[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 119-10]
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
AND COMMAND--CHALLENGES
AND RESOURCE PRIORITIES
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 9, 2025
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-764 WASHINGTON : 2026
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
RONNY JACKSON, Texas, Chairman
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JASON CROW, Colorado
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
NANCY MACE, South Carolina JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas SARA JACOBS, California
CORY MILLS, Florida PATRICK RYAN, New York
DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin GILBERT RAY CISNEROS JR.,
PAT HARRIGAN, North Carolina California
ABRAHAM J. HAMADEH, Arizona DEREK TRAN, California
Craig Greene, Professional Staff Member
Will T. Johnson, Professional Staff Member
Austin Richards, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Crow, Hon. Jason, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............ 2
Jackson, Hon. Ronny, a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............ 1
WITNESSES
Fenton, GEN Bryan P., USA, Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command........................................................ 4
Jenkins, Colby, Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict,
Department of Defense.......................................... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Opening Statement of Dr. Jackson............................. 29
Combined Statement of Jenkins, Colby; together with Fenton,
GEN Bryan P................................................ 31
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Van Orden................................................ 55
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Scott.................................................... 59
Dr. Jackson.................................................. 61
Mr. Hamadeh.................................................. 62
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND COMMAND--CHALLENGES AND RESOURCE
PRIORITIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 9, 2025.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 8:00 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ronny Jackson
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RONNY JACKSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
Dr. Jackson. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to
order.
I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to
declare a recess at any time.
Without objection, so ordered.
Today we will hear from our witnesses on U.S. Special
Operations Forces and Command and their challenges and resource
priorities for Fiscal Year 2026.
Over the past several years our nation has confronted an
evolving landscape, an evolving landscape of great power
competition. Our Special Operators have adapted to meet the
challenges posed by our adversaries, while continuing to combat
the continuous and evolving threats posed by violent extremist
organizations, military proxies, and non-state actors. Despite
the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq coming to a close, the
demands on Special Operations have actually increased, and they
continue to rise.
Special Operations continue to be our greatest hedge
against strategic distraction as they singly respond to crises
around the world and neutralize terrorist networks with the
intent and means to attack our homeland. The complexity of
these no fail missions continues to rise as the battlefield
becomes increasingly contested and denied by the proliferation
of peer adversary capabilities and malign influence.
We, similarly, rely on our Special Operations Forces to
impose costs on adversaries critical to reestablishing
deterrence and providing the nation with a position of
advantage should deterrence fail. We ask a lot of our Special
Operations Forces and demands on them will continue to grow
every day. It is critical that we provide you with the
resources that you need; and we intend to do that.
We look forward to hearing how Congress can best support
Special Operations Command so that you can continue to provide
the high return on investment the nation requires while
simultaneously modernizing for the challenges of the future.
Our witnesses today are leaders in the Special Operations
community. I want to welcome Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense Colby Jenkins, performing the duties of Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict.
Thank you, sir.
And General Bryan Fenton, U.S. Army, Commander of U.S.
Special Operations Command.
Thank you, sir.
In the interests of time, I ask that the witnesses keep
their opening remarks to 5 minutes or less so that we have
sufficient time for questions and answers.
With that, let me thank our witnesses for appearing again.
And I now recognize Ranking Member Crow for any opening remarks
that you have.
[The opening statement of Dr. Jackson can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JASON CROW, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Chairman. Appreciate your leadership
in this, and the other members as well.
Mr. Jenkins, General Fenton, thank you as well for your
leadership. As the chairman mentioned, you know, we are in an
era of unprecedented threats and evolution on the battlefield.
You all continue to lead the men and women that are on the tip
of the spear, so to speak, in that evolution.
This subcommittee is a partner in that effort. There is no
gamesmanship, there is no gotcha in this subcommittee, which
makes it unique in Congress at this time. We are here as your
partner.
We, of course, have an important oversight role which we
will always fulfill, and ask hard questions, and press when
necessary. But more than anything else, we just want to get the
answers to how we can better support you, what resources are
needed, so that the men and women who are doing incredible
things on our behalf around the world, very dangerous things,
oftentimes giving their lives to protect all of us, have the
best: the best training, the best equipment, the best
modernization. That is our simple goal here. And it is a goal
that I know that we share deeply and you have a commitment to
that goal.
So, with that, I won't take any more time. We can jump
right into it.
I yield back.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you.
We will now hear from our witnesses and then we will move
into question and answer session. We have a 9:00 a.m. hard stop
so that we can--in this open portion, so that we can get to the
closed portion immediately afterwards.
We will be reconvening in Rayburn 2337 immediately after
this open session for the classified session.
Mr. Jenkins, we will go ahead and begin with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. COLBY JENKINS, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW
INTENSITY CONFLICT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Jenkins. Good morning, Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member
Crow, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the global posture
of our nation's Special Operations Forces, or SOF. I am honored
to testify alongside General Fenton.
We are joined here today by two extraordinary Americans who
I would like to take a moment to recognize:
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and
Director of the Special Operations Secretariat, Dr. Sandra
Hobson, seated behind me.
And Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict Senior
Enlisted Advisor Command Master Chief Brad Rhinelander, also
seated behind me.
These dedicated servant leaders bring expertise and
insights, and have been invaluable as we advocate within the
Department of Defense on behalf of our Special Operations Force
members and their families. As a combat veteran Green Beret
myself, the opportunity to work with these incredible teammates
and represent our Special Operations Forces enterprise is
proud, profoundly humbling, and special.
Today's global security environment has become increasingly
complex as AI and other technological advancements rapidly
transform the character of warfare. Threats from state and non-
state actors continue to converge.
Our global competitors actively seek to undermine the
United States and our allies. Terrorist and transnational
criminal networks continue to pose a serious threat to the
homeland. In these turbulent times my office, the Office of
Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict, or SO/LIC, and the
U.S. Special Operations Command remain at the forefront of our
nation's strategic priorities.
Representing less than 2 percent--2 percent--of the defense
budget, our Special Operations Forces provide unique outsized
effects, adding exceptional value to the nation. Tasked with
the most challenging and dangerous missions, Special Operations
Forces remain the world's most lethal, adaptable, and capable
force.
Our priorities for the Special Operations Forces enterprise
are squarely nested within Secretary Hegseth's priorities for
the Joint Force: defend the homeland, strengthen deterrence,
and increase burden sharing with allies and partners.
Our elite warriors deter our adversaries by creating
strategic asymmetric advantages and maintaining irregular
warfare superiority. Leveraging our close relationships with
foreign partners in critical regions, Special Operations Forces
are uniquely positioned to identify and counter our
adversaries' malign and coercive activities. Whether in the
Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Western
Hemisphere, or near our own southern border, these low cost,
small footprint efforts promote stability, empower partners and
allies, and lead efforts against China, terrorists, drug
traffickers, and other threats.
Even with the global increase in demand, our Special
Operations Forces face personnel cuts and resource constraints.
In fact, armed conflict and regional instability have driven a
200 percent increase--200 percent increase--in our crisis
response mission over the past 3 years, while at the same time,
operational and logistics costs for crisis response have
increased 260 percent.
We must ensure Special Operations Force's readiness while
balancing operational demands and optimizing available
resources. We must also promote accountability through rigorous
analytics and data-driven decision-making.
Congress wisely established civilian oversight of Special
Operations to ensure that Special Operations Forces remains
strategically aligned, ethically grounded, and accountable. My
office provides that policy direction, resource advocacy, and
oversight needed to ensure that Special Operations Force's
initiatives and efforts stay focused on warfighter needs and
national objectives without mission creep or undue strain on
the force. This oversight is not bureaucratic, in fact, it is
essentially for effective warfighting.
Our nation's security depends on a strong, agile,
modernized, and accountable Special Operations Forces
enterprise. With your support we will continue ensuring that
Special Operations Forces is ready to deter, fight, and win,
anytime, anywhere.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I invite
you to visit the Special Operations Forces community around the
globe and to meet our servicemembers and their families, and to
see firsthand the capabilities that we bring in the defense of
our nation.
Your continued support is critical.
I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton
can be found in the Appendix on page 31.]
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir.
General Fenton, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL BRYAN P. FENTON, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
General Fenton. Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today.
This month marks 38 years since the creation of Special
Operations Command. We are thankful for Congress' incredible
foresight in creating us and steadfast support ever since.
Joined today by Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter, Shane
exemplifies the unmatched caliber of our non-commissioned
officer corps. If you look at the hardest problems facing our
nation at the darkest corners of this earth, you will our
Special Operations non-commissioned officers solving them. Our
non-commissioned officers exemplify the precision that we value
of your Special Operations teams, and demonstrate our
competitive and comparative advantage. They are the reason we
are envied by militaries around the globe.
It is an honor of a lifetime for Shane and me to represent
the uniformed and civilian members of your Special Operations
Command and the global Special Operations Force warriors from
28 nations, along with interagency partners stationed at our
Special Operations Command headquarters in Tampa.
I am also honored today to testify along Secretary Jenkins
from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict. We have Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict's partnership and support and advocacy to
ensure your Special Operations warriors and their families--we
serve right alongside them--continue to thrive and win.
We are in an era of serious national security challenges:
the border, Communist China, Russia, Iran, North Korea,
terrorist organizations all pose significant threats in
isolation. However, we are increasingly seeing these threats
converge across the globe.
Meanwhile, the character of war is changing faster than we
have ever seen. The innovation cycle now turns in days and
weeks, not months and years. Our adversaries use $10,000 one-
way drones that we shoot down with $2 million missiles. That
cost-benefit curve is upside-down.
To summarize, this is the most complex, asymmetric, and
hybrid threat security environment I have seen in 38 years of
service. Contending with these challenges demands more from
your Special Operations Forces. That requires tough choices,
forcing tradeoffs. We strike the balance of increase in
operations readiness and the need for modernization.
Your elite Special Operations Command team provides an
outsized return on any investment. However, with only 3 percent
of the Department of Defense forces and less than 2 percent of
Department of Defense's budget we are now playing a zero sum
game. Yet, I would submit your Special Operations Forces were
tailor made for this era, rapidly responding to crisis,
disrupting terrorist organizations, and asymmetrically
deterring our adversaries.
Employed expressly at the direction of the President and
the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations Command's crisis
response mission is the nation's most lethal and surgical tool
to eliminate threats to the homeland, rescue American citizens,
and protect our diplomats, all at a moment's notice.
In the past three-and-a-half years the frequency of these
presidentially directed missions significantly increased by 200
percent. Yet, for this sacred obligation we will accept no risk
in today's crisis response mission. Some may think we are done
fighting terror; I would submit terror is not done with us.
Special Operations Command's mission to degrade terrorist
groups starts at our border, spans the globe. In recent months,
your Special Operations teams eliminated over 500 terrorists
who had the intent and capability to strike at our homeland.
Alongside our global Special Operations partners, we have
captured over 600.
Aligned with the department's priorities, deterrence has
long been a part of Special Operations Command's DNA. We are
America's irregular warfare experts. We deter war by altering
our adversaries' decisions below the threshold of conflict in
the gray zone. And we stand ready to prevail if deterrence
fails.
As combatant commands seeks to strengthen deterrence,
requests for Special Operations Command capabilities have
increased by more than 35 percent in the last 2 years alone.
Against that backdrop we continue to grapple with years of flat
budgets, 14 percent decrease in buying power, significant
personnel reductions, and the requirements of all our
technology and authorities. All this forces tradeoffs, tough
choices that challenge current missions and puts modernization
at risk.
