[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STRATEGIC TRAJECTORIES:
ASSESSING CHINA'S SPACE RISE
AND THE RISKS TO U.S. LEADERSHIP
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE,
AND TECHNOLOGY
OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 4, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-19
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-279 WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BRIAN BABIN, Texas, Chairman
RANDY WEBER, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California, Ranking
JIM BAIRD, Indiana Member
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
JAY OBERNOLTE, California HALEY STEVENS, Michigan
CHUCK FLEISCHMANN, Tennessee DEBORAH ROSS, North Carolina
DARRELL ISSA, California ANDREA SALINAS, Oregon
CLAUDIA TENNEY, New York VALERIE FOUSHEE, North Carolina
SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida EMILIA SYKES, Ohio
MAX MILLER, Ohio MAXWELL FROST, Florida
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia GABE AMO, Rhode Island
MIKE COLLINS, Georgia SUHAS SUBRAMANYAM, Virginia
VINCE FONG, California LUZ RIVAS, California
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware
KEITH SELF, Texas LAURA GILLEN, New York
PAT HARRIGAN, North Carolina GEORGE WHITESIDES, California,
SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina Vice-Ranking Member
JEFF HURD, Colorado LAURA FRIEDMAN, California
MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida APRIL McCLAIN DELANEY, Maryland
MIKE KENNEDY, Utah JOSH RILEY, New York
NICK BEGICH, Alaska BILL FOSTER, Illinois
VACANT
------
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
HON. MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida, Chairman
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida VALERIE FOUSHEE, North Carolina,
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia Ranking Member
MIKE COLLINS, Georgia LAURA GILLEN, New York
VINCE FONG, California GEORGE WHITESIDES, California
KEITH SELF, Texas HALEY STEVENS, Michigan
MIKE KENNEDY, Utah ANDREA SALINAS, Oregon
C O N T E N T S
December 4, 2025
Page
Hearing Charter.................................................. 2
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Mike Haridopolos, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives........... 18
Written Statement............................................ 20
Written statement by Representative Brian Babin, Chairman,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 19
Statement by Representative Valerie Foushee, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives........... 21
Written Statement............................................ 22
Statement by Representative Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 25
Written Statement............................................ 26
Witnesses:
Mr. Dean Cheng, Senior Fellow, The Potomac Institute for Policy
Studies
Oral Statement............................................... 27
Written Statement............................................ 30
Mr. Clayton Swope, Deputy Director, Aerospace Security Project,
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Oral Statement............................................... 54
Written Statement............................................ 56
Dr. Patrick Besha, Founder, Global Space Group
Oral Statement............................................... 68
Written Statement............................................ 70
Dr. Michael D. Griffin, Co-President, LogiQ, Inc.
Oral Statement............................................... 73
Written Statement............................................ 75
Discussion....................................................... 113
Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. Dean Cheng, Senior Fellow, The Potomac Institute for Policy
Studies........................................................ 134
Mr. Clayton Swope, Deputy Director, Aerospace Security Project,
Center for Strategic and International Studies................. 142
Dr. Patrick Besha, Founder, Global Space Group................... 150
Dr. Michael D. Griffin, Co-President, LogiQ, Inc................. 157
STRATEGIC TRAJECTORIES:
ASSESSING CHINA'S SPACE RISE
AND THE RISKS TO U.S. LEADERSHIP
----------
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 4, 2025
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m., in
room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Haridopolos
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Haridopolos. Good morning. The Subcommittee on
Space and Aeronautics will come to order. Without objection,
the chair is authorized to declare recesses of the Subcommittee
at any time.
Welcome to today's hearing: Strategic Trajectories
Assessing China's Space Rise and the Risks to the United States
Leadership. I will recognize myself for 5 minutes for our
opening statement.
The topic today will address--is nothing more than a
critical issue and defining challenge for this Committee.
Understanding China's bold ambitions, addressing their
unapologetic drive for dominance in space. We are at the start
of the next age of exploration; one where humanity is not just
observing the cosmos but acting on its observations and
beginning to inhabit it.
For those who are new to this issue, the question we should
be asking as we explore beyond the planet is, will humanity
carry forward the American values of economic and political
freedom or those of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)?
For generations, the United States led humanity into space
with unmatched ingenuity and without a true rival. However,
that situation is changing as China moves methodically,
relentlessly, and ruthlessly to tighten the script on space
capabilities and seek the strategic advantages by any means
possible.
History reminds us that great power competition shapes the
destiny of civilizations. Just as the rivalry between Spain and
Great Britain define oceans in the 16th and 17th Century, the
competition between the United States and China will define the
space domain today. Whoever leads beyond Earth will shape the
future of Earth.
Let's go back to 1957, China's ambitions goes back decades.
Moments after Sputnik shook the world, Chairman Mao declared we
too will make satellites. That declaration ignited a vision
that has never faded.
In 1992, China set into motion Project 921, its human space
flight program which continues today. In recent years, China's
pace has surged in part due to the declaration of the space
stream, which transformed aspirations into coordinated missions
for dominance.
China's space sector has then surged forward, aimed to
compete with America's world-leading commercial space industry.
This is not an accident; it is strategic. To be clear, the
objective is not merely to keep up, their objective is to
outpace, outmaneuver, and ultimately defeat our Nation, the
United States of America.
But America is not standing still. In my district, Kennedy
Space Center, we surpassed 100 launches just 2 weeks ago, 95
launches came from one company, SpaceX who first launched in
2006. China is not even close with around 73 launches.
Still, Beijing is pressing ahead. Their plans include
landing their astronauts on the lunar surface by 2030 and
constructing research space on the Moon South Pole by 2035.
They are also launching historic firsts. China has already
returned lunar samples from the far side of the Moon, the first
to do so.
Next, they intend to launch a Mars-sample return mission in
2028. A timeline that may beat the United States. In low-Earth
orbit, we plan to de-orbit our own space station. China has
maintained a continuous human presence on its own space station
since 2021 where their astronauts serve in 6-month rotations.
In the coming years, China intends to deploy its own space-
based internet service and expand its global alternative to GPS
(Global Positioning System). And while these Committees'
jurisdiction covers commercial and civil space programs, we
cannot ignore their army's rapidly advancing space and counter-
space capabilities. Their systems are designed to threaten,
disrupt, and if necessary, take out United States assets in
space.
So, again, I ask: Will humanity move forward with American
values of economic and political freedom or those of the
communist Chinese? The reality is stark. China possesses a
real, immediate, and long-term threat to the United States
leadership in space. And, fortunately, today's witnesses will
provide us with more detailed overview of Chinese trajectory in
history, strategy, and intentions. They will also share
recommendations about how this Committee and Congress should
respond to this true challenge.
I thank our distinguished panel today for being here today
and sharing their expertise with us. And I look forward to a
serious, productive, conversation about the challenges we face
today.
But before I move forward, I would like to ask for
unanimous consent for a statement from the Full Committee by
Dr. Babin to present that copy.
And without objection, so that is ordered.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Babin follows:]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's hearing on
this critical topic.
A central priority of my service in Congress has been to
strengthen U.S. competitiveness in research and development,
science, and technology. As Chairman of this committee, I have
consistently emphasized the importance of this goal, focusing
not only on ensuring the United States maintains its position
as a global leader on Earth but also in space.
To achieve this, we must acknowledge the growing challenges
posed by the Chinese Communist Party.
The CCP has made no secret about its ambition to emerge as
the world's foremost leader in space exploration and
innovation. Since the election of President Xi in 2013, the CCP
has deepened the connection between its space program and its
broader national goals of domestic and military modernization.
This increased focus has led to greater attention and
resources for its space program, resulting in several recent
accomplishments that cannot be overlooked.
China has maintained a crewed presence in low-Earth orbit
since 2021, using its Tiangong [Tee-Yen-Gong] space station.
In 2024, China became the first and only nation to return
samples from the far side of the Moon.
This year, China conducted a series of tests to develop
major components and systems that will support its future lunar
missions, demonstrating that the CCP is both committed and
working expeditiously toward its goal of landing taikonauts on
the Moon by 2030.
The U.S. cannot afford to fall behind. If China takes the
lead in space exploration, it will set the rules of the road.
Our values - not those of the Chinese Communist Party--must
shape those rules.
To ensure that the United States retains its leading role
in space, Congress must understand China's capabilities, its
future plans, and the pace at which the CCP is completing its
objectives. That is the purpose of today's hearing.
A clearer understanding of China's space program will guide
this committee's work on space policy for the remainder of this
Congress.
I was in the Oval Office when President Trump signed the
last full NASA authorization bill into law in March 2017. It
was a crucial step in the right direction, but much has
happened in the years since.
In the coming weeks, our committee will consider a new NASA
authorization bill that will provide urgently needed direction
to the agency. I look forward to working with my colleagues to
send this bill to the President's desk.
However, China's achievements extend beyond its government
space activities. A report by the Commercial Space Federation,
released in September, highlights significant growth in China's
investment in its commercial space industry.
America's commercial space sector is the envy of the world,
but maintaining that status is not guaranteed, and our
leadership is far from assured. Next year, our committee will
consider new commercial space legislation that builds on the
Commercial Space Act of 2023, which I was proud to lead.
As I said during our commercial space hearing last
September, we can either be tethered to Earth by red tape while
the Chinese move ahead--or we can act decisively. This bill
will help ensure the continued growth of our commercial space
sector.
We have a lot of work ahead of us, but with Congress,
stakeholders, and the administration working together, we can
keep America at the helm as we enter the next era of space
exploration.
I am pleased to welcome today's excellent panel of
witnesses. Several of you are no strangers to this committee. I
look forward to your testimony and the opportunity to engage
with you this morning.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Haridopolos follows:]
The topic we will address today is nothing less than a
critical issue and defining challenge for this committee:
understanding China's bold ambitions and addressing their
unapologetic drive for dominance in space.
We are at the start of the next age of exploration. One
where humanity is not just observing the cosmos but acting on
its observations and beginning to inhabit it.
For those new to this issue, the question we should be
asking as we explore beyond our planet is: Will humanity carry
forward the American values of economic and political freedom
or those of the Chinese Communist Party?
For generations, the United States led humanity into space
with unmatched ingenuity and without a true rival.
However, that situation is changing as China moves
methodically, relentlessly and ruthlessly to tighten its grip
on space capabilities and seek the strategic advantages it
confers by any means possible.
History reminds us that great-power competition shapes the
destiny of civilizations. Just as the rivalry between Spain and
Great Britain defined the oceans in the 16th and 17th
centuries, the competition between the United States and China
will define the space domain today. Whoever leads beyond Earth
will shape the future of Earth.
Now, let's go back to 1957. China's ambitions stretch back
decades. Moments after Sputnik shook the world, Chairman Mao
declared, ``We too will make satellites.'' That declaration
ignited a vision that has never faded.
In 1992, the People's Republic of China set in motion
Project 921, its human spaceflight program, which continues on
to this day.
In recent years under President Xi, China's pace has
surged, in part due to his declaration of a Chinese ``space
dream'', which transformed aspirations into a coordinated
national mission for dominance.
China's commercial space sector has since surged forward,
aimed to compete with America's world-leading commercial space
industry. This is not accidental. It is strategic.
And to be clear, the objective is not merely to keep up.
Their objective is to outpace, outmaneuver, and ultimately
defeat the United States.
