[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
LESSONS LEARNED: AN EXAMINATION OF MAJOR SECURITY INCIDENTS AT MASS
GATHERING EVENTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
TASK FORCE ON
ENHANCING SECURITY FOR SPECIAL
EVENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 22, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-25
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-628 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Chair Ranking Member
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Eric Swalwell, California
Michael Guest, Mississippi J. Luis Correa, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Shri Thanedar, Michigan
August Pfluger, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Tony Gonzales, Texas Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Dale W. Strong, Alabama LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking
Elijah Crane, Arizona Member
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Gabe Evans, Colorado Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Al Green, Texas
Brad Knott, North Carolina Vacant
Vacant
Eric Heighberger, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
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TASK FORCE ON ENHANCING SECURITY FOR SPECIAL EVENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Nellie Pou, New Jersey, Ranking
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Member
Elijah Crane, Arizona Eric Swalwell, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Diana Bergwin, Task Force Staff Director
Jeremy Gaertner, Minority Task Force Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Task Force on Enhancing
Security for Special Events in the United States:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Nellie Pou, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Task Force on
Enhancing Security for Special Events in the United States:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Sheriff Rosie Cordero-Stutz, Sheriff, Miami-Dade County, Miami-
Dade Sheriff's Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. Edward F. Davis, III, President and CEO, The Edward Davis
Company; Former Police Commissioner, Boston Police Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Colonel Robert P. Hodges, Superintendent, Louisiana State Police:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Chief Stacey Graves, Police Chief, Kansas City Missouri Police
Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
LESSONS LEARNED: AN EXAMINATION OF MAJOR SECURITY INCIDENTS AT MASS
GATHERING EVENTS
----------
Tuesday, July 22, 2025
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Task Force on Enhancing Security for Special Events in the
United States,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
[Chairman of the Task Force] presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul, Gimenez, Crane, Pou, and
Swalwell.
Present: Representative Carter.
Mr. McCaul. The Committee on Homeland Security Task Force
on Enhancing Security for Special Events in the United States
will come to order. Without objection, the Chair may declare
the committee in recess at any point.
The purpose of this hearing is to assess historical
incidents and attacks at sporting events and other mass
gatherings in anticipation of upcoming high-profile
international events that the United States will be hosting.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
I would like to welcome everyone to this inaugural hearing
of the bipartisan House Committee on Homeland Security's Task
Force on Enhancing Security for Special Events in the United
States. In the coming decade, the United States will host
millions of international travelers for several major national
and international special events, including the FIFA World Cup,
the celebration of the United States' 250th birthday in 2026,
and the Los Angeles Summer Olympics of 2028. Though these
events present an opportunity to showcase everything that makes
America great, we cannot forget that our adversaries and other
violent extremists will view these events as targets for
inflicting mass casualties and generating fear. To that end, I
am honored to chair the task force and lead the committee's
efforts in investigating and conducting oversight of the
security needs of these major national and international
events.
Our goal is to develop and advance legislative solutions
that will enhance our preparedness and security posture against
all threats. I look forward to working with the Ranking Member
of the task force, Ms. Nellie Pou of New Jersey, and with all
the Members assigned to this task force to empower State and
local law enforcement and other first responders to carry out
their missions.
As we prepare to secure the major events ahead, this task
force must begin by learning from past failures, both here and
abroad. In the United States, we have seen deadly attacks at
mass gatherings: the 1996 Olympic bombing in Atlanta and the
2025 New Year's Day attack in New Orleans. Abroad, the 1972
Munich Olympics, which are still emblazoned in my mind, saw
terrorists murder 9--or, sorry, 11--Israeli athletes after
exploiting security gaps. In addition, in 2015, ISIS launched
coordinated attacks across Paris, killing 130. These tragedies
make clear the cost of complacency and we owe it to the
American people to confront these lessons and ensure we don't
repeat them. This hearing is the first step.
Today's historic focus will lead us to discuss and consider
like the instance of vehicular terrorism on January 1 this year
in New Orleans, the crowd security breach at the Copa America
final game at the Miami Hard Rock Stadium last year, and the
Kansas City parade shooting early last year. We will also
discuss the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, which occurred during
my tenure as Chairman of this committee.
Commissioner Davis, it is great to see you again. We worked
well together in our oversight and investigating the activities
following that tragedy to find a constructive outcome so that
something like that couldn't happen again.
So we look forward to hearing from our witnesses on these
challenges, what we can do better. More importantly, we want to
know what more Congress and the Federal Government can do to
strengthen security ahead of these major events.
One clear lesson from the past attacks is the need for
strong intelligence sharing. Our State and local law
enforcement rely on timely information from the Federal
intelligence community, especially our fusion centers. With
rising tensions in the Middle East and the threat of Iran-
backed actors operating inside the United States, raising
awareness and coordination is critical to stopping potential
attacks before they happen.
Earlier this month, Congress passed and the President
signed into law supplemental funding for the World Cup and the
Los Angeles Olympics, which will be used in part to enhance
information sharing. That same information sharing is critical
in stopping human trafficking, which we see, unfortunately, all
too well at these events.
With millions of international visitors expected, criminal
networks will look to exploit. We also face a growing threat
from drones. According to the NFL, there are over 2,800 drone
incursions at stadiums during the 2023 season, a 4,000 percent
increase from just 5 years prior. With minimal skill, bad
actors can use these drones to launch attacks or create chaos.
Yet most State and local agencies lack the authority to
respond. We need to equip Federal agencies so they can help the
State agencies and close the gap to make these events safe.
We have lots of work to do ahead of these events. Hope this
hearing is a strong first step to ensure the incidents we
discussed today will never happen again. The United States
remains a global leader in providing safe and secure
experiences for citizens and visitors alike.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
July 22, 2025
Welcome, everyone, to this inaugural hearing of the bipartisan
House Committee on Homeland Security's Task Force on Enhancing Security
for Special Events in the United States. In the coming decade, the
United States will host millions of international travelers for several
major national and international special events, including the FIFA
World Cup, celebration of the United States' 250th birthday in 2026,
and the Los Angeles Summer Olympics 2028.
Though these events present an opportunity to showcase everything
that makes America great, we cannot forget that our adversaries and
other violent extremists will view these events as targets for
inflicting mass casualties and generating fear. To that end, I am
honored to chair this Task Force and lead the committee's efforts in
investigating and conducting oversight of the security needs of these
major national and international special events. Our goal is to develop
and advance legislative solutions that will enhance our preparedness
and security posture against all threats.
I look forward to working with the Ranking Member of this Task
Force, Ms. Nellie Pou of New Jersey, and with all the Members assigned
to this Task Force to empower State and local law enforcement and other
first responders to carry out their missions for these events.
As we prepare to secure the major events ahead, this Task Force
must begin by learning from past failures--both here at home and
abroad. In the United States, we've seen deadly attacks at mass
gatherings: the 1996 Olympic bombing in Atlanta and the 2025 New Year's
Day terrorist attack in New Orleans. Abroad, the 1972 Munich Olympics
saw terrorists murder 11 Israeli athletes after exploiting security
gaps. In 2015, ISIS launched coordinated attacks across Paris, killing
130.
These tragedies make clear the cost of complacency. We owe it to
the American people to confront these lessons and ensure we don't
repeat them. This hearing is the first step.
Today's historical focus will lead us to discuss and consider
events like the instance of vehicular terrorism on January 1 of this
year in New Orleans, the crowd security breach at the Copa America
final game at Miami Hard Rock Stadium last year, and the Kansas City
parade shooting early last year.
We will also discuss the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, which
occurred during my tenure as Chairman of this committee. I was heavily
involved in organizing this committee's oversight and investigative
activities following that tragedy.
We look forward to hearing from our witnesses on the challenges
they faced, how coordination and response can be improved, and how
their agencies have adapted to prevent future attacks. Most
importantly, we want to know what more Congress and the Federal
Government can do to strengthen security ahead of major events.
One clear lesson from past attacks is the need for strong
intelligence sharing. Our State and local law enforcement rely on
timely information from the Federal intelligence community, especially
through our fusion centers. With rising tensions in the Middle East,
and the threat of Iran-backed actors operating inside the United
States, raising awareness and coordination is critical to stopping
potential attacks before they happen.
Earlier this month, Congress passed, and the President signed into
law, supplemental funding for the World Cup and the Los Angeles
Olympics, which will be used in part to enhance the information-sharing
environment. That same information sharing is critical in stopping
human trafficking. With millions of international visitors expected,
criminal networks will look to exploit the crowds.
We also face a growing threat from drones. According to the NFL,
there were over 2,800 drone incursions at stadiums during the 2023
season--a 4,000-percent increase from just 5 years prior. With minimal
skill, bad actors can use these drones to launch attacks or create
chaos. Yet most State and local agencies lack the authority to respond.
We need to equip Federal agencies and close the gap to keep these
events safe.
There is still much work to do to secure our homeland ahead of
these special events. I hope this hearing is a strong first step in
ensuring we discuss today never happen again, and that the United
States remains a global leader in providing safe and secure experiences
for citizens and visitors alike.
Mr. McCaul. With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member
of the task force, Ms. Pou, for her opening statement.
Ms. Pou. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. Good afternoon to
you, sir. I am so very pleased to be leading this, our
bipartisan task force with you today for our first hearing.
Before I start, I want to express my deepest sympathy to
the victims of the attack in Los Angeles over the weekend. I
pray for everyone's recovery. This tragedy, which injured more
than 30 people, demonstrates how important it is for law
enforcement to have plans in place to prevent, mitigate, and
respond to threats, including threats that may arise outside of
venues.
This task force has a deeply important mission as our
country prepares to host some of the world's largest gatherings
and celebration over the next 3 years, events like the 250th
anniversary of America's founding, the 78 matches of the 2026
FIFA World Cup, and the 2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games will
put American hospitality on display for the world to see. I am
so excited that the final match of the 2026 World Cup will be
held in Bergen County, in my district, and our Fan Festival
will be right down the road at the Liberty State Park.
Congress and the Executive branch must be ready to roll out
the red carpet and ensure that our State, local, Tribal, and
territorial partners have the resources they need to ensure the
safety, security and success of these mass gatherings. As we go
forward, we must keep in mind that it is not just stadiums and
parking lots we need to protect. It is fan festivals,
entertainment districts, bars, gathering spaces where people
will be gathering to celebrate.
I want to thank our witnesses for testifying. Each of you
has an important perspective on lessons learned as we examine
past security incidents at mass gathering events. At the 2013
Boston Marathon, terrorists detonated homemade bombs. Three
died and over 500 were injured.
In February 2024, the Kansas City Chiefs won the Super Bowl
and the city turned out for a massive celebration and parade.
Sadly, after the parade, 2 men began arguing and shot at each
other. Within minutes more shots were fired and 1 person was
killed and more than 20 people were injured.
During the 2024 Copa America finals in Florida, thousands
of fans without tickets crashed the gate, jumped the barriers,
and entered the stadium, bypassing the security and police.
We all were devastated this year when a terrorist rented a
pickup truck and rammed through a crowd on Bourbon Street,
killing 14 people and injuring dozens. Our committee traveled
to New Orleans to hear directly from those involved in the
response.
Today's witnesses are law enforcement officers who face
these tragic events and they are here to help us apply the
lessons they have learned to the hundreds of mass gathering
events that will unfold over the next 3 years. But we also want
to take a look forward and hear about what State, local,
Tribal, and territorial partners need from us to prepare for
the America 250 celebrations, the 2026 first FIFA World Cup and
the 2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Two of our witnesses
today will play leading roles in the securing FIFA World Cup
matches next year.
Before closing, I want to just point out that while our
cities prepare for these amazing, wonderful celebrations of
sports and global fellowship, I think it is important for me to
share that, you know, unfortunately, the administration has
cut, frozen, or slowed disbursement of DHS and FEMA grants to
help cities address terrorism as well as regional preparedness.
Cities and State needed that money absolutely now, yesterday. I
hope to hear from our witnesses how grants like the State
Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiatives
keep Americans safe at mass gathering events.
I am also worried that the administration's treatment of
immigrants have sent a message to the world that you are not
welcome here. Tourism is already down across the country and
our State and local economies are suffering. If the
administration's visa policies keep people from traveling to
the United States for the World Cup or Olympics, our
communities will indeed suffer. That is really bad policy and
bad economics.
Mr. Chairman, I truly look forward to working with you to
make sure that our communities and law enforcement get
everything that they need and that they are able to get that
soon.
I would also, Mr. Chairman, would ask a unanimous his
consent that the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter, be
permitted to sit with the task force and question today's
witnesses.
