[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 119-19]
NUCLEAR FORCES AND
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
PROGRAMMATIC UPDATES
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 7, 2025
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-760 WASHINGTON : 2026
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DON BACON, Nebraska SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California,
DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
MARK B. MESSMER, Indiana GEORGE WHITESIDES, California
JEFF CRANK, Colorado WESLEY BELL, Missouri
ABRAHAM J. HAMADEH, Arizona
Peter Schirtzinger, Professional Staff Member
Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
Austin Richards, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
DesJarlais, Hon. Scott, a Representative from Tennessee,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces..................... 1
Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
WITNESSES
Robbins, Teresa, Acting Administator, National Nuclear Security
Administration, Department of Energy........................... 4
Vann, Dr. Brandi C., Performing the Duties of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Programs............................................... 6
Yaffe, Andrea, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Space Policy....................................... 8
Gebara, Lt Gen Andrew J., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic
Deterrence and Nuclear Integration............................. 9
Wolfe Jr., ADM Johnny, USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs. 10
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
DesJarlais, Hon. Scott....................................... 33
Robbins, Teresa.............................................. 35
Vann, Dr. Brandi C........................................... 52
Yaffe, Andrea................................................ 63
Gebara, Lt Gen Andrew J...................................... 80
Wolfe Jr., ADM Johnny........................................ 92
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Wilson................................................... 111
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 111
Mr. Bacon.................................................... 113
NUCLEAR FORCES AND ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES PROGRAMMATIC
UPDATES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 7, 2025.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:00 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Scott DesJarlais
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SCOTT DESJARLAIS, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Dr. DesJarlais. Today's hearing will come to order.
Pursuant to Rule 4(b)(3), members of the House Armed Services
Committee who are not members of the subcommittee are allowed
to participate in today's hearing and will be recognized after
all subcommittee members have had the opportunity to ask
questions.
The Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive
testimony on the policies and programs related to nuclear
forces and atomic energy defense activities.
Appearing before the subcommittee, we have Ms. Teresa
Robbins, the Acting Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration; Dr. Brandi C. Vann who is currently
performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense; Ms. Andrea Yaffe, the
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Vice Admiral Johnny
Wolfe, the Director of the Navy Strategic Systems Program
Office; and Lieutenant General Andrew Gebara, the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration for
the United States Air Force.
Thank you all for being with us today.
While the topline numbers of the President's budget request
for fiscal year 2026 have been released, programmatic
information has not yet been made public.
This means our witnesses will be unable to comment on
specific levels of funding for individual programs as was the
case in last week's hearing on missile defense activities.
Nevertheless, we appreciate you being with us today to
testify about our nuclear forces and look forward to hearing
from you about how we are sustaining our legacy capabilities
and the progress we are making towards modernizing our
deterrent.
The scale of this challenge cannot be overstated.
As a result of previous decisions to delay and defer
modernization, both the Air Force and the Navy find themselves
sustaining submarines, missiles, bombers longer than ever
before, while simultaneously carrying out major development
efforts to recapitalize each leg of the triad.
The same is true for the National Nuclear Security
Administration which continues to operate in facilities that
date all the way back to the Manhattan era such as the Beta 2
facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex in my home state
of Tennessee while also rebuilding its production complex and
restoring the nation's ability to build nuclear weapons.
However, while sustainment modernization are both necessary
in foundational efforts, it is also clear that they are not
sufficient to meet the dynamic new nuclear threat environment.
China's nuclear breakout has fundamentally transformed the
security landscape.
Russia's nuclear stockpiles continue to grow as well and a
return of great power competition has replaced bipolar post-
Cold War environment of relative geopolitical stability and
declining nuclear arsenals with the new tripolar environment
that is less stable and more competitive.
This is not the future we anticipated when the plan for
nuclear modernization was developed.
We must adapt to these new challenges and supplement our
modernization plans with tailored capabilities to address the
changing threat environment.
We look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about
these issues and before turning to the ranking member for his
opening statement Dr. Vann, it is my understanding that you
will be retiring from government later this year.
So on behalf of the subcommittee, I'd like to thank you for
your many years of service.
Now recognizing my good friend, Ranking Member, Mr.
Moulton, for his opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Dr. DesJarlais can be found in
the Appendix on page 33.]
STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
you for your leadership of this committee and bipartisan
approach to the challenges that we face and of course welcome
our panel of distinguished witnesses.
Over the past decade, the global strategic landscape has
continued to deteriorate. The Chinese Communist Party is
dramatically expanding their nuclear arsenal. They are ahead of
us with new and destabilizing delivery systems like
hypersonics, and China has few established nuclear norms of
safe behavior.
Meanwhile, just this past weekend, war criminal Vladimir
Putin threatened to bring his criminal war to a, quote,
``logical conclusion with the outcome Russia requires,'' end
quote, using nuclear weapons. Recent escalation between India
and Pakistan raises concern about either side employing its
nuclear arsenal. And all of this calls into question decades of
nuclear stability, which makes the work of our witnesses and
this subcommittee all the more important.
Nuclear deterrence is the bedrock, the most important
priority of the Pentagon. So how are we doing? Well, we've got
some problems, and here are four major ones.
First, I believe, as does the bipartisan majority in
Congress, that we must maintain and modernize our nuclear
triad. But these programs are dangerously behind and over-
budget.
Second, National Nuclear Security Administration and the
Department of Defense have lost key personnel due to Musk and
DOGE, before they reversed course and they tried to get people
back. Morale is terrible, and this only makes the work that is
already behind even more difficult.
Third, even if we get our efforts back on track, all of our
modernization plans are based on one major nuclear adversary,
not two. So not only are we behind, we don't even know if what
we're building will be sufficient for deterrence.
Fourth, the President's Golden Dome threatens to throw all
of this out the window along the theory of deterrence that has
kept us safe since 1945. There is a direct tie between our
nuclear deterrence posture and what is being proposed for
Golden Dome by President Trump. When President Bush pulled us
out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a new arms race, both
conventional and nuclear, began. While we developed modest
missile defenses to defend against rogue nations, Russia and
China, never believing that was our real intent, developed
capabilities to evade our systems, including destabilizing
weapons like the nuclear-tipped torpedo that could take out any
coastal city, a space-based nuclear weapon that could wipe out
all of low-earth orbit including Golden Dome not to mention
hypersonics, where we are playing catch-up.
Last week, some members of the majority quoted the
bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission as rationale for
supporting Golden Dome. And I would like to highlight a major
caveat that was omitted in their remarks. Everything they said
was contingent on the capabilities being determined, quote,
``feasible.''
But you have to go to the footnotes to understand what the
Commission means by that term, because even I have never heard
questions if the concept is technically feasible. But on page
134 of the report, it says, by feasible, the Commission means
technically and financially sound as well as based on sound
policy deliberations. And this is where my concern lies. We
have not seen any of the work to determine if this concept is
even feasible as defined by the commission, yet we are throwing
billions of dollars at it already.
The Congressional Budget Office, in response to our
colleagues on the Senate Strategic Forces Subcommittee's
bipartisan request, just released its updated cost estimate for
deploying space-based interceptors. The 20-year cost ranged
from 160 to 542 billion dollars. We all know which end of that
range will be right, and that hardly seems fiscally sound.
Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise
Institute a conservative think tank recently said, ``While the
costs have come down and the technology has matured, the
physics of space-based interceptors has not changed.'' This
also questions the technical soundness of a system that the
Russians could eliminate with the push of one button. Most
importantly, multiple witnesses to this subcommittee have
admitted that there have not been any significant policy
deliberations on what the impact of Golden Dome would have on
strategic stability.
Look, it's dangerous when you have a President who doesn't
know what he's doing and a Congress that's unwilling to
question him. And the stakes are so, so much higher with
nuclear weapons. There are only two possible explanations for
what's going on.
One is that America has had deterrence all wrong. And a guy
who's most experienced at bankrupting casinos is so brilliant
with deterrence theory that he's corrected something that every
nuclear theorist, every Pentagon planner, and every
administration, including his first, had gotten wrong. Or
perhaps Donald Trump decided he wanted the gold-plated version
of something his friend has, so here we are. Which do we think
is more likely?
These are important questions and concerns to examine in a
serious, thoughtful, intellectually rigorous, and bipartisan
manner. That's what we have to do because the future of our
country, the bedrock of our strategic stability and security,
and the lives of our kids could well depend up on it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Dr. DesJarlais. I thank the ranking member. We'll now move
to opening statements from our witnesses. I would note that
your prepared statements will be made part of the record, but
you will each have five minutes to make some opening remarks.
Ms. Robbins, let's begin with you.
STATEMENT OF TERESA ROBBINS, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Ms. Robbins. Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton,
and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
to provide an update on the Department of Energy's National
Nuclear Security Administration. National Nuclear Security
Administration performs vital national defense, safety, and
security missions that cannot be accomplished anywhere else in
the United States government. With the support of this
administration and Congress, the National Nuclear Security
Administration is executing these missions in an increasingly
complex and volatile international environment.
Over the last year, the National Nuclear Security
Administration continued delivering modernized nuclear weapons
while sustaining the current stockpile. Our defense nuclear
non-proliferation programs work to minimize and secure nuclear
and radioactive materials around the globe. In the National
Nuclear Security Administration's Naval Reactors program, which
celebrated its 75th anniversary last year, continues to ensure
the United States Navy's competitive warfighting edge and
secure the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad with unmatched
submarine technology.
I am proud to report on some of the National Nuclear
Security Administration's recent accomplishments and activities
in support of our national security. The National Nuclear
Security Administration is executing an expanded program of
record to meet existing and emerging Department of Defense
requirements. We are simultaneously delivering seven major
stockpile modernization programs which are at different stages
of design, engineering, and production.
The modernization programs cover all three legs of the
nuclear triad and introduce new options and capabilities for
the President to strengthen deterrence in response to an ever
changing threat environment. Meeting a significant milestone,
the first War Reserve diamond stamped plutonium pit for the
W87-1 warhead was produced at Los Alamos National Laboratory in
October. Last December, the B61 Mod 12 life extension program
completed the last production unit.
The successful execution of this program saw the
consolidation of multiple B61 variants with updated non-nuclear
components and improved safety, reliability, and accuracy that
will extend its service life for at least 20 years.
