[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
UNMANNED AND UNCHECKED:
CONFRONTING THE RISING THREAT OF
MALICIOUS DRONE USE IN AMERICA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-34
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://judiciary.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-653 WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JIM JORDAN, Ohio, Chair
DARRELL ISSA, California JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland, Ranking
ANDY BIGGS, Arizona Member
TOM McCLINTOCK, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
THOMAS P. TIFFANY, Wisconsin ZOE LOFGREN, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
CHIP ROY, Texas HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin Georgia
BEN CLINE, Virginia ERIC SWALWELL, California
LANCE GOODEN, Texas TED LIEU, California
JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
TROY E. NEHLS, Texas J. LUIS CORREA, California
BARRY MOORE, Alabama MARY GAY SCANLON, Pennsylvania
KEVIN KILEY, California JOE NEGUSE, Colorado
HARRIET M. HAGEMAN, Wyoming LUCY McBATH, Georgia
LAUREL M. LEE, Florida DEBORAH K. ROSS, North Carolina
WESLEY HUNT, Texas BECCA BALINT, Vermont
RUSSELL FRY, South Carolina JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
BRAD KNOTT, North Carolina JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
MARK HARRIS, North Carolina DANIEL S. GOLDMAN, New York
ROBERT F. ONDER, Jr., Missouri JASMINE CROCKETT, Texas
DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas
BRANDON GILL, Texas
MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
ANDY BIGGS, Arizona, Chair
TOM TIFFANY, Wisconsin LUCY McBATH, Georgia, Ranking
TROY NEHLS, Texas Member
BARRY MOORE, Alabama JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
KEVIN KILEY, California DAN GOLDMAN, New York
LAUREL LEE, Florida STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
BRAD KNOTT, North Carolina ERIC SWALWELL, California
CHRISTOPHER HIXON, Majority Staff Director
ARTHUR EWENCZYK, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Tuesday, September 16, 2025
OPENING STATEMENTS
Page
The Honorable Andy Biggs, Chair of the Subcommittee on Crime and
Federal Government Surveillance from the State of Arizona...... 1
The Honorable Lucy McBath, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on
Crime and Federal Government Surveillance from the State of
Georgia........................................................ 3
WITNESSES
Sgt. Robert Dooley, Statewide UAS/C-UAS Coordinator, Florida
Highway Patrol
Oral Testimony................................................. 5
Prepared Testimony............................................. 8
Brett Feddersen, Vice President, Strategy and Government Affairs,
D-Fend Solutions AD, Inc.
Oral Testimony................................................. 12
Prepared Testimony............................................. 14
Dr. Ryan Wallace, Professor, Aeronautical Science, Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University
Oral Testimony................................................. 18
Prepared Testimony............................................. 20
Dr. Catherine F. Cahill, Director, Alaska Center for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Integration (ACUASI), Geophysical Institute,
University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF)
Oral Testimony................................................. 28
Prepared Testimony............................................. 30
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC. SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
All materials submitted by the Subcommittee on Crime and Federal
Government Surveillance, for the record........................ 49
Materials submitted by the Honorable Andy Biggs, Chair of the
Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance from
the State of Arizona, for the record
An article entitled, ``Increasing drone incidents near US
airports, stadiums prompt alarm, officials say,'' Jan.
22, 2025, Reuters
An article entitled, ``Drones lifting inmates out of prisons?
UK inspector says it's a `theoretical possibility,' ''
Jul. 10, 2025, Corrections1
An article entitled, ``New video: Cartels drop bombs from
drones near southern border,'' Feb. 5, 2025, The Hill
An article entitled, ``Drones in the Wrong Hands: How
Criminals Use UAVs to Threaten Prisons and Jails,'' Jan.
28, 2025, DroneLife
An article entitled, ``New State Drone Laws Set Strict
Operational Boundaries,'' May 2, 2025, DroneLife
QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD
Questions to Sgt. Robert Dooley, Statewide UAS/C-UAS Coordinator,
Florida Highway Patrol, Brett Feddersen, Vice President,
Strategy and Government Affairs, D-Fend Solutions AD, Inc., Dr.
Ryan Wallace, Professor, Aeronautical Science, Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University, and Dr. Catherine F. Cahill, Director,
Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration
(ACUASI), Geophysical Institute, University of Alaska Fairbanks
(UAF), submitted by the Honorable Troy Nehls, of the
Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance from
the State of Texas, for the record
A response to questions from Sgt. Robert Dooley, Statewide
UAS/C-UAS Coordinator, Florida Highway Patrol
A response to questions from Brett Feddersen, Vice President,
Strategy and Government Affairs, D-Fend Solutions AD,
Inc.
A response to questions from Dr. Catherine F. Cahill,
Director, Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Integration (ACUASI), Geophysical Institute, University
of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF)
A response to questions from Dr. Ryan Wallace, Professor,
Aeronautical Science, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University
UNMANNED AND UNCHECKED:
CONFRONTING THE RISING THREAT OF MALICIOUS DRONE USE IN AMERICA
----------
Tuesday, September 16, 2025
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance
Committee on the Judiciary
Washington, DC
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:09 p.m., in
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Andy Biggs
[Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Biggs, Jordan, Tiffany, Nehls,
Kiley, Knott, McBath, Raskin, and Swalwell.
Mr. Biggs. The Subcommittee will come to order. Without
objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess at any
time. I apologize to everyone for starting a little over an
hour late. We had votes that kind of took up more time than we
thought. Welcome everyone to today's hearing on the rising
threat of malicious drone use in America.
I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Nehls, who
will lead us in the pledge of allegiance.
Mr. Nehls. Will you please stand and join me in honoring
our Nation's flag.
All. I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States
of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one
Nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for
all.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you.
Mr. Biggs. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
I appreciate everyone being here today. In this hearing we have
before us, we're focusing on unmanned aerial systems and how
these systems are being exploited by criminal elements. This
issue is no longer confined to science fiction or battlefield
environments. It is now increasingly disrupting daily life in
America.
Over the past several years, UAS technology has rapidly
advanced, becoming more affordable, more accessible, and more
capable. While this has fueled innovation and commerce, public
safety and emergency response, it has also led to opportunities
for abuse by criminals and adversaries alike.
The threats we face today from drones are not theoretical,
they are real, and they demand urgent attention. Between
January and June of this year the FAA recorded more than 1,000
UAS incursions near U.S. airports. A nearly 13 percent increase
from the same period last year, each of these incidents
represents not just a violation of restricted airspace, but a
potential catastrophe for passenger safety. Despite some
progress like remote ID, our response architecture is
fragmented. Remote ID helps with accountability, but does not
integrate into real-time air traffic management or provide
automatic alerts to airport security.
Additionally, most of our airports like dedicated counter-
AUS systems. Legal restrictions further complicate matters,
limiting who can respond in real time. The problem does not end
with aviation safety. Criminal networks are adapting to AUS
technology for nefarious purposes dropping contraband into
prisons, smuggling drugs and weapons across the U.S.-Mexican
border, surveilling law enforcement, and, in some case,
experimenting with weaponization.
Correctional facilities are continuing to face surging
drone drops of drugs, phones, and weapons. The stealth speed
and GDS-guided precision of modern drones make it difficult for
correctional officers to detect or intercept them without
specialized training or technology. These drops enable
organized criminal activity within prison walls, disrupt inmate
discipline and threaten the safety of the staff and inmates
alike.
The U.S. Northern Command leadership purported that over
1,000 drones crossed into U.S. airspace from the Mexican border
each month with CBP agents noting that in Texas, along the Rio
Grande Valley alone over 10,000 drone incursions and 25,000
drone sightings occurred in 2024.
Unlike conventional smuggling methods, drones offer cartels
a cost-effective and low-risk means to deliver small payloads
while avoiding direct encounters with U.S. law enforcement.
The CBP and DOD recently recorded 70 incursions in 11 days
around Laredo, prompting the deployment of striker units to
bolster surveillance. Equipped with features like night vision
and the ability to operate below radar thresholds. These drones
present a stealthy and persistent challenge to border security.
Despite this growing threat, CBP lacks the authority to disable
or intercept UAS in most circumstances, limiting its ability to
respond effectively in real time.
National special security events, NSSEs, such as
Presidential inaugurations, political conventions, high-profile
sporting events are increasingly vulnerable to drone-based
threats due to their symbolic value, dense crowds, and media
visibility.
While Federal agencies like the U.S. Secret Service, the
FBI and DHS are authorized to deploy counter-UAS capabilities
and national special security events under the Preventing
Emerging Threats Act of 2018, these efforts are intense and
confined to a limited number of events each year.
