    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                            UNMANNED AND UNCHECKED:
                        CONFRONTING THE RISING THREAT OF
                          MALICIOUS DRONE USE IN AMERICA

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND FEDERAL
                             GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE

                                     OF THE

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                          TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2025

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 119-34

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                   Available via: http://judiciary.house.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    61-653                     WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                            JIM JORDAN, Ohio, Chair

    DARRELL ISSA, California             JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland, Ranking
    ANDY BIGGS, Arizona                      Member
    TOM McCLINTOCK, California           JERROLD NADLER, New York
    THOMAS P. TIFFANY, Wisconsin         ZOE LOFGREN, California
    THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
    CHIP ROY, Texas                      HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
    SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin              Georgia
    BEN CLINE, Virginia                  ERIC SWALWELL, California
    LANCE GOODEN, Texas                  TED LIEU, California
    JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey       PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
    TROY E. NEHLS, Texas                 J. LUIS CORREA, California
    BARRY MOORE, Alabama                 MARY GAY SCANLON, Pennsylvania
    KEVIN KILEY, California              JOE NEGUSE, Colorado
    HARRIET M. HAGEMAN, Wyoming          LUCY McBATH, Georgia
    LAUREL M. LEE, Florida               DEBORAH K. ROSS, North Carolina
    WESLEY HUNT, Texas                   BECCA BALINT, Vermont
    RUSSELL FRY, South Carolina          JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
    GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin            SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
    BRAD KNOTT, North Carolina           JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    MARK HARRIS, North Carolina          DANIEL S. GOLDMAN, New York
    ROBERT F. ONDER, Jr., Missouri       JASMINE CROCKETT, Texas
    DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas
    BRANDON GILL, Texas
    MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington

                                     ------

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND FEDERAL
                            GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE

                           ANDY BIGGS, Arizona, Chair

    TOM TIFFANY, Wisconsin               LUCY McBATH, Georgia, Ranking
    TROY NEHLS, Texas                        Member
    BARRY MOORE, Alabama                 JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    KEVIN KILEY, California              DAN GOLDMAN, New York
    LAUREL LEE, Florida                  STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
    BRAD KNOTT, North Carolina           ERIC SWALWELL, California

                   CHRISTOPHER HIXON, Majority Staff Director
                    ARTHUR EWENCZYK, Minority Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                          Tuesday, September 16, 2025

                               OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                       Page
    The Honorable Andy Biggs, Chair of the Subcommittee on Crime and
      Federal Government Surveillance from the State of Arizona......     1
    The Honorable Lucy McBath, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on
      Crime and Federal Government Surveillance from the State of
      Georgia........................................................     3

                                   WITNESSES

    Sgt. Robert Dooley, Statewide UAS/C-UAS Coordinator, Florida
      Highway Patrol
      Oral Testimony.................................................     5
      Prepared Testimony.............................................     8
    Brett Feddersen, Vice President, Strategy and Government Affairs,
      D-Fend Solutions AD, Inc.
      Oral Testimony.................................................    12
      Prepared Testimony.............................................    14
    Dr. Ryan Wallace, Professor, Aeronautical Science, Embry-Riddle
      Aeronautical University
      Oral Testimony.................................................    18
      Prepared Testimony.............................................    20
    Dr. Catherine F. Cahill, Director, Alaska Center for Unmanned
      Aircraft Systems Integration (ACUASI), Geophysical Institute,
      University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF)
      Oral Testimony.................................................    28
      Prepared Testimony.............................................    30

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC. SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    All materials submitted by the Subcommittee on Crime and Federal
      Government Surveillance, for the record........................    49

    Materials submitted by the Honorable Andy Biggs, Chair of the
      Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance from
      the State of Arizona, for the record
        An article entitled, ``Increasing drone incidents near US
            airports, stadiums prompt alarm, officials say,'' Jan.
            22, 2025, Reuters
        An article entitled, ``Drones lifting inmates out of prisons?
            UK inspector says it's a `theoretical possibility,' ''
            Jul. 10, 2025, Corrections1
        An article entitled, ``New video: Cartels drop bombs from
            drones near southern border,'' Feb. 5, 2025, The Hill
        An article entitled, ``Drones in the Wrong Hands: How
            Criminals Use UAVs to Threaten Prisons and Jails,'' Jan.
            28, 2025, DroneLife
        An article entitled, ``New State Drone Laws Set Strict
            Operational Boundaries,'' May 2, 2025, DroneLife

                     QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD

    Questions to Sgt. Robert Dooley, Statewide UAS/C-UAS Coordinator,
      Florida Highway Patrol, Brett Feddersen, Vice President,
      Strategy and Government Affairs, D-Fend Solutions AD, Inc., Dr.
      Ryan Wallace, Professor, Aeronautical Science, Embry-Riddle
      Aeronautical University, and Dr. Catherine F. Cahill, Director,
      Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration
      (ACUASI), Geophysical Institute, University of Alaska Fairbanks
      (UAF), submitted by the Honorable Troy Nehls, of the
      Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance from
      the State of Texas, for the record
        A response to questions from Sgt. Robert Dooley, Statewide
            UAS/C-UAS Coordinator, Florida Highway Patrol
        A response to questions from Brett Feddersen, Vice President,
            Strategy and Government Affairs, D-Fend Solutions AD,
            Inc.
        A response to questions from Dr. Catherine F. Cahill,
            Director, Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems
            Integration (ACUASI), Geophysical Institute, University
            of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF)
        A response to questions from Dr. Ryan Wallace, Professor,
            Aeronautical Science, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
            University