Mr. McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Pou. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Pou follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Nellie Pou
July 22, 2025
I want to express my deepest sympathy to the victims of the attack
in Los Angeles over the weekend. I pray for everyone's recovery. This
tragedy--which injured more than 30 people--demonstrates how important
it is for law enforcement to have plans in place to prevent, mitigate,
and respond to threats, including threats that may arise outside of
venues.
This Task Force has a deeply important mission as our country
prepares to host some of the world's largest gatherings and
celebrations over the next 3 years. Events like the 250th Anniversary
of America's Founding, the 78 matches of the 2026 FIFA World Cup, and
the 2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games will put American hospitality on
display for the world to see. I am so excited that the final match of
the 2026 World Cup will be held in Bergen County in my district. Our
Fan Festival will be right down the road at Liberty State Park.
Congress and the Executive branch must be ready to roll out the red
carpet and ensure our State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners
have the resources they need to ensure the safety, security, and
success of these mass gatherings. And as we go forward, we must keep in
mind that it's not just stadiums and parking lots we need to protect--
it's fan festivals, entertainment districts, bars, and gathering spaces
where people will be celebrating. I want to thank our witnesses for
testifying. Each of you has an important perspective on lessons learned
as we examine past security incidents at mass gathering events.
At the 2013 Boston Marathon, terrorists detonated homemade bombs.
Three died and over 500 were injured. in February 2024, the Kansas City
Chiefs won the Super Bowl, and the city turned out for a massive
celebration and parade. Sadly, after the parade, 2 men began arguing
and shot at each other. Within minutes, more shots were fired, 1 person
was killed, and more than 20 people were injured. During the 2024 Copa
America final in Florida, thousands of fans without tickets crashed the
gates, jumped barriers, and entered the stadium--bypassing security and
police. And we all were devastated this year when a terrorist rented a
pickup truck and rammed through a crowd on Bourbon Street, killing 14
people and injuring dozens. Our committee traveled to New Orleans to
hear directly from those involved in the response.
Today's witnesses are law enforcement officers who faced these
tragic events, and they are here to help us apply the lessons they
learned to the hundreds of mass gathering events that will unfold over
the next 3 years. But we also want to take a look forward and hear
about what State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners need from us
to prepare for the America 250 celebrations, 2026 FIFA World Cup, and
2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Two of our witnesses today will play
leading roles in securing FIFA World Cup Matches next year.
Before closing, I want to point out that while our cities prepare
for these wonderful celebrations of sport and global fellowship, the
administration has cut, frozen, and slowed disbursement of DHS and FEMA
grants that help cities address terrorism and regional preparedness.
Cities and States needed that money yesterday.
I hope to hear from our witnesses how grants like the State
Homeland Security Program and Urban Area Security Initiative keep
Americans safe at mass gathering events. I am also worried that the
administration's treatment of immigrants has sent a message to the
world that ``You are not welcome here.'' Tourism is already down across
the country, and our State and local economies are suffering.
If the administration's visa policies keep people from traveling to
the United States for the World Cup or Olympics, our communities will
suffer. That's bad policy and bad economics.
Mr. McCaul. I thank Ranking Member Pou. Other Members of
the task force are reminded that opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
July 22, 2025
The United States will soon host some of the world's largest
sporting events and gatherings--the 2026 World Cup, 2028 Olympic and
Paralympic Games, and America 250 celebrations. I thank my colleagues,
Michael McCaul and Nellie Pou, for spearheading the committee's Task
Force to help ensure our stadiums, arenas, and other venues are secure.
To protect the thousands of athletes, fans, and attendees, Federal
agencies must closely collaborate with State and local partners, and
Congress must provide first responders with the resources they require.
Mass gathering events are attractive targets, including for bad actors
who wish to inflict mass casualties to further their cause.
Our witnesses today know all too well the tragedy that can unfold
in a matter of seconds. Mr. Edward Davis is testifying today. He worked
closely with Congress during the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing that
killed 3 and injured hundreds. Also testifying today is a
representative of the Louisiana State Police. On New Year's Day, a
vehicle-ramming attack took 14 innocent lives in New Orleans, and 2
police officers were shot. And Miami-Dade County, where Sheriff Rosie
Cordero-Stutz is the top law enforcement officer, hosted last year's
Copa America soccer final, at which thousands of fans without tickets
stormed the stadium and overcame security and police.
While we continue to face domestic terrorism threats inspired by
foreign actors, we cannot lose focus on ensuring mass gatherings are
protected from gun violence. Police Chief Stacey Graves oversaw the
response to the mass shooting during the Kansas City Super Bowl parade
in 2024, in which a personal dispute left 1 dead and more than 20
people injured. The persistent threat of gun violence in this country
poses a significant public safety challenge, particularly around
special events that will draw tens of thousands of spectators. This
year alone, there have been at least 231 mass shooting events in the
United States, leaving 175 people dead. We must do more than offer our
thoughts and prayers.
Today's witnesses can teach us how to apply the lessons learned
from these past security incidents to future events. We must also
consider emerging threats, including drones. Drones, often a disruptive
nuisance at sporting events, can be altered to deliver a deadly
payload.
Last Congress, I cosponsored bipartisan legislation, H.R. 8610, the
Counter-UAS Authority, Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act, that
would have extended and expanded counter-drone authorities, including
by establishing a pilot program for State and local law enforcement
agencies to receive drone mitigation authorities. House Republican
leadership never called the bill up for floor consideration. Congress
must act now to provide enhanced authorities to counter the increasing
prevalence of drones.
It is also critical that Federal preparedness grants--which fund
everything from emergency planning and training to equipment and
exercises--are disbursed as required by law. President Trump and
Secretary Noem have frozen grant funding Congress provided for the
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), the State Homeland Security
Program (SHSP), and the Securing the Cities (STC) program. Law
enforcement and first responders that help protect us all are counting
on the Trump administration to follow the law and get this desperately-
needed funding to communities across America.
Ensuring that mass gathering events are secure from all threats,
including terrorism, drones, and gun violence requires a whole-of-
Government approach. Democratic Members stand at the ready to provide a
welcoming and safe environment for all who attend major events.
Mr. McCaul. I am pleased to have such an important panel of
witnesses before us today and ask the witnesses, please rise
and raise their right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. McCaul. Thank you. Please be seated. Let the record
reflect the witnesses have answered in the affirmative.
We have several witnesses. First, Sheriff Rosie Cordero-
Stutz serves as the sheriff for Miami-Dade Sheriff's Office.
Since her election on January 7, 2025, Sheriff Cordero-Stutz
has dedicated over 29 years to law enforcement profession.
Second, Mr. Ed Davis, present CEO of the Edward Davis
Company. Don't want to put you on the spot. He has been in law
enforcement for 35 years. Served as a police commissioner of
the city of Boston from December 2006 until October 2013. Mr.
Davis led the highly successful response to the Boston Marathon
bombing. The second month I was sworn in as Chairman of this
committee. It is quite an honor, sir, to see you back in the
same hearing room where we, I think, working together
accomplished a great deal to make this country safer. Thank
you, sir.
Colonel Robert Hodges is superintendent for the Louisiana
State Police. On January 8, 2024, he was appointed as the 27th
superintendent of the Louisiana State Police. He has 30 years
with the Louisiana State Police and briefly served as an
intelligence officer in the Louisiana Army National Guard
Reserve.
To our last witness, I would like to yield to Emanuel
Cleaver to introduce the witness from his great State of
Missouri.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Pou,
it is a pleasure for me to introduce our illustrious police
chief. Chief Stacey Graves, a lifelong resident of Kansas City,
Missouri, began her career at the KCPD in 1997 as a civilian
records clerk. After joining the Police Academy in December
1997, she had multiple assignments as a police officer,
including various divisions of that department.
She has unique credentials to assume this position. On
December 15, 2022, 25 years after starting her police career at
the Academy, she was selected to be the police chief of Kansas
City, Missouri. At age 48, Graves became the 48th police chief
in Kansas City, Missouri's 148-year history. It is a pleasure
for me to present my police chief, the police chief of Kansas
City, Missouri, including the Super Bowl-bound Kansas City
Chiefs, Chief Graves.
Mr. McCaul. That is very well done. Thank you.
I now recognize Sheriff Cordero-Stutz for 5 minutes to
summarize her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF SHERIFF ROSIE CORDERO-STUTZ, SHERIFF, MIAMI-DADE
COUNTY, MIAMI-DADE SHERIFF'S OFFICE
Sheriff Cordero-Stutz. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman
McCaul, Ranking Member Pou, and Members of the House Homeland
Security Task Force on Special Events. I would also like to
acknowledge the representative of my home town, Congressman
Carlos Gimenez. Congressman, is always nice to see you.
Thank you for the opportunity to address this task force
and provide a detailed analysis of the lessons learned from
Copa America and the ways in which we have reassessed and put
into motion advanced safety protocols in preparation for future
high-profile events such as FIFA 2026. While it is appropriate
to recognize and celebrate the accomplishments of the event, it
is equally incumbent upon us to acknowledge the inherent
challenges we encountered during Copa America. Foremost among
the lessons learned is the critical importance of meticulous
early stage planning, including comprehensive scenario-based
drills.
Equally vital is the development of robust mitigation
strategies that prioritize crowd dynamics, layered security
parameters--correction perimeters, agile deployment forces,
event-based intelligence gathering, and seamless interagency
collaboration at the local, national, and international levels.
During Copa America stadium personnel alongside members of the
Miami-Dade Sheriff's Office faced considerable operational
challenges stemming from a large influx of individuals at the
stadium premises. The crowd demonstrated persistent attempts to
breach established security measures in an effort to gain
entry. The existing single gate entry system was inadequate for
efficiently managing the volume of attendees. Notably, many
individuals present did not possess tickets, but still
attempted to access the sold-out event.
Due to the density of people at entry points, it was
difficult for deputies, security staff, and other law
enforcement agencies to accurately distinguish ticketed guests
from those without tickets and no procedures were in place for
the removal of unauthorized individuals. To address these
challenges, a three-tiered entry protocol has since been
adopted to ensure early identification and preemptive removal
of individuals without valid credentials, thereby alleviating
pressure at main entry points. Each tier focus--each tier
features a screening process that mandates attendees to present
valid admission tickets. This approach enables the effective
identification of removal of individuals without tickets prior
to their arrival at the main gate. Further security
enhancements include reinforced barriers and specialized
fencing within the inner perimeter, providing an additional
layer of deterrence against unauthorized access.
Staffing at each checkpoint has been increased with both
private security personnel and MDSO staff, deployed to ensure
the efficient management of large crowds. The strategic
placement of specially-trained deputies throughout the stadium
has proven effective in overseeing large and potentially
volatile crowds. These officers serve as a significant
deterrent and are prepared to effectively manage complex
scenarios.
During recent FIFA Club World Cup events, Rapid Deployment
Force, or RDF, personnel were assigned to critical areas,
successfully addressing unruly spectators and ensuring
comprehensive security around the stadium perimeter. The
initial event preparations involved gathering baseline data.
However, this information proved insufficient for supplying
stakeholders with actionable insight. As a result, an enhanced
methodology has been implemented incorporating crowd behavior
monitoring, social media analysis, and threat identification.
This comprehensive approach empowers key stakeholders to make
timely and well-informed decisions.
At this time, I would like to present an overview of the
strategies and safety protocols being implemented and evaluated
in preparation for the future high-level event, particularly
FIFA 2026. For example, the adoption of an integrated
communication system is essential. Real-time synchronized
communication among all stakeholders, including law
enforcement, emergency response services, event organizers, and
local authorities ensure seamless information flow and
coordinated responses. Additionally, transparent communication
with the public is crucial for fostering trust and encouraging
compliance with safety protocols.
Empowering qualified volunteers and personnel through
comprehensive training programs is also a key priority. Regular
drills and scenario-based exercises equip staff with the
necessary skills to respond swiftly and effectively to
emergencies, suspicious activities, and guest assistance needs.
It is equally important to ensure that venues and
communications are accessible to all individuals, including
those with disabilities and from diverse cultural backgrounds.
Employing multilingual law enforcement agents, both overt and
covert, further supports effective crowd management and
engagement.
A healthy budget is fundamental to ensuring the highest
level of safety at major events. Adequate funding is required
for additional deputies, overtime, and investment in advanced
technologies which will enable rapid response capabilities and
reinforce MDSO's commitment to safety.
The establishment of centralized command centers throughout
the venues is critical for the coordination of resources
information sharing and decision making during the large-scale
events. Command centers serve as operational hubs, enabling
authorities to monitor situations in real time and deploy
resources where needed most efficiently.
Community engagement and an educational outreach prior to
high-level events are also vital to the overall efforts.
Information campaigns through op-ed pieces, videos, and other
media will educate both locals and guests about safety
protocols, emergency procedures, and available resources,
enhancing the preparedness and promoting a culture of safety
throughout the host community and beyond.
Before closing, I would like to underscore one final point.
