[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
.
[H.A.S.C. No. 119-8]
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES
IN EUROPE
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 8, 2025
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLIISHING OFFICE
61-589 WASHINGTON : 2026
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Nineteenth Congress
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice JOHN GARAMENDI, California
Chair DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
DON BACON, Nebraska JASON CROW, Colorado
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
RONNY JACKSON, Texas JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
PAT FALLON, Texas SARA JACOBS, California
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
NANCY MACE, South Carolina PATRICK RYAN, New York
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO,
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia Pennsylvania
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
CORY MILLS, Florida DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia GILBERT RAY CISNEROS JR.,
LANCE GOODEN, Texas California
CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana ERIC SORENSEN, Illinois
DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin MAGGIE GOODLANDER, New Hampshire
JOHN J. McGUIRE III, Virginia SARAH ELFRETH, Maryland
PAT HARRIGAN, North Carolina GEORGE WHITESIDES, California
MARK B. MESSMER, Indiana DEREK TRAN, California
DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas EUGENE SIMON VINDMAN, Virginia
JEFF CRANK, Colorado WESLEY BELL, Missouri
ABRAHAM J. HAMADEH, Arizona
Chris Vieson, Staff Director
Katherine Earle, Professional Staff Member
Rob Ikoku, Professional Staff Member
Abby Snyder, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Thompson, Katherine, Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary
of Defense International Security Affairs...................... 5
Cavoli, GEN Christopher G., USA, Commander, U.S. European Command 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Thompson, Katherine.......................................... 65
Cavoli, GEN Christopher G.................................... 69
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Newspaper article entitled ``Russia Mocks Trump Ceasefire
Deal With Sea-Launched Missile Attack on Ukrainian Cities'' 89
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Wilson................................................... 103
Mr. Scott.................................................... 103
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 112
Mr. Kelly.................................................... 114
Mr. Gimenez.................................................. 114
Mr. Ryan..................................................... 115
Mr. Davis.................................................... 116
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 8, 2025
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
2218, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [chairman
of the committee] presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. The meeting will come to order. Today, we
continue our posture hearings with EUCOM [United States
European Command]. I want to thank the witnesses for being
here. And, General Cavoli, as this will be your last appearance
before this committee, I want to thank you for your incredible
service to our nation over a very long time. Thank you, sir.
Today, we gather with heavy hearts after the loss of four
American servicemembers in a tragic training accident in
Lithuania. I want to thank our Lithuanian and Polish allies for
their sparing no resource to recover the fallen.
Now, let me open with something fundamental: Vladimir Putin
is not our friend. He is an unreformed KGB [Komitet
Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti] agent who believes the collapse
of the Soviet Union was "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe
of the century." His desire to reconstitute the Soviet Union
drove him to attack Georgia in 2008, invade Crimea and the
Donbas in 2014, and then launch a full-scale invasion of
Ukraine in 2022.
Those that blame NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
enlargement or suggested Russia was somehow provoked into
attacking Ukraine are wrong. The Ukrainian people have fought
bravely over 3 years to defend their freedom, but I agree with
President Trump it is time to stop the bloodshed. President
Biden never had a plan in the war. By slow-rolling weapon
deliveries and imposing loophole-ridden sanctions, he allowed
the conflict to grind to a stalemate. President Trump has
broken that deadlock. Ukraine has agreed to a ceasefire as a
first step, showing their desire for peace. Russia, however,
has refused to do the same and continues to slaughter innocent
victims. Just last week, Russia bombed a playground, killing
nine children. Murdering innocent Ukrainian children does not
advance peace.
President Trump was right to warn Putin that, if he doesn't
start negotiating in good faith, then the U.S. will ratchet up
pressure and impose unprecedented sanctions. Because, as
President Trump knows, Putin only respects strength, and he has
acted accordingly, he sanctioned the Nord Stream 2, he withdrew
from the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] treaty after
Russian violations, he sent additional U.S. troops to Poland,
and he armed Ukraine with antitank missiles, not blankets. That
is why Putin didn't invade Ukraine during President Trump's
first term, and that is also why Putin must prove he is serious
about peace, and soon. We cannot allow Russia to drag out these
negotiations.
Now, while I agree that China is our pacing threat, we must
remain tough and unwavering in the face of Russia's enduring
threat because the reality is Russia maintains the world's
largest and most diverse nuclear arsenal. And despite suffering
massive losses in Ukraine, the Russian army is now larger than
it was before the war. The Russian military is also
reconstituting faster than expected, and its industrial base is
now on war footing and being supported, unfortunately, by
China, North Korea, and Iran.
Given these threats, I am concerned by reports that some at
DOD [Department of Defense] are considering not only giving up
NATO command but also significantly reducing our posture in
Europe. I am especially concerned that Congress has not been
consulted.
U.S. leadership in NATO is essential to ensure American
forces, including our nuclear weapons, always remain under U.S.
command. And cutting our presence in Europe now, especially on
NATO's eastern flank, would only weaken leverage with Putin.
Thanks to President Trump's leadership, our European NATO
allies are finally getting serious about investing in the
alliance's collective defense. For the first time, it appears
Europe is willing to shoulder most of the burden, and that is
how it should be. And it is not just Poland, Romania, Finland,
and the Baltic states. Allies across the alliance are ramping
up their defense spending. But Europe's rearmament will take
time. Pulling back prematurely would risk inviting further
Russian aggression, potentially even against NATO. That is why
I strongly support maintaining the current U.S. force posture
in Europe at this time. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses on how the U.S. and our NATO allies can ensure
credible deterrence against Russia.
With that, I yield to my friend, the ranking member, for
any opening statement he may have.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to echo your
opening comments thanking General Cavoli for his leadership. I
am sad this will be your last time before us. You have done an
amazing job in difficult times in Europe and also recognizing
and offering condolences for our lost servicemembers in
Lithuania. The chairman and I had the opportunity last year to
visit our troops in Lithuania, and it is an incredibly
important effort, and it is a huge tragedy for the force.
The obvious focus of this hearing with Europe is Ukraine,
and I do want to offer a little bit of good news. Ukraine is
holding the line against all odds, as they have for now over 3
years. We are in a real position to blunt Russia's momentum in
Ukraine. It is a huge accomplishment, something that hasn't
been talked about a lot. It is now more important than ever we
stick with Ukraine to stop Putin's invasion of Russia in its
tracks and crucially force him to the table.
I agree with the chairman. I even agree with the Trump
administration. We need to find an end to this war. But you
don't find an end to this war by undermining support for
Ukraine and praising Putin in Russia. That empowers Putin for
all the reasons that the chairman said. Putin has big ambitions
in Europe. Those ambitions can be blunted if we are strong, if
we deter him. But when Trump came into office, cut off intel
support, cut off aid to Ukraine, berated Zelenskyy, wouldn't
even admit that Russia started this war, while, at the same
time, praising Putin and Russia, that opened the door wide for
Vladimir Putin to walk right through.
The pressure doesn't need to be on Zelenskyy in Ukraine.
Trust me, I think most people on this committee have been to
Ukraine at one time or another. There is plenty of pressure on
Ukraine being brought by Russia every single day. The pressure
needs to be put on Putin and Russia to force them to the table,
and that is what this administration has refused to do to date.
It is prolonging the war and empowering Russia, and that needs
to change because the larger question for this hearing -- and I
agree with the chairman on the concerns about talk about
downsizing in Europe and everything that goes into it -- is
does this administration believe in the fundamental principle
that has made our country strong for the last 80 years, and
that is the partnership and alliance in Europe, sticking with
Europe. Sticking with the countries that believe in greater
political and economic freedom is to the benefit of the United
States of America, and those countries are the countries in
Europe, our allies, the European Union. It is not Russia, and
it is not Putin.
One of the most embarrassing things I have ever seen is
when the Vice President went to Europe and, instead of talking
about Ukraine, he lectured Europe about freedom of speech, that
that was the big problem with Europe. Well, to begin with, the
idea that this administration cares at all about the freedom of
speech is ridiculous. As we speak, they are purging the
government of all manner of different words that they don't
like. We had the great example of how pictures of the Enola Gay
disappeared from the Department of Defense website because they
had an algorithm that said the word gay was problematic. Now,
that is kind of funny when you stop and think about what the
Enola Gay means, but, even that stupid mistake aside, why are
we banning the word gay from discourse? Books are being banned
across the Department of Defense, one a biography of Jackie
Robinson because, Lord knows, we can't have people hearing
about that. So the notion of someone from this administration
lecturing anybody on free speech is offensive to anyone with an
ounce of common sense, and it sure as hell should have been
offensive to Europe.
But let's remember: was there anything mentioned in that
speech about how Russia treats free speech? About the fact that
they have eliminated all free media? That they kill and jail
their political opponents?
Yes, we should stand for free speech. We should stand for
economic and political freedom. But if we are going to do that,
we should stand with Europe, not with Russia and Putin. And
that is what is really at stake right now: are we still willing
to do that?
And the question of, well, how have we benefitted from
this. Economically, we have seen the greatest increase of
wealth of any nation in the history of the world in the last 80
years. Now, I will grant you that wealth has not been
distributed as fairly as it should have been, but we have
benefitted economically. We've also benefitted militarily. Our
European partners have stood with us in every conflict that we
have fought since World War II. After 9/11, they stood with us.
I have worked very closely with the Special Operations Command,
with everyone who has been fighting against Al Qaeda and ISIS
[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and all those terrorist
groups. Our European partners are crucial to that.
Meanwhile, Russia is partnering with Iran. They are
partnering with North Korea. They are partnering with China.
When I hear people in the administration say, oh, we have got
to pivot away from Europe because of the Middle East, you know.
Asia, that is what is important. Russia is in the middle of
that, and this administration does not show that they
understand this in the slightest.
We need to stand up for our European partners. Yes, there
are clear things. The dollars matter. It is good that Europe is
stepping up. But they stepped up on Ukraine. The U.S. is
somewhere like 13th or 14th in terms of percentage of GDP that
we have contributed to this from all of our partners. I
personally think the main reason that they stood up was because
Russia invaded Ukraine. Presidents have been pressuring them
forever. That is what focused their mind, and that is good.
Yes, we need to avoid getting into a war with Russia. Yes,
we need peace in Ukraine. But you do not get there by
belittling President Zelenskyy, by attacking Ukraine, by
undermining support for Ukraine, and praising Vladimir Putin in
Russia.
So we need to stand up for the alliances that have stood so
well for us for 80 years, and that, I think, is what this
committee really needs to hear from our witnesses today is how
are we going to do that so that the division that the chairman
correctly outlined that Putin has for the world does not come
to pass, that we deter him, we stop the war, and we protect
economic and political freedom, as we have done for a very long
time.
I look forward to the witness's testimony and to the
questions, and I yield back.
The Chairman. I think we made it very clear how we feel
about this. I thank the ranking member.
Now I would like to introduce our witnesses. We have Ms.
Katherine Thompson, who is performing the duties of Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International and Security Affairs;
and General Cavoli, who is Commander of U.S. European Command.
With that, Ms. Thompson, we will start with you. You are
recognized for 5 minutes for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF KATHERINE THOMPSON, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Ms. Thompson. Thank you, Chairman Rogers. Chairman Rogers,
Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today, and it is my honor to appear alongside EUCOM Commander
General Cavoli.
Before I begin my formal statement, I would like to take a
moment, as well, to echo the chairman and ranking member's
comments to honor the memory of the four American soldiers who
died in Lithuania on March 26th while conducting tactical
training. My prayers are certainly with them and their
families.
I would also like to thank the people and government of
Lithuania, Poland, and Estonia, who provided exceptional
support during the recovery operation. These nations showed our
soldiers the highest level of respect during the dignified
transfer back to the United States, and we thank them for those
efforts.
President Trump has directed the Department of Defense to
reorient the United States defense strategy so that it puts
America's interests first. In Europe, that means working with
our interagency partners to bring an end to the war in Ukraine.
It also means finding new ways to strengthen NATO so that the
alliance can be as effective in this century as it was in the
last.
To be sure, neither of these efforts will be easy, not for
us and not for our allies. But taking these measures is
essential. It is doable, and doing so will leave both the
United States and our allies and partners better off.
President Trump has spoken often and clearly about
achieving lasting peace in Ukraine. This is vital to stop the
bloodshed. It will also set Europe on a trajectory towards
security and stability like the region has not seen for many
years. This is not only good for Ukraine, but it is also good
for our NATO allies. And, of course, it is, most importantly,
good for Americans who benefit from a stable and secure Europe.
Already, the President's team is making progress in this
regard. Under his leadership, both Russia and Ukraine have come
to the negotiating table and already we are seeing initial
ceasefire take hold. The contours of a lasting peace are coming
into view.
President Trump and Secretary Hegseth have stated clearly
that the United States will not put boots on the ground in
Ukraine. At the same time, they have made clear that Europeans
must take the lead in supporting Ukraine's defense requirements
in the years ahead and our allies are taking steps to that
effect. Last month, for instance, the United Kingdom hosted the
Ukraine Defense Contact Group. The U.K. and France have also
committed to lead additional efforts to ensure a lasting peace
in Ukraine.
As the President and Secretary have said, far more will be
required of them and other allies. But it is a promising start,
and our allies deserve credit for taking these initial steps.
Given the sensitive nature of ongoing negotiations, I will
limit my remarks on this subject to this statement. I look
forward to being able to share more as peace negotiations
proceed. NATO played a central role in America's strategy
throughout the Cold War. If not for the alliance, it is not
clear that the Cold War would have remained just that: cold.
But then the Cold War ended, and, as it did, our NATO
allies forgot how important it was to invest in their defense.
Instead, they grew accustomed to the peace that defined Europe
at the height of the unipolar moment, and they divested of
their militaries accordingly. But peace can never be taken
granted, and it must be maintained, and that requires all of
us, allies and the United States alike, to do our part.
Unfortunately, that has not been the case for too many of
our NATO allies. In the east, some of our allies, as the
ranking member pointed out, did not forget the necessity of
investing in their defenses. Even today, allies like Poland and
many of the Baltic nations already spend more on defense than
the United States does as a percentage of GDP, and they are
going even higher and are on track to reach President Trump's
target of 5 percent.
These are model allies, but they can only do so much on
their own. Western and Central Europe are home to several of
the world's largest and wealthiest economies. These allies are
more than capable of raising powerful militaries. Tragically,
however, they have chosen not to do so. Instead, for decades,
they have shown themselves content to free ride not just at the
expense of American taxpayers but at the expense of their
fellow allies' security. President Trump has been clear this is
not acceptable. As a matter of justice, Americans are tired of
subsidizing European's defenses and, by extension, their vast
welfare states.
But this is also a matter of prudence. Over the last few
years, the international threat environment has grown far more
dangerous, and we must all do our part to restore through
strength.
This is why Secretary Hegseth has reoriented DOD
[Department of Defense] squarely on warfighting and lethality,
and this is why he has called for a factory reset of the NATO
alliance. As the Secretary said at the gathering of the NATO
Defense Ministers in February, it is time for our NATO allies
to take primary responsibility for Europe's conventional
defense. Relying on the United States for critical but more
limited support, including, of course, our extended nuclear
deterrent. That means that our NATO allies must take the lead
in providing Ukraine with the security assistance it needs
going forward to achieve lasting peace. At the same time, they
must generate, field, and sustain the forces required to deter
aggression against the alliance itself, including the seas
around it, like the Red Sea.
If our allies do these things, there is no question that
NATO can be as effective in this century as it was in the last,
and all of Europe can realize peace and stability for decades
to come. But our allies will only be able to achieve these
goals if they raise defense spending to 5 percent of their
respective GDPs, as President Trump has emphasized.
At the same time, our allies must focus these resources on
where they are needed most, on Europe's defense, not on the
Indo-Pacific and not on the host of other missions that NATO
has taken upon itself recently to field in recent years and to
detract from the alliance's proper focus on warfighting,
lethality, and deterrence.
President Trump has avowed to achieve peace through
strength, and the Department of Defense will do its part. Now
it is time for our NATO allies to do theirs and, in the
process, set conditions for a lasting peace in Europe. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Thompson can be found in the
Appendix on page 65.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Thompson. General Cavoli, you
are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHRISTOPHER G. CAVOLI, COMMANDER, U.S.
EUROPEAN COMMAND
General Cavoli. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Rogers,
Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee,
it is an honor to be here again today representing the men and
women of U.S. European Command. It is an honor to be here with
Sergeant Major Rob Abernethy, who has been with me the entire
command term in EUCOM, and I am glad to be sitting here next to
the person performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Ms. Thompson.
Thank you for your condolences for the soldiers we lost in
Lithuania, ladies and gentlemen. Our heartfelt condolences go
out to their families. They came from all over the United
States, from Georgia to Michigan, all the way to Guam. And they
represented the very best that we have to offer, and they were
off on a night mission to recover another vehicle. They were
mechanics, and they were tragically lost in a bog.
The people of Lithuania and the government of Lithuania
responded to that in the most heartwarming and reassuring
fashion. A week ago Sunday, I went to Lithuania to inspect the
operation to try to recover the vehicle and the soldiers. The
Minister of Defense of Lithuania was on that site every single
day until those soldiers were recovered. There was a Mass, a
Holy Mass, held by the Archbishop of Vilnius, who is a
Lithuanian-American from Chicago. There were 2,000 people at
that church service, and the stated purpose of the Mass was to
pray for the families of the servicemen who were, apparently,
lost.
I was touched by it, and I think all Americans would have
been touched by it. It is the spirit that undergirds the
alliance that the chairman and the ranking member talked about.
Before I begin, please let me thank this committee for all
your support to our servicemen and women and their mission. We
continue to face historic times in the European theater.
Russia's war in Ukraine, which is now in its fourth year, has
revealed Russia to be a chronic threat. And in the coming
years, it is going to be a growing threat, one that is willing
to use military force to achieve geopolitical goals and is
actively waging a campaign of destabilization across Europe and
beyond.
Further exacerbating this Russian threat are the deepening
partnerships among our adversaries in Russia, Iran, the Chinese
Communist Party, and the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of
Korea]. These linkages increasingly pose a global risk.
But U.S. EUCOM and the NATO alliance have risen to the
challenge. NATO deterrence has held. War has not spilled into
NATO territory. With support from a broad international
coalition, U.S. EUCOM led the charge in helping Ukraine. We
established Security Assistance Group - Ukraine, which is now
commanded by Lieutenant General Curtis Buzzard. And for 38
months of this war, SAG-U [Security Assistance Group-Ukraine]
has delivered critical munitions, arms, and equipment from the
U.S. and our allies. These efforts have been indispensable in
enabling the Ukrainian Armed Forces and have empowered them to
mount a courageous defense. And now NATO has taken up this
task. NATO has established in record time an organization to
take over much of SAG-U's mission.
The threat of war also led the NATO alliance to embark upon
a historic campaign to fundamentally overhaul and modernize its
military capabilities. After years of underinvestment, too many
years, our allies are finally optimizing the alliance for high-
end warfighting. And within NATO, we now have the plans, the
forces, the command and control, and we have the focus to meet
that mission. And there's still much to do, but our allies are
investing in defense at a rate we haven't seen since the Cold
War: a 40 percent increase overall since February of 2020.
So throughout this intense and challenging transformation
of the alliance's warfighting structures, the presence of U.S.
EUCOM forces has been essential to the alliance's modernization
efforts. We've converged U.S. headquarters with NATO command
structures. We've increased combined training and exercises,
and we've been accelerating European modernization and
readiness. So through U.S. leadership, we are laying the
groundwork for European leadership and, thus, for more years of
peace and prosperity for the United States.
There is a long road ahead. Sustained vigilance and
pressure will be required. We have done all this to protect
vital U.S. interests. Our strengthened allies will increase our
strength, and our deep relationships with them give them the
access, the basing, and the intelligence to defend our country
forward. The first line of defense of our homeland begins in
EUCOM where our Naval forces prevent Russian submarines from
breaking out into the Atlantic and threatening the United
States. The ballistic missile defense of Israel begins in EUCOM
from ships positioned in the Eastern Mediterranean. And in
EUCOM, it is our job safely to evacuate Americans from the
Levant. We are America's force forward in the world.
So, ladies and gentlemen, this is my last annual testimony
to you. As I am closing 38 years of service, it has been the
honor of a lifetime to serve with our brilliant members during
these historic times, and I continue to be inspired by their
commitment to our nation's forward defense. I thank you, our
Congress, for your unwavering support of our servicemen and
women, to their well-being, and your support to their mission.
America is the greatest country in the world, and it is, in
large part, because our Armed Forces are the greatest in the
world. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Cavoli can be found in
the Appendix on page 69.]
The Chairman. I thank both the witnesses. I recognize
myself for questions. General Cavoli, given Russia's armed
forces are mobilized for long-term confrontation, what is your
best military advice on whether or not DOD should maintain the
current force posture in Europe for the foreseeable future?
General Cavoli. Chairman, it is my advice to maintain that
force posture as it is now. We have reviewed periodically
since, in 2022, we originally surged forces forward. We have
periodically reviewed the force structure at both the military
level and the policy level, and I have consistently recommended
throughout that period to maintain the forces we surge forward
and I would continue to do so now, if asked, yes.
The Chairman. Now, you referenced in this in your opening
statement. I would like for you to reiterate it. How does the
U.S. force posture in Europe contribute to the defense of our
homeland, as well as our operations in CENTCOM [United States
Central Command] and AFRICOM [United States Africa Command]?
General Cavoli. Sir, thanks. Yes, it is an important part
of why we are there. First and foremost, Russian strategic
forces, Russia continues to have very powerful strategic
forces, thousands of nuclear weapons, and the delivery methods
to deliver those. Those are not pointed just anyplace. Those
are pointed, those are there, they exist for America. And our
defense against those strategic forces, whether in the air or
undersea, begins in the European continent.
For example, Russian submarines are mainly stationed with
the Northern Fleet up in Murmansk up in the area east of the
northern Nordic countries. They come out of their harbors, and
they go south between Greenland, Iceland, and the United
Kingdom, the famous GIUK [Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom]
gap. We have to bottle them up north of that gap. If they break
out into the Atlantic, for a variety of reasons, it gets
tougher to track them. And from those positions, they can hold
the country at risk.
So our maritime efforts, which are greatly aided by the
efforts of our allies, their maritime patrol aircraft, their
antisubmarine helicopters, their destroyers, all of our efforts
together, but built around America's exquisite capabilities,
that's the first line of defense against Russian subs.
If we look to the south, we participated in the defense of
Israel early this year. U.S. Central Command led a brilliant
campaign with the Israelis and some other allies to protect
against Iranian attacks against Israel. The ballistic missile
defense part of that comes off of EUCOM ships in the Eastern
Mediterranean. The refuelers come out of EUCOM. The air space
control comes out of EUCOM. We do the same for AFRICOM and
everybody else.
It is really because of our proximity and our familiarity
with the area. The bases that we have in Europe and the legal
permissions we have with nations hosting us give us the ability
to project power quickly in our interest, on behalf of our U.S.
unilateral interest.
The Chairman. Thank you, General. Ms. Thompson, given
everything you have just heard, does the Department support
maintaining its current posture of U.S. forces in Europe for
the foreseeable future?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. The
Department, right now, is undergoing a global force posture
review, and so we are taking into account not only the dynamics
in EUCOM but in all of our theaters and evaluating that based
on President Trump's stated interests and sizing our force and
our resources appropriately to that. No decisions have been
made at this time as part of that global force posture review.
It is ongoing.
The Chairman. I think the ranking member and I have made it
very clear in our previous correspondence to the Department and
I think in opening statements, you should be focused on
maintaining the surge posture that we have had in Europe since
the conflict was started by Russia for the foreseeable future.
General Cavoli, you noted in your written statement that
the inadequate U.S. defense production capacity and problems
within four military cell systems are making it hard for Europe
to buy U.S. weapons. What challenges does this pose to your
command responsibilities in EUCOM?
General Cavoli. Thank you, Chairman. In my oral statement,
in my opening statement, I talked about a historic
transformation of allied command operations, the operational
force in NATO. So we have designed these plans to defense NATO
territory, and, from that, we derive a force structure
requirement, a description of what exactly force is and how
many of them we need. So this is sort of the spending list, the
shopping list, for defense spending in Europe now.
Increasingly, nations are putting money up against that
shopping list. 23 nations are spending above 2 percent right
now. We are grateful for that, but there has got to be
something in the store to buy. There is a lack of production
capacity right now, and that is the first problem.
