[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SURVEYING THE THREAT OF AGROTERRORISM: PERSPECTIVES ON FOOD,
AGRICULTURE, AND VETERINARY DEFENSE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND
TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 16, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-26
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-704 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Chair Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Eric Swalwell, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida J. Luis Correa, California
August Pfluger, Texas Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Tony Gonzales, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Elijah Crane, Arizona Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Member
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Gabe Evans, Colorado Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Brad Knott, North Carolina Al Green, Texas
Vacant Vacant
Vacant
Keighle Joyce, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY
Dale W. Strong, Alabama, Chairman
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York,
Gabe Evans, Colorado Ranking Member
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Julie Johnson, Texas
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Staff Director
Lauren McClain, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Dale W. Strong, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Management and Technology:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Timothy M. Kennedy, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emergency Management and Technology:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. Daniel K. Wims, Ph.D., President, Alabama A&M University:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Dr. Cristopher A. Young, DVM, MPH, DACVPM, COL USA (RET.),
Professor of Practice, College of Veterinary Medicine, Auburn
University:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Dr. Marty Vanier, DVM, Director, National Agricultural
Biosecurity Center, Associate Director, Biosecurity Research
Institute, Kansas State University:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Ms. Asha M. George, DrPH, Executive Director, Bipartisan
Commission on Biodefense:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Appendix I
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Daniel K. Wims........ 33
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Cristopher A. Young... 34
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Marty Vanier.......... 39
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Asha M. George........ 42
Question From Hon. Pablo Jose Hernandez for Asha M. George....... 44
Appendix II
Supplemental Material Submitted by Asha M. George................ 45
SURVEYING THE THREAT OF AGROTERRORISM: PERSPECTIVES ON FOOD,
AGRICULTURE, AND VETERINARY DEFENSE
----------
Tuesday, September 16, 2025
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Management
and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dale W. Strong
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Strong, Brecheen, Mackenzie,
Kennedy, and Hernandez.
Chairman Strong. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Emergency Management Technology will come to
order. Without objection, the Chair may declare the
subcommittee in recess at any point.
The purpose of this hearing is to assess the threat of
agroterrorism to the United States' food and agriculture sector
and examine how Federal efforts to prevent, respond to, and
recover from such attacks can be strengthened. I now recognize
myself for an opening statement.
Good afternoon and thank you for joining us today. Today
this subcommittee is meeting to discuss the threats posed by
agroterrorism and other malicious actors who seek to harm
America's food and agriculture sector.
The importance of our Nation's agriculture assets to both
our economy and national security cannot be overstated.
Agroterrorists who use biological agents and other means to
disrupt our food supply chain can find success in generating
mass fear, instability, and economic damage. This makes our
agriculture a tempting target for hostile actors. Just earlier
this year, the DOJ charged 3 Chinese nationals with trying to
smuggle hazardous biological material into the United States,
materials that could have threatened the health of our crops
and our livestock. These Chinese nationals intended to conduct
further research on the materials at the University of Michigan
laboratory. That raises serious questions about the risk of
modifying dangerous pathogens and other strengths of security
measures protecting research conducted within our universities
and laboratories.
While CBP agents successfully intercepted the undeclared
biological materials, this incident highlights the critical
role of food safety and security in our homeland security
operations. Unfortunately, these incidents are just the latest
development in an on-going trend of foreign and malign interest
in U.S. agriculture.
The risks we face aren't limited to just the international
introduction of biological threats. More and more, the food and
agriculture industries have incorporated automations and
digital technologies to improve the efficiency of farming. But
as the farming industry continues to increase its use of these
technologies, it becomes more vulnerable to cyber attack,
potentially jeopardizing the entire supply chain.
Rogue actors have also attempted to breach our agriculture
sector from within. A GAO study from January of last year
confirmed that foreign ownership of U.S. farmland has been
steadily increasing over the course of decades. There is a
growing concern that groups affiliated with the PRC will
continue to seek to purchase farmland near and around U.S.
military bases and installations.
That is why I am proud to have sponsored the Protecting
America's Agriculture Land From Foreign Harm Act 2025. My bill
would prohibit people tied to the governments of Iran, North
Korea, China, or Russia from purchasing or leasing agriculture
land in the United States of America. It's a common-sense step
to protect our food, fiber, and supply chain and prevent
adversaries from using our farmland as a base for operations
that threatens our homeland security. I hope that the relevant
committees of jurisdiction can take up this bill soon.
I also commend President Trump and his administration for
standing up for the National Farm Security Action Plan, which
brings together USDA, DHS, the Department of War, and other
Federal agencies. This initiative has the potential to
revolutionize the integration of agriculture security into
national security, and I strongly support it.
Today we are fortunate to have a panel of experts who can
testify to the nature and severity of the threat that
terrorists and other malicious actors can pose to agriculture.
I look forward to hearing their perspectives of what else
Congress and the Federal Government can do to protect our
farmland and our food supply chain from bad actors.
[The statement of Chairman Strong follows:]
Statement of Chairman Dale W. Strong
Good afternoon, and thank you for joining us.
Today, this subcommittee is meeting to discuss the threats posed by
agroterrorism and other malicious actors who seek to harm America's
food and agriculture sector.
The importance of our Nation's agricultural assets to both our
economy and national security cannot be overstated.
Agroterrorists who use biological agents and other means to disrupt
our food supply chain can find success in generating mass fear,
instability, and economic damage.
This makes our agriculture a tempting target for hostile actors.
Just earlier this year, the DOJ charged 3 Chinese nationals with
trying to smuggle hazardous biological materials into the United
States--materials that could have threatened the health of our crops
and livestock.
These Chinese nationals intended to conduct further research on the
biological materials at a University of Michigan laboratory.
That raises serious questions--about the risks of modifying
dangerous pathogens, and about the strength of security measures
protecting research conducted within our universities and laboratories.
While CBP agents were able to successfully detect and interdict the
undeclared biological materials, this incident demonstrates the vital
importance of food safety and security as a part of our homeland
security operations.
Unfortunately, these incidents are just the latest development in
an ongoing trend of foreign and malign interest in U.S. agriculture.
The risks we face aren't limited to just the intentional
introduction of biological threats.
More and more, the food and agriculture industries have
incorporated automation and digital technologies to improve the
efficiency of farming.
But as the farming industry continues to increase its use of these
technologies, it becomes more vulnerable to cyber attacks, potentially
jeopardizing the entire supply chain.
Rogue actors have also attempted to breach our agriculture sector
from within.
A GAO study from January of last year confirmed that foreign
ownership of U.S. farmland has been steadily increasing over the course
of decades.
And there is growing concern that groups affiliated with the PRC
will continue to seek the purchase of farmland near and around U.S.
military bases and installations.
That's why I'm proud to have sponsored the ``Protecting America's
Agricultural Land from Foreign Harm Act of 2025.''
This bill would prohibit people tied to the governments of Iran,
North Korea, China, or Russia from purchasing or leasing agricultural
land in the United States.
It's a common-sense step to protect our food supply and prevent
foreign adversaries from using our farmland as a base for operations
that threaten our homeland security.
I hope that the relevant committees of jurisdiction can take up the
bill soon.
I also commend President Trump and his administration for standing
up the National Farm Security Action Plan, which brings together USDA,
DHS, the Department of War, and other Federal agencies.
This initiative has the potential to revolutionize the integration
of agricultural security into national security, and I strongly support
it.
Today, we are fortunate to have a panel of experts who can testify
to the nature and severity of the threat that terrorists and other
malicious actors can pose to our agriculture.
I look forward to hearing their perspectives on what else Congress
and the Federal Government can do to protect our farmland and our food
supply chains from these bad actors.
Chairman Strong. I now recognize the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, Mr. Kennedy, for his opening statement.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Chairman, and good afternoon.
Last week, several Members of this committee traveled to
New York City to pay our respects and honor the lives of those
who were lost on September 11, 2001. I am glad we were able to
come together in a bipartisan manner to remember those who
perished on that tragic day.
One of the problems identified in the aftermath of
September 11 was our country's failure to imagine the absolute
worst-case scenarios. In recognizing those gaps in our national
security, the Department of Homeland Security was created the
following year and Congress invested in first-responder
resources to strengthen communities' ability to counter all
types of threats and hazards. In fact, as a direct result of
the 9/11 attacks, Congress and the George W. Bush
administration recognized the need to improve the United
States' preparedness toward agroterrorism and biosecurity more
broadly. This included designating agriculture as a critical
infrastructure sector and passing legislation in 2002 to
implement a coordinated whole-of-Government strategy for
bioterrorism preparedness.
Since then, over the last 2 decades, the Federal Government
has worked closely with farmers, private-sector partners,
animal and plant experts, and academia to ensure that we have a
strong infrastructure in place to detect and defend against any
biosecurity threats. In fact, in my home State of New York,
Cornell University hosts the Animal Health Diagnostic Center, a
Level 1 facility that is part of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's National Animal Health Laboratory Network. Their
work involves receiving specimens from livestock and testing
them for infectious diseases that could have a devastating
impact on animal agriculture and, subsequently, on our national
economy.
Unfortunately, in the last week, Cornell's lab received
notice that 2 funding agreements they were set to receive from
the USDA have been paused. If Cornell's role in the national
lab network is diminished, the entire biosecurity surveillance
system becomes weaker, meaning there is a lower capacity
nationwide to respond quickly if we were to experience an
agroterrorism event.
There is a risk that terrorist groups could develop agro
and biological weapons in isolation or may even receive help
from our foreign adversaries like North Korea, China, Iran, or
Russia with biological weapons programs. Cornell's lab hosts
the infrastructure that would help counter a threat like this,
and losing a link in the USDA surveillance network due to
withheld funding would severely cripple our ability to respond
to an act of agroterrorism such as this.
More broadly, a weakening of Federal infrastructure is a
trend we are seeing across a counterterrorism and public health
sector, undermining the very lessons learned from September 11.
Just last month, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
announced $134 million in cuts to counterterrorism funding from
cities that have repeatedly been identified as top targets for
terrorists. New York City, the site of the deadliest terrorist
attack to hit our Nation, will have to weather a cut of $64
million this year alone.
Importantly, these grants support the first responders who
encounter threats from today's hearing subject, agroterrorism.
The Trump administration's counterterrorism funding cuts to New
York City; Washington, DC; Chicago; Los Angeles; Jersey City;
and San Francisco should be cause for bipartisan concern, and I
hope the Majority will hold a hearing on the impacts of funding
losses in places targeted by terrorists.
Since taking office, the Trump administration has also
dismantled some of the institutions that would lead to a robust
public health response to an agro or bioterrorism attack. This
administration has fired the head of the Centers for Disease
Control, failed to appoint permanent leadership to the
Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response, and to
FEMA. The administration has canceled hundreds of millions of
dollars for vaccine development and fired Federal employees,
including scientists and researchers, who would support a mass
public health response to emerging zoonotic diseases such as
avian flu. These Federal agencies, all of which are leaderless,
would have a primary role in a mass agro or bioterrorism
catastrophe.
I am incredibly concerned that America is not prepared to
respond to a serious biological threat. We are walking straight
into a scenario where we know the risks, but are completely
hamstrung in addressing them, not just today, but in years to
come. I hope today's conversation will be useful and
informative.
I want to thank the witnesses for participating in today's
hearing. I thank the Chairman for his leadership in putting
this together. I look forward to all of your testimony so we
can work together to move forward to make our Nation stronger
and the citizens protected.
With that, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Kennedy follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Timothy M. Kennedy
Last week several Members of this committee traveled to New York
City to pay our respects and honor the lives of those who were lost on
September 11, 2001.
I'm glad we were able to come together in a bipartisan manner to
remember those who perished on that tragic day.
One of the problems identified in the aftermath of September 11 was
our country's failure to imagine the absolute worst-case scenarios.
In recognizing those gaps in our national security, the Department
of Homeland Security was created the following year and Congress
invested in first responder resources to strengthen communities'
ability to counter all types of threats and hazards.
In fact, as a direct result of the 9/11 attacks, Congress and the
George W. Bush administration recognized the need to improve the United
States preparedness toward agro-terrorism and biosecurity more broadly.
This included designating agriculture as a critical infrastructure
sector and passing legislation in 2002 to implement a coordinated
whole-of-Government strategy for bioterrorism preparedness.
Since then, over the last 2 decades, the Federal Government has
worked closely with farmers, private-sector partners, animal and plant
experts, and academia to ensure that we have strong infrastructure in
place to detect and defend against any biosecurity threats.
In fact, in my home State of New York, Cornell University hosts the
Animal Health Diagnostic Center, a level one facility that is part of
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's National Animal Health Laboratory
Network.
Their work involves receiving specimens from livestock and testing
them for infectious diseases that could have a devastating impact on
animal agriculture and subsequently on our national economy.
Unfortunately, in the last week, Cornell's lab received notice that
2 funding agreements they were set to receive from the USDA have been
paused.
If Cornell's role in the national lab network is diminished, the
entire biosecurity surveillance system becomes weaker, meaning there's
a lower capacity nationwide to respond quickly if we were to experience
an agro-terrorism event.
There is a risk that terrorist groups could develop agro and
biological weapons in isolation or may even receive help from our
foreign adversaries like North Korea, China, Iran, or Russia with
biological weapons programs.
Cornell's lab hosts the infrastructure that would help counter a
threat like this. and losing a link in the USDA surveillance network
due to withheld funding would severely affect our ability to respond to
an act of agro-terrorism such as this.
More broadly, a weakening of Federal infrastructure is a trend
we're seeing across a counterterrorism and public health sector,
undermining the very lessons learned from September 11.
Just last month, the Federal Emergency Management Agency announced
$134 million in cuts to counterterrorism funding from cities that have
repeatedly been identified as top targets for terrorists.
New York City, the site of the deadliest terrorist attack to hit
our Nation, will have to weather a cut of $64 million this year alone.
Importantly, these grants support the first responders who encounter
threats from today's hearing subject, agro-terrorism.
The Trump administration's counterterrorism funding cuts to New
York City; Washington, DC; Chicago; Los Angeles; Jersey City, and San
Francisco should be cause for bipartisan concern. And I hope the
Majority will hold a hearing on the impacts of funding losses in places
targeted by terrorists.
Since taking office, the Trump administration has also dismantled
some of the institutions that would lead to a robust public health
response to an agro or bioterrorism attack.
This administration has fired the head of the Centers for Disease
Control, failed to appoint permanent leadership to the administration
for strategic preparedness and response and to FEMA.
The administration has canceled hundreds of millions of dollars for
vaccine development and fired Federal employees, including scientists
and researchers who would support a mass public health response to
emerging zoonotic diseases such as avian flu.
These Federal agencies, all of which are leaderless, would have a
primary role in a mass agro or bioterrorism catastrophe.
I'm incredibly concerned that America is not prepared to respond to
a serious biological threat. We are walking straight into a scenario
where we know the risks but are completely hamstrung in addressing them
not just today but in years to come.
I hope today's conversation will be useful and informative.
I want to thank the witnesses for participating in today's hearing.
I thank the Chairman for his leadership in putting this together and I
look forward to all of your testimony so we can work together to move
forward to make our Nation stronger and the citizens protected. With
that, I yield back.
Chairman Strong. Thank you, Ranking Member Kennedy. Other
Members of the subcommittee are reminded that the opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
I am very pleased to have such an important panel of
witnesses before us today. I ask that the witnesses please
rise, raise their right hand to be sworn in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Strong. Thank you. Please be seated. Let the
record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the
affirmative.
I would like to now formally introduce our witnesses. Dr.
Daniel K. Wims is the president of Alabama A&M University,
proudly located in my district. Dr. Wims has served 25 years in
government and higher education, leading academic and student
affairs, teaching agriculture science, and directing farm
research and development programs across the Southeast. Dr.
Wims' extensive educational background in agronomy has informed
his leadership of Alabama A&M's robust agriculture and food
science programming. Thank you for being here today.
Dr. Cris Young is a professor of practice at the College of
Veterinary Medicine at Auburn University. Dr. Young has worked
with USDA Animal Plant Health Inspection Services, Veterinary
Services in various roles. He has led instant response to avian
influenza, cattle fever tick, and screwworm. Dr. Young also
served 25 years in the U.S. Army Reserve, during which he
commanded the 358th Medical Detachment and held assignments
with the Standing Joint Force Headquarters of the 350th Civil
Air Command. Welcome.
Dr. Marty Vanier is the director of the National
Agriculture Biosecurity Center at Kansas State University and
the associate director of the Biosecurity Research Institute.
Dr. Vanier oversees programs that address diverse threats to
the United States and world agriculture economies and food
supply, and she serves as a liaison to the national, State, and
local stakeholders and industry groups. Thank you for joining
us.
Dr. Asha George is the executive director of the Bipartisan
Commission for Biodefense. In her role, Dr. George develops and
assesses recommendations to strengthen biodefense, conducts
research, and makes policies and oversight recommendations to
counter biological threats. Dr. George also served as Active
Duty in the United States Army as a military intelligence
officer and paratrooper. She is a decorated Desert Storm
veteran.
I thank all the witnesses again for being here today.
I now recognize Dr. Wims for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statements. Dr. Wims.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL K. WIMS, PH.D., PRESIDENT, ALABAMA A&M
UNIVERSITY
Mr. Wims. Thank you, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member
Kennedy, and honorable Members of the committee for allowing us
to participate in this critical conversation on national
security, agroterrorism.
My name is Daniel K. Wims. I serve as 12th president of
Alabama Agricultural & Mechanical University, an 1890 land-
grant HBCU in Huntsville, Alabama. Of note, for 16 years prior
to becoming president 4 years ago, I served as executive vice
president, provost, and vice president of academic affairs,
vice president for research, and professor of agricultural
sciences at 1890 land-grant universities in Alabama and
Georgia. Over the past 30 years, I've served in various
administrative and professorial capacities at land-grant
universities such as Alcorn State, Southern, South Carolina
State University, Fort Valley State, and Florida A&M.
I'm grateful to be here today to discuss this critical
topic of the threat of agroterrorism in the United States,
particularly the food and agricultural critical infrastructure
sector. In 2023, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, agriculture,
food, and related industries contributed roughly 1.5 trillion
to the U.S. gross domestic product, 5.5 percent share. The
output of America's farm contributed 222 billion of this sum
and 0.8 percent of U.S. GDP.