The DOJ officials testified that counter-UAS protections
are typically planned months in advance and require substantial
coordination with the FAA to ensure legitimate airspace
operations are not inadvertently affected. As a result,
thousands of public events that fall outside the NSSE
designation like any UAS mitigation coverage, even as drone
incidents rise nationally.
Expanding use of drones in public spaces also introduces
new risks for first responders. An active shooter, protest or
hazardous materials scenarios, the presence of unauthorized
drones can obstruct airspace, delay medevac or surveillance
operations, and even be used to track responder positions or
deliver harmful payloads.
Many of these tools are restricted under Federal law and
cannot be used by State or local entities without explicit
authorization. Additionally, these systems must be
miniaturized, cost-effective, and interoperable with existing
emergency response infrastructure to be viable at scale.
The dominance of Chinese manufacturers, particularly DJI
and the global drone market raises specific espionage concerns.
Under Chinese law, companies are legally obligated to cooperate
with Chinese national intelligence authorities, which amplifies
the risk that drones supplied by these firms can transmit
sensitive data back to foreign governments.
As of today, DJI holds nearly 90 percent of the consumer
drone market, and approximately 75 percent in commercial
sectors. Multiple policy reviews and commentaries warn that
adversarial actors may exploit the supply chain
vulnerabilities, together intelligence on U.S. critical
infrastructure, military bases, research facilities, and
emergency operations. The threat is persistent and
accelerating, and it will take a coordinated alignment of
resources, technology and authorities to contain it. This
hearing serves an important step to confront and combat
malicious drone use across the country and beyond.
I look forward to hearing what our witnesses say in our
lively discussion.
Now, without objection, I want to enter into the record an
article entitled, ``Increasing Drone Incidents Near U.S.
Airports, Stadiums Prompt Alarm Officials Say''; and ``Drones
Lifting Inmates Out of Prisons? U.K. Inspector Says It Is a
Theoretical Possibility.''
Without objection. Now, I yield back and recognize the
Ranking Member of the entire Committee, Mr. Raskin, for his
opening statement.
Mr. Raskin. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for holding this hearing
on the rising threat posed by an unmanned aircraft systems
commonly known as drones. The FAA reports that over one million
drones are now registered in the U.S. for a broad range of
commercial and recreational purposes; government agencies also
use them to improve diverse public safety operations, including
search and rescue, disaster response, crime scene
investigation, and even traffic enforcement. Like any
technology, including AI-enabled technology, which this
Subcommittee discussed earlier in the summer, drones can also
be used for unlawful purposes, like delivering contraband to
inmates in prison, or ferrying Fentanyl across the Northern and
Southern borders of our country.
In 2023, in my home State in Maryland, 15 people were
indicted as part of a criminal network that used drones to
smuggle Fentanyl and other drugs, cell phones, tools and other
contraband into the Roxbury Correctional Institution in
Hagerstown. I'm sure that many of my colleagues have similar
stories from their own States.
The DOJ is one of five Federal agencies with drone
detection and mitigation authority, which allows the Department
to detect, track, and even destroy drones that pose a credible
threat to Federal court houses, prisons, and large gatherings.
The FBI and the Federal Bureau of Prisons are also able to
utilize some counter-drone detection systems. In fact, earlier
this year, BOP reported the agency has deployed such systems at
64 facilities which have helped detect malicious drone use,
better inform law enforcement of incoming threats, and locate
suspected criminal drone operators.
Today, as we discuss law enforcement efforts to respond to
the malicious drone activity and the use of drones to enhance
public safety, we must be mindful of the risks associated with
the detection and mitigation of drones, as well as the need to
respect the privacy interest and civil liberties of the public
in the process. Let's make sure that law enforcement uses both
drone and counter-drone technology correctly, safely, and
always within the bounds of the law. That's why I was pleased
to join the Chairs and Ranking Members of the Transportation
Infrastructure Committee and the Homeland Security Committee to
introduce H.R. 5061, The Counter-UAS Authority Security,
Safety, and Reauthorization Act. The bill, which was reported
favorably by the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee by
remarkable vote of 60-0, would reauthorize, reform and expand
the existing counter unmanned aircraft system or counter-UAS
authorities of Homeland Security Department and the DOJ. Among
other provisions the bipartisan bill would, for the first time,
expand these authorities to State and local law enforcement
through a carefully calibrated pilot program.
The bill would also establish training program for these
agencies to meet before they can operate counter-UAS systems in
minimum performance requirements for counter-UAS technology
before it can be deployed ensuring these systems are used
safely and solely within the strictures of the law.
I trust today's hearing will commit to my colleagues the
need to support this bill, and then we will see swift unanimous
passage of it.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thanks to all our witnesses to being
here. I look forward to hearing from you. I yield back.
Mr. Biggs. The gentleman yields back. Thank you.
Without objection, all other opening statements will be
included in the record. Now, we will introduce today's
witnesses.
We will begin with Dr. Catherine Cahill. Dr. Cahill is the
Director of the Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Integration, ACUASI, and the Geophysical Institute at the
University of Alaska Fairbanks.
ACUASI leads one of the seven FAA UAS test sites, as the
FAA's Alaska BEYOND site and is a core university in the FAA's
center of excellence for UAS research. Dr. Cahill has served as
a member of the FAA's drone advisory committee and advanced
aviation advisory committee. Thank you for being here with us
today, Dr. Cahill.
Dr. Ryan Wallace is a Professor at Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University. His research focuses on UAS safety,
security, human factors and public policy. Dr. Wallace has
conducted training seminars for Federal agencies on the topics
of UAS safety operations, and counter-UAS techniques. He also
serves as a representative on the FAA's drone safety team and
served in the U.S. Air Force. Thank you for being with us, Dr.
Wallace.
Mr. Brett Feddersen is the Vice President for strategy and
government affairs at D-Fend Solutions, a manufacturer of
counter-drone systems for the military, law enforcement, and
others. He also serves as the Chair of Security Industry
Association's drone security subcommittee. He previously served
as the Executive Director for national security programs and
incident response at the FAA, and in various roles at the
Pentagon, the White House, the U.S. Army, and as a Pennsylvania
State trooper. Thank you, Mr. Feddersen, for being with us
today.
Next is Sergeant Robert Dooley. Sergeant Dooley has served
for more than 22 years with the Florida highway patrol, where
he is currently the UAS and C-UAS program coordinator. He
developed and has led the FHP's UAS program since its
inception.
Sergeant Dooley is an expert in law enforcement, UAS
operations, disaster response operations, and special events
and high value target UAS security operations. Thank you all
for being with us today.
We will begin by swearing you in and ask that you would
each rise and raise your right hand.
Do you swear or affirm under the penalty of perjury that
the testimony you are about to give is true and correct to the
best of your knowledge, information, and belief, so help you
God?
The record will reflect that the witnesses have each
answered in the affirmative. Thank you, please be seated.
Each of you should know that your written testimony will be
entered into the record in its entirety. Accordingly, we ask
that you summarize your testimony in five minutes. We're going
to begin today with Sergeant Dooley, so you're recognized for
your five minutes. I'll just tell you should see a clock in
front of you. When you're about 10 seconds, before you hit the
five, I will start tapping like this, that means please wrap it
up. We'll try to be a little bit lenient because we appreciate
you being here, but we would ask you to stay five minutes
because we all have your testimony, we've all read your
testimony.
Sergeant Dooley, you're first.
STATEMENT OF SGT. ROBERT DOOLEY
Sgt. Dooley. Thank you and good afternoon. Again, I'm
Sergeant Robert Dooley of Florida Highway Patrol. I am our
statewide coordinator for unmanned operations.
The critical importance of drone detection and mitigation
for public safety as unmanned aircraft systems continue to
proliferate across recreational, commercial, and malicious
domains. The ability of public safety agencies to detect and
mitigate unauthorized or threatening drones has become a
national imperative.
This statement outlines the growing threat landscape
associated with drones and discuss the current challenges,
detection, and mitigation, and advocates for urgent integration
of counter-UAS capabilities within a broader spectrum of public
safety framework.
The rapid evolution and accessibility of drone technology
have transformed industries. revolutionized emergency response,
and public safety operations. However, with this growth comes
an increasing threat of misuse, whether intentional or neglect,
from contraband drops over prison yards to surveillance of
critical infrastructure and interruptions of emergency scenes,
public safety agencies now face the complex airspace risk. The
ability to detect, track, identify, and when necessary,
mitigate rogue drones is essential for protecting lives,
preserving critical infrastructure and ensuring operational
integrity.
Drones present a unique set of challenges to public safety.
