    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                      ANTI-AMERICAN ANTITRUST: HOW FOREIGN
                       GOVERNMENTS TARGET U.S. BUSINESSES
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE,
                      REGULATORY REFORM, AND ANTITRUST

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                           TUESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 2025

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 119-44

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                   Available via: http://judiciary.house.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    62-369                   WASHINGTON : 2026
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                            JIM JORDAN, Ohio, Chair

    DARRELL ISSA, California             JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland, Ranking
    ANDY BIGGS, Arizona                      Member
    TOM McCLINTOCK, California           JERROLD NADLER, New York
    THOMAS P. TIFFANY, Wisconsin         ZOE LOFGREN, California
    THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
    CHIP ROY, Texas                      HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
    SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin              Georgia
    BEN CLINE, Virginia                  ERIC SWALWELL, California
    LANCE GOODEN, Texas                  TED LIEU, California
    JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey       PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
    TROY E. NEHLS, Texas                 J. LUIS CORREA, California
    BARRY MOORE, Alabama                 MARY GAY SCANLON, Pennsylvania
    KEVIN KILEY, California              JOE NEGUSE, Colorado
    HARRIET M. HAGEMAN, Wyoming          LUCY McBATH, Georgia
    LAUREL M. LEE, Florida               DEBORAH K. ROSS, North Carolina
    WESLEY HUNT, Texas                   BECCA BALINT, Vermont
    RUSSELL FRY, South Carolina          JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
    GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin            SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
    BRAD KNOTT, North Carolina           JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    MARK HARRIS, North Carolina          DANIEL S. GOLDMAN, New York
    ROBERT F. ONDER, Jr., Missouri       JASMINE CROCKETT, Texas
    DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas
    BRANDON GILL, Texas
    MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington
                                     ------

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE,
                        REGULATORY REFORM, AND ANTITRUST

                       SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin, Chair

    DARRELL ISSA, California             JERROLD NADLER, New York, Ranking
    BEN CLINE, Virginia                      Member
    LANCE GOODEN, Texas                  J. LUIS CORREA, California
    HARRIET HAGEMAN, Wyoming             BECCA BALINT, Vermont
    MARK HARRIS, North Carolina          JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
    DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas                ZOE LOFGREN, California
    MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington      HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
                                             Georgia

                   CHRISTOPHER HIXON, Majority Staff Director
                    ARTHUR EWENCZYK, Minority Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                           Tuesday, December 16, 2025

                               OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                       Page
    The Honorable Scott Fitzgerald, Chair of the Subcommittee on the
      Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust from the
      State of Wisconsin.............................................     1
    The Honorable Jamie Raskin, Ranking Member of the Committee on
      the Judiciary from the State of Maryland.......................     3
    The Honorable Becca Balint, a Member of the Subcommittee on the
      Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust from the
      State of Vermont...............................................     6

                                   WITNESSES

    Shanker A. Singham, Chief Executive Officer, Competere Ltd.
      Oral Testimony.................................................     9
      Prepared Testimony.............................................    12
    Aurelien Portuese, Research Professor, Founding Director, George
      Washington Competition & Innovation Lab
      Oral Testimony.................................................    44
      Prepared Testimony.............................................    46
    Dirk Auer, Director, Competition Policy, International Center for
      Law & Economics (ICLE)
      Oral Testimony.................................................    64
      Prepared Testimony.............................................    66
    Roger P. Alford, Professor of Law, Notre Dame University
      Oral Testimony.................................................   102
      Prepared Testimony.............................................   104

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC. SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    All materials submitted for the record by the Subcommittee on the
      Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust are
      listed below...................................................   126

    Materials submitted by the Honorable Darrell Issa, a Member of
      the Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory
      Reform, and Antitrust from the State of California, for the
      record
        An article entitled, ``Trump's tariff war is a tactic to
            cover up the ills of American society,'' Aug. 14, 2025,
            Chair Joo Byeong-gi, Korea Fair Trade Commission
        An article entitled, ``The China Fan Who Made It Into The
            Trump Admin,'' Sept. 12, 2025, American Greatness
    Materials submitted by the Honorable Becca Balint, a Member of
      the Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory
      Reform, and Antitrust from the State of Vermont, for the record
        An article entitled, ``Trump Warner Bros. Meddling Pushed
            Limits of Executive Power,'' Dec. 11, 2025, Bloomberg,
        An article entitled, ``Opinion | Big Tech's Most Effective
            Lobbyist, Jim Jordan, Is Temporarily Constrained,'' Oct.
            12, 2025, Common Dreams
        An article entitled, ``Swamp Undrained: Trump-Cozy Lobbying
            Firm Sets K Street Revenue Record,'' Aug. 8, 2025,
            American Enterprise Institute, Washington Examiner
        An article entitled, ``How Big Tech Powered A Justice
            Department Coup,'' Jul. 31, 2025, Lever News
        An article entitled, ``Trump Is Big Tech's Personal
            Lobbyist,'' Jul. 24, 2025, Economic Policy
        A statement entitled, ``The Rule of Law Versus the Rule of
            Lobbyists,'' Roger P. Alford, Tech Policy Institute Aspen
            Forum, Aug. 18, 2025
    Materials submitted by the Honorable Harriet Hageman, a Member of
      the Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory
      Reform, and Antitrust from the State of Wyoming, for the record
        An article entitled, ``Scoop: U.S. intelligence intervened
            with DOJ to push HPE-Juniper merger,'' Jul. 30, 2025,
            Axios
        A statement from Roger P. Alford, Tech Policy Aspen
            Institute, Aug. 18, 2025
    Materials submitted by the Honorable Scott Fitzgerald, Chair of
      the Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory
      Reform, and Antitrust from the State of Wisconsin, for the
      record
        A speech entitled, ``Deputy Assistant Attorney General Roger
            Alford Delivers Remarks at China Competition Policy
            Forum,'' by Professor Alford, Shanghai, Aug. 30, 2017
        A speech entitled, ``Deputy Assistant Attorney General Roger
            Alford Delivers Remarks at the 2018 Competition Policy
            Forum in Beijing,'' by Professor Alford, Beijing, Jul,
            31, 2018
        A letter to the Honorable Scott Fitzgerald, Chair of the
            Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory
            Reform, and Antitrust from the State of Wisconsin, from
            Sean Heather, Senior Vice President, International
            Regulatory Affairs and Antitrust, U.S. Chamber of
            Congress, Dec. 15, 2015
        A statement from the Consumer Choice Center, Dec. 11, 2025
        A statement from the NetChoice, Dec. 15, 2025
        A statement to the Honorable Jim Jordan, Chair of the
            Committee on the Judiciary from the State of Ohio, the
            Honorable Jamie Raskin, Ranking Member of the Committee
            on the Judiciary from the State of Maryland, the
            Honorable Scott Fitzgerald, Chair of the Subcommittee on
            the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and
            Antitrust from the State of Wisconsin, the Honorable
            Jerrold Nadler, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on the
            Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust
            from the State of New York, from ACT |  The App
            Association, Dec. 15, 2025
        A statement to the Honorable Jim Jordan, Chair of the
            Committee on the Judiciary from the State of Ohio, the
            Honorable Scott Fitzgerald, Chair of the Subcommittee on
            the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and
            Antitrust from the State of Wisconsin, the Honorable
            Jamie Raskin, Ranking Member of the Committee on the
            Judiciary from the State of Maryland, and the Honorable
            Jerrold Nadler, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on the
            Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust
            from the State of New York, and the Members of the
            Committee, from Computer & Communications Industry
            Association (CCIA), Dec. 16, 2025
        A statement entitled, ``Foreign Governments' Ex Ante DMA-
            Style Rules Harm Competition and Innovation in Digital
            Markets While Discriminating Against US Firms,'' from
            Alden Abbott, Senior Research Fellow, Director,
            Competition Policy Project, Mercatus Center, George Mason
            University, and Satya Marar, Research Fellow, Mercatus
            Center, George Mason University, Dec. 15, 2025

                                    APPENDIX

    A statement from the Software & Information Industry Association
      (SIIA), Dec. 16, 2025, submitted by the Honorable Scott
      Fitzgerald, Chair of the Subcommittee on the Administrative
      State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust from the State of
      Wisconsin, for the record
    An article entitled, ``The antitrust war inside MAGA,'' Jul, 30
      2025, UnHerd, submitted by the Honorable Becca Balint, a Member
      of the Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory
      Reform, and Antitrust from the State of Vermont, for the record
    A statement from multiple academics to the Members of the House
      Judiciary Committee, Dec. 22, 2025, submitted by the Honorable
      Jerrold Nadler, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on the
      Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust from the
      State of New York, for the record

                     QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD

    Questions submitted from the Honorable Ben Cline, a Member of the
      Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform,
      and Antitrust from the State of Virginia, for the record
      Questions for Roger P. Alford, Professor of Law, Notre Dame
          University
      Questions for Dirk Auer, Director, Competition Policy,
          International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE)
      Questions for Aurelien Portuese, Research Professor, Founding
          Director, George Washington Competition & Innovation Lab
        Response to questions from Aurelien Portuese, Research
            Professor, Founding Director, George Washington
            Competition & Innovation Lab
      Questions for Shanker A. Singham, Chief Executive Officer,
          Competere Ltd.
        Response to questions from Shanker A. Singham, Chief
            Executive Officer, Competere Ltd.