With nearly 2 million farms in the United States,
agriculture is essentially our Nation's most important pillar.
Americans must eat safe and high-quality food. Today threats
not only expose us to risk of food shortages, foreign
dependencies, and higher prices, but they also strike at one of
the most critical essential pillars of America, and those
threats to American agriculture could lead to agroterrorism.
Defending access to American abundance and preserving the
American experiment is the essence of agrosecurity and it's why
farm security is national security.
Twenty-three years ago, the Chairman of the Joint Economic
Committee addressed Congress stating that an agroterrorism
incident could immediately cost in the range of 25 to 60
billion. Given the inflation rate, this could cost as much as
106 billion today. In 2001, foot-and-mouth disease in the
United Kingdom affected 9,000 farms and required the
destruction of more than 4 million animals. That would cost
taxpayers in excess of 60 billion today.
As an 1890 land-grant university, Alabama A&M has robust
agricultural research capacity. Our researchers have been
actively working on technical solutions and research projects
in agrosecurity, food safety and quality, diagnostic and
detection of foodborne pathogens such as E. coli, salmonella,
and listeria. Additionally, the Alabama Cooperative Extension
System is a primary outreach organization for the land-grant
mission of Alabama A&M University and Auburn University. My
friend Auburn University President Dr. Chris Roberts and I are
committed to research and outreach of these programs and
collaborations.
ACES agents play a pivotal role in educating farmers and
stakeholders about agroterrorism and agrosecurity through
different agriculture programs such as Food Safety and
Security, Integrated Pest Management, Soil Health and Water
Quality, Agronomy, Animal and Plant Health, and Food Safety
Modernization Act. ACES has assigned agents to work with FEMA
agents and get trained by FEMA agents, particularly in times of
crisis and emergencies, and these agents are ready to work and
coordinate with FEMA agents as needed.
An additional threat is the increase of foreign investment
in our Nation's agricultural land from countries like China.
This, too, cannot be ignored. In fact, legislation introduced
by you, Mr. Chairman, the Protecting America's Agricultural
Land From Foreign Harm Act is a step in the right direction in
safeguarding these lands from foreign adversaries.
In closing, I'd like to reinforce the role of Alabama A&M
as an 1890 land-grant institution and what we can do to help
play in keeping our food safe. It is evident from the threats
that Alabama A&M is aligned with the National Farm Security
Action an introduced by USDA in July 2025. Our scientists stand
ready to partner with industry, the Government, and other
academic institutions to ensure our home-grown food supply
remains safe and secure for consumption for all Americans. Farm
security is national security and I thank you for bringing
attention to this important matter, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wims follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daniel K. Wims
September 16, 2025
acknowledgements
Thank you, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, [if present:
Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson] and the honorable Members
of the committee to participate in today's hearing on this critical
national security threat, agroterrorism.
introduction
I am Dr. Daniel K. Wims, and I serve as the 12th president of
Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical University, an 1890 land-grant
university in Huntsville, Alabama.
For 16 years prior to becoming president, I served as provost and
vice president of academic affairs, research, and professor of
agricultural sciences at 1890 land-grant universities in Alabama and
Georgia. More broadly, over the past 30 years, I have served in varying
capacities at land grant universities such as Alcorn State University
(MS), Southern University (LA), South Carolina State University (SC),
Fort Valley State University (GA) and Florida A&M University (FL).
agroterrorism
I am grateful to be here today to discuss the critical topic of the
threat of agroterrorism to the United States, particularly the food and
agriculture critical infrastructure sector. In 2023, the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, agriculture, food, and related industries
contributed roughly $1.537 trillion to the U.S. gross domestic product
(GDP), a 5.5-percent share.
The output of America's farms contributed $222.3 billion of this
sum--about 0.8 percent of U.S. GDP. With nearly 2 million farms in the
United States, agriculture is essential to our Nation considered and
one of the most important pillars of America. Americans must eat safe
and high-quality food.
Today, threats to American agriculture not only expose us to risks
of food shortages, foreign dependencies, and higher prices but they
also strike at one of the most essential pillars of America. Those
threats to American agriculture will lead to agroterrorism. Defending
access to American abundance and preserving the American experiment is
the essence of agrosecurity, and it is why farm security is national
security.
Twenty-three years ago, the Chairman of the Joint Economic
Committee addressed Congress stating that an agroterrorism incident
could immediately cost in the ``range of $25 billion to $60 billion.''
Given the inflation rate, this could cost as much as $106 billion
today.
In 2001, Foot Mouth Disease in the United Kingdom affected 9,000
farms and required the destruction of more than 4,000,000 animals.
Researchers believe that a similar outbreak in the United States would
cost taxpayers up to $60 billion.
aamu agroterrorism role
As an 1890 land-grant university, Alabama A&M has robust
agricultural research capabilities. Alabama A&M researchers have been
working actively on technical solutions and research projects in
agrosecurity, food safety and quality, diagnostic and detection of
foodborne pathogens such as E. coli, Salmonella and Listeria, and
Toxicology.
Additionally, the Alabama Cooperative Extension System (ACES) is
the primary outreach organization for the land-grant mission of Alabama
A&M University and Auburn University. Auburn University president, Dr.
Christopher Roberts and I are committed to research and outreach
programs collaborations.
ACES agents play a pivotal role in educating farmers and
stakeholders about agroterrorism and agrosecurity through different
agriculture programs such as food safety and security, integrated pest
management, soil health and water quality, agronomy, animal and plant
health, and the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA). ACES has assigned
agents to work with FEMA agents and get trained by FEMA agents. In
times of crises and emergencies, ACES agents are ready to work and
coordinate with FEMA agents.
With the development of the novel Rapid Detection System and Remote
Sensing for Chemical and Biological Threats by Alabama A&M scientists,
I can attest that our institution is well-positioned to contribute to
protecting our Nation from agroterrorism and provide technologies to
counter wide range of threats to our farmlands, crops, animal and
plants health, food processing facilities, and food supplies.
An additional threat is the increase in foreign investment in our
Nation's agricultural land from countries such as China. This too
cannot be ignored. In fact, legislation introduced by you, Mr.
Chairman, the Protecting America's Agricultural Land from Foreign Harm
Act, is a step in the right direction in safeguarding these lands from
foreign adversaries.
closing
To close, I'd like to reinforce the role Alabama A&M, as an 1890
land-grant institution, can play in keeping our food safe. It is
evident from the threats that Alabama A&M is aligned with the National
Farm Security Action plan introduced by USDA in July 2025. Alabama A&M
scientists stand ready to partner with industry, the Federal
Government, and other academic institutions to ensure our home-grown
food supply remains safe and secure for consumption for all Americans.
Farm security is national security and I thank you for bringing
attention to this important matter. As president of Alabama A&M
University, I look forward to working with you in the future.
Chairman Strong. Thank you, Dr. Wims. It is an honor to be
with you again.
I now recognize Dr. Young for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statement. Dr. Young.
STATEMENT OF CRISTOPHER A. YOUNG, DVM, MPH, DACVPM, COL USA
(RET.), PROFESSOR OF PRACTICE, COLLEGE OF VETERINARY MEDICINE,
AUBURN UNIVERSITY
Dr. Young. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Strong,
Ranking Member Kennedy, other Members, distinguished Members of
the subcommittee. My name is Christopher Andrew Young and I'm a
veterinarian by training, former USDA program director, as you
mentioned, and a retired U.S. Army colonel. I'm here today
representing Auburn University, though the views I express will
be my own and do not necessarily represent the views or
positions of the university.
Having said that, let's talk about agroterrorism. Each
year, Auburn University's biosurveillance research team reviews
several thousand articles across a broad spectrum of open
source work. Also, on average, a couple hundred books are read,
although not always cover to cover, but we read the sections
that are pertinent to the work that we're doing in our on-going
analytical operations on agroterrorism.
One consistent finding that we see is that there is no
single vetted source of information addressing the diversity
and complexity of the threats to food, agriculture, and water.
Also, even more importantly, no single work explains how those
threats can be mitigated. Our team spends a great deal of time
examining data generated by private industry, which we find
holds more information, more data on food, ag, and water than
Government entities.
Food, ag, and water systems are widely considered essential
components of our national security. Without security and
resiliency in these critical infrastructure systems that
provide safe, reliable food and water, we are vulnerable to
exploitation, thereby jeopardizing our Nation's public health,
our economic prosperity, our military readiness, and our
ability to perform force projection.
The term ``biosecurity'' traditionally refers to a set of
practices on farms designed to minimize risk from disease for
plants or animals. But biosecurity can also be thought of as a
desired state of being, a matrix of success, if you will, where
risk and threats have been identified and neutralized before
they become manifest.
The term ``biosecure'' means to be protected against
harmful biological agents, both naturally occurring or
intentionally introduced, which can include infectious
diseases, pests, and invasive species that may have an impact
on the health status of a system or ecosystem. So maintaining
systematic biosecurity entails continuous monitoring and the
persistent stare that's needed to occur across the continuum of
the security domains would include both animal and plant
agriculture, laboratory research security, environmental
security, and ultimately national security and defense
intelligence.
To frame the problem succinctly, if the United States ever
goes to war with a pacing adversary, food, ag, and water will
be as important as traditional military concerns such as
submarines or missiles. Critical problems could emerge first to
our west in the Indo-Pacific, but perhaps even within the
continental United States. Wars can be and are lost by lack of
material, but they can also be lost due to strategic and
tactical errors involving food and water. Non-state actors like
terrorists and violent extremist organizations may also target
our homeland food supply via the agricultural sector. I am
especially concerned today about gray zone conflicts.
So what would our adversaries' objectives be? Put simply,
their goal is food and water disruption, followed by tactical
and strategic dominance and eventual destruction. This picture
is bleak, but food, ag, and water threats, already widely
distributed and continually growing in intensity, both the
critical infrastructure and the food supply itself will almost
certainly be more intensely targeted in the future. Attacks are
likely to be geographically diffused, staggered over time, and
be combined with cognitive warfare elements, the specifics of
which are more suitable for a Classified forum. Because of this
threat landscape, it is critical that the U.S. Government
better prepare for and mitigate threats to our agricultural
sector.
I'd like to thank the committee Chairman, Chairman Strong,
and the Members of the committee for holding this hearing and
for the opportunity to testify on this important issue. This
concludes my opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Young follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cristopher A. Young
Good afternoon, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
My name is Dr. Cristopher Andrew Young, and I am a veterinarian, a
former USDA program director, and a retired U.S. Army colonel. I am
here today representing Auburn University, though the views I express
will be my own and do not necessarily represent the views or positions
of the university.
I am here today to discuss the critically important topic of
agroterrorism.
Each year, Auburn University's biosurveillance research team
reviews several thousand articles across a broad spectrum of open
sources. Also, on average, a couple of hundred books are read, perhaps
not completely, but certainly, we thoroughly read those sections that
are relevant to on-going analytical operations and agroterrorism. One
consistent finding is that there is no single vetted source of
information addressing the diversity and complexity of threats to food,
agriculture, and water. Also, even more importantly, no work explains
how those threats can be mitigated.
Our team spends a great deal of time examining data generated by
private industry, which holds more food-, agriculture-, and water-
related data than the Government. Food, agriculture, and water systems
are widely considered essential components of our national security.
Without security and resiliency these critical infrastructures that
provide safe, reliable, food and water supplies are vulnerable to
exploitation thereby jeopardizing our Nation's public health, economic
prosperity, military readiness, and force projection capability.
The term biosecurity traditionally refers to a set of practices on
farms designed to minimize risk from disease in plants or animals. But
biosecurity can also be thought of as a desired state of being, a
matrix of success, if you will, where risks and threats have been
identified and neutralized before they become manifest.
The term ``biosecure'' means to be protected against harmful
biological agents (both naturally occurring or intentionally
introduced) including infectious diseases, pests, and invasive species,
etc. that may have impact on the health status of a system (animal,
plant, ecosystem). Maintaining systematic biosecurity entails
continuous monitoring. This persistent stare needs to occur across the
continuum of security domains, including:
Agriculture Security (both animal and plant)
Public and One Health Security
Laboratory Research Security
National Security and Defense Intelligence
Environmental Security.
To frame the problem succinctly, if the United States ever goes to
war with a pacing adversary, food, agriculture, and water will be as
important as traditional military concerns, such as missiles,
submarines, etc. Critical problems could emerge first to our west in
the Indo-Pacific but perhaps even within the continental United States.
Wars can be and are lost by the lack of material, but they can also be
lost due to strategic and tactical errors involving food and water.
Non-state actors like terrorist and violent extremist organizations may
also target our homeland food supply via the agriculture sector. I am
especially concerned about this during gray-zone conflict.
what would our adversaries' objectives be?
Put simply, their goal is food and water disruption, followed by
tactical and strategic dominance, and eventual destruction. This paints
a bleak picture, but food, agriculture, and water threats are already
widely distributed and continually growing in intensity. Both the
critical infrastructure and the food supply itself will almost
certainly be more intensely targeted in the future. Attacks are likely
to be geographically diffused, staggered over time and be combined with
cognitive warfare elements, the specifics of which are more suitable
for a Classified forum. Because of this threat landscape, it is
critical that the U.S. Government better prepare for and mitigate
threats to our agriculture sector.
I would like to thank Committee Chairman Strong and the Members of
the committee for holding this hearing and for the opportunity to
testify on this important issue. This concludes my opening remarks, and
I'll be happy to answer any questions.
Chairman Strong. Thank you, Dr. Young.
I now recognize Dr. Vanier for 5 minutes to summarize her
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MARTY VANIER, DVM, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL
BIOSECURITY CENTER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, BIOSECURITY RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Dr. Vanier. Thank you, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member
Kennedy, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to speak to you today on Surveying the Threat of
Agroterrorism: Perspectives on Food, Agriculture, and
Veterinary Defense. I'm Dr. Marty Vanier, director of the
National Agricultural Biosecurity Center and associate director
of the Biosecurity Research Institute at Kansas State
University.
Agroterrorism has a very long history. From ancient wars to
more recent times, agricultural agents have been used to damage
food supplies; spread disease to humans, animals, and plants;
disrupt economies or governments; or create fear to affect
political change. In current times, economic disaster is the
intended effect of agroterrorism events. There is a significant
amount of data, some of which you've heard, to quantify the
cost of an attack on the U.S. food supply. However, the data do
not reveal the complexity of the U.S. agricultural enterprise
and the costs incurred by the interconnected elements.
My experience is centered on animal disease response.
However, I do want to mention 2 other issues. The first is the
threat to the cybersecurity of operating systems in the
agricultural community, and the second issue is that of
protecting intellectual property.
While the hearing's topic is agroterrorism, it is important
to acknowledge that Mother Nature is the most accomplished
terrorist. Therefore, introduction of any high-consequence
animal or crop disease, naturally or by accident, will require
the same response and result in the same consequences as an
introduction by a terrorist group.
In the most basic sense, there are 3 steps to a successful
response to a high consequence disease event: No. 1, identify
it; No. 2, find it, in other words, where is it; and, No. 3,
control or eliminate it. Rapid and accurate diagnostics are
critical, and planning and training for local responders is an
absolute necessity for a successful response.
The response to a high-consequence animal disease event
will be so large that it will require both traditional and
nontraditional responders. These two groups do not speak the
same language nor operate from the same system. A major role of
NABC is to bring these groups together to understand a common
operational picture, develop response plans, and train to those
plans.
Information sharing at all levels is important. There are a
variety of regional groups that share information between State
emergency management and agricultural agencies and also plan
joint exercises for these groups. There's also a role for
Classified information sharing. It gives us the ability to see
over the horizon, to recognize potential threats before they
get here. The Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center has addressed
biological and agricultural threats at the Classified level
since 2012 to protect the State and the Nation.
While all agricultural disasters are local, there is and
must be a role for the Federal Government to provide support
and resources. USDA supports plant and animal disease
diagnostics and policy decisions surrounding disease spread and
elimination in accordance with domestic and international trade
policy. DHS supports technology development by DHS S&T and
resources from FEMA in the form of access to training and
planning support for responders and logistics support for State
emergency managers.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, I thank you
for the opportunity to appear today before you and I welcome
any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Vanier follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marty Vanier
September 16, 2025
Good afternoon, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and
Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to talk with
you about threats to agriculture.
I am Marty Vanier, DVM, and I am the director of the National
Agricultural Biosecurity Center at Kansas State University, and the
associate director of the Biosecurity Research Institute at Kansas
State University. With a strong background in agriculture and 23 years
of experience in animal disease emergency response, I am pleased to be
here.
Agroterrorism has a long history. From ancient wars to more recent
times agricultural agents have been used to damage food supplies,
spread disease to humans, animals and plants, disrupt economies or
governments, or create fear to effect political change.
In 1952 members of the Mau Mau nationalist movement in Kenya
poisoned 33 cattle at a British mission station using African milk
bush. In the 1980's Iraq developed and tested wheat cover smut to
attack Iranian wheat crops. (https://biosecurity.fas.org/education/
dualuse-agriculture/1.-agroterrorism-and-foodsafety/biowarfare-against-
agriculture.html)
In 1984, the Rajneeshee cult in Oregon contaminated a restaurant
salad bar for the purpose of affecting a local election by sickening
voters prior to election day. And, in 2001, letters containing Anthrax
spores were sent to Members of Congress and the media. Five human
deaths resulted. (https://domesticpreparedness.com/articles/
agroterrorism-a-persistent-but-overlooked-threat)
Economic disaster is the generally intended effect of agroterrorism
attacks, though degradation of military personnel and supplies may also
be a goal. Either goal would also have the parallel effect of creating
fear and a lack of trust in the food supply chain and the Government's
ability to protect the safety of the American food supply.
There is a significant amount of data to quantify the cost of an
attack on the U.S. food supply. USDA data from 2023 reports that food,
agriculture, and related industries contributed over $1.5 trillion (5.5
percent) to U.S. gross domestic product and 10.4 percent of total U.S.
employment. (USDA ERS 2023). In 2007 Kansas State University
researchers Dr. Dustin Pendell and Dr. Ted Schroeder ran 3 Foot and
Mouth Disease (FMD) scenarios focusing on southwest Kansas and found
the following State-wide costs: small cow-calf operation--$36 million;
medium-sized feedlot (<20,000 head)--$199 million; 5 large feedlots
(>40,000 head)--$945 million. (Schroeder and Pendell, 2007 USDA/ERS)
What must be remembered is the complexity of the U.S. agricultural
enterprise, so the actual cost of any given event could be much higher.