Yet, your Special Operations Command remains the world's
premier Special Operations Force. And I pledge to always
provide the nation with the best Special Operations capability
for the fiscal and personnel resources we receive. We will
never compromise on standards in lethality.
We are grateful for this subcommittee's work on novel
approaches to funding and authorities. And I look forward to
taking your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Fenton and Mr. Colby
Jenkins can be found in the Appendix on page 31.]
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, General.
We will start with questions now. And I will start by
recognizing myself.
General Fenton, we had our office call about 3 week s ago,
and you mentioned the challenges of supporting all the requests
of Special Operations Forces that you are getting from the,
from the geographic combatant commands. In your statement you
mentioned the 35 percent increase from 2023 to 2025.
Can you expand a little bit for the benefit of the folks
here watching this hearing?
Can you tell us a little bit, give a better sense of what
that number is and how many times you have had to deny
requests, and the reason that you have to do so?
General Fenton. Representative, I will start by saying the
Combatant Command demand for Special Operations Forces is up.
And I am sure you have heard that from combatant commanders who
have come before you. I think for a number of reasons in
deterrence.
First, they know that the highest value proposition in some
sense that Special Operations Forces provides is prior to
conflict. The things we do to prevent: building relationships,
developing access basing and overflight, providing indications
and warnings; along with everything we are doing to prepare in
the event that worst day comes: posing kill webs or kill
chains, or sensor systems, giving Combatant Command commanders
options and opportunities they wouldn't otherwise have, and
presenting a whole bunch of dilemmas and challenges to an
adversary they wouldn't have.
I think that is why we see the demand going up. And that
comes in the form of asking for Special Forces teams, Marine
Raider teams, Naval Special Warfare teams, Command and Control
elements, Air Force Special Operations Command. And that is
that 35 percent increase.
To your point on where we have had to say no, I will give
you a number. Last December in one of the Global Force
Management Tanks I had to say no 41 times to requests just like
that. It hurt my heart. It is a high compliment that this
Special Operations Forces team has that value proposition to
the entire department. We couldn't do it.
We couldn't do it, and my sense, and I will wind this down
for you, is two reasons:
There is certainly a capability and capacity piece against
the great humans that do that work. And, as you know, we have
been reduced in the past couple years by up to 5,000.
But there is also now a fiscal constraint that is pulling
at us based upon an increasingly decreasing top line, a
decreasing top line. That now comes into play.
So, at times, even if I could put the person out there,
fiscally the cost is prohibitive.
And I will pause there, Representative.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that. We are
going to do our best to fix that.
Secretary Jenkins, Special Operations Command's budget has
been relatively flat for the past decade. In your combined
written statement it is less than 2 percent of the budget, and
one of the few Department of Defense organizations that has not
seen an increase, although overall budget has increased
significantly.
How are you using your service-like secretary position to
campaign for a higher budget for Special Operations Command?
And how much do you think Special Operations Command needs?
Mr. Jenkins. Well, thank you, Chairman. We love those kind
of questions. So, thank you very much.
In my service-like capacity it is very much my, my
responsibility and role to campaign, to keep those sharp elbows
out so that I can advocate on behalf of our Special Operations
Forces enterprise. And just, just last week we had the
opportunity to brief the new Deputy Secretary of Defense and
had a very warm reception in terms of examining what we would
have to propose for 8 percent cuts, because every organization
is being asked to propose those.
And we, we found a good reception in terms of we want to
keep you whole the best that we can.
So, it is our, our responsibility to make sure that we
interact with our service counterparts. That is where we see,
maybe danger is a strong word, but that is when they consider
cuts. There are so many downstream effects to us that aren't
often taken into account when the Army considers a cut, or the
Navy, or so forth.
So, that is where we really hedge our, our, and defend our
budget so that we make sure when services are defending--are
proposing other cuts we can step in early or before and make
sure that we guard our equities as well.
So, it is an ongoing campaign. We have irregular warfare
out against our adversaries, and we also run similar irregular
warfare within, within the department to protect our equities.
Dr. Jackson. Do you have any idea what that number looks
like?
Mr. Jenkins. I don't know the top number just yet. It
hasn't been identified. I have to leave that to the, to the
deputy and the comptroller as well. But I know that those are
actively being considered right now.
Dr. Jackson. Okay, thank you.
My time is essentially up here. So, I am going to yield and
recognize Ranking Member Crow.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Chairman.
Just picking up on that question stream, if there were, if
you were forced to make an 8 percent cut, what would that look
like? Just kind of paint a picture here.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, I am not a doctor, but if I was it would
be cutting into bone. And we are already lean and efficient.
And we try to be good stewards of everything, every penny that
we gratefully receive, but we have to be conscious of making
sure. It is always a good exercise to examine our resources and
make sure that we are posturing for the next, the future war
and not fighting the last war.
Mr. Crow. There is no fat in Special Operations Command.
Mr. Jenkins. There is no fat. No, sir.
Mr. Crow. You are lean and mean as you are supposed to be?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes.
Mr. Crow. So, cutting into that is cutting into valuable
resources and support?
Mr. Jenkins. Correct. Cutting right into the bone for sure.
And so we, we are doing our best to avoid that at all cost.
Mr. Crow. Right.
General Fenton, you know, we have had a number of
conversations about acquisition and rapid fielding
capabilities. So, I wanted to talk about that publicly on the
record a little bit.
Talk to me about the importance of giving you new
authorities that would allow you to go commercial to just
rapidly speed up the acquisition process so we could field new
technologies?
General Fenton. Representative, I think a--thank you for
having those discussions with us. It certainly planted a lot of
ideas in our team, and I hope did the same with yours.
I would start by saying I think when I talk about
modernization some folks may--and transformation, lots of times
folks think technology only. Of course, you know at Special
Operations Command people is the number one priority. We start
there, then we talk about technology.
But we also add authorities in there. And I think on this
piece, this is a modernization that is, I think, long overdue.
The reason I give it in that way, I think about it. Our current
acquisition procurement system--and I mean no harm to everybody
that has been a part of that--but I would just offer it is
outdated. It is glacial. I think it works in years and decades,
and probably rightly so for some of the highest ticket items:
aircraft carrier, bomber, or a fighter.
But what we are seeing through the lens of Ukraine needs to
be an acquisition site and procurement system that is hyper
speed, supersonic. Because over there we are watching the
changes in minutes, hours, and days. And that is a very stark
contrast.
Different. I came in 1987. I was using Vietnam era gear
because that was a generational acquisition procurement
process. That would be unacceptable today.
So, I think starting with that and then acknowledging it is
probably a reflection of requirements, processes that need to
be modified, updated, those authorities changed. If I could say
it so bluntly: take more people out of that system, get less
hands on the requirements process. Go from operator to
commander and then acquisition.
Mr. Crow. And one way would be to allow Combatant
Commanders and others directly down range--
General Fenton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Crow. --who come on the mission to--
General Fenton. Yep.
Mr. Crow. --to create those requirements?
General Fenton. That is right.
And then buckets of money, I think that is a challenge.
There is a lot, I call them handcuffs I guess, this triad at
Operation & Maintenance, Research Development Test &
Evaluation, and procurement pots. I think there is a way to
take a lot of that off, compress the multiple lines to just a
couple, and really modernize there.
And then, and I think lastly, is I think about the
requirements process. It is certainly buckets of time. Give us
multi--give us an opportunity to think through multi-year
processes.
So, 2 years might seem multi-year. But I think to all of us
multi-year probably needs to be 5 to 10 years so we can move--
Mr. Crow. Yes.
General Fenton. --at the speed and evolution of what we are
seeing out on the battlefield.
Mr. Crow. Okay.
My last piece, my own combat experience underscored for me
the importance of protecting civilians, doing everything
possible to minimize civilian casualties. Because not only is
that efficient, you know, less use of ammunition, more focus on
the adversary, less distraction, but it is actually there is a
moral imperative to make sure that we are leading with our
values, we are fighting with our values.
We created a couple of years ago, on a bipartisan basis,
the Armed Service Committee created the Civilian Protection
Center of Excellence. Could you speak very briefly in your own
experience to the importance of making sure that civilians are
protected in the conduct of our missions and what that means
for you as an operator?
General Fenton. Representative, I think you, you laid it
out pretty clearly. I think it is a strategic obligation, you
called it a moral obligation, to accomplish the mission. And
especially when we are talking about high-end kinetics of
eliminating the threat. Yet, also making sure that we protect
non-combatant civilians, vulnerable populations. Because that
sends a very different message, that we are, the United States
of America, will do the mission, get the bad guys so to speak,
but protect those around it.
And I think that differentiates us from the adversaries we
are watching in motion right now.
I think the other piece it sends is a message to the
civilian population in that nation that we are absolutely there
to do the missions against bad actors or bad things but in
many, many ways to be the United States of America that they
know to be and sending a diplomatic message that, you know, we
are, we are here to reassure. And that you can do that in a way
that the, certainly, Special Operations Command approaches
kinetic operations.
General Fenton. Thank you to you both.
I am out of time. I yield back.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you.
Mr. Scott, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Chairman, thank you for being here. I am going to have
to slip to a Rules Committee meeting as soon as I ask
questions.
But I want to mention this, and you don't have to comment
on it, but, General Fenton, the 18X program, my experience with
it is people that we have tried to help get in, the GENESIS
program has pushed out. And I think the GENESIS program would
be more appropriately named the Exodus program.
Most of the people that we would want in Special Operations
are going to have a career in athletics. That means they are
going to have an injury somewhere along the way. And, yet, the
GENESIS program seeks through every line of their medical
history, and if they find any little thing they, they force
them out.
So, somewhere, somehow we have got to find a balance
between getting the right people in the 18X program and getting
them around the GENESIS program.
With that said, the President, and I believe rightfully so,
does see the cartels as foreign terrorist organizations. And
they have directed, he has directed our military forces for
securing our southern border.
My question gets to your authorities and operations and how
they have shifted to address this foreign terrorist threat from
the cartels?
Mr. Jenkins. I can start just from the general authorities.
Mr. Scott. Okay. That is fine.
Mr. Jenkins. As a designation of Foreign Terrorist
Organization, that does not grant us any new authorities, but
it definitely unlocks our ability to work better with our whole
of government approach. You can think in terms of counterthreat
finance and how we can better, more efficiently pass off those
target packets, if you will, to law enforcement. But at the end
of the day it helps us across the force reinforce that border
security is national security.
And we will be ready to defend and provide options to the
President if he so chooses. But that is where we stand in terms
of authorities.
Do you want to add anything to that?
General Fenton. Yeah.
Representative, I would say I would double down on border
security is national security. And I mentioned it in my opening
statement. You know, our part is defend the homeland. And by
looking at it through the lens of counterterrorism first really
starts at our border and goes out across the globe.
I would offer, I would double down, you know, we have
gotten no new authorities or directions, as Secretary Jenkins
mentioned.
And then, but priority and focus certainly has changed. And
I think in that effort you have seen enough of Special
Operations Command teammates to SOCNORTH, Special Operations
Command North, working with General Guillot in United States
Northern Command in order to put together plans, assessments,
and various other documents and opportunities that are required
by the Secretary of Defense and by the department.
Mr. Scott. Well, the 2 percent of the defense budget and
how much you are called on has been addressed a lot, so I will
skip over that and say this: I think you will see the members
of this subcommittee working to make sure that that is
addressed. And I do think that the new Secretary will look
favorably on that.
And, so, you talked a little bit about intelligence and you
have talked a little bit about drones and how drone warfare in
Ukraine has changed really the face of war. How are you working
with the outside industry to develop how we are going to
protect ourselves from drones?