As you spoke earlier, criminal exploitation, criminal
organizations increasingly use drones to smuggle drones to
smuggle drugs, weapons, and contraband into correctional
facilities or across the borders, terrorist use, adversarial
State and non-State actors have experimented with drones for
surveillance and weaponization, creating low-cost and low-
detection threat vectors.
Privacy violations and harassment: Drones can be used to
stalk, harass, or violate the privacy of civilians and law
enforcement officers often in ways that are difficult to detect
and prevent.
Interference with public safety operations: Unauthorized
drones flying near traffic crashes, fire scenes, disaster zones
can impede emergency response, creating hazardous responses for
both responders and civilians.
The need for detection and mitigation capabilities: Public
safety agencies must be able to detect, identify and if
authorized, mitigate UAS threats in real time. Without this
capability, agencies operate blindly in shared airspace,
increasing risk to both responders and the public. The key
benefits of these capabilities include situational awareness,
drone detection systems enhance airspace awareness, allowing
agencies to monitor aerial activity near sensitive locations or
at the scenes.
Threat identification: Identifying type, intent and
operator of drone is essential for appropriate response and
legal action. Incident mitigation in critical scenario stopping
or redirecting a drone may be necessary to prevent harm or
disruption, especially during mass gatherings dignitary
protection or major disasters.
Current limitations in legal barriers: Despite the urgent
need, most State, local, Tribal, and territorial public safety
agencies lack the legal authority to mitigate and often face
limitations even detecting them. Only Federal agencies
currently possess this broad C-UAS authority under 6 U.S.C.
124(n) leaving a gap in homeland security at the local level.
Additionally: Technology access: C-UAS systems are costly,
complex and often limited to military or Federal use.
Interagency coordination: There's a lack of real-time data
sharing and standard operating procedures that could hinder
unified responses.
Policy gaps: Existing Federal laws, including the FAA's
preemption of airspace regulation complicate the rules and
responsibility of our SLTT agencies.
Legislative reform is needed, granted, limited controlled
UAS authority to vet and train public safety entities under
Federal oversight as proposed in several legislative efforts.
Training and standardization create a standardized C-UAS
training and certification programs ensuring safety,
accountability, and legal compliance.
Technology deployment: Fund and deploy scalable, nonkinetic
drone detection systems to local agencies, particularly those
responsible for critical infrastructure at mass events.
Public and private collaboration: Encourage partnerships
between technology providers, law enforcement and Federal
agencies to pilot C-UAS tools under lawful frameworks and
community engagement.
Educate the public on the responsible use of drones and
build awareness of the risks associated with unauthorized
operations. The ability to detect and mitigate rogue drones is
no longer a futuristic concept, it is a present-day necessity.
Public safety professionals stand on the front lines of both
natural and man-made crises and lack a C-UAS capability which
leaves critical vulnerability in our national preparedness.
Federal agencies play a vital role empowering State local
responders with tools, training and authority to protect their
communities from aerial threats is the next essential step in
securing the homeland.
I thank you and I await your questions.
[The prepared statement of Sgt. Dooley follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Sergeant Dooley. The Chair now
recognizes Mr. Feddersen for his five minutes. Mr. Feddersen,
please.
STATEMENT OF BRETT FEDDERSEN
Mr. Feddersen. Good afternoon, Chair Biggs, Ranking Member
Raskin, and the distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.
Thank you for the honor of appearing before you today.
My name is Brett Feddersen, I am the Vice President for
strategy and government affairs at D-Fend Solutions, a leading
counter-drone manufacturer. I also serve as the Chair of the
Security Industry Association's drone security Subcommittee, a
group comprised of leading providers and end users of counter
drone technologies available in the world.
I commend the Subcommittee for its proactive focus on the
threat and has quickly gone from a distant concern to clear and
present danger to our national security, to our critical
infrastructure and to our public safety. The illegal use of
drones has evolved from simple nuisance and trespassing to
sophisticated criminal malicious activity. The accessibility,
affordability, and adaptability of this technology have given
us new capabilities, most often used for good. However, they
also have created significant vulnerabilities that we as a
Nation are not yet prepared to face.
We can categorize these threats into three primary domains.
First are criminal and illicit activities. The use of drones by
criminal and terrorist organizations is no longer a
hypothetical scenario. Incidents of drones being used to
deliver contraband like drugs and weapons into correctional
facilities are a daily occurrence across America.
The weaponization of drones has been occurring in the
United States for years. The internet has brought battlefield
tactics to North America, through shared lessons learned in
conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. We continue to see
rival cartels repeatedly conduct indiscriminate carpet-bombing
attacks against other cartels using explosive laden drones.
In 2021, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel created a
dedicated unit of drone operators to attack rival groups in
Mexico. Today, Mexican cartels are reportedly using one-way
attack drones alongside the more traditional explosive carrying
quadcopters. Last year, U.S. Federal authorities detected
approximately 60,000 cartel drones near the border.
The second category is physical and cyber-attacks on
critical infrastructure. The potential for drone attacks in
critical infrastructure is alarming. A drone with a small
payload could cause widespread disruption and economic turmoil
by damaging power stations, water treatment plants,
communication powers, or data centers.
The U.S. critical infrastructure is often protected by
trained security professionals, not law enforcement. Any
assumption that State and local law enforcement could fill the
private sector gap is a gross underestimation of reality of
police resources.
The third category is surveillance and espionage. Drones
offer a low-cost, low-risk platform for persistent
surveillance. They can be equipped with sophisticated cameras
and sensors to gather intelligence from a distance without the
need for physical access.
Drones can bypass traditional security perimeters, making
them a favorite tool for illicit trade. Domestically, drones
are being used to stalk, harass, and spy on people in their own
homes. This invasion of privacy goes unchecked, as police watch
the drones fly away without leaving a physical footprint for
them to follow.
Our current legal and technological frameworks have not
kept pace with these clear and growing dangers. The authority
to detect and mitigate malicious drones is fragmented across
the Federal agencies, creating confusion and gaps in response.
While safe and effective counter-drone technology exists
today, its use is severely restricted by current laws. To
address these challenges, I respectfully offer the following
recommendations to the Subcommittee for consideration. A
comprehensive Federal counter-drone legislation. We need clear
and cohesive framework of nationwide counter-drone operations.
Year after year Congress continues to introduce counter-drone
legislation but never passes it. This legislation should
immediately expand the legal authorities to detect, track, and
identify drone threats to all Federal agencies, States, local,
Tribal, and territorial law enforcement, and trained security
professionals protecting our critical infrastructure.
This legislation should also expand the existing 2018
Federal pilot program for the mitigation of drone threats to
those same Federal, State, local entities, and trained security
professionals.
This pilot program must be launched in a robust manner to
enable the rapid scaling of capabilities ahead of the World
Cup, America's 250th anniversary celebration, next year's
elections, and the 2028 Olympics. If these authorities are not
granted by Congress quickly, then these mass gatherings will go
unprotected and require Federal resources to be diverted from
the border, other critical and national infrastructure
missions.
In conclusion, the threat from malicious drones uses in
real and immediate and growing, we must take decisive action
now.
I thank you for your time and look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feddersen follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Feddersen.
The Chair recognizes Dr. Wallace for his five minutes. Dr.
Wallace.
STATEMENT OF DR. RYAN WALLACE
Dr. Wallace. Chair Biggs, Ranking Member Raskin, and the
other distinguished Committee Members. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the important issue of protecting our
Nation from the misuse of unmanned aircraft systems, sometimes
referred to as UAS, or more colloquially, as drones.
My name is Ryan Wallace, and I currently serve as a
Professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. For the past
10 years, my research has focused primarily on UAS safety and
security threats through the use of UAS detection equipment.
This use of unmanned aircraft is not fundamentally a technology
problem, but rather, a people problem. What makes this problem
particularly challenging is the unique aerial capabilities that
UAS provides to their operators, capabilities previously
limited only to those with the resources and training to
operate manned aircraft. The accessibility, affordability, and
automation have now placed these capabilities within the reach
of anyone with a few hundred dollars. This creates a
disproportionate force multiplier for bad actors.
The destructive potential of consumer drones recently came
to global attention in Ukraine during the famed operation
Spiders Web where small drones were used to conduct rapid,
surprising, accurate, and devastating attacks. These attacks
were executed with near impunity, highlighting the critical
vulnerability gap posed by UAS threats. The remote nature of
these attacks left no one to arrest or hold accountable.
Today, these tactics and technology are being employed both
domestically and near our borders. The FAA estimates there are
currently more than 2.8 million drones in the United States,
nearly double the number of drones in 2018 than when the
Preventing Emerging Threats Act was signed into law.
