[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 119-11]
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 9, 2025
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-487 WASHINGTON : 2026
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Nineteenth Congress
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice JOHN GARAMENDI, California
Chair DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
DON BACON, Nebraska JASON CROW, Colorado
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
RONNY JACKSON, Texas JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
PAT FALLON, Texas SARA JACOBS, California
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
NANCY MACE, South Carolina PATRICK RYAN, New York
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO,
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia Pennsylvania
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
CORY MILLS, Florida DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia GILBERT RAY CISNEROS JR.,
LANCE GOODEN, Texas California
CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana ERIC SORENSEN, Illinois
DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin MAGGIE GOODLANDER, New Hampshire
JOHN J. McGUIRE III, Virginia SARAH ELFRETH, Maryland
PAT HARRIGAN, North Carolina GEORGE WHITESIDES, California
MARK B. MESSMER, Indiana DEREK TRAN, California
DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas EUGENE SIMON VINDMAN, Virginia
JEFF CRANK, Colorado WESLEY BELL, Missouri
ABRAHAM J. HAMADEH, Arizona
Chris Vieson, Staff Director
Mark Morehouse, Professional Staff Member
Spencer Johnson, Professional Staff Member
Brooke Alred, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Noh, John, Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense For Indo-Pacific Security Affairs...................... 4
Paparo, ADM Samuel, Commander, USN, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command........................................................ 5
Brunson, GEN Xavier T., USA, Commander, United Nations Command,
Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces Korea..................... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Noh, John.................................................... 67
Paparo, ADM Samuel........................................... 74
Brunson, GEN Xavier T........................................ 102
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Military.com article submitted by Ms. Houlahan entitled
``Army Planners Are Weighing Force Reductions of Up to
90,000 Active Duty Soldiers''.............................. 121
Article submitted by Mr. McGuire entitled ``Aircraft
Carriers: Still Indispensable,'' written by Admiral Paparo. 128
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 137
Ms. Houlahan................................................. 137
Mr. Bacon.................................................... 137
Ms. Strickland............................................... 137
Mr. Moylan................................................... 138
Mr. Vindman.................................................. 138
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bell..................................................... 157
Mr. Bergman.................................................. 153
Mr. Crow..................................................... 151
Mr. Davis.................................................... 156
Mr. Gimenez.................................................. 155
Mr. Kelly.................................................... 151
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 150
Mr. Ryan..................................................... 156
Mr. Scott.................................................... 142
Ms. Sherrill................................................. 154
Mr. Tran..................................................... 157
Mr. Wilson................................................... 141
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 142
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 9, 2025.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [Chairman
of the Committee] presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. The meeting will come to order. Today we
continue our posture hearings with INDOPACOM [United States
Indo-Pacific Command] and U.S. Forces Korea.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here, for their
service to our nation, and the time it took for them to prepare
for this hearing. These are very helpful, and I appreciate your
commitment.
Last week China carried out large-scale military exercises
off Taiwan's coast. China practiced assaulting maritime and
ground targets and cutting Taiwan off from the world. This is
not new.
In recent years, China has increased the size, scope, and
complexity of its drills around Taiwan. As Admiral Paparo has
said, these are not exercises, these are rehearsals forforceful
reunification. And these rehearsals are backed by real
capability.
China now has the world's largest navy and a ship-building
capacity over 200 times greater than our own. It is rapidly
expanding its nuclear arsenal and is expected to double its
warheads by 2030. And China leads the world in hypersonic
missile systems.
China's growing defense budget shows it isn't slowing down.
Last month it announced a 7.2 percent increase in defense
spending, the 4th straight year it increased by more than 7
percent. Its military modernization is also being assisted by
Moscow. In return for supporting Putin's war machine, China is
receiving advanced submarine, missile, and nuclear technology.
China is also working closely with Iran and North Korea to
further its effort to undermine American influence and
alliances around the world, and we cannot let them succeed. Yet
year after year, the billions in INDOPACOM's unfunded
priorities have shown we are not giving our warfighters the
tools they need to defeat China or to deter China. That must
change.
China is our pacing threat, and our defense investments
must reflect that. We must fund Guam missile defense as part of
President Trump's Golden Dome initiative. We must boost our
ability to blind Chinese forces while hardening our command and
control.
We must refill our munitions stockpiles, especially long-
range fires. We must expand the production of attritable
unmanned systems to create the hellscape Admiral Paparo
envisions.
And we must rebuild and modernize U.S. shipbuilding
capabilities. Delivering these capabilities will take serious
investment. That is why I am pushing for increased spending in
our military, including through reconciliation, through the
reconciliation process, with robust defense spending.
Ultimately, deterring China is not something we should do
alone. As Secretary Hegseth said during his recent trip to the
region, America First does not mean America alone. And he is
right. That is why I supported the upgrade of U.S. Forces Japan
to a Joint Force Headquarters. It will strengthen our combined
deterrence and response capabilities with Japan.
We must also accelerate AUKUS [trilateral partnership
agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States], especially efforts to field cutting-edge interoperable
systems. And we need more co-production, co-development, and
co-sustainment with our regional allies and partners.
We must also deliver weapons and training to Taiwan
faster. That is why I strongly supported the Taiwan Security
Cooperation Initiative in last year's NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act]. And I intend to authorize it at a robust
level again this year.
We know Xi instructed the PLA [People's Liberation Army] to
be ready for operations against Taiwan by 2027. However, I
don't believe he has yet decided whether to pursue unification
by force. Our job is to make sure Xi knows a cross-strait
invasion would be too costly and ultimately futile.
While China is our primary strategic adversary, North Korea
remains a growing threat. In October 2024, Kim tested a new
ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] that could strike the
U.S. homeland while carrying multiple nuclear warheads.
I am concerned these advances would accelerate as Kim
strengthens his ties with Vladimir Putin. Especially given
North Korea supplied Russia with millions of shells and
thousands of troops, Putin owes him.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how we can
establish or reestablish deterrents against these threats posed
by China and North Korea and what they need from us and this
committee to do that.
With that, I yield to my friend and ranking member for any
opening statement he may have.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome our witnesses and appreciate their service and
their leadership in a very, very complicated part of the world.
And I agree with the chairman that the primary goal for us in
that part of the world is to deter conflict.
Certainly, deterring conflict with China and North Korea
presents challenges in that regard as well. And it is
problematic, because China is in the midst of a massive
military buildup, and we see increasing cooperation, as the
chairman outlined, between China and North Korea, Russia, Iran,
and all of our adversaries in a way that will really stress our
ability to deter that conflict.
So it is most important to hear from the witnesses what do
we need from an equipment standpoint in order to be in the best
possible position to deter our adversaries.
Now, there is one challenge here, and that is that we have
a, what is it, $36 trillion dollar debt, and a massive deficit.
So the thing I am always anxious to hear from is what choices
are we going to make. Because as we sit before this committee,
every single group that comes before us tells us that they need
a lot more than what they have.
We simply don't have the money or the resources to meet all
of those demands across every sphere of our national security
needs. So we need to start making choices and looking for ways
to effectively deter in a more cost-effective manner.
We can't imagine that we can just throw money at the
problem. We have to be really smart about what is going to
work. So I am very curious to hear from our witnesses what
lessons they have learned from conflicts elsewhere in the world
about what we truly need to be deterrent and where we might be
able to do that in a more affordable way. Not less effective,
but more affordable.
We have got the great example of Ukraine, who doesn't even
have a navy, that has been able to blunt the force of the
Russian navy in the Black Sea with basically one-way attack
surface-level drones. They have been able to really leverage
that to get a good military outcome. We need to be smart about
how we do that going forward.
So that is going to be a key part of getting us to
deterrence. But ultimately, I think we need to be mindful of
the fact that one goal here needs to be to figure out how we
can peacefully coexist with China.
China is not going anywhere, we are not going anywhere.
There is no sort of win in the sense that one side is going to
ultimately defeat the other. China is a major economic power.
They are a major military power, and so are we.
So what is the plan to peacefully coexist with China? How
do we get there, admitting that deterrence has to be part of
that. We have to be strong to get to that point. But constant
conflict with China does not seem like a wise course of action
if we ultimately want to deter conflict.
And then the last part of this, the chairman mentioned the
importance of partners and allies, and Secretary Hegseth's
comment about America First doesn't mean America alone. Right
now, yes it does, all right.
I cannot see a single, solitary thing that the Trump
administration has done to build and strengthen relationships
with any partner in the world, except maybe Russia. They are
about the only place I can see where the President has said
things about how he wants to get along with Russia.
We have launched a trade war against every, single one of
our partners in the Asia region. Every last one of them. No
matter how much they have worked with us. Frankly even in the
case of Australia, where Australia, we have a trade surplus
with Australia. But we are going to shoot at them too.
How on earth is that not America alone? And our
partnerships have been really important, and I want to thank
our witnesses and others. In the last 5 or 6 years, we have
built very strong relationships with Japan, with South Korea,
with the Philippines. We are building stronger relationships
with India and Indonesia. Australia has been a tremendous
partner.
And this has been the greatest thing that has really
frustrated China. They are now surrounded by a group of nations
who don't want to be bullied by China, so they are looking to
us for support, and that has worked very well. And now, we are
trying to out-bully China. That seems to be the strategy.
We are going to show Australia and Japan and all these
countries that we can punch them just as hard as China can
punch them. I am deeply concerned that that is going to
undermine our ability to deter the region towards no particular
end.
So I really hope, I will close with two things. One, let's
push back on this. Let's build partnerships. And then also back
to the budget point, I knew I was forgetting something, you
can't cut taxes by $6 trillion and claim that you want to spend
more money on defense.
It just, well, unless you think debt, the debt and deficits
don't matter. And I thought that was an argument for the far
left, not for the far right.
So we have to be realistic about the choices we face if we
are going to meet the very important deterrence goals that we
have in the Indo-Pacific region. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the ranking member.
Now I would like to introduce our witnesses. We have Mr.
John Noh, who is performing the duties of Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs; Admiral Paparo,
who is the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; and General
Brunson, who is Commander of United Nations Command Combined
Forces Command and the United States Forces, Korea.
With that, Mr. Noh, we will start with you. You are
recognized for 5 minutes to summarize your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JOHN NOH, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. Noh. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to be here today to discuss our military posture
and the national security challenges in the Indo-Pacific. And
it is a distinct honor to speak with you alongside Admiral
Paparo and General Brunson.
Let me begin by reaffirming our mission as laid out by the
Commander-in-Chief, President Donald Trump. We will achieve
peace through strength. And Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth
has provided us very clear guidance on how the Department will
achieve that mission: revive the warrior ethos, rebuild our
military, and reestablish deterrence.
China is undertaking an unprecedented military buildup. The
PLA is developing a large and advanced arsenal of nuclear,
conventional, cyber, and space capabilities. Xi Jinping has
ordered the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. China
aims to dominate the Indo-Pacific and displace the United
States as the world's most powerful nation.
To counter the growing threat from China, it is critical
that we reestablish deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, resource
with combat-credible military forces postured forward, while
rebalancing burden-sharing with our allies and partners and
investing in our defense industrial base to support our
warfighters.
The bottom line is that we need to accelerate efforts to
strengthen our force posture and increase operational
capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, given China's historic and
rapid military buildup and the urgent need to reestablish
deterrence.
And we will pursue an America First approach, but America
First does not mean America alone or America only. It means
that America is supported by and standing capable, like-minded
allies and partners who will do their part to restore and
sustain deterrence. Stronger allies lead to stronger alliances,
and stronger alliances deter aggression and create dilemmas for
our adversaries. And this is what the Department, this
Department and the team seated here before you today are
delivering.
In closing, thank you for your support and leadership and
for the opportunity to testify before you today. And I greatly
appreciate your continued commitment to and support for the men
and women of the Department of Defense. Thank you for your
time, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Noh can be found in the
Appendix on page 67.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Noh.
Admiral Paparo, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL SAMUEL PAPARO, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-
PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Paparo. Chairman and Ranking Member and
distinguished members of the committee, thanks for much for the
chance to appear before the committee to discuss the Indo-
Pacific region.
First, with me over my right shoulder is United States
Indo-Pacific Command's senior enlisted leader, Fleet Master
Chief Dave Isom, who is retiring after 38 years of selfless
service as a Navy SEAL and special operator.
Indispensable to any commander, this senior enlisted leader
is in charge of key duties involving a region that spans over
50 percent of the globe, four out of five of the world's
major's threats, and most of much of the world's economic
activity.
Roughly 50 percent of the U.S. military's operational
forces falls under his charge. And as all know, the
noncommissioned officer corps is one of the Joint Forces'
absolute asymmetric advantages.
Fleet Master Chief Isom's leadership in this critical duty
has been exemplary. I honor his service. He has been
indispensable to me in making the transition as the commander
for the last year. And this summer, having bid farewell to
Master Chief Isom, we will welcome Marine Sergeant Major Eric
Cook to this post.
INDOPACOM faces a confluence of challenges. Foremost among
them is China's increasingly aggressive and assertive behavior.
Their unprecedented military modernization, encompassing
advancements in artificial intelligence, hypersonics, space-
based capabilities, among others poses a real and serious
threat to our homeland, to our allies, and to our partners.
In 2024, the People's Liberation Army demonstrated growing
capabilities through persistent pressure operations against
Taiwan, escalating by 300 percent. China's aggressive military
actions near Taiwan are, as the chairman said, not just
exercises, they are rehearsals.
And while the PLA attempts to intimidate the people of
Taiwan and demonstrate coercive capability, these actions
backfire, drawing increased global attention and accelerating
Taiwan's own defensive preparations.
North Korea's development of advanced nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles, including a new intercontinental ballistic
missile capable of reaching the United States, poses a direct
threat to our homeland and to our allies. Further, as
discussed, North Korea is deepening its relationship with
Russia, receiving military support and assistance to advance
its own military capabilities.
Russia's growing military cooperation with China adds
another layer of complexity, creating a compounding challenge
with the deepening cooperation between China, Russia, and North
Korea. U.S. INDOPACOM deters threats to the regional stability
in competition and in crisis, while ensuring the ability to
prevail in conflict. That ability to prevail is indispensable
to deterrence.
In 2024, the command conducted 120 joint exercises, among
them 20 major joint exercises across the region, including
allies and partners, demonstrating our capability and our
combined capacity.
We continue to strengthen relationships with Japan, South
Korea, Australia, Republic of the Philippines, India, Taiwan,
the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] nations, the
Pacific Island countries, and European partners in INDOPACOM,
including the United Kingdom and France.
Multiple groupings such as the Quad and trilateral
arrangements further enhance our capabilities. We must strive
for dominance in space and across the information environment,
including cyber, leveraging capabilities to counter command and
control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
targeting.
This enables the command to gain a non-linear advantage
over potential adversaries. And while the scale of our effort
is substantial, the ability to master information is absolutely
paramount to projecting power and safeguarding our interests.
To maintain credible deterrence, U.S. INDOPACOM requires
sustained investment in counter-C5ISRT [counter command,
control, computing, communications, cyber, intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting], in fires, in
integrated air and missile defense, in force sustainment, and
as discussed, in autonomous and artificial intelligence-driven
systems. And all under greater ability to maintain domain
awareness.
As the most consequential opponent, China poses real and
serious challenges to our military superiority, but this also
presents opportunities for reform and for establish enduring
advantage. While INDOPACOM faces significant challenges, I do
remain confident in our deterrence posture and the ability to
defend U.S. interests and maintain regional stability. But the
trajectory must change.
China is outproducing the United States in air, maritime,
missile capability, and accelerating their space and counter-
space capabilities. Though we face serious challenges, the
Joint Force remains confident, resolute, and determined to
prevail. Deterrence remains our highest duty.
Thank you for your continued support for INDOPACOM.
Together we advance the security, freedom, and prosperity of
the American people and our allies and partners. I look forward
to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Paparo can be found in
the Appendix on page 74.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
General Brunson, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL XAVIER T. BRUNSON, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
NATIONS COMMAND, COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, U.S. FORCES KOREA
General Brunson. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to speak to you today. I am honored to sit
alongside Mr. Noh and Admiral Paparo here in the first of my
posture hearings, the first of what I hope to be many more in
the future.
I would like to take a moment to thank you all for your
continued and steadfast leadership and support to
servicemembers, the civilians that serve alongside us, and
their families. I would also like to thank you especially for
your continued assistance to those soldiers, sailors, airmen,
Marines, and Guardians who are serving in Korea.
I would be remiss if I failed to recognize and give my
condolences publicly to the family of a Republic of Korea
special operations solider who lost his life in a free-fall
parachute accident yesterday. It is a reminder that there is a
high cost associated with wearing the cloth of our respective
nations.
In my career, every opportunity I have had to lead our
nation's men and women has been honor. And it is a privilege to
serve alongside our allies, partners, and friends as we work
together to further our shared interests, strengthen our ties,
and further security, freedom, and prosperity in all our
nations.
The Korean Peninsula is directly linked to the national
interests of the United States. What happens in this vital
region has a direct impact on American families, businesses,
and our nation's future.
For over 75 years, we have invested our national treasure
in the region. Northeast Asia is a region critical to U.S.
national security and a region where recent authoritarian
collusion between China, Russia, the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, and Iran has intensified.
It is a region of emergent challenges. However, there are
also undeniable opportunities. Because our interconnected world
grows closer and closer, any military actions that would occur
on the Korean Peninsula would have worldwide and potentially
global impacts.
One of the things that we are looking at presently is an
ability to continue to partner alongside others like those in
UN [United Nations] Command, those 18 nations that make up that
command, to continue to build partnerships which will
strengthen not only our capacity in the region, but also be an
indicator of our resolve therein.
In 2024, DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea]
focused on advancing their cruise missile and hypersonic live
vehicle research and development programs, launching some 47
ballistic missiles, with one failed satellite launch attempt.
Kim Jong-Un also had two highly publicized visits to his
nuclear sites, clearly conveying an intent to advance his
nuclear weapons capabilities. Over the past year and a half,
DPRK has exported munitions and troop support to Russia,
demonstrating an ability to not only provide for another
conflict, but to continue advancing their domestic
capabilities.
In the coming year, we expect DPRK to further develop
hypersonic and multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicle, MIRV [Multiple Independently targetable Reentry
Vehicle, capabilities to complete his eighth party congress
goals. At present, he is sitting at five of seven obtained.
Kim Jong-Un's leadership has shifted from focus on
reunification to declaring his own sovereignty. This change is
evidenced by the hardening of the southern border, the
rejection of reunification discussions, and the destruction of
unification monuments in buildings along the joint security
area.
DPRK continues to build its nuclear weapons program and
boast a Russian equipment-augmented modernized military force
of over 1.3 million personnel. To contrast that, I would like
to mention the ROK-U.S.-Japan alliance.
Our trilateral efforts along with those other nations
within the United Nations Command have woven together an
integrated regional defense posture. Together we have achieved
new levels of interoperability and theater-wide combined joint
all-domain exercises and training.
Our presence in Korea demonstrates American strength. It
imposes cost and deters military aggression by our adversaries.
The ROK-U.S. alliance remains the lynchpin of security in
Northeast Asia.
I am committed to working with you to ensure the continued
security, freedom, and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and a
free and open Indo-Pacific. Thank you, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Brunson can be found in
the Appendix on page 102.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General Brunson.
I recognize myself first for questions. Admiral Paparo, how
does the growing cooperation between China, Russia, and North
Korea present challenges in your area of operations?
Admiral Paparo. Chairman, each country compensates for the
others' weaknesses. In this case, it is quite transactional,
and there is a matter of symbiosis among it. So for example,
China has provided 70 percent of the machine tools and 90
percent of the semiconductors that support Russia's rebuilding
its war machine.
North Korea provides, as discussed, thousands of rounds in
support and troops. And coming back to China and to North Korea
are key capabilities where they would otherwise be behind that
would help close the gap, submarine technology, missile
technology, and surface-to-air missiles, and so forth. This is
a transactional symbiosis that poses a serious challenge.
The Chairman. Great. General Brunson, what does the U.S.
gain from our presence on the Korean Peninsula? And if in fact
your tri-command of U.S., South Korea, and UN Forces didn't
exist, what would it cost us to reestablish that kind of
foothold on the Asian continent?
General Brunson. Chairman, as you know, that will be surely
a matter of policy. But from my perspective, what I see is that
we have got positional advantage currently.
We have had experience, you asked us in your opening to
sort of highlight these things in regard to our experiences,
and I can say that honestly, having been a special operations
joint task force commander in Iraq one year, I found myself on
a FOB [Forward Operating Base] that I had been on as a
battalion commander 6 years before. And we don't want that same
condition.
I think what we have to recognize is that the way that we
are organized, the way that we posture ourselves in the region,
we ought not seek credit for it, but we ought to at least
acknowledge the fact that we are in all the places that we need
to be. Capacities aside, the capabilities that are resident
within the KTO [Korean Theater of Operations] presently are
right where they need in my military assessment.
I think that decisions will be made in the future but just
getting back in there and what we might be able to provide,
again, in terms of protection and sustainment, which we are
able to do across the globe, I think is critically important.
The Chairman. Admiral Paparo, how can the U.S. accelerate
the delivery of U.S. weapons to improve Taiwan's self-defense?
How will the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative authorized
by the FY2025 NDAA help us to deliver these needed capabilities
to Taiwan?
Admiral Paparo. Chairman, key is to eliminate and remove
bureaucratic, in some cases bureaucratic limitations in order
to do so. Liberalizing the supply bases, certifying supply
bases, a steady flow of funds in order to fund those
capabilities and downstream long lead item matters would
greatly enhance our ability to produce at speed.
The Chairman. And do you think that would have a deterrent
effect on China's perceived opportunities?
Admiral Paparo. Sir, I think it gains three to five to one
leverage for every capability that we provide in defense.
The Chairman. Great, thank you. With that, I yield to the
ranking member for his questions.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Sort of building on that last
question, Admiral Paparo and General Brunson, if you have
anything to add, as I mentioned in my opening statement, what
capabilities, just focusing for the moment on what the U.S.
could do, do you most need, do you think would have the most
deterrent effect?
I know obviously everyone wants more ships, more planes,
more everything. But if you could, you know, narrow it down to
here are some of the most crucial things that could help you,
just focusing on U.S. needs to deter. Both of you could give us
an answer on that.
Admiral Paparo. Ranking Member, the most critical need to
focus on is our counter-C5ISRT capability, which gives us
freedom to maneuver, freedom to operate at a lower risk
throughout the area of responsibility.
Mr. Smith. Secure communications, basically.
Admiral Paparo. The ability to dazzle, deceive, destroy the
adversary's ability to see and sense, and then hardening our
own ability to give a high-fidelity common operating picture to
units to unlock their ability to operate tactically.
Mr. Smith. Yeah. Any piece of that in particular where you
see the greatest need right now, understanding that I will ask
you this in the classified session as well and get into more
detail? But because posture hearings are different this year.
We haven't got the budget yet. So it is a little weird.
But as we lead up to the budget, it would hopefully, will
come in about a month, what would be most important to be in
there to meet that need?
Admiral Paparo. Leveraging the United States' ability,
having 90 percent of the space lift in the world, to bring
counter-space capability. And then to continue to enhance our
cyber capability.
And you know, many others in the form of long-range
weapons, in the form of unmanned and AI [artificial
intelligence] systems that effect air denial and sea denial in
enclosed places, such as the Taiwan Strait, augment these.
Mr. Smith. Yeah. I am just going to ask this. So General
Haugh got fired, he is the head of NSA [National Security
Agency] and Cyber [United States Cyber Command]. How has that
impacted your ability to work with NSA and Cyber on those very
critical issues that you just outlined?
Admiral Paparo. I say we are ready to work with whatever
competent individual is in place. And we will continue to try
to enhance that ability.
Mr. Smith. Did you think General Haugh was a competent
individual who you could work with?
Admiral Paparo. Yes.
Mr. Smith. General Brunson, on the first question about
capabilities, what would you most need in your command?
General Brunson. Sir, as I had the opportunity to mention
in that HACD [House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense]
closed session, all of my requests are inhabited within the IPL
[Integrated Priority List] of INDOPACOM. I would tell you that
as I look at the more ephemeral domains of cyber, EW
[electronic warfare], and space, I am looking to be engaged in
those in a more fulsome manner.
And I think that that is where we can talk in closed about
some of those particular capabilities that we need to bring to
bear on the peninsula.
But to an earlier question that you mentioned, Ranking
Member, I would like to say that, you know, if we are trying to
project strength, one of the things that we are continuing to
work on right now is the assailable flank that is United
Nations Command.
There are 18 total nations there. And so I see the KTO as
being a bit wider. And being able to leverage those other
nations in the Republic of Korea and beyond is a way for us to
continue to sort of underpin the things that we are doing on
the peninsula with legitimacy--
Mr. Smith. I am running out of time, that is really
important, I want to get to that. But I want to ask Mr. Noh
those questions.
So as I mentioned in my opening statement, we are
alienating every single partner in the region. And you made the
statement, you know, ``America First doesn't mean America
alone.''
I am puzzled. What are we doing to enhance relationships? I
think we have all seen on display what we are doing to sort of
make those relationships more problematic. But what is the
administration doing to try to strengthen partnerships when
they are launching a trade war against all of our partners?
Mr. Noh. Ranking Member Smith, so as you know, Secretary
Hegseth just came back from his first trip to the Indo-Pacific,
where he visited both the Philippines and Japan. He had a
chance to reaffirm our commitment to those important alliances
with--
Mr. Smith. What is that commitment? I mean, we can all go
on vacation to Japan and say how much we love the country, but
what is that commitment? Because there didn't seem to be any
commitment, other than threats and bullying.
Mr. Noh. It is reaffirming our commitment, our treaty
obligations to both the Philippines and Japan. He announced a
number of things that the Department is currently doing to work
with both the Philippines and Japan to accelerate and
strengthen our relationships.
In the Philippines, for example, he made an announcement
about bilateral SOF--I am sorry, special operations forces that
we are conducting.
Mr. Smith. Just one last question, how much damage do you
think the trade war that has just been launched does to all of
what you just said?
Mr. Noh. Ranking Member Smith, in all the engagements and
the personal engagements I have had and all the engagements
that I have seen the Secretary has had, our relationships with
our allies and partners in the region are strong and remain
strong.
Mr. Smith. This only started a couple days ago, so we will
see where it goes.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the ranking member. And I recognize the
gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
our witnesses for joining us. Thanks again for the incredible
job that you all are doing.
Admiral Paparo, I want to begin with you. You talked about
the importance of shipbuilding, but very specifically
shipbuilding in certain areas. We have a distinct asymmetric
advantage under the sea.
