[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
BUILDING BRIDGES, COUNTERING RIVALS:
STRENGTHENING U.S.-ASEAN TIES TO COMBAT
CHINESE INFLUENCE
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HEARING
OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
June 10, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-23
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-418PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida, Chairman
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York,
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey Ranking Member
JOE WILSON,, South Carolina BRAD SHERMAN, California
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee AMI BERA, California
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
ANDY BARR, Kentucky DINA TITUS, Nevada
RONNY JACKSON, Texas TED LIEU, California
YOUNG KIM, California SARA JACOBS, California
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan Florida
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, GREG STANTON, Arizona
American Samoa JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio JONATHAN L. JACKSON, Illinois
JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
THOMAS H. KEAN, JR, New Jersey JIM COSTA, California
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York GABE AMO, Rhode Island
CORY MILLS, Florida KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
KEITH SELF, Texas GEORGE LATIMER, New York
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI Jr, Maryland
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware
JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington
RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania
James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director
Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
YOUNG KIM, California, Chairwoman
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas AMI BERA , California, Ranking
ANDY BARR, Kentucky Member
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, BRAD SHERMAN, California
American Samoa JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RYAN ZINKE, Montana JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
JAMES MOYLAN, Guam GABE AMO, Rhode Island
SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI, Maryland
RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania
Tom Hill, Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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REPRESENTATIVES
Page
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Young Kim............. 1
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Ranking Member Ami Bera........ 2
WITNESSES
Statement of Gregory Poling, Director and Senior Fellow of The
Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency
Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies..... 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Statement of Barbara Weisel, Nonresident Scholar, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.............................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Statement of Lynn Kuok, Lee Kuan Yew Chair, Southeast Asia
Studies, Brookings Institution................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 56
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 58
Hearing Attendance............................................... 59
Questions for the Record
Questions submitted to Dr, Lynn Kuok from Rep. Biggs............. 60
Questions submitted to Mr. Poling from Rep. Biggs................ 63
Questions submitted to Mrs. Weisel from Rep. Barr................ 64
BUILDING BRIDGES, COUNTERING RIVALS:
STRENGTHENING U.S.-ASEAN TIES TO COMBAT CHINESE INFLUENCE
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Tuesday, June 10, 2025
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:24 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Young Kim (chair
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mrs. Kim. of California. The Subcommittee on East Asia and
the Pacific will come to order. This hearing aims to explore
strategies for countering China's influence within the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, while enhancing
the United States' engagement in the region. I now recognize
myself for opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN YOUNG KIM
Again, welcome to the East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee's
hearing titled Building Bridges, Countering Rivals:
Strengthening U.S.-ASEAN Ties to Combat Chinese Influence. This
hearing presents an opportunity for us to examine China's
growing footprint in ASEAN and to discuss ways the U.S. can
counter it by strengthening cooperation across economic,
security, diplomatic, and law enforcement sectors.
China has long prioritized Southeast Asia in its foreign
policy, using diplomacy, infrastructure investment, and trade
to entrench its influence. In contrast, U.S. economic
engagement has stumbled. Initiatives like the Trans-Pacific
Partnership and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for
Prosperity aimed high but failed to deliver meaningful market
access or address trade imbalances.
Despite our inability to engage economically, we continue
to build robust relationship with countries like the
Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore. But we too often
underestimate ASEAN's collective weight in our own Indo-Pacific
strategy.
We need to ensure the United States has a genuinely
responsive and effective strategy to remain the partner of
choice in ASEAN and ask ourselves, where have our past
strategies in Southeast Asia fallen short? What legislative
tools can strengthen our regional position? Are our frameworks
aligned with ASEAN partners' priorities?
Despite China's reach, the United States is the preferred
long-term partner of choice for many ASEAN countries. In the
2025 State of Southeast Asia Survey, 52.3 percent favored the
United States over China, recognizing our leadership in
investment, security, innovation, and shared values.
On security, the United States has made real strides,
expanding maritime security with the Philippines and partnering
with other South China Sea nations on law enforcement, maritime
safety, and capacity-building training, enhancing disaster
response and maritime governance capabilities.
