructure was established in a more peaceful
time in which it was assumed that major powers had a shared interest in
cooperation and would behave responsibly.
Unfortunately, the global security environment has greatly
deteriorated in recent years. The People's Republic of China may pose
the greatest threat the United States has ever faced. It is a
comprehensive challenge that includes economic, technological,
ideological, diplomatic, and military dimensions. Moreover, China is
working in coordination with an Axis of Aggressors, Russia, Iran, North
Korea, and Venezuela.
China seeks to dominate the digital infrastructure of the 21st
Century, including in subsea cables, to provide it with economic,
espionage, military, and geopolitical advantages.
China and Russia wage gray zone warfare to coerce vulnerable U.S.
allies and partners and to induce caution in Washington about
intervening on their behalf. Tactics in this war include Russia's
likely involvement with the bombing of a rail line in Poland earlier
this week, China's almost daily military incursions into Taiwan's
territorial waters and air space, and, increasingly, the cutting of
subsea cables.
Russian-linked vessels have cut many undersea cables in the Baltic
Sea in recent years. On Christmas Day last year, for example, an oil
tanker crossed the Gulf of Finland, damaging four cables. In 2023, PRC-
registered ships severed two undersea cables, forcing Taiwan's Matsu
Islands off-line. The Islands' 14,000 residents spent weeks with
limited connectivity. Sending a simple text message took hours.
The United States is not immune. As tensions escalate with
Venezuela, for example, a Maduro-linked vessel could drag an anchor off
the U.S. coast, cutting cables in shallow water. There is nothing
technologically difficult about this scenario.
Moreover, as tensions escalate, there is a risk of major conflict
with China, or Russia, or both simultaneously. In the event of war,
China and Russia could undertake a more systematic campaign to sever
cables to the United States and its allies.
Roughly 95 percent of global internet traffic relies on undersea
cables. Attacks on these cables disrupt connectivity and with it the
functioning of modern society, including: communications, financial and
business transactions, energy supplies, global supply chains, military
operations, and daily life in general.
Currently, the United States and its allies lack a coordinated and
effective strategy to deal with this threat. As a starting point,
Congress could task the Executive branch with developing a strategy to
secure subsea cables. It could also designate the Department of
Homeland Security as a single hub to coordinate and manage undersea
cable protection.
Such a strategy could include three key pillars:
The first pillar is resilience. The United States and its allies
need to develop a more resilient subsea cable infrastructure. This
could include de-risking from Chinese-owned or -maintained cables and
cables that route to mainland China. This could include building
redundancy by laying additional cables and by establishing back-up
sources of connectivity, such as satellite and microwave links. This
could also include an enhanced repair capacity to bring damaged cables
back on-line more quickly.
A more effective approach to resilience cannot only limit the
negative impact from severed cables, but also contribute to deterrence
by signaling to adversaries that we can bounce back from any attack.
A second pillar is monitoring. The United States and its allies
need to maintain presence near vulnerable cables to monitor, attribute,
interdict, and deter potential attacks. If adversaries understand that
attacks are likely to be interdicted or attributed, they are less
likely to make the attempt in the first place. NATO's new Baltic Sentry
mission and Taiwan's stepped-up coast guard patrols show the value of
increased presence. Finnish authorities took physical control of the
above-mentioned oil tanker last December, preventing additional damage.
The U.S. Coast Guard could likewise step up patrols and exercises near
vulnerable subsea cables, especially off the coasts of New York, New
Jersey, Florida, and Southern California. These patrols can be
multidomain and enhanced with new technology, such as unmanned systems
and AI platforms, to help monitor threats to subsea cables.
The third pillar is accountability. If foreign commandos were to
sabotage infrastructure on the U.S. homeland, Washington would not
limit its response to repairing the damage. It would hold the
perpetrators accountable. The same logic applies to attacks on subsea
cables. The United States and its allies must find creative ways to
impose costs on states that attack subsea cables as a tool of
statecraft and those who help them carry out attacks. Effective
deterrence requires that perpetrators understand that their actions
carry consequences.
Appended to this statement is a copy of Cyber defense across the
ocean floor: The geopolitics of submarine cable security, an Atlantic
Council report that explores these issues in greater detail and
provides actionable recommendations.
I am honored that the Committee on Homeland Security has invited me
to share my views on these challenges, and I look forward to taking
your questions.
Mr. Ogles [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Kroenig.
Representative Swalwell is the Ranking Member on the
Cybersecurity Subcommittee. He is unable to attend, so I'm
going to turn to Mr. Walkinshaw to offer an opening statement
on behalf of Ranking Member Swalwell.
Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here today to discuss
an issue that sits at the core of U.S. national security and
economic interests.
I'll note, this is my first hearing as a Member of the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Subcommittee, and I look
forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and the other
Members of the committee.
Approximately 97 percent of global data traffic travels
through subsea cables. Those cables support $9 trillion worth
of trade each day, carry sensitive communications for national
defense and intelligence operations, and ensure critical
functions continue to seamlessly operate.
However, as we've heard, many of those cables are poorly
protected and vulnerable to accidents or negligence. As the
price of uncrewed underwater vehicles decreases, the vehicles
may fall into the hands of non-state actors, enabling them to
dismantle essential global networks.
The urgency of better securing undersea cables hits close
to home for me. According to a recent study by the Joint
Legislative Audit and Review Commission in Virginia, an
estimated 70 percent of global internet traffic passes through
networks in northern Virginia, including Virginia's 11th
District that I represent.
That makes our region one of the most important digital
exchange points in the world, connecting Federal agencies,
critical industries, and global communication pathways. The
information moving through these networks depends on the steady
and secure operation of subsea cables that come ashore along
the East Coast. When those links are disrupted, the strain is
felt here at home.
As we've heard, U.S. adversaries continue to seek
mechanisms to disrupt the system and ensure their targets
remain vulnerable to threats. Russia has invested to develop
platforms to target undersea infrastructure, and the People's
Republic of China has targeted subsea cables to sabotage
Taiwan.
In late 2024, as we heard from Dr. Kroenig, 2 subsea cables
in the Baltic Sea were severed in close succession, cutting
connections between European nations. Officials in the region
described the events as ``hybrid attacks'' and pointed to
suspicious activity by vessels tied to Russia's shadow fleet.
The interruption triggered rerouting of data traffic across
alternative paths, which produced congestion on major routes
that ultimately connect to the communications infrastructure in
northern Virginia.
Soon after, another rupture between Estonia and Finland
affected both telecom and energy transmission. Authorities
identified abnormal maritime behavior by another Russian-linked
vessel as the likely cause.
Earlier this year, Taiwan detained the crew of a Chinese-
operated ship after one of its critical cables near the Matsu
Islands was cut. That incident followed recurring patterns of
anchor-dragging and location-spoofing by vessels operating near
sensitive undersea infrastructure.
These events reveal a troubling pattern: Foreign
adversaries with both capability and intent are increasingly
probing or threatening these networks.
The United States must ensure that our defenses and
preparedness match the scale of the threat. The Department of
Homeland Security, CISA, the Coast Guard, and our interagency
partners all have essential roles. But current efforts are
fragmented, and responsibilities are divided across multiple
entities and private operators, which complicates coordination
and slows action during emergencies.
In considering the roles of these agencies, it's also
important to acknowledge the strain placed on their mission
when resources are diverted from core security
responsibilities. I'm concerned about proposed cuts to
critical-infrastructure programs, including proposed cuts to
Coast Guard operations that are responsible for monitoring
unusual maritime activity around sensitive infrastructure. At a
time when foreign adversaries are probing undersea cables and
testing our resilience, we can't afford to divert attention or
resources away from these priorities.
This hearing provides an opportunity for bipartisan
leadership. Protecting the systems that carry our
communications, financial transactions, and public safety
information is a shared priority. Every community in our Nation
relies on secure connectivity, and regions like mine in
northern Virginia have especially high stakes and are home to
key stakeholders.
I look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides
of the aisle to strengthen Federal coordination, support
responsible investments, and ensure that the United States is
prepared to protect this critical infrastructure against
emerging threats.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Hon. Walkinshaw follows:]
Statement of Hon. James Walkinshaw
November 20, 2025
Approximately 97 percent of global data traffic travels through
subsea cables. Subsea cables support $9 trillion worth of trade each
day, carry sensitive communications for national defense and
intelligence operations, and ensure critical functions continue to
seamlessly operate.
However, many subsea cables are poorly protected and are primarily
vulnerable to accidents or negligence. Although a limited number of
malign actors can deliberately disrupt cables, as the price of uncrewed
underwater vehicles decrease, these vehicles may fall into the hands of
non-state actors enabling them to dismantle essential global networks.
The urgency of better securing undersea cables hits close to home.
According to a recent study by the Joint Legislative Audit and Review
Commission in Virginia, an estimated 70 percent of global internet
traffic passes through networks in Northern Virginia.
That makes our region one of the most important digital exchange
points in the world, connecting Federal agencies, critical industries,
and global communication pathways. The information moving through these
networks depends on the steady and secure operation of subsea cables
that come ashore along the East Coast. Regardless of the cause, when
those links are disrupted abroad, the strain is felt here at home. U.S.
adversaries also continue to seek mechanisms to disrupt the entire
system and ensure their targets remain vulnerable to threats.
Russia has spent money to develop platforms to target undersea
infrastructure and the People's Republic of China has targeted subsea
cables to sabotage Taiwan. In late 2024, two subsea cables in the
Baltic Sea were severed in close succession, cutting connections
between several European nations.
Officials in the region described the events as hybrid attacks and
pointed to suspicious activity by vessels tied to Russia's shadow
fleet. The interruption triggered rerouting of data traffic across
alternative paths, which produced congestion on major routes that
ultimately connect to the communications infrastructure serving
Northern Virginia. Soon after, another rupture between Estonia and
Finland affected both telecommunications and energy transmission.
Authorities identified abnormal maritime behavior by a Russian-linked
vessel as a likely cause.
And earlier this year, Taiwan detained the crew of a Chinese-
operated ship after one of its critical cables near the Matsu Islands
was cut. That incident followed recurring patterns of anchor-dragging
and location-spoofing by vessels operating near sensitive undersea
infrastructure. These events reveal a troubling pattern. Foreign
adversaries with both capability and intent are increasingly probing or
threatening these networks. Some incidents may have been deliberate
acts, while others may represent reckless behavior intended to signal
strategic pressure. In either case, the vulnerabilities exposed are
clear.
The United States must ensure that our defenses and preparedness
match the scale of the threat. The Department of Homeland Security,
CISA, the Coast Guard, and our interagency partners all have essential
roles, but current efforts remain fragmented. Responsibilities are
divided across multiple Federal entities and private operators, which
complicates coordination and slows action during emergencies. In
considering the roles of these critical agencies, it is also important
to acknowledge the strain placed on their missions when resources are
diverted away from core security responsibilities.
The Trump administration has repeatedly proposed cuts to critical
infrastructure protection programs within the Department of Homeland
Security and is shifting personnel and funding toward large-scale
deportation efforts. Those proposals include reductions to CISA's
cybersecurity programs and cuts to Coast Guard operations that are
responsible for monitoring unusual maritime activity around sensitive
infrastructure.
This administration's singular and cruel focus on ripping apart
families is jeopardizing the very capabilities to protect our Nation's
communications networks. At a time when foreign adversaries are probing
undersea cables and testing our resilience, we cannot afford to divert
attention or resources away from these priorities.
This hearing provides an opportunity for bipartisan leadership.
Protecting the systems that carry our communications, financial
transactions, and public safety information is a shared priority. Every
community in this country relies on secure connectivity, and regions
like Northern Virginia have especially high stakes and are home to key
stakeholders.
I look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle to strengthen Federal coordination, support responsible
investments, and ensure that the United States is prepared to protect
this critical infrastructure against emerging threats.
Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Walkinshaw. Welcome to Congress
and to the Cybersecurity Subcommittee.
Dr. Kroenig, thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Stronge, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY STRONGE, CHIEF RESEARCH OFFICER, TELE
GEOGRAPHY
Mr. Stronge. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished
Members of the committee, thank you for your time today.
My name is Tim Stronge, and I'm the chief research officer
at TeleGeography. We provide the independent data that the
global communications industry relies on to map and measure the
internet.
I'm here to talk about the physical backbone of the modern
U.S. economy, submarine fiber-optic cables.
The strategic importance of this network boils down to 3
characteristics: They are vulnerable, they are critical, and
they are irreplaceable.
First, vulnerability.
I've brought a cable sample with me. Encased inside are
thin strands of glass, each about the width of a human hair. If
this looks fragile to you, it's because it is. Individual
cables are especially vulnerable to damage from fishing gear
and anchor drags. The global network experiences roughly 200
faults every year, an average of 4 per week.
Second, criticality.
My son Kaz is away at college right now in Connecticut, and
one of our favorite ways of staying connected is to share funny
videos with each other. Fiber-optic networks make that
possible.
Chairman Ogles, perhaps you already lay awake at night
fretting over how we must protect our Nation's strategic
reserve of cat videos. But even if not, it's important to
understand that cables carry far more than social media and web
content. They are the backbone of global finance.
More than $12 trillion in financial transactions flow over
these cables each day. Millions of American jobs now depend on
access to digital infrastructure. The U.S. Government itself is
heavily reliant on commercial submarine cables.
Third, irreplaceability.
A common misconception is that satellites are a viable one-
for-one replacement. They are not. Satellites are a vital back-
up for mission-essential use, but they cannot replace the sheer
capacity and cost-efficiency of fiber. Cables carry over 99
percent of all intercontinental data for a simple reason: The
cost per unit of cable capacity is 2,800 times cheaper than
satellites.
Collectively, these 3 conditions--physical vulnerability,
high criticality, and economic irreplaceability--might seem
like a scary mix, but I'm here today with some good news. For a
cable operator, the loss of revenue streams during down time is
financially catastrophic. That means that these private
companies are already powerfully self-incentivized to secure
their cables.
So let's return to that vulnerability. The vast majority of
those 200 annual faults are accidents. This constant threat has
compelled the private sector to invest billions of dollars in a
tangible, layered defense. Companies have built dozens of new
cables and geographically diverse landing stations to ensure
that their data always has a back-up path. They've invested in
costly cable burial. They are innovating with new detection
technology that uses the fiber itself to sense threats. The
industry has funded a global fleet of 2 dozen repair vessels on
24/7 standby.
Crucially, the strategies built to defend against routine
accidents will also help to secure the network against
malicious attacks. However, there are critical gaps where
Government action is needed.
First, designate a single point of contact. We need one
Federal lead with the dual mandate to shepherd new cable
projects through the permitting maze and to build a coherent
national strategy for resilience.
Second, strengthen deterrence. Current penalties for cable
damage date back to an 1884 treaty on telegraph cables, and
they are woefully, almost comically, insufficient.
Finally, help fast-track cable repair abroad. The global
average delay to begin a repair is now a month-and-a-half. Much
of that is due to complex permitting in foreign waters. We need
a diplomatic push to cut the foreign red tape that keeps repair
ships at port.
The industry has already demonstrated its deep commitment
to cable security. It now looks to Government as a partner to
help clear the path.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stronge follows:]
Prepared Statement of Timothy Stronge
November 20, 2025
Chairmen, Ranking Members, and distinguished Members of the
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today.
My name is Tim Stronge, and I am the chief research officer at
TeleGeography. We provide the independent data that the global
communications industry relies on to map and measure the internet.
I am here today to talk about the physical backbone of the modern
U.S. economy: submarine fiber-optic cables. The strategic importance of
this network boils down to three characteristics: these cables are
vulnerable, they are critical, and they are irreplaceable.
First, vulnerability. I've brought a cable sample with me. Encased
inside are thin strands of glass, each about the width of a human hair.
If this looks fragile to you, that's because it is. Individual
cables are especially vulnerable to damage from fishing gear and anchor
drags. The global network experiences roughly 200 faults every year--an
average of 4 per week.
Second, criticality. My son Kaz is away at college in Connecticut.
One of our favorite ways to stay connected is to share funny videos.
Fiber-optic networks make that possible. Perhaps you already lay awake
at night, worrying about how we must protect our Nation's strategic
reserve of cat videos. But even if not, it's important to understand
that cables carry far more than social media and web content.
They are the backbone of global finance. More than $12 trillion in
financial transactions flow over these cables each day. Millions of
American jobs now depend on access to digital infrastructure. The U.S.
Government, itself, is heavily reliant on commercial submarine cables.
Third, irreplaceability. A common misconception is that satellites
are a viable one-for-one replacement. They are not. Satellites are a
vital emergency back-up for mission-essential use, but they cannot
replace the sheer capacity and cost-efficiency of fiber. Cables carry
over 99 percent of all intercontinental data for a simple reason: the
cost-per-unit of cable capacity is 2,800 times cheaper than satellites.
Collectively, these three conditions--physical vulnerability, high
criticality, and irreplaceability--might seem like a scary mix.
But I am here today with good news. For a cable operator, the loss
of revenue streams during down time is financially catastrophic. That
means that these private companies are already powerfully self-
incentivized to secure their cables.
Let's return to that vulnerability. The vast majority of those 200
annual faults are accidents. This constant threat has compelled the
private sector to invest billions of dollars in a tangible, layered
defense.
Companies have built dozens of new cables and geographically-
diverse landing stations to ensure data always has a back-up path.
Cable operators are innovating with new detection technology that uses
the fiber itself to sense threats. And they have funded a global fleet
of two dozen repair vessels on 24/7 standby.
Crucially, the strategies built to defend against routine accidents
will also help to secure the network against malicious attacks.
However, there are critical gaps where Government action is needed:
1. First, designate a single point of contact for cables. The
existing inter-agency permitting process can be confusing and
painfully slow. The industry needs one specific Federal lead to
shepherd new cable projects.
2. Second, strengthen deterrence. Current penalties for damage to
cables date back to an 1884 treaty on telegraph cables and are
woefully--almost comically--insufficient.
3. Third, help fast-track cable repair abroad. The global average
delay to begin a repair is now a month and a half. Much of that
is due to complex permitting in foreign waters. We need a
diplomatic push to cut the foreign red tape keeping repair
ships in port.
The industry has already demonstrated its deep commitment to cable
security. It looks to Government as a partner to help clear the path.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Ogles. Mr. Stronge, thank you for your testimony. I,
too, have a young one, or my oldest, away at college, and I do
rely on the technology to communicate with her.