Today, UAS outnumber manned aircraft by nearly 13-1. The
agency estimates that within five years, this number will grow
a further 10 percent. Presently, drones are causing three major
domestic problems: (1) Creating a collision risk with aircraft
operating in the National Airspace System; (2) contraband
delivery into prisons and correctional institutions; and (3)
incursions along our borders. The potential consequences of a
midair collision with a drone erode the safety of our skies. As
of the second quarter of 2025, the FAA recorded a total of
1,022 sightings, approximately 170 per month with aircrew
reportedly taking evasive action in 2.8 percent of those cases.
In January of this year, a Canada Air CL-415 conducting
suppression operations struck a small drone operating at low
altitude within a temporary flight restricted zone near the
Palisades fire. Their operations were suspended to allow that
fire to expand unabated, further enhancing the destruction and
risk to response personnel.
According to Michael Torphy, the FBI and Christopher Hardy
of the Department of Justice, drone activity has proliferated
to more than half of the Bureau of Prison Federal facilities
with incidents climbing to more than 479 in 2024, nearly 20
times the number since the agency started tracking in 2018.
Similarly, Steven Willoughby from the Department of
Homeland Security highlighted the extent of the porous UAS
activity along the U.S. border stating, In the last six months
of 2024, more than 27,000 drones were detected within 500
meters of the Southern border.
To effectively address these challenges, I offer several
observations, foremost that all drone incidents are local
incidents first. Often, first responders to these incidents
will be sworn officers from one of the Nation's nearly 18,000
State and local law enforcement agencies. Most of these
agencies lack formal training for dealing with drone incidents.
Even fewer are equipped with tools to support the detection,
tracking, and identification of UAS.
Currently, no State or local law enforcement agencies are
equipped and authorized to forcibly take down a UAS threat
without the compliance of the operator who may be positioned
miles away from the aerial vehicle.
Testimony by Michael Torphy from the FBI underscored
resource limitations in providing counter-UAS protection,
highlighting the agency was only able to cover .05 percent of
the more than 240,000 special events eligible for counter-UAS
protection. Ultimately, the widespread immediate need for
counter-UAS protection should be a part of calculus used to
determine future authorities.
The training is a vital element in protecting our public
safety personnel to respond effectively to drone instances.
Foremost, it is essential to ensure both UAS detection and
mitigation efforts do not create or exacerbate hazards within
the National Airspace System, respect from interference with
navigation or communications infrastructure, or impede air
traffic management functions.
It is also necessary to educate officers on how to
effectively respond, investigate, document, and charge these
incidents in a manner that leads to successful prosecutions.
Moreover, such training ensures reinforcement of appropriate
procedures designed to protect the rights, expression, privacy,
and other civil liberties. There are no magic bullet
technological solutions to this problem. Each type of
technology has its own inherent capabilities and limitations.
Finally, I would like to highlight the vital importance of
continued research and development. Research consortiums, like
the Alliance for System Safety of UAS Through Research
Excellence, ASSURE, and its accompanying and training arm
ASSURED Safe are qualified, equipped, and ready to address
these challenges that are affecting the National Airspace
System.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Wallace follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Dr. Wallace. Now, the Chair
recognizes Dr. Cahill for her five minute opening statement.
STATEMENT OF DR. CATHERINE F. CAHILL
Dr. Cahill. Thank you. Chair Biggs, Ranking Member Raskin,
and Ranking Member McBath, and the esteemed Members of the
Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance. My
name is Cathy Cahill, and I'm the Director of ACUASI, the
Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration.
The ACUASI leads one of the seven FAA test sites where we
are a key player in many other FAA, DOJ, and DOD programs. We
also partner with a variety of commercial and governmental
entities on cutting edge UAS and counter-UAS technologies,
required to safely integrate UAS us into the National Airspace
System. These facts uniquely position me to discuss the topic
of malicious UAS. This written testimony is provided to you
through my personal capacity as a private citizen based on my
professional experience. It does not necessarily represent the
views of the University of Alaska.
The ACUASI uses UAS for good, such as conducting medical
supply delivery, cargo delivery to isolated communities, and
emergency response. However, our team is very aware of how they
can be used maliciously.
I live in Alaska, but even in this remote location our team
has seen the malicious use of UAS. We have seen flights of
unauthorized UAS in the flight path of Ted Stevens
International Airport, one of the top five cargo airports in
the world.
Simultaneously, we have seen multiple UAS entering
restricted airspace of our military bases. We have observed the
flight tracks of UAS dropping contraband into correctional
facilities. I personally have seen UAS crossing the Southern
border, bringing drugs from Mexico. All these examples show the
malicious UAS activities are widespread, and we need policies,
procedures, training, and technologies to allow law enforcement
to stop these activities without creating a hazard to people
and property.
The first question I always get asked when I talk to the
public about the issue of malicious UASs, why can't we shoot
them? The United States Code, Section 49, defines UAS as
aircraft and all the laws codified for traditional manned
aircraft apply to them. Therefore, shooting an UAS is a Federal
offense with applicable jail time and fines. Only five
agencies, DOD, DOE, DHS, DOJ and, to a limited extent, FAA have
relief from the United States code sections applicable to
shooting down, hacking, or jamming UAS. Most law enforcement
operators dealing with unauthorized UAS do not have the legal
authority to do so. Also, it is unsafe to mitigate a UAS
without knowing what is under it and one might get hit when the
UAS falls.
Additionally, the operator of a counter-UAS system needs to
know that UAS under operation is authorized to be flying in
that location. These facts point to why we need highly trained
professionals with appropriate statutory relief and good
information, making the risk benefit calculations about whether
and how a UAS should be mitigated.
As the malicious use of UAS spreads, State, local law
enforcement, and officers will be on the front lines for
combating the threat from the rogue UAS, because Federal agents
with counter-drone capacities cannot be everywhere. The ACUASI
team has been studying the willingness of local law enforcement
officers to engage with systems designed to detect, track, and
identify malicious UAS.
In Alaska, we have had trouble getting State and local law
enforcement officers to address rogue UAS because they are
overworked, understaffed, dealing with more urgent situations,
and feel it is not their responsibility to do so. Additionally,
many of the law enforcement participants in our study aren't
sure as to what laws are applicable to malicious UAS, and do
not know what they can legally do to build a case for the
misuse of UAS.
We need to provide our law enforcement officers with clear
guidance on how to address rogue UAS. As the risk from
malicious UAS increases, the potential to mitigate the UAS is
certain circumstances.
We cannot afford to allow criminals to use UAS maliciously,
or our adversaries to use UAS to endanger our military bases or
personnel and conduct espionage. In my opinion, H.R. 5061, the
Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act
is a good first step toward safely implementing counter-drone
technology in the U.S. However, more needs to be done.
To accelerate our testing and implementation of these
technologies and the required risk benefit decision
calculations needed before UAS is mitigated. These investments
will not only help our law enforcement organizations here at
home, but also our military overseas, as they deal with the
malicious UAS threat.
The U.S. should be a world leader in the development and
deployment of these technologies. If we do not move fast
enough, the criminals and our adversaries will win the UAS war.
This ends my prepared statement. I'd be happy to answer any
questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cahill follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Biggs. Thank you. I now recognize the Ranking Member of
the Subcommittee, Ms. McBath, for her opening statement.
Ms. McBath. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to our
witnesses. I have read your testimonies, and I apologize that I
am just getting here. Thank you for convening today's hearing
to provide us with an opportunity to learn more about how
drones can be used to commit crimes; how law enforcement can
respond to those crimes; and what we might do here in Congress
to adapt our laws to meet the challenges that drones pose to
our society and the challenges that you have expressed today.
As with the internet, artificial intelligence, and so many
other technologies, drones can really be a valuable tool. They
can help first responders that survive or survey a disaster
area to search for survivors, or they can give law enforcement
another vantage point from which to monitor a special event or
a very sensitive location. They can keep officers safe by
allowing them to remotely investigate a dangerous situation or
location. The rapid proliferation of drone technology has
ushered in a new frontier of crime, and many, many public
safety challenges.
In the wrong hands, drones can be used to invade privacy,
smuggle contraband, as you just mentioned, or provide bad
actors with information that can help them avoid detection.
I've heard firsthand about these harms from many law
enforcement officers, in particular, in my district in the
State of Georgia, as they are working to keep us all safe. For
example, Georgia prison officials have informed me that they
are increasingly battling the use of drones to smuggle
contraband into our prison facilities. Drones have been used to
deliver illegal drugs, weapons and cell phones, which can each
pose a threat to the safety of our inmates and also the staff.