Additionally, the National Nuclear Security Administration
anticipates achieving the first production unit for the B61 Mod
13 later this month, almost a full year ahead of schedule. The
W88 Alt 370 maintained 100 percent on time deliveries to the
United States Navy and is scheduled to complete production by
the end of the fiscal year 2025.
The W80-4 program remains aligned with the Air Force
schedule for the long-range standoff missile. And we expect a
first production unit in September 2027. The W87-1 is currently
scheduled to begin production in the earlier 2030s. The W93
remains on track for production starting in the mid-2030s.
In response to congressional direction, the National
Nuclear Security Administration stood up a Nuclear-Armed Sea-
Launched Cruise Missile program office last year. A warhead
down selection decision for Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise
Missile was recently considered by the Nuclear Weapons Council.
And we have identified the W80 family as the most suitable
warhead.
In the coming year, the National Nuclear Security
Administration will continue to coordinate closely with the
Department of Defense to ensure that the pace of our stockpile
modernization efforts aligns with the platform delivery
schedules. Recognizing that deterrence is not static, the
National Nuclear Security Administration must also design new
materials, processes, and systems for future stockpile needs,
certify new and modified components and systems as they enter
the stockpile, and continue to assess the stockpile's current
condition annually. Our world class science and technology
capabilities allow us to perform this work and ensure our
stockpile is safe, secure, reliable, and effective without
requiring underground nuclear explosive testing.
As Secretary Wright has said, AI is the next Manhattan
Project. The enterprise is taking decisive action to leverage
advantages offered by AI in service to the nuclear deterrence
and non-proliferation missions. Last year, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory installed El Capitan, our first exascale
computing system for national security. With the ability to
perform 2.79 quintillion calculations per second at peak
performance, it has been benchmarked as the world's fastest
supercomputer and is currently running classified full 3D
nuclear weapons simulations in support of nuclear stockpile
stewardship activities.
As the National Nuclear Security Administration's workload
increases, the enterprise continues to advance extensive
infrastructure modernization efforts required to meet today's
needs and provide enduring flexible and resilient capabilities.
We look forward to talking to you more about those
infrastructure modernization activities.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Robbins can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Ms. Robbins.
Dr. Vann, you're recognized.
STATEMENT OF DR. BRANDI C. VANN, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Dr. Vann. Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and
the distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
allowing me to testify before you here today. And sir, thank
you for your kind words. It's my pleasure to join my colleagues
to discuss the matters relating to our United States nuclear
deterrent which underpins all of our national defense
priorities.
And as President Trump and Secretary Hegseth have stated,
the United States will achieve peace through strength by
rebuilding our military and reestablishing deterrence. And
nuclear weapons provides a unique deterrence effect that no
other element of the United States military power can replace.
And our nation must continue to field flexible in a modern
deterrent.
These capabilities are critical to the continued safety and
security of our American people and our allies and partners,
both now and in the future. And the Department continues to
prioritize nuclear modernization and sustainment of the three
legs of the triad as well as our nuclear command and control
systems and our supplemental capabilities for the program of
record. Additionally, the Department supports the effort of the
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration
to recapitalize, sustain, and operate that nuclear enterprise.
The President's '26 topline budget request of a trillion
dollars for the Department of Defense includes prioritization
for our nuclear modernization efforts as well as our
sustainment efforts. The Department of Defense remains
staunchly committed to the viability of our United States
nuclear deterrent in response to an unprecedented security
environment with multiple nuclear challengers who have not
followed our lead as a responsible nuclear power. And our
nation will soon encounter a fundamentally different global
setting than it has ever experienced.
And the Department of Defense is acutely aware of the
significant challenges that we face and recognizes that action
needs to take place. And the decisions that we make as a nation
today will have profound ramifications for decades to come. I
do want to acknowledge the creation of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Policy and Programs, referred to in the Department as
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs, who will
ultimately be at the forefront of the Department of Defense's
efforts to sustain and modernize that nuclear deterrent.
This new position not only will serve as a key point of
accountability to Secretary Hegseth but also to Congress on
this critical national security mission. And in addition to
serving as a senior advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the
Deputy Secretary on a broad range of issues associated with
both our nuclear deterrent as well as our chem bio defense
programs, it will also serve as the staff director for our
Nuclear Weapons Council or NWC, a key coordination position
across this nuclear enterprise.
Today, we face an unprecedented strategic environment with
China and Russia modernizing and diversifying their nuclear
forces at breathtaking pace, and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea continuing its to demonstrate its ability to
execute strategic tech. They're increasing their level of
coordination and cooperation which raises the possibility of
simultaneous conflicts with multiple nuclear armed adversaries.
And our adversaries have thus far given no indication of arms
control interest.
And with the expiration of the new Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty in February '26, the United States may face a historical
moment in the nuclear era without a major nuclear arms
limitation agreement in place. And while the evolving
geopolitical environment remains at the forefront of our minds,
we also recognize that our adversaries aren't our only
challenge, right? We're faced with unprecedented set of cross-
cutting risks.
We're simultaneously sustaining the current nuclear
stockpile and trying to modernize at a scale that we haven't
seen in over 40 years. And these risks that we find reside not
only in our industrial base but also with our workforce and
supply chain security and even in cybersecurity threats that
are requiring action in the near term in order to make lasting
effects across the deterrent.
So in response to this, the Department continues to
determine and implement necessary actions to address that risk
as we acknowledge that the nuclear modernization program of
record is necessary but may be insufficient for the realities
of the security environment we will face in the future. And we
recognize that we must be flexible, efficient, and adaptable to
that evolving geopolitical landscape in order to defend our
homeland and provide options to the Secretary and to the
President to bolster that deterrence.
The Department is focused on mitigating those potential
risks and ensuring that there's no gaps in our capabilities
from that transition of our legacy forces to our modern
systems. And there are bound to be challenges with the
complexity of the system that we have. However, the Department
remains really committed to delivering. The Nuclear Weapons
Council is acutely aware of this challenge and is working to
discuss, enact and identify, mitigate risks to ensure that we
continue to have a safe, secure, credible, and effective
nuclear deterrent today and into the future.
I just want to thank the members of the committee for its
longstanding support of this mission. And I would like to
acknowledge my colleagues at this table as well as the folks
within the nuclear enterprise who are tirelessly working this
issue day to day. Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Vann can be found in the
Appendix on page 52.]
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Dr. Vann.
And back again before our committee since last week, you're
ready for round two from Ms. Yaffe.
STATEMENT OF ANDREA YAFFE, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
Ms. Yaffe. Thank you. I'm glad to be back. Chairman
DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify
before you today on the Department of Defense's nuclear forces
and atomic energy defense activities. I'm honored to appear
alongside my distinguished colleagues.
The strategic threats to the nation continue to mount.
China, Russia, and North Korea are fielding more advanced
missiles with greater ranges and in greater numbers to provide
the means for strategic level attack against the homeland,
including nuclear and non-nuclear options. They are rapidly
modernizing, expanding, and diversifying their nuclear forces,
incorporating advances in warhead delivery systems and the
supporting command and control systems.
Iran meanwhile continues to engage in concerning behavior
related to enrichment and the pursuit of nuclear capable
missiles. These developments pose an increasing threat to the
United States and our allies and partners. The nation's nuclear
forces and supporting infrastructure remain the foundation of
deterrence and defense against the growing threats to the
homeland and our interests abroad.
We continue to affirm and support the full scope
modernization of United States nuclear forces and nuclear
command, control, and communication capabilities as well as the
modernization of the complementary defense industrial base and
the Department of Energy's nuclear production enterprise. The
United States must deliver the nuclear modernization program of
record while continuing to sustain legacy systems to avoid a
deterrent shortfall and to mitigate risk. The United States is
also committed to investing an extended deterrence and
assurance by fielding flexible nuclear forces suited for
regional deterrence and working with allies and partners to
provide concrete non-nuclear capabilities to support United
States deterrence operations.
To that end, the President fiscal year 2026 budget request
for the Department of Defense will, among other things,
prioritize investments to modernize the nation's nuclear
deterrent alongside efforts to defend the homeland, deter
Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, and revitalize the
United States defense industrial base. However, we recognize
that the current nuclear modernization program was conceived at
a time where we did not contemplate a world with multiple
nuclear challengers who are uninterested in arms control.
The multiple nuclear challenger problem that we confront
places demands on our deterrence and defense posture that no
United States Presidential administration has had to face since
the first nuclear weapon was developed. While each challenger
presents individualized risks to the United States, the
simultaneity and growing collaboration between challengers
forces us to think in new ways about what it takes to maintain
stable deterrence, provide extended deterrence to our allies,
deter opportunistic aggression in the event deterrence fails
against any one challenger, and manage increasingly complex
escalation dynamics. In assessing how to address the evolving
security environment, it may be necessary to adapt current
United States force capability, posture, composition, or size.
The Department will continuously evaluate whether
adjustments should be made and when appropriate make
recommendations to the President. The Department is firmly
committed to making the necessary policies and investments in
our nuclear forces to deter our adversaries and if deterrence
fails, to achieve our Presidential objectives. The mission
requires sufficient and consistent funding and support.
Thank you for your dedication to our mission and our
servicemembers, including your support for the nuclear
deterrent and the reconciliation process. And thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today. I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Yaffe can be found in the
Appendix on page 63.]
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Ms. Yaffe.
Now we'll turn to General Gebara.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL ANDREW J. GEBARA, USAF, DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION
General Gebara. Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member
Moulton, members of the House Armed Services Subcommittee for
Strategic Forces, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today. Along with my teammates across the Department
of Defense, Department of Energy, the airmen and guardians of
the Department of the Air Force worked tirelessly to ensure the
United States maintains the nuclear deterrent our nation
demands. Their unwavering professionalism to restore deterrence
and rebuild United States nuclear forces ensures the foundation
of our national security remains strong.
I'd like to take this opportunity to thank the Congress for
its sustained support to ensure that the United States nuclear
enterprise has the resources to meet all current and future
challenges. Our mission, to maintain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent, is as vital today as it was at the
dawn of the nuclear age.