Further, the interconnectedness of the production of food crops and
animals will have wide-reaching impacts. Think trucking, ag banking,
fuel and fertilizer, equipment manufacturing, sales and repairs,
feedstuffs, medications, harvest activities, employment, and all of the
economic multiplier effects on rural communities.
While my experience is centered on animal disease response, I do
want to mention 2 other categories of threat. The first is the
cybersecurity threat to information and operating systems and the
second is the threat of loss of intellectual property.
Cybersecurity threats can come in many forms, but 3 important
examples are: the threat to precision ag; mis- and dis-information; the
threat to control systems.
Precision agriculture has and will continue to revolutionize crop
production by increasing crop yields, reducing the environmental impact
of production methods and increasing sustainability. This is done
through linking information on soil types, soil condition, weather, the
target crop, terrain, pests, crop disease, and other parameters. In the
livestock world it is used to measure feed consumption, water
consumption, movement, body temperature, etc. The programs that collect
data and perform data analysis operate through Bluetooth and/or Wi-Fi
systems and the internet. One can imagine the impacts on data and its
analysis should the system be breached and data is deleted, corrupted,
or changed. This could lead to incorrect decision making regarding
planting, harvesting, soil amendments, or medical treatment.
Many crop-planting and livestock production and marketing decisions
are made based on information reported by USDA or private marketing
research firms. The impact on the financial markets of mis- or dis-
information could be catastrophic. In 2018, the Kansas Intelligence
Fusion Center evaluated 17 potential computer network attack (CNA)
scenarios and found a social media-based outbreak hoax would be the
most likely method of a CNA against Agriculture. On May 27 of this year
a false report of a case of New World Screwworm in Missouri was
published on a Missouri radio station's website. Although the story was
only on-line for 5 minutes, it impacted the national cattle market
futures anywhere from $250,000 to $500,000.
Much like the threat to precision agriculture, the threat to the
control systems in agricultural harvest and processing is high. I'm
referring to the systems that, for example, control food and milk
pasteurization processes, ingredient blending for bakery products, heat
treatments for ready-to-eat products and others.
Research security has been a concern for some time. You are aware
of the talent recruitment programs supported by our adversaries and the
multiple examples of theft of intellectual property by scientists,
graduate students, visiting business people, and foreign nations.
Particularly for the academic community there will always be a
philosophical conundrum. The purpose of academic research is to
discover and share new knowledge. This becomes difficult to balance
with the need to protect the intellectual property of academic
researchers whose projects are largely funded with taxpayer dollars.
While this hearing's topic is ``agroterrorism'' it is important to
note that any introduction of a high-consequence animal or crop disease
will require the same kind of response, and the same consequences,
whether the introduction is nefarious, accidental, or natural. As we
have seen most recently our major disease outbreaks have been from the
natural movement of disease vectors such as migratory birds and feral
swine. Veterinary defense plays a pivotal role--rapid diagnosis,
vaccines stockpiles, and disease detection networks are essential.
Despite valiant efforts, gaps remain at both the State and Federal
levels.
There are 3 steps to successful response of a high-consequence
disease:
(1) identify it;
(2) find it, i.e. where is it located or how widespread is it;
(3) control or eliminate it.
For clarity's sake most of my examples will use animal diseases and
will refer to them as ``foreign animal diseases'' (FADs).
Step 1 necessitates rapid and accurate diagnostics. This is
critical from both the agricultural enterprise perspective and from
national security. The laboratories and personnel must be operational
24/7/365. It also requires field veterinarians, whether Federal, State,
or private, be trained to recognize the clinical signs of high-
consequence foreign animal diseases. Are there disease look-alikes?
Yes, and that is why rapid diagnostics are so important. The size of a
response is so large that you do not want to expend resources
unnecessarily in the face of a disease look-alike. The sooner you know
what you are dealing with the sooner you can start the response.
Step 2 means finding out where the outbreak is or isn't. Once again
this helps determine the size of the initial response. Generally, once
the initial location is determined State animal health officials will
institute a ``stop movement'' action to reduce or prevent the
continuing spread of the disease. State, local, and sometimes Federal
assets are mobilized to control the movement of animals and animal-
related materials.
Step 3 institutes the action plan to control or eliminate the
disease. This step is dependent on the disease, the animal(s) it
affects, whether it is zoonotic, how it is transmitted, and the control
method needed to contain the outbreak. Unfortunately, many FADs are
only eliminated by euthanasia of the animals. Euthanasia brings a whole
host of issues to be considered and dealt with: animal welfare,
ethical, environmental, logistical, financial, responder safety,
domestic and foreign trade.
There are not enough people working in the animal disease world to
manage an outbreak of a FAD, so traditional first responders will be
necessary to assist. While traditional first responders in rural areas
will be very familiar with agricultural practices, they are generally
not familiar with FAD response. Similarly, the agricultural community
has little to no familiarity with the response community's Incident
Command System, which is the standard format for organizing a non-
agricultural response. Much of the work that my program, the National
Agricultural Biosecurity Center (NABC), does is bring together
traditional and agricultural emergency managers and first responders to
understand each other's processes, procedures, and language for the
purpose of joint planning, training, and response.
NABC did a survey in 2023 in conjunction with Health, Food, and
Agriculture Resilience program at DHS to understand the level of
preparedness of county emergency management agencies across the
country. One hundred and fifty-five counties from 31 States were
surveyed through 2 rounds. The first survey demonstrated that county
agencies did understand the importance of food and agriculture writ
large and incorporated some level of planning in their emergency
operations plans. However, the results also pointed out that counties
were looking for more State and Federal guidance, more training
specifically for food and agriculture incidents, better understanding
of planning for food and agriculture events, and better access to
subject-matter experts.
The second survey to the same respondents explored more deeply the
capabilities of the county agency to respond. Nearly half of the
agencies have fewer than 5 employees and are concerned that staffing is
not adequate to participate in a response. Nearly half were not briefed
on plans developed by lead agencies for food and agriculture response.
They also felt they had little communication with partner agencies that
would be part of a food or agriculture response.
Much like traditional emergency management and response the
agricultural community needs to plan and train for addressing an FAD
outbreak. For the last 10 years, the State of Kansas has hosted a
functional Foot and Mouth Disease exercise to explore and train various
levels of difficulty in its extensive FMD response plan. Depending on
exercise objectives, it may engage with several counties and/or USDA
FAD regulatory officials. In a situation where animals will likely be
quarantined on farms and ranches, plans need to be made to feed, water,
and care for the animals. Dairy cows need to be milked, pigs need to be
moved up to the next phase of production, eggs need to be collected all
the while animal health officials need to understand and determine
whether or not the animal products are safe to be moved or enter
commerce. If movement is not allowed what is to be done with the
products? Will farm workers and farm machinery and vehicles be allowed
to move on or off the farm? All these questions and hundreds more must
be addressed in a response plan. Many of these questions will require
some very creative answers. Unfortunately, some of these questions do
not have any good answers.
Another important aspect of disease response and overall threat
analysis is information sharing. This is information sharing at all
levels--open source, Controlled Unclassified Information, and
Classified information. At this point I am not addressing public
information, though that is quite important, I am addressing
information sharing between Government officials, animal health
officials, responders, and stakeholders.
In the event of a true nefarious event law enforcement will
naturally be involved. The FBI particularly has a protocol for working
with animal health responders and local law enforcement to handle the
criminal investigative portion of the response.
There are a variety of open-source sharing methods through
commodity and livestock organizations, the general farm media, and
regional disease response organizations. These regional organizations,
such as Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture (MSP),
Southern Agriculture & Animal Disaster Response (SAADRA), New England
States Animal Agricultural Security Alliance (NESAASA), and National
Alliance of State Animal and Agricultural Emergency Programs (NASAAEP)
are made up of State animal health officials, State emergency managers,
commodity organization members, land-grant universities and others, who
share information between States. The information might be about
disease response activity or creative solutions to difficult planning
or response questions. Some of these regional organizations meet
regularly virtually and usually annually in person. They also design
and run their own exercises. These joint exercises not only provide
planning and training for the member States but also encourage
collaboration and cooperation between member States.
There is a role for Classified information sharing. Clearly, we
need to ``see over the horizon'' to identify and understand risks and
threats around the world. Classified information by its nature means
that distribution is very limited. The State of Kansas has made great
strides in analyzing Classified information and using that information
to protect the State. The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense's
National Blueprint for Biodefense recommends enabling State fusion
centers to address the biothreat. The Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center
has addressed biological and agricultural threats at the Classified
level since 2012; however, no other State fusion centers currently have
this capability.
Much like ``all politics are local'', ``all agricultural disasters
are local''. Local and State responders will be the first ones on scene
and will be responsible for assessing the scope of the outbreak,
beginning control activities and managing the response to its
conclusion. This does not mean there is no role for the Federal
Government. In a word the role is resources. The resources necessary
take many forms. Most of my remarks today were concerned responding to
a disease outbreak. Confirmation of a FAD in the United States is done
by the USDA Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory on Plum
Island, and soon to be moved to the National Bio and Agro-Defense
Facility in Manhattan, Kansas. It is critical that this function remain
robust and well-resourced. Without these confirmatory diagnostics the
livestock community is blind in the regulatory sense, and the United
States cannot export susceptible livestock or their products. USDA has
the regulatory responsibility for plant and livestock disease control.
It assists States not only with diagnostic testing, but also with
understanding and achieving Federal FAD policy goals.
That being said, there is indeed a role for the Department of
Homeland Security. Prior to an outbreak the Department can use its
network through FEMA to provide and distribute training and exercise
materials to State and local responders. While there are some materials
in the FEMA Catalog they are dated. Working through the catalog is
important as FEMA training is often the only officially recognized
training for first responders. The Department can strengthen ties to
the agricultural community through State Departments of Agriculture and
the Cooperative Extension Service to assist with and distribute
training to on-the-ground responders and emergency management
personnel.
The Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology
Directorate must continue its work in threat assessment and technology
development to provide products that can be used on the ground and
ensure that State animal health officials are included in those
efforts. S&T can assist with deep analysis of traffic patterns,
marketing patterns, and distribution systems to help prevent massive
disruption of food supply chains.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today and I welcome any questions you
may have.
Chairman Strong. Dr. Vanier, we are honored to have you
here. Please forgive me, I mispronounced your name not once but
twice, and we will correct that. But it is an honor to have you
before us.
I now recognize Dr. George for 5 minutes to summarize her
opening statement. Dr. George.
STATEMENT OF ASHA M. GEORGE, DR PH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON BIODEFENSE
Ms. George. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Kennedy, and the other Members of the committee--the
subcommittee. Thank you for having me. It's always an honor, of
course, to appear before Congress to provide testimony for
important issues, but it is particularly important to me. I'm
glad to be here. I'm former committee staff for this committee
and it's always interesting to be on this side of the table, on
this side of the dais instead, so thank you.
I would like to just highlight a few things from my written
testimony. As a former intelligence officer, I think it's
important for the committee to remember that agricultural
terrorism, agricultural warfare, these are not new concepts.
The enemy of the United States and enemies around the world
have sought out agents, biological agents, and have used
weapons specifically targeting agriculture in recent history,
relatively recent history. We can go back to World War I and
World War II, where we have all kinds of evidence of our
country's--foreign countries targeting the United States and
specifically developing agents for the purpose of attacking our
agriculture and our food. We haven't gone backward from that.
Those countries, some of those countries have gone forward. As
stated earlier by Mr. Kennedy, there are active offensive
biological programs in Russia and North Korea, and we suspect
the same for Iran and China. We should not seek to be relaxed
even about that. There's no way those 4 countries are all by
themselves in the world pursuing these biological agents and
others.
The other thing I think is important to remember is that
terrorist organizations around the world have also expressed
interest. Part of it is because of the economic security
impact. Part of it is just that it would be just so incredibly
obvious and painful to any country that's attacked in this way.
If they were to use, for example, wheat blast, which has come
up in the literature from other--from terrorist organizations
and, and wheat blast were to blow through the United States, we
wouldn't have--obviously we wouldn't have wheat. But can you
imagine our citizens going into grocery stores and not finding
bread on the shelves, not finding flour on the shelves, et
cetera?
I know that there's a tendency to say, well, you know, no
big deal, we can--we'll just depend on corn or we'll depend on
something else. But I think that that's a very, maybe overly
practical aspect. That is not what terrorists are looking to
do. They're looking to evoke an emotional response and that
would absolutely happen if they used biological agents.
Beyond that, I think it's also important to remember that
agriculturally-related crime, food and agriculturally-related
crime, is on the rise, as is many other types of crime. But
those 3 things, crime, terrorism, and warfare, are all things
that this committee has been interested in and has to do
something about.
Leadership is key, of course, and we need those leaders not
just at USDA, but also at the Department of Homeland Security
and Department of Defense and Department of Interior when we're
talking about these threats. But I think, also, given the
nature of agriculture and food in our country and in every
country, supporting the leaders that we have down on the
ground, boots on the ground, is incredibly important.
Our commission, the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense is
co-chaired by former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge
and former Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna
Shalala. Others, we have other representatives, former
representatives sitting on the commission as well, as well as
former Senate Majority Leader Tom Ridge. But this is important.
This is important to our commission. We have gone to Kansas and
Colorado State to hold meetings and have issued some reports
about that and included ag-related and food-related
recommendations in our latest national blueprint for
biodefense.
But I think I'll just end my statement by saying when we're
talking about our State and local and Tribal and territorial
members of communities that are trying to produce our Nation's
food and are trying to deal with agriculture, there are 2
things they need to do. They need, in order to execute on the
President's direction, that they feel empowered and that they
take charge. One is time. They can't just turn on a dime and
say, OK, now we're in charge of everything. The other is
funding. How they get those 2 things is something this
committee is going to have to weigh in on.
So anyway, thank you. Thank you, committee, really
appreciate the opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Ms. George follows:]
Prepared Statement of Asha M. George
September 16, 2025
summary
Since its inception in 2014, the Commission has recognized the
importance of safeguarding food and agriculture from biological
threats. Despite how critical the food and agriculture sector is to the
Nation, Federal attention to, and investment in, biodefense activities
that support animal and plant health have historically lagged behind
those for human health. The uneven response to last year's highly
pathogenic avian influenza outbreak demonstrates that we are not as
prepared as we need to be for future threats. Not all States are taking
the same approach to responding to animal disease threats. The Federal
Government lacks sufficient coordination and speed in addressing a
fast-moving novel threat. Agricultural producers need to be engaged as
equal partners and educated about the risks posed by newly-emerging or
newly-transmissible diseases. Medical countermeasure development,
approval, and stockpiling are not where they need to be.
In 2015, the Commission released our foundational report, A
National Blueprint for Biodefense: Major Reform Needed to Optimize
Efforts, containing 33 recommendations and 87 associated action items
for national biodefense. That report included a recommendation
pertaining to taking a One Health approach to national biodefense that
better coordinates and integrates human and animal health. In
subsequent years, the Commission released 2 reports that directly
address food and agriculture. The 2017 report, Defense of Animal
Agriculture contains recommendations for investigations of animal
pathogen events, development of animal medical countermeasures,
information sharing, and coordination of Federal biodefense activities
impacting animal health. In the 2022 report, Boots on the Ground: Land-
Grant Universities in the Fight Against Threats to Food and
Agriculture, the Commission provides recommendations for strengthening
Federal support for State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT)
activities to protect food and agriculture from biological threats, and
explores ways to engage the land-grant universities in augmenting
national biosurveillance, research and development, and outreach and
education efforts. The Commission's 2024 report, The National Blueprint
for Biodefense: Immediate Action Needed to Defend Against Biological
Threats, builds on this previous work, and addresses further
recommendations for plant health surveillance, research, and
development.
statement
Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and other Members of the
committee, thank you for your invitation to provide the perspective of
the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense during today's hearing,
``Surveying the Threat of Agroterrorism: Perspectives on Food,
Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense.'' I am honored to talk with you
today about biological threats to food and agriculture, Federal agro-
biodefense programs executed by the Department of Homeland Security,
and the state of our national biodefense. My name is Asha M. George,
DrPH, and I am the executive director of the Bipartisan Commission on
Biodefense.
The Commission is co-chaired by former Secretary of Homeland
Security, Governor Tom Ridge and former Secretary of Health and Human
Services, and Representative Donna Shalala; with former Senate Majority
Leader Tom Daschle; former Representative Fred Upton; former
Representative Anna Eshoo; former Representative Susan Brooks (who
served on the Committee on Homeland Security); former Representative
Jim Greenwood; former Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis Ken Wainstein (who also served as Homeland
Security Advisor to President George W. Bush); and former Commissioner
of the Food and Drug Administration Peggy Hamburg serving as
Commissioners. The Commissioners and I have addressed homeland,
national, and public health security in various capacities for decades.
Although we have left our previous positions, we remain committed to
public service and the public health, safety, and security of our
Nation.
In 2015, the Commission released our foundational report, A
National Blueprint for Biodefense: Major Reform Needed to Optimize
Efforts, containing 33 recommendations and 87 associated action items
for eliminating what we identified as serious capability gaps in
national biodefense. In the decade since we released that report,
Congress, and the administrations have addressed many of our
recommendations, including the creation of a National Biodefense
Strategy (Recommendation 3). We appreciate the original iteration of
the Strategy released by the Trump administration in 2018 and the more
recent October 2022 refresh released by the Biden administration. We
eagerly await the Strategy's comprehensive implementation by the
Federal Government.
However, though progress has been made over the years, the Nation
remains critically at risk of a biological event, whether intentional,
accidental, or natural. Accordingly, the Commission decided last year
to release an update to our original Blueprint. Titled, The National
Blueprint for Biodefense: Immediate Action Needed to Defend Against
Biological Threats, this 2024 report incorporates the lessons learned
by the Commission during the course of its work over the past 11 years.
The experiences of the Nation's response to COVID-19, mpox, Ebola,
highly pathogenic avian influenza, and numerous other pathogens that
have emerged during that time informed the report's 36 recommendations
and 185 action items.