Can you give us a perspective about what that looks like in
relation to what we have as that advantage versus what the
Chinese have, what they are building in relation to what we
have?
Secondly, too, is that we know that the Marine Corps is
going to be the stand-in force there in the Indo-Pacific. They
are going to be the tip of the spear, have that ability to make
sure that they are the crisis response team.
The challenge for us today is we don't have enough
amphibious ships and the ones that we do have have an
operational availability of 41 percent. So when your call goes
out, the challenge is, is can it be met.
Because today, we cannot put together an Amphibious Ready
Group/Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit, better known as an ARG/
MEU. Can't do it. We can put a single ship out there, but we
can't put the complement of ships that we need for an ARG/MEU.
Can you tell where are we in relation to the need for
getting to that 2.33 submarines a year for AUKUS and ourselves,
why that is important? And then what do you see as your
alternative in a crisis response if when you call for an ARG/
MEU, there is not one to be had?
Admiral Paparo. Thank you, sir. Great to see you again.
Presently we have a generational advantage from a submarine
standpoint against our adversaries. And this key, critical, and
indispensable to the ability to prevail.
The PRC [People's Republic of China], though not perfectly
linear, but the PRC is outproducing the United States by a rate
of 2.0 per year to 1.28 presently attack submarines per year.
Required to get there are continued investments in the defense
industrial base, liberalizing the long lead time supply chains,
and giving a steady flow of funding.
On the Marine stand-in forces and on amphibious ships,
amphibious ships are absolutely critical to this effort. And we
are not meeting mission globally on doing so. It is a matter of
the maintenance of the current capability that we have, and
frankly it is also a matter of the number of amphibious ships
that we have.
So the ops [operational] analysis does not lie on that
matter.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you. Let then move from that.
You talk about the need for us to get above the 1.28
production. That is not only to meet our requirements, but also
to fulfill the obligations we made under AUKUS to make sure we
have that partnership.
Partnerships are incredibly important in that region, and
we talk about AUKUS, but we also talk about the Quad Agreement.
Can you give us your sense about are there any barriers that
are standing in the way for us to fully operationalize AUKUS,
whether it is pillar one or pillar two, and all the
opportunities that are there for us with the Quad?
We see what our adversaries are doing in trying to create
more relationships there. We have to do more at the pace of
relevance to make sure we have substantive outcomes of these
agreements. Can you give us a perspective about where you see
things and what we need to do to accelerate that?
Admiral Paparo. AUKUS pillar one, operationally we are
meeting every milestone. The biggest risk driver to AUKUS
pillar one is getting to that production rate by the time that
Australia purchases its own Virginia class submarine. That is
the greatest barrier that I see right now presently.
On pillar two, the other capabilities, missiles and
unmanned and cyber, on this case, the biggest barrier are our
barriers to our administrative and bureaucratic barriers to co-
production. Co-production among our partners, not just our
AUKUS partners, but all of our partners, would greatly enhance
our missile magazines for all of us.
Mr. Wittman. Would you say that ITAR [International Traffic
in Arms Regulations] currently has been modified enough to open
the door for pillar two? Because I know as we talked to the
Australians, they are not very happy with still the impediments
with ITAR.
Admiral Paparo. I would agree with them.
Mr. Wittman. Okay, very good. Let me ask, are there other
ways that we can get the most out of technological cooperation
with our friends, not just there with AUKUS, but also with the
Quad, where there is great opportunities with India and more
opportunities with Japan? Give us your perspective on that.
Admiral Paparo. Yes, that multilateral India, Japan, the
United States, and Australia, that is critical and it is
growing. And we have seen some progress also with co-production
among us, and we see some progress on exercises.
But again, our limits to co-production and speeding up the-
speeding up our ability to release key technologies to our
partners, under conditions of trust and under the scrutiny of
trust, that leads us to do so with confidence will enhance that
effort.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses for your testimony this morning.
Again, at the outset I just would note on Saturday, the
24th Virginia class submarine was commissioned into the Navy.
There are four more that are coming online between now and the
end of 2026.
So you know, there is no question that the cadence is not
where it should be, but if you look at tonnage, and again, if
you look at the fact that post-Covid, the yards are recovering.
We just had the new Secretary of the Navy at Quonset Point on
Friday, who, again, got an eyeful in terms of just the chock-a-
block activity that is going on there.
So just to go back to AUKUS for a second, Admiral, this
committee in record time enacted all the authorities in 2023
per optimal pathway to get, again, that engaged. There still
is, in my opinion, a misperception that AUKUS is primarily
about just helping Australia.
Can you talk a little bit about what it means in terms of
the U.S. as far as making our nation safer, and also the Indo-
Pacific safer?
Admiral Paparo. Yes, AUKUS delivers something to INDOPACOM
that is critical and could be a key advantage, and that is an
Indian Ocean submarine base. This gives us a faster response
time to the South China Sea than in Hawaii, in Washington, in
San Diego. It gives us the key ability to maneuver into the
Indian Ocean without the burden of having to go through
straits. And so it is key.
And then Australia is making key investments in the
submarine industrial base. As I utter these words, there are 11
Australians stationed on attack boats in Hawaii and scores that
are working in the Pearl Harbor shipyard. These are just but a
few of their contributions.
Mr. Courtney. And again, the plan is also to have the
rotation of Virginias starting in 2027, I believe, in Henderson
in western Australia, which again, they are making huge
investments in terms of the infrastructure that is necessary
for that effort.
You know, one of the authorities, Mr. Noh, that we enacted
vis-a-via AUKUS was we have actually passed a law to allow
Australia to invest $3 billion into our industrial base. It was
such a novel, extraordinary component of the optimal pathway
that we actually, as I said, had to change the Treasury
Department's rules to accept that money.
As you I think should know, the Defense Minister from
Australia went in his visit with Mr. Hegseth, brought the first
check for a half-billion dollars, which was deposited in the
U.S. Treasury.
And to follow up Mr. Smith's question regarding, you know,
the trade war that is happening right now, Australia has a free
trade agreement with the U.S. There are zero tariffs on U.S.
goods that come into Australia.
As Adam said, there is a two-to-one trade surplus from the
U.S. into Australia. They are putting money in our industrial
base, and yet we are tariffing Australia at the same level as
the country of Iran.
And I will tell you that in, you know, maybe you have had
sort of conversations where this hasn't come up. That is not
the case for some of us who, you know, are in touch with
members of Parliament in Australia. There is definitely
collateral damage to our allies in terms of what is happening
out there.
And the picture that was in the news the other day of
representatives from the South Korean Government and Japan
shaking hands with China to announce a new anti-tariff effort
by those countries, I mean, we are just pushing people in the
wrong direction in this part of the world.
And we need more from you in terms of just what is the
Department's position in terms of advising the White House
about the fact that this is driving our allies in the wrong
direction?
Mr. Noh. Congressman, on the issue of tariffs, I mean, that
is an issue that is beyond the purview of my personal position
to comment on. It is not something the Department of Defense
focuses on.
But you mentioned the $500 million contribution that
Australia made. I was there when Secretary Hegseth met with
Deputy Prime Minister Marles. We were grateful and we are
grateful for the contribution Australia is making. That is part
of a larger $3 billion investment into our submarine industrial
base.
Secretary Hegseth said at that meeting that there is more
that needs to be done to increase our--
Mr. Courtney. I have just a few seconds left. I mean, this
is an all-of-government situation, and you cannot stovepipe the
Department of Defense in terms of just what is happening with
other parts of the administration. And this trade war, as I
said, is driving our allies in the wrong direction, and we need
to stop it.
I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want
to thank each of you for your service. It is humbling to be in
your presence. And what a difference you make, and how
important it is, where we are today, sadly in the conflict we
did not choose. And that is dictators with rule of gun invading
democracies with rule of law.
And what we can do to deter, and that is your field. And we
saw, sadly, dictator, war criminal Putin to invade Ukraine on
February 24, 2022, under the theory that Ukraine doesn't exist.
Then we know that the puppets of Iran invaded Israel on October
7, 2023, under the theory that Israel doesn't exist from the
river to sea.
But it is just so important that we be as strong as we can
for peace through strength to deter the Chinese Communist Party
that claims, of course, Taiwan does not exist. There is a
parallel there, and it is before us. And so what you are doing
is just so important.
And with that in mind, I want to thank all of you for your
service. And I had the opportunity last year to have my third
visit in the Republic of Korea to visit at Camp Humphreys. What
a world-class facility that is.
I was there when the groundbreaking occurred, and then to
go back and see this facility, a $10.8 billion investment, 90
percent paid for the by the very appreciative people of the
Republic of Korea. And the American people need to know that
nearly 9, almost 10 billion dollars was spent by the people of
Korea to appreciate having an American presence there, which is
a deterrence to the maniac that is in charge of Pyongyang.
Keeping that in mind, I visited with troops from South
Carolina, and it is just so important that we remain ironclad
in supporting the people of Korea with the instability of
indeed the regime in Pyongyang. And we have 28,000 troops in
Korea, and the message of that is to protect Korea of course,
but Japan, all of our interests in the Pacific, which are so
critical.
And with that indeed, General Brunson, I am very grateful
myself that I am the only member of Congress who has actually
been to Pyongyang. I was on a delegation in 2003. And so I saw,
again firsthand, the oppression of the people of North Korea
and how sad that is.
But Kim Jung-Un has laid out a plan to advance missile
technology of North Korea, and he is proceeding, with this year
eight ballistic missile that are being developed that possibly
could reach the United States.
With that in mind, and we also note the increasing
relationship and war criminal Putin, with North Korea sending
troops to kill Ukrainians with the technology that indeed war
criminal Putin is providing to North Korea, but ultimately the
ability to attack the United States.
With this in mind and the strengthening ties with war
criminal Putin and the Chinese Communist Party, General, what
actions can we take to minimize the risk?
General Brunson. Congressman, thank you for the question.
As a son of a sergeant major retired from Manning, South
Carolina, I appreciate this question today.
The first thing I would like to say is that the Korean
people are incredibly resilient, as noted in the constitutional
crisis that was occurring recently, now resolved. Expect a new
presidential election on the third of June.
They also provide for us, as you mentioned, an environment
wherein we can build readiness across the Joint Force. And I
have seen that in the short 90 days that I have been in
command, whether it be Marines coming or a carrier strike group
coming to the peninsula.
And so those things are absolutely sound, and I thank the
Korean people for what they provide us. As Admiral Paparo
mentioned, the things are going there, we can see it very well.
We can see, we can sense, we can understand, we can track, we
can even target things that are going. We do not, however, but
we can see that.
What is most, as Admiral Paparo said, is what is coming
back. The technology development that they are able to almost
cut in half in terms of developing the ballistic missile
technology, to develop air vehicles for their missiles. All
those things that they are getting back in terms of the ability
to jam in the West Sea, which has now made that a contested
area.
I think that is what we keep our eyes on. And we deter that
by continuing to bring those strategic assets to bear in the
KTO.
Mr. Wilson. And I am grateful to see a son of Clarendon
County do well.
And Admiral, just a point, I appreciate Donald Trump naming
the INDOPACOM. And I appreciate every effort made to work with
our defense allies. Of India, what a great ally they can be,
and particularly with the development of an industrial base of
their own, not to be depending on war criminal Putin for
inferior--
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
your opening remarks as well Ranking Member Smith about this
set of issues.
I am going to very quickly, Mr. Noh, your response to my
colleague Courtney was totally inadequate. It was wrong. You
have got to send back to the Secretary that the trade war
significantly diminishes our power throughout the world. To do
anything other than to send that message back is simply a
dereliction of your duties as an Acting Assistant Secretary. So
be aware.
Last night, it appears as though Trump's tariff war seems
to be at least in part a gambit to open negotiations with
individual countries. His message last night to the Republican
conference was to open those negotiations with this message:
kiss my ass.
You might ask the Secretary just how well will that work in
maintaining good relationships that are absolutely essential in
the Pacific. Don't expect a response, but I expect you to do
your job. Send the message back that these negotiations, this
trade war is a very serious challenge toward the Indo-Pacific
region and other parts of the world.
Now, from my perspective this administration's approach to
addressing China is reckless and misusing our national
instruments of power.
So Admiral Paparo, let's talk about the Pacific Islands.
Are they important in your strategies in the Pacific?
Admiral Paparo. Congressman, just as in the Second World
War the Pacific Island countries, Guadalcanal, throughout the
Indo-Pacific to Bora Bora are important as well. And that is
why the People's Republic of China has efforts of elite
capture, of the attempted partnership with their security
apparatuses.
And so on history, on geography, and on interests they are
quite important.
Mr. Garamendi. Good. Are we missing the opportunities with
the trashing of USAID [U.S. Agency for International
Development] and also not using the Coast Guard to full effect
in the Pacific Islands?
Admiral Paparo. The USAID aid is under review, and I will
be advocating most strongly for that aid for all of the
countries.
And the Coast Guard provides a critical role in the South
Pacific, and that is counter-lawfare, counter illicit
trafficking, counter illegal, illicit, and unregulated fishing.
And those are key advantages, the Coast Guard is uniquely
capable of doing that, and they have done a wonderful job for
us.
Mr. Garamendi. Are they available 365/24/7?
Admiral Paparo. Presently they are on another task, but,
and we are compensating for that with appropriate naval
capabilities and air capabilities. But they are quite critical
to that mission.
Mr. Garamendi. I am told it cost about $140 million to have
a Coast Guard cutter available, operating in the Pacific
Islands. Is that an investment that you are willing to make
from the Pacific Defense Initiative?
Admiral Paparo. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I appreciate the direct response.
140,000,000.
There are also issues of basing relationships with various
ports in the Pacific. Will you be using the Defense Initiative
to enhance those facilities that are necessary for the Navy as
well as for the Coast Guard?
Admiral Paparo. Yes, sir, those bases, places, the
airfields, the ports, the piers are absolutely critical. They
are key to our principles of expanded maneuver that enables us
to put geography to work to deter and if necessary to win.
Mr. Garamendi. Good. I don't think I will go back to the
fact that we are imposing tariffs on islands that do not have
any exports to the United States, but that is another silly,
sloppy piece of work that the administration is doing with
regard to the tariff issue.
I want to spend a few moments on logistics. The support of
the Navy, some of this came up with the military ships, the
amphibs. Could you talk to us about the necessity of TRANSCOM
[United States Transportation Command] and non-kinetic ships
providing support in the Pacific?
Admiral Paparo. The combat logistics--
Mr. Garamendi. I think we are going to take that in
writing, my time is expired.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 137.]
Admiral Paparo. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes
the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr. DesJarlais.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman.
Admiral Paparo, good to see you. You noted that PLA
activity around Taiwan jumped 300 percent last year, including
what you described as dress rehearsals for potential invasion.
What indicators are you watching most closely to assess whether
those rehearsals are moving towards actual preparations for
imminent conflict?
Admiral Paparo. We watch the transloading of equipment, of
personnel, of ordinance. We look deeper into some of the non-
military instruments of national power for the People's
Republic of China in order to gain back strategic and
operational warning to give us early leverage to position a
force to respond to conflict.
Dr. DesJarlais. And you have spoken publicly about
hellscape plan to deter invasions through unmanned systems. And
you were very generous with your time on CODEL KELLY in
February at your headquarters in laying that out in great
detail.
In open source, can you walk us through how this fits into
your broader deterrence framework and how we are helping ensure
Taiwan is investing in the right capabilities to make this
concept viable?
Admiral Paparo. Yes, sir. As discussed in the Black Sea,
there are spaces where the force need not gain air superiority
or maritime superiority, but just deny it to the other, at low
human cost. And this is the essence of hellscape, undersea
unmanned, undersea vehicles, unmanned surface vehicles,
unmanned air, the air systems, and loitering munitions.
Summing those, operating them within one common command and
control framework to be able to put them to that best use. And
Taiwan, for that matter, is also making those investments. And
those investments are and must be aligned with the investments
that we are making.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. And Admiral, last week the U.S.
and Chinese military officials held their first working level
maritime security talk since the start of this administration.
Can you update the committee on how these conversations went
and how you see their value in the current environment?
Admiral Paparo. Both sides were very direct. They were
conducted professionally. And we lodged several inputs into the
discussions about unsafe, unprofessional behavior, the
deployment of flares in front of our partner nations' vehicles
and I should say aircraft, dangerous maneuvers around ships.
And it is an important dialog that we had. And I feel
confident that the People's Republic of China caught the
message.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay, and you touched on this briefly with
Mr. Wittman, but just a little deeper dive. We often hear that
alliances are our asymmetric advantage, and I agree with that
in principle.
But how do we ensure that those relationships may net
contributors to deterrence rather than creating dependencies?
And what have you already seen that you would like to see over
the next year or two that would signal they are stepping up in
the face of the PLA threat?
Admiral Paparo. Greater investment in their own defense
from the standpoint of a percentage of their GDP, their gross
domestic product is an indicator. Acquiring the right systems
that are interoperable among all of the partners.
And of course there is Australia's historic investment in
AUKUS, and the United Kingdom, I might also add. There is
Japan's investment in a counterstrike capability with the
acquisition of 400 Tomahawk land attack missiles. These are
some of the examples of how this is operationalized.
Dr. DesJarlais. Are there gaps that we still need to fill
to close and make those efforts more strategically impactful?
Admiral Paparo. There are always gaps because we are never
satisfied with how ready we are. But yes, we have to speed up
our ability to co-produce capabilities. We have to speed up the
bureaucratic barriers to executing those faster. And we must
reform the industrial base so that those capabilities deliver
on time.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, sir. And with that, I will yield
back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman for yielding. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Noh, you said in your testimony that stronger alliances
is what this team is delivering. Are alliances with Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, the
Philippines, and India included in your stronger alliances? Are
those important allies for us in the Indo-Pacific?
Mr. Noh. Congressman, absolutely.
Mr. Moulton. So you are raising tariffs 24 percent on
Japan, 25 percent on South Korea, 32 percent on Taiwan, 36
percent on Thailand, 46 percent on Vietnam, only 10 percent on
Australia, 18 percent in the Philippines, and 26 percent on
India. How do these tariffs strengthen our alliances?
Mr. Noh. Well, Congressman, as I said before, the issue of
tariffs is beyond the purview of my--
Mr. Moulton. Oh, so it doesn't matter? You don't think our
allies care about tariffs? You seem to care about our allies
and the relationship we have with them. You don't think tariffs
have any influence on that?
Mr. Noh. Congressman, I have had multiple engagements,
personal engagements with allies and partners throughout--
Mr. Moulton. Does weakening our allies' economies help our
alliance?
Mr. Noh. All the engagement that I have had, that I have
seen the Secretary have with his counterparts lead me to
believe that our alliances and partnerships are very--
Mr. Moulton. That they like the tariffs? That that is a
good move, it strengthens our alliances, is that what you are
saying, Mr. Noh?
Mr. Noh. Our alliances and partnerships are in a very
strong place.
Mr. Moulton. These tariffs are also going to raise prices
for American consumers, including American troops. Will this be
good for your soldiers, General Brunson? Do they have a lot of
extra disposable income to spend?
General Brunson. Congressman, in answer to the extra
disposable income, I have got two college-age daughters that I
am still putting through college and a 15-year-old at home. I
don't know that disposable income is what I would look at here.
Mr. Moulton. Admiral Paparo, will the tariffs raise the
prices that your sailors and Marines pay at the commissaries
for groceries, the PX [Post Exchange], whatever, does that, is
that good for your sailors and Marines, higher prices for them
and their families?
Admiral Paparo. Higher prices will hurt our servicemembers.
Mr. Moulton. I appreciate the direct answer, thank you. Mr.
Noh, you mentioned that Secretary Hegseth recently traveled to
the region to reaffirm our commitment to our allies. Is South
Korea one of those important allies?
Mr. Noh. South Korea is a very important ally. And in his
call several weeks ago with the--
Mr. Moulton. But I wonder if the reason why you have to
reaffirm those alliances is because of this trade war the
President has started. But regardless of that, can you explain
how pulling out Patriot batteries from South Korea demonstrates
that commitment?
Mr. Noh. Congressman, we face a very dangerous security
environment. The Department will--
Mr. Moulton. Yes, in the Indo-Pacific, which is your No. 1
priority. So, why are you pulling Patriot batteries out of
South Korea to send them to the Middle East? I thought that
China was the pacing threat.
Mr. Noh. Well, Congressman--
Mr. Moulton. Do you disagree with that?
Mr. Noh. Congressman, the Department will continue to
address threats as--
Mr. Moulton. General Brunson, is it helpful to you in South
Korea and your alliance with the South Koreans to pull out a
Patriot battery?
General Brunson. Congressman, if I could be given just a
second to explain the way we handled that?
Mr. Moulton. No, I don't want to know.
General Brunson. Okay.
Mr. Moulton. I just want to know if it is helpful or not. I
don't want an explanation. I just want an answer. And it would
be helpful if you could give direct answers like Admiral
Paparo.
Admiral Paparo, back to you. I recently heard from a
commanding officer under your command expressing frustration
and disgust over Secretary Hegseth's illegal disclosure of Top
Secret targeting information detailing when American pilots
would be over enemy territory on an unclassified platform that
we know is targeted by our adversaries, including China. I have
never heard from this commander about an issue like this
before. He seemed concerned about the example that this sets
for our troops.
You have to make rapid operational decisions. Do you use
Signal chats to discuss operational plans and other classified
information?
Admiral Paparo. No, Congressman.
Mr. Moulton. Do you allow sailors under your command to
keep their jobs when they knowingly disclose classified
information?
Admiral Paparo. No, sir.
Mr. Moulton. Do you criminally prosecute people under your
command who knowingly illegally disclose Top Secret information
upon which the lives of our pilots depend?
Admiral Paparo. We would if we encountered that.
Mr. Moulton. Do you allow your sailors and marines to drink
on the job?
Admiral Paparo. No, sir.
Mr. Moulton. Admiral Paparo, I assume you expect
accountability from your commanders. Secretary Hegseth said,
``Accountability is back at DOD [Department of Defense].'' When
you instill accountability in your subordinates, do you advise
them to lie about the disclosure of classified information?
Admiral Paparo. No, sir, I expect integrity.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. Noh, you talked about restoring the
warrior ethos. Is part of the warrior ethos disclosing Top
Secret information, and then, lying about doing so? Yes or no,
is that part of the warrior ethos? You were in the Army. Is
that what the Army taught you?
Mr. Noh. Congressman, there is, there is--
Mr. Moulton. Yes or no, did the Army teach you that, Mr.
Noh?
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi,
Mr. Kelly.
Mr. Moulton. My guess is no.
The Chairman. Mr. Kelly?
Mr. Kelly. It's unfortunate that this committee, which has
always been bipartisan--this is Ways and Means, tariffs and
those things, but I'm going to address something.
Is being a weak and feckless leader, does that make you
more respected by your allies and partners? And I don't expect
an answer.
But I can tell you we lived through 4 years of a weak and
feckless and non-existent leader, and I'm trying to remember
whether or not Russia invaded Ukraine under President Trump or
whether he invaded under a weak and feckless Biden. I'm trying
to remember over the last 4 years whether China has become more
aggressive or less aggressive, and I know for a fact that they
have become more aggressive, because weakness invites bullies
to attack.
I will talk about tariffs just a little bit. Is
appeasement, giving everyone everything that they want at your
expense--that is not a partnership. I'm reminded, in 2017, when
President Trump said NATO needs to pay their 2 percent fair
share. And I remember the same kind of reactions across the
aisle, ``Oh, my God, how dare we ask our allies. They're going
to hate us. They're going to get away.'' But if you look back
now, they have increased their ability to defend themselves and
to help us defend them in NATO.
I will tell you that tariffs, being taken advantage of is
not how we become strong leaders in the community. Giving your
kids everything they want is not good parenting. It is not
about likability; it is about respect.
And so, with that said, Admiral Paparo, in the INDOPACOM,
it is, arguably, the most consequential theater of this
century, specifically, as it pertains to fuel, both in the air
and on the sea. Are there gaps? Are there things that we can do
as far as air and sea and fuel delivery?
Admiral Paparo. Yes, sir, there are gaps in defense fuel in
support points. Those are those locations where aircraft and/or
ships would load fuel and distribute fuel. There are shortfalls
in our tanker fleet, in keeping enough fuel in the case of a
contingency, and there are gaps in the combat logistics force
in order to sustain the force. And I would like to work with
the committee to identify those gaps.
Mr. Kelly. And, Admiral Paparo, we have talked about USAID,
but another strength that we have is our state partnership
program where our National Guards partner with allies and
partners. In the Indo-Pacific are there any of those that are
valuable or are there places where we need new ones?
Admiral Paparo. Everyone is highly valuable, sir, and
indispensable to our capability. They build long-lasting
relationships and the continuity of the training that we
execute.
I will tell you, there are no gaps partner-to-partner, just
because of the good faith of the state partners and the good
faith of the National Guard Bureau that assigns those, but
there is always room for improvement everywhere, because we can
never be satisfied with good enough. We must always strive for
excellence.
Mr. Kelly. And I want to address just a little bit, because
I also sit on the House Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Signal chat. While ill-advised--and I will be the first to say
that--there is no indication that any classified real-time
information about strikes that are not specific in the
location, that would not be Top Secret information, would it,
if it doesn't disclose location, time, systems? That would not
be Top Secret unless it disclosed beforehand sources or methods
or direct specific things that could be used, is that correct?
To Admiral Paparo and General Brunson.
Admiral Paparo. Agreed, sir.
General Brunson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kelly. And, Mr. Noh, you have had a lot of hard
questions and I hate to put you all--listen, you all as
Secretary, you all work for the Department of Defense, not the
Department of Commerce, or for the Ways and Means Committee in
tariffs.
But I want to ask you, relationships, Mr. Noh, when we are
looking for strength of partnerships and alliances, are we
looking at someone who just takes everything we give them and
gets mad when we want something back? Or are we looking for
mutually beneficial relationships with nations where we both
can be more successful?
Mr. Noh. Absolutely mutually beneficial relationships,
Congressman.
Mr. Kelly. And do you agree, under the Trump
administration, the last time, and this time also, that he is
striving to build relationships that are dually--help both
sides, not just one side of the equation, their side?
Mr. Noh. Absolutely, Congressman.
Mr. Kelly. Okay. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Pennsylvania,
Ms. Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you very much for the conversation.
Admiral Paparo, I read that you went to Villanova
University, which is just down the road from my district.
And I want to--actually, I don't even need to probably draw
your attention to the recent earthquake in Myanmar, as some of
the conversation earlier in our hearing talked about USAID and
the earthquake in Myanmar that has claimed at least 2,000 lives
that we know of. And the United States was very noticeably
absent in terms of our response from USAID. No USAID presence,
no visible coordination or relief efforts, even as China and
Russia, in fact, stepped in to rescue people, children and
elderly, from collapsing buildings.
