    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                      EMBEDDED THREATS: FOREIGN OWNERSHIP,
                    HIDDEN HARDWARE, AND LICENSING FAILURES
                     IN AMERICA'S TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                           SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

                                     OF THE

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                          WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 21, 2026

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 119-52

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                   Available via: http://judiciary.house.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    62-658                     WASHINGTON : 2026
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                            JIM JORDAN, Ohio, Chair

    DARRELL ISSA, California             JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland, Ranking
    ANDY BIGGS, Arizona                      Member
    TOM McCLINTOCK, California           JERROLD NADLER, New York
    THOMAS P. TIFFANY, Wisconsin         ZOE LOFGREN, California
    THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
    CHIP ROY, Texas                      HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
    SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin              Georgia
    BEN CLINE, Virginia                  ERIC SWALWELL, California
    LANCE GOODEN, Texas                  TED LIEU, California
    JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey       PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
    TROY E. NEHLS, Texas                 J. LUIS CORREA, California
    BARRY MOORE, Alabama                 MARY GAY SCANLON, Pennsylvania
    KEVIN KILEY, California              JOE NEGUSE, Colorado
    HARRIET M. HAGEMAN, Wyoming          LUCY McBATH, Georgia
    LAUREL M. LEE, Florida               DEBORAH K. ROSS, North Carolina
    WESLEY HUNT, Texas                   BECCA BALINT, Vermont
    RUSSELL FRY, South Carolina          JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
    GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin            SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
    BRAD KNOTT, North Carolina           JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    MARK HARRIS, North Carolina          DANIEL S. GOLDMAN, New York
    ROBERT F. ONDER, Jr., Missouri       JASMINE CROCKETT, Texas
    DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas
    BRANDON GILL, Texas
    MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington

                                     ------

                           SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

                     JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey, Chair

    BARRY MOORE, Alabama                 JASMINE CROCKETT, Texas, Ranking
    ROBERT F. ONDER, Jr., Missouri           Member
    DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas                JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    BRANDON GILL, Texas                  HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
                                             Georgia

                   CHRISTOPHER HIXON, Majority Staff Director
                    ARTHUR EWENCZYK, Minority Staff Director

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                          Wednesday, January 21, 2026
                               OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                       Page

    The Honorable Jefferson Van Drew, Chair of the Subcommittee on
      Oversight from the State of New Jersey.........................     1
    The Honorable Jasmine Crockett, Ranking Member of the
      Subcommittee on Oversight from the State of Texas..............     3
    The Honorable Jamie Raskin, Ranking Member of the Committee on
      the Judiciary from the State of Maryland.......................     4

                                   WITNESSES

    Emily de La Bruyere, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of
      Democracies
      Oral Testimony.................................................     6
      Prepared Testimony.............................................     9
    Rocky Cole, Co-Founder, Chief Operating Officer, iVerify
      Oral Testimony.................................................    16
      Prepared Testimony.............................................    19
    Chris Spear, President, Chief Executive Officer, American
      Trucking Association
      Oral Testimony.................................................    22
      Prepared Testimony.............................................    24
    Rob K. Knake, Chief Executive Officer, TPO Group
      Oral Testimony.................................................    38
      Prepared Testimony.............................................    40

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC. SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    All materials submitted for the record by the Committee on the
      Judiciary are listed below.....................................    59

    An Interim Staff Report entitled, ``The Weaponization of CISA:
      How a `Cybersecurity' Agency Colluded with Big Tech and
      `Disinformation' Partners To Censor Americans,'' Jun. 26, 2023,
      Committee on the Judiciary, Select Subcommittee on the
      Weaponization of the Federal Government, submitted by the
      Honorable Brandon Gill, a Member of the Subcommittee on
      Oversight from the State of Texas, for the record
    Materials submitted by the Honorable Jasmine Crockett, Ranking
      Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight from the State of
      Texas, for the record
        An article entitled, ``DOGE Put Critical Social Security Data
            at Risk, Whistle-Blower Says,'' Aug. 26, 2025, The New
            York Times
        An article entitled, ``Transportation Department targets
            3,000 truck driving schools for non-compliance,'' Dec. 1,
            2025, AP News

                           EMBEDDED THREATS: FOREIGN
                        OWNERSHIP, HIDDEN HARDWARE, AND
                        LICENSING FAILURES IN AMERICA'S
                             TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