                            UNMANNED AND UNCHECKED:
        CONFRONTING THE RISING THREAT OF MALICIOUS DRONE USE IN AMERICA

                                  ----------

                          Tuesday, September 16, 2025

                            House of Representatives

           Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance

                           Committee on the Judiciary

                                 Washington, DC

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:09 p.m., in
    Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Andy Biggs
    [Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives Biggs, Jordan, Tiffany, Nehls,
    Kiley, Knott, McBath, Raskin, and Swalwell.
        Mr. Biggs. The Subcommittee will come to order. Without
    objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess at any
    time. I apologize to everyone for starting a little over an
    hour late. We had votes that kind of took up more time than we
    thought. Welcome everyone to today's hearing on the rising
    threat of malicious drone use in America.
        I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Nehls, who
    will lead us in the pledge of allegiance.
        Mr. Nehls. Will you please stand and join me in honoring
    our Nation's flag.
        All. I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States
    of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one
    Nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for
    all.
        Mr. Nehls. Thank you.
        Mr. Biggs. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    I appreciate everyone being here today. In this hearing we have
    before us, we're focusing on unmanned aerial systems and how
    these systems are being exploited by criminal elements. This
    issue is no longer confined to science fiction or battlefield
    environments. It is now increasingly disrupting daily life in
    America.
        Over the past several years, UAS technology has rapidly
    advanced, becoming more affordable, more accessible, and more
    capable. While this has fueled innovation and commerce, public
    safety and emergency response, it has also led to opportunities
    for abuse by criminals and adversaries alike.
        The threats we face today from drones are not theoretical,
    they are real, and they demand urgent attention. Between
    January and June of this year the FAA recorded more than 1,000
    UAS incursions near U.S. airports. A nearly 13 percent increase
    from the same period last year, each of these incidents
    represents not just a violation of restricted airspace, but a
    potential catastrophe for passenger safety. Despite some
    progress like remote ID, our response architecture is
    fragmented. Remote ID helps with accountability, but does not
    integrate into real-time air traffic management or provide
    automatic alerts to airport security.
        Additionally, most of our airports like dedicated counter-
    AUS systems. Legal restrictions further complicate matters,
    limiting who can respond in real time. The problem does not end
    with aviation safety. Criminal networks are adapting to AUS
    technology for nefarious purposes dropping contraband into
    prisons, smuggling drugs and weapons across the U.S.-Mexican
    border, surveilling law enforcement, and, in some case,
    experimenting with weaponization.
        Correctional facilities are continuing to face surging
    drone drops of drugs, phones, and weapons. The stealth speed
    and GDS-guided precision of modern drones make it difficult for
    correctional officers to detect or intercept them without
    specialized training or technology. These drops enable
    organized criminal activity within prison walls, disrupt inmate
    discipline and threaten the safety of the staff and inmates
    alike.
        The U.S. Northern Command leadership purported that over
    1,000 drones crossed into U.S. airspace from the Mexican border
    each month with CBP agents noting that in Texas, along the Rio
    Grande Valley alone over 10,000 drone incursions and 25,000
    drone sightings occurred in 2024.
        Unlike conventional smuggling methods, drones offer cartels
    a cost-effective and low-risk means to deliver small payloads
    while avoiding direct encounters with U.S. law enforcement.
        The CBP and DOD recently recorded 70 incursions in 11 days
    around Laredo, prompting the deployment of striker units to
    bolster surveillance. Equipped with features like night vision
    and the ability to operate below radar thresholds. These drones
    present a stealthy and persistent challenge to border security.
    Despite this growing threat, CBP lacks the authority to disable
    or intercept UAS in most circumstances, limiting its ability to
    respond effectively in real time.
        National special security events, NSSEs, such as
    Presidential inaugurations, political conventions, high-profile
    sporting events are increasingly vulnerable to drone-based
    threats due to their symbolic value, dense crowds, and media
    visibility.
        While Federal agencies like the U.S. Secret Service, the
    FBI and DHS are authorized to deploy counter-UAS capabilities
    and national special security events under the Preventing
    Emerging Threats Act of 2018, these efforts are intense and
    confined to a limited number of events each year.
        The DOJ officials testified that counter-UAS protections
    are typically planned months in advance and require substantial
    coordination with the FAA to ensure legitimate airspace
    operations are not inadvertently affected. As a result,
    thousands of public events that fall outside the NSSE
    designation like any UAS mitigation coverage, even as drone
    incidents rise nationally.
        Expanding use of drones in public spaces also introduces
    new risks for first responders. An active shooter, protest or
    hazardous materials scenarios, the presence of unauthorized
    drones can obstruct airspace, delay medevac or surveillance
    operations, and even be used to track responder positions or
    deliver harmful payloads.
        Many of these tools are restricted under Federal law and
    cannot be used by State or local entities without explicit
    authorization. Additionally, these systems must be
    miniaturized, cost-effective, and interoperable with existing
    emergency response infrastructure to be viable at scale.
        The dominance of Chinese manufacturers, particularly DJI
    and the global drone market raises specific espionage concerns.
    Under Chinese law, companies are legally obligated to cooperate
    with Chinese national intelligence authorities, which amplifies
    the risk that drones supplied by these firms can transmit
    sensitive data back to foreign governments.
        As of today, DJI holds nearly 90 percent of the consumer
    drone market, and approximately 75 percent in commercial
    sectors. Multiple policy reviews and commentaries warn that
    adversarial actors may exploit the supply chain
    vulnerabilities, together intelligence on U.S. critical
    infrastructure, military bases, research facilities, and
    emergency operations. The threat is persistent and
    accelerating, and it will take a coordinated alignment of
    resources, technology and authorities to contain it. This
    hearing serves an important step to confront and combat
    malicious drone use across the country and beyond.
        I look forward to hearing what our witnesses say in our
    lively discussion.
        Now, without objection, I want to enter into the record an
    article entitled, ``Increasing Drone Incidents Near U.S.
    Airports, Stadiums Prompt Alarm Officials Say''; and ``Drones
    Lifting Inmates Out of Prisons? U.K. Inspector Says It Is a
    Theoretical Possibility.''
        Without objection. Now, I yield back and recognize the
    Ranking Member of the entire Committee, Mr. Raskin, for his
    opening statement.
        Mr. Raskin. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for holding this hearing
    on the rising threat posed by an unmanned aircraft systems
    commonly known as drones. The FAA reports that over one million
    drones are now registered in the U.S. for a broad range of
    commercial and recreational purposes; government agencies also
    use them to improve diverse public safety operations, including
    search and rescue, disaster response, crime scene
    investigation, and even traffic enforcement. Like any
    technology, including AI-enabled technology, which this
    Subcommittee discussed earlier in the summer, drones can also
    be used for unlawful purposes, like delivering contraband to
    inmates in prison, or ferrying Fentanyl across the Northern and
    Southern borders of our country.
        In 2023, in my home State in Maryland, 15 people were
    indicted as part of a criminal network that used drones to
    smuggle Fentanyl and other drugs, cell phones, tools and other
    contraband into the Roxbury Correctional Institution in
    Hagerstown. I'm sure that many of my colleagues have similar
    stories from their own States.
        The DOJ is one of five Federal agencies with drone
    detection and mitigation authority, which allows the Department
    to detect, track, and even destroy drones that pose a credible
    threat to Federal court houses, prisons, and large gatherings.
    The FBI and the Federal Bureau of Prisons are also able to
    utilize some counter-drone detection systems. In fact, earlier
    this year, BOP reported the agency has deployed such systems at
    64 facilities which have helped detect malicious drone use,
    better inform law enforcement of incoming threats, and locate
    suspected criminal drone operators.
        Today, as we discuss law enforcement efforts to respond to
    the malicious drone activity and the use of drones to enhance
    public safety, we must be mindful of the risks associated with
    the detection and mitigation of drones, as well as the need to
    respect the privacy interest and civil liberties of the public
    in the process. Let's make sure that law enforcement uses both
    drone and counter-drone technology correctly, safely, and
    always within the bounds of the law. That's why I was pleased
    to join the Chairs and Ranking Members of the Transportation
    Infrastructure Committee and the Homeland Security Committee to
    introduce H.R. 5061, The Counter-UAS Authority Security,
    Safety, and Reauthorization Act. The bill, which was reported
    favorably by the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee by
    remarkable vote of 60-0, would reauthorize, reform and expand
    the existing counter unmanned aircraft system or counter-UAS
    authorities of Homeland Security Department and the DOJ. Among
    other provisions the bipartisan bill would, for the first time,
    expand these authorities to State and local law enforcement
    through a carefully calibrated pilot program.
        The bill would also establish training program for these
    agencies to meet before they can operate counter-UAS systems in
    minimum performance requirements for counter-UAS technology
    before it can be deployed ensuring these systems are used
    safely and solely within the strictures of the law.
        I trust today's hearing will commit to my colleagues the
    need to support this bill, and then we will see swift unanimous
    passage of it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thanks to all our witnesses to being
    here. I look forward to hearing from you. I yield back.
        Mr. Biggs. The gentleman yields back. Thank you.
        Without objection, all other opening statements will be
    included in the record. Now, we will introduce today's
    witnesses.
        We will begin with Dr. Catherine Cahill. Dr. Cahill is the
    Director of the Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems
    Integration, ACUASI, and the Geophysical Institute at the
    University of Alaska Fairbanks.
        ACUASI leads one of the seven FAA UAS test sites, as the
    FAA's Alaska BEYOND site and is a core university in the FAA's
    center of excellence for UAS research. Dr. Cahill has served as
    a member of the FAA's drone advisory committee and advanced
    aviation advisory committee. Thank you for being here with us
    today, Dr. Cahill.
        Dr. Ryan Wallace is a Professor at Embry-Riddle
    Aeronautical University. His research focuses on UAS safety,
    security, human factors and public policy. Dr. Wallace has
    conducted training seminars for Federal agencies on the topics
    of UAS safety operations, and counter-UAS techniques. He also
    serves as a representative on the FAA's drone safety team and
    served in the U.S. Air Force. Thank you for being with us, Dr.
    Wallace.
        Mr. Brett Feddersen is the Vice President for strategy and
    government affairs at D-Fend Solutions, a manufacturer of
    counter-drone systems for the military, law enforcement, and
    others. He also serves as the Chair of Security Industry
    Association's drone security subcommittee. He previously served
    as the Executive Director for national security programs and
    incident response at the FAA, and in various roles at the
    Pentagon, the White House, the U.S. Army, and as a Pennsylvania
    State trooper. Thank you, Mr. Feddersen, for being with us
    today.
        Next is Sergeant Robert Dooley. Sergeant Dooley has served
    for more than 22 years with the Florida highway patrol, where
    he is currently the UAS and C-UAS program coordinator. He
    developed and has led the FHP's UAS program since its
    inception.
        Sergeant Dooley is an expert in law enforcement, UAS
    operations, disaster response operations, and special events
    and high value target UAS security operations. Thank you all
    for being with us today.
        We will begin by swearing you in and ask that you would
    each rise and raise your right hand.
        Do you swear or affirm under the penalty of perjury that
    the testimony you are about to give is true and correct to the
    best of your knowledge, information, and belief, so help you
    God?
        The record will reflect that the witnesses have each
    answered in the affirmative. Thank you, please be seated.
        Each of you should know that your written testimony will be
    entered into the record in its entirety. Accordingly, we ask
    that you summarize your testimony in five minutes. We're going
    to begin today with Sergeant Dooley, so you're recognized for
    your five minutes. I'll just tell you should see a clock in
    front of you. When you're about 10 seconds, before you hit the
    five, I will start tapping like this, that means please wrap it
    up. We'll try to be a little bit lenient because we appreciate
    you being here, but we would ask you to stay five minutes
    because we all have your testimony, we've all read your
    testimony.
        Sergeant Dooley, you're first.

