[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 119-7]
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 1, 2025
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-590 WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Nineteenth Congress
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice JOHN GARAMENDI, California
Chair DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
DON BACON, Nebraska JASON CROW, Colorado
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
RONNY JACKSON, Texas JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
PAT FALLON, Texas SARA JACOBS, California
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
NANCY MACE, South Carolina PATRICK RYAN, New York
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO,
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia Pennsylvania
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
CORY MILLS, Florida DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia GILBERT RAY CISNEROS JR.,
LANCE GOODEN, Texas California
CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana ERIC SORENSEN, Illinois
DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin MAGGIE GOODLANDER, New Hampshire
JOHN J. McGUIRE III, Virginia SARAH ELFRETH, Maryland
PAT HARRIGAN, North Carolina GEORGE WHITESIDES, California
MARK B. MESSMER, Indiana DEREK TRAN, California
DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas EUGENE SIMON VINDMAN, Virginia
JEFF CRANK, Colorado WESLEY BELL, Missouri
ABRAHAM J. HAMADEH, Arizona
Chris Vieson, Staff Director
Taryn Woody, Professional Staff Member
Katy Quinn, Professional Staff Member
Rob Ikoku, Professional Staff Member
Anna Brooks Reed, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Guillot, Gen Gregory M., USAF, Commander, United States Northern
Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command........... 6
Holsey, ADM Alvin, USN, Commander, U.S. Southern Command......... 7
Leonardo, Rafael F., Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary
of Defense for HomelandDefense and Hemispheric Affairs......... 4
Salesses, Robert G., Deputy Director, Washington Headquarter
Services....................................................... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Guillot, Gen Gregory M....................................... 91
Holsey, ADM Alvin............................................ 116
Leonardo, Rafael F........................................... 69
Salesses, Robert G........................................... 69
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Carbajal................................................. 164
Mr. Graves................................................... 163
Mr. McGuire.................................................. 165
Mr. Ryan..................................................... 164
Mr. Scott.................................................... 158
Mr. Wilson................................................... 157
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NORTH AND
SOUTH AMERICA
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 1, 2025.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [Chairman
of the Committee] presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Today we
begin our fiscal year 2026 posture hearings with U.S. Northern
and Southern Commands. I want to thank our witnesses for their
service and for joining us today and for the time it took to
prepare this hearing. It's very helpful. And I appreciate you
all.
We know that border security is national security. Over the
past 4 years we have learned that the hard way. President
Biden's open border policies triggered historic levels of
illegal immigration. They also emboldened cartels that flooded
our streets with fentanyl and other drugs, made mostly with
Chinese precursor chemicals. The human cost has been
staggering.
In the 12 months ending October 2024, over 52,000 Americans
died from fentanyl overdoses. Republicans have been
unequivocal. The real fix had to come from the top. And
President Trump delivered. Through decisive executive action,
including authorizing the deployment of 7,500 additional
active-duty troops to the border, illegal crossings have
plummeted.
In February, apprehensions were down 94 percent compared to
the year before. And dangerous criminals and gang members are
being removed from our communities. But the job isn't done. I
look forward to working with the President and my colleagues on
a reconciliation package that provides the DOD [Department of
Defense] the resources it needs to support civilian authorities
in sealing the borders.
Meanwhile, America's adversaries are developing and
fielding more advanced air and missile capabilities. It is
clear the homeland is no longer a sanctuary. Chinese and
Russian aircraft have ramped up activity around Alaska,
including their first ever joint bomber patrol. North Korea
keeps testing its long-range missiles. And there are signs
Russia may be helping them. And China and Russia's strategic
missile capabilities, including hypersonic weapons, continue to
evolve rapidly.
Amid these threats, it is alarming there is an effort afoot
to auction off parts of the spectrum DOD needs to track
incoming missile. This spectrum supports most of our military
radar systems, including our early warning and homeland missile
defense. Losing it would put President Trump's Golden Dome
initiative at serious risk and undermine our security.
Turning to SOUTHCOM [United States Southern Command],
China's growing presence in our backyard is a direct threat to
the United States. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China
is expanding its control over ports, space facilities, and 5G
telecommunications in that region. It is also snapping up
copper, lithium, and other critical minerals essential to its
military modernization.
These are not business deals. They are beachheads. In a
conflict, these assets would be weaponized against us. That is
why I support efforts to roll back Chinese influence in our
hemisphere, especially in the Panama Canal. Thanks to this
administration, U.S. investors are potentially set to take
control of the Chinese-run ports on either side of this vital
waterway.
Panama has also quit the Belt and Road Initiative. Russia
remains active in the region, too, providing training and arms
to Venezuela and Nicaragua and Cuba, as well as spreading anti-
U.S. propaganda.
And the Kremlin is flexing its military muscle. Last
summer, Russian warships conducted missile drills in the
Atlantic before making a port call in Havana. It is critical
the United States wins the strategic competition with China and
Russia in the Western Hemisphere. I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses and gathering their best military judgment
on how we meet these growing challenges head-on.
And with that, I yield to my friend, the ranking member,
for any opening comments he may have.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED FORCES
Mr. Smith. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses
for being here for our inaugural posture hearing for the new
Congress. We have a lot of work to do in terms of looking at
the budget and looking at our national security threats.
And I think the chairman did a pretty good job of laying
out what the concerns are in the NORTH- and SOUTHCOM region.
Obviously, homeland defense is at the top of the list and then
organized crime that is involved in human trafficking and drug
trafficking, and then the malign influence of China, Russia,
and, to some degree, Iran in the region.
On the border security piece, yes, there is greater
security on the border. That is a good thing. I want to hear
from NORTHCOM [United States Northern Command] about what DOD's
role is going to be in that going forward. We have moved
considerable assets down to that border. And as the chairman
noted, illegal crossings are way down. Is that level of
commitment necessary? And what is it doing to readiness
elsewhere?
During the first Trump Administration, we used some of our
military bases to house migrants. That undermined the readiness
of those bases, the training that they were supposed to be
doing. So how are we balancing that mission with this one,
particularly in light of the reduced number of border
crossings? Is this the best place to be spending our money?
And then the real concern in all of this is partners and
allies. As I said, I think the chairman laid out a really good
set of priorities for what we need to do to protect the
homeland and meet our needs in NORTH- and SOUTHCOM. But I am
really curious to see how people feel about partners and
allies.
The chairman mentioned Panama, for instance, as, you know,
moving out for the Belt and Road Initiative. And that's great.
But if Panama thinks that the U.S. is going to use military
force to retake the Panama Canal, I suspect Panama might
recalculate who they need in terms of friends and partners.
The tariffs that we are lobbing at Canada and Mexico, as
all of you know, Canada plays a huge role in precisely that
aerodefense that the chairman outlined. They are an integral
part. Without them, we could not have the situational awareness
over our airspace that we have.
If we continue to treat them as a hostile nation, if we
continue to talk about annexing them, basically violating their
sovereignty, what is Canada going to do? Are they going to
maintain that partnership?
In addition to that, the Department of Defense, a lot of
the equipment that we need to build, is done in partnership
with Canada. We get a lot of parts for a lot of critical
munitions and equipment that we make. We are actually going to
drive the prices of that up.
Now, nobody, apparently, except for President Trump, knows
exactly what he is going to announce tomorrow. But the tariffs
that he has already announced, and crucially the tariffs that
he has already threatened, are basically turning our partners
against us. They are going to recalculate and figure out who
their true friends and allies are.
So I would really like to hear from our witnesses, how are
we going to navigate that? Can America really go it alone in
the world? Can we really tell the rest of the world, basically,
to go to hell, we only care about ourselves, we don't care
about you at all?
What are the consequences going to be for our national
security if we take that incredibly selfish approach and if we
basically tell the rest of the world that we have decided that
we are no longer the leader of the free world? We are no longer
here to help protect ideas. We are in it for ourselves, period,
full stop, and that is all we are going to do. I think the
consequences of that are going to be devastating to the
national security of this country.
So I look forward to this conversation to figure out how we
can better navigate all of those challenges, and I thank the
chairman for the time. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the ranking member. It is now time to
introduce our witnesses. We have Mr. Rafael Leonardo, who is
performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs. Mr. Leonardo is
accompanied by the Hon. Robert Salesses. He is currently Deputy
Director of Washington Headquarters Services, but also has been
advising the Secretary on border security issues.
General Greg Guillot is the commander of the United States
Northern Command and Northern Aerospace Defense Command. And
Admiral Alvin Holsey is the commander of the United States
Southern Command.
Welcome, and Mr. Leonardo, we'll recognize you first for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. RAFAEL F. LEONARDO, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND
HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. Leonardo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Rogers,
Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify
before you today on the national security challenges faced by
the United States and U.S. military activity in North America
and South America.
I am honored to be here in the company of Admiral Alvin
Holsey and General Guillot, with whom I have worked with very
closely over the past 2 months to implement the President's
agenda in the NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM areas of responsibility.
I am also grateful to have with me today, Senior Advisor to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense Mr. Robert Salesses. He also
recently performed the duties of Secretary of Defense and
Deputy Secretary of Defense and was at the leading edge of
advancing early administration priorities, especially our
efforts to secure the U.S. southern border. Additionally, he
brings decades of experience in homeland defense within the
Department. And he looks forward to joining me in answering
your questions today on behalf of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense.
Today, I would like to emphasize four key points. First,
President Trump and Secretary Hegseth share your assessment,
Mr. Chairman, that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary. And
so our top priority is to defend the homeland.
Second, we are surging DOD support in developing new
capabilities to meet these challenges.
Third, we continue to support our federal, state, and local
partners, including through a disaster response and our
activities on the southern border.
And fourth, closely tied to the defense of the homeland is
ensuring our interests are advanced throughout the Western
Hemisphere and to your point, Ranking Member Smith, that we do
this alongside our allies and partners in the region.
Both President Trump and Secretary Hegseth have been clear
that protecting our homeland is priority number one. The United
States faces a range of challenges that threaten our strategic
stability, including vulnerability posed by our unsecured
borders, China's unprecedented military buildup, and a range of
other threats, including adversaries who seek to undermine our
military advantage through asymmetric means.
Adversaries should know that the DOD is redoubling its
efforts on mission resilience, the ability to withstand, fight
through, and recover quickly from destruction to achieve
national strategic and operational objectives.
In the interim national defense security guidance Secretary
Hegseth approved last month, defending the U.S. homeland was
identified as a top priority of the Department as we seek to
seal our borders, repel forms of invasion, including illegal
immigration and narcotics trafficking and advance U.S.
interests in the Western Hemisphere. The threat from drug
cartels, criminal gangs, and illegal immigration are a national
security threat, transnational criminal organizations,
including recently designated foreign terrorist organizations,
cartels traffic humans and drugs, including fentanyl, resulting
in tens of thousands of American deaths annually.
On January 20, the President declared a national emergency
proclaiming that America's sovereignty is under attack, our
southern border is overrun, and we must defend our nation and
its citizens.
Since that time, the Department of Defense has been working
to address these challenges and implement executive orders to
seal our border. And we are proud to report a 97 percent
decrease in illegal border crossings as a result of these
efforts.
To defend the American people, we are developing new
capabilities. President Trump has ordered the creation of a
next generation missile shield called the Golden Dome for
America. At the same we work to continue to detect and track
and mitigate challenges posed by small unmanned aerial systems.
To help meet this threat, the Department will continue to
conduct counter-small UAS [unmanned aircraft systems]
operations, improve incident response mechanisms, and deliver
new technological solutions to rapidly evolving threat. And we
know that the Congress is also very interested in this subject,
and we look forward to partnering with you to address this
challenge.
We are also working to bolster capability in the Arctic
where China, despite being 900 miles from the Arctic Circle,
has made increasing attempts to bolster its influence in the
region. While limited in its ability to project military power
in the Arctic, China seeks to bolster its operational expertise
and has invested in scientific research with likely civil-
military applications.
In conclusion, from the Arctic to the Antarctic, in all
domains, homeland defense and the Western Hemisphere are
intertwined. The Department stands ready to ensure that our
homeland is fully defended. DOD is committed to achieving peace
through strength.
Our actions both at home and abroad demonstrate our resolve
to defend the American homeland, protect our interests, and
deter aggression.
We appreciate the committee's continued support for these
critical missions. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for your
support and leadership and for the opportunity to testify
before you today.
I would also like to express my appreciation for your
continued commitment and support to the men and women of the
Department of Defense. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Leonardo and Mr. Salesses
can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Leonardo. Mr. Salesses, you
are recognized.
Mr. Salesses. Chairman, I am going to pass to General
Guillot and Admiral Holsey in the interest of time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Guillot. Chairman --
The Chairman. General Guillot, you're recognized.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT, UNITED STATES AIR
FORCE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH
AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
General Guillot. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Smith, and distinguished members of the committee. It is my
honor to command the men and women of North American Aerospace
Defense Command and United States Northern Command. I am also
pleased to appear alongside my SOUTHCOM shipmate Admiral Bull
Holsey as well as Mr. Bob Salesses, and Mr. Raf Leonardo from
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense].
I would like to highlight three trends of particular
concern for NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense] and
NORTHCOM with direct implications on homeland defense.
First is the growing cooperation between China, Russia,
North Korea, and Iran to challenge the United States. While
their cooperation does not approach the level of complete
integration demonstrated by the United States and Canada, the
transfer of weapons, military technology, and basing access is
cause for significant concern.
The associated risks to North America have also grown. The
number of Russian bomber incursions into the U.S. and Canadian
Air Defense identification zones has returned to levels not
seen before the Russian invasion of Ukraine while the Russian
Navy's surface and subsurface vessels conducted out of area
deployments off both U.S. coasts, including in the vicinity of
Alaska.
Second, evolving technologies demand that NORAD and
NORTHCOM rapidly adjust our defensive posture. Small, uncrewed
aircraft systems, or UAS, pose a growing threat to safety and
security. Likewise, as competitors continue to target U.S.
networks and critical infrastructure and cyberspace, a whole of
government effort is increasingly necessary to mitigate
potential harm.
Finally, non-state actors continue to target our homeland.
Transnational criminal cartels based in Mexico threaten U.S.
territorial integrity and the safety of our citizens and
radical Islamic terrorist groups have rejuvenated attack
planning and anti-American propaganda intended to inspire lone
wolf attacks like the deadly New Year's Day attacks in New
Orleans.
With that strategic backdrop, homeland defense remains our
command's essential task. And in mindset and action, nobody
waits on NORAD and NORTHCOM. That mantra proved true over the
last year as the command's planning and preparation generated
swift and effective responses to competitor actions, major
disasters, and emerging requirements.
Over the past 12 months, NORAD and NORTHCOM intercepted
joint Russian and Chinese bomber patrols off the Alaska coast,
tracked Russian surface vessels off both coasts, detected and
assessed numerous North Korean ballistic missile launches,
tracked multiple Chinese dual use military and research vessels
in the Bering Sea and Arctic Ocean and supported Americans in
need following Hurricane Helene and wildfires in California
while posturing to support Hurricane Milton response.
We also deployed close to 10,000 troops and delivered
unique military capabilities such as airborne ISR
[Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaisance] and destroyers
in response to the emergency on the U.S. southern border and
improved defensive capabilities against all threats ranging
from ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] to small
drones.
Looking forward, NORAD and NORTHCOM modernization is
crucial to outpacing our competitors, establishing a layered
demand awareness network to detect and track threats
approaching North America from seabed to space. It is critical
to immediate and future mission requirements because we can't
defeat what we can't see.
To that end, I appreciate the Department and congressional
support for fielding all domain capabilities such as airborne
moving target indicator satellites, over-the-horizon radars,
the E-7 Wedgetail, and integrated undersea surveillance system.
These capabilities support longstanding NORAD and NORTHCOM
requirements and will serve as the foundation for the Golden
Globe construct, excuse me, Golden Dome construct.
Defending our borders and establishing a national missile
shield, protecting critical infrastructure and force projection
capability, and safeguarding our citizens will require the best
our nations have to offer, and I am grateful to the committee
for your ongoing support of NORAD and NORTHCOM's vital
missions.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today, and I
look forward to your questions. We have the watch.
[The prepared statement of General Guillot can be found in
the Appendix on page 91.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General. Admiral Holsey, you are
recognized.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ALVIN HOLSEY, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
SOUTHERN COMMAND
Admiral Holsey. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith,
distinguished members of the committee, I am humbled to appear
before you today as the 33rd commander of the United States
Southern Command.
We are a warfighting organization, and I have moved forward
to lead this command's servicemembers, civilians, contractors,
and their families as we embrace our vision of a secure, free,
and prosperous Western Hemisphere.
I am honored to testify alongside General Guillot, Mr.
Salesses, and Mr. Leonardo as the relationship between United
States NORTHCOM, United States Southern Command, and our
alignment with OSD is critical to the safety and security of
our homeland.
The United States of America and our partners in Latin
America and the Caribbean are linked together not simply by
history or geography, but cultural traditions, security, and
economic cooperation, and a steadfast devotion to democratic
values.
The enduring commitment to these values is a cornerstone of
our collective partnerships. Today this vision is imperiled by
a host of threats. These threats include strategic competition
from China and Russia, the impact of transnational criminal
organizations, and complex, transboundary challenges to include
irregular migration, natural disasters, eroding democracies,
food, and water, and security.
China, a pacing threat, continues to its methodical
incursion into our shared neighborhood, exerting diplomatic,
informational, military, economic influence to export its
authoritarian model to the region.
Most focus to the east and west when they think about great
power competition. A look to our south reveals that China has
already established a presence. Its predatory and opaque
investment practices, resource extraction, potential dual use
projects from ports to space threaten the security and
sovereignty of our partners while jeopardizing the United
States' national security.
Simultaneously, Russia supports its traditional partners,
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, using maligned propaganda,
military engagements, armed sales, and force projection. Moscow
is attempting to undermine the United States' leadership,
interests, and influence in the region.
Meanwhile, transnational criminal organizations continue to
fuel instability throughout the region. They exploit the
permissive environment to engage in brutal violence, illicit
trafficking, and other criminal activities that undermine the
rule of law, disrupt legitimate government functions, and are
having devastating effects that have spilled over into our
homeland, destroying lives.
Border security is a concern for us all. SOUTHCOM recently
stood up Joint Task Force Southern Guard at Naval Station
Guantanamo Bay in support of the Department of Homeland
Security to safely and humanely hold illegal aliens until they
are returned to their country of origin.
Our time is now. Deliberate and meaningful action to
address these threats is required or this region, our
neighborhood, will continue to change. Partnerships are our
most effective approach to countering shared economic and
security concerns to enable our enduring trust in the region.
However, we cannot assume that that will always be the case. To
be a trusted partner, we must be credible, present, and
engaged.
During my tenure at SOUTHCOM, I have witnessed how our
enduring presence builds trust. As a result, our partners
prefer to work with us over China, Russia, and other nations to
overcome their most pressing challenges.
SOUTHCOM has continued to stand shoulder to shoulder with
our partners. We have and will continue to respond rapidly to
crises in any form. Together with our partners, we are building
the capability and capacity to mitigate, respond, and recover
from our collective threats.
Sustained investment and security cooperation combined in
joint exercises, disaster assistance, among other niches,
enable us to deliver and innovate at the point of need.
As the Department sharpens its warfighting edge, I am
grateful for the continuing support of Congress. This support
is vital to defending our democratic principles and interests
that underpin the civility and prosperity of our region and
ultimately the security of our nation.
Thank you again, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and
members of the committee for this opportunity. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Holsey can be found in
the Appendix on 116.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral and all of our witnesses.
And I recognize myself for the first set of questions.
General Guillot, have the cartels -- how have the cartels
in Mexico responded to our shutting down our borders?
General Guillot. Chairman, there are two primary ways that
we've seen them respond. First is, they are trying to find new
ways to get their product, whether that is drugs or people,
across the border because of the seal efforts that have gone on
over the last 2 months. And that has also forced them to have
more cartel and cartel violence as the limited ability to get
across the border has forced cartels to incur onto other
cartels' territory to try to get across. And so we are seeing
an increase in that violence as well.
The Chairman. Admiral Holsey, how would you say that the
cartels in Central and South America have responded to our
closure of our borders? What behaviors have changed, if any?
Admiral Holsey. I think the first thing I am noticing,
Chairman, is the throughput or lack of throughput through the
Darien region right now. When we can take a look at the cartels
and the smuggling, human trafficking, we know that it is down.
We know that Panama has worked very closely with us on that.
With regard to the cocaine piece itself, we continue to see
a record pace of cocaine. The price of cocaine has dropped. So
the cartels are trying to find ways to get off that.
But we have been very deliberate with JIATF South [Joint
Interagency Task Force South], which is the gold standard for
interdiction. And they have been able to stop at a record pace
at this point, over 190 metric tons. We are on a record pace to
exceed what we did last year. So I think we are responding to
it. But more resources would definitely help.
The Chairman. Great. And I would ask this question of both
General Guillot and Admiral Holsey and a yes or no answer. Is
the current DOD acquisition system getting you what you need
when you need it? General Guillot?
General Guillot. No, Chairman.
The Chairman. Admiral Holsey?
Admiral Holsey. No, Chairman.
The Chairman. And General Guillot, you heard me make
reference to the auction, the potential auction of DOD
spectrum. I am concerned this would jeopardize President
Trump's Golden Dome initiative, its ability to track incoming
missiles. Do you have that concern as well?
General Guillot. Chairman, I have that strong concern.
Almost all the systems that we use for homeland defense rely on
that part of the spectrum that is being considered to be either
sold or shared.
The Chairman. Great. Thank you. Mr. Leonardo, how long will
it take to provide steady state southern border security and
what is your estimate of how long and how much it would cost to
execute that?
Mr. Leonardo. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you for that
question. We have been at this mission for about 2 months. So
we are still continually assessing how long it might take from
a steady state perspective. But that is definitely the goal is
to get it to steady state. In return -- as you know, the
Department of Homeland Security is the lead Federal agency in
war and support. So we will continue working them to assess
what their ongoing need is.
I will say as far as costs go, we did speak with our OSD
comptroller counterparts this morning, and so far the cost is
$376 million. So we expect that continued state of spending to
take place.
The Chairman. You know, I took a CODEL down to Gitmo
[Guantanamo Bay] recently. And right after that, the limited
number of people that were there were removed apparently back
to their original country. And I understand that it is very low
volumes now. Do you anticipate there being a steady flow of
removals from the continental United States to Gitmo or is that
going to continue to be sporadic?
Mr. Leonardo. So all of the folks who are sent to
Guantanamo Bay are selected by the Department of Homeland
Security and are on final orders supposedly to head to their
ultimate destination. So we are continuing to work with the
Department of Homeland Security to determine who should be sent
there. And, again, we are in support of their determinations.
The Chairman. So you don't really know if there is going to
be a steady stream or if it is going to continue to be
sporadic?