Other Commission recommendations have been taken up in a variety of
legislative vehicles, including the Farm Bill, Intelligence
Authorization Act, and Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and
Advancing Innovation Act. Most recently, the Servicemember Quality of
Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2025 (Public Law 118-159) required the Department of Defense to conduct
Biodefense Posture Reviews in 2026 and 2029, building off of the
progress made in the Department's first Review in 2023. The Act also
elevated the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs to a position that
straddles the Offices of the Under Secretary of Policy and Under
Secretary of Acquisition and Sustainment, to better align weapons of
mass destruction activities within those entities. Both of these ideas
came from recommendations in the Commission's 2024 National Blueprint
for Biodefense. Last year the Commission also issued the Proposed
Congressional Hearings on the Recommendations of the 2024 National
Blueprint for Biodefense to assist in future Congressional oversight of
the Federal biodefense enterprise.
Though human health rightfully garners a tremendous amount of
attention with regard to biodefense, animal health, plant health, and
food safety are equally critical elements of the Nation's biodefense
enterprise. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
agriculture, food, and related industries contributed approximately
$1.537 trillion to U.S. GDP in 2023. A single animal or plant
pathogen--introduced intentionally or spread naturally--could have
devastating consequences for multiple industries in this critical
infrastructure sector. We have all witnessed how highly pathogenic
avian influenza can devastate not just poultry producers but also dairy
farms, raising the price of eggs and dairy products for all consumers.
And those are the effects of a virus we are relatively familiar with
and for which we have developed or are developing countermeasures.
Other threats loom on the horizon and could inflict event greater
damage on American farming and associated industries. For example,
estimates suggest that the arrival of African Swine Fever in the United
States could cause $15 billion in losses for the domestic pork industry
in just the first 2 years after introduction alone, and potentially as
much as $50 billion in the long term. Wheat blast could have
catastrophic consequences for the Nation's wheat supply. Both of these
diseases, and many others, are already present in the Western
Hemisphere, increasing the chances that the United States will
eventually have to determine how best to respond to, recover from, and
mitigate their impacts.
Since its inception in 2014, the Commission has recognized the
importance of safeguarding food and agriculture from biological
threats. In our original 2015 National Blueprint for Biodefense, our
Commission discussed the need to: (1) better integrate Federal human,
animal, and environmental health activities into a One Health approach;
and (2) include the Department of Agriculture in the development
process for any National Biodefense Strategy. In the years since that
report's release, we continue to draw attention to the threats to this
critical infrastructure sector, and the capability gaps that leave us
unprepared for future biological events affecting food and agriculture.
That activity has included public meetings held at Kansas State
University (in 2017) and Colorado State University (in 2019) to discuss
these threats; Federal, State, and local activities to address these
threats; and how we can better leverage land-grant universities to
assist the Government in protecting food and agriculture. Based on the
information we gathered at those meetings, our independent research,
and further discussions with subject-matter experts, we have to date
produced 2 reports dedicated to strengthening the Federal Government's
food and agriculture defense activities.
The 2017 report, Defense of Animal Agriculture, contains
recommendations for the investigation of events involving animal
pathogens, development of animal medical countermeasures, information
sharing, and coordination of Federal biodefense activities impacting
animal health. In the 2022 report, Boots on the Ground: Land-Grant
Universities in the Fight Against Threats to Food and Agriculture, the
Commission provides recommendations to strengthen Federal support for
State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) activities to protect food
and agriculture from biological threats, and explores ways to engage
the land-grant universities in using their capabilities to augment
national biosurveillance, research and development, and outreach and
education efforts with regard to food and agriculture.
Despite how critical the Food and Agriculture Critical
Infrastructure Sector is to the Nation, Federal attention to, and
investment in, biodefense activities that support animal and plant
health have historically lagged behind those for human health. In 2023,
the Office of Management and Budget produced the first annual crosscut
analysis of Federal biodefense spending, as required by the William M.
(Mac) Thornberry Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public
Law 116-283), and in accordance with Recommendation 4 from our 2015
National Blueprint for Biodefense for the requirement of such a
crosscut. The crosscut revealed that the Department of Agriculture
spent $700 million on biodefense activities in fiscal year 2022,
compared to $8.4 billion spent by the Department of Health and Human
Services. The National Veterinary Stockpile, which is designed to store
critical veterinary supplies, equipment, animal vaccines, and response
support services for SLTT governments, received $6.5 million in
appropriations in fiscal year 2025, compared to $980 million for the
Strategic National Stockpile. The National Animal Health Laboratory
Network (NAHLN) has been historically underfunded through annual
appropriations relative to their mission. The National Plant Diagnostic
Network receives even less funding support for the critical work of
tracking the numerous plant pathogens that are circulating within the
United States at any given time. In lieu of dedicated appropriations
for animal and plant health response, the Department of Agriculture
relies on its borrowing authority through the Commodity Credit
Corporation for any emergency funding it may require to combat animal
and plant health disease outbreaks, including highly pathogenic avian
influenza.
The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-334, also
known as the 2018 Farm Bill) made some progress by increasing funding
for the NAHLN temporarily, establishing a National Animal Disease
Preparedness and Response Program (NADPRP), and creating the National
Animal Vaccine and Veterinary Countermeasures Bank (NAVVCB). The
Commission recommended the creation of both the NADPRP and the NAVVCB
in our 2017 report Defense of Animal Agriculture. The One Big Beautiful
Bill Act (Public Law 119-21) signed into law by President Trump a few
months ago contained a provision that directed an additional $233
million from the Commodity Credit Corporation to support these
activities through fiscal year 2030.
Deficiencies remain. The uneven response to last year's highly
pathogenic avian influenza epidemic demonstrates that we are not as
prepared as we need to be for future threats. Not all States are taking
the same approach to responding to disease threats to food and
agriculture. The Federal Government lacks sufficient coordination and
speed in addressing fast-moving novel threats. Agricultural producers
need to be engaged as equal partners and educated about the risks posed
by newly-emerging and newly-transmissible diseases. Medical
countermeasure development, approval, and stockpiling are not where it
needs to be.
Given the jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security, I
would be remiss if I did not also discuss the Department of Homeland
Security's biodefense activities and where they specifically align with
animal and plant health defense. All but one of the operational
components within the Department engage in activities that contribute
to national biodefense generally:
Agricultural inspectors within U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) work to prevent disease-carrying pests from
crossing our borders.
CBP and the Transportation Security Administration screen
passengers at ports-of-entry when diseases (including those
that could affect food and agriculture) move through the global
transit system.
FEMA bears responsibility for providing logistical and
emergency management expertise to support national response
activities, which is in no small part why President Donald
Trump asked them to step in to support the national response to
COVID-19 in March 2020. The agency also oversees direct
assistance programs to non-Federal Governments through the
State Homeland Security Grant Program.
The U.S. Coast Guard advises vessel owners and operators to
report suspected crewmembers and passengers sick with diseases
of concern to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as
part of its long-standing responsibility to implement
quarantine measures.
The U.S. Secret Service maintains discreet protective
measures to defend the White House from biological attacks and
manages the biological risk to National Special Security
Events.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement works to combat
counterfeit pharmaceuticals and theft of intellectual property
rights (such as for newly-developed medical countermeasures)
and plays a critical role in export enforcement.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
previously addressed biodefense of critical infrastructure
during the H1N1 influenza pandemic and issued guidance to the
sectors early in the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Science and Technology Directorate supports biological
attribution and characterization activities through the
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center
(NBACC).
In 2017, the Department combined some of its existing chemical,
biological, nuclear, and radiological functions into an Office of
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD). Congress subsequently
authorized the Office a year later and assigned the Assistant Secretary
for CWMD statutory responsibilities for coordinating Department of
Homeland Security activities for defending food, agriculture, and
veterinary systems, as enumerated in the Securing Our Agriculture and
Food Act (Public Law 115-43). Though Department officials envisioned
CWMD as a central hub for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) policy and
activities within the Department, authorizing legislation did not
reflect that mission and the Department did not utilize it in that way.
CWMD ultimately turned out to be little more than the sum of its parts,
focusing on legacy programs that existed before the Office's creation
with some additional elements brought over from other parts of the
Department of Homeland Security (e.g., WMD intelligence and analysis,
removed from the Office of Intelligence and Analysis).
Perhaps in recognition of this reality, the Department of Homeland
Security moved the position of Chief Medical Officer from CWMD to a
newly-created Office of Health Security, which consolidated
departmental health care, occupational health, and public health
responsibilities. The Department also moved CWMD food and agriculture
defense responsibilities to this new Office. The Office of Health
Security has been involved in Government-wide discussions regarding the
protection of food and agriculture, but this office neither coordinates
the Department's activities in this space, nor do they possess the
personnel and resources to effectively execute such a mission.
The biodefense responsibilities of CWMD focus largely on 2 long-
standing programs addressing biosurveillance and biological detection:
The National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC),
which was intended to collect and analyze biosurveillance data
from other Federal departments and agencies to enable early
warning and shared situational awareness of biological events,
including among animal populations. However, NBIC lacks the
authorities and resources necessary to fully achieve this goal.
Congress did not mandate that other Federal departments and
agencies provide this data to the Department of Homeland
Security. The Center has been left with publicly-available
sources of information to inform their products, limiting its
effectiveness. To illustrate this problem, the Department of
Agriculture does not currently share the data it receives from
States and the agricultural industry with the Department of
Homeland Security.
The BioWatch biological detection program has been in
service for 22 years, dating back to its initial deployment by
the George W. Bush administration to provide a modicum of
biological detection capability against potential attacks in
advance of the 2004 Presidential election. Located in about 35
metropolitan jurisdictions, the system collects air samples in
outdoor public spaces that must then be manually gathered at
least once every 24 hours. Public health laboratories then test
the samples for the presence of 5 biological agents. However,
the equipment barely functions, and the system (including
testing) takes too long to produce results. Hospital admissions
would indicate a biological event long before the system
definitively reported a positive test result. The system is
operating with the same technology from its 2003 deployment.
After 7 years, CWMD in 2024 finally terminated BD21 (or Biodefense
for the 21st Century), its troubled replacement program to identify,
acquire, procure, and deploy replacement technology for the BioWatch
program. Though CWMD continues to engage with stakeholders and industry
to determine how best to improve upon the BioWatch program, they are no
closer to a more capable national biological detection system than when
I last testified before this very subcommittee 6 years ago. The
Department of Homeland Security continues to spend more than $80
million in taxpayer money each year for the existing, flawed BioWatch
program.
Recommendation 31 from our National Blueprint for Biodefense called
for the development of an advanced environmental detection system to
replace BioWatch. The Commission further examined the program and
potential solutions in our 2021 report Saving Sisyphus: Advanced
Biodetection for the 21st Century. Understanding the political reality
that Congress will not terminate BioWatch without a replacement in
place, Saving Sisyphus presents short- and long-term action plans to
both deploy better technology right now and to create a technology
development process to regularly refresh both the biological detection
mission and technology. A research and development strategy that
regularly reassesses the mission of the system and the needs of
participating jurisdictions is also essential.
President Trump's fiscal year 2026 budget proposes eliminating CWMD
and dispersing its programs to other elements within the Department.
This is of little surprise to the Commission. We believe that the
ability of the Department to counter weapons of mass destruction would
not be meaningfully impacted by the closure of Office and the transfer
of those capabilities to other components. However, the end of CWMD
would not also mean the end of the Department's mission to address
chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological threats to the homeland,
nor should Congress or the administration redirect WMD funding for non-
WMD purposes. Biodefense (including agro-biodefense) should remain a
priority for the Department of Homeland Security. Should Congress
choose to accede to the administration's request to dissolve CWMD and
redistribute its capabilities, enacting legislation should also
establish regular review of Department of Homeland Security biodefense
activities. Congress should require the Department of Homeland Security
to compile and submit an annual report on its biodefense policies,
programs, and expenditures as they align with the National Biodefense
Strategy. As the Department of Homeland Security should already be
providing much of this information in support of the Congressionally-
mandated biodefense crosscut, it should be easy for the Department to
provide this information to Congress as well.
Last, we cannot ignore the broader state of biodefense when
discussing the defense of food and agriculture. Biological threats
continue to increase. Our enemies can see for themselves the disruption
that highly-pathogenic avian influenza has caused within the United
States, as well as the damage done by other disease outbreaks
throughout the world. Technology has made it easier to weaponize
biological agents. Diseases are spreading more frequently and easily
within and among countries, with increased likelihood of spillovers
from one animal population to another, from animals to humans, and from
humans to animals. Measles and other diseases are reemerging in the
United States, including most recently tuberculosis, mumps, pertussis,
and rubella, increasing the disease burden on our health care system
and leaving us more vulnerable to the impacts of animal disease
transmission to human populations.
Defending the Nation against biological threats that affect
national security is not, and has never been, a top priority for any of
the 15 Cabinet departments, 9 independent agencies, and 1 independent
institution (the Smithsonian) that possess responsibilities for
biodefense. Biodefense has always been disgracefully, woefully, and
incomprehensively underfunded. We cannot continue to rely forever on
emergency supplemental appropriations or withdrawals from the Commodity
Credit Corporation to make up for weak defense against biological
threats. As a Nation, we have never been adequately prepared for the
biological events that have occurred, and we know that, because we
never do seem to avoid the deaths of hundreds, thousands, and sometimes
millions when those events occur. The implemented and proposed cuts to
biodefense programs do not exist in a vacuum.
Biodefense is in crisis and has long been in crisis.
Our Commission has advocated in the past for reevaluation of
Federal biodefense programs and policies, of exploring opportunities to
find efficiencies in how the Government engages in activities to
prevent, deter, prepare for, detect, respond to, attribute, recover
from, and mitigate biological events. And we have suggested that
certain programs--such as BioWatch--need to be replaced or eliminated.
Such reductions or realignments should be made thoughtfully, with an
eye toward how we as a Nation can continue to meet the goals of the
National Biodefense Strategy President Trump issued in 2018. The
requirements are still the requirements, regardless of available
resources and personnel, and we need to be able to meet those
requirements. The Nation still requires biosurveillance. The Nation
still requires diagnostics, vaccines, therapeutics, and other medical
countermeasures. And the Nation still requires a well-equipped and
well-staffed public health and animal health departments. The
administration should strongly consider taking some of the funds they
are saving from on-going cuts and reinvesting those funds in programs
that actually work. The administration also needs to make future cuts
with current and previous cuts in mind.
This concludes my written remarks. The Bipartisan Commission on
Biodefense appreciates the subcommittee's interest in biological
threats affecting food and agriculture, and the Department of Homeland
Security's contributions to national biodefense. I would also like to
take this opportunity to thank all of the organizations that support
our efforts financially and otherwise. With this testimony, I am
submitting 3 of the Commission's reports (The National Blueprint for
Biodefense, Defense of Animal Agriculture, and Boots on the Ground),*
and the Commission's first annual State of Biodefense Address.* Thank
you again for inviting me to testify today. I look forward to answering
your questions and working with you to defend the Nation against
biological threats.
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* [The information referred to is included in Appendix II.]
Chairman Strong. Thank you, Dr. George.
Members will be recognized by order of seniority for the 5
minutes of questioning. An additional round of questioning may
be called after all Members have been recognized. I now
recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
Dr. Wims and Dr. Young, it is great to have you both here
today. Alabama A&M and Auburn University are pillars of
strength in our State. I am proud to see you representing those
institutions in this direction. Dr. Wims, you and I share
concerns about foreign acquisitions of farmland. What do you
see as the biggest risk when adversaries acquire U.S. farmland?
Mr. Wims. Sorry, Mr. Chairman. Speaking from an 1890 land-
grant perspective, we have farmers and producers throughout the
Southeast and Southern Crescent. As you know, the focus, say,
in Louisiana is catfish and/or crawfish, Arkansas rice. In
Alabama we have a robust catfish production apparatus as well
as cotton. In Georgia, you know, we have poultry farms. As you
travel and visit and our extension agents and professionals
work with those producers, you will find that they're very open
and very vulnerable. That vulnerability, particularly for those
who, if they lose a season, they essentially lose their
wherewithal to support their family and to maintain the farm.
So we think that awareness, as well as education, technical
assistance is very important. Technical assistance via our
cooperative extension system with very clear and concise
research produced, data-driven information from our
researchers. But as my colleague said, that requires funding
and there has to be a better and closer collaboration between
research and extension, particularly relative to terrorism and
the dangers that we face.
The challenge with us is being able to marry the
agricultural sciences, our researchers, and our extension
agents with our computer scientists and our people who are
proficient and professional and prepared in artificial
intelligence as well as cybersecurity. We have not done a good
job of that. Again, resources and time.
I also think that the type and way that we produce,
process, and then distribute food and fiber has to be carefully
studied in terms of the dangers that we face relative to a
potential threat, having access to food systems and the way
that we distribute and store food. I am a chief administrator
at an institution of higher learning. On every day we have
hundreds of pounds of food that we prepare and serve our
students and our constituents. It is vulnerable and we need
systems in place, whether it be artificial intelligence and/or
cybersecurity, to make sure that we protect not just the
production, but the distribution, dissemination, and storage of
those food items.
Chairman Strong. Thank you, Dr. Wims. Dr. Young, our
research institutions and universities often partner with
foreign institutions to conduct research and share information.
Do you believe that American institutions can maintain these
research partnerships while ensuring the safety of research and
intellectual properties from foreign malign actors?
Dr. Young. I do. But it takes some work, right? It takes
deliberate effort. So I would point out that Auburn has made a
very significant investment in vetting all the professors that
come to Auburn, even to the point of separating some from
research projects that they were involved in. So it has been
really an effort of Auburn to strive to have clearable faculty
working on the projects, Chairman, that we, you know, would
work on in this space in particular.
Chairman Strong. Across all of your experiences, what
safeguards can be implemented to protect sensitive research
while still enabling American scientists to engage
internationally, particularly in addressing agriculture
diseases that are that originate outside of our borders? How
would you do that?
Dr. Young. Yes. Well, I appreciate that question, Chairman.
I mean, I like hearing you say that, ``outside of our
borders.'' We were having a bit of a discussion about that
before the hearing began that we need to project our
surveillance outside. So just as an example for myself, I'm
headed to West Africa in a couple of weeks and that's part of a
project that's funded through the USDA, ARS. So when we're able
to collect samples in other areas of the world, we cannot only
keep track of what we know is occurring and potentially
impacting our livestock and poultry, but we can also, you know,
build a database that will allow us to notice emerging things.