                                  ----------

                          Wednesday, January 21, 2026

                            House of Representatives

                           Subcommittee on Oversight

                           Committee on the Judiciary

                                 Washington, DC

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in Room
    2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Jefferson Van
    Drew [Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
        Members present: Representatives Van Drew, Onder, Gill,
    Crockett, Raskin, and Johnson.
        Mr. Van Drew. The Subcommittee will come to order. Without
    objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess at any
    time. We welcome everyone to today's hearing on foreign
    involvement and threats to America's transportation system.
        I now recognize the doctor, the gentleman Dr. Onder from
    Missouri, to lead us in the Pledge of Allegiance.
        All. I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States
    of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one
    Nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for
    all.
        Mr. Van Drew. Remain standing for a moment of silence.
        I will now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    Again, I want to welcome everyone, and I want to thank the
    witnesses for being here today. I guess you could say this
    hearing is about control and who ultimately pays the price when
    we give that control away.
        Every day, millions of Americans travel on our Nation's
    highways, leaving behind a detailed digital record of who they
    are, where they go, what their destination is, and how they got
    there. I want to say on this hearing today--and I may be wrong;
    we are going to find out there may be some bipartisanship, not
    on all the subjects of the hearing, but particularly on this
    piece of it. I am hopeful for that. We are going to find out.
    We all agree that this is a serious issue.
        Electronic toll collection systems like E-ZPass were sold
    to the public as a convenience. You drive through; you get a
    bill later. Those bills get pretty big, by the way. Your data
    also does get tracked. In an alarming trend, more and more of
    this data is being stored and being controlled by foreign
    entities.
        In my home State of New Jersey, the E-ZPass system used by
    millions of residents--some of the most traveled roads in the
    United States of America are in the State of New Jersey, the
    New Jersey Turnpike, for example, used by millions and
    businesses as well, is now operated by a company under foreign
    government control, a Singaporean company with documented ties
    to the Chinese Communist Party.
        That means Americans are paying tolls into a system that is
    not under American control. Interestingly enough, New Jersey
    had a choice. There was an American company that submitted a
    lower bid to operate the system. Many believed it was a
    responsible bid. Instead of choosing the option that would have
    kept control here at my home and save residents money, the
    State went with the higher, more expensive foreign bid.
        This is at a time when families are struggling with
    inflation, high prices, and increased cost-of-living pressures.
    New Jersey taxpayers were asked to pay more for less
    accountability and less security. Higher costs, less
    transparency, more foreign control--it is a bad formula. The
    problems do not end with those who operate our toll systems. It
    extends to what is embedded inside the infrastructure itself.
        The United States has become dangerously dependent on
    Chinese-manufactured infrastructure components, including
    batteries, sensors, and cameras. In 2024, the Department of
    Homeland Security estimated that at least--at least--12,000
    Chinese-made internet cameras were already in use across United
    States infrastructure.
        The February 2025 DHS report revealed that many of these
    cameras lack basic data encryption and security settings, and
    by default, they can communicate directly with their
    manufacturer located in China. That means foreign entities may
    have visibility into American facilities, American operations,
    and American vulner-abilities.
        Chinese State-sponsored cyberattack groups linked to the
    Chinese Government have demonstrated the capability to
    infiltrate U.S. infrastructure, steal sensitive data, and
    maintain persistent access inside our networks.
        Once again, it comes back to control. If we do not control
    the systems, the hardware, and the data, then we don't control
    the risk. The loss of American control does not stop with toll
    systems or infrastructure. Under the Biden Administration,
    States were allowed to issue CDLs, commercial driver licenses,
    to individuals who were not qualified and not proficient in
    English. This is where it may not be as bipartisan.
        Truck drivers must be able to read road signs. If you are
    driving an 18-wheeler, a semi, on the road, you have to be able
    to understand the signs. I don't know why that is complicated.
    They have to be able to communicate with law enforcement and
    respond in emergencies. When States ignore those requirements,
    Americans pay the price.
        Let me give you a few examples. On March 13, 2025, Austin,
    Texas, a tractor trailer driven--slowed for a stop in traffic
    plowed into more than a dozen vehicles, killed five people,
    including an infant and a child. The driver couldn't read and
    write English. On November 14, 2025, Boone County, Indiana, an
    illegal immigrant from the country of Georgia driving with a
    New York-issued nondomiciled CDL lost control of an 18-wheeler,
    killing a National Guardsman by the name of Terry Frye.
        In Ontario, California, a semitruck driven by an
    undocumented immigrant crashed on Interstate 10, killing three
    Americans and injuring several others. In St. Lucie County,
    Florida, a commercial truck driver with limited English
    proficiency made an illegal maneuver on the Florida Turnpike,
    and it resulted in a crash and killed three people. In
    Washington State, an undocumented commercial driver struck a
    stopped vehicle on a State highway killing a motorist.
        These are not just statistics. These are families. These
    are brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers, daughters and
    sons, people whose families were destroyed because of what
    happened. Once again, it does come back to control.
        When States abandon enforcement of Federal law, Americans--
    American families--suffer the consequences. Safety on American
    roads is not optional. American roads should be controlled by
    Americans. American data should be controlled and protected by
    Americans and American safety standards should be enforced for
    the benefit of Americans.
        I thank the witnesses for being here today, and I do look
    forward to your testimony.
        I now recognize the Ranking Member from the great State of
    Texas, Ms. Crockett, for an opening statement.
        Ms. Crockett. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair. Thank you to
    the witnesses for appearing today to discuss threats to our
    transportation system.
        This is a serious national security issue. I appreciate the
    opportunity to have a bipartisan discussion, something that
    does not happen very often here, about how our foreign
    adversaries target America's critical infrastructure.
        Just last fall, the Federal Highway Administration warned
    that spyware had been found inside foreign-manufactured systems
    used to operate the signs, traffic cameras, weather stations,
    and vehicle chargers that line our highways all across the
    country. These communication devices could be used to collect
    individuals' transportation data, could be used to hack into
    government systems, and could even be used to cause outages in
    major American cities.
        Infiltration of our supply chains is just one vulnerability
    our adversaries can exploit. We consistently see our
    adversaries target our critical infrastructure with cyber
    espionage and cyberattacks.
        Unfortunately, from sending the names of CIA operatives
    over email to including a journalist in a Signal group chat
    discussing war plans, President Trump's Administration has
    shown a blatant disregard for our cybersecurity. The President
    has gutted the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
    Agency, our core civilian cyber defense agency. He also fired
    the head of the U.S. Cyber Command, DHS' Cyber Safety Review
    Board, and cybersecurity professionals at the NSA and NIST.
        The DHS determined the Critical Infrastructure Partner
    Advisory Council as a key advisory group that provided space
    for public-private collaboration to coordinate and craft
    cybersecurity plans to protect critical infrastructure. Experts
    repeatedly emphasize that public-private partnerships are
    necessary to protect the cybersecurity of our critical
    infrastructure. The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act,
    which facilitates the public-private cyber threat intelligence
    ecosystem, expired last fall, and the Republican-led Congress
    has failed to reauthorize it.
        President Trump's Administration has also disbanded key
    operations targeting foreign malign influence. Attorney General
    Pam Bondi dissolved the FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force.
    Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard dismantled the
    intelligence community's Foreign Malign Influence Center.
        It appears that there is no longer any Federal body
    dedicated to tracking and analyzing foreign-State efforts to
    interfere in American society. Meanwhile, the President seems
    to get friendlier with the heads of authoritarian adversarial
    Nations every day.
        This dismantling of the Federal Government's cybersecurity
    and national security resources and the continued
    politicization of our Federal agencies has left State and
    private officials reluctant to trust and share information with
    our Federal Government. This threatens the security of all
    critical infrastructure, from our healthcare to our elections
    to our transportation systems.
        It is vital that we address the ways our foreign
    adversaries target our key critical infrastructure sectors. In
    my opinion, the largest threat to our national security and
    critical infrastructure is not undocumented immigration or
    foreign investment. It is the incompetent folks at the highest
    levels of our government that have dismantled our cybersecurity
    resources.
        Thank you, and I yield back.
        Mr. Van Drew. I thank the Ranking Member. With that, I will
    recognize the Ranking Member of the Full Committee, Mr. Raskin.
        Mr. Raskin. Thank you very much, Chair Van Drew. Thank you
    to all our witnesses for joining us today.
        To the extent that our colleagues have called this hearing
    to examine how foreign threat actors are compromising our
    national security by targeting transportation and critical
    infrastructure, that is a valid and meaningful subject of
    inquiry. I salute the Chair for this initiative.
        China is in strategic competition with the United States
    and is using cyber espionage to undermine our defenses.
    Cybersecurity is of serious concern in the transportation
    sector because of the vast number of targets that operate new
    technologies and are run by a wide array of government and
    private entities.
        From AI-driven software to trip-reliant hardware,
    advancement in technology of course has great promise to make
    transportation faster, cheaper, and safer. We must be vigilant
    to ensure these systems are not vulnerable to infiltration or
    attack from malign actors, like Putin's autocratic Russia or
    the Stalinist bureaucrats of China.
        We cannot honestly discuss and debate the issue without
    addressing how President Trump has gutted the safeguards that
    protect our transportation and critical infrastructure against
    foreign threats. The programs and personnel in the U.S.
    Government that keep us safe have been cut wholesale and have
    been bizarrely politicized, jeopardizing our national security.
        Trump removed a third of the workforce at the Cybersecurity
    and Infrastructure Security Agency, which helps government and
    business work together to identify cyber threats before it is
    too late. That reduction included the Department officials
    dedicated to local government coordination with business, which
    is crucial to transportation infrastructure security.
        Trump fired the Chair of the Joint Chiefs and other top-
    level military leadership, eliminating continuity in national
    security, and his Attorney General shut down the FBI's Foreign
    Influence Task Force, the group responsible for identifying and
    combating malign foreign influence operations targeting the
    people of the United States.
        Trump's approach to national security, especially
    cybersecurity, is that of a coach who is friendly with the
    coaches of foreign teams and then suddenly takes his goalie
    off-net. To my mind, I don't think we can have a serious
    conversation about hardware vulner-abilities if we are going to
    ignore the fact that President Trump has made our
    infrastructure substantially less safe in just one year's time.
        What is even more confusing to me about today's hearing is
    that we are examining foreign threats as though Donald Trump
    isn't systematically ceding more global power to China every
    single day, even as he multiplies and deepens his own personal
    business ties to China.
        During his first term, Trump collected millions of dollars
    in payments from the Chinese Government and State-owned
    companies. In exchange for these unconstitutional emoluments,
    he opposed sanctions against Chinese telecom companies and
    banks even when they threatened our national security. He even
    tried to cancel military exercises with Japan and South Korea
    because China complained about them.
        In his second term, we have seen even more of enthusiastic
    Presidential embrace of the tyrants and dictators. Over the
    last year, the administration has dismantled USAID, giving
    China free rein to swoop in and offer countries around the
    world assistance with their infrastructure construction
    projects, their agricultural programs, their food aid, and
    public health, dramatically expanding China's sphere of
    influence.
        Trump has also hurt American consumers by imposing unlawful
    and arbitrary tariffs and hamstrung our ability to respond to
    threats by firing government workers, including key experts on
    China and national security personnel. All the while, he has
    been using his crypto ventures to pocket hundreds of millions
    of dollars directly from Chinese billionaires with ties to the
    CCP.
        In May, a tiny Chinese tech company with ties to the
    government announced it had bought $300 million of President
    Trump's memecoin, despite the fact that it has no revenue and
    only eight employees. Gee, I wonder where the money is really
    coming from.
        One year in Trump's second term, we've learned that other
    countries think that Donald Trump is indeed making a country
    great, but that country is not America. It is China. In a 21-
    country poll by the European Council on Foreign Relations, the
    majority of respondents around Europe said that while the U.S.
    is less feared by its adversaries and less revered by its
    friends, they fully expect China's global influence to continue
    to grow over the next decade.
        It is no wonder why they think, Mr. Chair, when Trump is
    inviting China, an egregious human rights violator, to join the
    Gaza Board of Peace and reverse its course and allows U.S. chip
    exports to China in a move that Anthropic CEO likened to
    selling nuclear weapons to North Korea.
        My friends, I wish this could just be about the problem of
    hardware technology in transportation, but it exists in this
    larger political context. That we have to make that clear for
    everyone if we are serious about confronting the problem of
    Chinese and Russian tyrannical influence in our government.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
        Mr. Van Drew. I thank the Ranking Member.
        Let me say--only conjuncture here. I am not sure, but I
    have this sneaking suspicion, this intuitive feeling, the other
    side doesn't like President Trump all that much. Am I right?
        Ms. Crockett. I have never met him.
        Mr. Raskin. I have never met him. It is not personal. We
    were looking just at what the effect is on the American people.
        Mr. Van Drew. I know. I am trying to have a little levity.
        With that, I thank Mr. Raskin. Without objection, all other
    opening statements will be included in the record.
        Mr. Van Drew. We will now introduce today's witnesses. The
    first witness--I am going to try not to murder your name; we
    will see how I do--Ms. Emily de La Bruyere. Pretty close? OK.
    Thank you for being here. The floor is yours.
        Ms. de La Bruyere. Thank you. Thank you, Chair Van Drew--
        Mr. Van Drew. Actually, let me--you know what? Let me do a
    little history of you. I am sorry. You are a Senior Fellow at
    the Foundation for Defense of Democracy. It is a think tank
    that conducts research on our national security and foreign
    policy issues. Your work focuses on China, economic security,
    international organizations, and supply chains.
        Now the floor is yours.