Economically, however, we are underleveraged. While China
remains ASEAN's top trading partner, the region is a $4
trillion market with enormous potential, especially in critical
minerals, regional trade, and development financing. The threat
of Chinese dominance isn't going away. China is aggressively
pursuing deals, over 100 secured just this April with Vietnam,
Malaysia, and Cambodia. These efforts reflect Beijing's
recognition of growing U.S. engagement and its desire to blunt
it.
We must show ASEAN partners that China's promises rarely
deliver lasting benefits. We also need a bold, whole-of-
government strategy, one that affirms our leadership,
reinforces our alliances, and upholds the sovereignty and
rules-based order that underpins a free and open Indo-Pacific.
So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and
your expertise will guide us in crafting stronger, smarter U.S.
policy in Southeast Asia.
So let me now recognize the ranking member from California,
Mr. Bera, for your opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER AMI BERA
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here on what is a
timely conversation in an important region, Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia is home to more than 650 million people and
has some of the fastest-growing economies in the world,
critical sea lanes, and key partnerships in our interest as we
look at peace and prosperity and sovereignty in the Indo-
Pacific. Collectively, the Southeast Asian ASEAN nations
represent the fifth-largest economy in the world, and it's our
fourth-largest export market. So what we do here in Congress,
the choices that we make, the partnerships and deals that we
put together, matter intensively.
That is why I really do have some concerns about the Trump
administration's approach. Obviously, sweeping tariffs have
created a lot of uncertainty in the region. But hopefully, it
creates some opportunities.
Not each country has been looked at equally, and if I think
about a country like Singapore, this is a country that we have
a free trade agreement with, we have mechanisms to resolve
issues, and we have a $2.8 billion trade surplus with
Singapore. So we are doing quite well with a country like
Singapore.
I would also think about the opportunities--in my
conversations with some of our ASEAN Ambassadors, they don't
want to be put into a position where they have to make a choice
between China, which is in their neighborhood, or the United
States. But the uncertainty that has been created by the Trump
administration approach has brought into clear focus that they
don't want the United States leaving their markets either.
So this is a time to engage in trade negotiations and
perhaps look for those opportunities where we can reduce those
trade barriers. As someone who was a supporter of TPP, as much
as I would love to go back and see if we could join the CPTPP,
that probably is a ways off. But can we do digital trade? We
ought to be able to do digital trade. It is in our interests,
and certainly, it is in their interests.
Now, if Vietnam is willing to contemplate going to zero
tariffs, let's engage in what that looks like. Can we work with
countries in the region like Indonesia to help develop
redundant supplies of critical minerals and develop their
geothermal capabilities? We ought to think about that. Can we
work with places like Vietnam that do have energy resources in
their EEZ that are being harassed by the PRC? We ought to work
there.
And the Philippines, certainly, they have experienced the
brunt of much of the harassment in South China Sea. How do we
work with nations like the Philippines and others to continue
to deepen and return to where we historically have been with
the Philippines?
So there is many more opportunities. Again, the Trump
administration's approach is not how I would go about doing
this, but we are where we are. We have got to double down on
our conversations, look for those partnerships, create those
redundant supply chains, and bring the Southeast Asian nations
closer together, not as a choice between China and the United
States but recognizing the unique assets, the unique
opportunities, the vibrant young population, and the dynamic
economies of the region.
So, with that, Madam Chairwoman, let me go ahead and yield
back. I am going to look forward to hearing the testimony of
the witnesses.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
Other members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record. And we are now
pleased to have distinguished panel member witnesses before us
today on this very important topic.
First, Mr. Gregory Poling is Director and Senior Fellow of
the Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency
Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies. Thank you for joining us.
Ms. Barbara Weisel, nonresident scholar at Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, thank you for being with us.
And Dr. Lynn Kuok, Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia
Studies at the Brookings Institution.
This committee recognizes the importance of the issues
before us and is grateful to have you here to speak to us
today. Your full statements will be made part of the record,
and I will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5
minutes to allow time for member questions.