So, I mean, I think that's one of the best ways, yes, is get
outside our borders and get after it.
Chairman Strong. Thank you. Thank each of you for your
testimony.
I now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from New
York, Mr. Kennedy, for his 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you again, Chairman, and thank you to
all of you once again for your leadership, for being here for
your testimony. It's extremely important. Also to those of you
who are military veterans, thank you for answering the call.
FEMA's Preparedness Grant Program, I talked a little bit
about FEMA and the issues that we are dealing with from this
administration in my opening remarks. The State Homeland
Security Program, the Urban Area Security Initiative, are part
of those preparedness grant programs. This is funding that is
critical for activities of biodefense, including our first
responders and detection technology, public health systems. Yet
this year we saw grant funding frozen, delayed applications,
withheld information about funding awards, cuts in many areas,
including to urban areas that depend on this funding, as well
as failed timely information about requirements.
So this question is for you, Dr. George. How do these
delays and freezes, lack of transparency, impact localities and
States' ability to plan and build capacity to defend against
these biological and agroterrorist threats?
Ms. George. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy. I have to say that the
way the system has been set up to date, those activities,
planning, preparedness, preparing specifically for response and
recovery and mitigation, they are dependent on FEMA grant
funding as well as grant funding from other departments and
agencies. As I said earlier, it takes two things in order to
get the States, the locals, the Tribes, and the territories to
be able to take on more responsibility and to execute on those
plans. They need time and they need money. Now if you've
decided, if someone has decided that the grant funding has to
with do decrease and it has to go away, then the States can,
they can step up and they can backfill, but they're not going
to be able to do it very quickly.
So I suggest to you that even putting into the budget, and
specifically the budget request and some of the other documents
that have come out, statements saying that the funding needs to
be cut is a clear indication to others outside of our country
that now we've created a vulnerability, a vulnerability that
the States are going to try and fill, but they're not going to
be able to fill very quickly.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you. Dr. George, your organization, the
Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, released a report last
year outlining national blueprint in biodefense. Can you talk
about that report and the findings of the report, as well as
what the funding means to the localities and their ability to
respond to biological threats?
Ms. George. Sure, sir. So, yes, our National Blueprint for
Biodefense is here and it's obviously way too large for anybody
to absorb all at once. But it's a compendium of all of our
recommendations over the years since we were implemented in
2014 and our first blueprint in 2015.
Some of our findings I covered earlier in terms of the
threat. The biological threat has, including the food and
agriculture threat, has only increased since 2014. So it's been
11 years of steady increase. We now have new threats on the
horizon. AI combined with bio, as you all know, bio and
chemistry becoming increasingly similar. The rise of the use of
toxins to attack people, not just for assassination, but for
other purposes. All of that is on the rise, as is this interest
in offensive biological weapons programs by foreign
adversaries.
In terms of the impact on the ability of the States,
locals, Tribes, and territories to respond, you have a threat
environment. We have increasing vulnerabilities and we have
consequences that are huge and just simply not mitigated. They
can't be mitigated by grants all by themselves.
Mr. Kennedy. Dr. George, just for the sake of time, what
happens and what is the risk if that funding disappears?
Ms. George. If the funding disappears, I think we're at
risk of being attacked, period. Then we have a giant problem.
We have a problem that Congress itself is going to have to step
in to solve with emergency appropriations. But I think an event
could get away from us very quickly. When it comes to food and
agriculture you're not talking about something that would be
constrained, like if we just dumped some chemicals somewhere.
It would spread. It would spread all throughout the United
States and not only affect our economic and national security
here, but it would affect economic and national security
throughout the world.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Chairman. I yield.
Chairman Strong. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Brecheen,
for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Brecheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
witnesses.
As you discussed, whether it be the Chinese Communist Party
or Iran, North Korea, a number of actors could be a real threat
using agroterrorism. What you all are discussing, you know,
throws open the door to billions, hundreds of billions of
dollars of economic harm. Just thinking it through, as was
discussed during the times of the past, extended periods of
warfare where this could be employed when you really have to
rely on domestic production.
So with that real threat, what we do know is GAO has shared
with the public about the massive amounts of land that has been
purchased, some near military basis and the prosperity of our
country that is so dependent upon production agriculture. I
want to kind-of figure out, Dr. Vanier, where are we most
vulnerable? Is it animal disease? Is it plant disease?
Then as a follow-up question, anybody else on the panel, is
the purchasing of land, many times near military installations,
does that factor in? Or is that just ancillary to the
conversation for other potentially nefarious means? So Dr.
Vanier.
Dr. Vanier. Thank you, Congressman.
Well, my orientation is animal health. Animal health
certainly is a tremendous threat in the sense that we not only
would have issues with livestock production, and you've seen
that already with PEDV and swine, high path avian influenza,
the idea that HPAI can now jump and infect dairy cattle. So
there are all of those ancillary effects and, as Dr. George
stated, it spreads. All of these things can spread so quickly
that we can't get our arms around it.
I do, though, want to recognize threats that exist in the
plant world and field crops. We have folks at Kansas State who
do a significant amount of work looking at crop diseases and
they tend to be the red-headed stepchild. It's not, if I could
use the term, it's not nearly as sexy as an animal disease. The
difference that we have, too, is that the crops don't get up
and walk around. So it can be a little easier to control those
because you've got the plants in place. But being able to
diagnose these diseases quickly to get around the disease, to
corral it, and be able to manage it before the crop is
harvested, before the crop is transported, and allow for the
potential for spread.
Mr. Brecheen. Does anybody want to follow up on my question
relative to is the ownership, foreign ownership of land in the
United States, could it factor in? Could they be utilizing that
land for something nefarious relative to spreading it quickly
on land that they control?
Dr. George, you look like you are nodding your head.
Ms. George. Yes. From a military perspective, this is what
you would want to do. You don't just do recon. If you can put
people on the ground and you can put people on the ground near
facilities, near the universities, near where the research is
going on, near where the vulnerabilities are, you would go
ahead and do it.
You know, I'd give you a different example just quickly. I
went to the University of Hawaii for my doctorate in public
health. Hawaii, we wanted Hawaii because of the military
significance that it has in terms of protecting our Nation. Yet
lots of land has been sold to the Japanese and to the Chinese
and many others. What happens when they own the entire State or
most of it and we have all those military assets sitting there?
It's the same thing here domestically or in the continental
United States.
Mr. Brecheen. Just following up, I got 12 seconds left. So
is it more so, if I am understanding, Dr. Vanier, your comments
in tandem with Dr. George's comments, that animal husbandry on
foreign-owned assets, that could be really an experimenting
location to where you can spread animal disease really quickly?
Dr. Vanier. Yes, it could, once again, depending on the
nature of the land that they've purchased. So in many cases, if
it's grassland or they've purchased a feedlot, then, yes, that
would be an animal disease issue. If the land they've purchased
is cropland, then you're naturally going to think about the
potential of a crop disease.
Mr. Brecheen. Thank you.
Chairman Strong. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Mackenzie, for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Mackenzie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
all of our panelists for being here today.
Agroterrorism and the threat that we face in this sector is
one that I have seen an increasing number of instances that
raise concerns. So I think it is a very important topic that we
are focusing here on today.
So just to build on the previous questioners' items, can
you tell me just logistically which ports of entry, airports,
land crossings do we believe are the most vulnerable right now?
What are we seeing terrorism networks and other individuals
utilize to gain access to our country?
Dr. Young. Thank you. I think I would just sum it simply as
whichever, I don't know the answer, but whichever port of entry
has the most illegal immigration through it, that's our
greatest risk.
Ms. George. Sir, I think it also depends on the
consequences you're looking for. If you're looking for large-
scale consequences in a high-population density place, then
you're looking at the major metropolitan areas and the ports of
entry there. If you're looking to affect agriculture, you're
probably looking at the ports of entry into places like
Pennsylvania and Oklahoma, places where all of that is
happening.
I would also say there's a question about staffing as well.
You'd have to look and see where are all the agricultural
inspectors, you know, in the airports? How many are there? How
many do we still need? They're not evenly spread throughout all
of that.
Last, I would say we have ports of entry in the territories
as well. They historically receive less in the way of support
for security, but they're part of the United States and people
can get in through there as well.
Mr. Mackenzie. In the history that you have seen these
instances occur, where are they originating from and is it a
concerted, organized effort or are they more typically lone
actors?
Ms. George. Well, I suppose recently we've seen some of the
experimentation by foreign nationals who brought in some stuff
from China that we didn't want to have here and we said, no,
you can't do it, but they came here anyway and decided to
conduct that research in our facilities. But I would say to
you, sir, there's probably more of it going on than any of us
realize. We do not have an effective investigatory mechanism
that is nationwide.
Even if you do investigate, we don't have a national
attribution apparatus either. So maybe you find out about
something, but, to answer your question, is it multiple
countries or multiple people in specific countries? It's very
difficult to tell because we don't have that apparatus in
place.
Mr. Mackenzie. I appreciate that, and I think you are
correct that we do need to do more to understand the
attribution of these cases.
So my final question is this. You have mentioned, a couple
of you have mentioned more inspectors. We raised the idea here
of doing more investigatory work for attribution. What are some
of the other potential solutions that you would recommend that
we should be taking up as Congress and also our administration?
Dr. Vanier. I don't want to make too fine a point of this,
but along with the comments that you've heard, one of the
things that I personally would like to see, when CBP agents
intercept seeds, plants, animal products, whatever, at ports of
entry, those items are not tested, those items are just
destroyed. The concept seems to be it's OK, we got rid of it,
no problem. I would like to see those items tested, one, to see
if they are, in fact, carrying a high-consequence agent.
But second, what is the agent? It gives us a better sense
of the actual risk that we're facing. We know we can't
intercept everything, but if we can test the things that we do
in fact intercept, then we should have a better idea of what's
coming in, where it's coming from. Is it an agent that is of
high consequence or not?
Dr. Young. Yes, if I can add on to that. So, you know, I
mentioned having the whole genome sequencing and having a
repository and we have lots of those in different places in our
country, but we don't bring all that data together. So if we
could bring that together, over time we would have the
opportunity to perhaps notice trends, emerging trends, and
whether something's been manipulated with gain of function or
CRISPR type work, or is it just downright engineered. So if
we're taking advantage of those opportunities, when samples
present themselves to catalog that material, it's advantageous
for us.
Mr. Wims. Our small and limited resource, farmers,
producers, particularly those that are fruit and vegetable as
well as farm to table, and those who are producing products for
local outlets, whether it be the larger corporate grocery
stores or even our campuses, in some cases, they need to be
better trained and there has to be larger awareness of the
threats. They are not aware, they have not been trained, they
have not been taught. That takes resources, people, teachers,
agents. We need more research on bioterrorism and to, again,
marry our computer science and cybersecurity areas with
agricultural scientists and experts.
Ms. George. Sir, I would just add two things. First, we
need more diagnostics. We need more diagnostic tests. Our
country has a tendency to wait until something happens and then
throws medicine at it. That's OK, but we need to get ahead of
it. So you'd want diagnostic tests that somebody could use
right away, all the way down at the local level, all the way up
to the feds. That's one.
Then the other is that we need to strengthen our law
enforcement. The FBI is involved very much in dealing with
this, but so is ICE and so is obviously CBP, the U.S. Secret
Service, and so forth. They need some more resources to be able
to investigate and interdict.
Mr. Mackenzie. Fantastic. Well, thank you to all of you for
those recommendations and for being here. Appreciate your
testimony.
With that, I yield back.
Chairman Strong. The gentleman yields back.
I concur with the Ranking Member Kennedy. You all have
traveled a long distance to get here and we would like to do
another round of questions if that is OK with each of you.
Dr. Wims, Alabama A&M, the national network of land-grant
universities make critical investments in home-grown food
security and the agriculture supply chain. You have said that,
and I quote, ``Farm security is national security.'' One piece
of that is imported food. Are imported food products held to
the same rigorous testing standards as home-grown food?
Mr. Wims. Mr. Chairman, in some cases, yes, in some cases,
no. I don't have specific data and I would yield to my
colleagues if they have more concise information.
But, as you know, many of our vegetables and fruits are
imported. Particularly in some sectors of our communities, in
our Southern region, there are meats, i.e., goats and others,
that are imported that don't necessarily meet the same standard
of review by Food Drug Administration as others. So we
certainly need to strengthen the testing and strengthen the
assessment. We in the land-grant community certainly can
support in that area.
We have a robust food safety security testing apparatus on
the campus. We have a doctoral program in food science, food
safety. We in the land-grant community stand ready to support
USDA and the Food and Drug Administration with any efforts. But
the simple answer is no, sir, we don't think that it's
consistent.
Chairman Strong. Thank you. Would any of the other
witnesses like to add to that related to the standards related
to here in America versus other foods that are being brought
into America?
Ms. George. Sir, I would say the standards are the
standards. It's a question of enforcement and the resources
available to enforce those. I think we do not test every single
piece of fruit, every piece of meat, every single piece of
anything coming into the country. We just can't. So we use a
sampling strategy. What have we seen? We see cases of food
poisoning, et cetera, diseases coming into the country because
we just can't get to all of it. That's why I think we need to
have more diagnostic tests out there, even to the point of, you
know, if we could, giving them to families and individuals so
that if something happens, we can test, we can be trying to do
it.
Chairman Strong. Thank you. I yield and now recognize the
Ranking Member from New York, Mr. Kennedy, for another round of
questioning.
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, just a couple quick questions. First of
all, I think this will go for the entire panel. You did travel
a long way. Again, thank you for being here. Thank you,
Chairman, for doing another round.
We can start with any one of you who wants to take it on
first. This is either a very easy question or a very difficult
question. What is the biggest and most concerning agroterrorism
threat that you feel exists in our country at this moment? Dr.
George.
Ms. George. I think the biggest threat would be the use of
a disease that is already endemic in the United States against
our agriculture. I agree that I know the plant people won't be
excited to hear me say that I think it's an animal thing, but I
do think it is. We have plague, anthrax, tularemia, and
brucellosis. Those 4 are all endemic to the United States and
they're all on the high concern lists. Using something like
that would immediately create a lot of confusion. Was it ours?
Did it grow? Did something naturally occur to modify that
organism? All of that would take a lot of time.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you. I'm going to move on. Others? Dr.
Wims.
Mr. Wims. Well, as an agronomist and former specialist that
worked in a limited resource community, I always thought that
our water source and how easily it's accessed, particularly in
the recycling areas and the way that we irrigate, even our
farms and then our catfish farms, our rice farms, you know,
it's just so open and vulnerable.
Mr. Kennedy. Dr. Young.
Dr. Young. Lack of food animal veterinary services in the
needed areas of rural America, and really critical
infrastructure analysis where are our vulnerability points. I
think those are the 2 biggest threats.
Mr. Kennedy. Dr. Vanier.
Dr. Vanier. Well, to follow along with Dr. Young's
comments, I would say our biggest threat is complacency and
lack of vigilance. I would like to see diagnostics. I would
like to see a more robust laboratory network system. I would
like to see more training for our local responders and
communication with our producers so that they can remain
vigilant and not be complacent about the fact that, well, I
have a small farm, no one's going to attack me. I think they
need to understand that they are equally at risk.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you. One last question. Dr. George, if
an agroterrorism attack occurred, FEMA would likely play a
critical role in distributing vaccines, antibiotics, other
medical countermeasures in that event. Yet this administration
has repeatedly proposed eliminating or drastically downsizing
FEMA without any transition plan to help States or localities.
What are the risks, you believe, with the Trump
administration and that attack on FEMA? What are the risks of
the national biodefense if FEMA's ability to distribute life-
saving countermeasures are reduced? How realistic is it to
expect States and territories to take on that role?
Ms. George. Well, I think if we were to eliminate FEMA
entirely, we would be placing the Nation at much greater risk,
if only because the requirements are the requirements. We have
requirements. Whether FEMA's picking them up or somebody else
is picking them up, they exist. If you eliminate the agency
that's been responsible for fulfilling those requirements and
don't have anybody else in place and nothing else is able to
take over for that, then you're suddenly at a loss. The States
and localities are not going to be able to pick up the
responsibility as comprehensively. We're not talking about
something happening in an individual State. We're pretty much
talking about scenarios that are going to spread all throughout
the States.
So to expect the States to then in the midst of response
and recovery, trying to coordinate with each other and pull
resources down from the rest of the Federal Government, I think
that's just unrealistic. So you're creating an even worse
threat-related situation.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Strong. The gentleman yields back.
I want to thank our witnesses for their valuable testimony
and the Members for their questions. The Members of the
subcommittee may have some additional questions for the
witnesses and we would like to ask the witnesses to respond to
these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the
hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands and is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X I
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Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Daniel K. Wims
Question 1a. Dr. Wims, you highlight the Rapid Detection System and
Remote Sensing for Chemical and Biological Threats developed by Alabama
A&M scientists.
How exactly does this system work?
Answer. The detection system is based on special optical non-
destructive technique that analyze light scattering when target samples
are tested for its chemical structures. The targets can be solid,
liquids, or gases.
Alabama A&M research scientists developed a portable spectrometer
operating with a 785 nm laser and a 2-in. refracting telescope to test
adulteration of liquid, olive oil. The pure olive oil was mixed with
other contaminants with which is detected between 1 percent and 100
percent at a minimum concentration of 2.5 percent from a distance of 15
cm and at a minimum concentration of 5 percent from a distance of 1 m.
The technique involves correlating the intensity ratios of prominent
optical signal bands of pure oils at 1254, 1657, and 1441 cm--1 to the
degree of adulteration. As a novel variation in the data analysis
technique, integrated intensities over a spectral range of 100 cm--1
around the optical signal line were used, making it possible to
increase the sensitivity of the technique. Due to the potential of this
technique for making measurements from a convenient distance, the short
distance stand-off optical technique has the promise to be used for
routine applications in food industry such as identifying food items
and monitoring contaminated food products at various checkpoints in the
food supply chain and storage facilities.
Question 1b. How can this system improve the ability of State and
local responders to detect diseases of high consequence and formulate
adequate response plans?