                    STATEMENT OF EMILY de La BRUYERE

        Ms. de La Bruyere. Thank you, Chair Van Drew. Thank you,
    Ranking Member Crockett. Thank you for this opportunity and
    both having names much easier to pronounce than mine.
        The Chinese Communist Party wants to control global
    resources, markets, and information so that it can control the
    world. Beijing pursues this ambition by leveraging nonmarket
    industrial policy through which it subverts critical supply
    chains and networks, a strategy of military-civil fusion
    through which it turns that positioning into a forward-deployed
    military presence, and a program State-sponsored data
    collection through which every Chinese company and component
    becomes an asset for influence and espionage.
        Transportation systems are a core part of this Chinese
    strategy. Beijing defines transportation systems as part of the
    military-civil fusion ecosystem because they are necessary for
    industrial operations, social functioning, and military
    mobilization. For that reason, China protects its own
    transportation systems domestically while looking to penetrate
    them internationally.
        Transport systems also represent a massive economic
    opportunity. The U.S. auto sector, for example, alone accounts
    for some 11 million jobs and $1.2 trillion of national output a
    year. Beijing wants those markets. Beijing also wants the
    military-relevant tech and industrial capacity that undergirds
    them.
        China wants something else from transportation systems,
    too. Today's technological trends are pushing the transport
    ecosystem toward an intelligent, connected, data-is-everything
    paradigm. In that environment, every foothold in a transport
    system, whether that is a component or a piece of software or a
    vehicle, becomes a possible back door. Everything is a
    computer. China is hacking all of it.
        For this reason, China's presence in U.S. transportation
    systems, (a) threatens U.S. industry and supply chains and
    markets, and (b) grants Beijing access to critical information
    on American society, the power to influence that information
    and therefore society, and the ability to disrupt the
    foundational networks on which our country depends.
        This isn't a notional danger. It is not something that is
    on the horizon. Our system is already embedded with Chinese
    components, and we are already under attack. LiDAR offers a
    valuable example. Autonomous vehicles use LiDAR to map their
    surroundings. Airports use it to track movement and crowds.
    Bridges use it to scan for defects.
        China controls 90 percent of the world's LiDAR market. The
    Chinese entities that are leading this charge are companies
    like Hesai, RoboSense, DJI that the U.S. Government has already
    identified as tied to the Chinese military. Those Chinese
    military-tied companies sell to GM's Cruise and Nvidia's Drive
    Hyperion. Their LiDAR sensors have been installed at JFK
    International Airport and Charlotte Douglas International
    Airport.
        Chinese LiDAR sensors are on intersections in Chattanooga
    and on drawbridges in Sarasota. Every purchase of a Chinese
    LiDAR sensor funds the Chinese Communist Party. Every Chinese
    LiDAR sensor risk collecting information on behalf of Beijing,
    and all of them could be turned off at China's command.
        This isn't a unique case. LiDAR is not isolated. The same
    story plays out across the broader ecosystem of components that
    go into modern transportation systems, whether those are IoT
    modules, optical transceivers, or cameras.
        Moreover, moving beyond the component level, Beijing is
    also building out the platform and software level of modern
    transportation. China is the world's largest player in in-car
    AI agents. Beijing is also developing unrivaled global shipping
    and transportation and logistics solutions, for example,
    LOGINK, a Chinese national platform that provides a centralized
    window into the otherwise fragmented world of global shipping
    under the Chinese Government's control.
        Washington needs to stop further Chinese penetration of our
    transportation systems. Those efforts can start with direct
    restrictions. No company that uses Chinese components software
    or those made by a Chinese-influenced entity should be eligible
    for Federal procurement, Federal tax incentives, or any other
    Federal incentives. In establishing restrictions like that,
    Washington should also tighten and clarify FEOC and PFE rules
    to make it clear what it is that is a Chinese entity and to
    make that a stricter definition.
        Targeted measures like this can directly bolster the
    security of American transportation systems, but Washington
    should also take broader action to change the State of play
    that has allowed China to embed itself into our critical
    infrastructure systems. Tariffs on Chinese goods can help
    dissuade the U.S. private sector from buying from Chinese
    entities and therefore from being complicit with the Chinese
    Communist Party. Tariffs can also create the circumstances in
    which to rebuild a trusted American industry.
        On the data front, no company that stores data in China
    should be permitted to collect data in the United States or be
    eligible for Federal procurement, defense industrial-based
    procurement, Federal tax credits, or other incentives.
    Washington should leverage trade deals to compel U.S. allies
    and partners to enact their own defenses against China, such
    that they don't serve as conduits for the Chinese Communist
    Party.
        It might seem impossible now to think that China could
    supplant American giants like FedEx, Boeing, and Ford. That
    scenario is on the very, very near horizon. Should it come to
    pass, China will claim a determinative advantage. Washington
    needs to fight back.
        Thank you for your time.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. de La Bruyere follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Van Drew. Thank you. Very informative. That outlines
    the seriousness of this issue. I know it is not the sexiest
    issue in Congress that everybody is talking about, and I get
    it. This room should be packed, and everybody should hear this
    and listen to it. It is a serious, serious issue.
        Again, as I said before--and I understand components of
    what you are talking about in your issues, but it should be a
    bipartisan one as well.
        Now, your name, on the other hand, Mr. Cole, is Rocky Cole.
    Couldn't be easier than that, right?
        Mr. Cole. Correct.
        Mr. Van Drew. The floor is yours.