Given that recent earthquake in Myanmar and the most likely
fact that there will be other sorts of natural disasters such
as these and some that are not natural, what should the DOD be
doing? How does this impact our strategic posture in the Indo-
Pacific region? Should the DOD have a posture in place, in the
absence of USAID, to help provide resources in disasters such
as these?
Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, thank you, and thank you for
the recognition of our home state.
Yes, we are postured in places, in certain locations, with
crisis response forces, and in partnership with USAID, there
are key and critical stores that enable us to respond to these
natural disasters. And the outcome of this is an enhanced
ability to gain access, basing, and overflight in combat.
Ms. Houlahan. So, I happened to have been flying through
Hawaii on our way to Australia when the Maui fires happened,
and the response was pretty forceful from our military because
we were still waiting for FEMA [Federal Emergency Management
Agency] to respond. This has to not be the most efficient way
for our government to respond to natural disasters that happen
for our own people and, also, for those around the world. There
has to be a better way of doing that than to distract and
deploy our military in those sorts of situations.
Do you feel as though that might be the case?
Admiral Paparo. As we do defense support to civil
authorities stateside, and as we do humanitarian assistance
disaster relief, the military is frequently a key and critical
partner to our other government agencies to deliver this at
first. But then, as the aid organizations step in, we execute a
graceful transfer of those capabilities to get back on our
primary mission of deterrence.
Ms. Houlahan. In many ways, I feel as though we are sort of
inviting our adversaries into the region to take that place. Of
course, the military will still be there. We still are America
and we still care.
But do you believe that we are also increasing the
possibility of influence in the region from places like China?
Admiral Paparo. The People's Republic of China sees these
opportunities and they seize them.
Ms. Houlahan. My final or my second-to-last question is for
General Brunson. I'm going to quote an article from April 3rd
from Military.com titled, ``Army Planners Are Weighing Force
Reductions of Up to 90,000 Active Duty Soldiers.'' Are you
aware of this article?
General Brunson. No, ma'am, I'm not.
Ms. Houlahan. I would love to introduce that, if that's
okay, for the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.[The
information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
121.]
Ms. Houlahan. It says that the military Army planners are
weighing reductions as a result of Secretary Hegseth's
requirement to find 8 percent cuts. To your knowledge--the
picture is actually of a live fire exercise in Indonesia, so it
is specific to the conversation that we are having today--you
are not aware of any conversations of any reduction in force of
90,000 Army soldiers?
General Brunson. No, ma'am, I'm not.
Ms. Houlahan. I would love it if I might be able to follow
up with you all and understand if there's any truth to this
article because it is sort of alarming to me.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 137.]
With what remains of my time, Mr. Noh, I want to talk to
you as well. Many of my colleagues have spoken to you about
trade tariffs, and yesterday we had a very similar conversation
with your colleague who had a similar position in Europe. And I
really was frustrated with her answers and I'm also frustrated
with yours, that there is not a whole-of-government
understanding of the implications of tariffs being levied on
our allies in the region and other nations in the region, too.
Is it really your position that this is not something that
is yours to opine on or to talk about?
Mr. Noh. Congresswoman, yes, tariffs is simply beyond the
purview of my position to--
Ms. Houlahan. But my understanding is that at the end of
March, South Korea, China, and Japan held an economic dialogue,
that they agreed that they would work together now as a result
of what the United States is levying upon them. Are you aware
of that?
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska--
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I yield.
The Chairman. --Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate all three of you being here.
And we have got our hands full, the United States. We have
got China as the pacing threat, the long-term threat. They want
to be the regional hegemon now and they want to be the world's
superpower in the decades to come.
I will also submit that Russia is the near-term threat by
its behavior with Ukraine, severing cables to united airliners,
and then, we also have Iran, the world's largest exporter of
terror.
And we have to deal with all three of these, which means we
have to have the capabilities, but we also have to have close
allies.
I appreciate the job our two four-star generals are doing
in the Pacific. I'm grateful to you.
My first question is to Admiral Paparo. I was a 30-year
electronic warfare guy in the Air Force. I think we were
dominant in the 1990s, but we have a little bit of atrophy.
Could you talk about the importance of EW in your theater?
But also the Air Force has funded 10 EA-37s, Compass Call
aircraft, which I used to fly the earlier version. I don't
think that is adequate for your needs. So, if you could talk
about the importance of electronic warfare and the EA-37?
Admiral Paparo. Thank you, Congressman.
Yes, as discussed, our highest priority is counter command
control communications and intelligence surveillance response
and targeting. And the electronic means, whether that is
through internet protocol, that is through radio
communications, is the absolute linchpin. And to be able to
target that non-kinetically is absolutely critical. And I
couldn't agree more with our need to strive even harder to gain
and to maintain dominance in those critical spectra.
Mr. Bacon. Is 10 EA-37s adequate?
Admiral Paparo. I'll have to get back to you on that, but
you are talking to somebody that's never satisfied with where
we are.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Bacon. Well, I have had some access to studies that I
think PACOM [Pacific Command] needs 21. So, I would like to
make sure we could fund more Compass Call aircraft, so you have
those capabilities.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 137.]
Admiral Paparo. Exactly--
Mr. Bacon. I was going to talk to you about attack
submarines, but you have already done that. So, let me pivot to
the Ohio class SSGN [Subsurface Guided Missile Nuclear]. They
are aging out. They are going to be deactivated at 600
Tomahawks. And when I visited with you in February, you were
also pointing out some of the cruisers that were going to be
deactivated. So, can you talk about the gap that we are
starting to build here and the impacts of losing these
submarines and cruisers?
Admiral Paparo. Yes, sir. Having quantity of vessels that
can impose costs, I'm probably quoting the wrong guy, but
``quantity has a quality all its own.'' And so, to the extent
that our capability decreases, that's bad for us.
Mr. Bacon. General Brunson, a question for you. Can you
talk a little about why is North Korea sending thousands of
troops to Russia? And how do you think they're benefitting from
this?
General Brunson. Yes, Congressman.
So, one of the reasons is it helps them to circumvent the
normal course of business and sanctions that exist on them
presently. It allows them to get around some of that because
there is materiel that is coming back to the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea.
They are also able to get a technological boost, if you
will, on things that they are seeking to develop. It is cutting
their development time in half. They are also receiving some
materiel that we can talk about in the closed session that is
causing us some problems in the operating environment
currently.
Mr. Bacon. I will come back to the attack submarine since
it is already touched on. We have been producing about one a
year right now. What your take on that, Admiral Paparo?
Admiral Paparo. It is inadequate and we have got to work
harder in order to do that. And it is a combination of a steady
stream of funding. It is a combination of liberalizing the
defense industrial base, reforming the industrial base. And so,
we have to work harder. We have to get to 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 per
year and we can't rest until we do so.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you very much. I appreciate all three of
you.
And I would just close by saying: leader of the free world
and we can only produce one attack submarine. We have got to do
better.
I yield.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Ryan.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here. I appreciate you making a
long trip, especially for two of the three of you.
Admiral Paparo, thank you for hosting myself and others out
in February, along with my colleague Mr. Bacon. I think it is
important to say in front of the American people and the whole
committee, I left with an incredibly optimistic and, frankly,
very proud view of your leadership--all the subordinate
component commands, all aligned, clear-eyed about the threat,
clear-eyed about the urgency of the moment. And I commend you
on that.
And I also commend you on that. And I also commend you on
always coming to us and letting us know in a productive way
what we can be doing to enable and continue to up that.
I want to share something specifically that you said at the
Honolulu Defense Forum when I was out there that I think is
really aligned with the chairman's leadership and the ranking
member's leadership and where we want to focus on acquisition
reform.
You talked about ``procurement that moves at the speed of
combat, not the speed of committees,'' or Congress, or we could
use other ``C-words.'' I just want to foot stamp that and thank
you for saying that so directly.
And again, I really appreciate the chair and the ranking
member's leadership in pushing us as a whole-of-committee to
drive on that. And I know that you will continue to let us know
specific reforms and needs, as that goes through.
I want to shift now to a separate, but related topic. And
again, I know we are talking about this a lot, but I share, Mr.
Noh, my colleague's concern and disappointment that we are not
getting candid answers. Frankly, as a very junior military
officer, I understood that all the elements of national power--
diplomatic, information, military, and economic--have to be
synchronized effectively. So, I do think the committee and the
American people are owed an answer on this. So, I want to talk
about the impacts to our allies that other colleagues have
highlighted.
The hypocrisy of asking allies and partners in INDOPACOM to
up their defense spending, up their burden-sharing, and then,
hitting them with nonsensical, uninformed, and I think now
clearly shown to be not even technically correct tariffs, is, I
think, a massive ``own goal,'' as we would say with my 5- and
3-year-olds that I'm teaching soccer.
Your testimony specifically calls out empowering our allies
and commanders in your opening remarks as one of the keys to
reestablishing deterrence in INDOPACOM and achieving peace
through strength.
Yes or no, please, do you think a 46, or does the
Department think a 46 percent tariff empowers Vietnam? Yes or
no?
Mr. Noh. Congressman, I can't give a yes-or-no answer
because the issue of tariffs is not in the purview of my
position?
Mr. Ryan. Do you think that a 25 percent tariff on South
Korea empowers our allies and partners?
Mr. Noh. The same, the same answer, Congressman.
Mr. Ryan. General Brunson, do you think that empowers our
allies and partners in South Korea?
General Brunson. Congressman, if I could just ask for a
point of clarification? Now, we are down to 25 percent. I would
say that it impacts their budget. And so, that is something
else they will have to work through the Korean government to
solve.
Mr. Ryan. Do you think it strengthens our partnership? Yes
or no?
General Brunson. Congressman, I cannot say that yet because
I don't know the impacts of it. I have been here for a week,
but we come through our recent exercise series. There have been
no impacts to what I understand are purchases that are ongoing
for the military element within Korea, and I believe that we
are sound.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, General.
On Australia, who everyone has acknowledged is our most
strategic partner in INDOPACOM--and Mr. Courtney spoke about
this--Admiral Paparo, you called them our most strategic
partner. Mr. Noh, you called them a key logistics hub. It is
clear that they were blindsided, in particular, by this tariff,
which I find particularly offensive, given the time and
investment all of us have spent in building that relationship
and nurturing and growing that relationship--to the point that
the Prime Minister said, quote, ``The Trump administration's
tariff's have no basis in logic and they go against the basis
of our two nations' partnerships.'' He is absolutely right.
Does that tariff--can you at least acknowledge on AUKUS,
given all the bipartisan work that has been done there, that
that hurts our relationship, Mr. Noh?
Mr. Noh. Congressman, we have a very strong relationship
with Australia.
Mr. Ryan. Yes or no, does that help or hinder our
partnership--
Mr. Noh. Congressman--
Mr. Ryan. --to blindside an ally with such a forceful
tariff?
Mr. Noh. I'm not, I'm not here to talk about tariffs,
Congressman.
Mr. Ryan. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Fallon.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thank you for being here and, General, as well,
and Mr. Noh.
I like to keep things simple, basic. 20 years ago, would
you agree, Admiral, that in the last 20 years China's
capabilities and ambitions have grown exponentially?
Admiral Paparo. I have a direct view of that, over that 20
years. Yes.
Mr. Fallon. And you would agree they are our military peer
now?
Admiral Paparo. I do.
Mr. Fallon. Okay. The same question, General.
General Brunson. Sir, looking through the DPRK lens, I
would say yes on both counts.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you.
So, Admiral, how many marines do we have on Okinawa today?
Admiral Paparo. 18,000.
Mr. Fallon. And was it, roughly, the same 20 years ago?
Admiral Paparo. 20 years ago, it was about the same, yes,
sir.
Mr. Fallon. What is the end-strength goal right now?
Admiral Paparo. Presently, right now, III Marine
Expeditionary Force is at end-strength, as it is stationed
where it is. It really is optimized.
Mr. Fallon. Okay. So, there's no plans to reduce it from
this 18,000-19,000 to about half, 10,000?
Admiral Paparo. There is a--there is the Defense Policy
Renew Initiative, our agreement with Japan, and it is a
conditions-based process. And ultimately, 5,000 U.S. Marines
are planned to be in Guam and another 2,700 Marines are planned
to be in Hawaii.
Mr. Fallon. So, given the considerations that, you know, we
are talking about with China and the threat, something that I
would recommend we do is to renegotiate with our Japanese
friends and keep those 18,000 or that strength of 18,000-
19,000.
Because if, God forbid--General, how many troops did we
have in Korea in the 1980s, roughly? Was it about 50,000? Is
that right?
General Brunson. Congressman, it was a bit lower than that.
Mr. Fallon. In the forties, 45,000 or so?
General Brunson. A little bit lower than that.
Mr. Fallon. 40?
General Brunson. 28.
Mr. Fallon. So, in the 1980s, 30 years ago, we only had--
I'm not talking today. What was it then? What was our high
strength?
General Brunson. Probably about 60,000 when the division--
Mr. Fallon. Okay. And what is it now? About 30? About half?
General Brunson. About 30, sir.
Mr. Fallon. Okay. So, we have established that this threat
has grown exponentially, and yet, we have reduced our
footprint. So, God forbid--it is a simple question and an
obvious answer--but, God forbid, there is a conflict on the
Korean Peninsula; God forbid, the Chinese do cross the
Taiwanese Straits. Would you rather have 45,000 or 50,000
American troops on the peninsula or would you rather have 30?
You know, it is obvious, right?
General Brunson. Yes. Yes, Congressman, it is an obvious
answer. You always want more, but--
Mr. Fallon. Of course.
But the same thing, Admiral, in Okinawa, right?
Admiral Paparo. If a little bit is good, a whole lot is
better, sir.
Mr. Fallon. Yes, you know. And I'm not worried that it is
going capsize, either. I think that is going to be solid.
So, Admiral, we have a great many allies in the region,
wonderful allies. You know, certainly, so many of them come to
mind. But what I want to ask is, what country, in your view, is
already an established model ally that we could--what is that
model ally and how can we foster more of our relationships to
look like that one?
Admiral Paparo. INDOPACOM has five of the Nation's six
treaty allies in its AOR [area of responsiiblity]. And I have
got tremendous pride in our execution of that alliance itself.
Japan, South Korea, and Australia are very much model allies in
their ability to provide capability, and the Philippines is
growing. And we have recently had a very good engagement with
Thailand and they continue to contribute.
Mr. Fallon. Yes, Thailand is worrying me a little bit about
cozying up to China. That is why this is so important, what we
do here.
So, another question; I'm very curious to hear your answer.
Which friend or friendly nation in INDOPACOM presents the most
promise and potential benefit for the United States and our
interests in the future?
Admiral Paparo. Vietnam and Indonesia, and India--
Mr. Fallon. Yes.
Admiral Paparo. --absolutely India above all others.
Mr. Fallon. I noticed in India in 2007 they only bought
about $230 million or so worth of military equipment, and
today, is neighboring around $24 billion, and it is very
promising, but they are still playing with the Russians. And I
get why, legacy systems and such. But they are still buying
more from Russia. So, we really do need to do--what do you
think we can do to pull India more towards our sphere, if you
will?
Admiral Paparo. India's security cooperation sales with
Russia is approximately 30 percent of the gear. No new buys on
this. It is all buys to maintain the vestigial equipment that
they had with India. They will continue to treasure their
nonaligned status, but they will move more and more in
partnership with the United States and the other market
democracies, as we move forward.
Mr. Fallon. And just for the record, Mr. Chairman, I really
hope that we do increase our footprint on the Korean Peninsula
and in Okinawa. I think it is strategically important and
vital.
And I yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms.
Tokuda.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Section 356 of last year's NDAA directed the Department of
Defense to establish an advanced manufacturing facility to
support submarine, shipbuilding, and the broader defense
industrial base in the Indo-Pacific. I was proud to help secure
this provision and I'm keen to better understand how the
Department is implementing it.
Admiral Paparo, as a primary user of this advanced
manufacturing program, how does it support your requirement, as
the combatant commander, and how are you providing direction to
the Services and other entities to guide ongoing efforts
related to advanced manufacturing in Hawaii to best support
your needs?
Admiral Paparo. Aloha, Congresswoman. Good to see you.
Ms. Tokuda. Good to see you.
Admiral Paparo. We are implementing, in partnership with
Hawaii Community College and on Wheeler Airfield and Schofield
Barracks, to bring additive manufacturing in order to gain as
much leverage as we can on the ability on-scene to provide
replacement capabilities, replacement parts, and to speed up
our supply chains. And I think this is a model everywhere, is
to be at the point of need there.
And greater investment in these capabilities, additive
manufacturing aided by AI, is critical to us. I have made it a
focus, as you know, having been on this mission for a good
while.
And I think one of the biggest barriers to it is going to
be to ensure that the systems commands quickly assess the
applicability of those components, and when they are finding
them wanting, we run to the problem and improve it, and when
they are adequate, quickly give authorities to employ those
additive manufacturing capabilities to move faster to repair
gear and to get it on the line faster.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Admiral. I'm sure we will have many
more discussions on this.
Right now, if I can pivot slightly a bit, Admiral, is it
helpful to your work in the Indo-Pacific when our European
allies support our deterrence in the Pacific, such as when
Germany and France conducted Taiwan Straits transits last fall?
Admiral Paparo. It is, and I commend our European partners
for having been especially robust in 2024.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you.
And, Mr. Noh, going back to the discussions about whether
America First means America alone, Mr. Noh, does this
administration agree that our European and NATO allies have an
important role to play in the Indo-Pacific?
Mr. Noh. Congresswoman, the Department does believe they
have a role.
Ms. Tokuda. Is it an important role that they play--
Mr. Noh. It's an important role.
Ms. Tokuda. --given that China is our pacing threat?
Mr. Noh. It is an important role. However, the Secretary
has asked our European partners to, first and foremost,
prioritize European continental security, to do more for their
own backyard, first and foremost. But we will look for--
Ms. Tokuda. So, you see it in a bit of a siloed effect in
terms of: stick to your region?
Admiral Paparo, do you think China is watching our
commitment in Ukraine? Do you believe China is engaging in the
European theater--not sticking to their own region? I believe
just recently Ukraine captured two men of Chinese origin
fighting for Russia.
Admiral Paparo. They did. And any success offensively in
Europe will embolden the PRC in their own offensive ambitions.
Ms. Tokuda. Clearly, we can't disentangle the theaters,
like perhaps some in the administration might think we can. And
I would hope that the administration's comments and actions
going forward would reflect the global impacts, that what
happens in Ukraine does matter in terms of our ability to
safeguard the Indo-Pacific and provide stability there.
I just want, with the time I have remaining, to go to
another question. Transactional relationships don't work in
defense; they don't. Whether you are talking about tariffs
that's been talked about today or demanding increased burden
for defense costs, it undermines trust; it undermines
commitment and our ability to withstand adversity going
forward.
The President has talked about providing our allies even
with toned-down versions of aircrafts because they may not
always be our allies. Now, this does not, to me, project
confidence to people that we want to fight side-by-side us in
the case of aggression.
Admiral Paparo, does this kind of transactional
relationship that is being projects, and these statements being
made about providing our allies with substandard aircraft or
equipment, does this help or hurt us in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, there are operational
security requirements for those, based on the ability of our
partners to secure that information. We do our very best to get
our partners--
Ms. Tokuda. But do you feel, in the time I have remaining,
that transactional relationships are a good foundation for
defense partners in any region, especially the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Paparo. You know my commitment to authentic
relationships with our allies and partners.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady for yielding.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Guam, Mr.
Moylan.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
I am happy to be here on such an important security hearing
about my backyard in INDOPACOM and the importance of Guam,
where it is my home, and to relay to our panel that we feel the
pressures you do. We feel distress and we understand the threat
from our adversaries in this region. And I'm so happy you are
there focusing on that, because Guam is where our day begins.
We are U.S. soil. We have many allies in the INDOPACOM and we
are the closest body of land that the United States has to our
allies. Allies are our friends, but Guam is USA and we are
family. So, I appreciate your importance in making that
interest No. 1 for you folks.
And part of that, as we grow, we know that the Marine Corps
is building up, building up in Guam, with our Camp Ben Blaz.
And that agreement has gone since 2012, when the United States
and Japan came together, where Japan made an investment. Would
you have an idea of that investment amount that Japan made for
that move from Okinawa to help build the Camp Ben Blaz?
Admiral Paparo. I believe it is in the neighborhood of $3
billion.
I will also say, if I may, sir, hafa adai.
Mr. Moylan. Hafa adai.
Admiral Paparo. And your backyard is America's front yard
in the homeland.
Mr. Moylan. Amen. Thank you.
How about the investments that the United States has made
thus far for the buildup of the Camp Ben Blaz?
Admiral Paparo. I believe the majority of the burden has
been borne by the Japanese.
Mr. Moylan. Okay. And we are still pumping in money to get
the continuation of getting that built. And there's a great
investment the island of Guam has done with our infrastructure,
working closely to ensure our power, our water, our roads are
built to withstand all this movement coming from Okinawa to
Guam, the 9,000, or as you mentioned, close to 5,000 marines,
to facilitate being on Guam. It has a great impact on Guam's
economy and our community, and we have been focusing on this
since 2012 and up to the future, and we have still got years to
go for its completion.
So, the concern is, though, there has been made a comment
by a senior military officer that says possibly the move for
marines going from Okinawa to Guam was going in the wrong
direction. But we have already invested since 2012 in the NDAA
for this investment to happen.
So, Admiral Paparo, the Department of Defense, do you feel
they are still committed to the agreement of the Marine forces
to move from Okinawa to Guam?
Admiral Paparo. Congressman, the DPRI, the Defense Policy
Review Initiative, remains the program of record and we are
committed to executing it in a conditions-based manner.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Admiral.
In addition to all this investment with moving the marines
from Okinawa to Guam, we also have other natural disasters that
have happened. Specifically, in 2023, we had Typhoon Mawar,
causing nearly $43 billion in damage to our island.
One of the major things that was damaged, also, and is one
storm away from being completely destroyed, is the Glass
Breakwater. Investments have been made. Construction is
happening. But this is the key. This is our only port for our
supplies that supply our community and our military. If that
fails, it is total destruction, and that is our only supply
chain to get these ships unloaded.
So, since this is being rebuilt, I would ask you for an
update on the progress of the project and the estimated
completion date of the Breakwater repairs.
Admiral Paparo. Congressman, to my situational awareness,
it is on track, but I owe you a more defined answer, and I will
give that to you in written form. But I believe it is on track.
It can't happen fast enough for me. But I will give you the
specifics.
Mr. Moylan. I appreciate that.
And recently, I was talking to Joint Regional Micronesia
Admiral Huffman, and he said he watched the rocks being
replaced with the crane. So, we are moving forward, but I would
appreciate your updates on that as well.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 138.]
Just a few more minutes here I have got to ask some
questions.
But we also have some big investments going into the
repairs in the Air Force. O&M investment is repairs for that.
One specific thing, the category, when our storm tracker was
tracking that, it was at a Category 4 of destruction force,
but, then, it blew away. So, we need all these things to be
repaired in time to properly prepare for the next battle with
the next storm, if not our adversaries.
So, I want to know--we had some unfunded priority lists--
how are you looking for that to be funded and what you want
Congress to help you with your priority list of unfunded
priorities? We only have 16 seconds.
Admiral Paparo. The Guam defense system is first and
foremost in our mind that, that remain on track and it deliver
on time for Guam's defense as the homeland.
And then, in addition, our improvements to Andersen Air
Force Base, to the northwest airfield, to those capabilities,
and the continued improvements to the submarine base are--
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
INDOPACOM is a region of consequence. China, our pacing
challenge, is obviously there. So are some of our strongest
allies, like Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Then, there are
other nations we want to strengthen our relationships with to
counter Chinese influence.
I would argue that actions taken by this administration,
like cutting off all our foreign aid and imposing severe
tariffs on multiple nations in the Indo-Pacific, friends and
foes alike, has significantly diminished our soft power.
Admiral Paparo, is soft power important in building and
maintaining relationships with countries, so we can provide an
alternative to China?
Admiral Paparo. Congressman, soft power is important.
Mr. Carbajal. No more?
Admiral Paparo. Well, I--
Mr. Carbajal. I like that answer, though.
Admiral Paparo. I want to just give you something direct
and plain-spoken. You know, I can't speak to the policy; I
execute it as a military officer. But soft power is very
important to us.
Mr. Carbajal. As a marine, I understand your answer.
Mr. Noh, the same question to you.
Mr. Noh. Congressman, yes. Yes, it is important.
Mr. Carbajal. Then, why is the administration cutting?
Mr. Noh. So, Congressman, on the issue of foreign aid, as
you know, the State Department has the lead for approving most
foreign assistance programs. Department of Defense, we fully
support reviews to ensure that American taxpayer dollars are
spent to support concrete American interests. We will have
honest conversations with our allies and partners about what
America is able to do in the region, but we will absolutely
make sure, as the Department, that these foreign assistance
programs are aligned with both the President and the
Secretary's priorities and policies.
Mr. Carbajal. Well, it is contradictory to what this
President and his administration is doing. So, I appreciate
your response.
Admiral Paparo, do you feel you have the space capabilities
and support you need in your AOR, including tactical
surveillance, reconnaissance, and tracking? And what are the
risks of losing space superiority?
Admiral Paparo. We have shortfalls in our air-breathing ISR
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] for persistent
STARE [Search, Track, Acquire, Radiate, Eliminate], and I would
like to make up those shortfalls. And space superiority, domain
awareness, space and counter-space are critical, indispensable,
and would be the first battle and are critical to determining
strategic, operational, tactical warning, and gaining early
leverage. That is the first battle and it is primus et
principes in ensuring our own capability to deter and to
prevail.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
China is producing aircraft, ships, missiles, and
satellites at rates we cannot match. They are closing the gap
in the quality and systems and have passed us on quantity. Even
combined with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, their systems
outmatch ours by numbers. This war is something that we must
try to avoid.
Admiral Paparo, do China's actions from their intense
procurement of systems to aggressive actions in the South China
Sea suggest there is a way to continue deterrence? And what can
the United States and our allies do to detour a conflict with
China?
Admiral Paparo. Congressman, my first comment there is that
we can match their capability and it is a matter of will, and
we have to get after it.
And second of all is that we can deter them in those areas
and we have to work towards it. But we have got to preserve our
combat capability that we have, and then, we have got to build
the right capabilities at the right time to continue overmatch.
And I say that we can match and it is a matter of will not
as a snarky way, but just as an expression of hope and
determination.
Mr. Carbajal. Admiral, you can always be snarky here. It is
welcomed.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr.