                      ANTI-AMERICAN ANTITRUST: HOW FOREIGN
                       GOVERNMENTS TARGET U.S. BUSINESSES

                                  ----------

                           Tuesday, December 16, 2025

                            House of Representatives

                   Subcommittee on the Administrative State,

                        Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust

                           Committee on the Judiciary

                                 Washington, DC

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
    Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Scott
    Fitzgerald [Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
        Members present: Representatives Fitzgerald, Jordan, Issa,
    Gooden, Hageman, Raskin, Correa, Balint, and Garcia.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee will come to
    order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a
    recess at any time.
        We welcome everyone to today's hearing on foreign antitrust
    laws and their effect on American companies.
        I will now recognize myself for an opening statement.
        If you want to beat your competitors, one option is to
    innovate them. Another is to regulate them, and unfortunately,
    foreign governments are increasingly choosing the second
    option.
        That is what today's hearing is about and a growing effort
    to rewrite the rules of the global economy in a way that
    punishes success, targets American innovation, and leaves
    consumers worse off.
        The blueprint for this effort is the European Union Digital
    Markets Act. For over half a century, antitrust law has been
    grounded in a simple principle: Protect consumers by promoting
    competition. The DMA flips that principle on its head. It
    protects competitors from competition without even considering
    how that might affect consumers.
        The DMA does not ask whether consumers have been harmed. It
    does not even ask whether a business has done anything wrong.
    It asks whether a company is large, successful, and most
    importantly, American. If the answer is yes, the rules suddenly
    change. Common business practices are banned; innovation is
    treated as a threat, and foreign rivals are handed access to
    data and technology that they could never build or earn on
    their own. That is not competition policy; that is forced
    redistribution, and we should not pretend that this came out of
    nowhere.
        Europe's economy has declined rapidly over the past several
    decades. As the Draghi report highlighted, no EU company with a
    market capitalization over 100 billion euros has been created
    from scratch in the last 50 years.
        Meanwhile, all six companies with a $1 trillion valuation
    have been created in America over that same period. Thirty
    percent of the quote, ``unicorn businesses'' founded in Europe,
    they are startups with a valuation exceeding $1 billion. They
    have all relocated their headquarters abroad at this point.
    Talented European engineers are frequently choosing San
    Francisco and Seattle over Berlin and Paris and taking with
    them their innovative ideas and patented technologies.
        Instead of confronting overregulation and weak economic
    growth, EU officials have chosen a different path. They target
    American companies and call it regulation; tax innovation and
    call it fairness.
        Well, what should concern us most is that this model is now
    spreading globally. We are seeing it in South Korea and we are
    seeing it in Brazil, and we are even seeing it in countries
    like Japan and Australia--different countries, but the same
    framework: Laws that single out American businesses, restrict
    consumer conduct, and hand sweeping power to regulators and
    bureaucrats with virtually no accountability or due process.
        The activists behind these proposals call it competition
    policy, but, in reality, it is industrial policy designed to
    give their own corporations a geopolitical edge. This is not a
    coincidence; it is coordination. The strategy is simple: Copy
    American innovation, and then, find and regulate the companies
    that create it out of existence.
        This is not a technical debate among different regulators;
    it is a values test. Do we believe in competition driven by
    consumers, and innovation or competition dictated by
    bureaucrats and foreign ministries?
        The United States has always chosen the first path. We let
    markets work. We punish real harm and reward innovation.
    America built the strongest economy in the history of this
    world by trusting consumers, not regulators.
        The DMA-style regulation would take us into exactly the
    opposite direction. It would raise prices, reduce choice,
    weaken privacy and security, and slow innovation. It would
    replace consumer judgment with regulatory command.
        That is why the Trump Administration has been pushing back
    on these discriminatory tactics. Free trade does not mean
    tolerating attacks on the very principles that created our
    great economic system. Free trade only works when it is also
    fair. When foreign governments use regulation to discriminate
    against American companies, that is not competition; that is
    protectionism.
        Free markets have been reciprocal in the past. When foreign
    governments went ahead and started to rig their laws against
    American companies, the United States will and can and should
    respond. Using our trade leverage to confront these policies is
    not aggressive; it is necessary.
        We should be just as clear about our own path here at home.
    The United States should not import these failed ideas. We
    should reject DMA-style antitrust outright. We do not need
    European-style micromanagement. We need free market
    competition.
        Our antitrust laws only work because they focus on
    consumers, evidence, and due process. In America, competition
    belongs to consumers, not commissioners. DMA-style antitrust
    rejects those values, and America should reject it all the way
    through to the end. Our principles are what have made America
    great and defending them is how we will keep America great for
    decades to come.
        I want to thank all the witnesses for being here today, and
    I look forward to hearing what you have to say on this very
    important topic.
        I will now recognize the Ranking Member. Mr. Raskin is
    going to go first.
        Mr. Raskin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Welcome to all
    our witnesses. Thank you for joining us.
        Today is just the second time this Congress and the
    administration has an official testifying before the Judiciary
    Committee. When we hear Roger Alford's testimony today,
    everybody will understand why they are not testifying about
    what is actually going on behind closed doors over there.
        In April, Mr. Alford, who is a distinguished Professor of
    antitrust law and constitutional law at Notre Dame, began
    serving as the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General in
    the Antitrust Division. That is the No. 2 spot at Antitrust. By
    July of this year, Professor Alford was fired for
    insubordination after he blew the whistle on DOJ's corrupt
    approval of a merger between Hewlett Packard Enterprise and
    Juniper Networks.
        Although the Antitrust Division strongly opposed this
    merger, its opposition was overridden by Attorney General Pam
    Bondi's then-Chief of Staff Chad Mizelle and her then-Counselor
    Stanley Woodward after Hewlett Packard lobbyists urged them to
    ignore and bypass the sweeping antitrust problems that had been
    identified.
        Professor Alford, thank you for sounding the alarm today
    about backroom corruption, political favoritism, and betrayal
    of the rule of law at the Department of Justice. We are
    grateful to you for your courage in speaking out before this
    Committee.
        Our colleagues have described this hearing as ``anti-
    American antitrust,'' but I'm afraid they are not interested in
    actually dismantling monopolies, collusion, or price-fixing. On
    the contrary, their policy is all about elevating the interests
    of the largest corporations, especially the ones donating
    directly to Donald Trump and MAGA, over the public interest in
    putting them all far beyond the reach of U.S. foreign and
    domestic antitrust laws.
        Our expert agencies, like the FTC, the FCC, and DOJ, review
    mergers to assess whether a proposed deal complies with the
    relevant antitrust laws or public interest standard, including
    by protecting U.S. consumers from rising prices. If, after
    applying the law to the facts, they find that the merger is not
    in the public interest, they can sue to stop it or propose
    conditions on any new combination.
        Under this administration, merger review has turned into
    another instrument of corruption--a way for the President to
    reward his rich insider friends and punish companies he
    dislikes, including news companies that have been critical of
    his administration. Antitrust enforcement is now driven by pay-
    to-play corruption, political favoritism, shakedowns, and
    retaliation, instead of the facts and the legal standards in
    each case. It is not the public interest that controls
    outcomes; it is the President's political and financial
    interests.
        Take the case of Hewlett Packard Enterprise's purchase of
    Juniper Networks. When DOJ moved to block it, Hewlett Packard
    Enterprise hired two lawyers with connections to President
    Trump and his men, Mike Davis and Arthur Schwartz, for $1
    million apiece to lobby the White House, Attorney General
    Bondi's Chief of Staff Chad Mizelle, and the Attorney General's
    Counselor Stanley Woodward. Although DOJ staff and Trump's head
    of the Antitrust Division, Assistant Attorney General Gail
    Slater, strongly opposed the merger of these two large
    companies, the lobbyists got Mizelle to ignore not just the
    facts and the law, but also the recommendations of Donald
    Trump's own antitrust team to bless the deal.
        We don't know what these lobbyists told Mizelle over
    cocktails in a private club in D.C., but we do know that he
    short-circuited DOJ's legal review process and gave the green
    light to a merger that, according to the Department of
    Justice's own press release, will, quote, ``significantly
    reduce competition, resulting in large segments of the American
    economy paying more for less.'' That was a backroom deal that
    centralizes power and sends more wealth to the wealthy, making
    life a lot more expensive for the vast majority of Americans
    already struggling to stay afloat in this economy.
        Take Skydance's acquisition of Paramount, which is owned by
    the Ellisons, close friends and big donors to President Trump,
    who plied him with financial and political favors to ensure
    Paramount's purchase of Skydance would go through. The company
    not only gave tickets worth about $12,000 to the soon-to-be
    Chair of the FCC, Commissioner Brendan Carr, but also collected
    Carr's candid advice on how to effectively lobby his agency for
    approval.
        While Chair Carr sat on the proposed deal, the White House
    squeezed Paramount to pay President Trump $16 million to settle
    an utterly frivolous personal lawsuit that he had filed about
    the way 60 Minutes edited an interview with Kamala Harris, and
    he pressured Paramount to give him an additional $20 million in
    free ads--well, just for the hell of it. Even after this
    corrupt tribute was paid, the administration extracted more,
    installing an informant or ``minder'' directly in the newsroom
    at CBS to make sure its news coverage would always be suitably
    pro-Trump--adding naked violation of the First Amendment to
    this bonfire of corruption.
        Even now, the President is saying he personally will be
    involved in the process of Warner Bros' sale, emphasizing that
    CNN must, quote, ``be sold'' because of the news outlet's
    discourteous coverage of his presidency. Netflix and Paramount
    both know that the person they really need to lobby on the
    proposed acquisition of Warner Bros by either company is the
    President himself. They have already gone to the White House to
    make their case. This is how a gangster State runs, not how
    antitrust enforcement is supposed to work in the United States
    of America.
        Every time corporations and lobbyists use political
    influence and money to thwart the actual merger review process,
    the American people lose. We get a marketplace with more
    corporate concentration and consolidation, reduced competition,
    less innovation, and mired in political influence peddling.
    Prices go up; wages go down. The economic elite profits and
    economic inequality intensifies.
        As our witness Professor Alford said of these lobbyists and
    their White House ties in August, quote, ``Regardless of the
    outcome, their commitment is to exert and expand their
    influence and enrich themselves as their friends and
    supplicants are in power.''
        These cash-for-merger backroom deals reflect the broader
    patterns of money corruption that define this administration.
        Today, we will hear from Roger Alford about the difference
    between fair enforcement of antitrust laws and backroom
    dealmaking. I hope my colleagues will listen to him and take to
    heart the warning that he shares about the economic costs of
    political corruption.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back to you.
        Mr. Issa. Mr. Chair? A point of privilege and personal
    question. Isn't it true that we still have a prohibition on
    pejorative remarks about the Office of the President or the
    President, as the Ranking Member just did? Is it not still a
    parliamentary objection to that language personally attacking