                        STATEMENT OF ROCKY COLE

        Mr. Cole. Thank you, Chair Van Drew, Ranking Member
    Crockett, and the distinguished Members of the Committee, for
    the opportunity to testify today.
        The topic of the hearing is embedded threats in America's
    transportation systems, and I will certainly address those
    directly. However, I believe, as several other people have
    pointed out, that these threats are best understood in the
    broader context of adversarial cyber operations against
    America's critical infrastructure as they constitute one piece
    of a larger strategic landscape.
        My name is Rocky, and I have worked to counter America's
    top cyber adversaries for almost 20 years now, first within the
    United States intelligence community, then at Google, and now
    at a U.S.-based, venture capital-backed company called iVerify,
    which secures the very powerful computers in our pockets,
    mobile phones.
        I have witnessed a strategic evolution of cyber operations
    from the earliest days of mere cyber espionage to what can only
    be called today's cyber cold war. My experiences have informed
    a somewhat unique perspective on both the problem and steps we
    can take to mitigate the threats.
        In cyberspace, America has two historical rivals, China and
    Russia. Historically, both Chinese and Russian cyber operations
    were focused on intelligence gathering. For China, this meant
    extracting intellectual property to feed their Made in China
    2025 strategy, which a former Director of the NSA described as
    the greatest transfer of wealth in human history, while Russia
    focused on more traditional espionage goals.
        However, we have recently, in within the last five years,
    reached a watershed moment where the objective of cyber
    operations has shifted to prepositioning for disruptive
    effects. Modern doctrine now views cyberspace as a basic
    platform for hybrid warfare where blinding cyberattacks are
    intended to paralyze command-and-control networks before
    kinetic operations even begin.
        The U.S. intelligence community assesses with high
    confidence that these actors are embedding, quote, ``sleeper
    software'' within our infrastructure to be activated at will.
    The threat from China is particularly acute through several
    multiyear campaigns aimed at achieving information dominance.
    The Volt Typhoon campaign, for example, targets energy, water,
    and yes, transportation sectors specifically to disable
    military mobilization and sow domestic chaos that would
    distract U.S. leaders during the potential invasion of Taiwan.
        Furthermore, Salt Typhoon has compromised the backdoor
    systems used by telecommunication providers for court-ordered
    wiretapping and allowing China to monitor law enforcement,
    track the real-time geolocations of millions of Americans, and
    compromise our mobile devices. These operations have even
    expanded to targeting toll systems and compromising State-level
    commercial driver's license databases, all which are vital for
    our national logistics.
        To evade detection, these actors have refined their methods
    to bypass modern defenses through malware-free intrusions. They
    utilize techniques like living off the land, which means using
    legitimate system administration tools to blend in with normal
    activity and avoid detection, using largely stolen credentials
    like passwords and tokens as their initial access point.
        Finally, as per the topic of this hearing, they
    increasingly utilize supply chain operations to gain backdoor
    access to critical technologies. This could manifest as
    tampering with or implanting hardware components, inserting
    malicious codes into software updates, or compromising the
    integrity of manufacturing processes for devices like routers,
    servers, and even large industrial equipment such as port
    cranes.
        Despite the magnitude of the threat, the United States
    remains hamstrung by a patchwork regulatory landscape and
    structural challenges that impede a unified defense. Our
    defensive posture is characterized by voluntary frameworks that
    have failed to keep pace with the adversary's strategic pivot
    to prepositioning. Compounding this is the complexity of
    coordinating between the Federal Government and 50 State-level
    regulatory bodies.
        This asymmetry demands a significant structural and legal
    overhaul to achieve true cyber deterrence both on the offensive
    side and on the defensive side. This includes formalizing the
    authority for the United States Cyber Command to, quote,
    ``defend forward and disrupt adversarial groups within foreign
    networks before they reach the homeland.''
        We must also address systematic personnel failures within
    the United States Cyber Command by transitioning toward an
    independent cyber force that establishes uniform standards for
    recruitment and training and bypasses the traditional military
    standards that have frankly hindered our cyber readiness. Most
    importantly, we should consider advancing a framework that
    treats cyberattacks on critical infrastructure that may imperil
    a human life as the acts of war that they are, equivalent to
    kinetic strikes.
        We must also harden our domestic resilience by moving
    beyond purely voluntary standards. Congress should fund States
    to build high-maturity response capabilities and convert
    voluntary resilience standards into mandates for systematically
    important entities requiring redundant power and physical
    hardening across physical sectors. We must shift the legal duty
    of care to software manufacturers and away from the end users
    like local governments, instead holding the software designers
    liable for design flaws while mandating a move to secure-by-
    design principles rather than today's voluntary pledges.
        Finally, to mitigate supply chain risks, Congress should
    consider implementing mandatory screening and the eventual
    phase-out of Chinese-manufactured hardware with remote
    communications capabilities within highly sensitive critical
    infrastructure and Federal networks, akin to the rip-and-
    replace campaigns that Congress has already funded to remove
    Chinese-made telecommunications gear from America's core
    networks.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cole follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Cole. With that, let me say
    you're the co-founder and COO of iVerify, a cybersecurity
    company focused on mobile phones, and previously worked at
    Google and Deloitte and served with the National Security
    Agency.
        Mr. Chris Spear is next. Mr. Spear is the President and
    Chief CEO officer of the American Trucking Association, an
    organization made up of trucking companies. He also serves on
    the Board of Directors for American Transportation Research
    Institute and the Trucking Cares Foundation.
        Mr. Spear?