Messmer.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you, Chairman.
And I would like to thank all the witnesses for their
service and for being here today.
Admiral Paparo, last year, your predecessor was asked about
the hypersonic threat in your AOR. He stated that hypersonic
weapons would be a major threat to U.S. Forces in a potential
conflict in the region.
2 years ago, Vice Admiral Jon Hill, the MDA [Missile
Defense Agency] Director, testified before this committee that
fielding a defensive system against hypersonic threat in 2035
was irrelevant and didn't meet the threat.
Do you agree with that testimony?
Admiral Paparo. We have a now threat, sir, and I do agree.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you very much.
Are you able to satisfy your requirements, when the
previous administration consistently came to Congress with an
anemic Missile Defense Agency budget request?
Admiral Paparo. Presently, I think the most important
element is to keep those hypersonic weapons on the rails with
counter-C5ISR, but I will not admit any complacency about our
ability to execute that mission.
Mr. Messmer. Okay. Thank you.
Would you agree that, in the absence of the glide phase
interceptor, we should look at stop-gap measures?
Admiral Paparo. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Mr. Messmer. While we are at it, can you comment on how our
depletion of exquisite effectors in the CENTCOM [United States
Central Command] AOR against cheap drones is affecting your
ability to maintain the required magazine depth for your AOR?
Admiral Paparo. We should equip our forces in the field
with the right kind of capabilities that gets the numbers in
the right way, so that we are not expending capabilities that
cost millions against something that costs thousands.
Mr. Messmer. Yes, I agree.
Also, Admiral Paparo, in your testimony, you state that the
survivable long-range fires are a key priority for your area,
AOR. When I hear that, I immediately think of hypersonic
weapons. The Conventional Prompt Strike Program (CPS) is
intended to provide much-needed long-range strike capability
for deep in the targets. How important to you is that CPS gets
deployed to your command on a submarine?
Admiral Paparo. Critical on submarines, critical on the
surface as well for the Army.
Mr. Messmer. Okay. Also, the Navy is targeting 2028 for CPS
to go on Zumwalt. If that program does not come to fruition, is
it acceptable to wait until CPS is available to be put on a
Block 5 Virginia submarine?
Admiral Paparo. We need the capability now and we need to
go faster to get it on Zumwalt as well, and get those Zumwalts
stationed in Hawaii, where they can be on point.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Messmer. Perfect. Thank you.
You have also previously testified that SLCM-N [Nuclear-
Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile] enduring forward presence in
the Western Pacific offers range flexibility and survivability
to extend deterrence and assurance.
Admiral Paparo. Congressman, I strongly endorse the
acquisition of SLCM-N as soonest availability.
Mr. Messmer. Not 2034?
Admiral Paparo. ``20-now,'' sir.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Messmer. Thank you.
Has your command defined operational scenarios in which
SLCM-N could be integrated into your theater operational plans?
Admiral Paparo. Yes, sir, and we will continue to do so.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you.
Also, Admiral Paparo, contested logistics will be critical
capability to maintain our lethality and resupply not only of
our forces, but of our allies in the Indo-Pacific. And your
recent operational energy initiatives have been distracted with
electrification and solar effects. What changes will you make
to INDOPACOM's operational energy effects, specifically,
related to investing in new, more resilient energy
capabilities, like advanced micronuclear reactors?
Admiral Paparo. I'm strongly in favor of providing the
right kind of energy into the theater and not to be at any
deficit at all. And if small modular reactors deliver that,
which I believe they do, I'm strongly in favor of them,
provided that they are operated safely.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you.
Also, last year, the Department announced it was cutting
missile defense sites from 22 to 16 on Guam. Can you explain
the plan for the committee, where you are in developing and
implementing those plans?
Admiral Paparo. Sir, Guam Defense System tranche one will
deliver in 2027, and I think to have our Guam Defense System,
to have the effectiveness of the system be the driver for the
acquisition, and to look at opportunities for directed energy,
for electronic warfare, and to not fall in love with the plan,
but to fall in love with the ability to defend effectively the
homeland and Guam.
Mr. Messmer. Thank you very much. I will yield back the
rest of my time.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our overall strategy with China is one of deterrence. Given
the strong support that China has had, critical support, to
Russia during its illegal and aggressive actions in Ukraine,
and the fact that, even recently, two soldiers were captured
who were Chinese--and we will wait to see the implications of
that, whether it is isolated or what the background is--how
important is it in terms of deterrence that the United States
and our allies, over 50 countries that are participating in
this, be successful in Ukraine and continuous in that effort to
underscore our deterrence with China?
Admiral Paparo. Congressman, I know that China is watching.
I know China is directly supporting that effort. And I think
that Russian success will embolden China, and Russian failure
will give China pause and would enhance our deterrence.
Mr. Keating. And also, what effect would it have if somehow
that 50-country coalition, and the United States not working in
concert with that 50-country coalition that it has led, have to
do with our other alliances in the Indo-Pacific, particularly,
you know, countries like Australia and our Pacific allies as
well? That kind of fragmentation could be a signal to China as
well in terms of deterrence.
Admiral Paparo. Well, sir, without a comment on policy and
not having much insight into that coalition, just side-to-side
insight, the credibility of our alliances and partnerships and
the credibility of American commitment is critical to our
alliances and partnerships. And that remains a key and critical
strategic center of gravity for the United States.
Mr. Keating. And how would you assess the evolving threats
posed by China, Russia, and North Korea, particularly in the
multi-domain operations, such as cyber and space warfare?
Admiral Paparo. I give them great respect, and that great
respect that I give them deserves a robust dominating response
from the United States of America. And they have got a lot of
gain in those domains and we have got to stay on top of it.
Even North Korea, with the way they operate in the crypto
markets which requires a lot of attention and the ability to
thwart that.
Mr. Keating. Okay. Well, I just want to thank you for your
service, all of you.
And I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Harrigan.
Mr. Harrigan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thanks for your testimony this morning. Very
much appreciate it, and I have just got a couple of questions
for you.
One thing I have noticed--and I think we all understand--is
that the Indo-Pacific is truly the pacing threat and theater
for strategic competition. That is happening right now. And
there is no doubt that the lessons that we are learning in
Ukraine show us that low-cost innovation is starting to
dominant the battlefield.
This is of particular concern for me as we look at China
because of the discrepancy between what China can produce
against our dollars versus what we can produce here in our
country. I think sometimes, most times, when a product is
purchased in China, and then, sold in the United States, it is
sold for approximately three to six times, depending on the
distribution model, what it actually costs to produce in China.
So, when we look dollar-to-dollar against what China is
spending on their defense and what the United States is
spending on our defense, what we are spending here, actually,
you can't compare it dollar-for-dollar because those dollars
are representative of a very different production capacity.
And this has me very concerned, particularly with SUAS
[Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems] and small drones, as we wrap
in the lessons that we are learning from Ukraine. And I think
that we have come to a point where we have $2500 drones that
are truly threatening multi-hundred-million-, if not billion-,
dollar assets.
The ranking member talked about how Russia's Black Sea
naval fleet has been, in part, scuttled by a force that has no
navy of its own. Truly remarkable times and incredible threats.
80 percent of the Russian casualties that are being caused
in the Ukrainian theater are being caused by FPV [First-Person
View] drones. And it is estimated right now that China's drone
output in 2024 was $29.4 billion, which is at least four times
the amount of money that the United States is spending,
obviously, with far lower, by an order of magnitude, unit cost.
China has continued modernizing its FPV swarm and biomimetic
drone capabilities.
So, I want to talk about the Chinese drone advantage that
we see today. What threats does China's dominance in the global
drone market pose for U.S. national security in the event of a
potential conflict?
Admiral Paparo. Congressman, China dominates the drone
industry, just by dint of their capacity to build them. Many of
the long-lead critical items that go into any drone are made in
the People's Republic of China. So, diversifying our supply
chains in order to ensure that we are not dependent on China to
acquire the drones that we need to deter China is absolutely
critical.
Mr. Harrigan. General Brunson, do you have anything to add
for that?
General Brunson. Yes, I would, Congressman, and thank you.
I can see without my glasses that you have served. So, thank
you for that, sir.
One of the things that we want to try to bring to Korea
is--I think what we might be able to do is to innovate better.
So, if you are familiar with the Army's Transforming in Contact
Part 1.0 and 2.0, there is some technology that is being put
forward now that is going to allow us to 3D print drones. And
so, we can have our own autonomous swarms that we could go
counter with.
We are also looking to invest in other counter-UAS
technologies. As we have seen the hardening along the DPRK
border within the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone], we have got to be
able to see a bit further.
And other things that we might be able to do in order to
improve our ability to understand our operating environment is
the use of technologies that already exist that would give us
the same advantages. High altitude balloons, for example, could
be used to great effect, in particular, on the peninsula.
Mr. Harrigan. Are we doing any of these initiatives at the
scale we need to do them in order to accomplish your strategic
objectives that you have been given?
Admiral Paparo. I'm dissatisfied with the scale. I'm
dissatisfied with the speed, and we have to go faster, work
harder, and get better.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Harrigan. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman makes an excellent point, though, about
China's spending. You cannot compare it dollar-for-dollar with
the budgets of our country for defense spending or any other
country. It is not apples-to-apples. And that is just one of
many illustrations that I am glad that you pointed out.
We now turn to the gentlelady from California, Ms. Jacobs.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our witnesses for being here.
Mr. Noh, first, I want to turn to you. In your testimony,
you frequently emphasized the importance of a whole-of-
government approach to counter Chinese influence in the Pacific
Islands. Yet, the administration has significantly cut funding
to USAID and other humanitarian programs that traditionally are
a part of a whole-of-government, integrated strategy.
Building on the question from my colleague Mr. Carbajal,
can you clearly explain how the reduction in U.S. economic and
humanitarian engagement undermines our ability to implement
this whole-of-government approach and directly hands China
greatly leverage?
Mr. Noh. Congresswoman, as I stated earlier, the State
Department has lead for approving--
Ms. Jacobs. I'm not asking about the State Department. I'm
asking about your testimony about whole-of-government approach.
Mr. Noh. So, I would be happy to talk about what the
Department of Defense is doing in the Pacific Island countries.
We have extensive engagements in security cooperation programs.
Under Title 10, Section 333, we work with these countries to
improve their cybersecurity, enhance their maritime domain
awareness. We conduct regular exercises. Of course, the focus
is on posture and warfighting capabilities, but these are
things that we do with many of these countries.
The COFAs, the Compacts of Free Association, that we have
with three countries, in particular, Palau, the Federated
States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Marshall Islands,
that is another big emphasis of the Department. We are doing a
lot of great work with them.
Ms. Jacobs. Yes, I understand all of the work that the
Department is doing in the Pacific Islands. But your testimony
mentions ``full-of-government,'' and DOD-only is not a whole-
of-government approach.
Admiral Paparo, in response to a question by my colleague
Mr. Garamendi, you said that, while review of USAID is ongoing,
you would advocate for a robust USAID in your AOR. Can you
expand on why you think USAID funding is so important and how
it helps you succeed in your overall mission?
Admiral Paparo. Our USAID programs, particularly the ones
that work on necessities--food, water, medical, and critical
infrastructure--they are key and critical to these poor areas
and they enable us to compete against the People's Republic of
China, who operate in the same domains.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
Now, I want to turn to Taiwan. I think it is important for
us to recognize what kinds of U.S. actions actually help shore
up Taiwan's defenses and what kind of actions can contribute to
escalation and actually make Taiwan less safe.
For instance, the training and weapons the United States
has provided over the years has helped Taiwan's ability to
defend itself in the event of invasion. And we haven't actually
seen that spark escalation with the PRC.
On the other hand, symbolic types of support like high
profile visits or Secretary Hegseth's over-the-top rhetoric
during his recent trip to Panama seem to have a more escalatory
effect without actually making Taiwan any safer.
So, Admiral Paparo, could you discuss ways in which the
Department is ensuring we are not unnecessarily escalating
tensions and maintaining open lines of communication with the
PRC?
Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, the policy enshrined in the
Three Communiques, the Six Assurances, and the Taiwan Relations
Act stipulates that defensive services and defensive capability
shall be provided to Taiwan, while the Department maintains the
capacity to resist any resort to force that jeopardizes the
social, political, and economic system of Taiwan.
Sticking strictly to that policy and ensuring that that
policy has the credibility that it requires, what comes to mind
is the Third Communique from August of 1982, I believe it was,
which was that those services shall decrease with the
demilitarization of the Taiwan Straits.
And so, being sensitive to affirm the Three Communiques,
but to also execute them in accordance with the letter and
spirit that they were initiated with is very important to us.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Admiral Paparo.
Mr. Noh, do you believe Secretary Hegseth's very over-the-
top rhetoric on Taiwan actually aligns with our stated policy
as the United States?
Mr. Noh. Congresswoman, I would disagree that anything
Secretary Hegseth stated about Taiwan is over the top. He has
emphasized the importance of reestablishing deterrence and
doing so in the Indo-Pacific. And the Department is moving with
urgency and focus to do just that.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
Deterrence is very important. Things we do that
unnecessarily escalate without actually making Taiwan any safer
are the opposite of deterrence.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady for yielding.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
McGuire.
Mr. McGuire. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
Mr. Noh, you are doing a great job. I really appreciate
what President Trump is doing, what Pete Hegseth is doing, to
return our military to lethality. We are eradicating the
divisive ideologies from our military and it is working.
What I understand is recruitment is up. And I have spoken
with soldiers, airmen, and marines, and others around my
district, and even on the southern border, and morale is way
up.
You know, we wouldn't have a country without our men and
women in the military. So, for all our servicemembers, all our
veterans here, thank you for what you do to keep us safe.
It is great to see my Navy SEAL brother, Fleet Master Chief
David Isom, here today.
And I see this as a way to continue service to our country.
I think we would all agree that we have many threats at
home and abroad, and you guys have covered a lot of territory
today.
And I would like to talk about aircraft carriers. I would
like to focus on their role, Admiral, in your area of
operation, air responsibility. I know you are pleased that the
USS George Washington CVN-73 has rejoined the forward-deployed
naval forces in Yokosuka, Japan.
I will also note that the USS Carl Vinson CVN-70, the
French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, and the Japanese
aircraft carrier Kaga all participated in a recent joint
exercise in the Philippine Sea.
The USS Nimitz CVN-68, our Nation's oldest aircraft
carrier--I must have been around a while because I remember
when that came into service nearly 50 years ago--is now
deployed on what is likely her final deployment and heading
West.
The Secretary of Defense has emphasized the need to restore
deterrence of our military and to achieve peace through
strength.
How do you see aircraft carriers' role in the deterrence
mission, especially in the Indo-Pacific area, your area of
responsibility?
Admiral Paparo. Congressman, carriers are absolutely
critical in the weight of fires that they can bring, which is
many, many times X almost any other capability. And when
knitted together with the rest of the Joint Force, they are
part and parcel of an all-domain force executing every mission
from ASW [Anti-Submarine Warfare] to strike to air superiority.
It is a mobile, capable airfield that the enemy would have to
work very hard to target, and they work hard to target them
because they are so afraid of them.
So, absolutely critical--critical with the Joint Force, not
at the exclusion of any other force, but in complement to that,
to achieve those critical missions.
The PRC demands information, air, and maritime superiority
as a pretext for their operations. Aircraft carriers are
critical to contesting and gaining those superiorities.
Mr. McGuire. Well, I certainly support those efforts. And,
Admiral, I would like to thank you for your response.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record a
recent U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings article entitled,
``Aircraft Carriers: Still Indispensable,'' written by Admiral
Paparo, that provides an excellent summary of the case for
aircraft carriers as a cornerstone for our national defense.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 128.]
Mr. McGuire. All right. Admiral, as well, when you consider
the potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific, contested logistics
will be a critical capability to maintain our lethality and
resupply, not only for our forces, but also our allies in the
region. Do you share this sentiment?
Admiral Paparo. Most strongly. Our adversaries note/believe
that the Pacific War was built on the ability to sustain, and I
agree with them.
Mr. McGuire. What changes would you make to INDOPACOM's
operational energy efforts? You know, in my district we build--
we have a nuclear power plant. We are building a small modular
reactor. But I believe the world's first microreactor is about
to come from my district. And how important is that to helping
you do your job?
Admiral Paparo. Sir, accepted, I mean, particularly, the
incredible efficiency of a nuclear reactor with uranium
delivering at its own critical levels 3 million megajoules for
power per kilogram. It is incredibly efficient. It is small,
modular, and I can't endorse that enough.
Mr. McGuire. It sounds great. But what can we do here in
Congress--I think we are all supportive--but in your words,
what can we do to better support the warfighters to give you a
chance to win the fight and come home?
Admiral Paparo. Sir, continued funding streams, and if a
CR, if Continuing Resolutions are a feature and not a bug--I'm
not making a comment on that--putting the kind of provisions
within Continuing Resolutions to be able to execute every
program that we have, and authorities that enable a steady flow
of funding, which provides a steady flow of predictability for
the defense industrial base, which enables them to recruit,
hire, train, retain workforce, so that we can be at full
capacity.
Mr. McGuire. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes Ms. Strickland.
Ms. Strickland. Thank you, Chairman Rogers and Ranking
Member Smith.
I have the honor of representing Joint Base Lewis-McChord,
home to tens of thousands of active duty servicemembers,
including the first Multi-Domain Task Force and the future
elements of the third MDTF [Multi-Domain Task Force], 5th
Security Forces Assistance Brigade, 1st Special Forces Group,
and America's First Corps.
And it is great to see you, General Brunson. Those stars
look good on you.
All of these things are regionally aligned toward the Indo-
Pacific theater, and JBLM [Joint Base Lewis-McChord] plays a
central role in the United States' ability to ensure a free and
open Indo-Pacific.
I'm going to talk about two issues. I will start with
climate change, and then, the alliances and partnerships of
AUKUS.
Admiral Paparo, how are the U.S. military operations and
plans being affected by factors like rising sea level, extreme
heat, and displacement in heavily populated coastal areas?
Admiral Paparo. Some of our efforts align our Pacific
partnership and our operations with the typhoon season within
the Pacific, so that we can be more ready to respond to
humanitarian assistance disaster relief. Similarly, many of our
expeditionary engineering capabilities work on key critical
infrastructure, particularly through the Pacific Island
countries. And so, that ability to respond is front of mind.
Ms. Strickland. Thank you.
Mr. Noh, under President Trump and Secretary Hegseth's
leadership, DOD is now cancelling programs that do a few
things: extend range and on-station time; mitigate contested
logistic challenges, and make our forces more easier to detect
by lowering thermal signatures--all because these programs also
happen to have a climate benefit.
In his approach, Secretary Hegseth said, quote, ``We do not
do climate change crap.'' And this approach is actually curbing
innovation and making us less ready. They don't make us more
lethal; they don't protect our troops, and they don't help us
confront a peer competitor.
How can the Department prepare for the realities of a
conflict in INDOPACOM in an environment of censorship where key
decisions are being made because of a catch phrase, instead of
the actual benefits that protect our warfighters?
Mr. Noh. Congresswoman, the focus of the Department is, and
will remain, on strengthening our posture and warfighting
capabilities. And I believe the President's budget, which will
be released soon, will reflect both the priorities of the
President and the Secretary's priority of reestablishing
deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
Ms. Strickland. Okay. So, the three things I mentioned
specifically--extending range and station time; mitigating
contested logistics, and making our forces harder to find by
lowering thermal signatures--are those things actually going to
happen, even though the Secretary said that this was climate
change crap?
Mr. Noh. Congresswoman, that is an issue I will have to
take back and follow up with you on.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 137.]
Ms. Strickland. Okay. So, you don't know?
Mr. Noh. I'm not sure, no.
Ms. Strickland. Okay. Thank you.
Now, I want to switch over to AUKUS. And we know that this
particular partnership is incredibly important. It prevents
Chinese malign influence and actually reduces costs for the
United States.
So, Admiral, can you talk about how this partnership has
already benefitted the United States and what capabilities it
is delivering to our Australian allies?
Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, first is that it has
benefitted us in the contributions that Australia has made to
the defense industrial base, to the amount of $3 billion, in
order to enhance the submarine industrial base's capability to
deliver on Pillar One.
Second, working towards Submarine Rotational Force Sterling
would give the United States an Indian Ocean capability which
is more responsive to the South China Sea and gives us the
ability to operate submarines with impunity without having to
go through straits in the Indian Ocean and its approaches
through the critical Straits of Malacca, of Lombok, and of
Sunda, among others.
And then, on Pillar Two, Australia hits way, way above its
weight from a cyber standpoint. It does some critical things
that really complement what we do. So, AUKUS is a winner in
every way for Indo-Pacific Command.
Ms. Strickland. Thank you.
And then, Mr. Noh, are there any obstacles that you think
the United States faces in fully implementing AUKUS, and
specifically, upholding our partnership, particularly in
transferring three to five Virginia Class submarines?
Mr. Noh. Congresswoman, I think our industrial capacity
remains a limiting factor. We are able to produce 1.28 Virginia
Class submarines a year. That number needs to be above two for
us to both fulfill our own submarine requirements and to
fulfill our obligations to Australia under Pillar One. So,
that--
Ms. Strickland. Thank you.
And you may want to tell your boss that some of the trade
decisions that are being made actually have--
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Virginia, Mrs.
Kiggans.
Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you so much to our panelists and for your years
of service to our great Nation.
I have the privilege of representing Hampton Roads, which
is home to the Atlantic Fleet; also home to East Coast Ship
Repair and shipbuilding, and just thousands of military
families and personnel, especially that are Navy members. So, I
want to focus on the Navy for a few minutes.
But, Admiral Paparo, we know that, if conflict were to
arise in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility, the men and
women of Hampton Roads would be on the front lines of that
fight. And I know that we are very focused on the Pacific and
on the West and on the West Coast, but can you just speak to me
about the importance of the Atlantic Fleet in your mission in
the Indo-Pacific?
Because we know that when things arise in the Middle East--
Israel is a perfect example. After October 7th, we sent the
Ford and the Eisenhower to that region of the world. But the
Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pacific is not too far away. So, just
speak to me about the important role of the Atlantic Fleet and,
specifically, the carrier air wings from Naval Air Station
Oceana in my district, what that means to your mission.
Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, thank you, also, for your
service to the Nation as a U.S. naval aviator and those of the
many members of your family that have served or are serving at
this very time.
And you make a great point, and that point is that all of
the Joint Force is designed that it must be responsive to any
threat anywhere; that the rebalance to the Pacific has got to
have the capability to have the total balance going to the
Pacific within weeks.
And so, presently, in our plans of record, the Atlantic
Fleet is very well represented in the Indo-Pacific, and not
just in the Indian Ocean, but in the Pacific itself. It would
be key and critical and indispensable to combat success.
Mrs. Kiggans. And how important to your mission is
investment in the upkeep of places like our East Coast Master
Jet Base to provide those carrier air wings?
Admiral Paparo. There can be no difference across the force
from a standardization standpoint about the readiness of the
facilities to support training and operations. And that is
precisely because every force has got to be ready to fight the
pacing threat.
Mrs. Kiggans. And so, we currently have F-18 squadrons
which are great in fulfilling the mission, but are also aging.
And so, I just want to ask you specifically, how would an F-35
integration help with your mission?
Admiral Paparo. F-35s are critical and we cannot make that
transition fast enough across the force, and F-35s must be a
part of the Atlantic Fleet in my humble opinion.
Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you for that answer.
And now, I want to move to shipbuilding. And we continue to
decommission ships at a rate that far outpaces new
construction, even as many of these platforms are still
operational and actively deployed. In some cases, we are
investing in maintenance and upgrades, only to retire the ship
as soon as it returns to port from deployment.
Given our growing global commitments and the urgent need
for naval presence, how does this approach make sense, Admiral
Paparo, and why are we decommissioning ships when we are
clearly short on capacity?
Admiral Paparo. Given the fact that the ship is relevant,
and given that there is the proper balance of investment in the
ship, so that the return on investment is right, and getting
absolutely the most relevance out of the most relevant ships
until the capacity of the United States is built up, so that
they can be replaced, I think I'm not a proponent of divest to
invest. I'm a proponent of make before break. And I would
prefer not to decommission combat-relevant capabilities until
its replacement is onboard. So, its sailors and marines can
properly transfer to that platform and get into the fight.
Mrs. Kiggans. Agree. We need all the ships we can get, and
even an old ship is better than no ship.
And speaking again about shipbuilding, I know that when we
had an opportunity to visit Pearl Harbor, you spoke about the
fact that, I think it was only 17 percent of your high school
graduates are attending colleges and universities, and the
lines of the shipyard for those skilled trade jobs are so long.
So, what are you doing in Pearl Harbor, in Hawaii, that is
working; that we might apply to other shipbuilding and ship
repair locations like Hampton Roads?
Admiral Paparo. And so, Hawaii is very unique, in that
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is an incredibly valued profession
in Hawaii, which confers that there is a waiting list in order
to get onto the rolls as a shipyard worker. And as a result,
because of the experience of the shipyard force, Pearl Harbor
delivers its projects ahead of schedule and usually below
budget. And that's a great model.
And I think outreach in individual communities that
similarly reflect and model that process where it is a highly
valued profession, making sure that we keep pace from a pay
standpoint, that we are not outcompeted for pay for shipyard
workers, because 90 percent of any organization's hiring
problems can be solved with pay and applying ourselves--
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you. Thank you.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Cisneros.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.
And, Admiral, I want to thank your Fleet Master Chief for
your career, sir, and everything that you have done for this
Nation.
Chiefs from the Navy, I'm a former naval officer, I can
tell you one thing, when I left the Navy, I wish I still had--I
wish I could have taken my chief with me there. The senior
enlisted are a valuable asset to our military and we need to do
what we can to make sure that we support them in any way
possible.
I also want to say, just go back to Mr. Courtney's comments
about the tariffs and what they are doing, Mr. Noh. You know,
the fact that we have three nations--Japan, South Korea, and
China--that are coming together because of these tariffs, and
these are three nations that have a history of contention. You
may say the tariffs don't affect the military, but it is going
to have an effect later on in the military. And so, the
Department of Defense should definitely be speaking up on that
there because it is going to affect us at some point.
General Brunson, I'm going to start with you, sir. We have
seen the PRC, the DPRK, and Iran provide support to Russia
during the Ukrainian conflict, supplying soldiers, munitions,
critical minerals. The strengthening of these relationships
continues to undermine the security and stability of the Indo-
Pacific region.
What are we seeing in the reverse as far as--I mean, those
Russia, China supplying materials, technology, and things to
North Korea? And really, what have we learned from the North
Korean army with their experience there in Ukraine that is
going to benefit you and your knowledge?