Just last year, the Georgia Department of Corrections see
drones, dozens of them, that could be used to smuggle in
contraband. Recently, officials at Washington State Prison in
Davisboro, Georgia, they worked with the Washington County
sheriff to track drones that were being used in an attempt to
smuggle methamphetamine and heroin into prison. By tracking the
drones and using a K-9 unit, they were able to locate the drone
operators, arrest them, and prevent the drugs from reaching the
prison.
While law enforcement succeeded in this effort, using
traditional tools, additional law enforcement tools may be
needed to respond to the rising challenges that are presented
by the drones.
As with any new technology, we must exercise caution and
proceed thoughtfully to avoid unintended consequences of
detecting and mitigating drone activities. Disabling or
intercepting drones presents very unique challenges. For
example, an intercepted or disabled drone could fall as was
stated, and injure innocent bystanders on the ground, damage
objects, or property in its path. Similarly, many of the
technologies used to combat drones rely on disrupting their
communications systems of planes or emergency--these
communication systems could disrupt aircrafts or emergency
responders.
The testing, planning, training, and targeted deployment
can all help ensure that counter-drone technologies are used in
a way that promotes public safety, but also strengthens our
national security.
I'm so thankful to each of our experts today for your
expert testimony. Thank you for coming here today to discuss
how we can work together to respond to these challenges and
opportunities that have been presented by drones and counter-
drone technology and our ever-changing technological landscape.
Thank each of you for sharing your expertise.
Mr. Biggs. The gentlelady yields back. Now, we'll go to
questions from Members of the Subcommittee, we'll start first
with the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Nehls.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Chair. You spoke so well about the
issues that we see down at our Southern border related to
drones coming across with all the drugs, killing our people
from the bad hombres we have on the Southern border. We have to
stop it.
I'd like to talk a little bit about drones in the airspace,
specifically airports, concerned about the airports, right? A
bad actor with bad intentions, entering restricted airspace
over one of our airports. As I do, I am looking at you, I am
thinking about Florida. You have about 400 airports as your
responsibility. What does a medium-size airport do? You detect
at the airport, a drone comes in restricted airspace, what's
your response?
Sgt. Dooley. Normally, I'll give you an example. We've done
some really different things in South Florida, especially Miami
International Airport, as an example, has a drone problem and
we have partnered with our FAA partners, DHS, et cetera,
entities that are allowed without question to detect or
mitigate because we recognized it was an issue. We incorporate
a lot of our public safety in the area of Miami-Dade, et
cetera, and we were involved as well. We are able to go out
there and start intercepting, but from the perspective of an
airport that simply has the ability to detect and there is
really nothing they can do other than watch it, honestly.
Mr. Nehls. Did you see how stupid that sounds?
Sgt. Dooley. It does.
Mr. Nehls. It's stupid.
Sgt. Dooley. Yes.
Mr. Nehls. I like the idea we can detect; we can detect.
All these airports we can detect a drone. Well, if it's being
operated by an individual with some bad intentions, you'll just
catch it on video. The destruction of--you are going to detect
it, but there's nothing to mitigate that drone? This is
airports, correct me if I am wrong, sir, but this is airports
across the entire country.
Sgt. Dooley. Yes, that's correct. There may be some that
have specialized, but--
Mr. Nehls. Well, Ms. Cahill brought up a few of the
agencies that have the ability to mitigate a drone.
Dr. Wallace, I hear these arguments, I'm on the
Transportation Committee, I hear all these arguments about you
can't mitigate the drone because it could interfere, it could
interfere with commercial aviation and all this. Is there
technology available out there that could mitigate a drone
without interfering with our commercial air?
Dr. Wallace. There are certainly several technologies that
are available for mitigation.
Mr. Nehls. Sure.
Dr. Wallace. Each of those technologies have their own
benefits and limitations.
Mr. Nehls. Sure, sure. That's an excuse that I hear over
and over again, it's going to interfere with the aircraft that
are coming in, I said, interfere with the aircraft coming in.
The damn drone could take down one of our aircraft. You talked
a little bit about what we've seen in Ukraine with the complex
missions that some of these drones are taking. I am appalled by
the fact that I was in Milwaukee and I went to visit the
airport, we were talking about the drones, and I was inside
there. I said well, ``what happens if a drone gets into this
red air--this restricted airspace?'' ``Well, we know it's
there.'' I said, ``what would you do?'' ``We try to call
somebody. Yes, we try to find the guy, he could be a couple
blocks, a couple miles away in the backyard and we will knock
on the door.'' I said, ``What if that guy has bad intentions?''
``Then, when we have a significant event, we'll bring in the
Coast Guard. The Coast Guard would have the ability to mitigate
the drone and send it out to Lake Michigan or set it down.''
The idea to say that, we have to be careful here that the
drone doesn't fall down and hit somebody in the head. The
technology is there to take control of the damn drone and get
it out of the restricted airspace. The idea that we have to be
worried about not offending somebody; it's in restricted
airspace. At some point in time, Mr. Feddersen, we're going
have a drone operated by some bad hombres over here interfering
with some commercial airliners, running into the engines and
causing problems but then, maybe then, is when we will actually
get serious about mitigating the risks of these drones, because
there's going to be millions of them out there. The bad guys
are understanding these are pretty--you can put some pretty
good payload on some of these drones, they are relatively
inexpensive, right? So, I am deeply concerned, Sergeant Dooley,
about the U.S. Government's position on this, whether it is
Section 49, it is a Federal offence, that just makes me sick to
think that this is a Federal offense for State individuals,
State officials to protect their own airports in their own
State. We must change; we must change.
I yield back.
Mr. Biggs. The gentleman yields. We appreciate that. The
Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Georgia, Ms. McBath.
Ms. McBath. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.
We know that drones, as I've stated and many have stated in
this hearing, drones have been used to smuggle drugs, weapons,
and phones into prisons and across our borders. As I mentioned
in my opening remarks, this is already happening in Georgia.
Drones present a significant risk to the safety of inmates and
staff.
Dr. Cahill, your written testimony notes that your team has
worked with Alaskan correction facilities to detect and to
track and to identify the drones that are being used to smuggle
contraband into the prisons. You also said this is a widespread
problem, but can you talk about--you said that you had
difficulty in getting law enforcement to address the rogue UAS,
and so including at correctional facilities. Could you explain
the source of the hesitancy?
Dr. Cahill. Ranking Member, the reality is when we have
dealt with our law enforcement, they are skeptical of a new
technology until it is proven because they have so many things
on their plate that it is a challenge for them to learn
something new and be able to work with it. We had hesitancy in
our correctional facilities for installing one of these
systems. The moment we did and were able to confirm some of
their intelligence that there was a contraband drop occurring
and we were able to track the drone, identify where the hand
controller for the operator was. We changed their opinion. As
soon as we gave them that briefing the answer was: Could you
please train us this afternoon? We did.
They've spread that story to additional correctional
facilities and they've accepted it. They have a very targeted,
very limited area that they need to protect.
The police and the Alaska State troopers who have much
wider ranges for them. We are severely understaffed. So, a
malicious drone doesn't mean anything compared to wife beating
or major traffic accidents in the middle of nowhere. The
priority is not there to be able do these additional duties
associated with monitoring the technologies and determining how
to interact with them.
Ms. McBath. Could you kind of explain to me when the drones
are seized in these crimes, what type of digital forensics can
be performed on them? What data can be extracted or recovered
from a seized drone?
Dr. Cahill. The Ranking Member, we don't actually do the
forensics on the drones. People do, for example, the Pacific
Palisades case where the drone hit the Super Scooper, a fire-
fighting aircraft. They were able to do a forensic analysis
because the drone was stuck in the wing of aircraft. In a lot
of these cases, all we see are the tracks and we may know it is
group one or group two, which is the size category, but we
don't know a whole lot about that aircraft because we have to
obey Title 18 and Title 49, which means we cannot break into
the communications link for that aircraft without permission,
the 124 and authority, for example. We as a State university do
not have that, but the partners we have who do, they are able
to get more information in terms of what the serial number is
what type of aircraft it is. They can say it is a DJI Mavic,
for example. It really is a function of what you have.
What we are doing when we are using passive RF is for
trying authorization, is we are looking for basically somebody
yelling. We have a network of censors, and we determine the
direction from which the yelling is coming. That lets us find
the drone and the operator. We will be able to track where the
drone is and where the operator is. In the recent case with the
Juneau glacial outburst flooding, we said at the system we were
able to determine where the controller was, where the drone
went and landed, local law enforcement went to that location
and knocked on doors and found the perpetrator.
Ms. McBath. Then, would you say that local law enforcement
is able then to build a criminal case from the data that they
are to extract that you can't do it but they can?
Dr. Cahill. Yes.
Ms. McBath. OK, thank you. Sergeant Dooley, what are the
greatest legal and technical hurdles in actively encountering a
drone in real time?