The second problem is --
The Chairman. I'm sorry. My time is expired. I am going to
have to yield to the ranking member.
General Cavoli. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Yes. Just to drive home that point with the
chairman, our production capacity is a major problem. Even if
we do spend more money, I think the summary of what you just
said, you know, it is great you have the money, you have to
have something to buy. And part of the challenge here, we don't
have a budget yet from the President. I am not going to be
harshly critical of that. When you had your first term, we
didn't get the budget from President Biden until mid May
either. Once we see that budget, a lot of these questions will
be in a better place.
But, General Cavoli, can you tell us what is going on in
the war in Ukraine right now? We seem to have forgotten those
details. It is still ongoing. Russia is still attacking. But
how is Ukraine doing in terms of holding off those attacks, in
the east primarily?
General Cavoli. Sure, Congressman. Starting on the ground,
if I could take just a moment and sketch down an imaginary map,
if we look into the northeastern part of the battlefield up
near the Russian province of Kursk, that is the northern extent
of the front line of troops.
As you know, last summer, late last summer, Ukraine pushed
into Russia there and established a salient of several hundred
square kilometers in a sort of surprise move. They have
continued to hold that. The Russians vowed to kick them out by
the end of last September. The Ukrainians are still there.
There is still a certain number of brigades. I could go into
the details in --
Mr. Smith. Sure. Russia has been throwing a lot of troops
and taking a lot of casualties, particularly in the last month
or 2. Has that stalled across, you know, from Kharkiv down to
Kherson, basically the front; or are there places where Russia
is making progress?
General Cavoli. So Russia has stopped making progress in
Kursk right now. They haven't been able to dislodge the
Ukrainians. If we come all the way down the front along Chasiv
Yar and the towns in Luhansk, if we go down to Pokrovsk and
Donetsk, the Russian attacks seemed to have petered out. They
have decreased in the last couple of weeks significantly in
number, but the size and scope of the attacks seems to have
petered out, as well. The Ukrainians are in good positions.
They are in good defensive positions. They have improved some
of their readiness and manpower situation. They are, indeed,
producing large numbers of Russian casualties.
In a couple of minor places, the Ukrainians have actually
gained some ground back, but I do not see the Ukrainians being
in imminent danger of collapse. I do see the Russians
struggling to make the kind of gains they were making last
autumn.
Mr. Smith. In your opening statement, Ms. Thompson, when
you said that the ceasefire continues to hold, there is no
ceasefire; let's just be clear about that. The war is very much
ongoing. I mean, as the chairman noted, I mean, Russia just
bombed Kiev and, you know, killed a whole bunch of people. What
do you mean the ceasefire is holding when the war goes on?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I
can speak more to the specifics when we go into closed session.
I am happy to share more. But I would point to the progress
that the administration has made --
Mr. Smith. But you would acknowledge the war is still
going, there is no ceasefire at the moment.
Ms. Thompson. So, again, from the administration's
perspective, what we would say is the goal is to get both sides
to the table to have peace negotiations so that the war doesn't
continue. That is priority number one, and I would point to the
progress we have made on the energy infrastructure ceasefire
and, again, happy to provide more color in closed session. But
I would point to that as the starting point and, you know --
Mr. Smith. As a general rule, to create the notion that
there is some kind of ceasefire over there, is wildly
inaccurate and misleading.
And one other question on the budget. You mentioned that we
want Europe to get to 5 percent of GDP. The U.S., as I
understand it, is right around 3 percent of GDP, and the budget
hasn't come out yet. Is it the President's intention to try to
get us to 5 percent of GDP? In just top-of-the-head math, that
would mean a defense budget of somewhere around $1.5-1.6
trillion. Does the administration intend to get to a 5 percent
GDP number in the U.S.? And if not, how does that square with
demanding that Europe do that?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question. And I think I
would point you to President Trump's framing of the 5 percent
comment, first and foremost, which is that his view is that our
European and Canadian allies should be at 5 percent and the
expectation is not necessarily for a stronger U.S. commitment.
The U.S. has already committed, you know, over $350 billion in
effort to the war effort in Ukraine. We have been the top
spender in NATO for the better part of at least a decade.
And so the goal, from President Trump's perspective, for
the 5 percent target is to ensure that our European and
Canadian allies make up the deficit that has, essentially,
existed for the better part of a decade.
Mr. Smith. So, no, we don't intend to try to get to 5
percent in the U.S.?
Ms. Thompson. On specifics for the budget, I would point
you to the comptroller, and budget decisions are not finalized,
so I wouldn't want to speak to that and get ahead of the
decision space there.
Mr. Smith. I am out of time. I yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. I would point out that we are in NATO, and
everybody in NATO should get to 5 percent, just like President
Trump said, including the United States.
The gentleman from South Carolina is recognized.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, both, for being here. And amen, Mr.
Chairman. And I am just so grateful to have both of you
serving. It is so reassuring to the American people.
And as a veteran myself and as a father of four sons who
have served overseas in the military, I want to offer
condolences to your team on the loss of the four American
servicemembers who recently passed away with our allies in
Lithuania. Staff Sergeant Troy Knutson-Collins, Staff Sergeant
Jose Duenez, Staff Sergeant Edvin Franco, and Private First
Class Dante Taitano. I especially identify. I spent many, many
summers in National Guard training at Fort Stewart, and I know
the quality and the competence of the people serving there.
Reading about how our European allies came together to help
the recovery efforts is a strong demonstration of the efforts
to stand side-by-side in times of need, and I am grateful that
our NATO allies are really coming forward. And I particularly
appreciate, Madam Secretary, the President's efforts to
encourage our allies to reach the 2 percent, and they are, but
with his encouragement.
And so it is so encouraging, as we try to achieve peace
through strength. And, indeed, to me, it is so important
because we are in a conflict we have not chosen, and that is
dictators with rule of gun invading democracies with rule of
law. It began February 24, 2022, War Criminal Putin invading
Ukraine. Then on October 7, puppets of Iran invaded Israel. It
is such a clear connection of the dots, and both of them being
backed up by the Chinese Communist Party.
And then keeping that in mind with European Command, what
we see, I believe, is War Criminal Putin is making every effort
to resurrect the failed Soviet Union. He really never left with
Russian troops in Transnistria, Moldova. They were supposed to
leave, but they did not, and so they occupied part of Moldova.
Additionally, we know they rigged the elections in Belarus.
Then there was the invasion of Georgia and the annexation of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. And then you had the invasion of
Ukraine with tens of thousands of people killed in 2014 and
2022, and then you had the rigging of the national elections
October 26th in Georgia where the effort was made to replace
the very courageous PresidentSalome Zourabichvili. And over and
over again, we can see. And then we see even more recently the
efforts to rig the elections of Romania, but, fortunately, they
were not successful.
General Cavoli, you mentioned in your presentation that War
Criminal Putin is on pace to replace all the combat material
that was damaged or lost throughout its invasion of Ukraine.
What are the implications that this new supply of munitions and
combat vehicles is helping Russia modernize its military?
General Cavoli. That's exactly what it is doing, sir. It is
helping them modernize their military. They had very extensive
modernization plans and expansion plans. The Russians, about a
year and a half ago, announced an intention to grow their armed
forces to 1.5 million up from 900,000, a significant increase,
to establish new commands, especially in the ground forces, in
the northeastern part of Europe. That is on the border of NATO
with Finland and the Baltics. They are on the path to doing
that. They are not going very quickly because they are devoting
so much to the effort in Ukraine. We will see how much effort
they will be able to put into it after the work. It depends
largely how the war ends, but that modernization program is
intended to go right back and challenge NATO on the borders of
NATO.
Mr. Wilson. And, indeed, for the United States, how
important is it for us to produce conventional combat vehicles
for future combat?
General Cavoli. Oh, I believe combat vehicles and tanks
maintain an important place on the battlefield, and our ability
to produce them is going to have a lot to do with our ability
to have a strong army component to our joint force.
Mr. Wilson. And, General, I am very encouraged that,
actually, the Ukrainians have done so well in reducing the
capabilities of War Criminal Putin when the dictator, Bashar
al-Assad, of Syria was asking for assistance in November, it
wasn't given and he had to flee to Moscow. And so the people of
Ukraine should be given credit that now there is a potential
liberation for the people of Syria, and we already know the
unintended consequence of what War Criminal Putin did of having
Finland and Sweden join NATO. So over and over again, it is so
encouraging.
A key point, too, is NATO now, NATO countries in the EU
provide more aid and have provided more aid than the United
States, but thank goodness for President Trump that he's there
to provide peace through strength. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman [presiding]. I thank the gentleman from South
Carolina. I will now recognize the gentleman from Connecticut,
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Wittman. And thank you,
General Cavoli, particularly, for your heartfelt comments
regarding the fallen and also, again, the really sincere
efforts by our allies to assist in every way possible. To me,
in some ways, that speaks more loudly about the value of an
alliance that has been around for so long and is founded on
shared values and interests.
In your narrative about the state of play with Ukraine
right now, I mean, one aspect which I think sometimes gets
overlooked a little bit in the U.S. is the fact that Ukraine
has not just held the line in the Black Sea, it has actually
pushed the Russian navy to the furthest eastern end of the
Black Sea. They have sank a third of the Black Sea fleet,
including its flagship, Moskva; sank a Kilo submarine in
Sevastopol.
Again, in terms of the state of play right now, we saw sea-
launched missile attacks over the weekend by Russia, which
actually has not happened much since Ukraine, without a navy,
has been able to push back the Russia fleet. Can you comment
again in terms of just how extraordinary that achievement is
without a navy and also whether or not the safe passage of
grain shipments are now going to be at risk because Russia now
seems to be sort of taking advantage of the lull.
General Cavoli. Congressman, thanks for the opportunity to
comment on one of the most amazing maritime feats in years. So
you put your finger right on it. Not only does Ukraine roll
back the presence of the Black Sea fleet, they don't even have
a navy. They have given us all a view of a future where
unmanned surface vehicles, basically sea drones, have the
potential to wage at a large scale against a traditional manned
navy. Really remarkable.
They have had some help from us, from our European allies.
But I should stress that a great deal of their expertise is
indigenous. It is grown with their own engineers, their own
lessons learned. It is remarkable.
They did clear out a passage lane for safe passage of grain
ships from Odessa down to the Turkish Straits, and that has
been what has been securing the free passage of grain. The
Black Sea Grain Initiative, you know, long defunct. So that is
very encouraging.
Russia did launch some surface launch cruise missiles the
other day. They have been doing that. They have the capability
to do that all the way from the Caspian, if you want to know
the truth. So it is not unusual for them to do that. They don't
have a very good ability to hit moving targets with those
missiles, though, so I think there is a lot of space where we
can help the Ukrainians here to continue to protect.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you. I mean, to Mr. Smith's
point, the notion that, Ms. Thompson, the ceasefire is taking
hold, the fact that, again there were sea-launched attacks,
maybe not on moving vessels, but they certainly hit cities in
Ukraine over the weekend that clearly shows that whatever
holding the administration may think is happening, in fact, I
would argue we are going in the reverse direction in terms of
where we were before the negotiations.
Mr. Chairman, there is an article in the April 7, just
yesterday's Kyiv Post, headline: ``Russia Mocks Trump's
Ceasefire Deal with Sea Launch Missile Attack on Ukrainian
Cities'' be made part of the record.
The Chairman [presiding]. Without objection.
[The information referred to can be found on page 89.]
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. So, General Cavoli, you talked
about the value of the alliance in terms of tracking a Russian
submarine. Again, I represent Groton, Connecticut, which we
have 15 attack subs that are sort of part of that team sport
that our NATO allies do to protect the homeland, and General
Guillot talked about that last week. Again, quickly before I am
done, could you maybe just again describe how the NATO
antisubmarine warfare effort, which is a team sport, really is
so important?
General Cavoli. Yes, absolutely. I will do it in
generalities, Congressman, because so much undersea warfare is
held pretty closely by nations, to include ours, of course.
Yes. So sub hunting consists basically of submarine looking
for submarine, maritime patrol aircraft using various means to
look for submarines, and helicopters looking for submarines,
and then surface vessels, usually destroyers or frigates, using
their assets. And we combine all four of those dimensions to
surge in specific areas that we, you know, that our
intelligence helps us to figure out.
We don't have the world's monopoly on all that equipment,
and it is very exquisite equipment. We don't have as much of it
as we wished we had. Our allies do. Our Norwegian allies, our
U.K. allies, the land space in Iceland where we base maritime
patrol aircraft out of Keflavik. The refueling ships to keep
our destroyers at sea, Danish frigates, all of this comes
together and gets orchestrated --
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, thank
you for your great opening statement and your great
articulation of the importance of our support for Ukraine, the
importance of our support for NATO, the importance of NATO's
integration into our own national security. I appreciate also
the ranking member's statement. I appreciate the chairman's
statement with Chairman Wicker concerning the importance of the
Supreme Allied Commander's position. To General Cavoli, thank
you for your great service as Supreme Allied Commander and the
work that you have done.
General Cavoli, we have nuclear weapons in Europe, do we
not?
General Cavoli. Yes, we do. The number and the modification
of them is classified, but their existence is not.
Mr. Turner. It is important that the United States has
those nuclear weapons there, correct?
General Cavoli. Yes. They fall under my command and control
for that purpose, sir, as the Commander of EUCOM.
Mr. Turner. And so it is important that the United States
have the position of Supreme Allied Commander because we have
nuclear weapons in Europe.
General Cavoli. Sir, if those nuclear weapons were going to
be offered to the alliance for nuclear deterrence or for
nuclear operations, that would come under the command of the
Supreme Allied Commander. The way we are currently set up, I,
as the commander of EUCOM, own the weapons, and I hand them to
myself as the Supreme Allied Commander. That is possible
because I am the same person, and I am American.
Mr. Turner. So I really appreciate that you just did that
straight line for every one because the idiocy of the fact if
there was any discussion about the aspects of relinquishing the
command or even the rumor of relinquishing the command is just
beyond me because you both indicated that we have nuclear
weapons in Europe, that it is important we have nuclear weapons
in Europe, and that it is important that you have the command
because you are an American and they are under your command.
So beyond all the other aspects of its importance, which is
important, all of which are incredibly important to our
national security, that alone ought to just end all of the
debate. So thank you for making that with such unbelievable
clarity.
There have been individuals who have, unbelievably, also
stated that they don't understand why we have bases in Germany
to defend Germany. In your opening, you were describing that
you don't go to work every day to defend Europe, that your part
of the overall arching aspects of the extended breach of the
United States' national and international security apparatus.
Would you please give us some description again of the fact
that the work that you do, that you are EUCOM but you don't sit
around every day and wait to see whether or not that someone
who is trying to invade Germany, that our bases in Germany
actually, where there are Americans, are working everyday on
international security operations for the United States and on
international security issues around the world.
General Cavoli. Congressman, as the Commander of U.S.
European Command, I have U.S. missions. I take all of my
instructions and direction from the United States from the
Secretary of Defense, and I am there exclusively to pursue U.S.
interests and to defend U.S. interests. In as much as I am
located in Europe with that force, it is almost always in
conjunction with allies, but I am doing it from a U.S.
perspective for U.S. interests.
Mr. Turner. But you were describing Israel. You do things
in the Middle East. You do things all around the world. You are
not just sitting there defending Europe.
General Cavoli. No, sir. If you, you know, look at the
Mediterranean Sea, three very important U.S. combatant commands
come together there. There is U.S. AFRICOM, Mike Langley, there
is U.S. CENTCOM with Erik Kurilla, and there is EUCOM. And the
intersection of the boundaries of those three organizations
demands that we work together.
EUCOM has the most bases and the most developed
infrastructure to be able to support the other two, so,
obviously, I spend more time supporting General Langley in
Africa than he spends, you know, supporting me in Europe. This
is a result of the infrastructure, the bases, the forces we
have located there, and, very importantly, the government-to-
government agreements we have that permit us to use non-U.S.
territory to stage our operations.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, thank you. That was very
important, General. I appreciate that.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
your clarity of your statement, as well as for the ranking
member, Mr. Smith.
General Cavoli, thank you for your service. You have been
at this a long time, and the clarity of your testimony today is
extraordinarily important to all of us about the role of EUCOM
and the defense of Europe and also the defense of the United
States.
My question really goes to Ms. Thompson, and I would like
to have clarity about the administration's belief or not that
our NATO European partners are critical to U.S. national
security.
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I
would point you to Secretary Hegseth's comments on his first
trip overseas, which was to the NATO Defense Ministerial, and
where he acknowledged that NATO is the most successful defense
alliance in history and that he made clear that we are not
abandoning our European allies. In fact, our efforts and
President Trump's efforts, particularly on the defense spending
front, is meant to bring our European allies alongside us, to
develop a status quo --
Mr. Garamendi. I got all that from your testimony, but my
question was different. My question is is or are the European
allies critical to our national American security?
Ms. Thompson. I would say a strong defense and deterrence
in Europe is certainly in our national interest, particularly
as the Department has an aim to focus on homeland defense. And,
certainly, as the chairman and ranking member recognized, the
looming threat of conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific,
having partners in Europe as allies and partners that are
strong on defense and deterrence and are capable only helps
further those interests for us.
Mr. Garamendi. The lack of clarity in your answer is noted.
However, it is also clear that the statements from the
administration, including the Secretary and the Vice President,
would indicate that the administration does not value our NATO
allies, calling them pathetic and other demeaning words and
also missing the monthly NATO meeting would indicate that
perhaps the administration's view does not coincide with your
roundabout statement.
So the question is does the U.S. still value the partners
that we have in Europe?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman. And,
again, I would say, as the Secretary and the President have
emphasized, we do value our partners in Europe to the extent
they are willing to step up and be strong allies and partners
with us, and that means pulling their weight. And that is the
tough message and the honest message that this administration
has been delivering, and we believe it is important to be
honest with our allies and that that only builds a stronger
relationship for us and for our European allies and partners.
Mr. Garamendi. Maybe that is not correct. Maybe it actually
weakens our partnership when you demean, when you discourage,
and when you place them in a lower value.
Moving beyond that, I just note the self-inflicted wounds
that the administration has put in place in Europe and the
extraordinary additional burden that places on our military
leadership trying to hold it together. I want to also thank Mr.
Turner for the clarity that he brought with regard to the
command of NATO.
General Cavoli, there are many facilities in Europe, some
of them on the eastern side in Poland. Are there any plans to
change the footprint of the U.S. military on the eastern front?
General Cavoli. Congressman, we move forces around
frequently in Europe. Our air forces are hopping all around,
our maritime forces. Even our ground forces move from place to
place. But the principal locations where we have forces right
now, that is where they are and that is where I am planning to
keep them.
Very generous, some of the countries on the eastern flank.
Poland, $3.2 billion in infrastructure to provide housing for
our servicemen who are rotating through there. Lithuania has
built a city for an armored battalion.
I think that got at your question, sir. If not, please let
me know.
Mr. Garamendi. I will in the classified. Thank you. I yield
back.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr. DesJarlais.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman. I would like to get
through a couple of questions for General Cavoli. General, last
month, the Defense Innovation Unit announced that EUCOM and
INDOPACOM would be the first to receive new generative
artificial intelligent capabilities under the Thunderforge
initiative for operational planning and decision support. From
the command level perspective, how do you envision this
technology enhancing EUCOM's capabilities?
General Cavoli. Oh, it is going to be fantastic if it works
out the way it is supposed to, Congressman. It is an ability to
use artificial intelligence to do complex models and then to
run scenarios in it. So, effectively, to do the sort of
wargaming that used to involve a bunch of majors hunkered over
a map in the middle of the night arguing back and forth, we
will be able to automate that and do thousands and thousands of
iterations. It will really help clarify some of our planning.
Dr. DesJarlais. What kind of guardrails are you putting in
place to ensure it augments, rather than replaces, human
judgment, especially in high stakes or escalatory scenarios?
General Cavoli. Well, I expect my subordinate officers to
come to me with the decisions and the recommendations, not the
computer. It is going to be an integral part of our staff
process and the way we do them now. It could conceivably help
to replace some manpower, but, in the beginning, it is designed
to enable manpower.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And, General Cavoli, I appreciate you
raising the alarm about the, roughly, dozen European ports near
or co-located with logistic hubs that have significant Chinese
investments. I think this is a critical issue that doesn't get
the attention it deserves in Washington. What is your
assessment of the risk this poses in a crisis, and, when you
bring these concerns directly to our allies, are they receptive
to your concerns?
General Cavoli. Yes. The concerns are obvious, sir. We
could lose access at a critical time to a port. In our exercise
program, we are very careful and very deliberate to exercise a
wide variety of different port facilities so that we understand
the way they work and their ownership and everything and so
that we exercise our rights to use them.
When we talked to our allies about them, they almost always
immediately respond if we have concerns about the ownership. In
some cases that we could talk about in closed session, allied
government have intervened and stop a tender because it was
going to put a critical piece of infrastructure potentially
into the wrong hands.
Dr. DesJarlais. And you also pointed to CCP-linked 5G
infrastructure across parts of Europe as an area of concern.
Beyond diplomacy, what tools do we have either bilaterally or
through NATO to mitigate the surveillance and influence risk
this poses?
General Cavoli. Beyond diplomacy, sir, I think I would do
best to answer that in closed session.
Dr. DesJarlais. Yes, sir. I yield back.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Russia has launched
1,460 guided aerial bombs, 670 attack drones, and more than 30
missiles in the last week, killing at least 21 civilians,
including nine children. Ms. Thompson, do you think that that
means we have seen an initial ceasefire take hold, to quote
you?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I
would point out that this is an ongoing peace negotiation
process. We are at the beginning stages --
Mr. Moulton. I am asking if you think that qualifies as a
ceasefire taking hold.
Ms. Thompson. Again, I am happy to provide additional color
on what we --
Mr. Moulton. Yes or no? Does that mean a ceasefire has
taken hold?
Ms. Thompson. I am happy to provide more clarity on this
situation --
Mr. Moulton. You are unwilling to answer the question. You
should answer questions when you come here, Ms. Thompson. Ms.
Thompson, you said that the Pentagon is undergoing a worldwide
force posture review based on President Trump's stated
interests. We know a lot of things happen in this
administration based on the whims of the President which he
intends to change day to day. Do you think a force posture
review should be based on the President's stated interests or
on sound military advice?
Ms. Thompson. So, first and foremost, our global posture
review is informed by the President's national security
priorities and then, subsequently, on our interim National
Defense Strategy guidance and then, ultimately, what will be
this administration's national defense strategy --
Mr. Moulton. Okay. So just to be clear, the National
Defense Strategy is secondary to what the President wants.
Ms. Thompson. Again, I would say --
Mr. Moulton. Ms. Thompson, you said that President Trump
will restore peace through strength and, quote, we must all do
our part to restore peace through strength. Does it show
strength to blame Zelenskyy for starting this war?
Ms. Thompson. I think the goal from President Trump is to
bring both sides to the table, both Russia and Ukraine --
Mr. Moulton. Does it show strength to describe Russian
President, Vladimir Putin, a war criminal, as a genius, as
savvy for his invasion of Ukraine?
Ms. Thompson. Congressman, given the sensitive nature of
negotiations, again, I don't want to provide any additional --
Mr. Moulton. I am just asking if you think it shows
strength to praise Putin over our own intelligence agencies, to
say that we trust Putin more than the CIA [Central Intelligence
Agency]. Does that show strength?
Ms. Thompson. Congressman, again, I would point to our
overarching goal and, certainly, President Trump --
Mr. Moulton. I am just asking you if it shows strength. I
get the overarching goals. You can point to whatever you want.
I am asking you to answer the question. Does it show strength
to call Zelenskyy an incompetent dictator while praising Putin
as a, quote, strong leader?
Ms. Thompson. I think what shows strength is President
Trump's ability to get both sides to the table, which is a
facet that he has already achieved, and what this
administration continues to --
Mr. Moulton. That is nice that you think that shows
strength, but what I am asking is does it show strength to say
Zelenskyy started the war, that he's an incompetent dictator,
and that Putin is a strong leader? Do you think that that
statement shows strength, yes or no, Ms. Thompson?
Ms. Thompson. Congressman, for further questions on
specifics on what President Trump has or hasn't said and the
implications of that, I would point you to the White House. I
represent the Department of Defense and how --
Mr. Moulton. Oh, you work with the Department of Defense.
Great. So do you think it shows strength to disclose top secret
targeting information to our enemies hours before pilots are
going to fly over enemy targets on a platform known to be
targeted by our biggest adversaries? Do you think that shows
strength?