Let me now recognize Mr. Poling for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY POLING
Mr. Poling. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Kim, Member
Bera, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am
honored to share my views before you today on the topic of
U.S.-ASEAN cooperation to combat China's influence in the
region.
Before I begin, I should note that CSIS, my home
institution, does not take policy positions, so the views
represented are mine and mine alone.
In my testimony, I have been asked to address both U.S.
cooperation with ASEAN in the maritime domain, particularly
South China Sea, and more broadly on the geopolitical front.
And I am happy to say that, on the first, I think the U.S. and
its allies and partners, particularly the Philippines, are
doing a remarkable job of holding the line in the face of
Chinese coercion.
On the second, the broader competition for influence in the
region, I worry that the U.S. is putting at risk what has
traditionally been its stronger position over China and most of
the countries of Southeast Asia. When it comes to the South
China Sea, China seeks to control all activity, peacetime and
military, in clear violation of international law. This is a
direct threat to U.S. national interests, longstanding U.S.
commitments to freedom of the seas, which has been an abiding
U.S. interest since the earliest days of the republic.
It is also a direct threat to our oldest ally in the Indo-
Pacific, the Philippines. This has been recognized by
administration after administration, Republican and Democrat.
And the U.S. has done a remarkable job in both showing its own
flag, pushing back on Chinese coercion, and helping build the
maritime capacity of partners and allies in the region to
maintain their own presence in disputed waters, even in the
face of what China now has: the largest Navy, the largest Coast
Guard, the largest missile force in the world.
Under Xi Jinping's leadership, China, for the last decade
plus, has engaged in a campaign of coercion in what is often
called the gray zone, just below the level of military force,
using Coast Guard vessels and Militia vessels to intentionally
create risks of collision, to bully and intimidate smaller
states into giving way in the South China Sea.
That campaign had a great deal of success for the better
part of a decade. For the last 3 years, that has not been the
case. For the last 3 years, starting at the end of the Rodrigo
Duterte administration in the Philippines but accelerating
under the current presidency of Ferdinand Marcos Jr., we have
seen the Philippines stand tall for the first time in quite a
while.
The Philippines engaged in a nearly year-and-a-half-long
standoff with China from 2023 to 2024 in order to resupply and
repair its facility the BRP Sierra Madre on Second Thomas
Shoal, an underwater feature, despite the largest presence of
Chinese Militia and Coast Guard we have ever seen deployed in
the South China Sea.
By December 2023, the Philippines were sailing two to three
ships up against 50 Chinese vessels, didn't blink, managed to
get through, often with a U.S.-paid overhead and with the
U.S.'s repeatedly stated commitment to defend the Philippines
should China use force. And it was China that blinked, not the
Philippines, in that standoff.
On the oil and gas front, we have seen Vietnam, for the
first time in many years, developing new oil and gas fields
despite a persistent Chinese Coast Guard presence in its
waters. Malaysia, over the last 2 years, set new records for
drilling offshore wells in disputed waters. Even Indonesia,
which has traditionally not viewed itself as a part of this
dispute, has begun to receive forceful bullying and coercion
from the China Coast Guard because of new oil and gas fields it
is developing, and it has done so anyway.
What we see is a Chinese strategy that is clearly
floundering. And all the U.S. really needs to do is continue
course in order to make sure that China continues to flounder.
Where I am more worried is on our overall influence in the
region.
As Chairwoman Kim said, if you look at public opinion
polling, elite opinion polling, U.N. voting records,
educational data, the U.S. remains the partner of choice. The
United States is more trusted. Its leadership is more sought
after globally. It is more popular in most places in Southeast
Asia.
In the Philippines and Vietnam, the U.S. has enormous leads
over China in every metric you could imagine. In Indonesia, the
largest country in the region, Indonesians are conflicted, but
in general they dislike China a great deal more than they
dislike the U.S., although that did flip last year, and I worry
that it will remain the case in the future that China may begin
to edge us out in Indonesia.