Sgt. Dooley. Just to the doctor's point again, we do have
legal constraints, we would violate about 15 different U.S.
codes by simply frequency jamming or mitigating all kinds of
FAA rules, regulations, FCC, et cetera. Most of those carry
jail time and significant fines as well. A lot of colleagues
would say, ``Like, oh, well, we're public safety, if we have to
do what we have to do.'' The problem is, to your point earlier,
mitigating a drone and they may have had a legal right to be
there, and they made an honest mistake, there is still a
tremendous amount of consequence that comes with that.
Our biggest hurdles are all the existing codes, our laws
simply do not keep up with the rate the technology progresses,
and the way that it can be manipulated for bad. Those are some
of the biggest hurdles we have is Title 18 pen trap, wire-
tapping laws, et cetera, that are of huge concern when we do
want to not only detect that a drone is there, but be able to
mitigate it away, we would be violating about 15 different
title codes, and also Title 18 and 49 as well.
Ms. McBath. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Mr. Biggs. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Wisconsin for five minutes, Mr. Tiffany.
Mr. Tiffany. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
As we heard over the last few years, every State became a
border State, with the previous administration and cartel
members openly stated that they used our Northern border to
smuggle in narcotics. Mr. Feddersen, do you think it is equally
important to implement these drone enforcement programs at both
the Southern border and the Northern border?
Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir, I do. They are being implemented
at the Federal level, particularly CBP on both the North and
the South sides. However, the lack of authorities for detection
track identifying, or even the mitigation piece does extend to
those local departments that are shoulder to shoulder with CBP
taking action to address these issues. We are severely
overmatched by the criminal element when it comes to it.
Mr. Tiffany. How should that change in your opinion?
Mr. Feddersen. It is actually quite easy, sir. Detect,
track, and identify authority is our Title 18. They are very
vague, they are antiquated, and they honestly add a lot of
confusion to law enforcement, commercial sectors, and critical
infrastructure that want to be able to see what's flying in
their airspace. The information that goes from there into the
counter-drone systems like ours are nothing more than remote ID
data. It's just data that comes directly from the drone. The
most personal information you may get from it is the serial
number which is akin to license plate on a vehicle. Law
enforcement still has to call the FAA to get the registry
information from the FAA and then from there, be able to take
leaps.
The DTI should be a blanket open authority for critical
infrastructure, security, law enforcement and honestly, all
Federal agencies because they don't all have the authority
right now.
Mr. Tiffany. With that authority they could accomplish the
mission that you were referring to that they are not able to
fulfill at this point. Is that correct?
Mr. Feddersen. Correct, most of it, because at this point,
you can figure out where the drone is, where it took off, and
where the pilot is in real time.
Mr. Tiffany. The cartels and others are light years ahead
of the law enforcement at this point in part because of that?
Mr. Feddersen. Honestly, the rest of the world, sir. We are
a global country in 33 countries. We do airports and law
enforcement and military everywhere else, and they use our
system quite a bit to mitigate.
Mr. Tiffany. Mitigation looks much different in other
places around the world than it does here in the United States?
Mr. Feddersen. It is only the policies and legislative
piece. They have given authorities to their law enforcement and
security entities.
Mr. Tiffany. You think China may have had a hand in the
drone activity around some of our military sites?
Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir, absolutely. I believe that drones
are a tool, they are a tool by criminal networks, and they are
a tool for foreign adversaries. Absolutely, they are being
used.
Mr. Tiffany. Sergeant Dooley, are you familiar with the
Guang Pan Cape Canaveral incident that happened earlier this
year in Florida?
Sgt. Dooley. Vaguely, yes.
Mr. Tiffany. In the case of Chinese-born Canadian citizen
Guang Pan was found to be using a drone to take unauthorized
photographs at Patrick Air Force Base, a submarine morph in
Cape Canaveral. Have you seen increased activity of drones
around U.S. military bases in Florida?
Sgt. Dooley. Military bases not so much. We don't support
them as often, it is normally during large scale events, but we
went from literally detecting a few hundred per month in those
general areas where they are restricted airspace like a DOD
site or a military base to thousands. In particular, when DGI,
in particular, drones, turned off their geofencing for the most
part. Our principal workhorse years ago in the State of
Florida, what we used was DGI drones. That is how we got
started. Now, we are not allowed to use them anymore. Back
then, you had to have special permission, the drone told you,
you're not allowed to fly here or take off from here. Now, that
is not the case. It is simply a check box where you turn on
your drone and it can be right next to an airport runway, and
before it would say, ``You can't fly here.'' It says, you're
taking responsibility, you touch a check box and it takes off
and flies wherever I want it to fly now. We've seen dramatic
increase over the past, I would say, 8-9 months of going from a
handful of detections to in the thousands of detections in
these areas or within range of our detection equipment because
there is no more geofencing. Yes, it has increased dramatically
in a lot of these areas, not just for infrastructure, but our
military sites and other places.
Mr. Tiffany. Is it correct that we do not produce a lot of
drones in the United States principally produced in China. Is
that accurate?
Sgt. Dooley. That's correct. The principal ones that are
produced here are normally purchased by DOD or law enforcement
or areas like Florida where we restrict the type of drones
we're allowed to purchase.
Mr. Tiffany. For national security purposes, do you think
that we should make that a priority to be able to produce them
in the United States?
Sgt. Dooley. I am a proud American for sure; I would love
to be prideful of us producing those types of things here, yes.
I also don't want to stifle some of the things where people
need to buy a certain product because it is the correct tool
for the correct job if that makes sense, but buying American
should be preferred, yes.
Mr. Tiffany. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield.
Mr. Biggs. The gentleman yields back. Before we go to the
next one, I want to submit for the record documentation called,
``Cartels Drop Bombs From Drones Near Southern Border.'' So
ordered.
I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Swalwell,
for five minutes.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you. There's no doubt that drones
particularly for law enforcement have changed the game for
surveillance, for search and rescue, to assist in active SWAT
operations, they can save not only civilian lives, but also
protect our men and women in law enforcement. The Sergeant just
alluded to a problem that we have run into is that cheaper
Chinese components have made it much more affordable for law
enforcement agencies to have these capabilities. We all know
the risk that comes along with having Chinese components in our
drones, which is that they could be pinging back to mainland
China and affecting our own national security in the way that
they could be gathering intelligence on behalf of the Chinese
Government. Certainly, no law enforcement agency wants that.
Sergeant Dooley, I imagine you would tell me that when
you're making decisions to protect the people who work with you
and to protect the public, you have to think about what can
bring public safety and how you can stretch your dollars the
best. Is that right? Is that some of the tension you have to
deal with in making a decision like that?
Sgt. Dooley. Not anymore. The State of Florida legislated
that, so we don't have to worry about it, we just take what we
need. They also supply funding now to help us reach those goals
of transitioning everything away.
Mr. Swalwell. My goal, just as you stated earlier, is that
we would have entirely an affordable American-made supply
chain. In fact, in California, there's a company, it's made up
of former Navy SEALS, called Inspired Flight which is American
made components. It sounds like you're familiar with Inspired
Flight.
Sgt. Dooley. Oh, yes. They are good people. I like them.
Mr. Swalwell. Yes, same. My question for Dr. Wallace is
knowing that 86 percent of the drones--I'm sorry. Knowing that
a high percentage of drones are made in China, in that the over
concentration can affect our national security. What can we do
in the near term to make sure that law enforcement has
affordable drones, but on the manufacturing side that we're
able to expedite our ability to produce American made
components?
Dr. Wallace. That's an excellent question. I can tell you,
I'm not a manufacturing expert. I can tell you that from a
capabilities' perspective, currently Chinese made drones have a
capability that can't be matched with the same dollar value. I
do think that given that limitation the choice that ultimately
has to be made with regard to especially public safety is one
of lives, because at the end of the day, if public safety
agency doesn't have access to the tool they need to protect
that public and the capability they need to accomplish what
they need to do, the ultimate price will be either law
enforcement member's life or potentially a member--a citizen's
life. That is a metric that should be taken?
Mr. Swalwell. Agreed. Sergeant Dooley, are there any
examples you have not given the Committee as to how a drone
facilitated saving life or protecting the officers who worked
with you that you think could animate the need for giving law
enforcement more resources in this area?
Sgt. Dooley. For the counter site or just a success story
from having drones in public safety?
Mr. Swalwell. Both.