Ms. Thompson. Congressman, again, those are discussions
that I am not privy to, and so --
Mr. Moulton. No, no, you don't need to be privy to the
discussions. I am just asking you if you think it shows
strength to disclose top secret information.
Ms. Thompson. I think what shows strength on the topic that
we are here to discuss, which is force posture in Europe --
Mr. Moulton. I am not asking about that. I am asking about
whether we should disclose top secret information. You
represent the Department of Defense. Are you going to hold the
troops under the command of DOD accountable to keeping
classified information safe, or do you think it shows strength
to tell our troops that it is okay to disclose top secret
information, that they will not be held accountable if that
happens?
Ms. Thompson. Congressman, I can only speak for myself, and
I personally practice all of the information security protocols
of the Department. And it is the expectation of the Department
in this position to do so, and I certainly do.
Mr. Moulton. And do you hold yourself accountable for that?
Ms. Thompson. I personally hold myself accountable for
compliance with information security. Absolutely.
Mr. Moulton. Well, that is a far cry from what we are
seeing from the Secretary of Defense who said that
accountability is back but has refused to hold himself
accountable.
General Cavoli, how many Lithuanians showed up for the Mass
to celebrate the lives of our servicemembers?
General Cavoli. Congressman, I couldn't give you an exact
number. I don't know what the police counted. But it is the
National Cathedral. It is in this main square --
Mr. Moulton. Several hundred, close to a thousand, what is
it?
General Cavoli. Certainly over a thousand.
Mr. Moulton. We only have one president who spent $26
million of taxpayer-funded golf vacations in first 69 days
since his inauguration. And, yet, he couldn't leave a Saudi
golf tournament to show up for the dignified transfer of those
soldiers' remains.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you both for being here. I appreciate you
both, and I applaud your service, General Cavoli, and
congratulate you. I served in Europe. I was a commander at
Ramstein, commander at Third Air Force. I know the importance
of NATO. It has been the bedrock or the foundation for our
security for seven decades. I know the threat that Russia
poses. I studied it my whole career.
So my first question for Ms. Thompson, I have significant
concerns about our approach to relations with Russia. I do not
like how we are treating Russia with kid gloves like they are
our friend. And, often, we use very harsh words towards our
allies in Europe and Ukraine in particular.
Does this administration see Russia as a potential partner
in things, such as resolving tensions in the Middle East? I am
just trying to get to motives.
Ms. Thompson. Congressman, what I would say is, as the
interim National Defense Strategy guidance points out, you
know, Russia, Iran, North Korea, China still pose great
threats, and we live in an extremely dangerous security
environment. And so I would acknowledge that up-front just to
get to the crux of your question.
What I would say is the goal for President Trump in peace
negotiations is obviously to bring both sides to the table. And
to do that, you know, we have to make sure that both scales are
balanced to get both parties in a room and talking. And so, you
know, what I would say, from what you are seeing from the
administration, is that, at the end of the day, the goal is to
get both sides to the table and keep both sides at the table so
that we can get to the overall objective that I think we all
share, which is an enduring peace in Ukraine.
Mr. Bacon. Does this administration believe that an
improved bilateral, including economic relations between the
U.S. and Russia, is worth pursuing once peace in Ukraine has
been achieved?
Ms. Thompson. Sir, unfortunately, I can't speak to those
dynamics. I would direct you to the State Department for, you
know, any sort of follow-on diplomatic elements that would come
after this. The Department of Defense is squarely focused on
supporting President Trump's efforts to reach an enduring
peace.
Mr. Bacon. I just wish we had more clarity when it comes to
Russia and Ukraine. Who is the good guy? Who is the bad guy?
Who is the invader? Who is the victim? And who is committing
the war crimes? I applaud the efforts for peace, but we can't
whitewash Russia's behavior to get them to the table. I think
we all see that what they are doing, and we should be very
clear about it.
My next question is to General Cavoli. I am deeply
concerned about the security situation in Eastern Europe with
the ongoing invasion of Ukraine by War Criminal Putin. I
believe that if he is not stopped in Ukraine, he will continue
to turn his attention towards other former Soviet states, like
Moldova, or going next to the Baltic nations, Latvia, Estonia,
and Lithuania.
Will the U.S. maintain its presence in these countries to
ensure that Russia is deterred from further aggression?
General Cavoli. Sir, clearly, that will be a policy
decision that will be made as time goes on. We are in a good
position right now.
Mr. Bacon. Is it correct the Department is considering
pulling out two rotational brigades out of Europe?
General Cavoli. Sir, as I said earlier, there is a constant
review of this all the time. Usually, the dynamic is services
are asking to recover some forces. They have readiness
concerns, modernization concerns. So those discussions continue
right now.
Mr. Bacon. I think it would be a grave mistake to pull
forces out of Europe right now. I mean, this is a time to deter
Russia, and I think withdrawing forces is a sign of weakness
and it lowers our deterrence.
I have one more follow-up question for you, General Cavoli.
While I agree with the administration that focusing on China as
our top threat is essential, I worry that we must not take our
eye off of Russia and Europe. I believe adamantly that Putin
will take any sign of U.S. weakness in Europe as a chance to
continue his campaign of aggression in former Soviet
territories.
What is the overall U.S. military posture in Europe going
forward?
General Cavoli. The overall posture for the U.S. military
will be to accomplish the objectives that we talked about a few
minutes ago in my opening statement and in some of my responses
to questions. First and foremost, to defend the United States
of America forward. Second, to arrange for and to support U.S.
operations and other combatant commands and throughout Europe.
And then, of course, to fight and deter as part of NATO to
deter Russia.
So we participate in NATO's deterrence strategy. We are a
vital part of that. I expect that to continue going forward.
Mr. Bacon. Could you, in my last remaining seconds, just
talk about the importance of the Baltic states. I am the Baltic
Security Caucus chairman, and they are right on the front
lines.
General Cavoli. Yes, they are right on the front lines.
They are absolutely one of the places that the Russian
Federation has focused their attention on. Their preliminary
attention, setting up a narrative of disputed territories and
things like that, passport diplomacy with Russian language
people, subversion campaigns and sabotage campaigns, all of
those things.
So they are certainly on the front line. They know it. They
respond. They spend all over 2 percent. Estonia is over 3
percent. They have all devoted a huge fraction of their
national power --
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses for being here today. General Cavoli, thank you for
your service. You are going to be missed. I hope you continue
to serve in a way that continues to contribute, as you have
done for so many decades, to our country. I wish you the best
in your next chapter, and thank you so much for being here.
I think the Russian threat, and even the Chinese threat to
a degree, are so far removed from us here in the United States
that it is hard for the people here to understand the reality
or the severity. I have traveled to several NATO countries,
including the Baltics, and let me tell you the threat is real
and it is at top of mind for people there.
General Cavoli, were you once an infantryman?
General Cavoli. I don't think you really ever stop being
one, sir, but when I became a General they took away my branch
insignia. Yes, I was an infantry officer.
Mr. Carbajal. As a Marine, I can relate. Do you speak
Russian?
General Cavoli. I do.
Mr. Carbajal. Have you worked with Russians in your career?
General Cavoli. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carbajal. You are also coming up on 40 years of a
distinguished career service in the Army, which, during that
time, included director of Russia and the joint staff, and you
are a foreign area officer with a concentration on Eurasia.
Based on this experience, what is your assessment of the threat
that Russia poses to the homeland and NATO?
General Cavoli. Sir, there could be a long and complicated
answer to that question, but, instead, I will just go back to
my opening statement. Russia is a chronic threat to the United
States and will be a growing threat in the future.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Ms. Thompson, based on the
situation that General Cavoli has described, does it seem
appropriate to try to reduce our force posture and presence in
Europe at this time?
Ms. Thompson. Congressman, thank you for the question, and
I would just reiterate that we are in the process of a global
posture review and no decisions have been made in any theater.
What I will say, as well, is that, you know, of course, as part
of this global force posture review, we are taking into account
competing requirements, as you highlighted correctly the
threats not only posed by Russia and the EUCOM AOR [area of
responsibility] but also by China in the Pacific and then,
certainly, concerns in our own SOUTHCOM [United States Southern
Command] AOR on homeland defense and NORTHCOM [United States
Northern Command], as well.
Mr. Carbajal. We all want this war to end, but it must end
on Ukraine's terms. Members of the administration, including
the Secretary of Defense, have suggested Ukraine should give up
hope of reclaiming all territory seized by Russia. How can that
be achieved when this president continues to play neutral
facilitator but not really because he keeps praising Russia, he
keeps putting down Ukraine, he keeps aligning himself with
Russia. Even the tariffs that we are dealing with don't include
Russia. How can we trust this president?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I
will address the first part of the question. On the economic
piece, I would direct those questions to the White House and to
State and Commerce for the specifics on that because I don't
want to speak for them on the tariff implications particularly.
But on DOD lanes in particular, our lane, our goal is to
help support the President and his efforts to bring both sides
to the table, keep them at the table, and reach a lasting
peace. That requires work on both sides of the scale both with
Ukraine and Russia, and it requires balance, as you point out.
And that is the efforts that we are working toward right now,
and the Department of Defense is poised to support both of
those efforts, including continuing to support Ukraine where it
will affect those negotiations, as well.
Mr. Carbajal. Ms. Thompson, you keep providing answers that
are just canned and don't really answer many of the questions
that have been asked by our colleagues today. So, quite
frankly, I am just not going to waste my time. I wish I was as
lucky as you when I was starting in my career with not as much
experience to be elevated to such a significant post where you
are now performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs, Office of the
Secretary of Defense. I wish I were so lucky.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Luttrell.
Mr. Luttrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cavoli, 38
years. Are you moving on to another post, or are they putting
you out to graze?
General Cavoli. I am retiring, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Luttrell. Well, you are never going to remember what I
am about to say to you, but one day you are going to look up
and you are going to say I remember somebody saying something
to me one time. After 38 years of service, you have been
wearing that armor for a very long time. All right. And when
you step away from this post and you are introduced outside
these walls to the civilian world once again, there is a black
hole, a deep, dark, black hole that you haven't seen since you
started your service. Okay. And I have read your portfolio, and
you are one of the most impressive individuals I have ever had
the chance to sit in front of. But this thing is very real,
okay, and when and if this happens to you, because the window
of opportunity is about 5 years. I have been out for about 10
years, and I think I was in it for about 5 years. And I have
talked to my veteran brothers and sisters, and they all have
the same problems because, once you start your next journey,
nobody is going to show up on time, nobody is going to complete
their work like they are supposed, nobody is going to answer
you like you think they should. It is just going to be
different, and you are going to look up and you are going to
realize you are the anomaly and that's okay.
Don't ever hesitate to reach out to your brothers and
sisters that you served with and just have those conversations
because what you have done is exceptional. And when you turn
the page for the next chapter of your life, you will be
starting over, and that will be very challenging. But as a
leader, someone that has gone through so much, the next chapter
is just one step forward until the day the good Lord calls you
home. Okay. And this may or may not make sense to you. I can
assure you if you're talking to -- whatever you do, don't run
for politics. Don't ever think about running for Congress. Stay
away from this place. I promise you, if you do, just hear me
out on this one.
I wanted to say that to you and thank you for, I mean, I
don't know if they are going to give you an award for 38 years.
I consider you like an overachiever. But good luck. My
questions are for the classified setting, so thank you.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As a Gold Star Family
member myself, I associate myself with the remarks of the
chair, the ranking member, and particularly Mr. Wilson, who
mentioned by name those soldiers that were lost from
representing our country well, as well as their homes,
Illinois, California, Guam, and Michigan.
General Cavoli, in your experience, if there are four
servicemen missing under those circumstances, wouldn't the
Commander-in-Chief be notified within 24 hours?
General Cavoli. You know, sir, I don't want to sound
evasive in any way, but I don't know. We report echelon to
echelon, and my job is to --
Mr. Keating. So that would be reported up from you,
certainly, if I am --
General Cavoli. It is reported through staff channels and,
typically --
Mr. Keating. Yes. It just sounded remarkable that, over 24
hours later, the President of the United States, when
questioned, didn't know anything about this. So I wonder about
the communication, at least at your level, it went up the
ladder. So it is good to know that, and it is good to know, too
-- I saw those films from Lithuania of the people in the
streets, even outside the Cathedral, little boys crying. And I
believe there were reports, too, I don't know. You were there.
Wasn't the President of Lithuania there, too?
General Cavoli. He was present for the procession for the
dignified transfer.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. Ms. Thompson, you know, you said we
should step up and match, I mean, the European allies. They
should step up and match our example, match what we are doing.
Was our President, did he partake in any of those services?
Ms. Thompson. Congressman, thank you for the question. I,
unfortunately, can't comment on that because --
Mr. Keating. You don't know?
Ms. Thompson. I don't speak for the White House.
Mr. Keating. No, no. People know. Do you read the
newspapers? Do you listen to commentary? Where was the
President during the services?
Ms. Thompson. I am not aware of the President's schedule --
Mr. Keating. Really? Someone in the Defense Department
where the Secretary of Defense was supposedly tasked for that
job. The President flew over that on his way to a Saudi golf
tournament at one of his golf courses. You didn't know that?
Ms. Thompson. Sir, I only knew --
Mr. Keating. You didn't know that?
Ms. Thompson. Sir, I only knew that the Secretary of
Defense had planned to attend and that, you know, he was --
Mr. Keating. Well, I guess we are really siloing
information then, if you weren't aware of that. General Cavoli,
you mentioned about the importance, and I couldn't agree more,
and it is more important now. If we don't understand it in
Ukraine, we will never understand it, of the deep relationship
that we have with our European allies in particular. And, you
know, there was a lot of talk with a recent Houthi attack. But
wasn't it true the prior attacks that U.K. and other allies
participated in attacks against the Houthis, as well? So there
was alliances there. We were working with allies in prior
attacks.
General Cavoli. I believe so, Congressman. I would have to
defer to General Kurilla on that for the exact details, but I
am aware that there was a --
Mr. Keating. U.K., in particular, fighters were there, as
well.
General Cavoli. Yes. I can't give you numbers or the exact
--
Mr. Keating. No. But they were there helping us, showing
that deep relationship. And I can only question the deep
relationship with the Signal chat breach of intelligence that
occurred, here's, you know, this deep relationship from Stephen
Miller, who was on that chat -- why ever he was there I have no
idea -- but he was there, and he said we need to extract some
economic gain for doing this. Vice President Vance said, ``I
just hate bailing out the Europeans again.'' Ms. Thompson, your
boss, Secretary Hegseth, said ``I fully share your loathing of
European freeloading. It's pathetic.''
Do you think that speaks to a deep relationship, Ms.
Thompson?
Ms. Thompson. Congressman, thank you for the question. I
think the sentiment that you are describing speaks to a
frustration that the American people hold for the deficit as
President Trump --
Mr. Keating. In fact, you used the word freeloading in your
testimony this morning.
Ms. Thompson. I said free rider just to --
Mr. Keating. Oh, free riders. I'm sorry. Thank you for
correcting me. You are right. So even though General Cavoli
said that there has been a 40 percent increase just in the last
few years and it is in pace to meet the requirements in Europe.
But free riding, that's your term, is that correct, that you
used this morning?
Ms. Thompson. Yes. And the description from that --
Mr. Keating. No. I am speaking for your testimony. Now, do
you think free riding of our allies, do you think that over
1,000 international allies, including European allies, were
killed in the U.S.-led war on terrorism, 9/11, the only time
Article 5 has been utilized. So the deaths of over 1,000
servicemen and women from our allies, that is free riding to
you? That is free riding?
Ms. Thompson. Congressman, my remarks and certainly those
echoed by the administration are speaking in the context of the
NATO problem set and the --
Mr. Keating. No. This was NATO allies, Article 5.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. McGuire.
Mr. McGuire. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to start
by also offering my condolences and prayers to the four
soldiers lost in Lithuania. That would be Staff Sergeant
Duenez, Staff Sergeant Franco, PFC Taitano, and Sergeant
Knutson. And I would also like to say thank you to our
witnesses for being here today. We really appreciate it.
I very much want to thank and appreciate the Trump
administration, President Trump, Secretary Hegseth. And, Ms.
Thompson, you are doing a wonderful job today. You know, your
efforts to keep our American people safe at home and abroad, we
very much appreciate what you are doing. And everyone knows we
wouldn't have a country without our military. So, General
Cavoli, I couldn't say it better than my Navy brother,
Luttrell, is we really appreciate your service.
But your efforts, Ms. Thompson, are working. Morale is up.
I have been to the Southern Border. I visited military bases.
Recruitment is up. We are getting these divisive ideologies.
You know, in the military and as a veteran, if somebody saved
your life on the battlefield, you wouldn't care if they were
pink or blue, male or female, Democrat, Republican,
Independent. We are all on the same team. And for special
operations forces, we are always behind enemy lines, we are
always outnumbered, and we always win because, if we don't win,
we don't come home. And so these divisive ideologies that have
plagued our military, I am so glad that we are focusing more on
the job, and that is making our military lethal again.
I very much agree with President Trump and the chairman. It
is time to end hostilities in Europe with Ukraine and Russia. I
very much agree with the chairman, as well. I would like to see
all members of NATO do 5 percent. I know that is a big ask,
but, you know, we have to have peace through strength.
And I am going to start with, Ms. Thompson and General
Cavoli, I have a few questions I would like to get your yes-or-
no response. Since President Trump assumed office in January of
this year, have our European allies and partners increased
their defense spending or shown actual plans to do so?
General Cavoli. Yes.
Ms. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. McGuire. Thank you. General Cavoli, can you please
provide some examples of how they have done that?
General Cavoli. Spain, today, announced that they are going
up to 2.3 percent of GDP. That is a big lift in Spain where
defense spending was not very favored for a long time and where
there was, for a very long time, a very weak coalition
government. That is just today's example, Congressman. We could
go on and on.
Denmark has recently announced plans to go to 3.2 percent
of GDP and to spend two additional billion euros on Arctic
security. Those are just two examples in the past couple of
days, weeks.
Mr. McGuire. Thank you. Would the strides these allies are
making be sufficient enough to meet the implementation
requirements of their regional plans under NATO?
General Cavoli. Not yet. They will be. So there is a long
process called the NATO Defense Planning Process, Congressman.
That is where we take the force structure requirement of the
plans and assign it out to nations to build for. That has been
concluded. All nations have accepted all their capabilities
targets. Now it is time to build, and this is where we come to
the question of industrial capacity.
Mr. McGuire. Certainly. And I remember you guys mentioning
that capacity and we have got to have something to buy, and
that is something that this committee and our chairman fully
supports and we have had many discussions on that.
Let's see. General Cavoli, we have already touched on this,
but if you could clarify. Some of our allies on NATO's eastern
flank have demonstrated their commitment to President Trump's
call to increase their GDP spending on defense and improve
capabilities, including Poland and the Baltic states. Poland
itself has increased its interest in American defense products.
Do you believe the current FMS [foreign military sales] system
in the Pentagon operates sufficiently enough to ensure that
U.S. defense equipment reaches foreign buyers on time?
General Cavoli. No, sir. We have a lot of work to do in
that regard.
Mr. McGuire. Thanks. General Cavoli, one last thing. Last
week, Defense News published an article highlighting President
Putin's announcement of the new Perm nuclear submarine of the
Yasen-M class. The article also highlighted some of the issues
being faced by the Russian industrial base not unlike our own.
General Cavoli, can you provide a brief overview of the
current state of the Russian undersea capability in your area
of responsibility?
General Cavoli. Could I do that in closed session, please?
Mr. McGuire. Sure.
General Cavoli. Thanks.
Mr. McGuire. And then, if you could, and this may be closed
session, as well, but how does the United States compare to
Russia in terms of its undersea capabilities?
General Cavoli. I am very confident in the United States
Navy, sir, but we can go into details in closed session.
Mr. McGuire. I appreciate your testimony today, and I yield
back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Ms. Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you all for
being here today. And, Ms. Thompson, I wanted to start with
you. We are here to talk about the European theater. We are
here to talk about our commitments to Europe and the NATO
allies. I wanted to raise concerns about remarks that we have
recently experienced over the last 3 days in terms of the
tariffs that are going to be levied across the entire world,
including, of course, many of our allies in Europe.
Senator Rubio recently argued that these tariffs would not
meaningfully affect European defense budgets or NATO's
cohesion, and he suggested that tariffs would be justified
without undermining readiness of our allies. I worry very much
that, based on your opening testimony asking our NATO allies to
spend more, build more, that tariffs cannot possibly not affect
readiness, can you please expound with me on your perspective
from the DOD on how might the imposition of significant tariffs
impact our European allies and their ability to meet NATO
defense spending requirements as levied by this administration?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman. And
it is an important dynamic that you bring up, so I appreciate
you highlighting it. What I would say, from the Department of
Defense's purview and lane, because I don't want to speak for
the broader implications of tariffs on diplomatic relations or
their effects because that's more in Commerce or Treasury lane,
but what I would say from the Department's perspective is what
we want to make sure is that any levers we are pulling don't
impede our objective, as the Secretary stated in his first
visit to NATO, which is a strong Transatlantic industrial base
on both sides of the Atlantic that includes bolstering not only
our own production, our own defense industrial base, but also
Europeans investing in theirs. And we want to ensure that they
are certainly able to do so in their comparative --
Ms. Houlahan. So I am going to stop because I don't think
that you can differentiate between the Defense Department and
Commerce in this sense. This is absolutely the industrial base.
The defense industrial base is directly connected to Commerce,
and our Commerce is directly connected to that of our allies
and our friends. And I think that we can't possibly believe
that our actions on the national level to impose very, very
high tariffs and levies upon our allies could not affect their
readiness and their ability to produce and manufacture and even
buy from the United States those weapon systems, amongst other
things.
I am really frustrated, to be honest, with your testimony,
which has consistently been evasive and consistently tried to
say that it is not within your lane to comment on things. And I
guess I went back to try to understand your position and your
tenure, and I have got to be honest, you know. It appears as
though you have been in this job a very short amount of time,
and it appears as though you have been here a very, very short
amount of time. And so I would ask the administration why you
are the person that they asked us to talk to about these issues
because it just doesn't seem as though you have the knowledge
to be able to answer the questions. I will echo my colleague's
frustration that I don't want to waste my time on these
questions.
General Cavoli, I am so, so sorry about the soldiers that
we lost in Lithuania. I am very, very sorry, particularly for
the soldiers themselves and their families, but I'm also
particularly saddened that is the partner nation with
Pennsylvania, and so I take it very, very seriously that we
have an amazing alliance with the Lithuanians and worry very,
very much that our men and women, Pennsylvanians, will be in
harm's way possibly if we don't find the way to peace and we
don't find the way to address Putin's aggression not just with
Ukraine but his intent with the rest of the European continent,
I believe.
I also do want to thank you so much for your service, sir.
And I really do hope that you have opportunities to enjoy the
remainder of whatever life brings you. I am very, very grateful
to you. With that, I yield back.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
North Carolina, Mr. Harrigan.
Mr. Harrigan. Mr. Chairman, thank you and, to both of our
witnesses, thanks for your testimony today. And, General
Cavoli, I never thought I would say this, but I absolutely echo
the comments of my two Navy SEAL colleagues here in expressing
well wishes for your retirement.
General Cavoli, I have got a couple of questions for you
today. One of the things that you testified about is that this
really is an industrial war and that we are behind in industry;
is that correct?
General Cavoli. This is an industrial-scale war, sir. It is
using a lot of old-fashioned equipment that requires heavy
industry. And when we look at our own ability, yes, we need the
ability to produce more weaponry more quickly.
Mr. Harrigan. And would you also agree that this is a
technologically-different conflict, as well?
General Cavoli. Yes, it is, sir. There is a very
interesting mix of legacy equipment and high-tech, and it
really seems that the side that is able to combine those two
advantageously and then out-adapt the other side's
countermeasures and counter-countermeasures, that side gains
the advantage for an enduring period.
Mr. Harrigan. Is it your understanding that 80 percent of
the Russian soldiers who are being killed in the Ukraine
conflict are being killed by FPV [First-Person View] drones?
General Cavoli. Yes, I have seen those figures, sir. I
think it is probably pretty hard for us to make sure we are
accurate on those, given our ability to be there and count and
everything. But it is certainly well over half, and it is
certainly a large number and it is a number that has increased
steadily over the course of the conflict.