But America is not standing still. In my district, at the
Kennedy Space Center, we surpassed 100 launches just two weeks
ago. Roughly 95 percent of those launches came from a single
commercial company, SpaceX, who first launched in 2006. China
is not even close at around 73 launches.
Still, Beijing is pressing ahead. Their plans include
landing taikonauts on the lunar surface by 2030 and
constructing a research base at the Moon's South Pole by 2035.
They are also achieving historic firsts. China has already
returned Lunar samples from the far side of the Moon--the first
to do so.
Next, they intend to launch a Mars sample-return mission in
2028, a timeline that may beat the United States.
In low-Earth orbit, while we plan to deorbit our own space
station, China has maintained a continuous human presence on
its own space station since 2021, with taikonauts serving six-
month crew rotations.
In the coming years, China intends to deploy its own space-
based internet service and expand its global alternative to
GPS.
And while this committee's jurisdiction covers commercial
and civil space programs, we cannot ignore the People's
Liberation Army's rapidly advancing space and counterspace
capabilities. Their systems are designed to threaten, disrupt,
and if necessary, take out U.S. assets in space.
So again, I ask: Will humanity carry forward the American
values of economic and political freedom or those of the
Communist Chinese Party?
The reality is stark. China poses a serious immediate and
long-term threat to U.S. leadership in space.
Today's witnesses will provide us with a more detailed
overview of China's trajectory: its history, strategy, and
intentions.
They will also share recommendations about how this
committee and Congress should respond to this mercurial
challenge.
I thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for being here
today and sharing your expertise with the subcommittee.
I look forward to a serious and productive discussion of
the challenges before us.
Chairman Haridopolos. And with that, I want to recognize
our Ranking Member, Mrs. Foushee, from North Carolina for her
opening statement. Thank you so much.
Mrs. Foushee. Thank you, and good morning. And thank you
Chairman Haridopolos for holding today's hearing to review
China's space activities and the implications for the United
States Space Program. I want to also welcome our distinguished
witnesses, thank you for being here.
It is no surprise that we are here today to assess China's
space rise and the risks to U.S. leadership. China's ascending
space capabilities are fast approaching strategic comparability
with the United States. This is intentional. Xi Jinping's space
dream stresses the importance of China dominating the space
domain.
The recently released 2025 annual report to Congress of the
U.S., China, economic, and security review commission states
that China has embarked on a whole of government strategy to
become the world's preeminent space power. These are not near
projections or rhetoric.
China is methodically carrying out increasingly
sophisticated space capabilities in its efforts to dominate.
China has joined the ranks of only the U.S. and Russia in
launching humans into space.
To date, China has become only the second Nation to land
and operate a spacecraft on Mars. In addition, China operates a
continuously crewed space station in low-Earth orbit and has
racked up a number of firsts, including landing on and
collecting and returning samples from the far side of the Moon
and placing communications satellites around the Moon and more.
That is not all. China has publicly announced its plans to land
humans on the surface of the Moon by 2030, establish a
permanent International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) by 2025,
and acquire samples from Mars and return them to Earth in the
early 2030s.
In 2024, China released its first Mid-and Long-Term Plan
for Space Science in which it aims to achieve top-tier
international ranking in major space science areas by 2050.
Further, China is aggressively investing in and enabling a
quasi-commercial space sector, as well as growing its
international partnerships.
Why does it matter? The People's Republic of China (PRC)
for which there is no distinction between civil and military
space knows that leadership in space has brought the United
States invaluable geopolitical soft power, significant and
beneficial international alliances, economic growth fueled by
innovation, bold and inspiring missions that drive and attract
STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics)
talent, and national security advantages.
How we navigate China's ascending space capabilities today
has direct impacts on every American--our banking,
communications, weather prediction, agriculture, natural
resource management and national security, for example, all
rely on space systems.
Threats to the U.S. presence and leadership in space could
put at risk a critical backbone of our social, security, and
economic systems.
And how are we navigating China's space rise? The Trump
Administration appears to believe that attacking research
university, gutting our Federal STEM workforce, withdrawing
from international engagement, and significantly
underinvestigating--investing rather, in research and
development (R&D) is the answer.
Just look at this stark comparison between China's space
science plans and those of the Trump Administration as prepared
by the Planetary Society. Is this a winning strategy?
While I am pleased that the Nancy Grace Roman Space
Telescope on which both Duke and North Carolina Central
University in my district collaborate is maintained in making
excellent progress, ceding so many transformational space
science missions to China alone will send a dangerous message.
As Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, I have expressed
before, I will not stand for handing the keys to lunar
exploration or space leadership to China. This is a pivotal
moment. We on this Subcommittee and the Science Committee have
a responsibility and an obligation to advance sound policies
that ensure and sustain America's civil and global leadership
in space.
We must meet this challenge with bold policies, robust
investments, and a unified vision to preserve our Nation's
leadership in space exploration and innovation.
We also need to critically navigate our coexistence with
China in space. For example, are there areas where limited
engagement in China, such as on space flight safety could serve
U.S. interests?
At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would ask for unanimous
consent to permit Representative Don Beyer to attend this
hearing and ask questions of the witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Foushee follows:]
Good morning and thank you Chairman Haridopolos for holding
today's hearing to review China's space activities and the
implications for the United States space program. I want to
also welcome our distinguished witnesses. Thank you for being
here.
It is no surprise that we are here today to assess China's
space rise and the risks to U.S. leadership. China's ascending
space capabilities are fast approaching strategic comparability
with the United States. This is intentional.
Xi Jingping's ``Space Dream'' stresses the importance of
China dominating the space domain. The recently released 2025
annual report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission states that ``China has embarked on
a whole-of-government strategy to become the world's preeminent
space power.''
These are not mere projections or rhetoric. China is
methodically carrying out increasingly sophisticated space
capabilities in its effort to dominate. China has joined the
ranks of only the U.S. and Russia in launching humans into
space. To date, China has become only the second nation to land
and operate a spacecraft on Mars. In addition, China operates a
continuously crewed space station in low-Earth orbit and has
racked up a number of ``firsts:''
Including landing on--and collecting and returning samples
from--the far side of the Moon; emplacing communications
satellites around the Moon, and more.
That is not all. China has publicly announced its plans to
land humans on the surface of the Moon by 2030, establish a
permanent international lunar research station by 2035, and
acquire samples from Mars and return them to Earth in the early
2030s.
In 2024, China released is first Mid-and Long-Term Plan for
Space Science in which it aims to achieve ``top-tier
international ranking'' in major space science areas by 2050.
Further, China is aggressively investing in and enabling a
quasi-commercial space sector as well as growing its
international partnerships.
Why does it matter? The People's Republic of China, for
which there is no distinction between civil and military space,
knows that leadership in space has brought the United States
invaluable geopolitical soft power, significant and beneficial
international alliances, economic growth fueled by innovation,
bold and inspiring missions that drive and attract STEM talent,
and national security advantages. How we navigate China's
ascending space capabilities today has direct impacts on every
American. Our banking, communications, weather prediction,
agriculture, natural resource management, and national
security, for example, all rely on space systems. Threats to
the U.S.'s presence and leadership in space could put at risk a
critical backbone of our social, security, and economic
systems.
And how are we navigating China's space rise? The Trump
Administration appears to believe that attacking research
universities, gutting our Federal STEM workforce, withdrawing
from international engagement, and significantly underinvesting
in research and development is the answer. Just look at this
stark comparison between China's space science plans and those
of the Trump Administration, as prepared by the Planetary
Society. Is this a winning strategy?
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2279.017
While I'm pleased that the Nancy Grace Roman Space
Telescope--on which both Duke and North Carolina Central
University in my district collaborate--is maintained and making
excellent progress, ceding so many transformational space
science missions to China alone would send a dangerous message.
As Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, I have expressed
before: I will not stand for handing the keys to lunar
exploration--or space leadership--to China. This is a pivotal
moment. We, on this Subcommittee and in the Science Committee,
have a responsibility and an obligation to advance sound
policies that ensure and sustain America's civil and global
leadership in space.
We must meet this challenge with bold policies, robust
investments, and a unified vision to preserve our nation's
leadership in space exploration and innovation. We also need to
critically navigate our co-existence with China in space. For
example, are there areas where limited engagement with China,
such as on spaceflight safety, could serve U.S. interests?
By strengthening our strategic focus, funding, and global
partnerships, we can ensure that the United States remains the
leader in space for decades to come.
I hope our witnesses will give us concrete recommendations
on how to ensure U.S. leadership in the strategic competition
with China, and what Congress should consider as we work to
reauthorize NASA, not only on highly visible programs such as
Artemis, low-Earth orbit, and science--But also on the
consequential roles of technical standards, regulatory
policies, and international partnerships and diplomacy that
have far-reaching influence for United States space activities
and much more.
At this time, Mr. Chairman, I ask for Unanimous Consent to
permit Representative Don Beyer, to attend this hearing and ask
questions of the witnesses.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Haridopolos. Without objection, that is ordered.
Next, we have--I want to recognize our Ranking Member, the
Ranking Member on the Full Committee, Ms. Lofgren for a comment
as well.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for today's
hearing. The topic is very important for our work here in the
Science Committee, and the Federal Science Technology and
Innovation Enterprise.
As we know, China is making unprecedented investments in
research and development across science and technology, and
space is a core component of this strategy. They represent a
real threat to the United States' long history as the
undisputed global leader in space. And it is critical that we
understand the PRC's current capabilities, their plans, as well
as their strategic objectives.
At the same time, it is also critical that we redouble our
commitment to supporting and stewarding a strong, robust space
program that continues to push the boundaries in Earth and
space science in human space flight exploration and space
technology development.
You know, in the very first Science Committee hearing in
this Congress, we heard from expert witnesses about the state
of U.S. science and technology, and that China was actually
leading in 37 of 44 critical technologies. In my remarks at
that hearing, I said we couldn't ignore the reality outside the
four walls of this hearing room.
The new Administration was actively and with unprecedented
speed and ferocity, apparently seeking to tear down and
undermine some of the very scientific foundations upon which
our leadership has been so painstakingly built.
Now, we are here 10 months later and the Administration has
not relented in its destructive endeavors. The U.S. Science and
Technology Enterprise continues to take blow after blow. NASA
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration) and the Space
Enterprise has not been spared.
This summer, the Administration launched a pressure
campaign of intimidation against the entire NASA civil servant
workforce. And now the agency has lost nearly 4,000 people over
20 percent of the civil servant workforce. And there doesn't
seem to be a strategy in determining who should leave and who
should stay.
And just over the last couple of months, largely under the
cover of a government shutdown, NASA has been rushing to
shutter nearly half of the Goddard Space Flight Center's main
campus.
I simply do not understand how anyone reconciles rhetoric
about competing with China while pulling the rug out from under
our own research enterprise. I don't want to speak for our
witnesses, but I expect we are about to hear that China is not
culling its talent and technical capabilities, that is not
undermining its universities, and turning the world's brightest
minds away. Yet, that is what our Federal Government is being
forced to do today by really an out-of-control White House and
OMB (Office of Management and Budget).
Congress needs to step up to the bat. The clock's ticking.
As this Administration continues to cripple our science and
technology enterprise, China is deliberately and systematically
implementing long-term plans.
