[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO PROTECT CHILDREN
AND TEENS ONLINE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING,
AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 2, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-44
Published for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
govinfo.gov/committee/house-energy
energycommerce.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISING OFFICE
63-241 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
Chairman
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia Ranking Member
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia DORIS O. MATSUI, California
GARY J. PALMER, Alabama KATHY CASTOR, Florida
NEAL P. DUNN, Florida, Vice PAUL TONKO, New York
Chairman YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
DAN CRENSHAW, Texas RAUL RUIZ, California
JOHN JOYCE, Pennsylvania SCOTT H. PETERS, California
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan
RICK W. ALLEN, Georgia MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
RUSS FULCHER, Idaho NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California
AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas DARREN SOTO, Florida
DIANA HARSHBARGER, Tennessee KIM SCHRIER, Washington
MARIANNETTE MILLER-MEEKS, Iowa LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
KAT CAMMACK, Florida LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
JAY OBERNOLTE, California ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, New York
JOHN JAMES, Michigan JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts
CLIFF BENTZ, Oregon TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana
ERIN HOUCHIN, Indiana ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RUSSELL FRY, South Carolina KEVIN MULLIN, California
LAUREL M. LEE, Florida GREG LANDSMAN, Ohio
NICHOLAS A. LANGWORTHY, New York JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
THOMAS H. KEAN, Jr., New Jersey
MICHAEL A. RULLI, Ohio
GABE EVANS, Colorado
CRAIG A. GOLDMAN, Texas
JULIE FEDORCHAK, North Dakota
------
Professional Staff
MEGAN JACKSON, Staff Director
SOPHIE KHANAHMADI, Deputy Staff Director
TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
Chairman
RUSS FULCHER, Idaho, Vice Chairman JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
NEAL P. DUNN, Florida Ranking Member
KAT CAMMACK, Florida KATHY CASTOR, Florida
JAY OBERNOLTE, California DARREN SOTO, Florida
JOHN JAMES, Michigan LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
CLIFF BENTZ, Oregon KEVIN MULLIN, California
ERIN HOUCHIN, Indiana YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
RUSSELL FRY, South Carolina DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan
LAUREL M. LEE, Florida MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
THOMAS H. KEAN, Jr., New Jersey ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
GABE EVANS, Colorado KIM SCHRIER, Washington
CRAIG A. GOLDMAN, Texas FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky (ex officio)
officio)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hon. Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida, opening statement............................ 2
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Jan Schakowsky, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Illinois, opening statement................................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Hon. Kevin Mullin, a Representative in Congress from the State of
California, prepared statement................................. 8
Hon. Brett Guthrie, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, opening statement.................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey, opening statement......................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Witnesses
Marc Berkman, Chief Executive Officer, Organization for Social
Media Safety................................................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Answers to submitted questions............................... 278
Paul Lekas, Executive Vice President, Global Public Policy and
Government Affairs, Software & Information Industry Association 38
Prepared statement........................................... 40
Answers to submitted questions............................... 283
Kate Ruane, Director, Free Expression Project, Center for
Democracy & Technology......................................... 52
Prepared statement \1\
Answers to submitted questions............................... 287
Joel Thayer, President, Digital Progress Institute............... 53
Prepared statement........................................... 56
Legislation \2\
H.R. ___, the Children and Teens' Online Privacy Protection Act
Discussion Draft, H.R. ___, the Kids Online Safety Act
Discussion Draft, H.R. ___, the Reducing Exploitative Social
Media Exposure for Teens (RESET) Act
H.R. 2657, Sammy's Law
H.R. 3149, the App Store Accountability Act
H.R. 1623, the Shielding Children's Retinas from Egregious
Exposure on the Net (SCREEN) Act
H.R. ___, the Safe Social Media Act
H.R. ___, the Algorithmic Choice and Transparency Act
H.R. ___, the No Fentanyl on Social Media Act
H.R. ___, the Promoting a Safe Internet for Minors Act
Discussion Draft, H.R. ___, the Safeguarding Adolescents From
Exploitative (SAFE) Bots Act
----------
\1\ Ms. Ruane's statement has been retained in committee files and is
available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20251202/118714/
HHRG-119-IF17-Wstate-RuaneK-20251202.pdf.
\2\ The bills have been retained in committee files and are available
at https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/
ByEvent.aspx?EventID=118714.
Discussion Draft, H.R. ___, the Kids Internet Safety Partnership
Act \2\
H.R. 5360, the AI Warnings And Resources for Education (AWARE)
Act \2\
H.R. 6265, the Safer Guarding of Adolescents from Malicious
Interactions on Network Games (GAMING) Act \2\
Discussion Draft, H.R. ___, the Assessing Safety Tools for
Parents and Minors Act \2\
H.R. ___, the Stop Profiling Youth and (SPY) Kids Act \2\
H.R. ___, the Safe Messaging for Kids Act \2\
H.R. ___, the Don't Sell Kids' Data Act of 2025 \2\
Discussion Draft, H.R. ___, the Parents Over Platforms Act \2\
Submitted Material
Inclusion of the following was approved by unanimous consent.
List of documents submitted for the record....................... 102
Letters from multiple correspondents to Mr. Guthrie, et al. \3\
Letter of November 3, 2025, from Penny Young Nance, Chief
Executive Officer and President, Concerned Women for America,
to committee members........................................... 104
Letter of December 1, 2025, from Nicole Smith, President, Dignity
Defense Institute, to Mr. Guthrie, et al....................... 105
Letter of December 2, 2025, from Morgan Reed, President, ACT-the
App Association, to Mr. Bilirakis, et al....................... 107
Letter of November 26, 2025, from Sam A. Cabral, International
President, International Union of Police Associations, to Mr.
Bilirakis, et al............................................... 113
Letter of December 1, 2025, from Engine to Mr. Bilirakis and Ms.
Schakowsky..................................................... 115
Letter of December 1, 2025, from Association of Ministers in
Utah, et al., to Mr. Guthrie and committee members............. 118
Letter of December 1, 2025, from the Center for Innovation and
Free Enterprise to Mr. Guthrie, et al.......................... 120
Letter from Erich Mische, Chief Executive Officer, Suicide
Awareness Voices of Education (SAVE), to Mr. Bilirakis, et al.. 121
Poll data from Digital Childhood Alliance, May 1, 2025........... 126
Letter of December 1, 2025, from Indiana University College
Republicans to Mr. Guthrie, et al.............................. 129
Letter from Raul Lopez, Chairman of the Board and Cofounder, and
Tommy Vallejos, Executive Director and Cofounder, Latinos for
Tennessee. to Mr. Guthrie, et al............................... 131
Letter of December 1, 2025, from the Main Street Privacy
Coalition to Mr. Guthrie, et al................................ 133
Letter of December 1, 2025, from Hilary Ware, Global Head of
Privacy, Apple, to Mr. Bilirakis and Ms. Schakowsky............ 135
Letter of December 2, 2025, from Chan Park, Head of U.S. and
Canada Policy and Partnerships, OpenAI, to Mr. Bilirakis and
Ms. Schakowsky................................................. 139
Statement of Amy Bos, Vice President of Government Affairs,
NetChoice, to subcommittee, December 2, 2025................... 141
Letter of December 2, 2025, from Arjun Bhatnagar, Chief Executive
Officer, Cloaked, to subcommittee members...................... 145
Letter of December 2, 2025, from Center for Black Equity, et al.,
to subcommittee members........................................ 146
Federal Trade Commission documents related to app stores......... 150
Letter of December 2, 2025, from Digital Childhood Alliance, et
al., to Mr. Guthrie, et al..................................... 169
Letter of December 1, 2025, from Stephanie Smith, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Alabama Policy Institute, to Mr.
Guthrie, et al................................................. 173
Letter from Sheriff Michael J. Murphy, Livingston County,
Michigan, to committee members................................. 175
Letter of December 1, 2025, from Design It For Us, et al., to Mr.
Guthrie and Mr. Pallone........................................ 176
Letter of November 24, 2025, from various parents to House
Speaker Mike Johnson, et al.................................... 178
----------
\2\ The bills have been retained in committee files and are available
at https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/
ByEvent.aspx?EventID=118714.
\3\ The information has been retained in committee files and is
included in the Documents for the Record at https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/IF/IF17/20251202/118714/HHRG-119-IF17-20251202-SD003.pdf.
Statement by AAJ: ``OPPOSE House KOSA & COPPA 2.0''.............. 189
Letter of December 1, 2025, from Hilary Ware, Global Head of
Privacy, Apple, to Mr. Bilirakis and Ms. Schakowsky............ 192
Letter of December 1, 2025, from Tom Kemp, Executive Director,
California Privacy Protection Agency, to Mr. Guthrie, et al.... 196
Letter of October 15, 2025, from Active Minds, et al., to Senate
Majority Leader John Thune, et al.............................. 199
Letter from Holly Grosshans, Senior Counsel, Tech Policy, Common
Sense Media.................................................... 213
Letter of December 1, 2025, from ParentsSOS to subcommittee
members........................................................ 215
Report, ``Social Media and Youth Mental Health, The U.S. Surgeon
General's Advisory,'' 2023 \3\
Report, ``Health Advisory on Social Media Use in Adolescence,''
American Psychological Association, May 2023................... 217
Report, ``Teens, Social Media and Mental Health,'' by Michelle
Faverio, et al., Pew Research Center, April 22, 2025 \3\
Statement of Cayce Savage to the Senate Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law, September 6,
2025........................................................... 229
Responses to Senate Judiciary Committee questions for the record
from Cayce Savage.............................................. 235
Statement of Jason Sattizahn to the Senate Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law, September 9,
2025........................................................... 253
Responses to Senate Judiciary Committee questions for the record
from Jason Sattizahn........................................... 260
Report, ``Teen Accounts, Broken Promises: How Instagram is
Failing to Protect Minors'' \3\
----------
\3\ The information has been retained in committee files and is
included in the Documents for the Record at https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/IF/IF17/20251202/118714/HHRG-119-IF17-20251202-SD003.pdf.
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO PROTECT CHILDREN AND TEENS ONLINE
----------
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2025
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:18 a.m., in
the John D. Dingell Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building,
Hon. Gus Bilirakis (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Bilirakis, Fulcher, Dunn,
Cammack, Obernolte, James, Bentz, Houchin, Fry, Lee, Kean,
Evans, Goldman, Guthrie (ex officio), Schakowsky (subcommittee
ranking member), Castor, Soto, Trahan, Mullin, Clarke, Dingell,
Kelly, Schrier, and Pallone (ex officio).
Also present: Representatives Joyce and Miller-Meeks.
Staff present: Christian Calvert, Press Assistant; Jessica
Donlon, General Counsel; Sydney Greene, Director of Finance and
Logistics; Megan Jackson, Staff Director; AT Johnson, Special
Advisor; Daniel Kelly, Press Secretary; Sophie Khanahmadi,
Deputy Staff Director; Alex Khlopin, Policy Analyst, Commerce,
Manufacturing, and Trade; Brayden Lacefield, Special Assistant;
Giulia Leganski, Chief Counsel, Commerce, Manufacturing, and
Trade; Joel Miller, Chief Counsel; Evangelos Razis,
Professional Staff Member, Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade;
Seth Ricketts, Special Assistant; Chris Sarley, Member
Services/Stakeholder Director; Matt VanHyfte, Communications
Director; Hannah Anton, Minority Policy Analyst; Keegan
Cardman, Minority Staff Assistant; Kelly Fabian, Minority Chief
Counsel, Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade; Waverly Gordon,
Minority Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel; Tiffany
Guarascio, Minority Staff Director; Jackson Hall, Minority
Intern; Perry Hamilton, Minority Deputy Director, Member
Services and Outreach; Megan Kanne, Minority Professional Staff
Member; Phoebe Rouge, Minority FTC Detailee; and Andrew
Souvall, Minority Director of Communications, Outreach, and
Member Services.
Mr. Bilirakis. The committee will come to order.
The chairman recognizes himself for 5 minutes for an
opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GUS M. BILIRAKIS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing to discuss
legislative solutions to protect children online.
Our children are facing an online epidemic. This issue is
personal. We have parents on both sides of the aisle, and we
all have constituents who have been affected. They are why we
are here today.
We are examining almost 20 bills today which together form
a comprehensive strategy to protect kids online. Our approach
is straightforward: Protect kids, empower parents, and future-
proof our legislation as new risks and technologies emerge.
These bills are not stand-alone solutions. They complement
and reinforce one another to create the safest possible
environment for our children. There is no one-size-fits-all
bill to protect kids online, and our plan reflects that.
Parents must be empowered to safeguard their children
online. Just as a parent can observe their children's
activities and social behaviors at home and at school
functions, so should they be able to check on their kids'
activities online.
Our bills ensure parents have the tools and resources to
keep their children safe in the modern world. A child's life in
the 21st century is much more complex than generations past,
and parents need the tools to adapt.
Our bills are mindful of the Constitution's protections for
free speech. We have seen it in the States: Laws with good
intentions have been struck down for violating the First
Amendment. We are learning from those experiences, because a
law that gets struck down in court does not protect a child.
And the status quo is unacceptable, as far as I am concerned.
All our bills employ this strategy, including the Kids
Online Safety Act, or KOSA, that I am proud to lead. KOSA sets
a national standard to protect kids across America and mandates
default safeguards and easy-to-use parental controls to empower
families.
It blocks children from being exposed to or targeted with
ads for illegal or inappropriate content like drugs and
alcohol. It takes on addictive design features that keep kids
hooked and harm their mental health. And, most importantly, it
holds Big Tech accountable with mandatory audits and strong
enforcement by the FTC and State attorneys general.
I made precise changes to ensure KOSA is durable. Don't
mistake durability for weakness, folks. This bill has teeth. By
focusing on design features rather than protecting speech, we
will ensure it can withstand legal challenge while delivering
real protections for kids online--kids and their families.
I am proud of the members of this subcommittee for working
on legislation to address a myriad of harms and challenges.
This issue is personal to every one of us up here. It shows in
the number of bills before us today. I know this is a shared,
bipartisan goal.
My office is open. Call me or find me on the floor. I think
you know that I am willing to listen. Let's find a way to work
together. And this is not a partisan issue, folks. Let's find a
way to work together and save America's kids from the threats
they are facing online. That is the bottom line.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Bilirakis. I yield back the balance of my time.
The chairman recognizes the ranking member, Ms. Schakowsky,
for her 5 minutes for an opening statement.
You are recognized.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAN SCHAKOWSKY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There is not a single thing that we deal with, in my view,
that is more important than to take care of our kids. And I
believe that the legislation that has been offered by the
Republicans does not do the job. And it is really frustrating,
because we have been working on this bill and moving it around
here and there for a long time.
Yesterday, I had the privilege of meeting with three women,
who are here today in the audience, who have been here for 5
years because their children died not necessarily. They didn't
need to die. And it is the kinds of things that we can learn
from them that we can do much better.
I mean to say that the--that--who can't--yes, the different
States--what is it? The States--States--sorry--cannot do their
own bill--cannot do their own bill. I am sorry. We have a long,
long way to go to protect our children and to make sure that
all are involved.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Schakowsky follows:]
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Ms. Schakowsky. Now I want to yield at this point to
Congressman Mullin to continue in this discussion.
Mr. Mullin. Thank you, Ranking Member Schakowsky, and thank
you, Mr. Chair, for convening this hearing on a very important
topic.
Protecting kids is perhaps the single most unifying,
bipartisan issue we have here in Congress. We all want to keep
our kids safe. I myself am the father of two small boys who
aren't yet--but will be before I know it--an age when they will
be navigating the internet on their own. To say I am worried
for them is an understatement.
But the country and Congress is not without tools to keep
people safe online. In fact, more than 100 years ago, the
Federal Trade Commission was set up to prevent harms to
consumers of all kinds, including kids. Indeed, most of the
bills we will be discussing today rely on the FTC to enforce
them.
So that is why it has been stunning to see the contempt in
which the Trump administration has held the FTC. Rather than
seeking from Congress a change in the law, President Trump has
simply attempted to unlawfully fire two of its Commissioners,
eliminating bipartisan input.
Meanwhile, the Chair of the FTC has attempted to
dramatically reduce the Commission's staff through buy-outs and
other drastic measures. He has actually bragged that he wants
to get the Commission's staff size to its lowest level in 10
years.
The Chair has also been using the tools of the FTC to wage
a culture war against medical professionals and parental
choices he disagrees with. This is more than a harmful
deviation from the Commission's mission. It undermines consumer
protections for all of us by taking cops off their normal beat.
Yet today we will be talking about all the things we want
and need the FTC to do to protect kids online. But who will be
doing that work? The remaining employees at the FTC, who are
already stretched too thin?
As evidenced by this long list of bipartisan bills, there
is clearly a lot of alignment across the parties about the role
we want the FTC to play. In that spirit, I hope that, as we
discuss the legislative proposals today, we acknowledge the
need to fully fund the FTC, protect its bipartisan commission
structure, and ensure the FTC is focused on the mission
Congress gives it.
I look forward to a robust discussion today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mullin follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Mullin. With that, I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr.