General Brunson. Yes, sir. So, one of the first things I
would say is I'm looking at and I'm concerned with, more
importantly, what is coming back versus what is going out.
Mr. Cisneros. Uh-hum.
General Brunson. I can see very, very well all the things
that are going out, but coming back is technology. Coming back
is critical munitions that are coming back there. What is
coming back is critical materiel which is changing our
operating environment in a large way.
And then, what it is causing us to really do is look at how
we might counter those things; that we might be able to
continue to deter them or have Kim Jong Un say, "Not today. Not
today."
And some of that has to do with the posture that we take,
as we sort of organize ourselves differently within our
operating environment.
And I think that another thing that I'm looking at
routinely is, how am I communicating those things back out? How
am I going back to ensure that not only our friends, partners,
and allies are also witting to this, but how am I communicating
back with INDOPACOM to ensure that we are able to talk about
the changes that we might have in our OE [Operating
Environment] as well?
Mr. Cisneros. Have you learned lessons about the North
Korean army, about how they have been operating and what they
have been doing in Ukraine that are going to be valuable to
you?
General Brunson. Yes, sir, we most certainly have.
Mr. Cisneros. Good. Thank you.
Admiral, you know, you and your fellow COCOMs [combatant
commands] are competing for assets continually, whether it be
the aircraft carriers, air squadrons, Special Operations
Forces, Patriot missile batteries.
Can you discuss the challenges that you are facing there in
trying to respond to China's operations while you are competing
for those assets?
Admiral Paparo. Yes, Congressman. Understanding that there
is a high demand for the global forces is just my job. So,
mitigating that, when the Department, when the Commander-in-
Chief makes a decision to shift one capability to another
theater, and to be able to mitigate for that, sometimes it is
the substitution of other relevant capabilities. Sometimes it
is knowing what the response time is of that capability to
restore it to the Indo-Pacific. All those are important
factors.
And so, our job is to take the policy decisions and to
mitigate those, to express the risk, and to do our very best to
restore deterrence and to provide the indications and warnings
if it has to return to a theater that has more exigent needs.
Mr. Cisneros. Okay. With that, thank you very much for that
answer, Admiral.
And I have got about 30 seconds left. So, I'm just going to
yield my time back. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
McCormick.
Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
It is great to see you again. First of all, congratulations
for a well-served career, for a Fleet Command Master Chief,
just phenomenal. That steely stare just kind of gives me
flashbacks of when I was on the drill field, just wondering
what my next fate was going to be. But I have got a coin for
you in the fine military tradition, when we get done with this.
I would love you to accept it.
You know, Admiral, when I was out there with your command
recently, you gave the best brief I have ever gotten.
Literally, I just thought a phenomenal overview of the
importance of that region--70 percent of the world's wealth
going through that for trade, 70 percent of the world's
population, a bunch of military forces. I'm really excited
about what you bring to the future vision of the military, and
really what a great visionary you are.
And I'm looking forward to working with you, too, General,
in that really important region. I'm sure we would love to turn
in our ties for a flight suit or an M4 and go out there and be
on the point end of the spear, but yet, here we sit,
determining the fate of the world as we seek it.
I'm curious right now with what is going on in North Korea.
And either one of you can speak on this. The instability of
that region right now and seeing what their government is
doing, their former government, their current government, and
the importance of somebody we fought alongside of, not just in
Korea, but in Vietnam and other regions. What they can bring to
the table still and can we count on them in this regional
conflict?
General Brunson. Thank you for the question, sir, and I
appreciate it sincerely.
I can just share with you what I'm seeing there in Korea
right now. Their system works. That is the first and foremost
thing I would want everyone to know, is that the Korean system
works.
We will have an election soon. We will have a new
president. Our Commander-in-Chief recently made a call to the
acting president of the Republic of Korea, and our military
relationships are absolutely sound and solid.
We most recently exercised in large scale during Freedom
Shield, one of our largest exercises, which includes the
Republic of Korea's government as part of the exercise. We had
some 4,000 marines in the KTO exercising live, virtual,
constructive, some 51 separate events that went on there.
I believe that the situation we find ourselves in right now
is one where we are going to continue to increase our capacity.
There was talk earlier of investments being made. I'm very
pleased with the investments that are being made by the
Republic of Korea military writ large across their joint force,
and I'm especially excited about the opportunities that we have
to collaborate in a combined fashion to produce effects on the
Korean Peninsula.
Dr. McCormick. Fantastic. Yes, as a guy who spent several
tours over there with the ROK [Republic of Korea] marines,
knowing their motto ``Pil Sung!'' which means, you know, ``must
win,'' ``victory,'' they only have one objective. They only
have one battlefield, one enemy, and if they lose, they are all
dead. So, I hope they resonate around that message and
understanding their mission and their importance to us in that
regional conflict.
There's been a lot of questions, Mr. Noh, about the tariffs
and the impact on the relationships between our countries. I'm
going to ask you to agree with something I'm about to state.
Because you say, you know, ``This is not really my field.'' And
they said, ``But you've got to bring it back to the Secretary
of Defense. Make sure he understands.''
One thing that we all understand, as military guys who have
seen what everybody understands around the world, is strength.
It doesn't matter if you are Asian. It doesn't matter if you
are Arab. It doesn't matter if you are African. It doesn't
matter if you are Latino. Everybody understands strength. And I
think if we come from a position of strength, the results are
obvious.
What I have seen with the tariffs is now, for the first
time in my lifetime, zero/zero tariffs reciprocating from
Japan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Israel, India, the entire European
Union, and more to follow. 50 countries coming to the table
saying zero/zero. Could we ask for a better result in tariff
negotiations that puts it in a position of strength? Because
everybody understands fairness, and there's nothing more fair
than a zero/zero tariff.
And it is more beneficial to the United States because we
have been at a disadvantage all this time, and I think it puts
us in a position where people understand strength and fairness
as well as anybody, especially in the Indo-Pacific region,
where people understand the Bushido. They understand strength.
They understand fairness. They understand honor. And I think it
puts us in a very good position. If you have any comment on
that?
Mr. Noh. Congressman, of course, the President emphasizes
needing to negotiate from a position of strength, and that is
something Secretary Hegseth strongly believes in as well.
Dr. McCormick. I think that pretty much sums it up.
I'm out of time at this point. But, once again, to the
Commander Master Chief, congratulations on a well-deserved
career ending and we look forward to fine things in the
afterlife. Semper Fi.
The Chairman. All right. The chair now recognizes the
gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Sorensen.
Mr. Sorensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning. Welcome to our witnesses, Mr. Noh, Admiral
Paparo, and General Brunson. Thank you for your insights, for
your leadership, as we face a new realm in the Indo-Pacific.
I would like to, first, take a minute to acknowledge
Taiwan, both as a democracy and a strategic ally. While we work
to boost our own domestic semiconductor manufacturing
capabilities, we must ensure that Taiwan is able to contribute
to our supply chains. Working together to develop new
technology and innovation means that we work together to make
both of us secure. That means that we must also remain
steadfast partners in the region, as China continues to develop
its offensive power.
Mr. Noh, I will begin with you. Last week, President Trump
announced that he would impose a 32 percent tariff on Taiwanese
goods. I don't know if that number has changed in the past 15
minutes or not. If we hurt the Taiwanese economy, how can the
administration demand that Taiwan spend more on its own
defenses?
Mr. Noh. Congressman, the Department is working to
prioritize our security assistance to Taiwan currently. We are
leveraging the different tools we have at our disposal, whether
that is PDI [Pacific Deterrence Initiative]US, FMF [Foreign
Military Financing], FMS [Foreign Military Sales], or TSCI, the
Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative.
Arming Taiwan and strengthening Taiwan's defense
capabilities is extremely important for not only the defense of
Taiwan, but for strengthening our posture and reestablishing
deterrence. So, we are moving quickly to do that and we are
committed to doing so.
Mr. Sorensen. So, what I am hearing from you is there is
100 percent connection between Taiwan and the United States
with this relationship?
Mr. Noh. Congressman, the future of Taiwan does matter to
American interests.
Mr. Sorensen. Admiral Paparo, in your written testimony,
you mentioned how critical our European allies like the UK and
France are to security in the Indo-Pacific. How important is
the ``all of the above'' approach to keeping the region secure?
Admiral Paparo. Congressman, the more partners and allies
that demonstrate that they have concurrence on the security
interests of the world, noting that the world globally will be
highly, if not completely, affected by conflict in the Indo-
Pacific, and when a partner demonstrates their expression of
will by putting key capability in the Indo-Pacific, it confers
more legitimacy and more leverage on the cause that the Taiwan
Strait matter shall not be changed by force.
Mr. Sorensen. I appreciate that.
Mr. Noh, I want to go back to the discussion of North
Korea. Besides strengthening our force posture in the region,
how is the Trump administration planning to address North
Korean aggression and will President Trump be sitting down with
Kim Jong Un?
Mr. Noh. Congressman, on your last question, I cannot speak
for the President on whether he will do so, but I will focus on
and explain to you what the Department is doing.
North Korea poses a serious threat, not just because of its
nuclear arsenal, but due to its development of missiles that
are capable of targeting not only our allies in the region, but
also the United States homeland. So, we will continue to work
with our South Korean allies, and, of course, General Brunson
and our team at USFK [United States Forces Korea], to make sure
we have a strong deterrence posture to deter the North Korean
threat.
Mr. Sorensen. Both the admiral and the general have
mentioned in their testimonies that North Korea is seeking
Russia's help in developing more advanced satellites and
drones, missiles, and submarines.
Mr. Noh, what is being done to prevent coordination between
Russia and North Korea, especially since we have just found out
the news yesterday that we have Chinese fighting alongside
Russians against Ukraine?
Mr. Noh. Congressman, I would be happy to have this
discussion more in-depth in a classified setting. I'm happy to
follow up there.
Mr. Sorensen. Okay. We will do that.
And I will yield back the balance of my time.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Crank.
Mr. Crank. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Noh, Admiral, General, thank you all for your service
to our country. I know each of you has served and I appreciate
all the years and decades that you have served our country.
Admiral--and I apologize, I missed a lot of your verbal
testimony; we have got another subcommittee and I had 32
amendment votes in that committee, so I'm sorry about that--but
I'm really encouraged. I did read your testimony. I'm really
encouraged to see a sizable section of your written testimony
dedicated to discussing INDOPACOM's collaboration with Space
Command and how vital intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, and tracking capabilities are to winning the
fight.
And I fully agree with you when you say, quote, ``Space
superiority is essential to INDOPACOM's operations across all
domains.'' Unquote.
And I want to start by asking you the same question that I
have asked all of our combatant commanders. And I understand
that it is difficult to answer in detail in open forum. But, in
your opinion, is the space-based threat to the United States
posed by Russia and China greater, lesser, or the same than it
was 4 years ago?
Admiral Paparo. Sir, Congressman, it is unequivocally
greater and growing by leaps and bounds for China by year, and
also, Russia is working very hard on it.
Mr. Crank. And we may follow up in closed session a little
more on that as well.
Admiral, you also say in your testimony ``USINDOPACOM
requires enhanced, ground-based space surveillance networks
throughout the Indo-Pacific region.'' Can you provide more
information on the systems or capabilities you need to win the
fight?
Admiral Paparo. Sir, may I please defer to our classified
session?
Mr. Crank. Of course. Thank you.
And then, we can talk about some other questions there, I
guess, in classified session.
Will the needs that you have in these areas--and we can
talk about them more later--will they be reflected in the
budget request submitted to this committee?
Admiral Paparo. Sir, they are reflected in detail in my
1313 report and are provided in detail.
Mr. Crank. Okay. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate it.
And I will yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New Hampshire,
Ms. Goodlander.
Ms. Goodlander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
Admiral, you are the commander of America's oldest and
largest combatant command. I just want to begin by talking
about the threats we face. Can you confirm for us what your
current assessment is of the top threat to our national
security that America currently faces in the Indo-Pacific
region?
Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, the People's Republic of
China and their capabilities they have built within the
People's Liberation Army are the biggest threat to the
security, the freedom, and the well-being of the Nation. Russia
also has a sizable Pacific fleet with whom they are growing in
their exercises with the PRC.
And, you know, I also acknowledge the threat of North
Korea, which is significant and growing in cooperation with the
others, and violent extremist groups as well.
Ms. Goodlander. Thank you for that, Admiral, and thank you
for your testimony on the importance of public shipyards in
this country.
My home state that I am proud to represent of New Hampshire
plays a central role in our maritime security, and protecting
the livelihood of our shipyard workers is a top priority for me
here in Congress.
I want to ask you about China's growing aggression in the
maritime domain. We just saw last month the threat that Chinese
warships posed to our partner Australia. How should we be
thinking about China's growing naval capabilities and who will
our most important partners and allies be in addressing this
line of threat?
Admiral Paparo. Well, thanks for affirming the role of,
Congresswoman, thanks for affirming the role of public
shipyards. My dear father was a shipyard worker at a shipyard
that is no longer in commission. That is what he did for his
life's work. So, thank you for that.
And Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is tops, absolutely tops, and
we affirm that and we benefit directly from that in INDOPACOM.
The People's Republic of China is building six combatants
per year. They are actively building aircraft carriers and they
are getting better. They have embarked on a program of nuclear
ballistic missile attack submarines. They are working on the
next generation. They are working on nuclear-powered submarines
in their Shang III series. And they are building at a high
rate.
But as we think about it, too, it is not just navy-on-navy.
Because when we say all-domain, that is really the capability
of the entire Joint Force to action that which is threatening
us and to do so in unison, affecting it across-domain.
So, these rates of build are concerning and we have got to
pace that with the entire Joint Force, but that includes
significantly increasing our shipmaking capability.
Ms. Goodlander. Thank you for that.
You have testified that America's network of allies and
partners is our most significant asymmetric advantage in the
Indo-Pacific region. We heard testimony yesterday about the
importance of the role that our support for Ukraine has in
deterring threats in Europe. Does our support for Ukraine deter
threats in the Indo-Pacific region?
Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, Russian failure and/or
Russian success has a direct bearing on the PRC's calculus, and
they are watching very closely.
Ms. Goodlander. So, I want to ask more about how we
strengthen our partners and allies. I agree with what has been
said by many of my colleagues in this hearing. I'm very
concerned about what impacts the global trade war against some
of our most important allies in the region will have on our
national security and our national defense.
General, I want to ask you about South Korea. You testified
just a few minutes ago that the South Korean system is working.
It is in the midst of a constitutional crisis right now. What
do you see--why is that system working? What have been the most
important checks in that system for the continuance of South
Korea's democracy?
General Brunson. Briefly, I will say simply that they read
their rules. They understand the rule of law well. They also
are following exactly what they said they were going to do:
they were going to send things to a constitutional court; they
were going to continue to move forward.
What I would like to note is the stabilizing force that the
military has been in that country. Whether it be wildfires in
the east or a training incident which affected a great portion
of the population, the military has been able to do all the
things that are necessary for that country to give time and
space for their constitution to do exactly what it said it was
going to do.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Gooden.
Mr. Gooden. Thank you.
And thank you all.
Admiral, I have just some brief questions for you about,
first, artificial intelligence. Successful integration of AI
and machine-learning into command-and-control functions is a
key challenge for our military. And near-peer conflict will
require robust C2 [command and control] systems that cannot
only ingest massive quantities of data across the kill chain,
but can also generate operational insight at the tactical edge
and into night environments.
Given the commercial platforms that have been validated by
INDOPACOM, how are you using commercial capabilities to meet
these needs?
Admiral Paparo. Congressman, we are in run at USINDOPACOM
as an AI-enabled headquarters, not to replace human judgment,
but to augment it. And so, the employment of AI models--I won't
tell you what the names of them are, just in the interest of
ethics--in conjunction with cutting-edge command-and-control
systems, and then, linking both our Top Secret databases, our
Secret databases, and its own open-source learning models, from
which there is a rich data field, is enabling us to make better
decisions faster at the strategic level, at the operational
level as we link the functions of command-and-control,
information, intelligence, movement, maneuver, fires, security,
and protection.
And this has got to take place at the strategic level for
decision-making, operationally in linking those functions, and
on the tactical edge from swarming capabilities, just to
increase the efficiency and the effectiveness of the force that
we have far above what our adversaries can.
Mr. Gooden. Do you feel like we are ahead of the curve in
that respect?
Admiral Paparo. You pay me to be never ahead of the curve.
And so, I never view that we are ahead of the curve. I think we
are doing some cutting-edge things. I know that our adversaries
are working on it, too, and you pay me to do those things
better and faster than the other guys do.
Mr. Gooden. Thank you.
I still want to keep visiting, changing course here. In
October of 2023, the Defense Logistics Agency conducted a
wargames simulation known as CAMOLAND, and that demonstrated
severe domestic production capability gaps in the clothing and
textile supply chain. And the wargame also showed that DLA
[Defense Logistics Agency] stockpiles were unable to fully
mitigate wartime demand and would have resulted in the military
personnel lacking uniforms, combat boots, and the corresponding
physical protection.
There was language in the 2025 year NDAA directly DOD to
expedite this Presidential Determination that action needed to
be taken, and DOD has not requested a PD [Presidential
Determination] for items such as American-made body armor,
ballistic helmets, ballistic plates, and organizational
clothing, and individual equipment.
And I know I'm catching you off guard perhaps. So, we can
visit offline if we need to. But, as a combatant commander, can
you explain the impacts to your ability to conduct operations
or even execute an operation plan in your AOR without the
materials and resources, as discovered by the CAMOLAND wargame?
And if a Presidential Determination is granted allowing DLA to
use DPA [Defense Production Act] Title III funds to help the
defense textile industrial base capacity, would that give you
the flexibility needed in your operational planning?
Admiral Paparo. Congressman, from a wargaming standpoint,
bad news is good news because we act on it and we run to the
problem. As I have discussed earlier in my testimony, World War
II was won every bit as much on our ability to supply, to
sustain the force, as any. We frequently overlook items that we
take for granted. This is why we do wargames. And we embrace
that data and it is our duty to act on it.
Mr. Gooden. Well, I just want to thank you all. I'm very
impressed. And thank you for all you are doing for our Nation.
Keep up the great work.
Thank you. Yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Maryland, Ms.
Elfreth.
Ms. Elfreth. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you for your service and thank you for being here
today in this candid conversation.
I would like to follow up on some questions started by my
colleague from Virginia, Mrs. Kiggans, and Ms. Goodlander here.
I'm really grateful to be on a committee that has a bipartisan
focus, particularly on shipbuilding. But equally important to
shipbuilding and our economy is the workforce that we
discussed, but also ship maintenance and repair. Particularly,
I don't know if you can do your job if we don't have a
thoughtful strategy on repair.
So, I would like to focus there. Admiral, you mentioned
earlier today about the defense industrial base and how we need
to liberate long lead times of supply chains. And I kind of
want to dig into this, as we are also talking about acquisition
reform here that is much needed.
Can you walk us through how you are advising big Navy to
better balance the need to have a robust investment stateside
in our domestic shipyards, while also ensuring that our ships
can be maintained in a potentially contested environment in
INDOPACOM?
Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, good morning.
I think there are four drivers to shipyards not meeting
rate, and it is new, unpredicted work. It is having to rework
systems. It is the workforce efficiency and the availability of
on-hand supplies. And we have to get better and faster, more
data-centric; use AI tools in order to anticipate problems and
to do the data analytics to get better.
Number 2, we need a steady funding flow, so the downstream
suppliers can lead the long lead times.
We need a diversification of the downstream suppliers.
Particularly, take advantage of the promise of AI-enabled
additive manufacturing. And I have gone to places in Torrance,
California, where I have just seen some cutting-edge stuff.
And we have to quickly certify those systems in order to
move faster.
So, steady funding; database orientation to fixing our
problems in those four fields; diversifying our downrange
supply chain, and getting faster, getting simpler at the
technical warrant holders in order to get to that.
Ms. Elfreth. That is very helpful.
I want to talk about prepositioning of equipment,
particularly, again, since you are far away from most of any
shipyard domestically adjacent. So, it is my understanding
that, of late, the military has done a better job or made
progress on prepositioning of equipment and parts at bases and
depots in your region, but across the world.
But just yesterday--and I don't mean to catch you off
guard; I would just love your genuine feedback here--the Army
issued a stop work order on efforts to maintain these
prepositioned stocks, the hard-to-get supplies for various
reasons here.
How critical is your ability to have this prepositioned
equipment to your ability to operate during a conflict,
particularly in a high area denial environment?
Admiral Paparo. Prepositioning is what gains you leverage
on the initial deployment of capability. And so, the speed of
getting capability there, to get that head start on that,
everything in the 21st century moves much, much faster. So, the
more relevant gear that we can get forward, the better.
You are likely talking about Army Prepositioned Stock 3.
And on that front, I work closely with the Department on the
Army as well about identifying what are the really relevant
air, missile, space, maritime capabilities, because the Army
does play in the maritime game, that should be prepositioned.
And how are we gaining the authority to position those in
places, so that we can respond to that change?
And so, I think it is an ongoing process, as we make those
calculations. I prefer that it was mission reasons why we
didn't versus fiscal reasons. And I work very closely with the
Services to advocate that the only reason that we don't
position something forward is for reasons of mission and not to
save a buck. Because, you know, INDOPACOM is not the place to
go for your savings.
Ms. Elfreth. Right. And also, preparedness will ultimately
save us money down the road.
Admiral Paparo. Save us money, lives. Lives, capability,
people, and time--
Ms. Elfreth. Thank you.
Admiral Paparo. --in that order.
Ms. Elfreth. Thank you.
With my remaining seconds, Mr. Noh, I want to follow up on
my colleague from Hawaii's conversation. I represent the U.S.
Naval Academy in Annapolis, which is going to be underwater in
a matter of decades. Now, thankfully, the Navy is preparing for
that, but I also would be remiss if I did not urge this
administration to take seriously the rising tides that are
coming, not just for the Academy, but across our installations.
And with that, Mr. Chair, I yield my time back.
The Chairman. The gentlelady yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Vindman.
Mr. Vindman. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I have the privilege of being last. And I congratulate you
all on sitting through this long hearing. And thank you for
your service.
And Fleet Master Chief, I congratulate you on your upcoming
retirement. It is great to serve, but it is also great to be
retired.
China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran represent decades-long
alignment of leading authoritarian states. They represent,
really, the antithesis of American values and ideals in many
ways.
Recently, Iran has been weakened in its Middle East
conflict with Israel, and Russia in its protracted engagement
in Ukraine--so much so that they could not reinforce their
bases in Syria and had to mostly withdraw.
Admiral Paparo, does this axis of authoritarians
demonstrate an increased threat environment inside and outside
of INDOPACOM, including to our homeland?
Admiral Paparo. Congressman, unequivocally, yes.
Mr. Vindman. Does helping Ukraine remain a strong,
sovereign, independent country weaken Russia in this axis?
Admiral Paparo. Sir, Russia's failure and/or Russia's
success will have a direct correlation on deterrence in the
Pacific, and Russia is a significant threat in the Indo-
Pacific.
Mr. Vindman. And I agree, and I think it is the best
observable way to weaken Russia, rather than trying to entice
them with some sort of carrot approach.
In fact, this weakening of this axis, two members of the
axis, comes at no cost to American servicemember lives,
although there have been Americans that have gone over and
volunteered and, tragically, lost their lives in Ukraine, but
it does come at a cost in material and treasure. And as a 25-
year Army vet, that is what I call a good deal.
So, Mr. Noh, unlike the United States, there's no daylight
between China's commercial and military sectors. They are one
and the same in many ways. You mentioned to my colleagues that
you don't look at tariffs. However, the military and commercial
sectors are intertwined. Then, in your role, and certainly the
Secretary, must take the impact of tariffs into consideration.
I mean, I think back on history and the U.S. oil embargo on
Japan in the prelude to War World II and Japan's attack on
Pearl Harbor.
In your assessment, does this constitute a major escalation
with China and escalate military tensions?
Mr. Noh. Congressman, I will talk about what I know and
what I have been working on, which is that the Department has
been moving quickly, at the direction of our Secretary of
Defense, to strengthen our posture, to strengthen our alliances
and partnerships with our allies and partners throughout the
region; to reestablish deterrence, and to deter China. So, we
have been doing so and we will continue to do so.
Mr. Vindman. So, I mean, has the Department conducted a
risk assessment of the administration's tariffs impact on the
risk of additional conflict or potential conflict with China?
And does the Department have--will the Department do so?
Mr. Noh. Congressman, I'm not sure if the Department has
conducted such an assessment. That is something I can take
back--
Mr. Vindman. Okay.
Mr. Noh. --and report back.
Mr. Vindman. I encourage you to do so.
If we are choking them off economically, and they have
already indicated an intent to seize Taiwan, it seems like we
might be further driving them into an aggressive posture
against us. So, it is something we should look at, certainly,
from the Department's perspective.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 138.]
Now, looking at the impact of tariffs on our partners, we
are asking our partners to raise their spending to 5 percent.
If at the same time we are looking at the risk of a global
recession and a U.S. recession, what are the chances that they
are going to be able to increase their spending in a
recessionary environment?
Mr. Noh. Congressman, Secretary Hegseth has communicated
the message, not only during his visit to the Indo-Pacific in
Japan and the Philippines, but when speaking with counterparts
throughout the region, that they need to step up and do more.
Mr. Vindman. And I understand that, but what I'm asking you
to do--and you may not be prepared to answer this now, and I
don't have much time left--but I encourage you to look at what
the imposition of these tariffs does to the request to increase
military spending.
So, thank you and I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.
And I believe I might get to be the last one today before
you.
But thank you so much for your patience and being before us
today, to Admiral Paparo, to General Brunson, and to Mr. Noh.
Any deterrence or offensive maneuvers in the Indo-Pacific
region require a resilient and modernized amphibious fleet.
Newport News Shipyard, with great hope for revitalizing the
domestic shipbuilding industry, employs more than a thousand
residents, and that is the 1st Congressional District. We go
right across the line and this becomes a very important
pipeline for us.
And I have listened and heard your remarks. And so far,
when we talk about workforce, data, AI, you know, looking for
steady funding flow, going through the certification process--
in all the concepts and ideas, as you reflect on where we need
to be, what would you say is the greatest challenge, if there
is one or two?
Admiral Paparo. For manpower, sir?
Mr. Davis. Yes.
Admiral Paparo. The greatest challenge is pay. It is being
able to outcompete other employers that match the work, and the
work is not as arduous, as tough. And so, when we are competing
with a job that is just not as hard on the--you know, I just
say shipyard work is hard trade work and you can't compete with
a services-type industry on equal pay.
Mr. Davis. I just want to follow up. How is INDOPACOM
partnering with, for instance, TRANSCOM to balance older,
foreign-made vessels with procuring new ships to maximize
sealift capability?