Answer. This system can be improved by implanting the following:
1. Expanding on the library of contaminants/diseases tested. This
will allow to identify wide range of signatures of the
contaminants/diseases.
2. Assemble and manufacture multiple systems to place in different
food industries such as crop harvesting and storage facilities,
food processing facilities, Food distribution facilities, port
entrees to test imported food products, and other facilities to
test for contaminants/diseases.
3. Establish data center to collect data from all systems remotely
and monitor testing.
4. Advance the system to implement Artificial Intelligence and
Machine Learning to improve efficiency of responding.
Alabama A&M research scientists are ready to work on the above
plans.
Question 1c. What other capabilities is Alabama A&M developing to
protect the food supply chain and prevent agroterror threats in the
region?
Answer. Alabama A&M has additional capabilities to protect the food
supply chain and prevent agroterror threat in the region are testing
laboratories to cover monitoring food supplies from farm to table. Our
soil and plant scientists are implementing different smart technologies
to monitor farms and protect them from threats. They use drones with
different sensors crops diseases, water quality, soil contaminants,
storage of supplies, and other threats.
Another novel capability is smart packaging to protect packaged
food from external biological or chemical contaminants. Alabama A&M
research scientists developed novel biocompatible materials to coat
packaging surfaces.
Alabama A&M AI/ML are experienced in the development of algorithms
from data collected to advance the protection operation from threats
and make it more efficient.
The goal of Alabama A&M is to lead the Nation in protecting our
food supply chain supplies from farm to table from biological and
chemical threats through scaling all our capabilities. This will be
achieved by Alabama A&M receiving fund to establish state-of-the-art
Agroterrorism Center that can handle food supply chain threats in
different areas. The facility will be equipped advance equipment and
technologies. This will include data center and allow expanding farm
land and food distribution facility surveillance.
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Cristopher A. Young
Question 1a. In your opinion, what value would a single
comprehensive source of information add to current food security
efforts at the national, State, and local levels?
Answer. A single comprehensive source of vetted information would
be of inestimable value in serving the Nation's food security needs by
fundamentally transforming its ability to better anticipate threats to
food, agriculture, and water (FAW). FAW systems are inextricably
interconnected in a food chain system of systems (food supply). FAW-
related threat information gathering and analysis therefore needs to be
conducted on a holistic basis, meaning that it addresses threats across
the whole of the food chain elements, and at the equivalency level of
other national security-related intelligence processes. As has been
stated numerous times, ``food security is national security.''
Currently, data is siloed, widely dispersed, inconsistent in quality
and frequently difficult to access because of unreconciled authority
and permissions. Two-way information exchange is a major issue within
the Federal Government, for example agencies with full Title 50
authorities and capacities vs. agencies with limited Title 50 capacity
(USDA, FDA), but also equally importantly from FAW-related businesses.
Access becomes a multi-tiered siloing conundrum not just within the
Federal Government, but also at the State, local, and Tribal levels.
FAW businesses also lack a comprehensive Information Sharing and
Analysis Center, which could function as a trusted interface between
the Government and business. Information sharing is further complicated
by the fact that the relevant FAW-related agencies (USDA and FDA) have
regulatory authority. This tends to be an obstacle to communication
between businesses and Government. As the CEO of one of the top 5 food
corporations said, ``We don't talk to the Federal agencies, our lawyers
do.''
The totality of deficiencies mean that vetted information is
consistently incomplete and often unavailable for review from vetted
subject-matter experts in government (Federal, State, and local),
academia, and business that could gauge its significance. In times of
emergency involving natural disease outbreaks or food-borne illness,
responses are reactive, meaning delayed, rather than being
anticipatory, predictive, and proactive. This additional burden causes
prolonged response tempo, slows containment, increases costs, and
inadvertently increases the probability of potential spiraling and
cascading fractures. Further this allows emergency events to rapidly
expand risk across the food supply. Consolidation of food processing
has increased to such an extent that the loss of a single plant can
negatively impact the food supply.
The complexity of issues presently occurs within a peacetime
environment. It should therefore be anticipated that the intensity,
distribution, and frequency of frictions will increase exponentially
during times of war, since a pacing adversary is highly likely to
directly target the U.S. food supply using a multidomain strategy.
Food-related emergencies in time of war will not simply be just larger
in scale, but rather of an entirely unconventional character, meaning
the rapid information collection, analysis, and distribution to
targeted FAW constituencies will become even more critical to survival.
A comprehensive source of vetted information would positively
impact threat-related information sharing. Additional value could be
leveraged at all levels of governance and business.
national level
More effective policy making.--A comprehensive data source would
allow Federal agencies to have a real-time, holistic view of FAW
systems and their state of biosecurity, as well as providing insight
into the robustness and resiliency of the food chain.
Enable proactive (``Left of Bang'') FAW-related
interventions by the Federal Government instead of reactive
responses.
Ensure policies and standards are tailored to harmonize the
oftentimes competing needs of national security, specific
regions, States and localities with corporate constituencies
and commodities. Value must be demonstrated in all directions,
including back to business, to quell the current adversarial
relationship between business and the regulatory agencies.
Provide a standardized, evidence-based approach that can
support efficiencies by precisely targeting Federal resources,
developing requirements, and planning new analytical programs.
Streamlined coordination.--With all data centralized and
standardized, Federal, State, and local government agencies, national
organizations, and commodity representative groups can better
coordinate with FAW business, so that they can become contributing
partners rather than just consumers of analytical findings. Data flow
needs to become two-way. This centralization of data does not mean that
multinational food corporations would gain access to Classified
national security programs but would instead create multiple lanes by
which vetted information can be shared with appropriate constituencies.
Improved data analysis.--Consolidating data would enable government
analysts (Federal, State, and local) and vetted academic researchers to
assemble a robust dataset to use for in-depth analysis, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) development, and modeling. Academia
could also serve as the trusted intermediary with FAW-related companies
for data analysis and development of creative means by which corporate
data could be utilized in national security programs. Where denied,
academia can serve as alternative data scouts, working with commercial
providers of data.
state level
Enhanced resource allocation.--A comprehensive database would give
State-level officials a clearer picture of Federally-acquired and -
analyzed data related to FAW security issues within their respective
States, enabling more strategic allocation of State resources.
Greater cross-agency collaboration.--Standardized data would
facilitate collaboration between Federal and State government agencies,
including State veterinary diagnostic systems and departments of
health, National Guard, and law enforcement.
Accountability and program evaluation.--A sole source of FAW-
related facts would enable States to measure the performance of both
Federal and State security efforts more effectively. This in turn would
open communication channels to ensure the products meet the needs of
the States, while also setting up a trusted network of vetted officials
who could receive and assist in data collection, analysis, and
interpretation during times of peace, in anticipation of the
operational ramp-ups that would be necessary in times of war. A
vigorous food-related war gaming network (FAW-Red Team) should be made
a priority, funded, and regularly exercised. This group should consist
of vetted experts from appropriate Federal, State, and local
governments, academia, and business and take place under strict non-
attribution standards. Regulatory elements of Federal agencies should
not be allowed to participate but instead be limited to those with
national security-related responsibilities.
local level
Targeted community constituency trust building and response.--Local
food retailers, food banks, and even consumers have no access to high-
quality data which could be used to improve the security of their
operations and thereby build a more robust and resilient local food
supply. Dissemination of validated and timely food threat information
at the retail or consumer level is largely non-existent. When shared
(e.g., DHS, FBI, etc.) it is often considered dated and covering known
threats. Currently, there is also no coordinated mechanism for the
anonymous sharing of retail-level food security information with
Federal, State, and local authorities.
Information sharing with State- and local-level agencies suffers
from the same regulatory conundrum as it does with the Federal level,
meaning there is a distinct impression within retail food that the
sharing of any information could and probably will result either in
civil liability or in regulatory backlash. Out of legal concern local
food retailers make it a habit to share no information other than that
which might be necessary to meet State or local regulatory requirements
or request law enforcement engagement. The collective effect is that
local information that might be indicative of adversarial coordination
across multiple localities is lacking.
business level
More informed programmatic and business planning.--Business-related
security officials consistently report the need for ``actionable
information'' which can be used for business development and continuity
of business planning. What information is shared by the Federal
Government is often quietly reported by business to be of low quality,
dated and not directed to the needs of business, thereby of little
value to the needs of corporate security.
Other commonly-reported data-sharing failures include:
Federally-shared intelligence products are generalized and
provide few if any specifics, cover known threats, and
frequently ask the wrong questions for business.
Political, regulatory bias and pressure is often perceived
by business rather than objective assessments. For instance,
animal agriculture is often interpreted as detrimental to the
environment. When regulatory FAW agencies serve in information-
gathering efforts, these biases can be co-mingled with
security-related matters.
A single data provider that is not charged also with
regulatory authorities would help eliminate tacit biases that
might otherwise be present or perceived as present and thereby
lessen the current adversarial relationship between Government
and business. This change in authorities could potentially help
to rapidly facilitate data sharing.
Question 1b. How should this resource be created and how can voices
from land-grant universities like Auburn University, as well as other
stakeholders, including agricultural producers, the intelligence
community, and various voices from within the Government, contribute to
the creation of this resource?
Answer. Information sharing necessitates a collaboration between
Government, business, and academia. Given that the bulk of the FAW
enterprises are privately-owned, a data-sharing solution would best be
accomplished through an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)
environment. Unfortunately, the food market is highly competitive, and
food-related companies have as a result consistently shown a lack of
trust with each other, perceiving the others, as trying to gain
economic and market advantage. The food industry had in the early
2020's an ISAC, but it has been shut down for many years. There is
currently a ``Food and Agriculture ISAC,'' but this is somewhat of a
misnomer because it is solely focused on cybersecurity rather than
being a comprehensive Food and Agriculture ISAC. Given that, it cannot
meet the needs discussed here. Beyond that, some of these same large
multinational food corporations have been accused and prosecuted for
coordinated price-fixing violations, bringing into question the value
of the current ISAC model being applied to FAW.
Food companies have on occasion withheld or otherwise obfuscated
information for a variety of reasons. This means that an independent
source of validated information must be collected, analyzed, and
offered as appropriate in a format that serves both Government and FAW-
related corporate needs.
Additionally, it is important to recognize the multi-national
character representing large portions of the U.S. food supply.
Currently, there is no manner by which national security-related FAW
information can be shared with a foreign-owned or -influenced food
corporation that operates in the Continental United States or even
within U.S.-owned food corporations that may have foreign employees in
this or other parts of the world.
The validated information may not be appropriate to share with
multinational corporations that are foreign-held or influenced. Even
so, given these corporations serve the United States by providing large
portions of its food supply (e.g., pork), some threat information may
on occasion need to be shared. How or by what mechanism this can be
accomplished are questions that must be settled by Congress.
The development of a coordinated U.S. Biosurveillance System that
can provide a ``persistent stare'' comprehensive view of FAW would
solve a multiplicity of problems and thereby serve multiple purposes:
1. A Federally-supported U.S. Biosurveillance System would provide
information that can be disseminated as appropriate to Federal, State,
and local government entities, FAW-related corporations and academia.
In addition, this system will provide a mechanism for standardized
collection, validation, analysis, and dissemination of actionable
information.
Academic involvement in said system would provide expertise in data
analysis, modeling, and technology development, bring novel approaches
to detect outbreaks faster, improve situational awareness, and enable
the creation of flexible, probabilistic forecasts of biothreats. This
collaboration leverages academia's scientific talent for developing and
evaluating new surveillance methods, such as those involving synthetic
biology or artificial intelligence, and helps bridge gaps in current
fragmented systems by offering diverse perspectives and a skilled
workforce for data interpretation and visualization.
Advantages of academic engagement include:
Advanced Analytics.--Academia can develop sophisticated data
analysis and modeling techniques for the detection of outbreaks in the
preclinical States (i.e., ``left of bang'').
Probabilistic Forecasting.--Academia can help design and implement
systems that provide explicit statements of probability and
uncertainty, enabling more accurate forecasts which better inform
decision making during biological threat events.
Reverse Engineering Biothreat Agents.--Academia can provide
expertise capable of reverse-engineering biothreat agents and develop
rapid countermeasures.
Novel Detection Systems.--Academia can lead in the development of
new and novel biosurveillance systems.
Enhanced Visualization.--Academia can provide expertise in
biological data visualization, thereby translating complex biological
data into clear and accessible formats for policy makers and decision
makers.
New Tools.--Academia can provide innovation and invention of new
tools.
Diverse Perspective.--Academia can function as a disinterested
third party for the validation of novel technology, processes, and
novel data sources. In matters of analysis, academia can also act in an
``Alternative View'' or ``Designated Contrarian'' role.
Skilled Workforce.--Academia can train, educate, and provide a wide
range of scientific and engineering talent, thereby helping to address
personnel gaps and fragmentation of biosurveillance efforts across
Federal and State agencies.
Gap Filler.--Academia can collaborate with Government agencies to
develop systems, TTPs, and requirements that enable the rapid ingestion
and integration of data from disparate sources.
2. A Federally-supported U.S. Biosurveillance System would ensure
that a ``Persistent Stare'' intelligence operation is in place, which
may if value can be proven to business incentivize the sharing of FAW
business information that might otherwise have not been shared.
Incentivization in data sharing could be further promoted by removal of
the influence and potential of regulatory blowback.
3. An element of a Federally-supported U.S. Biosurveillance System
could provide a model for food-related incident reporting by FAW
corporations. This model could potentially be adapted from the existing
and proven aviation incident reporting mechanism entitled the
``Aviation Safety Reporting System ``(ASRS). This program is managed by
NASA (non-regulatory agency) and provides limited, conditional immunity
from Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) penalties for unintentional
rule violations, thereby encouraging aviation personnel to report
safety issues without fear of reprisal.
A Food Security Reporting System (FSRS) could facilitate
information in the following ways:
Voluntary and confidential.--FSRS could be designed as a non-
punitive system where employees, corporate heads, and staff could
voluntarily submit reports. The identity of the reporter would be kept
confidential by a non-regulatory entity, which would act as a neutral
third party separate from USDA and FDA.
Limited immunity.--USDA and FDA would waive penalties and
processing certificate suspensions for inadvertent rule violations if
the individual has filed a report with the FSRS entity. This limited
immunity has several key restrictions:
The violation must have been unintentional and not a deliberate
act.
The event cannot have involved any criminal offenses, accidents, or
demonstrate a lack of qualification, competency, or willful violation
of FAW regulatory requirements.
A report must be filed with FSRS within 10 days of the
incident.
Immunity can only be used once every 5 years.
Enforcement protection.--If USDA or FDA initiates an enforcement
action based on information from another source, the reporter can
present the FSRS receipt as proof of a constructive attitude toward FAW
safety. USDA and FDA will not then impose a penalty, though the
violation may still be recorded in the individual's file.
Data collection.--The core purpose of the FSRS is to collect and
analyze FAW-related safety and security-related data to identify
systemic problems and hazards in the national FAW supply chains. This
data would be de-identified before being used for safety and security
research and published without attribution in reports, alerts, and
newsletters. Additionally, this information would be fed into the
consolidated FAW database.
Question 1c. The state of biosurveillance and agro-defense can
change drastically in a relatively short amount of time. How quickly
would this resource need to be updated, and how would it be determined
what content needs to go into this resource?
Answer. Biosurveillance requires persistent surveillance, meaning
that the updating of the system is continuous by applying the
principles established within the United States. IC's ``Persistence
Paradigm.'' Given that strategy, all new information would be populated
within the database and additionally used in the Research and
Development (R&D) phases which would evolve into a continuous loop
Operational Quality Control testing regimen.
Phase 1.--Planning efforts should begin with the establishment of a
``Biosurveillance Requirements Board'' (BRB), consisting of IC, USG
agency and academically based subject-matter experts. The BRB would be
charged with developing a list of initial priority biosurveillance and
agro-defense questions (i.e., requirements), as well as an initial
target list. This set of priority topics be used in Phase 2 and Phase
3.
Example.--The BRB determines that the first biosurveillance
priority for information model building is the detection of Avian
Influenza (AVI). A question is developed, which states, ``Can
Hyperspectral Imagery (HSI) be used for the detection of animals
infected with AVI?'' The BRB next designates the target list, which in
this example includes poultry and dairy cattle located in known AVI
infection zones (as designated by USDA) versus those same species in
areas where AVI infections had not taken place. The resulting target
list would result in the development of additional questions: ``Can HSI
be used for the detection of AVI in dairy cattle?'' or ``Can HSI be
used for the detection of AVI in poultry?'' These questions would help
identify current and future informational needs, which in time would be
turned into requirements.
Phase 2.--This phase would consist of the BRB inventorying current
IC national assets for historical HSI data to determine whether the
signatures differ by region (AVI vs. No AVI). Additionally, the BRB
would inventory the availability of commercial holdings of similar HSI
data that include the designated regions of interest. HSI analysts
would then be charged with comparing IC HSI data versus commercial HSI
data to determine the respective value of each in answering the BRB
Phase I question(s). At this point, no determination is being made as
to whether AVI is present, but rather only whether there is a
difference in the HSI signatures between the 2 regions. If no
historical HSI data is available for the respective regions, whether
within the IC or commercial HSI vendors, then a future requirement
would need to be set for synchronized biosurveillance collection
missions.
In a perfect world scenario, historical HSI data would be available
in both the IC and Commercial HSI vendors and determined to be of
identical value. If not identical, the HSI analysts would need to
designate the more valuable data source (i.e., distinguishable HSI
signature differences). Decision makers would need to designate what
and with whom data and findings will be shared. Authorities and
Permissions will need to be designated and reconciled by Congress where
necessary. This process of reconciling Authorities and Permissions
would need to be repeated with each type of data derived from national
asset collections (e.g., SIGINT, IMINT, OSINT, etc.).
This phase would consist of the building of the artificial neural
networks (ANNs), testing against known values (clinically diagnosed AVI
infected poultry and dairy cattle in this instance), establishing
sensitivity thresholds (HSI sensors), TTPs, and the tipping and cueing
protocols.
The phase would involve the following personnel:
BRB
Neural Network Design Engineers
Modelers and Epidemiologists
State and Federal Diagnostic Laboratories
Ground Truthers (in this case Veterinarians and Academic
Subject-Matter Experts)
IC Intelligence Discipline Experts
Business Equivalent Clearable Data Source Experts
Academic Subject-Matter Experts, involved in innovation,
technology applications, and discovery.