I now recognize Mr. Botting for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statement. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER BOTTING, SENIOR DIRECTOR, GLOBAL
SECURITY AND TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY, VENABLE LLP
Mr. Botting. Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member McIver,
distinguished Members of the subcommittees, thank you for the
invitation to appear before you today to discuss the critical
issue of subsea cable infrastructure security.
My name is Alex Botting, and I serve as senior director for
global security and technology strategy at Venable and as a
global fellow at NYU's Wahba Institute for Strategic
Competition.
For the past decade, I've worked on issues at the
intersection of digital technology, telecommunications, and
security, promoting policies that will make foundational
digital technologies more secure.
Over the past 2 years, I've devoted considerable time to
the issue of subsea cable security and recently offered a white
paper on the topic, ``Shoring Up Subsea Cable Security.'' My
full testimony incorporates the key findings and
recommendations from that white paper.
If I could leave you with just 2 takeaways from today's
hearing, they would be:
No. 1, redundancy is resilience. If cables are abundant and
repairs are swift, the impact of any incident is limited. This,
in turn, significantly reduces the incentive for our
adversaries to engage in sabotage.
Accordingly, we should pursue more efficient and
transparent approval processes for laying and repairing subsea
cables, while of course maintaining high security standards.
Second, our investigations into disruptions to subsea
cables today are insufficient. Roughly 70 percent of subsea
cable disruptions are caused by human activity, yet in almost
all cases we fail to investigate and determine whether the
damage was due to negligence or malicious intent.
If we believe that our adversaries may intend to engage in
sabotage, we must develop the means to distinguish between
accidental and intentional disruption and proactively
investigate human-induced disruptions.
As we seek to insulate ourselves against threats from
adversaries, we should note that the continental United States
is relatively well-protected against a major outage. We're
served by almost 100 subsea cable landings, more than any other
country. These cables land at diverse points across the East
and West Coasts, markedly reducing the risk that a single
incident, accidental or intentional, could wipe out our access
to the global internet. Moreover, in contrast to the radio
access network market, trusted vendors are today the dominant
players.
But because subsea cables are part of a globally-connected
ecosystem and because our force projection depends on
deployments beyond our shores, it's critical that we work not
only at home but with international partners to promote the
implementation of best practices in those countries and enhance
one another's understanding of the threat environment.
Subsea cables underpin the global internet, and in an era
where critical infrastructure is increasingly networked, they
are foundational to the operation of critical services upon
which Americans rely every day. Given their criticality, we
should not take today's security for granted. It is essential
that we stay ahead of emerging security threats and resilient
against incidents.
My full written testimony provides recommendations for the
U.S. Government across 3 areas: enhancing the resilience of the
global ecosystem, protecting individual cables, and
implementing appropriate legal and institutional frameworks.
The implementation of some of these will be led by other
parts of the U.S. Government that fall outside of the
committee's jurisdiction, so I'd like to draw your attention to
2 specific recommendations which the Department of Homeland
Security would be well-positioned to lead as a member of Team
Telecom and the Sector Risk Management Agency for
communications, IT, and maritime transportation.
First, DHS should collaborate with industry and other U.S.
Government stakeholders to conduct a comprehensive mapping of
the submarine cable supply chain to identify potential
chokepoints or areas of reliance on untrusted vendors and
advise industry of appropriate risk mitigations.
Second, DHS should manage a two-way--sorry--a proactive,
two-way threat-intelligence-sharing mechanism with trusted
cable providers and vendors to preempt potential attacks and
support the evidentiary body needed to prosecute criminal
activity.
I hope that the committee will consider and implement these
recommendations, which will better position us to address
threats to subsea cable infrastructure as they arise from
foreign adversaries.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Botting follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alexander Botting
opening remarks
Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member McIver, and
Ranking Member Swalwell, distinguished Members of the subcommittees,
thank you for the invitation to appear before you today to discuss the
critical issue of subsea cable infrastructure security.
My name is Alex Botting and I serve as senior director for global
security & technology strategy at Venable LLP and as a global fellow at
NYU's Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition. For the past decade,
I've worked on issues at the intersection of digital technology,
telecommunications, and security--promoting policies that will make
foundational digital technologies more secure.
Over the past 2 years, I've devoted considerable time to the issue
of subsea cable security and recently authored a white paper on the
topic entitled ``Shoring Up Subsea Security.'' My testimony
incorporates the key findings and recommendations from that white
paper.
If I could leave you with just two takeaways from today's hearing,
they would be:
1. Redundancy is resilience. If cables are abundant and repairs are
swift, the impact of any incident is limited. This, in turn,
significantly reduces the incentive for our adversaries to
engage in sabotage. Accordingly, we should pursue more
efficient and transparent approvals processes for laying and
repairing subsea cables, while of course maintaining high
security standards.
2. Our investigations into disruptions to subsea cables are
insufficient. Roughly 70 percent of subsea cable disruptions
are caused by human activity. Yet, in almost all cases we fail
to investigate negligence or malicious intent. If we believe
that our adversaries may intend to engage in sabotage, we must
develop the means to distinguish between accidental and
intentional disruption and proactively investigate human-
induced disruptions.
The following testimony provides recommendations for the U.S.
Government across three areas: enhancing the resilience of the global
subsea cable ecosystem; ensuring the security of individual submarine
cables against known threats; and implementing appropriate legal and
institutional frameworks.
The implementation of some will be led by U.S. Government agencies
which fall outside of this committee's jurisdiction. I'd like to draw
your attention to two specific recommendations which the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) would be well-positioned to lead as a member of
Team Telecom and the Sector Risk Management Agency for Communications,
IT, and Maritime Transportation.
DHS should collaborate with industry and other U.S.
Government stakeholders to conduct a comprehensive mapping of
the submarine cable supply chain to identify potential choke
points or areas of reliance on untrusted vendors and ensure
that appropriate risk mitigations are in place.
DHS should manage a proactive two-way intelligence-sharing
mechanism with trusted cable developers and vendors to pre-empt
potential attacks, and support the evidentiary body needed to
prosecute criminal activity.
As we seek to insulate ourselves against threats from our
adversaries, we should note that the continental United States is quite
well-protected against a major subsea cable outage. We are served by
almost 100 subsea cable landings, more than any other country. These
cables land at diverse points on the East and West coasts, markedly
reducing the risk that a single incident inhibits our access to the
global internet. Moreover, in contrast to the Radio Access Network
market, trusted vendors are the dominant players.
Because subsea cables are part of a globally-connected ecosystem,
and U.S. force projection depends upon deployments beyond our shores,
it's critical that we work with international partners to promote the
implementation of policy best practices, and enhance one another's
understanding of the threat environment.
Subsea cables underpin the global internet and, in an era where
critical infrastructure is increasingly networked, they are
foundational to the operation of critical services upon which we rely
every day. Given their criticality, we should not take today's security
for granted. It is essential that we stay ahead of emerging security
threats and resilient against incidents. Doing so will require robust
multi-stakeholder and multi-country cooperation.
why subsea cables are essential
There are few technologies more foundational to the modern economy
than subsea cables. As of 2024, 5\1/2\ billion people had access to the
global internet and the associated economic benefits. A network of 597
subsea fiber optic cables,\1\ largely operated by the private sector,
enable them to do so by carrying more than 95 percent of
intercontinental data traffic.\2\ Beyond use by individuals, subsea
cables are essential to the operation of critical sectors including
financial services, defense, and telecommunications.
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\1\ TeleGeography, Submarine Cable Map 2025, https://submarine-
cable-map-2025.telegeogra- phy.com/.
\2\ TeleGeography, ``Submarine Cable Frequently Asked Questions,''
(last accessed Nov. 17, 2025). www2.telegeography.com/submarine-cable-
faqs-frequently asked-questions.
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Today the most advanced cables can transmit more than 350 terabits
per second along the ocean floor, equivalent to ``the entire digitized
Library of Congress three times every second.''\3\ This achievement is
driven by investments in technological innovation and the global
economy's insatiable demand for data, which has risen from roughly 100
gigabytes of traffic per day in 1992,\4\ to an estimated 495.89 million
terabytes per day in 2025.\5\
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\3\ Chris Ciauri, ``The Dunant subsea cable, connecting the US and
mainland Europe, is ready for service,'' Google, Feb. 3, 2021,
cloud.google.com/blog/products/infrastructure/googles-dunant-subsea-
cable-is-now-ready-for-service.
\4\ UNCTAD, Global efforts needed to spread digital economy
benefits https://unctad.org/news/global-efforts-needed-spread-digital-
economy-benefits-un-report-says.
\5\ https://www.statista.com/statistics/871513/worldwide-data-
created/.
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With advanced-AI workloads introducing new demands for the movement
of data, global demand will continue to grow significantly in the years
ahead. There is no feasible pathway to meet this demand that does not
include significant investment in subsea cable infrastructure.
The rapid deployment of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites is an
impressive technological feat, but as of 2024 the combined capacity of
every SpaceX satellite was a little under 350 terabits per second.\6\ A
single cutting-edge cable such as the ``Grace Hopper'', meanwhile, can
transmit 352 terabits of data per second.\7\ As modern societies come
to depend ever more on data and computing capabilities, the ``cloud
under the sea'' is indispensable to the operation of a modern economy.
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\6\ Universe Space Tech, ``SpaceX presents Starlink V3 satellites
with 1 Tbps speeds,'' Jan 7, 2025, https://universemagazine.com/en/
spacex-presents-starlink-v3-satellites-with-1-tbps-speeds/
?srsltid=AfmBOor-h6nkfdYkNrl-hH5gyGg_XH6PFBeM00ZrWa_FyOtc4ecNdVBE.
\7\ Federal Communications Commission, Report No. SCL-00352 Actions
Taken Under Cable Landing License Act, Jan. 14, 2022, https://
docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-22-
44A1_Rcd.pdf#::text=Cable%20Design%20and%20Capacity:%20Grace%20Hopper%2
0will- ,system%20design%20capacity%20of%20approximately%20352%20Tbps.
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Given the critical function that they fulfill, submarine cables
should be, and in many countries are, categorized as critical
infrastructure themselves. This designation affords them additional
attention from industry and Government stakeholders to ensure their on-
going security and resilience.
the threat environment for subsea cable infrastructure
Owing to the vast distances that they cover, subsea cables are
inherently vulnerable to accidental damage, natural disasters, or
malicious interference. Across the 597 cables in operation today,
roughly 150-200 incidents impact their operations during a typical
year, according to the International Cable Protection Committee
(ICPC).\8\
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\8\ International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), Media
Enquiries & Frequently Asked Question, May 16, 2025, https://
www.iscpc.org/news/media-enquiries/.
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Recent disruptions to cables and rising geopolitical tensions have
spurred governments to intensify scrutiny of submarine cable accidents.
Public reporting that China has developed a cable-cutting device
capable of severing highly-fortified cables at a depth of 4,000 meters
has amplified concerns.\9\ As has the discovery of ``Project Harmony'',
a seabed sensor network established by Russia.\10\ Concerns have been
amplified further by high-profile instances of cable disruptions in the
Baltic Sea \11\ and the Taiwan Strait,\12\ the latter of which saw more
cable disruptions in January 2025 than in either 2023 or 2024.
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\9\ The Diplomat, ``China's new deep-sea cutting tool exposes
vulnerability of undersea cables,'' April 16, 2025, https://
thediplomat.com/2025/04/chinas-new-deep-sea-cutting-tool-exposes-
vulnerability-of-undersea-cables/.
\10\ International Consortium of Investigative Journalists,
``Russia secretly acquired Western technology to protect its nuclear
submarine fleet,'' Oct. 23, 2025, https://www.icij.org/investigations/
russia-archive/russia-secretly-acquired-western-technology-to-protect-
its-nuclear-submarine-fleet/.
\11\ Associated Press, ``Sweden seizes vessel suspected of
`sabotage' after undersea data cable rupture in Baltic Sea,'' Jan. 27,
2025, https://apnews.com/article/latvia-denmark-underwater-cable-
damage-investigation-63da5ef0d577bca12bbe118d527d3a14.
\12\ ABC News, ``Taiwan detains China-linked cargo ship after
undersea cable disconnected,'' Feb. 25, 2025, https://www.abc.net.au/
news/2025-02-25/taiwan-detains-china-linked-ship-after-undersea-cable-
incident/104981932.
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In an era of deep mistrust, it is easy to overstate the extent of
exploitation occurring today. Yet, while sabotage may occur, it is in
all likelihood rare. According to ICPC, the vast majority of
incidents--approximately 70 percent in any given year--are caused by
physical damage from fishing activity or anchoring.\13\ The remainder
result from natural events (such as storms or earthquakes), abrasion,
or internal system failures. These incidents are longstanding and
typically well-managed.
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\13\ ICPC, ``Charting submarine cables is critical for maritime
safety & infrastructure protection,'' June 25, 2025, https://
www.iscpc.org/publications/icpc-viewpoints/charting-submarine-cables-
is-critical-for-maritime-safety-and-infrastructure-protection/.
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Beyond cuts to subsea cables, there is a theoretical risk of data
interception on a subsea cable. As noted on pages 12-13, at this time
this is unlikely to be implemented in practice without detection.
Nevertheless, while the risk of exploitation is low today, public and
private-sector stakeholders should continue to assess the capabilities
of adversaries, informed by government intelligence where possible, and
adjust their assessment of the risk accordingly.
Finally, there is the risk that untrusted vendors in subsea cable
supply chains could compromise the confidentiality of data, or
availability of networks. This issue parallels the challenges faced
during the rollout of 5G communications when Chinese companies like
Huawei and ZTE leveraged government subsidies to dominate the
telecommunications market, especially in emerging economies.
China continues to lead in advanced optical communications
research, producing 37.7 percent of the field's research compared to
just 12.8 percent from the United States, underscoring the urgency for
democratic nations to restrict untrusted vendors from developing and
controlling optical core network infrastructure.\14\ Today, trusted
vendors maintain a technological advantage and a leading market
position, but we should not take this for granted.
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\14\ Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Critical
Technology Tracker, March 1, 2023, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/
critical-technology-tracker/#6a5a9bb3-c58e-4909-85f4-78bd8- 75c0a80-
link.
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promoting resilience in the ecosystem
Cable Redundancy
Building redundancy into submarine cable routes is vital for the
resilience and reliability of global communications. If cables are
abundant and repairs are swift, cuts will have limited practical
impact. This significantly reduces the incentive for our adversaries to
engage in sabotage.
To enhance resilience, companies design networks such that each
node connects to at least two others, allowing traffic rerouting. They
also seek to ensure that the supply of capacity stays ahead of demand
at both a local and global level. The building of new cables is
resource-intensive, however, often requiring hundreds of millions of
dollars in investment.
Cumbersome and opaque permitting and licensing regimes add to
expense and extend the time line for deployments, discouraging
investment. In the United States, permitting time lines have stretched
from under a year to over 3 years, involving up to 11 agencies with
overlapping mandates for environmental, historical, and national
security concerns.\15\ Moreover, national security reviews are often
slow and can result in the denial of a landing license after years of
investment, where Government guidance earlier in the process could have
redirected cable operators to more palatable routes or partners.
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\15\ Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Priorities for DHS
Engagement on Subsea Cable Security & Resilience, Dec. 18, 2024,
www.dhs.gov/publication/priorities-dhs-engagement-subsea-cable-
security-resilience.
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This lack of coordination, transparency, and predictability creates
uncertainty, deters investors, and can even increase vulnerability
through geographic clustering. Enhancing transparency with trusted
private-sector partners and streamlining permitting and licensing
processes, while maintaining security standards, is thus critical to
enhancing resilience.
In instances where laying additional subsea cables isn't
commercially feasible, such as in remote islands, governments and
development partners should explore alternative financing mechanisms or
satellite-based alternatives to subsea cables to ensure resilience
against single points of failure.
Recommendations
1. The U.S. Government should ensure that permit requirements for
the installation and repair of submarine cables are transparent
and establish clear time frames for approvals that are as short
as possible, without undermining security.
2. The U.S. Government should enhance clarity and predictability of
rules, partners, and geographies that will factor into
approvals decisions, and promote transparency between national
security agencies and submarine cable developers about security
risks.
3. The U.S. Government should establish and communicate clear
security and resilience requirements which are aligned with
international standards and harmonized with national security
review processes.
Effective route planning
At a global level, route diversity is a common best practice as it
allows data to reroute around damaged segments, reducing disruption and
deterring sabotage. Within a given country's EEZ, however, governments
and industry may decide between diversifying cable routes and landings
or concentrating them in Cable Protection Zones (CPZs).\16\
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\16\ International Cable Protection Committee, Government Best
Practices for Protecting and Promoting Resilience of Submarine
Telecommunications Cables Version 1.2, (last accessed Nov. 17, 2025),
pg. 3, https://www.iscpc.org/documents/?id=3733.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While diversification minimizes the impact of an individual
incident, it's not always feasible for countries with limited
coastline, crowded marine environments, or facing hostile maritime
disputes, such as the South China Sea. Where diversification isn't
possible, Cable Protection Zones (CPZs) can safeguard concentrated
routes by restricting anchoring and fishing. Governments must, however,
enforce protection measures and penalize violations to reduce the risk
that one event could damage multiple systems.
Ultimately, the United States' current approach of diversifying
cable routes and landings is the most appropriate for its
circumstances.
Recommendations
4. The U.S. Government should foster commercial and regulatory
conditions that support the development of diverse submarine
cable landing sites and pathways, including streamlining
permitting approvals processes.
5. The U.S. Government should establish regulatory frameworks that
embed submarine cable considerations into marine spatial
planning processes, ensuring early-stage coordination with
submarine cable stakeholders during the planning and
development of other marine activities.
6. The U.S. Government should coordinate with trusted international
partners to harmonize (to the extent possible) licensing and
permitting requirements.
Facilitating timely cable repairs
Fast, efficient repairs limit the disruption from security
incidents, yet cabotage laws, permitting delays, customs fees, high
costs, and limited repair vessels slow recovery efforts on many cables
today. Although most systems can be repaired within 2 weeks, recent
data show average repair times now go beyond that, owing to delays
caused by permitting, weather, or backlogs.\17\
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\17\ Recorded Future, Submarine Cables Face Increasing Threats Amid
Geopolitical Tensions and Limited Repair Capacity, July 17, 2025,
https://assets.recordedfuture.com/insikt-report-pdfs/2025/ta-2025-
0717.pdf.
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The imposition of cabotage requirements, which mandate the use of
locally-built and crewed vessels, is a problem at a global level. These
rules increase costs, delay urgent repairs, and conflict with
international law under UNCLOS, which affirms freedom to maintain
cables in international and exclusive economic zones.\18\
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\18\ ICPC, Government Best Practices, pg. 9.