Guthrie, for his 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRETT GUTHRIE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Chairman Bilirakis. Thanks for
having this hearing today. And thank you to our witnesses for
being with us here today.
Tragedy strikes children every day online. In March, I
shared the story of a constituent who took his life due to a
sextortion scheme. I know each of us here today and many others
have similar stories to share. And while we passed the TAKE IT
DOWN Act into law earlier this Congress to address sextortion,
countless other harms persist, and it is our responsibility to
find a solution.
That is why we are here today. We have almost two dozen
bills before us that take a broad approach to create a
comprehensive strategy to protect children online.
Imagine a 14-year-old child trying to download a social
media app on their phone. There are many different layers
needed to protect them from harm. And we are discussing a
comprehensive approach today, where different types of
legislation could work in harmony to address various concerns.
For example, age verification is needed first and foremost,
including appropriate parental consent, even before logging in.
Once a user's age is known, privacy protections under COPPA 2.0
would be triggered.
We also have a range of bills to further address issues
like parental monitoring of online activity, restrictions on
the types of apps kids can access, how information is presented
to kids in apps, and how children's data is used by online
platforms.
And, finally, the Kids Online Safety Act provides robust
parental controls and limitations on harmful design features to
ensure that platforms live up to these standards.
Now, I would note that we went to great lengths to address
concerns that Members of the House on both sides of the aisle
raised regarding KOSA in the last Congress, as well as concerns
that the previous version would not pass a legal challenge and,
thus, not protect a single child. The KOSA we are considering
today still holds platforms accountable while addressing these
concerns.
Further, when it comes to AI chatbots, we learned about
this in committee a couple of weeks ago. The SAFE Bots Act and
AWARE Act will ensure users are appropriately informed in their
using AI and that there are educational resources for kids,
parents, and educators on the safe use of AI chatbots.
These exemplify our strategy that Chairman Bilirakis has
highlighted. The online world is large and complex, and there
is no silver-bullet solution to protect kids. Each bill we are
looking at today could be a piece of a puzzle designed to work
together to create the safest possible environment for children
online.
They empower parents through parental consent mechanisms,
standards for parental tools, and educational resources. They
are curated to withstand constitutional challenges. A law that
gets struck down protects no one, and, if that happened, would
fail to protect the very children we are here to protect.
We have a unique opportunity to work together to craft a
multifaceted solution to protect children online.
Thank you again to our witnesses for being here. We really
appreciate the efforts you made to be here. We greatly look
forward to the discussions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Guthrie follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Guthrie. And I would yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. The gentleman yields back.
Now I will recognize the ranking member of the full
committee, Mr. Pallone, for his 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Chairman Bilirakis.
Today, we are discussing the important topic of youth
online safety. And as more of our lives are lived online, there
have been tremendous changes in how we communicate, socialize,
and learn. And with these changes come new challenges to
ensuring the health and wellbeing of all Americans but
particularly our youngest and most vulnerable.
We can all agree that we want our kids and teens to be safe
online. Congress, along with parents, educators, and States,
can and should play an active role in keeping minors safe. And
that role must include prioritizing strong, comprehensive data
privacy legislation, which unfortunately is not included in the
19 bills we are considering today.
Comprehensive data privacy legislation is something I have
cared about for many years. But in the absence of data privacy
legislation, companies will continue to collect, process, and
sell as much of our data and the data of our kids as possible.
And this data allows companies to exploit human psychology and
individual preferences to fuel invasive ads and design
features, without regard to the harm suffered by those still
developing critical thinking and judgment.
Artificial intelligence is only accelerating existing
incentives because, like social media, AI relies on the
exploitation of our data.
Without such a strong legislative solution for children,
teens, and all Americans, we must recognize that the measures
we take in Congress will not address the full scope of the
problems perpetrated by an online ecosystem fundamentally built
on reckless and abusive data practices. We can and should do
more for our children and for all consumers.
But if comprehensive privacy legislation was easy, it would
already be law. And the urgency of addressing harms to children
and teens presents an opportunity to make progress towards
ensuring the internet is a safer place for all Americans.
This is why I am pleased we will be discussing my bill that
will prevent shadowy data brokers from selling minors' data and
allow parents and teens to request the deletion of any data
already in the hands of brokers.
We simply should not allow nameless data harvesters to
profit off of our kids' data. Our kids deserve the right to
enter adulthood with a clean slate, not a detailed dossier that
will follow them throughout their adult lives.
They also deserve online safety legislation that will make
the internet safer, not put their data and physical safety more
at risk. And I am concerned that mandating third-party access
to children's data and requiring additional collection and
sharing of sensitive data before accessing content, sending a
message, or downloading an app would move us in the wrong
direction in the fight for online privacy.
Congress must also remember that, unfortunately, many kids
find themselves in unsupportive or even abusive or neglected
households. There can be real-world harm from allowing parents
complete access and control over their teens' existence online.
Instead of shifting ever more burden onto parents and teens
and putting ever more trust in tech companies, we can give
everyone safer defaults and more control over their digital
lives.
We can also require companies to evaluate their algorithms
for bias and harms before making our kids the guinea pigs.
And we can resist efforts to preempt existing protections
and let States continue to respond to rapidly evolving
technologies, like AI chatbots, and enforce their existing
child safety and privacy laws.
And we can all stand up for an independent Federal Trade
Commission.
Now, the FTC, under both Republican and Democratic
leadership, has consistently been Americans' strongest champion
against the abuses of all who seek to exploit our Nation's
children and adults for profit both on- and offline. When
President Trump attempted to illegally fire the FTC's
Democratic Commissioners, he made our children less safe
online.
If my Republican colleagues want to further empower the FTC
to protect kids and teens, they must join Democrats in standing
up for a bipartisan and independent FTC. They should join us in
demanding that the Democratic Commissioners be reinstated.
So I look forward to the discussion today on this important
issue.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Pallone. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. Bilirakis. The gentleman yields back. We appreciate
that.
And now we are going to introduce our witnesses for today.
Mr. Marc Berkman, CEO of the Organization for Social Media
Safety, welcome, sir.
Mr. Paul Lekas, executive vice president, Software &
Information Industry Association, welcome.
Ms. Kate Ruane, director of the Free Expression Project,
Center for Democracy & Technology, welcome.
And Mr. Joel Thayer, who is president of the Digital
Progress Institute.
Welcome to all our witnesses.
So, Mr. Berkman, you are recognized for your 5 minutes of
testimony.
STATEMENTS OF MARC BERKMAN, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
ORGANIZATION FOR SOCIAL MEDIA SAFETY; PAUL LEKAS, EXECUTIVE
VICE PRESIDENT, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS,
SOFTWARE & INFORMATION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION; KATE RUANE,
DIRECTOR, FREE EXPRESSION PROJECT, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY &
TECHNOLOGY; AND JOEL THAYER, PRESIDENT, DIGITAL PROGRESS
INSTITUTE
STATEMENT OF MARC BERKMAN
Mr. Berkman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon and thank you to the distinguished members
of this committee for the opportunity to offer my
organization's social media safety expertise at this historic
legislative hearing to protect our children from online harms.
My name is Marc Berkman, and I am the CEO of the
Organization for Social Media Safety, the first national
nonpartisan consumer-protection organization focused
exclusively on social media.
The reason for this legislative hearing must be explicitly
clear: Social media is harming children. It is harming millions
of America's children.
Up to 95 percent of youth ages 13 to 17 report using a
social media platform, with more than a third saying they use
social media almost constantly. Nearly 40 percent of children
ages 8 to 12 use social media. In our own study with the UCLA
School of Education including over 16,000 teens, we have found
that 50 percent self-report using social media for more than 5
hours daily.
The evidence, based on credible research and testimony in
this very chamber, shows severe, pervasive harms related to
adolescent social media use: cyberbullying, harassment,
predation, human trafficking, drug trafficking, violence,
fraud, sextortion, suicide, depression, cognitive impairment,
eating disorders, and more.
Social media-related harm is far reaching, impacting homes
in every congressional district, families of every demographic.
But to understand the true toll, we need look no further than
the many parents here with us today who have tragically lost a
child to a social media-related threat.
Sitting behind me is Rose Bronstein. Her son, Nate
Bronstein, forever 15, died by suicide after suffering severe
cyberbullying over social media. And Samuel Chapman. His son,
Sammy Chapman, forever 16, died after ingesting fentanyl-
poisoned drugs that he easily acquired from a drug dealer
operating on social media.
Rose and Sam and the many other angel parents who traveled
from across the country to be here today have collectively
spent years fiercely and bravely advocating for urgently needed
legislative reform in the hope that Congress acts to ensure
that other families do not have to suffer such tragedies. We
owe them a debt of gratitude.
The record on the extent and severity of the social media-
related harm impacting our children is clear, yet the social
media industry continues to fail to protect our children.
Thank you to the brave work of whistleblowers and attorneys
general across the country.
We know that the industry has an entrenched, durable
conflict of interest when it comes to safety. Even in the face
of mounting child fatalities, social media executives have
prioritized growing the number of child users and engagement on
their platforms over our children's safety, making a Federal
legislative response absolutely essential and critically
urgent. The social media industry has been too slow, their
solutions too ineffective, their apathy, sadly, too apparent.
And so we are grateful that the committee today recognizes
that a broad approach with multiple tactics are needed:
resources for education; accountability and rules for
platforms; research; privacy reforms; and, critically, safety
technology.
I would like to highlight Sammy's Law.
One of the most effective ways for parents to protect
children is by using third-party safety software, which can
provide alerts to parents when dangerous content is shared
through children's social media accounts, enabling lifesaving
interventions at critical moments.
For example, if a child is suffering severe cyberbullying
via social media, then a parent who has received an alert
through third-party safety software can immediately provide
critical support.
We know that this intervention is highly effective. Over
the last several years, safety software companies have provided
alerts to parents that have protected millions of children,
saving numerous lives.
Sammy's Law will finally provide families with this option
on all major social media platforms, while also substantially
increasing data security and child privacy over the status quo.
We urge this committee to pass this bipartisan, commonsense
legislation that will save lives.
American families have sat for years living in quiet
despair, watching social media steal from their children's
potential and wellbeing. We are hopeful that this year this
committee can join together and deliver the solutions families
so desperately need.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berkman follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you so very much.
Now I will recognize Mr. Lekas for his 5 minutes.
You are recognized, sir.
STATEMENT OF PAUL LEKAS
Mr. Lekas. Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Schakowsky,
and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today.
My name is Paul Lekas, and I serve as executive vice
president for the Software & Information Industry Association.
SIIA represents nearly 400 organizations at the forefront of
innovation, from startups to global leaders in AI, cloud
computing, education, technology, and more.
Our mission is to support policies that foster a healthy
information ecosystem. That cannot occur without responsible
data use. We share the subcommittee's goal: making the internet
a safer place for all. We appreciate that the subcommittee has
taken a fresh look at how to achieve this. We are here to urge
passage of bipartisan legislation that protects online youth
privacy and safety.
It is exactly for this reason that we worked closely with
industry and policymakers to develop our Child and Teen Privacy
and Safety Principles in 2024. Many of the themes in the
principles are reflected in provisions of the bills under
consideration today. I would like to highlight a few of these.
First is data minimization. Companies must be required to
minimize the collection of personal data from youth and
restrict how that data is used. This is widely recognized as a
best practice by privacy experts and is even more important in
the youth context.
Second, we believe companies should not advertise to youth
based on their online behavior, nor should they create profiles
of youth for targeted advertising. Contextual advertising
should remain permitted to ensure that youth receive age-
appropriate content.
Third is empowerment and transparency. Legislation should
incentivize companies to provide easy-to-use tools that allow
families control over their settings and data. Transparency is
key to building trust and helping families make informed
decisions.
Finally, we need national consistency. The internet is not
partitioned by State lines. The current patchwork of State
regulations creates confusion for both platforms and consumers.
A Federal law must be strong and preemptive to ensure all
American children have the same high level of protection.
As Congress considers new legislation, a threshold is to
strike the right balance between the Constitution's protection
of free expression and the governmental interest in youth
safety. Thus far, many online safety laws have failed to strike
that balance.
Several States have proposed inherently content-based
regulations, requiring platforms to judge speech as harmful or
detrimental. These regulations trigger strict scrutiny, and
courts have historically struck them down for being overbroad
and infringing on the free expression of adults and minors,
including content reflective of their own religious or
political speech.
Recent case law provides a roadmap. The Supreme Court in
2025 confirmed that age verification is constitutional when
targeting sites with unprotected sexually explicit material. On
the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in 2024 warned that broadly
requiring platforms to assess the risk of harm can transform a
design regulation into an unconstitutional content regulation.
Legislating in this area is possible but requires
precision. There is much that is permissible: securing data,
restricting certain features, leveraging nontechnical tools
like digital literacy.
Vague duty-of-care models, like the Senate version of KOSA,
that require filtering content based on subjective harm will
invite and fail constitutional scrutiny. The version of KOSA
before this subcommittee reflects a serious attempt to grapple
with this challenge.
In addition to creating new tools, we support modernizing
older ones, like COPPA. We support codifying recent FTC
regulations and, crucially, strengthening the privacy
protections at the intersection of COPPA and FERPA. We must
ensure that when schools contract with vendors, student data is
used solely for educational purposes and we are not
overburdening our families.
We also urge Congress to avoid unintended consequences in
two important but very different areas.
The first is age assurance. Mandating age verification
requires collecting sensitive data, often government IDs, from
all users, not just kids. We should instead incentivize age
estimation and parental controls which protect youth without
creating high-value data repositories for cyber criminals. We
must also recognize that everyone in the ecosystem has a role
to play.
The second involves the collection and use of third-party
data. Many institutions rely on data about minors for essential
services, like extending auto insurance to teen drivers,;
helping youth to develop credit history; protecting minors from
identify theft; college scholarships; financial aid; countering
human trafficking--the list goes on. We should prevent actors
from misusing youth data without disrupting vital, societally
necessary practices.
Online safety and privacy for children and teens requires a
holistic approach. There is no silver bullet. There is room for
legislation, and we are pleased the subcommittee is considering
an array of bills to identify the right mix.
I welcome your questions and look forward to continuing to
work with you to advance legislation to keep youths safe while
preserving the internet as a resource for learning and
connection.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lekas follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Lekas.
Now I recognize Ms. Ruane for your 5 minutes. You are
recognized.
STATEMENT OF KATE RUANE
Ms. Ruane. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Chair Bilirakis, Ranking Member Schakowsky,
Chair Guthrie, and Ranking Member Pallone, for the opportunity
to testify today.
I am Kate Ruane, director of the Free Expression Project at
the Center for Democracy & Technology.
Children will use online services for their entire lives.
The subcommittee is right to focus on their future.
I would like to raise five points essential to protecting
children online.
First, Congress should address root causes of online harms,
including privacy. Comprehensive consumer data privacy
legislation is the best way to protect everyone online.
Currently, many online services' business models are based
on advertising sales powered by platforms' collection, use, and
sale of personal information. This is harmful because it is
privacy invasive, increasing the risks of data breaches. It is
also deficient because it ignores better signals of what users
value about online services by conflating engagement with user
preference.
Congress could realign this business model to benefit
everyone through comprehensive privacy legislation.
Enhancing children's privacy protections is also a laudable
goal. Measures like COPPA 2.0 and Don't Sell Kids' Data Act,
crafted properly, would address some of the root causes of harm
to kids online.
But the bills under consideration today put the FTC in
charge of enforcement. At the same time, the current
administration is undermining its independence and ability to
enforce the law fairly.
As the committee considers how to protect kids, it must
also ensure that the FTC executes its policies to protect all
children and support the rule of law.
Second, protecting children includes protecting their right
to express themselves online. Minors use social media for
everything, including to access news, communicate with family
and friends, do their schoolwork, and create art.
Children have First Amendment rights, and as Justice Scalia
wrote, ``Only in relatively narrow and well-defined
circumstances may the government bar public dissemination of
protected materials to them.''
We are encouraged that today's Kids Online Safety Act
narrows the overly broad duty of care in an attempt to grapple
with the tension between ensuring safety and protecting free
expression. This is a difficult balance to strike, but it is
preferable to flatly banning minors from accessing critical
speech services like social media. We hope to work with the
committee as the bill moves forward.
Third, age assurance creates significant privacy risks that
should be mitigated in legislation. Age verification and
assurance raise significant concerns for all users' rights. To
name just two, age-assurance techniques mean either more
collection or more processing of sensitive data, leading to
increased risks of data breaches which could include people's
IDs or biometric information. Age assurance also chills online
engagement with sensitive topics that people want to keep
private.
These concerns are not theoretical. Researchers at Georgia
Tech have a forthcoming study demonstrating that the privacy
and security concerns related to the use of age-assurance
techniques are playing out in realtime, with increased risks
for end users.
If Congress nevertheless feels obligated to impose age-
assurance requirements, it should mitigate the risks by
requiring the highest levels of privacy guardrails, including
data minimization, deletion, reliance on high-quality data
transparency and accountability.
Fourth, creating good policy requires taking into account
the perspectives of minors and their caregivers. CDT has
conducted research asking a sample of teens and their parents
about features of current child safety proposals.