                    STATEMENT OF SGT. ROBERT DOOLEY

        Sgt. Dooley. Thank you and good afternoon. Again, I'm
    Sergeant Robert Dooley of Florida Highway Patrol. I am our
    statewide coordinator for unmanned operations.
        The critical importance of drone detection and mitigation
    for public safety as unmanned aircraft systems continue to
    proliferate across recreational, commercial, and malicious
    domains. The ability of public safety agencies to detect and
    mitigate unauthorized or threatening drones has become a
    national imperative.
        This statement outlines the growing threat landscape
    associated with drones and discuss the current challenges,
    detection, and mitigation, and advocates for urgent integration
    of counter-UAS capabilities within a broader spectrum of public
    safety framework.
        The rapid evolution and accessibility of drone technology
    have transformed industries. revolutionized emergency response,
    and public safety operations. However, with this growth comes
    an increasing threat of misuse, whether intentional or neglect,
    from contraband drops over prison yards to surveillance of
    critical infrastructure and interruptions of emergency scenes,
    public safety agencies now face the complex airspace risk. The
    ability to detect, track, identify, and when necessary,
    mitigate rogue drones is essential for protecting lives,
    preserving critical infrastructure and ensuring operational
    integrity.
        Drones present a unique set of challenges to public safety.
    As you spoke earlier, criminal exploitation, criminal
    organizations increasingly use drones to smuggle drones to
    smuggle drugs, weapons, and contraband into correctional
    facilities or across the borders, terrorist use, adversarial
    State and non-State actors have experimented with drones for
    surveillance and weaponization, creating low-cost and low-
    detection threat vectors.
        Privacy violations and harassment: Drones can be used to
    stalk, harass, or violate the privacy of civilians and law
    enforcement officers often in ways that are difficult to detect
    and prevent.
        Interference with public safety operations: Unauthorized
    drones flying near traffic crashes, fire scenes, disaster zones
    can impede emergency response, creating hazardous responses for
    both responders and civilians.
        The need for detection and mitigation capabilities: Public
    safety agencies must be able to detect, identify and if
    authorized, mitigate UAS threats in real time. Without this
    capability, agencies operate blindly in shared airspace,
    increasing risk to both responders and the public. The key
    benefits of these capabilities include situational awareness,
    drone detection systems enhance airspace awareness, allowing
    agencies to monitor aerial activity near sensitive locations or
    at the scenes.
        Threat identification: Identifying type, intent and
    operator of drone is essential for appropriate response and
    legal action. Incident mitigation in critical scenario stopping
    or redirecting a drone may be necessary to prevent harm or
    disruption, especially during mass gatherings dignitary
    protection or major disasters.
        Current limitations in legal barriers: Despite the urgent
    need, most State, local, Tribal, and territorial public safety
    agencies lack the legal authority to mitigate and often face
    limitations even detecting them. Only Federal agencies
    currently possess this broad C-UAS authority under 6 U.S.C.
    124(n) leaving a gap in homeland security at the local level.
        Additionally: Technology access: C-UAS systems are costly,
    complex and often limited to military or Federal use.
        Interagency coordination: There's a lack of real-time data
    sharing and standard operating procedures that could hinder
    unified responses.
        Policy gaps: Existing Federal laws, including the FAA's
    preemption of airspace regulation complicate the rules and
    responsibility of our SLTT agencies.
        Legislative reform is needed, granted, limited controlled
    UAS authority to vet and train public safety entities under
    Federal oversight as proposed in several legislative efforts.
    Training and standardization create a standardized C-UAS
    training and certification programs ensuring safety,
    accountability, and legal compliance.
        Technology deployment: Fund and deploy scalable, nonkinetic
    drone detection systems to local agencies, particularly those
    responsible for critical infrastructure at mass events.
        Public and private collaboration: Encourage partnerships
    between technology providers, law enforcement and Federal
    agencies to pilot C-UAS tools under lawful frameworks and
    community engagement.
        Educate the public on the responsible use of drones and
    build awareness of the risks associated with unauthorized
    operations. The ability to detect and mitigate rogue drones is
    no longer a futuristic concept, it is a present-day necessity.
    Public safety professionals stand on the front lines of both
    natural and man-made crises and lack a C-UAS capability which
    leaves critical vulnerability in our national preparedness.
        Federal agencies play a vital role empowering State local
    responders with tools, training and authority to protect their
    communities from aerial threats is the next essential step in
    securing the homeland.
        I thank you and I await your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Sgt. Dooley follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Sergeant Dooley. The Chair now
    recognizes Mr. Feddersen for his five minutes. Mr. Feddersen,
    please.

                      STATEMENT OF BRETT FEDDERSEN

        Mr. Feddersen. Good afternoon, Chair Biggs, Ranking Member
    Raskin, and the distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.
    Thank you for the honor of appearing before you today.
        My name is Brett Feddersen, I am the Vice President for
    strategy and government affairs at D-Fend Solutions, a leading
    counter-drone manufacturer. I also serve as the Chair of the
    Security Industry Association's drone security Subcommittee, a
    group comprised of leading providers and end users of counter
    drone technologies available in the world.
        I commend the Subcommittee for its proactive focus on the
    threat and has quickly gone from a distant concern to clear and
    present danger to our national security, to our critical
    infrastructure and to our public safety. The illegal use of
    drones has evolved from simple nuisance and trespassing to
    sophisticated criminal malicious activity. The accessibility,
    affordability, and adaptability of this technology have given
    us new capabilities, most often used for good. However, they
    also have created significant vulnerabilities that we as a
    Nation are not yet prepared to face.
        We can categorize these threats into three primary domains.
    First are criminal and illicit activities. The use of drones by
    criminal and terrorist organizations is no longer a
    hypothetical scenario. Incidents of drones being used to
    deliver contraband like drugs and weapons into correctional
    facilities are a daily occurrence across America.
        The weaponization of drones has been occurring in the
    United States for years. The internet has brought battlefield
    tactics to North America, through shared lessons learned in
    conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. We continue to see
    rival cartels repeatedly conduct indiscriminate carpet-bombing
    attacks against other cartels using explosive laden drones.
        In 2021, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel created a
    dedicated unit of drone operators to attack rival groups in
    Mexico. Today, Mexican cartels are reportedly using one-way
    attack drones alongside the more traditional explosive carrying
    quadcopters. Last year, U.S. Federal authorities detected
    approximately 60,000 cartel drones near the border.
        The second category is physical and cyber-attacks on
    critical infrastructure. The potential for drone attacks in
    critical infrastructure is alarming. A drone with a small
    payload could cause widespread disruption and economic turmoil
    by damaging power stations, water treatment plants,
    communication powers, or data centers.
        The U.S. critical infrastructure is often protected by
    trained security professionals, not law enforcement. Any
    assumption that State and local law enforcement could fill the
    private sector gap is a gross underestimation of reality of
    police resources.
        The third category is surveillance and espionage. Drones
    offer a low-cost, low-risk platform for persistent
    surveillance. They can be equipped with sophisticated cameras
    and sensors to gather intelligence from a distance without the
    need for physical access.
        Drones can bypass traditional security perimeters, making
    them a favorite tool for illicit trade. Domestically, drones
    are being used to stalk, harass, and spy on people in their own
    homes. This invasion of privacy goes unchecked, as police watch
    the drones fly away without leaving a physical footprint for
    them to follow.
        Our current legal and technological frameworks have not
    kept pace with these clear and growing dangers. The authority
    to detect and mitigate malicious drones is fragmented across
    the Federal agencies, creating confusion and gaps in response.
        While safe and effective counter-drone technology exists
    today, its use is severely restricted by current laws. To
    address these challenges, I respectfully offer the following
    recommendations to the Subcommittee for consideration. A
    comprehensive Federal counter-drone legislation. We need clear
    and cohesive framework of nationwide counter-drone operations.
    Year after year Congress continues to introduce counter-drone
    legislation but never passes it. This legislation should
    immediately expand the legal authorities to detect, track, and
    identify drone threats to all Federal agencies, States, local,
    Tribal, and territorial law enforcement, and trained security
    professionals protecting our critical infrastructure.
        This legislation should also expand the existing 2018
    Federal pilot program for the mitigation of drone threats to
    those same Federal, State, local entities, and trained security
    professionals.
        This pilot program must be launched in a robust manner to
    enable the rapid scaling of capabilities ahead of the World
    Cup, America's 250th anniversary celebration, next year's
    elections, and the 2028 Olympics. If these authorities are not
    granted by Congress quickly, then these mass gatherings will go
    unprotected and require Federal resources to be diverted from
    the border, other critical and national infrastructure
    missions.
        In conclusion, the threat from malicious drones uses in
    real and immediate and growing, we must take decisive action
    now.
        I thank you for your time and look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Feddersen follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Feddersen.
        The Chair recognizes Dr. Wallace for his five minutes. Dr.
    Wallace.