The United States, our allies and partners confront an
unprecedented strategic environment. China is rapidly expanding
its nuclear and conventional forces as part of a broader
project to reshape the Indo-Pacific and the international
order. China is projected to have over 1,000 nuclear warheads
by 2030, effectively adding the entire nuclear stockpile of the
next largest existing power every few years.
The nuclear activities of Russia, North Korea, and Iran
further complicate deterrence. Now I want to emphasize the
security landscape is not simply a return to the Cold War.
Instead, the emergence of multiple nuclear threats representing
new and fundamentally different strategic environment, one that
has never been seen before.
In this emerging world, sustaining a credible nuclear
deterrent remains a top Department of the Air Force priority
mission. United States nuclear forces underpin our national
security. Each element of the triad provides unique and
complementary attributes. Collectively, the triad offers the
President flexibility and resilience to deter our nuclear
challengers, assure allies and partners, and should deterrence
fail, achieve the President's objectives.
To prepare for this challenge, the Departments of Defense
and the Air Force are undertaking a full scope recapitalization
of current systems and supporting infrastructure to deliver
modern and effective deterrence capabilities. Our program of
record includes the B-21 and B-52 bombers, the long-range
stand-off weapon, the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic
missile system, nuclear certification for the F-35,
construction of advanced weapons generation facilities, and
nuclear command control and communications.
This is a once in a generation effort that cuts across
every aspect of the nuclear enterprise. As we modernize, it is
imperative that we continue to sustain current systems to
ensure there is no gap in our nation's strategic deterrence
mission. Your continued support of this years-long effort is
critical to our ability to restore deterrence and rebuild our
military for the challenges of the 21st century.
A strong, credible nuclear force is not an option. It is a
necessity. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Gebara can be found in
the Appendix on page 80.]
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, General.
Admiral Wolfe, you're recognized.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHNNY WOLFE JR., USN, DIRECTOR,
STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS
Admiral Wolfe. Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton,
and distinguished members of this committee, it is an honor to
be here and a privilege to continue representing the
servicemembers, civilians, and families of the Navy Strategic
Systems Programs. I'd like to thank this committee and Congress
for its continued support in providing us with the resources
required to execute our assigned mission. I have submitted my
posture statement for the record.
I'll begin by assuring you that the Navy's nuclear forces,
the bedrock of our national security are safe, secure,
effective, and credible. As the Navy command that provides cost
effective, safe, and secure sea-based strategic deterrent
solutions, Strategic Systems Programs is entrusted to provide
cradle to grave life cycle support to three critical programs,
the Trident II D5 strategic weapons system, Navy hypersonics, a
conventional strike program, and the nuclear armed sea launch
cruise missile nuclear programs.
These are three of our highest priority acquisition
programs. And with your support, they ensure the Navy is
delivering peace through strength. Strategic Systems Programs
ensures the highest levels of readiness and modernization for
the Trident strategic weapons systems which underlies our
national strategy to deter any adversary who threatens the
United States, our allies, or our interests.
The United States nuclear triad's most survivable leg is
provided by this sea-based strategic deterrent. The ballistic
missile submarine force represents a substantial portion of our
nation's deployed nuclear warheads, providing an unyielding
foundation for assured response against any adversary. The Navy
strategic deterrent stands at a critical juncture.
To maintain our advantage in the face of evolving threats,
we must prioritize the modernization of our nuclear
infrastructure and industrial base. A strong domestic
industrial base is the foundation of a credible deterrent.
Using resources authorized by this committee, Strategic Systems
Programs is actively working to revitalize this vital national
asset, ensuring the timely production and delivery of critical
strategic weapon systems components while fostering American
jobs and technological superiority.
Our modernization needs cannot succeed without investing in
research and development, the critical skills for our
workforce, and the facilities needed to produce, sustain, and
certify our nuclear systems. Our infrastructure is also at an
inflection point. Existing facilities are reaching their 30-
year recapitalization windows as we enter into a once in a
generational transition of both the Trident strategic weapon
system and the ballistic missile submarine platform.
In accordance with the fiscal year 2024 National Defense
Authorization Act, Navy established a Nuclear-Armed Sea-
Launched Cruise Missile program office at Strategic Systems
Programs in March of 2024. Over the past year, Strategic
Systems Programs has focused on standing up this program office
and conducting the assessments needed to deliver a weapon
system that meets warfighter needs. The Nuclear-Armed Sea-
Launched Cruise Missile program is focused on achieving a
milestone decision in fiscal year 2026 and continuing program
assessments to buy down technical and programmatic risk.
Executing this program requires careful balancing of
resources to ensure existing critical Navy and Air Force
programs of record are not adversely impacted. Strategic
Systems Programs mission, strategic deterrence, is critical to
this nation. It is the foundation of the national defense
strategy and is a top priority of the Department of Defense.
Based on the success of the Trident program, Strategic
Systems Programs has also been tasked with rapidly developing
and producing the Navy's first hypersonic weapon system,
Conventional Prompt Strike, along with the Army's long-range
hypersonic weapon system. In order to accomplish our mission,
Strategic Systems Programs relies on a relatively small number
of trained skilled employees. And it is critical that my
command is able to appropriately staff its workforce with these
highly specialized technical experts.
People are as fundamental to our nuclear deterrent as the
strategic weapons system itself. As the 14th Director of
Strategic Systems Programs, I have absolute faith and
confidence in the safety, security, effectiveness, and
credibility of our Navy's strategic deterrent due to the
proficiency and the professionalism of the dedicated
servicemembers and civilians who had made strategic deterrence
their life's work and committed themselves to our mission. With
continued congressional support and stable on-time funding, the
Navy will continue to effectively defend our nation and
preserve peace for future generations.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Wolfe can be found in
the Appendix on page 92.]
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Admiral. I thank all our
witnesses for their testimony. We'll now turn to member
questioning. I'll begin by recognizing myself for five minutes.
Admiral Wolfe, you gave quite a bit of description on the
Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile program. But would
you mind going into some more detail and updating us on the
progress you're making with the Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched
Cruise Missile program? And also, are there any changes we can
make her in Congress that would allow you to go even faster?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. So as I said, we stood up a
program office. We are looking at what the options available
are. My colleague talked about the warhead down selection which
was a major milestone that we needed to achieve, and we're on
track for that.
We continue to do all of the things to understand what it's
going to take us to get a milestone decision next year. So all
of that is in the works. What we're starting to realize is
based on particularly what United States Indo-Pacific Command
and United States Strategic Command are asking for, we're
looking to understand if there's any additional acquisition
flexibilities that we can get to be able to more rapidly move
through the acquisition process to deliver a capability, not
just on time but to accelerate it to continue to provide the
warfighter the things that we're looking for.
Dr. DesJarlais. And can you elaborate just a little bit on
what that capability brings to the table for us?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. It brings another option to our
decision makers to deter our adversaries. It is an underlay for
our triad. And certainly, it brings a regional weapon and a
deterrent that we just don't have today.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. Ms. Robbins, National Nuclear
Security Administration has proven it can deploy capabilities
rapidly to meet the warfighter needs. The W76-2 and the B61-13
are examples of this. Has the National Nuclear Security
Administration looked at institutionalizing this type of
approach and establishing a dedicated rapid acquisition pathway
for developing and deploying tailored capabilities?
Ms. Robbins. Thank you, Chairman. Yes, the National Nuclear
Security Administration is looking at that. We believe it would
be beneficial to have the capability to rapidly develop and
deploy new systems for the warfighter and for the Commander of
Strategic Command and the President.
We are looking at, as you noted with the W76-2 and the B61-
13, we were able to turn those from authorization to first
production unit in less than two years. And we are looking to
be able to stand up the capability to do that with new systems.
So the W76-2 and the B61-13 used our existing production line
and qualified components. We would like to create the
capability to do that with new components and in a production
line that's not already in the works.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. And Dr. Vann, is this something
the Nuclear Weapons Council has looked at? And would this help
address emergent deterrent challenges?
Dr. Vann. Excuse me. Yes, sir. The Nuclear Weapons Council
is actually actively focused on looking at ways to try to
tailor or joint acquisition guidelines that help enable some of
these rapid capabilities in response to emergent needs. The
Nuclear Weapons Council acknowledges that business as usual is
not going to suffice in today's environment and is committed to
try to break through acquisition barriers, whether they're
within the Department of Defense or across the nuclear
enterprise.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And can you update us on the progress
implementing Section 1621 of the fiscal year 2025 defense
authorization bill?
Dr. Vann. Yes, sir. So thank you for the acknowledgment of
this position. The Department is taking the implementation of
the 1621 language very seriously and of course has requested
some additional time to ensure that the Secretary of Defense
and some other additional administration leadership have the
opportunity to review all of the options and ultimately ensure
that this position is empowered to meet both the letter and the
spirit of the law.
Dr. DesJarlais. All right. I think there's something that
needs to be carried out expeditiously. I'll now turn to our
ranking member, Mr. Moulton, for questions.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll begin exactly
where you did, with Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile.
Vice Admiral Wolfe, appreciate the conversations that we've had
about this and the Navy's evolving position on the program in
general.
But I know that one of the great concerns that the Navy
continues to have is the impact the attack submarine force
including impact on operations, the new requirements for
training, and the new infrastructure required to support the
operations of carrying nuclear weapons. So can you share how
the Navy is working with United States Strategic Command and
the combatant commanders to shape concepts of operation and
reduce the impact to a fleet that's already oversubscribed?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. So as you said, that really is
between the combatant commanders and the fleet, that concept of
how we're going to operate that. Part of what you said and as
you said, we've had discussions about what's the impact to the
Ship Submersible Nuclear fleet and how do we minimize that.
That's part of what we've been trying to do over this last
year is to really understand what is that range of options
where we can work with the combatant commander and the
warfighter to get a concept of operations that allows us to
minimize that impact. Part of what we are trying to design
based on that is to just get at that. And in this environment,
that's about all we can talk about. But we continue down that
path to understand how to deploy a capability that's going to
meet the combatant commander and minimize that impact.
Mr. Moulton. Great. Thank you very much. As I noted in my
opening statement, I have serious concerns that the
administration is not treating the enormously consequential
decisions regarding deterrence strategy and policy with the
rigor that they deserve. So a couple questions on that point.