    the President and accusing him of crimes?
        Mr. Fitzgerald. It is, and I would ask the Members to
    refrain from that. If they could direct any of their questions
    or comments to the Chair or in response to the witnesses, that
    would be certainly more appropriate.
        Mr. Issa. Mr. Chair, I'd further ask that this objection be
    placed after the Ranking Member's opening statement. I realize
    that he can say anything he wants on an opening statement,
    including a statement that is intended to be prohibited by
    House rules, but I would like my objection noted for the
    record.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. That would--
        Mr. Raskin. Mr. Chair, I'll just state that nothing I
    stated is prohibited by any House rule and we are perfectly
    within our both First Amendment rights and Our Speech and
    Debate Clause rights to characterize both public policies that
    are taking place and actions that are taking place. I'm certain
    that the distinguished gentleman from California has engaged in
    equally vigorous criticism of Democratic Presidents and the
    administrations, and that is part of living in the land with
    freedom of speech.
        Mr. Issa. Mr. Chair, I will not ask that his words be
    taken--
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Do you ask to--
        Mr. Issa. We will not ask that his words to be taken down
    because I want to go forward with this hearing. I do, again,
    insist that my objection be noted for the record.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good. We will now move on to opening
    statements. Beyond opening statements, we will come back to
    Chair Jordan. At this point, we will now introduce today's
    witnesses.
        Mr. Issa. Well, then, we can take Mr. Jordan next.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Yes, unless Chair Jordan would like--
        Chair Jordan. No, I just want to thank the Chair for this
    hearing and look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. OK.
        Chair Jordan. I will yield back to the Chair.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. OK. Then, we will recognize the Ranking
    Member for an opening--
        Ms. Balint. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. OK.
        Ms. Balint. This hearing is nothing, from where I sit, it
    is nothing but a handout to big tech. These companies will
    oppose any rules to reform their anticompetitive conduct, no
    matter what nation or State tries to hold them accountable.
        Republicans are concerned about other countries beating up
    on big tech. I'm concerned about big tech beating up on
    Americans. Most Americans are struggling. Huge, dominant
    companies that don't have real competitors are being pushed--
    pushed--to have more and more power, but they are not being
    pushed to lower their prices or to make products better.
        We won't make life in this country more affordable if we
    don't commit to strong antitrust enforcement. Corporate greed
    is at the heart of rising prices. The fact is that both parties
    have failed to check the consolidation of economic power and
    the abuses of that power.
        Dominant companies have grown larger under both Democratic
    and Republican Administrations, but here in the House Judiciary
    Committee support for rigorous antitrust enforcement and merger
    review has been bipartisan. It was this very Subcommittee that
    studied the digital market, released a report, and crafted
    antitrust rules to rein in big tech. Those bills were supported
    and voted out of this Committee by both parties. That was just
    a few years ago.
        Boy, have times changed. Our bipartisan antitrust
    legislation failed to become law because of opposition from
    factions in both of our parties. Work still continued at the
    agencies. The FTC and DOJ sued big tech for breaking the
    antitrust laws. Many of these suits began under Trump, were
    continued under Biden, and now, are again in the hands of the
    Trump Administration.
        In the Senate, Republicans like Senators Lee, Grassley, and
    Blackburn, and Democrats like Booker, Klobuchar, and Blumen-
    thal, are still working to pass the same antitrust rules that
    started in this Committee. Those bills are, rightly, targeted
    at big tech. For example, Senator Lee's AMERICA Act would
    reform or break up dominant tech firms.
        Why is it that today, here in this House Committee, my
    colleagues across the aisle are characterizing those bipartisan
    bills as anti-American? Why is that? Because they target
    multinational big-tech companies that Chair Jordan seems to
    like.
        Today, Republicans in this Committee are showing the wide
    gap between them and other Members of their own party, and more
    importantly, the gap between what they are pursuing today and
    what Americans want us to be doing.
        Their Senate colleagues, the Vice President, and Trump
    appointees at the Justice Department and the FTC, all support
    strong antitrust legislation and enforcement. While our own
    government prosecutes American big-tech companies for breaking
    the law and our Senate colleagues advance measures to hold big
    tech accountable, we are, apparently, supposed to criticize
    other countries for doing the exact thing that our own voters
    want us to be doing, that Americans are actually clamoring for.
        Countries around the world, including Australia, Brazil,
    Japan, South Korea, the U.K., and the EU, did what we did. They
    studied the digital market, found dominant tech companies,
    found that they were abusing their power and stifling
    competition, and then, crafted rules and brought lawsuits.
        The Majority witnesses will claim that these rules and
    suits are unfairly targeting American companies, but that
    premise ignores reality. Other countries are actually trying to
    address the monopolistic power of big tech--power that poses
    danger to markets, democracies, and frankly, to public health;
    power that can and must be checked through the enforcement of
    antitrust laws.
        We should be world leaders on this. We are Americans. Do we
    still believe in healthy competition? Why would we use time on
    this Committee to blast others who are taking on the power of
    monopolies that are increasingly controlling our lives?
        Republicans will argue today that actions by other nations
    to address monopolistic power are discriminatory and unfairly
    target U.S. tech companies. The only true examples of
    discriminatory and unfair law enforcement are right here at
    home. I have an idea. Why don't we cleanup our own house first?
        The true threat to enforcement of antitrust law and to
    American companies is the perversion of antitrust undertaken by
    the Trump Administration. Under this President, principled and
    fact--based review of one company buying another is overruled
    in favor of deals struck by Hewlett Packard's well--paid
    lobbyists with government officials over cocktails at private
    clubs.
        Under Trump, Paramount's acquisition of Skydance was only
    approved after the President was paid tens of millions of
    dollars and a government spy was installed in an NBC--excuse
    me--in a CBS newsroom.
        Under this administration, the President pardoned an
    indicted bid rigger. This is one of the few antitrust
    violations that are criminally prosecuted. The pardon came
    after the President played a round of golf with the alleged
    criminal's lobbyist. One round at Mar-a-Lago wipes away a
    possible 10-year prison sentence for a crime that Trump's own
    Department of Justice and FBI worked to prosecute.
        Keep in mind that the individual pardoned was set to be
    deposed the very next day in a separate civil lawsuit, the
    government's Live Nation/Ticketmaster case. In one fell swoop,
    the Trump Administration manages to undermine two cases
    important to protect Americans from being fleeced by corporate
    misconduct and greed.
        The United States has long stood for something better--
    predictable enforcement, independent institutions, and
    decisions grounded in law and evidence. When the administration
    treats antitrust as just another way to make a corrupt deal,
    when it weaponizes antitrust to achieve political goals and to
    reward its allies, it undermines the foundations of our market
    economy: Competitive merit, not political influence, to
    determine who succeeds in this country.
        Competition creates the pipeline of American innovation and
    prosperity. Isn't that what we want? Isn't that what we say,
    what we want, what is better for all of us?
        Again and again, we have seen this administration do favors
    for their rich friends and allies, while the rest of us suffer.
    Big tech and big media are allowed to get bigger, raise prices,
    and squash competitors. All they need is a seven--figure
    payment to lobbyists and secret deposits into the President's
    ballroom fund. Companies are taking notice. They see that the
    fate of any multibillion-dollar deal is going to run right
    through the Oval Office.
        Right now, Warner Bros is up for sale, and the two biggest
    bidders, Netflix and Larry Ellison's Paramount, are doing all
    they can to get the White House to favor their buyout over
    another. Paramount is going to the White House and hanging out
    in the Presidential box at the Kennedy Center. President Trump
    promised sweeping changes to CNN after he renewed his
    longstanding criticism of the news channel. Not to be outdone,
    Netflix executives also paid homage to the President and
    visited the White House in recent days.
        Americans of both parties see this and they don't like it,
    and they want us to do something about it. They want us to
    fight back. We should be doing all we can to address the real
    and present dangers that monopolies, especially media and tech
    monopolies, pose to our markets, our wallets, to consumers, to
    competitors, and, yes, frankly, to the democracy itself.
        Big tech and big media are more than happy to pay to get
    their mega--mergers approved or evidence against them thrown
    out. Those close deals that lead to even more private economic
    power and control over what we watch, what we buy, what we see,
    and what we hear.
        Our Chair, Jim Jordan, has long opposed bipartisan
    antitrust bills aimed at reining in giant tech companies and
    cracking down on their abusive business practices. In 2021,
    when we advanced bipartisan tech antitrust bills, he called
    them, quote, ``Democrat bills,'' despite the support the bills
    continue to have from Republicans like Senators Grassley, Lee,
    and Blackburn.
        Now, we are supposed to beat up on other countries for
    doing the thing that we attempted to do? Give me a break. Big
    tech and their secret million-dollar donations and backroom
    deals cannot be how this country enforces the law. We have to
    fight against monopolies wherever we find them, and we cannot
    and should not criticize other nations for addressing the big
    tech global harms.
        I call on my colleagues to join me in standing up for the
    rule of law, for antitrust and competition laws to be enforced
    on the merits and the facts, not handshakes and favors and pay-
    to-play games.
        I look forward to hearing from our witness Professor Roger
    Alford about how far we have perverted the rule of law and what
    we must do to ensure that transparency, accountability, and
    justice rule the day.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentlewoman yields back.
        Without objection, all other opening statements will be
    included in the record.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. We will now introduce today's witnesses.
        Mr. Shanker Singham is the Chief Executive Officer of
    Competere, a trade law and economic policy consulting firm
    based in the U.K. He is also the Chair and President of the
    Competere Foundation for Trade and Competition Policy, a
    nonprofit organization that promotes trade, competitive
    markets, and property rights.
        Professor Aurelien Portuese. Mr. Portuese is a Research
    Professor and the founding Director of the GW Competition and
    Innovation Lab at the GW Institute of Public Policy at George
    Washington University. He previously was a Professor at George
    Mason University, the founding Director of the Schumpeter
    Project on Competition Policy at the Information Technology and
    Innovation Foundation, and a Professor at various universities
    in both the U.K. and in France.
        Mr. Dirk Auer. Mr. Auer is the Director of Competition
    Policy at the International Center for Law and Economics, a
    nonprofit organization that promotes the use of law and
    economics methodologies to inform public policy debates. Mr.
    Auer's research focuses on the competition and antitrust issues
    in the United States, the U.K., and Europe.
        Professor Roger Alford. Mr. Alford is a Professor of Law at
    the University of Notre Dame Law School. His classes and work
    focus on international trade, international arbitration, global
    antitrust, and transnational civil litigation.
        We welcome our witnesses and thank them for appearing
    today.
        We will begin by swearing you in. Would you please rise and
    raise your right hand?
        Do you solemnly swear or affirm, under penalty of perjury,
    that the testimony you are about to give is true and correct to
    the best of your knowledge, information, and belief, so help
    you God?
        [All witnesses respond in the affirmative.]
        Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in
    the affirmative.
        Thank you. Please be seated.
        Please know that your written testimony will be entered
    into the record in its entirety. Accordingly, we ask that you
    summarize your testimony in five minutes.
        Mr. Singham, you may begin.