The Miami-Dade Sheriff's Office is committed to public safety.
While we recognize and appreciate the partnership between event
organizers, vendors, and sponsors for large community events,
their operational cost and projected revenues should not
override or minimize the importance of public safety
considerations. MDSO maintains sole authority over personnel
deployment and resource allocation for these large-scale
events.
In conclusion, the World Cup served as a pivotal event,
offering valuable insight, experience, and lessons learned. A
thorough analysis of areas for enhancement has strengthened
MDSO's approach to safety and security for forthcoming major
events. By embracing technology advancement, fostering
interagency cooperation, and implementing a comprehensive
training program, we maintain--we remain committed to the
ensuring of a secure and successful, exceptional experience for
all the participants of FIFA 2026. We should move forward with
collective responsibility and vigilance to ensure that FIFA and
other international events hosted by Miami-Dade County
exemplify both the celebration of the achievement and the
higher standards of safety, unity, and resilience.
I thank you for your attention and I'm available to answer
any questions or receive recommendations.
[The prepared statement of Sheriff Cordero-Stutz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rosie Cordero-Stutz
July 22, 2025
Good afternoon, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Pou, and
Members of the House Homeland Security Task Force on Special
Events. I would also like to acknowledge the representative
from my home town, Congressman Carlos Gimenez. Congressman
always so nice to see you.
Thank you for the opportunity to address this task force
and provide a detailed analysis of the lessons learned from
Copa America, and the ways in which we have reassessed and put
into motion advanced safety protocols in preparation for future
high-profile events such as FIFA 2026.
While it is appropriate to recognize and celebrate the
accomplishments of the event, it is equally incumbent upon us
to acknowledge the inherent challenges we encountered during
Copa America. Foremost among the lessons learned is the
critical importance of meticulous, early-stage planning
including comprehensive scenario-based drills. Equally vital is
the development of robust mitigation strategies that prioritize
crowd dynamics, layered security perimeters, agile deployment
forces, event-based intelligence gathering, and seamless
interagency collaboration at local, national, and international
levels.
During World Copa, stadium personnel, alongside members of
the Miami-Dade Sheriff's Office, faced considerable operational
challenges stemming from a large influx of individuals at the
stadium premises. The crowd demonstrated persistent attempts to
breach established security measures in an effort to gain
entry. The existing single gate entry system was inadequate for
efficiently managing the volume of attendees. Notably, many
individuals present did not possess tickets but still attempted
to access the sold-out event. Due to the density of people at
entry points, it was difficult for deputies, security staff,
and other law enforcement agencies to accurately distinguish
ticketed guests from those without tickets, and no procedures
were in place for the removal of unauthorized individuals.
To address these challenges, a 3-tiered entry protocol has
since been adopted to ensure early identification and
preemptive removal of individuals without valid credentials,
thereby alleviating pressure at main entry points. Each tier
features a screening process that mandates attendees to present
valid admission tickets. This approach enables the effective
identification and removal of individuals without tickets prior
to their arrival at the main entrance. Further security
enhancements include reinforced barriers and specialized
fencing within the inner perimeter, providing an additional
layer of deterrence against unauthorized access. Staffing at
each checkpoint has been increased, with both private security
personnel and MDSO staff deployed to ensure the efficient
management of large crowds.
The strategic placement of specially-trained deputies
throughout the stadium has proven effective in overseeing large
and potentially volatile crowds. These officers serve as a
significant deterrent and are prepared to effectively manage
complex scenarios. During recent FIFA Club World Cup events,
Rapid Deployment Force personnel were assigned to critical
areas, successfully addressing unruly spectators, and ensuring
comprehensive security around the stadium perimeter.
The initial event preparations involved gathering baseline
data; however, this information proved insufficient for
supplying stakeholders with actionable insights. As a result,
an enhanced methodology has been implemented, incorporating
crowd behavior monitoring, social media analysis, and threat
identification. This comprehensive approach empowers key
stakeholders to make timely and well-informed decisions.
At this time, I would like to present an overview of the
strategies and safety protocols being implemented and evaluated
in preparation for future high-level events such as FIFA 2026.
For example, the adoption of integrated communication systems
is essential. Real-time, synchronized communication among all
stakeholders including law enforcement, emergency response
services, event organizers, and local authorities ensures
seamless information flow and coordinated responses.
Additionally, transparent communication with the public is
crucial for fostering trust and encouraging compliance with
safety protocols.
Empowering qualified volunteers and personnel through
comprehensive training programs is also a key priority. Regular
drills and scenario-based exercises equip staff with the
necessary skills to respond swiftly and effectively to
emergencies, suspicious activities, and guest assistance needs.
It is equally important to ensure that venues and
communications are accessible to all individuals, including
those with disabilities and from diverse cultural backgrounds.
Employing multilingual law enforcement agents, both overt and
covert, further supports effective crowd management and
engagement.
A healthy budget is fundamental to ensuring the highest
level of safety at major events. Adequate funding is required
for additional deputies, overtime, and investment in advanced
technologies which will enable rapid response capabilities and
reinforce MDSO's commitment to safety.
The establishment of centralized command centers throughout
the venues is critical for the coordination of resources,
information sharing, and decision making during large-scale
events. Command centers serve as operational hubs, enabling
authorities to monitor situations in real time and deploy
resources where needed most efficiently.
Community engagement and educational outreach prior to
high-level events are vital to overall safety efforts.
Informative campaigns through op-ed pieces, videos, and other
media will educate both locals and guests about safety
protocols, emergency procedures, and available resources,
thereby enhancing preparedness and promoting a culture of
safety throughout the host community and beyond. Before
closing, I would like to underscore one final point. The Miami-
Dade Sheriff's Office is committed to public safety. While we
recognize and appreciate the partnership between event
organizers, vendors, and sponsors for large community events;
their operational costs and projected revenues should NOT
override or minimize the importance of public safety
considerations. MDSO maintains sole authority over personnel
deployment and resource allocation for these large-scale
events.
In conclusion, the World Copa served as a pivotal event,
offering valuable insights, experiences, and lessons learned. A
thorough analysis of areas for enhancement has strengthened
MDSO's approach to safety and security for forthcoming major
events. By embracing technological advancements, fostering
interagency cooperation, and implementing comprehensive
training, we remain committed to ensuring a secure and
exceptional experience for all participants at FIFA 2026.
We should move forward with collective responsibility and
vigilance to ensure that FIFA and other international events
hosted by Miami Dade County exemplify both the celebration of
achievement and the highest standards of safety, unity, and
resilience.
Thank you for your attention. I am available to answer any
questions or receive recommendations.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Sheriff.
I now recognize Mr. Davis for 5 minutes for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD F. DAVIS, III, PRESIDENT AND CEO, THE
EDWARD DAVIS COMPANY; FORMER POLICE COMMISSIONER, BOSTON POLICE
DEPARTMENT
Mr. Davis. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Pou, and
distinguished Members of the Task Force, I would like to thank
you for the opportunity to testify at today's hearing and to
contribute to this important discussion with these
distinguished police leaders on how the lessons learned in the
12 years since the Boston Marathon bombings can help drive
meaningful security advancements.
As the United States prepares for a series of major
upcoming special events, including the FIFA World Cup and the
2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games, it is critical that we apply
those lessons to strengthen our collective preparedness,
incorporating advancements in intelligence and technology,
enhancing interagency coordination, and ensuring the safety of
all who participate.
The tragic events of the 2013 Boston Marathon, a terrorist
bombing that claimed the lives of Lyu Lingzi, Krystle Campbell,
and Martin Richard, Officer Sean Collier, and Dennis Simmonds,
and left hundreds injured and maimed, forever changed the city
of Boston. The response to the attack demonstrated that
effective preparedness depends not only on planning, but also
on seamless collaboration and the critical importance of
intelligence cooperation across all levels of law enforcement
agencies and first responders. This integrated effort was
instrumental in the successful identification and apprehension
of the suspects.
The Boston Regional Intelligence Fusion Center, the BRIC,
served as a central hub for intelligence gathering during and
after the attack. As one of the intelligence sharing nodes
established by the Department of Homeland Security, the BRIC
underscored the value of integrated intelligence operations and
led to broader national investments in fusion center
capabilities. This highlighted their role as force multipliers
in complex emergencies by breaking down agency silos, but
actively seeking out what is unknown through cooperative
efforts across jurisdictions.
Equally important is how that information is communicated,
as intelligence is only as effective as the clarity, content,
and timeliness with which it is received. This mindset starts
with leadership. The tone set by the boss matters because what
their leaders say, the officers respond to. BRIC's intelligence
response was swift in Boston. It allowed us to capture the
terrorists in 4 days' time.
Another tool exemplifying the benefits of integrated
coordination is the Department of Homeland Security Special
Event Assessment, or SEAR, rating. SEAR ratings are voluntarily
submitted for special events, which are sent to DHS Office of
Operations Coordination by State, local, and Federal officials
for an overall risk assessment. This intelligence is critical
for on the ground security planning and resources. The SEAR
rating is currently effective, but needs prioritization as the
United States prepares to host upcoming global events such as
the World Cup and the Olympic Games.
As I previously testified for this committee during the
Boston Marathon, the overwhelming number of phone calls, texts,
and internet searches rendered voice communications practically
useless for everyone, including the police officers on the
scene and those responding. Local and Federal law enforcement
were impeded and change was critically important. The goal of
the group, named FirstNet, is to provide law enforcement of
first responders with the ability to access a highly secure and
completely reliable service network during times when
commercial service becomes overwhelmed, exactly when it is
needed most. The system works. The partnership works for first
responders.
Another aspect of technology has seen significant
improvement is AI capabilities for video and photo
surveillance. This is both good and bad, Mr. Chairman. The AI
abilities of the police to analyze this data, which took us
days in the Boston Marathon situation, has been greatly
improved. So those days are now ours instead. But AI also
presents a challenge of deep fakes and other issues where the
malicious actors can use this information to sow unrest and
lack of trust in these events. This is one of the main
priorities I think we need to face at this time.
As was published in a white paper that I helped pen for the
National Institute of Justice's Harvard Executive Session on
Policing and Public Safety in March 2014, the Boston Police
Department successfully used Twitter to establish a two-way
dialog with the public about the status of investigations, to
calm nerves, and request assistance to correct mistaken
information reported by the press, and to ask for restraint
from the public tweeting of information from police scanners.
This demonstrated the level of trust and interaction that a
department and community can attain on-line.
Cyber attacks have emerged as a sophisticated and
escalating threat to major sporting events. A conversation with
Cathy Lanier recently, the head of security for the NFL,
indicates that cyber is high on her list of priorities as these
events continue on.
As technology evolves one of the main threats I see out
there is first person view drones. My company works at stadiums
across the country helping secure. First-person view drones are
an increasing concern at major public venues. The biggest
innovation in warfare in decades, FPV drones represent a
transformative shift in how aerial threats are deployed,
blending low-cost accessibility with high-impact potential.
Unlike conventional, GPS-stabilized drones, FPV drones are
manually piloted, maneuverable, and capable of streaming real-
time video to operators. They make it incredibly difficult to
thwart these efforts.
Although several promising technologies exist, including
jamming systems that can intercept and disable drones, these
technologies are expensive and not readily available outside.
The colonel is on the cutting edge of this technology. I'll let
him continue the conversation about the drones.
As the United States prepares to host a series of events,
the threat landscape has evolved significantly. Extremist-
driven acts of violence, foreign influence operations, and
ideologically-motivated terrorists, both domestic and
international, have surged across the country.
In closing, while advancements have created a better
environment for law enforcement agencies to respond to crime,
the risk of danger and sacrifice that police throughout our
Nation face should not be underestimated. As new technology
becomes available to law enforcement, it becomes available to
criminals and terrorists. New threats, both physical and cyber,
emerge daily, especially those related to drone technology and
advancement. Police will continue to adapt and overcome, but it
is critical to ensure a coordinated effort for detection and
avoidance is in place.
I want to extend my gratitude to our law enforcement and
intelligence community partners for their unwavering commitment
to protecting our Nation. I thank you and this task force for
the opportunity to reflect on the hard-won lessons since the
Boston Marathon tragedy 12 years ago and to consider how we can
apply them moving forward. As the United States prepares to
take center stage by hosting these events, we have a unique
opportunity to demonstrate leadership, resilience, and
innovation in public safety on a global scale.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward F. Davis, III
July 22, 2025
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Pou, and distinguished Members of
the task force, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
testify at today's hearing and to contribute to this important
discussion on how the lessons learned in the 12 years since the Boston
Marathon bombings can help drive meaningful security advancements as
the United States prepares for a series of major upcoming special
events--including the FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Olympic and
Paralympic Games. It is critical that we apply those lessons to
strengthen our collective preparedness, incorporating advancements in
intelligence and technology, enhancing interagency coordination, and
ensuring the safety of all who participate.