                     STATEMENT OF DR. RYAN WALLACE

        Dr. Wallace. Chair Biggs, Ranking Member Raskin, and the
    other distinguished Committee Members. Thank you for the
    opportunity to testify on the important issue of protecting our
    Nation from the misuse of unmanned aircraft systems, sometimes
    referred to as UAS, or more colloquially, as drones.
        My name is Ryan Wallace, and I currently serve as a
    Professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. For the past
    10 years, my research has focused primarily on UAS safety and
    security threats through the use of UAS detection equipment.
    This use of unmanned aircraft is not fundamentally a technology
    problem, but rather, a people problem. What makes this problem
    particularly challenging is the unique aerial capabilities that
    UAS provides to their operators, capabilities previously
    limited only to those with the resources and training to
    operate manned aircraft. The accessibility, affordability, and
    automation have now placed these capabilities within the reach
    of anyone with a few hundred dollars. This creates a
    disproportionate force multiplier for bad actors.
        The destructive potential of consumer drones recently came
    to global attention in Ukraine during the famed operation
    Spiders Web where small drones were used to conduct rapid,
    surprising, accurate, and devastating attacks. These attacks
    were executed with near impunity, highlighting the critical
    vulnerability gap posed by UAS threats. The remote nature of
    these attacks left no one to arrest or hold accountable.
        Today, these tactics and technology are being employed both
    domestically and near our borders. The FAA estimates there are
    currently more than 2.8 million drones in the United States,
    nearly double the number of drones in 2018 than when the
    Preventing Emerging Threats Act was signed into law.
        Today, UAS outnumber manned aircraft by nearly 13-1. The
    agency estimates that within five years, this number will grow
    a further 10 percent. Presently, drones are causing three major
    domestic problems: (1) Creating a collision risk with aircraft
    operating in the National Airspace System; (2) contraband
    delivery into prisons and correctional institutions; and (3)
    incursions along our borders. The potential consequences of a
    midair collision with a drone erode the safety of our skies. As
    of the second quarter of 2025, the FAA recorded a total of
    1,022 sightings, approximately 170 per month with aircrew
    reportedly taking evasive action in 2.8 percent of those cases.
        In January of this year, a Canada Air CL-415 conducting
    suppression operations struck a small drone operating at low
    altitude within a temporary flight restricted zone near the
    Palisades fire. Their operations were suspended to allow that
    fire to expand unabated, further enhancing the destruction and
    risk to response personnel.
        According to Michael Torphy, the FBI and Christopher Hardy
    of the Department of Justice, drone activity has proliferated
    to more than half of the Bureau of Prison Federal facilities
    with incidents climbing to more than 479 in 2024, nearly 20
    times the number since the agency started tracking in 2018.
        Similarly, Steven Willoughby from the Department of
    Homeland Security highlighted the extent of the porous UAS
    activity along the U.S. border stating, In the last six months
    of 2024, more than 27,000 drones were detected within 500
    meters of the Southern border.
        To effectively address these challenges, I offer several
    observations, foremost that all drone incidents are local
    incidents first. Often, first responders to these incidents
    will be sworn officers from one of the Nation's nearly 18,000
    State and local law enforcement agencies. Most of these
    agencies lack formal training for dealing with drone incidents.
    Even fewer are equipped with tools to support the detection,
    tracking, and identification of UAS.
        Currently, no State or local law enforcement agencies are
    equipped and authorized to forcibly take down a UAS threat
    without the compliance of the operator who may be positioned
    miles away from the aerial vehicle.
        Testimony by Michael Torphy from the FBI underscored
    resource limitations in providing counter-UAS protection,
    highlighting the agency was only able to cover .05 percent of
    the more than 240,000 special events eligible for counter-UAS
    protection. Ultimately, the widespread immediate need for
    counter-UAS protection should be a part of calculus used to
    determine future authorities.
        The training is a vital element in protecting our public
    safety personnel to respond effectively to drone instances.
    Foremost, it is essential to ensure both UAS detection and
    mitigation efforts do not create or exacerbate hazards within
    the National Airspace System, respect from interference with
    navigation or communications infrastructure, or impede air
    traffic management functions.
        It is also necessary to educate officers on how to
    effectively respond, investigate, document, and charge these
    incidents in a manner that leads to successful prosecutions.
    Moreover, such training ensures reinforcement of appropriate
    procedures designed to protect the rights, expression, privacy,
    and other civil liberties. There are no magic bullet
    technological solutions to this problem. Each type of
    technology has its own inherent capabilities and limitations.
        Finally, I would like to highlight the vital importance of
    continued research and development. Research consortiums, like
    the Alliance for System Safety of UAS Through Research
    Excellence, ASSURE, and its accompanying and training arm
    ASSURED Safe are qualified, equipped, and ready to address
    these challenges that are affecting the National Airspace
    System.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Wallace follows:]
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Dr. Wallace. Now, the Chair
    recognizes Dr. Cahill for her five minute opening statement.