Lieutenant General Gebara and Vice Admiral Wolfe, you're
both career experts on nuclear deterrence. Have either of you
spoken with the White House regarding nuclear deterrence,
particularly the implications of potential changes to policy
that might impact our nuclear deterrence?
General Gebara. Sir, I'll go ahead and start. So I
personally have not done so. It would not be typical for me to
do so based on the position I'm in. I would expect that advice
to go from the combatant commanders and the joint chiefs to the
President.
Mr. Moulton. It's also not typical to suddenly change 70
years of policy on a whim. So I thought they might ask. Admiral
Wolfe?
Admiral Wolfe. Sir, I would give the same answer as the
general. I have not had any personal discussions.
Mr. Moulton. What about--
Admiral Wolfe. That is something we'd work through policy
and through OSD.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you. Dr. Vann, Ms. Yaffe, have you had
any discussions about nuclear deterrence policy with the White
House?
Dr. Vann. Sir, I can say that I have not personally had any
conversations
Mr. Moulton. Okay.
Dr. Vann. --at this point. But that would normally go
through--
Mr. Moulton. Ms. Yaffe.
Dr. Vann. --policy.
Ms. Yaffe. So the policy office, certainly when the Golden
Dome came out, had a number of conversations with the White
House to understand intent and make sure that the architecture
recommendations were in line with the policy intent. We expect
ongoing conversations on the deterrence elements.
Mr. Moulton. What do you understand to be the new
deterrence policy? How is this going to work and how are our
adversaries going to respond since that's how deterrence works?
Your adversary gets a vote.
Ms. Yaffe. That's right. Sir, the guidance and certainly
the intent of the Golden Dome is to strengthen our deterrence
by denial approach to deterrence strategy to make sure that the
adversary does not believe that they can affect their
objectives through a cruise or a missile attack, cruise,
ballistic, hypersonic attack on the United States. It's meant
to send the signal we will not take that attack. We also, of
course, continue a deterrence through cost and position
strategy with our nuclear triad.
Mr. Moulton. Even though you admitted last week in the
hearing the Golden Dome will not protect against several of the
delivery systems like the nuclear-tipped torpedo. It's not
designed to stop a nuclear-tipped torpedo coming into Los
Angeles Harbor, for example.
Ms. Yaffe. Right. The priority is on aerial threats and
missiles.
Mr. Moulton. Right. So we're sort of accepting that even
though we claim deterrence by denial, we know that several
adversary weapons can get through?
Ms. Yaffe. I mean, this is where the deterrence through
cost imposition strategy comes in is to make sure that the
adversary understands that the range of attacks may face costs
that they're not prepared to bear.
Mr. Moulton. Well, that's back to the old decision of
deterrence, right?
Ms. Yaffe. Correct. I think enemies walked away from the
theory of deterrence through cost imposition is additive with
deterrence through denial through the Golden Dome.
Mr. Moulton. Yeah, except if you factor in what they might
do in response. Have there been any discussions about that?
Ms. Yaffe. There certainly have been discussions. And as
you noted in your opening statement, China and Russia have
continued to pursue a breadth of capabilities despite our prior
missile defense not being oriented toward them.
Mr. Moulton. Well, I hope we have I hope these
conversations continue. And they are actually backed up by not
just ideas but by numbers because the Congressional Budget
Office numbers that just came out are quite concerning. I don't
have time to get to this because I want to respect the time for
other members.
But there are a lot of concerns that both the chairman and
I have raised with implications for our workforce, the cuts
from Musk and DOGE, and the implications for morale. And so,
I'll send a couple questions for the record for you to respond
on that front. We know how important people are to this
process. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. DesJarlais. I thank the ranking member. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking
Member. Strategic deterrence is job one, most important mission
we have. I know the last 20 years, we were focused on Iraq and
Afghanistan, so we diverted some resources there. So we have
catching up to do. And I think that's why the Reconciliation
Bill, its position, the way it is, at least for the military
part because we got to catch up and take care of our troops.
My first question is to Dr. Vann, perhaps General Gebara
and Admiral Wolfe. But it's about nuclear command and control
and particularly survivability. For 29 years, we flew an
airborne command post 24/7, always a plane airborne with a
general.
And if the White House was hit, the Pentagon was hit,
United States Strategic Command was hit, there's a command
authority airborne that could take command of our nuclear
resources and respond. It was all about nuclear deterrence.
Russia and China needed to know, Soviet Union at the time
actually, that no matter what they did, we could respond back.
We stopped doing that in the early '90s, then we moved the
mission to the Navy at Tinker. And now we're hearing that the
Navy wants to adjust that airplane to a TACAMO (Take Charge and
Move Out) C-130 and walking away from the Looking Glass portion
of this mission. So we have a need still, I believe.
And it's more critical now than ever because we could be
hit within 15 minutes from China and Russia. And so that means
our survivable nodes are more they're more important than they
ever were. So Dr. Vann, what's your vision for the future of
the Looking Glass mission?
Dr. Vann. Yes, sir. Thank you for asking the question. Of
course, the nuclear command control and communications is
absolutely critical. It is the fourth leg of the triad as it
were. And you would know better than even I do on how important
that really is.
So recently, there was a meeting held inside the Department
with the NLCS[AR1] looking at that mission and supporting
transfer of that mission to the Air Force. So I'll ask General
Gebara to kind of add into this. My understanding is that's now
going to a Joint Requirements Oversight Council discussion. And
if supported, it will be officially transferred over to the Air
Force and stood up as a mission. So General Gebara, I don't
know if you have anything else.
General Gebara. Congressman, thank you for the question. So
just to clarify, the Department has not backed away from that
mission at all. We do that 24/7, 365. I personally have 58
missions on ABNCP, the Airborne Command Post, to do that
mission.
And those crews are very proud of what they do, and they
continue. The Navy has moved out on the C-130 model for their
TACAMO (Take Charge and Move Out) mission which has opened the
question of the airborne command post mission and which service
does that and which service does not. And so that's what Dr.
Vann was referring to in terms of the joint requirements.
Oversight council will take that on. They'll make the best
decision on who is the best service to do that. And then if the
Air Force is that service, then we will move out on that
program. The commitment of the Navy has been that they're going
to continue that mission until properly relieved.
Mr. Bacon. Right.
General Gebara. And so the last thing I'll say on that is
the Air Force, as you know, has moved out in establishing the
95th Wing which is our new command and control wing to get
after this, not just nuclear command and control but exquisite
forms of command and control throughout our department that
need to have full-time attention. It's not an additional duty
of an officer. It needs to be a wing commander that is looking
at this every day.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. I think what General Gebara said
is just right. As a matter of fact, on Monday, we had our Navy
nuclear mission oversight council, and this particular topic
came up. And the Navy is looking at how do they continue to
meet, the things they're being asked to do until that ultimate
decision is made and those responsibilities move.
Mr. Bacon. I'm hearing, though, the mission is still
vitally important. We have to find a way to transition it.
Another thing I want to state my position and most people know
it.
Doing a 15-minute alert I don't think works anymore. We did
29 years of 24/7 airborne. And granted we got the peace
dividend when the Soviet Union fell. And I think it was smart
what we did in the early 1990s.
But now we're back well, I think back to the future.
Russian is as threatening as ever, and China is going to match
our force in nuclear weapons. And a 15-minute response time I
don't think is adequate with the weapons that are here now but
also the future weapons that we're looking at. So I hope we're
going to look at some kind of 24/7 capability that ensures that
we have a command mode that cannot be targeted.
And again, we never want to use it. It's for deterrence. I
was going to ask, General, for you to give us some success
stories on the Sentinel, but I'm out of time. So maybe I'll
come back later. Thank you. I yield.
Dr. DesJarlais. I thank the gentleman. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you to all the witnesses for being here today. Dr. Vann, thank
you for your service. I wish you the best in your next chapter.
But I got to start by--if I can get my thoughts here--by
taking this opportunity to highlight that Secretary Pete
Hegseth's actions over the past several months have led to a
complete lack of confidence--a lack of confidence in his
ability to be the Secretary of Defense by many members on this
subcommittee. I don't even want to imagine a world in which he
shared secrets about our nuclear weapons details or plans in an
unclassified chat room. I have called on Secretary Hegseth to
resign, and I hope he'll heed that advice.
With that, let me start by saying I read an article
yesterday with the headline, Air Force now expects Sentinel
intercontinental ballistic missiles will predominantly need new
silos. It is my understanding the Air Force came up with this
requirement on its own ten years ago. I think one of the first
details to iron out when designing a next generation of silo-
based intercontinental ballistic missile systems would be
determining how these missiles would be launched.
General Gebara, can you speak to why it took the Air Force
ten years to realize new silos would be required for the
Sentinel? And how does this affect the cost and time line?
General Gebara. Sir, thank you for the question. I
appreciate the opportunity to speak to it. So the initial
Sentinel program that came under review last year was designed
to utilize the existing silos that exist today that were built
in the early '60s and then the Minuteman III missile which is
what we have on alert today was put into that infrastructure
from the early '60s.
There was an attempt and an assumption that reusing silos
would be the most cost effective way of going. As we went
through reviews last year as part of the recertification of the
program, as we determined it was essential to national
security, there was an effort made to look at all the areas
that we may need to restructure to be the most cost effective
as possible.
What you're seeing in the news recently is, in my view, a
positive interaction in that restructure in that we have
determined that it is more cost effective and more timely to go
with new silos in most cases, predominately new silos than it
is to put the money and time into refurbing old silos. So this
is just one example of the effort to restructure that our Air
Force has been going through over the last ten months.
Mr. Carbajal. And the cost factor?
General Gebara. Congressman, we believe this is more cost
effective than the original plan or reusing the silos.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. As Sentinel's timeline continues
to slip, maintaining Minuteman III is increasingly important to
our national security. General Gebara, what steps is the Air
Force taking to ensure the Minuteman remains viable until
replacement is ready?
General Gebara. Sir, thank you for the question. So
absolutely, the issue of nuclear forces is that our nuclear
forces need to be just as good on their last alert, last
patrol, last sortie as they were on their first. There
absolutely has to be safe, secure, effective, reliable forces.
The reality is the Minuteman III is going to be on alert
longer than we originally anticipated it being on alert. And so
we have to get after that. We have added monies into the
sustainment for our missile forces and the surrounding
infrastructure.