Mr. Jenkins. I can just say just briefly, then talk to the
details. Just to reassert or validate what you, what you said,
sir, I hosted a partner leader in my office a few weeks ago
that is over there, and he reinforced that if you think you are
at the cutting edge of battle and you haven't been to Ukraine,
then you are wrong.
And, so, we are actively taking the lessons that we learn
there that require us to innovate daily, if not hourly, to
adapt and build solutions on the spot that can be employed the
next day instead of weeks and months down the road. We are
definitely taking those lessons and applying them to United
States Indo-Pacific Command and elsewhere.
But in terms of, did you want to talk to the details of
that?
General Fenton. Representative, I think that part of your
question, when we look at Ukraine I think we come away with
what I call strategic lessons: symmetry vs. asymmetry. When I
think about symmetry, that is the things that all nations have
that are military fighting nations for their worst day:
artillery, aircraft carriers, bombers, fighters. And they need
it.
Asymmetry I think is where in this conflict it is showing
itself as 10X, 100X helpful through cost imposition. And I
think when we look at that, certainly through the lens of
Special Operations Command, and put it out figuratively in a
ledger, symmetry vs. asymmetry, our sense is the asymmetry side
of the house is not where we need to be. In many ways it is
probably missing drones of any kind, Artificial Intelligence,
economy, manufacturing.
To your point, that is now the purview in many of those of
the commercial and the private sector. We are absolutely
involved with them in many, many different ways. Personally
going out and meeting them, listening to the things they are
seeing, providing some of our observations and lesson learns
from Ukraine so that those things can be funded. We have tech
pods, two or three folks that are in New York-Boston corridor;
Austin, Texas; Silicon Valley.
And we have all kinds of ways for folks to come see us at
Special Operations Command to talk to us about that. Because we
know that we have got to get busy in changing that ledger.
Mr. Scott. Yeah.
General Fenton. We have got to start filling that thing
with asymmetric anything, hundreds of thousands of air uncrewed
systems, maritime surface, subsurface.
And I would just offer as I end this, that also takes
money. And I think as we think modernization, that is one of
the things that, you know, we are really talking about here. We
are transferring risk into modernization and deterrence. And
that risk in my mind is winning in the future. I think that
that is the challenge right now.
And that will be part of winning, those uncrewed systems
and Artificial Intelligence, and certainly autonomy.
Mr. Scott. Well, I am glad the leash is off. And I hope
that you get the money to get the equipment that you need.
Thank you.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
Mr. Cisneros, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank our
witnesses for being here today.
As a former Under Secretary of Defense of personnel &
readiness, I feel like I have to defend GENESIS in the sense of
what it does and the fact that it does give a picture of
looking at the whole medical thing. But it is the services, not
GENESIS, that decide what is acceptable medically and what is
not.
But, with that, being the former Under Secretary of Defense
of personnel & readiness, readiness was part of my portfolio.
And training fell under, under that.
So, my first question, General Fenton, is going to be about
training. And there was Government Accountability Office report
that came out that said most training accidents are a result of
human error and, concernedly, Special Operations Command lacks
the funding to fully implement a training oversight program.
So, does Special Operations Command have any plan to
conduct any analysis of negative safety trends or reevaluate
training assessment programs since it was reported that 80
percent of non-combat incidents come from training?
General Fenton. Well, Representative, I will start by
saying, first, any accident in training or, worse yet, a death
is absolutely not what we are, we are all about. We are about
rigorous, arduous training so that if in the event some of our
teammates go into combat, that combat is easier than the
training they have seen, and the training we will do over and
over again.
I would take a little bit of umbrage or maybe even skew for
the fact that we don't do continuous estimates of the safety of
our training courses. We do, we have a lot of training courses,
assessment selection for our Army teammates, Air Force
teammates, Marine teammates, Navy teammates. And those are
looked at consistently, usually by what I would call an order
cordon of medical safety, very, very experienced civilian
personnel to continue to address it.
That is our sacred obligation to the moms and dads who send
us their, their sons and daughters for these kind of standard
phase training. And we do that.
So, I think we are always in that motion. We continually
strive to have the very hardest training we can while
protecting the teammates that are certainly the national
treasure sent to us by this nation.
Mr. Cisneros. But do you have the funding that you need in
order to implement the training oversight programs and do
ensuring that the safety of the training is, is at max capacity
there?
General Fenton. Representative, first I will start.
No. I talk about it in terms of modernization.
And I think, as laid out in the opening statement and I
will continue to come back to, training and training exercises,
along with modernizing authorities, modernizing technology, and
when I talk about people, certainly I start with humans more
important than hardware, long held Special Operations Command
truth.
And education for uncertainty is part of the modernization,
and that is our humans.
We absolutely need more money to make sure we are doing
that and keeping up, especially as we make our training
exercises, not our assessment selection processes, more
complex, more complicated so that we emulate what we are
actually seeing on the environment now. Integrated air missile
defense is no longer just about operations security and
distance, now it is almost pure adversary systems everywhere.
So, I think absolutely, Representative.
Mr. Cisneros. No, well, thank you. And I understand. I
mean, the training, like you said, the job and the missions
that your, your servicemembers go out and have to do, they need
to train at optimum levels. So, but we need to make sure.
And I think I don't want to speak for the committee, but I
will do what I can to ensure that you have the funding to
ensure that you have the safety standards that you need to
ensure that it is safe.
Thank you.
Mr. Jenkins, just one question for you here, sir. You know,
Congress created, like, the Special Operations Forces there to
kind of almost make it like another service. But, yet, it is
not really another service because, you know, you are not like
a--you are not in the acting role as a service chief, you are
kind of, the way I think of it, assistant secretary level
there; right?
So, do you feel that the fact that they have kind of taken
this and kind of put it in there and started this off there
away from the services, that that has kind of had an effect on
the funding as to maybe why the services may not be funding
this, or it is not getting funded at the level because you are
not at an equal level? And, yet, the services don't have
control over this anymore, so they are not putting in the
assets that they used to?
Mr. Jenkins. Perhaps. You have landed on some key points
there.
And we are grateful to Congress that Special Operations/Low
Intensity Conflict exists so that we do have those service-like
capabilities.
I do wear two hats where I am: the service-like advisor to
the Secretary of Defense, but I am also a policy advisor. So,
it is a unique Assistant Secretary of Defense shift, as you
said.
And so, so yes, we are constantly keeping our elbows sharp,
making sure that we are at the correct tables with our service
counterparts. And that as they ponder cuts, we can defend our
own equities and make sure that they understand a cut here in
the Army affects Army Special Operations Forces down here, or a
cut in the Navy affects Naval Special Warfare as well.
So, we certainly are grateful for Congress, the
reinforcement that we receive.
Mr. Cisneros. All right. I yield back my time.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Luttrell, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Luttrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to you all
for coming this morning. And for everybody here in the uniform
and veterans, thank you for your service.
General, preservation of forces is one of the things that I
really focused in on as a member of Congress. And it is not, to
kind of roll the tape back, it is not something necessary we,
the shooters, necessarily concentrate on. I think it is more of
the force needs to apply that kind of those, those spaces to
the Special Operations community.
And we have subject matter experts in the Special
Operations community. We have dieticians, nutritionists, we
have exercise scientists, we have a myriad of professionals
that outline everything for our operators. But, yet, when this
information is provided to those operators they have to go out
and buy those supplements and those nutrients, and everything
for that sustainment and that sustainment process with their
own money.
And I wholeheartedly now disagree with that. I think that
that should be something that is provided by the community.
I would like to get your thoughts on that and see, and see,
you know, and get your stance. Because it is downstream that I
am also worried about.
Once the operators, they exit the military and they start
the next chapter in their life we want to make sure that they,
they have the ability to move forward, and they don't end up
bald, broken, with beards and--
Mr. Van Orden. Just say my name.
Mr. Luttrell. I had it.
[Laughter.]
General Fenton. Sir, I want that on the record, I don't
want to look in that direction.
Mr. Luttrell. Yeah, okay. But you know where I am kind of
going.
General Fenton. Yes, sir.
Sir, thank you. I will start with I do want to thank this
Congress and those who came before, those who will come after,
for the Preservation of the Force and Family program. That is
huge inside of an organization that says people are our number
one priority because they are a competitive, comparative
advantage. And in plain language, they are the weapon system.
And I think when you think about it that way, we look at it
through the lens of human performance vice maybe what standards
would be elsewhere for just wellness. And, and I think when we
go to human performance, you are an alumni representative of
what we do, it is a science-based approach to how we work out,
which is very different than maybe 20, 30 years ago.
Nutrition, absolutely as you said, we know that is a key
part. Sleep, it is everything. And we are blessed that that is
part of our, our ecosystem.
I think on the nutrition side we do have the greatest
nutritionists, dietitians. They come from the sports, the high-
end athletic community. And they are taking it like the
tactical athletes that we are. I think on that point they talk
to us quite a bit about upping our game through either third
party certified supplements in a way that they can account for
if we absolutely want to protect our force, putting anything in
the force that is a long-term endangerment. But these are
assessed and checked.
And I think supplements, third party certified, and sports
foods, things that help continue to up the performance, unlike
what maybe our adversaries are doing when they are
experimenting on each other and doing things that we absolutely
would not do to any of our teammates.
So, I, I absolutely think that is something we need to
consider. And we certainly look for your support on that.
Mr. Luttrell. Thank you.
And, so, Mr. Jenkins, when you are chatting with the
Secretary of Defense, if you would be so kind to bring this
point to him that, hey, this--he knows this. I have had this
conversation with him. But I want this to resonate not only
from the committee but to the leadership in the Department of
Defense that this is an area that needs to be filled. This is a
gap. This is a gap that we shouldn't have any longer.
Mr. Jenkins. You bet.
And, as you know, our Secretary of Defense, our
servicemembers are his first priority. You see him doing
physical training with them. At every turn he is, he is
engaging. So, definitely, that would be top of mind.
Mr. Luttrell. Okay. When it comes to preventive
maintenance, and I like to focus in on traumatic brain injury,
and I want to make sure that the forces are, you know, we are
gifted, we are innovative, creative thinkers and we adapt very
well. I want to make sure that we are concentrating on things
that we can carry with us on the battlefield for preventive
maintenance, but post-blast medical procedures, whether or not
we are talking about blast packs or--I don't want that to kind
of take a, take, get back on its heels and stall out any.
So, I know that you and I have had this conversation quite
a bit. But I need you to hear me say this, and I would like
you, you can respond to that if you would like.
General Fenton. I want to give you a commitment right back.
I appreciate you saying I want to double down.
I would just pull a thread from the last conversation. I
think some of these third party supplements, and I probably
don't know them by name, also have efficacy against TBI and
other things that our nutritionists have looked at. So, I think
there is a thread to be pulled.
And I double down on my commitment to you. We will not back
up on either the TBI side, which we, when we talk about as
acute brain injury, or even the repeat exposure to blast, which
is a chronic piece that I hope many of you got to see me talk
about on 60 Minutes, and reinforce Special Operations Command's
commitment to that.
So, you have my commitment to both of those,
Representative.
Mr. Luttrell. Thank you, sir.
Sir, I yield back.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you.
Ms. Jacobs, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General
Fenton, Mr. Jenkins for being here.
First I just want to thank you for your great comments on
the importance of addressing civilian harm. I know that there
is some conversation in the Administration about shutting down
the Center of Excellence. And so, I appreciate how forcefully
you have advocated for the importance of addressing this issue.