                    STATEMENT OF SHANKER A. SINGHAM

        Mr. Singham. Thank you very much, Chair, Ranking Members,
    and the Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity
    to testify today.
        My name is Shanker Singham. I appear on behalf of the
    Competere Foundation. I'm also Chair of the Growth Commission,
    which is an independent network of economists focused on lack
    of economic growth in the G7.
        I have actually testified to this Committee before in 2010
    on the Chinese competition law and anticompetitive market
    distortions in China. The concerns that I noted then about the
    possibility of the use of competition policy in other countries
    against American companies is still valid today, and what I'm
    about to say about a larger group of countries is even more
    troubling because it concerns countries who should be allied to
    the U.S. economic interests.
        There is a battle which has been waging for some time for
    the world's operating system. Markets based on competition
    without--competition on the merits without distortions versus
    markets that are defined by government distortions, subsidies,
    privileges, and other methods of deciding market outcomes: The
    U.S. model versus the China model, if you will.
        The way foreign governments regulate laws and digital
    platforms has become a major macroeconomic and trade issue for
    the United States. DMA-style digital regulations and
    interventionist antitrust enforcement abroad are operating as
    nontariff barriers. They lower growth in the countries that do
    them and impose very large costs on the U.S. economy, and they
    make the China model more likely to become the global norm.
        Our work at Competere focuses on why some jurisdictions are
    able to turn digital innovation into higher incomes and others
    do not. We use an econometric framework to link policy
    conditions to GDP per capita across countries, focused on three
    pillars: The openness of the trade regime; how competitive the
    market is--in other words, how much it delivers competition on
    the merits--how well it protects property rights.
        Digital regulation has now become one of the most--biggest
    sources of these distortions. Many governments are moving away
    from traditional effects--based antitrust toward ex ante
    prescriptive regimes modeled on the European Union's Digital
    Markets Act. These frameworks identify gatekeepers largely by
    size, and then impose conduct rules on self-preferencing data
    use, interoperability, ranking, and product integration without
    requiring proof of consumer harm. In practice, they function as
    nontariff barriers that fall overwhelmingly on U.S. firms.
        We've shown in our written testimony that many of the
    assumptions on which digital regulation and nationalistic
    enforcement are based are false and misunderstand the nature of
    technology markets; how they've developed, and how their
    underpinning economics actually works.
        This leads to the use of flawed doctrines such as the
    Essential Facilities Doctrine, or duties to deal, that treats
    them as if their government--created utilities, but have been
    around for a century.
        Our detailed case study of Korea illustrates the scale of
    the problem. Korea's proposed Online Platform Markets Act--
    there are various iterations of online fairness acts the
    Koreans are introducing, even as we speak, and these have
    imposed asymmetric burdens on large firms, particularly U.S.
    firms, but they damage the Korean economy itself. Our data
    suggests that the damage to the Korean economy is extensive,
    $450-$470 billion over a 10-year period. The damage that they
    do to the U.S. economy is greater than $500 billion over a 10-
    year period on a long-run basis.
        What should Congress do? First, treat digital regulation,
    foreign digital regulation, as a core trade and economic
    security issue. U.S. trade policy should explicitly recognize
    the practices I've described as nontariff barriers and address
    them in bilateral and multilateral engagements. The National
    Security Strategy makes it clear that economic security, which
    includes anticompetitive regulation applied to U.S. firms, is a
    national security issue.
        Second, Congress needs to row in behind all the weapons at
    our disposal to deal with this, including Section 232 tariffs,
    as well as Sections 301 and 338 investigations, to send a
    strong signal to countries that this type of damage to the U.S.
    economy will not be tolerated.
        Third, despite agreements, and in cases where Chinese firms
    are clearly benefiting from heavy-handed enforcement against
    U.S. firms that they are not subject to, and where countries
    persist in damaging the U.S. economy through these measures, we
    think it wholly appropriate for Section 232 tariffs to be
    applied until the national security threat to the United States
    is removed.
        We've submitted detailed testimony, our previous work over
    the last 30 years, a couple of books on distortions,
    anticompetitive market distortions, and trade issues. We look
    forward to your questions.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Singham follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, Mr. Singham. We will now go to
    Professor Portuese. You may begin.

                     STATEMENT OF AURELIEN PORTUESE

        Mr. Portuese. Chair Jordan, Chair Fitzgerald, Ranking
    Member Raskin, and the distinguished Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
        My work as Professor and founding Director of the GW
    Competition and Innovation Lab is focused on one thing:
    Promoting innovation for the benefit of consumers.
        I'm here to deliver a message of urgency. Congress must act
    to curb DMA--inspired regulations that are multiplying all
    around the world. These proposals are disproportionately
    targeting U.S. tech companies and insulate local monopolies.
        There are things that the administrations and the Congress
    can do to stop their spread. Before I turn to what Congress can
    do, including, Chair Fitzgerald, your well-crafted proposals,
    let me first talk about why the DMA is a problem.
        Despite the benefits of the DMA, such as enhanced
    interoperability and adjustments to the app store rules, which
    could be achieved through way less harmful means, these are the
    reasons why the DMA is a problem:
        First, the DMA wrongly targets U.S. tech companies. Now,
    every single gatekeeper designated in the DMA is a U.S.
    company. This is not an accident; it's by design.
        Second, the DMA is anti-innovation. The DMA forces and
    focuses on high political risks rather than actual harm, and
    the effect is to deter a firm from innovating.
        Third, DMA harmed consumers. For example, European
    consumers cannot access Google Maps in their search results,
    and they don't have Apple intelligence in their--as AI features
    in the iPhones. This is an effect of the DMA.
        Despite this, these problems, the DMA is spreading
    globally: South Korea, Brazil, Australia, Japan, and other
    jurisdictions are considering DMA-inspired regulations.
        I regularly engage with those regulators in these
    countries. If they move forward, that will cement Europe's
    approach at the expense of U.S. enterprises.
        The U.S. can avert this trend for what I call ``sharp
    power,'' a proactive strategy to advance pro-innovation
    regulations worldwide. This approach requires deliberate
    actions from Congress and the administrations to reassert tech
    leadership by reinvesting its full leadership on consumer
    welfare globally and as well as integrating national security
    concerns and competition enforcement.
        Now, I want to outline four ways the U.S. can curb DMA-
    inspired regulations.
        First, provisions akin to Chairman Fitzgerald's H.R. 4278,
    to Protect U.S. Companies from Foreign Regulatory Taxation Act,
    will be a strong step forward. This bill will empower the U.S.
    to impose reciprocal tariffs or sanctions on jurisdiction that
    implement DMA-like rules. This would help level the global
    playing field and protect American innovations.
        Second, Congress should enact legislation that will allow
    the government to take regulatory measures against
    discriminatory foreign regulations. These could be accomplished
    through amendments of the International Trade Act of 1974,
    which would strengthen the U.S. Trade Representative's
    authority to address unfair trade practices in digital markets.
        Third, Congress should initiate an investigation into the
    DMA's effect globally. Investigations will help assess the
    compliance costs, which are assessed to be perhaps over $1
    billion per year annually. This investigation could help
    measure the impact of the DMA and DMA-like regulations on
    consumer experiences and any benefit, if any at all. This
    information would bolster efforts to identify an alternative
    path for government considering competition legislation.
        Fourth and finally, Congress and the administration should
    prioritize digital diplomacy. Europeans have digital
    sovereignty. We should prioritize digital diplomacy to
    influence foreign competition policies.
        This would entail establishing a dedicated task force
    within the State Department and the U.S. Trade Representative's
    office to engage bilaterally and multilaterally with allied
    nations. Through technical assistance and competition dialogs,
    the U.S. can promote alternatives to the DMA.
        For instance, diplomatic efforts could encourage the USTR's
    effects--based analyses, which focuses on actual harm and
    consumer benefits instead of hypothetical risks. These can help
    counter the EU influence and promote global standards that are
    truly pro-
    competition and pro-innovation.
        I encourage the U.S. to take advantage of this window of
    opportunity to counter the spread of the DMA and champion a
    better approach.
        Thank you, and I welcome your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Portuese follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, Professor. Mr. Auer, you now may
    begin.

                         STATEMENT OF DIRK AUER

        Mr. Auer. Chair Fitzgerald, Ranking Member Correa, and the
    Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify.
        My name is Dirk Auer. While I work for an American research
    institution, I live in Belgium. From that vantage point, I have
    watched a disturbing trend accelerate.
        Over the past years, the European Union has enacted various
    digital market regulations and imposed colossal fines on
    American companies. I wish I could sit here and tell you these
    policies will make markets fairer and more contestable, as
    European policymakers claim, but that is not the case.
        It is becoming increasingly clear Europe's regulations will
    harm its startups, its consumers, and most importantly for me,
    my children's future. In practice, these policies are naked
    attempts to penalize American success and subsidize European
    stagnation. Because Europe has let all this unfold--sorry.
    Because America has let all this unfold with little to no
    response, other jurisdictions are rapidly forming suit.
        To understand why this is happening, we must look at the
    brutal economic reality. We are witnessing a great divergence.
    Since the year 2000, the U.S. economy has powered ahead, while
    Europe's engine has stalled. Real disposable income has grown
    nearly twice as fast in the U.S. as in the EU.
        Over the past 50 years, Europe built ASML, Spotify, and
    Novo Nordisk. Not terrible, but in that same time, the U.S.
    formed Microsoft, Alphabet, Apple, Meta, Amazon, OpenAI, and
    many, many others. To put it bluntly, Europe has become an
    open-air museum. It is rich in history and culture, but
    increasingly irrelevant in the global production of value.
        The lack of European tech giants encourages its politicians
    to regulate tech firms. That way, they can act tough on
    corporate power without antagonizing any domestic voting bloc.
        The enforcement numbers tell the story. Since 2019, the EU
    Commission has virtually stopped fining domestic firms for
    competition violations. American firms, on the other hand, were
    hit with almost $8 billion in fines.
        Europe did not stop there. Its marquee tech regulation, the
    Digital Markets Act, was gerrymandered to almost exclusively
    target five American companies, while conveniently excluding
    almost all large European firms.
        All this has resulted in degraded online services and
    delayed product launches. Google was forced to remove
    theseamless Maps integration from search. Likewise, Apple
    intelligence was delayed in Europe. Worse, Europe's overzealous
    regulation harms American consumers, too, because the world's
    brightest engineers must now comply with foreign regulations
    instead of designing groundbreak-
    ing new services.
        An even bigger danger for the United States is that this
    model is highly contagious. We are seeing DMA-inspired
    regulations crop up in the U.K., Japan, Brazil, and South
    Korea. This is, arguably, happening because the United States
    aided and abetted the EU when it passed the DMA. The U.S.
    administration's silence was interpreted as permission, and
    other jurisdictions are now emboldened to follow suit.
        Historically, defending U.S. commerce was a bipartisan
    duty. When the EU targeted the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger,
    the Clinton Administration threatened a trade war. When the EU
    went after Apple for back taxes, President Obama called it
    unfair and commercially driven.
        Unfortunately, in recent years, U.S. antitrust agencies
    have broken with this tradition, effectively outsourcing their
    enforcement wishlists to foreign capitals. When the EU blocked
    the Amazon iRobot deal, Washington's silence was deafening.
        This leads to my most critical point for this body. This
    administration must make foreign regulators understand that
    discriminatory targeting of U.S. tech carries consequences.
    Doing so would deter protectionist regulations; thereby,
    protecting U.S. companies, their workers, and ultimately,
    American consumers.
        It is also crucial for the U.S. to remain a shining beacon
    of consumer--focused antitrust enforcement. The U.S. cannot
    credibly combat discriminatory regulations abroad if it adopts
    similar ones at home. In short, the transatlantic alliance is
    strongest when it is based on mutual growth and innovation, not
    on the managed decline of one partner at the expense of the
    other.
        The time has come to reassert the principles of market
    competition and innovation that make the Western economy the
    envy of the world.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Auer follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, Mr. Auer. Professor Alford, you
    may begin.

                      STATEMENT OF ROGER P. ALFORD

        Mr. Alford. Chair Fitzgerald, Ranking Member Raskin, thank
    you for the opportunity to testify here today.
        I've testified at the Senate Judiciary Committee on several
    occasions, but this is my first opportunity to testify here in
    the House. I welcome the opportunity to discuss the
    politicalization of European antitrust enforcement, but also, I
    want to address my remarks, first, to the more pressing concern
    of the politicalization of United States antitrust enforcement.
        The DOJ Justice Manual is unequivocal; the rule of law
    depends on the even-handed administration of justice. The legal
    judgments of the Department of Justice must be impartial and
    insulated from political influence. It is imperative that the
    Department's investigatory and prosecutorial powers be
    exercised free from partisan considerations.
        On June 16, 2024, former prosecutor and current lawyer and
    lobbyist Trey Gowdy stated the following:

            Our justice system is the last thing that is holding us
            together. No one is above the law, but no one is beneath the
            law either. You should not be targeted because of your status,
            and you should not be rewarded because of your status.