That has been looked at through our Office of the Secretary
of Defense teammates as well. And they agree that adequate
dollars have been spent on that. We have also added engineering
support into the program office to get after one of those
unknown unknowns.
So I could talk to the subcommittee with charts and charts
of the various widgets that need to be replaced and the efforts
we're getting after to do that. But it's the unknown unknowns
that will, of course, get after it. And so we're working hard
to identify those early, and that's where we are on Minuteman
right now.
We continue to test the Minuteman system through periodic
shots out of Vandenberg as you know from your district. Members
of this subcommittee--some members of the subcommittee have
witnessed that personally. I took some of you to witness that
last February. We do that periodically. And that is very
critical to ensure that you can do everything you want in
PowerPoint. But at the end of the day, it's important to test
to make sure these things will stay safe, secure, and
effective.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I'm out of time. I have a few more
questions that I'll submit for the record. Thank you.
Dr. DesJarlais. I thank the gentleman. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Messmer.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for the
witnesses for being here. Admiral Wolfe, it's good to see you
again. I would like to ask you some questions about the
Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile program.
Do you agree the most important operational requirement for
Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile is to provide the
President a credible response option after a nuclear event? And
if employed by the President, how important is it that Nuclear-
Armed Sea-Launched Cruise missiles survives in an enemy's
missile defense system?
Admiral Wolfe. Well, certainly, sir. Any system that we
provide in the Navy has to be survivable. That is the whole
reason why the Navy is in the deterrent business. So I agree
with those statements. Yes, sir.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you. Has that importance been given to
you from the Navy as a formal requirement for the Nuclear-Armed
Sea-Launched Cruise Missile development?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. We've got that in addition to a
whole bunch of other requirements. But yes, sir.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you, excellent. When Secretary Hegseth
asked how he would make the Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise
Missile program go fast, he responded, competition. Will you
develop the Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile system
through open competition?
Admiral Wolfe. Sir, that is based on the current program of
record. Yes, we've actually already done an industry day. We're
already looking at how we get multiple vendors into this to
understand what the concepts are and what the viability of
those concepts will be. And that's what's actually going to
help get us informed to a milestone decision next year.
Mr. Messmer. Good. Underwater launch testing is critical to
both Conventional Prompt Strike and Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched
Cruise Missile. That testing will take place at Naval Surface
Warfare Center Crane in my district. How soon would you like to
see that testing occur?
Admiral Wolfe. Well, sir, as you know since it's in your
district, we'd like to have that facility read to go as rapidly
as we can. Of course, we talk about using that facility for sea
launch cruise missile. But it was originally envisioned that it
was going to be for conventional prompt strike hypersonic.
So in the effort to be lean and efficient, we're going to
look at that to be a multi-use facility. And so as we continue
to push both of these programs forward, that facility will
become more critical for us to be able to do that testing.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you. Do you think you have the resources
you need to perform testing when required?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. I do.
Mr. Messmer. Okay. I've heard reports of the desire to
field something sooner than 2034. Is it your understanding that
currently appropriated funds and those considered by this
committee in a proposed Reconciliation Bill are for the
Acquisition Category I program as established by Congress?
Admiral Wolfe. I do, sir. But that's why I'm also asking
and looking for discussions on additional flexibility to be
able to have us do multiple things at the same time.
Mr. Messmer. Excellent. That's what I was hoping you'd say.
Can you confirm that if you decide to pursue any early
capability that such an effort would not interfere with
developing the missiles needed for the Nuclear-Armed Sea-
Launched Cruise Missile program of record in Initial
Operational Capability?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you. In terms of managing your command,
do you have the facilities and people needed to run all three
of your major programs?
Admiral Wolfe. We are in a build up right now of the
workforce, sir. To your point, if you look at what this program
has taken on in the last four to five years, we need to grow
our workforce within National Nuclear Security Administration
to be able to meet the demand signal for all three of those
critical programs.
Mr. Messmer. Okay. Thank you. Are you aware of the
production challenges facing our current intermediate range
missile programs, both in terms of capacity and lead times?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. I am.
Mr. Messmer. Okay. Do you believe you can meet the 2034
Initial Operational Capability timeline established by
Congress?
Admiral Wolfe. Based on the current plan we have, yes, sir,
I do.
Mr. Messmer. Perfect. All right. Thank you. Ms. Robbins,
I'm very interested in the potential for small nuclear reactors
to fully power our military installations. My understanding is
there's an urgent need for High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium to
support the advanced reactor industry in the United States for
United States energy dominance.
High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium can be made from down
blending a small portion of National Nuclear Security
Administration highly enriched uranium stockpiles. What is your
view on whether that's a viable method to increase High-Assay
Low-Enriched Uranium supply to support our administration's
goals of rapidly deploying advanced reactors without impacting
our other nuclear programs?
Ms. Robbins. Thank you for the question, sir. We have been
providing some down blended--we have been providing some highly
enriched uranium for down blending to High-Assay Low-Enriched
Uranium. We have done pretty much at this point what we can
with the materials that we have in hand to do. We are going to
need as a nation the ability to enrich uranium to be able to
power these small modular reactors and advanced reactors.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back my time.
Dr. DesJarlais. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Whitesides.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start by
saying that I think we are all feeling very lucky that we have
professionals like yourselves working on these issues. So my
gratitude to you all for your service to the country. This
hearing is especially timely.
The committee and the offices that you all head are dealing
with a dramatically changing strategic environment. That's one
of the reasons why I felt the 189 million dollar cut to the
National Nuclear Security Administration's nonproliferation
budget in the Continuing Resolution was so concerning. Now in
my opinion, it's precisely the wrong time to be cutting that
programming.
Compounding the problem, we add the 177 National Nuclear
Safety Administration employees that were summarily fired in
February. Now reports indicate that as many as 500 more might
be on the chopping block. Between Russia, North Korea, Iran,
I'm at a loss to explain or understand how cutting
nonproliferation nuclear security and inspections serves any of
our national security interests.
Ms. Robbins, I hate to do this. But I'd like to ask you
some questions about the personnel process through which the
National Nuclear Security Administration security inspectors
were evaluated for firing. If you don't know the answer, you
can give an approximation or come back for the record. Can you
confirm the total number who were fired in February and the
total number currently subject to termination?
Ms. Robbins. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. On
February 13, 177 probationary employees were terminated. On
February the 14th, 150 of those employees were--the termination
was rescinded and they did return to employment.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you. That answered my next question.
So it sounds like a few have declined to be rehired. How many
of those?
Ms. Robbins. So the rescission was for 150 on February 14th
following the California judges order. The remaining 27
probationary employees were offered to return to employment.
Three declined. So out of the 177 that were terminated on
February the 13th, only three have not returned.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you. Can you describe for me the
process of the firings? Were you able to advocate for waivers?
Were any granted? And what advocacy before the action did you
conduct within the administration?
Ms. Robbins. The actions happened very quickly. I had asked
if there was an opportunity to consider national security as
being excluded from actions that were happening at the time.
There was nothing provided to give me a national security
waiver exemption. I proceeded with the termination as directed.
And the following day, the Secretary did rescind the
terminations, directed me to rescind the terminations for 150
employees.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you so much. I just want to underline
that point that the initial take of the DOGE team did not give
an opportunity for national security to be considered. I find
that remarkable.
Anyway, turning my attention to General, I appreciated our
conversation earlier today. And I wanted to give you an
opportunity to talk about the full range of modernization
that's happening now. I've got about a minute and 20 left. You
have a minute to do that.
General Gebara. Congressman, thank you very much. And there
are a lot of exciting things happening in nuclear modernization
right now. So a minute is going to go quick.
But I would just say that there is an entire spectrum of
things we're doing. So if you look from one end of the
spectrum, the Long-Range Standoff Weapon missile in conjunction
with the W80-4 that the National Nuclear Security
Administration is working on, on time, on budget, successful
flight test this year with a new flight test eminent and doing
very well. B-21 bomber, on time, on budget, exquisite sixth
generation capability, best air vehicle on the planet earth.
If you look at our B61-12, B61-13, my National Nuclear
Security Administration teammate has already kind of talked
about the success of that early or on time, depending on which
one you're talking about. As we go to the Mk21A program which
will have the W87-1 warhead in it, we've had successful flight
tests, on time, on budget. That is a weapon that will go on
Sentinel.
And so there will be a question as the Sentinel timing goes
to the timing of the Mk21A. We have reflowed that program so
that we can do maximum testing on other rockets while we come
up with a Sentinel as well. And then I'm happy to talk further
or in a different setting on the Sentinel as we're running out
of time.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, sir. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. DesJarlais. The gentleman yields. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Crank, for five
minutes.
Mr. Crank. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon.
Thanks to all of you for being here. In my mind, the rapid
modernization of our nuclear forces should be one of our
highest national security priorities.
Unfortunately, some essential nuclear Science & Technology
technologies have been deprioritized in the past. And the good
news is that new commercial efforts have emerged that may be
able to assist the department in making up lost time. Admiral
Wolfe, at a high level, can you share why Strategic Systems
Programs is interested in reentry capabilities and what
programs these efforts support?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. Certainly, reentry programs, not
just for the Navy but for the Air Force as well, all of those
technologies are absolutely critical when you look at what
these weapons do. Certainly for the Navy because of the W93-7,
that's our new development program that we've got, we need
those new technologies. We need to understand that
manufacturing capability, all of those things that are going to
go into us being able to deliver an entirely new capability in
the mid '30s.
Mr. Crank. And then how will the Department and Strategic
Systems Programs take advantage of higher cadence commercial
reentry capabilities and opportunities to increase testing?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. So we're looking at every
opportunity with commercial industry. And it's not just what
we're doing on the nuclear side but it's also on the hypersonic
side as well.
We have a program in the Department of Defense called MACH-
TB where we're using commercial industry rockets to allow us to
get more rapid testing at a quicker pace, more cost effective
to be able to develop some of these technologies. Maybe not a
full up system like what the General and I ultimately deliver,
but representative technologies that would need to go into
those systems. It allows us to use all these new capabilities
to develop those quicker to prove that they're going to give us
what we need.
Mr. Crank. Okay. And General, thank you. First of all,
thanks for coming by the office and visiting earlier today. I
enjoyed our discussion. I had a question for you on B-52
modernization.