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Likewise, mandatory port calls and customs duties add unnecessary
delays and costs. Streamlining entry procedures and eliminating taxes
and tariffs on repair operations accelerates service restoration.
Establishing free ports with bonded storage facilities further reduces
friction, allowing secure, duty-free storage of repair materials until
needed.
Recommendations:
7. The U.S. Government should actively engage with international
partners to address barriers to cable repair, which not only
impair local capacity but also undermine the resilience of the
global ecosystem. This includes:
7.1 Refraining from classifying submarine cable
installation and repair activities as cabotage and from
imposing cabotage or crewing restrictions on repair
vessels.
7.2 Eliminating port entry requirements for cable ships
engaged in installation or repair operations.
7.3 Avoid imposing customs duties, taxes, and fees on
submarine cable installation and repair activities, by
enabling the establishment of Free Ports with bonded
storage facilities at vessel base ports to facilitate
deployment and expedite repairs.
Global repair ship capacity
The global fleet of repair ships is limited in size and distributed
across the globe, which can cause delays in remote or high-traffic
areas. Although most repair operations are handled by trusted entities,
we do rely on a narrow vendor base that includes as least one untrusted
vendor--China's S.B. Submarine Systems (SBSS)--which participates in
repair efforts in the North Pacific region.\19\
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\19\ The Wall Street Journal, ``U.S. Fears Undersea Cables are
Vulnerable to Espionage from Chinese Repair Ships,'' May 19, 2024,
https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-internet-cables-
repair-ships-93fd6320?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqfyEGd0IiscfyyxW9hIWjo-
81A0KIhm6vclhvq9qX5Dqz5-
zFdPBaDY037Uqm0Y%3D&gaa_ts=691b909c&gaa_sig=pdns- 4KMa_RE6jXl2cxwWTF-
glzZzsrrZRQAdpCfsf6n2ZsYAsMqHUR5gu_R7fatAnf8Qg4vv_GmY-H4O3q3gtw%3D%3D.
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The U.S. established the Cable Security Fleet (CSF) in 2021, to
ensure rapid response and repair capacity during emergencies. While
this program strengthens U.S. capabilities, each new repair ship costs
over $100 million, requiring a long-term commitment.\20\
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\20\ Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS),
Safeguarding Subsea Cables: Protecting Cyber Infrastructure amid Great
Power Competition, August 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/
safeguarding-subsea-cables-protecting-cyber-infrastructure-amid-great-
power-competition. Governments should ensure private-sector involvement
in developing public policy initiatives to boost repair, to ensure that
they do not inadvertently reduce incentives for private industry to
invest in and maintain commercial repair capacity.
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Instead, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security should
collaborate with industry to develop an emergency response capability,
designed for targeted interventions in exceptional circumstances, such
as major natural disasters or acts of sabotage.
Recommendations:
8. The U.S. Government should co-develop a strategy with industry
for emergency cable repair capacity, to enable additional
Government resources to be deployed in the event of a wide-
spread disruption to cables.
9. The U.S. Government should streamline regulatory frameworks to
ensure efficient cable repair, while maintaining security and
transparency. This includes improving permitting and liability
regimes.
Secure and trusted supply chains
Resilience is dependent upon access to uninterrupted provision of
the trusted components necessary for laying, repairing, and maintaining
submarine cables. Today, global repair and installation capacity is
concentrated among a few providers, leaving little room for expansion
and creating potential chokepoints. Because no single country has
enough repair demand to sustain its own market, operators rely on
regional maintenance agreements to share ships and resources.
Within subsea cable infrastructure supply chains, potential market
dominance by untrusted vendors, especially Chinese state-backed firms,
poses a strategic risk. As seen during the 5G rollout with Huawei and
ZTE, such control can enable authoritarian influence over global
communications.
While trusted vendors lead the market today, China's leadership in
optical communications research, producing nearly 38 percent of global
output versus 13 percent from the United States, underscores the need
for the United States to invest in innovation, strengthen domestic R&D,
and avoid dependency on Chinese vendors.\21\ Collaboration between
cable operators and governments to mitigate these risks is critical.
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\21\ Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Critical
Technology Tracker, March 1, 2023, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/
critical-technology-tracker/#6a5a9bb3-c58e-4909-85f4-78bd875- c0a80-
link.
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Recommendations:
10. DHS should collaborate with industry to conduct a comprehensive
mapping of the submarine cable supply chain to identify
potential choke points or areas of reliance on untrusted
vendors and ensure that appropriate risk mitigations are in
place.
11. The U.S. Government should maintain a published list of
untrusted providers which will guide industry in the
development of their supply chain partnerships.
12. The U.S. Government and trusted industry partners should
cooperate on sharing risk and incident data to identify
protection gaps, enhance resilience, and detect and prevent
malicious activities by state and non-state actors.
enhancing the security of cable infrastructure
Submarine cables are engineered to withstand extreme underwater
conditions, protected by multiple layers of insulation and armoring.
While they rest along the seabed in deeper waters, they are typically
buried 0.5-3 meters deep when at less than 1,500 meters to protect
against damage.\22\ Despite these measures, cables remain vulnerable to
natural, accidental, and intentional harm.
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\22\ ICPC, Government Best Practices, pg. 2.
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Events such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, and
underwater landslides occasionally damage cables, though less
frequently than human activity. The most prevalent cause of disruption,
however, is human disruption caused by fishing and anchoring, which
accounts for roughly 70 percent of cable breaks annually.\23\
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\23\ ICPC, Government Best Practices, pg. 1.
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Several mitigations are available and are being utilized to address
these risks, particularly those related to accidental and intentional
human activities. The most obvious measure is armoring cables for
tensile and impact resistance.
Beyond physical reinforcement, Automated Identification Systems
(AIS) or Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) can be used to provide real-
time alerts regarding vessel movements, which facilitates better cable
protection.\24\ It also aids the investigation of incidents after they
occur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ ICPC, Government Best Practices, pg. 2.
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Recommendations:
13. Industry should continue to armor cables deployed shallower
than 1,500 meters.
14. The U.S. Government should ensure the use of AIS tracking
devices by vessels is mandatory in national law and enforce its
use in accordance with IMO regulations.
15. Governments should explore making the use of VMS tracking
mandatory within their EEZ to enhance visibility of activity
near submarine cables, and enforcement against negligent
activities.
Physical Security of Landing Stations
Of the world's 1.5 million kilometers of submarine fiber-optic
cables, all connect to land through roughly 1,400 Cable Landing
Stations (CLS). These shoreline facilities link subsea cables to
terrestrial infrastructure--such as fiber-optic networks and
satellites--that carry data to users and data centers. Like other
critical infrastructure, CLS facilities face risks from natural hazards
such as hurricanes, wildfires, and earthquakes, as well as intentional
threats from malicious actors. A 2017 U.S. Government report identified
landing stations as ``the most accessible and impact-rich targets''\25\
within global communications systems.
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\25\ CRS, Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables, pg. 6.
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While internet traffic can often be rerouted through other
terrestrial or subsea pathways, damage to a major CLS that connects
multiple cables can still cause widespread outages.\26\ For this
reason, network designers build redundancy by diversifying cable routes
and landing points.
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\26\ Data Center Dynamics, ``What is a cable landing station?''
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Protection of CLS sites is relatively comprehensive due to their
fixed locations and clearer jurisdictional control. Standard safeguards
include physical security measures--such as surveillance, access
control, and intrusion detection--as well as resilience planning for
energy supply and disaster impacts. Together, these practices form a
mature framework for protecting critical coastal infrastructure that
underpins global connectivity.
Recommendations:
16. The U.S. Government should work with industry to define clear
security best practices for cable landing stations and work
cooperatively to implement risk-based measures that enhance the
overall resilience and security.
Interception of Data on Cables
Given the technical complexity of this type of espionage, the
theoretical risk is unlikely to be implemented effectively at this time
for three reasons: it requires enormous technical and financial
resources, the sheer data volume makes useful extraction nearly
impossible, and any physical interference will create detectable
anomalies in the cable's performance.
Interfering with active cables post-deployment, however, is highly
complex and limited to nation-states with advanced resources. There are
reasonable concerns about Chinese-operated vessels like SBSS \27\ and
research ships such as Tan Suo Yi Hao \28\ conducting suspicious
activities near major cable routes. Yet much of the data that traverses
networks today is encrypted. Even attempts to pursue a ``harvest now,
decrypt later''\29\ strategy would require sufficient storage to retain
up to 352 TBPS of data, overwhelming the resources of even the most
well-resourced actors and creating a ``needle in a haystack'' problem.
Moreover, any attempts to tamper with the cable undersea would likely
create anomalies in the light passing through the cable, which would be
captured by the modems.
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\27\ Daniel Runde et. al., Safeguarding Subsea Cables: Protecting
Cyber Infrastructure amid Great Power Competition, CSIS, Aug. 2024, pg.
4., www.csis.org/analysis/safeguarding-subsea-cables-protecting-cyber-
infrastructure-amid-great-power-competition.
\28\ Samantha Dick and Stephen Dziedzic, ``Dutton says Chinese
research ship is collecting intelligence, mapping undersea cables,''
ABC News, Mar. 31, 2025, www.abc.net.au/news/2025-04-01/dutton-says-
chinese-research-ship-mapping-undersea-cables/105122068.
\29\ K.F. Hasan et al., A Framework for Migrating to Post-Quantum
Cryptography: Security Dependency Analysis and Case Studies, IEEE
Access, Feb. 16, 2024, pg. 23431.
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To mitigate future threats, data owners should implement strong
encryption in transit and plan migration to post-quantum cryptography.
Ultimately, however, given the vast resources required and without a
clear path to generating usable information, the risk associated with
cable `tapping' remains very low and the efforts of adversarial nation-
states are likely to be directed toward more accessible targets.
Vulnerabilities could, however, be introduced during manufacturing
or storage. Cable components kept in depots, such as China's Wujing
Depot, may face higher tampering risks due to weaker security controls.
While there is currently limited public evidence of exploitation, the
long-term storage of components in jurisdictions of strategic concern
warrants continued vigilance and mitigation of risks.
Recommendations:
17. Industry owners of data should continue to implement
comprehensive data risk mitigation frameworks including, where
feasible, encrypting data in transit.
18. The U.S. Government and industry owners of data should ensure
timely transition to quantum-resistant algorithms when
encrypting sensitive data.
19. DHS should work with industry to map potential supply chain
risks, to include those to the repair supply chain.
Emerging Detection Capabilities
One emerging technology--fiber sensing--can also play a role in
improving real-time incident detection. Fiber sensing leverages the
optical transmission technology used by modern cables to send
information between endpoints. The oscillation direction of the
electric field, known as the State of Polarization (SOP), changes as
the light propagates. The SOP is sensitive to external stimuli, such as
the pressure and physical movements experienced by the fiber, enabling
fiber sensing technologies integrated into modems to monitor and detect
variations to the SOP.\30\
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\30\ Brian Lavallee, ``Detecting Undersea Earthquakes with Cross-
Industry Collaboration,'' Ciena, Feb. 22, 2024, https://www.ciena.com/
insights/articles/2022/detecting-undersea-earthquakes-with-cross-
industry-collaboration.
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By analyzing these changes, operators can gain valuable insights
into the physical movements or disturbances affecting the cable,
enabling real-time detection of tampering or damage. Beyond detecting
damage to cables after they have gone off-line, fiber sensing can
provide insights into underwater activity in the vicinity of submarine
cables. This could improve investigations, support attribution of
incidents, and increase accountability, thereby enhancing deterrence.
Additionally, fiber sensing can serve as an early warning system
for natural hazards. For example, changes in the SOP of a particular
submarine cable caused by an underwater earthquake could provide
information to early warnings of tsunamis, allowing governments to
mitigate harms to populated areas.
While fiber sensing may enhance situational awareness and cable
protection, however, its deployment raises important legal
considerations. Adding fiber sensing to a cable may reclassify it from
a purely telecommunications cable to a measurement device. To enable
the wide-spread use of fiber sensing on cables crossing such
jurisdictions, further clarification of UNCLOS provisions will be
necessary to ensure continued compliance with international law.
Recommendations:
20. The U.S. Government and industry should continue to invest in
research and development (R&D) to advance fiber sensing
capabilities and establish clear guidance on the approvals
process for, and use of, fiber sensing solutions.
21. The U.S. Government and industry should explore potential
information-sharing agreements to leverage real-time data
regarding imminent natural disasters.
implementing legal & institutional frameworks
Domestic Legal Frameworks
Legal and institutional frameworks play a critical role in
reinforcing risk mitigation and deterrence. If designed effectively,
they will catalyze security and resilience efforts by promoting
awareness of risks, enhancing multi-stakeholder coordination, reducing
instances of unintentional disruption, and adequately deterring acts of
aggression.
Governments can play a constructive role first by enhancing
transparency around national security priorities. For example,
publishing clear guidance on high-risk countries, prohibited equipment,
and entities and countries of concern would help infrastructure
operators make informed decisions.
Second, by implementing national obligations under 1884 and UNCLOS.
Article II of the former states that it's ``a punishable offence to
break or injure a submarine cable, willfully or by culpable negligence,
in such a manner as might interrupt or obstruct telegraphic
communication.''\31\ Article 113 of UNCLOS, meanwhile, requires
countries to adopt laws to punish people or ships under its
jurisdiction for damaging or breaking submarine cables on the high
seas, whether ``done willfully or through culpable negligence.''\32\
Yet while on the surface this provides a robust enforcement framework,
in reality it is enforced sporadically.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph
Cables, Mar. 14, 1884, p. 2, https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/
2019/02/1884-Convention-for-the-Protection-of-Submarine-Telegraph-
Cables-1.pdf.
\32\ United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Sea, pg. 64.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, by enforcing IMO-required use of Automatic Identification
Systems (AIS). AIS is required to be fitted on most large ships. Yet
according to a recent study, enforcement is poor and ``sanctions are
not severe enough to act as deterrents.''\33\ Many vessels deactivate
AIS to evade detection while illegally fishing in protected areas or to
avoid revealing lucrative fishing areas to competitors.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Priyal Bunwaree, The Illegality of Fishing Vessels `Going
Dark' and Methods of Deterrence, Cambridge University Press, Jan. 11,
2023, pg. 191
\34\ Oceana, ``Avoiding Detection Global Case Studies.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, governments should ensure coordinated use of the
territorial seabed. This can be done by mandating educational programs
for maritime employees via local marine and fishing authorities, to
ensure they are aware of key cable pathways, charting requirements, and
measures to avoid accidental disruption.
Where fishing vessels are negligent in applying these measures,
penalties should be enforced, even in cases of accidental disruption,
to incentivize compliance. Due to the inherently cross-border nature of
this infrastructure, the United States should also promote their
implementation by foreign governments.
Recommendations:
22. The U.S. Government should implement national obligations under
1884 and UNCLOS, where applicable.
23. The U.S. Government should ensure IMO-required use of Automatic
Identification System (AIS) tracking.
24. The U.S. Government should ensure that charting authorities
update nautical charts regularly; ensure implementation of the
amended IHO Resolution 4/1967; and mandate educational programs
for employees of maritime vessels.
25. The U.S. Government should establish and rigorously enforce
penalties for the disruption of cables through negligence and
encourage international partners to do the same.
International Collaboration
Effective deterrence necessitates the ability to monitor,
intercept, and penalize vessels that may cause disruption within the
territorial sea. The cable ecosystem covers such vast territory,
however, that it would require an unfeasible number of resources for
countries to patrol the high seas individually.
The U.S. Government should work with international partners,
leverage existing security mechanisms such as NATO or the Quad, to
establish a multilateral mechanism for conducting patrols, focused on
high-risk areas. These include regions that are experiencing acute
geopolitical instability (e.g. Baltic Sea), have cables that are more
physically exposed (e.g. Red Sea), or are key fulcrums for the global
ecosystem (e.g. Straits of Malacca).
Supporting these efforts, governments should establish or expand
mechanisms for intelligence sharing with trusted partners to pre-empt
potential attacks, adapt patrol activities accordingly, and support the
evidentiary body needed to convict saboteurs. While the private sector
has proven itself adept at ensuring continuity of service during past
outages, only governments can conduct the kind of operational
activities needed to deter acts of international negligence or
aggression.
Beyond operational collaboration, there are critical gaps in the
existing international legal architecture for submarine cables. Even if
like-minded countries enforce their obligations under 1884 and UNCLOS
at a domestic level, state actors can opt not to impose penalties on
ships bearing their flag that engage in sabotage on the High Seas. As
recent disruptions in the Baltic Sea and Taiwan Strait have
demonstrated, existing legal frameworks in many countries make it
highly challenging to intercept, investigate, or prosecute security
incidents, even where governments suspect intentional foul play.\35\
Whether these incidents are deemed to be accidental or intentional acts
of sabotage, our inability to address acts of sabotage if and when they
occur inhibits our ability to deter such behavior.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Miranda Bryant, ``Sweden says China denied request for
prosecutors to board ship linked to severed cables,'' The Guardian,
Dec. 23, 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendations:
26. The U.S. Government should leverage existing security
cooperation agreements to conduct patrols in high-risk areas
and share intelligence about potential threats.
27. DHS should manage a proactive two-way intelligence-sharing
mechanism with trusted cable developers and vendors to pre-empt
potential attacks, and support the evidentiary body needed to
prosecute criminal activity.
Multi-Stakeholder Coordination
Government and industry have a shared interest in promoting the
security and resilience of submarine cable infrastructure, yet
mechanisms for public-private coordination are limited. To remedy this,
governments should take steps to formalize their private-sector
engagement. These efforts should initially focus on: establishing a
Single Point of Contact (SPOC) for private-sector engagement;
establishing two-way threat intelligence sharing with private
stakeholders; and enhancing transparency around trusted vendors.
In most governments, multiple agencies have responsibility for some
aspect of submarine cable resilience. Their remit may cut across
environmental, commercial, or security considerations and their
authorities may encompass new cable approvals, repair activities, or
critical infrastructure protection. Governments can reduce
inefficiencies, while meeting desired security outcomes, by appointing
a SPOC responsible for engaging companies as they navigate regulatory
processes. Their role would not prevent direct engagement with
individual agencies. Rather, this office would serve as the primary
external liaison to private entities and internally drive maximum
efficiency and transparency of the process.