Mr. Harrigan. And I would say that these low-cost high-
impact systems are fundamentally rewriting the rules of the
battlefield. Would you agree with that statement?
General Cavoli. Yes. The equipment, Congressman, that is
software-defined, where a greater part of its capability is
defined by its software, those are super easy and super
inexpensive to modify and adapt, and so you can take a piece of
hardware and, by manipulating the software, you can stay ahead
of the enemy's countermeasures. It is a remarkable thing we are
witnessing on both sides. The Ukrainians have proven especially
adept at putting engineers down at the lowest level, observing
what the soldiers do with the equipment, making modifications,
and putting it right back in the fight. It is a big advance.
Mr. Harrigan. Thanks for that. And just generally, when I
walk into this room, I don't walk into this room as a
Republican. I hope my Democratic colleagues don't walk in here
as Democrats. I know sometimes we all do, but I walk in here as
an American. And I think, however we feel about the Ukrainian
conflict, particularly as a former special operator, that I
think it would be unwise to not learn the lessons of this
conflict.
And one of the concerns that I have, particularly as we
have talked about our defense industrial base being behind, the
difference between high-cost exquisite capabilities and low-
cost ubiquitous capabilities and the capacity to actually build
those capabilities.
One of the concerns that I have, given the fact that 80
percent of Russian soldiers are being killed by FPV drones, is
that we have little to non-existent capability in our country
to produce these drones. Would you agree with that statement?
General Cavoli. Well, we do have some capability, sir. I
know a lot of people are working on it. I think, as it goes to
the U.S. military, I would refer you, respectfully, to General
George, the Chief of Staff of the Army who is working very hard
to distribute smaller drones at the lowest level and to
proliferate them across formations. He has got a program that
he calls transformation and contact where he uses brigades that
are deployed either into the Pacific or into Europe to
accelerate his distribution and his deployment of these drones.
I know that he needs some changes in the way funding works,
but I would leave it to him, sir, on that.
Mr. Harrigan. And I think I am aware of these, but I think
we are talking about, you know, thousands quantity. Am I
correct in saying Ukraine will produce approximately $4 million
FPV drones this year?
General Cavoli. Yes. That is right, sir.
Mr. Harrigan. So we are very far behind that level of
production capability for something that is achieving decisive
impacts on today's battlefield.
General Cavoli. Right. They are producing drones like most
countries produce ammunition, in massive quantities for
expenditure.
Mr. Harrigan. Should we be doing the same thing in the
United States of America?
General Cavoli. I believe we should be doing that, and I
believe we are increasingly going to be doing that. It's not my
responsibility to speak about those programmatics, sir.
Mr. Harrigan. Thank you, General. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Excellent line of
questions. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Jacobs.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Thompson, do you
believe the European Union was formed to hurt America?
Ms. Thompson. I do not.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. I ask because the President publicly said
yesterday that the European Union was formed in order to screw
the United States and even floated the idea of using military
force to take Greenland from Denmark, a NATO ally, because we,
quote, need it for national security.
Those kinds of statements suggest a U.S. stance that our
European allies and institutions are adversaries or fair game
for coercion. In your view, do such positions reflect a
coherent U.S. strategy towards Europe?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman.
What I would say is, as far as our approach to our allies and
partners, is, one, first and foremost, of honesty. We want to
be honest with our partners, and we also want to be honest
about the fact that they need to step up. And that is what I
was emphasizing in my testimony when I referenced the
administration's priority to bring European and Canadian allies
within NATO to 5 percent, and we have already seen great
strides in that process, and then also have our European allies
lead out, particularly on the future of security assistance to
Ukraine. And I would also underscore that, you know, Denmark
and our bilateral relationship with Denmark is certainly a part
of that equation, and we want to have a robust security
relationship there, particularly for the reasons that you
identify as far as Greenland being critical to homeland
defense. And we would share that view.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. Great. Well, it is good to know that our
approach is about honesty. I guess I am glad the President
publicly honestly said what he thinks about our European
allies.
Ms. Thompson, are you aware that Europe pays for 84 percent
of NATO's infrastructure at U.S. bases and that Poland is
spending over $300 million annually to support U.S. troops
directly?
Ms. Thompson. I am certainly aware of Europe's
contributions to NATO, at least on the defense side. I know
there is different streams of funding for defense contributions
or for NATO contributions on the state side, as well.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. And so how do you square that with
calling them free riders?
Ms. Thompson. So I think the commentary that I made and
then, certainly, that the administration has made really stems
from this chronic underspending of being under the 2 percent
threshold. The way it was pledged in 2014 was made in a
security environment that was, arguably, a lot more secure than
the security environment that we face today, certainly from the
adversaries that the U.S. is facing. And I think, from that
perspective, there is rightly placed frustration in wanting our
European allies to not only meet the spending commitment that
they made in 2014 but also live up to the overarching Article 3
pledge of contributing to the collective security of the
alliance, which includes defense spending.
And I would also argue that the security environment that
we face today, as bipartisan officials have recognized across
administrations, 2 percent as a threshold for spending is no
longer sufficient to meet the demands of the security
environment, which is exactly why President Trump has set the
target he has set. And it is really, really encouraging, I have
to say, for many of our allies to now be over the 2 percent
threshold. We want to see those time lines get pulled to the
left even further and to see them make further progress.
And I would also just take the opportunity to highlight the
eastern allies who are on track to meet 5 percent very, very
soon.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. And, General Cavoli, from a military
standpoint, what is the impact on our operations and
partnerships when our allies hear American leaders suggest that
the EU was formed to screw us or to entertain ideas of invading
an ally's territory or for calling them free riders when they
are contributing a lot to supporting our troops? How does this
affect trust and cohesion among our allies that we depend on
for our collective security?
General Cavoli. Ma'am, thanks for the question. Clearly, it
strays well out of my lane. But I talk to all of the chiefs of
defense in Europe all the time, and our military-to-military
relationships remain quite strong and are very solid, ma'am.
Ms. Jacobs. Have President Trump's comments come up in any
of your conversations with other military leaders?
General Cavoli. Rarely.
Ms. Jacobs. But have they in the context of Europe and this
being formed to screw them or what the President is trying to
do in Greenland?
General Cavoli. Ma'am, it is rare enough that I am
searching to be sure to give you a complete and honest answer.
I can't remember an incidence of that off the top of my head.
You know, military guys, we really try to stay carefully to the
military construct and to the military lane because it is not
our job in any of the nations in NATO, so I can't think of an
example off the top of my head. If I do think of one, I will be
sure to tell you.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Messmer.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you, Chairman. General Cavoli, in
dealing with U.S. missile defense and President Trump's Golden
Dome executive order, what might not be known is that Europe
already has a U.S.-provided Golden Dome in the form of the
Aegis ashore sites in Romania and Poland. These missile defense
systems have performed well in the Middle East. The Aegis air
defense functionality in Europe is not activated due to
regional political concerns. Given the willingness of Russia to
deploy novel hypersonic weapons in Ukraine, is your best
military advice that we activate these air defense capabilities
to counter that threat?
General Cavoli. Sir, I have, as the Supreme Allied
Commander, made that recommendation to the North Atlantic
Council.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you. Also, can you explain how the
missile defense architecture that we have invested in Europe
could protect the U.S. homeland?
General Cavoli. Oh, sure. Some of the radars involved
provide some of the very first warnings. And there is quite a
bit more, but I think I would be more comfortable discussing it
in closed session, sir.
Mr. Messmer. Fair enough. Okay. Given the increase of drone
threats to critical infrastructure at military bases in Europe,
how is EUCOM planning to integrate directed energy technologies
into its counter-drone defense?
General Cavoli. First of all, we are eager to do that,
Congressman, because a lot of the other kinetic solutions are
pretty problematic to use, you know, in congested areas and
bases that are in congested areas. We are planning to use a
layered defense and a full suite of different capabilities,
some of them electromagnetic interference, some of them
directed energy, as you said, some of them just kinetic
projectiles.
It is important to remember that we have got to do that in
close connection to civil authorities from the host nation and
each nation has different regulations for spectrum management,
for the release of weapons, and things like that. So we work
through this daily. It is a pretty big initiative.
Mr. Messmer. Would that be a more cost-effective
countermeasure to some of the million-dollar missiles that we
use to shoot down a --
General Cavoli. DE[directed energy]? Yes, sir. I mean, I
think everybody is looking for that new way to shoot down
aerial objects that doesn't require us to launch multimillion-
dollar missiles at a thousand-dollar drone type of thing.
Mr. Messmer. Yes. Very good. In my district in southwest
Indiana, General Cavoli, the Crane Army Ammunition Activity
mission where nearly 25 percent of the DOD's conventional
munitions are stored. A large amount of equipment and munitions
stored there has been withdrawn via the Presidential Drawdown
Authority and sent to Ukraine. How important is it from a
combat commander's perspective that we modernize and restock
these munition storage facilities?
General Cavoli. Our stockage levels are extremely important
to a combat commander, sir. And to the extent that they are
depleted by operations or by donations to another country, such
as Ukraine, they need to be replenished. There is a program to
do that, well-funded previously by the Congress, and it is an
important thing for us to consider.
Mr. Messmer. Okay. Thank you. Also, General Cavoli,
spectrum is a valuable finite resource that is used by the DOD.
There are some in Congress who want to require the DOD to
vacate spectrum allocations. Could you speak to what the impact
would be on EUCOM if the DO`D was forced to vacate the spectrum
allocations and what would be the effects on missile defense?
General Cavoli. Yes, sir. So I think most of the discussion
is around the S band, and we use that -- I could go in a little
bit more detail in classified session, although I am, you know,
not exactly an electrical engineer, but I could talk to you
more about it in classified session. It would affect missile
defense and air defense.
Mr. Messmer. That would affect the potential for defending
our country in Europe and the continental U.S., as well.
General Cavoli. That is right.
Mr. Messmer. Very good. I will yield back the rest of my
time. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Crow.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you both of you
for being in here today. I wanted to join my colleagues in
expressing deep sympathies for the families of those
servicemembers who we lost in Lithuania. And, General Cavoli,
thank you for responding very rapidly and working with our
allies to make sure that we had recovery operations going.
I also want to join my colleagues in thanking you for your
incredible service during your tenure. You met challenges
throughout Europe that we haven't seen since World War II. You
did so with extreme competence, diligence, and discipline, and
that was seen by many folks on the Hill, as well as our allies,
and we are very grateful for your leadership.
Turning to Ukraine, in the initial stages of the war, the
Ukrainians were able to destroy a very large percentage of the
conventional land forces of Russia; is that accurate?
General Cavoli. Yes, sir.
Mr. Crow. Over half by most estimations.
General Cavoli. Right. We would have to think of it as a
rolling figure because they were growing at the same time as
they were losing, but, yes, those are about the kind of
numbers. We are looking at about almost 4,000 tanks, Russian
tanks, destroyed by Ukraine in this --
Mr. Crow. Okay. But, since that time, Russia has, with
surprising speed, been able to recapitalize and rebuild both
its industrial base but also its conventional forces and
replace a lot of that equipment and personnel; is that
accurate?
General Cavoli. Absolutely.
Mr. Crow. How would you characterize China's involvement in
that recapitalization, both the industrial component, as well
as the military component?
General Cavoli. We could talk a lot more about this in
closed session, sir, and perhaps we will have the opportunity
to. But there has been contributions. Some of them have been
indirect by absorbing much of Russian-sanctioned oil exports
and gas exports. They have been able to continue to provide
funds that have enabled Russia to continue to build their
military.
Some have been more direct, some have been through
commercial ventures that may or may not be supported by the
Chinese Communist Party. And beyond that, I think I would be
safe just to talk to you about in closed session.
Mr. Crow. And we will convene in closed session, but both
directly and indirectly, economically and, to some degree,
militarily, China has chosen sides here.
General Cavoli. Oh, certainly. You know, I think there is
an important side note, Congressman. Sometimes, I have been
asked, well, they are only giving them moral support, and I
typically respond. But that is the most pernicious type of
support --
Mr. Crow. But it is more than moral support, would you say?
General Cavoli. And it is.
Mr. Crow. Yes. Okay. So they have determined that it is in
their interest to support Russia in this conflict.
General Cavoli. It would appear so.
Mr. Crow. Okay. Ms. Thompson, this administration has taken
a hard line on China in a number of big ways, trying to
reestablish and balance that relationship. Would you agree that
China has chosen sides in the Russia-Ukraine conflict?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman. Yes.
With the caveat, right, that you highlighted, which I think is
actually really, really important and that it aligns with their
interests. Insofar as perpetuating this conflict or other
conflicts aligns with their interests, I think that is where we
will see the adversary alignment and that is why it is so
important from the context of this administration to get the
work streams correct so that the U.S. can focus on deterrence
in the Indo-Pacific, avoiding conflict there, while our
European allies really step up --
Mr. Crow. So the Chinese have determined it is in their
interest to support Russia both directly and indirectly.
Ms. Thompson. I would echo General Cavoli's comments: it
appears so.
Mr. Crow. Okay. And so given that, would you agree that it
is in our interest to support Ukraine if China has determined
it is in their interest to support Russia?
Ms. Thompson. I would perhaps take it a step further,
Congressman, depending on how you look at it, which is I think
that's the impetus for trying to get to peace in Ukraine so
that we don't continue to burden that relationship or continue
to allow the interest to overlap, particularly given the
situation, and I know I don't speak for INDOPACOM, but
particularly given what we --
Mr. Crow. So you're not willing to say, though, it is in
our interest to ensure Ukraine is successful in this conflict?
Ms. Thompson. From our vantage point within the
administration, I think that is why the prioritization
imperative is placed on peace.
Mr. Crow. But the lack of ability to say that it is in
America's interests for Ukraine to prevail in this continues to
be staggering to me because our adversaries, our competitors,
have been very clear about the sides that they have chosen here
and who they think is in their best interest to prevail
militarily. And, yet, we are unwilling to do that. And there is
a lot of talk about peace through strength, but if you're not
willing to actually say the thing, if you're not willing to
actually call it out and take sides, I don't see how we can be
strong in that regard.
So I will continue to urge, along with my colleagues on
both sides of the aisle, that the administration is very clear
in its rhetoric about who we will support here. I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes another Coloradan, Mr. Crank.
Mr. Crank. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
General Cavoli, thank you for being here. Most Americans
probably aren't aware that some of the first shots in the
Russian invasion of Ukraine were in space when Russia knocked
out a satellite network providing communication support to
Ukraine. And according to a recent report, Russia is fielding
new anti-satellite weapons, expanding on-orbit counter-space
capabilities, and training in military space elements to combat
the United States.
According to General Whiting, Commander of U.S. Space
Command, "winning the space fight is foundational to defending
the nation." Can you provide an update of the role that on-
orbit warfare is playing in your theater?
General Cavoli. Sure, Congressman, with the caveat that I
think, as you know, it is really hard to talk about space
operations and capabilities in open session. So if you would
like to talk about it a little bit more in closed session, we
could.
I would also refer you to General Whiting and to General
Saltzman, who are genuine experts in this question. I'm a
customer, I'm a consumer of their efforts.
Yes, our space capabilities are absolutely essential to the
way we do operations. Our adversary space capabilities are
absolutely essential to the way they do operations, and they
understand how important space is to us. So it is very much a
contested environment and a contested capability, and I would
be delighted to talk more about it in a closed session, sir.
Mr. Crank. In your opinion, are Russia and China's space-
based capabilities stronger, weaker, or the same compared to
the start of the war in Ukraine?
General Cavoli. They grow constantly. They are both working
very hard to improve their capabilities and to expand their
capacity, and they have been doing that with the war in Ukraine
and I imagine they would have without the war in Ukraine, as
well.
Mr. Crank. Okay. And then, finally in your testimony, you
highlighted how EUCOM partners with cyber command to "deter
advanced persistent threats." Can you describe where those
threats come from and what they are targeting?
General Cavoli. Yes. They were non-governmental threats,
sir, criminal activity, ransomware, and things like that, that
have national security implications, and so they matter to us.
We help our allies with defending against those. There are also
state-based threats, and each one of our main adversaries, that
group of four that I named in my opening statement, each one of
those is quite active in the cyber sphere.
Mr. Crank. How can Congress help strengthen your hand in
those fights?
General Cavoli. Sir, by supporting U.S. cyber command. All
of their subordinate organizations have relationships with the
combatant commands. The 16th U.S. Air Force is my cyber
component for EUCOM. That makes a big difference when you
support cyber command. Also, when you support the National
Security Agency because that work is so closely tied to cyber
work.
Mr. Crank. Thank you. I would like to thank both of our
witnesses for coming today but for your service to our country
and for all that you do to keep us safe. Thank you, and I yield
back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moylan [presiding]. The gentleman yields. The chair now
recognizes Mr. Ryan from New York.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you both for being
here. General Cavoli, I want to add to the well-deserved praise
and recognition. I couldn't imagine a more critical time for
your leadership and could not imagine a better leader, and the
whole country is thankful to you. And I think I just want to,
on behalf of my constituents in particular, thank you.
Your leadership not only as EUCOM commander but as SACEUR
[Supreme Allied Commander of Europe] has been indispensable.
And as I am sure everyone in this room knows, that position has
a deep historical significance starting with General and,
ultimately, President Eisenhower as our first Supreme Allied
Commander. In a way that is truly staggering to all of us,
including, you know, the chair has weighed in on this, as has
the ranking member and many others, the plan that was floated
in March to restructure combatant commands and give up U.S.
command of that role, I think, would be a massive step
backwards. You have talked a little bit about it in front of
the Senate last week. One of my colleagues from the other side
of the aisle, Mr. Bacon, has said, "It signals a weakening
commitment to NATO, and I think it is wrong." Former SACEUR,
Admiral Stavridis, said for the United States to give up the
role of Supreme Allied Commander of NATO would be seen in
Europe as a significant signal of walking away from the
alliance.
Can you speak a little bit about, given your unique view
into that role, how would Russia and Putin specifically view us
backing away from that role?
General Cavoli. Thanks, Congressman. First of all, thanks
for pointing out the role General Eisenhower had as the first
SACEUR. You might imagine his likeness, his photographs, a bust
of him are all over the headquarters. There is one sitting
behind my desk that looks over my shoulder checking my homework
every day. So if you want to feel a little bit of pressure
ever, just take a job that Ike had. Big shoes to fill indeed.
Everybody relies on SACEUR. Our allies want American
leadership. Our allies like to have an American as SACEUR. From
our perspective, we gain quite a bit of influence from it. I
have a very loud voice inside Europe as a result of my
position, and I think those are to our to our advantage.
Of course, what the United States decides to do is always
going to be a policy matter and there are other considerations
that our civilian leaders will take into consideration as they
think about these things.
What do the Russians see? I think that, of all the nations
in the alliance, the Russians have the most respect for the
strength of the U.S. military. They respect all the militaries
and especially the collective military, but we are the military
that stands out as something for them to worry about. And so an
officer who has the ability to command U.S. forces probably is
a bigger problem for them than not.
Mr. Ryan. I can only imagine, truly, what General and
former President Eisenhower would think about us even
considering walking away from that position. I think it is
embarrassing and pathetic, which leads me to my follow-up
question for you, Ms. Thompson.
Given your opening, albeit very short and heavy on
buzzwords posture statement where you used the term ``factory
reset,'' which I have no idea what that means in the context of
something so critical and nuanced as what we are talking about,
but, given that, I wanted to ask you what you mean by that.
And, specifically, in January of this year actually, January of
2025, Senator Mike Lee called explicitly for the United States
to leave NATO; is that correct?
Ms. Thompson. Again, I --
Mr. Ryan. Would you know since you were his national
security advisor up through January?
Ms. Thompson. I left on January 20th, 2025. So if it was
after that, that was not something that I would have seen.
Mr. Ryan. Well, do you think we should leave NATO then?
Ms. Thompson. Again, I represent the Department of Defense.
I can only speak on behalf of the Department of Defense, and
Secretary Hegseth has been very clear we are not stepping away
from --
Mr. Ryan. So what does he mean then on behalf of the
Department of Defense by factory reset? Is it us walking away
from the leadership of NATO, and you heard some of the
consequences of that? Is it us abandoning NATO? At a minimum,
if we are going to make such a major change, I know you are
doing your posture review, but I think we owe the American
people transparency around something that would be so impactful
to our security.
Ms. Thompson. So, first and foremost, on the SACEUR
question, if the question is is the Department considering that
change, my definitive answer is no. Second part, on factory
reset, the Secretary, in his remarks to the North Atlantic
Council and to the Ukraine Defense Contract Group was very
clear that, by factory reset, what we mean is returning the
focus of the alliance to defense and deterrence of Europe to
the core mission and, to be frank, to Eisenhower's original
mission set and call for the alliance, which is conventional
defense and deterrence in Europe. Certainly, that is what we
are expecting of our European allies with the U.S. as the
nuclear strategic deterrent backstop, as well. But factory
reset really does mean returning to the core fundamental
mission of the alliance, which is defense and deterrence --
The Chairman [presiding]. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
Hamadeh.
Mr. Hamadeh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
panel for coming today. The conflict in the Ukraine is a
convergence of tensions not only with Russia but also Iran,
North Korea, and China, as well. Now, we have an America First
mandate to first protect the homeland and to use the strength
to deter war. That is a mission that the Biden administration
failed to achieve. Now we are divided across the Asian,
European, and Middle Eastern theaters, and we have faced tough
choices. There simply aren't enough brave young men and women,
sons and daughters, to be everywhere all at once.
Now, America First doesn't mean America alone. And, yet, a
continent divided by Chinese and Russian economic penetration
cannot stand. Now we must seize the chance to realign our NATO
commitments, defense manufacturing, and our trade policies to
find new ways to make Europe's economy a denied environment for
those plotting harm against America and its allies.
Now, my first question is to you, Secretary Thompson. Now,
we are directing immense resources to our defense industrial
base here, and, as you know, all the semiconductor industry, as
well as President Trump has really advocated in his first term
also and in his second term already. And what I am concerned
about right now is, at the same time, China threatens our
momentum by trying to purchase some of our most advanced
machines that are coming out of the Netherlands that are
capable of producing these chips.
Now, how does Chinese infiltration of European supply
chains threaten our security here at home?
Ms. Thompson. Congressman, it is a great question and I
think, you bring up a very important dynamic. And, this is
something that we do continue to encourage our European allies
to focus on, which is the economic security considerations.
Particularly, as we look to strengthen the transatlantic
industrial base on both sides of the Atlantic. This is a major
consideration that would affect our ability to co-produce, co-
develop, et cetera with our European allies.
And, we want to be able to do that. But, those conditions,
certainly on the front on China, do impact our ability to do
that.
And so, it is a consideration that we will continue to
raise with them, and encourage them to address so that we can
develop together.
Mr. Hamadeh. Sure. But, is it just conversations right now?
Ms. Thompson. That is all I can report on at this time. I
am sure my colleagues in Acquisition and Sustainment would have
more to say on the tangible operational side, because they deal
with the technical exchanges.
And so, I would defer respectfully to them and their
leadership and their expertise on that.
Mr. Hamadeh. Very good. And, I have full confidence in the
Trump Administration to protect our key defense industrial
base, as well as our chip manufacturing. That feeds so much
into it.
And, General, thank you for your lifelong service, and I
know it is going to continue afterwards, especially when you
become a veteran. But, I appreciate all of what you have done
to our country.
And, my question to you is regarding Europe. Is Europe
doing enough to control, or to help the situation contain what
is going on with the Houthis in Yemen?
General Cavoli. So, the EU has a mission called Aspedes,
which has ships in the Gulf to protect commercial shipping,
sir.
Obviously, the United States has felt the need to do the
same alongside it. Together, it is hard for me to say if it is
enough.
I refer to General Kurilla, who follows that much more
closely.
Mr. Hamadeh. Sure. But, we also know that the Russians have
been helping the Houthis as well. Is that correct?
General Cavoli. I would like to answer that in closed
session, please, sir.
Mr. Hamadeh. No worries. And, how much of the Iranian
Houthis and Chinese threats to Europe, how much can that affect
the United States?
General Cavoli. I guess indirectly, massively. Directly,
probably it, we don't have that much shipping, I don't think,
that comes through the Suez.
However, our warships transit that all the time. So, it
would affect our ability to conduct military operations for
sure.
I am not sure. I am not an economist. I couldn't comment on
how big the impact would be on us economically or something.
Mr. Hamadeh. Thank you. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now
recognizes the gentlelady from New Jersey, Ms. Sherrill.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. And,
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.