Obviously, I think concerning to all of us obviously that
the B-52H the Air Force plans to fly it until at least 2050.
But it's going to take pretty significant upgrades to achieve
that goal. Talk about--I guess the Air Force investments for
fiscal year 2025 include a total of just over a billion dollars
in research and development and then 194 million in procurement
for the B-52 modernization program. Can you talk about that and
the importance of it?
General Gebara. Yes, sir. Absolutely. Thank you for the
question. So the decision to go forward with the B-52 was a
decision made several years ago in that we needed a high low
mix of capability. So it would not be cost effective to the
American taxpayer to have all high end exquisite things when
many missions could be done with the proverbial old truck
that's paid for and we just need to do some upgrades to it.
And I don't mean to make light of the upgrades. They're
significant. But a modernized B-52J is roughly a third as much
cost as a brand new exquisite bomber.
To do the B-52J program, we need new engines. We need now
radar. We're going to install some new nuclear command and
control radios as those age out and put new crypto technology
on them which is fleetwide for all aircraft need that.
So those are at various stages of development. The engines
themselves that required a little bit of redesign on the inlet
as we did computer modeling, that redesign has been done. It's
currently in wind tunnel testing, and we believe that we'll
have a milestone decision later this year on that.
The radar has seen some cost growth to it. We currently
have been working through that to get that back a little bit
more favorable to us. And then the nuclear command and control
radio, of the two, one is going on the airplane with no
problems. The other one has been a little bit more delay than I
would like to see.
But overall, that kind of family of upgrades will happen as
much in parallel as we can do. But they are different programs
that are ongoing on the airplane. Again, this is something that
while we are upgrading these airplanes, they are also operating
in bomber task forces around the world.
So there's a bomber task force of B-52s going on as we
speak. And so these are things that we have to keep operating
while we're upgrading at the same time. Thank you for the
question, sir.
Mr. Crank. Well, and I see that I'm out of time. But thank
you. Thanks to all of you for being here, and thanks for what
you continue to do for our country. Thank you. Thanks, Mr.
Chairman. I yield back.
Dr. DesJarlais. The gentleman yields. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Bell, for five
minutes.
Mr. Bell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. Thank
you all for being here today. General, good to see you again.
Good speaking to you. I enjoyed the conversation. Appreciate
your time.
We discussed the importance of ensuring continued
investment and procurement for these vital programs. The last
thing we all want is to be slowed down in our effort to
modernize and fall behind our adversaries. From your
perspective, what specific actions can we do here in Congress
to strengthen our defense industrial base and ensure the timely
delivery and production of advanced systems, weapons, and
technologies so we can stay ahead of pacing threats such as
China?
General Gebara. Congressman, thank you for the question.
And so I think clearly the best thing we can do is provide
stable laws, Non-Disclosure Agreements, and appropriations as
best we can so that industry can react to that because they're
not going to react as well as they could if we're constantly
shifting around. And so that's that.
In terms of the flexibilities, we do appreciate flexible
uses of money that we've seen and kind of the Reconciliation
Bill. There's good opportunities there. And then just the
support of the Congress which has been unwavering in nuclear
deterrence space. I think all of us would agree that we've been
very happy and appreciative of the near unanimity of the
Congress and the importance of this mission.
Mr. Bell. In your written testimony, you mentioned the
growing alignment among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
How concerned should we be about operational or strategic
coordination among these nuclear armed or nuclear aspiring
states?
General Gebara. Sir, so clearly these countries are talking
and they're collaborating. What I would say is we don't need to
be scared. We do need to be prepared. We need to work as fast
as we can to ensure our modernization programs come into the
field as soon as possible. And we need to ensure the systems
that we--the legacy systems we have maintain safe, secure,
reliable, and effective until we can do that handoff. And I'm
not sure if Ms. Yaffe has anything to add to that.
Ms. Yaffe. Sir, I just echo that we remain very concerned
about increased cooperation to include missile cooperation
between Russia and North Korea, for example. We're watching it
very closely. But this is a dynamic that we need to take into
account as part of the overall multiple nuclear challenge or
strategic situation that we face.
Mr. Bell. Thank you. You provided testimony, General, also
highlights Iran's increased uranium enrichment and its
continued development of ballistic missiles, missile
capabilities, including potential Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile range systems. Given these advancements in Iran to
destabilize regional activities, how is the Department of the
Air Force preparing to address the potential emergence of Iran
as a nuclear arm state? And what implications would this have
for United States deterrent strategy and force posture in the
Middle East?
General Gebara. Sir, thank you for the question. And so the
President has made it clear that this United States policy Iran
cannot have a nuclear weapon, and I'll pass that to my policy
teammate in just a second. In terms of the Department of the
Air Force and what we're doing, we are a back to basics
military organization that needs to be lethal and ready to
support the President's goals. And our view of that is if we
keep that deterrent posture as strong as possible, that that
will give the President and the executive branch as much
flexibility as possible to do what they need to do in a
negotiation state and over to policy.
Ms. Yaffe. Thank you. Preventing Iran from acquiring a
nuclear weapon is absolutely paramount importance to the United
States. The President has expressed his preference to negotiate
a solution. The job of the Department of Defense is to provide
credible options to support a whole of government strategy to
deny Iran a nuclear weapon.
Mr. Bell. Thank you. And Admiral Wolfe, you submitted
testimony highlights the vital and close cooperation that has
existed and continues to exist between the United States and
the United Kingdom on nuclear deterrence through agreement such
as the Polaris Sales Agreement and the Mutual Defense
Agreement. From your perspective, how vital is this partnership
to the strength and credibility of our own sea-based deterrent?
And are there any current challenges, political, industrial, or
logistical, that can impact our ability to sustain this
cooperation effectively into the next generation of strategic
systems?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. So we
work very closely with United Kingdom on my side under the
Polaris Sales Agreement. I think it's absolutely vital that we
continue that partnership. Certainly, what we do under the
Polaris Sales Agreement, not only do they benefit, we do as
well. If you look at the cost share that they've got in many of
the areas where we are working together, there's mutual benefit
for all.
Mr. Bell. That's about my time. I yield back.
Dr. DesJarlais. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for
five minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Dr. Chairman DesJarlais.
And I want to wish Dr. Vann well. I'm so happy to see
University of South Carolina graduates be so strong and be so
competent and capable.
So thank you. And congratulations on your 2023 Meritorious
Presidential Rank Award and then your background working at
Nephron. My goodness, with Bill and Lou Kennedy, you have
worked with real superstars. So I wish you will for the future.
And any way that we can work with you in the future, please let
me know.
And with that in mind too, we truly are thanking each of
you for being here. And the world sadly is in a conflict we
didn't chose between dictators with rule of gun invading
democracies with rule of law. And indeed Russia, war criminal
Putin, and Chinese Communist Party continue to expand and
modernize their nuclear arsenals.
And we know clearly that war criminal Putin is trying to
recreate the failed Soviet Union. And with that, it's mass
murder in Ukraine. But it was also the annexation of Belarus
denying Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, the actual President, to be
able to be elected.
We know that they never left with troops in Transnistria of
Moldova. We know the annexation practically of South Ossetia,
Abkhazia, of the Republic of Georgia, and the rigging of the
elections in Georgia where Salome Zourabichvili should've been
elected President. But over and over again, we've just got to
understand that we're in a very, I think, critical situation.
I'm just so happy for your leadership. Additionally, we
know that North Korea has committed to increasing their nuclear
warhead stockpile. And they are continuing their efforts at
launching Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles to intimidate our
allies in Japan and Korea and indeed the United States.
And then we have the regime in Tehran which is making every
step to produce nuclear weapons. And we know and I support very
much President Donald Trump understanding that Iran must not
ever have a nuclear weapon. We know that they never stopped
developing Intercontinental Ballistic Missile development.
And there's only one reason for an Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile. It's not for space research. It's truly to
ultimately provide their goal of death to Israel, death to
America. And with that in mind, we must have a deterrent to
preserve and maintain peace through strength.
And Ms. Robbins, again, thank you for your service. I'm so
grateful to represent the Savannah River Site. So I know
firsthand of your good work and what it means to all of us. And
with that in mind--and I'm the only serving member of Congress
who actually worked there.
And with that in mind, I know firsthand how capable the
people are there. And I'm grateful to the local communities of
Aiken and Barnwell that host the site. And I'm also grateful
that it's by state because next door Georgia with Congressman
Rick Allen, we all support the Savannah River Site.
And we've discussed before here the importance of plutonium
pit production, a two-site solution. And it was a genius for
somebody to come up with that to have a two-site solution. And
would you agree that modernizing our plutonium pits and
bringing facilities such as the Savannah River Plutonium
Production Facility online as soon as possible is vital to
national security?
Ms. Robbins. Yes, sir. The Savannah River Plutonium
Production Facility plays a key role in restoring our pit
production capability which is essential for our nuclear
deterrent modernization.
Mr. Wilson. And the deterrence is so critical. And then
amazingly enough, Congressman Carbajal, I appreciate that
General Gebara, he has jumped ahead in regard to the missile
silos. And it's hard to imagine Republicans and Democrats can
work together and including even Seth Moulton and John
Garamendi.
With that in mind, my time is really up. I want to thank
Admiral Wolfe for your service. And indeed the industrial base,
we need to be working together to have it developed. And so
however we can--and hey, it is bipartisan.
And with Dr. DesJarlais working with our colleagues on the
left of the dais, we can achieve the deterrence for peace
through strength. Thank you. I yield back.
Dr. DesJarlais. I thank the gentleman. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. I'm curious. What is deterrence? What are we
deterring and who? And then what does it take to deter? Seems
to me that's the fundamental.
Each and every one of you use that in your testimony. But
I'm not so sure that we've ever come to a conclusion or even an
understanding of deterrence. My guess is that each of you has a
different definition of it and a different way in which it
could be achieved if, in fact, you were to define it.
I'm going to let it go at that. But it comes back to me
that we really need to decide what these nuclear weapons are
for. And then we can go about deciding what we need to use them
for.
But right now, it's kind of like whatever we might imagine.
But this is a different weapon, whether it's deployed on an
Long-Range-Standoff Weapon, on a B-52, or a Submarine-Launched
Cruise Missile, or a Sentinel or Minuteman or a Trident. What
is deterrence?