Mr. Leonardo. We are just continuing to test that,
Chairman. I don't know if you have anything to add, Mr.
Salesses, on that.
Mr. Salesses. Chairman, if I could, obviously, ICE [U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement] has an incredibly
important job here in the United States. As you know, ICE is a
very small organization with big responsibilities.
Currently, they have housing for about 45,000 high threat
illegal aliens. That capacity gets exceeded quite a bit and so
they need additional housing. That's where the Department has
stepped in, obviously to use Gitmo. So I do think we will be
continuing to use Gitmo for some time until ICE has more
capacity to house high threat illegal aliens.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Salesses. I yield to the
ranking member for any questions he may have.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Actually, I was curious about the
acquisition reform question for both General Guillot and
Admiral Holsey. You said, no, it's not adequate. How would you
change the acquisition system to make it more adequate for your
needs? Both of you.
General Guillot. Congressman, I think it's receptive to our
requirements. My concern is the time it takes from the
requirement process to go in until the capability is fielded. I
don't have the expertise to tell you what needs to change in
there other than we need the required equipment after.
Mr. Smith. I'm sorry. But I find that statement a little
hard to believe. You are a four star. You have been doing this
for a long time. You've had at least a little bit of expertise
as to how the acquisition process is harming you I would think.
And we are very interested in this committee in how to change
it.
I mean, you are an end user here so you have got to be
looking at this a little bit. Can you give us a little
something more about what you think should be changed about the
process there?
General Guillot. Well, Congressman, I would say that I
think the requirement process is solid, but the time that it
takes for it to go through and --
Mr. Smith. I got that. I know it takes a lot of time in
fact. And I would -- I just really important I think for
everyone here. I think those two statements are in direct
contradiction.
The requirements process isn't solid if it is requiring us
to take so much time to get us what we need. I mean, that is
kind of where the problem lies. And I would hope we would want
to change that process so that it didn't take so much time.
General Guillot. The time to establish what the requirement
is, I think, is solid, sir. What takes long after that is to go
through the development and procurement and delivery process is
the concern that I have.
Mr. Smith. General -- I am sorry, Admiral Holsey.
Admiral Holsey. Yes, Congressman, two points I would make.
One in the -- as I look in this region, we must be credible,
present, and engaged. The thing I am looking at right now is
counter-UAS technology. I need more of that. I need it quicker.
And we need to find a process to get after that from an
acquisition standpoint. There are a lot of innovative solutions
out there. I am continuing to work towards that.
From a ship maintenance standpoint, or a ship delivery
standpoint, I need ships. I need to be, again, credible,
present, and engaged to get after TCOs [Transnational Criminal
Organizations], to get after the counter-drug threat. Those are
just two points I would make. I am sure I could find some more
points with aircraft as well.
Mr. Smith. For what it is worth, I think the requirements
process is killing us. It is too cumbersome, too long, too much
detail. We need to more quickly buy commercial off-the-shelf
solutions, not rely so much on programs of record and
requirements.
Again, as the end users, the degree to which in the
building you can help make that argument, that is going to help
us get you the stuff you need faster.
General Guillot, talk to us about how Canada and the U.S.
partner on our aerodefenses.
General Guillot. Congressman, Canada and the U.S. are part
of the only binational command in the world in NORAD and have
been for almost 70 years. So the air defense, aerospace
control, and maritime warning mission are shared between Canada
and the United States through NORAD. And so we are integrated
at all levels in that mission.
Mr. Smith. And if Canada were to drop out of that, how
would that change our mission in terms of being able to protect
our aerospace?
General Guillot. Well, sir, the primary way would be -- is
the northern approaches would be severely under-resourced, and
we would lose a significant amount of domain awareness and
response in the northern approaches, which is the fastest and
the easiest approach for adversaries to take to North America.
Mr. Smith. And Mr. Leonardo, on the border cost, you said
it is 375 million to date. It is like the last 2 months. How
many DOD personnel are committed to the border at this point?
Mr. Leonardo. I believe the figure is approximately 6,600
active-duty soldiers. But I would yield to General Guillot who
may have the --
Mr. Smith. Sure. General.
Mr. Leonardo. -- accurate details.
General Guillot. Sir, it is approximately 6,700 on the
Title X forces are on the border. And then up to 10,000 have
been ordered. And the remainder are in the process of moving
down to the border.
Mr. Smith. Right. And do you have a -- do they have a
specific time period at this point, how long we are going to
have 10,000 people at the border?
Mr. Salesses. Sir, I am glad to answer that. As you know,
Ranking Member Smith, the Department has supported the border
for several decades.
Mr. Smith. I understand that. No, I --
Mr. Salesses. So as far as how long we are going to be
there now, I suspect for an extended period --
Mr. Smith. Sure.
Mr. Salesses. Based on the results that we have achieved in
just 60 days that shut down the border the way we have and to
support our partners at DHS and CBP and ICE, it's an
incredible, incredible effort by the Department of Defense
working with DHS and CBP and ICE and --
Mr. Smith. But when these 10,000 were sent down there, they
weren't sent down there for a 3-month deployment or a 6-month
deployment. They were just sent down there and then we will
just see how long they stay. There is no particular time frame?
Mr. Salesses. The executive order tells us to seal the
border. And that is what the Department will do. But I want to
clarify the number too. That also includes the numbers at
Gitmo, the number of military forces supporting SOUTHCOM, too,
sir.
Mr. Smith. I am over time. So I yield back. I yield back,
Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
Wilson, is recognized.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to each
of you for coming here today. I am very concerned about the
renewed actions at the Axis of Evil that have taken to
challenge the United States and Europe and Asia but also in our
backyard here in Western Hemisphere are threatening the
security and independence of our allies throughout the
hemisphere.
With that mind, we know that sadly that we are in a war we
did not choose of dictators with rule of gun invading
democracies with rule of law. It began February 24, 2022, when
war criminal Putin invaded Ukraine and then on October 7, 2023,
the puppets of Iran invaded Israel.
With that in mind, the Chinese Communist Party continues to
challenge the United States economically and diplomatically
within the Western Hemisphere and war criminal Putin continues
to push aggressive disinformation and propaganda while
continuing mass murder in Ukraine.
And war criminal Putin is clearly obsessed in trying to
resurrect the failed Soviet Union, oppressing the people of
Russia itself, Transnistria, Moldova, Belarus while invading
Ukraine and the Republic of Georgia, and threatening Estonia,
and then partitioning again of Poland.
With all of that in mind, Admiral Holsey, right now, 22 of
31 countries of the Southern Command still have a part of the
Chinese Communist Party Belt and Road Initiative.
It is really reassuring and so positive that Panama has
announced they are leaving the Belt and Road Initiative, and we
so appreciate our allies and the people of Panama, just great
people that understand the threat.
With that in mind, Admiral, what are the elements and what
is the conduct of the Belt and Road Initiative and what further
resources do you need to ensure that we can continue the trend
of pushing the Chinese Communist Party out of the hemisphere?
Admiral Holsey. Congressman, the Belt and Road Initiative
continues to betray economic opportunity. We see it a bit
differently. We think our partners, by the time they realize
what is going on, they have been duped, right? They find
themselves with high interest loans, more data insecurity,
resource extraction. It goes on and on and on. I think we have
to deliver by making sure we have an alternative, right? So
whether that is -- one thing our partners continue to ask for
is our presence, right? They want security cooperation. But
also, we can look at raising the profile of our businesses in
the region. We need to find a way to have that kind of
investment. I look at the Office of Strategic Capital, DFC
[Development Finance Corporation], EXIM Bank [Export-Import
Bank of the United States], finding ways that we can deliver
for our partners quicker.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. And indeed that is so
important. And I do want to reiterate again how important
Panama is and what a great model that can be for other
countries of the hemisphere to have their economic independence
to work freely in the world.
General Guillot, over the past few years, we have seen
Russia, China, and Iran continuously extend their reach into
the Western Hemisphere. We have seen the Iranian Navy send
warships into the Southern Hemisphere along with the Chinese
Communist Party and war criminal Putin continuing to increase
military cooperation in the Western Hemisphere with Russian
ships docking in Havana, maintaining the Communist Cuban
dictatorship. And we, again, can see that his resurrection of
the failed Soviet Union includes sustaining the very few
murderous allies they have in the world, sadly beginning here
in our hemisphere with Cuba.
Is it the increasing reach and cooperation between our
adversaries growing concern for the Northern Command and
Aerospace Defense Command.
General Guillot. Congressman, it is one of our primary
concerns, and that is the increased cooperation between China,
Russia, Iran, and North Korea, not only exchanging weapons and
technology, but also in access from which to operate.
As I mentioned, the number of incursions into our air
defense identification zones over the past year has reached a
level that exceeds what it was before the invasion. And if you
take the year since the invasion combined, that number of
incursions is less than what we had last year. And I expect
that trend to continue, and it is big concern to NORAD and
NORTHCOM.
Mr. Wilson. And I am really grateful that President Trump
is addressing the issue of the Iran capability of developing a
nuclear weapon. Indeed, with their ICBM capability, what we are
talking about is an existential threat to our ally Israel but
also to the United States. And so the regime in Tehran should
not be allowed to have a nuclear capability.
I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. And thank you to all
the witnesses this morning.
General Guillot, at NORTHCOM posture hearings in recent
years, you and your predecessors have described the increasing
frequency of Russian submarine patrols that have transited the
Atlantic in the vicinity of the homeland. You alluded to the
undersea a number of times in your testimony. It is in your
written testimony as well.
Can you tell us, as best you can in an unclassified
setting, if that trend is continuing?
General Guillot. Congressman, the trend of approaching our
coast from Russia and Chinese submarines is increasing. And we
need an expanded undersea detection capability to ensure that
we aware of these and can properly posture to defend against
submarine launched cruise missiles or ballistic missiles.
Mr. Courtney. And when you say that undersea detection, you
are talking about sensors, right? I mean, there is obviously
other levels of --
General Guillot. Yes, sir, I am talking about sensors.
Mr. Courtney. Right. Anti-submarine warfare, to follow up
Mr. Smith's question, is a team sport with our allies. It
starts in Europe in terms of Russian patrols where, again, you
know, UK, France, participate with the U.S. And then it
proceeds further west. Canada is also part of that team sport,
isn't that correct?
General Guillot. Congressman, that's correct. And if you
use the last out of sea deployment in July as an example, the
nations that you mentioned at first detection, we picked up on
those. And using both Canadian ships and maritime patrol
aircraft tracked those -- the submarine and the surface vessels
all the way until we handed it to Admiral Holsey's command, and
they went into Havana.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. And, again, we are talking about a
fleet that despite the war in Ukraine, Putin continues to
invest.
In fact yesterday, he was at a shipyard announcing, again,
another generation of submarine capability for the hypersonic
missile payload, which, again, I don't know if you have been
following that. But, I mean, again, this threat is not sort of
stalled out because of Ukraine.
General Guillot. That is right, sir. So the maritime threat
and most parts of the air threat have actually grown over the
last several years despite the activities in Ukraine.
Mr. Courtney. So, again, the focus in terms of just what
are the most effective ways to counter that clearly requires a
multinational effort. And, I mean, the good news is that we
have had good participation in recent years. And I just want to
associate myself with Mr. Smith's remarks that this trade war
that has started is just a complete needless impediment in
terms of, you know, having maximum levels of participation.
I mean, seeing yesterday the pictures of South Korea,
Japan, and China announcing jointly an anti-U.S. tariff
initiative with the leadership of the three governments shaking
hands, honestly, was sickening.
And, again, we have really got to do more as a Congress, as
a co-equal branch of government to try to rein in what I think
is just a really negative, you know, dynamic that is being put
into place.
And, you know, we are all going to find out tomorrow the
extent of the next level of these tariffs. But it is impossible
for, I think, anyone to argue reasonably that it is not
impacting the ability of us to interact with our allies when
their governments are being put under such strain and pressure
with these policies that, again, seem to be cascading out every
single day.
And, again, just Admiral, the General referred to the fact
that the Russian naval presence does make a way into your area
of command. Maybe you can just sort of allude to that in my
final minute.
Admiral Holsey. Yes, Congressman. And since 2009, we have
had over 40 Russian aviator deploys into the region. So, again,
working with us, NORTHCOM, to make sure we do some type of
relay to make sure we can keep pace on those.
I would say that we have to continue to have presence, and
again, presence of power. We have to meet presence with
presence. And if we don't do that, then we are going to cede
the space, right? So we have to make sure we stay in their face
and have the assets ready to engage.
Mr. Courtney. Now, and SOUTHCOM usually has been the poor
cousin in terms of Navy sort of allocation of ships. And so, I
mean, I think your point, I think, is really an important one
for us to hear.
And with that, I yield back.
The Chairman. Yeah. And we need to change that. There is a
lot more resource that needs to be going to South America, our
presence there, than we have been doing in the past, same thing
with AFRICOM.
With that, I recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
Scott, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to
reiterate the importance of the Western Hemisphere working
together to combat the Axis of Evil, as we have called it in
the past.
Admiral Holsey, I want to start with you. You are from
Peach County, Georgia, just outside of my district. But I go
through it a couple of times a week, home of Fort Valley State
Bluebird Bus Company. So welcome to Washington. You are from a
great part of the world.
I want to talk with you a little bit about drug
interdiction. And what percentage of drug trafficking activity
do you estimate that SOUTHCOM is able to observe and collect
intelligence on with the ISR and other assets that you have?
Admiral Holsey. Congressman, we typically can action about
10 percent of what we see. So, again, I think we have to be
consistent, present, and engaged with this piece. And so more
assets are definitely required to get after this.
Mr. Scott. So I want to reiterate for everybody who is
listening, that of the drug trafficking that we see that we
have actionable intelligence on, we only have the assets to
stop about 10 percent of it even when we have actual intel?
Admiral Holsey. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Scott. What additional assets and authorities do you
need to move that from 10 percent to 25 percent?
Admiral Holsey. I thank you for that, Congressman. I think
we need consistent presence to interdict and engage. We have to
continue to do that.
I think as I look at more maritime assets, aviation assets,
ISR assets, and then the security cooperation to continue to
build up our partners' capability and capacity, over 80 percent
of our interdiction last year, our partners actually helped us
at. And that is based off of our security cooperation. But
definitely at this point, more aviation assets, more maritime
assets to stop the flow.
And we also have something called a ship's special mission,
which actually take our partners out with interceptors to get
after the fight. And right now, we are on a record pace. But I
know we can do a lot more with a lot more assets.
Mr. Scott. Okay. So we talked about the assets. Do you have
all of the authorities that you need to sink the pangas?
Admiral Holsey. Yes, sir, I do have the authorities. We do
warning shots and disabling fire from time to time. But no
authorities for kinetic. That is not what we are doing at this
point. But, again, we do warning shots and disabling fire.
Mr. Scott. I think for some of us, we see sinking the panga
as actually saving lives because of the tons of drugs that come
into the United States and the damage that it does inside
America.
With that, I am going to shift over to you, General
Guillot. You have got General Tom Carden working with you. One
of the finest people I have ever met, National Guard, Georgia
National Guard, and he speaks highly of you. So that is kind of
all I need to know about you.
When we talk about threats to the homeland, no one
understands the whole picture of our supply chain
vulnerabilities against the PRC with respect to IT, software
and hardware, with our critical infrastructure. But we do know
that we are vulnerable.
What advice do you have for us, recommendations you have
for us, to ensure the defense and security of our nation's
infrastructure against the PRC's non-kinetic threat?
General Guillot. Congressman, first, thanks for pointing
out the outstanding service of Lieutenant General Tom Carden.
He is a phenomenal deputy commander and leader as you
mentioned. And we are very fortunate to have him in our
command.
Regarding defense critical infrastructure, I feel that I
look at it in two different ways. One is the cyber threat and
then the other is the physical threat.
For the cyber threat, I am very encouraged by the
relationship that Northern Command has with Cyber Command and
CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] to
address not only the DOD networks but the critical
infrastructure and the defense industrial base to ensure that
they are protected from hundreds and thousands of attempted
cyber-attacks that happen each day.
People ask often if the homeland is under attack or what
would it take for the homeland to be under attack? We are under
attack every day in the cyber domain, as you pointed out. The
physical threat --
Mr. Scott. I am down to about 20 seconds. I just want to
reiterate what you have said. We are under attack every day,
predominantly from China and China's proxies in our
infrastructure systems, both in our defense systems and in our
civilian systems that we depend on.
General Guillot. In the cyber domain, yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. Yes, sir, absolutely. Thank you very much. Mr.
Chairman, my time has expired.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We can clearly see
that the Belt and Road Initiative in South America has been a
goal for China that continues to come to fruition. I would say
they have been successful as some of these countries have
withdrawn their recognition of Taiwan.
Both China and Russia negotiate with the governments of
South America to build up military and commercial interests in
those countries. Let's compare that to our own foreign aid,
which has been decimated over the last few months,
significantly weakening our soft power and allowing China and
Russia in turn to further solidify their influence.
Admiral Holsey, what is COCOM [Combatant Command] doing to
combat the growing Chinese and Russian influence in South
America, and does our diminishing soft power make it more
challenging to accomplish this?
Admiral Holsey. Congressman, thanks for that question. At
SOUTHCOM, we continue to use the security cooperation support
that we have. Basically, I look at the joint exercise program.
That is a great way to bring our partners together, build
interoperability, trust, capability. We continue to do that.
We have several projects ongoing now with our security
cooperation, again, building cyber operation centers. So we
will continue to go that route.
With regard specifically to the lack of some of the soft
power, I have to use the tools that I have. So I think about
the LAMAT [Lesser Antilles Medical Assistance Team] exercises,
which are ongoing right now. We have already done over 4,000
encounters across the Caribbean doing medical procedures and
surgeries, over 300 surgeries.
I look at the Continuing Promise that is going to happen
this summer, another soft power initiative. We are going to the
USS Comfort to go out to over eight nations and treat thousands
of people. I try to continue to build the resilience that we
have.
And the last thing I want to mention is we have the
Tradewinds exercise that is going to start next month in
Trinidad and Tobago to do humanitarian assistance/disaster
relief type response.
So we are building capability and resiliency of our
partners to help them be ready. And we will stand shoulder to
shoulder with them.
Mr. Carbajal. So Admiral, if you could just answer the
question yes or no, does diminishing soft power make it more
challenging to accomplish your mission?
Admiral Holsey. Yeah, definitely. We always use soft power,
right? So that is part of my job as well to promote that, so
yes.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Admiral Holsey, can you discuss
how the special forces tactical surveillance reconnaissance and
tracking program has assisted you in carrying out missions in
your AOR [area of responsibility]? And do you think this is a
program we should continue to make investments in?
Admiral Holsey. Yes. In the past, this provides information
from an intel standpoint to help us out. So, yes, it is a
program that I am in support of.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. General Guillot, there are over
6,500 troops deployed to the southern border, helping with
detention activities. 6,500 troops seems like a lot and an
excessive number to me.
I can't imagine there is enough work to go around since
they can't assist directly with law enforcement activities. Can
you speak to what exactly your military members are doing in
the southern border?
General Guillot. Congressman, yes. First I would like to
point out they are not doing any detention activities. So the
6,500 are all performing roles in support of Customs and Border
Protection or providing unique military capabilities, such as
airborne ISR and the surveillance of the destroyers off of each
coast.
About 90 percent of what the active forces are doing down
there is in what we call detection and monitoring, where they
are using advanced system to monitor the border and detect
anybody that is trying to illegally cross. And as you pointed
out, once they see that, they vector in the Border Patrol or a
proper law enforcement agency to actually make the
apprehensions.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I know all these servicemembers
are following their orders and will continue to do so. But when
do you think these troops will be able to return to their
families, and in the case of the Guard, their primary jobs?
General Guillot. Congressman, as Mr. Salesses has said
previously, I think it will be probably measured in years, not
in months. The initial results of sealing the border have been
fantastic if you look at the stats. But we need to make sure
that one, that that's lasting and goes through all the cycles
of the legal migration that we see. The seasonal impact is
significant on this.
And then we need to make sure that it is sealed, and it
remains sealed. And I think that will take probably a couple of
years.
Mr. Carbajal. What has been the decline in the migration
since the build up?
General Guillot. Sir, all the stats that we see is that the
numbers of detections, incursions, apprehensions are all 95 to
97 percent less than they were before the executive orders were
issued.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you. The chair now recognizes the
gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank our witnesses
for joining us today. General Guillot, I want to begin with
you. We had had some conversations about what happened December
2023 at Joint Base Langley-Eustis where we had incursion of
UASs, small UASs, for almost a 2 month period.
We got briefs about what happened there. They came in well
lit. They weren't trying to hide anything. I felt bad for the
base commander because he wanted to do something and wasn't
getting backing from folks up the chain of command. We had a
bunch of resources there where we could do things. None of
those were used. If it wasn't for NASA Langley next door, we
wouldn't have even had the sensors to be able to sense those
unmanned aerial systems that are there on-site.
Let me ask this. We have from a hearing then asked for a
priority list under 130(I) [Section 130(I) of title 10, United
States Code], what bases are priority? What is being done to
protect those bases? How do we make sure those things don't
occur again?
I believe that our adversaries are probing, trying to
figure out what we can do, what we can't do. And that is very
telling to them what they saw that day or what they saw over
that month. It was very telling to them that there wasn't the
type of reaction that was necessary.
My question is this. What has been done in the meantime for
us to be assured that NORTHCOM and NORAD is doing everything
possible on these bases to protect them from these UAS threats?
What is our counter-UAS? Where are we with prioritizing these
bases? Where are we with training our security forces on base
to protect those bases? Where are we with supplying kits to at
least the priority bases or have some network of equipment that
is necessary to make sure we are protecting these bases?
General Guillot. Congressman, since the Langley incursions
of December 2023, NORAD -- or excuse me, NORTHCOM has requested
and then last November was given the responsibility to
synchronize the DOD and, if necessary, interagency response to
UAS incursions.
During that time, we have conducted three assisted
responses where we can use our new responsibilities to bring
capabilities to a base, similar to what you saw at Langley, but
this time with the authority to operate those systems based on
our headquarters' close ties with the interagency and LNOs
[Liaison Officers] to get the FAA [Federal Aviation
Administration] and other authorities that are necessary to
operate once they land.
The responsibility for defending bases resides with the
services and with the installation. But what NORTHCOM has done
is proposed a process where we would bring in fly-away kits to
supplement or in the case where there are no capabilities,
provide the initial capability at that base to defeat that.
Now we don't have those kits yet. But we are in the process
of acquiring those.
Mr. Wittman. I would say there is certainly a sense of
urgency there in making sure that we get that done, especially
here at the homeland.
General Guillot. Sir, I share that sense of urgency.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you. Admiral Holsey, I want to point to
a study being done or project, I should say, at College of
William & Mary called AidData. And AidData is looking at how
China has dramatically expanded its footprint in critical
mineral extraction around the world, but specifically in South
America, specifically Peru.