                  STATEMENT OF DR. CATHERINE F. CAHILL

        Dr. Cahill. Thank you. Chair Biggs, Ranking Member Raskin,
    and Ranking Member McBath, and the esteemed Members of the
    Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance. My
    name is Cathy Cahill, and I'm the Director of ACUASI, the
    Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration.
        The ACUASI leads one of the seven FAA test sites where we
    are a key player in many other FAA, DOJ, and DOD programs. We
    also partner with a variety of commercial and governmental
    entities on cutting edge UAS and counter-UAS technologies,
    required to safely integrate UAS us into the National Airspace
    System. These facts uniquely position me to discuss the topic
    of malicious UAS. This written testimony is provided to you
    through my personal capacity as a private citizen based on my
    professional experience. It does not necessarily represent the
    views of the University of Alaska.
        The ACUASI uses UAS for good, such as conducting medical
    supply delivery, cargo delivery to isolated communities, and
    emergency response. However, our team is very aware of how they
    can be used maliciously.
        I live in Alaska, but even in this remote location our team
    has seen the malicious use of UAS. We have seen flights of
    unauthorized UAS in the flight path of Ted Stevens
    International Airport, one of the top five cargo airports in
    the world.
        Simultaneously, we have seen multiple UAS entering
    restricted airspace of our military bases. We have observed the
    flight tracks of UAS dropping contraband into correctional
    facilities. I personally have seen UAS crossing the Southern
    border, bringing drugs from Mexico. All these examples show the
    malicious UAS activities are widespread, and we need policies,
    procedures, training, and technologies to allow law enforcement
    to stop these activities without creating a hazard to people
    and property.
        The first question I always get asked when I talk to the
    public about the issue of malicious UASs, why can't we shoot
    them? The United States Code, Section 49, defines UAS as
    aircraft and all the laws codified for traditional manned
    aircraft apply to them. Therefore, shooting an UAS is a Federal
    offense with applicable jail time and fines. Only five
    agencies, DOD, DOE, DHS, DOJ and, to a limited extent, FAA have
    relief from the United States code sections applicable to
    shooting down, hacking, or jamming UAS. Most law enforcement
    operators dealing with unauthorized UAS do not have the legal
    authority to do so. Also, it is unsafe to mitigate a UAS
    without knowing what is under it and one might get hit when the
    UAS falls.
        Additionally, the operator of a counter-UAS system needs to
    know that UAS under operation is authorized to be flying in
    that location. These facts point to why we need highly trained
    professionals with appropriate statutory relief and good
    information, making the risk benefit calculations about whether
    and how a UAS should be mitigated.
        As the malicious use of UAS spreads, State, local law
    enforcement, and officers will be on the front lines for
    combating the threat from the rogue UAS, because Federal agents
    with counter-drone capacities cannot be everywhere. The ACUASI
    team has been studying the willingness of local law enforcement
    officers to engage with systems designed to detect, track, and
    identify malicious UAS.
        In Alaska, we have had trouble getting State and local law
    enforcement officers to address rogue UAS because they are
    overworked, understaffed, dealing with more urgent situations,
    and feel it is not their responsibility to do so. Additionally,
    many of the law enforcement participants in our study aren't
    sure as to what laws are applicable to malicious UAS, and do
    not know what they can legally do to build a case for the
    misuse of UAS.
        We need to provide our law enforcement officers with clear
    guidance on how to address rogue UAS. As the risk from
    malicious UAS increases, the potential to mitigate the UAS is
    certain circumstances.
        We cannot afford to allow criminals to use UAS maliciously,
    or our adversaries to use UAS to endanger our military bases or
    personnel and conduct espionage. In my opinion, H.R. 5061, the
    Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act
    is a good first step toward safely implementing counter-drone
    technology in the U.S. However, more needs to be done.
        To accelerate our testing and implementation of these
    technologies and the required risk benefit decision
    calculations needed before UAS is mitigated. These investments
    will not only help our law enforcement organizations here at
    home, but also our military overseas, as they deal with the
    malicious UAS threat.
        The U.S. should be a world leader in the development and
    deployment of these technologies. If we do not move fast
    enough, the criminals and our adversaries will win the UAS war.
        This ends my prepared statement. I'd be happy to answer any
    questions you have.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Cahill follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Biggs. Thank you. I now recognize the Ranking Member of
    the Subcommittee, Ms. McBath, for her opening statement.
        Ms. McBath. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to our
    witnesses. I have read your testimonies, and I apologize that I
    am just getting here. Thank you for convening today's hearing
    to provide us with an opportunity to learn more about how
    drones can be used to commit crimes; how law enforcement can
    respond to those crimes; and what we might do here in Congress
    to adapt our laws to meet the challenges that drones pose to
    our society and the challenges that you have expressed today.
        As with the internet, artificial intelligence, and so many
    other technologies, drones can really be a valuable tool. They
    can help first responders that survive or survey a disaster
    area to search for survivors, or they can give law enforcement
    another vantage point from which to monitor a special event or
    a very sensitive location. They can keep officers safe by
    allowing them to remotely investigate a dangerous situation or
    location. The rapid proliferation of drone technology has
    ushered in a new frontier of crime, and many, many public
    safety challenges.
        In the wrong hands, drones can be used to invade privacy,
    smuggle contraband, as you just mentioned, or provide bad
    actors with information that can help them avoid detection.
    I've heard firsthand about these harms from many law
    enforcement officers, in particular, in my district in the
    State of Georgia, as they are working to keep us all safe. For
    example, Georgia prison officials have informed me that they
    are increasingly battling the use of drones to smuggle
    contraband into our prison facilities. Drones have been used to
    deliver illegal drugs, weapons and cell phones, which can each
    pose a threat to the safety of our inmates and also the staff.
        Just last year, the Georgia Department of Corrections see
    drones, dozens of them, that could be used to smuggle in
    contraband. Recently, officials at Washington State Prison in
    Davisboro, Georgia, they worked with the Washington County
    sheriff to track drones that were being used in an attempt to
    smuggle methamphetamine and heroin into prison. By tracking the
    drones and using a K-9 unit, they were able to locate the drone
    operators, arrest them, and prevent the drugs from reaching the
    prison.
        While law enforcement succeeded in this effort, using
    traditional tools, additional law enforcement tools may be
    needed to respond to the rising challenges that are presented
    by the drones.
        As with any new technology, we must exercise caution and
    proceed thoughtfully to avoid unintended consequences of
    detecting and mitigating drone activities. Disabling or
    intercepting drones presents very unique challenges. For
    example, an intercepted or disabled drone could fall as was
    stated, and injure innocent bystanders on the ground, damage
    objects, or property in its path. Similarly, many of the
    technologies used to combat drones rely on disrupting their
    communications systems of planes or emergency--these
    communication systems could disrupt aircrafts or emergency
    responders.
        The testing, planning, training, and targeted deployment
    can all help ensure that counter-drone technologies are used in
    a way that promotes public safety, but also strengthens our
    national security.
        I'm so thankful to each of our experts today for your
    expert testimony. Thank you for coming here today to discuss
    how we can work together to respond to these challenges and
    opportunities that have been presented by drones and counter-
    drone technology and our ever-changing technological landscape.
    Thank each of you for sharing your expertise.
        Mr. Biggs. The gentlelady yields back. Now, we'll go to
    questions from Members of the Subcommittee, we'll start first
    with the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Nehls.
        Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Chair. You spoke so well about the
    issues that we see down at our Southern border related to
    drones coming across with all the drugs, killing our people
    from the bad hombres we have on the Southern border. We have to
    stop it.
        I'd like to talk a little bit about drones in the airspace,
    specifically airports, concerned about the airports, right? A
    bad actor with bad intentions, entering restricted airspace
    over one of our airports. As I do, I am looking at you, I am
    thinking about Florida. You have about 400 airports as your
    responsibility. What does a medium-size airport do? You detect
    at the airport, a drone comes in restricted airspace, what's
    your response?
        Sgt. Dooley. Normally, I'll give you an example. We've done
    some really different things in South Florida, especially Miami
    International Airport, as an example, has a drone problem and
    we have partnered with our FAA partners, DHS, et cetera,
    entities that are allowed without question to detect or
    mitigate because we recognized it was an issue. We incorporate
    a lot of our public safety in the area of Miami-Dade, et
    cetera, and we were involved as well. We are able to go out
    there and start intercepting, but from the perspective of an
    airport that simply has the ability to detect and there is
    really nothing they can do other than watch it, honestly.
        Mr. Nehls. Did you see how stupid that sounds?
        Sgt. Dooley. It does.
        Mr. Nehls. It's stupid.
        Sgt. Dooley. Yes.
        Mr. Nehls. I like the idea we can detect; we can detect.
    All these airports we can detect a drone. Well, if it's being
    operated by an individual with some bad intentions, you'll just
    catch it on video. The destruction of--you are going to detect
    it, but there's nothing to mitigate that drone? This is
    airports, correct me if I am wrong, sir, but this is airports
    across the entire country.
        Sgt. Dooley. Yes, that's correct. There may be some that
    have specialized, but--
        Mr. Nehls. Well, Ms. Cahill brought up a few of the
    agencies that have the ability to mitigate a drone.
        Dr. Wallace, I hear these arguments, I'm on the
    Transportation Committee, I hear all these arguments about you
    can't mitigate the drone because it could interfere, it could
    interfere with commercial aviation and all this. Is there
    technology available out there that could mitigate a drone
    without interfering with our commercial air?
        Dr. Wallace. There are certainly several technologies that
    are available for mitigation.
        Mr. Nehls. Sure.
        Dr. Wallace. Each of those technologies have their own
    benefits and limitations.
        Mr. Nehls. Sure, sure. That's an excuse that I hear over
    and over again, it's going to interfere with the aircraft that
    are coming in, I said, interfere with the aircraft coming in.
    The damn drone could take down one of our aircraft. You talked
    a little bit about what we've seen in Ukraine with the complex
    missions that some of these drones are taking. I am appalled by
    the fact that I was in Milwaukee and I went to visit the
    airport, we were talking about the drones, and I was inside
    there. I said well, ``what happens if a drone gets into this
    red air--this restricted airspace?'' ``Well, we know it's
    there.'' I said, ``what would you do?'' ``We try to call
    somebody. Yes, we try to find the guy, he could be a couple
    blocks, a couple miles away in the backyard and we will knock
    on the door.'' I said, ``What if that guy has bad intentions?''
    ``Then, when we have a significant event, we'll bring in the
    Coast Guard. The Coast Guard would have the ability to mitigate
    the drone and send it out to Lake Michigan or set it down.''
        The idea to say that, we have to be careful here that the