I also just wanted to make sure I, we got on the record, I
know you said the foreign terrorist organization designation of
the Mexican drug cartels does not give you any new
authorizations. Is that accurate?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. And are there any planning or
preparations for military action occurring within Mexico?
Mr. Jenkins. Ma'am, I can't speak to active ongoing
discussions. But it is our sacred obligation to make sure that
we are prepared and ready to provide options for the President
should he decide.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. And given that the foreign terrorist
organization designation does not give you additional
authorities, is it your understanding that before any potential
use of military force in Mexico you would need to come back to
Congress for explicit congressional authorization?
Mr. Jenkins. Ma'am, that would, that would fall to our
Commander-in-Chief and the engagement between the Executive
Branch and Congress. Yes, ma'am, I would, I would think there
would be discussion there.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. Excellent.
General Fenton, I wanted to ask you about Africa. The
record of Special Operations Forces operations in Africa have
been mixed; right? We have had some tactical successes, some,
you know, evident strategic outcomes such as stability
governance and lasting reduction in extremist activity remain
elusive.
And we have seen it in Somalia and the Sahel.
So, given these outcomes, how is Special Operations Command
adjusting its approach to ensure that future engagements yield
more sustainable results and avoid unintended consequences,
such as inadvertently contributing to regional instability?
General Fenton. Representative, I will start by saying that
when I, when I look at partnerships, wherever they may be, and
certainly through the lens of Special Operations Command's
premier partner organizations and the way there are components
in our theater Special Operations Command there, I probably
take a bit of long-term view, maybe all the way back to the
1950s when Special Operations and our Marine Special Operation
Command, Air Force Special Operation Command, Naval Special
Warfare teams all started.
So, I think the record is mostly on the upside in terms of
partnership across the globe. I would probably say the same
thing in Africa. And I think that is attributable to when there
are challenges.
I think we are an incredibly fast-learning organization.
What we do to address them in terms of maybe it is how we vet
differently, if we are talking about a certain type of forces.
It could be about authorities we need modernized so that we
can move faster and then meet the partner nations' demands.
I think all of those really go towards at some point we
have a common interest. We want to go from some level of burden
sharing to burden owning by that nation, and at some point them
leading in that burden. And I think to do that we are always
going to learn lessons. But I can commit to you that we are
always bringing them back in a virtual cycle to our force and
then inserting them in an institutionalized way, and then doing
it all over again.
Ms. Jacobs. That is really helpful.
What do you think the lessons are, then, from some of the
sort of strategic failures we have had in the Sahel?
General Fenton. So, I don't know that Special Operations
Forces has had strategic failures, just to be on the record
myself. I think there are certainly strategic lessons to be
learned.
And I think the first one, if I could give, is we need to
do more information operations. I think there is a void. And
this is not only in Special Operations Command. It is probably
Department of Defense, it is probably across the interagency.
That information operation void I think in many ways allowed
adversaries to get in there and mistruths, untruths, falsities,
put a different narrative based on their view of the world,
what they wanted, and mostly the great work we have done for
years.
So, I think information operations is number one.
Silence is consent. If we are not informing and we are not
leveraging that as a traditional activity, I think we are
seizing space.
Probably the second one is an opportunity to really
understand the other partners there besides just that nation,
so, partners from across the globe and what are their agendas.
And I think we get better at that every time.
They will be the two put against a backdrop of Africa.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
Mr. Jenkins, anything you wanted to add about Special
Operations Forces, Special Operations Forces operations in
Africa?
Mr. Jenkins. We want to make sure that our--there are three
primary lines of effort that we are focusing on: defend the
homeland, deter China, and make sure that shift burdens to our
allies and partners. So, anything that affects those three
lines of effort, if we see threats emanating from West Africa
or otherwise, we need to take every opportunity we can to
mitigate that.
Thank you.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you.
Against my better judgment, Mr. Van Orden, you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Van Orden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I notice that my
colleague from Texas abandoned his post knowing that I had the
microphone next.
I just want to emphasize something, Mr. Jenkins, that you
mentioned. And we have had this discussion, we have had this
discussion since first brought it up.
The Army Special Operations Green Berets are named after a
hat. And the SEALS are named after how we go to work, right?
Sea, air, and land, those are the methods of infiltration for
us to accomplish a mission.
And when general purpose forces cut these platforms, we
simply can't go to work. And it would be interesting to know
what is your coordination process with general purpose forces
when they are speaking about cutting these platforms? I mean,
is there a formalized process, sir?
Mr. Jenkins. There are. There are different--and thank you
for calling that out because that is very much right in our
bailiwick where we need to defend our equities.
There are different processes: Deputy's Management Action
Groups, Reform Management Groups, where we are able to sit with
our services, with other representatives from Comptroller and
the Deputy's Office where, where proposals can be put forward
and we can, we can battle back. We can defend ourselves.
Mr. Van Orden. In the spirit of bipartisanship, bring up
Mr. Cisneros' point, when you sit at the table, I mean, are you
at the kid table at Thanksgiving or are you, like, sitting with
everybody and you're pulling you weight. Meaning does your,
does your assessment have value in these scenarios when you're
speaking about cutting, you know, multi-billion dollar, multi-
year platforms?
Mr. Jenkins. We certainly have to. It is a constant
struggle to make sure that our elbows stay sharp.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay.
Mr. Jenkins. But we are at, for example, just last week I
was sitting two chairs down from the deputy briefing our
budget, our Special Operations Forces budget.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay.
Mr. Jenkins. And had the full room to our, to our attention
and support so we could.
But to your point, we have to, it is a constant struggle.
It is, it is a different culture to think of Special Operations
Forces--
Mr. Van Orden. Oh, I know.
Mr. Jenkins. --as a service. So, that is why we appreciate
Congress' support so that we are there.
Mr. Van Orden. Very well. Thank you.
And, I am sorry, I am remiss for not recognizing the Master
Chief and Command Sergeant Major here. Thanks for coming here,
boys. It is good to see you.
Less than 2 percent of the Department of Defense budget is
spent on Special Operations Forces operations; correct?
Everyone here, I think everyone at least over here has done
Joint Combined Exercise for Training. Sometimes we could call
it training tomorrow's enemies today. And we have a pretty good
track record as training people that we should not, from the
School of Americas in the Seventies and, you know, we were
training Taliban, armed them, equipped them, did all this
stuff. We have created our own enemies.
And, so, I am wondering what percentage of the Special
Operations Forces budget is used for the Joint Combined
Exercise Training programs?
Mr. Jenkins. Well, I don't know that specifically off the
top of my head, but we can get that for you.
Mr. Van Orden. I would appreciate that tremendously.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 55.]
And then along with that, so, two tasks for you. It is
homework because you are not going to be able to answer this
right away.
So, that is not a--I am not impugning your knowledge, I am
just saying this is kind of a detailed question.
So, I would like to know what percentage of SOF's budget is
used for Joint Combined Exercise Training programs.
I also would like to know what percentage of the Special
Operations Forces budget is used for the Special Operations
Forces skills that are on Smoke Bomb Hill when we are talking
about nation building stuff.
I understand you are going to cut some of your
psychological operations down. I agree with that completely.
So, if you could get it, you know, on a piece of paper and
tell us how much of our budget is, Special Operations Forces
budget is being expended for these Special Operations Forces
skills for nation building, which have done horribly across the
world since Vietnam, honestly. And then what percentage
specifically for Joint Combined Exchange Trainings. That would
be awesome.
Mr. Jenkins. Will do.
Mr. Van Orden. Thank you, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 55.]
General Fenton, you understand your component commanders
start with the operational and Operation & Maintenance deficit
every year; right?
General Fenton. I do, sir.
Mr. Van Orden. And, so, our guys are filling out Unfunded
Requirements, unfunded requests, on the regular just to be able
to do their job?
General Fenton. Yep.
Mr. Van Orden. Correct?
General Fenton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay. So, here is what I would like for you,
sir. What I would like is, by component commander, what is the
delta between what they are given every year and then the total
of the Unfunded Requirements on average, let's say a 5-year
average, so that we, under this chairman's leadership can,
hopefully, plus up all the Operation & Maintenance budgets for
our Special Operations Forces Component Commands.
General Fenton. Will do.
Mr. Van Orden. Give us real numbers.
General Fenton. You will get numbers.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 55.]
And, Representative, if I might, so infraction. Just on
Joint Combined Exercise Training, I think one side of that
coin.
Mr. Van Orden. Yes.
General Fenton. You know there is also, there is many of
our teammates are not building nations, but those Joint
Combined Exercise Trainings go against building, high-end, tier
forces in a lot of those countries that have stayed with us for
quite some time.
Mr. Van Orden. General Fenton, I'm the longest serving
enlisted member of the United States military--
General Fenton. Yes.
Mr. Van Orden. --to ever be elected to Congress--
General Fenton. Yes.
Mr. Van Orden. --and I also have the most years as a
Special Operations Forces operative of any member of Congress
in the history of our country and I know exactly what the hell
I am talking about, sir.
General Fenton. Roger to that, Representative.
I would just add that many of those have then become
security exporters. Although, I think if we pegged out a track
record, and I probably owe you that, on where those that not
just been nation building and somehow turned enemy, but have
gone on to burden-share, to burden-owe(?), to lead, I think
those are great stories. And I can talk about them in closed
that we ought not to forget about.
Mr. Van Orden. Thank you, General. I appreciate it.
General Fenton. Thanks.
Mr. Van Orden. I yield back.
General Fenton. Thanks, Representative.
Dr. Jackson. Mr. Harrigan, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Harrigan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thanks for your testimony this morning. It is
good to see both of you.
General Fenton, I had the opportunity to spend a weekend
down with General Braga at United States Army Special
Operations Command. And one of the things that we were talking
about is, that concerned me greatly, is that the Green Berets
are currently only producing about half the number that they
are attriting each year through separation or retirement.
What are we doing across the force, specifically that is a
conversation about Green Berets, but what are we doing across
the force to make sure that we are actually replacing the
number of Special Operatives that we need?
General Fenton. Representative, I will start by saying
first we maintain the standards; right? And as I look at that
it is a challenge to get a production that in cases I think we
are talking about Special Forces enlisted. I think the
requirement, General Braga could probably talk to you, it is
about 825.
When the force overall shrinks, that certainly shrinks down
our input pipeline. And we are not going to adjust the
standards. And we have had this conversation with the Secretary
of Defense, rules all about lethality and warfighting.
And I talked a bit about production rates. And I think at
the very end he said, maintain the standards. Roger that.
Now, that isn't don't do other work to try to get more in
the pipeline. So, I think with some level of force size
reduction in the Army--we are talking about the Army here--that
is a challenge of who wants to come in the pipeline.
I will offer that we've tried to amp up 18X program which
has been, and hopefully General Braga explained, has been a
really good program. It is about 3,000 folks who otherwise
would not be coming into the Army coming in off the street,
going through entry basic training, advanced training, and then
going through Special Forces Assessment and Selection and the
qualification course. And that 3,000, about 800 make it.
So, there are about 2,200 just reinforcing the standard
that go back to the Army and serve in all kind of infantry
units and do well.
I do think there is a way we can amp that up, not only for
the good of the Green Berets, a part of the Joint Force, but
also to bring in additional folks into the Army who would
otherwise not even think about the Army unless they were coming
towards Special Operations. So, we have got the same type of
contracts with Ranger contracts.
So, I think there is a lot out there worth trying to do.