While you have pro-Chinese elites in charge in places like
the military junta in Burma or in Cambodia, when you look at
public opinion polling, Cambodia and Burma are the third and
fourth most pro-American publics in Asia. Even in Laos and
Thailand, the U.S. holds its own. It is really only in Malaysia
where we see China making any considerable ground on this issue
of soft power, of influence, of whose leadership do you
support.
And to be clear, the U.S. cannot win a geopolitical
strategic competition with China with military and economic
might alone. At the end of the day, it is a competition over
the rules and institutions of the international order. And that
requires other countries to agree with us more often than they
agree with China.
That means that we need to not forget the power of
attraction, not just coercion and compulsion, that we have to
be the preferred partner, not just the partner that one has to
side with. And so, as we have seen the winding down----
[Simultaneous speaking.]
Mrs. Kim. of California. Can you please wrap up? Sorry.
Mr. Poling. Yes, ma'am--on USAID, VOA and Radio Free Asia,
as we've seen the pauses on Fulbright and student visa
interviews, I worry that we are undermining that multi-decade,
latent advantage we have in being the preferred partner. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Poling follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
I now recognize Ms. Weisel for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF BARBARA WEISEL
Ms. Weisel. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera,
and distinguished members of this subcommittee for the
invitation to appear before you today. My name is Barbara
Weisel, and I am currently a nonresident scholar at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace but previously spent
nearly two decades working on Southeast Asia at USTR and have
many thoughts on your question on how the U.S. can strengthen
ties to ASEAN to counter China.
As well recognized by members of this committee, Southeast
Asia is an important U.S. economic partner. It is our fourth-
largest export market and a central player in global supply
chains. U.S. businesses have long been invested in these
dynamic markets, and their ties have expanded in recent years
as businesses, with U.S. Government encouragement, sought to
diversify away from China.
ASEAN countries stood to benefit directly from these
diversification efforts and hoped they would help strengthen
economic ties to the U.S., commensurate with our expanding
military relations. But the U.S. imposition of tariffs has
created anger and confusion in ASEAN regarding their relations
with the U.S. and resentment about the unilateral nature of
U.S. actions.
While ASEAN countries have long been concerned about
China's dominance in the region, they see the imposition of
tariffs as a much more immediate threat and direct assault on
their economies. Facing a five-alarm fire set by the United
States, they will not only avoid antagonizing China, their
largest two-way trading partner, but welcome its overtures of
greater economic cooperation.
It is also likely that the U.S. will reach bilateral
agreements with ASEAN in the coming weeks or months. To
accommodate the U.S., Southeast Asian countries will commit to
lower their tariffs and address longstanding trade barriers and
increase purchases of U.S. LNG, agriculture planes, and other
goods.
At the same time, they will pursue de-risking strategies
that lessen their economic dependence on the U.S. and expand
trade and investment ties to China and other partners. So,
while the U.S. may see some immediate results from the tariff
leverage it has exerted over Southeast Asian countries, if
China is the threat about which the U.S. is most concerned,
then we need to keep our eye on the ball.
We need to build an affirmative ASEAN economic strategy
that relies on carrots, not just sticks. This strategy should
build trust and certainty and deepen our economic partnership.
It also should capitalize on ASEAN's interest in keeping the
U.S. engaged in the region, create room for Southeast Asian
countries to work with the U.S. on curbing unfair trade
practices from China, and foster ASEAN integration to promote
regional stability and security.
Let me briefly offer five proposals for deepening economic
ties. First, we should promote development of the Southeast
Asian critical minerals sector and U.S.-ASEAN critical minimal
supply chains even as we work to build our own capabilities in
this sector. These efforts should include negotiation of
critical minerals agreements with select Southeast Asian
countries. These agreements should include criteria for trusted
critical mineral supply chains and guaranteed supplies of
critical minimal resources for U.S. industry, as the Japanese
Government has successfully done.
Second, the U.S. should swiftly pursue a plurilateral
digital agreement with Southeast Asian countries trying on the
commitments the U.S. Government is pursuing in its bilateral
agreements with ASEAN countries. Maintaining U.S. leadership
and setting digital trade rules is vital, given this sector's
role in U.S. innovation and economic growth and to ensuring the
U.S. remains at the forefront of the AI revolution. Doing so
also would support U.S. efforts to counter China's model of
digital authoritarianism.