To give just two salient examples of their views: First,
parents and teens expressed safety and privacy concerns with
subjecting minors to age-assurance methods, preferring parent-
centered approaches that enable parents to declare their
children's age.
Second, we found that teens preferred algorithmic
recommendations. Teens trust these feeds precisely because they
feel that they are in control of that content.
Knowing what parents and minors want and how they currently
navigate their online lives will improve policymaking at both
companies and in legislatures.
Finally, Congress must not unduly restrict States' ability
to act. Many of the bills at issue today would preempt State
laws and regulations that simply relate to the provisions in
the bills. We are concerned that the ``relates to'' standard
will broadly preempt many existing State laws and emerging
legislation that provide significant protections to children
online, even if State law would provide better protections for
kids.
To make matters worse, public reporting indicates that
Congress may be negotiating a deal to pair a kids' safety
package with the controversial provision preempting State laws
on artificial intelligence. It would be ill-advised to broadly
preempt States' ability to enact laws related to AI's impact
without putting in place strong Federal protections at least
equal in scope to any such preemption.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.1A\1\
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\1\ Ms. Ruane's prepared statement has been retained in committee
files and is available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/
20251202/118714/HHRG-119-IF17-Wstate-RuaneK-20251202.pdf.
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Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much. We appreciate that.
Now I will recognize Mr. Thayer for your 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOEL THAYER
Mr. Thayer. Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Schakowsky,
and members of this esteemed committee, thank you for holding
this incredibly important hearing to advance legislative
solutions that ensures the health and safety of kids online.
I am Joel Thayer. I am a practicing attorney, and I sit as
president of the Digital Progress Institute, a think tank
dedicated to finding bipartisan solutions in the tech and
telecom policy spaces.
Finding political consensus on incremental solutions to
today's acute concerns in tech policy is at the core of our
advocacy. Indeed, some of the bills before you today are based
off of frameworks we helped develop.
This hearing, coupled with its bevy of bills, makes a few
things abundantly clear.
First, we care about our children and their wellbeing, on
and off their devices.
Second, we are no longer satisfied with the status quo.
In so many ways, today's youth are robbed of their
innocence far more easily than ever before. This is thanks to
the ubiquity of mobile devices and the services they host.
Large tech platforms are inundating kids with lewd and
lascivious exhibitions and even connecting them to child
predators. This is well-documented. Senator Marsha Blackburn
even went as far as describing Instagram as the ``premier sex-
trafficking site in this country.''
Despite what the tech companies trumpet in their press
releases, parents are left with almost no resources to combat
their encroachments.
Worse, tech companies are, in fact, perpetuating the
problem. Herein lies the rub. Big Tech's form of child
exploitation pays very well. Our children are not only Big
Tech's users but are also their product. Meta specifically
targets young users and even places a monetary value of $270 on
each child's head.
But the issue is worse still. Children are not only feeding
Big Tech algorithms to sell to advertisers but are also used to
inform their respective AI programs--AI programs like chatbots
that have already resulted in some child deaths by encouraging
kids to commit suicide.
At DPI, we are all for winning the AI war, but we do not
believe children should serve as its casualties. It is why
measures you are considering today are so essential to both
ensuring that we remain dominant in the AI race and we protect
our most vulnerable: our children.
However, we cannot ignore the long road ahead to get these
passed. Big Tech's lobby is not only fierce but also
unrelenting. They mire the validities of these solutions by
instilling fears of consumers forfeiting privacy and the
stifling of speech. But this is all a farce.
As to privacy, I say consider the source. Courts,
regulators, and consumers have found every one of these
companies to have violated their users' personal privacy.
Take Apple, for instance, that proclaims your privacy is a
``fundamental human right.'' Discovery from a class action
lawsuit, however, reveals that since October 2011 Apple had
routinely recorded users' private conversations without their
consent and disclosed those conversations to third parties,
such as advertisers. Some of these disclosures included private
conversations with their doctors. So much for privacy being a
human right.
One of Google's privacy violations was so egregious that
the Federal Trade Commission created a first-of-its-kind
settlement requiring Google to implement a comprehensive
privacy program that it unbelievably didn't already have.
Social media companies do not fare much better. Again, an
FTC report found that social media companies like Snap, Meta,
and TikTok have all engaged in vast surveillance of users, with
lax privacy controls and inadequate safeguards for kids and
teens. Point being, these companies are hardly an authority on
proper privacy hygienics.
As to free speech, I stand on the shoulders of Third
Circuit Judge Paul Matey, who poignantly stated that Big Tech
``smuggles constitutional conceptions of a `free trade in
ideas' into a digital cauldron of illicit loves that leap and
boil with no oversight, no accountability, and no remedy.''
And it is true. Big Tech has leveraged the admittedly messy
First Amendment jurisprudence to turn our bulwark for free
expression into a sword to cut down laws they frankly don't
like.
But here is the good news. The Supreme Court has created a
clear pathway for these measures. To start, in TikTok v.
Garland, the Supreme Court categorically rejected TikTok's
argument that the mere regulation of an algorithm raises First
Amendment scrutiny. Even better, the Court clarified that a law
regulating a tech platform doesn't invite First Amendment
review if the law's primary justification is not content-based,
even if its ancillary justifications are.
In sum, the bills before us today, particularly the App
Store Accountability Act, the SCREEN Act, and the Kids Online
Safety Act, have taken these considerations into account and
are poised to resolve many of the challenges parents are facing
in today's digital age with respect to child safety.
With that, I appreciate the committee's time for inviting
me to testify, and I look forward to all of your questions and
working with you further.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thayer follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you so much.
Now I will begin the questioning and recognize myself for 5
minutes.
Mr. Berkman, for too long the narrative has been that
online safety is solely parents' responsibility. But, as you
know, 80 percent of parents say that harms now outweigh the
benefits and they feel completely outmatched by these highly
complex platforms designed to keep their kids hooked.
My bill, the Kids Online Safety Act--again, it is a
discussion draft--fundamentally flips this dynamic. We require
platforms to enable the strongest safeguards by default, rather
than forcing parents to dig through multilayered menus to find
these critical tools.
Can you explain why shifting the burden of safety from the
parent to the platform can change the trajectory of this dire
safety crisis?
Mr. Berkman. Thank you for the question, Chairman, and I
think it is a very apt one. You are correct that parents across
the country are frustrated, they are saddened, and they feel
defeated.
We work with hundreds of thousands of families, partnering
with K-through-12 schools, teaching essential social media
safety skills. And so we can hear from families on the ground
nationwide.
Children are using multiple platforms many hours a day with
many different features, and they are not set to be safe, by
design. And so we do believe that the provisions you have put
forward in your legislation would materially move safety
forward and ensure that parents are not battling for their
children's safety alone.
And I would note Sammy's Law, as well, would give parents
one unified tool to help maximize safety. And so that is why we
support that bill.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Thayer, in your testimony you state that KOSA, along
with many of the other bills considered today, will resolve
many of the challenges parents are facing in today's digital
age with respect to child safety.
KOSA includes numerous other protections such as parental
controls, default settings, policies to address design
features, and mandatory audits.
Can you explain how KOSA will empower parents to protect
their kids online and will hold Big Tech accountable?
Mr. Thayer. Well, you took the word right out of my mouth.
The keyword there is ``accountability.'' And right now there is
absolutely none.
At this point, we have to rely basically on their musings
via press releases and other terms of service that we hope they
will adhere to. And we have actual data to support that. At
this time, TikTok, Meta, and the like all have so-called
parental protections, and they all have failed miserably.
The problem is that there are, frankly, no laws that
actually articulate what their goals are and what they are
responsible for. Things like KOSA, which I prefer over more
general statutes, articulate clearly what these companies are
responsible for doing and when they run afoul of those
responsibilities and when we can enforce.
At this point, they have no Sword of Damocles over their
head, and even if they did, we wouldn't be able to cut it down
to get the results that we need to protect kids and protect
parents.
So KOSA would go a long way in ensuring that the status quo
is not going to be the status quo forever.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lekas, in your testimony you call for online tools that
empower children, teens, and families. In your view, are KOSA's
requirements for platforms to implement new safeguards and
parental controls workable?
Mr. Lekas. Thank you for that question.
In our sense--and we are still reviewing this with our
members, but--the tools that would be required under KOSA are
definitely workable. There's a number of companies that have
implemented some of these tools already, but we need them to be
implemented across the board. We need to protect all children
on all platforms.
The other thing I would say about KOSA is the requirements
to establish procedures and processes and so forth seem really
well designed to address the constitutional concerns that have
come up with respect to earlier drafts of this legislation.
Mr. Bilirakis. Very good. Thank you very much.
I will yield back.
And I will recognize now the ranking member of the
subcommittee, Ms. Schakowsky, for her 5 minutes of questioning.
Ms. Schakowsky. OK.
Ms. Ruane, I wanted to ask you, what is the biggest gap
that you see right now, that if we were to begin right now to
fix it, what do you think is the biggest gap that we are
encountering?
Ms. Ruane. Thank you, Representative Schakowsky, for the
question.
I see a number of gaps that would be left by the
legislation. Even with the 19 bills, I see a number of gaps
that would be left.
The biggest one that I see is the preemption standard that
is within all of the bills that are currently before the
committee. We are concerned that the ``relates to'' preemption
standard will preempt State laws that specifically protect kids
and also State laws that have general protections that also
apply to children, so State UDAP laws, State tort laws, and
also State comprehensive privacy laws that have specific
protections for children, including enhanced protections for
children's data as sensitive data.
Texas, for example, protects all children's data as
sensitive data at a higher standard than the current COPPA
does. The current preemption standard under the bills that we
are considering today would likely preempt that law as applied
to kids.
If we finish this process with the ``relates to'' standard
in place, you will likely wind up with children having less
protections at the State level than they do today, and we will
have failed to do our jobs.
So I think that is one of the biggest gaps that I see.
I also see that there is not enough--in any of the bills
that require age verification, we do not see sufficient
guardrails to protect and require privacy and security
practices within the age-assurance requirements and to ensure
that any age-assurance techniques that are used are fairly and
equitably accessible to everyone that has to go through the
age-assurance process.
Ms. Schakowsky. You know, when I listen to you, I think
there are so many things that need to be changed as soon as
possible, and the idea that the States cannot do anything in
the legislation is quite shocking to me. And so I just really
think that we have to go back to the drawing board and make
sure that we know.
The other thing I wanted to ask you is about LGBTQ kids and
making sure that they have some authority to be there, to be
heard. And I wonder if you could comment on that.
Ms. Ruane. Absolutely. Thank you for the question, Ranking
Member.
We are significantly concerned that any censorship
incentives within some of the bills that are before us today
and within the Senate's version of KOSA could lead to the
censorship of LGBTQ speech--access to that content by LGBTQ
kids and speech by LGBTQ kids, because oftentimes that speech
can be miscategorized as sexual speech or as speech that falls
into categories that platforms look to take down because they
are concerned about enforcement and about harms to children
related to accessing sexualized content.
Our second concern with respect to that is that the bills
at issue today delegate authority, enforcement authority, to
this current FTC, which has demonstrated its willingness to
target groups that it disfavors, including transgender
families--including transgender people, their families, and
their caregivers.
If we do not have an independent FTC that is enforcing the
law fairly as it applies to all children and protects all
children, we have significant concerns about how these bills
would operate in practice, even if the way that they are
currently constituted is neutral and would protect everyone.
Ms. Schakowsky. So appreciated.
And, with that, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. The gentlelady yields back.
I now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr.
Guthrie, for his 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you. I appreciate that.
And thank you all for being here.
So, Mr. Berkman, there is no single solution for protecting
kids online, and that is why we are advancing a comprehensive
strategy of nearly two dozen bills that build in layers of
protection, from age verification in COPPA 2.0 privacy
protections to parental tools and default by design.
Can you speak to the urgency of this moment and the need
for Congress to protect kids and children and teens online?
Mr. Berkman. Yes. I appreciate the question.
We are seeing, still, an alarming disconnect in terms of
awareness of how severe and pervasive the harms of social media
are. We are seeing millions of children across the country
harmed. We are on the ground, working with families, and the
actual data is absolutely stunning and the stories are
heartbreaking.
And so I appreciate the approach taken by the committee. We
need to find consensus and pass meaningful social media safety
legislation this year to protect our children.
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you.
And to add to that, Mr. Lekas and Mr. Thayer, can you
explain why we need a layered, comprehensive strategy rather
than just one single bill?
Mr. Thayer. I thank you for the question. And I think the
question sort of beckons the answer, is that individual layers
require different policy solutions. The same thing that would
apply to a social media company may not be apropos to maybe
something on the app store layer, even the operating system
layer or device layer. Each one of these folks have a role to
play--or, each actor has a role to play, and every policy
solution should be attuned to what those particular roles are.
So a comprehensive approach, whether it is privacy,
competition, or even child safety, has to be administratively
thought through. So, again, in full agreement with what I have
heard today. And it seems to be the case that each individual
layer requires a special sensitivity to what those particular
areas do and needs a policy solution that meets them where they
are.
Mr. Guthrie. Good. Thank you.
Mr. Lekas?
Mr. Lekas. Thank you for that question.
I think the overall goal that seems to be the consensus of
everyone in this room is, we need to protect youth online. We
need to improve the privacy protections and the safety
protections for youth.
And I think stepping back and looking at all the different
components here and trying to identify what is the best way to
do each of these components is a really smart way to proceed.
Congress has been debating legislation in this space for years,
and it is urgent to move forward now. So we appreciate the
approach taken by the committee.
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you.
And, also, Mr. Thayer, in my opening statement I emphasized
that a law that gets struck down by courts won't protect a
single child.
From a legal and constitutional perspective, why is it so
critical that Congress can step in to establish a single,
uniform national standard? And how does this package of bills
learn from the defects of laws that have failed judicial
review?
Mr. Thayer. Well, as someone that really does appreciate
the structure of our Constitution and especially the Federal
structure that they have created and, again, leveraging the
insights from different Justices, much smarter legal minds than
my own--Justice Brandeis, for instance, said that the States
are the laboratories of our democracy. But, at the same time,
those laboratories yield results.
And I think what we have seen in the past 10 years, absent
Federal insight as to what Congress actually wants or what the
national standard is, has allowed for a lot of these
experiments to go all the way through the courts. The courts
have evaluated each one of these standards and have given, as I
said in my opening testimony, a pathway for Congress to
actually set those standards.
Because part of that experiment is not just only seeing
where Congress can step in, it is seeing the limitations that
States have in fully protecting children. A child in Texas
should be equally protected as a child in California or in Iowa
and everywhere else. And that is where I think the Federal
standard is probably preferable in many cases. But, again, that
comes from a lot of the insights that we are getting from
States.
Mr. Guthrie. OK. Thank you.
And that concludes my questions. I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize the ranking member of the full committee,
Mr. Pallone, for his 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Chairman Bilirakis.
Data brokers collect and sell billions of data points on
nearly every consumer in the United States, including children.
And while I believe that comprehensive privacy is the preferred
path to addressing the risk of data brokers, I also believe it
is imperative to do what we can now to prevent data brokers
from exploiting the personal data of our kids.
So I have a series of questions for Ms. Ruane. If you could
just answer them quickly, because otherwise I won't get through
them.
First is, why is it so important that kids and teens are
able to enter adulthood without an extensive profile already
built of their online activities and inferences about who they
are?
Ms. Ruane. Thank you, Ranking Member.
Well, kids are growing up online, right? They are sharing
all of their information all of the time. They are engaging
constantly. And their data is also being collected constantly,
in ways that they might not understand or even be aware of or
be developmentally capable of making decisions about. They
don't know they are making a trail that is going to follow them
forever.
But what is most important is that children are not
commodities, and their lives and privacy have to be respected.
Ensuring that their information cannot be bought and sold by
shady data brokers will meaningfully protect their privacy in
general and their ability to enter adulthood without a profile
that will follow them for the rest of time.
Mr. Pallone. Well, thank you.
Now, many of the bills being considered for this hearing
today contain broad preemption clauses, and in many cases
preempting any State laws that relate to the legislation.
So the next question is, What are some unintended
consequences of such broad preemption? Could common law and
product liability claims currently being used to hold tech
companies accountable be impacted by that?
Ms. Ruane. Yes, absolutely. We are concerned that currently
extant State protections that protect everyone will no longer
be able to protect children across all 50 States.
One other thing to note is, a lot of the bills today focus
on legacy platforms and services that have existed for a while,
and they do not focus on emerging technologies like generative
AI. If we institute a broad ``relates to'' preemption standard
across all of these bills, we run the risk of preempting
States' ability to act on emerging technologies quickly.
Mr. Pallone. OK.
Many of the bills being discussed today also have
provisions that expand access to the data of teens, both to
third parties and to parents, in the name of increased safety.
And while I encourage parents and teens to have conversation
about teens' online activity, that also needs to be balanced
against teens' rights to privacy.
So, as we consider the bills before us, how do we best
balance privacy and safety? Are there any specific provisions
in these bills that pose a threat to kids' privacy?
Ms. Ruane. Absolutely. Parents and kids, families, need
tools to help them navigate their online lives, and CDT fully
supports giving parents those tools and children those tools,
but we are concerned about any provisions that give parents
access to and control over the content of kids' communications.