The important role of private companies in deploying, maintaining,
and securing these assets also necessitates multi-stakeholder threat
intelligence sharing. This enables public and private organizations to
benefit from information, analysis, and context that they would not be
privy to individually and provides an early warning system against
potential threats. Beyond direct information about tactics, techniques
and indicators of compromise, this creates a common understanding of
the threat environment and what steps need to be taken to mitigate
risks.
Untrusted vendors have been successful in winning contracts for
subsea cable infrastructure. While this is less acute than in Radio
Access Networks, organizations like HMN continue to leverage
significant Chinese government subsidies to undercut bids from
competitors by up to a third.\36\ While matching China's bids dollar-
for-dollar is not a feasible long-term solution, like-minded
governments can reduce the strategic advantage of untrusted vendors by
publishing clear guidance on high-risk equipment, entities of concern,
and trusted suppliers. This transparency would help infrastructure
operators make informed procurement decisions early in the planning
process and ensure alignment with national security objectives. Such
guidance can also deter the use of untrusted vendors by signaling
potential risks, while supporting trusted vendors in producing
competitive, security-enhancing bids.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Joe Brock, ``US and China wage war beneath the waves--over
internet cables,'' Reuters, Mar. 24, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/
investigates/special-report/us-china-tech-cables/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendations:
28. The U.S. Government should serve as a single point of contact
to centralize information and serve as an initial liaison for
Government agencies and private parties regarding existing and
planned submarine cables.
29. The U.S. Government should publish clear guidance on high-risk
equipment, entities and countries of concern, and trusted
suppliers.
30. The U.S. Government should establish formal 1.5 track dialogs
with trusted industry partners through existing regional and
security groupings, such as the Quad and NATO, to support
aligned approaches to submarine cable security and resilience.
Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Botting, for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Frazier for 5 minutes to summarize your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN FRAZIER, AI INNOVATION AND LAW FELLOW,
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW
Mr. Frazier. Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member McIver, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittees, thank you for the
opportunity to testify.
My name is Kevin Frazier. I'm the AI innovation and law
fellow at the University of Texas School of Law and a senior
editor at Lawfare.
I study how the United States can realize the full benefits
of AI. As the Chairman noticed, a robust undersea cable system
is an essential part of that mission and, therefore, a target
for our adversaries.
Inadequate attention to this critical infrastructure risks
jeopardizing the investments being made in AI while also
exposing the United States and its allies to significant
disruptions. It follows that the scale and scope of our AI
ambitions rise and fall with the responsiveness of the growing
threats to the undersea cable system.
My testimony focuses on a simple principle: Deterrence
should guide our undersea cable system.
Deterrence is a function of 3 variables: the cost of an
attack, the likelihood of its success, and the magnitude of its
success. Bad actors will have little reason to sabotage a
submarine cable if doing so is expensive, difficult, or
inconsequential.
Critically, the same tools to deter sabotage will also make
the undersea cable system more resilient to the most common
causes of cable faults, which also merit Congressional
activity.
The first variable, the cost of attacking a cable, involves
the actual expenses of locating and breaking a cable in
addition to the probability of being caught multiplied by the
punishment.
New technologies such as autonomous undersea vehicles will
decrease the cost of attacks. The United States should respond
by increasing its enforcement capabilities and punishments. To
echo Mr. Stronge, Congress must amend the Submarine Cable Act
of 1888 to adjust the fines for willfully or negligently
breaking a cable to an amount that reflects the importance of
the undersea cable system.
The current fines are $5,000 and $500, respectively. It's
cheaper to break an undersea capable than to go on a holiday
trip to Europe. In contrast, New Zealand imposes a $150,000
penalty on any person who breaks a cable, regardless of their
intent.
To increase the odds of detecting parties, Congress should
condition any subsequent cable landing licenses on the cable
operator implementing the latest sensing technologies or paying
a fee to support the Coast Guard's ability to track ships,
submarines, and AUVs. These 2 straightforward steps will alter
the calculus of bad actors, who often turn to commercial
vessels to carry out attacks on their behalf.
A more ambitious, though necessary, step involves
designating cable protection zones. Such zones prohibit vessels
from entering the areas where cable faults tend to occur and,
assuming sufficient monitoring, ease detection and mitigation
of threats.
Looking to the second variable, as Mr. Botting notes,
Congress can also diminish the likelihood of a successful
attack by imposing heightened responsibilities on cable
operators to lay more attack-resistant cables.
The vast majority of cable breaks occur in shallow water,
near shore, and in cable chokepoints. Cable operators can
implement several safeguards against such breaks. First, they
can increase the armoring of cables. Second, they can bury
cables at a greater depth. Third, they can adhere to minimum
separation standards. Fourth, in the event Congress does create
cable protection zones, operators can lay cables in those zones
to assist with monitoring and enforcement.
Each of these measures will frustrate efforts by bad actors
to cause significant and prolonged outages. Operators that opt
not to adhere to these defensive measures should face greater
licensing fees.
Finally, with respect to the third variable, in the event
that a bad actor manages to break a cable or, in a worst-case
scenario, several cables, deterrence calls for policies that
ensure network redundancy and rapid repair times.
A redundant undersea cable system includes a number of
cables being laid along diverse routes. Congress should study
various financial levers to support on-going cable building,
especially in regions that will see many cables be retired in
the coming years.
While hyperscalers race ahead with their own cable
projects, the United States has an interest in ensuring
redundancy across the entire system. Every cable has 2 landing
points. It's pivotal that the United States--and not China--aid
allies looking to increase their own cable connections.
Most importantly, Congress should swiftly pass legislation
like the NEPTUNE Act that aims to bolster the number of cable
repair ships. Across the global cable fleet, at least 15
maintenance ships will need to be replaced by 2040. If the past
is prologue, foreign nations will likely develop those ships.
Our cable operators should not have Chinese ships on speed-dial
to patch cables carrying our sensitive communications. This is
and must be a problem solved by U.S. ships and its allies.
I applaud you all for studying the underappreciated
connection between America's AI aspirations and the fragility
of the undersea cable system. We cannot lead on AI if we fail
to secure the seas.
Thank you again for inviting me here. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Frazier follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin Frazier
November 20, 2025
A robust undersea cable system is an essential part of achieving
the Nation's AI aspirations and, therefore, a target of adversaries
also in pursuit of AI dominance. Inadequate attention to this critical
infrastructure risks jeopardizing the substantial investments being
made in AI and related technologies.\1\ Consider, for example, that
U.S. hyperscalers spent around $371 billion on data centers and
computing resources in 2025 alone and anticipate spending more in the
future.\2\ As one representative of a major lab made clear, ``without
the connectivity [via undersea cables] that connects those data
centers, what you have are really expensive warehouses.''\3\ A failure
to adequately maintain and protect the undersea cable system may also
expose the United States and its allies to significant economic,
political, and technological disruptions.\4\ It follows that the scale
and scope of AI ambitions rises and falls with our attention and
commitment to the numerous and growing threats to our undersea cable
system.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Tim Stronge, Do $10 Trillion of Financial Transactions Flow
Over Submarine Cables Each Day?, TELEGEOGRAPHY: BLOG (Apr. 6, 2023),
https://blog.telegeography.com/2023-mythbusting-part-1 [https://
perma.cc/QQ3K-S2XT].
\2\ Martin Stansbury et al., Can US infrastructure keep up with the
AI economy?, DELOITTE (June 24, 2025), https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/
insights/industry/power-and-utilities/data-center-infrastructure-
artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/Z8VV-GL7J]; Eli Tan,
Meta Raises Its Spending Forecast on A.I. to Above $70 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 29, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/29/technology/
metaspending_ai.html [https://perma.cc/T8M6-W2FA].
\3\ See, e.g., Magdalena Petrova, Underwater cables are a vital
piece of the AI buildout and internet--investment is booming, CNBC
(Nov. 8, 2025), https://www.cnbc.com/2025/11/08/big-tech-ai-underwater-
cables.html [https://perma.cc/Z2XE-G2PP] (quoting Alex Aime, vice
president of network investments at Meta).
\4\ See JOCELINN KANG & JESSIE JACOB, CONNECTING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
THE FUTURE OF SUBSEA CABLES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR AUSTRALIA 5 (2024),
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/connecting-indo-pacific-future-subsea-
cables-and-opportunities-australia/ [https://perma.cc/9CEQ-KGLN]
(detailing how even a few undersea cable faults can wreak havoc on
connected nations, especially those with comparatively fewer cables).
\5\ See Kevin Frazier, Wired for Failure: The Undersea Cable
Emergency That Could Sink America's AI Aspirations, LAWFARE (Sept. 16,
2025), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/wired-for-failure-the-
undersea-cable-emergency-that-could-sink-america-s-ai-aspirations
[https://perma.cc/ED9K-82PB] [hereinafter Frazier, Appendix A].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is no back-up plan. If all or even a significant number of
the 20 or so cables connecting Europe to North America were
disrupted,\6\ for example, satellites would not serve as a viable
alternative. Internet traffic travels drastically slower via
satellites.\7\ The satellite network also has significantly less
bandwidth.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Alan Mauldin, Cutting off Europe? A Look at How the Continent
Connects to the World, TELEGEOGRAPHY: BLOG (Oct. 13, 2022), https://
blog.telegeography.com/cutting-off-europe-a-look-at-how-the-continent-
connects-to-the-world?utm_source=chatgpt.com [https://perma.cc/M2CM-
AGP2]; see MIKE CONSTABLE ET AL., THE FUTURE OF SUBMARINE CABLE
MAINTENANCE: TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND STRATEGIES 34 (2025) [hereinafter
FUTURE OF SUBMARINE CABLES], https://www2.telegeography.com/hubfs/
LPAssets/Ebooks/The%20Future%20of%20Submarine%20Cable%20Maintenance-
%20Trends%2C%20Challenges- %2C%20and%20Strategies.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7CQ2-Y26G] (forecasting as many of 25 trans-Atlantic cables by
2040).
\7\ Submarine Cable Frequently Asked Questions, TELEGEOGRAPHY,
https://www2.telegeography.com/submarine-cable-faqs-frequently-asked-
questions [https://perma.cc/5LTQ-UMPE] (last accessed Nov. 17, 2025);
INSIKT GRP, Submarine Cable Face Increasing Threats Amid Geopolitical
Tensions and Limited Repair Capacity, RECORDED FUTURE (July 17, 2025),
https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/submarine-cables-face-
increasing-threats [https://perma.cc/6VG5-UFP3] (``[A] trans-pacific
fibre-optic call need only travel about 5,000 miles point-to-point,
compared to a satellite call, which must travel 22,235 miles from the
Earth to a satellite and then another 22,235 back.'') (internal
citation and quotation omitted).
\8\ Alex Mauldin, Will New Satellites End the Dominance of
Submarine Cables?, TELEGEOGRAPHY: BLOG (July 1, 2019), https://
blog.telegeography.com/will-new-satellites-end-the-dominance-of-
submarine-cables [https://perma.cc/3XP6-LXZC]; The Battle for
Bandwidth: Submarine Cable and Broadband Satellite Data, NEW SPACE
ECONOMY, https://newspaceeconomy.ca/2023/08/13/the-battle-for-
bandwidth-submarine-cable-and-broadband-satellite-data/ [https://
perma.cc/2GFT-TX2C] (last visited Nov. 17, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This reality merits a two-prong response. The first is a ``sea
shot'' that includes building 10 new cable repair ships explicitly for
use by the Nation's allies, deploying 100 autonomous undersea drones to
gather critical information to maintain the undersea cable system, and
laying or retrofitting 100,000 miles of undersea cables.\9\ This prong
is best thought of as an ``offensive'' strategy through which the
United States can reassert its authority in this critical domain. It
will require significant political buy-in, financial support, and time.
Cable operators often take years to lay a new cable.\10\ Construction
of a new undersea cable repair ship can take as many as 5 years.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See Frazier, Appendix A.
\10\ See Jurgen Hatheier, AI's role in revolutionizing submarine
network connectivity, RCR (Aug. 9, 2024), https://www.rcrwireless.com/
20240809/network-infrastructure/ais-role-in-revolutionizing-submarine-
network-connectivity-reader-forum [https://perma.cc/JA2W-D6QT]
(``[T]hese are projects that cost in the hundreds of millions of
dollars and take years to plan and deploy.'').
\11\ MIKE CONSTABLE ET AL., supra note 6, at 67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Those delays mean that the United States should pursue a second,
``defensive'' prong of this strategy in the interim. This strategy
involves immediate adoption of policy strategies that deter bad actors
from attacking the undersea cable system.
increased deterrence as an immediate priority
Deterrence is a function of three variables: the costs of an
attack, the likelihood of its success, and the magnitude of its
success. Bad actors will have little reason to attempt to sabotage the
undersea cable system if doing so is expensive, difficult, or
inconsequential. Critically, the same tools to deter intentional
sabotage will also make the undersea cable system more resilient to the
more frequent causes of cable faults, which also merit due
consideration. As recommended by the International Cable Protection
Committee (ICPC), undersea cable policy should be driven by evidence,
not speculation or exaggeration.\12\ Dragged anchors account for about
30% of all breaks.\13\ More generally, most breaks occur due to fishing
and other human activities.\14\ Any short-term solution should be
evaluated under its responsiveness to both emerging issues, such as
sabotage, as well as these more common causes of breaks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Government Best Practices for Protecting and Promoting
Resilience of Submarine Telecommunications Cables, ICPC (last accessed
Nov. 15, 2025) (on file with author).
\13\ Damage to Submarine Cables from Dragged Anchors, ICPC:
VIEWPOINTS (Feb. 24, 2025), https://www.iscpc.org/publications/icpc-
viewpoints/damage-to-submarine-cables-from-dragged-anchors/ [https://
perma.cc/Q4RX-XPPP] [hereinafter Dragged Anchors].
\14\ SUBMARINE TELECOMS F., Year in Review, 14 SUBMARINE TELECOMS
INDUS. REP., at 166 (2025) [hereinafter INDUSTRY REPORT].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
increasing the cost of sabotage
The costs of attacking submarine cables involve the actual expenses
of locating and breaking a cable in addition to the probability of
being caught multiplied by the punishment. New technologies, such as
autonomous undersea vehicles or AUVs, will decrease the costs of an
attack.\15\ For sake of illustration, it appears as though Iran has
already developed uncrewed undersea vehicles (UUVs) that are precisely
designed to attack static targets.\16\ What's more, Iran may have
already made those tools available to the Houthi militant group.\17\
Aerial drones have already transformed terrestrial conflicts by
lowering the cost of destruction.\18\ Iranian advances and their
willingness to pass technology along to non-state actors suggests the
same may be true in the undersea domain--to the extent it is not
already.\19\ The United States should respond by developing similar
AUVs and UUVs--as called for under the ``sea shot'' described above,
while also increasing its enforcement capabilities and punishments in
the short run. To start, Congress must amend the Submarine Cable Act of
1888 to minimally bring the fines for willfully or negligently breaking
a cable in line with international norms and, ideally, to specify fines
of an ever-greater magnitude. The current fines are $5,000 and $500,
respectively.\20\ It's likely cheaper to intentionally break an
undersea cable than to go on a holiday trip to Europe. In contrast, New
Zealand imposes a $120,000 penalty on any person who breaks a cable
regardless of their intent.\21\ Singapore has imposed a penalty on that
scale, too;\22\ in 2022, a private construction company faced $220,000
in fines for causing multiple telecommunication cables to break while
working on a nearby project.\23\ Australia may impose fines of nearly
$27,000 for related offenses.\24\ The United States should not dilly
dally in updating the Submarine Cable Act and sending a strong signal
that it is ready and willing to hold bad actors accountable for their
interference with this critical infrastructure. Many of the undersea
cable breaks attributed to nations such as China and Russia have been
carried out by commercial vessels in relatively shallow waters \25\--
breaks that may fall within ambit of the Submarine Cable Act if
committed near the U.S. coast.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, SUBSEA
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CABLES: RESILIENCE AND CRISIS PREPAREDNESS 2024-26,
HC 723/HL 179, at 10 (UK); see id. at 14 (citing Professor Rowlands'
observation that advances in AUVs may increase the odds of attacks on
multiple cables at once); Yuval Eylon, The Challenge of Defending
Underwater Communication Infrastructures, INSS (June 29, 2023), https:/
/www.inss.org.il/publication/under-water/ [https://perma.cc/96RY-RRU2]
(warning of ``[r]ecent state-of-the-art developments of underwater
capabilities, such as long-range midget unmanned submersible vehicles
and remotely controlled submarine robots[.]'').
\16\ Ash Rossiter, Cable risk and resilience in the age of uncrewed
undersea vehicles (UUVs), 171 MARINE POL'Y, Jan. 2025, at 1, 1-5.
\17\ Id.
\18\ See, e.g., James Paterson, High-tech drones are changing
warfare--terrorists may soon follow the same playbook, THE CONVERSATION
(Aug. 12, 2025), https://theconversation.com/high-tech-drones-are-
changing-warfare-terrorists-may-soon-follow-the-same-playbook-262626
[https://perma.cc/N6BM-VEJU].
\19\ Margo Anderson, Protecting Undersea Internet Cables Is a Tech
Nightmare, IEEE (Dec. 5, 2024), https://spectrum.ieee.org/undersea-
internet-cables-protection-tech [https://perma.cc/U2KR-3P4Y].
\20\ 47 U.S.C. 22.
\21\ Protecting New Zealand's Undersea Cables, MINISTRY TRANSP.,
https://www.transport.govt.nz/aboutus/what-we-do/queries/protecting-
new-zealands-undersea-cables [https://perma.cc/CM8M-B3MH] (last visited
Nov. 17, 2025)
\22\ William Yuen Yee, Laying Down the Law Under the Sea: Analyzing
the US and Chinese Submarine Cable Governance Regimes, JAMESTOWN (Aug.
4, 2023), https://jamestown.org/laying-down-the-law-under-the-sea-
analyzing-the-us-and-chinese-submarine-cable-governance-regimes/
[https://perma.cc/WE83-J4CA].
\23\ Id.
\24\ Id.
\25\ John Dotson, Strangers on a Seabed: Sino-Russian Collaboration
on Undersea Cable Sabotage Operations, JAMESTOWN (June 7, 2025),
https://jamestown.org/strangers-on-a-seabed-sino-russian-collaboration-
on-undersea-cable-sabotage-operations/ [https://perma.cc/BQ77-N3JC].