Now, I have no doubt that all of us on both sides of the
aisle serving on this Committee want to ensure U.S. leadership
in space. But words are cheap, and actions are priceless. It is
up to us on this Committee and in Congress to take the
necessary actions that will sustain our global leadership in
space and in science and technology more broadly.
Anything less is an invitation to take--let China take the
mantle in space and in so much more.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lofgren follows:]
Good morning, and thank you Mr. Chairman, for holding
today's hearing. I also want to thank our expert witnesses for
being here.
This topic is incredibly important for our work here on the
Science Committee and the federal science, technology, and
innovation enterprise. China is making unprecedented
investments in research and development across science and
technology, and space is a core component of their strategy.
They represent a very real, constant threat to the United
States' long history as the undisputed global leader in space.
It is critical that we understand the PRC's current
capabilities, plans, and strategic objectives. At the same
time, it is also critical that we redouble our commitment to
supporting and stewarding a strong, robust space program that
continues to push the boundaries in Earth and space science,
human spaceflight exploration, and space technology
development.
In the first Science Committee hearing of this Congress, we
heard from expert witnesses about the state of U.S. science and
technology, and that China is actually leading in 37 of 44
critical technologies. In my opening remarks, I said that I
could not ignore the reality outside of the four walls of this
hearing room:
The new Administration was actively, and with unprecedented
speed and ferocity, apparently seeking to tear down and
undermine some of the very scientific foundations upon which
our leadership has been so painstakingly built.
Unfortunately, here we are, ten months later, and the
Administration has not relented in its destructive endeavors.
The U.S. science and technology enterprise continues to take
blow after blow, to this very day. NASA and the space
enterprise has not been spared. This summer, the Administration
launched a pressure campaign of intimidation against the entire
NASA civil servant workforce, and now the agency has lost
nearly 4,000 people--over 20% of its civil servant workforce,
with no apparent strategy in determining who should leave and
who should stay. And, just over the last couple of months--
largely under the cover of a government shutdown--NASA has been
rushing to shutter nearly half of the Goddard Space Flight
Center's main campus.
I could go on with the insults and injuries this
Administration sees fit to impose upon this nation's space
program, but I will spare us. I'll simply repeat something else
I said in February: I simply do not understand how anyone
reconciles rhetoric about competing with China with pulling the
rug out from under our own research enterprise.
I do not want to speak for our witnesses, but I anticipate
that we are about to hear that China is not culling its talent
and technical capabilities, nor is it undermining its
universities and turning the world's brightest minds away. Yet,
that is what our federal government is being forced to do today
by an out-of-control White House and OMB. Congress needs to
step up.
The clock is ticking. As this Administration continues to
cripple our science and technology enterprise, China is
deliberately and systematically implementing its long-term
plans.
I have no doubt that all of us serving on this Committee
want to ensure U.S. leadership in space. Words are cheap, but
actions are priceless. It is up to us on this Committee and in
Congress to take the necessary actions that will sustain our
global leadership in space, and science and technology more
broadly. Anything less is an invitation for China to take the
mantle in space and more.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Haridopolos. Thank you. We are now going to
introduce our witnesses.
First, our first witness today is Dr. Dean Cheng who serves
as senior fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
Our second witness is Dr. Clayton Swope who serves as the
deputy director of this aerospace security project at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Our third witness is Dr. Patrick Besha who is the founder
of the Global Space Group.
And our final witness is Dr. Michael Griffin who serves as
the co-president of LogiQ, Inc.
I would like to thank each of our witnesses for joining us
today. And our first speaker today will be Mr. Cheng for 5
minutes to present his testimony. Welcome to the Committee.
TESTIMONY OF MR. DEAN CHENG, SENIOR FELLOW,
THE POTOMAC INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES
Mr. Cheng. Thank you very much, sir. Chairman Haridopolos,
Ranking Member Foushee, Ranking Member Lofgren, thank you for
the opportunity to be here today. My comments are purely my
own.
As the opening remarks noted, the Chinese Communist Party
sees space as vital. Space from the CCP's perspective
contributes to all aspects of comprehensive national power--
military, economic, diplomatic, political, scientific, and
technological, even cultural. One of the key benefits this PRC
sees from engaging heavily in space is the experience gained in
things like systems integration and systems engineering, which
then redounds throughout the Chinese economy in all of its
various aspects.
Space from the CCP's perspective is also vital because we
live in the information age. And space is central for
establishing information dominance in a world where information
is the new currency of power, economic power, military power,
international power.
To this end, the Chinese are using space to develop their
domestic techno-economic base. Two key concepts in this regard:
One is dual circulation, creating essentially a walled-off
domestic economy where foreign players are not part of the
supply chain, engaging in intense, internal competition to
generate new technology and efficient production, which they
will then go out and compete globally against the rest of the
world, including American companies. And the other element here
is military-civil fusion, which is ensuring that every renminbi
serves both civil and military purposes.
And we see in particular the Chinese shift from a state-
owned enterprise-centric approach to one that also embraces
commercial enterprises as a key part of the overall Chinese
effort to improve their overall space industrial complex.
In this regard, then, the Chinese have a plan, and that
plan is very much the core of the threat to the United States.
In essence, the Chinese are striving to build out their space
capabilities, whether it is an array of satellite networks and
constellations, including mega constellations, a cis-lunar
capacity to support a sustained long-term presence both on the
Moon and in cis-lunar space, replete with lunar Position,
Navigation, Timing (PNT), and communication support and, of
course, building out a robust military space capability as
reflected in the Military Aerospace Force.
Second, to buildup their space industrial base, which will
include commercial as well as state-owned enterprise elements,
but has also seen the creation of regional aerospace industrial
complexes in places like Wuhan, away from Beijing and Shanghai,
and finally building in dual use. Military civil fusion is
about creating a melded, fused national industrial base that
can serve as both the military and civilian demands.
Here the Chinese have a huge advantage and much of the
opening remarks by the respected Members highlights this. China
sticks to a plan. It creates a plan, and it sticks to it for
decades. And the benefit there is programmatic stability,
budgetary stability, staff stability. I know I will have a job
on this project for years and decades, and the people I work
with will be the same ones.
Very quickly, specifically, on the PLA aspect, the People's
Liberation Army, the PLA poses a multifaceted threat in part
because China views space holistically: satellites, ground
segment, data links. The threat to American space systems,
therefore, is not simply the very sexy image of anti-satellite
systems, but also jamming and cyber attacks. And we have seen
the intelligence community accuse China of engaging in things
like Volt Typhoon, implanting malware in critical
infrastructure. But we should also note that the Chinese being
very close observers of other people's wars have undoubtedly
learned lessons, such as operation Spider Web in Ukraine, the
use of drones launched within an adversary's country to attack
critical infrastructure, which in this case should be
considered to include to space capability.
The other aspect of the threat, however, is the industrial
and standards aspect. The growth of Chinese commercial space
poses a very different, but nonetheless threatening, challenge.
Why shouldn't other countries buy from PRC commercial
companies? And Huawei leads the way in demonstrating how China
has been very much able to use commercial capabilities to
achieve inroads where it does not therefore have to use the
military.
Thank you very much to the Committee for the opportunity to
be here today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cheng follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Haridopolos. Thank you, Mr. Cheng.
Next, we have Mr. Swope for 5 minutes. You are recognized.
TESTIMONY OF MR. CLAYTON SWOPE,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, AEROSPACE SECURITY PROJECT,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Swope. Thank you, Chairman Haridopolos, Ranking Member
Foushee, Ranking Member Lofgren, and distinguished Members of
the Committee. I am honored to share my views with you on this
important topic. CSIS does not take policy positions, so the
views represented in this testimony are my own and not those of
my employer.
The People's Republic of China is methodically executing an
ambitious space agenda that aims to prove that China is a world
power in space without equal. Beijing is using space in ways
that provide direct, tangible benefits to its military and its
economy, while also fostering national pride and unity. Every
new space technology, skill, and industrial capacity acquired
by the PRC will be used to provide the People's Liberation
Army, a battlefield advantage, as well as power civilian and
commercial innovation and economic growth.
So what is China doing today? Space fits squarely into the
PRC's economic development policies to increase its industrial
might. The PRC has built satellite and rocket factories and
associated supply chains, launch facilities, ground stations,
and space object tracking systems. China is developing on-orbit
technologies, such as in-space refueling, highly maneuverable
satellites, space station nuclear and solar power, and
satellite docking and captured technology.
To date, China has not shown that it can conduct space
launch at the same scale or build satellites as fast as the
United States. But China is working to close that gap and
master reusable launch. It just tested a reusable launch
vehicle within the last 24 hours.
China is already launching satellite constellations. The
PRC Civil Space Program has methodically checked off
achievements in human space flight and uncrewed exploration
that will probably culminate in a human landing on the Moon by
2030.
China has already built three space stations and conducted
six robotic lunar missions, and a mission is Mars. China is on
track to be the first country to return samples of Mars to
Earth.
China has deployed space capabilities that allow the PLA to
monitor what is happening on Earth and in space, communicate
with its forces throughout the Indo-Pacific region, and
navigate with a high level of precision. The PLA is fielding an
increasingly sophisticated toolkit of counter-space weapons
that can threaten U.S. and allied satellites.
To date, China has mostly copied the U.S. playbook in
space. But China is doing things that no one else has done.
China was the first Nation to land on and conduct a sample of
return from the far side of the Moon. China conducted the
world's first satellite refueling in geosynchronous orbit
within the last few months.
China operates the first and only communication satellite
in an orbit around an Earth-Moon Lagrange point. So what can
the United States do? How should we think about this? If the
United States is in a race with China, it is a race that has no
end. Other than an end associated with the rise and fall of
nations in a timeframe measured over centuries.
Chairman, to your point, like the contest between England
and Spain, I also think the contest between Rome and Carthage.
These races last centuries.
China is running such a race. With its focus on military
civil fusion, Beijing is marshalling its technical and
manufacturing resources to enhance its overall national power
with space playing a key role.
The importance of space and national power is also
recognized by the United States. With President Trump noting in
July that space systems power exploration, defense, and
communication, and that the Nation will ensure the American
flag remains the ultimate symbol of leadership across the final
frontier.
Though the PRC space power is growing, the United States
can retain its lead and ensure it remains the world's most
consequential space power. To do so, we must use our strongest
advantages. We have a maturity of still growing space
innovation ecosystem; we have a space economy built on free-
market principles; and we have a coalition of willing and
international partners who want and choose to work with the
United States.
These characteristics of our national space power are force
multipliers and should be harnessed in the same way that
Beijing uses military civil fusion to advance the defense,
economic security, scientific objectives, and prestige of our
Nation.
In 1963, Edward Teller, a scientist who played a critical
role in the Manhattan project testified before Congress on
strategic developments, saying that I believe that in a race
for knowledge, we will win. But I believe that in a race in
which we are not running, or running halfheartedly, we have
been losing, and we will continue to lose.
Today, we as a nation may face a similar situation in
space. We have many advantages over the PRC, structural
advantages that we can use to maintain our edge, but to do so
we need to start running.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Swope follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Haridopolos. Thank you, Mr. Swope. Next, we have
Dr. Besha. I keep pronouncing your incorrectly, I want to make
sure I----
Dr. Besha. Besha.
Chairman Haridopolos. Thank you. You are recognized for 5
minutes.