There are two large copper mines there that are mining at
record pace. China is putting a significant amount of money
into those regions, much the same way they did in Africa, in
places like the Democratic Republic of Congo where they own 16
of the 18 mines.
You know, we in the United States can talk about resurging
manufacturing and building all these semiconductor plants, but
if we don't have access to critical minerals and rare earth
elements, those things to the left in the value chain, then we
can build all the plants we want, but none of that is going to
come to fruition.
Give us your perspective on how you see the Chinese
footprint expanding in South America, specifically as it
relates to critical minerals and rare earth elements.
Admiral Holsey. Thank you, Congressman. Thank you for that
question. There is no doubt that China continues to -- or would
like to control the abundance of resources and rare earth
minerals in the region. We know that.
So I think what we have to do is have a solution. Recently,
just this last year, EXIM Bank was able to finance a copper
mine or mine in Peru, but we have to continue to up that,
right? So Office of Strategic Capital, Development Finance
Corporation, we have to continue to raise the profile of
companies willing to go down there.
When we go to these regions, they know they have someone
who is going to respect their laws, respect the environmental
concerns, right? So we have to continue to get at that, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield
back.
The Chairman. Thank you. The chair now recognizes the
gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Crow.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to all of you for
your testimony today. General, I wanted to start with you. The
Air National Guard plays a very critical role in America's
national security.
However, of the current 25 Air National Guard fighter
squadrons, 15 do not have a recapitalization plan, including
the 140th Wing of the Colorado Air National Guard headquartered
at Buckley Space Force Base in my district.
That is why my good friend, Don Bacon, and I introduced a
bipartisan legislation to stop the decline of fighter readiness
and stabilize the Air Force fighter force structure across the
active-duty Guard and Reserve components.
Your written testimony stated that the Air National Guard
is critical to generating greater readiness against high end
threats through enhanced campaigning and training while
remaining available to NORAD when indications and warning
triggers are met. I, of course, couldn't agree more with you as
Mr. Bacon and many of us on this dais have advanced just that
cause.
So, being in Colorado and being in close proximity to the
140th Wing, your predecessor testified not too long ago that it
was key to have a fighter wing at Buckley Space Force Base to
protect all of the stuff within the Western United States,
including the many facilities in Colorado.
Is it your opinion that that is still the case, that having
an alert squadron in close proximity to NORAD and NORTHCOM and
the facilities in Colorado and surrounding communities is still
essential?
General Guillot. Congressman, absolutely, the Buckley unit
is an outstanding unit, does a fantastic job in air defense,
and they are critical to protecting not only Colorado, but the
region's critical infrastructure.
Mr. Crow. And what is the -- if there weren't a unit at
Buckley, what would be the next closest unit?
General Guillot. It would most probably be Tucson or Tulsa.
Mr. Crow. Okay, a considerable distance?
General Guillot. Yes, sir. And we map that, sir, all the
time with the range of the aircraft, how far they can fly
unrefueled, refueled. And keeping Buckley and the capability
they have there is essential for our air defense, as well as
for critical infrastructure.
Mr. Crow. Thank you. And the projections, I have seen a
couple of different scenarios, that if the 140th Wing isn't
recapitalized and phases out, they would still have to then
have a rotational unit because of the things you just
described. There would still have to be fighter aircraft there
that would have to be rotated in. And that has costs to it,
right? In fact, in some ways, rotating units is more expensive
than just maintaining a permanent unit.
General Guillot. Yes, sir, the location is critical. And as
you said, if the Buckley Guard unit weren't there, we would
have to rotate a unit in. And you lose a lot of efficiencies
and effectiveness when you rotate versus having permanently
based.
Mr. Crow. So it sounds like your professional military
opinion is that it is essential to have a unit at Buckley to
protect the homeland in the western region?
General Guillot. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, General.
Admiral, to you, can you explain to me the current security
situation in Colombia? I have been watching the Petro
administration with a lot of interest over the last couple of
years. It appears to be degrading pretty rapidly. I would just
love your thoughts on the situation in Colombia.
Admiral Holsey. Thank you, Congressman. I think this is a
very challenging problem set. I will share with you that I
think, from a military relationship, we are very tied, and very
tight. I can say right now they are in the fight today when it
comes to the counter-TCOs, ELN [National Liberation Army], FARC
[Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia], we continue to
support them with our current authorities. But I think that it
becomes more tenuous every day. But they are in the fight, they
are committed to working with us and are one of our strongest
partners in the region.
Mr. Crow. And what more should we be doing to engage and to
assist our Colombian partners with that deteriorating
situation?
Admiral Holsey. I think across the spectrum it comes back
to strategic operation, our partnerships. So, whether it is
joint exercise training -- we do joint exercises -- whether it
is the different type of hardware and equipment we can give
them, intelligence sharing, and we continue to do that. But we
have to continue to stay at the forefront and understand their
needs and work with them.
Mr. Crow. And you have also mentioned in your testimony
that diplomacy and non-military means of engagement are
essential for you as a combatant commander. Does that remain
true? Is that an essential tool for you that we continue to
invest in humanitarian and diplomatic efforts in the Southern
Hemisphere?
Admiral Holsey. So, I think it is a whole-of-government
approach, right? So, I think we have to work across the whole
of government. I think from Department of State having
diplomats in place, and then working with us. So, again, I have
a very small footprint as far as forces. So every engagement,
every handshake, every look in the eye matters. So we have to
be very committed and continue to do that.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi,
Mr. Kelly.
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir. General, do you feel like our southern
border is more or less secure today now that we don't have just
unknown threats pouring through every single moment of every
single day who may intend to -- do you think we are more or
less safe today on the southern border?
General Guillot. Congressman, we are more secure today on
the southern border.
Mr. Kelly. And talking a little bit, Admiral, just in
SOUTHCOM, I think that is one of the areas we can have the
greatest impact. So, what are we doing state partnership
program wise, what are we doing -- back when I was a young
lieutenant, they used to send engineer units to build roads,
basically combat trails for us, but roads. They would build
soccer fields, do infrastructure, help with schools.
What are we doing in South America now with our Guard and
Reserve units, where they get a cool overseas training ribbon,
and we get to actually impact a country's view of the United
States? What is your intent to use some of those things?
Admiral Holsey. So, Congressman, that is one of my biggest
levers I have in the region, is the right after strategic
operation, always talk about state partnership programs. We
currently have 24 states partnering with thirty countries in
the region, so it is a very powerful lever. They do everything
from subject matter expert exchanges, cyber, aviation ops, they
are all in on this, and I can't do without them.
Mr. Kelly. Yeah, and going back to those projects though,
we used to send engineer units, and other type of units
routinely to South America, which again, gave them engagements,
and gave them familiar, but also gave support, soft support to
-- are you looking at reiterating that thing that we did in the
1990s and 2000s?
Admiral Holsey. So, that is ongoing, sir. That, as well as
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, we are totally engaged in the
region with the assets that we have, yes, sir.
Mr. Kelly. And then back to you, General. I am really
concerned, we had a Chinese air balloon fly over the United
States, and basically surveil the whole United States, and we
shot it down after it got everything that it wanted. We
continue to have folks who surveil, or send drones over our
bases, or put infrastructure things that have the potential to
surveil.
How serious are we in NORTHCOM in protecting and hardening
our bases against surveillance, and also attacks?
General Guillot. Congressman, between both NORAD and
NORTHCOM, we are very engaged in what you described. NORAD to
ensure that the air sovereignty of the United States and Canada
are maintained. NORTHCOM for the UAS challenge that you
mentioned, and we are working with the services, and with the
Department to increase not only the capability, but also to
expand the authorities we have to knock out not only aircraft,
or UAS that are a direct threat, but also that are surveilling
over the installation.
And I would like to even see it expanded beyond the
installation to ensure that they can't see anything sensitive
on our bases.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, General. And the balance of my time I
yield to Mr. McGuire.
Mr. McGuire. [Inaudible.] The new guy, all right. Admiral
Holsey, U.S.-sanctioned Iranian warships have been spotted in
your AO [area of operation] over the last few years. Last May,
an Iranian warship, reportedly equipped with long-range
missiles, crossed into the Southern Hemisphere. How troubled
are you by this increased Iranian Navy presence in or near your
AO?
Admiral Holsey. I am always concerned, right? So again, we
must be credible, present, and engaged, I can't be clear about
that. So, when it comes to resources and assets to meet
presence with presence, we must do that.
Mr. McGuire. Again, this will be for Admiral Holsey and Mr.
Leonardo. Under the Belt and Road Initiative China has
established itself as a dominant player in telecommunication
infrastructure throughout Latin America, how could China use
their command of Latin American telecommunications and
infrastructure to threaten America's network?
Mr. Leonardo. Thank you for that question, Congressman. As
you know, the President is the first of many to finally place a
high emphasis on the Western Hemisphere given how closely
connected it is to defense of the homeland. And with his
increased focus just specifically on Panama, for example,
working with those partners over there, they have successfully
withdrawn from the Belt and Road Initiative.
Knowing that that influence in that region, particularly
with the Panama Canal, would be extremely detrimental to
American interests. So, I think the administration is very
proud of that increased emphasis on that, and making sure that
we encourage our partners in the region to withdraw.
Mr. McGuire. Admiral?
Admiral Holsey. So, we are laser focused on the possible
Chinese incursion in the form of cyber, right? So, when you put
Chinese technology on your infrastructure, whether it is 5G, or
safe city, smart city technology, our job is to try to
illuminate, and make sure our partners understand what they are
dealing with, and then try to find options, right? So again,
some of our partners work very closely with us.
We do cyber exchanges all the time, every exercise we do
has some cyber component to it to try and make sure we can help
our partners.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Jacobs.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Guillot, I
would like to follow up on some of the questions that my
colleague asked. You specifically said that DOD will not be
doing any detention of migrants at the southern border, but we
have seen recent reporting indicate that the administration
intends to use active-duty military personnel to hold migrants
at the border.
So, could you talk about what exact activities constitute
holding migrants if troops are explicitly not detaining them?
General Guillot. Congresswoman, I said that we are not
currently doing any detention, and I have no orders to conduct
any detention.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay, and are military personnel currently, or
will they at any point be responsible for physically
transporting migrants from one location to another, or
facilitating their transfer into DHS [U.S. Department of
Homeland Security] custody?
General Guillot. The Northern Command Title 10 forces at
this point are not allowed to transport any migrants, illegal
aliens, or other.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay, great. And will military personnel be
operating checkpoints, conducting crowd or traffic control, or
performing any surveillance of migrants or border area
residents?
General Guillot. Well, to the first two, the answer is no.
Can you repeat the last part please, ma'am, on surveillance?
Ms. Jacobs. Sure. So, they will not be conducting
checkpoints, conducting crowd or traffic control. Will they
perform any surveillance of migrants or border area residents?
General Guillot. Well, we do do detection and monitoring,
which includes surveillance of the border, and the region near
the border to ensure that no illegal crossings are either
underway, or about to happen. If we detect those, we notify the
Border Patrol, and they take any action necessary. But the
action is not taken by the Title 10 forces.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay, thank you. And so, then do troops have
access to DHS surveillance tools, databases, or intelligence
systems that collect or store information about U.S. citizens,
or lawful border residents?
General Guillot. No. We are very careful to ensure that we
follow all intel oversight requirements, and we regularly
inspect to make sure that all of the Title 10 forces that are
in support of the Border Patrol follow those rules.
Ms. Jacobs. Excellent. And then when your military
personnel come in contact with a migrant, they are not eligible
to detain them, but what happens if Border Patrol personnel are
not immediately available, what are the processes?
General Guillot. Congresswoman, what they do is they
continue to surveil them using the sensors and the systems that
they have so they can give updated locations to the border
patrol agents. But as you mentioned, they will not stop or
impede the illegal migrants, that is only a law enforcement
action.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay, excellent. And as you know, General
Guillot, the law is quite clear on this, right? The Posse
Comitatus Act explicitly states that it shall not be lawful to
employ any part of the Army of the United States as a Posse
Comitatus, or otherwise for the purpose of executing the laws
except in such cases and under such circumstances as such
employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the
Constitution or by an act of Congress.
And no money appropriated by this Act shall be used to pay
any of the expenses incurred in the employment of any troops in
violation of this section. General, can you explicitly assure
this committee today that NORTHCOM's activities at the border
fully comply with this law, and that under your command our
military personnel will not be put into positions that
compromise the foundational principle separating civilian law
enforcement from military authority?
General Guillot. Congresswoman, I can assure you that we
are very familiar with that law, and we follow it to every
detail.
Ms. Jacobs. Excellent. And what specific training and
guidance have servicemembers received regarding these legal
constraints?
General Guillot. When the units are identified to come down
to support the NORTHCOM mission, they go through an extensive
period of training both at their home station, and then once
they arrive on the border during what we call the RSO&I
[Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration] process,
which can take several days to a couple weeks to ensure that
they have all the required training, to include the standards
on the use of force, and the Posse Comitatus.
Ms. Jacobs. Great. Since January 20th have there been any
revisions or contemplated changes to the rules of engagement,
or rules for use of force for military personnel deployed at
the southern border?
General Guillot. The only one that I have proposed is a
change to the rule of force which would allow us to shoot down
or bring down drones that are surveilling over our deployed and
mobile troops. That is the only change to the use of force that
I have proposed.
Ms. Jacobs. Excellent. And are servicemembers deployed at
the border armed?
General Guillot. Yes. I have directed that all
servicemembers that are operating in close proximity to the
border will be armed with the weapon that they are trained to
use, whether that is a long rifle or a sidearm.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr.
Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am on the right side
over here, your left. Thank you for being here. And I have got
to brag, I did serve with a Colonel Guillot back in the day, we
both got to command the greatest wing in the United States Air
Force, the 55th Wing. My first question to General Guillot,
tracking hypersonics is a big concern for many of us, I know
for you as well.
Can you talk about the challenges of tracking hypersonics,
and also what is the time, if it is a hypersonics launch in
China, how long could it reach the continental United States?
General Guillot. Congressman, I share the shout out for the
fighting 55th, and thank you for that. Hypersonics are very
destabilizing, they are a tremendous challenge to us, because
they start off often in a ballistic manner, which is very easy
to predict where they are going to eventually impact. But
because of their speed and their maneuverability, all that goes
away once they enter the hypersonic and the glide portion of
their profile.
So, I think it also, because the speed cuts down the amount
of time to as little as 5 minutes to detect, track, and predict
where it is going to go, but because of the end game
maneuverability that they have, really we don't know until the
very end where these could go because of the maneuverability.
Mr. Bacon. What kind of capabilities do you need to better
track this, what should we be funding in Congress?
General Guillot. The HBTSS, the Hypersonic Ballistic
Tracking and Sensing System is an extremely promising
satellite-based capability to detect and track the hypersonics
through the regimes that I just described. And then I think
that we are going to have to increase our commitment to defeat
mechanisms, which are a challenge for the same reasons that I
just mentioned, the maneuverability and the speed.
We have some great defeat mechanisms, but they aren't
geared towards the speed and maneuverability that hypersonics
bring.
Mr. Bacon. Sounds like a good priority for us to work on.
General Guillot. We would appreciate it, yes, sir.
Mr. Bacon. CJADC2 [Combined Joint All Domain Command and
Control] and AI [artificial intelligence] I know is growing
importance for your air defense command and control. Could you
talk a little bit about the importance of the Maven Smart
System?
General Guillot. Congressman, Maven Smart System has become
the staple for our Joint All Domain Command and Control system
because it not only presents a picture of the battle space in
multiple domains, most systems show one domain or another, but
you can get all domains in Maven Smart System. And the
increasing number layers, live layers of live data that can be
brought in, everything from undersea through space sensors
displayed at the same time. So, it is a staple to both NORAD
and NORTHCOM, and I see it growing in the future.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. Admiral Holsey, what is the biggest
gap that you have for the counter-drug mission, and what can
Congress be doing to help you?
Admiral Holsey. Congressman, I think the biggest gap
remains assets. We have to be consistent, present, and engaged,
and have a consistent presence on the waters, in the air, to
deter and interdict. So, I think, from an air standpoint,
maritime standpoint, and ISR, all is very critical to the
mission.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. I want to follow up on a question
that General Guillot got earlier about cyber. I appreciate you
talking about it. It is not just ballistic missile threat, or
hypersonic; it is also cyber. And you have got to work with
Cyber Command, and CISA, which there is a seam there, and we
are trying to close those seams. Are there any additional
authorities that you need to work with Cyber Command and CISA?
General Guillot. Sir, I think we have the authorities that
we need. And I should point out the FBI [Federal Bureau of
Investigations] is very active as well in our cyber defense.
Having those organizations resident in our headquarters is
helpful, frequent talks with General Haugh, sometimes weekly,
on the threat. And every time I ask him if he can take action,
he has had the authorities necessary to do that on our behalf.
So, I don't have any authority requests at this time for the
cyber domain.
Mr. Bacon. One last question with my final minute. I have
worked in NATO, I have worked with the Canadians, I have worked
with the Danes, and I am concerned about some of the comments
that -- these are our allies, so as a traditional Republican, I
hate to see the friction with our allies. Are you seeing any of
those frictions at all at NORAD or NORTHCOM?
General Guillot. Congressman, as you know, in NORAD we have
several hundred Canadians that work side by side with us, as
well as at the installations. At the military-to-military
relationship level, we have zero problems or concerns.
Everybody is focused on defending our continent, and I am real
proud of the effort that they are putting into it.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, good to hear.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms.
Tokuda.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Mr. Chair. You know, when we visited
Guantanamo Bay, we were told that there were servicemembers
there from every branch minus Space Force. The question I have
is where are they being reassigned from, and are we
compromising our readiness, and posture in other areas where
they are now being detoured and reassigned to GITMO? And what
kind of military commitment will the people and costs be
required if in fact we reach the President's threshold of
housing 30,000 migrants there?
Clearly, there is a lot of additional costs, but even just
the living facilities for 30,000 troops, right now you have
servicemembers in tents at Guantanamo Bay. What would be the
cost and personal impact, and will this impact our readiness
posture elsewhere from where they are being reassigned?
Admiral Holsey. Congresswoman, from the standpoint of where
the troops are coming from, as a force user if you will, we put
in our request for forces, and the forces come to us. We ask
for specific requirements, and problem sets, so they actually
send the forces to us from all over the nation. So again,
really up to the services to show the impact of the readiness
of their command.
For my command itself, the folks who are working for me
down there, from the register reporting tool, they are not
showing any degradation in training or readiness at this time.
Ms. Tokuda. Okay, so you are telling me that we really
don't know if it is impacting any kind of readiness or posture
in any other theater, we don't know where they are coming from,
we have to ask every branch specifically?
Admiral Holsey. Yes, Congresswoman, it comes from the
services --
Ms. Tokuda. Okay, how about the cost? If we have over 1,000
servicemembers there to basically oversee, at the height, maybe
200, 177 individuals there. If we have 30,000 migrants at
Guantanamo, what kind of military presence would you expect to
have to have there at Guantanamo Bay?
Admiral Holsey. So, Congresswoman, SOUTHCOM always postures
and plans for a migrant operation, we have done that in the
past. Our planning shows that if we were to go up to 30,000, if
we were to do that, and we have not been told to do that, it is
approximately 9,000-plus servicemembers to do that mission. But
right now we are in the tail approach, and we have not gone
beyond anything over 1,000 at this point.
Ms. Tokuda. Okay, so the President has said 30,000 will be
at Guantanamo Bay. Everyone is talking about meeting the
President's mission. You are saying it is 9,000 servicemembers.
What is the estimated cost? And is that inclusive of their
housing, their meals, transport, all of these different things?
Mr. Salesses. Congresswoman, I don't have the cost for --
Ms. Tokuda. If someone could get me that, if you have the
projection scenario of 9,000 servicemembers, there must be at
least a back-of-an-envelope estimate on costs. Now, I don't
know if this question came up already, but when we went there,
over 30 percent of the migrants there were low threat, which
means that they did not have a criminal record other than
having illegally crossed the border.
So, that being said, does it make financial sense, and also
military security sense in terms of where we are taking these
individuals to house upwards of 30 percent of migrants at
Guantanamo Bay that are actually low threat, low risk?
Mr. Salesses. So, Congresswoman, obviously we worked very
closely with ICE, and DHS, and CBP [U.S. Customs and Border
Protection] on this. They make the determination of who goes to
the housing areas, and obviously there is a capacity issue for
housing that they have. So, they will make a determination who
to send to GITMO, whether it is high threat illegal aliens, or
lower threat illegal aliens. And what we do is we provide the
capability to house them temporarily.
Ms. Tokuda. Okay, so let's talk about housing capability
then. Let's say 30,000 individuals do come to Guantanamo that
are in fact high risk. We were told by ICE that they cannot be
housed in soft-sided tents, like the tents that are currently
sitting vacant right now. Do we have the hard structure
capacity to house upwards of 30,000 potentially high-risk
migrants at Guantanamo Bay in hard sided facilities?
Mr. Salesses. Currently we do not have that capability.
Ms. Tokuda. So, basically you are telling me that the
President's plan to have the hardened, most aggressive
criminals, 30,000 of them housed at Guantanamo, is unfeasible?
Mr. Salesses. Well, at this time we don't have the housing.
But if we were directed to house high-threat illegal aliens at
large numbers at GITMO, we would absolutely execute that
mission. ICE has other --
Ms. Tokuda. Okay, I only have 26 seconds of my time, so we
will definitely have that. Chair, I have more questions, but
specifically we have now been told that military bases will be
co-used to house migrants, as the great granddaughter of a
Japanese internee, Fort Bliss was one of those particular camps
that actually housed them years, generations ago.
What impact to readiness and budget constraints would this
have on our O&M [operation and maintenance] and MILCON
[military construction] dollars if you now have to do a dual
use in terms of both be a military base, and a migrant --
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Virginia --
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, I will ask that question in writing.
The Chairman. The chair recognizes the gentlelady from
Virginia, Mrs. Kiggans.
Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you so much
to our panelists for being here today, and for the update.
Thank you for the work you are doing on the southern border
especially, I think we are all sleeping a little more soundly
just knowing that our border is secure but for the work you do.
Given NORTHCOM's responsibility for defending against
nation state cyber threats, what is your assessment of the
military's readiness to defend critical infrastructure,
including power, ports, and logistic nodes?
General Guillot. Congresswoman, I think it is -- the
ability to defend in cyber for the DOD network is strong. And
then for the ports, we rely heavily on CISA and Cyber Command
to identify weaknesses, and there are some. There are teams
that go out and check this, I think it is improving. And I
think there is a lot of awareness on it, but there are still
some vulnerabilities in there, especially when you get into the
defense industrial base, and in critical infrastructure that
need to be addressed.
Mrs. Kiggans. Do you see it improving, or is it continuing
to get worse by the day?
General Guillot. Ma'am, I think it is, at least from the
results that I am seeing from the inspections, it is improving.