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increasing the odds of detection
To increase the odds of detecting responsible parties, Congress
should condition any grant or renewal of a cable landing license upon
the cable operator installing the latest sensing technologies and
timely reporting any threats or anomalous activity. In the alternative,
the cable operator can agree to a greater licensing fee to contribute
to the ability of the U.S. Government, including but not limited to the
Coast Guard,\26\ to track ships, submarines, and AUVs and UUVs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Cf. Madison L. Long, Information Warfare in the Depths: An
Analysis of Global Undersea Cable Networks, U.S. NAVAL INST. (May
2023), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/may/information-
warfare-depths-analysis-globalundersea-cable-networks [https://
perma.cc/9WTN-GEF5] (contending that the Coast Guard should lead in
efforts to protect the undersea cable system).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As an aside, fees collected by licensing authorities around the
world should be explored as a means to gather funds necessary to solve
some of the collective action problems that plague the undersea cable
system.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Kevin Frazier, Pooling Responsibility: Incentivizing Cable
Owners to Safeguard the Global Undersea Network, SSRN (Nov. 11, 2025)
(forthcoming UNIV. CINN. L. INTELL. PROP. COMP. L.J.) [Appendix B].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Every cable operator must secure a license from the Federal
Communications Committee (FCC) prior to landing a cable in the United
States. \28\ Applicants must provide relatively little information to
the FCC to satisfy statutory obligations.\29\ Certain applications
receive heightened scrutiny by the FCC and a number of other agencies
with an interest in the Nation's telecommunications network--
collectively known as ``Team Telecom.''\30\ This group broadly examines
whether granting a license would ``pose[] a risk to national security
or law enforcement interests of the United States.''\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ 47 CFR 1.767.
\29\ Id.
\30\ Exec. Order No. 13,913, 85 Fed. Reg. 19643 (Apr. 8, 2020)
(Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation
in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector).
\31\ Id. at 19645.
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Even under this heightened review, it's unclear if Team Telecom
will surface meaningful information about an operator's plans to adopt
specific safeguards and to share specific information. For example,
while applicants must answer, ``What provision will be made to monitor
suspicious activity occurring over the paths of the cables?'',\32\ the
response may not detail the information called for here. It's also not
clear whether the applicant's answer to that question would be
determinative in the decision to grant, renew, or deny a license.
Though the FCC is in the process of amending and streamlining this
process,\33\ decisions by Team Telecom have been faulted as
unpredictable for relying on a seemingly shifting set of standards and
information.\34\ Amid these reform efforts, the FCC--at the direction
or encouragement of Congress--should factor this information into its
review of all licenses.
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\32\ Process Reform for Executive Branch Review of Certain FCC
Applications and Petitions Involving Foreign Ownership, Second Report
and Order, 36 FCC Rcd. 14848, 14873 (2021), https://docs.fcc.gov/
public/attachments/FCC-21-104A1_Rcd.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8H5-43EV].
\33\ Ari Fitzgerald et al., FCC issues submarine cable rules, seeks
comment on additional proposals, HOGAN LOVELLS (Sept. 16, 2025),
https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/fcc-issues-submarine-
cable-rules-seeks-comment-on-additional-proposals [https://perma.cc/
6GX2-JU4G].
\34\ RICHARD SALGADO, UNDERSEA CABLES, HYPERSCALERS, AND NATIONAL
SECURITY 9 (2023).
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Myriad new technologies can generate important information from
undersea cables. Quantum sensing, for example, ``could transform subsea
cable monitoring by enabling accurate detection of environmental
changes, underwater seismic activity, and potential threats like
fishing trawls or sabotage.''\35\ Acoustic sensors may perform a
similar function.\36\ A German company has even developed a means to
update existing cables with sonar-like technology that can determine if
threats are nearby by ``sens[ing] vibrations traveling through the
water[.]''\37\ Deciding which of these sensing technologies should be
imposed on applicants warrants additional analysis by the FCC based on
their costs and accuracy. The key is that ``dumb'' cables that provide
little to no information to the operator and Government become a thing
of the past. Any information gathered by the sensors, such as any
indications as to the current functionality of the cables,\38\ then
needs to be passed along to the relevant Government authorities.
Provision of more information about cables can inform on-going policy
decisions about how to increase the resiliency of the undersea cable
system--decisions that are often made in the absence of full
information.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Devon A. Johnson, INTO THE FUTURE: Quantum Technologies and
the Impact on the Resilience of the Subsea Cable System, SUBMARINE
TELECOMS FORUM (Dec. 2, 2024), https://subtelforum.com/into-the-future-
quantum-technologies-and-the-impact-on-the-resilience-of-the-subsea-
cable-system/ [https://perma.cc/Q9TL-2MVC].
\36\ OPTODAS: The Leading Technology for Distributed Acoustic
Sensing, ASN, https://www.asn.com/fiber-sensing [https://perma.cc/C7MM-
KMWY] (last accessed Nov. 17, 2025) (ASN opens a new era in subsea
intelligent sensing based on advanced DAS technology).
\37\ Jowi Morales, New undersea cable tech listens for sabotage--
can be retrofitted to existing fiber optic lines, TOM'S HARDWARE (Mar.
18, 2025), https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/new-undersea-
cable-tech-listens-for-sabotage-can-be-retrofitted-to-existing-fiber-
optic-lines [https://perma.cc/DX5MKZ4D].
\38\ See JOCELINN KANG & JESSIE JACOB, supra note 4, at 21
(recommending that Australia likewise mandate the provision of such
information).
\39\ See, e.g., JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY,
supra note 15, at 2 (highlighting the fact that additional information
on how cable damage impacts cable operations would assist policy
discussions).
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These two straightforward steps will alter the calculus of bad
actors who often turn to commercial vessels to carry out attacks on
their behalf. A more ambitious, though necessary step involves
designating cable protection zones, which would prohibit activities
that interfere with the seabed from occurring in specified areas with a
high density of cables.\40\ Australia,\41\ New Zealand,\42\ and Denmark
\43\ are among the nations with such zones. The efficacy of this
strategy turns on whether the State allocates sufficient enforcement
resources to what may be a very difficult task of monitoring several
zones. The United States could start by creating cable protection zones
where there is already a high number of cables in a relatively finite
geographic area. One place to start may be the North Coast of Oregon.
At least eight trans-Pacific cables go through that area.\44\ This area
is also forecasted to be especially prone to breaks in the coming
years.\45\ A combination of the Coast Guard, Air Force, Navy, and other
authorities with resources to closely monitor ship traffic in that
region could ensure a high enough degree of enforcement so as to deter
bad actors from even attempting to sabotage those cables.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ See Pierre Thevenin, A legislative route to combat sabotage of
undersea cables: A Q&A with Pierre Thevenin, SIPRI (Oct. 23, 2025),
https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2025/legislative-
route-combat-sabotage-undersea-cables [https://perma.cc/352U-NBUG]
(including bottom trawling, dredging, and anchoring among such
activities).
\41\ Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (Submarine Cable
Protection) Bill 2014 (Cth) (Austl.).
\42\ Submarine Cables and Pipelines Protection Act 1996 (N.Z.).
\43\ Order no. 939 of 27 November 1992 on the protection of
submarine cables and submarine pipelines (Den.).
\44\ Submarine Cable Map, TELEGEOGRAPHY, https://
www.submarinecablemap.com [https://perma.cc/B87F-89UQ] (last accessed
Nov. 17, 2025).
\45\ FUTURE OF SUBMARINE CABLES, supra note 6, at 51-52.
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Technological advances such as AI may make this monitoring all the
easier \46\ and justify creating such zones in other areas.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Matthew Kastler, Move Beyond AIS for Maritime Domain
Awareness, U.S. NAVAL INST. (Sept. 2025), https://www.usni.org/
magazines/proceedings/2025/september/move-beyond-ais-maritime-domain-
awareness [https://perma.cc/M8W6-MLMT].
\47\ See Kevin Frazier, Policy Proposals for the United States to
Protect the Undersea Cable System, 13 CASE W. RSRV. J.L. TECH. &
INTERNET, no. 1, 2022, at 30-32 (2022) (identifying the high number of
undersea cables across two coasts as a barrier to the United States
adopting cable protection zones) [Appendix C].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
reducing odds of success
Congress can also drastically diminish the likelihood of a
successful attack by imposing heightened responsibilities on cable
operators to adopt best practices for laying more attack-resistant
cables. The vast majority of cable breaks occur in shallow water, near
shore, and in cable choke points.\48\ Cable operators can implement
several safeguards against such breaks. First, they can increase the
armoring of cables.\49\ Use of Kevlar to safeguard cables from sharks
and other threats was once regarded as a novel tactic,\50\ though its
use has since spread.\51\ New materials may soon promise even greater
protection while not unduly burdening the cost and operational
difficulties of coiling, then unspooling cables as they're laid on the
seafloor.\52\ The FCC should expect that operators are continuously
studying the availability of superior armoring and justifying to what
extent they do or not use it. Second, operators can bury cables at a
greater depth and further from the coast. As it stands, the norm is
that cables lie on the surface when at a depth of 100 meters or
more.\53\ This means that in some deepwater ports and high-trafficked
areas cables may be especially susceptible to sabotage.\54\ Operators
could additionally be obligated to at least consider the need to use
mattress covering around the cable and assess the placement of nearby
rocks, which may shift due to currents.\55\
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\48\ See NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. EXCELLENCE, STRATEGIC
IMPORTANCE OF, AND DEPENDENCE ON, UNDERSEA CABLES 3 (2019) [hereinafter
NATO REPORT], https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/11/Underseacables-Final-
NOV-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/98RV-46DK] (warning that terrorists are
most likely to attack cables near cable landing stations).
\49\ CAMINO KAVANAGH, WADING MURKY WATERS, UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE
FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH 12 (2023), https://unidir.org/wpcontent/
uploads/2023/05/
UNIDIR_Wading_Murky_Waters_Subsea_Communications_Cables_Responsible_Stat
e- _Behaviour.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZP9-T4R7]; James Griffiths, The
global internet is powered by vast undersea cables. But they're
vulnerable, CNN (July 26, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/25/asia/
internet-undersea-cables-intl-hnk [https://perma.cc/8KSY-BLXN].
\50\ NATO REPORT, supra note 48, at 3; Will Oremus, The Global
Internet Is Being Attacked by Sharks, Google Confirms, Slate (Aug. 15,
2014), https://slate.com/technology/2014/08/shark-attacks-threaten-
google-s-undersea-internet-cables-video.html [https://perma.cc/CX8D-
4T3S].
\51\ James Griffiths, supra note 49.
\52\ See Darren Orf, Scientists Created a Bulletproof Material 3
Times Stronger Than Kevlar--It's Already Breaking Records, POPULAR
MECHANICS (Nov. 11, 2025), https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/
a69268884/carbon-nanotube-kevlar/ [https://perma.cc/ZF4TQZS2].
\53\ Alex Botting & Ines Jordan-Zoob, How the US and its Partners
can Ensure the World's Data Super-Highways Remain Reliable, Secure,
Open & Free, WILSON CTR. (July 15, 2024), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
article/how-us-and-its-partners-can-ensure-worlds-data-super-highways-
remain-reliable-secure-open [https://perma.cc/T2CJ-MMYJ].
\54\ Id.
\55\ The JRC explains: Subsea cables: how vulnerable are they and
can we protect them?, Joint Rsch. Ctr. (Aug. 8, 2025), https://joint-
research-centre.ec.europa.eu/jrc-explains/subsea-cables-how-vulnerable-
are-they-and-can-we-protect-them_en [https://perma.cc/B3D5-T6PT].
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Third, operators can adhere to minimum separation standards to
distance their cables from others. Additional spacing between cables
can reduce the odds of single incidents causing numerous breaks. By way
of example, in 2008, a single ship damaged 6 cables due to dragging its
anchor along the sea floor.\56\ Some degree of spacing can make it less
likely that one net, anchor, rock, or UUV can break several cables at
once. Fourth, in the event Congress creates cable protection zones,
operators can lay cables in those zones to ease the task of monitoring
threats to cables. As the requisite authorities closely monitor these
specific areas, they can quickly mobilize the forces necessary to stop
a bad actor from ``lingering'' in that zone as that actor attempts to
break several cables in quick succession.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Dragged Anchors, supra note 13.
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Each of these measures will frustrate efforts by bad actors to
cause significant and prolonged outages. Operators that opt not to
adhere to these defensive measures should again face heightened
licensing fees.
diminishing the damage from a successful attack
In the event that a bad actor manages to break a cable or, in a
worst-case scenario, several cables, deterrence calls for policies that
ensure network redundancy and rapid repair times. Put differently,
adversaries will have less interest in attacking cables if traffic can
easily be routed through other cables and damaged cables can be
restored in days rather than weeks or months. A case study makes this
point clear. When a series of minor accidents caused damage to several
cables off the coast of Cote d'Ivoire, many internet users across
Africa experienced diminished service.\57\ Comparatively, when 2 cables
broke in the Baltic Sea, users experienced few to no issues because of
the availability of alternative routes for internet traffic.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Paula Gilbert, Multiple cable failures impact Africa's
internet, CONNECTING AFR. (Mar. 15, 2024), https://
www.connectingafrica.com/connectivity/multiple-cable-failures-impact-
africa-s-internet [https://perma.cc/CV2U-3PFD].
\58\ David Belson, Resilient Internet connectivity in Europe
mitigates impact from multiple cable cuts, CLOUDFLARE: BLOG (Nov. 11,
2024), https://blog.cloudflare.com/resilient-internet-connectivity-
baltic-cable-cuts/ [https://perma.cc/384B-86UZ].
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That's precisely why redundancy is a key part of a robust undersea
cable system.\59\
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\59\ INSIKT GRP, supra note 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A redundant undersea cable system includes a number of cables being
laid along diverse routes. Congress should study various financial
levers to support ongoing cable building both by the United States and
its allies, especially in regions that will see many existing cables be
retired in the coming years. A survey of industry stakeholders suggests
that more than 800,000 km of cables will be retired by 2040.\60\ As
cables reach the end of their operational or economic lives, the United
States must pay attention to whether their allies are at a heightened
risk of being susceptible to prolonged internet outages due to just a
few breaks.\61\
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\60\ FUTURE OF SUBMARINE CABLES, supra note 6, at 2.
\61\ See, e.g., Commission Recommendation (EU) of 26 February 2024
on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures, 2024 O.J.
(L779) at 1 (warning that some members of the European Union may
already be in such a position).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While hyperscalers are racing ahead with their own cable projects,
the United States has an interest in ensuring redundancy across the
entire system.\62\ If Google, Amazon, and other hyperscalers do not see
an economic case for filling in gaps in the undersea cable system, it's
unlikely other private actors will fill the void. Cable laying is a
gamble. Only about half of announced undersea cable projects get
completed.\63\ An increasingly bifurcated and concentrated supply chain
is only making such projects costlier.\64\ For all those reasons, it's
pivotal that allies look to the United States and not China to increase
their own cable connections. Most importantly, the United States must
ensure that any successful disruptions to a cable or cables are short-
lived. This is yet another cost-intensive and logistically difficult
task. Average repair times have varied over the last few years--taking
nearly 3 months in 2022 (78 days) while falling to about a month (32
days) in 2025.\65\ As the number of cables increases over the next
decade \66\ and the number of cable repair ships in need of replacement
surges,\67\ a betting man would like the odds that the average undersea
cable repair time is increasing. This will be especially true if a
repair is required during a geopolitical conflict. One industry
observer expected that a cable repair ship would demand a military
escort prior to sailing to the repair point.\68\
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\62\ JOCELINN KANG & JESSIE JACOB, supra note 4, at 7 (estimating
that hyperscalers such as Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon have had
at least some stake in nearly 25% of all undersea cable projects that
launched between 2019 and 2023).
\63\ Big tech and geopolitics are reshaping the internet's
plumbing, ECONOMIST (Dec. 20, 2025), https://www.economist.com/
business/2023/12/20/big-tech-and-geopolitics-are-reshaping-the-
internets-plumbing.
\64\ JOCELINN KANG & JESSIE JACOB, supra note 4, at 10-12.
\65\ FORUM INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 14, at 100.
\66\ FUTURE OF SUBMARINE CABLES, supra note 6, at 47.
\67\ Id. at 61.
\68\ JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note
15, at 24.
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Congress should swiftly pass legislation like the Neptune Act that
aims to bolster the number of cable repair ships.\69\ The number of
cable repairs is forecasted to reach 287 by 2040.\70\ Our cable
operators should not have Chinese ships on speed dial to patch cables
carrying our sensitive communications. Nor should U.S. cable providers
expect cable repair ships flying another nation's flag to prioritize
repairs to U.S. cables over their own.\71\ This is and must be a
problem solved by U.S. ships. We're woefully behind on this front.
Minimally, Congress should amend the cable landing license to mandate
that operators have at least a 10-year contract with a cable repair
provider. This shift would address the financial uncertainty that often
prevents cable repair ship owners from further investing in their
fleets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ Press Release, Max Miller, Congressman Max Miller Introduces
NEPTUNE Act to Protect America's Critical Infrastructure (July 25,
2025), https://maxmiller.house.gov/posts/congressman-max-miller-
introduces-neptune-act-to-protect-americas-critical-infrastructure
[https://perma.cc/4NGA-8YBT].
\70\ FUTURE OF SUBMARINE CABLES, supra note 6, at 50.
\71\ See JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra
note 15, at 25 (expecting French cable repair ships to respond to
cables of French significance over cables of importance to the United
Kingdom).
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conclusion
The United States is entering an era in which AI will amplify every
facet of national power--from scientific research and economic
productivity to military readiness and diplomatic leverage. But AI's
promise is only as strong as the physical infrastructure that
undergirds it. Undersea cables are not a peripheral issue in the AI
age. Instead, Congress must regard the undersea cable system as a
foundational part of the emerging global economy. If these cables are
compromised, our most advanced AI labs, high-performance computing
clusters, and data-rich enterprises will be unable to operate at the
scale that global leadership demands. Congress must therefore treat
cable resilience not as a niche maritime concern but as a foundational
pillar of American competitiveness.
Though Congress should move forward with a ``sea shot'' over the
long term, a focus on deterrence in the short run can collectively
reshape the incentives of adversaries and limit the consequences of
disruptions. But as AI systems become more central to real-time
intelligence analysis, financial markets, precision agriculture,
disaster response, and critical infrastructure management, even brief
outages will impose cascading harms. A cable system built for the pre-
AI era--an era of slower data flows, fewer real-time applications, and
limited global compute--cannot meet the demands we now face. Policy
makers must recognize that strengthening undersea infrastructure is not
just about preventing sabotage; it is about ensuring that the Nation
can fully leverage AI to enhance the well-being and security of every
American.