                        STATEMENT OF CHRIS SPEAR

        Mr. Spear. Chair Van Drew, Ranking Member Crockett, and the
    Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify here today.
        For over 90 years, the American Trucking Associations has
    represented an industry that employs the hardest-working men
    and women in the country. Safety is in our DNA, and it is at
    the forefront of everything that we do. The overwhelming
    majority of America's 3.6 million truck drivers take immense
    pride in their work. They meet every requirement every day, and
    they move our economy forward with proficiency and with pride.
        Safely operating a tractor trailer requires specialized
    skills and an adherence to high standards of professionalism. A
    CDL should represent a promise that the person behind the wheel
    of an 80,000-pound vehicle is qualified, competent, and
    accountable.
        Regrettably, years of lax and uneven enforcement have
    undermined that promise. Serious vulnerabilities, particularly
    related to driver training and CDL issuance, have been exposed
    through several high-profile, tragic, and preventable crashes.
    CDL mills which masquerade as legitimate schools have fast-
    tracked prepared individuals into trucking by putting profits
    before training.
        Meanwhile, State licensing agencies handed out improper
    credentials, and Federal regulators looked the other way,
    enabling unqualified individuals to climb into the driver's
    seat. ATA has long warned that insufficient compliance allows
    unsafe operators to obtain CDLs.
        Fortunately, Secretary Duffy has made it a priority to
    close these loopholes. Our federation has been working hand-in-
    glove with USDOT to implement comprehensive solutions. We know
    that meaningful oversight works. Since December, FMCSA at DOT
    has removed nearly 7,000 CDL mills from the training provider
    registry and put an additional 450 noncompliant providers on
    notice.
        These actions, coupled with upholding Federal driver
    qualifications and implementing regular audits, are critical
    steps toward improving the CDL system. We appreciate the
    Subcommittee's focus on these issues, and we look forward to
    being a resource as you seek to codify these regulations.
        While the integrity of CDLs is foundational to highway
    safety, the systems that monitor driver compliance and enable
    roadside enforcement are just as critical. In recent years, the
    proliferation of noncompliant electronic logging devices has
    emerged as a serious and rapidly evolving threat. Cheating has
    gone high-tech, with some devices using AI to produce fake
    documentation, like fuel and food receipts, to fabricate hours
    of service.
        Equally concerning are digital back doors that could
    provide U.S. adversaries access to sensitive supply chain data.
    When operators are able to purchase devices that falsify logs
    or conceal violations, it rewards unsafe behavior and penalizes
    carriers who invest in compliant systems.
        ATA strongly supports FMCSA's efforts to strengthen
    electronic logging device certification, which have led to the
    removal of nearly 100 noncompliant devices in just the last two
    months. An additional 250 devices have been removed,
    underscoring the need for better vetting on the front end. We
    urge Congress to improve device screening, apply greater
    scrutiny to foreign-owned ELDs, and enhance penalties against
    violators.
        Another growing concern involves cross-border trade with
    Mexico. The B-1 visas allow Mexican drivers to haul freight
    between Mexico and the U.S., but not within the United States.
    When
    B-1 drivers haul domestic freight, it is called cabotage, and
    it is illegal. This underhanded practice exploits Mexican
    drivers, and it is unfair to law-abiding motor carriers and
    American truck drivers. ATA is pushing for stepped-up
    enforcement against these violations.
        Finally, I would like to draw the Subcommittee's attention
    to a transportation security lapse within the Department of
    Defense that was identified by ATA's Government Freight
    Conference. The Department is improperly awarding shipments to
    unauthorized carriers to move sensitive cargo like M1 Abrams
    tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles.
        This practice compromises safety by putting military
    freight in the hands of unvetted carriers and drivers. Last
    year, ATA worked with Congress to enact several provisions in
    the NDAA aimed at this problem, and we will continue to partner
    with you to shore this up.
        ATA thanks the Subcommittee for your interest in
    identifying foreign ownership risks and hidden vulnerabilities
    across our transportation system. I look forward to answering
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Spear follows:]
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Spear.
        Mr. Rob Knake is the Chief Executive Officer of TPO Group,
    a cybersecurity consulting firm. He previously served as the
    Deputy National Cyber Director with the National Security
    Council and at the Department of Homeland Security.
        Mr. Knake?