TESTIMONY OF DR. PATRICK BESHA,
FOUNDER, GLOBAL SPACE GROUP
Dr. Besha. Thank you, Chairman Haridopolos, Ranking Member
Foushee, and Ranking Member Lofgren, and distinguished Members
of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to provide my
perspective on China's space strategy and its implications for
the U.S. You know, when I started at NASA 20 years ago as a
specialist on China, the country had just launched their first
astronaut into orbit and had not yet launched their first lunar
mission. How times have changed?
Today, the U.S. and China are the two most powerful
spacefaring Nations, engaged in a long-term strategic
competition that spans multiple elements.
Geopolitics, national security, economic competitiveness,
social and cultural influence, and science. I will briefly
discuss each major area. Geopolitics, national pride, and
prestige have been central drivers of China's space program
since its establishment. Today, human space flight missions are
most closely associated with these goals, including its current
space station and planned human lunar landing and the
International Lunar Research Station. Human spaceflight is
extraordinarily expensive and highly symbolic.
And so, therefore, serving very powerful signalling
function. The geopolitical stakes were once summed up by Lyndon
Johnson as: In the eyes of the world, first in space means
first period; second in space is second in everything.
Today, the importance of space has only grown with our
national security and economy relying on it. Developing a major
space program has also exercised in compelling excellence from
propulsion and material science to industrial organization and
the supply chains, space missions pull and push the development
of new technologies while adhering to the highest quality
standards. In essence, such missions provide a tangible measure
of a nation's economic strength in geopolitical power.
Second, our ability to operate in space is integral to
national security, including our utilization of Position,
Navigation, and Timing, reconnaissance communications. The same
holds true for all major space powers. Second, space has always
been intensely dual use. From military-funded civilian startups
to federally funded research centers that build both civil and
military spacecraft.
In China, a similar phenomenon is referred to as military-
civil fusion. It is part of a comprehensive effort to exploit
the best innovation wherever it may exist. In 2019, images of
Chang'e 4 on the far side of the Moon were celebrated in the
Great Hall of the People. Xi Jinping held it as--the mission as
a demonstration of a new type of whole nation system.
Social and cultural influence also shapes the strategy of
the space program. Spaceflight is the core part of the China
Dream of national rejuvenation--a return to the country's
preeminent place at the center of the world and now the
expansion of civilization deeper into the solar system.
Tying together China's ancient and modern cultures is a
hallmark of Xi Jinping thought and a push to promote the
country's unique cultural identity while legitimizing party
rule. One way this is symbolized is the use of traditional
mythology in the naming of the space missions.
Economic competitiveness is a measure of how well a
nation's firms compete globally. It can provide insight into
firm productivity, or how officially inputs are turned into
profits and services. China's state-owned enterprises typically
lag its private sector firms in productivity. For this reason,
it expanded the commercial space sector, which is now the
world's second largest after the U.S. However, under a state
capitalist model, the commercial sector is still robustly
controlled by the state from capital markets to firm
management.
Core to the Nation's competitiveness is its manufacturing;
China's ability to outproduce and outscale others is reflected
in its roughly one-third share of all manufacturing in the
world. With this comes process knowledge, not simply the
building instructions, but the hands-on knowledge of how to
build, how to innovate, and how to become more efficient. China
has hundreds of space companies competing to drive down costs
through process and scale efficiencies. As space becomes
commoditized, this approach will greatly improve its economic
competitiveness, just as it has in other sectors such as solar.
The pursuit of science and the expansion of knowledge is
evident. And the country's recent achievements as you have
mentioned, the first return of lunar samples since 1976, the
first successful landing on Mars--a second country to land on
Mars successfully.
Its latest science strategy covering the next 25 years
proposes ambitious missions to Jupiter and Saturn--Jupiter and
Neptune, excuse me. Other key strategies such as ``Made in
China 2025'' also prioritizes space. Success in these goals
such as building infrastructure on the lunar South Pole and
returning samples from Mars would mark exceptional world-
class--world first achievements with significant national
prestige and soft-power effects.
We are engaged not so much in a space race, but a long-term
broad, strategic competition. I recommend a few measures that
could support an enduring American advantage. Support Earth and
space science robustly, including strategic missions of
national importance, establishing a long-term Artemis mission
manifest; and advance a strategic international cooperation.
I recently left NASA, but I had great optimism that the
agency and its partners in industry can, if appropriately
funded, continue to achieve the highest level of excellence.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Besha follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Haridopolos. Thank you, Dr. Besha. Finally, we
have Dr. Griffin of his first 5 minutes. Welcome to the
Committee.
TESTIMONY OF DR. MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN,
CO-PRESIDENT, LOGIQ, INC.
Dr. Griffin. Chairman Haridopolos, Ranking Members Foushee
and Lofgren, and Members of the Committee, I thank you for the
invitation to appear before you to discuss what I believe to be
a critically important topic. To the point of this hearing, the
Chinese Communist Party's goals in space and its rising
capability to implement them could not be more clear. China is
going to the Moon. No access to classified information or other
special knowledge is required to realize this.
In my statement for the record, I have noted well over a
dozen open source references from among many more that could be
offered, describing their progress in developing the heavy-lift
launch vehicles, crewed lunar lander, lunar surface suit and
rover, and Earth return vehicle that will enable the execution
of an Apollo-style mission to the lunar surface.
Going to the Moon is a very hard thing. They may or may not
make it by the publicly referenced date of 2030, but that is
not important. What is important is China is going to the Moon.
The problem facing us is not China's rise. We cannot control
what China is doing. We can only control what we are doing. Of
those efforts, I am forced to say that mediocrity would be an
improvement. We have squandered a 60-year head start on
pioneering the space frontier to a nation that, without reason
or provocation on our part, has chosen to become our adversary.
For a self-declared adversary to occupy a human frontier
that we can no longer reach, should be understood as an
existential concern, if only because of their own words on the
matter.
From Ye Peijian, China's former director of lunar
exploration missions at the 2017 Beijing Space Congress, I
quote: ``The Cosmos is an ocean. The Moon is the Diaoyu
Islands. Mars is Huanyan Island,'' which we call Scarborough
Shoal. ``If we can go, but don't go, future generations would
condemn us. Once others are there, once others have occupied,
no matter how much you wanted to go, you couldn't.''
This is a stunning statement. The United States and its
allies and partners would never think to say that if we reach
the Moon while others cannot, they cannot also go there. The
fact that key figures in the Chinese Communist Party hold this
view should be of the utmost concern. But what is our response?
When I appeared before this Committee on January 17 of
2024, I had offered a rather blunt assessment of NASA's plan
for human return to the Moon. I said it will not work in any
reasonable timeframe. Additional misgivings have been more
recently offered by former NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine
in September 2025 Senate hearing and by the NASA Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel, both referenced in my statement for the
record.
To avoid offering criticism without a solution in the 2024
statement, I submitted a system architecture for human lunar
return that could be implemented with systems available today
or near term. I and my colleague, Dr. Lisa Porter, who
contributed significantly to both that testimony and today's,
subsequently offered a more comprehensive paper on that
architecture available online and incorporated for reference in
my statement for the record for this hearing. Others have also
suggested alternative system architectures for human and lunar
return missions.
However, NASA, two successive Presidential Administrations,
and the Congress that oversees them have so far chosen to
continue on a path that cannot work, and which even if it could
poses a level of crew risk that should be considered
unacceptable.
I will repeat my recommendation from 23 months ago. The
Artemis III mission and those beyond should be canceled, and we
should start again, proceeding with all deliberate speed. We
have lost a lot of time, we may or may not be able to return to
the Moon before the Chinese execute their own first landing, or
we may.
Space is hard, and despite the progress that China is
making, mission success is guaranteed to no one. But though we
may not win at this first step, we cannot cede the pursuit and
leave the playing field to others.
The true risk the United States faces right now is not just
in failing to return to the Moon before China, but in failing
to commit to what winning really means. In the long run,
winning is about being first, and then remaining to establish
the protocols, the governance rules, and ultimately the culture
and the values--the primacy of the individual over the State,
the rule of law, the right to own property, the bounty of the
free market--that others who wish to join us on the human
frontier must embrace.
Establishing the foundations for that future cannot be
accomplished without a sustained commitment. I am confident
that China fully understands this. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Griffin follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Haridopolos. Thank you, Dr. Griffin. I thank each
of the witnesses for their testimony. I will now recognize
myself for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Cheng, if you would, there has been a lot of discussion
about schedules and the idea that the United States and China,
of course, are in this race not only to the Moon but beyond.
But there has also been this unique conversation that each one
of you brought it up in the sense that China seems to stay on
schedule a little better than the United States at this point,
despite, as I think everyone in this room knows, we put an
additional $10 billion into NASA during the bill that we passed
in July. That said, what allows China to stay on schedule? And
what can we learn from their, at this point, success in staying
on schedule?
Mr. Cheng. Mr. Chairman, I think that one of the ironies
here is that the very authoritarianism that is a hallmark of
the Chinese system does grant certain benefits. One of which is
the ability to coerce a workforce, an overall government. But,
two, because the CCP has set a target, whether it is to put a
man in orbit or to put Chinese boots on the Moon, that is then
translated to programmatic imperatives across the bureaucracy,
which is not to say that there aren't bureaucratic resistance
centers within the system.
But when it is high profile, when it is Xi Jinping or his
predecessor, Hu Jintao, or his predecessor Jiang Zemin, who
says, ``You will make this happen,'' woe betide the bureaucracy
that chooses to fight it.
Alongside that is an economic structure that allows 5-year
plans, which allows again the budgetary stability. If it is in
the 5-year plan, it is bureaucratically approved, everyone is
going to go along with this, and conversely the budget and
therefore the staffing is stable for at least 5 years.
This is an enormous benefit with regards to ``I have set a
target. We are funding it. There will not be cuts because of a
new Congress, a new President, a new legislature, a new
director, and do not get in the way, not of these sorts of
programs.''
Chairman Haridopolos. Mr. Swope, to build on that idea, you
had mentioned in your comments there are relationships within
China between their main space agency as you put competitors
within China. What are they doing differently in China with
their quote, ``private sector,'' wherever you can say it about
a communist system with a private sector, that they are doing
that we can maybe improve upon and learn from?
Mr. Swope. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think the Ranking
Member mentioned quasi commercial space. That is how I think we
should view it. It may be financed partly by private sector
money, but in addition to money from the central government, it
also has money from provinces and local and municipalities.
But one thing that I think we should think about with
regards to how China operates then, I look at the quote on the
wall here, ``Where there is no vision, the people perish,''
from Proverbs. I think a lot of what Mr. Cheng said, too, is
true here. When you have the ability to kind of march in the
same direction for such and extended period of time, you are
going to achieve things that you wouldn't if you had more
uncertainty.
But I think they are missing out, though, is the free
molecules that we have in our system where it does encourage
innovation. You are not constraining innovation into a certain
goal. That is a benefit to the United States that the PRC just
does not have structurally in their system.
So I don't know if we should necessarily want to replicate
how they approach that top-down approach to the commercial, the
quasi commercial sector. I think our free-market principles
based approach where you do have that chance for innovation and
new ideas to percolate up through the ether, that is the best
way to do it. I don't think we should try to alter the way that
we innovate.
Chairman Haridopolos. And, Mr. Cheng, again, if I could.
There is a lot of conversation about the Belt and Road that the
Chinese have used across the world, and I think manipulate
countries with dead issues along the line. What should we be
fearful of as far as moving forward as they try to do much the
same with space?