Ultimately, Congress has a rare opportunity to act before a crisis
forces its hand. The investments and policy changes proposed here will
not only strengthen our undersea cable network but also secure the
connective tissue of the AI economy for decades to come. With
deliberate action--guided by deterrence, informed by evidence, and
executed with urgency--the United States can ensure that its cables,
like its AI ambitions, are resilient, adaptive, and firmly under
American control.
Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Frazier.
Thank you to all of our witnesses.
You know, this is an incredibly important subject and,
quite frankly, one of those handful of subjects in Congress
that should not be partisan in any way but, rather, bipartisan,
because we are talking about the future of our country.
Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their
5 minutes of questions.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Many of our closest allies have experienced suspected
foreign interference with their subsea cables, where
attribution took time, required extensive coordination across
governments and industry.
U.S. operators worry about similar activity along routes
connecting the United States to Europe and Asia, especially
since no single Federal agency is clearly responsible for
subsea cable security. Understanding how the U.S. Government
should organize itself is essential for building a credible,
responsible framework.
Mr. Botting, from the industry's perspective, what role
should DHS play when operators detect potentially concerning
PRC or Russian activity near cables, cable routes, landing
stations, or what kind of support would make DHS more effective
in that role?
Mr. Botting. Thank you for the question.
The main thing that stands out to me is, cable operators
obviously have access to a certain set of information through
operating those cables, but they don't have a holistic view of
the adversary. The U.S. Government has access to what could
potentially be a lot of valuable information that could help
them to make appropriate risk determinations about potential
future activities by adversaries.
So I think it's essential that we establish a two-way
threat-intelligence-sharing mechanism that ensures that
appropriate people within those companies--depending whether
that has to happen at a Classified level, it could be people
with security clearances; it could happen at the unclassified
level--that they have access to information about the latest
and greatest threats emerging from adversaries.
This isn't, sort-of, pie in the sky, this concept of two-
way threat-intelligence-sharing. Our allies over in Australia
are implementing something similar at the moment for Systems of
Critical--SOCI, Systems of Critical Infrastructure, I believe
it is.
Anyway, they are requiring that companies report incidents
but also creating a mechanism for voluntary sharing of
information by critical infrastructure into the Government,
which the Government can then enrich with their own
intelligence and share back out with critical infrastructure so
that they are responding to the latest and greatest
intelligence, as far as the threat profile.
For me, that is one of the key things that DHS
specifically, I think, would be well-positioned to----
Mr. Ogles. It should be noted, you know, we have similar
type of cooperative agreements with nation-states, whether it
be the Five Eyes, Seven Eyes, Fourteen Eyes groups. Obviously,
these are private companies, and so different protocols would
be needed, but that being said, your point is well-taken.
Dr. Kroenig, based on recent cable incidents in Europe,
what lessons should guide U.S. planning for attribution, public
communication, and multinational coordination when foreign
interference is suspected?
Mr. Kroenig. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am struck by the commonality in the recommendations
across the panelists.
First, how greater resilience can help to protect these
cables; and, also, to deter. If adversaries know that any
attack is going to cause minimal disruption, that should reduce
their incentive to do it in the first place.
Second, attribution. As was pointed out, often we don't
know who's responsible. Even in these cases of the Chinese
attacks against Matsu Islands and these recent cases in the
Gulf of Finland, questions about was this intentional, was it
deliberate or not. So having better information to attribute
the source of the attacks would be helpful.
Then, third, the ability to hold those responsible
accountable. In this case of the Gulf of Finland, Finland tried
to prosecute the seafarers in the Finnish courts throughout the
case. So, if there's going to be no consequences for these kind
of attacks, it obviously makes it easier for our adversaries to
continue.
So I think those are the 3 areas where we need to focus.
Mr. Ogles. Well, Mr. Stronge, you know, we've seen where
these disruptions have an immediate impact, but yet the
recovery period is often slow, laborious, and then attribution
is a problem.
If the PRC or Russia disrupted several U.S.-connected
cables simultaneously, what sectors would experience problems
first, what are the challenges, and what kind of repair ship
capabilities, availability, do we have?
You've got about 30 seconds, sir.
Mr. Stronge. Thanks for the extra challenge there.
The United States is connected right now by 97 cables. We
are really blessed as a Nation to have such resilience. If
there were purposeful cuts to some of these cables, it likely
would not be felt or even noticed by most Americans. It would
take an incredibly concerted effort to simultaneously cut
enough to cause noticeable damage.
I could say more later.
Mr. Ogles. We'll get back to it.
I now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentlewoman from
New Jersey, Mrs. McIver, for her 5 minutes.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Good job, Mr. Stronge. That was right on time.
Mr. Frazier, thank you so much for your testimony. It's
clear that a failure to safeguard subsea cables could result in
significant economic, political, and technological instability
for the United States.
Can you provide some great sugges---you've already provided
some great suggestions for improving our defenses of these
cables. In your view, what is the most--one critical, just one,
critical step that Congress could take to mitigate these risks?
Mr. Frazier. Well, thank you for the question, Ranking
Member.
I think the first thing we need to focus on is the cable
landing stations. We don't talk as much about the dry plant
aspect of the undersea cable system--this is in reference to
everything that's not underwater--but these cable landing
stations are often in places like Valdez, Alaska, and Bandon
Dunes, which is great for golfing if you live in Oregon but
easy to attack if you're looking to sabotage the Nation's
submarine systems.
So I think an emphasis on securing these cable landing
stations is of the utmost importance, because, as Mr. Stronge
pointed out, we have a heck of a lot of them, which also means
we don't necessarily have the physical security and
cybersecurity mechanisms in place to safeguard each of those
isolated stations.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you for that.
I would open it up to each of the witnesses of what you
think the No. 1 step, you know, Congress could be taking at
this point.
Whoever can jump in is fine.
Mr. Kroenig. Well, I think one that's maybe most relevant
to this committee is the role that Department of Homeland
Security and the Coast Guard can play.
You know, we don't like fragmentation in national security
policy. We saw the dangers of fragmented intelligence before 9/
11. Right now it seems like there are several different parts
of Government that have some responsibility here. So I think
making Department of Homeland Security a coordinated hub to
address this challenge could make sense.
Then, also, Congress, you can mandate that the Executive
branch develop strategies to deal with an issue. I would
recommend that you task the Executive branch with coming up--
and Department of Homeland Security--coming up with a U.S.
Government strategy for dealing with subsea cable security.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you, Mr. Kroenig.
Mr. Stronge. So I think some of the things we've talked
about so far are essentially reactive in nature, a very
defensive posture. I think we also need to think about being
proactive.
That follows on with what you just said, Matthew.
I really love learning about cables, but something I'm even
more passionate about is college football. I don't know if any
of you Representatives are big football fans, but the one thing
I hate is when my team pushes past the 50-yard line, stalls out
with a fourth and short, and what do they do? They punt. To win
the game, you have to score points.
Right now, we are really ahead in the game. Eighty percent
of all intercontinental data flows through the United States.
But that's down from 97 percent 20 years ago.
We also have a lot of cables that gives us a lot of
resilience. But the industry, from what I can see, is running
into a lot of permitting issues. The permitting time in the
last 5 years has greatly gone up, dealing with Team Telecom. If
it becomes too difficult, the industry may choose to start
routing to other places in North America. Canada and Mexico are
viable options. As an American citizen, that scares me.
I think what we do need is one agency that is a champion of
cables, not in their own right, but realizing that cable
security is national security. We need more resilience and
someone in the Executive department that will help usher
through these new, innovative plans.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you.
Mr. Botting. I'd like to reinforce that point, a specific
statistic. I believe the time for cable approvals has gone from
around 1 year, around 12 months, to about 3 years.
We are seeing fewer and fewer entities willing to invest in
subsea cables globally, to a point where today it's a small
handful of companies, typically the, sort-of, hyperscalers, who
are laying cables.
In that environment, we are not driving toward abundance,
and abundance is our real strength here. If we have more cable
capacity than we need, then we can afford to have incidents on
individual cables and we reduce the incentive for adversaries
to engage in sabotage on those cables.
So I completely agree, I think some level of reform and
greater efficiency and creating a single point of contact
around that is very important.
Mrs. McIver. Wow. Thank you so much for that.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mrs. McIver.
I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Luttrell, for
his 5 minutes.
Mr. Luttrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stronge, make sure I close out with you on that permit
conversation, OK?
Mr. Botting, shoring up and securing our cables. At the
classification level we have in this room currently--which is
not one, so our conversation is going to be kind-of delicate
here, OK? I have not read your publication yet, but I'm looking
forward to doing that. But can you explain to me what you mean
by that?
My colleague sitting to my right and I have a fair bit of
experience with undersea cables from our previous career, so
I'm very interested in what you're about to tell me, I think.
Mr. Botting. Sorry. I missed--missed the question.
Mr. Luttrell. You said ``shore up and secure.'' I want to
know what you mean by that----
Mr. Botting. The security?
Mr. Luttrell [continuing]. When it comes to undersea cables
and capabilities. Because I can appreciate depth of water; I
can appreciate depth of the cable underneath the water. But,
inevitably, it always gets shallow, and then it's touchable.
Now, when we talk about cable security, when we talk about
breaking or cutting, that's the easy part. There's a lot of
other things that exist that are far worse than that. So my
question is, how do we prevent that from happening?
Mr. Botting. That question is in terms of cable tapping? Or
it's in terms of----
Mr. Luttrell. We can go into that a little bit, I think, at
a higher level.
Mr. Botting. So, I mean, as I would look at the risk
profile to cables, I think cuts is the biggest concern in terms
of frequency of what occurs----
Mr. Luttrell. Oh, I think the long-term damage is a lot
worse if it's tapped. But that's my personal opinion.
Mr. Botting. Sure. So, I mean, happy to walk through that,
because, like you, I would look at that as something our
adversaries would very much like to do.
There are challenges to it. If you take a cutting-edge
cable today like the Grace Hopper cable, which goes across the
Atlantic, that will generate 352 terabytes per second of data,
I believe. Over a year, that is about as much data, I believe,
as the whole mobile internet usage globally. So it's a vast,
vast amount of data.
You would need to tap that cable without creating a
detected anomaly, right? Because people are monitoring, in
theory, at either end. But let's say they can do that. You've
then got to syphon that data off, so you've basically got to
lay your own subsea cable to syphon that amount of data off.
You've then got to store it somewhere in data centers that--we
did a bit of back-of-the-napkin kind-of estimations--would
probably be, those data centers would take up several times the
size of a Central Park or something like that, and it could be
as much as, say, a third the size of Manhattan. So huge
infrastructure, possibly billions of dollars in----
Mr. Luttrell. That's on the new cabling system.
Mr. Botting. Correct, on a new cable.
Mr. Luttrell. The older cabling system's still in use.
Mr. Botting. Yes, and would have less bandwidth going
through it----
Mr. Luttrell. Correct. Yes.
Mr. Botting [continuing]. But also then less valuable to
tap, because you're getting access to less information.
You then have to decrypt that information, which--you know,
most of the information travel is encrypted.
I guess where I'm going with this is, it would take a vast
amount of resources to come away with anything useful. I
suspect our adversaries would have other ways of getting to
more, I guess----
Mr. Luttrell. I know where you're going with that, but it's
where we are not looking is where they're going to go.
Mr. Botting. Potentially.
Mr. Luttrell. I can tell you how terrifying being
underwater is, all right?
Mr. Botting. Yes.
Mr. Luttrell. Let me shift real quick. On mapping, you
mentioned mapping the cabling system. For a defensive posture,
is that a good idea?
It's not something that--for instance, right now, our
cabling system's kind of a spider web or a scatter plot across
the bottom of the water. If you're that specific corporation,
you understand where your cables are running.
Defensively, I think it would be a bad idea--I can be
talked out of this, but--if we were to populate what that
infrastructure looked like underground.
Mr. Frazier, you mentioned--you said something about the
same thing, where if we--oh--the cable areas, they don't allow
ships to go across just in case. If we create that, that's
kind-of a bull's-eye----
Mr. Frazier. Right.
Mr. Luttrell [continuing]. For nefarious actors.
Mr. Frazier. Thank you for that question.
I think the cable protection zone is a blessing and a
curse, right? There's a huge tradeoff here of concentrating
cables in any specific corridor, like we've seen New Zealand
do, like we've seen Australia do, and Denmark.
The benefit of that is it tremendously eases the
enforcement burden, right? Instead of having cables laid across
the entire West Coast, if you concentrate them in a narrower
environment, in terms of the actual enforcement and monitoring,
that's made tremendously easier.
Mr. Luttrell. Right.
Mr. Frazier. But, of course, that does raise----
Mr. Luttrell. Yes, I think there's a good and a bad in
there, unfortunately.
Mr. Frazier. Right, there's a good and a bad.
I think it's important to note, though, that the vast
majority of breaks are from anchors----
Mr. Luttrell. Shallow water.
Mr. Frazier. Right.
Mr. Luttrell. Yep. I got you.
Mr. Frazier. Those are the issues. So that's where the real
benefit----
Mr. Luttrell. OK.
Mr. Stronge, I've got to come back to you. I apologize.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will get back to you, sir, I promise--unless Mr. Crane
helps me out on it.
Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Luttrell.
I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Walkinshaw.
Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to dig in a little bit, Mr. Stronge--and then
maybe others want to weigh in--on the permitting process.
Someone mentioned a 3-year process. Obviously, the process
isn't you fill out an application and drop that application off
with one agency and your permit is approved 3 years later.
So can you give us the summary of what that permitting
process might look like for an entity hoping to lay a new
cable? Then I want to try to talk through how could it be
streamlined.
Mr. Stronge. Sure. There's a whole industry attached to the
cable industry just for permitting. I'm not a permitting
expert. From what I understand, you usually have to go through
municipal entities, State entities, and the Federal Government.
I think that's what your question is, the Federal. You
would first file it with the FCC, who would refer it to Team
Telecom, which is an interagency working group with DOJ as the
head, DHS, and DOD.
The problem with the permitting that we've seen is that the
Government obviously wants to make sure these cables are
secure, but there's a complicated interagency process where
each one has their own duplicative, at times, requirements and
they're able to stop the clock on the permit to ask more
questions. So, whereas things were 100 days 10 years ago to
expect an answer back, there was one cable that had to wait 908
days.
That injects a lot of risk, economic risk, in building
these cables. You don't know--if the Government is not being,
sort-of, precise and reliable with its time lines, it's
confusing to the industry.
Mr. Walkinshaw. A number of you have recommended DHS as a
coordinating agency or entity, and it's your hope that DHS
could help more quickly cut through that interagency process to
speed things up.
Mr. Stronge. Well, I think what we need is an agency that
recognizes the need not just to secure a cable but that
securing all cables is what gives us national security. That
means more of a sense of urgency to assist the industry to
build more protection.
Right now, the DOJ is leading the charge. They require
individual cable operators to submit national security
agreements, NSAs. These are secret, so the other--anything
learned by that cable company can't be shared by other cable
operators. It's very confusing.
So, essentially, instead of a coherent national policy,
what we have is a thousand different rules by fiat by Team
Telecom. This is at a time when France has a coherent seabed
strategy--Italy, Norway, United Kingdom. Even Russia does. As
far as I can tell, the United States doesn't really prosecute
that kind of strategy.
Mr. Walkinshaw. Mr. Frazier, you're champing at the bit
here, I can see. You've written about--I think it's still a
proposed FCC rule. How far would that rule go, if adopted? What
other actions are necessary to speed up the permitting process?
Mr. Frazier. Yes. Thank you. Thank you for the question and
for the pun, champing at the bit. Well done.
So I think that it's critically important that we look also
to the State level here. So most States are operating under
delegated authority under the 1953 Submerged Lands Act to
exercise control over the 3 nautical miles extending from their
respective baselines. Some States have relatively
straightforward permitting processes. Some States don't have
really any established permit process to begin with. Then you
have States like California, which has the California Coastal
Commission and the California Lands Commission. Both of them
conduct independent reviews at different stages, which add
about 2 years to that permitting process.
So if I were in your shoes, I think, looking at the FCC's
common role in narrow preemptions for sort-of critical
infrastructure development like we've seen in the 5G space is
something we could emulate here.
Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ogles [presiding]. I thank the gentleman from Virginia,
Mr. Walkinshaw.
I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say thank you
to the panelists for coming.
Today in the Homeland Security Committee, we are talking
about undersea cables. This isn't a topic that gets thrown
around at a lot of dinner tables here in America, and it is
actually a very important topic because, as you gentlemen have
described in your opening statements, what--the vast majority
of the data that we send across the world goes through these
undersea cables. Is that correct?
[No verbal response.]
Mr. Crane. Satellites can't quite handle the load, is that
correct, if these undersea cables are sabotaged or damaged,
right?
[No verbal response.]
Mr. Crane. Now, when I was doing a little research--and
maybe you guys can correct me--but while I was doing some
research, the research that I did showed that most of these
undersea cables, when they're sabotaged or intentionally
damaged, are done in shallow water, about 200 feet of water or
less. Is that correct?
[No verbal response.]
Mr. Crane. So there are things that we can be doing to make
sure that we are protecting this critical infrastructure.
Mr. Kroenig, can you go into some of the things that we can
be doing to protect these--this critical infrastructure?
Mr. Kroenig. Yes. I think we can learn some lessons from
how our allies and partners are dealing with this. We have seen
that NATO's set up this new Baltic Sentry mission with aircraft
ships patrolling these areas using unmanned systems as well. We
have seen a decrease in these incidents since they've started
that. So, you know, you never know, is Russia deterred or did
they just decide not to attack? But there is a pattern there.
Similarly, Taiwan has stepped up its patrols using the
Coast Guard since some of these incidents. It seems that maybe
the incidents are decreasing.
So I think for the United States, the Coast Guard has a
role to play here and, obviously, within Department of Homeland
Security. So having the Coast Guard do more patrols near
vulnerable areas. My colleagues can speak to this, but there
are some areas--Oregon, New Jersey, New York--where there is a
concentration where they could focus their efforts.
Mr. Crane. Outside of just increasing patrols, though, Mr.
Stronge, is there a way to harden these cables and bury them
deeper which make them harder to access?
Mr. Stronge. Yes, there is. The industry has undertaken
that over the last several years. The standard had been varying
at 3 meters around 10 feet, and now it's going down to 9
meters, I believe--or at least it's tripled.
As--the effect of that has been that, over time, the number
of faults over the last 10 years has remained constant or
actually slightly going down, and this is at a time when the
industry has actually put in 50 percent more miles of cable in
the water. So, essentially, what we've seen is a big success.