        Today, Trey Gowdy is playing a leading role in promoting a
    politicized justice system. After the Department of Justice
    indicted Tim Leiweke with bid rigging in July 2025, Gowdy
    lobbied senior leadership within the Department of Justice to
    get the case dropped, but to no avail. Gowdy went above the
    heads of every senior official within the Department of Justice
    and appealed directly to President Trump. The Tim Leiweke
    pardon is not the first or the last example of politicized
    antitrust enforcement in the past year.
        In Aspen, this past August, I spoke about the HPE-Juniper
    merger scandal. I am heartened that over a dozen State
    Attorneys Generals have successfully intervened in that case,
    and that the court is holding hearings, including a hearing
    today, on that case.
        Of course, the concerns go far beyond Trey Gowdy. The MAGA
    lobbyists are shameless in their self promotion, aware that
    their window of opportunity is short and closing fast. Press
    reports reveal the pervasive practice of lobbyists attempting
    to corruptly influence antitrust law enforcement.
        The populist Steve Bannon said that,

            We're in a fight right now . . . . The concentration of power
            comes from the lobbyists, [and] the top law firms, and they're
            all over the White House, the administration, and the
            President.

        MAGA lobbyists, reportedly, are liberally pitching their
    services to clients, stating that, for a mere $225,000 a month
    per client, these lobbyists will go above and around the
    Antitrust Division to lobby their cases, and even seek to have
    AAG Gail Slater removed from her Senate-confirmed position.
        The future of the Republican Party is at stake in this
    battle. MAGA lobbyists are betraying President Trump's populist
    antitrust agenda. If the Antitrust Division does not have a
    free hand to address the affordability crisis that is plaguing
    the American people, what hope does it have for the Republican
    Party to be the party of the working class and the rural poor?
    It is also disheartening, given the hopes and dreams that so
    many of us had just one year ago.
        What is to be done about the politicalization of antitrust
    enforcement? Among the best responses is greater involvement by
    State Aattorneys General. When Federal enforces can stand
    alone, there is a risk of a single point of political failure.
        Another response is reform from within the antitrust bar.
    More transparency is critical. The lobbying disclosure
    requirements should be enforced, and FOIA requests should be
    redoubled.
        Of course, as I mentioned, greater judicial oversight is
    also critical, both with respect to merger review and conduct
    cases. Congressional oversight is welcome, and I welcome
    hearings such as this to address the matter.
        Then, ultimately, though, reform must occur from within the
    Department of Justice. The government enjoys the presumption of
    regularity, but that presumption can be rebutted.
        In my view, we should consider the current hearing as
    another manifestation of efforts to politicize antitrust
    enforcement. Much of the antitrust enforcement in Europe
    parallels antitrust enforcement in the United States, including
    prosecutions brought by the Trump Administration and Republican
    State Attorneys General.
        I am not suggesting that there are not real risks of
    discrimination against American companies with respect to
    antitrust enforcement abroad. My written testimony provides
    details in that regard. I have said as much on previous
    occasions.
        Yes, the risk of discrimination is real abroad, and I
    witnessed it firsthand when I was at the Department of Justice,
    but the risk that big-tech companies have achieved gatekeeper
    status are also--and abusing their monopoly power--are also
    real.
        I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Alford follows:]
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, Professor. We will now proceed
    under the five-minute rule with questions.
        I want to recognize the gentleman from California, Mr.
    Issa, first.
        Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for holding this
    important hearing. Notwithstanding the professor's claim that
    this is somehow politicizing, nothing could be further from the
    truth. The fact is this Subcommittee, and the entire Committee,
    has clearly been on this subject for a long time, but it
    vacillates.
        As the Ranking Member would often state, forget about
    competition abroad--I'm talking about the Subcommittee Ranking
    Member in this case--let's just go ahead and focus on American
    companies. Nothing could be more inappropriate.
        President Trump is the first President in a very long time
    to ask, what is the relevant market? Three out of our four
    witnesses understand; the relevant market in antitrust is now
    the world, and in tech, it is the world.
        When countries like Korea, Australia, and most of Europe,
    countries that we have--and Brazil, for that matter--we
    considered allies, in fact, used their vast market power, not
    always in that product, but their vast market power as
    sovereign nations to, in fact, adversely affect our
    competitiveness. It doesn't matter--and I'll go on the record--
    it doesn't matter if you have a 100 percent market share in the
    United States and a 100 percent global market share as an
    original innovator, if, in fact, foreign nations--in jealousy
    or simply not wanting to, in fact, allow these unicorns to
    exist--in fact, use their market power to stop you. That is
    what is going on often with our closest allies.
        Notwithstanding, I'll just quote one, and I would like it
    to put up behind me. Chair Joo of the Korea Free Trade
    Commission--that is a wonderful title--in his own words,
    disparages America, takes us down. In fact, his commission, as
    this board says--and I would ask unanimous consent that the
    entire article be placed in the record--says, ``So why are many
    Americans, especially White workers in the Rust Belt in the
    Midwest, so angry?''
        I'll tell you why they are so angry, as somebody born and
    raised in Cleveland, Ohio, and somebody who happily went to
    work for the Trump Administration, because, in fact, they
    believed in free and fair trade, something that we had talked
    about, but always left the second half off.
        The fact is we now have to take on the status quo of global
    competitiveness. China, but also our allies; Europe, one of our
    closest partners, including Australia, in fact, are operating
    in unfair trade practices. The Digital Markets Act is just one
    in which every unicorn in that field is American, and as
    innovators, and they as regulators, they intend on using
    regulation to take us out of our competitive lead.
        Let there be no doubt that there are additional barriers
    and they are not new. I know that the testimony we are
    receiving today is important, but I'm just going to give you
    one piece of testimony.
        More than 40 years ago, I began traveling the world and
    doing international business. More than 30 years ago, I was in
    South Korea for a trade conference. The highest level of
    management at that time, both government and Samsung and the
    other majors, proudly said to the delegation that had gone
    there,

            We're so delighted to have you here. We want you to, in fact,
            come here and invest, transfer your technologies, and enjoy the
            benefits of our ability to make your products.