Admiral Paparo. Well, first, we collaborate--as Military
Sealift Command, the component of TRANSCOM, we hire out CONSOL
[consolidated cargo operations] tankers to be able to hire
commercial providers to be able to take up some of that
capability. We hire out commercial air services to execute
tanking airborne. And we do a great deal of movement via
contracted air.
But in the unforgiving hour, the best way that we are going
to be able to get to contested areas is with gray hauls and
gray tails for our ships and for our aircraft.
Mr. Davis. Yes. Well, I want to again thank the witnesses
for being here.
And, Mr. Chair, we are going to yield back the balance of
the time.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields.
The chair now recognizes the ranking member.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I just wanted to follow up a little bit on some of the
earlier comments around the tariff thing--not trying to be
excessively argumentative, but I'm curious about the answer to
this question.
So, the premise that was given us is that, basically, the
reason we are doing all the tariffs is we have bad
relationships with all of these countries; that they are using
us, in essence. It is not a mutually beneficial relationship.
It is one where we are giving too much and they are taking too
much. And that is at least a theory.
But I'm just curious, General Brunson, you work with South
Korea. Do you view our relationship with South Korea as
mutually beneficial or do you think they are taking advantage
of us?
General Brunson. Congressman, I view it as mutually
beneficial.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
And, Admiral Paparo, it is tougher with you because you
have got a whole bunch of different countries to worry about.
But is there a country out there that you think is taking
advantage of us, that we are partnering with in Australia, the
Philippines, Japan, Taiwan, any of these places? Or do you view
our relationships with these countries--right now, you know,
prior to all the current contested stuff--is it mutually
beneficial or are we being taken advantage of?
Admiral Paparo. Ranking Member, from my seat with the
military instrument, it is mutually beneficial.
Mr. Smith. And, Mr. Noh, I know you docked all of this
because, you know, DOD doesn't put tariffs in place, but it is
a whole-of-government thing, as you said in your statements,
and diplomacy, development, certainly trade and business is an
important part of it. It impacts your job. I mean, it clearly
impacts it. If we have an antagonistic relationship with a
country in Admiral Paparo's region, I would trust that you
would think about that.
I mean, what you do about it is highly debatable. But it is
not really your answer that tariffs and trade relationships
have nothing to do with our national security interests or with
the Department of Defense's mission in the Indo-Pacific, is it?
Mr. Noh. Ranking Member, I will speak to what I know, which
is the defense relationship that we have, the relationships we
have with our allies and partners throughout the region. In
that regard, we have strong, very strong relationships. And
like I indicated earlier, the engagements that I have
personally had, that I have seen the Secretary have with his
counterparts, all indicate that we have very strong
relationships and--
Mr. Smith. So, you would not say that we are being taken
advantage of by these countries? You would view the
relationships, much as Admiral Paparo and General Brunson have
said, as mutually beneficial?
Mr. Noh. I will say two things, Ranking Member.
Mr. Smith. Sure.
Mr. Noh. One, they are mutually beneficial, but, two, our
allies and partners absolutely need to do more. And that means
spend more. That means buy more of the right capabilities to
strengthen our deterrence posture. So, there is absolutely more
that they can be--
Mr. Smith. Do we need to do more?
Mr. Noh. Oh, we all need to do more, Ranking Member.
Mr. Smith. So, it is a mutually beneficial relationship?
And the last thing--and I know you are in an acting
position; I confess, I didn't look to see if somebody has been
picked yet for your position--so, I know you are not going to
be there in a little while.
But, for everyone listening, for everyone involved, it is
just not an acceptable answer for the Department of Defense to
say, ``Well, that's not us. We're not paying any attention to
it.''
And I'm not going to pin you down whether or not you
support it or not, but it definitely is connected to our
mission in the region, to have all of this interrelated, and it
really frightens me to think that you are like, ``Well, the
State Department is doing their thing. You know, the trade
folks are doing their thing, and we're over here and we really
don't pay any attention to them.'' That is not the right
approach. It definitely needs to be more interrelated with
that.
And I thank the chairman for his indulgence, and I yield
back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from South
Carolina, Ms. Mace.
Ms. Mace. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.
The Indo-Pacific region is a dynamic region strategically
critical to the United States, as you all know, and our
national security. China's rapid military expansion,
significant advances in technology and cyber warfare, and its
aggressive pursuit of economic and political influence
represent its very aggressive and calculated effort to reshape
the region and to displace the United States. We now recognize
that a formidable adversary is systematically working to
undermine our influence and reshape the region.
President Trump is committed to ensuring peace through
strength, and Congress must act to ensure the Department is
resourced to meet the challenges we face. Through increased
capabilities and robust partnerships, we will create a network
of deterrence that can effectively counterbalance the CCP's
malignant goals.
And dare I say we have a President who is the strongest
President we have seen in my lifetime who can stand up to Xi
Jinping, stand up to Communist China, and the threats that they
are pursuing against the United States and our allies.
The challenges we face in the Indo-Pacific region are not
fleeting. We have to respond with a comprehensive, whole-of-
government approach. Our strategy must be defined by
preparedness, innovation, capability, and also, swiftness,
decisive action, being nimble, being fast, which is something
we need to work on these days, as you all know.
The PLA has made significant progress towards fielding a
joint force that is capable of challenging the United States in
every domain. So, my first question is to Admiral Paparo today.
There have been many reports on the staggering pace of the
PLA's navy shipbuilding activities. How does the U.S.
shipbuilding measure up?
Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, the PLA is building surface
combatants at the rate of six per year. The United States is
building surface combatants at the rate of 1.6 per year.
PLA is building two submarines per year. The United States
is producing 1.28 presently, attack submarines per year. We are
working on Columbia-Class SSBN [nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine]--
Ms. Mace. How does the quality of the Chinese manufacturing
of their naval ships and submarines compare to the United
States?
Admiral Paparo. I think from a capability stand--
Ms. Mace. Uh-hum.
Admiral Paparo. --just numerically, they are not as capable
on range. You know, the SM-2 [Standard Missile-2], SM-3
[Standard Missile-3], SM-6 [Standard Missile-6] dominates their
capability. The Tomahawk Land Attack Missile dominates their
capability.
Our sonars are better. SPY-6 radar is going to be a better
radar. Our ships are more capable from a tonnage standpoint.
They are more capable from a weapons standpoint and in the
electromagnetic spectrum.
Ms. Mace. And then, in the event of a conflict, do we have
sufficient naval yard capacity to repair and refit our vessels?
Admiral Paparo. I assess we do not, Congresswoman.
Ms. Mace. And what do we need? I mean, how quickly do we
need to move on that?
Admiral Paparo. We need to fire up more shipyards and we
need to fire up more shipmaking capability, unequivocally.
Ms. Mace. How would you rate the PLA's ability to conduct
joint operations between the air and naval forces with the
First Island Chain?
Admiral Paparo. Inferior to the United States in every way,
working to get better every single day, and I see the palpable
progress.
Ms. Mace. And how does that affect their anti-access/area
denial strategy?
Admiral Paparo. They get better at it and it requires me to
counter it, us to counter it more effectively. But they are
getting better at it. They are proliferating more and they are
getting more and more joint in their exercises, and more
farther afield.
Ms. Mace. And we have all seen them. They engage in
destabilizing behavior in the South China Sea, as they seek to
advance expansive territorial claims. It has increasingly
resorted to non-militarized tactics to bully their neighbors.
Mr. Noh, how is the Department working with partners to
increase their capability to withstand the CCP's coercive
actions in the South China Sea?
Mr. Noh. Congresswoman, we are doing a great deal in the
South China Sea to work with our allies and partners to
strengthen our posture, to enhance their capabilities.
I think one good example is the Philippines.
Ms. Mace. Uh-hum.
Mr. Noh. We are conducting monthly bilateral operations
with the Philippines. We provide them ISR support.
Ms. Mace. When did we increase that, the joint operations?
How long has that been going on, the increased frequency with
them?
Mr. Noh. The exact timeline, Congresswoman?
Ms. Mace. Uh-hum.
Mr. Noh. I will have to get back to you on that.
Ms. Mace. Yes, sir.
Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, we have greatly expanded the
Balikatan series, the Salknib series, the Archipelagic Defense
Continuum series, and we are working towards heel-to-toe
exercises with the Philippines at greater numbers and with
greater joint and combined capability, and bringing in more
partners--Japan, Australia, among others.
Ms. Mace. And it seems you are being more effective,
particularly the last 2 years, I would argue.
But thank you so much, gentlemen, for being here today.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentlelady yields back.
This concludes the open portion of this hearing. We will
reconvene in room 2212 at 1:15.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 9, 2025
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 9, 2025
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 9, 2025
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 9, 2025
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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Admiral Paparo. USINDOPACOM relies heavily on USTRANSCOM to
coordinate the massive logistics network necessary to support
our operations across our area of responsibility. We cannot
project forces without USTRANSCOM's partnership. Our amphibious
fleet provides essential capabilities, but USTRANSCOM's ability
to leverage military assets and commercial partners through
programs like the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Voluntary Intermodal
Sealift Agreement and Maritime Security Program ensure rapid
deployment and sustainment of our forces both in peacetime and
conflict. This partnership with the Department of
Transportation, USTRANSCOM and their commercial carriers is
critical for day-to-day operations and will be heavily relied
upon in contested environments. [See page 18.]
------
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN
General Brunson. Representative Houlahan, thank you for
raising this important question. While this question has been
redirected to the Army's Legislative Liaison, I welcome the
opportunity for a future discussion. [See page 24.]
------
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
Admiral Paparo. China's aggressive investment in electronic
warfare capabilities across the Indo-Pacific creates a growing
challenge for the region. We need enhanced electronic warfare
capacity, including platforms like the EA-37, to effectively
counter this threat and maintain our competitive advantage.
Although the EA-37 modernization program provides critical non-
kinetic capabilities, acquiring only ten EA-37s to replace
fourteen EC-130Hs will not fully address the growing electronic
warfare requirements in the Indo-Pacific. Bolstering our
overall capacity in this area remains essential for ensuring
spectrum dominance. [See page 25.]
------
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STRICKLAND
Mr. Noh. The Department is focused on strengthening our
posture and warfighter capabilities. The Department remains
committed to improving the resilience of military
installations. Additionally, energy resilience is key to
maintaining the readiness of our installations and force
projection capabilities. We continue to identify energy
resilience gaps for critical missions and prioritize
investments for addressing risks to capabilities critical for
readiness. [See page 43.]
------
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOYLAN
Admiral Paparo. Phase 1 of the $571 million Glass
Breakwater repair project in Apra Harbor commenced April 1st,
ahead of schedule. This initial phase includes relocating 10-
15-ton armor stones to create a temporary protective barrier.
Crews will then install 42-ton interlocking concrete armor
units to ensure long-term stability. The project is expected to
be complete by July 2029. As repairs continue, there will be
incremental improvements in the resiliency of the breakwater
over time. We will continue to assess the condition of the
breakwater as repairs proceed, and work to capitalize
opportunities to accelerate construction efforts where
possible, prior to the estimated completion date of July 2029.
[See page 32.]
------
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. VINDMAN
Mr. Noh. To my knowledge, the Department has not conducted
such an assessment. The Department of Defense is committed to
reestablishing deterrence and prioritizing efforts to deter
China. [See page 56.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 9, 2025
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Noh, in your testimony you stated how the US and
South Korea have deepened their cooperation in the industrial base and
other areas. You also stated that the US has relied on South Korea for
some pilot projects, such as support ship maintenance, repair, and
overhaul.
Does the Department foresee expanding these types of projects with
South Korea and our regional partners? Do you believe the US will
expand the number and types of ships for maintenance and repair in
foreign ports?
Mr. Noh. The United States and South Korea have continued to expand
defense industrial cooperation, particularly on maintenance and
logistics of U.S. military assets. We have a long history of sustaining
U.S. air platforms in South Korea under the Special Measures Agreement
(SMA) and are actively expanding the scale and scope of these efforts.
We have also increased the number of co-sustainment initiatives under
the Regional Sustainment Framework to include additional air and sea
assets. Recently, South Korea successfully demonstrated its capacity
and capability to efficiently perform maintenance, repair, and overhaul
on U.S. naval vessels by conducting repairs on the USNS Wally Schirra
and the USNS Yukon. We will continue to explore maintenance and repair
opportunities with our allies and partners that are consistent with the
Administration's America First policies and the Executive Order on
Restoring America's Maritime Dominance.
Mr. Wilson. Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Indo-Pacific
is vital to protecting our bases and infrastructure as well as
deterring against regional aggressors like China and North Korea. Last
year, the Missile Defense Agency conducted a successful missile
interception from Guam. This is part of the Guam Defense System that
provides 360-degree defense for Guam against various missile and air
threats.
Admiral Paparo, with the Guam Defense System in progress, are
options being considered to add more anti-air systems in the region,
especially with China's continuous development and integration of
hypersonic and advanced missile capabilities?
Admiral Paparo. While the Guam Defense System's Increment 1 is
scheduled for 2027, we continue to explore additional kinetic and non-
kinetic defensive capabilities. This would include a comprehensive
approach to develop and field effective layered missile defeat
capabilities. My preferred defense against hypersonic weapons uses
counter-C5ISR to keep them "on the rail," but we continue to explore
developing defensive capabilities.
Mr. Wilson. Admiral Paparo, I am grateful to hear of the work being
done by Secretary Hegseth and yourself to improve defense cooperation
with our allies in the Indo-Pacific. Especially with the recent news
that we will be deploying the NMESIS anti-ship missile system to the
Philippines for an exercise. Can you explain the importance of
expanding our cooperation with our allies in the region? Are there
obstacles that are preventing us from doing so in the region?
Admiral Paparo. Our alliances in the Indo-Pacific bolster
legitimacy and deterrence, add key capabilities and capacity, provide
essential access, basing, and overflight rights, enabling power
projection across multiple domains, and fundamentally provide our
strongest asymmetric strategic advantage. While we have strong ties
with our treaty allies, some potential partners gravitate toward
China's economic influence, and India's defense relationship with
Russia presents a challenge despite its growing partnership with us. We
must actively strengthen all our relationships, remaining vigilant
against adversaries who attempt to undermine them through coercion and
encroachment.
Mr. Wilson. Admiral Paparo, in your statement you said space
superiority is essential to our operations across all domains. With our
adversaries expanding their space and counter-space capabilities, the
US must not fall behind.
Can you explain some of the current capabilities that our
adversaries possess in the region?
Admiral Paparo. China and Russia have devoted considerable economic
and technological resources to growing all aspects of their space and
counter-space programs. Operational capabilities include a range of
satellites for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance;
communications; and precision navigation and timing. North Korea has
very limited capabilities. China and Russia also possess advanced
counter-space capabilities including direct-ascent anti-satellite
weapons, co-orbital threats, directed energy weapons, and advanced
jamming systems, often in both fixed and mobile configurations.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. The Navy has established one unmanned surface vessel
squadron and is in the process of establishing a second squadron to
operate and maintain small unmanned surface vessels (sUSVs). You have
previously commented on the need for unmanned platforms for area denial
operations in the event of a conflict in the Western Pacific. How do
autonomous vessels, specifically sUSVs, factor into the U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command's strategy for countering China in the Pacific? What is
the plan and timeline for fielding these capabilities to meet demand
and operational requirements?
Admiral Paparo. Small unmanned surface vessels (sUSVs) are crucial
to some of our denial operations concepts, which use coordinated
unmanned systems across all domains to deny adversaries air and
maritime superiority at low human cost. These systems offer affordable
asymmetric advantages and - integrated with conventional forces - can
defeat numerically superior opponents. We are focusing on sUSV
procurement, storage, operational testing, concept refinement,
training, and maintenance and need these capabilities delivered as
quickly as they can be produced.
Mr. Wittman. Admiral Paparo, do you believe the current ISR
allocation process gives you the flexibility and responsiveness needed
to adapt to changing threat dynamics in the Indo-Pacific? If not, if
Congress were to provide additional ISR funding modeled after the
previous ISR Transfer Fund designed to deliver immediate capabilities
to combatant commanders, would you utilize it to surge unmanned ISR
assets, and if so, what specific gaps or operational needs would you
prioritize addressing with those funds?
Admiral Paparo. The ISR requirements have grown exponentially since
FY21, yet available airborne ISR meets less than 10% of the needs.
Divestment of platforms like the RQ-4B30, E-8 JSTARS, EP-3, and U-2
without fully operational replacements exacerbates this shortfall.
Additional funding would be prioritized toward unmanned and contractor-
owned, contractor-operated ISR platforms capable of operating in
contested environments, addressing our most critical unmet ISR
requirements.
Mr. Wittman. Given the need to detect, classify, identify, and
track Chinese threats inside the first island chain, what additional
persistent surveillance assets would be valuable to the INDOPACOM
theater that can sense across a wide range of sensor modalities and
active and passive collection techniques and that can communicate in
real-time across the joint force?
Admiral Paparo. USINDOPACOM needs persistent, integrated space-
based sensor networks for broad area coverage, advanced ISR platforms
for contested environments, and multi-modal sensing systems such as
SeaVision Maritime Domain Awareness that incorporates satellite
synthetic aperture radar, a visible infrared imaging radiometer,
electro-optical imagery, radio-frequency geolocation, and upgraded
undersea sensor arrays. Real-time information sharing through
unclassified systems is crucial for bilateral and multilateral
collaboration with regional partners.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. There's evidence North Korea uses Illegal, Unreported,
and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF) to fund its regime, sneaking into
foreign waters. How is USFK tracking this, and what's the plan to choke
off that revenue stream without escalating tensions?
General Brunson. Although the prevention of illegal DPRK fishing is
not a USFK mission, USFK does work closely with the Republic of Korea
(ROK) and United Nations Command Member States in a concerted effort to
restrict North Korea's stream of illegal revenue including illegal,
unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF). To this end, USFK closely
coordinates through the ROK Navy with the ROK Coast Guard as they
monitor and restrict DPRK fishing vessels that enter ROK sovereign
waters and their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The DPRK also continues
to generate revenue by selling fishing licenses to China, whose fishing
vessels also operate off the western coast of the DPRK. USFK is
committed to address North Korea's unlawful activities and violations
of UN Security Council resolutions in conjunction with the ROK
government.
Mr. Scott. In the event USINDOPACOM or USFK captures enemy weapons,
will your command have to undergo the lengthy Civil Asset Forfeiture
process under United States law or can the enemy weapons be immediately
provided to our allies and partners? What logistical hurdles does your
respective command anticipate in cataloging, securing, and processing
captured enemy weapons for forfeiture under wartime conditions in
Europe? Are you expected to comply with U.S. forfeiture procedures of
enemy weapons, such as documenting the chain of custody, while
operating in a dynamic combat environment?
General Brunson. USFK would not have to undergo the lengthy Civil
Asset Forfeiture process under US law in accordance with the Law of
Armed Conflict. All personal (movable) property belonging to an enemy
State that has a military use, which includes any weapons, may be
possessed and utilized for the benefit of occupying power. The law of
civil forfeiture is neither designed nor intended to apply to foreign
battlefields. As a result, there would be no need to comply with any of
the US forfeiture procedures, to include documenting chain of custody.
While US forfeiture procedures are not applicable, documenting the
chain of custody is still essential and to create records of the
capture, handling, and transfer of enemy weapons to ensure
accountability and compliance with military regulations, regardless of
the environment and component.
Mr. Scott. Has the intelligence and data provided by Ukraine on
Russian technology, captured equipment, battlefield operational guides,
weapon performance, and countermeasures against U.S. and Allied systems
been useful to your command? Will it have saved the lives of U.S.
service personnel in a war against an enemy peer nation?
General Brunson. USFK continues to benefit from an intelligence
relationship, through EUCOM, with Ukraine. Most notable are the regular
updates on lessons being learned by the DPRK's military and their level
of implementation. DOD foreign material exploitation of debris of DPRK
missiles launched from Russia and recovered by Ukrainian partners is
currently refining DPRK missile capabilities analysis and helping to
identify options for missile defeat to protect US interests in Eastern
Europe and in the ROK. These exchanges help us better understand the
DPRK military we may have to face in the future rather than the legacy
force of the past - knowledge which will almost certainly save American
lives in the case of a resumption of hostilities.
Mr. Scott. How does the U.S. Coast Guard collaborate with U.S.
Forces Korea to enhance maritime security in the Korean Peninsula,
particularly in addressing threats like illegal fishing or maritime
smuggling?
General Brunson. When operating in the region, US Coast Guard
(USCG) cutters receive taskings from 7th Fleet, which is under U.S.
Pacific Fleet. While there is currently no direct engagement or
collaboration between the USCG and USFK, USCG taskings and missions in
the AOR enhance maritime security on the Korean Peninsula.
Mr. Scott. Does the Coast Guard engage with South Korean maritime
forces, such as the Republic of Korea Coast Guard, under the USFK
framework to build regional maritime security capacity?
General Brunson. The US Coast Guard (USCG) and Korean Coast Guard
(KCG) partner to enhance regional maritime security, with the KCG
modeling its development after the USCG. This collaboration includes
USCG training for KCG officers in areas like law enforcement, search
and rescue, and leadership. The USCG is also encouraging the KCG to
establish a Mobile Training Team program similar to its own, aimed at
providing instruction to partner nations. The USCG collaborates with
the KCG and Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) on regional capacity building.
Joint efforts include workshops for Asian and Pacific Island partners
hosted in Korea. USCG, KCG, and JCG signed a trilateral agreement
formalizing future cooperative capacity-building initiatives in
Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands in 2026.
Mr. Scott. Are there opportunities to further integrate Coast Guard
assets, such as cutters or maritime patrol aircraft, into USFK's
operational plans?
General Brunson. The US Coast Guard (USCG) is integrated into
USFK's operational plan, but their presence in the Republic of Korea
(ROK) is limited during armistice. Visits consist of an annual National
Security Cutter deployment and occasional Maritime Patrol Aircraft
(MPA) operation from Japan. Permanent USCG presence in the ROK consists
of a single O-5 Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. Increased USCG
support for maritime security missions and capacity building in the
region would require additional resources and assets beyond current
funding levels.
Mr. Scott. How could South Korea's potential role as a provider of
lethal aid to Ukraine reshape the U.S.-ROK defense relationship,
particularly in terms of joint exercises, technology sharing, or global
security cooperation?
General Brunson. The strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance rests on the
foundation of our Mutual Defense Treaty and our shared commitment to
regional stability. While we understand the Republic of Korea's
sovereign decision-making regarding international lethal aide, my
priority as the UNC/CFC/USFK Commander is ensuring those decisions do
not detract from our ability to maintain a high level of readiness
through combined exercises, technology sharing, and security
cooperation focused on our treaty obligations.
Mr. Scott. South Korea faces domestic legal constraints and
international pressure to avoid direct lethal aid to conflict zones.
From a USFK perspective, how can the ROK balance these constraints
while responding to calls from allies, including the U.S., to support
Ukraine more actively?
General Brunson. I consider ROK's decisions regarding external
lethal aid to be a sovereign concern. I do not routinely engage with
ROK leadership on their desires to provide external lethal aid.
However, from a USFK perspective, our alliance with ROK is paramount
for maintaining stability and deterring aggression in the Korea Theater
of Operations (KTO). Our focus remains steadfastly on strengthening our
combined readiness and interoperability to fulfill our treaty
obligations in this critical region. As the UNC/CFC/USFK Commander, it
is incumbent on me to ensure that the ROK's balance of such decisions
does not impact on our ability to fulfill our mutual commitment.
Mr. Scott. How do you view the potential for South Korea's weapons
support to Ukraine to strengthen trilateral cooperation with the U.S.
and Japan, or broader partnerships with NATO allies, in addressing
global security challenges?
General Brunson. While I view the Republic of Korea's decision to
provide external lethal aid as sovereign, I assess that such decisions
would not directly enhance our existing trilateral security cooperation
with Japan, which remains focused on regional defense and deterrence.
Our trilateral exercises serve as a visible demonstration of our
collective and enduring commitment to regional stability.
Mr. Scott. Reports last year indicated South Korea was considering
supplying lethal weapons such as 105mm shells to Ukraine in response to
North Korea's deployment of troops and arms to Russia. How would the
ROK's potential decision to provide offensive weapons to Ukraine impact
the security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula, particularly in the
context of the U.S.-ROK alliance?
General Brunson. My key consideration on the ROK's sovereign
decision on external lethal aid, would be to assess and prevent any
potential effect on the progress of the Bilaterally Agreed Upon
Operational Control (OPCON) Transfer Plan. Maintaining momentum on the
COT-P is critical to ensuring a stable and effective alliance capable
of deterring aggression on the Korean Peninsula. Any unilateral
decisions that could jeopardize our mutual security objectives would be
a key concern.
Mr. Scott. If South Korea moves forward with providing lethal aid
to Ukraine, how would USFK coordinate with the ROK military to ensure
that such a policy shift does not compromise readiness or deterrence
against North Korean threats?
General Brunson. I would coordinate directly with the ROK CJCS to
ensure that ROK readiness and depth is not impacted by their sovereign
decision. I would identify risks and risk mitigation strategies to
ensure readiness and adjust posture, if required, to maintain
deterrence. The priority remains a robust ROK defense posture, and I
would request the ROK balance their support elsewhere with their
requirements at home.
Mr. Scott. Given North Korea's growing military cooperation with
Russia, including troop deployments and potential technology transfers,
how does USFK assess the risk of North Korean retaliation or escalation
on the Korean Peninsula if the ROK begins supplying weapons to Ukraine?
General Brunson. The ROK has already provided non-lethal aid to
Ukraine. Additionally, the ROK has publicly warned it was considering
sending lethal aid to Ukraine several times. Until now, DPRK reaction
has been muted. Recently, DPRK publicly acknowledged providing direct
lethal aid including troop deployment to Russia, therefore DPRK is
unlikely to take retaliatory actions against the ROK for doing the
same. DPRK likely will respond with harsh rhetoric against the ROK
supplying weapons to Ukraine. The risk of North Korean retaliation or
escalation on the Korean Peninsula could slightly increase but would
likely remain low.
Mr. Scott. Beyond economic losses, how is Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated Fishing (IUUF) fueling other threats in your AOR-like
piracy, human trafficking, or even cover for military ops? Are you
seeing patterns that tie fishing violations to broader adversary
playbooks?
Admiral Paparo. We see little evidence linking Illegal, Unreported,
and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF) to other criminal activities. However,
China uses its state-sponsored fishing fleet as cover for broader
malign activities. Their maritime militia, backed by the PLA Navy
(PLAN) and Coast Guard, uses fishing vessels as a front to advance
territorial claims and harass regional partners in the South and East
China Seas. China attempts to legitimize sovereignty claims through the
continuous presence of fishing and maritime militia vessels, escorted
by Coast Guard cutters with PLAN warships in overwatch.