The--a number of incidents per cable mile has greatly
decreased.
Mr. Crane. Can you tell the American people who, like I
said, probably don't talk about this over the dinner table, how
many cables are we talking about here?
Mr. Stronge. There are almost 600 in the world right now.
About 100 connect to the United States, another 34 are
connecting to the United States in the next 2, 3 years.
Mr. Crane. Thank you. How long does it take to repair one
of these cables that gets damaged, and how much does it cost?
Mr. Stronge. Well, once you're at station, it takes 1 to 2
days to actually repair the actual cable. The problem is
getting the permits, if you can believe it or not. That is the
number----
Mr. Crane. You have to get a permit to repair one of these
cables?
Mr. Stronge. Not if it's at the--at high seas. But if it's
in territorial waters, you sure do, and sometimes it can be
duplicative permits.
One of the worst areas of the world right now, if you have
a cable break, is Indonesia, and that's because they have
cabotage restrictions. They essentially require that their
vessel be Indonesian flagged or crewed, or perhaps both; I
can't recall. It can take months to get that permit.
I would caution the U.S. Government not to adopt similar
laws because, right now, you never hear about American cables
breaking. They actually do break all the time. It's just
because we have so much resilience and we are able to repair
effectively and quickly, that's why you never hear about it.
But if it started taking months, it would be a problem.
Mr. Crane. You think it's safe to say for our foreign
adversaries that might be listening to this hearing today that
it is considered a deterrent, that we can play the same games?
Mr. Stronge. I don't know if I--I have enough information
to speculate on that, but what I can say is that redundancy
forms its own deterrence.
If you really wanted to attack 97 cables simultaneously, it
would be a--require phenomenal effort, and I'm not sure it's
really worth that effort.
Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Ogles. I thank the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.
I now recognize the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.
Magaziner.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.
Since taking office, President Trump and Secretary Noem
have eliminated one-third of the work force at the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA. The
President's 2026 budget also calls for nearly half a billion
dollars to be cut from CISA, and reports have indicated that
staff at CISA have been reassigned, diverted to immigration and
other matters. These actions weaken our cyber defenses and
undermine Federal collaboration with industry and critical
infrastructure organizations.
The administration has cut or withheld hundreds of millions
of dollars in funding for terrorism prevention. Highly-trained
counterterrorism analysts are being diverted away from
investigating terrorist groups to focus on other work. Daily
intelligence reports the top officials about terrorism and
other threats are being directly impacted by the diversion of
resources.
As our adversaries like Russia and China intensify their
cyber attacks on the U.S. telecommunication system and our
critical infrastructure, the administration instead is focused
on deporting children with cancer, United States veterans who
served our country honorably, even American citizens have been
detained, green card holders; sending armies of masked men to
terrorize neighborhoods. A 4-year-old U.S. citizen child with
cancer is not a threat to the security of the United States.
Attacks on subsea cables are.
So why is the administration diverting resources away from
addressing real threats to our telecommunications
infrastructure, to other critical infrastructure, and instead
focusing on deporting children and grandmothers and landscapers
and other people trying to make a living? Doesn't make America
more safe.
We need to refocus on real national security threats,
including the threats that we are talking about today.
Mr. Frazier, do funding and personnel cuts at CISA weaken
our ability, impact our ability to detect and deter threats to
subsea cables?
Mr. Frazier. Thank you for the question, Mr. Magaziner. I
think there's a real need to make sure that we have a work
force that's scaled to the threats we are facing on a daily
basis.
As we've heard from a number of the panelists, the number
of cables is going to increase over time. The interest in
upsetting and perhaps tapping into just a fraction of those
cables is going to increase. So making sure that we have a work
force that's able to handle the increased volume and potential
attacks is of paramount significance.
I'd also note that there are deeper or perhaps even less
popular topics to discuss with respect to the work force
efficiencies we are seeing. Cable repair ships, it's not a job
you hear a lot about. You don't meet a cable repairman very
frequently at Subway or wherever you go. So making sure that we
are training the next generation of folks to staff those
maintenance ships is another area of critical importance.
Mr. Magaziner. Yes, I'm glad you touched on that. You know,
I come from Rhode Island, where we have a growing and thriving
industry in underwater technology, including autonomous systems
that I think are very relevant in this space, and we need to
continue to invest real resources in this area, again, just to
the point of investing to protect ourselves from the actual
threats, not deporting kids.
I'll ask any of you, I mean, has the administration--I
haven't seen it. I'm glad that our committees here--our
subcommittees here are addressing this issue. But has the
administration communicated to any of you any sort of a
comprehensive plan for how the Federal Government is going to
work with industry to address these threats?
Yes. See, you don't have to answer. I think the silence
says it all.
So, again, I mean, this is about making sure that we as a
Government are focused on where our greatest threats are. This
is one, no doubt about it. I read all of your testimony. I
think it's important. I think it's insightful. We absolutely
need to be prioritizing this space, and I hope that the
administration will listen.
With that, I'll yield back.
Mr. Ogles. I thank the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.
Magaziner, and also want to thank--your comment regarding
strategic planning. I think this is an important conversation
that we are beginning, and remind the gentleman this is just
the beginning. I look forward to working with you on this issue
and coming up with real solutions.
I now recognize Mr. Mackenzie, the gentleman from
Pennsylvania.
Mr. Mackenzie. Absolutely. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman,
and appreciate the fact that we are holding this hearing and
focusing on this important topic in Congress. It's very
important that we as Members don't get sidetracked and chase
the shiny objects all the time instead of actually focusing on
the issue that is at hand and right in front of us in a
committee like this.
So do want to ask the testifiers and the members of the
panel here today, what exactly is the role of the private
industry participants that are out there and then their
interplay with the Federal Government?
Mr. Stronge. I suppose I could start. I would say that the
cable industry, the private industry is the first line of
defense for the national security of these networks. They're
the ones who first detect faults, then they are required to
notify the FCC, which shares the information with Coast Guard
and DHS. Then the industry itself is expected to repair the
cables, which is what happens.
The industry has been around for about 150 years, and it's
accustomed to failure. It's a fact, accidents happen all the
time. So they've come up with multiple strategies for defeating
this, not just denial or hardening the asset, but deterrence,
with cooperation with other seabed users, detection
technologies that I would like to talk about with you, Mr.
Luttrell, and several other strategies as well.
Mr. Mackenzie. Now, the multiple companies that are in the
private industry focusing on this type of work, is that what
leads to the redundancy and resiliency for America, or is it
multiple points of connection, or both? Can we talk about that?
Mr. Stronge. It's everything. There are multiple companies,
fortunately. So there's a lot of competition in that space.
There are multiple cables, there are multiple landing points.
I'm sometimes asked what I worry about the most about single
point of failure. There is no single point of failure. There's
no kill switch for the American internet. Trusted vendors are
installed for the most instances of equipment on these--on
these cables.
But the landing--areas of the landing station has been a
concern of the industry. In the--on the U.S. East Coast, just
10 years ago, so many cables were concentrated in the New York/
New Jersey area, and they've spent billions of dollars of
building landing stations up and down the East Coast since
then.
Conversely, the West Coast is a potential problem. There's
more herding of cables there. There are a lot of national
marine sanctuaries up and down the coast of California that are
essentially a no-go zone for the cable industry. If we are
going to worry about a national strategy for resilience, that's
an area where there should be some improvement.
Mr. Mackenzie. So what I'm hearing, though, is that the
private industry, that their role in this subsea cable space is
actually a huge benefit for us, probably a competitive
advantage to other countries around the world that don't have
the technology companies that are doing this type of work in
this space.
So that's something we want to continue to foster. We don't
want to impede that kind of private-sector activity. But there
is, you're saying, a potential space for the Federal Government
to step in.
So in a national strategy conversation, is it something
that we should be looking at from a Government perspective on
the whole or just in targeted areas where there are problems?
Mr. Frazier. Well, I'm a law professor, so I have to
answer, it depends. So I think if you look at different
components of the undersea cable issue, we'll see a different
makeup of where we need to see private actors taking the lead
and the Government taking the lead.
To start, I would recommend that, for the FCC licensing
process, we need to see resiliency planning as a part of that
application. If stuff does hit the fan, who are these cable
owners going to turn to? It's still the case that we have
Google, Meta, and other of our hyper-scalers turning to ships
owned by China to repair their cables. We've seen proposals,
for example, to ban Chinese-affiliated entities from laying,
maintaining, repairing U.S. cables. I think that's a wise
position to take because the odds, for example, of China, when
they're repairing a repeater, installing some malicious add-ons
to that, we don't know just how high or how likely that may be.
So I think having an explicit ban on Chinese intervention
on this piece of critical infrastructure makes a lot of sense.
Mr. Mackenzie. Great. Well, thank you. I see my time's
about to expire, but I appreciate the point of rebuilding and
bringing back American shipbuilding that is critical to our
national security in so many areas, not just here with the
subsea cables, but I appreciate you raising that today. Again,
thank you all for being here today.
Mr. Ogles. I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Mackenzie.
I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
witnesses for being here today.
Protecting our subsea cable infrastructure is critical to
national security and to our U.S. economy, which increasingly
relies on on-line markets. These lines are the quiet backbone
of modern economy, and because they're largely invisible,
they're easily taken for granted.
But foreign adversaries do not take them for granted.
Nations like China and Russia have developed specialized
vessels and undersea capabilities designed to tap, disrupt, and
sever subsea cables. They understand that interfering with
these networks can undermine America, without firing a single
shot.
Off the coast of my district in South Louisiana, the Gulf
of Mexico provides a stark example of the importance of this
infrastructure. Subsea cables support offshore energy
platforms, vessels, and critical industrial operations hundreds
of miles from land. A significant disruption could halt
production, spike energy prices, and compromise safety systems.
That's why DHS must elevate this issue to the top of
operational priority.
However, a recent New York Times investigative report found
that Department of Homeland Security under President Donald
Trump has reassigned large numbers of agents, including those
from wings of homeland security investigations that investigate
child abuse, exploitation, human trafficking, terrorism, and
transnational crimes, to focus primarily on immigration
enforcement and mass deportation efforts. Internal DHS
documents and interviews show that this shift in priorities has
diminished the capacity to investigate serious criminal
national security threats.
Protecting subsea infrastructure is not optional. This is a
national security priority we cannot shift our attention away
from. Our economic stability, our energy sector, and the safety
of millions of Americans depend on these networks functioning
every hour of every day.
Mr. Frazier, about 20 or 30--20 to 30 U.S.-owned cables
need repair each year, but repairing them is a challenge due to
the limited number of specialized repair vessels worldwide.
Only an estimated 80 ships exist to service nearly a million
miles of subsea cable, creating high demand and delays that can
last months for a single repair. Cable operators are also left
with little choice but to rely on Chinese ships for repairs
because alternatives are scarce.
In your opinion, what can Congress do to help with this
problem?
Mr. Frazier. Thank you for that question.
I think we have to lean into America's shipbuilding
capacity. The fact that we are still relying on ships built by
foreign adversaries, in particular, to repair some of these
critical cables is, in my opinion, a sign of our neglect to
this issue. We have to pay attention to the fact that, again,
every cable has 2 sides.
A lot of those cables land, for example, in Taiwan. Taiwan
isn't blessed with 88 different cables like we are. Taiwan has
15. So making sure that there are ships in Guam, in Hawaii, and
near Taiwan, for example, is very important, and those ships
should be built by American companies.
Mr. Carter. As you know, as you may know, in Louisiana, I'm
proud to have, within Louisiana, some of the best, strongest,
and most reputable shipbuilders in the world within the State
of Louisiana.
Mr. Frazier, you note the need for cable repair
capabilities is likely to continue to grow as we use these
cables more. Repair of these subsea cables is believed to cost
the United States between $12- and $116 million annually.
Does the United States know what the true financial cost of
repairs and disruptions of undersea cables really is every
year? What kind of data sharing could help provide better
insight in the impacts of these disruptions?
Mr. Frazier. I think this is where we really need to have
that lead agency that's able to collect information from a
variety of the private and public stakeholders who are
gathering this information and to establish stronger ties with
our allies.
For example, we know in Tonga, just a volcano caused the
single line connecting Tonga to the rest of the world to go
off-line. Tonga lost internet access for about 4 to 5 weeks. So
we have to factor in also, how are our allies doing when the
internet gets disrupted.
Mr. Carter. So $12- to $116 million. That's a pretty big
gap. That means we really don't know. That means we have not
been able to ascertain just how deep this problem is or how
deep it is to fix.
What can we do to be more scientific, because we understand
and know how important it is, No. 1, to understand the problem
and, No. 2, to have a remedy to fix it? Any idea, Mr. Botting?
You're shaking your head. Would you like to jump in on that? My
time is up, so you got to do it quickly.
Mr. Botting. No. I think the--the other point that I wanted
to make on repairs was----
Mr. Carter. Can you stay to this point? That's all I've got
time for.
Mr. Botting. Oh, I'm sorry. I don't have an answer.
Mr. Carter. OK. Mr. Frazier.
Mr. Frazier. I would include in the FCC licensing
provisions that companies have to share the information related
to repairs and any service disruptions that are seen directly
to DHS or the FCC.
Mr. Carter. Mr. Chairman, I yield.
Mr. Ogles. The gentleman's time has expired. I thank the
gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter.
Now recognize the gentlewoman from South Carolina, Mrs.
Biggs.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
witnesses for being here today.
I don't think there's any question about the critical role
that the subsea cables play in the security and the daily
functioning of the United States, yet responsibility for
protecting these assets is fragmented across multiple Federal
agencies with no single entity clearly designated as the
Federal lead.
Someone mentioned earlier about maybe looking at the
Executive Order for some direction for that. But the ambiguity
creates doubts in the oversight, and actually it leaves the
industry without a clear point of contact during emerging
threats.
So as Members of Congress, we really need to understand
whether the structure is adequate for today's risk environment.
So I would like to hear from each one of you--I know we've
kind-of danced around and made--kind-of hinted at ideas, but
which Federal entity should be responsible for overseeing sea
cable security as it relates to national security, and what
core responsibilities should that agency hold?
Mr. Kroenig. Well, I think you're right, fragmentation is a
problem. Having a single hub to coordinate subsea cable
security would make a lot of sense. As I said in my opening
testimony, I do think the Department of Homeland Security could
make sense for that.
Mr. Botting. Yes. I'd say across 2 specific areas that DHS
would be well-positioned. No. 1 is, as I mentioned earlier, the
two-way threat intelligence sharing to make sure that industry
has access to a more sophisticated understanding of the latest
and greatest from our adversaries and what they might be
intending to do.
The second is, we've talked about, you know, concerns
within the supply chain, perhaps repair vehicles coming out--or
vessels coming out of China. Supply chain's big, right. Most of
these supply chains were developed at a time originally when
China probably wasn't the biggest threat to the United States.
I think we need to take a more holistic approach than just
calling on one piece of the puzzle and have DHS work with
industry to map that supply chain so that we understand it, we
understand where China may have access in other parts of the
supply chain. If that poses a risk, then we propose mitigations
for solving that.
I think doing this whack-a-mole is probably not a great
strategy for us. I think DHS could play a really important role
in looking at this holistically with industry and getting us to
a place where we feel comfortable.
Mr. Stronge. Talking to people in the industry, I don't
think they have a preference. They just want someone who knows
what--who knows what the strategy is and can prosecute it.
DHS has been--proposed a few years ago--a Member of
Congress I know--proposed that NTIA take over leadership of
Team Telecom. That could also work.
But what we do need is something, as you've said, is a
holistic approach. Right now I think supply chain mitigation is
really well-managed. Team Telecom has done an excellent job at
that.
Also, other strategies that would fall under the denial
curtain of strategy of making sure that cable landing stations
are hardened and they're not letting in potential bad actors.
That's already well-covered under Team Telecom provisions, but
that's only one aspect of protecting cables.
To have actual deterrence, you need to have a policy to
prosecute companies that are damaging cables. You need to allow
the industry to innovate with detection technologies. Most
importantly, you need to promote physical diversity of these
cables. Right now I'm not really seeing that a great deal.
DHS did put out a study a couple of years ago promoting
this idea, but as best I can tell, nothing's really happened on
that.
Mr. Frazier. I'll echo much of the same sentiments as my
colleagues here. I do think that DHS can play a lead agency
role in a lot of these domains.
One in particular that I would encourage you all to think
creatively about is, you all have sponsored in the cyber
domain, bug bounty problem--bug bounty programs, for example. I
would love to see a boat bounty program where we identify
members of the shadow fleet. I think you can get a lot of folks
who would be excited to help identify Russian ships flying
under flags of convenience. I would also encourage DHS to
really lean into its role in terms of national emergency
planning to assist in contingency plans in this domain.
Mrs. Biggs. Well, thank you very much for your insight on
that.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Ogles. I thank the gentlewoman from South Carolina,
Mrs. Biggs.
We did run out of time with you, Mr. Carter, so I'll
recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I've got one quick
question for each of our panelists.
The reconciliation bill which passed this summer included
billions of dollars in funding for DHS agencies responsible for
detecting, deterring, and responding to threats to subsea
cables. How should these agencies utilize these funds better to
protect subsea infrastructure?
Mr. Kroenig. Going back--thank you, sir. Going back to my
previous points, I think making sure that the Coast Guard has
the resources it needs to do patrols is an important piece of
the answer.
Mr. Stronge. I would--I can't speak to the actual
capabilities and whether they've been degraded or not,
Representative Carter. But I do know that in other countries
it's been shown that----
Mr. Carter. I didn't suggest it would degrade it. I said
there was additional funds that have been allocated. How can we
better use them to ensure that we are protecting subsea
infrastructure?
Mr. Stronge. Thank you for that clarification. I was
thinking of your earlier question to another witness.
What we have seen in other areas of the world is that
aggressive deterrence by military or police activity really
makes a difference. We've seen that in the Baltic. There is a
huge media frenzy about cable breaks in the Baltic. Finland,
Sweden, and Estonia really stepped up efforts, and since then,
there have not been any cable breaks. That's anecdotal, but
it's possible.
The actual last cable that has experienced a fault in the
Baltic Sea was a Russian military cable. We've seen the same
thing off the coast of Taiwan.
Mr. Carter. I don't want you to miss this great
opportunity. I'm saying you just got a whole lot of money, and
we are asking you to help us spend it. So I don't want you to
look back and say, I blew this moment.