General Cavoli, you said in your opening statement that
Russia is in the process of significantly rebuilding its
military by recruiting more soldiers, building more vehicles,
and creating more munitions than we have seen before.
Ms. Sherrill. So, if the war in Ukraine were to end today,
do you believe that the Russian military would continue to
represent a significant threat to the U.S., Ukraine, and our
European allies in the coming years?
General Cavoli. Yes, ma'am. It would take them a little bit
of time to reorient their conventional force and reposition it.
But, not that much time.
And then, they could pose a conventional threat. Very
important for me to add, however, that they have never stopped
having their strategic capabilities.
Their nuclear submarines, their long range aviation, their
cyber, their space, all of that is alive and well, and largely
unaffected by the war in Ukraine.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. And, if Russia was able to retain
and control significant portions of Ukrainian territory once
the war ends, do you believe Russia would consider that a
victory and consider launching a similar invasion of Ukraine or
another European country in the future?
General Cavoli. It is hard for me to predict the future,
ma'am. But, I think, it is very safe for all of us to say that
wouldn't prevent them from doing it in the future.
It would certainly leave the door open for them. Yeah.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. And, as the Trump administration
chooses to abandon Ukraine and let Russia rebuild its military,
they are also considering cutting the U.S. military presence in
Europe.
So, General Cavoli, how would cutting U.S. forces from
EUCOM, impact your ability to respond to a crisis or potential
conflict with Russia?
General Cavoli. Ma'am, it would reduce, it would increase
the amount of time it took to respond. It depends, of course,
on what forces were hypothetically to be removed.
It depends on what kind of action we are required to
counter Russia. But, clearly, moving things to the other side
of the Atlantic increases the time space challenge.
Other than that, I don't want to be evasive, but it is
really a very situation dependent question.
Ms. Sherrill. And, would removing, I guess, to be more
clear, our brigade combat team from Poland, or having our
forces stationed in Germany or Italy, slow your response to a
Russian assault on our Eastern European allies?
General Cavoli. Yes. I have consistently testified to that.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. So, as we move forward, can you
just talk a little bit too, as you mentioned about what you
think the key strategic aspects are of Russia's military?
General Cavoli. So, in the broadest sense, ma'am?
Ms. Sherrill. That provides the biggest threat to the
United States?
General Cavoli. Yes, their nuclear arsenal.
Ms. Sherrill. What about their cyber capabilities?
General Cavoli. I believe, their nuclear arsenal poses a
bigger threat. Their cyber capabilities are more likely to be
used, but, in most cases wouldn't have the catastrophic effect
that the nuclear threat would have.
But, of course, that again, depends on what nuclear weapons
we are talking about, what cyber attacks. But, in general, I
would say the nuclear capabilities, and then, I would say the
space and cyber sort of on a level.
But, conventionally, their strategic advantage continues to
be mass that they can put in direct proximity to NATO forces
that challenges us to respond in time across the spaces
required.
So, basically, they can put a force into place that would
cause us to have to react in a timely fashion. And, that time
space problem is really the essence of conventional deterrence
on the continent.
Ms. Sherrill. And, given the recent conflict in Ukraine,
what has been kind of, what will be the hardest for Russia to
rebuild in the aftermath of that?
General Cavoli. I would like to answer that in closed
session, because it goes into some technical stuff. What I can
say, is I don't think it is that hard to rebuild their mass.
They have manpower available. They demonstrate the
willingness to conscript it. And, it doesn't take that long to
reconstitute the size of their whole force or even to increase
it.
They still have equipment in storage that they could pull
out and renovate. And, they have increased their ability to
produce legacy hardware tanks and armored personnel cares and
things like that.
So, there are some things that are easy. The things that
are hard, it would be better to answer in closed session,
ma'am.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. And, I yield back.
The Chairman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Guam, Mr. Moylan.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, as my colleagues
did, I also would like to start in recognizing the four
soldiers that were lost on March 25, in Lithuania. Mentioning
their names, Staff Sergeant Troy Knutson-Collins of Battle
Creek, Michigan, Staff Sergeant Jose Duenez of Juliet,
Illinois, Staff Sergeant Edvin Franco of Glendale, California,
and Private First Class Dante Taitano, a son of Guam.
These brave men were lost too soon in a tragic accident.
And, our hearts and thoughts and prayers go out to their
families and loved ones during this challenging time.
And, I asked for my colleagues and the audience to please
have a moment of silence.
[Moment of silence.]
Mr. Moylan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And, for my first question, General Cavoli, last year we
had a discussion, and I thank you for that, and, I truly
appreciate sir, your service. And, I understand what you are
going through with the EUCOM and you are doing a fantastic job,
sir.
And, previously we talked about how the U.S. territories in
the Pacific will seek their protection with Article Five. But,
that is not the case and would not. But however, Article Four
gives the authority for consultation and non-obligated support.
And, I just want to know on what the situation now we have
with EUCOM's situation, our strategic situation, are our
allies, sir, still willing to support us in the Pacific?
And, with your experience through this situation, how can
we better coordinate with your partners on security
cooperation, and international organizations, and regional
security in Pacific and Asia, General?
General Cavoli. Thanks, Congressman. First, thanks for your
kind words about our servicemen.
Yes. So, many of our European allies have direct security
interests in the Indo-Pacific. France has possessions there,
the U.K. So, they have direct interest.
And, they do have military presences abroad there to help
those out. They also do stage exercises in order to make sure
they maintain the defense of their territories.
They also work very closely with the Department of Defense
and with U.S. INDOPACOM, to coordinate occasional presence. A
U.K. aircraft carrier is about to start a global mission.
They are going to go through the Indo-Pacific. They are
going to do so in close coordination with Admiral Paparo. So,
this gives us additional capacity out there as they come and go
and they continue to do that.
However, the alliance is focused on the defense of the
alliance territory as defined as you pointed out in Article
Six. That does not prevent them from operating outside my AOR.
SACEUR's AOR does not include the United States.
But, the only time the alliance has declared Article Five
in its history was the morning after 9/11 when they declared
that it was an attack on all of us and sent NATO AWACS
[Airborne Warning and Control System] planes to help our
operation Noble Eagle to defend our skies in the aftermath of
those 2001 terrorist attacks.
Mr. Moylan. All right. Thank you, General. And also, with
the expansion of the ballistic missile system we have in EUCOM,
I am wondering, especially with the Aegis ashore, and the sites
in Romania and Poland, the Golden Dome that we are looking at,
what is this experience and these lessons learned that we can
reflect to help us in the INDOPACOM area?
General Cavoli. So, at an unclassified level, we are able
to collect an awful lot of information about adversary rockets
and missiles during the course of the conflict in Ukraine.
A lot of that is given to us by our Ukrainian colleagues.
You know, we gave them radars to defend themselves. They give
us back invaluable data that we are able to study.
So, that is only one example, sir.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, General. Ms. Thompson, just one
quickly, we have just got a few seconds.
I appreciate what SECDEF [U.S. Secretary of Defense] is
doing, and he went to EUCOM for a specific reason. Where does
he go next?
Ms. Thompson. I believe, he went to the Indo-Pacific.
Mr. Moylan. That is right. I got to visit him there. Who
was the last SECDEF that came to the Indo-Pacific, to Guam,
before our current Secretary of Defense?
Ms. Thompson. I actually don't know off the top of my head.
But, I know, it has to have been 10 years at least? Is that
right?
Mr. Moylan. It was Rumsfeld.
Ms. Thompson. Oh, that is right.
Mr. Moylan. I am glad that the interest of the United
States where our Secretary of Defense is going from, not just
from the West coast to the East coast, but from the Atlantic to
the Pacific.
So, I thank you. Thank you for your testimony. General,
sir, thank you.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair
now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Cisneros.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you Mr. Chairman. And, I also want to
give my prayers and sympathies to the families of the
servicemembers who lost their lives.
And, General Cavoli, thank you for your years of service as
you kind of approach the end of a fantastic career that you
have had. So, thank you, sir, for everything.
So, when I was Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
Readiness, I had a meeting with one of my counterparts from
Latvia, who was really concerned about how they could build up
their reserves.
I mean, to the point they were worried about the Russians
and the possibility of them coming there, that they were
actually drilling, you know, elementary school children.
Preparing military drills, ensuring that they are learning that
in elementary school to get them ready as they matured and got
older.
Obviously, I think, all the Baltic states, Lithuania,
Estonia, Latvia, they are all very concerned about the
Russians. And, the invasion in the Ukraine probably did not
ease their tensions.
But, how are we preparing our Baltic allies, getting them
ready for the possible threat of a Russian invasion?
And, really, and maybe this might be more for there, but I
mean for the classified briefing. But, what is the possible
threat of later on, if the Russians are successful in Ukraine,
that they will continue their aggression on other former Soviet
states?
General Cavoli. Thank you, sir. So, we help them in a
variety of ways. First, how does NATO help them? NATO's new
defense plans give a structure for them to plan and to nest
their national defense plans inside.
So, those plans go together with the NATO plans. And, this
really helps a defense planner clarify a whole bunch of things
about how much of what he needs, where, et cetera, et cetera.
Second, the command structures that have been outlined, and
the relationships that have been outlined as a result of the
plans or inside the plans, gives them permanent relationships
for units to build readiness with and headquarters to build the
procedures with.
So, that is one big advantage that helps them a great deal.
Bilaterally, we work very closely with those allies, because
they are so intent on buying American stuff.
So, it is one thing to buy a HIMARS [High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System], it is another thing to know how to
use it. That is pretty simple. But, it is another thing
entirely to know how to integrate that capability into your war
fighting methodology.
And so, for example, I have got a battery of HIMARS,
American HIMARS in Estonia that has been working for well over
a year and a half with them on how exactly they are going to
incorporate their long range fires into their operational
methodology after this.
I just was on the phone with, I just received a letter from
the Chief of Defense of Lithuania, who is interested in having
a similar program, some sort of a HIMARS Academy. I could go on
and on.
On a third level, we also do special security assistance
initiatives. So, there is the Baltic Air and Missile Defense
Initiative, there is the Baltic State Security Initiative.
And, those are focused appropriations for us to be able to
help them buy the American stuff that matters to us. Focused on
air and missile defense, and domain awareness in the air right
now, of course, because that is the most important thing.
I guess, I could go for hours. There are some classified
things we do as well, Congressman.
Mr. Cisneros. All right. Ms. Thompson, can we still be
confident that we are going to keep troops in Europe there, and
keep supporting NATO?
That the United States will step up if, in fact, Russia
does invade the Baltic states?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman. On
the first piece, I would just emphasize again, we are in the
midst of a global posture review. So, certainly, we are taking
these priorities and these considerations into our analysis as
we conduct that.
And then, I would also emphasize the Secretary was very
clear that we remain committed to NATO. And, that includes all
facets of the treaty.
And so, I would say yes. And, I would also just add perhaps
a bit of color to what General Cavoli was talking about,
specifically with the Baltics, and just emphasize that we have
been so appreciative in this Administration so far, of how our
Baltic friends acutely understand the threat perception.
And, we hope that and we have encouraged our Baltic friends
to communicate that threat perception to the Western and
central European powers, as well as we try to encourage the
alliance as a whole, to focus on defense spending.
Mr. Cisneros. All right. And then, I got 30 seconds. But,
so, very quickly, General Cavoli, you and your counterparts in
INDOPACOM and AFRICOM, are always, you know, I don't want to
say at odds, but always fighting for assets to kind of come
into your areas of your command and areas of operation there,
responsibility.
How are we kind of working through that to get to this
point there, to kind of ensure that we are not asking for too
much, but, you know, you are getting what you need?
General Cavoli. Sure, sir. Our job is to articulate our
requirements based on the task we are given, sir. And, the
Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the Chairman,
allocates to the resources.
There is another step though, right? Erik Kurilla and I
have known each other our whole lives. We can communicate.
There are things that I can do to help alleviate some of his
challenges and vice versa.
Mike Langley's headquarters is right next door to my
headquarters in Stuttgart. We talk back and forth and --
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Kansas, Mr. Schmidt.
Mr. Schmidt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, I would like to
add my condolences as well, to those expressed by my
colleagues, of the families who have loved ones and friends of
the lost soldiers.
And, General Cavoli, from the home state of the first
Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, I would like to
extend our congratulations and gratitude to you for your
service.
And, would just note that we have had an unbroken line of
American leadership at the top of NATO from its inception. And,
I for one, expect and hope that is going to continue into the
foreseeable future.
But, we are engaged in a, I will call it a public
rethinking of America's role in the world. Everybody in this
room certainly spends their lives, their careers, their talents
focused on this at a granular and strategic level every day.
But, because we have been effective at that for so long,
many Americans have not had to engage in those discussions out
and about. And, their support is critical as we make the
decisions that move us ahead.
So, with that in mind, General, I would like to ask a
couple of questions that are intended to inform the public
discussion, not only the particularized discussion.
Can you talk for a bit about the level of importance, the
nature of importance, of continuing to have a heavy ground
presence on the European continent in terms of our security
planning going forward, whether it is armory, infantry, or
otherwise?
General Cavoli. Sure, sir. So, the alliance, we
collectively require a heavy ground presence. That is
specifically to be able to overcome that singular Russian
advantage of being able to put its forces on our borders, as an
alliance, before the initiation of hostilities.
That causes a time/space problem for us in terms of
reinforcing. So, the positioning of this large force has to be
appropriate to the situation, right, to the level of threat.
Whether that ground force comes from America or someplace
else, is really, SACEUR doesn't care as long as it functions.
There are some capabilities that the U.S. is very careful
to make sure we continue to contribute, because they are
exquisite and in some cases unique. And, we understand that and
those will have to be there all the time otherwise.
So then really, the question is, what is the preponderance
of U.S. versus other nations' heavy ground force that is
committed?
And, that is something we balance all the time. And, that
is something that will change as our European allies pick up
the capabilities' targets we have just assigned them in the
NATO defense planning process and commit the money that they
have devoted in a profitable and a productive acquisition
program to get the stuff they need.
Mr. Schmidt. Thank you, General. And, at risk of sounding
like I am reading from the history books, I am old enough to
remember Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.
And, if my memory is correct, it was our ability to rapidly
move the Seventh Corps from Europe to the Middle East, that
allowed us to launch Desert Storm with the rapidity that we
did.
Can you speak a little bit, your point about whether there
are American heavy ground forces or European allies in Europe,
how does having American heavy ground forces pre-deployed in
the European theater, affect our planning and our ability to
respond to American interests in the Middle East or in other
proximate areas outside of Europe immediately?
General Cavoli. It is fundamental to it, sir. There are
three principal components if it is important to us. Access,
basing, and overflight.
So, our ability to base our forces some place, and to have
the ability to access those forces to deploy them, and then to
have the agreements to overfly nations, all of those things
happen. They are usually based on pretty deep relationships.
If you want it to be there when you need it, it has got to
be, you know, you have to have prepared for that moment. So,
that, those three things, access, basing, and overflight, are
really a shorthand way of saying that gives us the ability to
put forces forward in readiness waiting to be deployed.
Now, to what extent do we need to do that, that is largely
a policy question. But, that is the strictly military advantage
of having forces forward for our own purposes.
We do deploy them all the time. We have been, you know,
leaning toward and then backing off of noncombatant evacuation
operations throughout the Mediterranean area for a couple of
years. We provide forces on short notice to General Kurilla to
be able to use in Central Command.
I could go on, but, I think, I have, I hope I have answered
your question.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair
now recognizes the gentlelady from New Hampshire, Ms.
Goodlander.
Ms. Goodlander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to begin by
joining my colleagues in expressing my heartbreak over the loss
of our four fallen servicemembers and my sincere condolences to
their families.
I also want to join in expressing my gratitude to you,
General, for your long and faithful service to our country. You
know, we don't agree always in Congress, we often disagree
these days.
But, one thing I want to say at the outset is we have heard
a lot of noise. But, we have actually heard a lot of agreement
in this hearing from across this dais.
Agreement on basic principles and commitments that I think,
are worth reiterating. Because, people from Warsaw to the
Kremlin should hear it loud and clear.
Does the United States of America have a national security
interest, General, in the survival and the strength of the NATO
alliance?
General Cavoli. I believe it does.
Ms. Goodlander. And, Ms. Thompson?
Ms. Thompson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Goodlander. And, what about the survival and strength
of our European allies, including Ukraine?
General Cavoli. Yes.
Ms. Thompson. Yes.
Ms. Goodlander. Thank you. I think, it is important that we
reiterate these basic principles. And, General, could you
elaborate on what is the nature of that national security
interest that we have in the NATO alliance and in the survival
and strength of Ukraine?
General Cavoli. Yes, ma'am, absolutely. So, a lot of
interests are, a lot of the benefits are rooted, common
interest, common values, common histories, things like that.
I am not going to go into those, just because that is
subjective, debatable, and people have different opinions on
it.
As a military matter, some of the most advanced militaries
in the world are in the NATO alliance. And, some of the
militaries in the world that we can be surest will work with us
and are militarily interoperable with our forces, are in the
NATO alliance.
It is surprising when you go outside of Europe, how much
the absence of something like NATO, the structures, the
interoperability, is noticed immediately.
Ms. Goodlander. Thank you, General. This may be more for a
closed setting, but, you shared with us in your written
testimony and several times today, that Russia's war in Ukraine
is the most visible sign of Moscow's great power ambitions.
So, I want to give you an opportunity to tell us a little
bit more about how you think about Vladimir Putin's ambitions.
What would satisfy Vladimir Putin?
Would taking the eastern half of Ukraine satisfy his
ambitions? Or, would it embolden him?
General Cavoli. Well, you know, I think, if we go back and
look at the history of his tenure as the President of Russia,
you can follow his ambitions. They are pretty consistent, but
they expand.
Clearly, he has not yet been satisfied with the amount of
Ukraine that he has taken over, because he is continuing to try
to fight forward. How the conflict ends, you know, may disprove
that. We don't know yet.
But, he certainly is interested in controlling the nations
that are in his immediate neighborhood, by whatever means
necessary. And, we have seen that demonstrated consistently
over time.
Could he stop tomorrow? We don't know.
Ms. Goodlander. General, you testified to the importance of
our intelligence cooperation with our European allies and with
Ukraine. You said that our ability to gather intelligence is
enabled by enduring relationships that cannot develop
episodically and that must be sustained.
As someone who comes from the intelligence world, thank you
for recognizing the important role that our intelligence
cooperation plays. Is pausing our intelligence cooperation with
European allies a good thing for America's national security?
General Cavoli. No. We want continuous sharing of
intelligence. We normally do it, as you know, ma'am, on a
bilateral basis.
We have very strong agreements with the nations in the
alliance about bilateral intel sharing. And, we are very
grateful for it.
Ms. Goodlander. Was the pause last month in our
intelligence cooperation and sharing with Ukraine helpful or
harmful to America's interests in your area of operation, in
your region?
General Cavoli. That one I have to answer in closed
session, ma'am. Because, I just have to answer that one in
closed session.
Ms. Goodlander. Thank you, General. With that, Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair now
recognizes the gentlelady from Maryland, Ms. Elfreth.
Ms. Elfreth. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And, in General, I too
echo my deep condolences for the lives lost, and the
servicemembers and their families.
And, echo my colleagues in congratulations and thanks. As
the daughter of an infantryman, he only retired as an SFC
[Sergeant First Class], but I greatly appreciate your 38 years
of commitment to this nation's security. It doesn't go
unnoticed from this committee. So, thank you very much.
General Cavoli. Not to correct you ma'am, but there is no
such thing as only an SFC.
Ms. Elfreth. I think, I am aligned and agree with you. So,
I want to dig in General, you mentioned the contributions of
our allies in your command, in EUCOM, such as Poland, as to the
security of Europe and the subsequent security of this nation.
You also mentioned Denmark, as recently increasing its
financial contributions here, but also, critically expanding
its patrol of the Arctic. Can you please just briefly expand on
the importance of that particular allyship with Denmark?
General Cavoli. Sure, yes. Denmark, ma'am, is one of our
strongest allies. The bilateral relationship from the Danish
perspective, is far and away their most important bilateral
security relationship.
I have known the Prime Minister of Denmark for quite a
while, and she would initiate any conversation with that
comment. They have been very reliable allies.
They have got a high-tech military, not a big one, but it
is high-tech. They have extremely competent Special Forces and
Naval Special Forces. And, they contribute those liberally to
the operations under my command as the Supreme Allied
Commander.
So, yes, a very strong ally. We love all our allies, but, I
would say that Denmark's a very strong one.
Ms. Elfreth. You don't have favorites, but I appreciate
that.
Ms. Thompson, reflecting on that, wouldn't you agree that
the President's threats to possibly utilize military force to
seize Greenland, a territory of Denmark, could only threaten
that key allyship and again, our shared ability to address the
threats, particularly from Russia in the Arctic?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you, Congresswoman. What I would say,
is I would focus on the bilateral relationship piece that
General Cavoli hit on.
I think, that there is a lot of cooperation here, including
on Greenland in particular, on the landmass particularly. We
already have space capabilities there and I think, that there
are opportunities.
And, the Secretary and his pull aside with the Danish
Minister of Defense had a really positive conversation about
where we could take the bilateral defense relationship. So, I
think, there is room for growth and positivity there.
Ms. Elfreth. Okay. General, you have shared that Russia
poses a chronic and growing threat. And, that they are focused
on a "campaign of destabilization across your command."
You also spoke about the intersection of how you work with
the other combatant commands, particularly around the
Mediterranean. I want to switch our conversation to yet another
domain that being of cyber.
And, can you help us better understand the cyber wars that
Russia is waging against Ukraine, our allies in NATO, your
command in Europe?
And can you speak to your collaboration with Cyber Command,
which is headquartered just to stone's throw from my district?
General Cavoli. Yes, ma'am. I think, the simplest way to
get at this question is to describe roughly the two buckets
into which, in which we can consider Russian cyber operations
to fall. Right?
Some of them are about the content. It is information
operations, it is influence operations. It is the campaigns to
spread their version of information around Europe and the
world.
Those are very, very active. Those don't necessarily
involve cyber work, but can be injected through cyber vectors.
But, it can be as simple as a television channel.
On the other hand, there is also the technical cyber work
that they do, which is designed to penetrate our networks, to
get into systems, to produce effects. Sometimes it is to take
information and sometimes it is to leave us problems, and they
do a lot.
I depend very, very heavily on U.S. Cyber Command through
16th Air Force, in order to be able to combat those things and
to help our allies combat them.
Ms. Elfreth. Thank you very much. And, Ms. Thompson,
wouldn't you agree that the continuity of leadership and
expertise for any command, but particularly when it comes to
combating cyber war, is essential to the security of EUCOM and
our national security? Just yes or no.
Ms. Thompson. Yes.
Ms. Elfreth. Okay. I contend that the recent firing of a
Four Star General, Commander of U.S. Cyber Command and National
Security Agency Director, General Timothy Haugh, with no
succession plan in place, and no word if his replacement, poses
a significant threat to EUCOM, Ukraine, NATO, and our homeland.
Can you please speak, Ms. Thompson, briefly to the
Secretary's timeline in announcing the replacement for
Cybercom?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the question. I
have to say I am not privy to those decisions and it is outside
of my jurisdiction in International Security Affairs.
What I would say, is obviously Cybercom, as you have
pointed out, is essential to not only the EUCOM AOR, but also
Homeland Defense, which is a major priority.
So, I would just leave it there. Thank you.
Ms. Elfreth. I would contend this is an astonishing
volatility in lacking continuity. It is posing a real threat,
unnecessary threat to our national security.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Tran.
Mr. Tran. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And, I too am very saddened
by the loss of our soldiers. And, I send my condolences to
their family.
General, I salute and thank you for your years of service.
Thank you so much. And, I appreciate you both being here to
testify today.
Tariffs have been in the news a lot lately with President
Trump leaving tariffs against our allies and adversaries alike.
Like many people, I am deeply concerned about how these attacks
will impact our military and diplomatic partnerships with our
closest allies and partners.
Ms. Thompson, with the Trump Administration's imposition of
tariffs on EU goods, which I expect could disrupt global supply
chains critical to American defense manufacturing, how is EUCOM
preparing for possible delays for cost increases in defense
equipment sourced from Europe?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I
will start by saying, and again, I want to say this very
respectfully, I am not trying to be evasive. It is just the
effects of tariffs, specifically on the diplomatic relationship
side or on the economic side are a little bit outside of my
jurisdiction.