Mr. Scott. Countries like Japan, Australia, and the Philippines are
hit hard by IUUF. How is INDOPACOM working with them to track and deter
it, and where could USDA or NOAA fisheries expertise plug gaps in that
effort?
Admiral Paparo. USINDOPACOM enhances partners' and allies' maritime
domain awareness through initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Maritime
Domain Awareness (IPMDA) program to combat Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated Fishing (IUUF). We use the Pacific Quadrilateral
coordination forum and SQUAD framework with Japan, Australia, and the
Philippines to routinize multilateral activities, improve
interoperability, and counter IUUF. We welcome interagency support,
such as NOAA Office of Law Enforcement's decade-long counter-IUUF
capacity building engagement with the Philippines.
Mr. Scott. What tools-drones, satellites, AI-is INDOPACOM using to
monitor IUUF across such a huge maritime domain? Are there blind spots
where illegal fleets slip through, and how could ag-tech from USDA or
partners help close them?
Admiral Paparo. USINDOPACOM employs a multi-layered approach to
maritime surveillance with the SeaVision Maritime Domain Awareness
tool, integrating multiple data sources to include Automatic
Identification System (AIS) signals, satellite imagery, and radio
frequency geolocation, enhanced by machine learning algorithms to
identify suspicious patterns. We are expanding partnerships to close
surveillance gaps, with five Indo-Pacific partners among our top
SeaVision users. USINDOPACOM welcomes USDA's agricultural technology
expertise to enhance detection capabilities. However, we still meet
less than 10% of our ISR requirements, creating significant blind spots
that require immediate attention.
Mr. Scott. Small island nations rely on fisheries but lack
enforcement muscle. How does IUUF undermine their sovereignty, and is
INDOPACOM prioritizing capacity-building-like joint patrols-to counter
it?
Admiral Paparo. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF)
significantly threatens the sovereignty, food security, and economies
of Indo-Pacific nations, particularly small island states with vast
exclusive economic zones and limited enforcement capabilities. We
actively combat IUUF alongside allies and partners through initiatives
that improve surveillance, enforcement, and partner capacity. These
include expert exchanges, formal agreements, equipment provision, and
maritime domain awareness development. The Coast Guard is crucial in
this fight, and additional cutters would greatly enhance our ability to
support these missions.
Mr. Scott. If you could tap one resource-real-time USDA fisheries
data, legal frameworks, or training for local navies-to tackle IUUF in
the Indo-Pacific, what would it be?
Admiral Paparo. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF)
requires a multi-faceted approach, but I would prioritize expanding
SeaVision Maritime Domain Awareness capabilities, a proven platform
with five of our Indo-Pacific partners ranking among the top 10 global
users. SeaVision integrates multiple data sources, including AIS
signals, satellite synthetic aperture radar, a visible infrared imaging
radiometer suite, electro-optical imagery, and radio-frequency
geolocation, providing comprehensive surveillance capabilities our
partners need to combat IUUF in their territorial waters.
Mr. Scott. China's been snapping up farmland and fishing rights
across the Indo-Pacific. How does INDOPACOM view this as a strategic
play, and could USDA insights on crop production or trade patterns help
counter that dominance?
Admiral Paparo. China uses economic competition, including
acquiring farmland and fishing rights, as a central facet of its
strategic approach to gain access and influence across the Indo-
Pacific. China aims to achieve regional supremacy, becoming the center
of Asian cultural, economic, social, and political authority. While
China has seen some success, most of the region recognizes its self-
serving and exploitative tactics. We always welcome insight and
analysis from interagency partners like the USDA.
Mr. Scott. Small island nations depend on subsistence farming and
fishing, but they're vulnerable to disruption. How is INDOPACOM
factoring their agricultural resilience into your partnerships, and
could USDA expertise in sustainable practices strengthen those ties?
Admiral Paparo. Food, water, medical care, and critical
infrastructure programs are vital for regional stability. We deploy
Civil Affairs teams to provide permanent forward presence and surge
capabilities as needed. Through Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and
Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding, we enhance partner resilience in disaster-
prone nations, particularly in places like Fiji and other Pacific
Island countries. We welcome assistance in these resiliency efforts
from all able interagency partners, including UDSA.
Mr. Scott. With dense farming and aquaculture systems in countries
like Indonesia or Thailand, has INDOPACOM picked up any intel on
agricultural sabotage-like fish farm diseases or crop pests-as a
potential threat? How would you coordinate a response?
Admiral Paparo. We are unaware of any specific threats to
agriculture, food storage, or distribution systems, but we cannot rule
out the possibility of adversaries using this tactic. All three major
state threats in the Indo-Pacific have active biological research and
development programs that could support such an effort. A coordinated
response would require an inter-agency approach to share information on
threats, countermeasures, mitigation strategies, and response options.
Mr. Scott. Small island nations depend on subsistence farming and
fishing, but they're vulnerable to disruption. How is INDOPACOM
factoring their agricultural resilience into your partnerships, and
could USDA expertise in sustainable practices strengthen those ties?
Admiral Paparo. Food, water, medical care, and critical
infrastructure programs are vital for regional stability. We deploy
Civil Affairs teams to provide permanent forward presence and surge
capabilities as needed. Through Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and
Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding, we enhance partner resilience in disaster-
prone nations, particularly in places like Fiji and other Pacific
Island countries. We welcome assistance in these resiliency efforts
from all able interagency partners, including USDA.
Mr. Scott. How do the Baltic States' contributions to NATO, as
steadfast allies, enhance the broader security framework that supports
U.S. objectives in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in countering
authoritarian influences?
Admiral Paparo. The Baltic states' steadfast commitment to NATO
reinforces U.S. objectives in the Indo-Pacific by demonstrating the
strength of alliance cohesion. Their high per-capita defense spending,
military modernization, and interoperability enhancements with allies
demonstrate the potential of collective defense capabilities. Their
experience under Soviet occupation and willingness to confront
authoritarian pressure, exemplified by Lithuania's stance on Taiwan,
demonstrates how strong alliances effectively counter mutual
adversaries.
Mr. Scott. Given the Baltic States' critical role in European
security against Russian aggression, how does their stability influence
U.S. efforts to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region?
Admiral Paparo. The Baltic states' stability influences Indo-
Pacific security in three ways: First, their experience countering
Russian hybrid warfare and disinformation provides valuable lessons
against similar Chinese Communist Party tactics. Second, their
resilience inspires Indo-Pacific nations facing comparable pressures by
demonstrating that smaller countries can resist larger authoritarian
powers. Third, their strong democratic institutions and successful
resistance to authoritarian influence reinforce the credibility of the
global network of democracy-oriented nations.
Mr. Scott. What lessons from military cooperation with Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania-such as joint exercises or cyber defense
initiatives-can be applied to strengthen partnerships with Indo-Pacific
allies facing similar hybrid threats?
Admiral Paparo. Baltic states' experience countering Russian hybrid
warfare and disinformation efforts offers valuable lessons for Indo-
Pacific partners facing similar Chinese Communist Party tactics.
Mirroring the Baltics' emphasis on unified responses to hybrid threats,
we are standardizing multilateral activities and enhancing
interoperability among our Indo-Pacific partners. This network of
allies, built on shared values, mutual trust, and respect, is our
asymmetric advantage.
Mr. Scott. Estonia, in particular, is a global leader in
cybersecurity. How can its expertise in countering cyber threats inform
USINDOPACOM's strategies to protect critical infrastructure and
networks in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Paparo. USINDOPACOM welcomes future collaboration efforts
with Estonia to share cybersecurity best practices, lessons learned,
and emerging threat awareness to inform and mature our approach to
identifying and protecting critical infrastructure and key resources
(CIKR). As an opportunity, we would love to collaborate with Estonia on
the development of the Guam Cybersecurity Strategy, an FY25 NDAA
directive, that entails defense in depth analysis of government and
commercial infrastructure supporting mission requirements. This
partnership has the potential to assist USINDOPACOM'S effort to harden
regional CIKR, improving resiliency and availability that enables
mission success.
Mr. Scott. The Baltic States' geographic position makes them a
frontline for NATO's deterrence efforts. How does their resilience
against regional threats contribute to broader U.S. deterrence
strategies in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Paparo. The Baltic states' resilience demonstrates how
strong alliances and partnerships effectively deter authoritarian
aggression. We are strengthening Indo-Pacific relationships,
recognizing that capable partners are essential for regional stability
and security, especially given increasing military collaboration
between authoritarian states. We are building partner capacity,
enhancing interoperability, and fostering trust-based relationships to
create multiple dilemmas for potential adversaries, even without a
NATO-like alliance in our theater.
Mr. Scott. How can strengthened economic and technological
collaboration with the Baltic States, known for their innovation
ecosystems, support USINDOPACOM's goals of fostering resilient supply
chains and technological superiority in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Paparo. Strong partnerships with like-minded nations,
including the Baltic states, build diverse, trusted supply chains,
reducing dependence on potential adversaries while advancing shared
technological capabilities and economic interests.
Mr. Scott. The Baltic States have taken measures to limit Chinese
economic and technological influence in their region. What insights
from their approaches could guide U.S. and allied efforts to address
similar challenges in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Paparo. Our partners are countering Chinese economic
influence through a multi-layered approach: diversifying economic
partnerships away from Beijing, building indigenous technologies with
trusted allies - like Lithuania and Taiwan's drone technology
collaboration - to reduce exposure to predatory Belt and Road
Initiative projects, and joining alternative economic frameworks with
like-minded nations. We've seen Belt and Road investments decrease due
to international pushback, creating opportunities for us to strengthen
economic ties with partners through transparent and mutually beneficial
arrangements.
Mr. Scott. In the event USINDOPACOM or USFK captures enemy weapons,
will your command have to undergo the lengthy Civil Asset Forfeiture
process under United States law or can the enemy weapons be immediately
provided to our allies and partners? What logistical hurdles does your
respective command anticipate in cataloging, securing, and processing
captured enemy weapons for forfeiture under wartime conditions in
Europe? Are you expected to comply with U.S. forfeiture procedures of
enemy weapons, such as documenting the chain of custody, while
operating in a dynamic combat environment?
Admiral Paparo. Under the Law of War and Department of Defense
procedures, captured enemy weapons may be used immediately by U.S.
forces or temporarily provided to allies and partners if necessary for
military necessity, including self-defense. We must document these
temporary transfers. Longer-duration transfers fall under foreign
assistance authorities such as Title 10 US Code Section 333, and
require State Department concurrence.
Mr. Scott. Could the battle-tested lessons learned by the
Ukrainians potentially save the lives of American service personnel in
any future war against Communist China?
Admiral Paparo. Lessons from Ukraine demonstrate how to save lives
in a potential conflict with China. They serve as a stark reminder of
the high cost to be paid when lacking sufficient Integrated Air and
Missile Defense (IAMD), air and long-range fires superiority or the
Counter-Command, Control, Computing, Communications, Cyber,
Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Targeting (C-C5ISRT) key to achieving
it. We have also learned from the Ukrainians' use of low-cost
autonomous munitions against Russia's fleet despite having no navy of
their own. Leveraging information campaigns, declassified intelligence,
and use of social media provided Ukraine additional asymmetric
advantages. We are incorporating these lessons into our planning to
deter China and protect our forces.
Mr. Scott. Has the intelligence and data provided by Ukraine on
Russian technology, captured equipment, battlefield operational guides,
weapon performance, and countermeasures against U.S. and Allied systems
been useful to your command? Will it have saved the lives of U.S.
service personnel in a war against an enemy peer nation?
Admiral Paparo. Lessons and insights from Ukraine, especially
regarding unmanned systems and asymmetric capabilities, have been
valuable to our understanding of modern warfare. Analyzing advanced
capabilities in combat improves our preparations for future conflict,
but I cannot speculate on specific life-saving impacts.
Mr. Scott. Given the vast distance of your AOR, how do you assess
the potential role of seaplanes in enhancing INDOPACOM's readiness
particularly in remote areas?
Admiral Paparo. Seaplanes offer valuable capabilities to overcome
the tyranny of distance and access challenges in the Indo-Pacific. They
enhance force projection and sustainment, especially within the First
Island Chain, when equipped with the capability to render assistance to
battle damage under the principles of distributed maritime operations.
They complement our C-130s and unmanned platforms, bolstering
distributed logistics networks. Their ability to operate from remote,
damaged, or unimproved locations strengthens partner capacity building,
humanitarian assistance, and ISR operations, contributing to deterrence
through improved influence and access throughout the Pacific's remote
islands and atolls.
Mr. Scott. How could seaplanes support INDOPACOM's logistics and
rapid response capabilities, especially for humanitarian assistance,
disaster relief, or resupply missions to austere locations?
Admiral Paparo. Seaplanes enhance our operational resilience across
multiple Indo-Pacific mission sets, especially in austere environments
and areas lacking established runways. They strengthen distributed
operations with the ability to render assistance for ships that have
battle damage. They also support Agile Combat Employment, search and
rescue and personnel recovery capabilities, while improving mass
casualty response. Further, these platforms enhance humanitarian
assistance, disaster response, and logistics, enabling persistent
presence and rapid response capabilities that strengthen partnerships
and contribute to strategic deterrence in contested environments.
Mr. Scott. Japan presently operates the ShinMaywa US-2. What
opportunities do you see for integrating seaplanes into joint exercises
or operations to strengthen alliances and partnerships?
Admiral Paparo. Exercise VALIANT SHIELD offers excellent
opportunities to integrate seaplanes, especially in terms of search and
rescue, anti-submarine warfare, and maritime domain awareness.
Additionally, KEEN SWORD, PACIFIC ANGEL, BALIKATAN, FREEDOM EDGE, and
COBRA GOLD offer other joint and combined venues to incorporate
seaplanes and further strengthen alliances and partnerships.
Mr. Scott. Could seaplanes, with their ability to operate from non-
traditional bases, help mitigate challenges posed by adversary A2/AD
strategies in the Indo-Pacific theater?
Admiral Paparo. While not a panacea, seaplanes offer a unique
approach to mitigating some anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) challenges
by enabling distributed operations in the Indo-Pacific, especially
where adversaries threaten airbase infrastructure. Operating seaplanes
from diverse locations enhances operational flexibility and complicates
adversary targeting.
Mr. Scott. What are the primary challenges (e.g., sea states,
infrastructure, or maintenance) that INDOPACOM would need to address to
effectively integrate seaplanes into its force structure?
Admiral Paparo. Seaplanes do offer agility in several areas:
mitigating some anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) challenges, increasing
flexibility to operate from diverse locations (complicating adversary
targeting), enabling rapid access to remote areas, minimizing
logistical burdens and reducing reliance on limited Coast Guard and
naval assets. Speed of response and access to remote areas are
especially helpful in responding to disasters or humanitarian crisis,
like we saw with the 2014 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. ability
to rapidly respond in times of crisis also strengthens our
relationships with partners and allies, ultimately contributing to
deterrence through improved influence and access throughout the
Pacific's remote islands and atolls. Seaplanes may also add mass in our
maneuverability and the importance of overcoming the tyranny of
distance, further supporting force projection and sustainment
operations, while they potentially relieve some of the burden on our C-
130s. Any implementation of an enduring nature would require rigorous
analysis to include: lifecycle costs (moorage, maintenance-related
labor and repair part costs, etc.), basing agreements, recruiting and
training aircrews to fly and maintain the aircraft, and an assessment
of impacts on other existing programs to determine if seaplanes offer a
viable advantage.
Mr. Scott. The Indo-Pacific region frequently faces natural
disasters and maritime incidents. How could modern seaplanes bolster
INDOPACOM's SAR capabilities, particularly in remote areas of the
Pacific?
Admiral Paparo. Modern seaplanes would significantly enhance
theater search and rescue, especially in austere locations, offering a
potential paradigm shift in disaster response. Seaplanes provide rapid
access to remote areas, minimizing logistical burdens and reducing
reliance on limited Coast Guard and naval assets. This rapid response
capability is critical for disaster-vulnerable low-lying islands.
Mr. Scott. The U.S. military has a rich history of using seaplanes
in the Pacific, notably during World War II. Are there historical
lessons that INDOPACOM is drawing upon when considering the modern
application of seaplanes?
Admiral Paparo. World War II seaplane operations demonstrated the
strategic value of flexible basing and persistent reconnaissance,
particularly their ability to overcome the tyranny of distance and
access challenges by operating from remote, damaged, or unimproved
locations across the Pacific in support of distributed maritime
operations, sustainment, and theater-wide search and rescue. Modern
seaplanes can enhance these capabilities, and we are applying these
lessons through other distributed operations concepts that reduce
significant infrastructure dependence while contributing to strategic
deterrence in contested environments. We are exploring opportunities to
extend maritime patrol and reconnaissance capabilities through
locations like Adak, Palau, Peleliu, and Yap.
Mr. Scott. How do you envision the USCG's presence and mission set
evolving within INDOPACOM to address long-term security dynamics in the
Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Paparo. The Coast Guard provides unique diplomatic,
military, economic, and law enforcement capabilities in the Indo-
Pacific, especially where DoD presence is limited. It enhances maritime
domain awareness and strengthens regional partnerships, as demonstrated
through work with Malaysian maritime security forces. Coast Guard
collaboration with Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF West)
strengthens our ability to combat transnational threats, including
illegal fentanyl trafficking. Representing a key component of
USINDOPACOM's counter-lawfare activities to expose and oppose China's
weaponization of the law, the Coast Guard partners with the Republic of
Philippines, Palau, and across Oceania to safeguard sovereign rights,
strengthen legal capacity, and promote legal vigilance. I continue to
advocate for increased Coast Guard resources, including Arctic
operations and ice-breaking missions.
Mr. Scott. How does the USCG enhance INDOPACOM's maritime domain
awareness through its unique authorities and capabilities, such as
vessel tracking and intelligence sharing?
Admiral Paparo. The Coast Guard provides unique diplomatic,
military, economic, and law enforcement capabilities in the Indo-
Pacific through information and intelligence sharing and patrolling in
areas where the DoD doesn't typically maintain presence. Programs like
the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) partnership enhance
maritime domain awareness by integrating emerging technologies,
enabling vessel identification, detecting automatic identification
system (AIS) spoofing, and supporting regional fusion centers. Coast
Guard liaisons, including embedded officers in USINDOPACOM, and
partnerships with nations like Malaysia, improve their maritime domain
awareness and facilitate information sharing between partners.
Mr. Scott. What are the primary operational or logistical
challenges for USCG assets operating in the vast Indo-Pacific theater
under INDOPACOM, and how are they being addressed?
Admiral Paparo. Vast distances, maintenance facilities, and afloat
refuel (tanker) availability are the primary challenges for Coast Guard
assets in the Indo-Pacific. USINDOPACOM mitigates these challenges by
integrating the Coast Guard into our maritime component during
exercises and day-to-day operations, to share resource requirements,
improving logistical support. Continuing these efforts will enhance the
Coast Guard's regional maritime security contributions.
Mr. Scott. How does the USCG contribute to INDOPACOM's efforts to
build maritime security capacity among Pacific Island nations, and what
specific programs or deployments are proving effective?
Admiral Paparo. The U.S. Coast Guard contributes to maritime
security and capacity building through bilateral law enforcement
agreements, commonly referred to as ship rider agreements, such as the
one with Tonga since 2009 to counter Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated Fishing (IUUF). The Coast Guard provides vessel transfers
through the Excess Defense Article program (e.g., the former U.S. Coast
Guard Cutter Munro to Sri Lanka and U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Mellon to
Vietnam). It also conducts joint training and exchanges and helps
establish new Coast Guard capabilities, such as assisting Malaysia in
developing their own coast guard. Cutters homeported in Hawaii and Guam
operate throughout the Indo-Pacific, playing a critical role in
maintaining regional maritime security. Amid China's increasing
illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive gray-zone activities
threating our regional allies and partners, the U.S. Coast Guard
provides valuable capabilities to address regional maritime security
challenges, significantly enhancing capacity-building efforts in
coordination with USINDOPACOM through several targeted initiatives and
programs. First, the USCG maintains and actively implements bilateral
law enforcement agreements that allow local maritime law enforcement
officers to embark on U.S. vessels. These agreements, commonly known as
Shiprider Agreements, are in place with multiple Pacific Island
nations, including Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea,
Vanuatu, Palau, and Samoa. Additionally, the Coast Guard also conducts
joint exercises, exchanges, and training programs. Notably, the U.S.
Coast Guard has deployed mobile training teams to support courses
focused on Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing and
Maritime Law Enforcement. The Coast Guard transfers decommissioned
vessels to partner nations through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
program, significantly enhancing their maritime operational
capabilities. The Philippines has received multiple U.S. Coast Guard
cutters under this program and employs them to protect its sovereignty
against gray-zone activities. Japan: USCG has a robust relationship
with the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) bilaterally, in two separate
Trilateral Maritime Security partnerships (with Philippines and South
Korea), and the Quad Maritime Security Dialogue with Australia and
India. USCG coordinates regional training programs with JCG building a
true team environment to empower regional partners in South East Asia
and in Oceania. Operationally, USCG routinely conducts joint sails and
search and rescue exercises when in the region. USCG Academy also has a
growing partnership with the JCG Academy. Philippines: The USCG's
largest recipient for resident training is the Philippines Coast Guard
(PCG). In addition, the USCG is funded via Department of State INL to
work with the PCG to develop, strengthen and empower the PCG as they
grow their force both in personnel, and in capabilities. Operationally,
when in the region in uncontested waters, the USCG conducts joint
patrols and has conducted SAR and oil response exercises in addition to
assisting in two significant oil response incidents. USCG maintains a
robust tri-lateral partnership with Japan and the Philippines to
address maritime environmental response, search and rescue and training
among other topics. Taiwan: The USCG has an excellent working
relationship with the Taiwan Coast Guard Authority (TCGA), coordinated
through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), via a 2021 Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU)establishing a Coast Guard Working Group (CGWG).
TCGA and the USCGA have conducted HADR and SAR exercises together
outside of contested waters. In the past five years, the USCG has sent
six training teams to Taiwan for law enforcement and emergency response
courses and hosted six students at resident USCG courses in the United
States. Additionally, two TCGA Cadets are currently attending the U.S.
Coast Guard Academy, one of whom will graduate in May 2025. Recent
examples of impactful engagement include: MCA ops off of Philippines
(C7F request) - National Security Cutter (NSC) STRATTON, ECC ops
enroute to Busan - NSC STRATTON, CARAT Thailand MIO/VBSS support (C7F
request) - Maritime Security Response Team-West (MSRT-W), CARAT Timor
Leste MIO/VBSS support (C7F request) - MSRT-W, SAMA SAMA MIO/VBSS
support (C7F request) - MSRT-W, CARAT Brunei MIO/VBSS support (C7F
request) - MSRT-W, SAREX with TCGA (not public) - NSC STRATTON, Tri-lat
exercise with PCG & JCG - NSC STRATTON, Tri-lat with KCG & JCG - NSC
STRATTON, TACON to 7th Flt for SCS - NSC STRATTON, QUAD observers sail
- NSC STRATTON, COFA territorial integrity patrol - NSC STRATTON, 2
port calls in Japan, 1 in PHL - NSC STRATTON, Search and Rescue
Activities - Exercise BALIKATAN
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
Mr. Moulton. Admiral Paparo and General Brunson, what does a
reduced integrated air and missile defense posture in the region mean
as far as protecting US assets that are located there?
General Brunson. In the event of a directed reduction of our
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) posture, the ability to
protect and defend assets on the Korean Peninsula would be
commensurately reduced. DPRK's chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons programs, formidable missile force (ballistic and cruise), and
growing drone capability pose a threat to the US military and civilian
personnel in country, as well as to critical ROK infrastructure such as
ports and airfields. The US and ROK possess a robust, layered, and
persistent IAMD network of sensors and shooters ready to defend
military and civilian critical assets. While the ROK-JPN-USA tri-
lateral sharing agreement will continue to provide situational
awareness and early warning for US assets off the Korean Peninsula,
reduced IAMD within the ROK will reduce capability to mitigate DPRK's
ability to strike US and ROK forces and critical infrastructure.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. Noh, based on Ranking Member Smith's questions
regarding the Administration's commitment to the INDOPACOM region. Can
you explain how pulling out Patriot batteries from South Korea
demonstrates that commitment?
Mr. Noh. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, United States
Forces Korea (USFK) rotationally deployed personnel and equipment from
the Korean theater of operations. South Korean government and Ministry
of National Defense were notified. This temporary deployment provides a
flexible deterrence option to protect U.S. national interests abroad.
Mr. Moulton. As the Original Classification Authority for INDOPACOM
Command, and in accordance with your Security Classification Guidance,
can you provide the classification of the following:
Prior to an imminent, kinetic, INDOPACOM strike, targeting a
foreign actor:
The exact launch time of any portion of the strike package
Accompanied by the weapons system to be used Accompanied by the weapons
launch platform The time on target for a specified weapons system The
time on target for a weapons launch platform Note: Please provide an
unclassified response, if the question cannot be fully answered in an
unclassified manner please provide additional details at the necessary
classification level.
Admiral Paparo. The details of the USINDOPACOM security
classification guide cannot be discussed in this forum. I will provide
a response in an appropriate venue.
Mr. Moulton. Admiral Paparo and General Brunson, what does a
reduced integrated air and missile defense posture in the region mean
as far as protecting US assets that are located there?
Admiral Paparo. A reduced integrated air and missile defense (IAMD)
posture significantly degrades our ability to protect critical bases
and infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific. Patriot and THAAD batteries
protect our assets and demonstrate commitment to regional stability,
while also freeing DDG availability for a broader range of missions to
deter adversaries. We face increasingly sophisticated threats from sUAS
to hypersonic weapons and maneuverable re-entry vehicles from China and
North Korea. Without robust IAMD capabilities including air and space
sensing (including space-based ISR) along with sufficient capacities of
threat and cost-informed effectors, we increase the risk to our
forward-deployed forces and infrastructure while simultaneously
weakening our regional deterrent posture.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY
Mr. Kelly. ADM Paparo, one concern I hear often from warfighters is
about our force posture-not just how much capability we have in-
theater, but where it's located and how fast it can respond. Do you
believe our forces are in the right places to respond quickly and
decisively to a contingency in the Indo-Pacific? Specifically, how
would moving Marines out of Okinawa impact your ability to respond in
the region?