Mrs. Kiggans. Okay, that is good to hear. Then for both
NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, both of your commands rely heavily on
Military Sealift Command for logistics, transport, and resupply
whether it is supporting contingency operations, humanitarian
missions, or routine sustainment, right now MSC [Military
Sealift Command] is facing serious challenges with manning and
the availability of ships.
How are these readiness issues impacting your ability to
plan and execute missions that depends on sealift support?
Admiral Holsey. From the standpoint of our mission we are
doing in Haiti right now, since November airport has been
closed, we have been able to fly 62 flights in there providing
supplies to the MSS [Multinantional Security Support Mission in
Haiti], so no impact there. I think as you look at some of the
resources we flew down to the islands as well, the commercial
shipping, so we have been safe there as well.
So, I think it is still we have to continue to look at it,
and just make sure we notice our impacts that we are seeing.
But right now minimal on my part from SOUTHCOM.
Mrs. Kiggans. Good, thank you.
General Guillot. And Congresswoman, based on where our
locations are on the continent, we primarily use air and rail,
and have very little requirements that go by sealift.
Mrs. Kiggans. That is good to hear. Recently we were in New
Zealand with a CODEL [congressional delegation] listening to
some of the influence from China with some similar to kind of
the Belt and Road Initiative that they are doing in Central and
South America, but the New Zealanders were talking about kind
of the shoddy workmanship from the Chinese, and that they
didn't use local employees, local workers.
They would come in and build bridges, infrastructure, then
it would then fall apart. So, it was almost like the Chinese
had attempted to make some inroads in places like New Zealand,
and some of the island chains out in the South Pacific, but
then the people were really kind of catching onto what was
going on and almost seeing through what was happening.
So, do you feel like that same thing is happening in
Central and South America, or are they making continued
progress, and really just helping with community development,
and people are buying that?
Admiral Holsey. Congresswoman, they are not buying it, they
are seeing it. I think by the time they realize they have been
duped, these relationships, again, more interest. Poor
construction, resource extraction, again, it goes on, and on,
and on, right? So, I think our goal is to try to have an
alternative to it, right? So, these state-owned enterprises,
they know what they are doing.
They are exploiting the instability, the corruption, the
weak economies, and the lack of foreign lending shortfall to
embed and get in. So, I think we have to continue to look for
ways to bring more economic stability to the region. We have an
economic strategic working group we setup at SOUTHCOM a year
and a half or so ago, so we are trying to find ways to get Exim
Bank, the Development Finance Corporation, others that offer
the capital to come in and fill that void, and we have to
continue to do that.
Mrs. Kiggans. Yeah, I agree, and I appreciated your
comments when you talked about every handshake, every time we
look in someone's eye, that stuff matters, just that people to
people exchange. So, along those same lines we enjoy close
relations with several Latin American countries, but how can we
work with Latin American allies even more closely to achieve
this close security cooperation on immigration, drug smuggling,
and counter-Chinese influence?
Admiral Holsey. I think our security cooperation, one of my
biggest levers, provides that subject matter expert exchanges,
joint exercise programs, those things put me on the ground,
right? So, now I can train side by side, it builds confidence,
trust, and really just knowing that we are there for them, so
we have to continue to do that. Security cooperation.
Mrs. Kiggans. Yeah, I agree, and just echo Trent Kelly's
words as well, and my dad, just growing up he was in Army
Reserves, and used to always go down there and work on those
projects that he mentioned, I remember that. And I think those
one-on-one things that we can do to help their communities are
so meaningful, thank you so much.
I yield back.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
New Mexico, Mr. Vasquez.
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
witnesses that are here today, thank you for your service to
our country, and for your time today. I represent New Mexico's
Second District, that includes 180 miles of the U.S. and Mexico
border. I know nearly every mile very intimately, as well as
our three ports of entry with our southern neighbor in Mexico.
Now, for decades the Department of Defense has operated
Joint Task Force North to support law enforcement's efforts to
identify and interdict drugs before they enter the United
States. That is why I was proud to have secured bipartisan
language in the FY25 NDAA, [National Defense Authorization Act]
which requires the Department of Defense to make countering
drugs entering the United States the Department's top counter
drug priority.
My first question is for General Guillot and Admiral
Holsey. The DOD has historically engaged in several counter-
drug campaigns, the dynamics of illicit drug smuggling have
shifted over the years, and it is no secret that there has been
an influx of fentanyl and other precursor chemicals coming to
the United States from places like China. Could you give me an
example of how the Department has shifted its focus to
prioritize countering the flow of fentanyl into the United
States?
Admiral Holsey. I will start here. At least from a SOUTHCOM
standpoint, we continue to work across the interagency to try
and identify those crucial hot spots. Right now we know that
the precursors are going into Mexico first, so we are not
seeing a lot in the SOUTHCOM AOR. We have some potential hot
spots being Honduras, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, so
interagency work supports doing that.
We continue to see the cocaine prices drop, so the cocaine
continues to come in, and we are getting that at record pace
this year, and I could do a lot more with more assets. But
right now I think from fentanyl, we are still studying that
very hard with our partners interagency to get after it.
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, Admiral.
General Guillot. Congressman, first I have visited Santa
Ana Monument Three, and a number of the locations along your
district, and I am always very proud of the great work that is
being done there. Regarding the fentanyl, we have seen the
numbers drop significantly over the last 2 months as we have
sealed off portions of the border and also established maritime
blocks for this.
We are waiting to see what is the next way that they are
going to try to get that across. We established a joint
intelligence task force that is bringing in interagency, and
the intel community, along with Border Patrol and DOD intel
experts that is really illuminating that flow in, as you
mentioned with the precursors, where it is being assembled, and
then how they try to get it across the border.
I think this is going to take more time, but I think that
we are on the right track to find and put the pressure on the
cartels in ways that they haven't had pressure put on them
before to make them find other ways to earn money than
fentanyl.
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, General. And I think our best
resources are used in the ability to both counterdict the
smuggling activities that happen, but more importantly the
actual precursors that are coming in from China, and the
manufacturing in the laboratory facilities that the cartels are
using to then move that product across the country.
I believe that is one of the best resources for DOD to
continue its focus on, so thank you for that. And I remain
committed to working with the Department to stop the spread of
fentanyl in our country. Now, I do have some serious concerns
about a recent shift in DOD posture when it comes to
immigration enforcement, and it is DHS's job to enforce our
domestic immigration laws.
And I believe DOD has to remain focused on preparing to
fight and win America's wars. And I am very concerned the
Department is wasting some of these precious resources, which I
have seen firsthand from talking to DOD personnel at places
like Santa Ana Monument Three, and the Santa Theresa port of
entry, and the Santa Theresa Sunland Park Station.
Now, it has been reported that there is plans for the
Department to detain and process immigrants at installations
like Fort Bliss and Kirtland Air Force Base. Mr. Leonardo, are
there any plans to house individuals or families at Kirtland,
or other installations in the region?
Mr. Leonardo. Thank you for your question, Mr. Vasquez. And
the administration shares your concern about the flow of
fentanyl, which is why we are eager to support the Department
of Homeland Security in any way that we can. I will note as
mentioned earlier by General Guillot, the Department of Defense
and its military servicemembers do not do direct detention,
this is always in support of ICE, and CBP, and the Department
of Homeland Security at large. So --
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, Mr. Leonardo, I have 20 seconds,
and that was not the question that I asked. My question was
about immigrants being housed at Kirtland or Fort Bliss. So,
just in terms of the actual expenditures that we are spending
to potentially use Department of Defense facilities for migrant
detention, I believe takes away from that critical mission of
counterdicting fentanyl traffic.
And so, I would love to see those millions of dollars
actually used to protect Americans, and I believe that is best
used by making sure that we can stop the flow of fentanyl --
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Higgins.
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Guillot, you
are familiar with the joint reserve base Belle Chase in
Louisiana?
General Guillot. Yes, sir, I am.
Mr. Higgins. It housed the 159th Fighter Wing. They do a
hell of our job defending our border at the coast, they work
together of course with their partners, and they fly F-15Cs,
you are familiar?
General Guillot. Sir, I am very familiar.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, sir, I would imagine you are. I have been
advised that the Air Force plans to send F-15EXs to the Kadena
Air Base in Okinawa, and my sources state that Okinawa would
have difficulty supporting some of these new aircraft in
defense of our homeland, which is the subject of today's
hearing primarily.
It would seem to a reasonable American, that perhaps we
should deploy these F-15EXs to the 159th Fighter Wing to defend
our coast to replace these older craft, as opposed to sending
them to Japan. Would you potentially meet with this committee
to discuss that, or what are your thoughts on that, what you
can discuss in this setting?
General Guillot. Sir, I would be glad to meet with the
committee and discuss the air defense needs. The F-15C although
old, is still unmatched in air-to-air combat, and it does a
great job, but as you mentioned, being old, maintenance
problems, reliability problems, and fatigue on the aircraft is
setting in. I would love to see all of our F-15 units replaced
with EXs.
Mr. Higgins. So, respectfully, General, if the old aircraft
are all cool, why do we need new ones?
General Guillot. Well, as I mentioned, the maintenance --
Mr. Higgins. The new ones are newer and better, right?
General Guillot. The new ones are better, I would like to
see them replaced with EXs.
Mr. Higgins. So, to defend our coast, regular Americans
might expect that we might use the best, I am just putting this
out there, we might use the best and most modern aircraft to
defend the Gulf of America, and to patrol the Gulf of America,
as opposed to sending them overseas. That is all I am asking
respectfully, sir, is that we have that conversation, and we
can engage in that conversation in another setting. Will you
commit to that, to me and my office, and to this committee?
General Guillot. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you.
General Guillot. And I want to make sure I was clear, I
would love to have the F-15EX.
Mr. Higgins. That is a real good answer, we are going to
stop there on the F-15s, because I want them in Louisiana, I
think it is a real good idea. You mentioned earlier, General,
regarding the northern trajectory, my colleagues across the
aisle are quite upset about corrective actions that the
Executive Branch is taking regarding our relations with our
allies, and adversaries alike across the world.
You mentioned the northern trajectory, it was brought up as
a concern. So, when you describe the northern trajectory,
talking about tracking ICBMs, is that correct?
General Guillot. Yes, sir, and cruise missiles.
Mr. Higgins. Okay, so ICBMs and cruise missiles, so
American technologies on sea-based, and land-based, and space-
based technologies that track these launches, the launch of a
cruise missile or an intercontinental ballistic missile from a
northern trajectory, from an adversary most likely used to make
a fast and effective approach to the United States, can we
track that with Canada or not -- without Canada or not?
General Guillot. We can do the detection and the mid-course
tracking, depending on the route. There are some routes where
we could track it without Canada, others if it goes straight in
the 12:00 o'clock position, we would need Canadian assets.
Mr. Higgins. So, the Canadian assets that you are
describing, would you clarify the way those joint operations
work when it comes to tracking an ICBM? Does this not transcend
trade negotiations, we are talking about an incoming nuclear
missile.
General Guillot. For ICBMs, the capabilities are all United
States. Canada has a policy that they don't conduct ballistic
missile defense. For the cruise missiles, we would rely on some
of the radars, and the fighters that Canada has depending on
the route of the cruise missile.
Mr. Higgins. So, you have worked with our Canadian allies
for a long time, correct, General?
General Guillot. Yes, I have, sir.
Mr. Higgins. Can you envision any scenario under any
conditions, whether it would be an incoming cruise missile,
ICBM, detected by our Canadian allies, or by American tech,
that we would not share that with Canada and vice versa?
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired, you will
have to answer that for the record.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Davis.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Davis. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair, and to the
witnesses for being with us today. My question is, and I would
love to hear General Guillot, and from Admiral Holsey, how is
SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM working together with Latin America and
others, in particular I continue to hear a theme identifying
new ways that the cartels are now looking at making a path for
illegal drugs into our country?
General Guillot. Congressman, two new ways that I think
illustrate how SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM are working together, one
is we recently established the Joint Intelligence Task Force
Southern Border, which is headquartered in Tucson, Arizona at a
CBP facility. And what we do is we bring in interagency, DOD,
and intel community feeds, and fuse it, and redistribute that
information from there.
That has led to unparalleled sharing of intelligence data
on this mission set that used to be available, but not all
processed from one location, and Admiral Holsey's team is a
strong participant in that. The other is as we have deployed
ships into the Gulf of America, and also off the Pacific Coast
to counter illegal drug and migrant flow, we built into the
plan that we could seamlessly move these ships further to the
south, if required, to benefit Admiral Holsey's JIATF-South
mission.
Or his resources could move more to the north to seamlessly
address the illegal flow of drugs and illegal migrants around
the Gulf, or in the Pacific Ocean around San Diego up to the
coast. We have never had that level of cooperation between our
two commands before.
Admiral Holsey. I would just add that, as I look at the
JIATF-South, they remain the gold standard for the detection
and monitoring mission, and so a great collaboration with
General Guillot. But also I have to say our partner nations, so
the security cooperation, 80 percent of our interdictions last
year were conducted along, by, with, and through our partners.
We have something called a ship special mission where we can
position ourselves and then use the interceptors to get after
it.
Another thing we are working with really hard with JIATF-
South is this AI/machine learning. So, now, based off that
technology, based off the time of year, the size of ship,
aircraft, we can predict where it is going and make sure we can
have assets there. But, again, consistent presence is required
and have to continue to do that.
Mr. Davis. I want to say, and really emphasize this work
because too many people, too many American lives have died, and
we have to stay in front of it, and that is what I am really
emphasizing here, staying in front of it. I want to shift
gears, if I may, for a second. I was honored to be able to
travel with our chair and other committee members to Guantanamo
Bay.
My question is, as we have seen now, Guantanamo Bay exists
as an alternative while Homeland Security is actually
increasing capacity, what do you see as Homeland Security
increases that capacity, the long-term role then with
Guantanamo Bay, Mr. Salesses?
Mr. Salesses. Congressman, thank you. Again, the Department
is in support of DHS, and ICE, and CBP. So, as they gain more
capability to house, it could lead to us not needing our
certain capabilities. But until that threshold has been
determined, which it has not at this point, we will continue to
provide that support at GITMO.
Mr. Davis. And a follow up there, do you anticipate or see
any level of a timeline in terms of dealing with that capacity?
Mr. Salesses. I know that ICE is working very hard at
trying to identify additional housing, but I think they will
continue to rely on the Defense Department to support that for
the near future.
Mr. Davis. Okay, thank you again for being a witness today.
And I yield the remaining balance of my time, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Gimenez. [Presiding.] The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
Admiral Holsey, by the way, great name, you had to be a Navy
man, right? You had to be. Okay, Admiral Holsey, do Cuba,
Venezuela, and Nicaragua pose a security threat to the United
States?
Admiral Holsey. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Gimenez. How big a security threat?
Admiral Holsey. I think it is very challenging. I think as
I look at the region, and watch the engagement, I can see out
of area deployers come in from Russia, and pull into Cuba. When
I watch Iranian ships come over and deliver goods and services
to Venezuela, it becomes very challenging, and so we have to
continue to keep our eye on that piece, and make sure, again, I
can't be more clear, I have got to be consistent, present, and
engaged. And when I have aircraft assets, ships in the region,
I can block those maneuvers.
Mr. Gimenez. And would a regime change in those three
countries make your life easier and also make America much more
secure?
Admiral Holsey. That is more of a policy question, I think
anything that is going to make us more secure in support, but
that is more of a policy question.
Mr. Gimenez. Well, if Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua became
friends instead of the way they are right now, enemies, would
that make your life easier?
Admiral Holsey. Yes, if they were friends, that would be
totally -- right now we have twenty-eight democracies in the
region, so if we had thirty-one, that would be great.
Mr. Gimenez. Do you think Cuba is the head of the snake in
stirring up trouble in the region and also helping Russia,
Iran, and especially China in the region?
Admiral Holsey. So, I would just say this, let's be clear,
they do it because they know they have the backing of some of
the nefarious actors, where it is China and Russia, so I think
it is a little bit of both.
Mr. Gimenez. And I share your concern about the intrusion,
or the incursion of Russia, Iran, North Korea, and especially
China in our hemisphere. And I think for far too long we have
been maybe not blind to it, but certainly not paying the
attention to what is going on in South America with these
nefarious actors right in our own back yard, and I think we
need to start paying much more attention to it. Do you agree
with that?
Admiral Holsey. I totally agree with that, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. Okay. General Guillot, how many cartel members
are there in the southern border? When you estimate, how many
actually are members of the cartel?
General Guillot. Number of people?
Mr. Gimenez. Yeah, number of people, number of cartel
members, yeah.
General Guillot. Sir, my estimate would be certainly in the
thousands, as there is 25 to 30 different cartels that we are
tracking and watching.
Mr. Gimenez. Can you give me an estimate of how many
thousands?
General Guillot. No, sir, I can't, but I will follow up
with that.
Mr. Gimenez. Okay, but those thousands are killing 50,000
Americans every year?
General Guillot. Through the fentanyl, yes, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. Okay, and while we have had great success in
stopping the flow of migrants, I mean, we are down 90 percent,
which by the way runs counter to everything we were hearing
during the previous administration, said they needed a lot more
money, money, money, and really all they needed was policy and
will to do it.
What are your records, or what do you indicate is happening
in the southern border with regards to fentanyl, which is
killing 50,000 Americans every single year?
General Guillot. Sir, what we are seeing is the amount
moving across that they are detecting is at about 40 percent of
what it was before. So, a significant drop, but not to the same
rate as the migrant flow. And then what we are also seeing is
that a lot of frustration with cartels, their inability to get
fentanyl across the border, and so they are pursuing other
locations to send it other than United States.
Mr. Gimenez. Okay, and so they have been labeled as
terrorist organizations, right?
General Guillot. They have, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. What are we doing about that?
General Guillot. What are we doing about it?
Mr. Gimenez. Yeah, what are we doing about it? They have
been killing fifty -- well, they have killed probably half a
million Americans, and they are killing, still, 50,000
Americans every year. They are a terrorist organization, they
are right across the border, what are we doing about it?
General Guillot. Well, for the last 2 months that NORTHCOM
has had the mission, we have significantly increased several-
hundred-fold the amount of intelligence that we are gathering
on the cartel members, and they --
Mr. Gimenez. You think intelligence alone is going to stop
them from shipping fentanyl across the United States, and
killing 50,000 Americans?
General Guillot. Well, I think it -- not alone, no, sir.
But I think it contributes to the other actions that we are
taking that is stopping it at the borders, and that is stopping
it from going through the maritime.
Mr. Gimenez. Do you think it is the number one duty of
government to protect its citizens?
General Guillot. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. Gimenez. And do you think we have been doing a really
good job of protecting American citizens from the poison that
has been flowing through the southern border?
General Guillot. Sir, I think we have been doing an
increasingly better job since we picked up this mission.
Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. I guess my time is up.
And now I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr.
Cisneros, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And if I could just
say, the Department of Defense is not a law enforcement agency,
nor should it ever become a law enforcement agency. That is not
its purpose, that is not its mission. But with that, General, I
am going to kind of change locations on you here a little bit.
I am concerned about the accelerated rate of climate change and
its impact on the Arctic.
The melting of the polar ice caps is creating an opening of
sea lanes up there, it is kind of making a quicker, easier path
for China shipping, China military, the Russians as well, to
kind of transit that way, and with quicker access not only to
Alaska, but down into the west coast of the United States. So,
with that, how is NORTHCOM adapting to the operational
strategies to address the increased security challenges among
the PRC and Russia?
And really how is that impacting NORAD, and their mission
as far as monitoring air patrols overseeing that area, and as
far as the Navy goes, is this something that we need to start
increasing other than submarines, naval patrols out there in
that area as well, in order to show the flag, and show there,
and not let them take over these shipping lanes?
General Guillot. Congressman, the Arctic is extremely
important to both NORAD and NORTHCOM, as it makes up over half
of our area of operations. What we have seen over the past year
is an unprecedented presence by the Chinese in the Arctic
region. For the first time we had bombers, Chinese bombers that
flew into the Arctic region in July, that we intercepted and
escorted out of the area.
But at the same time there was also the highest number of
ships, all dual use under the guise of being scientific, but
also certainly military purpose there to map out, we presume,
China's ability to operate both subsurface, and on the surface
in that region. So, it is a big concern. What we are doing
about that is we are operating with the Canadian military, the
Coast Guard, and United States Pacific Command to make sure
that we have presence both on the surface and in the air to
monitor this traffic.
And also we have also expanded our intelligence gathering
with the other arctic nations, with the exception of Russia,
all are NATO members, to ensure that we are sharing information
with the other seven arctic nations on that.
Mr. Cisneros. As far as naval forces go, is that something
that we need to start seeing, more naval ships in the region? I
am a former Navy guy, WESTPACs [Western Pacific deployments],
Med Cruises, do we need to start having a North Pole polar
cruise now?
General Guillot. I would like to see more maritime
presence, naval presence up there. I would point out that
Admiral Paparo is very helpful in sharing ships up there, but
we could use more in that region as -- because of the strategic
nature of that region.
Mr. Cisneros. Okay. Admiral, with consideration for
SOUTHCOM, and increased U.S. presence in South and Central
America, it is no secret the region is expanding its ties with
the PRC through the Belt and Road Initiative, so again, not a
lot of assets in SOUTHCOM, again we do WESTPACs, we do
Mediterranean cruises, we don't typically go down there, every
once in a while we will send a ship down there to kind of show
the flag.
But how do we partner with these countries to promote
stability, and do we need to see an increased naval presence in
South America, where maybe we now need to start considering
routine deployments down in the area?
Admiral Holsey. 100 percent, sir, we need more assets in
the region. Again, I have said it before, I said it in my
statement, we need to be credible, present, and engaged.
Present means power, it sends a strong signal to our partners
and allies, and also it sends an even stronger signal to would
be adversaries. PRC, Russia, Iran, they have to see us, and we
must meet presence with presence. So, I will take those ships
from the Arctic, and you can bring them down to Antarctic, I
will take them.
Mr. Cisneros. Well, look, we need to do more to increase
the size of our Navy, but we need to have those ships kind of
in those areas, and I know the big struggle with NORTHCOM and
SOUTHCOM has always been assets. But we need to figure out a
way so that we can get the assets to you as well, because those
regions definitely are becoming more important, and I am
willing to work with the administration to see if we can do
that.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
The Chairman [presiding.]. The chair now recognizes the
gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Van Orden.
Mr. Van Orden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
coming, I would like to give a shout out to my two e-dogs in
the back there, Chief Master Sergeant Storms, and Sergeant
Major Rodriguez, we know who is really running the show
gentlemen. I want to assuage some of the fears of my Democrat
colleagues that are concerned about the Panama Canal, and
remind them that in 1956 when Gamal Abdel Nasser seized the
Suez Canal, that the British and the French got together with
the Israelis, and they took that back.