                       STATEMENT OF ROB K. KNAKE

        Mr. Knake. Thank you, Chair Van Drew, and thank you,
    Ranking Member Crockett and the Members of the Committee, for
    the opportunity to testify on this subject.
        While I can't speak to the issues that my colleague Mr.
    Spear has addressed, I think you are going to find that the
    bipartisan approach that you were hoping for, Chair Van Drew,
    really has emerged, at least within the cybersecurity
    community, on these topics. There is very little that I could
    disagree with in either the tone or the substance of what my
    other two panelists have said about the cyber threats.
        As not to repeat much of what they have said, let me make a
    series of points about how we address these threats. First, let
    me applaud the focus on embedded threats. As Mr. Cole pointed
    out, our critical infrastructure is compromised through remote
    hacking capabilities that China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea
    have deployed. This is a serious issue. This is a serious risk,
    and more needs to be done to address that traditional threat.
        The threat from embedded systems that are dependent on
    Chinese-produced electronics, Chinese IT components, and
    Chinese products is unique to China because of the scale of
    their manufacturing and the lack of capacity that we have in
    the United States today.
        I will primarily focus my remarks on the cyber aspects
    here, but it should be noted that in the event of a conflict
    with China, they will have the ability to cutoff supplies for
    critical minerals, critical goods, critical parts, and services
    that our economy needs to run. That alone means that we need to
    diversify our supply, onshore our supply, and build trusted
    supply networks with our allies overseas.
        While we need to diversify our supply, we also simply
    cannot simply trust that something produced by an ally or
    something produced by a U.S. company, built by U.S. citizens,
    is necessarily trusted. Let me go for another point of
    bipartisanship here by quoting Ronald Reagan. This is an area
    where the mantra needs to be, ``Trust but verify.''
        We need to verify that the systems we rely on are in fact
    secure, regardless of whether they are produced by a U.S.
    company from entirely U.S.-made components or they are produced
    by our allies through an extended and secured supply chain. We
    cannot simply assume that onshoring will address this risk.
        We have seen the risk from transshipment where U.S.
    companies may think that they are building from chips that did
    not in fact come from China, but those chips may have been
    transshipped from China through Vietnam, Mexico, or another
    country. A drone or other device that you may think is secure
    and is U.S. and American made may have a risk inside it that
    even the company that manufactured it does not know about.
        That is why it is critically important that we invest in
    the ability not only to produce these goods domestically and
    with our allies but also be able to identify and recognize when
    these supply chains have been compromised and when there are
    back doors or logic bombs or other threats embedded in these
    systems. We can envision a future in which we have trusted
    supply chains, but to get there, we need much stronger
    government action.
        Chair Van Drew, to your point about a more expensive
    Chinese system, I think what we are seeing today is that,
    typically, Chinese suppliers are often cheaper, but in some
    cases they in fact have better capability than some U.S.-
    produced goods. What that will mean on the market is that
    companies are going to purchase the cheaper good, particularly
    if it is more effective than an American-made good.
        I was part of a long-running--what I would call a
    whispering campaign against Huawei to say that Huawei's
    technology shouldn't be trusted; it shouldn't be put in our
    core infrastructure. The FBI did briefings. We did briefings at
    the NSC. What finally worked was banning that technology, and
    then for the rural broadband telecommunications providers that
    were incapable of investing to replace that, subsidizing that
    investment.
        We need a far broader approach like that to the categories
    of technology that China is dominant in today, and we need to
    develop and invest in the ability to verify that the
    replacement technologies produced in the United States are, in
    fact, secure and have not been compromised.
        Thank you for this opportunity.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Knake follows:]
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Knake. All good statements.
        I am going to ask you all to rise to be sworn in. Raise
    your right hand. Do you swear or affirm under penalty of
    perjury that the testimony you are about to give is true and
    correct to the best of your knowledge, information, and belief,
    so help you God?
        You may be seated.
        Mr. Raskin. Point of order, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Van Drew. Yes.
        Mr. Raskin. Does that apply also to testimony they have
    already given?
        Mr. Van Drew. Correct.
        Mr. Raskin. Thank you.
        Mr. Van Drew. Thank you for that. That does apply to the
    testimony you have already given. What the Ranking Member is
    pointing out in his gentle way is I should have done that at
    the very beginning when you started your testimony.
        That is a good point. Thank you.
        With that being said, we are going to begin with the
    questions. I am going to start with the gentleman from
    Missouri, Dr. Onder.
        Mr. Onder. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Over the past decade, Federal agencies and infrastructure
    operators have embedded software-driven electrical equipment
    throughout America's roads, ports, rail systems, and power
    networks. Through this rapid modernization, we have quietly
    opened a dangerous national security vulnerability. Foreign-
    manufactured hardware now sits at the core of systems that keep
    the American economy running and the military moving.
        Nowhere is the threat more acute than in the power sector.
    Chinese-made inverters, batteries, and transformers have become
    foundational to the power grid and critical infrastructure. The
    components are designed, built, and in some cases remotely
    controlled by firms operating under the authority and influence
    of the Chinese Communist Party. As a result, the CCP is
    increasingly positioned to monitor, disrupt, or manipulate the
    infrastructure that underpins U.S. commerce, public safety, and
    national defense.
        Ms. de La Bruyere, can you explain why it is inherently
    dangerous for U.S. roads, ports, and rail systems to rely on
    electronic components manufactured in China, particularly when
    those components are embedded deep inside operational systems?
        Ms. de La Bruyere. Yes. There are three main reasons from
    the informational perspective.
        (1) The first is those components give China access to
    critical American information: Who is traveling, where, when,
    and how. That is like a personal privacy risk, but it is also a
    strategic asset.
        We are in a competition where data is the new oil. Data is
    the single most dominant resource. In the great power
    competition with China, if Beijing has full information on our
    society, that is how it can target all its attacks.
        (2) China can shape information: If information is fueling
    transportation and you can shape information, you can decide
    who is moving where, when, and what. You can pick winners and
    losers, what company, shipping route, and software add-on is
    going to win. That means that Beijing controls our society.
        Then, there is the disruption threat. All these two things
    are short of any outright conflict scenario. That is just
    happening. If China decides it is time, they can shut off our
    systems. They can interfere with our systems. They can
    destabilize our society.
        (3) That is informational threat: On top of it, there is
    just a basic supply chain and industrial threat. China can stop
    providing these components. We are trying to build new
    infrastructure or modernize infrastructure. We are at their
    mercy? Plus, our industrial base depends on being able to
    produce these critical goods. Our country depends on having an
    industrial base. Our economy depends on that. If we forfeit
    that to China, there goes American growth and freedom.
        Mr. Onder. What categories of U.S. infrastructure, like EV
    charging stations, tolling stations, rail signaling, port
    cranes, traffic management systems, currently depend on
    foreign-manufactured electronic hardware? I am afraid you are
    going to say all the above.
        Ms. de La Bruyere. All of the above. At so many levels,
    too, that we aren't--you mentioned inverters. No one is talking
    about inverters.
        Mr. Onder. Right.
        Ms. de La Bruyere. That is a huge risk to the grid. All of
    those sectors. Every sector. Data centers. Optical
    transceiver--building them at rapid scale. Optical transceivers
    are necessary for data centers. We increasingly depend on those
    for so many other industries. What if China shuts those off?
        Mr. Onder. Yes. I was at an energy conference in Houston a
    few months back, and someone, one of the speakers, talked about
    Chinese-made batteries. Any kind of reliance on so-called green
    energy when their solar is going to rely on massive battery-
    charging capability, or even one's--the electrical panel on
    one's roof, private home, would depend on a battery.
        Apparently, a large percentage of these are being made in
    communist China right now. Those could, in theory, be remotely
    flipped off or even remotely made to overheat, causing
    electrical power or even explosion risk.
        Mr. Cole, I see you nodding. Any comments on this?
        Mr. Cole. Congressman, I was just discussing with the other
    witnesses before the hearing that there are virtually no
    cybersecurity standards around electric vehicles as a category,
    whether that be batteries that can communicate directly,
    perhaps, with China, or other cybersecurity standards of the
    self-driving components of the vehicle.
        You can imagine a world where the United States is trying
    to mobilize for a conflict, and suddenly EVs are blocking
    roads, the interstates, and cities.
        Mr. Onder. Yes. It is frightening. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Van Drew. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from
    Georgia.
        Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Hostile foreign nations like China are targeting critical
    infrastructure here in America. Donald Trump is enriching
    himself with money from China while weakening United States
    programs that protect us from their security threats.
        For example, the Chinese Government and its State-
    controlled entities spent over $5.5 million at Trump-owned
    properties during the first Trump Administration. In this
    second administration, the greed and corruption is
    turbocharged. A Chinese company recently announced that it
    would buy up to $300 million of President Trump's
    cryptocurrency. Coincidentally, the Trump Administration is