What I would say from the defense perspective, is we are
acutely focused on making sure that we can have a strong
transatlantic industrial base on both sides of the Atlantic,
which includes reforms on both sides of the Atlantic.
We certainly want the European Union to be open to
continuing to partner with the United States as the defense
relationship goes.
And, both of us, both the European Union and ourselves,
have reforms that we need to make to ensure that the economic
environment in the defense industrial base context is certainly
robust enough that we can make successful investments together.
Mr. Tran. But, you do recognize that these strains will
cause an effect on our industrial base, yes?
Ms. Thompson. It is something that we will be looking at
and taking into consideration as we pursue the defense
industrial base effort in particular.
Mr. Tran. All right. General, what measure is EUCOM taking
to address potential strains in defense collaboration and
ensure joint operational effectiveness?
General Cavoli. So, we continue with our exercise programs.
We continue with our consultations with our allies.
We continue to work very closely. EUCOM continues to work
very closely with NATO, with the Allied Command Operations.
And, we move forward just in a straight military fashion,
sir.
Mr. Tran. And, as European nations aim to enhance their
defense industries and reduce dependency on U.S. arms, how does
EUCOM assess the potential impact on NATO's collective defense
posture?
General Cavoli. Well, first we need our allies to re-arm in
general. If they re-arm with stuff, we want them to re-arm with
equipment that works with ours.
In many cases, the easiest way to do that is to buy U.S.
So, during the course of this conflict, Congressman, the
orders, the value of foreign military sales orders, that is,
our allies' orders to buy American equipment, have increased by
600 percent.
There right now are 4,000 sales cases worth $265 billion
that European nations are lined up to buy from the United
States as arms manufacturers.
As the Allied Commander, I encourage that, right? I want
more capability and capacity as fast as we can get it.
Mr. Tran. Have you seen any impacts of the recent tariffs
impacting the 600 percent increase in those sales?
General Cavoli. Sir, I have not. I have been here for the
last week and a half testifying to the Senate now here.
Mr. Tran. The deepening strategic partnership among China,
Russia, Iran, North Korea, poses an increasing challenge for
the United States and its allies in Europe. I am particularly
concerned by Russian and Chinese economic and military
partnership causing strain on individual European countries
within the NATO Alliance.
General, how is EUCOM working with European partners to
deter or expose CCP [Chinese Communist Party] efforts to
fragment NATO cohesion through strategic investments?
General Cavoli. Sure, sir. The first way is through intel
sharing. Right?
We a number of different, we have many, many bilateral
intel channels. But, we also have a few lesser known
multilateral intel sharing fora. And, in those, we talk about
these things.
The Department of Defense, EUCOM, also works closely with
our State Department colleagues and missions throughout the
alliance, because they really have the lead in helping our
allies avoid malign Chinese investments.
Finally, as I mentioned to a member earlier, our exercise
program specifically uses infrastructure that we want to be
sure of the reliability of.
So, we vary what we do and where we do it so that we are
always testing the reliability of our infrastructure. And, when
we find a problem, we talk to our host nation about it right
away.
Mr. Tran. Thank you, General. Thank you, Ms. Thompson.
Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now
recognizes Mr. Bell of Missouri.
Mr. Bell. Thank you, Mr. Chair and the Ranking Member. Ms.
Thompson, General Cavoli, thank you for being here. And also,
General, I want to add to the chorus of thanking you for 38
years of service.
I would be remiss if I did not express my deepest
condolences to the families of the four servicemembers who
tragically lost their life serving our nation in Lithuania.
But again, thank you for your service and on behalf of my
district in the St. Louis region, we want to thank you. And,
since you got a little time, if you ever want to come out, we
are known for our beer. You can have that now, right? We are
known for that and the Cardinal's game.
So, while our European allies have been working to increase
their defense spending to meet the 2 percent NATO defense
spending target, the Administration's recent decision to impose
tariffs on nearly every NATO country and ally partner, could
undermine these efforts and potentially slow our collective
progress.
General Cavoli, how do you foresee these tariffs impacting
the defense spending of our European allies?
General Cavoli. You know, I don't know, Congressman. Sir,
in an economic sense, I am not an economist, so I can't, you
know, walk through the trail of how it will work.
I do know that our allies are determined to increase their
defense capability and capacity no matter where they buy things
from or no matter how they get it. That is nearly a universal
sentiment in the alliance right now. And, to spend more than 2
percent, as you go around. You hear a lot of that.
Mr. Bell. And, are these countries now less likely to meet
the 2 percent target due to these tariffs? And, will this hurt
our European allies, including the Baltic states who outspend
the U.S. spending, you know, as a percentage of GDP?
General Cavoli. Sir, if they are unable to access our
market, or if they have to pay more than expected for
equipment, certainly that is going to affect how much capacity
they can build, how quickly.
I don't know how the tariffs will exactly do that though.
Mr. Bell. In the past 6 months, Russian and Chinese ships
have been implicated in sabotaging undersea cables. This comes
as no surprise given Russia's ongoing efforts to target
Ukrainian power cables, telecom links, and gas pipelines, since
its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
General, how is European command addressing the threat of
sabotage or disruption of undersea cables in European waters,
and what steps are being taken to mitigate the risks posed by
state actors, particularly Russia and China?
General Cavoli. So, European command, sir, first, as with
some of the other responses, shares intelligence, when we get
intelligence on this to support our allies as they defend their
own infrastructure.
We also defend our own U.S. critical infrastructure that is
overseas. Interestingly, the biggest collective defenses of
critical national infrastructure don't involve the U.S. hardly
at all.
So, last year I started an operation called Baltic Century,
where we brought together under NATO Command, voluntarily
donated ships and crews as well as coastal defense radars from
the Baltic allies, the allies in the Baltics and the Nordics.
And, we sewed those together into a single operation that
surveils and increases our understanding of what is going on on
the surface and below the surface of the Baltic Sea. For the
longest time, there were no U.S. ships involved in that.
There are no U.S. ships involved in it today. I think, I
have 40 Marines who have temporarily helped with a couple of
radars. And, I think, they may have departed already.
So, this is an example of our allies taking that upon
themselves as they should, and happily.
Mr. Bell. And, if I could get one more question in,
General. Can you discuss the implications if the Administration
withdraws U.S. troops from Syria, how might this affect our
counter-terrorism efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean?
General Cavoli. So, it would mainly, from my perspective,
affect our ability to collect intelligence. And, I have to
leave that at that in open session, sir.
You know, I concern myself very much with the Russian
presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. That has been greatly
weakened by our --
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair
now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Whitesides.
Mr. Bell. Thank you, General.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
being here at this pivotal time for U.S. interests in Europe.
Obviously, this is a time of immense change in your AOR,
the shifting U.S. posture, the continuing war on Ukraine, not
to mention the recent additions to the NATO alliance.
It is clear to many of us on this committee that continued
strong support for Ukraine is not only vital to U.S. security
interests, but to the continued strength and vitality of our
alliances and partnership in Europe.
General Cavoli, in the years since Putin's unprovoked
invasion, I have been heartened to see that former Soviet
States who had previously been deferential to Russia, were
beginning to push back on Putin's bullying tactics.
Obviously, the U.S. posture toward Ukraine has changed a
great deal in the last 3 months. In your opinion, how would a
U.S. withdrawal from global leadership in support of Ukraine,
impact the smaller nations' ability to demonstrate independence
from Russia?
Specifically, in your opinion, will it have an impact on
the democracy movement in Belarus?
General Cavoli. Congressman, it is a great and important
question. A lot of answering it would go well outside of my
wheelhouse.
I will say that all nations are watching very closely what
the U.S. does any place all the time. You know, we are such a
mover on the global stage that everybody is constantly
observing and calculating against that.
That is especially true in those states that have the
opportunity to get out from under Russia's shadow. Armenia
would be an excellent example of that.
Sir, they are watching closely.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, sir. On a similar note, I wanted
to ask you about the following subject. So, Putin's regime is
constantly engaged in egregious cyber crime and offensive cyber
operations against us, our allies, against companies,
infrastructure, you name it, which is why I was very distressed
to hear that this Administration initiated a pause on offensive
cyber operations against Russia.
I am honestly at a loss to understand how giving Putin's
cyber criminals a free pass, serves our national security or
economic interests.
General, does a cessation of offensive cyber operations,
either temporarily or ongoingly, against Russia, create any
risk for our troops and operations in Europe?
General Cavoli. Sir, any details would have to be spoken
about in closed session. Of course, the cessation that you are
talking about did not pose risk to my troops.
If they had, I would have made that clear immediately.
Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, sir. I just want to say on
behalf of Congress and the nation, we are so grateful for your
service. And, you are what makes America great.
So, thank you so much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Louisiana, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you so
much for being here, sir. You are a tremendous service to our
country. I am an old Army guy, enlisted. I wanted to be Navy,
but my ASVAB (Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery]
scores were too high.
So, I appreciate your service and it just can't be
overstated, the debt that our country has to your family. So
many decades of sacrifice, thank you, sir.
General Cavoli. Thank you, sir. Since you are a former
enlisted member of the service, I should point out that
Sergeant Major Abernathy, sitting right behind me, is leaving
after many years of service this year as well. And, we thank
him for it.
Mr. Higgins. Well, and, NCOs are always quite certain that
if the officers don't show up, eventually somebody will notice.
But, if the NCOs don't show up, well, the Army is in trouble.
So, General, Ukraine, I would just like to chat with you
about Ukraine. And, if you could, for America and for some
members of this committee that need clarity, could you describe
from your perspective, which is quite unique and experienced,
what does victory look like?
Can you share with us what, how you would envision victory?
Should we continue to invest American treasure to seek some
resolution of the Ukrainian war and Russian invasion of
Ukraine?
Clearly we seek some definition of victory. Could you
possibly share that?
General Cavoli. Absolutely, Congressman. And, without
getting into the realm of policy, which Ms. Thompson is
obviously much, much better prepared to talk about than I, but,
I think, you have to start by saying victory for whom, right?
And, whose victory? What is a good outcome for the United
States look like, is one part of that.
Mr. Higgins. Okay.
General Cavoli. What does a good outcome for Ukraine look
like? When you think about Ukraine, you know, you can think
about it in increments.
The first step to winning is not losing. Right? So, Ukraine
has to defeat Russia's efforts to continue to take their
territory.
Then, after that, you have a national question, how much of
it do we want to take back? And, what is the cost benefit
analysis of what it will take to take that back?
And, I think, the Ukrainians calculate that every day and
plan against that every day. So, you know, it is a complicated
question.
But, I think, an important part of it is, we have to ask
ourselves, you know, what are the benefits for us in the
various outcomes?
Mr. Higgins. So, to the gentleman's point, and thank you
for sharing your perspective there in this setting. You are
limited in how you can respond, I am quite sure.
But, it is important for America to observe that we do seek
resolution of this war. And, this Congress and this committee
in particular, carries quite a heavy burden on, you know,
making responsible decisions on behalf of the American people
that we represent.
So, defining victory to some of us at this point, has
become as clear as just a cessation of war. The cessation of
the killing.
And, for some of us it was difficult to envision any
scenario where Ukraine defeats Russia. It seems to be a
fantastic projection of the wildest imaginations of what
potentials could be.
So, sustaining the war, it would be sustaining the killing
of Ukrainian men and women, and the destruction of Ukrainian
territories. And, it seems to us that Russia can bear the brunt
of this conflict for quite a long time.
And, I would ask the good lady's perspective of, give us a
window on ending this thing, and how can we look forward to
some sustained peace in a way that Ukraine could measure some
prevail?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you, Congressman. And, I can certainly
provide additional color to this in our closed session from a
policy perspective.
But, President Trump, as you have rightly hit on, his goal
is to end it as soon as possible. And, that is why we are
undergoing the peace process that is currently in discussion.
And, I would say, you know, again, the goal is to end that
peace process in an enduring fashion so that we are not at this
table again in the short, medium, or long-term period of time.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, ma'am. Chairman, my time has
expired.
The Chairman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. Vindman.
Mr. Vindman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I want to pass
on my condolences to you, the entire EUCOM family, and the
families of the fallen four dogface soldiers from Third ID.
That is a tremendous loss.
Next, I want to say, as a retired Army officer myself, I
want to congratulate you on your upcoming retirement and
recommend avoiding electoral politics if you want peace and
quiet.
Right now, our adversaries are challenging the United
States interests around the globe, and Russia's continued
illegal war in Ukraine is far from over.
In your written testimony, you focused on the chronic
threat that Russia poses to the United States and the
importance of land deterrence. And, it has been a really
persistent threat for decades now in one iteration or another
from the Soviet Union to the present.
General Cavoli, how many troops do we need in Europe to
deter Russia at its current end strength?
General Cavoli. Sir, our current capacity is deterring
Russia right now. Of course, the answer to that question always
depends on where Russia goes in the future, right?
How do they configure themselves? Where do they place
themselves? What are their intentions? For what we are doing
right now, it is obviously working. But, they are quite
occupied elsewhere.
I would point out, I wouldn't measure it also strictly by
end strength, the numbers of human beings. It really comes down
to what capabilities are we able to bring to bear, how quickly,
and how does that nest into the alliance's efforts which are
evolving and increasing?
So, over time, I would expect our contribution to drop. It
is going to take some time, however.
Mr. Vindman. So, I want to address the issue that my
colleague from Louisiana just discussed. And, kind of part of
what victory looks like is a free, and sovereign, and secure
Ukraine.
And so, so far that has come at no cost in American lives
as far as uniform servicemembers. Although, there have been
obviously many volunteers that have gone over and felt the need
was great, and sacrificed tremendously.
In the context of my definition, and kind of how you see
victory, is victory for Ukraine possible?
General Cavoli. Congressman, not losing is definitely
possible. And, I think, that is the first step.
Mr. Vindman. So if we are talking about a free, secure,
sovereign Ukraine, the actions that we have taken so far, I
mean they have not lost yet, but how do we take it to the next
level?
If we want to get a meaningful peace that provides for a
free, sovereign, secure Ukraine, what do we need to do in
addition to what we have done so far?
General Cavoli. Well, I think, there is a military
contribution to that, sir, of course. But, I think, that the
principal questions would probably be outside of my lane, sir.
Mr. Vindman. Well, I am talking in your purview, and
briefly obviously, do we need to provide them more stuff?
General Cavoli. We need to continue to provide them the
defensive mechanisms to prevent the heinous attacks that we
have seen.
Mr. Vindman. Provide more intelligence?
General Cavoli. Intelligence, air defense, weapon systems,
and then artillery systems and ammunition. Those are always the
important things that they need.
Mr. Vindman. And, those would pressure Russia to come to
the negotiating table in a more balanced fashion to achieve the
victory that I described, which is a free, secure, and
sovereign Ukraine?
General Cavoli. Those could be a contributor to that
effort.
Mr. Vindman. Okay. I want to transition a little bit and
talk about, you mentioned your relationships going back decades
with your counterparts in different COCOMs, General Kurilla for
instance.
There are other relationships that, for instance, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am sure you have known
him, you have worked with him. You closely coordinate with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the functional
combatant commanders like Cybercom, with the Senior Advisor to
NATO.
Those folks have all been fired in the last couple of
months, is that correct?
General Cavoli. Yes sir.
Mr. Vindman. Yes. And so, have you ever seen this type of
sort of chaos, or sort of lack of coordination?
In your 38 years, have you ever had to deal with that kind
of shuffling of personnel that are your counterparts that help
enable your mission?
General Cavoli. I have had to deal with shufflings and
things like that before, yes, sir.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. McCormick.
Mr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Good to see you again,
General. It has been a couple years now that we have known each
other and I have seen you around the world in several different
places.
I know you are going to miss dealing with crayon eating
Marines and better-looking uniforms, I might add, better
commercials.
But, with that said, it is interesting, the first time I
ever saw you at a hearing, I asked you a very specific question
about can we win in Ukraine?
You didn't even hesitate. You said absolutely. And, I agree
with you. And, for those people who are doubters, I make the
case first of all, that we have, between us and Europe, we have
a $50 trillion economy, versus $2. Versus $2.
We control sanctions. We control the economy. We control
energy production. And, we can undermine Russia in so many ways
economically. Not even to mention militarily. Germany has a $5
trillion economy versus $2 for Russia. There should be no
competition here.
But, the problem is when we went to Command and Staff, and
we went to go to Water College, and we do all our advanced
training, we always learned how to execute a war full throated,
not half-assed. Not going partial measures and then drawing it
out like we have every war since Korea, in my opinion.
We did this with Iraq. We did it with Afghanistan. We
continue to draw it out. We went half measures and it went way
too long.
And, I feel like we are doing the same thing here. Instead
of just saying all in, end this thing within one year, it is
over. That is Clausewitzian warfare. Now, of course, we take
nukes off the table. I understand the deterrence there.
But, do you think we still, a year after we had our first,
a couple of years after we had our first conversation, do you
still think that what I just said is viable, and has
application in this process to ending this war?
General Cavoli. I do, sir. The role of assistance to
Ukraine, the pace of assistance to Ukraine, the magnitude of
it, has an outsized impact in this war.
Mr. McCormick. So, Ms. Thompson, I just say, if I could
give you feedback to the President. These are two military guys
who have been in this business for a long time, and actually
there is a whole lot more than that.
We can end this war in many ways. I love what the President
is doing to put pressure on Russia to end this. But, he is in
the power seat. He is the most powerful man in the world.
With sanctions, with energy production of things that he is
doing, also with the development of our businesses there, which
Russia would have a hard time attacking if we are there.
But also, the fact that the President has been very strict
in saying, hey, I got the bigger button. I have the bigger
military. I have more economic power than anybody in the
universe. We can end this.
The President is the big man in the room. And, I would love
to see him put pressure on Putin, because he has that leverage.
Getting back more to tactics and away from strategy. We
have new munitions. We have the glide bombs. We have wire
guided munitions now, very similar to what the TOW is, but they
have loitering capacity with the new drones.
What are we doing to both develop that and also to counter
that in technologies? Obviously, you are not going to talk
about anything classified.
But, do you feel like we are moving at pace for our newly
developed weapon systems?
General Cavoli. Yes. Congressman, a General never feels
like we are moving at an adequate pace when it comes to
development and new weapon systems, especially in conflict.
We continue to help our Ukrainian partners in their
development of this stuff. But, they have really, you know,
they have become the world experts in one-way drones. And, they
are very, very good at it. They are also very good at
countering it. And, are doing that.
Our ability to learn from them is an important thing. A few
minutes ago, a member asked about lessons learned and how we
are incorporating those.
You know, one of the, if you can find a silver lining in
this tragic, dark cloud of this war, we are learning an awful
lot about the future of warfare and about Russia's capabilities
as well.
Mr. McCormick. I think, you are on. We have great
applications to Taiwan and the straits as well, when we are
talking about legacy systems versus the newer technologies that
are going to impact the battlefield.
I am almost out of time, but, I want to take this time as
you are nearing retirement, just to say that no matter what
happens, no matter how bad your uniform looks compared to the
Marines or anything like that, you have one thing that you can
always hang your hat on, and you have the coolest title ever,
the Supreme Allied Commander.
Nobody can take that from you for the rest of your life.
God bless you. Semper Fidelis. Good luck in your next career.
General Cavoli. Thank you, sir.
Mr. McCormick. With that, I yield, sir.
The Chairman. The gentlemen yields. We will now conclude
this open session and take up the closed session in room 2212
at 10 minutes after one o'clock. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee proceeded in closed
session.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 8, 2025
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April 8, 2025
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 8, 2025
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 8, 2025
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. General Cavoli, in your testimony you stated how the US
is building up its collective security to combat space threats by
working alongside our European allies.
Can you speak on the types of capabilities Russia currently
possesses in the space domain, and our ability to meet those threats
with our allies? Can you also speak on the types of capabilities Russia
currently possesses or is trying to obtain?
General Cavoli. Russia currently possesses ground-based anti-
satellite (ASAT) systems, including electronic warfare (EW) systems,
high-power ASAT lasers, and direct-ascent missiles. To date, Russia has
fielded a wide range of ground-based Electronic Warfare systems to
counter Global Positioning System, radar, and communications
satellites. Additionally, Russia has several ground-based lasers
intended to disable satellite sensors, such as the Peresvet, which is
designed to blind enemy optical tracking systems for the purpose of
masking the movement of strategic missile systems. By 2030, Russia may
also field higher power laser systems that threaten the structures of
the satellite itself, and not just the sensors. Russia is developing
ASAT missile systems to destroy U.S. and Allied satellites in all
orbits. Under the guise of inspection and service missions, Russia
continues to research and develop sophisticated orbital capabilities
that could serve dual-use purposes. Over the last five years, Russia
has deployed satellites that have performed outside their stated
mission areas, conducted maneuvers that threatened U.S. satellites, and
tested space-based ASAT weapons. Critically, Russia is also developing
a new satellite meant to carry a nuclear weapon as an anti-satellite
capability.
Mr. Wilson. General Cavoli, you mentioned how the European
Deterrence Initiative supports EUCOM's ability to deter and build
readiness. Having the ability to rotate forces ensures that we maintain
a constant presence of combat-credible forces.
Can you explain the importance of the US being able to maintain
this capability?
General Cavoli. The United States' ability to rotate forces and
maintain a constant, combat-credible, presence in Europe through the
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) is crucial for several reasons.
First, a visible and robust U.S. military presence in Europe serves as
a powerful deterrent against potential adversaries. It signals a
commitment to the defense of our NATO Allies and partners, making any
aggressive action by our adversaries a much riskier proposition. The
ability to rotate forces enhances this deterrent effect by
demonstrating that the United States can quickly reinforce its
presence. Second, maintaining regular rotations and training exercises
with our Allies builds interoperability, enhances our collective
warfighting abilities, and strengthens the Alliance. Further,
maintaining a forward presence in Europe allows the United States to
project power globally in support of U.S. interests in other areas of
responsibility (AORs), like CENTCOM or AFRICOM. Europe serves as a
strategic hub for operations in these regions, and a robust U.S.
presence there enhances the ability to respond quickly and effectively.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. From your perspective, how does the National Guard
enhance EUCOM's ability to project stability and reassure allies in
regions like the Baltics or the Black Sea?
General Cavoli. Through the State Partnership Program (SPP) in
Europe, National Guard service members mentor NATO Allies on meeting
the NATO Regional Plan capability targets. These efforts focus on
enhancing capability and capacity of SPP partner nation militaries. The
trust established through the long-term relationships developed by this
program bolsters defense capability throughout USEUCOM's area of
responsibility. For example, National Guard leaders play a critical
role as we look to our NATO Allies and European partners to increase
burden sharing of defense requirements, especially in the Baltics and
the Black Sea. Because of the conversations and relationships fostered
by National Guard leaders, many European nations are already committing
to increasing defense spending, investing in defense and enhancing
defense capacity building, and creating a stronger, and more reliable,
defense posture in Europe.
Mr. Scott. Are there specific skill sets or capabilities within the
National Guard that EUCOM is looking to expand or tap into further to
meet future operational demands in Europe?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM relies on the National Guard to engage with
partners nations to develop relationships that are tailored to
partnered-country requirements. For example, in addition to providing
training in areas like land operations, air defense, cyber defense, or
space defense; National Guard service members provide expertise in
areas like interaction with civilian agencies, Noncommissioned Officer
development, and Division-level Command and Control. As the operational
demands evolve and host nation requirements change over time, USEUCOM
will continue to leverage the National Guard's capabilities and
relationships as much as possible through the State Partnership
Program.
Mr. Scott. How does EUCOM leverage the unique capabilities of the
National Guard to strengthen partnerships with NATO allies and enhance
deterrence in the European theater?
General Cavoli. The trust established through the long-term
relationships developed by the State Partnership Program bolsters
defense capability, influences defense spending increases, and provides
opportunities for access, basing, and overflight in support of U.S.
interests. USEUCOM also leverages the relationships built by the
National Guard to influence partnered-country investments in the NATO
capability targets.
Mr. Scott. With Europe's reliance on imports and potential
disruptions from conflicts-like Ukraine's grain export issues-how does
EUCOM assess risks to food security as a destabilizing factor? Are
there specific agricultural choke points you're monitoring?
General Cavoli. EUCOM does not actively monitor specific
agricultural chokepoints but does maintain situational awareness of the
overall political and economic environment, which would indicate any
potential risk to future security. USEUCOM is also tightly linked with
our NATO Allies and partners, which are the first lines of defense for
addressing food insecurity. We also actively monitor natural and man-
made disasters that could potentially impact Europe. For additional
details about specific agricultural choke points, I would refer to the
subject matter experts at the Department of Agriculture.