Mr. Cheng. Ironically, one aspect that we should be very
worried about is the application of space technology to Chinese
Belt and Road Initiative investments here on Earth. When the
Chinese build a pipeline, a cell phone network, a
telecommunications structure on Earth, timing signals are
essential. And if the Chinese are funding it, one should not
expect that those investments across the world in key areas, in
key countries, in key regions, for key resources are going to
use GPS rather than BeiDou.
And that means that these countries are in a sense
potentially signing up without perhaps even realizing it. A
structural vulnerability to create a structural dependence that
will far outlast whoever is in the Presidential Palace or in
the parliament leading their respective governments.
Chairman Haridopolos. Thank you so much. I will now
recognize our Ranking Member from North Carolina, Mrs. Foushee,
for 5 minutes. You are recognized.
Mrs. Foushee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Besha, can you
tell us about your former role at NASA and why you are no
longer with the agency?
Dr. Besha. Sure. Thank you for the question, Ranking Member
Foushee. I started at NASA as a China specialist back in 2007.
I advised every administrator, including as a junior staffer to
Administrator Griffin until early 2025, including joining high-
level NASA delegations to China, and I was a China expert in
the administrator's office. Earlier this year, the Technology,
Policy, and Strategy Office was eliminated, and myself and
about a dozen colleagues were riffed.
Mrs. Foushee. So you were the top expert and advisor on
China at NASA and you were riffed? That is beyond puzzling, and
I would say incredibly alarming.
From reading your bio, I see that you are fluent in
Mandarin Chinese. Based on your observation of recent Chinese
media, can you describe how China is perceiving and responding
to the actions taken by this Administration such as
eviscerating and driving out the Federal STEM workforce,
including a 20 percent hemorrhage at NASA, gutting NASA
science, attacking research university, and drastically cutting
U.S. investment and research and development?
Dr. Besha. Yes, I would say that most of the discussion is
about expanding their own science industrial science technology
industrial base. You know, expanding their funding for science
programs, for technology. And to the extent they compare it
with cuts in the United States, I have seen that as well. I
think the criticism is muted, and I think they are probably
content to watch what happens here happen as they greatly
expand their own industrial base.
Mrs. Foushee. As I said in my statement, this is a pivotal
time for U.S. leadership in space. And we on this Committee
have a responsibility to act. So to each of you on the panel,
what should this Committee prioritize as we look to reauthorize
NASA and sustain U.S. global leadership in space? I would like
to start with you, Dr. Besha, and then move to Dr. Griffin, Mr.
Swope, and Mr. Cheng.
Dr. Besha. Well, I think your authorization is very
important in that it helps set some guidance for how the agency
should pursue its programs and plans. Emphasizing space
science, Earth science is critical, especially a balance
between, say, let's call it, generally, you know, NASA-led
projects and private sector. We still need strategic missions.
We need very large missions. Mars sample return, it is not
going to be a cheap mission. It is not going to be inexpensive.
It is going to cost money.
We also need to understand what comes after Artemis III,
right? With some clarity on what is the intention? Is it a
long-term stand on lunar surface, or are going onto Mars? We
need some clarity. And then to the extent we can kind of
advance some more robust international relations policy, that
would be helpful to compete with a strategic competitor that is
using international cooperation.
Mrs. Foushee. Dr. Griffin.
Dr. Griffin. Thank you, Ms. Foushee. I would make a couple
of comments. In answer to the chairman's question a few moments
ago about sticking to the plan, I would have commented that
sticking to a plan is important when the plan makes sense.
China is sticking to a plan that makes sense. It looks a
lot, in fact, like what the United States did for Apollo.
Provably, that worked. We have stuck to a plan that does not
make sense. So this Committee, an authorization Committee,
should not authorize the agency to continue down a path that
does not make sense.
The plan matters. I have enough history here to recall the
Authorization Act by this Committee in 2005 that required me as
the then administrator of NASA to use to the maximum extent
possible the existing assets from shuttle and those that
remained from space station and Apollo.
That is that the administrator of that time was required to
use the system that we had. We seem to have lost track of that
today. Again, sticking to a plan that will not work for Artemis
III and beyond makes no sense.
Mrs. Foushee. Mr. Swope.
Mr. Swope. Thank you. I think when NASA spends its money,
it is good to think about two different things. If NASA can
spend its money in a way that it can do its mission, but then
also enable private sector actors to try out business ideas or
new innovations, like the Commercial Lunar Payload Services
Project with ride-sharing opportunities, I think that is great
for the U.S. innovation ecosystem.
The second thing is really I think when NASA spends money
on things like basic research and development and science, that
also feeds into innovation at the very early part of it.
Without science, we would never have something like the
Manhattan Project. We would never have had the radio. James
Maxwell's theories proven by Reinhardt's Hertz led to Marconi's
radio.
I look at those investments that the government makes, that
NASA makes that is critically important to that innovation
ecosystem as well. So, I think in both those cases, when you
are looking at NASA authorization, look at it in a way where
you are the genesis of that innovation ecosystem, that flywheel
that really powers the U.S. national security and economic
security in a way that the PRC just can't match.
Mrs. Foushee. Can you indulge me 30 seconds for Mr. Cheng
to answer, please? Thank you.
Mr. Fong [presiding]. Sure.
Mr. Cheng. Ma'am, absolutely. Sure. It matters what this
Committee chooses to push as a priority. The problem is, a
failure to achieve whatever targets are set has no
consequences. So if I were to give a recommendation to this
Committee, I would say that whatever it is that this committee
feels should be the priorities for NASA--and my colleagues,
frankly, I think are far better qualified--I am focused
primarily as a China analyst, ma'am, not really a space person.
One, it needs to be bipartisan to make very clear
throughout our system that this is something that everyone is
pushing for; and, two, that there are consequences, budgetary,
legal, and others, to the agency, to supplying companies. If
they fail to deliver on time and on budget that it will not be
a, ``Well, OK, let's try again next year'' attitude. That there
are consequences.
Mrs. Foushee. Thank you for that, and I yield back.
Mr. Fong. Thank you. I now recognize the representative
from Florida, Mr. Webster, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Webster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity. Thank you for appearing as witnesses for this very
important subject.
Dr. Griffin, in your testimony, written testimony, you
mentioned the fact that it is important to be first, and that
history teaches us that those that show up first usually get to
write the rules and standards and set the direction of what,
where we are going and what is going to happen. That comes from
just showing up. And, in your opinion, are we staying at home,
or are we showing up?
Dr. Griffin. Well, at present, sir, in line with the
comments I made in my oral statement, we are staying home
because the approach we are advocating is not going to work.
The train may have left the station, but the train is headed
over the cliff. The importance of showing up, as you put it, is
that--in line with Mr. Cheng's comments--the people who are
there are the ones who established the GPS timing signals or
the BeiDou timing signals. The people who are there establish
the communications protocols. The people who are there
establish the rules of the road for space traffic management
and other things.
If we are watching from the sidelines it will be China that
is establishing those things. And with respect to the future
for the rest of the humans on Earth, that will not go well.
Mr. Webster. Well, that is, I guess, my second question
then. What will happen if China sets a standard and guides the
development, rules, and norms of space? What would be the
result?
Dr. Griffin. Then other nations will look to China and will
choose to align themselves with China because they are the ones
who are in space. The rest of the world will look to China as
the technological leader of the world. Lyndon Johnson was not
wrong, 50 years ago, when he said that first in space is first
and second in space is second everywhere.
Mr. Webster. OK. Thank you, very much. I appreciate it. I
yield back.
Mr. Fong. Thank you very much. I now recognize the
Representative from California, Mr. Whitesides, for 5 minutes
of questions.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you. I want to thank the chair and
Ranking Member for organizing this substantive hearing. It is
good to see you all. It is good to see my old friend Dr.
Griffin and others.
Let's start with Mr. Swope. You note in your prepared
testimony that China is likely to achieve something no nation
has done before, returning martian samples to Earth. With the
mission launching in 2028, NASA's scientific Mars exploration
program has been methodically building toward the return of
dozens of scientifically selected samples; the highest priority
of multiple decadal surveys that the agency is not settled on
the plan to collect them.
And the Fiscal Year 2026 President's budget request would
eliminate the program entirely, the scientific significance of
abandoning this effort will be enormous. What would, in your
view, be the geopolitical significance if the U.S. were to
abandon its plan to retrieve scientifically selected samples
from Mars while China moves forward on its own crash program to
return martian samples?
Mr. Swope. Thank you for that question. It is the historic
opportunity for humankind to maybe find evidence that there was
life that originated on a planet that is not Earth. That is not
really measurable, the significance of that discovery. What
that could mean, I mentioned the impact on innovation from
science. What that could mean down the road, the country that
is the first to do something like that, to control that.
I don't know if I trust the PRC to do that in a way that
benefits the planet, that benefits our Nation. So I think the
huge impact is beyond just geopolitics that you could pull off
a mission like that. I think it has science and long-term
implications that maybe what is conceivably the most important
discovery in the history of humankind.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you. For Mr. Swope or Mr. Besha, you
all state that one of our advantages over the Chinese is our
allies, international cooperation. Of course, the
Administration has proposed cutting a wide swath of
international space missions in its budget. Fundamentally, how
does this impact our ability to compete with China? Either of
you can answer.
Dr. Besha. So, there is another competition going on that
is international, right? And so, we are very conscious at NASA
of how we were and how we expand our cooperation, because this
allows us to influence. So Artemis Accords are a good example.
We have a set of principles and values that we want to make
shared. So we want other countries to agree with us on our set
of principles. China is doing the same thing with the ILRS, the
International Lunar Research Station.
They have a set of principles, and they are looking to get
a group of nations aligned with them to move forward. The
difference between the two are Artemis accords and ILRS is that
ILRA actually offers programmatic cooperation, as well. And so
whereas the accords are nonbinding, this is programmatic. And
so countries can join them on the surface of the Moon.
And now when they start making those first steps toward
norms, toward standards, they will have a coalition of
countries along with them. And this bleeds over into other
areas say at the United Nations, other topics and things like
that. And so it is basically a competition of influence
internationally.
Mr. Whitesides. In the interest of time, I am going to cut
to my last question, which is for Dr. Griffin, who, by the way,
I worked for about 25 years ago. I think. I can't remember.
Anyway, Dr. Griffin, you are probably the closest to the
agency today of this panel. Although, Dr. Besha, you were there
recently. So either of you can answer this question. I think it
is important that we expose what is the current state of NASA?
So we have lost 4,000 people, primarily senior staff, but also
junior staff, new employees, and recently promoted staff.
Goddard's getting taken apart, JPL (Jet Propulsion Laboratory)
is getting cut. You know, there is just turmoil. Morale has
dropped, but I don't want to put words in your mouth. What do
you perceive as the current state of NASA, you know, at the end
of 2025?
Dr. Griffin. Regrettably, I am not that close to NASA
anymore. It has been 16 years since I was there, and more. But
from outside, I would offer the perspective that as much as I
regret the damage to individual people and the loss of--notable
loss of technical competence that goes with massive cuts like
that, an agency without a proper, clearly defined, high-
priority mission is a rudderless agency.
It almost doesn't matter. It might just not matter what
actually happens at the agency until and unless we have a
mission to put the United States first among equals on the
human frontier.