This phase would also include the scouting of additional data
sources that could be added to the neural network model and
subsequently used for testing results. At maturity, the Biosurveillance
System would be maintained as an agnostic (meaning not limited to a
single target set) All-Source Intelligence functionality, thereby
providing a comprehensive understanding applicable to both biosecurity
and Agro-defense.
A Biodefense/Agro-defense system based on All-Source Intelligence
provides the following advantages:
Comprehensive View.--Provides broader and deeper understanding
through the fusion of diverse and disparate data sources.
Enhanced Accuracy.--Provides a means to cross-reference data from
diverse sources, enabling the verification of findings, reduction of
bias, and increasing reliability (ground truth).
Context and Nuance.--Provides decision makers with additional
actionable information.
Informed Decision Making.--Provides finished FAW Intelligence
products that serve decision makers (Government, military, State, and
local officials) and policy makers concerned with biosurveillance and
agro-defense.
Note.--Auburn University has developed a document that describes
how current operational military Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance systems and authorities (Title 32) can be adapted to
rapidly serve Biosurveillance and Agro-Security requirements.
Additional adaptation of said systems would further enable the rapid
stand-up of a persistent stare Biosurveillance and Agro-Security
capability that would serve Title 50, 10, and 22 authority-related
needs. This document is available upon request.
Phase 4.--This phase would consist of making the Biosurveillance
System operational. At this point analytical findings would be fed into
the larger Intelligence Cycle:
Planning, Direction, Needs, Requirements
Collection
Processing Exploitation
Analysis
Dissemination.
This phase would also require the development of a tear-line
protocol by which appropriate all-source findings and products can be
made available to business decision makers through sanitization and
redaction.
Question 1d. How can this consolidated database be functionally
utilized by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents for the purpose
of screening and testing biological materials to determine if those
materials have been synthetically modified or engineered, and what
technology would be needed to enable that process?
Answer. CPB decision makers would have unfettered access to all
Intelligence products and data included in the Biosurveillance and
Agro-Security System. Additionally, they would have the opportunity to
work with subject-matter experts to determine if existing system
technology elements can be used for the detection of synthetically
modified or engineered materials.
Modifications and adaptations of said technology, as well as
development of new technology should be evaluated against materials
verified as containing modifications of known interest. Testing and
proof of principle demonstrations would ideally include the
adaptability of the technology in detecting any deviation from baseline
(i.e., differing from norm), to address present or future gaps in
materials with yet unknown modifications.
An ideal location for a research and development pilot program
would be Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL) due to
the volume of travelers, the frequency of restricted food (e.g., ``bush
meat'' and live plant) encounters and the proximity to potential
partnering major academic research institutions (e.g., Auburn
University, Georgia Tech, etc.).
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Marty Vanier
Question 1a. Dr. Vanier, in your work with the National
Agricultural Biosecurity Center, you have developed relationships
between Kansas State University and State and Federal emergency
management agencies, a topic of vital importance to this committee and
subcommittee.
In your dealings with State and local emergency management
agencies, what resources and information do these emergency managers
need to successfully execute their missions to prevent, prepare for,
mitigate, respond to, and recover from agricultural emergencies?
Answer. The single most important resource emergency management
agencies need is information. Emergency managers have little to no
exposure to bio- or ag security issues because they are not categorized
as disasters. Food and agricultural events are generally managed by the
relevant regulatory agency, i.e. public health, department of
agriculture, animal health, or plant health, consequently there is
little to no interaction between or among these agencies. This was
borne out by the results of a survey that NABC did a number of years
ago that revealed that county emergency managers assumed that food and
agriculture emergencies would be managed by other agencies and
emergency management would have no role. A solution we have employed in
Kansas is routinely running scenario-based exercises that have elements
that require the involvement of all entities--emergency management,
animal health, public health, crop health, law enforcement, and public
information.
As part of the survey mentioned above, NABC provided the county
emergency managers with information on the value and economic impact of
agricultural activity in their respective counties to emphasize
agriculture as critical infrastructure and demonstrate that significant
events would be viewed as disasters.
Better distribution of information at the State and county levels
of government that identifies threats and risks to agriculture is
needed for emergency managers. Again, there is plenty of information,
but it tends to be stove-piped by response area, both vertically and
horizontally. Finding ways to better utilize, for instance, the
National Biosurveillance Integration Center at DHS to get threat
information down to the State and local level is one example. The
Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center has developed a methodology by which
it can analyze Classified threat information and develop unclassified
products that State-level decision makers can use in formulating
response and recovery policy. Crop and animal disease diagnostic
laboratories provide crucial information with regard to the disease
threat and geographic scope of the disease incident.
The information must flow in all directions--up, down, and side-to-
side. Locals will be the first to identify a problem. That information
needs to not only go up the chain to State and Federal regulatory and
response agencies, but the information needs to go sideways and back
down the chain to inform other stakeholders and regulatory/response
agencies. An integrated approach to this information flow will enhance
response and recovery, and has the ability to prevent agricultural
emergencies in the first place. This problem is most acute at the
Federal level.
Question 1b. In your opinion, what can FEMA do to raise
preparedness standards for agroterrorist incidents and other
agricultural emergencies at the national level, and how can they
perform better outreach to rural communities and other communities
likely to be closely connected to these threats?
Answer. There are multiple ways FEMA might raise standards and
perform better in agricultural emergencies; however, the current state
of disarray at the agency makes these efforts quite problematic. The
efforts include a greater emphasis by FEMA on understanding and
supporting agricultural emergencies and providing appropriate training
opportunities, supporting the Homeland Security grant program to allow
States to practice and train for ag emergencies, and supporting food
and ag scenarios in national exercises. In all of these cases, food and
agriculture must be the primary emphasis, not an afterthought.
With the understanding that ``all disasters are local'' FEMA will
truly have a support and logistics role. Local and State responders
will be the first on the scene, executing their response plans that
have been integrated with plans from the appropriate regulatory
agencies which are in alignment with NIMS and ICS.
FEMA can improve its outreach to rural communities by increasing
its attention on food and agricultural events and giving these events
more prominence in its planning, training, and educational materials.
This will drive necessary information to the FEMA audience--State and
local emergency managers. In turn those emergency managers will need to
collaborate with State and local regulatory agencies (food safety,
animal health, plant health, public health, law enforcement) and
subject-matter experts to plan, train, and exercise response plans.
Question 2a. Dr. Vanier, while direct actions by foreign actors
such as the release of harmful pathogens or intellectual property theft
are clear examples of agroterrorism, indirect threats can have wide-
spread human and economic impacts. For example, invasive species such
as the spotted lanternfly have caused millions of dollars in crop
losses due to the infestation.
Could malign foreign actors exploit vulnerabilities at ports of
entry to introduce invasive species or diseases?
Answer. Absolutely. It is well-known that only a small percentage
of products are inspected at ports of entry. This creates a
vulnerability not only for malign foreign actors to exploit, but also,
and much more likely, for unintentional introduction of plant, animal,
or pest invasive species.
Most of this is due to the nature of the international trade in
agricultural products. We move massive amounts of plant and animal
products into and out of the United States every day. Invasive species
have created significant losses in annual agricultural output. We have
depended on USDA/APHIS to identify and mitigate these impacts, but they
have not been able to keep up with the volume of introductions due to a
lack of resources.
Strengthening our national plant and animal disease diagnostic
capabilities will allow for more rapid identification of invasive
species and diseases, and therefore a faster response. Additionally,
more integration across Federal and State departments and agencies will
improve information flow and response support.
Question 2b. How can CBP harden vetting at ports of entry to
interdict invasive species?
Answer. The sheer volume of agricultural products arriving at ports
of entry on a daily basis precludes a 100 percent interdiction rate, so
CBP needs to collaborate and integrate its processes with other
stakeholder agencies at the Federal and State level to create a risk-
based surveillance and sampling scheme; utilize State and Federal
diagnostic capabilities to confirm suspicious interceptions and support
its risk assessments; send information to and receive information from
stakeholders on interdictions; and strengthen its interactions with
State and Federal regulatory and response agencies, State and local
emergency management, academia, and industry.
Question 3a. The Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate's Office of National Laboratories operates
several national laboratories with direct relevance to deterring animal
and plant pathogens, including the Plum Island Animal Disease Center
and the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center.
These national laboratories play an important role in investigating
agriculture-related crimes and assisting in performing biosurveillance,
emerging biological threat characterization, information sharing, and
enabling preparedness. How can the work of these national laboratories
be improved upon to amplify the Federal Government's response to
threats of an agroterrorist nature?
Answer. There are several critical roles these labs could perform
in the protection of U.S. agricultural enterprise.
Beyond roles the labs play in biosurveillance, threat
characterization, information sharing, and law enforcement attribution,
the labs could extend their ability to test disease introduction
scenarios for realism. These scenarios can be shared with responders at
all levels, including emergency managers via FEMA planning and training
materials. This look-over-the-horizon, coupled with the confirmatory
diagnostic work at Plum Island Animal Disease Center and the National
Plant Diagnostic Network would give Federal, State, and local
responders the ability to get in front of a potential disaster.
There is a critical threat looming that could render my comments
moot. The Plum Island Animal Disease Center is well beyond its
envisioned life span and its successor laboratory, the National Bio-
and Agrodefense Facility, is not operational. Any gap in the ability of
the U.S. Department of Agriculture to provide confirmatory testing of a
transboundary animal disease sets the country up for a high-consequence
agricultural emergency. Likewise, the diminishing support for the
National Plant Diagnostic Network would create the same result for the
crop world.
Question 3b. Besides assisting through S&T's Office of National
Laboratories, what do you see as the biggest supporting role that DHS
can provide to the Federal Government and the Nation in deterring the
threat of agroterrorism?
Answer. DHS has a unique and broad role in minimizing the impacts
from both agro-terrorism and other high-consequence events related to
the food and agriculture sector. The Securing our Agriculture and Food
Act (Pub. L. 115-43) directed DHS, via its Office of Health Security,
to `` . . . carry out a program to coordinate the Department's efforts
related to defending the food, agriculture, and veterinary systems of
the United States against terrorism and other high-consequence events
that pose a high risk to homeland security . . . and coordinate with
other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate . . . ''.
DHS's Science and Technology Directorate provided significant
research support for efforts to mitigate the effects of transboundary
animal diseases. This funding included supporting work at DHS Centers
of Excellence devoted to transboundary animal diseases.
The DHS Office of Health Security is responsible for the
coordination, oversight, and integration of all the Department's
health, food, and agriculture efforts--to include agriculture
emergencies and most recently, the National Biosurveillance Integration
Center. It can drive planning, interact directly with key stakeholders,
and fund resilience efforts to ``harden'' the food and agriculture
sector.
DHS can link the food and agriculture sector into the broader
critical infrastructure framework and examine the economic
vulnerabilities, cascading effects, and national security mission
disruptions caused by an incident in the food and ag sector.
All of this together allows DHS to inform planning across all
levels of government.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to answer your questions. You will notice several themes
that run through all of my answers. They are:
1. The importance of and need for effective communication and
information sharing by all levels of government and across all
response agencies, regulatory agencies, and stakeholder groups.
2. The importance of and need for round-the-clock, state-of-the-art
diagnostic capabilities for animal, plant, and food pathogens.
3. The importance of and need for inclusion of crop systems given
the dependence the livestock industry has on the availability
of grain.
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Asha M. George
Question 1a. Dr. George, you note in your written testimony that
the United States suffers many gaps in preparedness for dealing with
future biological threats to agriculture. Among these, you identify
that States do not employ the same responses to agricultural disease
threats, creating uneven responses the likes of which we saw during
last year's response to the outbreak of highly pathogenic avian
influenza.
What problems result from uneven State responses to mitigating
disease threats, and what role can the Federal Government take in
setting national standards to encourage States to adopt a more even
approach?
Answer. ``Diseases know no borders'' is an oft-repeated phrase, but
one that is applicable to this question. States that fail to rigorously
prevent, conduct surveillance of, detect, respond to, attribute,
recover from, and mitigate food and agricultural disease threats are
vulnerable to under- and undetected spread of those threats within
their borders and, by extension, their neighboring States. As we saw
last year with the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza within
the dairy cattle population, some States dedicated more personnel and
resources to look for, and respond to, these outbreaks. It is no
coincidence that States like Colorado and Michigan identified many
cases earlier in the outbreak. These States took deliberative action to
find cases and prevent further virus spread. When States choose not, or
do not have the resources or programs in place, to act quickly and
decisively, they unintentionally leave surrounding States and, by
extension, the Nation at risk of additional disease spread and damage
to the food and agriculture critical infrastructure sector.
Tepid response to agricultural disease threats also poses a risk to
humans. More than two-thirds of emerging infectious diseases are
zoonotic in nature. Pathogens like highly pathogenic avian influenza
have can and often do subsequently affect humans and other types of
animals. Disease outbreaks in States that are not proactive increase
the risk to other populations.
The Federal Government previously used financial incentives to
encourage State and industry cooperation with disease reporting.
Indemnity programs for poultry producers have proven to be an effective
tool for encouraging the identification and depopulation of infected
commercial flocks. However, as we saw with the H5N1 outbreaks in dairy
cattle last year, this approach currently requires producers to
understand the threat, and indemnification as a policy only works if
the livestock is very likely to die or suffer long-term harm from
infection. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) previously
established other financial incentive and assistance programs for dairy
farmers, but those efforts took time to come into effect, giving the
virus additional time to spread. The Federal Government should consider
adding a requirement to standing agricultural assistance programs for
producers and industry veterinarians to identify and report disease
symptoms to State officials, particularly when there is a known
outbreak or other threats to food and agriculture, in order to qualify
for this assistance.
Question 1b. You also note that the Federal Government lacks speed
and coordination in responding to these disease threats properly. How
can the Federal Government's response operations best be improved?
Answer. USDA and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) are the 2 leading Federal entities addressing biological threats
to food and agriculture, with occasional support from other departments
and agencies. Unfortunately, while USDA and CDC sometimes coordinate
their activities, their operations remain largely separate, with CDC
usually deferring to USDA until a human is exposed to an animal
pathogen such as H5N1. USDA, in turn, usually defers to State
departments of agriculture and livestock producers, before eventually
investing money from the Commodity Credit Corporation to incentivize
case reporting. This is what occurred with regard to the recent spread
of H5N1. USDA originally deferred to the departments of agriculture in
States affected by H5N1 as late as the summer of 2024 and then finally
required national bulk milk testing in December 2024 to detect H5N1
cases, 9 months after the first dairy cattle cases presented.
Though not a perfect solution alone, a good first step toward
addressing issues with Federal response would be to create a food and
agriculture biosurveillance planning committee to develop
recommendations for strengthening USDA biosurveillance activities, as
we propose in Recommendation 31b of the Commission's 2024 National
Blueprint for Biodefense. Recommendation 31e from that same report
calls for increased appropriations to support enhanced data sharing of
food, agriculture, plant, and wildlife disease data.
Question 2a. Dr. George, in your written testimony, you write that
``The Office of Health Security has been involved in Government-wide
discussions regarding the protection of food and agriculture, but this
office neither coordinates the Department's activities in this space,
nor do they possess the personnel and resources to effectively execute
such a mission.''
In your opinion, what role should the Office of Health Security
play within agro-biodefense, and how will this role impact the roles of
other DHS components already active in this space?
Answer. The Securing Our Agriculture and Food Act (Pub. L. 115-43)
assigned responsibility for coordinating Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) food, agriculture, and veterinary defense programs to
the Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs, and later the Assistant
Secretary for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. These
responsibilities included outward-facing activities, such as
coordinating with Federal departments and agencies outside of DHS on
food and agriculture defense policy matters, pursuant to Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 9 (Defense of United States Agriculture
and Food) and later National Security Memorandum 16 (Strengthening the
Security and Resilience of United States Food and Agriculture). This
responsibility statutorily remains with the Assistant Secretary for
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), but DHS moved those
duties to the Office of Health Security (OHS) following the creation of
this office in 2022.
Whether it is CWMD or OHS, the responsibilities under Pub. L. 115-
43 and National Security Memorandum 16 must not conflict with or
duplicate responsibilities elsewhere within DHS. The administration and
Congress only intended for DHS to coordinate food and agricultural
security requirements during large-scale events that would require the
participation of multiple Federal Departments and agencies and exceeded
USDA capacity to do so itself. The food and agriculture leads in OHS
should maintain awareness of what activities the DHS operational
components contribute to food and agricultural security, and coordinate
with them if and when called upon to address large-scale biological
events affecting food and agriculture.
Question 2b. What resources does the Office of Health Security, and
OHS's Health, Food, and Agriculture Resilience Directorate need to
execute upon its mission more effectively?
Answer. The Office of Health Security would benefit from additional
personnel who would allow the Office to more proactively coordinate
within and outside of DHS on food and agricultural security.
Question 3a. Dr. George, as you know, the President's fiscal year
2026 budget request proposes transferring the National Biosurveillance
Integration Center (NBIC) from the Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction Office to the Office of Health Security.
You note in your written testimony that NBIC suffers from
insufficient coordination with the rest of the Federal Government in
carrying out its mission set. How can this coordination be improved,
and how will this impact NBIC's mission?
Answer. The National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) has
historically lacked, and continues to lack, the necessary funding and
authority to access data to effectively execute its statutory
biosurveillance mission. Congress never mandated that other Federal
departments and agencies actively share access to their non-public
biosurveillance data. The result is a situation where NBIC must rely on
open-source information already available to the rest of the Federal
Government. Congress should mandate that Departments and agencies share
their biosurveillance data with NBIC to improve the Center's ability to
coordinate with the rest of the Federal Government in order to achieve
its mission. However, it is unclear whether Congress would choose to
dedicate the enormous amounts of time and effort required to overcome
the hurdles associated with Congressional referrals needed to direct so
many other Departments and agencies to share their biosurveillance
data. NBIC personnel are doing the best they can with the resources
they have, and the very limited access granted to date, but the current
situation leaves the Center expending enormous effort for little return
on investment.