Mr. Scott. Russia uses its grain and fertilizer exports as
geopolitical tools. From EUCOM's vantage point, how is this shaping
alliances or pressuring NATO partners, and could USDA data on
alternative supply chains strengthen your response options?
General Cavoli. Russia uses its grain and fertilizer exports as a
geopolitical tool, but it has a limited impact on the NATO Alliance.
Most European countries have strong agricultural sectors capable of
mitigating adverse impacts due to Russian sanctions on European food
producers. Some NATO Allies are more vulnerable to Russia's
manipulation of its grain and fertilizer exports, and USEUCOM has
historically relied on interagency partners' efforts to support those
Allies in achieving agricultural independence.
Mr. Scott. As the Arctic warms, opening new land for farming, how
does EUCOM see this shifting regional power dynamics? Are you tracking
foreign actors-like China or Russia-eyeing agricultural expansion in
the Arctic?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM tracks Russia's current economic and
military activity within the Arctic and continues to assess Russia's
actions in response to environmental changes. Russia is attempting to
capitalize on emerging economic opportunities caused by warming in the
areas of agricultural, energy, mineral, and other natural resource
extraction. Additionally, Russia views shipping through the Northern
Sea Route as key to its future economic prosperity. Thawing permafrost
and newly accessible transportation routes are providing new areas for
cooperation and competition in the Arctic. However, warming will also
present challenges, such as coastal erosion and flooding. Russia has
sought to work with partners, including China, to develop this region
and exploit its economic opportunities.
Mr. Scott. Europe's a hub for cutting-edge agricultural technology.
Has EUCOM detected adversaries targeting this sector for intellectual
property theft, and could USDA collaboration help safeguard it?
General Cavoli. To date, USEUCOM has not detected adversaries
targeting agricultural technology for intellectual property theft. The
food and agriculture sectors are susceptible to a variety of physical
and cyber intrusions, to include attacks on the irrigation and global
navigation satellite systems used to cultivate and manage farmland. If
adversarial actions are detected, USEUCOM will work with its
interagency partners, including USDA, to counter them.
Mr. Scott. Given Europe's dense farming networks, has EUCOM picked
up any signals of potential agricultural sabotage-like engineered crop
diseases-as a hybrid warfare tactic? What's the contingency if that
threat materializes?
General Cavoli. There is no current report that indicates state, or
non-state, malign actors are actively planning agriculture sabotage in
the USEUCOM area of responsibility. If the threat materializes, EUCOM
will work with our U.S. and Allied agency partners to share
intelligence and warning through established reporting mechanisms to
develop countermeasures.
Mr. Scott. If EUCOM could tap one USDA resource-whether it's
expertise on resilient crops, trade flow analysis, or rural
infrastructure insights-to support your mission, what would it be?
General Cavoli. USDA shares important resources and tools, such as
trade analysis, that help support USEUCOM's mission. Other USDA
expertise is welcome as it relates to infrastructure resilience and
European food security.
Mr. Scott. Europe's mix of farmland and forests offers cover for
illicit activities-smuggling, troop movements, etc. How does the
agricultural landscape influence EUCOM's operational strategy, and
could USDA's satellite or land-use data sharpen your situational
awareness?
General Cavoli. Europe's physical geography, including open
farmland and canalizing forests, are important factors that are
considered in mission planning processes. USEUCOM has access to robust
intelligence about Europe's terrain and uses the USDA Texture
Classification System methodology to assess European soil types,
layers, and characteristics as part of its Joint Intelligence
Preparation of the Operational Environment.
Mr. Scott. How is EUCOM working with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
to integrate their national air defense systems into a cohesive NATO
IAMD framework?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM works with the Baltic nations via the
Congressionally approved Significant Security Cooperation Initiative to
acquire interoperable Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
capabilities. These are designed to complement NATO operations,
actions, activities, response plans and associated defense designs. New
and existing Baltic IAMD capabilities, including command and control,
communications, computers, and intelligence, are integrated into NATO's
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Network. This ensures the full range
of Alliance IAMD capabilities (that would otherwise exceed Baltic
nation Gross Domestic Product limitations) that can be employed to
deter aggression and defend the Baltic nations as required.
Mr. Scott. Given the Baltic states' limited indigenous medium- and
long-range air defense capabilities, what is EUCOM's plan to address
these gaps, either through rotational deployments, permanent basing, or
support for local acquisition of systems like NASAMS or Patriot?
General Cavoli. Through the Baltics Significant Security
Cooperation Initiative, USEUCOM ensures Baltic nation Integrated Air
and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities complement U.S. and NATO
operational plans. Further, USEUCOM works with Baltic nations to
acquire IAMD systems and build interoperable defense capabilities with
the U.S. and NATO Alliance. Rotational deployments of U.S. and other
Allied forces reinforce Baltic and NATO IAMD capabilities and serve to
hone combined operations, demonstrate resolve, and strengthen
deterrence.
Mr. Scott. How does EUCOM prioritize missile defense enhancements
in the Baltics, particularly against the backdrop of competing demands
across the European theater?
General Cavoli. The Department of Defense's train and equip funding
for our Baltic Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) program
remains USEUCOM's number one priority to the Significant Security
Cooperation Initiative. USEUCOM expects to complete the Baltic IAMD
program with $35M in FY26 and can then address other critical needs.
Mr. Scott. What role do joint exercises like Baltic Operations
(BALTOPS) or NATO's Air Defender play in testing and improving IAMD
readiness for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania? How is EUCOM supporting
the Baltic nations in developing early warning and command-and-control
capabilities to enhance their contribution to NATO's Integrated Air and
Missile Defence System?
General Cavoli. Joint and combined exercises are essential for
maintaining readiness, ensuring responsiveness, realizing seamless
integration at speed, and executing effective command and control.
USEUCOM efforts integrate Baltic capabilities into U.S. and NATO
command and control infrastructures, such as NATO's Integrated Air and
Missile Defense Network and the U.S. Shared Early Warning system.
USEUCOM helps develop early warning and command and control
capabilities for all Baltic nations through the Baltics Significant
Security Cooperation Initiative. This effort ensures Baltic nation
capabilities complement U.S. and NATO plans and operations and are
interoperable with the full range of U.S. and Alliance IAMD systems.
Mr. Scott. What is EUCOM's assessment of the rotational deployment
of U.S. air defense assets (e.g., THAAD or Patriot batteries) to the
Baltic states as a deterrent against Russian air and missile threats?
How does EUCOM balance the need for a persistent IAMD presence in the
Baltics with the broader demands of reinforcing other NATO allies in
Eastern Europe?
General Cavoli. Rotational deployments of U.S. Integrated Air and
Missile Defense (IAMD) assets leverage joint IAMD capabilities from
multiple domains (i.e., Baltic Air Policing). Also, rotational
deployments are ideally executed as national force contributions to
NATO operations that reinforce Baltic IAMD capabilities for deterrence
against Russian air and missile threats. USEUCOM considers the full
range of operational requirements throughout the entire area of
responsibility and works with NATO to array and employ in-theater
forces to achieve objectives and manage risk.
Mr. Scott. How is EUCOM preparing the Baltic nations to counter
emerging threats, such as unmanned aerial systems (UAS), cruise
missiles, and electronic warfare, which could bypass traditional air
defense networks? What role does EUCOM envision for next-generation
technologies-like directed-energy weapons or AI-driven IAMD systems-in
bolstering Baltic defenses over the next decade?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM considers current and emerging threats, as
well as potential innovations for employing next-generation
technologies, as an essential part of building Integrated Air and
Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities. USEUCOM pursues a layered approach
to IAMD that leverages the full range of joint capabilities to include
electronic warfare, cyber, and space. Developing and leveraging next
generation technologies is essential for countering air and missile
threats both in mass and sophistication. Effects-based passive and
active defense and attack capabilities, enabled by artificial
intelligence with improved intelligence and warning, support ever
decreasing engagement decision timelines and execute time-sensitive
targeting of adversarial air and missile threats.
Mr. Scott. What mechanisms are currently in place under U.S. law
(e.g., the Arms Export Control Act) to facilitate rapid third-party
transfers of U.S.-provided weapons and ammunition among Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania during a crisis? How does EUCOM coordinate with
the U.S. State Department to streamline approval processes for such
transfers, and are there pre-existing agreements with the Baltic states
to expedite these in wartime scenarios?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM is prepared to support the execution of
third-party transfers. However, because third-party transfers are
policy considerations, I recommend referring this question to the
Department of State, which is the authority on third-party transfer
policy and arms control.
Mr. Scott. How does EUCOM assess the operational need for Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania to share U.S.-supplied munitions, such as Javelin
missiles or HIMARS rockets, given their geographic proximity and shared
threat environment?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM assesses the requirement for interoperable
U.S.-supplied munitions as critical to Baltic Defense. As the region
lacks strategic depth, the Baltics are dependent upon a narrow land
corridor and vulnerable sea and air lines of communication for NATO
reinforcements. Therefore, collective defense needs to be integrated,
agile, and responsive. USEUCOM continues to coordinate with the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency and the security assistance enterprise to
ensure technical and procedural interoperability of Javelin and High
Mobility Artillery Rocket System munitions. Additionally, USEUCOM is
working to ensure the exchangeability of Baltic target packages so they
can seamlessly share target sets across the Alliance.
Mr. Scott. What contingency plans has EUCOM developed to ensure
that third-party transfers can occur seamlessly if one Baltic state
faces a munitions shortfall during a conflict?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM is prepared to support the execution of
third-party transfers. However, because third-party transfers are
policy considerations, I recommend referring this question to the
Department of State, which is the authority on third-party transfer
policy and arms control.
Mr. Scott. What logistical hurdles does EUCOM anticipate in
transferring U.S. weapons and ammunition between the Baltic states,
particularly given the region's limited transportation infrastructure
and potential for disruption in a crisis? How is EUCOM working with
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to preposition stockpiles or establish
cross-border supply chains to minimize delays in transferring critical
munitions?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM anticipates significant logistical
challenges in the Baltics due to constrained rail capacity, road
networks not designed for heavy military traffic, and the potential for
adversary disruption targeting of key nodes. USEUCOM is working with
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to establish secure, pre-positioned,
stockpiles of critical munitions within their borders. Simultaneously,
USEUCOM is developing streamlined cross-border customs agreements to
facilitate rapid movement, including utilizing multi-modal transport
solutions. These efforts, coupled with infrastructure improvements,
coordinated with our Baltic partners, aim to ensure timely delivery of
vital support in any contingency. Despite these operational realities,
the accession of Finland and Sweden present opportunities for Allies to
assume increased burden sharing for prepositioned war reserve materiel
and reinforcement across vital movement corridors.
Mr. Scott. What are the primary sources of delay EUCOM foresees in
executing third-party transfers during a crisis-e.g., bureaucratic
approvals, transportation bottlenecks, or enemy interdiction-and how
are these being mitigated? In a scenario where Russian forces disrupt
Baltic airspace or ground routes, how would EUCOM ensure the timely
delivery of U.S. weapons and ammunition between the three nations?
General Cavoli. Efforts are underway to speed up cross-border
processes, such as customs and regulations, through digitization and
collaborative exercises with partners like the State Department. To
enhance logistical capabilities, the Reinforcement & Sustainment
Network (RSN) is being developed and improved with support from NATO
and Allied Nations. This network is being rigorously evaluated for
resilience against potential enemy interference, using a framework
focused on robustness and redundancy. Specifically, regarding potential
Russian disruption in the Baltics, the plan relies on a strong RSN,
pre-positioned supplies, and diversified transport alongside close
Allied coordination. USEUCOM would anticipate delays in potential
third-party transfers stemming from bureaucratic hurdles like export
controls, limited Baltic infrastructure capacity, military mobility
capacity and residency in commercial sector, and the potential for
Russian interdiction of key transport routes. If airspace or ground
routes are disrupted, USEUCOM will prioritize maritime and strategic
airlift options utilizing alternate ports and airfields outside the
immediate conflict zone. Ultimately, a resilient network of pre-
positioned supplies and diversified transport methods will ensure
continued support to our Baltic Allies despite Russian interference. In
addition, USEUCOM is working with our Allies to build cyber resiliency
in key aspects of logistics infrastructure.
Mr. Scott. What joint training initiatives is EUCOM conducting with
the Baltic states to prepare their forces for the rapid transfer and
use of U.S. weapons and ammunition from a neighboring country? How does
EUCOM ensure that Baltic military leadership is aligned on protocols
for requesting, approving, and executing such transfers under time-
sensitive conditions?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM's Army service component, U.S. Army Europe
and Africa, hosts a European HIMARS Initiative to bring together all
European HIMARS users to share best practices and cooperate on rocket
artillery fielding and operations. The Ministers of Defense of all
three Baltic nations are in lockstep on this issue, and we continue to
encourage them to work with the Department of State to ensure any
protocols necessary for third-party transfers are in place.
Mr. Scott. How does EUCOM integrate NATO's logistics and command
structures into the process of third-party transfers between the Baltic
states to avoid duplication or delays with Alliance-wide efforts? Are
there discussions with other NATO allies, such as Poland or Germany, to
act as intermediaries or facilitators for U.S. weapons transfers to the
Baltics during a crisis?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM's approach is built on seamless integration
with NATO's logistics frameworks, utilizing the Alliance's Strategic
Airlift Capability, and coordinating movement requests to optimize
efficiency in third-party transfers. USEUCOM participates in NATO's
Combined Joint Operations Area-Center planning, ensuring our efforts
complement and support the broader Alliance defense posture in the
Baltics. Discussions with key Allies like Poland and Germany are
ongoing, as they are designated as potential staging areas and transit
hubs for U.S. assistance. This collaborative approach, formalized
through existing NATO agreements and enhanced by bilateral discussions,
ensures a unified and responsive Alliance effort.
Mr. Scott. Drawing from recent conflicts (e.g., Ukraine), what
lessons has EUCOM applied to improve the speed and efficiency of third-
party transfers of U.S. munitions to allies like Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania?
General Cavoli. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine highlights the
critical need for pre-positioned stocks and streamlined approval
processes-lessons USEUCOM has directly applied to bolstering Baltic
security. USEUCOM increased the volume of U.S. munitions pre-positioned
within the Baltics and neighboring Poland, reducing reliance on lengthy
transfer timelines during a crisis. Furthermore, USEUCOM established
standing agreements with key transit nations and expedited export
control procedures, mirroring successful models observed in support of
Ukraine. Also, USEUCOM is investing in enhanced digital logistics
visualization and communication systems to provide real-time data for
munitions flows, supporting rapid response and adaptability tailored to
evolving battlefield needs. Lastly, USEUCOM is working alongside our
NATO Allies to mature an Alliance-wide distribution network capable of
overcoming geographic and military mobility challenges. NATO Allies'
access to national commercial mobility networks is key to ensuring
sustainment at the point of operational and strategic need.
Mr. Scott. Has EUCOM conducted simulations or tabletop exercises
with the Baltic states to identify and address potential delays in
these transfers during a hypothetical Russian invasion?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM has not run specific simulations or
tabletop exercise (TTX) focused solely on rapid transfer delays to the
Baltics during a Russian invasion scenario.
Mr. Scott. In the event USEUCOM captures enemy weapons, will
USEUCOM have to undergo the lengthy Civil Asset Forfeiture process
under United States law or can the enemy weapons be immediately
provided to NATO partners? What logistical hurdles does EUCOM
anticipate in cataloging, securing, and processing captured enemy
weapons for forfeiture under wartime conditions in Europe? Is USEUCOM
expected to comply with U.S. forfeiture procedures of enemy weapons,
such as documenting the chain of custody, while operating in a dynamic
combat environment?
General Cavoli. The Law of War rather than Domestic Civil Asset
Forfeiture laws would govern U.S. Forces' transfer of captured enemy
weapons during an armed conflict. Captured enemy equipment is
considered war materiel and falls under a different set of rules
governed by international law (specifically, the law of war) and U.S.
military regulations. Under international law, enemy property becomes
the property of the capturing state. Under U.S. law the Secretary of
Defense could, with the Secretary of State's concurrence, transfer most
captured weapons to Allies during multinational operations. U.S.
domestic statutes governing arms transfers provide the executive branch
with broad discretion in making arms-transfer decisions. NATO currently
has no specific policies or doctrine addressing the transfer or receipt
of captured enemy weapons. In determining whether a specific transfer
would be allowable, NATO would look to the laws of the host nation
where the weapons were captured, those of the sending state which
captured and seeks to transfer the weapons, and international law. Non-
proliferation and other legal obligations would apply depending on the
type of former enemy property being transferred. Cataloging, securing,
and transporting captured enemy weapons for forfeiture during combat
operations could present logistical hurdles, by necessitating dedicated
resources and robust tracking systems. Integrating captured weapons
into NATO logistics and inventory systems would also require
interoperability solutions. Despite the dynamic environment under
wartime conditions, USEUCOM would nevertheless expect to maintain and
document chain of custody and adhere to reporting requirements, thus
ensuring accountability.
Mr. Scott. Considering the significant investment by the Romanian
government in the modernization and expansion of the Mihail
Kogalniceanu (MK) Base, how does this investment align with U.S.
strategic interests in Eastern Europe, and what role does this base
play in enhancing regional security?
General Cavoli. Romania's investment into Mihail Kogalniceanu (MK)
airbase is one example of a NATO Ally investing in its own
infrastructure that enhances collective NATO capability along NATO's
eastern flank. Aircraft from across the NATO Alliance will be able to
stage, refuel, and rearm from Romania before executing training or
operational missions located in other parts of Europe. The credibility
of NATO's deterrent capability will increase as more sorties from
across the Alliance are flown out of MK Airbase.
Mr. Scott. How does the current U.S. troop presence in Romania
contribute to NATO's collective defense posture, particularly in light
of recent reports suggesting potential troop withdrawals from Eastern
Europe?
General Cavoli. The rotational Infantry Brigade Combat Team in
Romania supports deterring Russian Aggression as part of the overall
Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE efforts that ensure an optimized balance of
power on NATO's Eastern flank. Additionally, it also integrates and
trains with European forces, which accelerates those forces' ability to
provide for their own defense. Although the Allies have considerable
strength in brigade structure, they lack key brigade enablers the
United States considers organic in our forward stationing of units. The
United States Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System in Romania is a land-
based missile defense facility designed to detect, track, engage and
destroy ballistic missiles in-flight outside the atmosphere, thereby
enhancing the defensive posture and protection of European NATO Allies
and U.S. deployed forces in the region.
Mr. Scott. What role does U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) capability in Romania play in supporting NATO's
early warning systems against potential Russian threats, and how does
this capability enhance regional security?
General Cavoli. U.S. airborne intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities assist NATO early warning systems by
providing indications and warning of Russian military activities and
movements in the vicinity of Russia's Western and Southern military
districts, Crimea, and the Black Sea. Although not categorized as ISR,
an Aegis Ashore site in Romania also supports NATO early warning of
ballistic missile threats. Our broader capability set, including ISR,
strengthens regional security by enhancing deterrence, improving
collective defense, and enabling multinational coordination for better
decision-making.
Mr. Scott. In light of ongoing discussions about U.S. troop
deployments in Europe, can you confirm the U.S. commitment to
maintaining a robust military presence in Romania, and what future
plans are in place to ensure continued cooperation with Romanian
forces?
General Cavoli. Regarding current and future troop deployments in
Europe, I respectfully refer you to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. On the topic of continued cooperation, USEUCOM and Romania
have deepened our relationship through increased security cooperation,
addressing shared priorities such as deterrence and defense, countering
Russian influence, and enhancing NATO's defense capabilities. The U.S.
and Romania have 18 defense agreements, which include measures for
protecting classified military information, payment processing, and
enabling military operations. USEUCOM participates in several
multilateral military exercises with Romania and supports Romanian
efforts to develop advanced air combat capability, indirect fire
support, ground-based air defense, and maritime domain awareness
through various programs and Foreign Military Sales cases. Furthermore,
the Alabama National Guard maintains a robust State Partnership Program
with Romanian forces, engaging in numerous activities across land, sea,
air, space, and cyberspace.
Mr. Scott. The Department of Defense has been working for at least
a year on finding a solution to enable the cross border use of HIMARS
systems and munitions acquired by the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania. This is clearly required for seamless cross-border NATO
operations in the Baltics. Can this committee get your personal
commitment to make it a priority to find a solution that would enable
the cross border use of HIMARS systems and munitions by the 3 Baltic
countries?
General Cavoli. Yes. NATO's operational plans have given renewed
impetus to integrated cross-border fires planning, and USEUCOM supports
those efforts with technical and tactical expertise.
Mr. Scott. What missions do U.S. forces stationed in Germany
conduct to support counterterrorism campaigns?
General Cavoli. In the USEUCOM AOR, Counter-Violent Extremist
Organizations are almost exclusively a Law Enforcement (LE) problem set
requiring LE authorities. However, CT authorities serve as a pretext to
build and sustain select strategic partnerships with national level
Special Operations Forces (SOF) CT formations. U.S. SOF based in Europe
also provide various intelligence and operational support capabilities
to both CENTCOM and AFRICOM CT Campaigns.
Mr. Scott. What would ground launch cruise missiles in Germany do
to support US European Command's efforts to deter further Russian
aggression?
General Cavoli. Stationing an Army Long Range Fires Battalion
(LRFB) in Germany would provide a key deterrent capability against
Russian aggression. The LRFB capabilities are designed to strike
targets well beyond the range of existing rocket artillery and missile
systems. The United States is uniquely capable of providing long-range
fires capability. The LRFB's presence in Europe would position an
important capability forward that adds depth to USEUCOM's defense of
the homeland. Also, the high-end capabilities resident within the LRFB
would restore the balance of ground-launched fires in the region
following Russia's violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty.
Mr. Scott. What additional ways can Poland contribute to NATO's
deterrence mission?
General Cavoli. Poland is leading the way in increased military
spending across NATO Allies, which directly contributes to NATO's
deterrence mission. In the last ten years Poland has increased its
military spending by over 200 percent and are currently at 4.1% GDP.
Poland developed its Host Nation Defense Plans and works closely with
our United States Army Europe command and Allied Joint Force Command
Brunssum to ensure its plans are integrated with NATO Regional Plans.
Mr. Scott. Do the evolving threats from missiles and drones require
new and additional defenses in Europe?
General Cavoli. Yes. USEUCOM recognizes the speed at which missile
and drone threats are evolving. We are leveraging the DoD processes for
increased capability and capacity to address all IAMD threats, as well
as working with industry and developers on innovative solutions for
next-generation technologies. USEUCOM pursues a layered approach to
IAMD that leverages the full range of joint and all-domain capabilities
including electronic warfare, cyber, and space. The U.S. and our Allies
cannot afford to rely solely on active defense, as we will quickly get
behind the cost curve for engagements. Rapid development and fielding
of systems capable of defeating threats in all phases of flight is
required to stay ahead of the rapidly evolving threats.
Mr. Scott. What are specific ways you see China posing a military
threat inside your AOR?
General Cavoli. While there is minimal Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) military activity within USEUCOM's area of responsibility (AOR),
the access and influence that China derives from its commercial seaport
projects could interfere with USEUCOM and NATO's military capability to
respond in a crisis. China's state-owned enterprises have considerable
investment in commercial seaports in the USEUCOM AOR and are
responsible for handling 10 percent of Europe's port capacity. Fourteen
such ports are near, or co-located, with hubs used to move NATO
equipment and forces. Additionally, China-Russia military cooperation
has the potential to grow in USEUCOM's AOR, which would increase the
CCP's threat.
Mr. Scott. How can Non-Governmental Organizations like Blue Yellow
Lithuania partner with USEUCOM?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM supports working alongside the interagency
and Non-Governmental Organizations. For instance, USEUCOM closely
coordinates through our Offices of Defense Cooperation located in U.S.
Embassies and the Foreign Policy Advisor program, which assigns State
Department officers to USEUCOM and our component commands. Non-
Governmental Organizations, like Blue Yellow Lithuania, can work within
the existing Non-Governmental Organization processes to partner with
USEUCOM. I would respectfully refer additional questions about the
processes to the Department of State.
Mr. Scott. What steps is EUCOM taking to strengthen Moldova's
defense capabilities, particularly through programs like the National
Guard State Partnership Program with North Carolina?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM leads the strategic implementation of U.S.
defense cooperation with Moldova and partners with the North Carolina
National Guard (NCNG) as a critical element to its success. NCNG
provides direct support to noncommissioned officer development;
maintenance and logistics; and brigade-level combat and support
operations. NCNG integrates with the Moldovan Armed Forces to mature
its annual training plan, which now culminates in a large-scale
exercise incorporating European Allies, which USEUCOM uses to validate
growth and development in key strategic areas.