The tragic events of the 2013 Boston Marathon--a terrorist bombing
that claimed the lives of Lu Lingzi, Krystle Campbell, Martin Richard,
Officers Sean Collier and Dennis Simmonds, and left hundreds injured,
forever changed the city of Boston. While the impact of that day will
never be forgotten, the collective response has served as a catalyst
for transformation. This incident reshaped how law enforcement, public
officials, the media, and the broader community prepare for and respond
to major emergencies. It highlighted the critical importance of
interagency coordination and real-time communication strategies. The
lessons learned continue to inform our approach to safeguarding public
events, managing crisis response, and conducting complex investigations
into terrorism. As we plan for future major events and incident
response, the Boston Marathon bombing stands as a stark reminder of the
stakes--and a testament to the importance of preparedness, resilience,
and unified action.
The response to the attack demonstrated that effective preparedness
depends not only on planning but also on seamless collaboration and the
critical importance of intelligence cooperation across all levels of
law enforcement agencies and government. Close coordination between
local, State, and Federal agencies was essential to ensuring public
safety. This integrated effort was instrumental in the successful
identification and apprehension of the suspects. The Boston Regional
Intelligence Fusion Center (BRIC) served as a central hub for
intelligence gathering during and after the attack. As one of the
intelligence-sharing nodes established by the Department of Homeland
Security, the BRIC synthesized information in real time from
surveillance footage, social media monitoring, citizen reports, and law
enforcement databases. This centralized and collaborative approach
significantly accelerated the identification of critical evidence and
suspects. The performance of the BRIC underscored the value of
integrated intelligence operations and led to broader national
investment in fusion center capabilities. This highlighted their role
as force multipliers in complex emergencies by breaking down agency
silos and enabling a unified response. To best safeguard against
evolving threats, intelligence agencies must remain open to
collaboration--not only sharing what is known, but actively seeking out
what is unknown through cooperative efforts across jurisdictions.
Equally important is how that information is communicated, as
intelligence is only as effective as the clarity, context, and
timeliness with which it is received and understood by those who must
act on it. This mindset starts with leadership; the tone set by the
chief matters, because what their leaders say, the officers do.
While the fusion center's intelligence response was swift in
Boston, the city of Los Angelos used lessons learned from Boston by
integrating Emergency Operations Centers into the fusion centers to
proactively embed the LA's Emergency Management Department software
during the 2022 Super Bowl, enabling minute-by-minute threat analysis
for on-the-ground tactical teams. Another tool exemplifying the
benefits of interagency coordination is the Department of Homeland
Security's Special Event Assessment (SEAR) Rating. SEAR ratings are
voluntarily submitted for special events, which are sent to DHS's
Office of Operations Coordination by State, local, and Federal
officials for an overall risk assessment. This intelligence is critical
for on-the-ground security planning. The SEAR rating is currently
utilized for major events such as the Super Bowl and Kentucky Derby,
and I would highly encourage it for the upcoming events as well. As the
United States prepares to host upcoming global events such as the FIFA
World Cup and the Olympic Games, the continued integration of fusion
centers into emergency operations and interagency collaborative
resources like the SEAR rating will be critical to facilitating real-
time communication, coordinated decision making, and effective threat
mitigation across all levels of law enforcement.
As I have previously testified to this committee, during the Boston
Marathon bombings, cell network capabilities dropped for all of those
in the direct vicinity of the attacks. The overwhelming number of phone
calls, texts, and internet searches rendered voice communications
practically useless for everyone, including the police officers on the
scene and those responding. With a lack of a secure network,
communications between municipalities, local and Federal law
enforcement were impeded, and change was critically important. In the
years since, technological advancements have played an important role
in enhancing investigative capabilities and public safety since the
2013 Boston Marathon bombings.
As a member of the board of advisors for AT&T and the company's
FirstNet platform, I've seen the public-private partnership of FirstNet
take on this challenge and improve first responders' ability to
communicate on scene. The goal of FirstNet is to provide law
enforcement and first responders with the ability to access a highly
secure and completely reliable service network during times when
commercial servers become overwhelmed, exactly when it is needed most.
In 2018, the network launched ``The FirstNet Core, a physically
separate and highly secure infrastructure that creates a differentiated
experience for first responders. FirstNet ensures an encrypted, end-to-
end communication network for law enforcement. This partnership works
for first responders.
Another aspect of technology that has seen significant improvement
is AI capabilities of video and photo surveillance, both private and
public. It has been well documented that the use of video surveillance
from Boylston Street restaurants and photos provided by spectators who
were at the scene of the attack led to the identification of the 2
suspects and provided a time line of their movements after the attacks,
leading to their apprehension. While video surveillance can sometimes
carry a negative connotation, it is essential to respect the
fundamental right to personal privacy. However, in high-profile
critical events, a clear cost-benefit analysis demonstrates that the
enhanced safety and security provided by identifying and preventing the
actions of bad actors outweighs the temporary compromise of privacy in
public spaces. Law enforcement combined video with analytic resources
available quickly and effectively after the fact. If only we had the
tools to prevent it.
At the time of the bombings, law enforcement agencies also faced
the challenge of sifting through and verifying information gathered
from the scene, tips from the public, and witness accounts, while
coordinating interagency decisions on how and when to share verified
information with the public. The Boston Marathon bombing was one of the
first incidents where law enforcement utilized the tools of social
media, such as ``X'' formerly known as Twitter, to communicate directly
with the public and media agencies. This was the Boston Police
Department's most effective way to share pertinent safety information
to the masses in real-time. As was published in a white paper I helped
pen for the National Institute of Justice's Harvard Executive Sessions
on Policing and Public Safety in March 2014, ``[The Boston Police
Department] successfully used Twitter to keep the public informed about
the status of the investigation, to calm nerves and request assistance,
to correct mistaken information reported by the press, and to ask for
public restraint in the tweeting of information from police scanners.
This demonstrated the level of trust and interaction that a department
and a community can attain online.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Davis, Edward F., Alejandro A. Alves, and David Alan Sklansky.
Social Media and Police Leadership: Lessons from Boston. New
Perspectives in Policing (Executive Session on Policing and Public
Safety) March 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reliance on open-source data, though, presents real challenges, as
the sheer volume of information can both aid and hinder investigations.
AI can now create realistic, false images of people and voice
replication. As was the case during the marathon bombings, these ``deep
fakes'', when used to interfere or disrupt an investigation, pose a
distinct challenge to law enforcement that Congress and legislation
must anticipate and prepare for. Deepfakes pose a significant threat to
major sporting events by enabling compelling disinformation campaigns
that can erode public trust and incite fear. In the lead-up to the 2024
Paris Olympics, a Russian-linked group released a deepfake video of Tom
Cruise warning of violence and corruption at the Games, part of a
broader effort to undermine confidence in French security and the event
itself. These tactics included spoofed news broadcasts, digitally-
fabricated graffiti threats, and false claims of mass ticket returns.
In the United States, the NFL has also flagged deepfakes and AI-
generated phishing as emerging threats, warning that impersonations of
players or staff could lead to reputational damage, data breaches, or
public panic. As generative AI tools become more accessible, the
potential for viral misinformation targeting athletes, teams, and
venues continues to grow, making deepfake resilience a crucial
component of modern event security.
Deepfakes are just one of the many resources available to cyber
criminals. Cyber attacks have emerged as a sophisticated and escalating
threat to major sporting events, with high-profile venues and
organizations increasingly targeted for espionage, disruption, and
extortion. Recent global incidents underscore the scope of this threat:
as stated, Russian-linked hackers targeted French Olympic planners
ahead of Paris 2024; Iranian actors leaked personal data of Israeli
athletes; and ransomware crippled IT systems at the Grand Palais, an
Olympic venue. In Asia, China reported over 200,000 cyber attacks
against infrastructure supporting the 2025 Asian Winter Games. The
threat has grown exponentially--Tokyo 2020 alone saw 4.4 billion cyber
attack attempts, prompting agencies like Microsoft and the UK's NCSC to
classify sports as high-risk sectors.
In the United States, the Super Bowl is emblematic of the
cybersecurity stakes. This mirrors a broader trend: 70 percent of
sports organizations now experience at least one cyber attack annually,
often targeting sensitive financial data, internal communications, or
live event feeds. Personal data from athletes and fans is increasingly
vulnerable due to the wide-spread use of digital apps and IoT-connected
systems. From data leaks that endanger athlete safety to attacks that
disrupt critical venue functions or broadcast feeds, cyber threats now
pose a tangible risk to national security, public confidence, and the
operational continuity of premier sporting events. A coordinated,
layered cybersecurity strategy is no longer optional, it is a
prerequisite for safe and resilient event execution.
As technology rapidly evolves, so does the potential for its
misuse, with advancements capable of exponentially increasing the risks
associated with emerging threats. A striking example is the rise of
First-Person View (FPV) drones, which are becoming an increasing
concern at major public venues across the United States. Often referred
to as the biggest innovation in warfare in decades, FPV drones
represent a transformative shift in how aerial threats are deployed,
blending low-cost accessibility with high-impact potential. Unlike
conventional GPS-stabilized drones, FPV drones are manually piloted,
highly maneuverable, and capable of streaming real-time video to
operators through goggles or screens. They bypass geofencing
restrictions and altitude limitations, enabling them to navigate
complex environments, such as stadium entrances, bleachers, or
rooftops, with precision and speed. Their analog controls and low radar
visibility make them challenging to detect, as they can be launched
discreetly from areas like parking lots with little to no advance
warning. The unfortunate reality is that it is only a matter of time
until this technology is used for terrorist goals. To effectively
address the evolving threat landscape posed by the proliferation of
privately-operated drones, a more robust approach is required,
particularly with regard to identifying potential insider threats. This
is especially critical in the context of high-profile or special
events. For example, in 2014, individuals from Massachusetts were
thwarted in an attempt to attack the Pentagon using self-piloted
drones; this early attempt underscores the importance of proactive
threat assessment and mitigation strategies.
Most recently, during the January 2025 AFC Wildcard game at M&T
Stadium, the game was stopped due to the use of an unauthorized drone
hovering above the stadium. This incident marked the third drone-
related disruption at the venue in 2 years, highlighting on-going
security concerns about how FPV drones can interrupt and cause
potential threats to major events.
Although several promising technologies exist, including jamming
systems that can intercept or disable threatening drones, these
technologies are expensive and not readily available outside of a
military setting. The most glaring concern remains the lack of an
acceptable, coordinated response protocol available to State and local
law enforcement agencies. A number of bipartisan bills have been
introduced over the years; however, these efforts have stalled. The
recent Executive Order helps, but does not go far enough. It is
imperative that we prioritize meaningful legislation that equips law
enforcement with the necessary tools to address the growing threat
posed by the public availability of drones. This absence of a clear
tactical and legal framework to respond to drone incursions represents
a critical gap in our current public safety strategy, and one that must
be urgently addressed to safeguard future events.
As the United States prepares to host a series of high-profile
international sporting events, we must draw clear lessons from past
domestic incidents like the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. That tragic
event underscored the devastating potential of lone-wolf actors and the
vulnerabilities of open-access venues. Since then, the threat landscape
has evolved significantly: extremist-driven acts of violence, foreign
influence operations, and ideologically-motivated terrorism, both
domestic and international, have surged across the country. Recent
attacks targeting public officials, religious gatherings, and
diplomatic personnel reveal a growing pattern of politically- and
religiously-motivated violence, often involving veterans, foreign
nationals, or radicalized individuals exploiting ideological divisions.
Coupled with rising threats of espionage and terrorism from state and
non-state actors such as Iran, North Korea, China, and ISIS, these
developments demand a comprehensive security posture. Protecting the
integrity of large-scale events now requires not only traditional
counterterrorism efforts but also robust intelligence coordination,
foreign influence detection, cyber resilience, and proactive community
threat assessments.
In closing, while advancements have created a better environment
for law enforcement and agencies to respond to crimes, the risk of
danger and sacrifice that police throughout our Nation face should not
be understated. As new technology becomes available to law enforcement,
it is also becomes available to criminals and terrorists. New threats,
both physical and cyber, emerge daily, especially those related to
drone technology and advancements. Police will continue to adapt and
overcome but it is critical to ensure a coordinated effort for
detection and avoidance is in place. I want to extend my gratitude to
our law enforcement and intelligence community partners for their
unwavering commitment to protecting our Nation. I thank you and this
task force for the opportunity to reflect on the hard-won lessons since
the Boston Marathon tragedy 12 years ago--and to consider how we can
apply them moving forward. As the United States prepares to take center
stage by hosting several major international sporting events in the
coming years, we have a unique opportunity to demonstrate leadership,
resilience, and innovation in public safety on a global scale.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
I now recognize Colonel Hodges for 5 minutes for his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT P. HODGES, SUPERINTENDENT, LOUISIANA STATE
POLICE
Colonel Hodges. Good afternoon, Chairman McCaul, Ranking
Member Pou, and distinguished Task Force Members. I'm Colonel
Robert Hodges, superintendent of Louisiana State Police. I was
born and raised in New Orleans and have served as a trooper for
the last 30 years. I've held a variety of positions in both
patrol and investigations, culminating to my appointment in
January 2024.