But I think it all goes against we will absolutely maintain the
standards. We have had a recent audit, and that audit from the
Department of Defense has come back that we are maintaining the
standards.
So, I think we have got some challenges.
Mr. Harrigan. Yeah. Thanks, General for that. And thank you
for maintaining the standards. It is incredibly important.
And I would like to take the rest of my time and talk about
drones.
Mr. Jenkins, you talked about we need to be actively taking
lessons and innovate from current conflicts.
General, you talked about a supersonic acquisition and
procurement process, that we are moving at a glacial pace, that
we have an outdated system. And you also said that we are still
at the talking stage with industry with respect to small
drones.
General Fenton. Representative, no, we are well in
discussion. I just wanted to make sure that folks understood.
Maybe I misstated. We are in constant discussion with small and
medium size companies that are in this business. And in many
ways we have some of their product already.
So, we are not just talking, we are actually doing it.
Mr. Harrigan. Okay.
General Fenton. We need to do more.
Mr. Harrigan. I appreciate that because I was a, I was a
little concerned by the statement, I think, we need to move a
little bit faster in Special Operations Forces.
General Fenton. Roger. So, we are absolutely. But I am
never happy.
Mr. Harrigan. Absolutely.
General Fenton. I want to go speedier. So, I won't be
complacent, but we are well in the thick of this.
Mr. Harrigan. One of the lessons that I have picked up from
Ukraine is that their production process of how they are
manufacturing these First Person View drones which we have
discovered are responsible for 80 percent of the Russian
casualties on the front lines. These have become a very, very
important and transformational technology on the battlefield.
It is that they have somewhat of a hybrid mechanism of
production, some outside industries, some internal.
Are you open to a possibility that in order to actually
create this capability at scale that part of that effort may
actually need to be done organically within the force, given
all the frustrations and constraints that we have with our
defense industrial base and our acquisition process at this
time?
General Fenton. I absolutely am, Representative. I think we
are already doing it throughout all of Special Operations
Forces. We have got incredible folks who come in who not only
want to shoot those, communicate, do combatives, get after what
I call the Special Operations Forces basics that are the
baseline. They are all into putting this stuff together and
getting it out in a homemade way and doing them. And hundreds I
think are challenges at some point to scale that. There is
probably a private sector piece that has got to come in.
But I think in many ways we are doing that. We need to be
able to scale that. And we want to scale more.
Mr. Harrigan. Thank you.
Mr. Jenkins. If I could just double down, that costs money,
too. That costs money.
Thank you.
Mr. Harrigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you.
Mr. Ryan, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I know we have a hard stop
so I will--if you need to cut me off, that is fine. I was late.
Thank you both for being here. And thank you for all the
work you are doing and have done.
I want to pick up on what you said, General Fenton, earlier
about Information Operations and both the importance and
opportunity and, frankly, really the high Return On Investment
we have had on doing Information Operations versus cost of a
lot of other things we have talked about today.
And, specifically within that realm I want to focus on
Military Information Support Operations and United States Indo-
Pacific Command--you know, Military Information Support
Operations within United States Indo-Pacific Command Area of
Responsibility. I am pretty sure you guys are still designated
as the joint proponent for Military Information Support
Operations across, across the Joint Force.
As I have heard from various folks across the force, while
there is a continued investment in this area, we are still
seeing that across the different components and Theater Special
Operations Commands with a pretty wide variety of capability
and, specifically, tech tools and data that is available from
Theater Special Operations Commands to Theater Special
Operations Commands.
Have you guys looked at standardizing tools across the
force for Military Information Support Operations so that kind
of Combatant Command and Theater Special Operations Command
commanders can better plan and sort of know what they are going
to get?
Mr. Jenkins. I can just talk policy real quick.
Within Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict we have
the Information Operation Policy Office that sits in oversight
of all the Information Operations, Military Information Support
Operations plans across all the Combatant Command. So, that is
a tremendous tool to make sure that our messages are seen, that
we are coordinating with our interagency partners as well,
which in the past was not necessarily the case. We had
Information Operations messages going across each other.
And, so, synchronization is, is working at the policy level
even down to the tactical.
Do you want to expand on that?
General Fenton. I will just hit the part of we are trying
to make that a balance, as you mentioned. Because we want folks
to continue to innovate.
And then there is a balance between standardization. And I
think we are always looking at that, Representative, in the
right way through Special Operations Force size so we don't
suffocate innovation, which is for the here and now
modernization for tomorrow.
But I would offer that where I see standardization, because
I don't have the modernization money I am unable to scale it.
Almost back to the previous discussion.
So, I think that is a challenge. If we find something, if
we want to bring it across all the theater Special Operations
Command, that costs, that takes funds. And I think in that
arena that those are many of the things of modernization we are
not able to do.
Mr. Ryan. Yeah. And I just want to reiterate that I think
that is one of the smartest and, frankly, lowest dollar
investments we can make and provide huge leverage in terms of
when you have identified those, come back to us so that we can
figure out how to, how to help you scale that across.
I know just big--I only have 2 minutes, but I want to pick
up also on what I have heard as I came in around this idea of
sort of burden sharing and shifting of burden. I have heard
that used a lot now in the last few months. I don't really know
what we are, what we are talking about there.
Can you, either of you or both of you, in the time we have
expand on that? I am, frankly, I am concerned about that given
I feel like that could mean we are backing away from critical
partnerships that you all in your forces have built through
blood, sweat, and tears over many, many decades. Maybe I am
wrong. Can you help me understand that?
Mr. Jenkins. Yeah. I will just briefly start high and then
we will go down to the weeds.
Just from my own personal experience, for example, working
in Colombia as part of Plan Colombia, working by, with, and
through our partners there, foreign internal defense that's
core to our mission, building that partner nation capacity
allows us as a nation to build partners that are fully--
Mr. Ryan. No, no, not to interrupt you. I understand that.
That is something I want to make sure we continue.
Mr. Jenkins. We are not backing away from partners. We are
just making sure that those partners that have capability and
capacity can now operate on their own a little bit more
efficiently. And then we can have priorities as well.
Mr. Ryan. And I just--well, go ahead, General.
General Fenton. First, I will be happy to cover a really
detailed one in the closed session, Representative. And then I
will double down on Secretary Jenkins.
We are not backing away. I think it is a key part of who
Special Operations Command is. It is in our DNA to be a premier
partner force. Right now almost 7,000 folks across 80 different
countries persistently present. And I think that is, that is
the way we do business.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you. I commend that. I agree.
And I just want to make sure that is a message that we are
sending loud and clear. And I appreciate you saying that. And
ask that others in the Administration continue to reiterate
that we are not backing away from those critical partnerships.
General Fenton. And, Representative, it would be
dereliction of my duties if I didn't say and that cost of that
is also going up.
Mr. Ryan. Yep.
General Fenton. You know, the price to have somebody out
there doing that, which I think is a global sensor, provides
opportunities and advantages to Combatant Commands, at the
price of sustaining the humans when I come out of the Middle
East has gone up exponentially.
So, those are risks carried out. So, we may--won't mean we
are backing away from partners. Might mean the fiscal
constraint plus the personnel piece can put us in a place we
can't do it.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you.
With this, we are just going to close the open session
here. We are going to immediately reconvene in 2337 for the
classified session.
I just want to say before we leave, thank you, gentlemen,
for your time today. I want to say thank you to everyone in the
audience that is in uniform for your service. We all recognize
the sacrifice of you and your families and the value that we
get from that. You are protecting our country. And we want to
just say thank you.
So, with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 9:02 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 9, 2025
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 9, 2025
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 9, 2025
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. VAN ORDEN
Mr. Jenkins. In FY 2024, 0.351% of the USSOCOM budget was
used for the Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET) Program.
For FY 2025, 0.429% of the USSOCOM budget is planned for the
JCET Program. [See page 19.]
General Fenton. In total, the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command accounts for 16% of the USSOCOM budget. We would need
clarification on what specific mission sets or capabilities you
are referring to and what is meant by nation building, to
provide a complete and accurate response. [See page 19.]
General Fenton. First, I'd like to reiterate USSOCOM's
support for the FY26 President's Budget Request submission. The
USSOCOM FY 2026 Budget Request is aligned with the Department's
focus on reviving the warrior ethos, rebuilding the military,
and reestablishing deterrence through our strategic priorities
of People, Win, and Transform. Your Special Operation Forces
embody the warrior ethos and uphold uncompromising standards.
USSOCOM's internal unfunded requirements (UFR) from FY 2020 to
FY 2024 averaged about $58M and have mainly been driven by
increased deployment costs that were not offset by
Congressionally appropriated supplemental funding. Internal
UFRs can be broken into two categories: deployments and crisis
response. While deployment funding is executed by component
commanders, each contingency has different requirement costs
that are not distinctly separated by component.
Deployments: Prior to FY21, deployment costs were not as
significant and were primarily contained in the USCENTCOM and
USAFRICOM AORs ($3.50/day). However, expansion into other AORs
over the last few years, with significantly higher daily rates,
has led to unplanned cost increases. USSOCOM internally funding
increased deployments imposes costs at the expense of training,
readiness, and other Command initiatives. UFRs were not
submitted in FY21, because COVID-19 caused a reduction in
deployments.
Crisis Response: Prior to FY23, Crisis Response was funded
internally by USSOCOM and normally at the detriment to training
and readiness. In FY23 USSOCOM received a $25 million UFR from
DoD and reprogrammed an additional $30 million from other
Command priorities to accomplish the Crisis Response (CR)
mission. In FY24, Israel Supplemental funding was provided to
fund requirements. [See page 19.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 9, 2025
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. What is the primary role of SOF in the Baltics, and how
does it support broader U.S. and NATO objectives in deterring Russian
aggression?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. How does USSOCOM tailor its operations in the Baltics to
address the specific threats posed by hybrid warfare tactics, such as
disinformation or cyberattacks from Russia?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. Can you describe a recent SOF exercise in the Baltics
that strengthened regional security or interoperability with Baltic
nations?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. How does USSOCOM collaborate with Baltic special
operations forces, and what unique capabilities do these partners bring
to joint missions?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. What challenges do SOF face in operating in the Baltics,
given the proximity to Russia and the potential for rapid escalation in
a crisis?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. How does USSOCOM contribute to building resilience among
Baltic populations against Russian influence operations or
unconventional threats?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. What role does SOF play in enhancing NATO's Enhanced
Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltics and how is this coordinated with
conventional forces?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. What lessons have SOF learned from operating in the
Baltics that could apply to other frontline regions facing similar
threats from near-peer adversaries?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. How is SOF leveraging intelligence-sharing with Baltic
nations and other NATO partners to monitor and counter Russian
activities in the region?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. In what ways is SOF training Baltic forces to improve
their own capabilities in irregular warfare or territorial defense?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. How does USSOCOM adapt its tactics, techniques, and
procedures to the Baltic environment, such as its terrain, climate, or
urban-rural mix?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. What emerging technologies or capabilities are SOF
deploying in the Baltics to stay ahead of Russian innovations in
electronic warfare or drones?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. How do SOF operations in the Baltics contribute to the
U.S. strategy of great power competition, particularly in countering
Russia's regional ambitions?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. Looking forward, how do you envision the role of SOF
evolving in the Baltics as tensions with Russia persist or intensify?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. What lessons have SOF learned from operating in the
Baltics that could apply to other frontline regions facing similar
threats from near-peer adversaries?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. How does USSOCOM assess the current capabilities of
Moldovan SOF, and what specific training programs could further enhance
their capabilities?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. Moldova's military has historically relied on aging
Soviet-era equipment. What opportunities does USSOCOM see for providing
technical assistance or non-lethal equipment to Moldovan SOF to improve
their operational effectiveness?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. Moldova is a NATO partner but not a member. How does
USSOCOM balance its engagement with Moldovan SOF to strengthen
bilateral ties without overstepping Moldova's neutral stance in
international alliances?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. Romania's SOF have evolved significantly since the
establishment of the Special Operations Forces Command in 2018. How
does USSOCOM evaluate Romania's progress in aligning its SOF
capabilities with NATO standards, and what areas still require
development?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. Romanian SOF have benefited from training with U.S.