Mr. Scott. Given Moldova's proximity to Ukraine and the ongoing
conflict, how is EUCOM assessing and addressing potential security
risks to Moldova, including the situation in Transnistria?
General Cavoli. Based on current Russian force disposition and
focus on Ukraine, USEUCOM does not consider Moldova to be at imminent
risk of a Russian military incursion or aggression from Transnistria.
The main security risk to Moldova from the Russia-Ukraine conflict is
derived from Russian missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles violating
Moldovan airspace. Moldova has noted several of these violations since
2022 and has taken steps to acquire new radars and air defense systems
with support from European and other Western partners. Moldova also
continues operations to secure national elections from Russian
interference efforts, which aim to install a Kremlin-friendly
government that would support Russian efforts in Ukraine and elsewhere
in the region.
Mr. Scott. How is EUCOM supporting Moldova's efforts to modernize
its military, especially in transitioning from Soviet-era equipment and
doctrine to NATO-compatible standards?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM enables Moldova's defense modernization by
supporting its acquisition of NATO-interoperable equipment. As the
first country to authorize sales of lethal equipment to Moldova,
USEUCOM partners with the European Union and NATO to encourage
investments and activities that enable Moldova to divest its antiquated
Soviet-era equipment. To ensure Moldova is trained and organized to use
this infusion of equipment, the command provides a forward deployed
company-level advisory team focused on mentoring noncommissioned
officers and developing disciplined initiative at tactical levels.
USEUCOM has also embedded a senior advisor in the Ministry of Defense
who mentors and assists in the development of NATO-compatible
institutional changes necessary to support a modern force.
Mr. Scott. What measures is EUCOM implementing to help Moldova
counter hybrid threats, such as disinformation, cyberattacks, or
economic coercion, potentially originating from regional actors?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM collaborates with CYBERCOM to enhance both
offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, in coordination with our
Allies and partners. This initiative aims to deter advanced, persistent
threats and bolster the resilience of the NATO Alliance and our
European Partners. Additional details are available at a higher
classification. With reference to disinformation and economic coercion,
USEUCOM, in coordination with the U.S. Embassy Chisinau, counters
adversary disinformation by providing truthful and factual messaging
that supports our interests in Moldova. Messaging includes highlighting
adversary predatory and coercive economic behavior, as well as the
benefits of economic ties with the United States and western Allies.
USEUCOM messaging is executed both unilaterally and with local partners
using social and traditional forms of media. Discussions about
countering hybrid threats are typically held at higher classification
levels. To address this question more thoroughly, I prepared an answer
to this question in a classified annex.
Mr. Scott. As Moldova pursues closer ties with NATO through the
Partnership for Peace program, what role does EUCOM play in
facilitating joint exercises or training to enhance interoperability?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM facilitates Moldova's participation in
joint and combined exercises and training by providing funding for its
armed forces to participate through the provisions of Title 10, U.S.
Code, section 321: Training with Friendly Foreign Countries,
International Military Education and Training, and Foreign Military
Financing. This funding enables USEUCOM to fund Moldova's participation
in exercise alongside U.S. forces and to bring U.S. service members to
Moldova to participate in subject matter expertise exchanges or
training.
Mr. Scott. How does Moldova fit into EUCOM's broader strategic
priorities in Eastern Europe, especially in balancing deterrence
against potential aggression and fostering regional partnerships?
General Cavoli. Moldova's status as a European Union candidate and
location between NATO's eastern flank and Russia make it strategically
significant. Countering Russian destabilization efforts in Moldova,
including Russia's military presence in Transnistria and political
interference in Moldovan elections, directly supports regional
stability and defends NATO's eastern flank. Bolstering Moldova's
resilience against hybrid threats and promoting Transnistria conflict
resolution are vital to containing Russian aggression and furthering
broader Euro-Atlantic security. This approach safeguards a strategic
access point and prevents further malign influence in the Black Sea
region. As Russia rebuilds its armed forces, its modernization program
is intended to challenge NATO on its borders. A secure Moldova
contributes to a stronger, more unified NATO that is aligned with
USEUCOM's overarching goals.
Mr. Scott. How would Russia and China interpret U.S. base closures
and troop withdrawals in Europe?
General Cavoli. Based on our current assessment, Russia would
likely view the removal of U.S. forces favorably. Russia considers the
United States as the dominant player in the international system and
seeks to degrade the U.S. position in Europe, particularly by
undermining Euro-Atlantic institutions, such as NATO. China seeks
opportunities in Europe to exert its global influence and fracture the
West. It might view U.S. base closures as an opportunity to expand ties
and influence over European countries. China might aim to use expanded
ties and influence to try to frustrate European support for a U.S.
redirection to Asia.
Mr. Scott. What unique advantages do U.S. bases in Europe provide
that Indo-Pacific or Middle East bases don't?
General Cavoli. The legal agreements that underpin U.S. basing in
Europe enable the United States the access, basing, and overflight
permissions to put forces in European countries and stage them for
deployment. As a result, U.S. bases in Europe offer many policy options
to move U.S. forces around the globe that are necessary to protect the
homeland and respond to crises. Also, access, basing, and overflight
enables the United States to project power in support of other theaters
outside of Europe. USEUCOM routinely supports other combatant commands,
such as CENTCOM and AFRICOM, with forces that are either based in
Europe or through staging U.S. forces that are deployed from the United
States before onward movement to another theater.
Mr. Scott. How would losing air and naval installations like
Ramstein, Sigonella, and Souda Bay impact U.S. Force projection
globally?
General Cavoli. The loss of bases at Ramstein, Sigonella, and Souda
Bay would severely hinder U.S. force projection. These bases are
crucial for rapid response, logistical support, and command and control
across Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Their loss would weaken
deterrence, complicate logistics, and strain U.S. resources. The United
States would face increased reliance on less strategic locations and
potentially longer, more vulnerable supply lines.
Mr. Scott. Has the intelligence and data provided by Ukraine on
Russian technology, captured equipment, battlefield operational guides,
weapon performance, and countermeasures against U.S. and Allied systems
saved U.S. taxpayer dollars? Will it have saved the lives of U.S.
service personnel in a war against an enemy peer nation?
General Cavoli. The intelligence and data collection concerning the
future of warfare and Russia's capabilities is a silver lining in this
conflict. Russian operations in Ukraine have provided the United States
with insight into Russian forces' combat capabilities; tactics,
techniques, and procedures; and equipment capabilities and employment
tactics. As a specific example, since at least 2011, Russia has
invested heavily in developing new advanced precision guided munitions,
some of which it has employed in operations in Ukraine. Recovered
materiel provides insight into these new capabilities, many of which
Russia would use in future conflicts, and demonstrates areas where
Russia is investing into its defense-industrial complex. This
intelligence continues to inform U.S. capabilities and requirements
development. Discussions about lessons learned from the ongoing
conflict are typically held at higher classification levels. To address
this question more thoroughly, I prepared an answer to this question in
a classified annex.
Mr. Scott. Given the USCG's unique authorities and capabilities,
how does EUCOM coordinate with the USCG to optimize the use of cutters,
aircraft, or other assets in the European theater, particularly in
areas with limited U.S. Navy presence?
General Cavoli. When a U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) cutter, aircraft, or
personnel are available to support initiatives in Europe, there is a
focused effort to connect USCG assets with our European partners, as
well as U.S. Navy presence where possible. Examples of recent USCG
assets in the USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) include U.S. Coast
Guard Cutter (USCGC) HEALY in Summer 2024, and USCGC CALHOUN, which
completed a port call and Kely Leadership Engagement with the French
Commander in Chief for the Atlantic in April 2025. Although the USCGC
CALHOUN departed the AOR early, it also had patrol plans to participate
in a Norwegian Coast Guard Search and Rescue exercise, as well as an
Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing focused Arctic patrol.
Additionally, the Coast Guard's Intel Branch (MIFCLANT) and Joint
Inter-Agency Task Force - South (JIATF-S) in Key West, Florida work
closely with the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre - Narcotics
(MAOC-N) in Lisbon, Portugal. The MAOC-N supports European partner,
African partner, and U.S. Navy intelligence sharing, which has directly
led to European and African partner interdictions of illegal narcotics
and other illicit maritime activities within the European and African
AORs. USEUCOM works with the USCG Atlantic Area Commander in
Portsmouth, as well as through the NAVEUR/AF USCG LNO to facilitate
joint initiatives with USEUCOM.
Mr. Scott. What role does the USCG play in supporting joint
exercises or operations with NATO maritime forces in the EUCOM AOR, and
how are USCG capabilities integrated into these multinational efforts?
General Cavoli. There is limited USCG participation in NATO
maritime forces joint exercises. There has been recent discussion
regarding more USCG involvement in NATO related activities, but I am
not aware of any current efforts to integrate USCG and NATO
initiatives.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
Mr. Moulton. What do you believe is America's current plan to win
in Ukraine?
Ms. Thompson. The President has been clear that the United States'
top priority is putting an end to the war and stopping the needless
bloodshed on both sides. The Administration has engaged with Ukraine
and Russia on several occasions. The President has stated all options
are on the table as part of negotiations and both sides will need to
compromise to reach an enduring peace. The Department continues to
support the Administration's efforts to bring about an enduring peace.
Mr. Moulton. As the Original Classification Authority for EUCOM
Command, and in accordance with your Security Classification Guidance,
can you provide the classification of the following: Prior to an
imminent, kinetic, EUCOM strike, targeting a foreign actor: 1. The
exact launch time of any portion of the strike package a. Accompanied
by the weapons system to be used b. Accompanied by the weapons launch
platform 2. The time on target for a specified weapons system 3. The
time on target for a weapons launch platform Note: Please provide an
unclassified response, if the question cannot be fully answered in an
unclassified manner please provide additional details at the necessary
classification level.
General Cavoli. The Secretary of Defense holds the highest level of
classification authority within the Department of Defense (DoD) and has
the authority to set classification/declassification for any
information that originates from the entirety of the DoD, including
information within the USEUCOM AOR. Within USEUCOM, security
classification policy for the planning and execution of operations in
Europe is contained in USEUCOM Command Guide (ECG) 5201.02 (USEUCOM
Security Classification Guide). Operational and intelligence details
are classified from Confidential to Top Secret when linked to an actual
target, strike, or planned operations. Original classification
determinations for USEUCOM originated information can only be made by
the Original Classification Authorities (OCA) designated within ECG
5201.02. USEUCOM designated OCAs only have the authority to declassify
and downgrade classified USEUCOM originated information.
Mr. Moulton. Were you consulted prior to the firing of VADM
Chatfield?
General Cavoli. I was not informed by the Acting Chairman prior to
VADM Chatfield's removal as the U.S. Military Representative to NATO.
The Joint Staff's General and Flag Officer (G/FO) Matters office
instructed USEUCOM J1's NATO G/FO Manager to confirm that the Chairman
of the NATO Military Committee was formally notified of the U.S.
Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee removal. This
notification process involved coordination with the U.S. Military
Delegation to NATO and the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
Mr. Moulton. Based on VADM Chatfield's performance and her work
with your headquarters, do you have any reason to believe that there
was cause to fire her?
General Cavoli. The U.S. Military Representative to the NATO
Military Committee (USMILREP) is the senior U.S. military officer at
NATO Headquarters in Brussels and represents the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the Military Committee (MC), NATO's highest
military authority. The MC provides strategic direction to both the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who commands Allied Command
Operations, and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, who leads
Allied Command Transformation. The USMILREP works within the MC
structure and reports back directly to the CJCS. The MILREP's chain of
command is distinct and separate from that of SACEUR.
Mr. Moulton. Has EUCOM ever made operational plans for the use of
Greenland? Has EUCOM ever asked Denmark for operational authority to
use Greenland? Have you been asked to prepare any future plans for the
use of Greenland if Greenland is acquired by the United States?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM does not have contingency plans for
operational use of Greenland. Greenland establishes the western
boundary of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap. This gap poses a
unique strategic challenge in the maritime and air domain that USEUCOM
accounts for in its plans. Also, the air and port infrastructure on
Greenland can be used to support logistics of cross-Atlantic movement
of personnel and equipment flowing from the United States into Europe.
USEUCOM closely coordinates with NORTHCOM/NORAD to share access to
Greenland for operational use in the event of a contingency operation.
SPACECOM also retains assets that are forward positioned on Greenland.
I would refer you to NORTHCOM/NORAD and SPACECOM for additional details
about their possible planning efforts.
Mr. Moulton. Have you been asked to prepare, or have you prepared,
and military plans for a military invasion of Greenland?
General Cavoli. I have not been asked to prepare plans for a
military invasion of Greenland nor have I prepared such plans. I
respectfully refer any additional questions related to policy about
Greenland to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Moulton. Democrats and Republicans frequently criticized the
Biden team for not having a plan to decisively win the war in Ukraine.
Since the arrival of SECDEF Hegseth, has this DoD or White House
provided you with a plan to win the war in Ukraine?
General Cavoli. As the President has stated on multiple occasions,
the United States wants a permanent ceasefire to end the bloodshed in
Ukraine. Please refer additional questions about U.S. military plans
and policy related to Ukraine to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
Mr. Moulton. What do you believe is America's current plan to win
in Ukraine?
General Cavoli. America's current plan in Ukraine is to reach a
ceasefire or peace deal to stop the bloodshed. To achieve this, Ukraine
must continue to fight from a position of strength and not capitulate.
The goal remains preventing a Russian victory, and Ukraine is
effectively holding its lines to achieve that objective.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY
Mr. Kelly. Recent GAO findings have highlighted gaps in the
availability of Amphibious Ready Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units
due to maintenance planning and execution delays of the Navy's
amphibious ships. During the February 2023 earthquake in Turkey and
Syria, and the Russian buildup on Ukraine's border in early 2022, EUCOM
did not have a MEU/ARG assigned due to amphib availability. Describe
the strategic impacts, along with an assessment of severity, of amphib
/ MEU availability to deterrence credibility in your theater.
General Cavoli. The Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary
Unit (ARG/MEU) can play an important role in deterrence in Europe,
offering a unique combination of capabilities that contribute to
regional stability and discourage potential adversaries. ARG/MEUs are
essentially "floating bases" that can be positioned strategically near
potential hotspots. This forward presence demonstrates commitment to
Allies and partners, and allows for rapid response to crises, whether
natural disasters or military contingencies. This rapid response
capability is crucial in deterring aggression, as potential adversaries
must consider the swift arrival of a capable force. Next, ARG/MEUs are
incredibly versatile. They can conduct a wide range of operations, from
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to amphibious assaults and
sustained land operations. This flexibility makes them unpredictable
and difficult for adversaries to plan against. They can adapt to
evolving situations and provide tailored responses, further enhancing
their deterrent value. Additionally, ARG/MEUs can project power ashore,
establishing a foothold, and can conduct operations inland. This
capability is vital for deterring potential land-based aggression,
particularly in littoral regions. The ability to quickly land a
substantial force, including ground troops, aircraft, and logistics,
presents a significant obstacle to any adversary contemplating
territorial expansion. Lastly, the deployment of an ARG/MEU sends a
clear message of resolve to both Allies and potential adversaries. It
signals a commitment to regional security and a willingness to act if
necessary. This demonstration of resolve is a key component of
deterrence, as it aims to convince potential adversaries that the costs
of aggression outweigh the benefits. Although the focus is often on
land operations, ARG/MEUs also contribute to sea control and maritime
security. Their presence helps to safeguard vital sea lanes and deter
piracy and other maritime threats. This contributes to overall regional
stability, which in turn supports deterrence efforts.
Mr. Kelly. General Cavoli, could you speak to the role of the State
Partnership Program within EUCOM? Specifically, how does this program
strengthen our relationships with allies and partners across Europe,
and what strategic value does it bring in terms of interoperability,
regional stability, and shared readiness objectives? Additionally, how
has the program adapted to address the evolving security landscape,
particularly in response to Russia's increasingly aggressive behavior
and growing alignment with China and North Korea?
General Cavoli. The long-term relationships established through the
State Partnership Program are critical to reaching our defense
objectives in Europe. They have helped bolster defense capability,
influence increased European defense spending, promote burden sharing,
and provide opportunities for greater access, basing and overflight in
support of U.S. interests. Both Austria and Switzerland are now
partners through this program. As neutral nations, this created a
formal military partnership that cannot be obtained otherwise and opens
new opportunities and access. As European nations collectively seek to
strengthen their militaries and take a larger role in their own
national defense capabilities, these recent inductions into the program
have encouraged other historically neutral nations in Europe to also
seek a military partnership with the United States.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIMENEZ
Mr. Gimenez. In your written testimony you discuss how quickly
Russia has been able to reconstitute and rapidly replace lost vehicles
and equipment through productions in it's commercial and industrial
base. This committee has had several hearings and will have many more
on our own Defense Acquisitions process, to ensure we're not getting in
our own way of innovation, development, and production of the weapon
systems we need to deter threats like China, Russia, and several other
actors you mentioned. What recommendations would you make to improve
our current Defense Acquisitions process?
General Cavoli. There have been several studies undertaken over the
years to reform the Defense Acquisition process. USEUCOM would endorse
any new system that would provide greater speed, efficiency, and
improved delivery of the critical capabilities required for our
mission. Some ways of doing this could be to simplify regulations and
empower program managers; embrace the use of readily available
commercial technologies; enhance transparency and improve communication
between the Department of Defense, Congress, and industry stakeholders
through the acquisition lifecycle; and provide better tools and
training to the workforce. However, specific policy proposals to
improve the Defense Acquisition process should be developed by policy
experts and the decisions made by policy makers.
Mr. Gimenez. In your pre-provided commentary, you discuss the
Chinese Communist Party's investments into industry in Europe, and how
those investment's have the potential to fracture the NATO Alliance and
US partnerships. As a member of not only this committee, but also the
Special Select Committee on China, I am very concerned with the CCPs
malign influence around the world. What does the US need to do to deter
our partners in NATO from getting further intertwined with Chinese
investments and influence?
General Cavoli. Within USEUCOM, we continue to monitor Chinese
activity as members of the China Watcher's community of interest.
Additionally, we work closely with our inter-agency partners to share
information on Chinese Communist Party activity in Europe. For further
details on specific policies regarding Allied and partner investment
into Chinese-controlled infrastructure projects, the Departments of
State, Treasury, and Commerce will be better suited to address your
question.
Mr. Gimenez. In your testimony, you note the $65.9 billion in
munitions, weapons, vehicles, and other assistance that has been
provided to Ukraine since 2022, along with contributions from our NATO
allies. At this critical inflection point, what should U.S. assistance
look like toward Ukraine? Should we abandon this fight, and if so what
signal would this send to Russia?
General Cavoli. At the present inflection point of the Russia-
Ukraine conflict, the Administration is working with Ukraine and Russia
to secure a ceasefire and enduring negotiated settlement. The
Administration's policy is that U.S. assistance supporting Ukraine
remains mostly unchanged allowing Ukraine to present their strongest
position at the negotiating table. The U.S. provides military advice,
intelligence, and key weapons systems and munitions including high-end
air defense systems and interceptors, armored vehicles, precision
ground and air munitions allowing Ukraine to defend across the
frontlines in eastern Ukraine. Russia's conclusions about diminished
U.S. support to Ukraine requires extensive geopolitical analysis of all
the factors affecting U.S.-Russian relations. I am not a participant in
developing U.S.-Russia policy and am not fully aware of all of the
Administration's deliberations and policies related to Russia. I would
refer you to the Department of State for a complete answer.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RYAN
Mr. Ryan. Commercial capabilities for AI and data integration are
able to provide a common operating picture and enable effective C2 in
order to increase joint warfighting capability and AI-augmented
decision to significantly increase the scale, speed, and accuracy of
the targeting process. How are you using commercial capabilities to
meet these needs, particularly with regard to supporting certain CJADC2
requirements and fill current capability gaps?
General Cavoli. Maven Smart System, and its underlying data and
artificial intelligence capabilities are the software backbone of our
efforts to modernize and achieve Combined Joint All Domain Command and
Control (CJADC2). Last October, EUCOM transitioned our common
operational picture to Maven Smart System, which allowed us to increase
from the only three live data sources that fed our previous common
operational picture, to over 200 live data sources today. We are
building on this progress to create our Decision Advantage Environment
by digitizing other operational and staff processes through Maven. It
also enhances our ability to make better informed decisions across all
the joint functions, in addition to the targeting process, at the speed
of modern war. My Chief of Staff is leading an effort to onboard other
commercial capabilities by working closely with the Defense Innovation
Unit and others to further enhance our Decision Advantage Environment
with artificial intelligence.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. DAVIS
Mr. Davis. Yes or no, is it a threat to our national security if we
are spending so little on our own industrial base that we have to rely
on foreign nations to supply our weapons systems?
Ms. Thompson. Over-reliance on foreign nations can pose risks to
military readiness and national security, but a collaborative
industrial base with allies and partners is vital for burden-sharing,
resilience, and interoperability. The key is fostering a robust
domestic base that is balanced with and reinforced by strategic
international partnerships to leverage shared innovation, production
capacity, and access to critical materials. I look forward to working
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, if
confirmed, to ensure we have a strong, resilient defense industrial
base that strengthens our collective security through partnerships with
allies and through increased domestic investment.
Mr. Davis. Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, located in my district,
is home to two F-15E combat squadrons, which deploy over 50 percent of
the time. To sustain a ready force and address the threats to our
servicemembers in the Middle East, we need to transfer the F-15Es
stationed at Royal Air Force Lakenheath back home.
General Cavoli, now that all F-35 squadrons at Lakenheath are
projected to reach full operability by next year, do you expect to work
with the Air Force and relieve the fourth-generation aircraft,
including the F-15Es stationed there so they can fulfill their core
mission?
General Cavoli. I understand that the U.S. Air Force is planning to
change the proportion of its land-based fighter squadrons in Europe
from fourth generation to fifth generation and would welcome changes at
RAF Lakenheath to transition the F-15E to F-35. The Department of
Defense stationing process will ensure collaboration between
Headquarters Air Force, USEUCOM, and other stakeholders involved, to
achieve a deliberate plan for the capability adjustment.
Mr. Davis. General Cavoli, what should the United States do to
counter the accelerating Russian buildup, as Russia increases its
defense spending by 25 percent while we are not committing to meet the
5 percent NATO target we have set for our European allies?
General Cavoli. There are multiple policy options that could be
pursued to counter Russia's buildup, but I refer the policy-related
questions to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Within the
military domain, USEUCOM counters Russia's buildup through defending
the homeland forward, projection of U.S. combat power, and deterring
Russian aggression. Defense of the homeland from Europe is largely a
function of posture. USEUCOM is strategically located in Europe to
detect, identify, and eliminate Russian threats before they range U.S.
territory - especially across the Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom
Gap. USEUCOM also capitalizes on the access, basing, and overflight
privileges with our European Allies and partners to flexibly project
combat power across the globe. Lastly, USEUCOM's support to NATO's
modernization effort is accelerating NATO's deterrence capability.
However, the insufficient production capacity across the Defense
Industrial Base is causing delays in U.S.-produced war materiel from
being delivered to our NATO Allies.
Mr. Davis. Since coming to Congress, I have fought to equip Ukraine
with the resources it needs to protect itself against Russia's
unprovoked invasion. Of the $175 billion Congress has approved in our
fight for democracy, over 70 percent, or $123 billion, has directly
funded the American defense industrial base.
General Cavoli, can you explain how replenishing our domestic
defense industrial base and revitalizing production demand through
supporting our allies can help keep the American people safe?
General Cavoli. The number of Foreign Military Sales cases managed
by USEUCOM rose by 600% from the annual average from FY17-21 to FY24.
Last year alone, our NATO Allies and European partners invested over
$68 billion in the U.S. defense industry to purchase new equipment and
munitions that will be used for collective defense. For our NATO Allies
to commit more to the NATO Force Model and take on a larger burden of
European security, they need sufficient quantities of equipment and
munitions. Until the U.S. and European defense industrial bases are
capable of producing the required materiel, the threats in the European
theater will be able to pose significant risks to U.S. security and our
interests. U.S. forces will be required to defend the homeland forward
until our NATO Allies have generated the capabilities necessary to take
on Europe's security requirements.
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