We want to make sure we hear from you, policy makers who
are appropriating money, to make sure that we are doing and
hitting the spots that you think as experts need to be hit. DHS
has a lot more money that is in the reconciliation bill. We
want to make sure it's being spent in a way that experts think.
So I don't want to put you on the spot, but I just want to
give Mr. Botting a little bit of a runway on that.
Mr. Botting. Certainly. Thank you, sir.
Yes, I would go back to I think DHS should be the place
where we do a comprehensive mapping of the supply chain. I
think DHS should lead a two-way threat intelligence-sharing
mechanism with industry so that we get information into their
hands that can help them adjust their risk mitigation measures
to better protect us against activity by our adversaries.
One more that I'll throw in there is engagement with
international partners. A lot of the challenges that we face
are mirrored, if not amplified, in foreign jurisdictions. So if
we look at things like time for permitting approvals or repair
ships getting in, we are not the worst offender in the United
States, but we are impacted when capacity is taken out of the
global interconnected cable ecosystem when others do not
address those issues.
So I would strongly encourage engagement with international
partners through DHS as well.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Frazier. Thank you for the question. I would spend all
that money on 2 things. I would create 10 new cable repair
ships. Each cable repair ship costs about $300 million. So you
can start allocating a lot of money to just building more cable
repair ships.
I would then use any remaining funds after that to begin to
create the same sorts of drones. They're called XLUUVs, Extra
Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles, that China just paraded
around in Beijing about 2 months ago. I think we need this
similar set of drone capabilities that they're demonstrating
undersea.
Mr. Carter. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Ogles. I thank the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Carter, and for your follow-up questions.
I welcome Mr. Fong to the Cybersecurity Subcommittee, and I
recognize the gentleman from California for 5 minutes.
Mr. Fong. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to the witnesses.
Thank you for the hospitality, and certainly excited to be part
of this critical conversation on the Cyber and Infrastructure
Subcommittee.
My first question to Mr. Botting. It was alluded by my
colleague from Texas, but the PRC continues to expand its
technical capabilities for intercepting and collecting global
communications data, including data that travels across these
subsea cables.
Given the PRC's rapid investment in quantum computing and
its known practice of harvesting encrypted data for future
exploitation, what steps should the United States and our
allies take to ensure that the data moving through subsea
cables remains protected, not only today, but also against
future decryption attempts that could enable state-sponsored
cyber operations years or decades from now?
Mr. Botting. Thank you very much for the question.
Certainly, it is not that I'm dismissing that threat out of
hand, by any means. It's that, as I look at it, it is a very
technically challenging way to get access to information. I
think, certainly, if we look at the cybersecurity domain,
they've proven themselves very adept to getting access to
information through other means.
It is a very important point, though, that part of the kind
of scenario I walked us through earlier was the idea that a lot
of the data is encrypted, right. If we get to a point where
China has a quantum event and is able to far easily decrypt
that information, again, that would change the risk profile.
I guess, 2 direct answers to your questions. No. 1 is, we
need to be ready to make that transition so that our financial
transactions or other sensitive data are being transmitted with
quantum-resistant algorithms ahead of the point in time when
China is able to decrypt it. So that is an important thing that
we drive forward.
I think that needs to happen primarily with the data
owners, not on the cable itself, because if it's on the cable
itself, then you create a single point of failure in the
system, where if they tap it on a terrestrial cable, it's not
encrypted. If they tap it on the subsea cable, it is encrypted.
So you just redirect their efforts somewhere else in the
system. It needs to be encrypted before it's sort-of traversing
the cables and the global ecosystem.
So, yes, I think that is something that's important for us
to work on. I know this committee could potentially help to
drive forward.
Mr. Fong. Thank you very much.
To Mr. Stronge, over the past 2 years--and it's been
alluded by some of the other witnesses--several cable breaks
near Taiwan have demonstrated how vulnerable the region's
communications infrastructure is to both accidental damage and
deliberate interference. These cable systems, as mentioned, not
only carry Taiwan's domestic internet and phone traffic, but
they also carry and support a substantial volume of transit
data that moves between the United States and key markets in
Asia.
If the PRC intentionally disrupted cable segments near
Taiwan, what would the immediate effects to the United States
be? What would we experience in terms of slowed cloud services,
delayed financial transactions, and interruptions to routine
commercial data? Based on your industry insights, how quickly
could alternate cable routes and backup systems realistically
absorb the sudden shift in traffic without causing instability
across U.S. networks?
Mr. Stronge. Well, it would--I would be more concerned for
the Taiwanese, but I can say that it would be very difficult
for the CCP to intentionally cause faults in these cables and
then prevent repair ships without maintaining a blockade. Then
we are in a situation of potential warfare.
In terms of the effects on the continental United States, I
wouldn't say necessarily minor, but only a small proportion of
trans-Pacific cables is routed through that area. Japan is a
much larger hub for us through the Pacific, and there are a lot
of new cables going in on a southerly route to provide more
physical diversity.
Mr. Fong. OK. I have to ask you, Mr. Stronge, you mentioned
California's specific challenges in one of your previous
answers. Being a Californian now on this committee, I would--I
want to, I guess, allow you to expound on what those
California-specific challenges are.
Mr. Stronge. Sure. The way--as I understand it, the normal
permitting process for going through U.S. territorial waters is
applying for a permit with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
and that's pretty well-founded. Both for installation and quick
repair, it generally has not been a huge problem.
However, NOAA is the administrator of the national marine
sanctuaries. They have, instead of a 25-year license, as the
FCC does for normal cables, they would only have a 5-year
license. It's not known by cable operators of how quickly they
would react to an emergency repair.
So, essentially, the cables have completely routed around
that area. As a result, if you look at a map, they're all
squeezed into a few landing stations in California, Oregon, and
Washington.
Mr. Fong. Got you. Well, I certainly look forward to
working with you.
My time has run out. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Ogles. I thank the gentleman from California, Mr. Fong.
I have a couple of follow-up questions, but before I do
that, I'd like to recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Luttrell.
Mr. Luttrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Currently, what is--how do they find the breaks in the
cable system? Is that a--are they pinging it with a sonar,
side-scan sonar, underwater unmanned vehicle, or are they
tracking where--is it repeaters?
Mr. Stronge. Thank you, Representative Luttrell.
Yes. It's essentially the light equivalent of a sonar. They
have something called a reflectometer, shoots light down and
sunlight can bounce back, and they measure the delay in the
time. That's easiest if there's a clean break of the cable.
They know precisely where that fault is.
Mr. Luttrell. OK. If not?
Mr. Stronge. It requires more investigation. There are
problems with--called a shunt fault if the electricity fails on
the cable. It's harder to pinpoint. But they investigate it
further.
Mr. Luttrell. It's normally at a shallower depth?
Mr. Stronge. Yes, sir. It's normally----
Mr. Luttrell. At the deeper waters, the deeper depths, we
are not having that problem?
Mr. Stronge. Less than 10 percent are at highest.
Mr. Luttrell. Any sort of vehicle unmanned tracking these
cable systems to find breaks or faults before we have a loss?
Mr. Stronge. So that's a great question, detecting things
before. This is an incredible new technology, if you don't mind
me just telling you for a moment.
So you're talking about U.S. SEAL activity or other
activity to--that, hypothetically, could cut a cable. Before,
there's no way to hear that. You can use automatic
identification system to see where a ship is, but you can turn
that off.
The industry has developed something that allows the light
signals and changes to the light to actually hear what's going
on. So if you actually go and touch a cable that has this
technology on, it sounds like this. [Indicating.]
You can actually hear it. You can also hear ships that are
dropping the anchor near the cable. It's a remarkable new
technology.
But the industry's kind-of afraid of adopting it widely
because they don't know how that is going to be permitted. It
could greatly complicate the permitting process.
So if we want the industry to adopt this incredible new
technology, we need to give them a little bit more assurance of
what would be allowed.
Mr. Luttrell. All right. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ogles. I thank the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Luttrell.
You know, we've got about 15 minutes left in the hearing,
and my guess is I think everyone has essentially been on the
same page. So why don't we go down the line, roughly 4 minutes
apiece, closing remarks, anything that you want to put a fine
point on or, quite frankly, if there's something that we
missed, I think it's been stated by both sides of the aisle
that this is an incredible area of importance that's going to
require bipartisan cooperation and, quite frankly, a lot of
strategic planning, because we have both vulnerabilities here
in the continental, under the sea, and, then, of course, with
our foreign partners.
So, Mr. Kroenig, I'll begin with you. You're recognized for
4 minutes.
Mr. Kroenig. Well, I think one important issue we haven't
spent enough time on is the Chinese-owned and -operated and -
maintained cables. The internet developed in the 1990's, the
2000's, it was a more peaceful time, a time of globalization, a
lot of economic interdependence between the United States and
China in all areas, including in this one.
So as I think--as we think about a global strategy to
derisk from China economically, this is another important part
of that. I think the message has gotten to U.S. industry, and
my colleagues can comment, that Chinese equipment is a problem,
landing points in China is a problem. Google was blocked from
having a landing point in Hong Kong recently.
So I think there are going to be costs to efficiency
because of that, but it is worth it for national security. This
gets back to this point. Industry, I think, is an asset for us.
But industry left to its own devices is often going to make
decisions based on profitability. So I think the U.S.
Government does have an important role to play in national
security.
Even though we are relatively protected here, our allies in
the region do depend more on Chinese-owned and -operated
cables. So that is something to be aware of and does get back
to this espionage point. China doesn't have to tap into our
cables if they're operating them theirselves.
So I'll stop there.
Mr. Ogles. Mr. Stronge, you have 4 minutes.
Mr. Stronge. Thank you. I think I'll use a few minutes to
address a couple of questions that were left unanswered. I
think--I hope both will provide some comfort to the committee.
First of all, Representative Luttrell asked me to convince
him otherwise that mapping the infrastructure is not dangerous.
Well, some things can't be hidden, and cables are one of those.
If you think of other critical pieces of infrastructure, roads
and bridges would--do you think it's a good idea to classify
those? Well, no. We economically need them, and we'd be running
into them if we didn't know where they were.
The same goes with the electricity grid. The first thing
you do when you bury a line is notify and map where that is so
that there's less risk of electrocution.
The same goes for submarine cables. The cable industry
works very closely with the fishery industries to let them know
where those cables are. Otherwise, the numbers of accidents
would go way up over time, and it would also make it more
difficult to discern what is malicious versus what is an
accident. We'd be so overwhelmed with accidents.
My company does collect a lot of sensitive data. We don't
show, however, the specific location of the cable landing
stations or the specific location of the cables. We don't
provide that at least to our normal clients.
The second thing that I hope is a little bit of comfort is
I think there might be a misconception that the United States
relies on Chinese repair vessels. That's simply not the case.
We do rely on repair vessels from friendly countries, NATO
partners, Japan, Korea.
There are a handful of ships in the sea that are Chinese-
flagged and -operated. The United States does not tend to use
those. In fact, U.S. operators have commitments with Team
Telecom not to use those for repair. In fact, the only place
where those ships operate are in the South China Sea and the
coastal waters around China. So it's really not--that aspect
doesn't scare me as much. That is being handled right now.
I think what I would just close with is that this is one of
those rare opportunities or moments where the private sector is
almost completely aligned with the public need. The last thing
cable operators want is a cyber intrusion on their cables, so
they have heavy cybersecurity. The last thing they want is
physical security.
So they've already committed a lot of money to protect the
cables, and I think they're really looking forward to having a
continuing and more open dialog with the Government on how to
move that forward.
Thank you.
Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Stronge.
Mr. Botting, closing remarks, I recognize you for 4
minutes.
Mr. Botting. Thank you, Chairman.
Yes, equally, I want to address a couple of points that we
didn't delve into too deeply here.
No. 1 is on repair capacity. One aspect we've not talked
about is what is the scenario in which we are needing rapid
repair capability across multiple cables. I should say we in
the United States or partners internationally with whom we are
interconnected.
We had an example in the Red Sea where Houthi rebels were
shooting at ships, and a ship had to drop an anchor, and that
anchor sliced a whole bunch of cables. Commercial repair ships
are not going into that scenario to repair those cables.
So I do think there's a question, if we believe that an
adversary is going to engage in sabotage on our cables, the
Government needs to work with industry to figure out when a
commercial vessel's going in and when is it potentially the
U.S. Navy or some other part of, you know, the U.S. military
that's going in to repair these cables.
That kind of scenario planning, if you believe that that
eventuality is a possibility, is incredibly important, and I
would encourage the U.S. Government to work with industry on
that.
Second, I want to reemphasize a point I made in my opening
remarks. Around 200 incidents per year happen on those 600
cables, and they don't get investigated very well. That leaves
a huge opportunity for adversaries to engage in gray zone
activities, cutting cables, and just say, sorry, it's an
accident, happens all the time. We need to get better at
investigating those incidents and understand why they happen.
There are perfectly normal, benign reasons why it happens.
You know, being out at sea you get very bad weather, things
like that, you need to drop anchor. You know, it will happen to
some extent. But we actually need to find out if that is what
happened or if a--member of the shadow fleet went through,
dropped its cable and intentionally sliced key cables in the
Baltics, for instance.
So I agree, I think a lot of our allies in the Baltic Sea
are doing great work in starting to push that forward and
actually seeking to prosecute some of these things.
To the point made earlier about cable protection zones,
it's a reason why I'm skeptical about cable protection zones,
because you are concentrating your risk, and the only way to
offset that is to very actively investigate and prosecute when
somebody does something bad in that cable protection zone. We
are not seeing a lot of people doing that internationally at
the moment.
Finally, I just go back to my two recommendations specific
to DHS. We need a two-way threat-intelligence-sharing mechanism
to ensure that the private sector is aware of threats and, you
know, particular tactics that adversaries may use, and we need
to do a good mapping of the supply chain, which I think DHS is
well-positioned to do with the industry.
So with that, thank you.
Mr. Ogles. I do believe the gentleman from Arizona has a
follow-up question. So I'll go to you, Mr. Crane, recognize you
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I'm thinking about this topic in how to defend our
subsea cables, one of the things that I'm thinking about is,
obviously, we can harden the cables along our shores a lot
easier than we can, you know, defend and harden the--where they
go to right across the sea to other countries, allies of ours.
Have any of you guys done a cost analysis regarding is it
cheaper for us to actually harden these cables with everything
that goes with that or is it cheaper for us to just build up
our ability and our fleet to repair these cables? Mr. Stronge.
Mr. Stronge. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question.
About 12 percent of the world's cable mileage is buried,
and that accounted for 60 percent of the time to lay it, or,
essentially, the cost. It's hugely expensive to bury it. It's
typically only done in shallow areas or areas with other seabed
industries, like fishing.
Now, you could mandate that it gets buried even further,
but it would--then you're thinking--you have to think through
the economics of that. What is going to provide us more
protection? If we say bury it the whole way, that's the cost of
3 cables. I would guarantee you that we are going to--you would
have more resilience by building 3 cables rather than having 1
that has--is buried the entire way.
I also don't know of the physical constraints on armoring a
cable at deep sea. There are limits to the winch, a power on
the cable. So as it's laid, and certainly if it would need to
be recovered, it might simply be impossible.
Finally, hardening always sounds like a great thing. These
cables--this is an actual cable. This is what it is at deep
sea. The shallow end you have steel armor around it, but really
that's more to protect against environmental problems, like
rock chafing. Steel armoring around the cable is not going to
stop an anchor.
So you need diversity. That's the No. 1 way to protect.
Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Ogles. I thank the gentleman from Arizona.
Mr. Frazier, if you'd like to offer some remarks. But also,
I would love for you to touch on AI and what that's going to do
with our need for additional bandwidth. Obviously, you know, if
you want to touch on energy demand, but also, of course, the
hardening that goes therein.
I recognize the gentleman for 4 minutes.
Mr. Frazier. Yes. Thank you for that question, Chairman.
I think, just to start--and I certainly will get to AI--I
want to emphasize that, as you pointed out in your opening
remarks, we've been here before. We've had reports from 2004,
for example, from DHS basically enumerating every policy
proposal we heard here today. We punted the issue to subsequent
Congresses.
So I would just emphasize that, to me, the developments we
are seeing in China with respect to their drone capabilities in
particular should be regarded as a sort-of subsea Sputnik
moment that we are living through right now. If we don't act
and make sure that we are protecting Taiwan, and make sure we
are protecting our allies, and make sure we are defending our
own undersea cable infrastructure, we may be sitting in this
room again in 2025--or excuse me--2035 having the same
conversation.
So I do think this needs to be a priority because, in
particular, we are going to see this increase in bandwidth
demand only increase with our reliance on AI. If you talk to
Meta officials, one of their main data center executives made a
fantastic line, which is a data center without the undersea
cable system is just a warehouse.
We are seeing billions, soon trillions, of dollars across
the AI industry being spent on these data centers, and to not
see the undersea cable system as a key component of the--as
wisdom of those investments is missing out on just the
essential role we have to make sure we are leaning into there.
Then, finally, I would say that we may not be as reliant on
China and Chinese infrastructure today as we have been in the
past, but that's certainly not true of strategic partners
around the world. We need to be studying and paying close
attention to the Digital Silk Road, specifically in the Middle
East and North Africa where China is experiencing tremendous
success in getting other countries to buy into its cable
infrastructure and to broader economic and technological
infrastructure.
Then I would emphasize that, perhaps outside of the
confines of this meeting, paying greater attention to
international law is something that we should lend support to
with respect to countries like Estonia, Poland, and Finland.
They are trying to see an expansion in our interpretation, for
example, of what it means to defend national sovereignty in the
EEZ and outside of territorial waters.
But finally, I would just say really taking the lowest-
hanging fruit first and starting to make progress on these
fronts by, for example, updating the penalties in the Submarine
Cable Act of 1888 to make sure that people can actually be
deterred.
Mr. Ogles. Well, I want to thank the witnesses. You know,
to your point, this is certainly an area where we need to move
and move swiftly, which is why the Cyber Subcommittee, we just
moved and passed in Congress the PILLAR Act, which I was the
author of, and then also the resilience to foreign entities.
So we'll continue to work in this space. My commitment to
the panelists and everyone on this committee is that I will be
a loud voice as we continue to expand, protect, and, quite
frankly, better strategic plan around this very issue.
Again, I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony,
the Members for their questions. The Members of the committee
may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we
would ask the witnesses to respond to these in writing.
Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the hearing record will
be open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank
you all.
[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Supplemental Material Submitted by Matthew Kroenig
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Supplemental Material Submitted by Timothy Stronge
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Supplemental Material Submitted by Kevin Frazier
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