instructors, including US Army Special Forces courses. What future
opportunities does USSOCOM foresee for deepening operational
collaboration, such as joint deployments or intelligence sharing?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. As a NATO ally on the Black Sea coast, Romania plays a
strategic role in Eastern Europe. Does USSOCOM see Romanian SOF taking
on a leadership role in coordinating multinational SOF operations in
the region, and how might the U.S. support this?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. Romania has experience in international missions like
Afghanistan. How does USSOCOM plan to leverage Romanian SOF expertise
in counterterrorism and hybrid warfare to address threats from state
and non-state actors near NATO's eastern front?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. The U.S. has supported the development of Romania's
Special Forces Qualification Course. Are there additional investments
or resources USSOCOM could provide to enhance Romania's SOF training
infrastructure, such as advanced simulation technologies or specialized
facilities?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. Romania's more advanced SOF could potentially mentor
Moldova's developing forces. Does USSOCOM have plans to encourage or
formalize such a mentorship dynamic, possibly under U.S. oversight?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. Both nations have participated in U.S.-led exercises
like Rapid Trident and JCET. How could USSOCOM structure future
exercises to maximize synergy between Moldovan and Romanian SOF units,
particularly in scenarios involving regional crisis response?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. How does USSOCOM envision the long-term partnership with
Moldovan and Romanian SOF contributing to U.S. strategic goals in
Eastern Europe, particularly in countering Russian influence?
General Fenton. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Scott. The USCG employs assets like cutters and unmanned
systems that could complement SOF maritime capabilities. Does USSOCOM
have plans to collaborate on joint development or deployment of
technologies, such as small boat platforms or advanced sensors, to
enhance mission effectiveness?
General Fenton. The Special Operations Forces (SOF) Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics organization has a history of technology
collaboration with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). In recent years, the
USCG integrated a version of SOF Combatant Craft Forward-Looking
Infrared 2 (CCFLIR 2) sensors into several USCG craft, maximizing the
situational awareness of the platforms in a variety of environmental
conditions. Both SOF and the USCG benefit from sharing the cost
associated with/ maintenance and sustainment of these sensors.
Mr. Scott. Has USSOCOM considered formalizing personnel exchange
programs with the USCG, such as embedding SOF operators with Coast
Guard deployable specialized forces or vice versa, to build mutual
understanding and operational cohesion?
General Fenton. USSOCOM and combatant commanders already enjoy a
formal, robust exchange of liaison officers and engagement activities
with the USCG. There is a full-time USCG O-6 liaison officer embedded
in the USSOCOM J3 Operations Directorate who is fully connected and
cognizant of almost all USSOCOM actions.
Similarly, the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) have
full access to the support from the USCG liaison officers at their
respective combatant commands, as well as any joint interagency task
forces (JIATFs) in their AOR, such as JIATF-West, and/or JIATF-South.
Additionally, there are numerous annual opportunities for SOF/USCG
joint activities, such as sniper training, visit, board, search, and
seizure (VBSS) training, service and joint staff exercises, including
security cooperation events (e.g., the USCG provides personnel to
instruct small outboard motor maintenance, and the SOF Naval Special
Warfare personnel provide small-boat tactics).
Mr. Scott. The USCG often operates in gray-zone environments where
irregular warfare tactics are relevant. How might USSOCOM assist the
Coast Guard in adapting SOF expertise-such as psychological operations
or civil affairs-to maritime law enforcement challenges?
General Fenton. The separation of the maritime law enforcement
mission of the USCG and the direct action/irregular warfare mission of
USSOCOM is supported with corresponding differences in operational
authorities that may not be granted to both commands.
For example, psychological operations (PSYOP) conducted by SOF
require very restricted and specific authorities the USCG may not have.
So even if the tactics, techniques, and procedures or schoolhouse
courses are shared with the USCG, that service may not have the
authority to use those skills. Although there continue to be cases
where the USCG conducts operations, such as overseas port security and
VBSS, expanding the mission sets to include PSYOP and civil affairs
(CA) must be considered very carefully. However, there is nothing to
preclude USCG personnel from attending various SOF CA and PSYOP
courses.
Mr. Scott. How does USSOCOM view the long-term strategic
partnership with the USCG in addressing emerging threats and what
specific initiatives could strengthen this relationship?
General Fenton. USSOCOM views long-term strategic partnership with
the USCG in terms of two primary efforts: 1) defending the homeland
from threats posed by terrorist groups, including the illicit
activities of cartels operating out of Central and South America; 2)
enabling our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific to push back
against the malicious activities of China in the region. The USCG has
learned many lessons from its decades-long fight against illegal
smuggling of drugs, weapons, and people, from which USSOCOM can learn
as we take a more deliberate approach to countering cartels in the
Western Hemisphere. In addition, the coast guards of allies and
partners in the Indo-Pacific, such as the Philippines, have proven an
important tool in the fight against the illegal and expansive Chinese
territorial claims in the East and South China Seas.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
Dr. Jackson. I trust you are aware of the threat of Ubiquitous
Technical Surveillance - from your standpoint are we executing a
coordinated strategy to deal with such a threat? In your opinion who
owns or should own that strategy? What measures will you implement to
conduct thorough digital risk assessments aimed at identifying and
mitigating vulnerabilities exploited through UTS?
General Fenton. Yes, we are executing a coordinated strategy to
deal with ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS). In the 2024 National
Counterintelligence Strategy, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence through the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center (NCSC) identified the growing threat of cutting-edge
technologies, such as technical surveillance equipment being employed
by foreign intelligence entities, and goals for the intelligence
community to mitigate.
The NCSC, chartered as the nation's premier source for
counterintelligence and security expertise, leads the development of a
whole-of-government strategy to address the challenges of UTS.
In accordance with the 2024 National Counterintelligence Strategy
guidance, the USSOCOM Directorate of Intelligence (J2), as the office
of primary responsibility for the UTS problem set, in close
collaboration with the Directorate of Operations (J3), has developed
procedures to assess the counterintelligence risks of ongoing
operational activities. Specifically, the J2 leverages sensitive
intelligence reporting to identify adversary capabilities to exploit
UTS threat vectors and develop mitigation techniques to secure those
operations, activities, and investments in accordance with the NCSC
strategy for the Intelligence Community.
Dr. Jackson. China has deployed one of the most sophisticated UTS
ecosystems in the world, leveraging AI-powered surveillance, mass data
aggregation, and biometrics to monitor its citizens and foreign
individuals operating in China and beyond. The CCP's use of commercial
technology for intelligence gathering extends to U.S. military
personnel, business executives, and government officials traveling
abroad. Given this reality, what immediate steps is SOCOM taking to
ensure the SOF personnel are proactively identifying and countering UTS
threats posed by adversarial state actors like China?
General Fenton. For the last several fiscal years, USSOCOM's SOF
service component commands have realigned existing funding to
incorporate training to simulate the threats posed by UTS and evaluate
mitigation techniques. The USSOCOM director of Intelligence identified
the potential long-term sustainability of this approach and is
sponsoring a capability-development requirement to gain efficiencies
across the enterprise.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HAMADEH
Mr. Hamadeh. Given the active-duty cuts, how could you potentially
fill some of these gaps by boosting the capabilities of, and
reorganizing, some of the reserve PSYOP and CA units? How can we better
integrate reserve PSYOP and CA with the broader Army? Specifically, I'd
like to ask the following for additional detail: A. How could missions
increase for COMPO 3, and handoffs between COMPO 1 and COMPO 3 be
improved, given the separate structures and coordination challenges
between SOCOM for active, and USARC and FORSCOM for reserve? B. COMPO 1
PSYOP often deploys with less than their required force. The same
service members often brush up against dwell time issues, preventing
them from other deployments. Constant deployments, schools, and workups
leads to lower retention which causes further headcount issues. With at
the vast majority of PSYOP forces residing in COMPO 3, what efforts are
being made to integrate and utilize these resources?
C. What could be the advantages and considerations of relocating
the reserve PSYOP and CA school from Fort Jackson (now co-located with
the human resources school) to Fort Bragg, to be near the active-duty
PSYOP and CA footprint? D. What could be the advantages and
considerations of moving a USACAPOC reserve unit-whether CA, PSYOP, or
IO-to Ft. Huachuca in Arizona, with the intent to better integrate the
unit into the joint planning process with Ft. Huachuca's latest in
human intelligence, unmanned vehicles and AI, and web-based information
warfare? E. Experienced PSYOP and CA reservists seeking active duty
face a dilemma: despite recruitment shortfalls in the active component,
the reservists must pass selection or risk a forced career change. This
discourages reservists from applying. Can selection for reservists
seeking active duty be made available pre-contract to avoid this risk,
without compromising standards? F. How could some of the reserves be
slimmed down in order to cover the costs of preserving and expanding
capabilities to better support COMPO 1?
Mr. Jenkins. ASD SO/LIC exercises policy oversight of the
organization, training, and equipping of U.S. Special Operations Forces
(USSOF). It does not however provide policy oversight over reserve
PSYOP and CA forces. The capacity of reserve forces to sustainably
support the active component may be better addressed by the U.S. Army
and/or Reserve Command.
USSOCOM, in conjunction with the combatant commands (CCMDs) and the
Army Reserve, previously demonstrated their ability to transfer USSOF
requirements to general purpose forces. This required deliberate
processes to overcome the challenges often seen in the Reserve force
such as manpower, readiness, and funding. Long pre and post
mobilization training is another factor that limits transfer of mission
requirements to U.S. Army Reserve (COMPO3). Operationally, the CCMDs
own the mission requirements and identify their mission requirements
two years out. This timeline precludes the planning of funds for
deployment and training.
Solutions to COMPO 3 readiness and manpower issues include an
increase in recruitment, to potentially include direct commissions, and
an increase in funding for unit or individual Annual Training
(typically 14 days a year) and Unit Training Assembly days. As the Army
is looking at combining and integrating information forces and force
structure, to include COMPO3, there is an opportunity to develop a
rotational COMPO3 "ready force" that, with some additional specific
mission training, is able to deploy to support CCMD operations.
The Special Operations Center of Excellence is the doctrinal and
training nerve center for Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological
Operations (PSYOP) forces and ensures interoperability across
components and could assist in developing specific mission-type
training packages for COMPO3 ready forces. Additionally, the Theater
Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), who traditionally serve as
operational integrators, facilitating cross-COMPO CA/PSYOP efforts for
their supported CCMDs can serve as integrators with COMPO3 forces.
A. U.S. Army and Reserve Command can best speak to any feasibility
of increasing missions for COMPO 3 forces.
Regarding handoffs between COMPO 1 and COMPO 3 forces, USSOCOM
determines sourcing feasibility of USSOF requirements through a process
called the Global Special Operations Synchronization process. If or
when a validated requirement exists that USSOCOM is unable to source
with COMPO 1 forces, the requirement is then turned over to the Army
Service Component for potential sourcing by COMPO 3 forces.