I'm here today to provide an overview of how Louisiana
navigated extraordinary public safety challenges in early 2025,
ranging from a terrorist attack to inclement weather. The
testimony reflects not only what we've endured, but what we
have achieved through resilience and partnership.
On New Year's Day 2025, just after 3 a.m., a vehicle
bypassed police barricades and plowed into pedestrians on
Bourbon Street in the city of New Orleans. Fourteen lives were
tragically lost and dozens others were injured. This was not a
tragic accident. It was confirmed by Federal partners as a
terrorist attack. LSP troopers and first responders immediately
rendered aid and secured the scene. Due to a longstanding
partnership with the Homeland Security Investigations, FBI,
ATF, and New Orleans Police Department, LSP initially took
complete control of the scene, allowing a rapid stabilization
while Federal teams mobilized to begin their investigation.
Agencies across multiple States worked together to identify and
locate other potential suspects.
In the wake of the attack and with the Sugar Bowl just
hours away, public safety priorities immediately shifted. LSP
and partners implemented an expanded security plan and delayed
the college football playoff game by just one day,
demonstrating the strength of interagency coordination and our
shared commitment to public safety.
As preparations began for Super Bowl LIX, Louisiana was
struck by a historic snowstorm which brought over 12 inches to
New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana, closing all of the major
interstate thoroughfares. The city was effectively paralyzed
and roadways were iced, access routes shut down, and emergency
services stretched to the limit. Nonetheless, LSP troopers
continued operations, conducting rescues, securing roads and
pressing forward with Super Bowl preparations. On February 9,
2025, Super Bowl LIX went forward without incident.
More than 500 LSP troopers and DPS officers and over 300
Louisiana National Guard members were deployed, including the
French Quarter Enhanced Security Zone. The operation
demonstrated the effectiveness of planning, discipline, and
community coordination.
Immediately afterward, our attention turned to Mardi Gras.
Enhanced safety protocols remained in place throughout the
State. Over 150 troopers and DPS personnel were deployed for
the carnival season to ensure secure, accessible celebrations.
In conclusion, during that 3-month span, Louisiana overcame
a terrorist attack, a paralyzing snowstorm, and multiple high-
risk public events. These experiences tested our infrastructure
systems' resolve, but they also reinforced our readiness, our
colleagues locally, rather our unity and our mission focus.
Through these events, we confirmed the need for several
critical resources from the Department of Homeland Security,
including the Special Event Threat Assessment, or SEAR, and
TFR, or temporary flight restrictions, along with UAS
mitigation and funding for training and equipment. Once Super
Bowl LIX was approved as a SEAR 1, the deployment over 100
explosive K-9 detection teams significantly increased our
ability to provide pre-event sweeps of large venues throughout
the week of Super Bowl.
Furthermore, the allowance of the TFR expansion and UAS
mitigation efforts enabled LSP to collaborate with local, other
State, and Federal partners to ensure a drone mitigation teams
collectively. This team identified over 250 violations and
intercepted over 80 pilots violating the TFR restrictions. The
CR1 classification, as Commissioner Davis talked about earlier,
also opened funding resources for training and equipment,
including additional robotic and X-ray devices for explosive
detection and other tactical enhancements.
The challenges we faced were unprecedented, but the lessons
learned will shape our path forward. As we say in our
department, it's one team, one dream, and one Louisiana.
Thank you for this opportunity and I welcome your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Hodges follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert P. Hodges
July 22, 2025
resilience in action: louisiana state police's unprecedented start to
2025
Distinguished Members of the committee, good afternoon. I am
Colonel Robert Hodges, superintendent of the Louisiana State Police
(LSP). I was born and raised in New Orleans and have served this great
State for over 30 years. During that time, I've held a variety of
positions in Patrol and Investigations, culminating in my appointment
as superintendent in January 2024.
I am here today to provide an overview of how Louisiana navigated
extraordinary public safety challenges in 2025, ranging from terrorism
to extreme weather. This testimony reflects not only what we've endured
but what we've achieved through resilience and partnership.
January 1, 2025: Vehicle-Ramming Terrorist Attack
On New Year's Day 2025, just after 3 o'clock a.m., a vehicle
bypassed police barricades and plowed into pedestrians on Bourbon
Street in New Orleans. Fourteen lives were tragically lost, and dozens
more were injured. This was not a tragic accident--it was confirmed by
Federal partners to be a terrorist attack.
LSP Troopers and local first responders immediately rendered aid
and secured the scene. Due to long-standing partnerships with Homeland
Security Investigations, the FBI, and the ATF, LSP initially took
complete control of the scene, allowing a rapid stabilization while
Federal teams mobilized to begin their investigation. Agencies across
multiple States worked together to identify and locate the suspect.
In the wake of the attack, and with the Sugar Bowl scheduled just
days later, public safety priorities immediately shifted. LSP and its
partners implemented an expanded security plan that delayed the College
Football Playoff game by only one day, demonstrating the strength of
interagency coordination and our shared commitment to public safety.
Snowstorm, Super Bowl, and Mardi Gras: Resilience in Action
As we began preparations for Super Bowl LIX, Louisiana was struck
by a historic snowstorm that brought over 12 inches of snow to New
Orleans. The city was effectively paralyzed, with roadways coated in
ice, access routes shut down, and emergency services stretched to the
limit. Nonetheless, LSP Troopers continued operations--conducting
rescues, securing roads, and pressing forward with Super Bowl
preparations.
On February 9, 2025, Super Bowl LIX went forward without incident.
More than 500 LSP and DPS personnel and over 300 National Guard members
were deployed, including in the French Quarter's Enhanced Security
Zone. The operation demonstrated the effectiveness of planning,
discipline, and community coordination.
Immediately afterward, our attention turned to Mardi Gras. Enhanced
safety protocols remained in place throughout the State. Over 150
Troopers and DPS personnel were deployed for the Carnival season to
ensure secure, accessible celebrations.
Conclusion
In a 3-month span, Louisiana overcame a terrorist attack, a
paralyzing snowstorm, and multiple high-risk public events. These
experiences tested our infrastructure, systems, and resolve, but they
also reinforced our readiness, unity, and mission focus.
Louisiana State Police has demonstrated resilience, adaptability,
and professionalism. Our efforts have been grounded in partnership with
our Federal colleagues, local agencies, and the people of Louisiana.
Through these events, we confirmed the need for several critical
resources from the Department of Homeland Security, including the
Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR), TFR expansions and UAS
mitigation, and funding for training and equipment.
Once Super Bowl LIX was approved as a SEAR 1 event, the deployment
of over 100 explosive detection canine teams significantly increased
the ability to provide pre-event sweeps of several large venues
throughout the week of Super Bowl activities.
Furthermore, the allowance for TFR expansions and UAS mitigation
efforts enabled LSP to collaborate with local and Federal public safety
agencies to establish a Drone Mitigation Team. This team identified
over 250 TFR violations and intercepted over 80 pilots violating the
temporary flight restriction.
The SEAR 1 classification also opened funding sources for training
and equipment, including additional robotic and X-ray devices for
explosive detection and other tactical enhancements.
The challenges we faced were unprecedented, but the lessons learned
will shape our path forward.
As we say in our department: One Team. One Dream. One Louisiana.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I welcome your questions.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Colonel Hodges.
I recognize Chief Graves for 5 minutes for an opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF CHIEF STACEY GRAVES, POLICE CHIEF, KANSAS CITY
MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief Graves. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Pou, and
distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to be here today. I also thank my Congressman
Cleaver for the wonderful introduction. My name is Stacey
Graves and I am proud to serve as a chief of police for the
Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department.
Our department is steadfast in its commitment to delivering
a safe and successful World Cup experience for participants and
fans. Drawing on valuable lessons learned from past incidents
and embracing innovative strategies and resource management and
collaboration, the department stands ready to meet
unprecedented challenges that lie ahead. The opportunity to
host the World Cup is not only a testament to our city's
vibrant spirit, but also an occasion to showcase Kansas City,
Missouri, on the global stage.
Full-time dedicated planning for this event started in
January 2024. Since then, the police department has dedicated
even more full-time staff members in planning for all aspects
of the upcoming World Cup FIFA 2026. Regional coordination has
been key in planning. Beginning with 6 planning committees
comprised of various public safety leaders as well as
nongovernmental organizations. Planning committees are focused
on issues ranging from intelligence analysis and sharing,
interoperability, command control and coordination, critical
infrastructure protection, and tactical coordination, just to
name a few.
Given our city's many championships, we have experienced
large-scale events. These learning opportunities involve crowd
management, public communication, critical infrastructure
protection, and advanced incident command system training.
Full-scale exercises and tabletop exercises have been executed
and continue to be planned as we test and retest our plans and
readiness.
One incident in particular guides our planning and
execution of large-scale events like the World Cup. On February
14, 2024, a tragic shooting occurred during the Kansas City
Chiefs' Super Bowl LVIII celebration parade and rally. Despite
careful planning and implementation of lessons learned from
previous large-scale events, an act of violence disrupted what
was intended to be a joyous occasion for Kansas City. The
incident resulted in significant harm and cast a somber tone
over the day underscoring the unpredictable nature of such
open-air public events and the critical importance of
coordinated emergency response and planning. The swift actions
of first responders and mutual aid personnel whose roles had
been expanded based on prior experience played a vital role in
mitigating further harm and provided aid to those impacted at
the scene. This tragedy stands as a solemn reminder of the
ever-present need for vigilance and preparedness in planning
for mass gatherings.
In Kansas City, we understand what is needed to ensure we
are prepared for an event like World Cup FIFA 2026, which will
arrive in 11 American cities in less than a year. As we draw
near to this exciting and massive event, we have 2 key areas of
concern.
The first is funding. To date, the Kansas City, Missouri
Police Department has not received any Federal funding toward
the planning and preparation for the 2020 World Cup. We've
submitted a budget request for personnel costs and equipment to
the KC 2026 World Cup Planning Committee, which was then used
in a comprehensive Kansas City regional budget submission to
the Federal Government. We are ever so grateful for the One Big
Beautiful Bill providing $625 million for planning and security
costs relating to the 2026 FIFA World Cup host cities. It's our
understanding that funding will be allocated amongst host
committees based on their budget estimates submitted as part of
the $625 million and will follow the general structure of the
State Homeland Security Grant Program in the form of separate
grants for each host city committee.
However, we are still awaiting guidance on the timing,
program restrictions, and application for this grant. I also am
aware that that this is has just been passed. Some of this is
changing day by day and it's progressing very quickly. So thank
you so much for that.
This puts host cities in a compressed time line to procure
equipment, train members for usage, and deploy the equipment in
time for FIFA. We respectfully request Congress to consider the
following regarding the fund funding process: We respectfully
urge the parties to work quickly to finalize the funding
execution process to secure the necessary equipment and
resources identified in the host committee budget estimates.
The second primary concern is detection and counter-UAS
authority. Despite our responsibility to safeguard the public,
the local law enforcement agencies are currently constrained by
Federal regulations that prohibit or severely limit our ability
to detect, disrupt, or disable unauthorized drones in real
time. This creates a significant operational gap that hinders
our capacity to respond effectively to aerial threats. The
proliferation of consumer drones, their affordability, and
their potential use by bad actors amplifies this concern.
At times, our officers are put in the position of observing
potentially dangerous drone activity without the legal
authority or technical tools to mitigate the threat. This not
only endangers the safety of event attendees and
infrastructure, but also undermines public confidence in our
ability to provide safe environment.
We respectfully request Congress to prioritize the
following: Authorize the deployment of unmanned aerial systems,
UAS, detection and counter-UAS technology at local and regional
levels.
No. 2, current FAA BVLOS, or beyond visual line of sight,
waivers without visual observers are limited to 200 feet above
ground level, while standard UAV operations allow up to 400
feet AGL. This restriction hampers our ability to monitor and
secure wide areas, particularly around stadiums and large
venues. For events like FIFA World Cup authorization for BVLOS
operations at 400 feet AGL is essential.
Ensure Federal UAS teams are embedded at each World Cup
host sites to provide air space security.
Without these changes, the increasing use of drones,
whether by careless hobbyists or bad actors, will continue to
outpace the ability of local law enforcement to respond. We
stand ready to collaborate with Federal partners to close this
critical gap in public safety.