    drone doesn't fall down and hit somebody in the head. The
    technology is there to take control of the damn drone and get
    it out of the restricted airspace. The idea that we have to be
    worried about not offending somebody; it's in restricted
    airspace. At some point in time, Mr. Feddersen, we're going
    have a drone operated by some bad hombres over here interfering
    with some commercial airliners, running into the engines and
    causing problems but then, maybe then, is when we will actually
    get serious about mitigating the risks of these drones, because
    there's going to be millions of them out there. The bad guys
    are understanding these are pretty--you can put some pretty
    good payload on some of these drones, they are relatively
    inexpensive, right? So, I am deeply concerned, Sergeant Dooley,
    about the U.S. Government's position on this, whether it is
    Section 49, it is a Federal offence, that just makes me sick to
    think that this is a Federal offense for State individuals,
    State officials to protect their own airports in their own
    State. We must change; we must change.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Biggs. The gentleman yields. We appreciate that. The
    Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Georgia, Ms. McBath.
        Ms. McBath. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.
        We know that drones, as I've stated and many have stated in
    this hearing, drones have been used to smuggle drugs, weapons,
    and phones into prisons and across our borders. As I mentioned
    in my opening remarks, this is already happening in Georgia.
    Drones present a significant risk to the safety of inmates and
    staff.
        Dr. Cahill, your written testimony notes that your team has
    worked with Alaskan correction facilities to detect and to
    track and to identify the drones that are being used to smuggle
    contraband into the prisons. You also said this is a widespread
    problem, but can you talk about--you said that you had
    difficulty in getting law enforcement to address the rogue UAS,
    and so including at correctional facilities. Could you explain
    the source of the hesitancy?
        Dr. Cahill. Ranking Member, the reality is when we have
    dealt with our law enforcement, they are skeptical of a new
    technology until it is proven because they have so many things
    on their plate that it is a challenge for them to learn
    something new and be able to work with it. We had hesitancy in
    our correctional facilities for installing one of these
    systems. The moment we did and were able to confirm some of
    their intelligence that there was a contraband drop occurring
    and we were able to track the drone, identify where the hand
    controller for the operator was. We changed their opinion. As
    soon as we gave them that briefing the answer was: Could you
    please train us this afternoon? We did.
        They've spread that story to additional correctional
    facilities and they've accepted it. They have a very targeted,
    very limited area that they need to protect.
        The police and the Alaska State troopers who have much
    wider ranges for them. We are severely understaffed. So, a
    malicious drone doesn't mean anything compared to wife beating
    or major traffic accidents in the middle of nowhere. The
    priority is not there to be able do these additional duties
    associated with monitoring the technologies and determining how
    to interact with them.
        Ms. McBath. Could you kind of explain to me when the drones
    are seized in these crimes, what type of digital forensics can
    be performed on them? What data can be extracted or recovered
    from a seized drone?
        Dr. Cahill. The Ranking Member, we don't actually do the
    forensics on the drones. People do, for example, the Pacific
    Palisades case where the drone hit the Super Scooper, a fire-
    fighting aircraft. They were able to do a forensic analysis
    because the drone was stuck in the wing of aircraft. In a lot
    of these cases, all we see are the tracks and we may know it is
    group one or group two, which is the size category, but we
    don't know a whole lot about that aircraft because we have to
    obey Title 18 and Title 49, which means we cannot break into
    the communications link for that aircraft without permission,
    the 124 and authority, for example. We as a State university do
    not have that, but the partners we have who do, they are able
    to get more information in terms of what the serial number is
    what type of aircraft it is. They can say it is a DJI Mavic,
    for example. It really is a function of what you have.
        What we are doing when we are using passive RF is for
    trying authorization, is we are looking for basically somebody
    yelling. We have a network of censors, and we determine the
    direction from which the yelling is coming. That lets us find
    the drone and the operator. We will be able to track where the
    drone is and where the operator is. In the recent case with the
    Juneau glacial outburst flooding, we said at the system we were
    able to determine where the controller was, where the drone
    went and landed, local law enforcement went to that location
    and knocked on doors and found the perpetrator.
        Ms. McBath. Then, would you say that local law enforcement
    is able then to build a criminal case from the data that they
    are to extract that you can't do it but they can?
        Dr. Cahill. Yes.
        Ms. McBath. OK, thank you. Sergeant Dooley, what are the
    greatest legal and technical hurdles in actively encountering a
    drone in real time?
        Sgt. Dooley. Just to the doctor's point again, we do have
    legal constraints, we would violate about 15 different U.S.
    codes by simply frequency jamming or mitigating all kinds of
    FAA rules, regulations, FCC, et cetera. Most of those carry
    jail time and significant fines as well. A lot of colleagues
    would say, ``Like, oh, well, we're public safety, if we have to
    do what we have to do.'' The problem is, to your point earlier,
    mitigating a drone and they may have had a legal right to be
    there, and they made an honest mistake, there is still a
    tremendous amount of consequence that comes with that.
        Our biggest hurdles are all the existing codes, our laws
    simply do not keep up with the rate the technology progresses,
    and the way that it can be manipulated for bad. Those are some
    of the biggest hurdles we have is Title 18 pen trap, wire-
    tapping laws, et cetera, that are of huge concern when we do
    want to not only detect that a drone is there, but be able to
    mitigate it away, we would be violating about 15 different
    title codes, and also Title 18 and 49 as well.
        Ms. McBath. Thank you. I appreciate it.
        Mr. Biggs. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    Wisconsin for five minutes, Mr. Tiffany.
        Mr. Tiffany. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        As we heard over the last few years, every State became a
    border State, with the previous administration and cartel
    members openly stated that they used our Northern border to
    smuggle in narcotics. Mr. Feddersen, do you think it is equally
    important to implement these drone enforcement programs at both
    the Southern border and the Northern border?
        Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir, I do. They are being implemented
    at the Federal level, particularly CBP on both the North and
    the South sides. However, the lack of authorities for detection
    track identifying, or even the mitigation piece does extend to
    those local departments that are shoulder to shoulder with CBP
    taking action to address these issues. We are severely
    overmatched by the criminal element when it comes to it.
        Mr. Tiffany. How should that change in your opinion?
        Mr. Feddersen. It is actually quite easy, sir. Detect,
    track, and identify authority is our Title 18. They are very
    vague, they are antiquated, and they honestly add a lot of
    confusion to law enforcement, commercial sectors, and critical
    infrastructure that want to be able to see what's flying in
    their airspace. The information that goes from there into the
    counter-drone systems like ours are nothing more than remote ID
    data. It's just data that comes directly from the drone. The
    most personal information you may get from it is the serial
    number which is akin to license plate on a vehicle. Law
    enforcement still has to call the FAA to get the registry
    information from the FAA and then from there, be able to take
    leaps.
        The DTI should be a blanket open authority for critical
    infrastructure, security, law enforcement and honestly, all
    Federal agencies because they don't all have the authority
    right now.
        Mr. Tiffany. With that authority they could accomplish the
    mission that you were referring to that they are not able to
    fulfill at this point. Is that correct?
        Mr. Feddersen. Correct, most of it, because at this point,
    you can figure out where the drone is, where it took off, and
    where the pilot is in real time.
        Mr. Tiffany. The cartels and others are light years ahead
    of the law enforcement at this point in part because of that?
        Mr. Feddersen. Honestly, the rest of the world, sir. We are
    a global country in 33 countries. We do airports and law
    enforcement and military everywhere else, and they use our
    system quite a bit to mitigate.
        Mr. Tiffany. Mitigation looks much different in other
    places around the world than it does here in the United States?
        Mr. Feddersen. It is only the policies and legislative
    piece. They have given authorities to their law enforcement and
    security entities.
        Mr. Tiffany. You think China may have had a hand in the
    drone activity around some of our military sites?
        Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir, absolutely. I believe that drones
    are a tool, they are a tool by criminal networks, and they are
    a tool for foreign adversaries. Absolutely, they are being
    used.
        Mr. Tiffany. Sergeant Dooley, are you familiar with the
    Guang Pan Cape Canaveral incident that happened earlier this
    year in Florida?
        Sgt. Dooley. Vaguely, yes.
        Mr. Tiffany. In the case of Chinese-born Canadian citizen
    Guang Pan was found to be using a drone to take unauthorized
    photographs at Patrick Air Force Base, a submarine morph in
    Cape Canaveral. Have you seen increased activity of drones
    around U.S. military bases in Florida?
        Sgt. Dooley. Military bases not so much. We don't support
    them as often, it is normally during large scale events, but we
    went from literally detecting a few hundred per month in those
    general areas where they are restricted airspace like a DOD
    site or a military base to thousands. In particular, when DGI,
    in particular, drones, turned off their geofencing for the most
    part. Our principal workhorse years ago in the State of
    Florida, what we used was DGI drones. That is how we got
    started. Now, we are not allowed to use them anymore. Back
    then, you had to have special permission, the drone told you,
    you're not allowed to fly here or take off from here. Now, that
    is not the case. It is simply a check box where you turn on
    your drone and it can be right next to an airport runway, and
    before it would say, ``You can't fly here.'' It says, you're
    taking responsibility, you touch a check box and it takes off
    and flies wherever I want it to fly now. We've seen dramatic
    increase over the past, I would say, 8-9 months of going from a
    handful of detections to in the thousands of detections in
    these areas or within range of our detection equipment because
    there is no more geofencing. Yes, it has increased dramatically
    in a lot of these areas, not just for infrastructure, but our
    military sites and other places.
        Mr. Tiffany. Is it correct that we do not produce a lot of
    drones in the United States principally produced in China. Is
    that accurate?
        Sgt. Dooley. That's correct. The principal ones that are
    produced here are normally purchased by DOD or law enforcement
    or areas like Florida where we restrict the type of drones
    we're allowed to purchase.
        Mr. Tiffany. For national security purposes, do you think
    that we should make that a priority to be able to produce them
    in the United States?
        Sgt. Dooley. I am a proud American for sure; I would love
    to be prideful of us producing those types of things here, yes.
    I also don't want to stifle some of the things where people
    need to buy a certain product because it is the correct tool
    for the correct job if that makes sense, but buying American
    should be preferred, yes.
        Mr. Tiffany. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield.
        Mr. Biggs. The gentleman yields back. Before we go to the
    next one, I want to submit for the record documentation called,
    ``Cartels Drop Bombs From Drones Near Southern Border.'' So
    ordered.
        I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Swalwell,
    for five minutes.