        He didn't even listen to himself. They were not interested
    in buying our products. They were not interested in joint
    ventures. They were interested in technology transfers. Even
    when they manufacture in the United States, Hyundai and Kia,
    they won't even obey our rules and, in fact, will illegally
    bring in their own workers, which has recently been found by
    this administration.
        I normally ask a lot of questions. I'm not going to ask a
    lot of questions this time. I'm going to thank our witnesses.
        I'm going to, because you raised your hand, go to Professor
    Portuese, because you do want to say something and I would like
    to hear it--quickly.
        Mr. Portuese. Thank you very much.
        I want to rivet back to the point that you made about
    relevant markets, because that's at the basis of antitrust
    principles. To look at if companies abuse their positions, we
    look at--first, we have to define the relevant market. We
    cannot call companies ``monopolies'' if we haven't defined
    relevant market.
        You say that the relevant market today is the world. That
    is true. I just want to add that, also, the relevant market is
    not online or offline. These companies compete both--with their
    online platforms, but they compete with, also, offline
    groceries and other effects. The idea of, first, insulating
    what we call digital markets is wrongheaded. There's no such
    thing as digital market. There are markets and digital is just
    a means of distribution to the consumers.
        When digital platforms compete, digital advertising
    competes with print advertising. Digital supermarkets compete
    with groceries offline.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman's--
        Mr. Portuese. The competition is much larger than what we
    can think.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Issa. Mr. Chair, I would ask unanimous consent to enter
    into the record an article entitled, ``The Chinese Fan Who Made
    It into the Trump Administration.'' This article discusses the
    professor who is with us here today, Mr. Alford. Without
    objection.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Without objection. I now recognize--
        Ms. Balint. Mr. Chair, I ask unanimous consent.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Go ahead.
        Ms. Balint. I ask unanimous consent to submit ``Trump
    Warner Bros Meddling Pushes the Limits of Executive Power''
    from Bloomberg, which quotes Professor Herbert Hovenkamp,
    stating that Trump's involvement in this merger, quote,
    ``illustrates that not only is this President interfering with
    enforcement policy, but is doing so for reasons that have
    nothing to do with antitrust.''
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Without objection. I now recognize the
    Ranking Member of the Full Committee, Mr. Raskin, again for
    five minutes.
        Mr. Raskin. Mr. Chair, thank you very much. Mr. Alford, you
    served in the first Trump Administration and the second Trump
    Administration, is that right?
        Mr. Alford. Yes, correct.
        Mr. Raskin. Am I correct in deducing you are Republican?
        Mr. Alford. Yes, correct.
        Mr. Raskin. Thank you for your testimony. I am wondering
    about this: What is the greater threat today to a healthy and
    competitive U.S. economy? Corruption in our own antitrust
    agencies or foreign countries enforcement of their antitrust
    laws?
        Mr. Alford. I would say the former. The concern for
    protecting the U.S. market is absolutely critical to the
    American people. What we want in the United States is vigorous
    antitrust enforcement that will protect the average American.
    That is being undermined now in light of the undue influence of
    lobbyists.
        Mr. Raskin. The DOJ Manual begins by stating, ``The legal
    judgments of the Department of Justice must be impartial and
    insulated from political influence.'' Can you share with the
    Judiciary Committee what you saw as the second most senior
    political appointee at the Antitrust Division of DOJ relevant
    to that principle?
        Mr. Alford. Yes. Obviously, to be careful with respect to
    government deliberate privilege, but as has been publicly
    reported, lobbyists are pervasively involved in the--every
    level of the Department of Justice trying to influence the
    outcomes, not based on the merits, but based on relationships
    that these lobbyists have with particular individuals in power.
    My written testimony actually goes into detail of numerous
    different articles that sort of outline that kind of problem.
        Mr. Raskin. In that context if our antitrust system is
    failing because it is being overrun by insider influence,
    political lobbying, money contributions and so on, what do you
    think the role of this deflection is toward international
    antitrust in the conversation about what needs to be happening
    in America?
        Mr. Alford. Well, obviously if you really want to focus on
    the politicalization of antitrust enforcement, we should focus
    on fixing our problems at home first and foremost.
        With respect to concerns about what is happening abroad in
    the extent to which there's discrimination, most of the cases
    that are being addressed with respect to European antitrust
    enforcement have very close parallels to exactly the same kind
    of cases that are being brought in the United States by
    Republican administrations, as well as Republican State
    Attorneys General, as well as private parties? You can go down
    the list and look at what the European cases are and then find
    parallels in the United States.
        Mr. Raskin. You've taught both international antitrust and
    domestic antitrust for decades at Notre Dame Law School and
    other places. Can you put in just a common parlance what it
    means to American citizens, American consumers, and small
    businesses, if we depart from strong antitrust enforcement and
    instead let the whole system be overrun by insider influence
    and big money?
        Mr. Alford. Well, just last month the Rasmussen poll had a
    survey of whether or not American people support vigorous
    antitrust enforcement and the results were overwhelming.
    Overwhelming American support for vigorous antitrust
    enforcement. What we fear and what we think is happening is
    that rather than having cases decided on the merits there are
    cases that are being resolved based on political relationships.
    When that happens there is a corrupting influence that happens
    throughout the government.
        The risk is real that without the contributions of State
    Attorneys General, private litigation, or careful judicial
    oversight that the good work the Antitrust Division is trying
    to accomplish, that Gail Slater is trying to accomplish will
    not be possible.
        Mr. Raskin. Again, if you would break it down for us. I am
    talking about the original principles of antitrust. If we allow
    for greater and greater concentration, consolidation of
    corporate power, and control over markets, what does that mean
    to consumers in terms of prices? What does it mean to workers
    in terms of wages? What does it mean for the possibility of
    other businesses to enter into the competitive sphere?
        Mr. Alford. Sure. Obviously, if there's not vigorous
    antitrust enforcement, then the pocketbook issues that are
    central to the American people with respect to housing,
    healthcare, agriculture, entertainment, and the whole variety
    of different industries that are critical to the American
    people--all of the prices will go up. There will be lower
    quality, less innovation, and fewer entrants.
        Mr. Raskin. Very good. I yield back to you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, the gentleman yields back. I now
    recognize the gentleman from Texas for five minutes.
        Mr. Gooden. Thank you. Mr. Portuese, based on your work on
    digital competition policy, what have we learned about how
    broad ex ante platform regulations such as the DMA affect the
    speed at which new technologies reach the market, particularly
    for small-and medium-sized tech firms?
        Mr. Portuese. Thank you very much. This ex ante type of
    relations is what I call fundamentally precautionary. In Europe
    we have these principles, precautionary principles which stop
    acting, developing products and services. Even if there's no
    actual harm, just very remote, what we call hypothetical risks
    of something happening leads to prohibition.
        What we've learned from these ex ante type of relations is
    that blanket regulation doesn't work in the sense that it's
    just deterring on innovations and leads to underinvestments.
    Because companies will spend more time on compliance and
    counsels and fees trying to understand regulations that are
    always vague rather than focusing on innovation and deploying
    products.
        I just want to agree with Representative Raskin when he
    said we need stronger enforcement. Yes, but that's why we don't
    need regulations. Regulation is the opposite of enforcement.
    The greater risks for potentially corruptions or risks for
    consideration are regulatory capture, is the risk of crony
    capitalism. What we have is the greater amount of the number of
    regulations, the more we have these kinds of regulation dialogs
    between these large companies and the regulator behind closed
    doors.
        I prefer a system based on U.S. antitrust where there's
    enforcement, in quote, ``that is public and is based on
    evidence and effects-based analysis rather than regulatory
    potential capture between closed doors, between a regulator,
    and a company where each company is treated differently
    according to their political favors or others.''
        We need to reinforce the role of the courts and the
    judicial principles that are underlying the antitrust history.
        Mr. Gooden. I guess I have also heard that these laws are
    designed by foreign governments to kneecap American companies
    so that the local companies who are effectively exempted can
    get ahead. My question to you finally then is how many of these
    domestic companies are subject to these new rules and can you
    explain how these foreign legislatures have carefully, or not
    carefully, designed their regulations to target American
    companies?
        Mr. Portuese. It's very interesting because the DMA was
    capturing most of the U.S. companies. Now, it's all U.S. tech
    companies. Booking.com was the only Dutch European companies
    that could have been included into the DMA. Now, booking.com
    has a holding in Connecticut. Can be considered as an American
    constitution. TikTok was regulated. Now, with the sale of
    TikTok we can consider TikTok as a U.S. company when it comes
    to U.S. All companies under the DMA are somehow American
    companies.
        Sometimes those regulations in other parts of the world,
    try to include a local company to avoid overt discriminatory
    intent of those regulations, because otherwise they're going to
    be sued before the world trade organizations. That doesn't mean
    that in effect they are disproportionately targeting U.S. tech
    companies. To include one company out of seven or eight and the
    rest are all Americans, the point is digital sovereignty and to
    target U.S. tech companies.
        Mr. Gooden. Thank you. Oh, sorry. Mr. Singham, go ahead.
        Mr. Singham. Just wanted to come back very quickly on that
    question with regard to Korea specifically. It relates to
    something that Congressman Raskin also said, which is this
    issue of cronyism that my colleague mentioned.
        What you see in Korea is that the U.S. companies and the
    U.S. platforms are targeted through the regulation and through
    the operation of the KFTC and some of the things that it does
    which violate the principles that were talked about here in
    terms of predictable enforcement, due process, and competition
    on the merits that Congresswoman Balint mentioned.
        What's happening is that the Chinese firms are linked to
    the Korean chaebol. They escape virtually all enforcement
    activities and it's the U.S. companies that are in the target
    crosshairs. That is why I made the comments I made about
    delivering by this approach or delivering the markets in these
    sort of battleground countries to the China model and to
    Chinese companies.
        Mr. Gooden. Thank you. I appreciate that. I yield back.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back. I am going to
    recognize the gentlewoman from Wyoming for a unanimous consent
    request.
        Ms. Hageman. Thank you. I would like unanimous consent to
    enter into the record an article by Axios, titled, ``Scoop:
    U.S. intelligence intervened with DOJ to push HPE-Juniper
    merger.'' This article explains that it was not corruption, but
    U.S. national security interests against Communist China--owned
    Huawei that led to the HPE-Juniper settlement.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Without objection. I now recognize the
    Ranking Member of the Committee today.
        Ms. Balint. That is all right.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Ms. Balint.
        Ms. Balint. Today. Thank you so much to the witnesses for
    being here. I very much appreciate it.
        Professor Alford, you have been such an important voice on
    antitrust, and I am so grateful that you are here because the
    work that we have to do going forward has to be bipartisan. The
    majority argues that antitrust rules for dominant big tech in
    other countries are discriminatory, and they claim it is anti-
    American. We don't have any jurisdiction over foreign
    countries. What this hearing is really about, and as my Ranking
    Member has said, ``is about trying to stop longstanding
    bipartisan efforts to hold big tech accountable.''
        Professor Alford, does the EU's Digital Markets Act
    resemble bills that this Committee advanced in the 117th
    Congress?
        Mr. Alford. Yes, it does. There was a whole spate of bills,
    particularly in 2022, that addressed concerns about these
    different monopoly abuses in a whole variety of different
    sectors. Those bills were bipartisan in nature. They were voted
    out of Committees, but with supermajority numbers. Senators
    Grassley, Blumenthal--Senators Grassley and Lee and others like
    that were very, very prominent proponents of those bills.
        Ms. Balint. Yes, They still support--
        Mr. Alford. They would have had a very good chance of
    passing, but for the fact that Chuck Schumer did not present
    them to the floor.
        Ms. Balint. This is what we have talked about on this side,
    it is what I talked about in my opening statement, that it is
    both parties, Members of both parties that are holding up
    progress on this.
        Does antitrust enforcement help smaller tech companies?
        Mr. Alford. Antitrust enforcement is critical to the
    success of small- and medium-sized companies. If we do not have
    a way to bring enforcement actions against monopoly abuse, then
    the companies that are trying to compete with those big-tech
    companies are going to have an incredibly difficult time to
    survive.
        The central focus of antitrust is not protecting other
    competitors. It's protecting the American consumers. Obviously,
    the American consumers want vigorous opportunities to choose
    between different products from different companies and
    therefore it inures to the benefit of the consumers when little
    and medium tech companies are thriving.
        Ms. Balint. As you said--you referenced the Rasmussen poll,