Sgt. Dooley. OK, from the success side, I will give you an
example and I give it all the time, I work very closely with
the Palm Beach County sheriff's office in South Florida. There
was a deputy and I were eating lunch and we get this call of a
stabbing inside a home and everybody fled. Unfortunately, the
person that was the criminal in this particular case was off
his medication, recognizing that we may have had some type of
mental episode and we approach it differently. As soon as we
arrive there, the deputy get permission to put his drone and I
supported him by making sure everything was squared aware. He
put his drone under the house and within three minutes he
located the suspect, we recovered the suspect, they are in
custody, no one got shot, not one got dog bit. Everybody went
on about their day and the person who had been stabbed was
getting medical attention. This was solved in minutes, versus
like an hour standoff with a SWAT team without this type of
technology.
From the other side of not having detection or counter UAS
that has been hindering is a bulk of what we get is like
careless and clueless individuals where they just as dangerous
at times as someone with bad intent. For example, the person in
California gave an example of hitting the sea plane that was--I
forget the name of it. That person didn't do it on purpose;
they were just careless and clueless. Same thing in Texas
during the flooding, we had someone strike a helicopter. They
didn't do it on purpose, sometimes careless and clueless
individuals, dangerous as those that have those negative
intentions. Having this technology both for public safety
provides a tremendous value of being able to save lives, to
protect lives. More importantly, having the ability to detect
and potentially mitigate if needed could provide those values
where we can keep mandate aviation safe. We harp on the
terrorist side, and OK, careless and clueless can be just as
dangerous as those individuals that intended and planned
something versus someone just popping up trying to make a
YouTube video and actually hit an airplane or violate airspace.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you for your service, Sergeant. To the
men and women that you serve with, I'll say what we say in our
law enforcement family: Be safe. Thank you.
Mr. Biggs. The gentleman's time has expired.
I have two more documents that I'm introducing into the
record: ``Drones in the Wrong Hands: How Criminals Use UAVs to
Threaten Prisons and Jails,'' and another one titled, ``New
State Drone Law Sets Strict Operational Boundaries.''
Without objection, so ordered. I now recognize the
gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Knott.
Mr. Knott. Thank you, Mr. Chair. To the witnesses, thank
you for being here.
I'll piggyback on one of those submissions. When I was
working in law enforcement, the problem had already arrived in
many respects. We would send some of the most dangerous people
in the country away to jail for sometimes 20-40 years, but
there would be no interruption in the criminal enterprises that
these folks led, in large part, because of devices and
capabilities that made it into the Bureau of Prisons because of
the drones. It seemed like just a lumbering bureaucracy and
inefficiency that it could not keep up with the technology.
I am curious. Mr. Feddersen, you mentioned that the United
States seems to be overwhelmed at this particular juncture. Is
the posture of being overwhelmed--is that from just a volume
standpoint of all the drones that are in circulation? Is it a
technology standpoint, or is it just the layers of bureaucracy
that prohibit effective deterrence?
Mr. Feddersen. Thank you for the question. It is a policy,
legislative, and bureaucracy issue. Technology is out there
today from many companies that have been tested by the FAA,
tested by TSA, deemed safe to use at airports, but the
confusion over detection, track, and identify has hesitancy
across the land, and the fact that the mitigation authorities
haven't been expanded in a quick enough manner is--
Mr. Knott. What makes sense to remedy this? Because a drone
is not an airplane. The fact that they are being regulated as
such, in many respects, does not make much sense in terms of
placing the same value on a drone as it does an airplane.
Should we have a facility-specific code for unmanned aircraft?
Mr. Feddersen. I don't think so, sir. I disagree that
labeling it an aircraft hinders anything. It actually gives
both operators and those that are working around the drones
more protection and coverage into what they're doing. It gives
better regulatory understanding of what these drones can and
cannot do when they're flying because, honestly, as it has been
said before there are drones that are as small as a coffee cup
but some that are as big as a car.
Mr. Knott. Yes, yes.
Mr. Feddersen. You would have to be able to safely manage
that, and aircraft is the right designation for that.
Mr. Knott. In terms of fixing the issues that we see,
though, how can we fix the bureaucracy and I would say the
ineffective legislative posture we have with drones?
Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir, I'm going to have to point the
finger back to all of you on the panel.
Mr. Knott. Well, you're the expert. I'm just asking.
Mr. Feddersen. No, because that's exactly what it is. We
had a five-year pilot program for a very small sect of Federal
law enforcement that started in 2018. We're now in the eighth
year of that five-year program. No authorities have been
expanded. We have seen that that technology can be used safely
and without issue. We've had those departments and agencies ask
for an expansion of authorities to get them some relief off
their responsibility.
Honestly, especially from being a former State trooper, to
say that an FBI agent is smarter and more apt at using this
equipment than a State trooper or local law enforcement isn't
the right way. The delay is simply understanding the technology
and giving trust back to the process and the system.
Mr. Knott. What does the technology do specifically?
Mr. Feddersen. It gives you the basic remote--for remote ID
information, it tells you where the drone is, what the drone's
serial number is, where it's flying, which way it's heading,
and where the pilot is in real time. That information can be
used for a ground interdiction without even having to worry
about the airspace, to talk to the pilot, and have him bring it
down.
There are technologies like ours, which is cyber takeover,
which takes control of the drone and lands it safely where it
needs to be, which then allows for the officer to either give
it back to the child and parent with a warning undamaged, no
collateral damage, or go ahead and submit for a search warrant
to get the information out of the drone.
Mr. Knott. Do you think there is a space in the legal
construct to have emergency authorization to remove a drone,
whether it's shooting it down, taking control of it, or some
other means?
Mr. Feddersen. No, sir. These drones are flying at 30-60
miles per hour. The decision cycle for law enforcement or a
security individual is literally seconds and minutes. It's not
weeks or hours. If it is to be that type of system, then I
think it has to be preemptively done to say that a search
warrant is going to cover a large area for a large period of
time.
Mr. Knott. The emphasis of my question is--let's say a
drone is flying over an airport, or over a Bureau of Prisons
facility. Should there not be the authorization to remove that
drone immediately?
Mr. Feddersen. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. Knott. Do we lack that currently? Is that correct?
Mr. Feddersen. We do.
Mr. Knott. OK. The technology is there to remove that
drone?
Mr. Feddersen. The technology is available to remove the
drone and remove it safely, and the technology has been tested
by the FAA and TSA. A prime example, though, is Federal Air
Marshals--
Mr. Knott. Yes.
Mr. Feddersen. --who are using the Chinese equipment at our
major airports to assess what the situation is, but they don't
have authority to use other equipment or use mitigation.
Mr. Knott. Mr. Chair, I have more room, but that's--I'll
yield back the--
Mr. Biggs. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Knott. Yes.
Mr. Biggs. I now recognize--thank you. We've got lots of
questions, don't we?
Mr. Knott. Yes.
Mr. Biggs. The gentleman from California, Mr. Kiley, is
recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Kiley. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
Clearly, the problems being discussed at this hearing are
extremely serious when it comes to the malicious and
unauthorized uses of drones. Of course, there are a lot of good
and authorized uses of drones as well for agriculture, for
hobbyists, for security, and so forth, and increasingly,
actually, for delivery. If you look at companies like Walmart
and Amazon, they have actually been expanding their use of
drones to make almost instantaneous or very quick deliveries at
least of smaller parallels at this point, and that many believe
this will become quite widespread in the coming years.
This sort of problem of the unauthorized uses of drones
threatens the ability to have that process go smoothly, both
from the perspective of having the regulatory process--or
framework, more correctly--and in terms of public perception
and support for these sorts of things.
Maybe I'll ask Dr. Wallace, and if any of the other
panelists want to add to this, how do we sort of address the
malicious uses of drones in a way that does not threaten the
productive and valuable uses of them?
Dr. Wallace. It's an excellent question. The initial
challenge is there is a misperception that it's easy to
identify the misuse of a drone, at least initially. If you're
looking at a radar screen, for example, you're going to see a
dot and an altitude. That doesn't really give you the ability
to immediately distinguish that someone is doing something
improperly.
Typically, we leverage information contextually with other
kinds of information to try to make some assertions about what
is actually happening. Is the drone operating above the
altitude that the FAA would permit? Are they operating at an
unusual time? Are they operating near a facility that would be
questionable? You never really know definitively if this drone
is a threat or not. You only have indications.
Mr. Kiley. Thank you. Did any of the other panelists want
to weigh in?
Mr. Feddersen. Yes. That the question is a very good
question, but it comes back into the fact that when we look at
our Nation's airspace, we look at it through two lenses: Safety
and security. Air Domain Awareness, which would allow you to
see all the drones, is an essential part of the safety aspect
of things. It's akin to telling police officers they can't look
at certain vehicles that are flying around--or driving around
in areas that are off-limits and not being able to react to it.
It's the same--you either drive the car legally or you drive
the car illegally. It's the same with a drone.