Improving NBIC capabilities and coordination with other Federal
departments and agencies also requires a substantial increase in data-
sharing partnerships. Lack of access to public health data from the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Department of
Agriculture (USDA), among other departments and agencies, will continue
to limit NBIC's utility to Federal partners. Funding also remains a
challenge, even with the increase in NBIC over the last 5 years,
preventing NBIC from developing the necessary information technology
infrastructure to store and process information from other Federal
departments and agencies.
Recommendation 13 from our Commission's first and foundational 2015
report, A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major
Reform Needed to Optimize Efforts, stated that the National Security
Council should examine NBIC and its National Biosurveillance
Integration System to determine whether funding for the program yields
sufficiently useful biosurveillance information. In the Commission's
2021 report, Biodefense in Crisis: Immediate Action Needed to Address
National Vulnerabilities, we recommended evaluating and implementing
necessary authorities to enable NBIC to be a true biosurveillance
integration center, as originally envisioned by Congress. If data-use
restrictions at USDA, CDC, and other Federal entities continue to
prevent NBIC from developing more useful products for the Federal
interagency, and if annual appropriations continue to inhibit NBIC from
building necessary capacity and personnel, Congress should either
remove those constraints or terminate the program.
Question 3b. If Congress transfers NBIC to OHS, how do you envision
that this will impact the mission of both NBIC and OHS?
Answer. There may be an opportunity for OHS to leverage their
relationships with other Federal departments and entities with food and
agriculture equities to increase NBIC coordination. Otherwise, we would
anticipate that NBIC and OHS would see slight changes in their
respective missions due to any such transfer.
Question From Hon. Pablo Jose Hernandez for Asha M. George
Question. Puerto Rico manufactures nearly 10 percent of the United
States' prescription drugs and over 40 percent of the saline used in IV
bags--supplies that are critical for treating medical conditions that
could result from an agroterrorism attack. In 2017, Hurricane Maria
destroyed much of Puerto Rico's pharmaceutical infrastructure, causing
medical shortages and worsening an influenza outbreak that ultimately
hospitalized over 30,000 Americans. Dr. George, if another disaster
disrupted our medical supply chain, what concerns do you have about the
impact on human and veterinary medicine? And are you concerned that our
enemies might exploit this vulnerability?
Answer. The Commission remains gravely concerned about the
resilience of our Nation's biodefense critical infrastructure and
pharmaceutical supply chain. Efforts to identify and secure these
assets from natural disasters and other threats that could disrupt
operations and worsen the impact of and response to a biological event
have been insufficient.
Puerto Rico is, indeed, responsible for a sizable portion of
prescription drug and saline manufacturing. Puerto Rico possesses this
important manufacturing capacity and has unique geographic needs that
differentiate it from States and localities when it comes to disaster
response and recovery. These circumstances raise alarms about the
impacts of damage to these facilities, as well as about how long it
will take to secure and reinstate them following a disaster.
Areas impacted by natural disasters are already at higher risk of
disease outbreaks. Storm damage to manufacturing capabilities worsens
the susceptibility of areas hit by natural disasters to subsequent
biological events. Unfortunately, this plays out repeatedly. Hurricane
Maria damaged the intravenous (IV) fluid and prescription drug
infrastructure in Puerto Rico. Seven years later, in 2024, Hurricane
Helene damaged a Baxter International facility in North Carolina that
is also responsible for a large amount of IV fluid manufacturing,
causing nationwide critical supply chain issues for hospitals. Our
adversaries cannot help but notice the massive impact these disruptions
have on our health care and public health infrastructure and readiness
for future threats, biological or otherwise. We must assume that they
will exploit this glaring vulnerability. The Federal Government can and
should do more to assist States, localities, Tribes, territories, and
industry, in protecting these assets from future disruption or
destruction.
We are also concerned about the potential interruption of these
operations caused by biological events, as demonstrated during the
COVID-19 pandemic. In the Commission's 2021 report, Insidious Scourge:
Critical Infrastructure at Biological Risk, we recommended that the
director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
work with the critical infrastructure sectors to identify sector
vulnerabilities biological threats that need to be strengthened. For
the Chemical Sector, we recommend that CISA work with the Chemical
Sector (which includes the manufacturing of pharmaceutical
ingredients), Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Defense Threat
Reduction Agency to develop a detailed plan to maintain operations
safely and securely before, during, and after a biological event.
A P P E N D I X I I
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Supplemental Material Submitted by Asha M. George
the state of u.s. biodefense--written remarks by dr. asha m. george
may 8, 2025--10:45 am et
Good morning, Commissioners. I come before you today to speak to
the state of our Nation's Biodefense. As executive director of the
commission, I frequently and privately brief you on the threats,
vulnerabilities, and consequences that comprise biological risk to the
Nation. However, with the current environment of uncertainty and
apprehension about the fate of Federal biodefense programs--combined
with ever-increasing biological threats--I felt it important to brief
you during this public meeting and allow the biodefense community and
those concerned about our national security to hear this address, as
well.
While I realize that the administration's cuts and changes to
government are top of mind, allow me to talk about the threat and the
biodefense enterprise in general before talking about impacts,
requirements, and shortfalls, as a starting point for conversations
here and among policy makers about the direction of national biodefense
in the 21st Century.
biological threats
The Department of State recently released its annual compliance and
verification report. (This is the one that addresses compliance with
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.) This year again, the
State Department said that Russia and North Korea possess offensive
biological weapons programs. The State Department also added more to
their discussions of China and Iran, talking about their inability to
prove that historic offensive programs ever ceased, their
sociopolitical aims, and their dual-use research. We also know that
China is investing tens of billions into their bioeconomy while we are
not. We are about to be lapped by China with regard to biotechnology.
No self-respecting military person would ever assume that these are
the only 4 countries in possession of, or actively pursuing, offensive
biological weapons. Motivations for proliferation vary, from asymmetric
advantage, to mutually assured destruction, to the takedown of society
and global order, to the pursuit of something that does not require
getting hold of more highly-regulated and tracked materials for use in
weapons of mass destruction. Whatever the motivation, as a Nation, we
must assume that more than just these 4 countries will develop their
own programs or obtain their own weapons.
Bioterrorism remains an issue as well. Ricin events continue to
occur throughout the country, threatening individuals, communities,
populations, and America. Terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda and
ISIL, continue to try and obtain biological weapons and agents to
foster fear. Lone wolves see the value as well and have figured out how
to create some of these agents by themselves. But we ought not to
consider terrorists as always separate from nation-states. Nation-
state-sponsored terrorism continues and we assume that extends to
bioterrorism.
Accidents remain problematic. The debate about COVID origins
continues, with staunch believers on every side of every argument. I
remind you that the intelligence community remains divided as to the
origins of COVID and our own Commission has declined to pass judgment
because we simply do not have access to all of the needed information,
classified and unclassified, to make that determination. But other
proven accidents continue to occur in laboratories across the world,
including in the United States. Fungi grow unobserved, produce toxins,
contaminate our food supply, and in some cases, produce cancer. Cross-
contamination, improperly disposed of biological materials, and too few
people doing the jobs of too many in lab environments still lead to
accidents and unintentional exposures.
This leaves us with one category--that of naturally-occurring
diseases--and there is plenty to bring to your attention. Let us start
with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). You have seen it
spreading throughout avian populations with some scary symptoms, such
as thousands of infected penguins flinging themselves off of glaciers.
The disease has spread to mammals, including cattle, and there have
been dozens of human infections in the United States, including at
least one death. Tied up in this is fear about: (1) the impact on food
and agriculture, and by direct extension, our economy; and (2) the
impact on tourism. Our accusations about other countries not reporting
their diseases have come home to roost. People are afraid to find out
what is going on, so they are simply not finding out. The result is an
incomplete picture of where the disease is, and, therefore, how to stop
its spread. Of course, that does not seem to make a difference to a
disease that has decided it is here to stay.
While we do not usually talk about diseases of purely public health
concern--this is not the Bipartisan Commission on Public Health, it is
the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense--I do want to call your
attention to the increasing disease burden in our country. We have lost
control of diseases we thought we had a chance of eradicating. Measles,
of course, comes to mind. The best thing I can say about it is that at
least elected officials have stopped calling for measles parties after
children started dying, but that is what it took, the deaths of
children. Other diseases are reemerging in the United States, including
most recently tuberculosis, mumps, pertussis, and rubella. I imagine
that tetanus, polio, and meningitis are not too far behind. Mpox is now
endemic here in the United States. And people are still dying from
diseases like influenza and chicken pox.
Our disease burden is increasing and when that happens, the overall
health status of our national population decreases. It is going to be
hard to Make America Healthy Again while diseases we thought were
previously under control are on the rise. Even worse, we are creating
ideal conditions for our enemies to use biological weapons to attack
our populations, and those weapons need not contain particularly
devasting diseases at that. When individuals have weakened immune
systems, they more easily fall prey to illnesses that ordinarily would
not affect them very seriously or for very long. The same can be said
for populations. Some military doctrines call for doing just this--
weakening the population so that they are easier to overcome.
the biodefense enterprise
Moving on from the threat, let me address how the biodefense
enterprise is faring. Prior to the beginning of the current
administration, over the last 10 years, we made it clear that all 15
Cabinet departments, 9 independent agencies, and 1 independent
institution (the Smithsonian) possess responsibilities for biodefense.
We will hear from one of those independent agencies--NASA--today about
their unique responsibilities, particularly for planetary protection.
Overall, the biodefense enterprise is in chaos. Everyone that has not
been cut is diving for cover, putting out fires, and trying to simply
survive.
Defending the Nation against biological threats that affect
national security is not a top priority for any of these organizations,
including those that most often come to mind--USDA, HHS, and DOD. But
they all do recognize that biological threats to the Nation are
existential and persistent.
The national biodefense enterprise also exists, but it cannot
evolve, not in today's environment. Agencies are disintegrating,
disappearing, changing, and moving.
In 2018, the previous Trump administration developed and released
the first National Biodefense Strategy, the accomplishment of which
President Trump was rightly proud. We called for that national
biodefense strategy in our first Blueprint for Biodefense--it was our
third recommendation. But we also called for a coordinating council and
for that to sit at the White House. Our country could still use one.
Dr. Gerry Parker, one of our former ex officios, is there now. I hope
he can establish that council at the White House and use it to
stabilize things. The national biodefense enterprise stands, but on
increasingly wobbly legs.
impact of recent cuts
So let me get on to the issue at hand--the impact of the cuts and
changes to the U.S. Government. The administration has decided to
prioritize cutting, cutting as much as it can, wherever it can.
I remind the commissioners that we have made recommendations to
eliminate or replace Government programs that were (and are) not
performing as originally intended by previous administrations and
Congresses. We have done the work of leaning into Government efficiency
when it comes to biodefense. For example, we brought attention to the
shortcomings of our national system of biodetectors--BioWatch--and
called for replacing the 22-year-old technology or shutting the program
down altogether. We also talked about the challenges that the Hospital
Preparedness Program has experienced since its inception. In both cases
the requirements were right--we need to detect biological agents in our
major metropolitan areas, and we need to prepare hospitals for large-
scale biological events. If programs cannot address these and other
requirements successfully, though, we felt they should be shut down.
But the requirements remain and upon those requirements, we must
remain focused.
Biodefense has always been disgracefully, woefully, and
incomprehensively underfunded. As a Nation, we have never been
adequately prepared for the biological events that occur, and we know
that, because we never do seem to avoid the deaths of hundreds,
thousands, and sometimes millions when those events occur. The cuts
already implemented, the cuts revealed in the top line discretionary
request (more commonly known as the skinny budget), the cuts we expect
to find in the President's Budget Request, the cuts in the
Reconciliation package, the cuts in Appropriations and Mandatory
Spending, the cuts in personnel, and the cuts in things we thought were
safe (like Medicare, Federal retirement benefits, intelligence
operations, and defense spending) may feel good at the time to some,
but do not, and will not, for long.
The biodefense community is in for the fight of its life to get the
funding it needs. It was starving before. It is going to be anorexic
soon.
I know you want to hear specifics. But the situation is changing
daily, if not more frequently, and the facts remain unclear. And there
is no doubt that this constant uncertainty is impacting and disrupting
capabilities and operations. Decisions have not been made, or when they
have been, some are undone. Sometimes there is follow-through,
sometimes there is not. Sometimes responsibilities are reassigned,
sometimes they are not. Announcements are made and then withdrawn. But
this is what I can say.
Our Nation has certain requirements. Many in both the public and
private sectors are driven by requirements. We engage in requirements-
driven planning. We know we cannot do and pay for everything, so we
identify what absolutely has to be done--requirements--and then set
about fulfilling them. The requirements remain. And while the
administration is making all of these cuts, the biodefense community
cannot adequately fulfill those requirements.
The good people throughout and outside the Government are not just
trying, they are struggling mightily, and they are fighting to defend
the Nation against biological threats that are here now and coming on
inexorably. You asked me what the impacts of the actions of the
administration are as of now, and I will tell you.
As of now, our grasp on biological intelligence is weak at
best.
As of now, we are losing programs that--by their very
existence--were thought to serve as a deterrence.
As of now, we are still not prepared to deal with large-
scale and other biological events that affect national
security.
As of now, we are increasingly reverting to what I call the
human sentinel surveillance system, in which we are waiting for
people to get sick before we detect diseases that are emerging,
reemerging, and spreading.
As of now, we are not capable of responding efficiently and
effectively to biological events.
As of now, our ability to attribute biological events to
sources, nation-states, criminals, and terrorists is
compromised.
As of now, we are still recovering from the last pandemic,
while outbreaks, epidemics, and 7 other pandemics are either
already here or on their way.
As of now, the very last to ever get funding and support,
mitigation, barely has a heartbeat.
And as of now, talented public servants are being let go,
with real pain and consequences felt across the country.
Biodefense is in crisis and has long been in crisis.
But the biodefense community has not given up and the public and
private sectors are aware of, and engaged in, biodefense (to the extent
they can be). They are doing their best to preserve capabilities in
everything from biosurveillance to attribution to medical
countermeasure development. We need to maintain those capabilities no
matter where entities in the organizational chart land.
In addition to telling you that times are tough and that we are at
great risk of losing millions again to the ravages of disease, I want
to end with a few other observations.
Members of the national biodefense enterprise are all for
efficiency. Most have had no choice for decades but to do the best they
could with what little funding they got. This is why we have advocated
for so long to move money from failed programs to those that are
successful. The administration needs to consider reinvesting some of
the funds they are saving into programs that actually work. And the
administration needs to make future cuts with current and previous cuts
in mind.
I have told the Department of Defense for years that they can stand
up and say that dealing with anything other than attacks on the United
States is someone else's job, and that is fine, until those entities
can no longer fulfill that responsibility. The Department of Defense
needs to prepare for the worst, a situation in which they are left
holding the bag. A situation in which all of biodefense becomes their
responsibility. They will do it. They will continue to defend the
Nation against all enemies, foreign and domestic. But that will come at
great cost to that Department.
In addition to national defense, other areas are being affected
that are not usually thought of as biodefense, such as emergency
management, agriculture, and homeland security. The idea may be to save
money, but we are not saving anything if all we are doing is shifting
costs and that includes to the States. I know the Governors agree.
It is every administration's prerogative to reorganize the White
House and reorganize the Executive branch. It is also Congress'
responsibility to ensure that Congressional intent for the Departments
and agencies in the Executive branch is not thrown out. The
administration can make cuts and reorganize, but at the end of the day,
they and Congress cannot allow the Nation to be caught flat-footed.
They cannot allow America to cede the high ground to disease or any
other enemy of the state.
As a former Congressional staffer, I may be biased, but the Dome
still shines on the Hill. Congress is the stabilizing force in
Government, not the Presidency. It still does the work of the people.
And while all of this is going on, that work is crucial.
With regard to biodefense, there are ways for Congress to operate
during this time of profound change. If Congress wants the best people
to be named to political appointments, they do not have to give up that
responsibility because they want to work with the administration.
Saying no does not mean that the other party automatically wins. There
are other Republicans in the country that can take those appointments.
Whenever the administration thinks there is a problem in the
Government, the relevant Congressional committees can and should
immediately open an investigation into that problem.
If Congress has concerns about all of this being too much and too
fast, they are perfectly capable of conducting oversight.
If someone in Congress thinks that the Nation needs something other
than the few must-pass bills that move, they do not need to wait to
start drafting that legislation. They do not need anyone else's
permission to draft legislation (like the reauthorization of the
Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act) and get ready for when those
bills can be taken up again.
And the Constitution is clear. No matter what the President's
budget request says, the power of the purse remains with Congress.
Congress decides on mandatory spending and Congress decides on
appropriations.
There are people holding the line. Our Government is the government
of the people, by the people, and for the people. Nothing has changed
about that.
Biodefense rests in the hands of State, local, Tribal, territorial,
and Federal Governments, as well as academia, industry, and
nongovernmental organizations. What they do is important. They
themselves are important.
The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense is a problem-solving,
solution-oriented Commission. We stand up for biodefense and help in
whatever way we can. We have a record of working with the previous
Trump administration and with all administrations since 2014. We are
willing to do so again but will say what cuts and other actions concern
us, as well as what we agree with. We stand ready to assist and share
the decades of the combined expertise of the Commissioners, ex
officios, and staff with the administration and with Congress.
If Elon Musk called to ask our opinion about increasing Government
efficiency in biodefense, we would take that call.
The former co-chair of this commission, Senator Joe Lieberman,
often talked about the need to examine and learn from the past, while
also looking to the future.
It is our duty to ensure the safety of all Americans, to anticipate
threats, and to create strategies that safeguard our future. Together,
we will meet any challenge, strengthened by past wisdom, present
innovation, and hope for the future. Let us move forward with courage,
and as the good Senator said, we and the national biodefense enterprise
shall prevail.
______
report
Defense of Animal Agriculture
Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, October 2017
The full report has been retained in committee files and is
available at https://biodefensecommission.org/reports/defense-of-
animal-agriculture/.
______
report
The National Blueprint For Biodefense
Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, April 2024
The full report has been retained in committee files and is
available at https://biodefensecommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/
05/National-Blueprint-for-Biodefense-2024_final_.pdf.
______
report
Boots on the Ground: Land-Grant Universities in the
Fight Against Threats to Food and Agriculture
Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, May 2022
The full report has been retained in committee files and is
available at https://biodefensecommission.org/reports/boots-on-the-
ground-land-grant-universities-in-the-fight-against-threats-to-food-
and-agriculture/.
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