And then the only way that was resolved was that there was
a UN peacekeeping mission that took over security for the Suez
Canal. In 1989 when Manuel Noriega was acting up we did use
military force to seize the Panama Canal in Operation Just
Cause. So, there is precedent for this because those are the
only two strategic canals on the entire planet.
And if we need to act in the best interest of the United
States as we have done in the past, or our allies, we shall.
And that should not be controversial at all. General Guidot
(phonetic) -- Guidot, correct?
General Guillot. Guillot, sir.
Mr. Van Orden. Guillot, my bad, sorry. Hey, so the blimp
thing, in your testimony you mentioned the word -- you didn't
mention balloon or dirigible, you mentioned UAS seventeen
times, Chinese three times, China seven times, but you never
connected the dots between the Chinese balloon, or Chinese UAS.
So, I am going to ask you, Mr. Leonardo, has the Department of
Defense given the General the authorities to shoot down
anything that is up and around our sensitive military bases, or
the air space of the United States, these UASs? Does he have to
call you, or can he do it himself?
Mr. Leonardo. Congressman, thank you for that question. As
you know, it is difficult in the homeland --
Mr. Van Orden. Yes or no.
Mr. Leonardo. I would have to take that specific question
for the record, sir.
Mr. Van Orden. all right, so we need to have the
authorities pushed down to the General, and the General needs
to push it down to the person on the base. And when you
mentioned that you don't have the capabilities, but you want to
because of the procurement system, that is a real issue, it has
been two years. So, we have to learn, sir, I want you to not
have to call him, and Pete Hegseth, who I trust explicitly,
implicitly, I mean he is a great dude.
But he shouldn't have to make that call, he shouldn't have
to make that call, nor should you. I just want to make sure
that that is very clear.
General Guillot. Sir, I do have the authority to shoot
these down --
Mr. Van Orden. You do, right now you can? But do you have
the capability --
General Guillot. Over an installation, or a threat to the
United States coming in from the outside, I have the authority
to shoot that down --
Mr. Van Orden. What is a threat? It was a Chinese balloon,
and the Biden Administration lied to every single person saying
that they couldn't penetrate that stuff, that we were blocking
them, that is not true, you need proximity. And unless a plane
is flying ECM jammers, that is not true, the Biden
Administration lied to everybody. I want to make sure you can
shoot down something over Canada, you can shoot down something
over the United States.
So, I have 2 minutes left. Admiral Holsey, holy beanbags, I
would not have want to have been Ensign Holsey in 1988. For
Pete's sakes, you weren't even a tin can sailor, were you? Did
you get heavies?
Admiral Holsey. Actually I started out on frigates and
destroyers.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay, that is -- it doesn't say destroyers,
it says frigates in your bio here, sir. Hey, you said in your
estimate we can only interdict 10 percent of the things that we
see, correct? So, 90 percent of the stuff that we are seeing,
that are people bringing this poison into the country, 90
percent is just going to go because we don't have the ability
to stop that, correct?
Admiral Holsey. That is correct.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay, and you said that the precursor
chemicals go into Mexico, correct?
Admiral Holsey. Correct.
Mr. Van Orden. Where do they come from?
Admiral Holsey. China.
Mr. Van Orden. Okay, so let me ask you this question, sir.
In your professional military opinion, put aside everything
policy, as an Admiral if we just started killing these people
that are killing Americans, 250,000, 300,000 Americans, about
the amount of people that died in World War II, why aren't we
just killing these people?
Admiral Holsey. Now, are you talking about the ships coming
across, or are you talking about the --
Mr. Van Orden. I am talking about the ships, I am talking
about these narco-terrorists, why aren't we just killing the
people that are killing American citizens? It makes absolutely
no sense to me.
Admiral Holsey. It comes down to authorities, those --
Mr. Van Orden. It is policy and authority, right, okay. So,
in your professional military opinion, if we started killing
narco-terrorists and sinking Chinese ships that are bringing
poison into the Western Hemisphere, would that reduce the
amount of stuff coming into the Western Hemisphere, and reduce
the amount of American citizens that are being poisoned to
death?
Admiral Holsey. Well, just to be clear --
Mr. Van Orden. Professional military opinion, sir.
Admiral Holsey. Well, the ships that are coming across, the
way they bring it across is legal, right? So it is coming in
legally, the precursors, so we can't do that.
Mr. Van Orden. So, is that a yes? I have 10 seconds.
General, if we started killing the people that are killing
American citizens, do you think less American citizens would be
killed by this poison? No policy, military.
General Guillot. Well, I think if we aggressively stop
them, it will bring it down.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Maryland, Ms.
Elfreth.
Ms. Elfreth. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And my friend from
California broke the ice for me a little bit, talking about
climate change, and the impacts in the Arctic, particularly as
we are seeing increased, and frankly very brazen presence from
China and Russia into shipping lanes. I want to drill down on
that just a little bit. As you know, this committee is very
focused on acquisition reform, but we are also going to be
focused on shipbuilding this year.
I want to speak to, or ask about a very specific type of
ship, icebreakers. In general, you mentioned last year in front
of SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee], that the lack of
icebreakers, it is my understanding we have two functional
icebreakers, one of which might also be going down to Australia
on occasion, that lack of icebreakers limit our freedom of
maneuver in that region.
Since your statement last year, what actions have you taken
to mitigate this gap in Arctic operations, and have our allies
helped fill that gap since we are clearly underperforming?
General Guillot. Congresswoman, we are still severely
underperforming in icebreakers. We work very closely with the
Coast Guard to try to prioritize the Arctic region, and I have
made proposals to see if we could contract the capability from
Nordic states that produce those while we wait for the
shipbuilding to catch up with the demand.
Ms. Elfreth. Okay, can you give this committee any type of
timeline on those partnerships?
General Guillot. I personally can't. I am a recipient of
this, and so I hope it is very soon.
Ms. Elfreth. Okay, but we agree that it is important for
our national defense?
General Guillot. It is extremely important, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Elfreth. Thank you. And again, as we wait for
shipbuilding to pick up, as we wait for our partners to fill
that gap, you have also spoken about the importance of missile
defense in the Arctic, and our allies both in detection and
defense. I am new to the committee, but would it be fair to say
that the importance of strong diplomacy and strategic allyship
would not include threats of seizing territory of an ally by
military force?
General Guillot. I am not trying to be coy here, I really
don't understand the question.
Ms. Elfreth. Okay. So, we are now in a position as a nation
in which we are -- our leadership is threatening the territory
of certain allies with the use of potential military force to
seize that territory. My contention is that that is in direct
contradiction of our ability to form strategic allyships to the
end of national security. Would you agree with that statement?
General Guillot. I agree in the importance of partnerships,
and building allies for common defense given that the task that
we face with the multiple threats, four or five different
nation states that can threaten our country, we need to handle
it with partners, we can't do it alone.
Ms. Elfreth. And again, just putting a finer point on it
when it comes to detection, missile defense, but also these
critical icebreakers as we are seeing ice thin, as we are
seeing particularly post invasion of Ukraine, a great Russian
incursion into the Arctic, those strategic partnerships and
allyships have never been so important in that region?
General Guillot. I would agree with everything that you
just said, ma'am.
Ms. Elfreth. Okay, thank you very much.
Mr. Chair, I yield my time.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. McGuire.
Mr. McGuire. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for our
witnesses for coming here today to speak to the committee. I
believe that a number one priority, as President Trump has
said, is to protect the homeland. And I have a bunch of
questions, but I will just see if we have got enough time to
get them. I will ask each of you one at a time, would you agree
that China has more ability to attack the homeland today than
they did 4 years ago? I will start with the Admiral.
Admiral Holsey. Yes.
General Guillot. Yes, they do, sir.
Mr. Salesses. Absolutely.
Mr. Leonardo. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. McGuire. I recently -- and by the way, we need to have
reliable allies, not reliant allies. And so, under President
Regan we were spending 6 percent of our GDP on national
defense, and it has dwindled down to close to 2 percent, and so
I am in big support of keeping the American people safe. And I
think the decisions that President Trump has made has caused
our allies to step up, and actually be reliable partners, not
reliant partners.
And I think for us to deal with North Korea, Iran, China,
Russia, we have got to strengthen those relationships, and we
can't do it alone. And so, I think we are moving in the right
direction. I recently participated in a CODEL in SOUTHCOM, and
by the way I served in the Navy SEALS, most of my experience
was SOUTHCOM, and I learned that the cartels will lie, cheat,
steal, and they will kill you to get their way.
And there is no way they are giving up a billion-dollar
business. Now, when we were down at the border we talked with
the mayor, the sheriff, business owners, we met with ICE
agents, Border Patrol, and the 10th Mountain Division, and we
asked them what are your concerns, what is going on? And they
said that on one particular Saturday border crosses were zero,
compared to 2,000 crosses a year before.
And so, I think as I heard one of the members say, we
didn't need new policies, we needed a new president who was
serious about protecting the homeland. But that being the case,
what I heard from every one of those groups was they can see
drones coming from Mexico, they can see where they are coming
from, and they are hovering around our Border Patrol vehicles,
they are hovering around our military bases.
And General, I heard you say that you had permission to
shoot them down, but I spoke with five different agencies, and
they all, as of a couple of weeks ago, said they were not sure.
So, it is not clear. So, I would like to hear what the answer
is, can they, or can they not shoot these drones down?
General Guillot. They -- when I said we could shoot them
down, that is over an installation that is covered under
130(I). The forces on the border at this time are not, because
they are mobile, and so I have put in a request for 130(I) to
be expanded to include U.S. forces within 5 miles of the
border.
Mr. McGuire. I understand. And where there are many ways to
possibly solve this problem, we are looking at legislation that
takes a different approach, but we will talk about that later,
but we should have had this settled 2 years ago. Basically
there are many times in our history where our soldiers have
been caught with their pants down, and they are reactive, not
proactive.
And we should be able to detect and engage far before they
get anywhere near our soldiers or our installations. Let's talk
about fentanyl, I call it Chinese chemical warfare. It is being
produced in China, coming across our southern border, and
poisoning the American people. China believes that everything
can be used as a weapon and should be used as a weapon.
And if it were ten people a year dying from fentanyl
overdose, it would be egregious, and I heard a member say it
was 50,000 people, but I have heard a number over 100,000
people a year dying from fentanyl poisoning, and if we don't
make a strong stance such as shoot the people that are bringing
it over, if the penalty is not high enough, they are going to
continue to poison us.
Now, you think about we have had skirmishes with
adversaries in the history of our country where less than
100,000 people died in the skirmish, and I think we are at war
and we don't want to admit it. And so, we have got to do
something about it. How has -- I saw a video where the cartels
under cover said that they were actually using the northern,
coming in through Canada trying to get the fentanyl in, is that
true or false, and what can we do?
General Guillot. Sir, it is true that they use avenues
other than the south, come through the north, comes through the
mail, comes through all sorts of different mechanisms to get
into the United States.
Mr. McGuire. What can we do as a Congress to help you
logistically better protect our homeland, and make sure that if
we are going to put our soldiers and assets on the border, that
they are safe, and they are proactive, that they have got a
better chance of coming home?
General Guillot. Sir, the first request I would have would
be to expand the 130(I) so we can shoot down drones not just
that are in self-defense, but anything that is surveilling,
planning, planning the next attack on us, within 5 miles of the
border.
Mr. McGuire. Thank you, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Whitesides.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for being here today. This is a time with novel challenges in
these AORs, and your testimony is very timely. I know there has
been a lot of discussion on moving sensing missions to space,
namely to be put into proliferated LEO [low earth orbit]
constellations. Most of my career has been focused on securing
U.S. leadership in space, both from an economic and a national
security perspective.
With that in mind, I would not be the first to say that
space-based sensing is a vital part of our sensing
capabilities, but not the only part. I am concerned, the recent
reports of novel weapons systems being placed into orbit could
result in a strategic surprise if we don't have redundancy
across domains when it comes to sensing air and missile
threats.
General Guillot, can you share your view of the appropriate
role and relationship between space-based sensing capabilities,
and the need for sensing redundancies across domains?
General Guillot. Congressman, I do -- I am very encouraged
by the increased capability that space brings us, and sensors
from there, but I have always advocated for a layered approach
that goes from the undersea, the land, air, and space to ensure
that we aren't over reliant on one domain, and we can layer the
approach for detecting threats to the continental United
States.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you so much. Now, as we all know,
NORTHCOM's AOR has seen increased threats not only from foreign
adversaries, but from natural disasters like wildfires,
hurricanes, and floods. It is no secret that the increased
cadence and severity of these disasters pose a serious threat
to our CONUS military installations readiness, and to our
homeland itself.
General Guillot and Admiral, can you speak to the utility
of -- to the extent you can, can you speak to the utility of
the National Guard's FireGuard program, which uses satellite
sensing capabilities for near real time wildfire intelligence,
not only as a means of protecting our constituents, but of
safeguarding our ability to effectively protect our homeland?
General Guillot. Sir, I can tell you that that system is of
great benefit to us, as we hit the ever-expanding wildfire
season. It used to be more closely defined, now it is almost
year-round, as we saw with the tragic fires in southern
California earlier this year. So, we use that, and we know,
based on what we are seeing through those sensors, where we
might need to provide DOD assistance to NIFC [National
Interagency Fire Center] and others if it exceeds their
capacity.
Mr. Whitesides. You get huge points for knowing NIFC, and
all that, so thank you so much for your comments on that. I
think it is a very important thing and would love to work with
you as we think about those things in the future. I would just
close with a tough one, and maybe it is more of a statement
than a comment, and I know it has been addressed here
extensively already.
But I think the recent quotes of the prime minister of
Canada, who said it is clear that the U.S. is no longer a
reliable partner, it is possible with comprehensive
negotiations we could reestablish an element of confidence, but
there will be no going backwards, the old relationship we had
with the United States based on deepening integration of our
economies, and tight security, and military cooperation is over
he said, that is the prime minister of Canada said that.
How does this posture impact your ability to defend the
United States from threats conveyed through the Arctic, and
through other northern territories?
General Guillot. Congressman, we have been fortunate that
the relationship, military to military relationship with
Canada, primarily in NORAD, which is a binational command, has
been as strong as ever over the recent months. And we are all
dedicated to detecting air and maritime threats and ensuring
that we can defeat those threats to protect the U.S. and
Canada. So, I have not seen any negative ramifications at the
military-to-military level.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, sir.
I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr.
Messmer.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you, Chairman. General Guillot, I would
like to follow up on a question my colleague asked earlier
about your testimony that in 2024 the Russian Navy partook in a
training exercise with their submarines, nuclear subs in the
Atlantic Ocean. If these were to become more of an occurrence,
would you continue to task the Navy with the same tempo of
material, time, and manpower for all future Russian vessel
visits in your area of responsibility?
General Guillot. Sir, depending on the type of vessels,
yes.
Mr. Messmer. Okay, thank you. Also in your testimony you
mentioned that air and missile threats to the United States
from our adversaries continue to mount as North Korea tests
ICBMs, Russia and China expand their stockpiles of long-range
missiles, one program that falls under NORTHCOM's purview of
current activities is the next generation interceptor.
Your testimony states that it is a high priority for
NORTHCOM to have the on-time fielding of this interceptor. What
would be the implications if fielding this system were to be
delayed?
General Guillot. Congressman, if the fielding of the NGI,
or the Next Generation Interceptor were delayed, we would run
the risk of falling behind our ability to defeat any rogue
nation ICBM that threatens the United States.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you. Additionally, ground-based
interceptors are dedicated to defending against threats that
come from places such as Iran and North Korea. Due to
increasing threats from other adversaries such as China and
Russia, should policies be changed to allow for defense against
those countries as well?
General Guillot. Congressman, I think that we should always
look at our policies, and while they have served us well to
this point, I think we should look at them against the current
and expected threat, and make sure that the policies are
aligned.
Mr. Messmer. Okay, thank you. Those interceptors are only
effective against ballistic threats. Given your testimony about
increasing hypersonic threat, do you think the President needs
a space-based interceptor to effectively counter our
adversaries?
General Guillot. Sir, I think similar to the answer I just
gave on detecting, I think having a layered approach with both
space and ground based would be effective. And then also as you
mentioned hypersonics, the fact that they can maneuver end game
means that we need to invest in capabilities to defeat that
threat, which is very different from a ballistic threat.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you. Admiral Holsey, over the past
several years China has made warring advances and building
influences with militaries within our hemisphere. Beijing has
bolstered its equipment sales and donations and offered
attractive training and exchange opportunities to regional
militaries. As this has happened, the U.S. has placed
increasing restrictions on its military cooperation and reduced
its overall offering to Latin American militaries.
What is SOUTHCOM doing differently this year, and going
forward to respond to this warring dynamic?
General Guillot. Sir, that is a very great question. As I
look at the region in general, I try to reach out to our
partners, and meet them where they are, and ask them what is it
that they need. Time and time again, security cooperation at
the very top, maritime demeanor awareness, cyber support, space
support. So, right now we are trying to meet them, and I look
at just from the cyber standpoint, we have been able to work
with our partners, specifically Paraguay, and Costa Rica, and
others in the region to help build their cyber capabilities.
So, that is one of the key things in Colombia right now,
our partners are asking for counter-UAS technology, they are
learning lessons from FARC-EP [Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia-People's Army], ELN, learning lessons from Ukraine,
and using basically rudimentary UAVs to attack our partners.
So, again, trying to meet them where they are at, and deliver
at the point of need.
Mr. Messmer. Okay. Are current resource allotments for
SOUTHCOM sufficient to accomplish this?
Admiral Holsey. No.
Mr. Messmer. Okay, thank you. Also, today the U.S. military
has nearly 40 bases with 100,000 troops across Europe. By
contrast, the U.S. has only two military bases in Latin
America, and none in South America. At the same time, Beijing
has ramped up its increasingly militarized presence in Latin
America, including through dual use infrastructure that can be
used easily to target the U.S., or disrupt critical supply
chains, such as the Panama Canal.
The U.S. also faces deadly threats within our hemisphere
from drug cartels and weaponized mass migration, that
increasingly require a central role for the U.S. military.
Given all this, is it appropriate and sufficient for the U.S.
to have such a limited operational presence so close to home?
Admiral Holsey. No, Congressman, we need to increase our
ability to engage and respond. Again, credible, present,
engaged, more assets, again, it sends a strong signal to our
partners that we are there with them, and we are not doing that
now.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you, I yield back my time.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New Hampshire,
Ms. Goodlander.
Ms. Goodlander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses for being here today. My home state New Hampshire
shares a 58-mile border with Canada. It is a border that has
been peaceful, it is a relationship, as you have all testified,
that is really important to American national security. Winston
Churchill said that it is a border that has been peaceful
because it is guarded by our neighborly respect, and honorable
obligations to one another.
General, starting with you, could you tell us why does the
relationship between the United States and Canada matter?
General Guillot. Congresswoman, from my perspective it is
because we are part of a binational command in NORAD, and we
share the strong and important burden of defending Canada and
the United States against air and maritime threats, and that is
built on capability and trust.
Ms. Goodlander. So, the North American Aerospace Defense
Command, NORAD, you mentioned it is the world's only binational
command, what would it mean for American national security if
Canada were to pull out of its cooperation with our country in
NORAD?
General Guillot. We would have to fundamentally change how
we approached air defense and maritime warning because of the
shared and distributed nature of the command, and its
capabilities today.
Ms. Goodlander. And how would you go about doing that, what
would that require?
General Guillot. To be honest I haven't put thought to it,
but obviously resources. We would need additional radar
coverage, we would need additional aircraft, and maritime
assets to cover what Canada provides today.
Ms. Goodlander. You mentioned air and maritime cooperation,
what about land cooperation? Where has, in your assessment,
where have our Canadian partners fallen short with respect to
the security of our homeland, and our broader security along
our northern border?
General Guillot. Well, as we look at securing the borders,
and having territorial integrity, I have talked with the chief
of the defense staff, General Carignan, about the potential
that we would look at looking to seal the north border. They
have a system similar to ours where they have government, but
non-military capability that is augmented by military. While we
haven't started any planning, we recognize that any planning to
seal the northern border would be done jointly.
Ms. Goodlander. Is there a national security crisis, is
there a national emergency at our northern border right now?
General Guillot. There has not been one established,
although it is something that we watch closely to -- watch at
both borders to see what is coming across in terms of illegal
migration, or illegal drugs, or other illegal activities.
Ms. Goodlander. So, to be clear, as you see it, there is no
national emergency at our northern border?
General Guillot. Well, I think there is -- I don't want to
get into semantics, a national emergency has not been declared
on the northern border like it was on the southern border. But
I do think that we need to look at all of our borders and the
security of them with a high level of urgency.
Ms. Goodlander. So, is a trade war with Canada justified
right now based on your assessment of our security at our
northern border?
General Guillot. Ma'am, that is not my place to answer. I
can tell you on the mil-to-mil relationship, which I have
stated is very strong with Canada, and they are our strong
partners in NORAD.
Ms. Goodlander. Suppose a trade war will have an impact on
our mil-to-mil relationship with Canada, would it be justified?
General Guillot. Ma'am, that is a hypothetical that I don't
think I should address. I do think that the -- again, the
relationship in NORAD with the Canadians is very strong, and my
goal is to keep it strong.
Ms. Goodlander. General, Admiral, I want to ask you, you
have both served our country well and faithfully for many
years. What is the role of military lawyers in our national
security, and having a military that operates under the rule of
law? Admiral, have military lawyers been important throughout
your long career of service to our country?
Admiral Holsey. Congresswoman, throughout my career I have
had military lawyers advise me at the appropriate time dealing
with different justice cases, so they have been helpful.
Ms. Goodlander. So, is the firing of senior judge advocate
generals justified?
Admiral Holsey. That is a policy decision, ma'am, and I
would refer you to the policy.
Ms. Goodlander. Well, your testimony today is that military
lawyers have played an important role in your career, and in
the functioning of our military under a system of rule of law.
Admiral Holsey. Yes, they have been a help in providing
advice to me, yes.
Ms. Goodlander. And General, can you speak to the
importance of military lawyers in our system?
Admiral Holsey. They are extremely important, I rely on
them heavily, in fact there is one in this room right now, I
won't tell you who it is, but on our staff we use them all the
time.
Ms. Goodlander. Well thank you, I appreciate your testimony
on that front, because I think there is a real threat to the
rule of law in our country today, and from what I have seen in
my --
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time is expired.
Ms. Goodlander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Colorado -- you just snuck in on me. I am sorry, Mr. Crank, Mr.
Fallon stole your thunder.
The gentleman from Texas is recognized.
Mr. Fallon. My deepest apologies. Thank you all for coming.
General, what is NORTHCOM's primary mission?
General Guillot. Sir, it is homeland defense.
Mr. Fallon. Defend the homeland, right?
General Guillot. That is right.
Mr. Fallon. Do transnational gangs and Mexican drug cartels
present a threat to our homeland?
General Guillot. Yes, they do.