One thing that the current version of KOSA does well is it
ensures that platforms do not have to disclose the contents of
kids' communication. But today's new version of COPPA 2.0, for
example, contains language that might allow parents to delete
their kids' data and to delete content that they may have
created.
When we talk to parents and kids about whether they wanted
to have those sorts of tools, parents told us that that seemed
overly burdensome for parents, and kids told us that seemed
overly invasive to them.
Moreover, as you noted in your opening statement, not all
kids are growing up in families that are perfectly supportive,
and some kids are growing up in situations where they don't
have families at all.
Mr. Pallone. Well, that is sort of my last question----
Ms. Ruane. Yes.
Mr. Pallone [continuing]. Because I know we're going to run
out of time. But the unfortunate reality is that there are
parents who abuse and neglect their children. For these kids,
access to safe spaces online can be critical.
So the last question is, how do we foster healthy
connections online while ensuring that kids and teens are
protected? Are there potential risks to children and teens in
dangerous or hostile family environments caused by the measures
in these bills?
Ms. Ruane. Well, when we talked to teenagers about how they
use, for example, direct messaging services, they told us that
what they really want are more controls over who gets to
message them--so the ability to reduce their own visibility
online. Congress could also incentivize more friction or speed
bumps in interaction with, kind of, unknown profiles or unknown
adults.
We also took note that one of the bills today would
restrict access to ephemeral messaging. Now, while it is
understandable that in some circumstances ephemeral messaging
could be linked to harm, we also want to note that it could
also be used to protect kids' privacy.
So, for example, children might communicate with each
other, teens might communicate with each other through racy
text messages. Ephemeral messaging could reduce the likelihood
that those messages be used for abusive purposes like
nonconsensual intimate image distribution at a later date.
Ephemeral messages could also be helpful for children who
have relationships with domestic violence victims or who are
domestic violence victims themselves to ensure safety and to
ensure their ability to communicate privately without risk to
their physical selves.
Mr. Pallone. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
And the gentleman yields back.
We will recognize the vice chairman of the subcommittee,
Mr. Fulcher, for his 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Fulcher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A question for Mr. Berkman. This has to do with
recommendations you might have for young adults who are
engaging with some self-harming behavior.
In your testimony, you cite some statistics having to do
with self-harm, cyberbullying, with eating disorders, and--and
that particular topic. And we have also learned through various
court filings that social media companies have been knowing
about this. They know this is going on.
Not long ago, we had some hearings with TikTok, and we
learned that they had sent 13-year-olds even more content on
self-harm and with eating disorders. And that came out also
that Meta had pushed body-image content when teens had
expressed some dissatisfaction with their bodies. So these
social media companies, they know about this.
And I dealt with this in a previous life as a State
legislator, with some mental health issues.
And I just want to ask you, from your perspective, what
recommendations or guidelines can you offer for this body here
to address this growing problem?
Mr. Berkman. Thank you, Congressman, for the question, and
I appreciate it.
It is true and something we really need to recognize across
this country that these companies have a durable inherent
conflict of interest between our children's safety and their
profits. And so, last decade, we have seen child harmed after
child harmed. And so one of the bills that we really support
here is a bill called Sammy's Law, and that would give parents,
families access to what we call third-party safety software--
software not connected to the social media platforms
themselves--that can provide families with critical lifesaving
alerts, like eating disorder-related content, content involving
suicidal ideation, so that families can provide lifesaving
support at the exact right critical moment, which right now
they are not getting, and because of that we are seeing
fatalities.
Mr. Fulcher. So engagement with the parents, and that
third-party software is a help.
Mr. Berkman. Third-party software, and I would note, is
significantly--it adds to privacy in a significant way over the
status quo. This is technology that we now have that can limit
alerts to parents on a list of harms that every Member of this
body agrees on and that children vitally need support to
protect themselves from.
Mr. Fulcher. Thank you for that. I am going to come back to
you here in just a second, but I want to get a question to Mr.
Thayer here.
We really need real consequences for bad actors and the
enforcement that goes with it. In all the bills we consider
here today, they place regulatory obligations on tech platforms
and include both FTC's first fine authority and authorizes
State attorneys general to engage with this.
First of all, do you see that as adequate, and can you
discuss the benefits of these enforcement tools and how they
will actually be used to hold some of these tech firms
accountable?
Mr. Thayer. Yes, our DPS position is the more cops on the
beat, the better. State attorney generals have a very special
role when it comes to consumer protection, as does the FTC. I
think one value of these bills is that they are specific
authority statutes as opposed to general authority statutes,
which means you can target the specific harms on both the
Federal and the State level on exactly what they want.
And in terms of combining the two, you have the FTC, which
has a giant remit already--they have a national remit--whereas
State attorney generals can react almost in real time or, if
not, very close to, to the local issues that have--that they
can observe.
So I work very closely with State attorney generals'
offices in California, Texas, and Louisiana, and I can tell you
that they look at these statutes and they--they look at these
statutes in a very comprehensive way, and they also look at it
from the perspective of protecting their populations in
particular.
So, again, in my view, you need both. You can't just have--
put all the reliance on the FTC. You are going to need some
State attorney generals looking at this as well.
Mr. Fulcher. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Berkman, I have got 20 seconds left. Any input on that?
Mr. Berkman. Yes, we agree you need a robust enforcement
regime. State attorneys general kind of added to that regime.
We have leadership across the country from Mississippi,
Illinois, Arkansas, and California attorneys general
prosecuting in an effective way violations of law by the social
media industry that is impacting children. They are doing it
collaboratively, which means pooled resources, that means
effective enforcement, that means saved lives.
Mr. Fulcher. Great. Thank you, Mr. Berkman.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. The gentleman yields back.
Now recognize Ms. Castor from the great State of Florida.
You are recognized for 5 minutes of questioning.
Ms. Castor. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
teeing up action to address the privacy, intrusion,
surveillance, and targeting of kids online and the growing
harms due to the malign design of online apps that lead to
physical and mental harm to young people.
I want to thank the witnesses, but the panel is missing a
parent. There are many here today who could have testified. You
are missing a young person. There are other young people here
who could have testified. You are missing a psychologist or a
pediatrician. And one of the many whistleblowers, former tech
company employees, to testify on the insidious schemes to
addict and exploit children even as tech company executives
knew of the harm to kids.
It was 2021 when Francis Haugen, the Facebook
whistleblower, testified before Congress that Facebook Meta
built a business model that prioritizes its profit over the
safety of its users. She said Facebook repeatedly encountered
conflicts between its own profits and safety and that Facebook
consistently resolved those conflicts in favor of its own
profits. She went on to testify that Facebook became a
trillion-dollar company by paying for its profits with our
safety, including the safety of our children. Doesn't this
remind you of the tobacco company propaganda of years ago?
This committee knows too well that the big tech companies
take advantage of young people online. That is why it is so
disappointing that Republicans in the House are offering weak,
ineffectual versions of COPPA and KOSA. These versions are a
gift to the big tech companies and they are a slap in the face
to the parents, the experts, and the advocates, to bipartisan
Members of Congress, who have worked long and hard on strong
child protection bills to protect them from what is happening
online.
So despite a broad agreement among House Members and Senate
Members, we really need to address these watered-down bills,
and I am hoping that the rank-and-file membership and the
members of this committee will chart that course. For example,
we should not put a ceiling on kids' protections at the State
level or stifle the good work of the States or weaken knowledge
standards that are critical to holding tech companies
accountable.
Ms. Ruane, you have already addressed preemption. You said
a lot of the preemption language in the bills would provide
less protection to kids. You have touched on weaker
enforcement. That is contained here. You talked about data
minimization.
How does--there is now a difference in the knowledge
standards too. The Senate versions are kind of viewed as the
strong bipartisan versions. How does the Senate knowledge
standard further protect young people compared to what is in
the House version?
Ms. Ruane. Thank you, Representative Castor. Yes, there is
a difference in the knowledge standard in the bills at issue
today. Particularly in COPPA 2.0, we see a tiered knowledge
standard that preserves actual knowledge for the vast majority
of actors, and that is, you know, basically preserving or
maintaining the status quo. The Senate version of COPPA 2.0 has
an updated knowledge standard, which would apply to all actors.
Honestly, this is a difficult balance to strike, but the hope
is to land on a standard that does not permit a company to look
the other way when they know there are kids on their service,
while avoiding incentivizing broad age assurance across the
entire internet.
While we think there needs to be changes to House COPPA, we
fully support enhancing protections for children's privacy, and
we hope that we can all work together to update COPPA 2.0 in a
way that would do so.
Ms. Castor. Thank you for that. Do you want to say anything
else about enforcement as well? You already talked a little bit
about the FTC, but when we are talking about kids, isn't it
appropriate to have a number of tools in the toolbox to make
sure they are safe and tech is held accountable?
Ms. Ruane. Absolutely. It is not just appropriate, it is
also how Congress has approached protecting children
historically. Congress has generally not chosen to preempt
States' ability to act and has always ensured that there are
more tools in the toolbox. It was good to hear and it is good
to see that the FTC would have things like first fine authority
and that State attorneys general would have the ability to act,
but we also need to see things like private rights of action as
a force multiplier for families and kids to be able to enforce
their rights under any statute that Congress passes.
Ms. Castor. Thank you for that.
I also want to make sure that I get into the record a
number of provisions. Mr. Chairman, at the end of the hearing,
we will have a number of documents to submit for the record, a
lot of letters from groups: the Federal Trade Commission
September 2024 report that I recommend to the committee, the--
some of the whistleblower testimony from the United States
Senate that is very illuminating, some of the other reports
from various medical societies. I think all of this would
really inform our decision making as we move forward.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Ms. Castor. And I will ask unanimous consent at the
appropriate time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Absolutely.
All right. Now we will recognize Dr. Dunn. He is the vice
chair of the full committee. We will recognize you for 5
minutes, sir, for your questions.
Mr. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have been fortunate to wear a lot of hats in my life. I
was a soldier. I served my community as a sergeant for 35
years. But the title that keeps me up at night, that drives me,
is granddad. My sixth grandchild was born yesterday, as you
know, Gus. I made it look easy.
But we are living through a crisis right now. We have
handed our children devices that are more powerful than the
most powerful computers, sent men to the moon, but we failed to
install the digital equivalent of seatbelts and smoke detectors
on these things.
As a doctor, I see--when I see a patient bleeding, I just
apply a tourniquet. I don't call a committee meeting. Right now
our children are bleeding. Our children and our grandchildren
are being targeted, groomed, and exploited on social media
platforms that are designed--intentionally designed--to hide
the evidence of their exploitation.
That is why I introduced H.R. 6257, the Safe Messaging Act
for Kids, call it SMK Act of 2025. This bill is a direct
intervention to stop two specific mechanisms that predators use
to hunt our children: ephemeral messaging and unsolicited
contact. The problem is disappearing evidence.
Let's talk about ephemeral messaging. This is a fancy term
for a dangerous feature that messages automatically delete
themselves after they are viewed. Imagine if a drug dealer
could sell fentanyl to a teenager in a school hallway, and then
the moment the transaction is done, any security camera footage
automatically erased itself. That is what is happening online.
Predators love ephemeral messaging. It is their best
friend. It destroys any evidence of grooming, cyberbullying,
illicit transactions before a parent ever sees it and before
law enforcement can build a case. My bill would put an end to
this.
Under section 3 of the SMK Act, social media platforms
would be strictly prohibited from offering ephemeral messaging
to any user they know or willfully disregard is a minor under
17. If you are a tech company and you know your user is a 14-
year-old child, you should not be handing them a tool to
destroy evidence. It is that simple. The solution is, of
course, parental authority.
The second part of this bill is unsolicited contact. Right
now in the digital world, strangers can walk up to our children
and whisper in their ear. We would never allow that on a
playground. Why do we allow it in direct messages? The SMK Act
mandates parental direct messaging controls. We are putting
parents back in the driver's seat.
For children under 13, the bill requires the direct
messaging features be disabled by default. A 10-year-old should
not be fielding messages from strangers. If that feature is to
be turned on, a parent must proactively give verifiable
consent. For teenagers under 17, parents have to have the tools
to see who is knocking on the door.
The bill requires platforms to notify parents of requests
for unapproved contacts and gives the parents the power to
approve or deny those requests before any messaging occurs.
This isn't about hovering. This isn't helicopter parenting. It
is just about parenting. It is about giving moms and dads the
dashboard they need to keep kids safe.
Mr. Chairman, in medicine, you know, we take an oath: Do no
harm. For too long we have allowed social media platforms to
violate that oath, and they have built features that harm our
children, drive engagement by our children. The Safe Messaging
Act for Kids is a commonsense, you know, treatment plan for
this, and it preserves the evidence of crimes, it restores
parental authority that protects our kids, and I urge my
colleagues to support this legislation.
I will submit questions for the panel. Sorry I have used up
my time, but I wanted to make a case for this.
Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fulcher [presiding]. Thank you.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Soto, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Soto. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today we are here to empower parents to protect kids
online, and Congress needs to do its job and make rules of the
road. It has been 5 years since the Children's Online Safety
Act has been filed--5 years too long to address this critical
issue.
When we look at the internet and social media, we see
education, entertainment, communication with friends--all great
things for kids. But we also see a quagmire of issues that they
could fall into, which is why we need guardrails to protect
children's privacy, stop access to adult content, unbridled
chatbots, even predators online.
So today we have 19 bills, including our bipartisan
Promoting a Safe Internet for Minors Act with Representative
Laurel Lee, my fellow Floridian. H.R. 6289 directs the Federal
Trade Commission to conduct nationwide education campaigns to
promote safe internet use by minors, encouraging best practices
for educators, parents, platforms, and minors, and sharing the
latest trends about negatively impacting--that are negatively
impacting minors online, and making publicly available online
safety education.
The only issue is we have an FTC where President Trump
fired both the Democrats, and now there are only three out of
the full five strength that they need, and the courts have been
taking their sweet time to address this issue. And so it is
critical that we as a committee make sure we get the FTC up to
strength and hold the President accountable for this unlawful
action.
We also need to limit kids' access to chatbots. We saw a
tragic story from Central Florida--of Sewell Setzer III's
story, a ninth-grader from Orlando Christian Prep. He died by
suicide last year at age 14 after being prompted by a chatbot
that he was listening to. Sewell's mother, Megan Garcia,
testified in the Senate Judiciary Committee in September of
this year. In her testimony she described how Sewell was
manipulated by the chatbot and sent sexually explicit material.
She has filed a wrongful death suit--lawsuit.
This is why bills like the SAFE Bots Act that we see which
would develop AI policies to prevent harm, AI disclosure
prohibiting them from posing as licensed professionals, and
then enforcement's key, the FTC, which we need to fully restore
to its full strength, and State attorneys general.
And then back in Florida we see new laws that restrict use
under 14 years of age, parental consent 14 and 15 years of age,
and it was just recently upheld on appeal. And lastly, we are
working with local sheriffs like the Osceola County Sheriff's
Office to get the millions in funding to protect kids online
with the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force,
absolutely critical for our local kids.
Ms. Ruane, we saw President Trump illegally fire two of the
Democratic members of the FTC. Even with all these bills that
we have filed, even if they pass, how does the decimation of
the FTC affect enforcement of laws meant to protect kids
online?
Ms. Ruane. Thank you, Representative Soto. So the FTC has
historically had--as an independent agency, has historically
had a reputation of protecting consumers regardless of the
party in office. The current administration is undermining that
reputation and threatening the FTC's ability to enforce the law
fairly.
If--I say this in my testimony, but I will say it here
again: Laws are only as good as their enforcement mechanisms.
They are only as good and fair as their enforcers. Laws without
good enforcement are, at best, just words on the page, but at
worst they are weapons to be used by the powerful against the
powerless. And the worry with the FTC becoming a politicized
institution is that, rather than enforcing the laws to protect
everyone and uphold the rule of law, it will instead become a
partisan tool that could be used and weaponized against those
that the administration, whoever occupies the office, dislikes
or, on the other hand, favors.
If, for example, you know, the President has a particular
relationship with a particular company or a particular CEO, we
are concerned that the politicization of an FTC could lead to
favorable treatment and lack of enforcement of laws against
those companies and, on the other side, targeting or
retribution against those who would----
Mr. Soto. Thank you, Ms. Ruane.
Mr. Thayer, we talked a little bit about bots being out of
control. What rules really do we need to help make sure we
protect our kids?
Mr. Thayer. Thank you, Congressman. Look, we are going to
need a lot. I mean, the rate at which this adoption is
happening is unlike anything that we have ever seen, even with
respect to social media and particularly when it comes to kids.
Kids are now using chatbots for everything under the sun,
whether it is----
Mr. Fulcher. Mr. Thayer, time has expired. If you could
wrap really quick, please.
Mr. Thayer. Sure. In general, solutions that you guys have
proposed today can go a long way. Also, what Senator Hawley has
introduced is another interesting avenue, along with Senator
Blumenthal. So I look forward to working with you and your
office on this.
Mr. Fulcher. Thank you for that. Time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Mrs.
Cammack, please.
Mrs. Cammack. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
our witnesses and for everyone in the audience here today.