If that is done properly, the right people will come to the
agency, the budget will be supported, all of those good things
will come true. It starts with defining what you want to do and
then backing it up.
Mr. Whitesides. Thanks. I yield back. Thanks.
Mr. Fong. I now recognize the Representative from Texas,
Mr. Self, for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Self. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Wow. Lots to unpack
here. First of all, Mr. Cheng, you said that you were more a
China expert than a space expert. So we talked a little bit
about free markets. I think Mr. Swope did. Talk to us about the
challenges that China has and any results from the recent
plenum. Because they have economic challenges, their economy--
and when I think back to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union was
10 feet tall until they weren't.
So I need to know what you think as a China expert just in
the economic and the results from the recent plenum?
Mr. Cheng. Sir, I am always very concerned when folks talk
about the slowdown of the Chinese economy, which we do seem to
be seeing, and promptly equate that with the collapse of the
Soviet Union. I think it was Winston Churchill who made the
observation that there is a great deal of ruin in a nation.
And when you would only look at North Korea, a fraction of
China's economy, much worse off, and yet has managed to survive
to caution that whatever problems we are seeing in the Chinese
economy--and we are seeing some--making that leap to that it is
a collapse.
What I would note is that Xi Jinping is continuing the
policies of his predecessor Hu Jintao and frustrating efforts
at expanding the role of the private sector of markets, et
cetera, in China, that Chinese economic reform pretty much came
to an end in 2004, and has not been renewed under Xi Jinping.
But, strikingly, one of the exceptions to that is in the
aerospace sector, where private companies are, in fact,
encouraged and welcome. Quasi private in some ways, but
nonetheless motivated by more classic market principles than
State direction.
Mr. Self. Dr. Griffin, you have been very clear that
Artemis III on won't work. Tell us exactly why not. Is it the
complexity? Is it the crew risk? Is it the fuel versus demand?
So why exactly do you think it won't work? I have read your
paper, but what is the bottom line as to why you are
recommending we cancel this and go a different direction?
Dr. Griffin. The quick bottom line is that an architecture
which requires a high multiple number of refueling flights in
low-Earth orbit, no one really knows how many, uses a
technology that has not yet ever been demonstrated in space is
very unlikely to work, unlikely to the point where I will say
and have said it cannot work.
Secondarily, the length of time required for the Earth
departure ship to remain in low-Earth orbit almost guarantees
that the propellant you have loaded will boil off before it can
fully be used, and the requirement of the lander to occupy
lunar orbit waiting for the crew for 60 to 90 days guarantees
that the fuel will boil off.
I do not see a way with the current technology we have to
overcome those problems, and, therefore, we should not pursue
that line of approach.
Mr. Self. OK. Probably, and I will ask who would like to
answer this. The Lagrange regions, L1 and L2, are prime real
estate. Do we, should we deploy them as a first strike to get
something into the L1 through L5, perhaps, to include relay
positioning, navigations, timing beacons, space-domain,
sensors, so forth and so on? Is that a critical mission?
Dr. Griffin. To whom is the question directed, sir?
Mr. Self. Mr. Cheng.
Mr. Cheng. Sir, first off, the Chinese have already
deployed equipment there. I believe that this is one of those
regions that will wind up becoming much more strategically
centered. It would be beneficial to us to establish a presence,
probably not military because that opens the door to propaganda
by others but certainly scientific, but, most importantly,
application, communications relay, data relay, things like that
that have an economic as well as scientific benefit.
Mr. Self. Well, let me ask you because GPS--because I think
the Chairman mentioned a Chinese-style GPS. We know that GPS
spoofing is now a real thing on the battlefields around the
world. So why would we not go with something other than GPS?
Mr. Cheng. I think that my understanding is that these
orbits--deploying items into those orbits can become extremely
complex, but, yes, if the issue here is GPS robustness, that is
absolutely a major concern from a security perspective.
Mr. Self. And I think we--my time is done. I think we have
a magnetic field sort of alternative.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Fong [presiding]. The Subcommittee stands in recess
subject to the call of the Chair.
[Recess.]
Chairman Haridopolos [presiding]. Welcome back.
For our next, Ms. Salinas, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Salinas. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our
Ranking Member, and thank you to our witnesses for being here
today.
In my district, NASA and its partners helped to support a
very robust economy of small manufacturers that supply
components to a lot of these missions, and these are really
good local jobs that help to build talent and expertise across
the country.
Several months ago, we held a hearing on the Artemis
program, and I asked how we can continue to support this
workforce. I was told that we achieve that by building hardware
and actually flying these missions. In other words, we need to
signal consistency and predictability to workers in industry.
And this question is to anyone who would like to answer.
What can we learn from China about the value of long-term
planning and predictability, and how has their approach
benefited their economy and their workforce more broadly?
Mr. Cheng. So, ma'am, the Chinese often describe their
space program--not their space program, describe space as
being, quote, unquote, very dense in high technology. If you
take a look at a satellite, it has advanced materials; it has
computers; it has communications equipment, solar panels. But
above all, it has systems integration and systems engineering.
All of those systems have to be able to work together in orbit
and, since the end of the Space Shuttle, you are not going to
bring it back for repairs.
The Chinese have used their aerospace program as a training
ground for systems integrators and systems engineers, and one
prime example of this is COMAC, the Commercial Airline
Corporation of China, which is going to compete with Boeing.
They took an entire cadre of folks from CASC, the China
Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, a state-owned
enterprise, and said, all of you, your systems engineers,
systems integrators, you will now go to COMAC, another state-
owned enterprise. And it jump-started their ability to do
systems integration in the commercial airline industry thanks
to the education and training and on-the-job experience in
aerospace.
Ms. Salinas. Dr. Besha?
Dr. Besha. Thanks. You know, I think there are some things
we might want to learn from China, but China is actually
learning quite a bit from the United States.
When I was at NASA, I ran a study, the civil space supply
chain study where we looked at manufacturers across the U.S.
that were engaged in the Artemis program, and what we found is
that small businesses are the bedrock for the program. It is
mostly small businesses.
And what I think China is learning, actually, from us is
you can't only rely on a state-owned enterprise, a massive
conglomerate. You actually need to go and find smaller
companies that can produce bespoke parts and things like that
that can then feed up into the larger enterprise, and we do
that very well. And our supply chain integration is actually
very good.
The second thing I think China is learning from us is the
ability for space to upgrade technology. So you may have valves
that work well on automobiles, but when you have to make them
space qualified, it is another quality control process. So it
upgrades a lot of the technology in the process along the way.
They are learning that, and it is a process that they can
extend to other industries as well.
Ms. Salinas. Thank you.
Dr. Griffin. I would like to take a turn at that. I don't
want to surpass China. I don't think the United States can or
should try to surpass China by behaving like China. I want us
to rely on our free market principles that encourage and allow
and reward successful innovators to compete.
The role of the government in this particular enterprise,
since going to the Moon is not remotely a commercially
successful activity in anything like the near future, the role
of government is to establish the point that we are creating a
program. We are going to sustain it. We, the United States with
our allies and partners, are going to be on the Moon for the
foreseeable future, and we, by doing that, we establish a
demand signal which will allow the best and brightest in
industry to come forward to produce those capabilities.
If the U.S. Government does not set that kind of a
consistent demand signal, then we should not expect industry to
invest alongside.
Ms. Salinas. Thank you.
Mr. Swope, would you like to answer?
Mr. Swope. Yes. I just thought about when I was in high
school, I had friends that their family owned a factory that
built--machines that built mattresses. So I thought about the
time that it takes to really ramp up to do something like the
Artemis program, and to me that is where that commitment, that
stability is needed from a government standpoint, the demand
signal, but also put the money on the table to say this is what
we want to buy. So then that trickles down through all those
other suppliers.
And I also worked for Derrick Hilmer years ago, and I
remember going out on the Olympic Peninsula, and I found a
company that was building something for Blue Origin. I am like
this is super cool. And all the time it took for that to ramp
up, it just can't turn on a dime. So I think that is the
biggest lesson there for companies like that at the very, very
back end of that. It takes time to get to the point where we
are building a rocket that is going to go to the Moon.
Ms. Salinas. That is right.
And I think to your point that I think many of you are
making, if President Trump's proposed 24 percent cut to NASA's
budget, which will actually go into effect, what could we see
in terms of the long-term implications for our workforce and,
thus, our ability to compete with China?
Dr. Besha?
Dr. Besha. So the supply chains around a lot of these
projects----
Chairman Haridopolos. Please keep your comments to a
minimum. We are already over time.
Ms. Salinas. Oh, I am sorry. I did not realize that.
Dr. Besha. Supply chains are very extensive. They affect a
lot of suppliers, and some of these suppliers are single-source
suppliers. So they have one customer in some cases, and that
customer is NASA.
Ms. Salinas. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Haridopolos. Thank you.
Next we have the Congressman from Georgia, Mr. McCormick,
for his 5 minutes. You are recognized.
Mr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
It is interesting just in the last line of questioning, I
heard each one of you point back to the supply chains, single-
source in competitive markets. One of the problems with
competition, which I am all for. I am all for capitalism
competition, but when you have a monopoly of several critical
minerals that a foreign adversary or at least a peer competitor
controls, what are we doing for a solution for that? I mean, I
don't see it.
Because right now we basically don't have a competitive
market. We don't have a market. All we have is one country that
controls all the resources for something that in the military
it probably supplies thousands--no, hundreds of thousands of
parts. They are literally the bottleneck, and it is probably
one of the reasons that our fleet readiness for all aircraft is
around 50 percent, which is atrocious. If we get into a war, we
are done.
And in space, which is something that is, obviously, the
final frontier, if you will, what do we do to prevent that from
being a choke point for us? They literally have us by the neck.
What are we doing? What is a good solution? And I don't want to
hear generalities of open market because we don't have an open
market. We have a monopolistic system.
What can we do--and I have my own ideas so I hope we get
somebody that gives me a good answer so I don't have to
interject my own opinion. But I will start with you, Mr. Cheng.
Mr. Cheng. To break your question into several smaller
buckets, first off, while China has an advantageous position,
it is not the sole producer of rare earth--rare earth actually
is a terrible misnomer. I think other more scientifically
learned folks prefer platinum group metals.
There are other places that do produce them. There is,
unfortunately, only one facility in the United States, and one
of the reasons for this has been additional regulatory
considerations, including environmental, that basically say,
well, if you are going to mine that, you have to do X, Y, and
Z. Suffice to say the Chinese are not as enthusiastic about
environmental regulations.
The other aspect here is that whatever the rare earths are
that you mine you have to process them, and that is enormously
polluting. And the Chinese have been more than happy to be the
primary rare earth processor. So you may mine it in India. You
may mine it in Canada. It still gets shipped to China for
processing.
I believe back around 2018, the United States broke ground
for a domestic rare earth processing facility. To be honest,
sir, I don't track that very closely. I don't know what the
status of that is. But if you want to break the Chinese
monopoly, it is not enough to open up more mines. It is
absolutely essential to open additional non-China located
processing facilities for rare earth minerals.
Mr. McCormick. So Mr. Chair, I will just go to that because
I am already halfway through my time, and that is how it works
here.
I will accentuate your point. We have 10 rare earth mills
we have no access to, except for through China right now.
Another 10 that we have limited access at best. Our regulatory
burden and our inability to mine and process these rare earth
minerals have put us not only at a strategic disadvantage but,
actually, in a worrisome position for any future conflict. We
are not ready, simply not in the military sense or especially
in the space sense.