Third, the U.S. should propose a customs cooperation
initiative that demonstrates its willingness to work in
partnership with ASEAN as a group to tackle this priority
issue. Many Southeast Asian governments already are
strengthening rules in this area, but a U.S.-ASEAN customs
cooperation agreement would better position ASEAN to deal
collectively with transshipment from China.
Fourth, Congress should fully fund U.S. economic statecraft
tools, including reauthorization of DFC this year. Similarly,
to promote U.S. exports, Congress should reauthorize the
Export-Import Bank next year and ensure adequate funding for
the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.
And last, the U.S. should consider regionalizing the trade
commitments it is negotiating bilaterally with ASEAN countries,
building out an ASEAN agreement with rules of origin that limit
nonparties from benefiting and including rules in critical
areas to U.S. competitiveness.
In exchange, the U.S. should gradually eliminate tariffs on
imports from Southeast Asian parties to the agreement. A
regional agreement with reciprocal commitments would
incentivize Southeast Asian countries to deepen supply chains
with the U.S. in ways that can promote U.S. manufacturing and
exports.
Again, thank you for this opportunity to share my views,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Weisel follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you, Ms. Weisel.
Let me now recognize Dr. Kuok for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF LYNN KUOK
Dr. Kuok. Thank you so much, Chairwoman.
Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera, members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify. It is
an honor to be able to contribute to this important
conversation on strengthening U.S. engagement with Southeast
Asia, a region that is at the geographic as well as the
strategic heart of the Indo-Pacific.
You have both outlined why Southeast Asia matters, so let
me just say that despite its economic and strategic importance,
the region remains a weak link in U.S. Indo-Pacific engagement.
U.S. influence in the region is declining, and China is
gaining ground. Both yourself, Chairwoman, and Greg mentioned
how the United States is the partner of choice. But in a
regional survey in 2024, the survey showed for the first time
the majority of respondents in Southeast Asia actually choosing
to align with China over the United States if they were forced
to choose. Now, that margin was slim, overall 50.5 percent
versus 49.5 percent. But support dropped dramatically in some
countries, including all three Muslim majority countries by
about 20 percentage points.
The 2025 survey you mentioned reflected a modest U.S.
rebound, but it was conducted very early in the year, from
early January to mid-February, and preceded several
developments, most notably the April 2 announcement of tariffs.
This hit all countries in Southeast Asia, including some of its
poorest. Cambodia, Laos, and war-torn Myanmar face a 49
percent, 48 percent, and 44 percent tariff level respectively.
These Liberation Day tariffs have triggered a strong
backlash in the region. ASEAN leaders recently expressed deep
concern over these unilateral tariff measures, and the
Singapore prime minister warned that they undermine the global
trading order that the United States helped build and declared
bluntly that these are not actions that one does to a friend.
What began as frustration over limited U.S. engagement, or
limited U.S. economic engagement, in the region is now concern
over counterproductive policies. Washington is not just missing
an economic action in Southeast Asia; it is inflicting real
damage. Tariffs, as well as aid cuts, are hurting Southeast
Asian countries.
Now, for years, relatively weak U.S. engagement was offset
by the important security role it plays. But that, too, is
increasingly cast in doubt as Washington recalibrates away from
longstanding allies and partners in Europe and the President
openly questions defense commitments. Lack of clarity around
U.S. goals in the Indo-Pacific compounds these concerns as the
possibility of a grand bargain or even a more limited economic
detail entailing concessions to Beijing on issues vital to
allies and partners, such as the South China Sea or the U.S.-
Philippine Alliance, sows further doubt about American intent,
consistency, and staying power.
U.S. standing in the region has also been badly hurt by its
handling of the Gaza crisis. Now, although a loss for the
United States doesn't necessarily mean a win for China, Beijing
has been very proactive about continuing to deepen its regional
ties through trade, through investment, through infrastructure,
and through consistent diplomacy.