American law enforcement officers are invested in the
safety and betterment of our country. We are the first
responders to violence and terrorism in our city and stand
ready to keep people safe from all threats every day. We look
forward to working together to ensure the 2026 FIFA World Cup
events hosted in American cities are safe and secure.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I
stand ready to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Chief Graves follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stacey Graves
July 22, 2025
Thank you Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Pou, and Members of the
Task Force for convening today's hearing.
I lead the Kansas City Missouri Police Department, a department
with a full strength of over 1,400 sworn law enforcement officers who
serve a city with over half a million residents. Our police department
covers over 300 square miles in Kansas City, touching 4 counties.
Kansas City has hosted, planned, and responded to numerous large-scale
events. We have hosted the 2012 MLB All-Star Game, 2015 World Series
Championship parade/rally, the 2023 NFL Draft, the 2020, 2023, and 2024
Superbowl World Championship parades and rallies, in addition to
several events, celebrations, parades, and protests.
fifa world cup 2026
The Kansas City Missouri Police Department is steadfast in its
commitment to delivering a safe and successful World Cup experience.
Drawing on valuable lessons learned from past incidents and embracing
innovative strategies in resource management and collaboration, the
department stands ready to meet the unprecedented challenges that lie
ahead. The opportunity to host the World Cup is not only a testament to
our city's vibrant spirit but also an occasion to showcase Kansas City,
Missouri on the global stage.
Full-time dedicated planning for the World Cup events in Kansas
City, Missouri started in January 2024. Since then, the Police
Department has dedicated even more full-time staff members in planning
for all aspects of the upcoming FIFA World Cup 2026 events. Regional
coordination has been key in planning from the beginning, with 6
planning committees comprised of various public safety leaders, as well
as non-governmental organizations. Committees have now grown to over 20
distinct areas of planning to ensure the best possible preparations are
in place. Planning committees ranging from intelligence analysis and
sharing, interoperability, command control and coordination, critical
infrastructure protection, and tactical coordination, to name a few.
Lessons learned regarding large crowd, mass gatherings, and best
practices have been implemented and have resulted in a layered security
screening approach, expanded perimeters around venues, enhanced vehicle
screening areas, and additional transportation safety and security.
Multiple training opportunities have been sought out and brought
directly to our region in preparing specifically for World Cup events.
The learning opportunities involve crowd management, public
communication, critical infrastructure protection, and advanced
incident command system training. Full-scale exercises and tabletop
exercises have been executed and continue to be planned as we test and
retest our plans and readiness.
lessons learned/confirmed
Kansas City has witnessed a remarkable era of championship sports
over the past decade. The Kansas City Royals and Chiefs' World
Championships have provided opportunities for celebration. The Kansas
City Missouri Police Department plans large events using an all-hazards
approach, integrating parade organizers, medical and fire personnel,
Federal partners, city services, State agencies, and regional law
enforcement. This continued cooperation in our pre-planning has only
enhanced our partnerships and has allowed for comprehensive contingency
plans to be in place.
After each mass gathering celebration, the Police Department has
conducted after-activation reviews which have led to improved security
plans at subsequent events. For example, after the Royals Championship
parade in 2015, we improved ingress and egress areas and created
pathway barriers for first responders for an improved emergency
response. Although we had vehicle mitigation along the route for the
Chiefs' Super Bowl parade in 2020, an intoxicated driver drove through
the start of the parade barricade and made it on to the route, causing
officers to utilize a tactical vehicle intervention to stop the threat,
resulting in no injuries. In 2020, we began utilizing DMAT (Disaster
Medical Assistance Teams) to ensure a proper response to a potential
mass casualty event. These lessons learned in 2020 and 2023, led to
additional security measures such as enhanced vehicle mitigation,
improved public communication, comprehensive traffic plans, and
integrated operations at the 2024 Super Bowl parade and rally.
On February 14, 2024, a tragic shooting occurred during the Kansas
City Chiefs' Super Bowl LVIII (58) celebration parade and rally.
Despite careful planning and the implementation of lessons learned from
previous large-scale events, an act of violence disrupted what was
intended to be a joyous occasion for Kansas City. The incident resulted
in significant harm and cast a somber tone over the day, underscoring
the unpredictable nature of such open-air, public events and the
critical importance of coordinated emergency response and planning.
The swift actions of first responders and mutual aid personnel,
whose roles had been expanded based on prior experience, played a vital
part in mitigating further harm and provided aid to those impacted at
the scene. This tragedy stands as a solemn reminder of the ever-present
need for vigilance and preparedness in planning for mass gatherings.
Staffing for the 2024 parade was comprised of 900 law enforcement
personnel from 71 different Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies. In addition to route security, specialized law enforcement
personnel for explosive device detection and response, police K9s,
SWAT, traffic control, and drone mitigation were included in the plan.
Hundreds of additional first responders such as fire department and
medical personnel also assisted with parade planning and
implementation.
The 2020 implementation of DMAT (Disaster Medical Assistance Teams)
at strategic locations was instrumental in providing immediate medical
attention to victims in 2024, which saved lives. Rapid triage and
transport of critically injured patients to nearby hospitals, combined
with pre-MCI standard medical treatment, minimized hospital transport
and should be standard practice for large events.
The Kansas City Missouri Police Department completes risk
assessments as part of the planning process. This allows for the pre-
planning of both known and assumed factors leading to the correct
allocation of resources. Placing the needed number of law enforcement
officers in areas throughout the footprint allows for a quick and
appropriate response. In addition, the priority placed on continuous
training aligned with the latest standards. This was evident after
shots rang out at the rally in 2024, as all law enforcement officers
ran toward the threat. It is the direct result of this proper
deployment and continued training that put law enforcement officers in
the right place to apprehend the suspects quickly and secure the scene
within minutes. By utilizing risk assessments, we can plan for complex-
coordinated attacks, as well other acts of violence and public
disorder.
recommendations for congress
FIFA World Cup 2026 will arrive in 11 American cities in
approximately 10 to 11 months. As we draw near, there are 2 key areas
of concern in preparing for the events.
Funding.--To date, the Kansas City Missouri Police Department has
not received any Federal funds toward the planning and preparation for
the FIFA World Cup 2026. We have submitted a budget request for
personnel costs and equipment to the KC 2026, FIFA World Cup, Planning
Committee which was then used in a comprehensive Kansas City regional
budget submission to the Federal Government.
We are grateful for the One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBB), providing
$625 million for planning and security costs relating to the 2026 FIFA
World Cup host cities. It is our understanding that funding will be
allocated among Host Committees based on their budget estimates
submitted as part of the $625 million, and will follow the general
structure of the State Homeland Security Grant Program in the form of
separate grants for each Host City Committee. Unfortunately, not much
else is known about the timing, program restrictions, and application
process for this grant.
From experience, applying for and being sub-awarded State Homeland
Security Program grants, funding most likely will not be available
until this fall. This puts host cities in a compressed time frame to
procure equipment, train members for usage, and deploy the equipment in
time for the FIFA World Cup 2026 events. We anticipate we will likely
be trying to purchase the same type of equipment, at the same time, as
all 11 other host city agencies, which may negatively impact delivery
times.
We respectfully urge the parties to work quickly to finalize the
funding execution process to secure the necessary equipment and
resources identified in the Host Committee budget estimates.
Detection and Counter-UAS Authority.--Despite our responsibility to
safeguard the public, local law enforcement agencies are currently
constrained by Federal regulations that prohibit, or severely limit our
ability to detect, disrupt, or disable unauthorized drones in real
time. This creates a significant operational gap and hinders our
capacity to respond effectively to aerial threats. The proliferation of
consumer drones, their affordability and their potential use by bad
actors amplifies this concern.
At times, our officers are put in the position of observing
potentially dangerous drone activity without the legal authority or
technical tools to mitigate the threat. This not only endangers the
safety of event attendees and infrastructure, but also undermines
public confidence in our ability to provide a secure environment.
We respectfully request Congress to prioritize the following:
1. Authorize the deployment of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
detection and counter-UAS technology at local and regional
levels.
2. Current FAA BVLOS (Beyond Visual Line of Sight) waivers without
visual observers are limited to 200 feet Above Ground Level
(AGL), while standard UAV operations allow up to 400 feet AGL.
This restriction hampers our ability to monitor and secure wide
areas, particularly around stadiums and large venues. For
events like the FIFA World Cup 2026, authorization for BVLOS
operations at 400 feet AGL is essential.
3. Ensure Federal UAS teams are embedded at each FIFA World Cup
2026 host sites to provide air space security.
Without these changes, the increasing use of drones, whether by
careless hobbyists or bad actors, will continue to outpace the ability
of local law enforcement to respond. We stand ready to collaborate with
Federal partners to close this critical gap in public safety.
American law enforcement officers are invested in the safety and
betterment of our country. We are the first responders to violence and
terrorism in our cities and stand ready to keep the people safe from
all threats, every day. We look forward to working together to ensure
the FIFA World Cup 2026 events hosted in American cities are safe and
secure.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Chief Graves.
I recognize myself for questions.
Commissioner Davis, it is great to see you again. It is
hard to imagine it has been 12 years since you testified before
this very committee after the tragic events of the Boston
bombing. I want to thank you for both yours and law
enforcement's heroism and the first responders in saving lives
that day.
We ran an investigation. I remember walking down Boylston
Street in Boston with you. Then we found several disturbing
facts. Information was not shared. The Russian report FSB that
Tamerlan had traveled overseas, radicalized, came back, was
never brought to your attention even though you had 2 officers
on the Joint Terrorism Task Force. The travel that he made to
Dagestan to radicalize was never communicated with you, sir,
even though you had 2 officers on the Joint Terrorism Task
Force. Then to make things worse, the DHS and the FBI using
Post-It notes were not connecting the dots on the travel, and
on and on.
I remember we asked you the question would this have
changed things if you had known about this? You, of course,
said yes, and we would have monitored the suspect and,
unfortunately, you didn't have that opportunity at that time. I
think since then we, we made a lot of progress within the JTTS
with an MOU that requires the sharing of the information with
the State and locals.
Can you speak to lessons learned from this tragic
experience that we went through and how is it better today? One
final point on the--you talked about AI and how that can now
play a huge factor in these investigations.
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So looking back on
those days, I can remember us meeting with Director Muller, who
had good intentions on establishing the Joint Terrorism Task
Force. There was supposed to be complete sharing across that
organization, but some of the mid-level managers in there kind-
of pushed back against that, and I think that really was what
impeded a really effective preventive measure being put in
place.
So, as you said, with your help and the help of Congress
and the Senate, we were able to change the rules there. That's
not an easy thing to do and I feel very happy that we had that
impact across the Nation. It's working today. My partner from
the FBI was Rick DesLauriers. He was a tremendous asset to what
we were doing. But organizations can sometimes be difficult. So
stressing the cooperation and coordination and the equal
treatment of all aspects of law enforcement, Federal, State,
and local, so everyone's at the table and able to share their
little piece of information through these fusion centers and
the BRICs can make all the difference in the world.
Artificial intelligence is extremely dangerous. The
benefit, hopefully, will outweigh the danger as we put things
in place to determine what's legitimate and not legitimate on-
line. But the incredible gains that have been made in going
through reams and reams of video and photographs, which is what
we did in the time following the incident which actually led to
the capture of the these two guys, has improved vastly.
The impediment right now is coming to a compromise with
privacy rights experts and advocates and weighing that, that
cost-benefit analysis between public safety and people's
privacy and making sure we have a well-reasoned-out and
effective balance of the two. I think that that still needs
work. Those are the two things I'd mentioned.
Mr. McCaul. I am glad we you had cameras, otherwise we
never could have identified the subjects. I know there was some
dispute about the traffic lights having access to that as well.
On the issue of UAVs, I know in 2013, the same year as the
Boston bombing, you also tracked a team that were threatening
to bomb the Pentagon with UAVs. I think to Mr. Davis, Colonel
Hodges, and Chief Graves, all three of you have referenced to
UAVs. I see this, you know, we have had vehicles, we have had
bombs. In my view, this is probably the greatest emerging
threat now to these games. We saw how effective drones were in
the Ukraine response to the Russians, how cheap and inexpensive
they are, yet it is very difficult to detect and to counter
those measures.
Mr. Davis, you wouldn't mind commenting on your experience,
and Colonel Hodges and Chief Graves?
Mr. Davis. Sure. Briefly, the success in the Ukraine and
other countries of using these devices on the battlefield is
front and center in the minds of malign actors who cause harm
or want to cause harm here. So it's vitally important that we
pay attention to this and we coordinate a Federal, State, and
local response.