        Mr. Swalwell. Thank you. There's no doubt that drones
    particularly for law enforcement have changed the game for
    surveillance, for search and rescue, to assist in active SWAT
    operations, they can save not only civilian lives, but also
    protect our men and women in law enforcement. The Sergeant just
    alluded to a problem that we have run into is that cheaper
    Chinese components have made it much more affordable for law
    enforcement agencies to have these capabilities. We all know
    the risk that comes along with having Chinese components in our
    drones, which is that they could be pinging back to mainland
    China and affecting our own national security in the way that
    they could be gathering intelligence on behalf of the Chinese
    Government. Certainly, no law enforcement agency wants that.
        Sergeant Dooley, I imagine you would tell me that when
    you're making decisions to protect the people who work with you
    and to protect the public, you have to think about what can
    bring public safety and how you can stretch your dollars the
    best. Is that right? Is that some of the tension you have to
    deal with in making a decision like that?
        Sgt. Dooley. Not anymore. The State of Florida legislated
    that, so we don't have to worry about it, we just take what we
    need. They also supply funding now to help us reach those goals
    of transitioning everything away.
        Mr. Swalwell. My goal, just as you stated earlier, is that
    we would have entirely an affordable American-made supply
    chain. In fact, in California, there's a company, it's made up
    of former Navy SEALS, called Inspired Flight which is American
    made components. It sounds like you're familiar with Inspired
    Flight.
        Sgt. Dooley. Oh, yes. They are good people. I like them.
        Mr. Swalwell. Yes, same. My question for Dr. Wallace is
    knowing that 86 percent of the drones--I'm sorry. Knowing that
    a high percentage of drones are made in China, in that the over
    concentration can affect our national security. What can we do
    in the near term to make sure that law enforcement has
    affordable drones, but on the manufacturing side that we're
    able to expedite our ability to produce American made
    components?
        Dr. Wallace. That's an excellent question. I can tell you,
    I'm not a manufacturing expert. I can tell you that from a
    capabilities' perspective, currently Chinese made drones have a
    capability that can't be matched with the same dollar value. I
    do think that given that limitation the choice that ultimately
    has to be made with regard to especially public safety is one
    of lives, because at the end of the day, if public safety
    agency doesn't have access to the tool they need to protect
    that public and the capability they need to accomplish what
    they need to do, the ultimate price will be either law
    enforcement member's life or potentially a member--a citizen's
    life. That is a metric that should be taken?
        Mr. Swalwell. Agreed. Sergeant Dooley, are there any
    examples you have not given the Committee as to how a drone
    facilitated saving life or protecting the officers who worked
    with you that you think could animate the need for giving law
    enforcement more resources in this area?
        Sgt. Dooley. For the counter site or just a success story
    from having drones in public safety?
        Mr. Swalwell. Both.
        Sgt. Dooley. OK, from the success side, I will give you an
    example and I give it all the time, I work very closely with
    the Palm Beach County sheriff's office in South Florida. There
    was a deputy and I were eating lunch and we get this call of a
    stabbing inside a home and everybody fled. Unfortunately, the
    person that was the criminal in this particular case was off
    his medication, recognizing that we may have had some type of
    mental episode and we approach it differently. As soon as we
    arrive there, the deputy get permission to put his drone and I
    supported him by making sure everything was squared aware. He
    put his drone under the house and within three minutes he
    located the suspect, we recovered the suspect, they are in
    custody, no one got shot, not one got dog bit. Everybody went
    on about their day and the person who had been stabbed was
    getting medical attention. This was solved in minutes, versus
    like an hour standoff with a SWAT team without this type of
    technology.
        From the other side of not having detection or counter UAS
    that has been hindering is a bulk of what we get is like
    careless and clueless individuals where they just as dangerous
    at times as someone with bad intent. For example, the person in
    California gave an example of hitting the sea plane that was--I
    forget the name of it. That person didn't do it on purpose;
    they were just careless and clueless. Same thing in Texas
    during the flooding, we had someone strike a helicopter. They
    didn't do it on purpose, sometimes careless and clueless
    individuals, dangerous as those that have those negative
    intentions. Having this technology both for public safety
    provides a tremendous value of being able to save lives, to
    protect lives. More importantly, having the ability to detect
    and potentially mitigate if needed could provide those values
    where we can keep mandate aviation safe. We harp on the
    terrorist side, and OK, careless and clueless can be just as
    dangerous as those individuals that intended and planned
    something versus someone just popping up trying to make a
    YouTube video and actually hit an airplane or violate airspace.
        Mr. Swalwell. Thank you for your service, Sergeant. To the
    men and women that you serve with, I'll say what we say in our
    law enforcement family: Be safe. Thank you.
        Mr. Biggs. The gentleman's time has expired.
        I have two more documents that I'm introducing into the
    record: ``Drones in the Wrong Hands: How Criminals Use UAVs to
    Threaten Prisons and Jails,'' and another one titled, ``New
    State Drone Law Sets Strict Operational Boundaries.''
        Without objection, so ordered. I now recognize the
    gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Knott.
        Mr. Knott. Thank you, Mr. Chair. To the witnesses, thank
    you for being here.
        I'll piggyback on one of those submissions. When I was
    working in law enforcement, the problem had already arrived in
    many respects. We would send some of the most dangerous people
    in the country away to jail for sometimes 20-40 years, but
    there would be no interruption in the criminal enterprises that
    these folks led, in large part, because of devices and
    capabilities that made it into the Bureau of Prisons because of
    the drones. It seemed like just a lumbering bureaucracy and
    inefficiency that it could not keep up with the technology.
        I am curious. Mr. Feddersen, you mentioned that the United
    States seems to be overwhelmed at this particular juncture. Is
    the posture of being overwhelmed--is that from just a volume
    standpoint of all the drones that are in circulation? Is it a
    technology standpoint, or is it just the layers of bureaucracy
    that prohibit effective deterrence?
        Mr. Feddersen. Thank you for the question. It is a policy,
    legislative, and bureaucracy issue. Technology is out there
    today from many companies that have been tested by the FAA,
    tested by TSA, deemed safe to use at airports, but the
    confusion over detection, track, and identify has hesitancy
    across the land, and the fact that the mitigation authorities
    haven't been expanded in a quick enough manner is--
        Mr. Knott. What makes sense to remedy this? Because a drone
    is not an airplane. The fact that they are being regulated as
    such, in many respects, does not make much sense in terms of
    placing the same value on a drone as it does an airplane.
    Should we have a facility-specific code for unmanned aircraft?
        Mr. Feddersen. I don't think so, sir. I disagree that
    labeling it an aircraft hinders anything. It actually gives
    both operators and those that are working around the drones
    more protection and coverage into what they're doing. It gives
    better regulatory understanding of what these drones can and
    cannot do when they're flying because, honestly, as it has been
    said before there are drones that are as small as a coffee cup
    but some that are as big as a car.
        Mr. Knott. Yes, yes.
        Mr. Feddersen. You would have to be able to safely manage
    that, and aircraft is the right designation for that.
        Mr. Knott. In terms of fixing the issues that we see,
    though, how can we fix the bureaucracy and I would say the
    ineffective legislative posture we have with drones?
        Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir, I'm going to have to point the
    finger back to all of you on the panel.
        Mr. Knott. Well, you're the expert. I'm just asking.
        Mr. Feddersen. No, because that's exactly what it is. We
    had a five-year pilot program for a very small sect of Federal
    law enforcement that started in 2018. We're now in the eighth
    year of that five-year program. No authorities have been
    expanded. We have seen that that technology can be used safely
    and without issue. We've had those departments and agencies ask
    for an expansion of authorities to get them some relief off
    their responsibility.
        Honestly, especially from being a former State trooper, to
    say that an FBI agent is smarter and more apt at using this
    equipment than a State trooper or local law enforcement isn't
    the right way. The delay is simply understanding the technology
    and giving trust back to the process and the system.
        Mr. Knott. What does the technology do specifically?
        Mr. Feddersen. It gives you the basic remote--for remote ID
    information, it tells you where the drone is, what the drone's
    serial number is, where it's flying, which way it's heading,
    and where the pilot is in real time. That information can be
    used for a ground interdiction without even having to worry
    about the airspace, to talk to the pilot, and have him bring it
    down.
        There are technologies like ours, which is cyber takeover,
    which takes control of the drone and lands it safely where it
    needs to be, which then allows for the officer to either give
    it back to the child and parent with a warning undamaged, no
    collateral damage, or go ahead and submit for a search warrant
    to get the information out of the drone.
        Mr. Knott. Do you think there is a space in the legal
    construct to have emergency authorization to remove a drone,
    whether it's shooting it down, taking control of it, or some
    other means?
        Mr. Feddersen. No, sir. These drones are flying at 30-60
    miles per hour. The decision cycle for law enforcement or a
    security individual is literally seconds and minutes. It's not
    weeks or hours. If it is to be that type of system, then I
    think it has to be preemptively done to say that a search
    warrant is going to cover a large area for a large period of
    time.
        Mr. Knott. The emphasis of my question is--let's say a
    drone is flying over an airport, or over a Bureau of Prisons
    facility. Should there not be the authorization to remove that
    drone immediately?
        Mr. Feddersen. Yes, absolutely.
        Mr. Knott. Do we lack that currently? Is that correct?
        Mr. Feddersen. We do.
        Mr. Knott. OK. The technology is there to remove that
    drone?
        Mr. Feddersen. The technology is available to remove the
    drone and remove it safely, and the technology has been tested
    by the FAA and TSA. A prime example, though, is Federal Air
    Marshals--
        Mr. Knott. Yes.
        Mr. Feddersen. --who are using the Chinese equipment at our
    major airports to assess what the situation is, but they don't
    have authority to use other equipment or use mitigation.
        Mr. Knott. Mr. Chair, I have more room, but that's--I'll
    yield back the--
        Mr. Biggs. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Knott. Yes.
        Mr. Biggs. I now recognize--thank you. We've got lots of
    questions, don't we?
        Mr. Knott. Yes.
        Mr. Biggs. The gentleman from California, Mr. Kiley, is
    recognized for five minutes.
        Mr. Kiley. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
        Clearly, the problems being discussed at this hearing are
    extremely serious when it comes to the malicious and
    unauthorized uses of drones. Of course, there are a lot of good
    and authorized uses of drones as well for agriculture, for
    hobbyists, for security, and so forth, and increasingly,
    actually, for delivery. If you look at companies like Walmart
    and Amazon, they have actually been expanding their use of
    drones to make almost instantaneous or very quick deliveries at
    least of smaller parallels at this point, and that many believe
    this will become quite widespread in the coming years.
        This sort of problem of the unauthorized uses of drones
    threatens the ability to have that process go smoothly, both
    from the perspective of having the regulatory process--or