And as you mentioned, Chairwoman, in the weeks after the
April 2 tariffs, Beijing visited Southeast Asia and concluded
113 deals. And even if few of those materialize, the signal was
clear that China is a consistent and reliable economic partner,
while the United States throws a wrecking ball at the global
trading system.
Beijing's actions in the South China Sea are a serious
irritant in its relations with its neighbors, particularly the
Philippines and Vietnam. But I think China has been remarkably
adept at containing the fallout both with the use of economic
incentives as well as quiet diplomacy.
Southeast Asia does not want to choose between the two
countries, and they will continue to hedge for as long as
possible. But China's growing sway hampers Washington's ability
to engage bilaterally and multilaterally in the region to
strategic effect.
I have detailed policy recommendations for the U.S.
Government and legislative proposals in my written testimony,
but very broadly, these touch on three areas that the United
States must act on: first, economic engagement. For the region,
economics is security, and failing to understand this leaves
Washington on the back foot. Congress can lead by, first,
reviewing tariffs; second, advancing targeted trade agreements
in strategic sectors, like digital infrastructure and critical
minerals; and third, bolstering funding support for
infrastructure and development.
The second main area that the United States needs to work
on is strengthening its alliances and partnerships in Southeast
Asia. It has done well with the Philippines, but what is
necessary at the moment is commitment at the very highest
levels to treaty commitments and expanding economic and
strategic engagement with key regional players, including
Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia.
And finally, the third area, defending international law
and maritime rights--international law reduces conflict risks
and advances concrete U.S. interests. The second Trump
administration should maintain the strong stance that it
adopted during its first term, when it made regular lawful
assertions of passage rights and freedoms of the seas and when
it affirmed the merits of the 2016 tribunal decision, a step
that the previous administration had failed to take.
Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member, and members of the
subcommittee----
Mrs. Kim. of California. Well, let's continue the
conversation during----
Dr. Kuok. Sure.
Mrs. Kim. of California.--question and answer period.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kuok follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you so much. I appreciate
all of the witnesses giving your opening testimoneys and for
the recommendations that you are making. And we can hopefully
get into that more.
And let me start with the first round of questioning. As
you all mentioned, we want to be the partner of choice, and our
ASEAN partners are waiting for us to show up. And we need to
provide a clear and consistent economic framework for the Indo-
Pacific region. But unfortunately, we have--U.S. has struggled
to regain momentum in economic engagement following its
withdrawal from TPP.
So, Ms. Weisel, what elements of the TPP and IPEF prove
effective and ineffective, and how can future agreements
demonstrate strong commitment to Southeast Asia's developing
goals while safeguarding our U.S. interests?
Ms. Weisel. Thank you for the question. I think, in terms
of TPP, I mean, TPP is now in force. The U.S. is not a party to
that agreement. So it was a successful agreement
notwithstanding the fact that we are no longer a party.
I think that what was successful about TPP was, first, that
it was a very high-standard agreement and included a lot of
issues that had not been part of previous trade agreements that
advanced rules that were of importance to U.S. economic
competitiveness, including on things like intellectual
property, on state-owned enterprises and competition in other
areas.
In looking back at what we would want to do were we to
pursue a free trade agreement with the region, I think there
are definitely additional areas/updates that you would want to
consider and things that we learned, for instance, over the
last couple years about resilience of supply chains, about our
competition with China, that you would want to add to an
agreement like that that were not issues then. But as in all
free trade agreements, there are new generations of agreements,
new issues that you need to think about and incorporate in
updated agreements.
IPAF, I think, was, in my view, more of a political
agreement than an economic agreement and that the purpose of
that was to demonstrate to our trading partners that we were
going to be engaged in the region. We wanted them to commit to
a range of issues related to areas of mutual concern, including
related to supply chains.
But we were not prepared to discuss market access in any
way, and I think that that really hobbled the effort. I also
think that our decision not to engage on digital trade was
problematic and something that we would want to revisit going
forward.
Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
As we strengthen our strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific,
particularly with ASEAN partners like the Philippines, Subic
Bay, which I visited, is again emerging as a critical location
for U.S. logistics and operational planning. And our defense
cooperation agreement with the Philippines grants us access to
sites like Subic. But we must balance our military presence
with Philippines' constitutional limits on foreign bases and
sensitivities to national ressentiment, which has historically
complicated our security cooperation.