Chief Graves mentioned that the ability to work on these
issues by local police is critical. There's been a lot of talk
about it right now. There was a Presidential order, Executive
Order, that came out recently that moved the ball down the
field a little bit, but more needs to be done. There has to be
a full court partnership there. The latest technology has to be
employed, both electronic jamming techniques and also actual
use of kinetic force against these things to protect the people
who are in these stadiums. I cannot imagine if there's an
attack from the air, what will happen to the crowd in an event
like this.
Mr. McCaul. Colonel Hodges.
Colonel Hodges. So we saw much success in Louisiana,
specifically New Orleans. Just like your field intelligence
teams working together, like the commissioner said, that's what
we did for our drone team to detect, identify, and mitigate
those drones throughout the special events. Most of the
upcoming national events that are across the country are going
to be outdoor, and that's the biggest concern with the drones.
Having a member from the local police, the State police,
sheriff's office, and the Federal entities together to
collaborate, just having the availability or the authorization
to mitigate, which is to disable or return the drone back to
the controller, is not enough. You have to coordinate with the
partners. We did that to ensure that we did not take down
another public safety agency's drone, who were, in fact, doing
the same as we did.
So as we move forward, because drones are more accessible,
because they have a capability for a higher payload, and can
remain in the air, the flight time is significantly longer,
it's a unique challenge for all of law enforcement to maintain
a temporary flight restriction. So to detect those within that
TFR, even though they're up for various things throughout the
year, when those special events take place simultaneously
across the country, we must have that collaboration that I
think we showed through those special events, both Sugar Bowl,
New Year's Day, Super Bowl, and in our carnival season.
Mr. McCaul. That was a great example of being successful.
Chief Graves.
Chief Graves. Kansas City, Missouri Police Department is no
stranger to drones. We've been utilizing drones for different
purposes for 10 to 12 years, everything from crime scene
capturing to investigating traffic accidents to making entry
with some of our SWAT teams. We are in the stages now of
launching our drones as first responders program and have
already taken shipment of those drones. But even still, the
authority for local law enforcement, who are usually on the
ground handling any kind of an incident, right, in real time,
needs that authority. Not only the authority, but also the
technology to down drones.
You know, we are there in various different situations.
Obviously, you know, you could use the Chiefs parade in that
situation. You know, there was a lot of drones going over in
the air, but at that point we had a lot of our Federal
agencies. I will say that in Kansas City we have a wonderful
historical relationship with all of our Federal partners. But
even still, there are times when local law enforcement is
experiencing an issue, sees a threat, and doesn't have the
authority or the equipment to address that threat in real time.
Mr. McCaul. Many times it is coming from--you know, you are
on the ground near the line of defense and we need that two-way
street of information. I think this is something this task
force would be looking at is the authorities given to State
locals to work with the Feds on UAVs.
Chief Graves. I think also the problem is the availability.
I mean, I don't know if you'd say it's availability, but
they're inexpensive, anyone can access them. Even here recently
I observed one that's used for agriculture, that you can fly
over a field with pesticides. Those types of situations where
you can just buy something like that on-line, you know, just
having that local law enforcement authority to mitigate that
threat in real time is really what's needed. I know that's been
a topic of conversation here recently and I just encourage you
to continue that conversation and help us.
Mr. McCaul. I agree. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Ranking Member Ms. Pou.
Ms. Pou. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you to all
the witnesses that are providing testimony.
Chief Graves, thank you. Thank you for joining us today. I
appreciate your time and willingness to share insight on how we
can better support our State and local partners and prepare our
communities with high-profile events like the FIFA World Cup.
Your testimony is especially important given the continuing
toll of gun violence in the mass shootings in our country.
What should have been a joyful event turned tragic when an
argument escalated into gunfire during the celebration of the
Kansas City Chiefs Super Bowl victory. Sadly, 1 person was
killed and at least 20 others were injured, including 8
children. The time line in the after-action report shows just
how quickly a situation can escalate and become deadly. Gun
violence remains a persistent threat that law enforcement must
be plan for among all other threats we have heard about today.
According to the Gun Violence Archives, we have already
been at least--there have already been at least 231 mass
shootings in the United States this year, resulting in 175
deaths and over 1,000 injuries. We must do all that we can to
be protect fans, athletes, innocent bystanders, especially
children from this on-going threat during our major public
events.
Chief Graves, from your experience, how do firearms affect
our police plan for security at mass gathering events? What did
your department learn from the parade shooting, about the
presence of firearms in the crowds?
Chief Graves. As we plan for all situations, obviously
localized gun violence is one of those. You know, when you look
at these mass gatherings, we're looking at lone attacks, we're
looking at coordinated terrorist attacks, but also localized
gun violence. On that day, on February 14, 2024, there were 2
groups of people that had a perceived provocation with one
another that led to gun violence.
The lack of, I guess, the respect for life, conflict
resolution, emotional regulation, and just going straight to
guns in a conflict is a problem in many cities in America. I
would say, you know, as we plan for those, we want to make sure
that we have enough officers that are on the ground that can
respond, that can immediately stop a threat, or, in fact, if we
see something brewing, we can deescalate it.
In this situation we had a lot of officers right in the
area where the shooting happened. At times law enforcement is
no longer a deterrent when someone decides to pull a trigger.
You know, we've seen that time and again not only in my city,
but also across the United States. So just making sure that we
are properly deployed and that we also have the training that
you saw on display of officers running toward the threat when
you have what you believe to be an active shooter.
Ms. Pou. Thank you. Thank you. Chief, very quickly, how do
the police departments ensure that people are secure not just
at the main event, but also in areas where fans gather to watch
the event at places like the Fan Fest, bars and restaurants?
How do we ensure that people are safe from the altercations
that may erupt into these mass shootings or other major
incidents? What is your thought on that?
Chief Graves. I want to make a note of the Super Bowl
parade and rally where shots were fired. You know, we had
officers there at the ready and looking forward into planning
for some of those. That's one of the challenges of those mass
gatherings. It's an open-air public event. We had the parade
route secured. We had plenty of officers in and around the
rally and along the route. But, of course, if you don't have a
perimetered, secured entry, that is when you have some of those
challenges in those public open-air events. It's open to all. I
would say we had close to a million people in and around that
area on February 14 in 2024.
So looking forward, when you are looking at some of those
events, whether that be Fan Fest or some of the matches that
are going to take place at Arrowhead Stadium, there are levels
and levels of security that will be in place to make sure that
we stop any threat before it comes into the door. We will
continue to do that in and around some of the events. So we
will also not--in addition to those officers that are on duty,
we also will have off-duty officers that will be working in
different venues to make sure that those areas are safe, also.
Ms. Pou. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. McCaul. The gentlewoman yields.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Gimenez.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Question I guess to all of you. Start out with the sheriff.
Sheriff Cordero-Stutz, if you had a gunman that you identified
as a threat, do you have the authority to stop that?
Sheriff Cordero-Stutz. If you've identified an immediate
threat that is going to take action? Yes, we do.
Mr. Gimenez. OK. If you had a, I guess Sheriff Graves, if
you had a vehicle coming toward a group of people and you know
that there was mal intent, you know, gunning it down, and you
knew that they were going to run over a lot of people, do you
have the authority to stop that vehicle?
Sheriff Cordero-Stutz. Absolutely.
Mr. Gimenez. If you had somebody with a Molotov cocktail
about ready to toss it into a group of people, Colonel Hodges,
do you have the authority to stop that?
Colonel Hodges. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. Yes, that is what I thought. So even though,
you know, even though we still have a number of threats, our
local law enforcement partners have the authority to stop that.
Sheriff Cordero-Stutz, if you had a drone heading toward
Hard Rock Stadium, unidentified, et cetera, and you don't know
what the intent was, do you have the authority to stop that?
Sheriff Cordero-Stutz. With that information, sir, in a
very, very limited way. Additionally, it's not just the
authority, sir. It's the technology to be able to----
Mr. Gimenez. I am saying even if you had the technology, I
don't think you have the authority to stop it.
Sheriff Cordero-Stutz. Correct. With that information, no,
we would not. We need a lot more.
Mr. Gimenez. Chief Graves, same thing, right?
Chief Graves. That's correct. We don't have the authority
to down a drone.
Mr. Gimenez. That is the problem. I know that my colleague,
Representative Steube, has introduced a bill to give you that
authority. We need to, and we need to move that as quickly as
we can because, frankly, that is the one thing that really,
really worries me, not only for these events, but also to
protect some of our infrastructure.
Can you imagine if we had a Ukraine-style attack, some of
our major airports, what would that do to air travel? It would
stop it in its track. So our airports don't have that
authority, our sheriffs don't have that authority, our local
law enforcement doesn't have that authority. We better give it
to them quickly because if we have thought about it, they
thought about it, too. So we need to move on this as quickly as
possible.
There are two things we need to do: we need to share the
technology and we need to share the capability, and we also
need to share the authority for you to do something about it.
Because at the end of the day, you are the ones that are
protecting your local communities. We come after the fact. We
are the third tier. Local first, then State, and then the
Federal Government.
So, you know, would you agree with that assessment? Would
the 4 of you agree with that assessment?
Sheriff Cordero-Stutz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Davis. Yes, sir.
Chief Graves. Yes, sir.
Colonel Hodges. Yes, absolutely, Congressman.
Mr. Gimenez. Now, Chief Stutz, if we--I am sorry, Sheriff,
if you had--if we had the identified the technology and we have
some kind of--the Federal Government did some kind of
certification and we gave you the authority, would you wait for
us to buy it or would you buy it yourself? The capability.
Sheriff Cordero-Stutz. Absolutely. I would make sure that I
would purchase that capability. But we need the funds to be
able to do so.
Mr. Gimenez. No, I got it.
Sheriff Cordero-Stutz. Yes.
Mr. Gimenez. But at the end of the day, even if we didn't
give you the funds, was it something that you would purchase to
protect your community?
Sheriff Cordero-Stutz. Of course, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. OK. How about you, Chief Graves?
Chief Graves. Absolutely.
Mr. Gimenez. OK. Colonel.
Colonel Hodges. Yes, sir. I would just add an important
point. With funding, always generous from the Federal
Government, but ensure that we include continuous training and
maintenance.
Mr. Gimenez. Correct.
Colonel Hodges. Those are often things that are overlooked.
It's one-time training, one-time equipment. We need to protect
that investment. More importantly, we need to continuously
train as technology evolves and we need to protect that
investment.
Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. Absolutely, Congressman. These are vital
investments in the future. This is a pending threat.
Mr. Gimenez. I agree. Sometimes we here in Congress think,
well, gee, we have to fund everything, and I don't think we do.
OK. We may help you. All right? But I think we also need to
give you the authority and give you access to the technology
and then have some kind of a, you know, overall umbrella saying
in order to utilize it, you must meet these standards. But I
know that, you know, if I were still the mayor of Miami-Dade
County, I would make sure that my community is protected
because I have too many assets that are vital to my community
and are vital to my economy that--to wait for the Federal
Government to give me what I need to do. So thank you for your
testimony.
I am run out and I yield back.
Mr. McCaul. I thank the gentleman. I think that is going to
be one of the greatest legislative takeaways of this hearing,
is to have those authorities at the State and local level, your
force multiplier.
The Chair recognizes the gentlemen from Arizona, Mr. Crane.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you guys for
coming today. This is a very important topic, examination of
major security incidents at mass gatherings.
You know, obviously we have got a bunch of big events
coming up in the United States within the next couple years:
The Olympics, World Cup, our 250th anniversary. I am aware that
you guys, as law enforcement agents, you guys have been dealing
with a bunch of threats for a very long time to include vehicle
ramming attacks, IEDs, improvised explosive devices, vehicle-
borne IEDs, active shooters, cyber attacks. But the one that is
keeping me up at night is the one that we keep talking about up
here. That is as warfare has continued to evolve, the drone
threat. I just don't think that we are ready.
I have sat in on a bunch of these hearings. I have had
Classified hearings with some of our Federal agencies. What I
can tell you is that we are not ready. I am going to do
everything that I can to push for these authorizations that you
guys need. But what I can tell you, and I know that you guys
are probably aware of this, the Federal Government moves very
slowly. Right now this type of authorization, to my knowledge,
has to go through 3 committees up here.
I was interested, Colonel Hodges, in doing some research
and finding out that in Louisiana, you guys just passed in June
2025, the We Will Act Act, which gives specifically trained
State and local officers the authority to intercept and disable
drones that pose a credible threat to public safety. I think
that is fantastic. I hope that other States follow your lead.
Have you guys had a chance to use any of the provisions under
that authorization yet, Colonel?
Colonel Hodges. So in conjunction with our Federal partners
prior to the passage of law, we did it throughout the Sugar
Bowl, Super Bowl, and Mardi Gras season. Now that we have the
authorization, not at that moment, we're finalizing our policy
and procedures and protocols for State-wide compliance and
ensure best practices. But I'm quite certain with the landscape
of events that are coming this fall, that we'll be putting that
law to law enforcement benefit.