    systematically weakening our defenses against China's security
    threats.
        Ms. de La Bruyere, would you agree that the U.S. needs to
    be the No. 1 country for artificial intelligence?
        Ms. de La Bruyere. I would agree with that.
        Mr. Johnson. You would agree also that Nvidia chips power
    the Nvidia or the AI revolution, correct?
        Ms. de La Bruyere. They are among the components that power
    the AI revolution, yes.
        Mr. Johnson. Does it surprise you that Trump has discarded
    America's strategic technological edge over China insofar as AI
    chips by changing the rules and allowing the export of Nvidia's
    AI chips to China?
        Ms. de La Bruyere. What surprises me the most is that--
        Mr. Johnson. Does that surprise you?
        Ms. de La Bruyere. I think what surprises me the most is
    that we don't actually have an edge in AI chips over China
    anymore.
        Mr. Johnson. OK. All right. You want to take me in a
    different direction.
        Ms. de La Bruyere. Yes, sir because it is important
        Mr. Johnson. I don't want to go in the direction you are
    trying to take me.
        I am going to now ask Mr. Cole. Mr. Cole, Elon Musk and his
    DOGE musketeers benched hundreds of cybersecurity professionals
    at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, also known as
    CISA, and at the National Security Agency. Nearly a third of
    CISA's staff was cut, including divisions that coordinated with
    States and businesses which provide key assistance for
    transportation infrastructure.
        Was that a wise move by Trump?
        Mr. Cole. Well, first, Congressman, I'm a native Georgian,
    so it is a pleasure to meet you.
        Mr. Johnson. Well, good to meet you, too, sir.
        Mr. Cole. I have always wanted to. To answer your question,
    I do think now is not the time to cut CISA's budget or
    operational--
        Mr. Johnson. That was a bad move. His budget request to
    Congress now includes an additional 18 percent cut to CISA's
    Cybersecurity Division, which leads efforts to protect
    government networks and helps defend critical infrastructure.
    Was that a good move or a bad move?
        Mr. Cole. Congressman, if you go around the country and
    talk to the State cyber leaders, they will all tell you they
    would like additional Federal support to respond to
    cyberattacks.
        Mr. Johnson. Well, it was a bad move. That is probably what
    you are trying to say.
        Let me ask you, Mr. Knake. We have seen our foreign
    adversaries exploit cyber vulnerabilities against our
    communications, energy, and water sectors, among others. It may
    be easy to discount national security risk to our
    transportation infrastructure because we haven't yet seen
    widespread consequences in this field.
        While embedded technology like undisclosed radios and
    batteries in cranes clearly shows that our adversaries may have
    the capability to conduct espionage or even cause outages in
    transportation infrastructure, when local governments or
    private companies are acquiring technology, they may be willing
    to overlook the national security risk in favor of getting
    technology that they need more quickly or for cheap, or
    cheaper.
        Does the fact that we haven't yet seen a major cyberattack
    against our transportation infrastructure mean that we don't
    have to worry about this national security threat? It comes at
    a time when Trump's net worth increased by $3 billion over last
    year. With this security threat, does it mean we need to be
    worried, or do we have cause for concern as the President gets
    richer and our security is eroded?
        Mr. Knake. Sir, we have absolutely seen campaigns carried
    out against our transportation infrastructure for the purposes
    of collecting intelligence and for the purposes of planning
    future attacks. What we haven't yet seen is significant
    disruption of that infrastructure because the geopolitical
    moment in which our adversaries would want to take advantage of
    that has not emerged yet.
        Mr. Johnson. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Van Drew. I thank the gentleman.
        I am going to yield five minutes to myself. This is to Mr.
    Spear. How does weakened enforcement of Federal CDL and English
    proficiency requirements undermine safety on American roads?
    Tell me if you agree this should be viewed as a national
    security and rule-of-law issue rather than just a regulatory
    problem.
        Mr. Spear. Well, the criteria or the standards that you are
    speaking to come from the United States Department of
    Transportation, handed down to the States. The States
    administer the tests. Some States do it very well, and there is
    a handful that aren't.
        We have seen over the last few years a whole host of CDLs
    get issued to people that shouldn't have them, candidly. First,
    they may not be here legally. They may not be able to speak or
    understand English. They shouldn't be operating an 80,000-pound
    heavy-duty truck, moving freight across the country.
        Those standards and the relationship between the Federal
    and State Government is absolutely essential to make sure that
    all States are doing the same thing on those fundamentals.
        Mr. Van Drew. If I was to ask you if Federal CDL and
    English proficiency standards have been consistently enforced,
    am I being fair when I say that some of the fatal crashes we
    discussed today probably could have been prevented?
        Mr. Spear. There is absolutely no question. Your opening
    statement covered several crashes that we have also watched
    very closely. A lot of the folks that you cited in those
    actions, those drivers, were not able to speak English,
    understand English, probably should never have been driving in
    the first place. They were issued CDLs when they shouldn't have
    had them. You don't want people like that behind the wheel of a
    40-ton U.S. truck.
        Mr. Van Drew. I would think. Thank you.
        I am going to ask you a rapid-fire question here, and if
    you agree we do need to do more, if you could catch up with us
    and get information to me. What I am going to ask is, do you
    believe, in the United States of America, we need to do
    anything legislatively? Does Congress need to do something to
    make us more safe and more secure? Very briefly. I am going to
    ask all of you, so we have to go quickly.
        Ms. de La Bruyere?
        Ms. de La Bruyere. Yes, absolutely. First, a low-hanging
    fruit stopping an unforced error is, with any Federal
    incentives or procurement, having actually enforced stringent
    restrictions on the ability of Chinese or Chinese-influenced
    entities with clear rules of what those are to receive them.
        Mr. Van Drew. I know you don't write bills, but if you
    could get us that information, get it to my office and also to
    the Committee, of what you saw, this bill gives us priorities
    on that.
        Mr. Cole?
        Mr. Cole. Yes, Mr. Chair, I do believe Congress needs to
    act in a few ways. First, I believe the United States Cyber
    Command needs additional authorities to be able to operate at
    the speed with which our adversaries are. I believe Congress
    must do more legislatively to increase our resiliency against
    cyberattacks.
        To some degree, we have to assume that Nation-State
    adversaries have already compromised our infrastructure, and
    that means giving States the ability to more quickly respond to
    threats as they emerge. That could mean additional funding or
    clearer frameworks.
        Finally, I agree with Ms. de La Bruyere that we should take
    a legislative approach to data sovereignty as well.
        Mr. Van Drew. Please get that to my office, both of you, as
    quickly as you could. Thank you.
        Mr. Spear?
        Mr. Spear. On the English language proficiency, we would
    advocate, for the American Trucking Associations, that Congress
    fully codify English language proficiency for all drivers, that
    all States should test for this consistently across the board.
    This is a safety issue.
        If you are operating a vehicle, you shouldn't be pulling a
    U-turn on the Florida Turnpike. You should be able to
    understand weather signs in, say, Wyoming. You need to
    understand English. You need to be able to operate that
    equipment safely around the motoring public.
        Congress needs to codify this to ensure that all 50 States
    abide by this and aren't just handing CDLs out carelessly to
    people that shouldn't be driving a 40-ton truck.
        Mr. Van Drew. Thank you. Please bring that to my office as
    well.
        Mr. Knake?
        Mr. Knake. I would say the most important thing, from my
    perspective, is to fill gaps in regulatory frameworks so that
    we have comprehensive ability to oversee regulation in this
    space.
        Mr. Van Drew. Thank you. I will yield back the rest of my
    time.
        With that, I will yield to the Ranking Member of this
    Committee, Ms. Jasmine Crockett.
        Ms. Crockett. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.
        I will point out that being a bad driver doesn't
    necessarily have anything to do with whether or not you can
    speak English. I also will point out that I have had the
    privilege, or maybe not so much the privilege, of driving in
    multiple countries, and I was not required to get another
    license. I was able to rent cars in other countries and drive
    because some things are kind of universal. Frankly, if somebody
    passes the test as it is laid out, then I think that this is
    what it is. If we need to change the test, then we need to
    change the test.
        Nevertheless, one of the things that has become clear over
    the past year is that this President can be bought. If you have
    enough money, you can get favorable regulations from this White
    House. You can get pardons, you can get contracts, and you can
    get influence with this President, even if you have ties to a
    foreign government, which the Justice Department has described
    as--and I quote, ``a significant risk to U.S. national
    security.''
        We have already established that the Trump Administration
    has shown a blatant disregard for our cybersecurity. In his
    first month in office, the President dismantled nearly all of
    the DHS' advisory committees that study major cyberattacks and
    provide actionable recommendations to defend against those
    attacks.
        Mr. Knake, what role did these advisory committees play in
    protecting our critical infrastructure? How does their
    dissolution make us less safe?
        Mr. Knake. Thank you, Ranking Member Crockett. Absolutely,
    these committees were essential to establishing the mechanisms
    for coordinating and collaborating on cybersecurity with our
    industry partners. They were necessary but not sufficient. They
    laid the groundwork for the real-time collaborative engagement
    that has been emerging over the last five years.
        We have gone from having just these discussions on policy
    and risk and threat to actually working with government
    agencies, with CISA, NSA, Cyber Command, and the FBI.
        Ms. Crockett. If I am to understand you correctly, you
    believe that they were necessary, but you believe that they
    weren't even sufficient in their current form. If anything, you
    believe that they should have been beefed up, not deleted,
    correct?