Mr. Fallon. Fair to say that they can be described as an
evil, heartless, sociopathic criminal?
General Guillot. I would agree with that.
Mr. Fallon. So, it would stand to reason that disrupting
their illegal activities, and reducing their revenue, and
upsetting their organization and planning would weaken
transnational gangs, and the cartels?
General Guillot. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fallon. And that would be a very good thing for the
United States?
General Guillot. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fallon. General, over the past 80 days have the Mexican
drug cartels indeed been disrupted?
General Guillot. Yes, sir, I think they have. Not fully
disrupted -- I am sorry.
Mr. Fallon. And has their revenue been -- no, go ahead.
General Guillot. Not fully disrupted, but we are --
Mr. Fallon. Sure, but disrupted?
General Guillot. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fallon. Has their revenue been reduced?
General Guillot. It has.
Mr. Fallon. And has their organization and planning been
upset?
General Guillot. It has been.
Mr. Fallon. So, they have been weakened?
General Guillot. They have been weakened.
Mr. Fallon. And by the way, good job on that. So, illegal
immigration presents certain dangers to the homeland too, does
it not? As far as vetting, we don't really know who a lot of
these folks are, there is a stress on schools and medical
services if people are allowed to stay in the country, and it
also, more importantly, enriches the cartels?
General Guillot. They profit greatly from illegal
migration.
Mr. Fallon. Right, because they charge a tax, or a fee,
whatever you want to call it.
General Guillot. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fallon. And they make a lot of money, into the billions
of dollars, and in fact annually maybe estimates are as much as
into the tens of billions of dollars now?
General Guillot. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fallon. Given that then, when you reduce illegal
migration, you are denying revenue to the Mexican drug cartels?
General Guillot. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Fallon. So, in that sense, and many others, reducing
illegal immigration is in the best interests of the United
States?
General Guillot. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fallon. So, in 80 days, is that what has happened, has
illegal migration gone down?
General Guillot. By most estimates, about 97 percent, yes.
Mr. Fallon. So, dramatically, like a collapse, not even a
reduction, but a collapse?
General Guillot. That is right, sir.
Mr. Fallon. And what has changed? I mean, when you look at
some of the last 4 years, and some of the record profits that
the cartels were making, in fact in December of 2023, I think
the number was about 304,000 illegal encounters in 1 month,
what were the encounters in February of this year?
General Guillot. They dropped down from about 6,000 a day
to somewhere around 100 to 150 a day, on average.
Mr. Fallon. I think, if I am not mistaken, it was about
8,300, give or take, in February.
General Guillot. Total?
Mr. Fallon. Yeah.
General Guillot. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fallon. So, that is -- so, December 2023 would be 3,800
percent higher than February 2025?
General Guillot. It has been a dramatic decrease.
Mr. Fallon. Or to put it your way, 97 percent reduction?
General Guillot. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fallon. And what orders were you -- were you given new
orders in January of this year?
General Guillot. I was, sir. On the 21st of January we --
NORTHCOM significantly increased our presence in support of
CBP, and also really for the first time that I am aware of,
began using unique military capabilities to seal and repel at
the border.
Mr. Fallon. So, the new orders you were given by your new
Commander-in-Chief Donald J. Trump have helped secure the
homeland?
General Guillot. That, along with policy. I don't want to
say that the military has done it all, but --
Mr. Fallon. Well, the military, and certainly the Customs
and Border Patrol, and --
General Guillot. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. Fallon. I actually really, truly, and being a Texan,
feel safer today than I have in a very long time.
General Guillot. Yes, sir, and it is a team effort, as you
said, but the numbers are significantly down since we became
increasingly involved in the --
Mr. Fallon. Kudos to you, and Admiral Holsey, and the great
men and women we have on the border, and the Federal agencies
as well. And, General, my final question, is NORTHCOM
collaborating with the Department of Homeland Security to
integrate new and innovative technologies and strategies into
the border security operations?
General Guillot. Yes, sir. And directly with the CBP I have
established a technology working group that is looking to see
how in the near and long-term we can transition some of the
manpower into technological means to keep the border sealed,
and the threat repelled.
Mr. Fallon. Just all options open.
General Guillot. We are looking at everything, yes, sir.
Mr. Fallon. I am going to tell you a little story, in Texas
when I was in the legislature, they were using deer blinds, I
mean just something that simple, and put hundreds of them on
the border, and that was just helping as well. So, thank you
very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Tran.
Mr. Tran. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for testifying
today, like all of you I am deeply concerned with the CCP's
encroachment in NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM's AOR. The CCP is using a
multi prong strategy that blends economic, diplomatic, cyber,
and military tools to attempt to displace U.S. influence in and
around the Western Hemisphere. We will start with you, Admiral.
How is NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM synchronizing their efforts to
address the growing influence of the PRC across both AORs?
Admiral Holsey. So, first of all, thank you for that
question, Congressman. So, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, we always
work together in very deliberate fashion, whether it is drug
trade, but specifically as I look at China, it is the joint
exercise program. We continue to do that, every exercise, every
conference we do, we always invite our NORTHCOM partners there,
we invite the ambassador to Mexico to our training as well.
Again, it is that overarching effort to identify threats
and get after it. But again, we have to continue to build
partner capacity together as well.
Mr. Tran. Thank you. General, anything to add?
General Guillot. No, sir, everything he said is exactly the
same from our perspective.
Mr. Tran. Appreciate it. Going on, how are both NORTHCOM
and SOUTHCOM working to build military relationships in the
region that counterbalance China's growing defense cooperation
with countries like Venezuela and Brazil? General, you want to
take this one?
General Guillot. Sure. We strive, sir, to have strong mil-
to-mil relationships so that our partner nation looks to us
first. We do that -- so, we have three countries that are
partners in NORTHCOM, with Mexico we have a strong mil-to-mil
relationship built on a foundation of exercises and subject
matter exchanges. We also deal with the Bahamas as the third
country in our region.
I would say that the mil-to-mil relationship is strong
there, however I am increasingly concerned about the
vulnerability to Chinese actions outside of the military, and
we are trying to see if we can take outsized efforts in the
Bahamas to try to curb that.
Mr. Tran. Thank you. Admiral?
Admiral Holsey. Yes, thank you. So, as I look at the
region, I go to what our partners are asking for. They are
continuing to ask for our presence, again, maritime presence,
ships, and everything else, maritime domain awareness, cyber
support, so again, we are trying to build the capability and
capacity with cyber. More and more they are asking for space
support, as you may be aware.
They have more space and labor infrastructure in SOUTHCOM
AOR, second only to mainland China. So, again, cyber, space.
All of the joint exercises that we do have some component of
cyber and/or space. Again, whether it's UNITAS, different
exercises we do, to try to build that capability and capacity.
Mr. Tran. Thank you. And as you sit here today, can you
identify any additional authorities or resources that your
department may need to effectively counter China's influence in
the Western Hemisphere?
Admiral Holsey. Certainly. So, right now the first thing I
would point to is security cooperation. That is my largest
lever, so when I get more support there, I can do more. I can
do more -- where right now we are building a cyber support
center in two other countries in the region, those things help
me out. So, again, any way I can get more support for security
cooperation, that builds my portfolio.
Mr. Tran. General?
General Guillot. Sir, I do not lack any authorities
required to counter Chinese presence.
Mr. Tran. How about resources?
General Guillot. I will always take more. But actually I
don't have any unfilled requests at this time.
Mr. Tran. Thank you.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
The Chairman. I have never heard that before, General.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Crank.
Mr. Crank. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being
here and testifying today. General Guillot, it took you a long
time to get to your hometown Congressman, but here I go. Thank
you, I am very proud to have Northern Command in Colorado
Springs, and the wonderful work that you do. I am especially
proud, and it has been noted here by you and by others, about
the great work that you have been doing since January 21st to
execute the new authorities given to you by President Trump at
the southern border.
I think it is a very clear message that most people here on
Capitol Hill have gotten, that the American people want that
problem solved. And not everybody here has gotten the memo yet,
but I think most people have, and I know that all Americans are
very appreciative of the efforts that you are doing. I also
want to discuss the great work that Northern Command, and Fort
Carson's 4th Infantry Division are doing there at the southern
border.
And just incredible that in 2 months you got illegal border
crossings down 97 percent, just incredible work. But I also
want to talk about another priority. President Trump made
securing the homeland from missiles a major priority for his
administration, and I am excited for the Golden Dome
initiative, and what it means for NORTHCOM, and for our
national security.
And as you know, there is ongoing conversations on the Hill
about how much spectrum DOD needs to fulfill its mission. And
General Guillot, can you share how a sizable reduction in
spectrum allocations for the Department could affect NORTHCOM's
ability to fulfil its duties? And as a follow up to Chairman
Rogers' question about Golden Dome, understanding that details
aren't finalized.
But if DOD was required to vacate the lower three spectrum
bands, would that simply delay the ability of the Department to
get Golden Dome to full operational capabilities, or would it
render it impossible to deploy? And can you help me understand
the magnitude of the value of the spectrum in deploying Golden
Dome?
General Guillot. Congressman, first it is a pleasure to be
headquartered in Colorado Springs, a very supportive community.
The spectrum is -- having full use of the spectrum is essential
for the homeland defense mission based on the variety of
sensors and capabilities that must work together to build that
network of detection and defeat capabilities.
In particular, the part of the spectrum that is most often
a challenge would be from basically three to 3.5 gigahertz. And
because of physics, that gives us the best ability to combine
range and fidelity, which together help us track inbound
threats. So, you couldn't move to another part of the spectrum
and get the same capability.
So, I am very concerned about losing access to that part of
the spectrum, because of the importance it plays in our
homeland defense systems.
Mr. Crank. So, given that this is a priority of President
Trump, how concerned should we be as members of Congress, as we
are sitting and looking at this possibility of selling off
spectrum?
General Guillot. Congressman, I would suggest that you be
very concerned, especially in the key ranges that your military
experts will help describe, to ensure that we don't have to
lose or share that spectrum, because of the importance to our
mission.
Mr. Crank. Thank you. Any other thoughts on that from any
of the other witnesses? No, okay, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my time.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Vindman.
Mr. Vindman. Thank you, chair. General Guillot, the United
States and Canada have shared and prospered from a strong
bilateral partnership for several decades. NORAD is a critical
component of our homeland defense, and provides aerospace
warning and control for North America, which includes
detection, validation, and warning of attacks, as well as
monitoring of aircraft suspected of illegal drug trafficking, a
layered all domain defense.
However, the administration has threatened this
relationship with comments about making Canada our 51st state,
and dramatic changes to our trade relationship. Because of
this, Canadian officials are starting to assess whether a
bilateral partnership, again, a relationship that makes us
safer, is beneficial. At the same time, our competitors have
the capability and capacity to threaten all of North America
with a wide range of threats.
If Canada and the United States were to halt our long-
standing military cooperation, would it be harder to fulfill
the current NORAD mission, and increase the threat on the
United States?
General Guillot. Congressman, the binational relationship -
- excuse me, the binational command that we enjoy in NORAD
between the Canadians and the United States as you mentioned,
has been established for almost 70 years. Everything that we do
in the aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime
warning is interwoven between the U.S. and Canadian
capabilities. If we were to lose that --
Mr. Vindman. Not to cut you off, is the answer it would be
more difficult to fulfill the mission?
General Guillot. If we were to lose that, there are certain
avenues of approach that we could not cover alone from the
United States.
Mr. Vindman. Okay, thank you. And so, with the President's
proposal for a Golden Dome, would that make the implementation
of the Golden Dome, and I understand this still needs to be
fleshed out, exactly what it is, would it make it more
difficult to implement that system?
General Guillot. Sir, not at this time, because Canada has
a policy, a national policy against conducting ballistic
missile defense. So, all of our ballistic missile defense
capabilities are solely U.S.
Mr. Vindman. If we are looking at early warning, and other
aspects of that relationship, would it affect those aspects?
General Guillot. Early warning for ballistic missiles is
all the United States, early warning for cruise missiles is a
shared responsibility between Canada and the United States.
Mr. Vindman. Okay, thank you. And can you tell me, in the
July 24 intercept, did Canada participate in that intercept?
General Guillot. The July 24 -- I assume you are talking
about the combined bomber patrol with Russian and Chinese
aircraft --
Mr. Vindman. Correct.
General Guillot. Yes, we intercepted with three sets of
fighters, one of those sets of fighters was a Canadian flight
of CF-18s.
Mr. Vindman. Thank you. Mr. Salesses, you were acting
Secretary of Defense for a short period of time in the Trump
Administration, is that correct?
Mr. Salesses. That is correct.
Mr. Vindman. And that is an immense responsibility, and
honor, isn't it?
Mr. Salesses. It is an incredible honor.
Mr. Vindman. And you took that responsibility seriously?
Mr. Salesses. Absolutely.
Mr. Vindman. Were you involved in any Signal chats, either
small group, PC [Principals Committee], or anything that sounds
like an NSA [National Security Advisor] type meeting, PC
[Principals Committee], PCC [Policy Coordination Committees, DC
[Deputies Committee], during your time as acting secretary?
Mr. Salesses. No, I was not, I don't even have Signal chat.
Mr. Vindman. Okay. And part of your responsibility as
Secretary was to enforce good order and discipline, is that
correct?
Mr. Salesses. That is correct.
Mr. Vindman. And if a servicemember had violated
operational security, would you expect that there would be
charges on that servicemember?
Mr. Salesses. We have policies that govern what we do on
security violations.
Mr. Vindman. And so, have you read the Signal chats that --
the reports on the Signal chats?
Mr. Salesses. No, I have not. And based on it being under
review, I think it is inappropriate for me to comment on that.
Mr. Vindman. Okay, but you have not read the chats, that
article, you are not familiar with that?
Mr. Salesses. I am familiar that it is out there, I haven't
read it.
Mr. Vindman. Okay, would you -- you said you don't have
Signal, is that correct?
Mr. Salesses. That is correct
Mr. Vindman. Well, it is my opinion, and the opinion of
many, especially from my time as a member of the National
Security Council staff, that those chats were completely
inappropriate. I was frankly floored, seeing that there was a
small group PC that was on signal, a not secure, non-government
system. And as a servicemember, as a commander, I certainly
would have been preferring charges on somebody that committed
that violation.
As a JAG [Judge Advocate General] officer I would have been
preparing to prosecute those, and when you have a spill, you
have to investigate the spill, you have to remediate it,
because you have to understand the full scope of the damage,
and you have to hold people accountable, and I haven't seen
that yet, and that is a major problem.
Thank you, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Guam, Mr.
Moylan.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Assistant Secretary,
thank you for meeting with me just last week during your visit
to Guam with Secretary Hegseth. The secretary demonstrated a
historic commitment to support Guam and build out the right
missile defense system for the island. Another administration
priority has been the development of the Golden Dome to protect
the entire United States.
So, how will Guam's missile defense be part of this Golden
Dome approach, and how would the Golden Dome make the people of
Guam safer?
Mr. Leonardo. Thank you, Congressman, it was a pleasure to
meet you as well. As you noted, Secretary Hegseth actually was
the first secretary since Donald Rumsfeld to visit Guam, so he
was very proud to be able to do that and note that Guam is part
of the homeland. And so, as you know it is a high priority to
appropriately defend Guam, and that will definitely be part of
considerations as we consider the larger Golden Dome
initiative.
Mr. Moylan. Excellent. Let's see, a program that I also
supported is the National Guard State Partnership Program,
which SOUTHCOM often relies upon to work with regional
partners, I am particularly proud of Guam National Guard's work
in their state partnership with the Republic of Palau and the
Philippines.
So, Admiral, given that there were 18 U.S. states that have
established National Guard partnerships with Latin American
countries, and 30 participating partner nations within your
area of responsibility, have you gained any insight which can
help Congress further support the state partnership program?
Admiral Holsey. Thank you, Congressman. The state
partnership, we actually have 24 states supporting 30 countries
in the region. They do typically over 325 activities in the
hemisphere, so it is a great lever, it is probably one of my
largest levers next to security cooperation. Again, I can't get
enough of it, so we are looking for more opportunity, and
definitely from the standpoint of a joint exercise program.
They are going down, they are doing aviation ops, they are
doing cyber ops, so these things are all very important to
build up partner capability and capacity.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you. Then for NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM are
actively monitoring and countering the influence external state
actors including China and Russia. These concerns also have a
significant impact on Guam, in particular Guam and the CNMI
[Commonwealth of the North Mariana Islands] have seen a
noticeable rise in illegal Chinese immigration, with
individuals using our shores as a point of entry into the U.S.
Additionally, Guam has been grappling with influx of drugs,
including fentanyl and methamphetamine. In your testimony you
have thoroughly outlined the efforts your commands have
undertaken to secure our southern border, and to carry out
counter-narcotic missions. This question is for both the
Admiral and the General, what have been your most effective
strategies for addressing illegal immigration and narcotic
trafficking across the southern border?
General Guillot. Congressman, the most effective technique
we have used is partnership with the Border Patrol. We serve in
nine different mission areas that are Border Patrol mission
areas where they just lack the capacity, not the capability,
but the capacity. And so, our ability to fill in with military
capability there has been helpful.
But over the last 2 months, being able to also provide
unique military capabilities that aren't resident in DHS to
help complement those mission areas that are has led to or
contributed to the dramatic reductions that we have talked
about here today.
Admiral Holsey. With regard to the counter drug piece, and
migration both, I think the first of all consistent presence is
required to interdict in that mission there, for the drugs, so
we continue to do that. We work there very closely with our
partners. So, our allies and partners contributed to over 80
percent of our interdictions last year along with us.
So, again, we look at that piece there, building capability
and capacity with our partners, I look at the Panamanian
example, specifically going through the Darien Gap, they have
been able to close that gap down. Again, so working with our
partners, and security cooperation helps them to achieve that.
Mr. Moylan. Okay, the Guam missile defense system is being
built to protect the people of Guam and is a critical military
logistical hub in the Indo-Pacific from ballistic missiles, and
this question is for the general. In your testimony you spoke
about the need to improve our ability to detect and track
incoming threats, such as missiles from our adversaries.
Are current systems being developed and implemented going
into providing tracking across the specific to also support
Guam missile defense system, and if not, what else are we doing
to ensure that it does?
General Guillot. Congressman, my responsibility is to
defend the Continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii, but
the systems -- INDOPACOM is responsible for defending Guam,
however the systems that we are talking about --
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Bell of Missouri.
Mr. Bell. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, and Ranking Member
Smith. Hello, General Guillot, and Admiral Holsey, Mr.
Leonardo, and Mr. Salesses. Last year we saw a notable increase
in drone and UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle] activity near
sensitive infrastructure, including military installations. In
my home state of Missouri, we are proud to host several crucial
and vital military and intelligence installations, including
NGA [National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency] West in my
district in St. Louis.
I am deeply concerned regarding the threats unauthorized
drones pose to our intelligence operations and military
personnel. General Guillot, are there additional authorizations
NORAD and NORTHCOM need that can help enhance their ability to
detect and counter unauthorized drones and UASes?
General Guillot. Congressman, the biggest benefit that we
would get would be from expanding 130(I) authorities to include
information sharing with -- on those tracks, with federal,
state, and local law enforcement. Would be to classify all DOD
installations as covered under 130(I) instead of just select
ones. And then also to expand the area that we can engage a UAS
instead of being limited to the perimeter of the installation,
to go slightly outside so we can get UAVs that might be looking
across into our installations.
Or somebody that we detected and is trying to get away,
that we can get them and capture whatever it is that they
surveilled over our installations.
Mr. Bell. Given the critical role that geospatial
intelligence plays in air defense with the development of
hypersonic weapons and advanced drone technologies by our
adversaries, how does NORTHCOM collaborate with NGA West to
enhance and optimize the operational effectiveness and mission
planning of our Air Force's assets?
General Guillot. Sir, they are an extremely important
partner with us, in fact we have a presence in our headquarters
of NGA personnel, because of the day-to-day reliance we have in
all of our mission areas. To be clear, every advanced mission
we do includes NGA capabilities.
Mr. Bell. Admiral Holsey, given the Trump Administration's
waver for funding the multinational security support mission in
Haiti, and the recent delivery of $6 millionin armed vehicles
and heavy equipment to Haitian national police to combat gang
violence with SOUTHCOM playing a key role in delivering the
support, can you outline whether SOUTHCOM plans to provide
additional equipment or resources to the MSS or Haitian
national police?
Admiral Holsey. Congressman, there has been no decline in
funding at this point. I have funding to the end of the year to
support the Haitian national police and the MSS mission. So,
right now my role is logistics, supplies, service, and support.
I have done that since the airport was closed, and I continue
to do that to this day.
Mr. Bell. And how does the ongoing insecurity in Haiti
impact SOUTHCOM's operational readiness, particularly in
addressing broader regional security challenges?
Admiral Holsey. I think we have to watch the Haiti province
there very closely, that is one of the key items I have been
watching for the last couple years. I would say that as we
continue to go down this path, if the unrest continues it will
require more support, and we look for a -- continue to push,
and hopefully the international community will come in as well
to do a UN [United Nations] Peacekeeping mission, that is
probably the way forward.
Mr. Bell. Thank you, and I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Harrigan.
Mr. Harrigan. General and Admiral, thanks for your
testimony today, genuinely appreciate it, and am certainly very
thankful for a 97 percent reduction in illegal immigration
coming from our southern border. I think that is a phenomenal
testament to your work, the work of the men and women who serve
underneath your commands, and my only encouragement is to go
stop the other three. So, from the American people, thank you.
And Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the beginning in
the opening statements, I noticed our witnesses talked about
the importance in the Western Hemisphere in the north and the
south from countering the importation of the authoritarian
model of government. I noticed last though, that to counter
this, that our witnesses said we could do this by our bonding
and relationship with arms sales, with rule of law, and
disaster assistance.
All things that you said were important in the
relationship. And also in questioning, heard people say when
they were saying did recent events affect our relationship with
these partners that are so important in the hemisphere? Saying
that well, it is a whole of government approach, and military-
to-military it is fine, but it is whole of government.
So, I just want to look at a couple of issues here, arms
sales, one of the things that bonds us. Eight countries
participated together on the F-35 partnership. And the
successor, F-47, President Trump the version sold to our allies
would be deliberately downgraded because someday they won't be
our allies. Does that sound, Mr. Leonardo, like the kind of
whole of government approach that we should be taking?
Mr. Leonardo. Sir, as you noted, working alongside our
allies and partners is key to securing the region, and all of
the work that we do in the Department of Defense across the
world, we definitely rely on our allies and partners to do
that.
Mr. Keating. Well, I am glad you said that, but it is not
conforming with reality, and the facts that are being done. You
see the results, Canada just made a $4.2 billion agreement with
Australia just this past month in dealing with cutting-edge
radar. And they are now engaged in talks publicly with the EU
[European Union] in their discrete defense building, separate
from the United States.