In addition, USSOCOM has a demonstrated history in each CCMD of
transferring, when appropriate, USSOF operational requirements to
general purpose forces. Decisions to transfer a mission or requirement
from COMPO 1 to COMPO 3 forces is the result of a deliberate process
and informed by several factors, including but not limited to the
nature of the operational requirement and risk.
B. CCMDs have requested support from both Army COMPO1 and COMPO3
PSYOP forces to meet some of their requirements. Also, the Marine Corps
provides PSYOP / military information support operations (MISO) forces
to support CCMD operations. There are efforts at USSOCOM, United States
Army Special Operations Command, TSOCs, and CCMDs to train and
integrate COMPO3 forces to fulfill joint force requirements. We in SO/
LIC are conducting a capabilities-based assessment (CBA) to identify
capability gaps across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum
for the entire Joint Force to help address this and other shortfalls.
The CBA findings are set to be completed in Q2 of FY26.
C. I defer to U.S. Army and Reserve Command and their analysis to
offer any potential advantages and considerations associated with
moving initial entry training from Fort Jackson to Fort Bragg.
D. I defer to U.S. Army and Reserve Command and their analysis to
offer any potential advantages and considerations associated with
moving reserve units to Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
E. Under current regulations and policies, PSYOP and CA reservists
may attend assessment and selection in a temporary duty status prior to
their accession to active duty. The United States Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School provides TDY funding for the
reservist's attendance.
F. I defer to U.S. Army and Reserve Command regarding any potential
reductions that could be made to preserve or expand capabilities for
COMPO 1 forces.
Mr. Hamadeh. What is the potential that PSYOP and CA will be needed
to help fill some of the influence tasks previously performed by USAID?
Mr. Jenkins. DoD is collaborating closely with other Departments
and Agencies and will be better able to assess impacts and
opportunities once the Administration completes its foreign assistance
review. Additional requirements would need to be balanced against
existing operational requirements and military objectives.
Mr. Hamadeh. The Defense Language and National Security Education
office recently said that US Special Operations Command should presume
that there will be no funding for FY 2026. Sending home these
specialized instructors will disrupt the SOF training pipeline for
months, and take 3-5 years to be rebuilt, at a cost that could easily
surpass $10 million dollars. What is the plan to avoid this scenario?
Mr. Jenkins. We are undertaking a comprehensive study of SOF
language requirements. While this study was not specifically designed
to inform resource optimization, the data gathered will inform the
development of a new strategy to address potential funding shortfalls
and preserve essential language capabilities. This strategy may include
strategies such as exploring internal reallocations, prioritizing high-
impact programs, and identifying potential areas for reduction.
Mr. Hamadeh. What does it look like if this happens in conjunction
with deep cuts to the Defense Language Institute, which provides
language skills to the broader force and supporting agencies?
Mr. Jenkins. While our ongoing study of SOF language requirements
was not specifically created to evaluate a scenario of funding cuts,
the data it provides will be critical as we analyze the potential
combined impacts. We intend to leverage this information, along with
other analyses, to determine how best to utilize resources like MFP-11
funds.
This comprehensive review will explore potential strategies such as
prioritizing programs, exploring alternative funding sources, and
identifying potential areas for consolidation or reduction to mitigate
the overall impact and maintain critical language capabilities within
SOF.
Mr. Hamadeh. Your joint testimony mentions how you "see `burden
sharing' change to `burden owning'" when it comes to our partner
forces. What have the lessons with the Afghan and Iraqi armies, versus
the Kurds in Syria, taught us about commitment to long term state and
non-state partner capacity-building?
Mr. Jenkins. Leveraging partnerships is crucial and cost-effective
way to achieve our strategic objectives. SOF provide exceptional value
by empowering partners to achieve substantial, high-impact effects with
relatively small numbers of personnel and resource-efficient approaches
that minimize the burden on the United States while ensuring our
partner forces are appropriately supported to own the primary burden
and risk.
Building partner capacity is a critical function of the whole Joint
Force, not just SOF. But from a SOF perspective, I would highlight our
experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria offer contrasting lessons
about burden owning in long-term partner capacity building. The success
we have seen with our SOF partners in Syria with the Syrian Democratic
Forces and in Iraq with the Counterterrorism Service demonstrates the
effectiveness of focusing on specific, mission-oriented forces embedded
within a broader strategy. A key lesson learned is that partners should
take the lead in defining and executing their own security strategy and
- through relationships built on presence, advice, and assistance - we
should ensure their commitment and efforts are aligned with U.S.
interests. Building capacity in a way that leaves the partner capable
of sustaining missions that are in the U.S. interest and with resources
the partner can one day sustain without the United States is critical.
Mr. Hamadeh. How do you view a strategy that includes having our
own pro-America proxies, consisting of oppressed minorities, whether in
Iran, or someday, China, if necessary?
Mr. Jenkins. The Department would be willing to discuss this issue
at a higher level of classification.
Mr. Hamadeh. Given the active-duty cuts, how could you potentially
fill some of these gaps by boosting the capabilities of, and
reorganizing, some of the reserve PSYOP and CA units? How can we better
integrate reserve PSYOP and CA with the broader Army? Specifically, I'd
like to ask the following for additional detail: A. How could missions
increase for COMPO 3, and handoffs between COMPO 1 and COMPO 3 be
improved, given the separate structures and coordination challenges
between SOCOM for active, and USARC and FORSCOM for reserve? B. COMPO 1
PSYOP often deploys with less than their required force. The same
service members often brush up against dwell time issues, preventing
them from other deployments. Constant deployments, schools, and workups
leads to lower retention which causes further headcount issues. With at
the vast majority of PSYOP forces residing in COMPO 3, what efforts are
being made to integrate and utilize these resources?
C. What could be the advantages and considerations of relocating
the reserve PSYOP and CA school from Fort Jackson (now co-located with
the human resources school) to Fort Bragg, to be near the active-duty
PSYOP and CA footprint? D. What could be the advantages and
considerations of moving a USACAPOC reserve unit-whether CA, PSYOP, or
IO-to Ft. Huachuca in Arizona, with the intent to better integrate the
unit into the joint planning process with Ft. Huachuca's latest in
human intelligence, unmanned vehicles and AI, and web-based information
warfare? E. Experienced PSYOP and CA reservists seeking active duty
face a dilemma: despite recruitment shortfalls in the active component,
the reservists must pass selection or risk a forced career change. This
discourages reservists from applying. Can selection for reservists
seeking active duty be made available pre-contract to avoid this risk,
without compromising standards? F. How could some of the reserves be
slimmed down in order to cover the costs of preserving and expanding
capabilities to better support COMPO 1?
General Fenton. Better integrating reserve PSYOP and CA with the
broader Army is largely a unity of command or command relationship
(COMREL) question. TSOCs have served as the operational integrators for
CA and PSYOP for their supported combatant commands, facilitating
integration between deployed components (COMPOs). The Special
Operations Center of Excellence serves as the doctrinal and training
nerve center for both CA and PSYOP in all Components, including those
forces under U.S. Army Reserve Command (COMPO 3). Army Reserve Command
can align a COMPO 3 CA/PSYOP unit to directly support SOF requirements
or create a force tracking number that allows TSOCs to request COMPO 3
CA/PSYOP units to support SOF requirements (Military Occupational
Specialties 38A/38B/38G/37A/37F).
A. How could missions increase for COMPO 3, and handoffs between
COMPO 1 and COMPO 3 be improved, given the separate structures and
coordination challenges between SOCOM for active, and USARC and FORSCOM
for reserve?
USSOCOM has a demonstrated history in each combatant command (CCMD)
of successfully transferring USSOF requirements to general-purpose
forces. The decision to transfer a mission from COMPO 1 (Active
Component) to COMPO 3 (Reserve Component) forces is the result of a
deliberate process and informed by several factors, including but not
limited to requirements and risk. The Department of Defense uses a
deliberate annual process for CCMDs to request forces called the Global
Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP).
There are several challenges associated with employing COMPO 3
PSYOP and CA units to meet joint and SOF mission requirements, not the
least of which is the separate command chains for COMPO 3 and COMPO 1
forces. There are many current joint and SOF missions that COMPO 3
units could be doing today with minimal additional training or changes
in task organization to meet mission requirements. The main challenges
limiting use of COMPO 3 units are readiness and funding. Readiness is
an issue in that most COMPO 3 units require lengthy pre- and post-
mobilization training, including time to integrate cross-leveled
personnel, to be mission capable. They are not able to be ready in the
short time frame necessary to respond to emerging or crisis
requirements. CCMDs do not normally identify reserve units'
requirements for more than two years in the future, precluding the
planning for necessary funds in their POM submission.
Solutions to COMPO 3 readiness issues could include emphasis on
recruiting to minimize cross-leveling, increasing funding for
additional annual training and unit training assembly (UTA) days to
improve readiness, and creating a rotational COMPO 3 "ready force" that
has completed most pre- and post-mobilization training requirements,
decreasing the time between mobilization and employment. Funding
challenges are more difficult but could be addressed by funding the
mobilization of the COMPO 3 ready force annually at Fort Bragg. Once
mobilized, this activated force can be training to improve readiness
and interoperability and be available for short-notice deployment
worldwide alongside its COMPO 1 counterparts.
Mobilization of COMPO 3 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, can also
solve a long-standing issue of support to the Immediate Response Force
(IRF). Historically 9th PSYOP Battalion has supported short notice
deployments of the IRF until COMPO 3 forces could be mobilized. Army
Structure Memorandum 2025-2029 will reduce the 9th PSYOP Battalion by
the Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters and Headquarters Company
(HHC), and one line company in FY27, challenging its ability to support
the IRF. Mobilization of a COMPO 3 element to train with both 9th PSY-B
and the 82nd Airborne Division Ready Brigade (DRF-1) will enhance COMPO
3 readiness and improve COMPO 1/COMPO 3 coordination and integration.
Additionally, PSYOPS and CA active component personnel are no
longer assigned at Army division and above echelons, creating a
challenge to effectively integrate COMPO 3 into supported units
planning, training, and operations. Establishing PO and CA billets at
the division and above levels will identify COMPO 3 requirements,
enhance readiness, and improve COMPO 1 / COMPO 3 coordination and
integration. Conventional Army Theater Information Operations Groups
(TIOGs) also have capacity that is not yet fully leveraged.
B. COMPO 1 PSYOP often deploys with less than their required force.
The same service members often brush up against dwell-time issues,
preventing them from other deployments. Constant deployments, schools,
and workups leads to lower retention which causes further headcount
issues. With at the vast majority of PSYOP forces residing in COMPO 3,
what efforts are being made to integrate and use these resources?
COMPO 3 experiences its own manning and dwell-time challenges in
filling operational requirements. COMPO 3 dwell-time requirements are
1:5 vs 1:3 for COMPO 1. Finding qualified personnel with the capability
and willingness to fill non-traditional (joint or SOF) requirements
over extended periods can pose manning challenges.
COMPO 3 PSYOP forces are currently employed in several joint and
SOF missions, reducing the strain on COMPO 1 PSYOP forces. COMPO 3
PSYOP missions include: 29 personnel manning the Central Command
(USCENTCOM) team in the Joint Military Information Support Operations
(MISO) WebOps Center (JMWC) in Tampa, 4 personnel supporting Special
Operations Command - South (SOCSOUTH) by manning a Military Information
Support Team (MIST) in Argentina, 4 personnel providing MISO planning
support to the Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) J39, 6 personnel
supporting Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), 4 personnel providing planning
support to U.S. Navy - Central (NAVCENT) in Bahrain, 2 personnel
supporting Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF HOA), with
an additional 22 personnel supporting Special Operations Command -
Africa (SOCAF) in various locations.