As a new mom, today's hearing certainly is hitting pretty
close to home. Today we are reviewing 19 bills, but we are
missing a critical one: the App Store Freedom Act. This bill
would empower parents and consumers, foster innovation, and
most importantly protect kids online and their data. This bill
has broad bipartisan support on this committee and is a
critical step in keeping kids safe online.
I want folks to imagine for a moment what it would look
like if parents--parents--were allowed to build an online
marketplace, an app marketplace, where they could vet the apps
and knew for sure that their kids were safe. Today that is not
possible. And only our bill, the App Store Freedom Act, can do
that.
I would also like to point out for the record that last
year alone, in 2024, the Apple App Store facilitated nearly
$406 billion in sales. So taking that into consideration, the
30 percent tax, no matter how you slice it that Apple requires
of these apps and their subscriptions, is a multibillion-dollar
industry. So it would stand to reason that Apple has a couple
billion reasons why they don't want to protect kids online and
they don't want parents creating their own marketplace.
So I am going to jump to our questions. Panel, we are going
to go rapid fire to start.
In 2024, in my home State of Florida, 13- and 14-year-old
boys were using nudify apps to take pictures of their 12-year-
old classmates and digitally unclothe them. The perpetrators--
because that is what they are--then shared those images with
their classmates and others. Another investigation into Apple
showed that it allowed a nudify app in its App Store and then
rated it, Apple rated that app as appropriate for 4-year-olds.
Four-year-olds.
So for the panel, rapid fire. We will start with you, Mr.
Berkman: Do you think that app stores should be allowed to have
children accessing nudify apps, yes or no?
Mr. Berkman. No.
Mrs. Cammack. Mr. Lekas?
Mr. Lekas. No.
Ms. Ruane. No.
Mr. Thayer. Hell no.
Mrs. Cammack. Excellent. I like this rapid fire.
For the panel, yes or no: Today Apple and Google profit by
taking a 30 percent commission for sales of app subscriptions,
apps that include the ability to nudify underage classmates.
Is that acceptable, yes or no?
Mr. Berkman. No.
Mr. Lekas. I have no awareness of those facts. I can't
speak to the question.
Mrs. Cammack. Interesting.
Yes or no?
Ms. Ruane. I am not sure, but I think no, because----
Mrs. Cammack. God, I would hope no.
Mr. Thayer?
Ms. Ruane. The question is whether they should profit off
of nudify apps?
Mrs. Cammack. Should they profit--should Apple and Google
be profiting off of----
Ms. Ruane. No. No, no one should profit off of nudify apps.
Mrs. Cammack. I appreciate the clarity in your answer.
Thank you.
Mr. Thayer?
Mr. Thayer. Again, hell no.
Mrs. Cammack. No. I appreciate that.
Now, I think we are all aware that there have been
investigations into nudify apps being used by minors against
fellow minors and also adults using these apps to nudify
minors. This has been covered extensively through the BBC, FOX
News, CNN, CNBC, and others.
So, Mr. Thayer, Apple and Google have said that they are
keeping kids safe online, but based on that track record that
is well documented, do you think that Apple and Google are
doing everything that they should to keep kids safe in the app
store?
Mr. Thayer. Not even the bare minimum.
Mrs. Cammack. Perfect. Now as mentioned before, we have a
bipartisan bill with many cosponsors on this committee that
would stop Apple and Google from maintaining their app store
monopoly, because that is, in fact, what they have. Often when
we talk about monopolies, we focus on price gouging, but there
are other good reasons why you would want to stop a monopoly
from abusing their power, like speeding up innovation,
improving quality, protecting kids, for example.
So, Mr. Thayer, you recently signed a letter in support of
our bill, the App Store Freedom Act. Thank you for that.
It is not easy taking on the tech giants, is it?
Mr. Thayer. As someone who has taken them on in every
State, no.
Mrs. Cammack. You can just keep your microphone on too.
Mr. Thayer. OK.
Mrs. Cammack. Now, could you----
Mr. Thayer. Just point of clarification, I think we led
that letter, so----
Mrs. Cammack. Yes, you did. Thank you. Thank you for your
leadership in that.
Could you help the committee here understand how more
competition keeps kids safe?
Mr. Thayer. Well, it is pretty intuitive. So, I mean, more
competition means more tools. More tools means more access for
parents to use. So at the end of the day, competition is
another area where we can actually increase parental controls
and also incre--make privacy actually a thing that you have to
fight for in the market.
Right now, as you note, there is no free market in the app
store market. There is no app--there is no--and there actually
is no competition in the search market either. But I would like
to quote one thing from an antitrust case that involved Apple
at the Supreme Court.
Mrs. Cammack. OK. Go fast.
Mr. Thayer. This is Justice Kavanaugh: There is no
intermediary in the distribution chain between Apple and the
consumer. And they need to be held accountable.
Mrs. Cammack. Mr. Thayer, I appreciate that. And I just
want to end on this: Do you think that any monopoly,
particularly those like Apple and Google, are in the best
position to protect kids and their data?
Mr. Fulcher. Make that a yes or a no. Time has expired.
Mr. Thayer. Yes. But without--we need legislation to make
sure they actually do what they say they are going to do, but
the answer is kind of----
Mrs. Cammack. A bit of the fox guarding the hen house?
Mr. Thayer. Little bit.
Mrs. Cammack. OK.
Mr. Thayer. More than a little bit.
Mr. Fulcher. Thank you. Time has expired.
Mrs. Cammack. I appreciate that. I yield.
Mr. Fulcher. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
Massachusetts, Mrs. Trahan, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Trahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Well, I don't think I need to belabor the points that my
colleagues have correctly made about this hearing's policy and
procedural failures. The flagship proposals for today's
hearing, KOSA and COPPA 2.0, have been gutted and co-opted by
Big Tech. And in their process of backroom dealmaking,
committee leadership has shunned parents, advocates, and
bipartisanship. I sincerely hope we can move past this to get
meaningful, balanced kids safety legislation across the finish
line, and I am here, as I always have been, to work with my
colleagues on both sides of the aisle to achieve that.
To that end, I do want to call attention to an area that is
missing from this hearing's slate of kids safety measures: app
store competition. App stores are the distributors of the
software kids rely on to run their digital lives. Apple and
Google control access to nearly all American smartphones, and
Federal courts have already found that they hold monopoly power
over those markets. They wield that dominance to block third-
party app stores while profiting from their own inadequate
child safety practices.
As a coalition of child safety organizations recently noted
in a letter to the committee, quote, ``without meaningful
competition, these firms have continually failed to protect
children from sexual exploitation, exposure to obscenity, abuse
of their data, and more,'' end quote. In the case of Apple, one
of its engineers even said in private messages that it is,
quote, ``the greatest platform for distributing child porn''
and called child predator grooming a, quote, ``underresourced
challenge.''
Mr. Thayer, in your testimony, you call out some of the
specious arguments offered by Big Tech against practical
solutions to improve kids' safety. What is your response to
Apple and Google's suggestions that the App Store Freedom Act
and other measures will hurt kids' privacy and security, and
are these companies' financial incentives actually aligned with
the needs of our children?
Mr. Thayer. So in my testimony--I will State it again--it
is all a farce. It is always the case where they play this game
of if you want to regulate competition, it is a privacy issue;
if you want to regulate privacy, it is a competition issue. So,
frankly, it is the same story being told over and over again.
And as I said in my testimony, Big Tech's lobby is unrelenting
and unwavering on these points, and, frankly, it has to stop.
And the fact that they have been gaslighting us for the past
couple decades is a bit absurd, and I think it is now time to
act on bills like how you--bills that you propose and many of
the bills that we are seeing today.
Mrs. Trahan. Thank you. It is, I agree, exhausting.
What we need is competition in parents' and kids'
interests. As my colleague from Florida posed earlier, imagine
for a moment a kids-first app store, one built from the ground
up to protect children, replete with a curated set of apps,
tailored review practices run by experts in child safety, and
feature rich parent controls. In this app store, safety ratings
are vetted by experts, not self-reported. Bad actors are
promptly booted and not allowed to return. Such an experience
is technically feasible but made virtually impossible by Apple
and Google's policies.
Mr. Thayer, do you agree that the App Store Freedom Act, a
bipartisan bill that I am coleading with Representative Cammack
and Soto and others, would empower parents with meaningful
choice over what software is on their kids' devices?
Mr. Thayer. I think it is a huge step in the right
direction, and it would absolutely go a long way in helping
parents. More competition means more tools.
Mrs. Trahan. Thank you.
In closing, I urge this committee to internalize two
important points: Apple and Google cannot be trusted to protect
our kids, and parents deserve better. It is vital that Congress
ensures that the open market can foster competition that,
unlike Big Tech, actually takes kids' safety seriously. Thank
you. I yield back.
Mr. Fulcher. The gentlelady yields.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Obernolte, please.
Mr. Obernolte. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
I would like to thank the committee for holding this hearing.
This is a critically important topic, and, frankly,
Congress is far behind in enshrining some of these protections
into Federal law. So we have been trying for years to get this
across the finish line. I am hoping that this is the year that
some of these bills will make it through a markup and get past
the House.
As most of the people on the committee know, for many years
I ran an app developer, and so when I read these bills, I kind
of look at them through the lens of, if I was still developing,
how difficult would these be for me to comply with and how
would I go about complying with these requirements? And through
that lens, unfortunately, the bills that we are considering
today have a couple of pretty serious implementational
problems.
Let's start with age verification, which, you know, is key
to the protections we are trying to provide here, because if we
are going to say that an application can't do things if certain
things--if a user is a minor, then we have to be able to figure
out whether or not the user is a minor. That is really central
to the protections we are trying to provide.
The problem is--and a couple of the panelists brought it up
in your testimony--when you force every single app developer to
do that and the typical user might have 100 apps on their
phone, you are collecting private information used to verify
that age is 100 times and you are storing it 100 times, and
that creates these repositories of private information that are
really attractive targets for cybercriminals.
So let me just suggest that it is much more efficient and
much safer to do that just once at the operating system level.
And that means that in the case of an iPhone, Apple would do
it; in the case of an Android phone, Google would do it. They
have a lot more information than developers do about the users
of those platforms. And when you do it that way, you can
enforce other protections.
For example, if you have an application that is labeled
``for adults only,'' the operating system shouldn't even launch
it if a minor is the current user of the system.
A couple of the bills, you know, talk about this. When an
application developer is allowed to rely on the age signal that
is being generated by the operating system, and there has been
kind of an assertion that there are conditions under which
applications shouldn't be able to rely on that signal, and that
is crazy, because the developer doesn't know as much as the
operating system does.
So let me just assert that, if your application is for
adults only and the operating system is telling you that there
is an adult using it, you should be able to rely on that.
You know, another thing that I think is really important
for us to have a discussion on is this concept of duty of care.
And I think it is reasonable that we should impose a duty on
the people that are developing and deploying these
applications, but I also think that it is lazy legislating for
us not to define what we mean when we say ``duty of care.''
We had a good example in a hearing in this subcommittee--I
believe it was last year--when we were talking about whether or
not an application should have a duty to prevent online
bullying by taking down a post if it was reported as bullying.
And we all could agree, you know, that is reasonable. That is a
reasonable requirement.
But we are also obligated to say, you know, when we impose
that requirement, well, what is the requirement? What is a
reasonable amount of time? Is it 2 days? Is it a day? Is it an
hour?
You know, if we don't define what we mean when we say
``duty of care,'' then we are allowing some court in the future
to be arguing about what we meant when we crafted the
legislation. And let me just assert that, you know, it is our
responsibility to not put our courts and our judicial system in
that place and define what we mean up front.
Enforcement. There has been a couple assertions by the
panelists that a private right of action is a good thing. You
know, let me just say we have to be really cautious about that.
There are numerous examples in States across the country where
that has gone awry. I will give you an example from my home
State of California.
We passed in the State legislature a few years ago
something called the Private Attorney General Act that allowed
private parties to enforce labor laws, and now if--anyone that
has a district in California has horror stories about where
abusive law firms go after not big businesses, because they can
defend themselves, but small businesses. And I can point to
multiple businesses in my district that have been driven out of
business by frivolous lawsuits that anyone would agree is
frivolous.
And then one last--and I am not going to have time for
questions, because I talk too much--but talking about
preemption. You know, here is the deal. Like, we are trying to
craft a compromise between being permissive and being
protective. I mean, if we wanted to completely protect our
kids, we would say kids can't go online, right. But, you know,
we don't want to do that. We want to strike a balance.
Once we have struck a balance, why would we allow different
States to enact different balances? That creates a barrier to
entry that favors large businesses over small businesses, and
just think about how difficult it is to comply with potentially
50 different State standards if you are two people in a garage
somewhere trying to start a development company.
So I am really happy we are having this conversation, and I
think it is critically important we get this balance right, we
get something across the finish line this year.
I appreciate the discretion, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis [presiding], OK. The gentleman yields back.
Now I will recognize Mr. Mullin for his 5 minutes of
questioning.
Mr. Mullin. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Turning to the SAFE Bolts Act--pardon me, SAFE Bots Act. As
with some of the other bills being discussed today, I am
concerned that this bill would require sensitive age
verification data from users for it to be effective--data that,
as pointed out by my colleagues, in recent times has not been
collected or safely stored by companies.
So, Ms. Ruane, in your testimony you described the First
Amendment and privacy concerns with the age verification tools.
Can you briefly outline some of the tools or ways companies
verify the ages of their users and some of the risks with those
methods?
Ms. Ruane. Yes, absolutely. Thank you for the question.
Yes, age assurance techniques create privacy and security
risks regardless of where they are deployed, and if we are
going to require their usage, we need to require them under the
safest, highest guardrails we can possibly implement, including
ensuring data minimization and deletion of that data.
We also need to ensure that there is equitable access to
services that impose age verification to access them, because
some age verification techniques are disproportionately
ineffective when applied to people who have differing gender
identities and people of--with differing skin colors than White
people, basically.
Mr. Mullin. Thank you for that. I believe the SAFE Bots Act
discusses important issues. AI chatbots should not impersonate
licensed professionals, but I think this is true under all
circumstances, not just for minors, especially given the
difficulties around verifying the age of users.
So turning to a separate issue. In your testimony, Ms.
Ruane, you outline this important role that States have
historically played in protecting minors from harm. I believe
this is an important point to acknowledge, particularly as
lawmakers look to close gaps and loopholes that may have left
some emerging technologies outside the reach of current law.
So what are the risks of widespread preemption displacing
longstanding State-level protections or preventing lawmakers at
all levels of government from adapting current laws to novel
circumstances of chatbots?
Ms. Ruane. Absolutely. Thank you for the question.
Red States and blue States alike are currently examining
the impacts of emerging technologies on children and, frankly,
on everyone. We don't fully understand how these technologies
work, how they gather data, how they use data, and the bills at
issue today do not focus enough on chatbots to ensure that
there will be comprehensive protections going forward. States
are light years ahead of the Federal Government on that issue
right now, and we need to preserve their ability to act--not
just with respect to kids, but with respect to everyone.
Mr. Mullin. Thank you for that. So, lastly, turning to
KOSA. There is certainly no question that we need to protect
kids online, but we need to also balance concerns around young
people's right to access legitimate information. Kids use the
internet to find community as well as to access important
resources that are essential to their health, safety, personal
development, that may not be available or easily accessible in
offline circumstances.
As we consider proposals like KOSA, we need to ensure we
are reducing real harms without creating new risks throughout
intended censorship or eliminating access to critical
resources.
So again, Ms. Ruane, you noted in your testimony the
current version of KOSA moves in the right direction by
strengthening protections for kids online while preserving
access to information. Could you elaborate on that just a
little bit? Why do you think this better ensures we maintain
that balance and avoid unintended restrictions on the resources
kids and teens are currently relying on?
Ms. Ruane. Absolutely. Thank you.
So in the Senate version of KOSA, one of our concerns is
that it gives too much authority to platforms and requires them
essentially to guess what types of content will harm children,
and the guessing process is going to be backed up by whatever
the government in charge of it--in this case the current FTC--
will determine harms children. So, for example, LGBTQ-related
content or other controversial content, like climate change-
related content or content related to armed conflicts going on
in the world, could be censored under KOSA if platforms guess
that it will harm children.
The House version of KOSA narrows the duty of care,
requiring platforms to essentially address what are already
illegal categories of content, hopefully narrowing and limiting
the amount of guessing they will have to do about what content
to deliver to kids. And we think that that is moving in the
right direction in terms of preserving all kids' ability to
access information and speak online.
Mr. Mullin. Thank you for that. I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. Appreciate it. The gentleman yields back.
Now recognize Mr. Bentz for his 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Bentz. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank the panel for
sharing with us today your thoughts on this most important
issue.
Back in Oregon, where I am from, legislators have contacted
me and asked what we are going to do in this space. Their
primary concern is preemption.
And so, Mr. Thayer, starting with you. One of the questions
that has been asked is that several States--California, Utah,
Arkansas, Texas, Florida--have passed and are implementing laws
that require parental consent, a default time limit, secure
curfews, or age verification for minors. If this bill preempts
those laws but does not itself impose comparable restrictions,
aren't you effectively asking Congress to shield business
models from the very protection States have decided children
need?