I think we need to think long and hard about that. The
nuclear commission didn't deal with that other than to say we
need a lot of everything to deter it. I yield back.
Dr. DesJarlais. The gentleman yields back. The chair
recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Hamadeh, for five
minutes.
Mr. Hamadeh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we speak, Russia
and China are rapidly expanding and modernizing their nuclear
forces. This includes building new missiles, new hypersonic
weapons, and even exploring nuclear weapons in space.
Now these treats are not theoretical. They're very real and
directly aimed at us. And we know the threats we face. What we
don't know is if and when we are attacked is America will have
an adequate response.
And our country cannot be complacent when lives are at
risk. And that is why President Trump's Golden Dome initiative
is so important. And for the first time in decades, we are
prioritizing the safety of the American people.
The Golden Dome will protect us from the threats from
above. It is bold, ambitious, and exact the deterrent our
country needs. We are here today to ensure America leads, not
lags so our enemies know that if they even consider threatening
our homeland, they will fail.
Now my first question is to Ms. Robbins. You say that
Artificial Intelligence is accelerating some of our timelines,
echoing Secretary Wright's words that, quote, ``Artificial
Intelligence is the next Manhattan Project.'' Now how do we
count our enemies' use of Artificial Intelligence?
Ms. Robbins. Thank you, sir, for that question. One of the
ways that we can do that is by getting there faster and using
it to drive efficiencies and advancements in our programs
first. One of the ways that we are using it is to identify new
materials.
If we use it on our weapons program, we can identify new
systems faster. We can reconcile data faster. We are currently
using it in our stockpile modernization for verification that
components meet quality requirements. So this gives us more
reliability in those quality inspections and it also completes
those more efficiently.
Mr. Hamadeh. Very good. And you also mentioned that China
and Russia dominate the field of nuclear reactor construction
and that they designed 48 out of the 52 of the world's reactors
being built since 2017. That's pretty shocking to hear that our
enemies are building 90 percent of the world's new reactors.
Would you agree that this is a national security risk and what
is our current plan looking at that?
Ms. Robbins. Yes, thank you. There's a couple of avenues.
One, as Secretary Wright has been advancing new nuclear in the
United States and enabling United States companies to expand
their capabilities globally, that's key, as well as ensuring
that we have the materials that we need.
Another is our nuclear nonproliferation program engages
with United States companies to design safeguards in to new
reactor designs. So that ensures protection of our materials if
we were to deploy reactors globally and even within the United
States.
Mr. Hamadeh. Thank you, Ms. Robbins. My next question is to
you, Dr. Vann. You expressed grave concerns about Russia's
interest in deployment of nuclear weapons in space which would
float in orbit waiting to be detonated. Now the consequences of
that, as we all know, would be catastrophic. Now what are the
risks that hostile actors could detonate a nuke in orbit and
how do you think we should respond to this emerging threat?
Dr. Vann. Yeah, so as General Gebara mentioned earlier, I
think the key for the Department of Defense is to be prepared,
right, to understand what the potential risks and optionality's
that our adversaries hold. Work across our nuclear enterprise
to understand those risks, and then develop countermeasures or
deterrence measures in order to defend. That is absolutely
critical to work those types of decisions through our policy
colleagues as they set and establish what our nuclear policies
are, and then across the acquisition and execution enterprise
in order to develop the capabilities as directed for our
nuclear deterrent.
Mr. Hamadeh. Thank you, Doctor. Now General, your testimony
warns about the dangerous synergy of China, Russia, Iran, and
North Korea as an emerging anti-Western coalition that could
put us in simultaneous conflicts with two or more nuclear armed
powers. Now how can we expand our alliances to reestablish
deterrence?
General Gebara. Sir, thank you for the question. And so the
discussion of what alliances we have, what partners we have is
a national level decision. I would say in general we continue
to be the partner of choice across the world.
As you look at--as an example, if you look at our bomber
task forces that United States Air Force operates, we've
operated with roughly a quarter of the world's Air Forces over
the last year to 18 months because everyone wants to be part of
a team that is a successful--can give lethality if necessary
but is understanding the freedoms associated with Western way
of thought. And I don't know if you have anything to add on
that.
Ms. Yaffe. I'd say our extended deterrence partnerships
remain essential. And certainly, assuring our allies and
partners is a fundamental role of our nuclear weapons.
Mr. Hamadeh. My time has expired. Thank you.
Dr. DesJarlais. Seeing no further members for questioning,
this will conclude the open portion of this hearing. We will
adjourn and move into the closed session barring a quick
comfort break. We'll see you all soon. Meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
May 7, 2025
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 7, 2025
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
May 7, 2025
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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. We have heard from several nuclear weapons labs about
challenges with personnel recruitment and retention. Some recruitment
efforts, such as internships and outreach programs are successful. But
retaining employees remains challenging.
What steps have you taken to ensure we have the needed workforce at
the labs? What can Congress do to help?
Mr. Robbins. The workforce at NNSA's laboratories, plants and sites
is NNSA's most valuable asset. In 2022, NNSA's management and operating
(M&O) contractors were on track to experience historically high
attrition rates between 9-15 percent. NNSA has successfully implemented
several initiatives to attract, recruit, and retain employees for our
M&O contractor workforces, including recognizing service credit across
the nuclear security enterprise to allow the movement of employees and
introducing special targeted funds, stipends and bonuses to retain
employees in areas where attrition is high. The normalization of
attrition to rates comparable to or lower than the historical average
of 6% indicate that these retention efforts have been effective.
Mr. Wilson. Vice Admiral Wolfe, a modernized nuclear force is vital
for continued deterrence. In your statement you mention that
``modernization needs cannot succeed without investing in research and
development, the critical skills in the workforce, and the facilities
needed to produce, sustain, and certify our nuclear systems''.
What is your assessment of the industrial base that you rely on,
and how is the Navy working to increase industrial base capacity,
particularly in the areas of solid-rocket motors, radiation-hardened
electronics, and inertial instrumentation?
Admiral Wolfe. The domestic industrial base has atrophied
significantly during recent decades of nuclear sustainment efforts
(vice development and production). As we begin to undertake a variety
of nuclear modernization efforts within Navy Strategic Systems Programs
(SSP) - e.g. the TRIDENT II D5LE2 missile, the W93/Mk7 warhead, and the
Sea-Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear - it will be imperative that we
continue making program agnostic investments to ensure that industry
has the capacity and critical skills necessary to meet the needs of the
Warfighter and our Nation.
Recently, the solid-rocket motor industrial base has grown
significantly in response to new demands driven by the commercial space
industry. However, there is limited overlap and applicability between
these technologies and production processes when compared to the needs
of the nuclear enterprise. Through close collaboration with the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Services, and industry, we have
been able to begin mitigating production risks that will enable trade
space for senior leadership to make informed decisions. Beyond
investments into the infrastructure and capital equipment supporting
the solid-rocket motor industrial base, a major area of focus will be
on industry's ability to attract, train, and retain a workforce such
that it is capable of supporting concurrent development programs across
the conventional and nuclear enterprises in conjunction with the
demands of commercial vendors.
Similarly, radiation-hardened microelectronics and inertial
instrumentation have a very niche workforce that will need to be
developed and grown to meet the needs of DoD programs while maintaining
the technical acumen and rigor necessary to outpace our adversaries.
Navy SSP works closely with the OSD (Industrial Base Policy) and OSD
(Research & Engineering) - as well as our Naval Surface Warfare Centers
that provide valuable subject matter expertise - in order to highlight
opportunities to make cross-cutting investments that maximize the
benefits realized across multiple programs. Continued investment in
each of these areas is critical to ensuring SSP is supported by a
robust and resilient industrial base that is capable of delivering
time-relevant capabilities to the Warfighter.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. Last year, you stated that the total budget request
for the Ground leg of the Triad was $7.54 billion, not including NC3
modernization. Broken down by program sub-component, how much did the
Department of Defense actually spend on the Sentinel program in FY24
and FY25?
General Gebara. For FY 2024, the DoD budgeted $4.5 billion for the
Sentinel program. The Sentinel Program Office spent $3.1 billion in FY
2024. Due to under execution of prior year budgets, the DoD adjusted
Sentinel's budget to $2.8 billion in FY 2025 reflecting carryover. The
projection for FY 2025 spending is $4.3 billion.
Mr. Garamendi. When did the Air Force first conduct a feasibility
review of whether silos could be used for the Sentinel?
When did they first determine that they might not be feasible?
When they make the determination that the previous course of action
was untenable?
General Gebara. The Air Force conducted an analysis of alternatives
(AoA) in 2014 to assess options for the future of the land-based leg of
the nuclear triad. At that time, the analysis concluded that continued
silo-basing in existing Minuteman III infrastructure, with enhanced
capabilities, was the most cost-effective approach to satisfy nuclear
deterrence operations.
When did they first determine that they might not be feasible?
Structural site assessments in the F.E. Warren Air Force Base
missile field, conducted from 2022 to 2023, raised concerns that the
silos could require costly structural modifications, as well as
remediations for lead and asbestos to support Sentinel. By the time the
results of the assessments were complete, diameter risks and work-in-
progress constraints surfaced, raising additional concerns about cost
increases and schedule delays for Sentinel. Additionally, construction
at test Launch Facility (LF)-04 at Vandenberg Space Force Base (VSFB)
revealed previously unknown site conditions that led to substantial
schedule delays. These combined effects were further validated during
the Nunn-McCurdy review which indicated re-use of silos presented
higher risk of cost increases and schedule delays due to varying
unknowns, which led to the 8 Jul 24 certification of a modified program
that included new silos.
When did they make the determination that the previous course of
action was untenable?
July 8, 2024, after completing its Nunn-McCurdy review, USD(A&S)
certified the program to continue, based on a reasonably modified
program concept-a concept that included new silos. Three primary
factors emerged: 1) issues with VSFB LF-04 conversion project; 2) work-
in-progress constraints impacting deployment timelines, delaying Full
Operational Capability; and 3) limitations and risks related to the
existing silo diameter.
Mr. Garamendi. Last year, NNSA stated that ``we are working closely
with the [USAF] to understand and assess expected changes to the
Sentinel acquisition schedule resulting from the Nunn-McCurdy breach''.