Admiral Paparo. USINDOPACOM's theater-wide posture strategy ensures
our joint forces are ready to respond rapidly and effectively to
regional crises, deter malign activities, and, if necessary, prevail in
conflict. We are constantly working to improve our posture and are
making meaningful progress. For example, we have effectively employed
our expanded unspecified minor military construction authority and
Defense Wide appropriations to fund and execute posture-improving
projects across the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of
Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia. Regarding the Marine
relocation from Okinawa, we are working with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Government of Japan to ensure the
right forces are in the right places at the right time. We remain
committed to executing the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) with
our Japanese counterparts using a conditions-based approach.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CROW
Mr. Crow. In previous iterations of the NDAA, Congress directed DOD
to develop a plan for updating and expanding existing infrastructure on
Guam to support U.S. forces and facilities, including improving energy
resilience for DOD equipment and facilities. What steps has DOD taken
to incorporate independent renewable energy sources into its planning
to update and expand the energy infrastructure on Guam?
Mr. Noh. The Department supports improving energy resilience for
DoD operations in Guam. DoD coordinates its investments in Guam across
Components and integrates its efforts with civilian infrastructure
partners. Through the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization
Act, Congress established the Under Secretary of the Navy as the
responsible official for coordinating infrastructure projects to
support members of the armed forces and their families in Guam and the
Commonwealth of Northern Marianas Islands. I would refer you to the
Department of the Navy for more information on improving energy
resilience of Guam.
Mr. Crow. Access to energy is particularly critical for enabling
distributed units to operate effectively in the absence of direct
logistical support. Renewable energy sources like renewable-powered
microgrids present both environmental opportunities and strategic
advantages. That's why I lead a Sustainable Power Initiative, which
brings defense and energy experts together with policymakers to discuss
how we improve military readiness and resilience. What steps has
INDOPACOM taken to incorporate renewable energy sources into its
sustainment and resiliency efforts?
Admiral Paparo. USINDOPACOM focuses near-term energy resilience
efforts on hybrid-electric technologies and microgrids while expanding
fuel distribution networks and storage capabilities across 56 key
locations. We have explored electrification and solar effects, but our
primary emphasis remains ensuring resilient and redundant energy
systems throughout the theater that are underpinned by traditional
capabilities. The immediate solution that we depend upon includes
advanced digital controls for generators and energy storage to optimize
utilization of the available fuel while supporting the lethality of our
forces. Should a service implement advanced capabilities like small
modular reactors and hydrogen-based energy systems, we are prepared to
incorporate these into our operational planning and exercises and look
forward to the opportunity to experiment with associated new
technologies.
Mr. Crow. Based on existing reporting, DOD/military-owned and -
operated electrical power capability on Guam is limited and the Guam
Power Authority (GPA) is the primary provider of electrical power for
the U.S. military. Admiral, is that accurate? What is your assessment
of the reliability of the GPA's energy infrastructure?
Admiral Paparo. Guam Power Authority (GPA) is the primary power
provider for Guam, including Department of Defense (DoD) installations.
The existing power plants are aging and require frequent maintenance
and repair, straining the system. The new Ukudu Combined Cycle
Combustion Turbine Power Plant is coming online, which will improve
reliability and allow for the retirement of older plants, some over 50
years old. GPA is modernizing its distribution system by combining
renewable energy projects with an effort to move distribution lines
underground.
Mr. Crow. PRC aggression is one of the most serious challenges to
U.S. national security in the Indo-Pacific. Any potential conflict with
China would likely feature large-scale, joint-domain maritime
operations with implications for massive civilian population centers
across the Indo-Pacific, notably in Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines.
How does INDOPACOM plan to enhance civilian harm mitigation and
response in the Indo-Pacific? What additional steps are we taking to
prepare the operational environment to reduce the potential of civilian
harm?
Admiral Paparo. Our ability to precisely apply lethal effects in
combat while mitigating and responding to civilian harm is critical to
achieving our strategic objectives. To do this, we apply Civilian Harm
Mitigation and Response resources, such as intelligence, fires, and
command and control joint warfighting functions, to improve battlefield
awareness, reinforcing these functions through exercises, including the
upcoming PACIFIC SENTRY exercise.
Mr. Crow. Policy experts and service members overwhelmingly agree
that the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMRAP)
improves our operational effectiveness and provides strategic
advantages, yet there are individuals within the DoD that seek to
dismantle civilian protection efforts. What is the importance of CHMR
during potential large-scale combat operations (LSCOs) against near
peer adversaries?
Admiral Paparo. Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response-which
enhances lethality-strengthens coalition unity, operational
credibility, and public support, which are key to countering Chinese
aggression. In large-scale combat operations, it enables commanders to
use force precisely while safeguarding mission legitimacy and reducing
operational friction in complex civilian environments.
Mr. Crow. Cultivating alliances and partners in the Indo-Pacific is
critical to deterring, and if necessary, fighting and winning a
conflict in the Pacific. The expertise built by INDOPACOM to train,
advise, and fight alongside partner forces will be invaluable to such
an effort. What are some of the things your forces are doing there to
train and enable partner forces? How are we applying lessons learned
from Europe and the Middle East to the Pacific?
Admiral Paparo. Our forces train and enable partners through joint
exercises, operational partnerships, and security cooperation programs.
These activities enhance interoperability, strengthen regional defense
capabilities, and facilitate intelligence sharing. We have expanded
trilateral cooperation with Japan and Australia through exercises like
KEEN EDGE and increased engagement with the Philippines through
Exercise BALIKATAN. USINDOPACOM is adapting lessons from Europe and the
Middle East by prioritizing multi-domain operations, integrated defense
systems, and asymmetric warfare, tailored to the Indo-Pacific. This
includes heavy investment in unmanned systems, information operations,
cyber capabilities, and initiatives like "Replicator" to enhance
deterrence through technological superiority.
Mr. Crow. I am interested in understanding how we can better assess
the capabilities and resolve of some of our partner forces' will to
fight. Can you speak to the current resolve and will of partners like
Taiwan and Japan to fight in future possible conflicts in the Indo-
Pacific?
Admiral Paparo. I am confident in Japan's and Taiwan's resolve and
will to stand against unprovoked aggression. Japan demonstrates strong
resolve through its National Security Strategy, recognizing peace and
stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to regional
security. Japan actively works with us to bolster U.S. posture,
particularly in its southwest islands. Taiwan's resolve, whole-of-
society approach to defense, and ability to fight are critical for
deterrence. We continue modernizing capabilities and developing new
operational concepts with Taiwan, strengthening their defense in
accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN
Mr. Bergman. APS-3 ships are currently fully loaded, crewed, and
able to sail within days. If moved to Reduced Operating Status in
Texas, reactivation, loading, and transit could take two to three
months. What is the operational impact of replacing a days-ready
capability with one that may arrive too late in a high-end contingency?
Admiral Paparo. The APS-3 vessels themselves are currently planned
to transition into a Ready Reserve Status and are expected to be
maintained by the Military Sealift Command (MSC). A portion of the
equipment has been downloaded in the theater, with a portion currently
downloading for a maintenance inspection in South Carolina, before
being returned to theater in the first quarter of FY26 (based on
current coordination between USARPAC and Department of the Army). APS-3
includes an infantry brigade set, a sustainment brigade, a theater
opening/port operations set, engineering, and medical treatment sets.
These specific capabilities are those we need to rapidly respond in
crisis to enable the rapid building of combat power and provide options
to the SECDEF and the President. Going forward, working with the
Department of the Army, our intent is to preposition the right
equipment sets in the right places in support of tasks within our
operational plans and contingency plans. Downloading and prepositioning
is carefully coordinated and at the invitation and with the permission
of our Allies, so we can further increase the responsiveness and
increase its survivability through dispersion. USINDOPACOM has already
downloaded portions of APS-3 including logistics, engineering, and
medical equipment sets in the Philippines and Australia.
Mr. Bergman. Are you aware that the Army has ordered three of the
five remaining APS-3 ships to depart the Indo-Pacific this month,
offload in Charleston, and await transfer to Reserve Operating Status?
Admiral Paparo. I am aware of the Department of the Army Execution
Order.
Mr. Bergman. Do you believe the Army's plan to deactivate APS-3 and
place the five government-owned ships in Reserve Operating Status
without cargo in Texas strengthens INDOPACOM's readiness for conflict,
or is it a cost-cutting move that reduces sealift capacity in the
Pacific?
Admiral Paparo. Currently, the APS-3 vessels are planned to
transition into a Ready Reserve Status and are to be maintained by the
Military Sealift Command. A portion of the APS-3 equipment was
downloaded in the USINDOPACOM theater, with the remainder being
returned to theater in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2026 based on
current coordination between USARPAC and Department of the Army. Any
temporary loss of capacity of APS-3 equipment degrades readiness and
reduces response options for the Joint Force. I refer you to the U.S.
Army and USTRANSCOM regarding costs associated with the leasing and
life-cycle management of these vessels.
Mr. Bergman. Given that APS-3 ships are fully loaded, forward-
deployed, and ready to sail within days, do you consider them a
critical part of the Indo-Pacific's prepositioned posture?
Admiral Paparo. Forward-deployed APS-3 ships do represent important
capabilities and flexibility for our theater, in which vast distances
present a hurdle we must overcome in pursuit of any response options.
While these assets offer significant advantages for rapid force
projection, I remain open to exploring alternative strategic mobility
and prepositioning strategies to meet our responsive logistics support
requirements across the Indo-Pacific.
Mr. Bergman. APS-3 ships are Military Sealift Command-operated gray
hulls. Do they meet the standard of government-owned, mission-ready
assets required in a contested environment?
Admiral Paparo. I would refer you to query USTRANSCOM and Military
Sealift Command (MSC) to respond to the standards held by these
organizations.
Mr. Bergman. You've identified lift capacity-by sea or air-as a
major gap. It took 73 C-17 flights to move one Patriot battalion. If
APS-3's operational status is reduced, how will that sealift gap be
filled? How critical is APS-3 to providing scalable, ready logistics in
the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Paparo. Limited air and sealift capacity remains a key
challenge in the Indo-Pacific where vast distances complicate rapid
force deployment. As a result, the APS-3 vessels can provide critical
capabilities to augment sealift requirements. Vessel movements
complement our airlift options and provide more efficiency in moving
large quantities of heavy equipment. The movement by aircraft is 10 to
14 times faster but is much more expensive and scales to much greater
mass and energy. My theater lift requirements remain unchanged, and I
will continue working with USTRANSCOM to ensure my inter and intra
theater movement needs are clearly understood.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHERRILL
Ms. Sherrill. Last month, Secretary Hegseth visited Japan where he
announced the commencement of phase one in upgrading US Forces Japan
(USFJ) into a Joint Forces Headquarters. This is a vital step in
strengthening the US-Japan security alliance and will encourage the
Japanese government to continue modernizing the Japanese Self-Defense
Forces. Why do you believe it is important for the US to strengthen its
military partnership with Japan and establish a Joint Forces
Headquarters?
a. What is the estimated timeline and what are the key milestones
for upgrading USFJ to full Joint Forces Headquarters?
b. Are you considering increasing the number of service members
stationed in Japan as the Joint Forces Head Quarters is established?
Mr. Noh. The upgrade of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) demonstrates the
significant work the Department is doing to posture American forces and
the U.S.-Japan Alliance to more effectively deter China. It also
reflects the progress the Alliance has made towards improving
interoperability and Japan's own advances in strengthening its
indigenous capabilities. Through this process, the Department will
improve U.S.-Japan cooperation on joint operations capabilities as
Japan establishes its own joint operations command and USFJ expands its
missions, operations capabilities, and authorities. Developing joint
warfighting capabilities and enhancing interoperability with Japan will
greatly strengthen our deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific region,
and, if necessary, ultimately allow the Alliance to prevail in a
conflict.
Transforming USFJ into a joint force headquarters (HQ) that can
more effectively conduct operational activities in Japan - operating as
a warfighting HQ, if required - and better coordinate with Japan Joint
Operations Center requires a phased approach. In March, the Secretary
announced the commencement of Phase One of the upgrade of USFJ to a
joint force HQ. The most important aspect of this phased approach is
the expansion of USFJ missions, operational capabilities, and
authorities.
The Department's priority is enhancing the functions of the joint
force HQ and providing necessary resources for USFJ. The Department
will carefully review USINDOPACOM resource requirements as we continue
work to delineate the roles, missions, and functions of the upgraded
USFJ.
Ms. Sherrill. Last month, Secretary Hegseth visited Japan where he
announced the commencement of phase one in upgrading US Forces Japan
(USFJ) into a Joint Forces Headquarters. This is a vital step in
strengthening the US-Japan security alliance and will encourage the
Japanese government to continue modernizing the Japanese Self-Defense
Forces. Why do you believe it is important for the US to strengthen its
military partnership with Japan and establish a Joint Forces
Headquarters?
a. What is the estimated timeline and what are the key milestones
for upgrading USFJ to full Joint Forces Headquarters?
b. Are you considering increasing the number of service members
stationed in Japan as the Joint Forces Head Quarters is established?
Admiral Paparo. The alliance with Japan is vital for Indo-Pacific
stability and security. Establishing a Joint Force Headquarters for
U.S. Forces Japan deepens our alliance and integrates us with Japan's
Self-Defense Forces. This headquarters enhances cross-domain
coordination (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace), enabling faster
decision-making and increased interoperability. We expect full
implementation within three to five years. Phase one, currently
underway, focuses on structural changes and aligning operational
commands to establish command-and-control mechanisms for better joint
and bilateral force integration in Japan. For example, USFJ serves as a
standalone Joint Force Headquarters separate from 5th Air Force and its
other service components in Japan. Phase two will establish integrated
advanced planning and expand joint capabilities, including further
U.S.-Japan personnel integration. Additionally, Phase three will
represent the fully manned and equipped Joint Force Headquarters to
fulfill all operations through the continuum of conflict and range of
military operations. USFJ achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC)
in March 2025 with enhancements to their Headquarters. USFJ is
comprised of three directorates: the Joint Staff, the Alliance
Management Directorate, and the Japan Joint Operations Center (JJOC)
Cooperation Team (JCT). The Joint Staff and the Alliance Management
Directorate will continue their legacy mission. The recently
established JCT is based out of Akasaka Press Center/Hardy Barracks and
represents a tangible commitment to enhancing operational synergy
between USFJ and JSDF. This transformation drives interoperability by
streamlining communication and coordination for a more seamless
response to crises, including natural disasters and security threats.
The JCT reflects the deepening of our alliance with Japan and our
shared commitment to regional security. The USFJ upgrade will involve
personnel growth to support enhanced headquarters functions. These
adjustments will ensure we have the right people, skills, and
positioning to effectively execute our mission and deepen cooperation
with Japan. Currently, USINDOPACOM is already using assigned forces to
augment USFJ in support of its transformation as a JFHQ. We will
continue to assess personnel requirements as the headquarters develops
while optimizing force structure for bilateral operations. Any
adjustments will balance strategic goals, efficiency requirements, and
integration with our Japanese counterparts. We will continue to keep
Congress apprised as the transformation continues.
Ms. Sherrill. Do you believe that the PRC is closely watching the
Russian invasion of Ukraine and are you aware of Russia sharing any
lessons learned from the conflict with the PRC? a. Have you seen the
People's Liberation Army incorporate any lessons learned from Russia's
invasion of Ukraine?
b. How do you believe Ukraine's ability to resist the Russian
invasion has influenced the PRC's calculus for a potential invasion of
Taiwan?
c. Do you believe the US and our allies' military support for
Ukraine and Russia's failure to achieve a quick victory have had a
deterrent effect on the PRC's possible invasion of Taiwan?
Admiral Paparo. China is clearly studying and applying lessons from
Ukraine, particularly in information warfare, international support,
defense self-sufficiency, and economic resilience. These lessons are
shaping Chinese military operations and wartime doctrine. Taiwan has
also learned valuable lessons about deterring a more powerful
aggressor. We are working with Taiwan to modernize their capabilities
and develop new operational concepts under the Taiwan Relations Act.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIMENEZ
Mr. Gimenez. In the written testimony you provided, you mention the
grave concern of alliances between China, Russia, and North Korea.
We've also seen recently that North Korea deployed troops to support
the Russian war in Ukraine, with reports yesterday that several Chinese
nationals working with Russian Forces were taken prisoner by Ukrainian
forces. How do we make the message clear to our allies and partners
that they need to increase their defense spending, given this increased
cooperation amongst malign and adversarial nations?
General Brunson. The U.S. continues to expose cooperation between
our adversaries, particularly China, Russia, and the DPRK. Our network
of allies and partners in the INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)
have responded positively to counter that cooperation and maintain our
"Fight Tonight" readiness. One prominent example of this cooperation
revolves around our allies' commitment to the Regional Sustainment
Framework (RSF) initiative. More than an economic decision for our
regional partners, our allies recognize the benefits of maintaining,
repairing, and overhauling U.S. forces ships, aircraft, and major
equipment in theater. The RSF decreases the "tyranny of distance" in
sending major end items back to CONUS for repair, keeping them in the
area for rapid repair and return to warfighting readiness. Faced with
evolving security challenges on the Korean peninsula and within the
INDOPACOM AOR, USFK is committed to modernizing its sustainment
strategy in coordination with our allies and partners to ensure
agility, effectiveness, and ability to provide a responsive force
posture capable of supporting both peacetime and crisis scenarios.
Through continued collaboration between USFK and our allies and
partners in the region, we are effectively countering the cooperation
of our adversaries and ensuring we are collectively able to fight and
win as a team.
Mr. Gimenez. In your provided statement, you mention the transition
to advanced platforms like upgraded ships and new aircraft as a
required military capability for INDOPACOM. This committee has been
very focused on Defense Acquisition Processes, and I have concerns
about our current system producing capabilities for the warfighter in a
reasonable time. What is your assessment of the current Defense
Acquisitions Process, do you believe it is producing capabilities for
the warfighter and speed and scale necessary to deter adversaries like
China? What changes would you make to the current Acquisitions process?
As the USINDOPACOM Commander, what struggles do you have with
individual service components holding most of the buying power for the
DoD?
Admiral Paparo. I need acquisition processes that deliver
capabilities at the speed and scale required to maintain our
competitive advantage against China's rapidly advancing military
modernization. Traditional 10-15 year timelines fail to match
technological change and our operational requirements in the Indo-
Pacific. I advocate for expanded rapid acquisition authorities,
increased experimentation, and greater combatant commander influence
over procurement decisions to ensure we field the joint, integrated
capabilities required in the Indo-Pacific.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RYAN
Mr. Ryan. Commercial capabilities for AI and data integration are
able to provide a common operating picture and enable effective C2 in
order to increase joint warfighting capability and AI-augmented
decision to significantly increase the scale, speed, and accuracy of
the targeting process. How are you using commercial capabilities to
meet these needs, particularly with regard to supporting certain CJADC2
requirements and fill current capability gaps?
Admiral Paparo. My command leverages new technologies while
investing in infrastructure improvements and cybersecurity to enhance
operational flexibility. We collaborate with the Defense Innovation
Unit to harness commercial technologies, strengthening our information
processing and multi-domain data sharing across the Pacific. These
partnerships and investments improve our ability to respond effectively
to regional developments throughout the Indo-Pacific.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. DAVIS
Mr. Davis. In preparing for conflict in the Indo-Pacific, gathering
granular, detailed data about how the Taiwanese and Chinese populations
view the prospect of a potential invasion can be a critical element in
how we use American soft power.
What are some of the innovative technologies and strategies
INDOPACOM is using to establish strategic deterrence and assess
Taiwan's capabilities in the event of a Chinese blockade or full-scale
invasion?
Admiral Paparo. We use innovative technologies and strategies,
including unmanned systems developed under Replicator, to enhance
deterrence. We advocate for rapidly equipping Taiwan with asymmetric
defensive systems and work closely with them, in accordance with the
Taiwan Relations Act, to assess and enhance their ability to resist
Chinese malign actions and aggression, including blockade or invasion.
Mr. Davis. As we assess force posture and influence across the
Indo-Pacific, how is INDOPACOM incorporating human geography data and
intelligence information-including localized sentiment, trust in
institutions, behavioral patterns, and economic vulnerabilities-into
its planning, intelligence, and operations? Do we have adequate
capabilities to monitor and assess, at scale and with sufficient
geographic precision, the cognitive and societal effects of both PRC
and U.S. actions across the AOR? Specifically, do our existing
capabilities support robust, data-driven measures of effectiveness to
assess the impact of PRC and US operations, security cooperation, and
influence efforts-particularly within China and partner nations
targeted by PRC soft power and gray zone operations?
Admiral Paparo. We monitor key indicators of Chinese activity in
the Indo-Pacific, but recognize the need to better understand the
broader societal and cognitive impacts of both U.S. and Chinese
actions. Improved data analysis capabilities would help measure the
effectiveness of influence operations and countering CCP gray zone
tactics. We leverage regional partnerships and information sharing
networks to develop improved data-driven methodologies to enhance our
assessments, contributing to regional stability and effective
competition in the information domain.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TRAN
Mr. Tran. As cost-saving measures are being taken across the
interagency, do you believe there is a greater need to leverage U.S.
private capital to improve resiliency in the Indo-Pacific and push back
against China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)? If so, what would that
look like specifically?
Admiral Paparo. There is a critical need to leverage private
capital given China's continued use of economic statecraft for
influence. China shifted focus to smaller, green technology Belt and
Road Initiative projects; offers at-cost communications technology
under the Digital Silk Road; and use state-owned enterprises to invest
in key industries and infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region and
around the world. We must mobilize private equity to invest in enablers
of lethality - digital infrastructure, energy, strategic ports,
airfields, and logistics facilities - to support our military posture
and positioning. Where the national security case exceeds the business
case, we must use targeted government financing to maintain our
advantage.
Mr. Tran. Huntington Ingalls recently signed an MOU for
shipbuilding collaboration with South Korean shipyard, HD Hyundai Heavy
Industries, which may pave the way for greater collaboration between
our two countries. Do you think agreements such as these - whether they
include maintenance or shipbuilding - will increase our ability to meet
our readiness requirements? And what authorities are necessary for the
services to utilize these kinds of strategic business relationships?
Admiral Paparo. Strategic partnerships like the one between
Huntington Ingalls and HD Hyundai expand our defense industrial base,
helping address naval maintenance and shipbuilding challenges. This
agreement strengthens our alliance with South Korea. By maximizing
these partnerships, we can significantly increase our ship-making
capability. The PLA is building surface combatants at the rate of six
per year. The United States is building surface combatants at the rate
of 1.6 per year. While the PLA is building two submarines per year, the
United States is presently producing 1.28 attack submarines per year.
In terms of worldwide ship capacity, the United State is 1% of
shipbuilding while the global total built in Korea is 23% and Japan is
15%. We've got to keep pace and avail ourselves of our partners' unique
shipbuilding expertise where it makes sense, while we regain our own
shipbuilding expertise in the United States.
Mr. Tran. As the Department continues to prioritize operational
readiness and effectiveness, do you believe USINDOPACOM could benefit
from gaining additional acquisition authorities? What are some examples
of specific authorities that would be needed?
Admiral Paparo. USINDOPACOM requires rapidly developed solutions
for critical capability gaps exceeding our current Service Component
contracting capacity. I advocate for acquisition authority and
increased resourcing for a Joint Rapid Capabilities Office solely
focused on USINDOPACOM requirements to support this effort. We would
work with Congress and the services to provide funding to expand and
sustain these products once they are successfully demonstrated. The
goal is to develop integrated minimum viable products that can be
deployed rapidly to the joint force while production can be scaled to
provide the mass required.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BELL
Mr. Bell. With the current Administration dismantling USAID and
global programs committed to soft diplomacy, what steps is the
Administration taking to counter China's expanding influence through
the Belt and Road Initiative and military diplomacy?
Mr. Noh. The United States has a strong interest in a securing a
free and open Indo-Pacific. I will defer to the State Department to
outline the Administration's diplomatic efforts to counter China's
growing influence. For the DoD, we are focused on deterring China by
strengthening our own force posture and capabilities and assisting our
allies and partners throughout the region to strengthen their own
defense capabilities.
Mr. Bell. We have seen China expand its footprint among Pacific
Island nations, resulting in nations switching diplomatic recognition
from Taiwan to China and some signing security agreements with China.
Does the Administration have a plan to implement further military
and security cooperation with Pacific Island nations?
Mr. Noh. In the Pacific Islands region, we are accelerating force
posture projects as part of an overall effort to reestablish deterrence
in the Indo-Pacific. This includes the Freely Associated States, where
we enjoy exclusive access rights under the Compacts of Free Association
and related agreements. The Department also continues to build capacity
in the Pacific Islands through the DoD State Partnership Program as
well as regular exercises.
Mr. Bell. How is USINDOPACOM addressing China's growing military
presence and activities, particularly in the South China Sea, Taiwan
Strait, and the Indo-Pacific region as a whole?
Admiral Paparo. Our strategy prioritizes operations and activities
in the Western Pacific and South China Sea, positioning us to deter
Chinese aggression and assure allies and partners of our commitment to
shared interests and security. We are improving interoperability with
capable and willing allies and partners while expanding the scope and
scale of bilateral and multilateral exercises and operations.
Additionally, we are improving our posture and access in U.S. and
allied territories to keep forces forward longer, while conducting
operations, activities, and investments to build allied resilience,
promote innovation cooperation, and increase defense industrial base
capacity across the region.
Mr. Bell. I want to ask you about the F-15EX. With the vast
geographic expanse of the INDOPACOM region, how valuable is the F-
15EX's extended range and payload capacity in sustaining operations
across the Pacific?
Admiral Paparo. Due to its excellent range, diverse large capacity
payload options, and multi mission capability, the F-15EX is especially
well suited for operations in the Indo-Pacific Theater and would
provide me tremendous capability. It expands decision space through its
long-range strike, air defense, and maritime domain awareness
capabilities. Its advanced radar, open mission systems architecture,
and electronic warfare suite enable effective integration with our 5th
generation aircraft. The F-15EX directly supports our rapid response
requirements and contingency options in the Indo-Pacific.
Mr. Bell. How does the F-15EX's ability to carry stand-off weapons
like hypersonic missiles enhance your ability to hold targets at risk
and maintain deterrence?
Admiral Paparo. Diverse long-range precision fires and platforms
across all domains strengthen our deterrence posture and operational
resilience. I advocate for a variety of hypersonic strike capabilities,
including through the F-15EX platform, which provides a flexible and
survivable capability that adversaries cannot easily counter. The F-
15EX's characteristics enhance our ability to strike emerging targets
and expand our planning options across the theater.
Mr. Bell. Several Indo-Pacific allies still operate legacy F-15
variants. Does the F-15EX provide unique opportunities for
interoperability, training or burden-sharing with key partners like
Japan and South Korea?
Admiral Paparo. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
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