Mr. Thayer. So on the issue of preemption, obviously, it is
a sticky wicket and we take heavy thought in. I actually agree
a lot with Ms. Ruane's--and I apologize if I am mispronouncing
your name--statements when it comes--it relates to standard. I
like a more complex type of preemption and to be a little bit
clearer about what it is conflicting out.
And so at Digital Progress Institute we are very interested
in narrow preemptions. And so, again, happy to work with your
office, and I am sure other folks as well would like to work
with you as well to figure out exactly how to straddle that
line.
Mr. Bentz. Mr. Berkman, your thoughts.
Mr. Berkman. On the App Store Accountability Act
specifically?
Mr. Bentz. No. On the thought of if we act here as we are
going to, I hope, to protect children and we include in that
packet of legislation a preemption of States getting involved,
how do we explain to the States that we have gone to the very
top level of protection when many would say, ``No, you
haven't''?
In other words, how does this preemption piece fit, and how
do we justify it here in Congress by saying to States, like my
Oregon, saying, ``Hey, we have it right, and you guys can just
watch''?
Mr. Berkman. Yes, so we make this analysis on a bill-by-
bill basis, and our calculus is very clear: We are looking for
a robust national framework that improves social media safety
in the totality of the circumstances. And so we will move bill-
by-bill in that analysis.
Mr. Bentz. When I was thinking this through--and I haven't
given it enough thought, I will admit that right off--it seemed
to me that it was a commerce issue, right. You have 51
different approaches--50, depending upon who you count as
States and who aren't. The question is, why would we say we in
Congress want to take this upon ourselves when we are basically
establishing a ceiling as opposed to a floor? That is how the
question has been put to me back by my legislature--
legislators.
Mr. Berkman. It really is--in our view, it is a bill-by-
bill analysis. In some pieces of legislation, like Sammy's Law,
preemption is noncontroversial, bipartisan, and makes a lot of
sense. And so we are looking at, at the end of the day, where
are we going to get the most protection for children and what
is the analysis per bill?
Mr. Bentz. So your thought would be, look at each bill,
measure each bill, and go from there, and then somehow you can
go back to the States and say, ``Well, we may not have taken
care of it here, but we have over there.''
That takes us nicely to the remarks made by my colleague,
Mr. Obernolte, where he was talking about the difference
between a general duty as opposed to specific things that you
can't do. Share with me why one is better than the other, the
broad, general duties undefined, although we hope we could, as
opposed to calling out specific practices that are not allowed.
Mr. Berkman. In terms of a duty of care?
Mr. Bentz. Yes, but tell me which one is better for the
protection of the child.
Mr. Berkman. I mean, our focus today is on the legislation
in front of us, and we are desperately trying to seek consensus
on legislation that moves social media safety forward. And so
right now we're not looking at a broad level duty of care in
the hearing today.
Mr. Bentz. Well, ignoring that attempt to not answer my
question, which one do you think is better, or is it a
combination of the two? Because as a lawyer I understand how
great it is to have a specific, clear standard that you then
have to prove as opposed to a broad, general thing that you
are, you know, shooting at as you are bringing witnesses in.
Which one do you think is better?
Mr. Berkman. I mean, it is really hard to answer in the
hypothetical. We support language, specific language, that is
going to give the most robust workable protection for children
at the end of the day. We want language that can pass Congress.
We want language that is going to stand, be implemented, and
enforced.
Mr. Bentz. Thank you. Thank all of you for being here.
I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. The gentleman yields back.
Now recognize my friend from the great State of Michigan,
Mrs. Dingell, for her 5 minutes of questioning.
Mrs. Dingell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and--for holding
this important hearing, and to all of the witnesses for
testifying today. But I hope, Mr. Chairman, this is our last
hearing and we move to action, because we need to be moving
legislation.
I want to remind us why we are here today. In this room
there are parents who lost their children because Big Tech
failed to protect them. This picture sits on my desk. Sam and
Laura Chapman are here for their son. Sammy was just 16 years
old when a drug dealer contacted him through a private Snapchat
message and delivered fentanyl-laced pills to his home. On
February 7, 2021, he was found dead in his bedroom. And that is
why, along with Representative Evans, we have introduced the No
Fentanyl on Social Media Act.
Joann Bogard is here for her son. Mason was a 15-year-old
who filmed himself attempting the choking challenge that he had
seen on YouTube. That day, on May 1, 2019, his father found him
unconscious. He died 3 days later. This coin sits on my desk
too.
Maureen Molak is here for her 16-year-old son, David, who
died by suicide on January 4, 2016, after enduring relentless
cyberbullying, harassment, humiliation, and threats by his
peers via text message and on social media.
Rose Bronstein is here for her son Nate, a 15-year-old who
died by suicide on January 13, 2022, following nonstop
cyberbullying and online harassment by his classmates in which
no one stepped in to stop.
And Deb Schmill is here for her daughter, Becca, who was 18
when she bought what she thought was cocaine from a dealer she
found on Facebook. It was laced with fentanyl and it killed her
on September 16, 2020, the night before she was supposed to
enter rehab.
These families are here today because they are fighting for
what is right: to hold Big Tech accountable and protect every
child online. And I know there are other parents here. I want
to hear your stories. But Sammy, Mason, David, Nate, and Becca
are just five of the countless young people whose lives have
been stolen because Big Tech won't act, and it is time for us
to act. We owe these families real bipartisan action.
So I am going to move to my bill quickly. I want to discuss
the legislation that I have introduced with Congressman Evans.
This bill directs Federal agencies to examine how traffickers
use social media to reach minors; how platform design enables
access to fentanyl, which I hope angers the President of the
United States on down to all of us; and what solutions could
help keep deadly drugs out of kids' hands.
Mr. Berkman, how can this research under our bill help
identify platform design features that enable fentanyl access
and trafficking that targets minors?
Mr. Berkman. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the question and
for your legislation, which we do support.
There are a number of families here today. You mentioned
some. You don't have time for all of them. There are a number
of families here that lost children due to fentanyl trafficking
and drug trafficking over social media.
This is a vital issue. We see it impacting children across
the country. And so your legislation is incredibly important,
because we need to understand with more specificity the
features of platforms that are enabling trafficking, and it is
happening. Someone mentioned drug trafficking happening in high
schools. It was an example in person. It is happening on phones
in high school via social media platforms.
We have looked into this issue. We have been able to
connect with a drug dealer that we obviously did not know
before, and in minutes. That is how accessible this has
become--drugs have become to children in the social media age.
So your research is necessary so that we can have the
interventions, both legislative and educational as well.
Mrs. Dingell. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to beg my colleagues on this
committee, can we please work together to protect children and
keep other children from dying? And with that, I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. Absolutely, I am with you, that is for sure.
OK. Next, I will recognize Representative Fry from the
great State of South Carolina. You are recognized for your 5
minutes of questioning.
Mr. Fry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I actually really have enjoyed hearing the discussion here
today on the bills. I think, in preparation, my staff made this
giant binder of homework that I had to go through, but I really
wanted to kind of hear the discussion evolve. Because what I
see on this issue generally is that you have two sides that are
talking at each other or past each other, but not necessarily
with each other. And I think it is really important we have got
parents in the room. Typically, in an Energy and Commerce
hearing, you don't see this level of engagement or people that
are--that have a tremendous interest in watching what happens
in these hearings, but I think it is important that we get this
right. It is incredibly important.
I have got an 8-year-old, and thankfully he is not on
social media, and I don't anticipate anytime in the near future
where he would be on social media, but kids are, and it is
important that Congress gets this right.
In the audience we have Brandon Guffey from the State of
South Carolina. He is a State legislator from the Rock Hill
area. Not my district. I represent the beach, which is a much
better place, Brandon. But Brandon has made it his life's
mission to go after sextortion. His son committed suicide as a
result of a sextortion plot by a Nigerian man with 30 letters
in his first name--I cannot pronounce it--messaging people on
social media apps.
And so the concern is absolutely there. As a parent myself,
certainly he has done incredible work in the State of South
Carolina, but beyond that we have to get this right.
Again, I have a simple bill in this, the Kids Internet
Safety Partnership Act, which I think encourages that dialogue,
right, that it takes stakeholders--parental groups, social
media companies, tech industries big, small, medium--putting
together best practices, not only for the companies but for the
parents too, on what to do and how to act and how to protect
your children in this very connected environment.
So I am super happy with that. I am happy that it is
bipartisan. No one has talked any bad things about it today, so
I think we are doing something right, I think, I hope.
Paul, I want to ask you something, though. Your association
published a child and teen privacy and safety principles,
talking about data minimization, parental tools, transparency,
and risk assessments. How well do you think that the
partnership model like KISPA can do, the bill that I have,
operationalize those principles, part one, and two, will your
member companies commit to fully participating if Congress were
to pass this and it were to be signed by the President?
Mr. Lekas. Thank you for your question, and we appreciate
your legislation as well. I think it is a really smart
approach, and bringing more people together in a room to come
up with solutions is always valuable and especially here. Not
every solution is going to be legislative. There are things
that Congress can and should do.
So I think that, you know, this is an area where a lot can
be done on a voluntary basis, but it also needs some teeth from
Congress. And we are supportive of turning data minimization
for youth into law, prohibiting targeted advertising of youth.
We think these are really important, meaningful steps that can
be taken. And the challenge is we may be able to bring together
a number of companies that believe in upping their game and
being more responsible and recognize the real concerns out
there, but we don't know that that is going to be the case
across the board. And very likely there will be some of that.
Mr. Fry. Thank you for that. Real quick, I want to jump
into the hot topic of the day, which is preemption. You like
the House version preemption component as opposed to the
Senate-passed version. Is that fair to say?
Mr. Lekas. With respect to--well, we believe in preemption.
We think that preemption is an important concept to start with
because, right now--
Mr. Fry. I understand that, and I have got 46 seconds, so
let me nail this down. You like the House version of the
preemption better than the Senate version.
Mr. Lekas. We are still reviewing that with our members,
the specific language, but we believe there needs to be a
strong national standard for everybody.
Mr. Fry. Mr. Thayer, you do not like the preemption of the
House version. Is that correct? Not as much as maybe the Senate
version.
Mr. Thayer. I prefer the conflict preemption over as it
relates.
Mr. Fry. The Senate version.
Mr. Thayer. I believe the Senate version has something
similar to what the House version has, but it should--it is
unclear right now as to whether or not this is a conflict
preemption standard or--but as it relates typically is a
broader standard, and at DPI we typically like incremental
approaches to different policies. So the closer we can get to a
conflict preemption standard, I think, the better off we are.
Mr. Fry. Ma'am, and you like the conflict preemption
standard over the broad preemption standard. Is that correct?
Ma'am?
Ms. Ruane. Pardon me. Yes, yes, we prefer conflict
preemption--
Mr. Fry. And unfortunately, Chairman, I am out of time,
because I actually really wanted to dive into, like, a legal
argument about the--or legal discussion about this to kind of
figure out where the components are that really drive the
differences and are there ways to rectify that, right. I mean,
you hear the arguments on the other side on why maybe a broad,
sweeping preemption would be beneficial, but then there are
compelling arguments too on the other side of allowing States
the flexibility to do their thing too.
So unfortunately, Chairman, I am out of time, so I yield
back, but I still want to have that discussion with you all.
Mr. Bilirakis. Absolutely. The gentleman yields back.
Now recognize Representative Kelly for her 5 minutes of
questioning.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the
witnesses.
In Illinois and across the country, children and teens are
becoming increasingly subject to the risk of AI chatbots,
social media, and other online services. So without thorough,
comprehensive privacy laws for all Americans, I worry we aren't
meeting the moment to ensure the health and safety of our
children, particularly concerning the mental health of children
and teens. The bills we are discussing today present some
opportunity for progress but also give me some concerns.
Ms. Ruane, rates of depression and suicidal ideation among
teens are alarming. In Illinois, there was a law passed just
this year to prohibit the use of AI for direct therapeutic
purposes, such as generating treatment plans. Can you describe
how overbroad Federal preemption could overrule this and other
important State laws?
Ms. Ruane. Absolutely. Thank you, Representative Kelly.
Red and blue States alike are currently examining kids'
interactions with chatbots and online services and emerging
technologies, and they are working to design ways to address
concerns related to kids' privacy and their use of these
services, like Illinois--like Illinois law. Preemption--relief
to preemption, in particular--would put an end to that
necessary thought-and-design process that is currently
happening at the State level. Ossifying incomplete Federal
standards and eliminating the possibility for States to step up
and fill in gaps would be a mistake.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you. Children might feel inclined to
disclose sensitive data about their emotions, issues at school,
mental health struggles to an AI chatbot. Alternatively, they
may look to these tools to receive guidance on addressing their
struggles in lieu of a friend, family member, or trusted adult.
We have seen this lead to devastating situations, as Adam Raine
who ended his life after seeking emotional support from
ChatGPT.
With that in mind, how can we treat--prevent chatbots from
attempting to diagnose, manage, or treat children?
Ms. Ruane. Absolutely. So we think that chatbots should not
be allowed to present themselves as mental health professionals
when they are not, when they are not licensed to do so.
Another aspect of this that is worth thinking about is that
this is another good example of why broad preemption would be
concerning in this circumstance. Chatbots, basically all
generative AI services, are data vacuums. They are collecting
and compiling information from first parties, from third
parties, from data brokers, all over the internet, and they are
still in need of more and ever more data to train their
services.
If we preempt States' ability to deal with that issue,
along with the issue of the--with the issue of the prompts that
children are giving to services that are, as you noted, very
private and related to extremely sensitive information, we will
be failing children if we leave that gap in Federal law and at
the State level as well.
Ms. Kelly. You answered my other question. Like, how do we
protect--but I did want to ask everyone really quick--this is a
question that was posed to me that I am just going to ask.
Some wanted to know, why don't we just codify massive
statutory damages that make it so painful to be caught that
then companies would pay attention? Do you think that would
work?
And just go down the line.
Mr. Berkman. Yes.
Ms. Kelly. Oh, you do. Oh, that was short and sweet.
Mr. Lekas. I think there needs to be a showing of harm.
Ms. Kelly. A showing of harm.
Mr. Lekas. Actual harm. Yes.
Ms. Ruane. We absolutely agree that damages need to be
meaningful.
For example, earlier this year, the FTC issued a fine
against Disney for $10 million for COPPA violations. Disney is
a $200 billion company. Ten million dollars is a rounding
error.
We need any damages that come as a result of violations of
these privacy laws to be meaningful so that it incentivizes
compliance.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you.
Mr. Thayer. Yes, with strong injunctions.
Ms. Kelly. All right. Thank you so much.
Thank you to the witnesses.
And I yield back.
Mr. Fulcher [presiding]. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Lee,
for 5 minutes, please.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and our witnesses.
I also want to thank Chairman Bilirakis and Chairman
Guthrie for including two of my bills--the Promoting a Safer
Internet for Minors Act, which is co-led by my friend from the
great State of Florida, Mr. Soto, and the Children and Teens'
Online Privacy Protection Act, also known as COPPA 2.0, which I
am proud to colead with Mr. Walberg of Michigan--in today's
hearing.
I have dedicated much of my career to protecting the most
vulnerable in our society, including children and teens online,
and I am committed to working with this committee to continue
that work. I very much appreciate the discussion today about
advancing policies that protect children and also empower
parents as they navigate the digital landscape, while also
safeguarding our First Amendment rights.
Mr. Berkman, specifically, thank you for your work in
empowering children and families with the tools they need to
navigate social media safely and securely.
Digital technologies change so fast that even the most
engaged parents struggle to keep up with the latest apps and
features. That is why the Promoting a Safe Internet for Minors
Act would direct the FTC to launch a nationwide education
campaign to help kids and parents learn how to stay safe.
Would you share with us why a national education campaign,
similar to what the Federal Government has done for seatbelts
and cigarettes, is important and what type of information or
tools you believe would be the most important to include?
Mr. Berkman. Yes. Thank you so much for the question and
for your cosponsorship of that legislation. We support it. We
are across the country, as you mentioned, educating students,
parents, and administrators at schools on how to keep children
safer on social media because of that harm.
And so I will say first, on the advocacy part of your
campaign, it is absolutely critical--I have mentioned this
before in the hearing. There is an alarming disconnect in the
awareness of how severe and pervasive the harms are. People are
concerned and frightened, but they just don't understand how
truly bad this is.
And so your legislation and that campaign is very sorely
needed to bring awareness, and that helps us and other NGOs do
our job.
In terms of specific education, we need help certainly on
the ground. We can't cover every single child in every single
school, though that is our goal.
In terms of talking about best practices, there is a lot of
talk out there. It seems accessible, when we talk about social
media safety. There is a lot of talk out there about social
media safety, and the curriculum is not necessarily evidence-
based. And that leads to time wasting at best and, at worst,
counter-results or detrimental results to the child.
And so we thank you for your legislation. I think it is
going to do a lot of good, and I hope it passes.
Ms. Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Lekas, thank you for your work, as well, in protecting
the safety of minors online and your perspective on modernizing
COPPA for the 21st century. When it was originally enacted, of
course, it was well before today's landscape of digital devices
and online platforms.