These are the results that we are getting in our hemisphere
from this kind of whole of government approach that President
Trump is issuing. In Brazil they are just continuing to trade
with China, and they are doing it in Chinese currency, putting
our dollar on the sidelines. And disaster relief that is
supposed to bond us all together, President Trump just cut the
USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] money
drastically.
The same disaster relief that we are talking about that
will bond us together in the Western Hemisphere. And I can't
imagine, do you think, Mr. Leonardo, that saying to Canada that
they should be the 51st state is a whole of government approach
bringing our allies together?
Mr. Leonardo. Sir, I just recently met with my counterpart
in Canada, and as noted earlier, the mil-to-mil relationship is
strong --
Mr. Keating. So, you are saying they like this in Canada,
they are happy with that statement in Canada?
Mr. Leonardo. As noted earlier, we want to make sure we
have reliable partners, and not reliant partners. And at times
with our friends we have to be firm --
Mr. Keating. So, having statehood is good, you don't think
that is demeaning to the country of Canada?
Mr. Leonardo. Sir, as noted earlier --
Mr. Keating. What about taking over Greenland if necessary
by force? Is that making us bond with our people here? What
about threatening to invade Mexico, is that making us bond with
them? Or Panama, for that matter? I mean, these are things you
think the whole of government approach, bringing us together?
And what about the rule of law? What about the rule of law, one
of the things that was referenced in the beginning holding us
together?
Do you think that having a Vice President that says, well,
if the courts here say one thing, what are they going to do,
they can't make us implement that. Is that a good statement in
a whole of government, for these bonding things we talked about
right at the outset of this hearing?
I am just -- Mr. Leonardo, maybe you found the one person
in Canada that wasn't offended by saying it wasn't -- the
President did want to make them the 51st state, but what about
the rest of Canada?
You can't close your eyes to these things. And I understand
the military is going to work in their universe, but you are
here representing the administration. Can you sit there and
tell me these are things that bond us together the same way
that the initial testimony indicated?
Mr. Leonardo. After many administrations' attempts to have
our allies and partners increase their investment into defense,
President Trump was the first to get the Europeans to pay more.
I think sometimes we need to have tough love with our allies
and partners, so that we can be reliable --
Mr. Keating. Well, I will say this. If I --
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
McCormick.
Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And with your
permission I would like to yield 30 seconds to Representative
Van Orden.
Mr. Van Orden. Mr. Leonardo, if someone in a previous
administration on the National Security Council conspired to
unlawfully disclose classified information to start something
like the Russia collusion hoax, should they be able to hold a
security clearance? Yes, or no?
Mr. Leonardo. No.
Mr. Van Orden. Thank you, I yield back.
Dr. McCormick. Thank you. First of all, great to see you.
General, I just talked to General Carns. He is a big fan of
yours. He is working well with you. I understand you guys are
doing great things. Appreciate you. Also, it is funny, as a
Marine, I remember sergeant majors, I always like to see that
scowl on the second role, it makes me feel much more at home, I
appreciate that. I have got a box of crayons for you when we
get done. It will be awesome, we will eat together. I
appreciate everything we are doing right now.
One of the big questions I had for -- actually, I want to
start with Admiral Holsey, if you don't mind. The Chinese
fishing fleet is really worrisome to me. Obviously, it is a
paramilitary unit that is used to kind of confound our issues,
especially in the Western Hemisphere, I am very concerned about
that.
Our maritime sovereignty in the Western Hemisphere and the
Monroe Doctrine is very important to me. I think we have really
let up on that. We have seen incursions by China, and Russia,
the influence they have in Brazil, Venezuela, Cuba, Panama,
just to name a few, it is very concerning to me. What do you
think our best tools are to combat that not only militarily,
but also from PSYOPS [Psychological Operations]?
Admiral Holsey. I think the best tools, as it goes for me,
is it goes with presence, right? Presence means power, it sends
a strong message. But also security cooperation allows us to
give a chance to build our partner capability and capacity. One
of the key things our partners are asking for is maritime
domain awareness, to get the fishing fleet. They don't have the
assets to get out there, they don't actually see what is out
there, right?
So, we have to make sure we are continuing to build their
capability and capacity and have assets to support them.
Dr. McCormick. Thank you. And what assets are we lacking? I
know that when you are talking about paramilitary force, it is
hard to confront directly obviously, we know what they are
doing for intel, we know what they are doing to confound us.
What can we do better as far as supplying you with the
necessary assets to combat this?
Admiral Holsey. So, to be clear, as I look at my Navy
assets, I have one Navy ship today, so I have got to do more. I
need more assets throughout the region. And also when I look at
the partners and what they don't have, I think security
cooperation gives those the tools they need, we have had some
great support with EXIM Bank to try and buy, and get in front
of the foreign military sales process.
But again, having the assets so they can do their own, and
we can support them, I mean our defense of this homeland is
tied to their resiliency, security, stability, so we have got
to make sure we are continuing to support them as well.
Dr. McCormick. Okay. And what can we do from a partner
aspect of encouraging these nations, especially those ones that
are tipping right now, the ones that are right on the verge of
basically handing it over to the bad guys? What do we do better
as a nation, in diplomacy, to keep them tight, to bring them
back over to where we want them to be?
Admiral Holsey. I think a starting point is to make sure
our ambassadors are in place, so they continue to work with
them, and then you start looking for ways to increase the
economic engagement. We have an economic strategic working
group we started a couple years ago working with the Department
of Commerce to look for and find that direct investment from
the United States, we have to do that.
Dr. McCormick. Excellent. General, appreciate you being
here, I don't have many questions for you. Please, give General
Carns my absolute regards, he is a stud.
General Guillot. Thank you, sir, I agree.
Dr. McCormick. With that, I yield, sir.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
This will be the last questioner in the open session, the
gentleman from New York, Mr. Ryan.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you all
being here, and as we approach 3 hours, appreciate your
resilience and endurance through all of our questions. I will
try to be relatively respectful, and gentle here. Two topics I
wanted to hit on, first, some of my colleagues have talked
about this, several on counter-UAS, but I want to just
reemphasize the importance of this point and share in my
district we have a really interesting setup where we have
Stewart International Guard Base.
Which is both International Guard, but also an actual
international civilian airport, which presents a lot of
complexities, and late last year we actually had a series of
controlled airspace drone incursions in December 2024,
including several very, very sizable drones that were within 25
feet of our C-17 fleet at Stewart. The airport actually had to
close down on the FAA side, which is in and of itself,
unprecedented.
And in conversations with leadership there at Stewart, they
are still doing their best certainly, and working very, very
hard, but feel that they still don't have full clarity on
authorities, and I appreciate some of your answers on that,
General Guillot, today. And also certainly don't have the tech,
and some of the other support pieces that they need.
So, on that note, General Guillot, you talked about 130(I),
have you actually recommended to the secretary that all
installations have that? I know you said that in your previous
answer, has that recommendation been made?
General Guillot. Yes, Congressman, I have made that
recommendation.
Mr. Ryan. Is your sense that that is moving quickly, or
there is anything we can do to accelerate that given the
urgency?
General Guillot. Sir, it has been well received, and I
think it is moving quickly, that, and the other three elements
that I have brought up, that I think we need to better address
this growing threat.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you. And I know, I think it was my
colleague Mr. Wittman spoke about sort of deploying some sort
of relatively rapidly deployable set of tools, is that
something that the committee can support, or that we can
support to push on?
General Guillot. Congressman, I will take any help I can
get there. We have the authority now to use fly-away kits, I
think we have the great relationship with FAA that would allow
us to operate them quickly, we just need to procure, and field
those kits so we can respond to Picatinny and Stewart in a fast
-- my goal would be inside of 24 hours, being able to respond.
Mr. Ryan. And just to build on that very quickly, to their
credit on the ground, and partnering with the TAG [The Adjutant
General] in New York state, there are some very sophisticated
tech capabilities there at Stewart that they are exercising and
practicing now. And so, figuring out to the chairman's point,
and the ranking member's point, how to speed up the procurement
of those exact kind of capabilities, I think is something we
are all keen to push on.
Very quickly, I wanted to shift to a different topic, and
bring both the general, and the admiral into this, and possibly
you, Mr. Leonardo, as well if we have time. There was very
concerning reporting about a potential consolidation of
NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM into a new entity, not a lot of public
details available, but I want to commend and acknowledge my
colleagues, including Chairman Rogers and SASC Chairman Wicker,
speaking out, saying, at a minimum, we are very concerned about
reports that this is being considered, and quote, "We will not
accept significant changes to our war fighting structure that
are made without a rigorous interagency process, coordination
with combatant commanders and the Joint Staff, and
collaboration with Congress."
Actually, I will start, actually, with you, Mr. Leonardo.
Is that happening right now? Is this real, is this just another
thing that has sort of been put out there, or is there an
actual interagency process playing along, and do you plan to
update the Congress and this committee on that?
Mr. Leonardo. I don't want to get ahead of internal
deliberations, but I will note we want to maintain a strong
collaboration with Congress to make sure that you have up to
date information. And I will also note as I started today, that
homeland and the Western Hemisphere are high priorities for
this administration. So, any such decisions would have to weigh
against what resources are necessary in order to fulfill the
missions that we need to do in those areas.
Mr. Ryan. Do you acknowledge, and does the administration
acknowledge that this would require an actual act of Congress
to do?
Mr. Leonardo. I wouldn't like to speak on hypothetical
questions to --
Mr. Ryan. Well, it is not hypothetical. I am asking you,
would removing a combatant command, which has been proposed,
require -- or merging two, to be specific -- require
congressional approval, and, ultimately, authorization?
Mr. Leonardo. I would have to review with the lawyers, sir,
whether or not that would require congressional authorization.
Mr. Ryan. I know we -- well, I am out of time, I appreciate
it, and I know we are at the end. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for
giving me the time.
I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. We will now recess
this open session and move to 2212 for the closed session of
the hearing, which will start at 10 minutes after 1:00 o'clock.
The committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:03 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 1, 2025
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 1, 2025
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 1, 2025
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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. General Guillot, in your testimony, you mentioned small
uncrewed aircraft systems operating over sensitive Department of
Defense sites, and that law enforcement partners have uncovered
evidence of a foreign intelligence nexus.
Can you explain how our adversaries could utilize the intelligence
that they have gathered on these sites to harm us?
General Guillot. Adversaries employing small uncrewed aircraft
systems (sUAS) have unique opportunities to collect high-resolution
information against military installations and defense critical
infrastructure. Small UAS incursions can also be used as a probing
activity to learn about defensive capabilities and responses at DOD
sites and could provide adversaries with information about DOD systems,
capabilities, and vulnerabilities.
Mr. Wilson. General Guillot, cybersecurity is critically important
in defending our military and civilian infrastructure. We've already
observed Russian and Chinese sponsored cyber-attacks on US assets, and
they possess the ability to create major disruptive attacks should
conflict occur. Q. Inter-agency cooperation is vital when it comes to
cybersecurity. Have you encountered any issues in cooperation when
working with other agencies? Have you seen, and do you foresee, an
escalation in cyber-attacks, and are you working with private industry
to help with their cybersecurity?
General Guillot. No, USNORTHCOM has not encountered cooperation
issues when working with partner agencies. USNORTHCOM works closely
with interagency partners such as Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA) to improve communications and sharing of cyber
attack information in the Homeland, and within DoD with USCYBERCOM to
defend mission systems from cyber attacks, while also coordinating with
other agencies such as FBI, for additional support if required.
USNORTHCOM foresees continued adversarial cyber activity on U.S.
critical infrastructure. USNORTHCOM works closely with our partners at
CISA and USCYBERCOM as the primary way to help private industry improve
cybersecurity protection and cyber defense capabilities.
Mr. Wilson. Admiral Holsey, in February, the Department of State
designated eight international cartels as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations. This designation provides more options for the US to
utilize military action against the organizations that are smuggling
synthetic drugs into the US.
With this new designation, how does the combatant command see the
scope of operations changing in the theater? With our allies in the
region?
Do you have the resources necessary to conduct these operations?
Admiral Holsey. The recent Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)
designations, while not granting U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) new
military authorities, do significantly enhance our intelligence
collection and interagency cooperation, particularly with law
enforcement and our regional partners. This improved coordination,
facilitated by the State Department designations, enables more precise
operational planning against these cartels. We will be leveraging our
existing authorities and capabilities, including counter-threat finance
measures, enhanced detection and monitoring of cartel activities, and
increased intelligence support to disrupt their operations. We are also
actively working with partner nations, while respecting their
sovereignty, to share actionable intelligence and coordinate
activities.
Increased investment is crucial for effectively countering these
newly designated FTOs. Our current Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) assets - terrestrial, maritime, and airborne - are
insufficient to meet the challenge. We require additional platforms
across all domains to adequately monitor and track these groups. Beyond
platforms, we also require enhanced tools to identify, disrupt, and
dismantle these sophisticated criminal networks. Expanding access to
commercially available digital ISR capabilities, telemetry data, and
geospatial analysis and analytical tools, would significantly improve
our situational awareness and ability to target FTO leadership and
finances.
Increasing U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Cutter deployments, particularly
National Security Cutters, and Navy deployments with embarked USCG Law
Enforcement Detachments to Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S)
would significantly bolster the Task Force's detection and monitoring,
and maritime interdiction capabilities. This would allow for more
frequent and successful drug interdiction operations, disrupting the
flow of illicit narcotics into the United States. On land, a greater
Special Operations Forces (SOF) presence in the area of responsibility
(AOR) is needed to conduct effective advise-and-assist missions with
our partner nations, enabling them to target key cartel nodes and
disrupt their operations.
Mr. Wilson. Admiral Holsey, as we continue to promote our
partnerships with our allies in Central and South America, we have also
seen our adversaries, namely the People's Republic of China, push an
increase of military activities in the region along with their economic
interests.
Do you foresee needing more ground troops in the region to maintain
the relationships we currently have with our allies and counter the
growing Chinese influence?
Admiral Holsey. In the USSOUTHCOM AOR, presence means power.
USSOUTHCOM requires additional resources to better deter Chinese
influence and maintain and bolster relationships with our allies and
partners. We are seeing substantial Chinese investment in
infrastructure projects across the region. USSOUTHCOM must be credible,
present, and engaged with our regional partners for us to be
successful. Working together with our allies and partners to address
security challenges throughout the region is a significant force
multiplier. Our Joint exercise program, which in fiscal year (FY) 2024
included eight exercises in seven countries, enhances our relationships
with our partners and promotes stability across all domains. Our side-
by-side cooperation bolsters U.S. security and blocks out adversaries.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. How do you see the strategic partnership between
NORTHCOM and the Coast Guard evolving to meet future threats, such as
those posed by adversarial nations in the maritime domain?
General Guillot. USNORTHCOM has a longstanding and close working
relationship with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and recognizes them as
the lead agency and subject matter experts for Maritime Homeland
Security. At the Department level, DHS and DoD collaborate via the
Maritime Operational Threat Response that designates a lead agency and
support agencies to address a maritime threat to the Homeland, which
then drives USCG and USNORTHCOM partnership in day-to-day activities.
In addition, DoD and DHS have established agreements to share forces
for maritime homeland security or maritime homeland defense. These
agreements are currently being utilized in response to adversary
maritime forces in the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility and for
USNORTHCOM maritime forces directly supporting USCG maritime law
enforcement. The outstanding operational relationship is exemplified by
the USCG's participation in shadowing the Atlantic Russian out of area
deployment last summer as well as consistently monitoring Russian and
Chinese ships in the Bering Sea. The relationship is also displayed
daily in USNORTHCOM Southern Border operation in the Gulf of America
and the Pacific Ocean.
Mr. Scott. How does NORTHCOM view the Coast Guard's role in
strengthening relationships with Canada and Mexico, especially in joint
maritime operations or border security initiatives?
General Guillot. USNORTHCOM views the role of the U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG) as indispensable in strengthening relationships and contributing
to maritime security. The role of the USCG in the North American
Maritime Security Initiative - a U.S. (USN/USCG); Canada (Royal
Canadian Navy); and Mexico (Marina) cooperative forum -- demonstrates
the breadth and depth of the relationship the USCG has built, and
maintains, with our neighboring partner and ally. The Law Enforcement
Detachment role USCG members assume while aboard USN vessels, as well
as their ability to detain and transfer persons of interest while
maintaining chain-of-custody, is invaluable as USNORTHCOM expands
operations within the maritime domain.
Mr. Scott. What are the biggest challenges NORTHCOM faces in
synchronizing efforts with the Coast Guard, particularly when balancing
military defense priorities with law enforcement and regulatory
missions?
General Guillot. USNORTHCOM and USNORTHCOM's Navy Service Command
Element (U.S. Fleet Forces) collaborate and synchronize efforts with
the U.S. Coast Guard in support of maritime homeland defense and
security on a daily basis. The biggest challenge we face is the growing
demand for resources to execute homeland defense, law enforcement, and
regulatory missions.
Mr. Scott. Given the Coast Guard's responsibilities in search and
rescue, how does NORTHCOM integrate those capabilities into broader
defense and humanitarian missions within the command's jurisdiction?
General Guillot. As directed in the National Response Framework,
the U.S. Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for search and rescue
in the maritime domain and USNORTHCOM provides support when requested.
For natural disaster response in the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility,
USNORTHCOM supports the U.S. Coast Guard guided by the National
Response Framework to ensure unity of effort and mutual support when
required. This framework is incorporated into existing USNORTHCOM
response plans.
Mr. Scott. With the Coast Guard's unique dual role under the
Department of Homeland Security and as an armed service, how does
NORTHCOM leverage their capabilities during a domestic crisis, such as
a natural disaster or a security threat?
General Guillot. For a domestic crisis response, USNORTHCOM
leverages U.S. Coast Guard capabilities via the Request for Assistance
process which gives each agency a means to request a capability or
resource to address specific requirements. USNORTHCOM relies on the
Coast Guard's relationships with local, state, and federal partners and
industry in U.S. ports and waterways. This support relationship is
currently being executed in support of the President's Executive Order
to secure the southern border, where U.S. Navy ships are operating ISO
USCG in both the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of America.
Mr. Scott. How is SOUTHCOM tracking the use of legitimate
agricultural operations-like coca fields or fruit plantations-to mask
narco-trafficking or money laundering, and what role could closer U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) collaboration play in disrupting that?
Admiral Holsey. USSOUTHCOM recognizes the challenges posed by the
use of legitimate agricultural operations to mask narco-trafficking and
money laundering. Collaboration with the interagency is important to
our work, and closer collaboration with the USDA could potentially
provide additional expertise in agricultural practices, supply chains,
and financial tracking specific to the region, that could further
assist our efforts.
Mr. Scott. In countries where food shortages fuel unrest and
migration, how does SOUTHCOM assess agriculture's role in stabilizing-
or destabilizing-the region? Are there specific ag-related pressure
points you're watching?
Admiral Holsey. USSOUTHCOM recognizes the critical link between
food security and regional stability. In countries experiencing food
shortages that contribute to unrest and migration, agricultural
vulnerabilities are a key concern. We assess agriculture's role as
potentially both a stabilizing and destabilizing factor, depending on
factors such as climate resilience, access to markets, and resource
distribution. Specific pressure points we are monitoring include the
impact of climate related events such as droughts, flooding, and wild
land forest fires as these can exacerbate existing challenges and
contribute to instability. We support whole-of-government efforts to
strengthen agricultural resilience and promote sustainable development
within the region.
Mr. Scott. China's been buying up farmland and investing in Latin
American agriculture. From SOUTHCOM's perspective, how does this affect
U.S. security interests, and could USDA intel on crop production or
trade flows help counter that influence?
Admiral Holsey. China's investments in Latin American agriculture,
such as the reported 50 million Lempira investment in a Honduran
agricultural school represents a concerning expansion of Chinese
influence in the region. USDA information and expertise on crop
production and trade flows could be instrumental in countering this
influence by providing insights into the scope and impact of Chinese
agricultural activities and providing a valuable alternative source of
information or assistance for our partner nations.
Mr. Scott. A lot of SOUTHCOM's area is remote farmland or jungle.
How does the agricultural landscape shape your counterinsurgency or
border security ops, and could USDA's rural data (e.g., land use maps)
give your teams an edge?
Admiral Holsey. Highly developed mapping products of terrain and
topography within the USSOUTHCOM AOR are always beneficial to shaping
the partner nations' operational environment. USSOUTHCOM's geospatial
intelligence team employs various land use classification datasets,
like USDA's rural data, to inform analyses and support operations in
the region.
Mr. Scott. The U.S. Coast Guard plays a vital role in SOUTHCOM's
counter-narcotics efforts, particularly through its interdiction
operations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. How do you assess the
current effectiveness of these joint operations, and what enhancements
could further disrupt drug trafficking networks in your area of
responsibility?
Admiral Holsey. The USCG plays a vital role in our counter-
narcotics efforts, but current asset limitations significantly hamper
our effectiveness. As I have stated before, presence in this AOR means
power, and a sustained increase in maritime presence is crucial. This
includes deploying more USCG cutters and U.S. Navy (USN) ships,
equipped with Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) and armed
helicopters, along with persistent maritime patrol aircraft coverage
along all major drug trafficking vectors in the Eastern Pacific,
Western Caribbean, and Eastern Caribbean. This persistent presence is
critical not only for detection and monitoring and support to
interdiction operations, but also for deterrence. We estimate that each
additional force package consisting of a ship, helicopter, and maritime
patrol aircraft, has the potential to interdict an additional 50 metric
tons of cocaine annually.
Commercial capabilities, such as the Ship Special Mission (SSM), a
contracted mothership that extends Partner Nation interceptors' range
for high-seas interdictions, have helped offset gaps in DoD surface
assets for unsourced validated requirements. For example, in FY24 the
SSM directly facilitated a 56% increase in disruptions from FY22 and
FY23.
Additionally, improving our maritime domain awareness offers a
significant opportunity to improve USCG interdiction rates by providing
near-real-time cueing of suspect vessels. Furthermore, increasing
intelligence sharing with our partner nations, focusing on key
trafficking networks and land-based shipment nodes before maritime
departure, would significantly enhance our ability to proactively
target these threats.
Mr. Scott. SOUTHCOM often collaborates with the Coast Guard to
address illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which
threatens regional stability and economic security. What steps is
SOUTHCOM taking to strengthen partnerships with the Coast Guard and
regional allies to combat this issue?
Admiral Holsey. USSOUTHCOM combats IUU fishing, a threat to
regional governance and maritime security, through a multi-faceted
approach focused on building sustainable partner capacity and fostering
a robust maritime security environment. As USCG is the lead U.S. agency
for counter-IUU fishing operations, we are increasing joint operations
with the USCG, including coordinated patrols, intelligence sharing, and
capacity-building exercises. We also build partner capacity through
joint exercises like TRADEWINDS, for example, that bolster the defenses
of our Caribbean partners against narcotics trafficking and IUU fishing
and increase interoperability. We also invest in regional partners
through Foreign Military Financing and International Military
Education, including USCG-led exchanges on tactics and procedures for
countering IUU fishing.