Now that the Department of Defense has completed its first Nunn-McCurdy
review, how has the NNSA adjusted its timeline for the W87-1?
Mr. Robbins. NNSA continues to work with the Department of Defense
through the Nuclear Weapons Council to ensure alignment of the two
programs as the Sentinel program completes its re-structuring efforts.
The W87-1 Modification Program's First Production Unit is planned for
the early 2030s.
Mr. Garamendi. Last year, NNSA predicted that it will go from
producing 1 pit per year (in 2024) to 30 pits per year seven years
later (2028) at Los Alamos National Laboratory and that it will go from
0 to 50 pits per year in 6 years at the Savannah River Site after
facility completion (targeted in 2032). Are these estimates still
accurate?
Mr. Robbins. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) produced the
first War Reserve (WR) pit in CY 2024. The number of pits manufactured
per year will increase as more equipment is installed at LANL and
manufacturing capacity increases. The number of manufactured pits that
are judged to meet War Reserve standards will also grow as
manufacturing processes mature. LANL remains on track to achieve the
minimum capability needed to produce 30 pits per year in 2028.
For the Savannah River Site (SRS), NNSA acknowledges the Savannah
River Pit Production Facility (SRPPF) completion estimate of 2032 is
aggressive and includes significant uncertainty. There will be more
fidelity in the SRS pit mission schedule once SRPPF's cost and schedule
is baselined with CD-2/3 approval in FY 2026. NNSA will continue to
review estimates and update as appropriate as facility designs,
construction, equipment installation, and rate production operations
progress.
NNSA is actively taking steps to minimize the time needed to reach
rate production at SRS, including development activities at LANL, so
certification and qualification activities can be accelerated once the
SRPPF Main Process Building comes online. NNSA is also developing and
executing plans to build production competency at SRS ahead of project
delivery so that the workforce is trained and ready to begin pit
production operations. A key component of training the workforce will
be the High-Fidelity Training and Operations Center (HFTOC), a
subproject of SRPPF that is forecasted to become available in 2028. The
workforce that is trained in HFTOC will also help expedite the startup
and readiness of the Main Process Building. NNSA is proactively taking
steps to mitigate project delays and ramp to rate production as quickly
as possible once the facility is available.
Mr. Garamendi. The 2024 initial Pit Production Total Cost
Aquisition Cost estimate forecasts pit production project costs in the
range of $28B-$37B. Is the improved baseline total acquisition cost
estimate still expected in 2026? Do you have more specifics about when
it will be delivered?
Mr. Robbins. Yes, the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility
(SRPPF) project cost, scope, and schedule baseline will be available in
2026.
Mr. Garamendi. The first plutonium pit produced at Los Alamos in
2024 was for a W87-1 warhead, which is being developed to be used on
Sentinel missiles. With the delays in this program, has NNSA adjusted
which warheads future plutonium pits will be allocated to? Will the
NNSA continue to produce diamond stamped plutonium pits for the W87-1
despite program delays?
Mr. Robbins. The plan for plutonium pits produced and their
sequenced need for warhead modernization programs has not changed. NNSA
continues to produce stockpile quality plutonium pits at Los Alamos for
the W87-1 and will coordinate with the Department of Defense on future
requirements through the Nuclear Weapons Council.
Mr. Garamendi. Now that the Department of Defense has finished its
first Nunn-McCurdy review, how is the Department of Defense working
with the NNSA to synchronize the timelines related to the W87-1, the
development/testing of the Sentinel missile and the design/construction
of the silos? Has the DoD adjusted the timeline for production of the
missile itself in light of delays on the MILCON part of the program?
Mr. Robbins. While the W87-1 program is separate and distinct from
the Sentinel program, there certainly are dependencies between the two.
The Nuclear Weapons Council is sensitive to the alignment of the two
programs and is looking at all options to maintain that alignment.
The Air Force continues to work on the Sentinel program restructure
which includes an updated test strategy and launch facility design. I
defer to the Air Force on the specifics of the updates and integration
with the NNSA.
Mr. Garamendi. What will the Department do with Sentinel missiles
produced without silos to place them in?
Ms. Yaffe. The Sentinel program continues to develop its
restructure plan that will be approved by USD(A&S) at a new Milestone B
decision. While the aerospace vehicle equipment (AVE) is farther along
in development than the launch facility, there is still work that must
be done to mature the AVE.
Mr. Garamendi. What is the assessed total number of warheads
required for the Sentinel program?
Ms. Yaffe. Sentinel will replace the 400 Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missiles currently in service. Decisions
regarding the number of warheads deployed across the nuclear triad are
ultimately made by the President in consultation with the Departments
of Defense and Energy through the Nuclear Weapons Council based on
assessments of geopolitical, operational, legal, programmatic, and
technical needs. I can provide more information at a classified level.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
Mr. Bacon. Section 1631 of the FY24 NDAA directed the Secretary of
Defense to establish a unified Major Force Program for NC3 and to
report to Congress for each budget year from FY25 to FY30. To date, the
defense committees have not received any information from DoD on it's
compliance with this requirement. Please summarize the Department's
progress on Sec 1631 and when the committee can expect the first budget
report on NC3.
Dr. Vann. DoD has developed a draft budget report in coordination
with the Military Services and Defense Agencies. The Department's
objective is to deliver the report to Congress by August 2025, pending
delivery of the FY 2026 President's Budget.
Background: In response to Section 1631 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 2024, a DoD working group consisting of the
representatives from the Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer (OUSD(C)/CFO); Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic, Space, and
Intelligence Portfolio Management (OASD(A/SSIPM)); OASD(A/SSIPM)'s
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) Directorate; Office
of the DoD Chief Information Officer; and Military Services met to
determine the best way forward. This team ultimately concluded that DoD
could best meet the intent of the legislation by producing a budget
exhibit. This exhibit establishes the boundaries and contents of the
NC3 portfolio and, instead of creating a new Major Force Program (MFP)
for NC3 that would necessitate re-aligning segments of several other
MFPs (Space, Joint All-Domain Command and Control, etc.) to NC3, will
report on its investment budget.
On February 29, 2024, OASD(A/SSIPM)'s NC3 Directorate team met with
professional staff members (PSMs) from the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees' Strategic Forces Subcommittees to present an
interim response and make the budget exhibit proposal; the PSMs agreed
to this course of action. Given the pending submission of the FY 2026
budget, the first brief is anticipated to be delivered in August 2025.
Pending the acceptance of this brief, DoD plans to coordinate with the
PSMs for a legislative proposal to codify the budget exhibit.
Since this initial meeting on February 29, 2025, OASD(A/SSIPM)'s
NC3 Directorate team has engaged with CAPE, OUSD(C)/CFO, Military
Services, and Defense Agencies to improve the accuracy of the report
and determine whether the report could be automatically generated from
DoD databases. Financial experts determined that there are no automatic
means to pull the required budget and program data and that the
Military Services and other organizations' manually pulling data will
be required to support an annual brief by OASD(A/SSIPM)'s NC3
Directorate team to the congressional defense committees.
Mr. Bacon. In 2018 the Secretary of Defense directed the NC3
Governance Improvement Implementation Plan to clarify the roles and
missions for NC3 operations and modernization. However, with the
exception of a small number of service-specific NC3 modernization
programs (SAOC, E-130J and ESS as examples), there has been limited
progress in initiating new programs of record to modernize the
software, networks, and communications capabilities that support the
joint functions of the NC3 enterprise. a. When will the Department of
Defense define the reference architecture for NC3 Next? b. How are
joint requirements for the NC3 enterprise defined, prioritized,
resourced and executed? c. What are the Department's view on
establishing a Joint PMO for NC3? d. Since FY2019 how much has the
Department invested by FY in the development of new joint NC3
enterprise capabilities?
Dr. Vann. a. The U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Nuclear
Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) Enterprise Center published
architecture artifacts capturing NC3 Next up to 2035. The next
increment will be published in the third quarter of FY 2026 and capture
NC3 Next up to 2040. Architectures beyond 2040 are being developed to
incorporate updated threat assessments and emerging technology research
findings.
b. The Commander, USSTRATCOM (CDRUSSTRATCOM), is the NC3 Enterprise
Lead and fulfills the assigned responsibilities to oversee and manage
NC3 enterprise operations, requirements, and systems engineering and
integration functions in accordance with (IAW) DoD Directive S-3730.02.
IAW Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Memorandum 034-19, the
CDRUSSTRATCOM is the lead sponsor for NC3 requirements and will
document mission requirements (defined as "the essential capabilities
that are needed across the Joint Force to address the NC3 mission").
The NC3 Enterprise Center is on course to complete a set of 10 initial
capabilities documents (ICDs) in FY 2025 to define the mission-level
requirements needed to address all gaps identified in the 2021 NC3 Gap
Analysis (classified Top Secret). Per JROC direction, the Services
retain responsibility for NC3 system requirements and will leverage the
NC3 mission ICDs to develop system-level requirements.
c. A joint program office for NC3 is not deemed necessary. The
scope of the NC3 acquisition portfolio is too broad to organize under a
single program office. In 2018, the Secretary of Defense designated the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S))
as NC3 Capability Portfolio Manager (CPM). As NC3 CPM, USD(A&S) is
responsible for NC3 strategic alignment of programs across the spectrum
of planning, requirements, technology, acquisition, sustainment,
programming, budgeting, and execution. This oversight responsibility
includes coordination with numerous Service and agency program
executive officers and program offices to ensure their activities
enable the delivery and sustainment of NC3 capabilities. The role of
the NC3 CPM keeps NC3 acquisition programs synchronized without the
additional overhead of a joint program office.
d. DoD's commitment to ensuring the modernization of new NC3
enterprise capabilities is reflected in the investment amounts from FY
2019-2025: FY 2019 - $3.4 billion, FY 2020 - $3.6 billion, FY 2021 -
$4.5 billion, FY 2022 - $4 billion, FY 2023 - $6.8 billion, FY 2024 -
$9.0 billion, and FY 2025 - $10.2 billion. This year-over-year budget
growth demonstrates DoD's consistent and deliberate investment in NC3
modernization to ensure the Nation's military is postured to
reestablish deterrence and defend the homeland.
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