Efforts are ongoing to regionally align COMPO 3 just like the COMPO
1 battalions. This provides training opportunities and greater
integration between AC/RC PSYOP. As the joint MISO proponent, commander
of USSOCOM promotes interoperability not only between components within
the Army, but also across the armed services' lines. The USMC has been
building its own organic PSYOP and information operations structure for
the past few years and efforts to integrate and cross train with them
are also underway. Most recently, the USMC assumed responsibility for
manning a MIST in the Philippines and its leadership has expressed
interest in expanding future joint mission commitments.
C. What could be the advantages and considerations of relocating
the reserve PSYOP and CA school from Fort Jackson (now co-located with
the human resources school) to Fort Bragg, to be near the active-duty
PSYOP and CA footprint?
I recommend maintaining the USAR PSYOP and CA Advanced Individual
Training (AIT) at Fort Jackson. Before FY2020, the Reserve PSYOP and CA
AITs were the only initial entry training (IET) activities on Fort
Bragg. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) regulation 350-6
mandates a "separate and secure environment" for IET soldiers, the
drill instructors and their facilities. Under this requirement, all
Fort Bragg installation support activities (medical facilities, DFACs,
soldier support organizations, etc.) that interacted with IET soldiers
required additional annual training to support this very limited
population.
IET soldiers must be separated from other soldiers until they
graduate and be supervised by a trusted individual like a drill
sergeant, instructor, or vetted platoon sergeant. A 2018 TRADOC staff
assistance visit found that Fort Bragg IET facilities did not meet the
standards required to ensure the safety of IET soldiers. The unbudgeted
requirement to mitigate this deficiency exceeded the budget of the U.S.
Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Special Warfare Center and
School. Several interim solutions using the unfunded requirements (UFR)
process were assessed to be economically unsustainable. Ultimately,
both AITs were moved to Fort Jackson, South Carolina, which meets all
standards for the training environment of IET soldiers. The Special
Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg (SWCS) still maintains command
and control of the units, as well as control and oversight of the
program of instruction.
D. What could be the advantages and considerations of moving a
USACAPOC reserve unit-whether CA, PSYOP, or IO-to Ft. Huachuca in
Arizona, with the intent to better integrate the unit into the joint
planning process with Ft. Huachuca's latest in human intelligence,
unmanned vehicles and AI, and web-based information warfare? If the
intent is to better integrate the joint planning process, I recommend
the establishment of AC and RC PSYOP, CA and IO billets within those
elements (human intelligence, artificial intelligence, & web-based
information warfare) under the Intelligence Center of Excellence, to
provide an information lens to development and integration of
information into intelligence collection processes.
Realigning a USACAPOC unit to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, presents
unique considerations. Units are typically not incorporated into force-
modernization entities. Instead, they are requested to provide support
as part of the development / experimentation process to test new
concepts, systems, or platforms. A recruiting analysis for a PSYOP, CA
or information operations unit at Fort Huachuca would be needed to
determine the feasibility of a move. The feasibility of placing a COMPO
3 unit at Fort Huachuca could be best answered by USACAPOC.
E. Experienced PSYOP and CA reservists seeking active duty face a
dilemma: Despite recruitment shortfalls in the active component, the
reservists must pass selection or risk a forced career change. This
discourages reservists from applying. Can selection for reservists
seeking active duty be made available pre-contract to avoid this risk,
without compromising standards?
CA and PSYOP have similar issues when recruiting and assessing
reservists into the active force. The PSYOP Proponent Office revised
its Inter and Intra-Service Transfer (IST) policy in 2021 to address
the dilemma described above. COMPO 2 (National Guard) & 3 PO-qualified
soldiers considering transfer onto active duty may apply to attend
PSYOP Assessment and Selection (POAS) in a temporary duty (TDY) status
prior to entering an active-duty contract. The same is true of the CA
forces. In these cases, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) reviews the application for eligibility
prior to enrolling the soldier into CAAS or POAS reservation. While the
sending unit is responsible for funding soldiers' pay (man-days),
USAJFKSWCS funds the authorization for travel.
RC soldiers who do not pass CAAS or POAS are returned to their
sending units without further action. They are afforded the opportunity
to reapply in as little as 6 months, or up to 2 years, in accordance
with the Eligibility to Return (ETR) determination made with their non-
selection. No soldier will receive more than three total attempts for a
USAJFKSWCS Assessment and Selection course (any SOF branch).
F. How could some of the reserves be slimmed down in order to cover
the costs of preserving and expanding capabilities to better support
COMPO 1?
Unfortunately, this is not an option. Within the Army, each
component has a separate end-strength cap. Any increase in structure in
one COMPO must have an equal size decrease from within the same COMPO
as a bill payer. Drawing down forces in a reserve component, such as
COMPO 3, cannot be used as a bill payer for an increase of forces in
COMPO 1. Even if COMPO 1 could be increased by reducing COMPO 3, the
greater problem of recruiting and retention is not solved. Both COMPOs
struggle to produce enough qualified PSYOP personnel to fill their
formations. This is a question best directed to Army leadership for the
points addressed above. Force structure (billets) among COMPO 1/2/3 is
a decision for Army senior leaders, not USSOCOM.
Additionally, under current force designs, both COMPO 1 and COMPO 3
have unique mission sets. COMPO 1 primarily supports the Joint, SOF,
SMU and emerging / short-notice requirements at the tactical -
strategic / global levels (cooperation, competition and conflict /
large-scale combat operations (LSCO)). COMPO 3 is structured to support
the conventional force at the Corps and below echelons at the tactical
level (LSCO). Anticipated additional force reductions in COMPO 1 as
part of ARSTRUC 25-29, will likely further reduce capacity to support
SOF.
Mr. Hamadeh. The Defense Language and National Security Education
office recently said that US Special Operations Command should presume
that there will be no funding for FY 2026. Sending home these
specialized instructors will disrupt the SOF training pipeline for
months, and take 3-5 years to be rebuilt, at a cost that could easily
surpass $10 million dollars. What is the plan to avoid this scenario?
General Fenton. Due to a loss of Congressional grant funding for
the Defense Language and National Security Education Office's Language
Training Centers (LTCs) beginning June 1, 2025 (grant year 2025),
USASOC will lose 49 university-provided instructors for its language
training programs. To minimize the impact, the USAJFKSWCS will replace
29 LTC instructors with 18 contracted instructors, increasing the
student-to-instructor ratio from 1:6 to 1:8, which may affect the
quality of initial language training for Special Forces, PO, and CA
soldiers. Simultaneously, 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) will
replace its 20 LTC instructors with 20 contracted instructors.
These two changes will result in an un-forecast $5 million expense,
forcing USASOC to cut or reduce funding for other vital Language,
Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) training programs. Furthermore,
the loss of the LTCs will severely limit USASOC's ability to provide
ongoing language sustainment and enhancement training for approximately
600 USAJFKSWCS permanent party cadre with validated language
requirements.
Mr. Hamadeh. What does it look like if this happens in conjunction
with deep cuts to the Defense Language Institute, which provides
language skills to the broader force and supporting agencies?
General Fenton. The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language
Center (DLIFLC) notified USSOCOM that due to funding cuts in Fiscal
Year 2026 (FY26), DLIFLC plans to switch the U.S. Marine Corps Forces
Special Operations Command (MARSOC) and the Air Force Special
Operations Command (AFSOC) language training detachments (LTD) from
non-reimbursable to reimbursable. MARSOC and AFSOC are currently non-
reimbursable, meaning DLIFLC funds both LTDs.
Neither MARSOC nor AFSOC included funding for their LTDs in their
President's Budget Submissions for FY26 or across the Fiscal Years
Defense Program. Changing these LTDs to reimbursable programs would
present challenges for MARSOC and AFSOC to provide critical initial
acquisition language training to their special operations personnel.
Mr. Hamadeh. Your joint testimony mentions how you ``see `burden
sharing' change to `burden owning''' when it comes to our partner
forces. What have the lessons with the Afghan and Iraqi armies, versus
the Kurds in Syria, taught us about commitment to long term state and
non-state partner capacity-building?
General Fenton. USSOCOM's experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Syria with state and non-state partner forces underscores the critical
shift we are pursuing from "burden sharing" to "burden owning" - a
transition predicated on a nuanced understanding of the factors
influencing long-term capacity building.
Efforts in Afghanistan highlighted the immense challenges of
forging a unified national army within a deeply fragmented society.
Afghanistan's complex terrain exacerbated existing tribal, religious,
and linguistic divisions, hindering the development of a cohesive
fighting force. Despite substantial U.S. investment and sustained
commitment, the Afghan National Army remained reliant on external
support for both cohesion and operational effectiveness. The subsequent
withdrawal demonstrated the fragility of a capacity built upon external
linkages rather than internal unity.
The Iraqi case presented a different, yet equally complex, set of
obstacles. The dismantling of the Ba'athist regime resulted in a loss
of institutional military expertise. Rebuilding the Iraqi Army required
navigating sectarian divisions - Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish - and
fostering cooperation within a nascent national identity. While U.S.
training and guidance were essential, sustained involvement was
required to build trust, codify procedures, and cultivate a sense of
national purpose. This experience demonstrated that establishing a
truly independent and effective national force often requires a longer
timeframe than U.S. and Coalition forces initially project. This proved
true for Iraqi capabilities which have improved towards increasing
independence.
Partnership with the Syria Democratic Forces (SDF) offers a
compelling case study. The SDF's relatively homogenous composition -
largely Kurdish, united by a shared commitment to democratic values -
facilitated a more rapid and effective capacity-building process.
Unlike Afghanistan and Iraq, the SDF possessed a preexisting sense of
collective identity and a clear, self-defined objective: the defeat of
ISIS. U.S. support enhanced SDF's capabilities but did not constitute
the essential connective tissue holding the force together.
These experiences demonstrate that successful partner capacity-
building is contingent on a complex interplay of factors, including
cultural cohesion, shared ideology, ethnic composition, geographic
realities, and the passage of time. Predicting the long-term success of
such endeavors remains inherently challenging. USSOF stand ready to
execute national policy directives regarding partner capacity-building,
applying the hard-won lessons from these past operations and adapting
our approach to the context of each engagement.
Mr. Hamadeh. How do you view a strategy that includes having our
own pro-America proxies, consisting of oppressed minorities, whether in
Iran, or someday, China, if necessary?
General Fenton. We follow policy and guidance, though working with
proxies is well within our capabilities if we are directed. When
considering activities with any group in the territory of a sovereign
country, we must be sensitive to a variety of risks, including risk of
escalation.
While USSOCOM actively pursues operations by, with, and through
partners, surrogates, and proxies to impose costs and push back against
the activities of countries like Iran in the Middle East and China in
the Indo-Pacific and globally, we tend to focus these actions outside
the territories of these states. That said, demonstrating the ability
to access groups, such as oppressed minorities, within countries like
Iran and China, serves as a potential means to influence behavior,
especially in terms of perceived internal security, which tends to be
the primary concern of authoritarian regimes.
Mr. Hamadeh. What is the potential that PSYOP and CA will be needed
to help fill some of the influence tasks previously performed by USAID?
General Fenton. The impact of the changes to the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) on special operations forces is
unknown. We cannot project how future PYSOP and CA of shifting efforts
previously executed by the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) may be used or affected. We stand by to respond to Secretary of
Defense directives and requirements.
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