One of the principles that you have discussed is the
approach to child and teen privacy and restricting advertising
to minors. COPPA 2.0 would prohibit targeted advertising to
children and teens.
But would you explain for us how targeted advertising
differs from contextual advertising, and the risk that targeted
advertising poses to young people?
Mr. Lekas. Absolutely. Thank you very much for that
question.
So targeted advertising involves delivering advertisements
that are specific to an individual based on their online
behavior and the information that may be collected about them.
So think of, perhaps, creating a profile or a dossier on an
individual--a machine would do this--and then deliver
advertisements that seem suitable, according to the automated
system, to that individual.
Ranking Member Pallone raised some concerns earlier today
about the way in which data can be used--minors' data can be
used, and when they turn 18, there is this dossier on them. And
that is what we are seeking to prevent.
We think that contextual advertising, which is based on
things like age-appropriate advertising, where your location
is, is something that is appropriate because it doesn't require
collecting individually specific information and creating a
repository of very sensitive information.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis [presiding]. The gentlelady yields back.
I now recognize Ms. Schrier, Dr. Schrier, for her
questioning.
Ms. Schrier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all of our witnesses for this really important
discussion today.
I am very glad to see Sammy's Law included in this hearing.
I have worked closely with Representatives Carter and Miller-
Meeks and Wasserman Schultz to really carefully craft this
bill.
Over and over today and in past hearings, we have heard
about all of the tremendous dangers that kids and teens are
facing online and the real-world problems and dangers that
social media can create or make much worse. And, as discussed,
we are talking about anxiety and depression and eating
disorders and bullying and sexual trafficking and abuse and
exposure to or access to drugs and even suicidality. And it
feels really almost impossible for parents to protect their
kids online.
This bill--we already saw a picture of Sammy--is named
after Sammy Chapman, who, when he was just 16, bought a
fentanyl-laced pill over Snapchat, and it killed him. One pill.
And Sammy's dad, Sam, is in the room today.
And I just want to thank you, Sam, for your advocacy and
for stepping up to protect other kids from that same fate.
Sammy's Law is simple. It would just make sure that parents
can monitor their teens on social media. And we worked so hard
to find the right balance so that parents are alerted by third-
party watchdog apps but kids' privacy is also protected. And
so, if certain topics rise up, then a parent gets a warning.
But this only works if the social media companies will
allow these watchdog apps to work with them.
Mr. Berkman, thank you for being here today. I was
wondering if you could just expand on why the existing settings
and controls for minors on social media apps just aren't
cutting it and why we need these watchdog apps.
Mr. Berkman. Yes. First of all, thank you so much for your
coleadership of this legislation, especially given your
background as a pediatrician. And I say that as a son of a
pediatrician, so I have reverence for that experience.
Sammy's Law is an essential part of this puzzle in terms of
protecting children. First of all, it protects against almost
the full spectrum of harms that are impacting children. And you
named a lot of them, not even all of them. There's a lot of
them, to be clear.
We have mentioned numerous times in this hearing that the
social media platforms have an inherent conflict of interest
between our children's safety and their profits. They move
slowly.
And a perfect example here is drug trafficking over social
media. We started--this was not really a major harm when we
started our work as the Organization for Social Media Safety.
It really exploded on the scene around 2020, and we started
seeing a lot of deceased children because of drugs that they
purchased over social media.
We saw safety software companies, which do exist today and
are actively protecting children, immediately act to make sure
that they were keeping up with the language used by dealers to
communicate with children--the emojis, the acronyms. Meanwhile,
it took the social media platforms years to even acknowledge
the problem.
And so that is point number one.
Point number two, really quickly, I will make really
quickly, is this technology, sending parents alerts,
maintaining your child's privacy as well--alerts just on the
harm--is incredible technology. We are able to alert parents to
imminent risk. The social media platforms----
Ms. Schrier. I am going to have to----
Mr. Berkman [continuing]. Cannot do that.
Ms. Schrier. Thank you.
Mr. Berkman. Thank you.
Ms. Schrier. I am going to cut you off there. Just--I want
to make a couple more comments.
We have heard about this today. I want to just talk about
KOSA, the Kids Online Safety Act, which is a great bipartisan
bill that passed, I believe unanimously or almost unanimously,
in the Senate, has teeth, has a duty of care for social media
companies that really holds them accountable. And yet the
version this year that we are taking on of KOSA has been
gutted. It is toothless. It does not give the enforcement
mechanisms.
And all of the people--I was a colead of the last one--who
supported it last time are feeling so frustrated that, like,
this is not the best we can do. And I just want to emphasize
that the previous bill, the one with teeth, is the one we
should be bringing up today to really protect kids online.
Similarly, there is a discussion today about getting kids
under 16 off social media. I just want to say that there is a
Kids Off Social Media Act, KOSMA, that also has a bill,
bipartisan, in the Senate, with a path that could be signed by
the President. And we need to be taking that bill up if we are
serious about doing something soon to protect our kids.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. The gentlelady yields back.
I will recognize Representative Kean for his 5 minutes of
questioning.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our distinguished witnesses for being here
today.
Protecting America's children is of the utmost importance.
The internet and social media have brought many opportunities
to the American people; however, they have also brought with
them dangerous harms to American children. I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses on how we can ensure that parents
have the tools necessary to safely guide their children through
their online activities.
Mr. Berkman, video games are a part of daily activities for
many families in New Jersey and across this Nation. While many
view these games as merely toys, the truth is that many video
games have become fully functioning social networks.
For years, the gaming industry has defaulted to open
communication, letting anyone talk to anyone. That is why I
introduced the Safer GAMING Act. My bill requires that for
minors the default setting must be the safest one, meaning
voice and text chat with strangers is turned off until a parent
turns it on.
Can you discuss how minors are using social gaming
platforms and the risks to minors using these platforms?
Mr. Berkman. Thank you very much for the question,
Congressman.
We believe that these types of gaming platforms that you
call ``social gaming,'' they are social media. They are a space
where children and adults can go on, meet other people on the
platform, and exchange content in the gaming situation,
context--video and text mainly.
And so, because of that, we see the same risks,
essentially, that we see on other types of social media
platforms: severe cyberbullying, sextortion, sexual predation,
abduction as well. So there is a full range of very serious
risks here.
Mr. Kean. So, as a followup to that, we know that predators
often use the shared interest of a video game to build trust
with a child. The statistics show that about two-thirds of
minors say that an online-only contact has asked them to move
from a public chat into a private conversation on another
platform.
How would the default safeguards in my bill, which limit
communication with strangers automatically, disrupt that cycle
before it even starts?
Mr. Berkman. Well, the short answer is, it is as effective
as you can get with a legislative change to mitigate this
threat. If we are removing the ability for adults to contact
minors over gaming platforms, that is almost entirely effective
in terms of mitigation.
And let's be clear: When children go on these gaming sites,
they are spending anywhere from 20 minutes to many hours, to
many hours a day, over months, with adults that they do not
know in real life. That is a lot of time for adults with
malintent to spend with a child and conduct that grooming
process.
We saw in April, I should note, in April, a 10-year-old
abducted after using the gaming platform Roblox. This is an
active, serious threat.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Berkman.
Mr. Thayer, the data is alarming. Nearly 70 percent of
teens report they are playing online games with strangers at
least weekly, and three-quarters of players have experienced
harassment in these games.
My bill takes an important step to address that. The Safer
GAMING Act says if a user is under 18 they should not be
participating in chats, particularly with adults, unless a
parent explicitly allows for it.
Mr. Thayer, what harms can arise when every teenager
playing an online video game automatically has an open
communication line to a random adult stranger?
Mr. Thayer. Well, Congressman, the short answer is too
much.
And I think you have seen that even outside of your typical
game that you see on Xbox or PlayStation. You see it even on
mobile apps. I mean, this has been a longstanding problem with
mobile apps in particular.
Pokemon GO, for instance, was a hot-button game, and it
actually indirectly--or, actually, directly led kids to the
predators' hands. Because the whole point of the game was to go
into public areas and go find Pokemon, which--guess who picked
up kids like that and also tracked kids with, you know,
Pokemon?
So, again, this is a longstanding issue. It has been
something that has been strategically, maybe even
categorically, ignored by the tech companies, and maybe it is
time for a lot of congressional oversight and legal oversight.
Mr. Kean. All right.
And I thank our entire panel for being here today and for
your insights.
I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. The gentleman yields back.
Now I will recognize Representative Clarke from the great
State of New York for your 5 minutes of questioning.
Ms. Clarke. Good afternoon, and thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. I thank our Ranking Member Schakowsky for holding
this hearing.
And thank you to our witnesses for joining us today.
Earlier this year, in March, the subcommittee held a
hearing titled ``Examining Online Harms'' with the expectation
to discuss how Congress can help protect children from online
harms. That hearing was derailed when, in the days leading up,
Donald Trump attempted to illegally fire the Democratic
Commissioners of the FTC, the very agency tasked with
protecting kids and adults online.
The FTC has a long, bipartisan history of working to
protect children online through their enforcement of the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, the FTC Act, and
their rulemaking authority. But since March, the FTC has been
unable to do its job in good faith and maintain its historic
role as a bipartisan, independent cop on the beat.
As I said to this committee 9 months ago, I am curious how
Mr. Trump and my Republican colleagues think the firing of
Democratic Commissioners furthers the mission of the FTC to
protect kids online and the public from deceptive or unfair
business practices. If my colleagues, my Republican colleagues,
are serious about protecting kids from online harm, we should
all be able to agree today that Rebecca Slaughter should be
reinstated to the FTC.
But, unfortunately, my colleagues on the other side of the
aisle are not serious about this topic. And that is why they
continue to entertain the idea of a moratorium on State AI
laws, even after it was defeated 99 to 1 in the Senate. In 2025
alone, all 50 States introduced legislation on AI, while
Republicans in Congress offered no Federal alternative other
than preemption. It is no mistake that the only Republican
proposal frees AI and Big Tech companies from all oversight.
Without a comprehensive Federal standard, existing State
laws are the only legislation keeping kids safe online right
now. Without a comprehensive Federal online data privacy law,
all of these attempts at protecting our children online will be
in vain.
Today's legislative package is missing the mark.
The State laws include State bills like the AI companion
law in New York that clearly and regularly notify users that
they are not interacting with a human and detect signs of self-
harm and can direct users to crisis resources.
Any kind of broad preemption or moratorium on existing AI
State legislation would kneecap the important work States like
New York have already done to protect kids.
Instead of talking in circles and restating the obvious,
today I encourage my colleagues to finally act. Demand the
reinstatement of Commissioner Slaughter. Demand the exclusion
of an AI moratorium in must-pass legislation. Demand that
Donald Trump stop giving handouts to Big Tech. And let Congress
do our job to protect kids and adults online with comprehensive
legislation.
As I look out at the many families representing their loved
ones here today, I find today's hearing extremely vexing. My
staff has noted that this committee has had at least 5 hearings
on the threats to kids online over the past 5 years. This is
ridiculous.
It is time for us to act, colleagues. Every moment that we
sit here restating the obvious, children and our families are
at risk.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. The gentlelady yields back.
I now recognize Mrs. Houchin for her 5 minutes of
questioning.
Mrs. Houchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the ranking
member for holding this hearing today and for the bipartisan
work reflected in today's hearing.
I thank the witnesses for being here and for offering your
testimony.
The importance of this work is impossible to overstate,
because behind every policy choice are families who are living
with the consequences.
I have been deeply moved by the parents, some of whom are
here today, who despite losing a child continue to fight for
stronger protections so no other family has to experience the
same tragedy. Their experience brings an urgency and a clarity
for policymakers, and we owe it to them to turn that into
meaningful change.
Every parent I talk to is doing everything they can to
guide their kids and protect them online, on social media,
through gaming platforms, and now AI. And they are simply
overwhelmed and cannot keep up--policymakers can barely keep
up--with the advance in technology.
So this Congress we are recognizing how quickly the risks
are evolving. I worked to launch the bipartisan Kids Online
Safety Caucus so Members can stay current and engage with
parents, researchers, schools, and industry.
I am also proud that today's hearing includes bills that I
have been working on--the AWARE Act, the SAFE Bots Act, and the
RESET Act, as well as the Parents Over Platforms Act, which I
am helping colead with Representative Auchincloss.
Kids deserve the same safety mindset online that we have
with car seats and playgrounds and other harms. The bills today
reflect that approach.
The AWARE Act gives parents and educators clear, accessible
guidance on how chatbots work, what red flags to look for, and
where to go to for help.
The SAFE Bots Act ensures no AI system can impersonate a
licensed professional and requires age-appropriate disclosure
so kids always know that they are talking to software, not a
human being.
The RESET Act asks whether 13 should still be the standard,
the age of internet adulthood. Given that research shows the
highest risks for social media harms fall below the age of 16,
this bill creates a bright line and a national rule that
platforms may not maintain accounts for users under 16. They
must delete known under-16 accounts and their data and must
follow a single standard enforced by the FTC and State's
attorneys general.
The legal and global trends point in the same direction.
Protecting minors from high-risk digital environments is both
necessary and clearly permissible and possible. Our job is to
learn from these developments so we can set guardrails worthy
of the moment, and I look forward to working with colleagues on
both sides of the aisle to accomplish that.
I do have a few questions with the remaining time that I
have. I am going to go to Mr. Thayer.
We have heard a lot of concerns raised about the First
Amendment relative to some of these bills. The 11th Circuit
decision on H.B. 3, the Florida legislation, emphasized that
States can act decisively to protect minors from harmful
digital environments even when platforms claim editorial
rights.
Does that signal, in your view, that Congress can likewise
adopt RESET's type of bright-line Federal standard--under-16
account prohibition and deletion--without triggering First
Amendment concerns that Big Tech continues to raise?
Mr. Thayer. Absolutely.
So the 11th Circuit, as you rightly noted, did uphold a law
that was somewhat similar to what you are describing. And just
to reiterate what the ruling basically said, which was just a
rehashing of what was said in the Supreme Court in TikTok v.
Garland, it essentially said that--the court basically
clarified that a law has to be based off of what it is
attempting to regulate.
If the regulation is attempting to regulate something that
is a nonspeech-related thing, even if the ancillary aspects of
that regulation does impact speech, it is likely going to be
content-neutral, with some provisos.
So I think that what the 11th Circuit did was clarify
something that the Supreme Court has said. And I think it would
be very wise to heed that guidance and move forward
accordingly.
Mrs. Houchin. Thank you.
We have talked some today about preemption. I just want to
note that we do seek a Federal standard so that States cannot
go below--I certainly wouldn't want a State like California,
who has a 13-year-old standard.
So, if we are talking about preemption, I think we have to
be cognizant that, if there are--we want the States to be
nimble, but we also don't want them to go below a standard set
federally that we have determined will protect kids. Otherwise,
we might as well not do this work and just leave it up to the
States.
Protecting children in the digital age is one of our most
important responsibilities that we have as elected leaders. It
is clearly one of the most important moral responsibilities we
have as parents. AI is not going away. Social media is not
going away. It is our obligation to defend and protect the
innocent and the next generation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. I thank the lady for all her good work on
this issue.
I next will recognize Representative Evans for his 5
minutes of questioning.
Mr. Evans. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and, of
course, to all of our witnesses for coming.
My first question will be to Mr. Berkman.
Before I came to Congress, I spent over a decade as a cop
in the Denver metro area, and I saw the fentanyl crisis grow in
my State and across the country. In 2023, Colorado had the
second-highest overdose rate in the Nation for teenagers, and
75 percent of that was attributed to fentanyl. Earlier this
year, we had the sixth-largest fentanyl seizure in U.S. history
happen on the south side of the Denver metro area--6.8 million
lethal doses of fentanyl in that seizure.
And we know a lot of this stuff is trafficked to our kids
through things like social media. So, to counter this threat,
one of the bills that I am carrying is the No Fentanyl on
Social Media Act, which seeks to address this problem by
assessing the full scope of how social media is used to be able
to traffic fentanyl to our kids.
Can you discuss the role of social media in trafficking
drugs and how this piece of legislation can help to resolve
that issue?
Mr. Berkman. Yes. Thank you for your legislation. We
enthusiastically support it, and we need it.
Children are acquiring drugs over social media. The
accessibility is astonishing. This is not the situation that we
had presocial media in terms of accessibility. They are able to
get on, quickly connect with a drug dealer, sometimes one that
they don't know. There is solicitation happening with
regularity to teens. They are able to conduct a drug
transaction and then have drugs delivered to their door like a
pizza. This is the tragic story of what happened to 16-year-old
Sammy Chapman as well.
I will note, this is also happening cross-platform, which
is a safety concern, where drug dealers can advertise on one
platform, conduct a conversation and transaction on another,
and then receive payment on yet another. That is a very severe
problem.
So we need your bill to understand the full facet of how
this is happening, the features that are enabling it to happen,
as well, and go undetected.
Mr. Evans. Online games with a chat feature--I mean, again,
I saw it during the course of my career.