        Mr. Knake. There is absolutely a need to expand these
    collaborative mechanisms with industry and to make them real
    time and substantial. Yes.
        Ms. Crockett. Now, I represent the State of Texas, which is
    the largest exporting State in the country. Texas has 32
    official ports of entry that serve as critical gateways to
    global trade.
        Mr. Knake, as you probably know, 80 percent of cranes at
    U.S. ports are manufactured by a Chinese State-owned entity,
    and the government has found communication devices embedded on
    these cranes that could be used to track port activity and
    enable cyber espionage. What concerns are raised when the
    technology used inside a critical infrastructure system is
    manufactured by a foreign adversary?
        Mr. Raskin. In the case of these devices, what we are
    talking about is an ability to both monitor and control and
    disrupt the infrastructure, should it be in China's interest to
    do so. It is an absolutely critical risk that we be able to
    maintain our trade in the event that they feel they are
    compelled to use that capability.
        The focus here, in my view, needs to be retrofitted at this
    point. We don't need to replace the steel that holds up the
    cranes. We are certain that is pretty strong. What we need to
    do is replace the electronics, rip and replace the electronics,
    and operate them with trusted hardware and trusted software
    that we know is not communicating back to China.
        Ms. Crockett. The costs associated with operating
    technology needed for critical infrastructure are increasing.
    It doesn't help that the Trump Administration's policies are
    partly responsible for the cost increase. However, States are
    weighing the costs and availability of the technology they need
    to operate and maintain their critical infrastructure. There
    aren't domestic manufacturers for many of these necessary
    machines, such as cargo ships or port cranes.
        Let me ask you this. We did have the CHIPS and Science Act,
    and my predecessor in Congress was actually the one that
    ushered that through. That was to make sure that we could
    manufacture more chips right here domestically.
        It is so unfortunate because there were so many plans, and
    there were so many that were saying, ``We are going to take
    advantage of this bill and pull down on these dollars,'' and
    now those plans have fallen by the wayside because of some of
    the terrible tariff policies that currently are taking place.
        It is harming us not only economically, but it is harming
    us from a security standpoint. This was not fiscally
    responsible policy that this administration has engaged in, but
    it has also been very harmful to us domestically.
        The last question is, so what solutions are there to
    mitigate the risk posed by foreign technology and
    infrastructure supply chains?
        Mr. Knake. We badly need to make a government investment in
    the retrofitting of these technologies. The markets simply are
    not going to support this investment on their own, given that
    these are national security risks, and no risks that are
    necessarily going to be borne by shareholders of companies.
        Ms. Crockett. Thank you so much for your time. I yield
    back.
        Mr. Van Drew. I thank the Ranking Member. I would just make
    one minor point that, probably, when she was driving in those
    foreign countries, she wasn't driving an 18-wheeler. I could
    probably guarantee that.
        Ms. Crockett. How do you know?
        Mr. Van Drew. Well, I am hoping not. I couldn't even drive
    one. The CDL requirements are much more specific and much
    harder. Do you have an CDL? I don't have an CDL.
        Ms. Crockett. I am just saying I may have.
        Mr. Van Drew. You could. You could.
        Ms. Crockett. I got a license to carry.
        [Simultaneous speaking.]
        Mr. Van Drew. Jasmine, so do I. So, do I. You never know.
    With that, we have--the gentleman from Texas has a UC request.
        Mr. Gill. I would like to ask for unanimous consent to
    enter into the record this report, ``The Weaponization of CISA:
    How a Cybersecurity Agency Colluded with Big Tech and
    Disinformation Partners to Censor Americans.''
        Mr. Van Drew. Without objection. I will ask the gentleman
    to go forward and present testimony--questions.
        Mr. Gill. Thank you, Mr. Chair for holding this hearing.
        In 2016, the Obama-Biden Administration issued internal
    guidance that weakened enforcement by discouraging roadside
    interviews and out-of-service penalties, effectively nullifying
    a core safety rule without changing the law.
        Since that time, fatal truck crashes have increased, and
    multiple deadly incidents have involved nondomiciled or non-
    English-proficient drivers who should have never been licensed
    or allowed to operate in the first place. In many cases, they
    shouldn't have even been in this country in the first place.
        The Trump Administration has moved to restore the rule of
    law by rescinding the guidance, and even Democrat-led States
    such as California couldn't hide the damage inflicted by the
    radical Democrats' open-borders policies and revoked 17,000
    commercial driver's licenses given to illegal aliens.
        Thank you, witnesses, for taking the time to be here.
        Mr. Spear, do you consider the Obama-Biden Administration
    2016 rule guidance which discouraged out-of-service enforcement
    for English proficiency failures to be a breakdown in
    regulatory control over critical transportation sector?
        Mr. Spear. I do. That decision cost lives. Respectfully,
    Congresswoman Crockett, the accident that was cited in the
    Chair's opening statement killed people because that driver did
    not understand what he was doing. An 80,000-pound vehicle is
    much different than a car. It does not stop on a dime. It
    doesn't turn on a dime.
        These are very heavy vehicles that need to have people
    trained and skilled to operate them, and they need to
    understand the language we speak. Here in America, that is
    English. I have lived and worked in five continents, driven in
    all five--Arabic, Chinese, you name it. You have to understand
    that country's language to understand how to operate a vehicle.
    It is for the safety of those around you.
        That 2016 decision by the Obama Administration took the
    lives of innocent people because it put people out on the road
    behind the wheel of an 80,000-pound vehicle that should never
    have been driving. We need stronger enforcement. That rule has
    been in the books since the 1930s. It should be consistent no
    matter what party you are for.
        If you care about the safety of people driving in your
    district, then this needs to be enforced in all 50 States
    evenly. It is simply fundamental. There is absolutely no
    compromise when it comes to safety. We don't hedge on any of
    that.
        I want to be very clear. We need to enforce it. It needs to
    be done by every State. It needs to be done evenly. Yes, the
    language does matter.
        Mr. Gill. You are exactly right. It does cost lives. It
    cost the life of the son of one of my constituents. A little
    over two years ago, eight-year-old Barron Ritchey of Pilot
    Point, Texas, was killed on I-35 near Hillsboro when a wheel
    hub and tires broke off a semi and struck the Ritchey family's
    SUV as his mother drove him home from a school trip.
        The non-English speaking illegal alien Martin Monreal-
    Alvarado had overstayed a B-1 visitor visa that expired six
    months prior to the incident. Further, Monreal-Alvarado was a
    party to RTD Carriers trucking company, an entity with an
    abysmal Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration record.
        The RTD Carriers employed other foreign drivers, as well,
    without valid work visas and sent Monreal-Alvarado on an
    unlawful route beyond the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement
    commercial zone. The reality was that if even one of these
    issues had been policed, Barron Ritchey would still be with us
    today.
        Mr. Spear, what can Congress do to confront unsafe carriers
    such as RTD from closing and reopening under a new name,
    reusing the same dangerous equipment and dangerous personnel?
        Mr. Spear. Well, certainly, work with your colleagues in
    the Transportation Infrastructure Committee to give the Federal
    Motor Carrier Safety Administration at DOD the authority it
    needs to clean up the registry. OK? We have people come on,
    off, on, off. They have an accident; they come back on. They
    change their name.
        This system is broken. The Federal oversight and ability to
    manage the motor carrier populace properly, safely, is broken.
    Secretary Duffy understands that. They are going back to the
    basics and enforcing the laws that you have given them. Where
    there are shortfalls, you all in Congress need to step up and
    give these agencies the power they need to have interstate
    commerce standards applied equally in all States.
        These are just fundamentals. When you take a test in a
    State like California for a CDL, you need to be able to speak
    English. You need to be here legally. You need to have training
    to acquire the CDL, not some online one-day source, and you get
    the CDL. This has got to be enforced. I look to Congress to
    work with DOT to shore that up.
        I can guarantee if you call over there now, they will give
    you a list of things that we support that will help them ensure
    that all States take steps forward to ensure that lives like
    that are not lost.
        Mr. Gill. I agree, Mr. Spear. Learn English or get out of
    our country. Thank you for being here. I appreciate it.
        Mr. Van Drew. I thank the gentleman from Texas. That
    concludes today's hearing.
        Ms. Crockett. Oh, I have got a UC. OK. ``DOGE employees
    shared Social Security data.'' Court filings show employees
    detailed to the Social Security Administration shared sensitive
    data through a nonsecure server, the Justice Department
    disclosed. This is from The New York Times, January 20, 2026.
        My final one is Federal review finds 44 percent of U.S.
    trucking schools don't comply with government rules. Nearly--
    this is from December 1, 2025. This is the AP. It says nearly
    44 percent of the 16,000 truck-driving schools in the U.S. may
    be forced to close if they lose their students after a review
    by the Federal Transportation Department found they may not be
    complying with the government requirements. It did not say
    anything about languages.
        Mr. Van Drew. Without objection.
        Ms. Crockett. OK. Now, I am good.
        Mr. Van Drew. That concludes today's hearing. We thank our
    witnesses for appearing before the Subcommittee today. I thank
    you all. You did a great job. Looking forward to the
    correspondence from all of you.
        Without objection, all Members will have five legislative
    days to submit additional written questions for the witnesses
    or additional materials for the record.
        Without objection, this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

        All materials submitted for the record by Members of the
    Subcommittee on Oversight can be found at: https://
    docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=118875.

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