    which is fascinating. It was conducted back in November. You
    had 69 percent of those polled saying they want the government
    to do more antitrust enforcement. Only 13 percent of those
    polled disagreed.
        This is what I am hearing from my constituents regardless
    of party. They feel like they are getting screwed over by big
    companies that do not have their best interest in mind. Given
    the framing of this hearing this morning, it seems like the
    Majority would like for foreign governments to stand down and
    not act even when American tech companies break the rules.
        Let's think about the inverse of that. Should we only
    enforce our laws against U.S. companies, or should we also
    address bad conduct in the U.S. by foreign companies, Mr.
    Alford?
        Mr. Alford. Well, as I said in my written testimony,
    Federal enforcers are acting appropriately when they
    investigate foreign companies that are abusing monopoly power,
    engaging in price fixing, or seeking to merge in a manner that
    is anticompetitive. If foreign competitors are harming United
    States markets with anticompetitive conduct, I assume, I hope
    that Federal enforcers will not hesitate to act.
        When I was at the Department of Justice in the first Trump
    Administration and in the second Trump Administration, we saw
    numerous examples of foreign companies that were engaging in
    anticompetitive conduct. We did not hesitate to go after those
    companies if we thought that there was a serious problem.
        Ms. Balint. You go where the evidence is?
        Mr. Alford. Yes, absolutely.
        Ms. Balint. As you said--and this is one of the things that
    I really appreciate about you and your integrity is it is even-
    handed justice. You go where the facts take you.
        I wanted to give you time to respond to my colleague from
    Wyoming about the national security concerns in the HPE-Juniper
    merger. Do you have something that you would like to say on
    that?
        Mr. Alford. Yes. It's interesting. The suggestion that this
    is really about national security is belied by the fact that it
    was never presented to the Antitrust Division as a serious
    argument. Obviously, it would have been the kind of thing that
    we would have considered had it been considered relevant.
        The Department of Justice right now in the hearings in the
    Tunney Act in California before the Federal court have not
    mentioned one time the national security arguments. It's not
    even in any of the arguments. They recognize that's not the
    kind of thing that should have been a factor in the
    determination of whether or not to settle that case.
        Ms. Balint. I really appreciate that. It is my
    understanding it only came that argument only came in a press
    conference when they knew that cameras would be there. It was a
    hook for the press. I really thank you for your time. Again,
    this requires bipartisan efforts and I am ready to do the work
    with anyone on the other side that is willing to work with me.
        Mr. Alford. Antitrust enforcement is a bipartisan issue.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentlewoman's time is expired.
        Ms. Balint. Yield back.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentlewoman yields back. I now
    recognize the gentlewoman from Wyoming for five minutes.
        Ms. Hageman. Professor Portuese, you have said that the
    Digital Market Act and similar legislation harms consumers. I
    am especially concerned about harm to children. For example,
    Apple has written that DMA compliance creates new exposure to
    harmful apps citing that for the first time pornography apps
    are available on iPhone from other marketplaces. Can you speak
    more about how these foreign laws are creating this issue and
    the implication for child safety?
        Mr. Portuese. Thank you very much for the questions. The
    positive thing about interoperability is that it can create
    more choices for the consumers, but the negative things is when
    you have blanket regulations that force interoperability, force
    other operators to accept business users that are not the most
    legitimate ones. This is the type of regulation that makes
    interoperability and forced to accept different apps, different
    app stores that lead to really child safety issues.
        The question is: How can we have those tech platforms
    create in a way that promote choice, but for quality bringing
    new actors, new business users in these digital systems that
    promote quality? We don't want to undermine children's safety.
    These regulations are blanket regulations that force any actors
    who have any claim to enter into this digital legacy system.
    That's why we end up with potentially those apps in our iPhones
    where we haven't asked for it.
        It's a case for--it demonstrates that we need a case-by-
    case approach to every kind of complaint or every competition
    concern. We cannot have blanket regulations where we treat
    equally legitimate U.S. firms and Chinese malware and spyware,
    or Russian's malware and spyware. These regulations almost
    treat equally all these actors. That isn't acceptable because
    we don't have a way to correct, to bring efficiency defense, or
    innovation defense. These defenses are explicitly prohibited in
    those types of regulations.
        Ms. Hageman. OK. Mr. Singham, you seem to have something
    you would like to offer with regard to this discussion.
        Mr. Singham. Yes, thank you, Congresswoman. Because of your
    question goes to the heart of the issue, which is much of this
    regulation is based on the assumption that these platforms are
    sort of like government--owned utilities that have monopoly
    power, or total power, and you must therefore impose on them
    duties to deal and you must impose on them through the
    operation of things like the Essential Facilities Doctrine.
        Now, in the U.S. we have learned that the Essential
    Facilities Doctrine duties to deal should be sparingly used and
    only when the facility is truly essential. Leaving aside the
    issues of market power, durability of market power, and the
    size of the market that Congressman Issa mentioned, the fact
    that these are not in fact government-owned entities means that
    if you impose this kind of duty to deal on them, you are going
    to get all these unintended consequences. That's why the
    regulatory approach, the ex-ante regulatory approach is not a
    very good approach.
        Mr. Hageman. What is the solution?
        Mr. Singham. Well, the solution is the proper and sound
    implementation of competition law. What I'm concerned about is
    the way the competition agencies in Europe, and Korea
    particularly, and other countries are approaching it is they
    are imposing those same duties on these companies through
    competition law.
        I am also concerned about the way the competition law is
    being enforced in places like Korea, in particular, where we
    see enforcement that is unpredictable, harassment of witnesses.
    You see a whole range of procedural irregularities. They're
    actually captured in our economic model, which is why the
    amount, the cost to the U.S. economy is so great. When you talk
    about the affordability crisis, it's around $2,000 per
    American. That is the cost of the bad regulation and the bad
    approach to competition policy.
        Ms. Hageman. Coming from Europe? Coming from these--
        Mr. Singham. In other countries.
        Ms. Hageman. Coming from these other countries?
        Mr. Singham. That $2,000 is just Korea by itself.
        Ms. Hageman. Just Korea?
        Mr. Singham. The EU and all the other countries is going to
    be much greater. There's real damage to the U.S. economy that
    is being done by the lack of proper enforcement of competition
    policy that flies in the face in the case of Korea from the
    U.S. operation and implementation of antitrust law, and even
    the European operation of antitrust law. The complaints that
    people make about Korea are the same complaints people made
    about the EU's enforcement in the 1990s and 2000s.
        Ms. Hageman. Well, I appreciate that. Obviously, we need to
    have a much more detailed discussion about these particular
    issues, but I am out of time.
        Before I yield back, I would like unanimous consent to
    enter into the record a speech by Professor Alford that he
    delivered in Beijing in May 2016, in which Professor Alford
    compared President Trump to Senator Bernie Sanders and
    complained that President Trump might use trade to stand up to
    China.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Without objection.
        Ms. Hageman. With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Without objection. The gentlewoman yields
    back. The gentleman from California is now recognized for five
    minutes.
        Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        First, let me welcome and thank the witnesses for being
    here today. If I can, I would like to ask each and every one of
    you a yes or no question.
        Mr. Alford, are you for corruption?
        Mr. Alford. No, I'm not.
        Mr. Correa. Mr. Auer, are you for corruption?
        Mr. Auer. No.
        Mr. Correa. Mr. Portuese?
        Mr. Portuese. No.
        Mr. Correa. Mr. Singham?
        Mr. Singham. No.
        Mr. Correa. I want to also distinguish between antitrust
    and overregulation European style. European overregulation,
    there is really only one winner. That is the Chinese economy.
    There are some in the U.S. who have embraced the European Union
    philosophy of big is bad, irrespective of the consequences. I
    want folks to remember two proposed mergers: Spirit Airlines
    and iRobot. Both of those mergers were opposed. They didn't
    happen. I consider them both self-inflicted wounds. Today
    instead of Amazon a Chinese rival robot company took over
    iRobot.
        I am from California. The fifth largest economy in the
    world today. These big firms we are talking about are mostly
    California firms. They are our biggest taxpayers in California
    that support our social programs, support education, create
    millions of jobs in California, and they are responsible for
    innovation. Silicon Valley and most of the places in the State
    of California. I believe the European approach puts a big
    target on the backs of these firms, American companies.
        The problem today is not only are U.S. firms being
    threatened by European regulation, other self-inflicted wounds
    is what we are doing to them here in the U.S. Crushing tariffs.
    Slashing research funding. Zeroing out research funding at our
    universities. Of course, our new immigration policies that have
    essentially stopped the immigration of the world's best and
    brightest to America.
        Mr. Auer, I am going to start out with you, if I can, with
    the little time I have. Explain to me the concept of U.S.
    gatekeepers. What is that?
        Mr. Auer. Under the DMA the European--
        Mr. Correa. European regulation.
        Mr. Auer. Yes, under the European Digital Markets Act the
    European Commission has the power to designate as gatekeepers
    essentially companies that have very large revenue and a very--
        Mr. Correa. Those are companies that have been designated
    from all over the world that are gatekeepers?
        Mr. Auer. It is essentially the U.S. tech companies.
        Mr. Correa. U.S. tech companies? When they go after U.S.
    firms that have--when Europeans go after U.S. firms those
    penalties, are those based on fines and revenues of Europe, or
    the whole company worldwide revenues?
        Mr. Auer. For competition it's based on the European
    revenue with a cap being set based on their global revenue.
    Under the DMA it's not yet clear.
        Mr. Correa. You talked about your children's future. What
    did you mean by that?
        Mr. Auer. Europe's overregulation. There is mounting
    evidence that Europe's overregulation is causing huge harm to
    its economy. For the GDPR for instance the evidence is clear. I
    am worried that Europe, if no one pushes Europe in the right
    direction, will continue down this path, and it's the path to
    poverty.
        Mr. Correa. Saying goes that U.S. innovates, Europe
    regulates, and the Chinese emulate. Close your eyes and think
    about what the world is going to look like in 5-10 years if we
    go down the European approach.
        Mr. Auer. It's a very scary thought. If you're in Europe
    and you see on the one hand, you're falling behind the
    technological frontier compared to U.S., antagonist
    jurisdictions like China are--
        Mr. Correa. My concern is that we are looking at antitrust,
    we are looking at competition with a lens of maybe 10-15 years
    ago. Today the competition is not only American firms. It is
    international competition as well. AI and other areas of high
    tech. Competition is fierce. Investment is tremendous.
    Europeans, they are falling behind. American firms are leading
    the way. The Chinese firms are right with us.
        What is the significance of winning these high-tech
    competitions to the American economy, the American worker, to
    the American taxpayer? Mr. Portuese?
        Mr. Singham, you had something to say?
        Mr. Singham. In sort of the cost to the U.S. personally,
    the average American family, of the interpretation of antitrust
    policy in these countries and the regulations that come after
    the competition world, the competition--derived regulation, if
    you'd like, it's about--and they're always cast as fair
    competition, our Korea study alone says 525 billion in over 120
    years to the U.S. economy. These are very significant numbers.
        Mr. Correa. We are essentially losing at long-term economic
    job loss?
        Mr. Singham. Yes. Job loss, loss of money in the
    affordability crisis. As Mr. Auer said, ``the European economy
    and the countries that do this are the ones that lose arguably
    the most.'' Our Growth Commission--
        Mr. Correa. I am really more focused on the California,
    U.S. jobs than I am the Europeans.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am out of time. I appreciate your
    indulgence.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back. I am now going
    to recognize myself for five minutes.
        Thank you, Mr. Correa. I think you got us kind of back on
    the right track here for what we were trying to accomplish
    today, which was just to have a discussion and expose what is
    going on and has started in Europe, which some Members of this
    Committee were exposed to on a congressional trip that happened
    this past summer in Brussels, then in London, and in Dublin
    where it was very clear to me after meeting with those that had
    created the DMA or similar types of bureaucratic structures
    that there is eight major platforms. Seven of the eight were
    created here in the States, and many of them in Mr. Correa's
    district.
        All I had to do was hear the first conversation with the
    counsel, with the attorney for Apple who said the issue is--and
    very frustrated by this, is that these European commissions
    that are creating these DMAs it is a situation where it is a
    moving target always. Always a moving target.
        Once they think they are in compliance they will get
    another letter saying you are in violation, and oftentimes a
    violation that quite honestly, they disagree with. Then, beyond
    that what you would see is this level of frustration on
    something that we just spoke about, which was how they were
    going to levy fines on these American corporations. Two percent