We think--and this is something I challenge both sides of
the aisle to look at realistically--just because we don't
pollute when we get these minerals we are going to use anyway
doesn't mean that they are not polluting 10 times worst than we
would with the same minerals that we are going to buy anyway
and use anyway.
So it is not conservationism. It is not a smaller blueprint
of carbon emissions when you buy it from China. It is just
pretending like we are not polluting when we are actually
polluting more. I just want to be very realistic about this.
The future is America using resources we have without the
regulatory burden that makes it too expensive to do because we
are going to have access regardless, or the alternative is
don't be competitive. That is not going to happen. We are
America.
So I challenge both sides of the aisle to take a realistic
look at we have to have access to these things, and we will do
it cleaner, better, and cheaper if we are not putting
overregulatory burdens on the American businesses. And so let's
just take a really honest look at this scientifically,
domestically, so we have a chance into the next century.
And with that, I yield.
Chairman Haridopolos. Thank you.
I now recognize the representative from Illinois, Mr.
Foster.
Mr. Foster. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
On the subject of rare earths and permanent magnets
specifically, there is a model that the government is in the
process of succeeding at that I am really a fan of, and it is a
company called Nira, which has spun up through decades of
federally funded research in Minnesota that has got a way--and
they are building a significant skill factory to make permanent
magnets with a BH product and energy density comparable to the
best neodymium iron-boron magnets, and the input materials
there are basically rust and ammonia, nothing else.
And it is really an impressive thing, and it has to do with
decades of research, government-funded research led,
interestingly, by an immigrant born in China. So there are a
bunch of lessons I think that we should learn from that, one of
which is to not push away foreign talent from our shores
because of unfounded worries.
Now, I have been worried for a long time about the
fragility and the dual use of nature of all of the systems we
are putting into low-Earth orbit. Now, we are talking about,
you know, we are having at least two major U.S. companies put
big satellite arrays in low-Earth orbit. The Chinese have at
least two companies. The Europeans are doing it.
You know, everyone's first worry is about the Kessler
Syndrome where you just have a big cascade of collisions, which
I think is unlikely because of the altitude and the rapidity of
the orbit decay, but it is still something to worry about
because some of these systems are not really in low-Earth orbit
but somewhat higher. And so this is something that I think we
are going to have to need international understanding on
because this is a big problem.
The fragility is also a real issue. You know, one thing
that has worried me for a while is the refueling that was
mentioned. I guess Dr. Griffin shares my skepticism of how easy
it will be to make it work. But, you know, the scenario for
starships, for example, and other similar missions is to go put
these in low-Earth orbit, refuel them with 10 refueling
missions, OK.
Now, I don't know if you have noticed, but these starships
have a tendency to like detonate themselves from time to time.
And the issue comes up, what happens if one of those explodes
fully fueled in low-Earth orbit, and the debris field from that
is potentially frightening.
I was just wondering has anyone looked at this particular
problem when, you know, SpaceX is talking about running
hundreds of starship missions a year in some scenarios? You
know, do we actually--are we going to need understandings on
the accidental destruction of everything in low-Earth orbit in
addition to big worries about how that could happen
deliberately by even a not very talented adversary?
Is there anyone that can speak to this?
Dr. Besha. A few comments on that. So I think in terms of
space debris, it is a huge issue, and it is not an issue that
any one company can solve, right. And I think China was
recently in the news because one of their Shenzhou human
capsules was hit by debris. Our Space Station is also
occasionally hit by debris. We have shielding that can
withstand about 3 millimeters particle size of debris.
China has continued to do EVA (extravehicular activity)
missions outside their own space station. They had additional
armor, additional shielding to their space station. They
recognized this as a major issue, and it is affecting their
crown jewel, their human spaceflight program.
So we are both in some senses on the same page that this is
a problem that we need to solve, and it is only going to get
worse, as you mentioned, with these very large vehicles that
potentially could not reenter appropriately.
Mr. Foster. Has anyone looked specifically at the issue of
these very large vehicles and what happens when one detonates
in low-Earth orbit? Because I actually had Claude Code write me
a simulation of it, which I am not willing to quote the results
from, but it was, you know, people then studying Kessler
Syndrome for decades. And there are computer codes that do that
pretty well, and I guess we must have a pretty good idea of how
many fragments of what sizes are liberated when something blows
up on the launchpad at least.
So it seems like we have the information to understand, you
know, the size of the debris field and the damage it will do
to, you know, very militarily important assets, you know,
including the Golden Dome, which is now talking about many tens
of thousands of additional assets in low-Earth orbit with many
countries having an incentive to accidentally on purpose
destroy them all.
So I was just wondering if that is something that really we
need some more study on. All right. So I guess I am now down to
15 seconds, so I will just--if any of you have thoughts on that
and could respond for the record, I would be really interested.
That is something we have to keep our eye on.
And I think, ultimately, we are going to have to negotiate
with China and the other countries, space-faring countries to
come up with some understanding. We can't just go off doing
what we are currently doing.
Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Haridopolos. With that, I recognize the
representative from Utah, Mr. Kennedy, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kennedy. Chairman Haridopolos, thank you for holding
this important hearing on the space race with China, and I want
to be very clear where I stand. The Chinese Communist Party is
a major threat to our national security. For years, I have been
calling attention to the Chinese Communist Party being a
dangerous and aggressive adversary. We must expose their every
underhanded and subversive action. Passivity on our part will
only be rewarded with more aggression.
There are some voices that would question why going back to
the Moon should be a priority given we have already achieved
it. I would counter that this isn't just about national pride.
It is a national security imperative to beat China to the Moon
because the Chinese Communist Party intends to establish a
lasting presence with exclusionary zones for their own economic
and national security benefits.
It is important that we understand where China's space
program is at and how we can do everything in our power to win
this race because the stakes are too high.
And thanks to the witnesses for their testimonies.
Dr. Griffin, I have a question for you. I am a cosponsor of
Chairman Hill's Taiwan and American Space Assistance Act to
establish a partnership between TASA (Taiwan Space Agency) and
NASA. And, of course, we have the Artemis accords with 60
countries. Can you describe, Dr. Griffin, the importance of
these international partnerships to maintaining U.S.
preeminence in space?
Dr. Griffin. I would offer the view that if the United
States is not willing to partner with other nations in the
world to be on the space frontier, then they will have no
alternative but to partner with China or they can choose to
stay home. It is my observation that every nation that reaches
a technological level where they can do something in space
wants to. In some ways, it is like owning the only swimming
pool in your neighborhood. You become an attractive nuisance.
So since that is observably true, nations that can do space
want to do so but the barriers to entry are very high, the
United States can lower those barriers or we can watch while
China lowers those barriers. I think the latter course of
action is not what I would recommend.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you for that response.
China has also used radioisotope power systems to survive
the lunar nights since 2019, giving it the only continuous
presence on the Moon, and it plans to launch more missions
using this technology in 2028.
The use of landers, by contrast, are limited to 14 days
because they can't operate through the lunar night, and NASA
has not incentivized commercial providers to adopt radioisotope
power systems at this point.
Dr. Besha, thank you for your testimony earlier. How can
the United States leverage commercially developed radioisotope
power systems that China has to ensure our lunar landers can
survive the night and operate continuously on the surface?
Dr. Besha. Thank you.
Well, the U.S. actually does have commercial companies that
are exploring radioisotope power systems. Some of them are here
today. I think the advantage here is they are looking at a
couple of different ways to do it, a couple of different
approaches. They are using different fuels. They are using in
there amboresium. They are using things like that, fuels that
we haven't traditionally used in the past. So that is going to
be an advantage.
I don't think China is using commercial companies to do
their radioisotope power systems. They are very much part of
the China nuclear energy agency and the associated industries
below that. But, you know, I think our approach of multiple
different approaches, seeing what works, doing some
demonstrations and then start flying them, demos on clips
missions, on, you know, the next flight opportunity to prove
them out is the right approach.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you for that answer.
Mr. Swope, I have a question for you as well. As Acting
NASA Administrator Duffy announced plans for fission nuclear
reactor on the Moon by 2030, and I am very supportive of that
effort, can you tell us where China stands technologically on
establishing nuclear power systems on the Moon?
Mr. Swope. Thanks for that question. I can speak to what
China has said. They have said they want to work with Russia to
build a nuclear power station for their International Lunar
Research Station. So they are thinking the same way, and it
makes a lot of sense.
To your point about the length of the lunar night, it has
to have power in order to keep those electronics warm so they
don't break. So I am not surprised that China is moving in that
direction. I think the approach of the acting administrator to
look at industry in the United States to see if they can come
up with good ideas, novel ways to do that innovation, like Dr.
Besha said as well, is the best approach. I think we are going
to come out ahead on that.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Chairman Haridopolos, I yield back.
Chairman Haridopolos. Thank you, Congressman Kennedy.
Next we have--I recognize the Representative from Virginia.
Mr. Beyer, 5 minutes. Welcome to the Committee.
Mr. Beyer. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and thank you
for letting me wave on. And thank you, all of you, for your
testimony today.
Dr. Besha, I am particularly grateful to have you here. You
mentioned in your testimony the importance of supporting Earth
and space science robustly, and you made a great point about
the downstream, national security consequences, of doing that
or not doing that. I care about this a lot.
The National Science Foundation headquarters is a few
blocks from my home, and we have been very upset about this
Administration's attacks on Federal science funding this year.
The NASA science mission cut by 47 percent, 56 percent at the
National Science Foundation. Lots of other Federal science
agencies have just been gutted.
Could you discuss how these cuts to our core science
programs are going to affect our national science programs and
our national security downstream?
Dr. Besha. Well, I think there are a couple of ways to look
at funding for basic R&D. No. 1, it is very much a public good.
You know, it is a national good that we can't identify a profit
immediately but we should do it, right, basic science, the
fundamentals of science. These trickle down eventually into
applications, but initially, you know, basic R&D funding that
provides funding benefits.
And that is the strength of the U.S. system versus China,
to be honest. We have invested in basic R&D for the last 50
years as part of the system we set up. China hasn't invested
that much. They have taken a lot of our hard work.
The second thing is world first. So you are not going to be
a world first by simply seeing what everyone else is doing and
then copying it, right. And so you do have to do that initial
hard work to develop world-first successes like Mars first
sample return, you know, habitable worlds, observatories,
exoplanets, research, things like that that we have never
really done before.
And the final thing is, you know, it is not just basic R&D.
We create these missions, these astrophysics missions, things
like James Webb Space Telescope. We are at the cutting edge. We
are developing mirrors of such high refinement that these also
have other applications, not just in science but in, you know,
military applications, industrial applications, and things like
that.
So there is very much a cross-pollination between these.
They are not simply only for science.
Mr. Beyer. Let me follow up on the two because you have the
basic research, but then I am really concerned, too, about the
science workforce. Once again, we heard the National Science
Foundation right down the street, that virtually all of their
postdocs, their graduate students, the people that were getting
ready for their long careers were washed out and that many of
them were not able to figure out how they are going to finish
their Ph.D. programs.
And the real concern is that they are looking for
opportunities in Germany, in England, in France. There is this
reverse brain drain of our best young science people. I don't
know. Hopefully they are not going back to China. Although, I
am sure some of them are doing that, too.