Mr. Scott. The Coast Guard's deployable specialized forces, such as
Maritime Safety and Security Teams, often support SOUTHCOM's security
cooperation initiatives. Can you highlight a recent example where this
collaboration made a significant impact in the region?
Admiral Holsey. Elements of the USCG's deployable specialized
forces [e.g. LEDET] routinely serve as force multipliers onboard U.S.
and allied naval vessels in the joint operating area and are a key
feature of the success countering cartels in the maritime domain on a
regular basis. Additionally, teams like the Maritime Safety and
Security Teams have in the past been a part of our exercises like
CENTAM Guardian, TRADEWINDS, UNITAS, and PANAMAX. Through a mix of
real-world operations (including law enforcement) and exercises, we can
ensure cohesion and interoperability before the time of crisis.
In April 2025, the USCG significantly supported USSOUTHCOM's
counter-narcotics efforts when a LEDET aboard the USS Minneapolis-Saint
Paul interdicted two vessels in the Caribbean Sea. Working with Joint
Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), the Coast Guard LEDET took the
lead during the law enforcement phase, successfully seizing 580
kilograms of cocaine (valued at over 9.4 million) and 2,480 pounds of
marijuana (valued at over 2.8 million). This operation exemplifies how
Coast Guard deployable specialized forces regularly enhance the
capabilities of both U.S. and allied naval forces, disrupting cartel
activity in the maritime domain.
Mr. Scott. How does SOUTHCOM leverage the Coast Guard's unique
authorities and capabilities to counter malign influence from
adversaries like China or Russia in the maritime domain?
Admiral Holsey. USSOUTHCOM leverages the Coast Guard's law
enforcement authority and maritime security expertise to counter malign
influence, particularly through combating narco-trafficking and IUU
fishing. In areas like the Galapagos, the Coast Guard conducts presence
patrols, partners with regional authorities like Ecuador, and
contributes to maritime domain awareness to deter IUU fishing by
Chinese fishing fleets. Throughout the USSOUTHCOM AOR, the Coast Guard
interdicts drug shipments, gathers intelligence on trafficking
networks, and cooperates with regional partners to dismantle these
organizations. The USCG's unique ability to board, inspect, and seize
vessels on the high seas, combined with their focus on maritime
security, makes them a crucial asset for USSOUTHCOM in addressing these
threats. This approach supports regional stability and protects vital
resources. Furthermore, USSOUTHCOM has partnered with Coast Guard Cyber
Command on several Subject Matter Expert Exchanges throughout the AOR
to identify malicious cyber actors. Coast Guard cyber personnel
directly support U.S. Cyber Command operations in the region,
identifying malicious activity by Chinese and Russian-sponsored
advanced persistent threats.
Mr. Scott. Transnational criminal organizations often exploit
maritime routes for smuggling drugs, weapons, and people. How does
SOUTHCOM synchronize intelligence-sharing with the Coast Guard to stay
ahead of these adaptive threats?
Admiral Holsey. USSOUTHCOM leverages JIATF-S as the primary
mechanism for tactical-level intelligence sharing and operational
synchronization with the USCG to counter maritime threats posed by
criminal and terrorist actors. JIATF-S, a model of interagency command,
control, and coordination, embeds liaisons from the USCG, U.S.
Department of Justice, and Intelligence Community (IC), fostering unity
of effort to conduct detection and monitoring operations to interdict
illicit trafficking in the region. Its Joint Interagency Intelligence
and Operations Center serves as the central hub for processing and
disseminating illicit air and maritime information, integrating data
from national agencies (Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), and the IC), international partners, Coast Guard
assets, and signals intelligence. All-source analysis conducted at
JIATF-S and USSOUTHCOM creates a comprehensive common operational
picture accessible to the USCG, including Sector 7 and Coast Guard
Intelligence Coordination Center, which also receive finished
intelligence on counterterrorism and counterdrug issues from
USSOUTHCOM.
Mr. Scott. The Coast Guard brings a law enforcement perspective to
SOUTHCOM's military operations. How do you see this dual-role
capability enhancing the command's ability to build partner nation
capacity in the region?
Admiral Holsey. The USCG plays a critical role in both capacity
building and our efforts to encourage key partners and allies to do
more, both with us and on their own, to contribute to our shared
security. The USCG has LEDET memoranda of understanding with France,
the Netherlands, the UK, and Canada to deploy and exercise its unique
law enforcement authorities from their platforms, which are a major
force multiplier, especially with limited availability of USCG assets.
USCG Cutters also closely integrate with Partner Nation interceptors to
hand off targets between surface assets and maritime patrol aircraft.
The SSM has helped to increase this interoperability and boost Partner
Nation participation rate in JIATF-S operations to 80.5%.
Mr. Scott. What emerging maritime threats in SOUTHCOM's area of
responsibility do you believe will require even closer collaboration
with the Coast Guard, and how are you preparing for those challenges?
Admiral Holsey. Within USSOUTHCOM's AOR, two emerging maritime
threats demand even closer collaboration with the Coast Guard: the
trafficking of fentanyl precursor chemicals/derivatives and the
increasing use of self-propelled semi-submersible vessels (SPSS).
Early indications suggest criminal and terrorist organizations are
using USSOUTHCOM's AOR to traffic fentanyl precursors, primarily
originating in Mexico. To counter this, we are enhancing intelligence
sharing with the Coast Guard at all levels to improve detection and
interdiction efforts targeting these shipments.
The increasing use of SPSSs, equipped with advanced technologies
like Starlink and encryption, presents a significant challenge. We are
preparing for this by deepening our collaboration with the Coast Guard
to enhance detection capabilities, improve domain awareness, and
develop coordinated interdiction strategies, as demonstrated by the CGC
CALHOUN's recent seizure, which highlighted emerging secondary markets
for cocaine in Europe and Australia, and will require even closer
interagency and partner coordination to stem the tide.
These threats necessitate a unified, multi-agency approach,
leveraging the Coast Guard's unique authorities and capabilities to
effectively safeguard the maritime domain.
Mr. Scott. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF)
often intersects with drug trafficking in your AOR-boats smuggling
cocaine alongside illegal catches. How is SOUTHCOM tracking this dual
threat, and what's the strategy to disrupt it?
Admiral Holsey. While direct evidence of IUU fishing vessels
engaging in large-scale cocaine smuggling is limited, we recognize they
often provide logistical support to drug trafficking. USSOUTHCOM's
strategy centers on disrupting Transnational Criminal Organizations and
other organized threats by denying them logistical support and
financial gains from illicit maritime activity. This approach aims not
only to interdict immediate threats but also to deter illegal future
engagement, build long-term regional security, and protect the
homeland. We leverage intelligence platforms to identify vessels
exhibiting patterns indicative of both IUU fishing and potential drug
trafficking support. This proactive intelligence gathering is crucial
for shifting from reactive interdiction to preventative disruption. We
work with the USCG and regional partners to develop maritime
interdiction tactics, techniques, and procedures, building partner
capacity for sustained enforcement.
Mr. Scott. Chinese fishing fleets have been spotted off South
America, overfishing waters like the Gal pagos. How does SOUTHCOM view
this as a security challenge, and are you seeing it as a soft-power
play in your backyard?
Admiral Holsey. The presence of Chinese fishing fleets overfishing
in areas like the Gal pagos represents a significant security challenge
to our partners and a blatant disregard for regional sovereignty. This
isn't just an environmental issue; it's a calculated strategy with
potential economic and security implications. IUU fishing deprives
fragile economies of crucial fish stocks and the export revenues
necessary for basic government functions and the livelihoods of their
citizens, increasing the potential for instability in the region.
Globally, IUU fishing is a massive illicit industry, estimated to
generate roughly $36 billion annually, ranking as the sixth largest
after counterfeiting and drug trafficking. This illicit activity not
only threatens marine ecosystems and biodiversity but also undermines
the food security of millions of Latin Americans.
Beyond the immediate economic and environmental damage, we must
also consider the potential for dual-use capabilities of these Chinese
fishing fleets, including intelligence collection targeting the region
and the United States. China's focus on exploitation of regional
resources for their own benefit undermines regional stability and poses
a direct challenge to U.S. interests.
Mr. Scott. Small Caribbean nations depend on fish but can't patrol
their waters effectively. How is IUUF eroding their economies or
sovereignty, and what's SOUTHCOM doing to bolster their defenses?
Admiral Holsey. IUU fishing poses a significant threat to the
economies and sovereignty of small Caribbean nations, many of which are
heavily dependent on fishing for food security and economic survival.
IUU fishing depletes vital fish stocks, directly impacting food
security and causing significant losses in government tax revenue. This
has adverse consequences for local fishing communities who rely on
these resources for their livelihoods. While Caribbean nations
recognize this growing threat, limited resources and capacity often
necessitate that they prioritize other security challenges like
transnational crime and migration.
USSOUTHCOM is actively working to bolster the defenses of these
Caribbean partners against IUU fishing in exercises like TRADEWINDS,
which frames IUU fishing as a regional security threat linked to other
criminal activities, and incorporates intelligence gathering, joint
patrols, and port security scenarios. Recognizing their patrol
shortfalls, we provide access to intelligence and automated suspicious
activity alerts to enhance their maritime domain awareness and ability
to monitor their waters. We also work closely with the USCG, the lead
U.S. Government agency for addressing IUU fishing, to improve maritime
domain awareness and build partner capacity, enabling them to better
protect their sovereignty.
Mr. Scott. SOUTHCOM's AOR includes vast coastlines and remote seas.
What's SOUTHCOM's approach to monitoring IUUF-satellites, coast guard
partnerships-and where do you need more eyes to catch violators?
Admiral Holsey. In order to adequately monitor IUUF, we need, and
our partners are asking for, increased Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
in the form of Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and commercial air ISR
capabilities. Building partnership capacity is a significant force
multiplier in our efforts.
Monitoring IUU fishing in USSOUTHCOM's vast AOR requires a multi-
layered approach. To truly cover the vast maritime expanses of the
USSOUTHCOM AOR, we require a multi-intelligence discipline layered
approach with DoD, DHS, and partner nations assets to monitor IUU
fishing. Coverage gaps remain along the eastern Pacific equatorial
corridor, where persistent, all-weather synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
collections would be valuable.
Mr. Scott. IUUF is depleting stocks like shrimp or tuna, which
could spark local conflicts or food crises. How does SOUTHCOM weigh
this long-term risk?
Admiral Holsey. USSOUTHCOM is keenly aware of the long-term risks
posed by IUU fishing and its potential to destabilize the region. The
depletion of crucial fish stocks like shrimp and tuna has significant
economic and social consequences for our regional partner nations which
rely on these resources for domestic consumption and export revenue.
While we are actively working to counter other closely related
causes of instability in the region, notably drug cartels and their
illicit activities, we recognize that IUU fishing is a major
contributing factor to regional insecurity. IUU fishing costs the
region an estimated $6 billion annually and has been linked to other
illicit activities, including migrant smuggling and labor exploitation.
This criminal activity goes beyond simply destroying the diverse
ecosystems of our partners; it undermines legitimate commercial fishing
industries, threatens food security, and weakens overall fisheries
management efforts.
Mr. Scott. Countries like Colombia or Panama want to fight IUUF but
lack resources. How is SOUTHCOM prioritizing joint ops or training to
level up their navies, and could USDA fisheries data amplify that?
Admiral Holsey. Partner Nations, such as Colombia, Panama and
others in the region view IUUF as an existential threat to their
economies and national security. Our commitment to hemispheric security
is highlighted by our efforts to meet our partner nation equipping
needs, such as our recent $35 million program to enhance Peru's MDA,
and our current effort to build Peruvian capacity to receive the
delivery of one of two maritime patrol aircraft in 2025.
Joint exercises are an important lever for USSOUTHCOM that build
partner nation capacity and interoperability. UNITAS, for example,
focuses on practical, at-sea training, including simulated boardings,
MDA sharing, and communication drills, addressing scenarios like "ghost
vessels," misreported catches, and fishing in protected areas.
TRADEWINDS frames IUU fishing as a regional security threat linked to
other criminal activities, incorporating intelligence gathering, joint
patrols, and port security scenarios. SOUTHERN STAR, while primarily a
counter-terrorism exercise, reinforces maritime interdiction skills
through MDA sharing and boarding exercises. These exercises, along with
our security cooperation initiatives, demonstrate our commitment to
strengthening regional maritime security and combating IUU fishing.
Mr. Scott. In terms of interoperability, what steps are being taken
to enhance communication and operational alignment between NORTHCOM
forces and Coast Guard units, especially in joint exercises or
contingency planning?
Admiral Holsey. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GRAVES
Mr. Graves. General Guillot, as you see increased Chinese and
Russian activity in the Arctic, how important is the Coast Guard's
icebreaking mission in the region? How do Chinese and Russian
icebreaking capabilities compare to our own, and what resources will
the Polar Security Cutter bring when it comes online at the end of the
decade?
General Guillot. Having year-round access to the Arctic is critical
to the sovereignty and homeland defense of the United States. The U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG) icebreakers are paramount to the U.S. maintaining
access and controlling our interests in the Arctic.
Russia has the largest icebreaker fleet in the world, including
eight heavy icebreakers capable of year-around operations in Arctic
waters and seven medium icebreakers capable of operating in ice up to
2.5 meters thick. China has no heavy icebreakers and three medium
icebreakers capable of operating in ice up to approximately 2.5 meters
thick. In comparison, the United States currently has one heavy
icebreaker capable of year-around operations in Arctic waters and one
medium icebreaker capable of operating in ice up to 1.2 meters thick.
USNORTHCOM fully supports the USCG's efforts to build a fleet of Polar
Security Cutters (PSCs) and Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs). Once
operational, both the PSCs and ASCs will be significant force
multipliers. They will ensure not only access but the ability to
protect and defend our territorial sea, Exclusive Economic Zone, and
extended continental shelf in the Arctic.
Mr. Graves. Admiral Holsey, the U.S. Coast Guard reports that it is
able to intercept about 10 percent of the cocaine flowing into the
United States. As you are well aware, the Coast Guard is not able to
act upon most intelligence it receives and is constrained by limited
assets that cover a large area on the Southern approach to our waters.
How is SOUTHCOM working to utilize the limited number of Coast Guard
assets most effectively to execute counterdrug and migrant missions and
how have the decommissioning of many of the Coast Guard Medium
Endurance Cutters impacted SOUTHCOM missions?
Admiral Holsey. The past few years have witnessed a growth in
cocaine flow from South America, with a 20% increase in non-commercial
maritime cocaine flow towards the United States. In this environment,
the right mix of operational assets, in the right place, yield
significant results. This formula, long employed by JIATF-S, makes the
most out of limited assets.
However, USSOUTHCOM operates in a resource-constrained environment
in which we face more threats than available assets-including those of
the USCG. Therefore, any reduction in available maritime assets does
affect our interdiction rates. To maximize the impact of limited Coast
Guard resources on counterdrug and migrant missions, USSOUTHCOM
actively collaborates with the Coast Guard, who consistently exceeds
its planned asset commitments to our efforts in the region. While the
decommissioning of Medium Endurance Cutters presents challenges, the
Coast Guard proactively communicates these changes, allowing USSOUTHCOM
to adjust to most effectively execute our missions.
Mr. Graves. Joint Interagency Task Force South is often cited as
the gold standard for inter-agency cooperation. Headed by a Coast Guard
Admiral, what do you think the United States Coast Guard brings to this
task force that helps make it so successful? And are there lessons from
the task force that could be applied to other task forces in SOUTHCOM?
Admiral Holsey. The Coast Guard brings unique authorities,
capabilities, and partnerships to every mission it conducts, including
its leadership role at JIATF-S. The unique experience of a USCG Admiral
with a combined understanding of intelligence and operations within the
overlay of law enforcement requirements is a tremendous asset when
leading such an organization. JIATF-S employs a "team of teams"
approach that integrates the Department of Defense's efforts with the
contributions of dozens of interagency and international
representatives, all working cooperatively to help safeguard our
nation's southern approaches and the security of our shared hemisphere.
Everyone working at JIATF-S recognizes that homeland defense does not
begin at the "one yard line" of our southern border, but instead
extends forward, throughout our AOR. To the extent applicable,
USSOUTHCOM utilizes these and all best practices across the entire
command.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
Mr. Carbajal. Commander Holsey, during your testimony, you
discussed the need for a persistent presence to identify and interdict
drug trafficking operations at the borders, which requires persistent
access to capabilities and assets to support these operations.
The past two years we have seen a greater demand from the COCOMs
for commercial remote sensing technologies to include commercial SAR, a
capability proven to be an effective phenomenology to access
unclassified, persistent monitoring capabilities, especially in
maritime environments, to support our warfighters in situations where
actionable ISR is needed. Unfortunately, access to this data is limited
and sometimes restricted due to resources leaving a gap between demand
and availability.
Would expanding access to commercial SAR data collected from the
various border environments close that information gap and what would
it mean for the success of your operations to have that information
quickly to identify and interdict drug trafficking operations at the
borders?
If so, what do you need to accelerate response time from NRO and
NGA when requesting access to the COMSAR capabilities?
Admiral Holsey. Commercial remote sensing technologies are a
critical tool in supporting partner nation operations, U.S. law
enforcement agency activities, and during Humanitarian Assistance/
Disaster Relief missions in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Key to our operations
is an ability to detect, hold, and execute operations to affect an
outcome. Existing commercial sensing capabilities provide valuable
support across multiple Command lines-of-effort; however, it falls
short in achieving decision advantage in drug tracking operations.
USSOUTHCOM requires platform agnostic, long-dwell sensing capabilities
with enhanced sensitivity and accuracy. This new capability should be
integrated with automated processing from point-of-detection, target
hold, command and control, and conclude with a successful interdiction.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RYAN
Mr. Ryan. What is the Department's current process for fielding and
evaluating base applications pertaining to C-sUAS authorities under 10
U.S. Code 130I? What assistance and coordination is provided to base
commanders in navigating the 130i authorities process?
Mr. Leonardo. The primary responsibility for submitting a 130i
request package is delegated to the Military Departments. The Secretary
of Defense has authorized the Secretary of each Military Department to
determine what assets and facilities within their respective
departments fall within the covered missions in section 130i. The
application package also includes a concept of operation for potential
UAS mitigation, considering the threat and the complex operating
environment in the U.S. homeland. Once a specific military department
submits a 130i application packet to the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, it is coordinated with the Department of
Transportation (DoT) in accordance with statutory requirements. Any
necessary adjustments to the application are addressed with the MilDep
or sent back to the installation for correction. After completing
coordination with DoT, a memorandum is signed between the DoD and DoT
and then provided back to the MilDep for routing to the installation.
Military Departments are required by DoD Directive 3800.01E, section
2.11(f), to fund C-sUAS unit-level training. This is a unique service
requirement, as each department may have specific equipment or
operating procedures. However, my staff provides support to the 130i
packet coordinators for any questions or requests for information
related to processes or procedures involved in completing their
packages. They also schedule monthly video calls to disseminate
information, gather input from installation commanders, and
continuously improve the submission process. This ensures our
facilities that need coverage receive the necessary equipment and
support. In response to section 925 of the Servicemember Quality of
Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2025, my staff reduced the requirements for the 130i package to better
align with statutory mandates. During this process, we ensured that the
updated procedures were communicated to the Military Services and
provided training on the revised process. The streamlined procedures
have lessened the burden on installation commanders and shortened
coordination timelines within the Department and with DoT-once the
package is received from the Military Departments-to as little as one
week.
Mr. Ryan. It is apparent that UAS threats involved in New Jersey
and elsewhere were "dark drones", or drones that intentionally do not
emit RF signals in order to evade traditional drone detection methods.
What is NORTHCOM doing to address the threat of dark drones and equip
more domestic bases with the systems necessary to detect these
incursions in the future?
General Guillot. The military Services have the responsibility to
man, equip, and train the forces on their installations with C-sUAS
capabilities. As of November 2024, USNORTHCOM is now responsible for
synchronizing the DOD and IA response to drone incursions. As such,
USNORTHCOM advocates for multi-layered C-UAS defenses on installations
that include the following capabilities: Radio Frequency Sensors,
Radars, Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) Camera systems and Low
Collateral Defeat (kinetic) capabilities. USNORTHCOM is also procuring
three "Fly-away" kits that include all the above listed capabilities
and can deploy to an installation within 24 hours to support future
incursions that exceed the installation capabilities and/or capacity.
In addition, USNORTHCOM is partnering with the Defense Innovation Unit
(DIU) on the "Replicator 2" initiative, which will provide C-sUAS
capabilities to priority installations within the next two years,
including installations within the homeland.
USNORTHCOM will conduct our FALCON PEAK C-sUAS experiment this
September at Eglin AFB, FL Test Range, in conjunction with the Joint C-
sUAS Office and DIU. This experiment is focused on low collateral
defeat options. DIU is conducting an event in coordination with FALCON
PEAK that will advance the development of homeland C-sUAS capabilities
as part of the Replicator 2 initiative.
Mr. Ryan. What are SOUTHCOM's plans to monitor the Panama Canal
zone for foreign intrusion (e.g. SIGINT, Counter Drone, etc...)?
Admiral Holsey. One of USSOUTHCOM's missions is to defend the
Panama Canal and we do that by, with and through our Panamanian
Partners. We monitor the Panama Canal zone for foreign intrusions using
a multi-layered approach by leveraging intelligence capabilities,
commercially and publicly available imagery and information, and
collaboration with host nation security services. Annually, we conduct
PANAMAX, a multinational exercise focused on defense of the canal,
refining our multi-intelligence collection plan. Panama has agreed to
host PANAMAX in 2026.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCGUIRE
Mr. McGuire. General Guillot, it's understood that CJADC2 and AI
capabilities significantly enhance a commander's decision-making and
operational advantages. How has NORTHCOM utilized the Maven Smart
System to achieve these benefits in missions?
General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM employ Project Maven as a
CJADC2 system to drive data-informed decisions and enable seamless
interagency data sharing. Maven delivers a unified common operating/
common intelligence picture for enhanced domain awareness, streamlined
reporting, and reduced workload across all echelons. Use of CJADC2
enables rapid analysis that provides critical context and situational
awareness for senior decision makers. Its AI integration boosts
productivity and supports DoD and interagency domain awareness in
support of numerous command missions.
Our INTEL team implemented a MAVEN capability that uses AI and
Computer Vision to produce a daily summary of adversary activities that
could threaten the Homeland. This AI drive workflow replaces the manual
efforts of one service member, elevating the individual from counting
objects to providing expert analysis of competitor intentions and
threats to improve the decision-making process.
NORAD and USNORTHCOM execute inter-CMD collaborative Maven
development and missions with USSOUTHCOM, USCENTCOM, USTRANSCOM,
USINDOPACOM, and USEUCOM. This approach advances joint operations and
homeland defense through a scalable, AI-enabled framework.
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