    of global revenue. It is ridiculous what they are actually
    doing.
        In the 27 countries of the EU, who are now floundering on
    many different fronts--and there is always this affinity with
    the EU, but quite honestly, they are not able to compete with
    the States. What they are doing is trying to carve out a space
    for some of these platforms that may have had a little bit of
    success, or small successes, so that they can try and flourish.
    Well, that is not the way it works. It is not going to work
    that way.
        That is what I was hoping this discussion would be about
    today. We have a real problem with the EU on this front. It is
    up to us as the Members of Congress. I know the administration
    has taken a lot of bullets here today, but it also is a
    responsibility for the Executive Branch to do the same thing.
    That may have been missed here today.
        Mr. Singham, I want to ask you specifically if I could to
    move on. The Korea Fair Trade Commission, which we are now
    concerned, is kind of doing the same thing that we see in
    Europe. Can you give us--because you have estimated that South
    Korea's targeting of American companies could cost us trillions
    in economic costs. Then, South Korea could potentially lose out
    on as much as $450 billion if it continues down the same road.
    What is your overall perspective about what is going on in
    Korea when it comes to fair trade right now?
        Mr. Singham. Chair, what you'll see in Korea is--there's
    one element of this, which is the DMA, the European Digital
    Markets Act is the model that is sort of being spread around
    the world. Korea is a particular battleground. Japan, Brazil,
    Australia, the U.K., and others are following suit. It's based
    on a fundamentally flawed model that we've described earlier
    here.
        What the Korean case shows is it's not just the regulation
    approach to digital platforms. It's also what the KFTC is
    doing. Our economic model that we wrote about in this book
    actually picks up these procedural irregularities.
        The lack of predictable environment that you referred to
    with the counsel, I think from Apple you mentioned, that sort
    of thing is incredibly chilling because what happens is
    companies--they don't know what they can do. Competition is not
    a tea party. It is a brutal exercise. Actually, the efficiency
    gains and the wealth creation that comes from competition comes
    because of that really brutal competitive process. It isn't a
    tea party.
        When these companies don't know what they're supposed to
    do, they pull their punches and they don't do anything. They
    don't innovate. They don't develop. That's what you're seeing
    in Europe and that's what you're seeking in Korea. That's why
    the cost is so high.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good. Thank you. Thank you very much.
    I am going to now recognize the gentleman from Illinois for
    five minutes.
        Mr. Singham. Thank you, Chair Fitzgerald.
        Donald Trump campaigned on reigning in the power and
    influence of the tech industry. He said he would no longer
    allow the industry to, quote, ``run wild stifling competition
    in our most innovative sector.'' He appointed regulators who
    talked about a big game about breaking up tech companies and
    smashing their cartel. It turns out that Trump was not running
    to be Commander in Chief. He was running to be lobbyist in
    chief for big tech.
        There was a reason why the tech CEOs were grinning in the
    front row at Trump's inauguration. They had them in their
    pockets. They knew that he would sell out American workers and
    consumers. They were right. As part of his betrayal Trump has
    turned the State Department and USTR into lobbying arms for big
    tech. His administration uses industry talking points and
    abuses trade authorities to bully countries over tech
    regulation.
        Let's be clear about what Republicans are empowering big
    companies to do: Favoring their products on the platforms they
    own, forcing users to take bundled products, refusing to make
    their products compatible with their competitors, surveilling
    users and denying them access to their own data.
        Where is the popular support for any of this? Since when
    did MAGA voters want their elected officials to fight for big
    tech's right to screw them over? This isn't about innovation.
    The big-tech companies are in the business--aren't in the
    business of innovation. They are in the business of extracting
    our data and selling it to advertisers at the expense of labor,
    privacy, and consumer rights. They are paying politicians like
    Trump and his loyalists in Congress to let them get away with
    it.
        The truth is Trump's betrayal of the working class and his
    corrupt embrace of big tech is not a break from U.S. policy. It
    is a continuation. This is just the latest example of the U.S.
    defending corporate abuses even if it comes at the price of
    undermining democracy at home and abroad.
        This corrupt alliance is why our government negotiates
    trade agreements like NAFTA, to prioritize corporate interests
    over workers. It is why we prop up autocratic leaders who back
    U.S. corporate interests even if they support terrorism or drug
    trafficking, too. It is why we fail at effectively regulating
    industries even as their practices harm workers, consumers, and
    communities at large.
        When Trump used the age-old playbook campaigning on big
    tech regulation then selling people out, he got caught in a
    lie. He is not America's first. He is corporate America first.
    Now Trump is angry that other countries are actually trying to
    do what he promised to do.
        Mr. Alford, thank you for being here today. In your opinion
    does threatening other countries with tariffs and sanctions
    over their digital regulations without evidence of
    discrimination against U.S. companies help or harm the movement
    to address big tech's monopoly abuses?
        Mr. Alford. It does nothing to address the monopoly of
    abuses in the United States. The litigation that was started in
    the first Trump Administration has continued with the State
    Attorneys General, including many Republicans is the best way
    to deal with that concern.
        Mr. Garcia. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back.
        I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter into the
    record a speech by Professor Alford that was delivered in
    Beijing in August 2018. Also, unanimous consent to enter into
    the record a speech by Professor Alford that was delivered in
    Shanghai in August 2017.
        I now would recognize the Chair of the Whole Committee.
        Chair Jordan. Thank you, Chair. Mr. Singham, the Ranking
    Member said, ``the United States needs to be more like
    Europe.'' Do you agree with that?
        Mr. Singham. No, I think Mr. Auer--
        Chair Jordan. That would be the dumbest thing ever.
        Mr. Singham. Yes.
        Chair Jordan. How about you, Mr. Portuese? You think we
    should be more like Europe?
        Mr. Portuese. No, I don't. We should--
        Chair Jordan. Wasn't it about like 20 years ago the GDP in
    the European Union, which was like 400-and-some million people,
    and the GDP in the United States with like 300-and-some million
    people was roughly the same. Right? Mr. Portuese. Yes. Yes,
    that's right.
        Chair Jordan. What is it today?
        Mr. Portuese. It's one-third higher in the--
        Chair Jordan. That is even accounting for Brexit, right?
        Mr. Portuese. Right. In the U.K.--it's actually 40 percent
    lower in the U.K.--
        Chair Jordan. You got a Member of Congress saying we should
    be more like Europe. That may be one of the craziest things I
    have ever--what do you think, Mr. Auer? Should we be more like
    Europe?
        Mr. Auer. No, I don't think so.
        Chair Jordan. Yes. Not just overall, but with a digital
    marketing act that we are going to--how many big-tech companies
    have, by the way?
        Mr. Auer. None.
        Chair Jordan. Zero. Zero. We want to take this--what, we
    got like seven humongous tech companies that have done amazing
    things. They are not all perfect. I went after them before--for
    goodness sake, they shadowbanned me, we found out a few years
    ago. I went after them. They are not perfect, but they are
    amazing.
        What does Europe want to do? Oh, we can't create them
    because we got layer of bureaucracy on top of bureaucracy. Our
    GDP is like flat while America's is growing like crazy. Let's
    go shake down the American tech industry.
        Is that right, I see you shaking your head, Mr. Portuese.
    Is that right?
        Mr. Portuese. The main thing about competition is that we
    need dynamic competition. Europe is frozen into a static
    competition where we preserve the status quo. The core of the
    competitive process is competition on the merits where there's
    disruptions and technological innovations. It's not about
    protecting the current incumbents and protecting the--
        Chair Jordan. We need choice in competition to get growth
    into--and good things for consumers. The Chair makes this point
    better than anyone, but when we were over there this summer in
    Europe, we met with the app creators in Europe. They told us,
    they said, you know what, if you got a new app, you know where
    you go? You don't go to Europe. You go to the United States--
    frankly, I was surprised, they say you go to the United States
    or Dubai. You don't go to Europe. Because you can't get--there
    is so much regulation you can't do it. It is ever scarier,
    because it's not just the Digital Market Act. It's also the
    Digital Services Act.
        Mr. Portuese. Right.
        Chair Jordan. They get into the censorship thing.
        Mr. Portuese. Yes.
        Chair Jordan. Maybe that is why Democrats want us to be
    more like Europe, so they can censor what Americans are saying.
    I don't want that. It is just a matter of time before it
    happens because we had the irony of how the Good Lord works. It
    was amazing. We had Nigel Farage testifying. That every week,
    the day before he came Graham Linehan, a comedian, issues a
    tweet while he is in Arizona--so an Irish citizen does a tweet
    in Arizona, flies to Heathrow and gets arrested for what he
    tweeted here. He is not even a citizen of the U.K. Now, that is
    the online--but it is the same as the Digital Services Act.
        Mr. Portuese. It's part of the same package. The Digital
    Services Act is one leg; the DMA is the other leg.
        Chair Jordan. Yes.
        Mr. Portuese. More generally there's the cloud out. There's
    also the EU AI Act, which is coming. It's part of what they
    call a legislative package. It's not one regulation or the
    other. Those come by packages of regulations.
        Chair Jordan. Such a deal. I am going to let--I know Mr.
    Singham and Mr. Auer want to get in here, but that is such a
    deal. We can censor American speech, censor European speech,
    and censor American speech. If they don't do what we want them
    to say, we can shake them down to get a ton of money under the
    DMA. Wow. Such a deal.
        Mr. Portuese. Yes.
        Chair Jordan. We have Members on the other side saying we
    should do that. We should embrace that. Mr. Singham I will come
    to you.
        Mr. Singham. Yes, I was just going to say with respect to
    Europe, it's not working that well over there, so we certainly
    don't want it over here. It's very clear. If you look at the
    data in the last 25 years, the European economies, particularly
    Western European economies--the central Eastern Europeans are
    doing slightly better--have absolutely stagnated. In fact, in
    many cases some of the member states, Germany for example, have
    been in a contraption phase. Not just GDP per capita is going
    down, but overall GDP is going down.
        This is why it is so troubling for European citizens,
    because their prospects, their growth prospects are looking
    extremely bad at the moment. This is something they've done to
    themselves. This is not something that's been imposed from
    without. It's the regulatory approach of the Europeans of which
    the DMA and the DSA are examples that have led to this crisis
    in Europe.
        Chair Jordan. Well said. Well said. I am going to give Mr.
    Auer the last 30 seconds.
        Mr. Auer. America has one superpower above all. It's faith
    in free markets. In our space that leads to evidence--based
    antitrust that tries to ensure that consumers get the best deal
    and that puts aside dangerous autocratic preferences of
    enforcement and looks at the data quality only,
    dispassionately.
        Mr. Portuese. Europeans recognize their overregulations, as
    Chair Fitzgeralds mentions. We have the Draghi report. If you
    read the Draghi report in Europe, it says that we killed
    innovation in Europe by European regulations. Europeans
    themselves recognize their overregulated. That's why now they
    posed the EU AI Act. They know they're killing the regulations.
        It's not like there's no diagnosis. The diagnosis is here.
    Why would you emulate and copy something that they themselves
    recognize as broken?
        Chair Jordan. Great question. Great question. I yield back
    to the Chair and thank you for this hearing.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The Chair yields back.
        Ms. Balint. Mr. Chair, I have some unanimous consents to
    enter into the record.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. I recognize the Ranking Member.
        Ms. Balint. From Common Dreams, ``Big Tech's Most Effective
    Lobbyist, Jim Jordan, Is Temporarily Constrained.'' From the
    Washington Examiner ``Swamp undrained: Trump--cozy lobbying
    firms,'' from National Politics, ``How Big Tech Powered A
    Coup,'' and the Economic Policy, ``Trump is Big Tech's Personal
    Lobbyist.''
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Without objection.
        Ms. Balint. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. I also asked unanimous consent. A letter
    from the U.S. Chamber of Congress, dated December 2015; a
    letter from the Consumer Choice Center, dated December 11,
    2025; a letter from NetChoice, dated December 15, 2025; a
    letter from the App Association, dated December 2025; and a
    statement from Alden Abbot and Satya Mara of the Mercatus
    Center at George Mason University.
        Without objection.
        Ms. Balint. Mr. Chair. I have one more, please.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentlewoman is recognized.
        Ms. Balint. I ask unanimous consent to enter into the
    record Professor Alford's whistleblowing speech from April,
    ``The Rule of Law Versus the Rule of Lobbyists.''
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Without objection.
        Ms. Balint. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentlewoman yields back.
        That concludes today's hearing. We thank our witnesses for
    appearing before the Committee today.
        Without objection, all Members will have five legislative
    days to submit additional written questions for the witnesses
    or additional materials for the record.
        Without objection, the hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 10:57 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

        All materials submitted for the record by Members of the
    Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform,
    and Antitrust can be found at: https://docs.house.gov/
    Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=118753.

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