You know, for decades we have been the country of tracking
top-tier candidates from around the world to come here and
study and make their whole careers in science. We looked at the
fact that it is a plurality, if not a majority of our U.S.
Nobel Prize winners were born in a different country.
How concerned are you about losing our investment in our
next generation of science leaders?
Dr. Besha. Very concerned, right. Science is often
multigenerational, and so we have very accomplished scientists
that are later in their careers. They teach the middle-tier
scientists, and those middle-tier scientists teach the
postdocs. The postdocs teach the graduate students, and the
graduate students--you know, on and on and on.
If you wipe out one of those cohorts, the postdocs, for
example, in a lot of ways you are wiping out a generation for
that science, and it is not easy to jump right down. You are
losing that mentorship. You are losing a lot of that talent, so
it is very concerning.
I think if they were to go overseas, for example, you know,
they, perhaps, could come back. You know, nothing is
necessarily permanent. We have had waves. Things go in waves. I
would be more concerned if this persisted for a longer time.
Mr. Beyer. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, the morning is getting on, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Chairman Haridopolos. Congressman Beyer, I appreciate it.
We are going to go for round two with questions. I am going
to take the next 5 minutes and turn it over to Mrs. Foushee and
we will go from there.
Dr. Griffin, you mentioned a few times now about Artemis
III and your concerns, and I think those concerns have been
heard today, of course. But I want to address specifically on
the China issue and the potential of their Moon opportunity and
what loss of mission might they face as they move forward with
their plans on the Moon and beyond.
Dr. Griffin. Thank you. That is an interesting question.
The loss of mission probability, of course, involves not lives
but wasted money and wasted time. When we speak of loss of
crew, that is a different thing. So for loss of mission, I will
point out that during Apollo, we estimated that to be about 10
percent, and we lost one of the seven missions, which we sent
to the Moon. And for a statistically small sample, it turns out
we had it about right.
China's approach to exercise their first missions to the
Moon is quite a lot like Apollo. So I would estimate that they
have a pretty similar loss of mission probability as Apollo
did. So I would say 10 percent or maybe a little bit lower
because there has been a lot more experience over the last
several decades.
So my answer is less than 10 percent, and I tried to
explain why.
Chairman Haridopolos. Thank you, Dr. Griffin. I appreciate
it.
Mr. Cheng, if we could, I want to get in the idea of if we
lose this race to China, and this is why we are all here today,
to make sure we do not lose that race, what position will the
Communists have an advantage on as we talk about the standards
of the future? We talked a little bit about GPS and other
technologies. What are other concerns should we somehow lose
this space race?
Mr. Cheng. So let me first emphasize that in this context,
we are, in a sense, in a relay of marathons. That you may win
this--you may be fastest in the second leg or the third leg,
but that doesn't mean that you have won.
So in this context here, it is a matter of who will make it
back to the Moon first, but much more important will be who
will be able to sustain a presence on the Moon. The Artemis
programmers talk about a manned station for 1 month out of the
year. I suspect that the Chinese are much more thinking 12
months out of the year.
If that is the case and we are talking about who is setting
the standards for not just communications and PNT, but
everything from keep-out zones for health and safety reasons to
scheduling for insertion, in essence, what will be the language
of cislunar space travel? Will it be English or will it be
Chinese?
And from the Moon, we potentially then go further outbound.
The Chinese already talk about going to Mars. Certainly with a
sample retrieval mission. Probably with human space flight in
the out years. Again, being first matters. Being there
persistently matters, and that, too, is about setting the
rules, setting the industrial standards, the business,
literally the dollars and renminbi, as well as the law and
order aspects.
Chairman Haridopolos. Thank you.
Mr. Swope, on the question of the International Space
Station (ISS), we know about the potential of the United States
bringing it back down to Earth. What kind of impact might that
have in this space race?
Mr. Swope. Thanks for the question.
I think we have to think about what we are trying to
achieve in low-Earth orbit, their science there, their prestige
there, look at that transition to a commercial approach to
space stations, and really is NASA putting enough money on the
table to make that work. I think that is the big question I am
asking in my head when I think about what happens after the
ISS.
I do think there are impacts to the prestige and science. I
think determining what the level of those impacts are really
determines what that gap is and the capabilities that we want
and that we don't have. We will still have a lot of
international partners that will want to work with the United
States, but I don't think that looks great.
If we do have a gap, we can't have people in low-Earth
orbit. I think that hurts our ability to go beyond low-Earth
orbit with human spaceflight, too, and that is something that I
think we need to quantify as well. What does that hurt us for
Artemis if we don't have the International Space Station or
something like that that we can do experiments with people of
how they live in space. There are impacts there, too, that I
think we need to consider.
Chairman Haridopolos. Thank you.
I will yield back now.
Mrs. Foushee, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Foushee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So to each of you on the panel, we have heard about the
importance to U.S. leadership of returning our astronauts to
the surface of the Moon and doing so before China lands
taikonauts there. What are the likely impacts should the U.S.
not return humans to the Moon before China?
So please answer with a quick yes or no. No. 1, is NASA on
track to return humans to the Moon before taikonauts set foot
there? We will start with Mr. Cheng.
Mr. Cheng. I am very pessimistic about our ability, so, no.
Mrs. Foushee. OK.
Mr. Swope?
Mr. Swope. Worried.
Mrs. Foushee. OK.
Mr. Besha?
Dr. Besha. You are not going to like it. Maybe. Maybe.
Mrs. Foushee. Dr. Griffin?
Dr. Griffin. No possible way is NASA on track to return
astronauts to the Moon with the present plan.
Mrs. Foushee. And lastly, if trying to beat China to the
Moon with humans means committing massive resources that
jeopardizes and sets back U.S. space science, aeronautics, low-
Earth orbit activities, and space technology, where does that
leave the United States, NASA, and the health of our civil
space program?
Dr. Griffin. I will start. NASA was created in the late
1950s to pioneer spaceflight. Many other activities become--
space science, space applications become possible when your
goal is to pioneer a new frontier. Many follow on activities
are possible, but if you don't have the central mission goal
that the United States will be preeminent on the space
frontier, then the other things don't follow and they don't
matter.
Mrs. Foushee. Thank you.
Dr. Besha. I think one way to think about the space agency
is not so much just as a monolith but as--80 percent of NASA's
funding goes to things like small businesses. It goes to
universities, scientists, engineers. And so when you cut that
budget, you may be cutting that agency, but you are really
cutting this broad industrial base. You are trimming some of
the American industry and some of our competitiveness. That
money is going to researchers and things like that.
Mr. Swope. I think I would add just that I have confidence
that NASA can execute on the Artemis mission, which is a long-
term sustained presence on the Moon as a steppingstone beyond
to for Mars. I think Mr. Cheng mentioned that. So to me I do
have confidence in that, and I don't think we should take our
focus on that.
So if it takes more resources just to beat China before
Artemis III, I don't know if it is worth it, but I do have
confidence in the long run we are going to execute on that
Artemis mission.
Mr. Cheng. Because China confronts us with a whole-of-
society challenge, I would really hope to see that NASA
integrates itself more broadly into our terrestrial efforts.
Why hasn't NASA sent a team of astronauts on a good-will tour
of Africa, of South America, to bring home the achievements of
American space capabilities?
NASA has one of the best brand recognitions out there.
Coca-Cola would kill to have NASA's reputation. But they don't
seem to have integrated themselves into that broader component,
which the Chinese absolutely do.
Mrs. Foushee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Haridopolos. Thank you.
The Representative from Georgia, Mr. McCormick, you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
First of all, I love that idea, Mr. Cheng, on the way NASA
goes out there and markets itself. I, too, would love, as a
pilot and a physician, I would like to get out into outer space
myself. They market it quite well to me.
Mr. Swope, you in your writings have talked about the
fractured regulatory burden on our companies and how it kind of
makes us noncompetitive. Meanwhile, China has been basically
getting rid of all the burdens. They can do that because they
are kind of top-down driven. They don't have any balance in
their government.
What could we do that would put us in a more advantageous
position so that we can actually be competitive in this future
market rather than--for example, we have regulations on every
single launch. If you change something, even for safety, to
make it more safe, you have to go back and reapply--I am just
going to give you one example--for that right to launch the
next time. Ridiculous because you did something safe and now
you are getting punished for that by saying you are not safe
enough to launch again. That is one example.
But give me some examples of what we could do here in
Congress to make sure that we become--we continue to be the
most competitive market, encourage people to stay here, launch
here, and excel here in the greatest Nation of the world rather
than become an afterthought in the space race.
Mr. Swope. Thanks for the question. I really think you
nailed it there. One thing about the U.S. space ecosystem that
is based on free market principles to thrive, less regulation,
less red tape, less bureaucracy is probably what we need to
inject in that system to get the outcome that we want.
Three areas to think about--and in some cases folks in the
Administration and past Administrations have looked to try to
optimize this. So I am not saying we are not doing it now. But
definitely spectrum. How are spectrum rules aligned so that
they encourage innovation and they don't encourage the status
quo?
When it comes to launch and reentry, I think I would put a
little focus on reentry. I looked at one U.S. company that
tried to do reentry the first time to a U.S. Federal range.
They had a lot of trouble and since then they have been going
to Australia. So I think right there, where is that? Is that a
regulatory burden? Is that a coordination burden? Is that a
prioritization burden that is not happening? I don't know, but
we should look at that because there is a lot of growth
probably for reentry.
And then the third area we should highlight is export
controls, ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations),
issues where companies want to sell technology to other
countries, allied governments. Specifically, thinking of things
on synthetic aperture radar. If you can't get it from a U.S.
company, I am going to go to a French company. And that is what
happens because those rules are a barrier and a paperwork
barrier.
So I think in all those areas we can improve the
regulations that we have now. I don't think it is time for more
red tape, more paperwork for space companies. So if I hear
anything about adding a regulatory burden or rules, even if it
is a light touch approach, that is still paperwork. I don't
think the industry needs that.
Mr. McCormick. That is such a great point you just made,
and, first of all, I want to point out that every company that
is trying to put spaceships out there and retrieve them has a
reputation that they exist on. If you fail, if you are unsafe,
their business is done. There is nobody who wants to be more
safe than those companies. They can regulate themselves
probably better than we ever could and be competitive only when
we get out of their way.
And to your point, our ability to get in the way of selling
our products to other countries only encourages us to be
supplanted by China as the industry standard. And that is not
just in space, by the way. That is in computer chips or
anything else. We have to be very careful not to limit our
ability.
And by the way, we just had a dissemination bill last year
that was overseen by the Secretary that we withdrew that
boundary that the Biden Administration put on us before and has
made us competitive again in the market. But we lost shares
during that time. We lost our industry standard.
So I just want to encourage people--and thank you so much
for putting a very succinct outline of that--to not limit our
ability to produce and disseminate and actually flourish in our
Nation as competitors. The government is not the solution. We
are the problem. Thank you for outlining that. Thank you.
And with that, I yield.
Chairman Haridopolos. Thank you.
I want to thank each of the witnesses for coming in today.
This has been very insightful and thought-provoking, and we
appreciate that very much. I also appreciate the thoughtful
questions of the Members as well. This is a race we must win,
and I think you've all given us a nice roadmap to which to work
from, especially, as the latest line of questioning, trying to
reduce some of those barriers to entry.
And with that, the record will remain open for 10 days for
additional comments and written questions from Members.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
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