Mr. Crane. Have you guys had any pushback from the Federal
agencies who typically control the air space and authorities
with this State-passed legislation?
Colonel Hodges. No, sir. They've been very supportive and
we have a great working relationship with the Federal partners.
I think that's why we were successful over the last several
months, both in New Orleans, but really across the State.
Because we were able to work with them and use their technology
in conjunction with our technology, we feel that we have a
skill set that's ready to hit the ground running as soon as we
finalize our policy.
Mr. Crane. Chief Graves, have you talked to your State
legislature and Governor about passing something similar?
Chief Graves. I'm not sure that we have anything in the
works of passing something similar, but I will get with Colonel
Hughes to try to get some of the language.
Mr. Crane. Sheriff, how about yourself?
Sheriff Cordero-Stutz. Sir, we will be having that
conversation in the upcoming legislature.
Mr. Crane. One of the recommendations that I have made up
here is that with FIFA and every sporting event that we can, we
try and make sure it happens in a dome. For obvious reasons, I
think that will drastically cut down the threat of drone
attacks. But in doing some research, I think out of the 11
different stadiums that the FIFA World Cup is going to be held
in, only 4 of them are in domes.
I believe, Colonel, you guys have one yourself. Is that
correct?
Colonel Hodges. Although we're not host, we have a dome,
we're not hosting a FIFA. But as you know, the watch parties
and the other outdoor events that coincide bring a larger
sometimes crowd than what's inside the stadium or dome. So the
drone is still a challenge, even though inside, like the game
itself for the Super Bowl was indoor, everything indoors, the
events throughout the week, as well as things that are
associated with, you know, an event of this magnitude, FIFA
will need outdoor coverage and TFRs throughout.
Mr. Crane. Colonel, do you know how long it took to get
that piece of legislation passed?
Colonel Hodges. Well, Governor Landrieu has been in just a
little over 18 months and it was a priority of his to have that
done. We knew right before the--I believe your membership tried
to get it done prior to 2025, but were unsuccessful. But we're
very appreciative of the effort to move forward.
I just wanted to add one comment about the drone with the
detection and identification. Commissioner Davis talked about
it. But that AI component, that technology which used to take
days, now takes just hours and sometimes minutes to identify
who the operator of the drone is, is equally as important to
mitigate or to return the drone or to take down the drone,
because otherwise, they're just going to go get another one and
do the same thing. So I believe that's a technology we should--
an investigative tool that we should embrace in conjunction
with the counter-drone and other capabilities.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Colonel.
Mr. Gimenez [presiding]. I now recognize the gentleman from
Louisiana, Mr. Carter.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all
of our witnesses here today, especially Colonel Hodges from my
great State of Louisiana. Thank you for being here, sir. Thank
you all for being here.
In the early hours of New Year's Day, a 42-year-old U.S.
citizen from Texas drove a rented Florida Ford F-150 pickup
truck into a crowd on Bourbon Street in the French Quarter
during the city's celebration. After crashing, he exited the
vehicle, engaged in a shootout with law enforcement, before
being fatally shot by courageous New Orleans police officers
who rushed to the scene. I want to take this moment to
personally thank the NOPD officers, Louisiana State Police, and
other first responders for the heroic action that night. Sir,
we cannot thank you and those other law enforcement agents
enough for while most were running away from the danger, you
were running into it, and we appreciate you.
This heinous act shattered the lives of victims and their
families. It also exposed vulnerabilities in our urban security
infrastructure and serves as a grim reminder of the evolving
tactics of terrorism and terrorists and the potential for more
catastrophic methods. Since that incident, I have worked with
Representative Gimenez on the Department of Homeland Security
Vehicular Terrorism Prevention and Mitigation Act, a critical
piece of legislation designed to protect Americans from
weaponized vehicles on our streets. In April, this committee
passed this legislation as a proactive step toward safeguarding
our citizens from the unimaginable. By enhancing our detection
and response capabilities, we deter adversaries from
contemplating heinous acts in our communities. I want to thank
the committee for holding this hearing and I look forward to
continue to work on ways to prevent and deter future attacks on
large-scale events.
Colonel Hodges, you and I know, oh too well, that New
Orleans is the greatest city in the world to host major
sporting events. Visitors stay in hotels, walk to the
Superdome, they leave and walk to the French Quarter and
celebrate their team's victories or to drink away the loss of
losing to the Saints. Doesn't happen as often as we like, but
it happens and it is going to continue to happen more. This
walkability combined with culture, food, and hospitality of New
Orleans means that we are responsible for protecting countless
mass gatherings throughout the year: Mardi Gras, Jazz Fest,
French Quarter Fest, Essence Fest, Bowl games, concerts, the
list goes on and on.
What can other cities learn from what we learned during
this event while hosting World Cup matches, Olympics, and other
events and public violence is a threat? What can we share with
the rest of the world the great work that you did and how we
prevent these measures going forward?
Colonel Hodges. Well, thank you for the question,
Congressman. I think it's the collaboration between all
branches of law enforcement or all levels, local, State, and
Federal. No one worried about who's getting the credit, just
acting as a force multiplier. It doesn't matter who's in
charge. It doesn't matter the badge or the uniform, just that
we all work collectively and that we share the information.
I think we were able to do that with the help of many
others who had challenges before we learned those lessons. We
had been working very closely throughout the year of 2024,
prior to that, that New Year's Day--New Year's Eve attack. We
had such a strong relationship with our partners in law
enforcement. It's no secret that the crime in the city of New
Orleans, violent crime, was down 40 percent at the time of that
attack. So when it did happen, and we all collectively were
already there for the Sugar Bowl and New Year's Eve, everyone
knew, all the leaders in the room, we knew our capabilities,
our limitations, and we leveraged that. Because we worked and
trusted one another so much, that's how we were able to----
Mr. Carter. Building trust and working together regardless
of background, no fiefdoms, no one trying to take credit.
You testified about the tragedy that struck New Orleans on
New Year's morning. The terrorists had placed bombs in ice
chests along Bourbon Street, which, thankfully, did not
detonate. But video showed people on Bourbon Street looking at
the coolers and not reporting them as suspicious. How can law
enforcement effectively communicate to the public to not only
see things, but to say what you see when you see them? Report
suspicious packages, but also let us know what you see so we
can further protect.
Louisiana constantly faces threat from Mother Nature. We
know these things come, but those we have to deal with in many
cases after the fact, before the fact. But these terrorist
acts, if people see things, if someone had seen that ice chest
that was just sitting there, that could have meant the
difference in finding this and saving even more lives.
Thankfully, those things were not detonated, but your people
were on the ground, they were working with law enforcement.
Having science and technology, being able to go back and trace
this terrorist's steps were helpful tools, correct?
Colonel Hodges. Yes, sir. I don't want to leave out the
importance of building community trust and also the business
partners. To your point, when they see something, to message it
to us before it happens, whether they're a victim of a crime or
they're a witness to a crime or they see something that's out
of place, messaging that. I think we've done a good job and we
have to earn the public's trust each and every day. But on that
particular night, because we had all the resources and all the
capabilities there, once we identified those 2 IED ice chests,
we were quickly able to X-ray them and render them safe.
Thankfully, to your point, that they weren't activated because
the New Orleans police officers immediately engaged the driver
of that truck and he never made it to that destination.
But the AI technology to rule out other potential threats
because we were still trying to play the game a few hours
later, ended up being delayed a day. But when you think about
all the number of folks that were in town and to reassure the
community that it was not only safe to come back to work, but
safe to host that football game the following day, that trust
is so important as well as the technology.
So I think sometimes we overlook that piece of the puzzle.
But despite all of the technology and the number of officers,
deputies, troopers, agents, if you don't have that public's
trust and they're not coming to you with the information, we're
not successful today.
Mr. Carter. Well, my time is far expired and I thank you
for your generosity. As I exit, I want to just again, thank
you. Thank you. Thank you for the great work that you all did
to protect the citizens and visitors of New Orleans. Know that
this committee will do everything in our power to arm you with
the technology and tools to continue doing the great work.
Mr. Chairman, I yield.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields.
I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Swalwell.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to each and
every one of our witnesses today and the men and women, sworn
officers, a part of your departments, who are responsible for
making sure that these events are successes. As the son of a
cop and a brother to 2 police officers and a former prosecutor
myself, I know that although when the confetti comes down and
the winning teams celebrate, we see the players who were a part
of the victory, but we don't see the men and women in law
enforcement who made sure that it was a safe and fun
environment for everybody who witnessed or participated in it.
So thank you for that.
My State, Mr. Chairman, California, over the next couple
years, we will host, obviously in 2026, the World Cup. I think
we have 8 games. Folks will see in February, Super Bowl LX,
where the San Francisco 49ers will run an undefeated season and
cap it off by winning the Super Bowl at home, something that
has never happened. A perfect season and a victory in your own
stadium. Of course, in 2028, the Olympics in Los Angeles. We
expect the Bay Area may host some of the cricket matches. So we
are ready to work with law enforcement and support its needs.
Chief Graves, I know you are looking at me as I am talking
about the 49ers and you are talking about the Chiefs, and
congratulations to you all on that win over the 49ers. I was
only surprised at the parade that you referenced that I didn't
see the referees on the float because they were a part of the
victory, too. But again, I do look forward to working with all
of you coming up on this. This committee wants to be responsive
to what the funding needs are going to be.
I want to ask first, Mr. Davis, you had referenced that the
Fusion Center can be a force multiplier. You said to best
safeguard against evolving threats, intelligence agencies must
remain open to collaboration. If intelligence and analysis are
eliminated or its capacity and capabilities to share
intelligence with the Fusion Centers were reduced, would that
make us safer? What impact would reducing the Fusion Center
capabilities have on the safety of our communities?
Mr. Davis. Sorry. I think it would be devastating,
Congressman. The Fusion Centers have become such an integral
part of everything that we do, especially on the prevention
side of things. If there's any inhibition to continuing their
work, the United States will not be as safe as it could be. I
will tell you that the analysis that comes out of those centers
every day is the first thing I read when I was the police
commissioner in the city of Boston. It informed all of our
decisions and it helped us prevent serious crimes not only at
the terrorism level, but also at the other levels that we deal
with day-in and day-out crime.
So if that ability becomes impeded, either through a lack
of funding or through the propensity of big organizations to
snap back to all old practices, which is what I fear after the
changes that we made in 12 years ago, whether or not there's a
slow degradation of that cooperation, that has to be looked at
all the time. The preventive work that can be done in the
Fusion Centers outweighs what they are able to do afterwards.
Mr. Swalwell. Mr. Davis, I also want to credit you,
obviously for your work during the Boston Marathon bombings.
But you had publicly credited at the time the Alameda County
Sheriff's Office and its Urban Shield Program, which had worked
with and your department had trained with for many years. That
was a very public validation of a training program that has
made our community and many communities safer. I know the
community appreciated at the time you crediting that program.
Mr. Davis. Truly. It was funded by UASI grants that gave us
the ability to prepare. You fight the way you train.
Mr. Swalwell. That is right.
Mr. Davis. That's what it gave us the ability to do.
Mr. Swalwell. Yes. Chief Graves, it is only fair I took a
shot at the Chiefs, I do want to give you an opportunity to
also respond to the question of reducing intelligence-sharing
capabilities between your office and the Federal Government and
what impact that could have.
Chief Graves. We have, like I said earlier, we have a great
historical, positive working relationship with our Federal
partners in Kansas City. That being said, the Fusion Center is
an integral part of some of that communication. Not only do we
work with them regularly, and I have no worries of getting
notified of something that we should be aware of, we work side-
by-side with them at Arrowhead Stadium during the football
games. You know, there's been a couple things that have been
taken care of and handled right away. It would definitely
inhibit our ability to maintain that open line of communication
of emerging threats.
Mr. Swalwell. Great. Thank you.
Chairman, I yield back. I thank the witnesses.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields. I will remind the
gentleman from California there is only one undefeated team in
NFL history, the greatest team in NFL history, the 1972 Miami
Dolphins.
Mr. Swalwell. But did they win the Super Bowl?
Mr. Gimenez. The Miami Dolphins, 1972. So probably before
your time.
Mr. Swalwell. Yes.
Mr. Gimenez. OK. The one thing I guess we learned from this
hearing is that we need to move on authorizations. My colleague
from Arizona was absolutely right. It takes too long for us
here in Congress to push the legislation that is actually
needed. This is a priority, giving you authorizations for you
to do something about unmanned aerial systems. So I want to
thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the
Members for their questions.
The Members of the task force may have some additional
questions for the witnesses. We would ask the witnesses to
respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(E),
the hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, this task force stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:27 p.m., the task force was adjourned.]
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