This is for a situation--what we just discussed--the
situations where somebody is potentially looking to go buy
drugs, that is their intent. Can you talk a little bit about
storefront apps, where maybe somebody is not actually looking
to go buy drugs, they just bought a painkiller that they
thought was legitimate, but it ends up being counterfeit and so
then, when they consume what they thought was a legitimate
product, they end up dying of an overdose because it was an
illicit or a fraudulent pill?
So can you just talk about how policy solutions like what
we are discussing today can be used to fix some of the
storefront nature of these apps, where people are buying
something they think is legit but ends up being fraudulent?
Mr. Berkman. With the focus of this hearing on children, I
will focus on children there. We see this happening with
children. And, again, Sammy Chapman thought that he was buying
Xanax over social media. I wish I could name all the parents
and children here and honor them. That is the case with a lot
of the parents here as well.
And so legislation like Sammy's Law would help protect
against a child that is otherwise bored trying to go out and
get something like Adderall, Xanax, Vicodin, which we are now
seeing being poisoned with fentanyl and being lethal. And that
education and awareness needs to spread as well. But Sammy's
Law is a very strong deterrent to that behavior.
Mr. Evans. Thank you.
And then a final question here. In your comments, you
talked about some of the other harms that come from kids on
social media. We have talked a lot about drugs. As a cop, I
unfortunately had many situations where I interacted with kids
being human trafficked over the internet and over social media.
And for me as a cop, probably the most shocking statistic,
once I really got into this space, was understanding that a lot
of times this trafficking happens within a half a mile of these
kids' home. It is done through peer pressure over social media.
And then the exploitation, whether it is digital, whether it is
sexting, whether it is an actual in-person encounter--I mean,
it can happen in their own home. I had one girl, 14 years old,
that was repeatedly trafficked in her own basement through
social media and online peer pressure.
So can you just talk about things that this committee can
do legislatively to be able to put guardrails around situations
like that? Twenty seconds.
Mr. Berkman. Yes. trafficking, sextortion--our children are
no longer safe in their homes. That includes cyberbullying as
well, which does not end at the end of the school day.
And so there are a range of solutions on here. I have 5
seconds. Let me highlight Sammy's Law once again. All the
dangers that you mentioned, a parent would get an alert as that
risk is imminent and occurring so that they could provide
immediate, lifesaving support.
Mr. Evans. Loop in the parent. Sounds good.
I yield back, Chairman.
Mr. Bilirakis. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize Mr. James from the great State of Michigan
for his 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. James. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And, first, I want to
express my sincere gratitude to you and Chairman Guthrie for
your leadership in organizing this amazing hearing.
I also appreciate all our distinguished panelists for being
here today. I look forward to hearing from your insight, and I
have been enjoying your feedback thus far.
I have said for years Facebook is the Philip Morris of our
time. Yet they are just one example of the cesspool that is the
modern internet. Americans are waking up to Big Tech's game.
They provide lip service on how they are protecting children
while actually delivering none of those protections.
Social media has been labeled the primary culprit, and for
good reason. Countless studies and multiple congressional
hearings make clear that social media is not only an addictive
service for children but is also harmful for their mental
acuity and overall mental health.
The damage social media is doing to our kids is
unconscionable and extremely disturbing. Big Tech is knowingly
and willingly wreaking havoc on our kids' mental health. As a
father of three school-age boys, the warning signs of social
media's impact on kids are abundantly clear to me and to all
parents.
My bill, H.R. 3149, the App Store Accountability Act,
ensures that children are not accessing age-restricted material
through online app stores and gives parents real control over
what their kids can download.
In fact, a national poll commissioned by Digital Childhood
Alliance found that 88 percent of parents want app stores to
require parental approval before minors can download a new app.
Eighty-eight percent. Can you imagine any other issue that 88
percent of Americans agree on? We have printed 83 letters just
today from parents and groups who agree.
Just as brick-and-mortar stores are held responsible for
selling age-restricted materials like tobacco or alcohol to
minors, the App Store Accountability Act will hold digital app
stores accountable for providing adult or addictive material to
minors as well.
Kids cannot consent. I say again: Kids cannot consent. And
any company that exposes them to adult or addictive material
should and will be held accountable.
The App Store Accountability Act holds Big Tech companies
to the same standard as local corner stores. It protects the
next generation by empowering parents now and making clear
that, when it comes to safeguarding our children, no one gets a
free pass.
My time is limited, so I will get right to it.
Mr. Thayer, as excited as I am to lead this App Store
Accountability Act, I do want to share, the logic is very
simple: App stores are a gateway to the internet, for social
media, for our children.
You have played a very critical role in shaping similar
legislation at the State level. Can you state one more time why
placing the burden to verify a user's age on the app store,
rather than on individual websites or apps, is the most
efficient and privacy-protective way to ensure online safety
for kids?
Mr. Thayer. Well, thank you, Congressman, for all of your
work on this. You have been a real champion, and it has been an
honor and privilege working with you and your staff.
Actually, I think who said it better was Congressman
Obernolte themselves. They have the data already. They already
have all of the access to this information. And not only that,
they already are developing the tools currently.
So, in the States, we got, I think, three States to
subscribe to the App Store Accountability Act and pass it.
Texas is among them. And, as a result, it actually forced Apple
to create the API that would be necessary in order to
accomplish all of this.
As you say, this is a very simple idea: Leverage the
existing infrastructure to do an amount of good. And at the end
of the day, they are the ones calling themselves a store, not
us. So if they want to be a store, we should hold them to the
same accountability as any other store in any other market.
It is absurd that merely because you put electrons into a
store it is somehow magically new. No. They know what they are
selling, they know what is on their product, and, most
importantly, they know the age of their user better than any
other company in the world.
Mr. James. That is exactly right.
And maybe you could help me to respond to some of--I won't
say the ``critics,'' but those who may not know the intent or
the details of what we are trying to do here. Can you help
explain a little bit differently privacy concerns that some may
rise?
Mr. Thayer. So I actually don't have to, because Apple
itself has said that they can actually do all of this in a
privacy-conscious way.
So, to be clear, all the Act is really requiring Apple and
Google to do is to share an API that is encrypted. And they do
this on multiple different layers, not just on--not just to
verify age, but actually they have done it--every time you do a
financial transaction, that is an API. That is an API that is
connecting with some other app that says, ``Hey, the
transaction has gone through.''
Apple and Google act as the direct not only the
intermediaries, but they are basically the brokers to all of
these issues. And they have been able to say with a straight
face that they can do so--privacy--and put all the safeguards
in place. All this Act does is hold them accountable to what
they tell the American population. That is it.
Mr. James. Thank you, Mr. Thayer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
The gentleman yields back.
Now, Dr. Joyce, you are recognized for your 5 minutes of
questioning.
Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today's hearing is an important step toward protecting our
children from the harms of social media. And I want to
personally thank Chairman Bilirakis and Chairman Guthrie for
their tireless work to protect the most vulnerable among us.
Two weeks ago, the Oversight subcommittee held a hearing on
the risks of AI chatbots and the way that these platforms can
be improved to keep children safe. As new technologies like AI
chatbots are deployed online, we must honestly evaluate the
potential benefits and risks and enact operational, futureproof
safeguards that will protect current and future generations.
So I welcome the opportunity to learn more about the
proposals before us today and how they can achieve our shared
goal of protecting children online.
Mr. Lekas, the Don't Sell Kids' Data Act is predicated on
the view that data practices of third parties are inherently
harmful to children and teens. Yet, while privacy protections
are essential, not every use of data is harmful.
In your opinion, as drafted, could the Don't Sell Kids'
Data Act bring about unintended adverse consequences for kids
and teens?
Mr. Lekas. Thank you for that question.
In my view, yes.
There are no exemptions in this law. And I think there is
something that the general public doesn't understand, which is
the many ways in which data is used behind the scenes actually
provide us with benefits that we don't see, such as extending
auto insurance to teenagers or enabling students to apply for
financial aid or be scouted for college scholarships.
There is a range of positive uses that don't rely on social
media data that we have been talking about today but they rely
on data that actually is protected by other privacy laws--the
FCRA and the GLBA and these laws that already provide a means
to protect that data so it is only used for legitimate
purposes.
Mr. Joyce. Continuing, Mr. Lekas: The Don't Sell Kids' Data
Act includes private right of action to enforce that bill. And
in your written testimony, you state that effective enforcement
``should be designed to improve privacy and safety practices''
and that ``enforcement shouldn't be watered down with private
rights of action.'' That is a quote from your testimony.
Can you expand on that point and discuss how a private
right of action could actually weaken enforcement and hurt
consumers?
Mr. Lekas. Happy to.
We have seen a number of instances across the country, in
State laws especially, with private rights of action that lead
to lawsuits that are based on statutory violations even if
there is no showing of harm. And the impact of this--there's a
number of impacts that result from this.
One is that it causes firms to act in a more defensive
posture. They are trying to minimize their legal risk rather
than actually trying to fulfill what their duty is to their
consumers or their users or, in some cases, as in here, the
youth.
And another thing is it drives up costs, especially legal
and compliance costs. Particularly hardest hit are the smallest
firms--startups, small, medium-size enterprises.
Mr. Joyce. Could this deter those small startups, those
small firms, from entering into the market?
Mr. Lekas. It very well could. There have been a lot of
studies done on this about the actual economic costs on
companies based on privacy laws. There is a law in Illinois
called BIPA which has been particularly notable in this regard.
So we want meaningful--we want meaningful enforcement and
accountability, but we want that enforcement and accountability
to lead to change where we need change and for there to be a
recourse for individuals who are truly harmed by practices.
And so that is why we would recommend in some of these
children-focused laws to really home in on FTC and AG
enforcement.
Mr. Joyce. Thank you.
Mr. Thayer, many proposals rely on age-verification
technology. Some have critiqued age verification as violating
privacy and age-gating the internet.
What advances in age-verification technology give you
confidence that we can effectively verify users' ages
accurately while at the same time protecting their privacy?
Mr. Thayer. Well, in short, many.
So you saw this play out in the Supreme Court in the Paxton
case, where part of the assessment that the Court was grappling
with was not just the content that was at issue but also the
technological advances since the last time they evaluated this,
which I believe was in, like, 1996 or 1992. And the internet
has completely changed, right? I mean, with the amount of--the
sheer amount of data that we give these companies has
completely altered the landscape.
And now you have vertically integrated systems like Apple
and Google's systems, for instance, where Apple and Google both
own not only the device, they own the operating system, they
own the app store, and they even have their own native apps.
So the idea that, you know, somehow they know exactly when
you go to the bathroom and what you want to eat but yet your
age confounds them, like, is a bit of a ridiculous and almost
outdated view.
Mr. Joyce. My time has expired.
Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for holding this important
hearing, and I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Doctor. Appreciate it very much.
Now I will recognize last, but certainly not least, Dr.
Miller-Meeks for her 5 minutes of questioning.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Chairman Bilirakis and
Ranking Member Schakowsky, for allowing me to waive on to this
important hearing.
I also want to thank our witnesses for being here today.
Protecting children and teens online is one of the most
urgent responsibilities we face as policymakers. As digital
platforms become central to how young people learn,
communicate, and navigate the world, and, importantly, how much
they trust these platforms, we must ensure that these spaces
are safe, transparent, and designed with their wellbeing, not
corporate profit, as the driving priority.
And to one of the witness's points, it is astonishing to me
that we can build computers, build platforms, build apps all
through a digital world, but somehow Casey's General Store can
verify your age no matter how old you look, but a digital
platform that has this remarkable innovation can't verify an
age when inappropriate apps or content is accessed.
So my bill, the SPY Kids Act, takes an important step
towards that goal by prohibiting online platforms from
conducting market or product-focused research on children under
13 and by requiring verifiable parental consent before such
research can be conducted on teens.
After all, didn't the public-health community raise red
flags about cereal companies marketing directly to children for
the type of cereal that they would purchase? So it is not
impossible that we do this.
This legislation matters because the online environment our
children encounter today is fundamentally different from
anything previous generations have experienced. Platforms are
engineered to capture attention, collect sensitive information,
and shape behavior in ways that young users may not recognize
or be able to navigate safely.
Children and teens should not be profited, studied, or
targeted for commercial advantage, especially without parental
oversight. By limiting how platforms can analyze and monetize
minors' data, the SPY Kids Act helps reduce the risk of
manipulative marketing practices, strengthens privacy
protections, and reinforces the principle that the wellbeing of
America's youth must come before business models of technology
companies.
Our goal is simple: to build an online ecosystem where
children can grow, learn, and connect without being exploited
in the process.
Mr. Berkman, before I came to Congress, I was a doctor and
director of the Iowa Department of Public Health. The CDC
recommended limits to screen time. And in the medical world, we
have strict ethical rules about conducting research on
children. You cannot just use a child in research without the
parents' informed consent, even when it comes to drawing cord
blood.
Yet it seems that Big Tech companies run tests and
psychological experiments on our children every single day to
see which color or sound keeps them addicted the longest.
In your view, what are the most pressing risks minors face
from being profiled or studied for commercial purposes online?
Mr. Berkman. Yes, I would refer the Members to the former
Surgeon General's advisory on mental health. First of all, the
longer our children are online, the more at risk they are for
adverse mental health outcomes, including suicide. They are
also more at risk for all the acute harms that we see through
social media: cyberbullying, sextortion, and trafficking as
well.
So innovation in the social media industry means, ``How
many features can we design to get our children to use the
social media platforms more?'' Our children's time is their
profit.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you.
Mr. Thayer, how can behavioral research targeting minors be
used to shape features that may increase addictive or
manipulative design patterns?
Mr. Thayer. Well, we are seeing it play out in realtime. I
mean, Big Tech's big experiment on our kids is evidence of
that.
Not to mention, as Congressman James noted, there is an
immense amount of research that demonstrates that these
addictive behaviors will actually manifest in multiple
different ways even outside of the use of the app. So, even
after the app is long turned off, they are still susceptible to
all of the harm that has been caused based off of the
repetitive nature of the videos, based off of the inundation of
all the materials and even the features themselves, which
happens not just at the app layer but at the app store and the
operating system.
These devices, on the whole, are designed to keep you
addicted and designed to keep you--I guess the kids don't call
it this anymore, but it is called FOMO. And so, ultimately, if
you take--I mean, just ask any parent who has ever taken a
tablet or phone away from a child. I mean, you will recognize
that these kids do not look like themselves after that. They
act a lot like your average drug addict.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Right. I have seen it in my doctor's
office with both the parents and with children.
Thank you so much.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. The gentlelady yields back.
All right. So we have finished with questioning. However,
now I would like to recognize Representative Castor.
Now, I will tell Representative Castor that the documents
that she is going to propose have already been submitted for
the record, but you are recognized to elaborate on that if you
would like.
Ms. Castor. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
adding to the record a past KOSA letter of 10/15/25 from 408
organizations in all 50 States calling on House and Senate
leadership to pass the Senate version of KOSA.
Also, a parent letter to Congress of November 24th. It is a
letter from over 300 parents to the House Energy and Commerce
urging them to pass the Senate KOSA and stand strongly against
the demands of the tech industry to gut this and other
children's online privacy and safety legislation.
The Common Sense Media opposition letter of December 1st
opposing these versions of KOSA and COPPA 2.0.
And the ParentsSOS KOSA 1-pager of December 1st, a
coalition of over 20 families who have lost their children to
online harms, with significant concerns about the House
Republican KOSA draft.
Mr. Berkman mentioned the U.S. Surgeon General's advisory
of 2023. It is very important that that is in the record.
The 2023 American Psychological Association advisory
examining the potential beneficial and harmful effects of
social media, including 10 recommendations based on scientific
evidence.
The Pew Research Center report on teens, social media, and
mental health of 2025 saying that roughly one in five teens say
social media sites hurt their mental health and a growing share
think that they harm people their age.
Also, the 2024 Federal Trade Commission report, ``A Look
Behind the Scenes.'' That is the detailed report finding large
social media and video-streaming companies have engaged in vast
surveillance of users, with lax privacy controls and inadequate
safeguards for kids and teens.
The Design It For Us letter of December 1st, 2025. Several
organizations, led by Design It For Us, in support of a strong
KOSA; in opposition to a Federal provision that would undermine
existing State protection for kids.
And the Senate Judiciary hearing materials. If you haven't
read through the whistleblower materials or the transcripts and
the questions, that would be very edifying for legislation.
And the master complaint in the Meta lawsuit, 2025.
And ``Teen Accounts, Broken Promises: How Instagram Is
Failing to Protect Minors,'' the 2025 Fair Play report on the
weaknesses of Meta's teen accounts, spearheaded by a
whistleblower and verified by university researchers.
Thank you for including these in the record today.
Mr. Bilirakis. Absolutely.
I ask unanimous consent that the documents on the staff
documents list be submitted for the record. If I don't hear any
objections, so ordered.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Bilirakis. OK, folks. Thank you very much.
Again, I remind Members that they have 10 business days to
submit questions for the record. And I ask the witnesses to
respond to the questions promptly. Members should submit their
questions by the close of the business day on December 16th.
And I would like to thank everyone for being here today.
The testimony was excellent. I thought it was a great hearing.
And I want to thank the parents--the parents that are here
today on behalf of their children and other children. We
appreciate you so very much, and the personal stories
definitely do matter.
So, without objection, the subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
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