    framework, more correctly--and in terms of public perception
    and support for these sorts of things.
        Maybe I'll ask Dr. Wallace, and if any of the other
    panelists want to add to this, how do we sort of address the
    malicious uses of drones in a way that does not threaten the
    productive and valuable uses of them?
        Dr. Wallace. It's an excellent question. The initial
    challenge is there is a misperception that it's easy to
    identify the misuse of a drone, at least initially. If you're
    looking at a radar screen, for example, you're going to see a
    dot and an altitude. That doesn't really give you the ability
    to immediately distinguish that someone is doing something
    improperly.
        Typically, we leverage information contextually with other
    kinds of information to try to make some assertions about what
    is actually happening. Is the drone operating above the
    altitude that the FAA would permit? Are they operating at an
    unusual time? Are they operating near a facility that would be
    questionable? You never really know definitively if this drone
    is a threat or not. You only have indications.
        Mr. Kiley. Thank you. Did any of the other panelists want
    to weigh in?
        Mr. Feddersen. Yes. That the question is a very good
    question, but it comes back into the fact that when we look at
    our Nation's airspace, we look at it through two lenses: Safety
    and security. Air Domain Awareness, which would allow you to
    see all the drones, is an essential part of the safety aspect
    of things. It's akin to telling police officers they can't look
    at certain vehicles that are flying around--or driving around
    in areas that are off-limits and not being able to react to it.
    It's the same--you either drive the car legally or you drive
    the car illegally. It's the same with a drone.
        Sgt. Dooley. When we do large-scale events, we do have to
    do a lot of deconfliction. To your point, like, how do you know
    which one is good and which one is bad? We have briefings prior
    to large-scale events of our public safety professionals--
    Amazon, Walmart, if they're doing deliveries in those areas,
    and make sure that we understand that those are already
    authorized and we can get a list because, again, it's all about
    communication and reaching out. We reach out to our FAA
    partners and say who has been authorized to fly in this area,
    because we're going to be their eyes and ears.
        If we do have something that is authorized to be there or--
    to their point, we're not accidentally intercepting or
    mitigating with our Federal partners. We know that they're
    supposed to be there, or we already have those clearances ahead
    of time. Communication is key, and getting out of your silo and
    talking to the other entities that can do that is key.
        Mr. Kiley. Yes. That's very important. If this is going to
    become more common, deliveries being done in this way, we want
    folks to have the assurance that these drones are supposed to
    be there and that they are safe and that they're doing just a
    routine delivery as opposed to some of the other encounters
    that people might have in other contexts with drones. I
    appreciate the work you're doing.
        I appreciate the Chair for bringing attention to this
    issue. I yield back. I would be happy to yield to my colleague,
    Mr. Knott.
        Mr. Knott. Thank you, Mr. Kiley.
        Sergeant, I noticed that you waved me down when I was
    talking about the ability to shoot down drones in emergency
    situations that's not currently within the legal construct. Do
    you have any insight into how we can best achieve that across,
    I would say, the sensitive areas, whether they're airports,
    bases, Bureau of Prisons, what have you?
        Sgt. Dooley. Well, the ideal means would be nonkinetic. You
    don't want to, accidentally, a projectile goes up and comes
    down. There are some scenarios which we've seen overseas where
    people don't care that you're mitigating, jamming, or GPS
    denying. They're using fiber-optic and other things to cross
    these barriers and be very successful, and that may be
    something that we have to deal with at some point.
        We don't want to box our public safety in to just
    nonkinetic issues, which is basically radio frequency jamming,
    et cetera. We want to be able to give them a full spectrum of
    what they feel is necessary to do--or based on their personal
    experience of what they've encountered, or maybe the intel that
    they're getting--to be able to handle the situation
    accordingly. That's my biggest fear, is that we're going to
    authorize this, but box them in so much that they--
        Mr. Knott. Yes. They can't respond.
        Sgt. Dooley. They can't--they are like, I wish I could do
    something. It would be like me standing on the side of the road
    with a radar gun and I clock someone going 100 miles an hour,
    but they didn't give me a car to go chase them down and stop
    them from that dangerous speed. This is the same thing. We want
    to have multiple options available to us without being boxed
    in, but be doing it responsibly with a high level of
    accountability.
        I do think that if we do make a mistake, we should be held
    accountable. If we mitigate a drone that wasn't supposed to be
    mitigated, we figure out what went wrong and how we can fix it,
    but more importantly, document and justify to our Federal
    partners if we mitigated a drone why we made that decision and
    what was going on at the time, not just I hit the button, he's
    not supposed to be there, have a nice day. We have to have some
    level of that, too.
        That will help with the trust part as well in allowing
    committees like this to approve those type of authorities
    because we're going to be able to explain when, where, and why
    we actually did some form of mitigation versus just hitting a
    button and trusting that everybody is doing what they're
    supposed to be doing.
        Mr. Knott. Sergeant, thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Biggs. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
        This was going to be the last question if I had time, but
    you touched on this here, and that is has a framework--and I
    know the answer has a framework been established that clarifies
    indemnification and liability provisions for law enforcement
    interacting with drones? Then, my guess is no, other than just
    general qualified immunity.
        Sgt. Dooley. From the FAA perspective, there is a law
    enforcement toolkit that--it gives you things that you're
    allowed to do if you have to interact with a drone pilot. That
    you can ask for their registration, you can ask for their trust
    certificate or part--
        Mr. Biggs. It doesn't deal with--
        Sgt. Dooley. As far as the mitigation and the detection
    side, no.
        Mr. Biggs. Right. I guess that's really my question
    regarding mitigation and detection, that there really is
    nothing right now--
        Sgt. Dooley. Other than you can't do it unless you're one
    of the four Federal entities.
        Mr. Biggs. Right. This leads to the next question.
        You kind of addressed it, Mr. Feddersen, and so I may ask
    all of you.
        What is the current framework under the pilot program? What
    agencies are given authority, what kind of authority are they
    given, and how do we effectively expand that nationwide?
        Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir. In DHS, there's only a small
    number of them, small components. There're components out there
    like his and ICE, the FAMs, and TSA that don't have any
    authorities that probably should. There on the DOJ side, U.S.
    Marshals, BOP, you've got DEA and FBI. All Federal components
    that have authorities are using our system because of the
    methodology that it has.
        The DOD also has it, and you've got--on DOE, falling short
    of how they're going to go ahead and use things because it's
    private contractors that particularly take care of power plants
    and nuclear plants.
        The authorities in 124n are fine, because they actually go
    ahead and do the notwithstanding aspect and waive Title 18 and
    the Title 49 piece. The issue is training. As long as we have a
    good solid training program, those authorities in 124n should
    be broadly spread across the rest of the Federal agency, State,
    local law enforcement, and critical infrastructure security
    officers.
        Mr. Biggs. We have--for instance, in immigration law, we
    provide status for training for departments--sheriffs'
    departments, et cetera--so they can then enforce certain
    aspects of immigration law. Is that the kind of thing that
    might be helpful?
        I'm just going to go down--be very quick--and start with
    Dr. Cahill and go all the way down and finish with Sergeant
    Dooley.
        Dr. Cahill. That would be very useful, Mr. Chair, in terms
    of getting it to the people who need it.
        Mr. Biggs. By the way, when I read your statement, I got a
    kick out of the people that are operating these things while
    they're drunk. I shouldn't get a kick out of that, but that you
    reported it kind of made me smile.
        Dr. Wallace?
        Dr. Wallace. I would generally agree.
        Mr. Biggs. Mr. Feddersen?
        Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir. Very helpful.
        Mr. Biggs. Sergeant?
        Sgt. Dooley. Yes. In fact, a lot of our Federal partners
    have asked, but, unfortunately, that's not an authority they
    can delegate under those programs like a TFO program. That
    would have to change to allow us to receive those authorities.
        Mr. Biggs. Right. That would be new legislation we would
    have to pass to get those authorities in place.
        Right now, I want to make sure everyone knows. If I
    understand correctly, if there is a drone, whether it's a
    malevolent actor or benign, and it's operating in a restricted
    airspace, you as local law enforcement--you can't do anything
    effectively to mitigate?
        Sgt. Dooley. Mitigating, no. That's it.
        Mr. Biggs. You can make a phone call and say, Hey--
        Sgt. Dooley. Yes. We can go try to find the operator or try
    to deal with it, but if we're unsuccessful, that person gets
    away and we have no record of being able to go back and track
    it down of where it took off from, who was flying, et cetera.
        Mr. Biggs. We've got major events coming up. We've got
    Olympics. We've got World Cup. I guess the question is, are we
    prepared? Are we prepared? We'll just go down this way now.
        Sergeant Dooley?
        Sgt. Dooley. No. I would say public safety could
    significantly fill those gaps within a--I'm not talking about
    moving fast and breaking things but moving with a purpose and
    start filling those gaps pretty quickly.
        Mr. Biggs. Mr. Feddersen?
        Mr. Feddersen. No, sir. We're not prepared. The crux of the
    issue is that, to get systems and people trained and in place
    before the World Cup and the 250th Anniversary, you have to be
    able to do an evaluation, determine what you want to buy,
    secure the funding, and then manufacturers have to get the
    equipment out and on time for the training.
        At that point, we are honestly--Christmas is the deadline
    for us to be able to do that. If we don't put the authorities
    in place and expand that to State and local law enforcement,
    then Federal entities are going to have to do the job, but
    they're going to have to let something else go.
        Mr. Biggs. Yes. Gosh, I'm out of time. Because I wanted to
    get to the next point, which is--and you kind of touched on
    it--what is the time lag to get equipment and train enough
    personnel to actually be effective for some of these big events
    coming up?
        Go ahead. My time is up, but you can answer Dr. Wallace and
    Dr. Cahill, really quickly.
        Dr. Wallace. I would agree with my colleagues. We're not
    prepared, and part of that critical need is the ability to
    detect, track, and identify.
        Dr. Cahill. I agree we're not prepared, and one of the
    challenges, of course, is some of these events are very, very
    spread out. The number of people and assets you need is going
    to be significant.
        Mr. Biggs. Thank you.
        Well, it sounds to me like we need to get on our horse and
    get a piece of legislation passed very quickly, as quickly as
    we possibly can. Maybe Representative McBath and I can work
    together on maybe designating that just, I would say,
    correlative to the immigration authorities that we give.
        With that, I thank all of you for coming today. I
    appreciate your testimony, again, bearing with us as we started
    late. Thank you very much.
        With that, we are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

        All materials submitted for the record by Members of the
    Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance can
    be found at: https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent
    .aspx?EventID=118608.

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