Sgt. Dooley. When we do large-scale events, we do have to
do a lot of deconfliction. To your point, like, how do you know
which one is good and which one is bad? We have briefings prior
to large-scale events of our public safety professionals--
Amazon, Walmart, if they're doing deliveries in those areas,
and make sure that we understand that those are already
authorized and we can get a list because, again, it's all about
communication and reaching out. We reach out to our FAA
partners and say who has been authorized to fly in this area,
because we're going to be their eyes and ears.
If we do have something that is authorized to be there or--
to their point, we're not accidentally intercepting or
mitigating with our Federal partners. We know that they're
supposed to be there, or we already have those clearances ahead
of time. Communication is key, and getting out of your silo and
talking to the other entities that can do that is key.
Mr. Kiley. Yes. That's very important. If this is going to
become more common, deliveries being done in this way, we want
folks to have the assurance that these drones are supposed to
be there and that they are safe and that they're doing just a
routine delivery as opposed to some of the other encounters
that people might have in other contexts with drones. I
appreciate the work you're doing.
I appreciate the Chair for bringing attention to this
issue. I yield back. I would be happy to yield to my colleague,
Mr. Knott.
Mr. Knott. Thank you, Mr. Kiley.
Sergeant, I noticed that you waved me down when I was
talking about the ability to shoot down drones in emergency
situations that's not currently within the legal construct. Do
you have any insight into how we can best achieve that across,
I would say, the sensitive areas, whether they're airports,
bases, Bureau of Prisons, what have you?
Sgt. Dooley. Well, the ideal means would be nonkinetic. You
don't want to, accidentally, a projectile goes up and comes
down. There are some scenarios which we've seen overseas where
people don't care that you're mitigating, jamming, or GPS
denying. They're using fiber-optic and other things to cross
these barriers and be very successful, and that may be
something that we have to deal with at some point.
We don't want to box our public safety in to just
nonkinetic issues, which is basically radio frequency jamming,
et cetera. We want to be able to give them a full spectrum of
what they feel is necessary to do--or based on their personal
experience of what they've encountered, or maybe the intel that
they're getting--to be able to handle the situation
accordingly. That's my biggest fear, is that we're going to
authorize this, but box them in so much that they--
Mr. Knott. Yes. They can't respond.
Sgt. Dooley. They can't--they are like, I wish I could do
something. It would be like me standing on the side of the road
with a radar gun and I clock someone going 100 miles an hour,
but they didn't give me a car to go chase them down and stop
them from that dangerous speed. This is the same thing. We want
to have multiple options available to us without being boxed
in, but be doing it responsibly with a high level of
accountability.
I do think that if we do make a mistake, we should be held
accountable. If we mitigate a drone that wasn't supposed to be
mitigated, we figure out what went wrong and how we can fix it,
but more importantly, document and justify to our Federal
partners if we mitigated a drone why we made that decision and
what was going on at the time, not just I hit the button, he's
not supposed to be there, have a nice day. We have to have some
level of that, too.
That will help with the trust part as well in allowing
committees like this to approve those type of authorities
because we're going to be able to explain when, where, and why
we actually did some form of mitigation versus just hitting a
button and trusting that everybody is doing what they're
supposed to be doing.
Mr. Knott. Sergeant, thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Biggs. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
This was going to be the last question if I had time, but
you touched on this here, and that is has a framework--and I
know the answer has a framework been established that clarifies
indemnification and liability provisions for law enforcement
interacting with drones? Then, my guess is no, other than just
general qualified immunity.
Sgt. Dooley. From the FAA perspective, there is a law
enforcement toolkit that--it gives you things that you're
allowed to do if you have to interact with a drone pilot. That
you can ask for their registration, you can ask for their trust
certificate or part--
Mr. Biggs. It doesn't deal with--
Sgt. Dooley. As far as the mitigation and the detection
side, no.
Mr. Biggs. Right. I guess that's really my question
regarding mitigation and detection, that there really is
nothing right now--
Sgt. Dooley. Other than you can't do it unless you're one
of the four Federal entities.
Mr. Biggs. Right. This leads to the next question.
You kind of addressed it, Mr. Feddersen, and so I may ask
all of you.
What is the current framework under the pilot program? What
agencies are given authority, what kind of authority are they
given, and how do we effectively expand that nationwide?
Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir. In DHS, there's only a small
number of them, small components. There're components out there
like his and ICE, the FAMs, and TSA that don't have any
authorities that probably should. There on the DOJ side, U.S.
Marshals, BOP, you've got DEA and FBI. All Federal components
that have authorities are using our system because of the
methodology that it has.
The DOD also has it, and you've got--on DOE, falling short
of how they're going to go ahead and use things because it's
private contractors that particularly take care of power plants
and nuclear plants.
The authorities in 124n are fine, because they actually go
ahead and do the notwithstanding aspect and waive Title 18 and
the Title 49 piece. The issue is training. As long as we have a
good solid training program, those authorities in 124n should
be broadly spread across the rest of the Federal agency, State,
local law enforcement, and critical infrastructure security
officers.
Mr. Biggs. We have--for instance, in immigration law, we
provide status for training for departments--sheriffs'
departments, et cetera--so they can then enforce certain
aspects of immigration law. Is that the kind of thing that
might be helpful?
I'm just going to go down--be very quick--and start with
Dr. Cahill and go all the way down and finish with Sergeant
Dooley.
Dr. Cahill. That would be very useful, Mr. Chair, in terms
of getting it to the people who need it.
Mr. Biggs. By the way, when I read your statement, I got a
kick out of the people that are operating these things while
they're drunk. I shouldn't get a kick out of that, but that you
reported it kind of made me smile.
Dr. Wallace?
Dr. Wallace. I would generally agree.
Mr. Biggs. Mr. Feddersen?
Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir. Very helpful.
Mr. Biggs. Sergeant?
Sgt. Dooley. Yes. In fact, a lot of our Federal partners
have asked, but, unfortunately, that's not an authority they
can delegate under those programs like a TFO program. That
would have to change to allow us to receive those authorities.
Mr. Biggs. Right. That would be new legislation we would
have to pass to get those authorities in place.
Right now, I want to make sure everyone knows. If I
understand correctly, if there is a drone, whether it's a
malevolent actor or benign, and it's operating in a restricted
airspace, you as local law enforcement--you can't do anything
effectively to mitigate?
Sgt. Dooley. Mitigating, no. That's it.
Mr. Biggs. You can make a phone call and say, Hey--
Sgt. Dooley. Yes. We can go try to find the operator or try
to deal with it, but if we're unsuccessful, that person gets
away and we have no record of being able to go back and track
it down of where it took off from, who was flying, et cetera.
Mr. Biggs. We've got major events coming up. We've got
Olympics. We've got World Cup. I guess the question is, are we
prepared? Are we prepared? We'll just go down this way now.
Sergeant Dooley?
Sgt. Dooley. No. I would say public safety could
significantly fill those gaps within a--I'm not talking about
moving fast and breaking things but moving with a purpose and
start filling those gaps pretty quickly.
Mr. Biggs. Mr. Feddersen?
Mr. Feddersen. No, sir. We're not prepared. The crux of the
issue is that, to get systems and people trained and in place
before the World Cup and the 250th Anniversary, you have to be
able to do an evaluation, determine what you want to buy,
secure the funding, and then manufacturers have to get the
equipment out and on time for the training.
At that point, we are honestly--Christmas is the deadline
for us to be able to do that. If we don't put the authorities
in place and expand that to State and local law enforcement,
then Federal entities are going to have to do the job, but
they're going to have to let something else go.
Mr. Biggs. Yes. Gosh, I'm out of time. Because I wanted to
get to the next point, which is--and you kind of touched on
it--what is the time lag to get equipment and train enough
personnel to actually be effective for some of these big events
coming up?
Go ahead. My time is up, but you can answer Dr. Wallace and
Dr. Cahill, really quickly.
Dr. Wallace. I would agree with my colleagues. We're not
prepared, and part of that critical need is the ability to
detect, track, and identify.
Dr. Cahill. I agree we're not prepared, and one of the
challenges, of course, is some of these events are very, very
spread out. The number of people and assets you need is going
to be significant.
Mr. Biggs. Thank you.
Well, it sounds to me like we need to get on our horse and
get a piece of legislation passed very quickly, as quickly as
we possibly can. Maybe Representative McBath and I can work
together on maybe designating that just, I would say,
correlative to the immigration authorities that we give.
With that, I thank all of you for coming today. I
appreciate your testimony, again, bearing with us as we started
late. Thank you very much.
With that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
All materials submitted for the record by Members of the
Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance can
be found at: https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent
.aspx?EventID=118608.
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