Mr. Poling, keeping this delicate balance in mind, what
specific capabilities or pre-positioned assets would most
enhance deterrents at Subic?
Mr. Poling. Thank you, Chairwoman. The most important thing
for the Philippines--well, I suppose there is two. One, it
needs asymmetric capabilities, much like Taiwan or anybody else
facing a giant neighbor. This is not a footrace the Philippines
can possibly win.
So seeing more deployments like the NMESIS right now,
Tomahawks paired with Philippines' own midrange land-based
capabilities like the BrahMos missiles they bought from India,
is key. It allows the Philippines to hold Chinese vessels in
the South China Sea at risk in a situation in which there is no
number of hauls that they could possibly be sold or loaned that
would make up for the asymmetry they face.
The second is presence. At the end of the day, there is no
military solution to the South China Sea. The Philippines needs
to be able to show the flag. And they have done a remarkably
good job with a very limited Coast Guard and Navy. We need to
see more uncrewed platforms. We need to see more cheap vessels.
We need to see more support for Philippine basing in the
islands, and that doesn't mean U.S. boots on the ground, but
the U.S. could be providing more funding for the Philippines to
buildup its own facilities, as China and Vietnam do as well.
Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
One of the most pressing challenges in the region is
China's dominant grip on critical mineral supply chains,
especially for material vital to clean energy and defense
technologies. And we mentioned Indonesia is the world's top
producer of nickel. This is critical for battery technologies.
But it is alarming that Chinese companies control 75 percent of
Indonesia's nickel-refining capacity.
Ms. Weisel, what are the implications of China's choke hold
on critical mineral supply chains for the U.S. and allied
nations?
Ms. Weisel. Well, I think we are seeing the results of that
choke hold in our industries today where China can limit access
to critical minerals, and then it also controls these critical
minerals from other countries. So I think all of this is quite
disturbing and just reinforces the need for the U.S. to
establish its own supply chains with the region.
I think, as I mentioned in my testimony, Japan has had
quite a good deal of success in trying to limit its reliance on
Chinese critical minerals by promoting its relationships with
the region. They have an organization called the Japanese
Organization for Metals and Energy Security that has the
purpose of ensuring stable supplies of critical minerals and
energy for Japan.
Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you----
Ms. Weisel. The result of that, and something I think we
should be looking at, is that they have been able to
successfully diversify their sources of critical minerals. And
in the funding that they use for this organization that's known
as JOGMEC, they have----
Mrs. Kim. of California. Yes. Sorry, my time is up. So let
me yield my time to Ranking Member Bera for his questioning.
Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
And we can stick to the topic of critical minerals. Japan
built those redundant supplies after facing economic coercion
and retaliation from China, I think, in terms of choking off
some of those. And we are certainly at risk and experiencing
some of that potential risk right now. So there is an
importance in expedience to not just develop our own domestic
supplies but also look at, in a strategic way, how we go into--
you know, whether that is Vietnam, Malaysia, other--Indonesia--
and build redundant supplies.
And I would argue, in the Biden administration, the mineral
security partnership gives us some vehicles by which to work
with countries like Japan, Korea, and others to help build
those and perhaps even go into--you know, the Koreans are going
into Mongolia--perhaps go into other areas.
But this is--I would agree with you, Ms. Weisel, that I
think this is a key area where we can deepen our relationship
in a positive way with Southeast Asian nations, and we should
do so.
And, Chairwoman, I think we have a hearing actually coming
up soon looking at that particular issue.
Let's go back to digital trade for a second. While I wish
we could go back to TPP, I clearly thought digital trade was
something that we would get under the Biden administration, and
obviously it didn't happen. It is in our interest, certainly in
the region's interest.
We can work off some of the existing digital trade models,
whether that is taking the digital trade chapter out of USMCA
or looking at some bilateral pieces. But maybe, each of you, if
you wanted to just touch on the importance of getting a digital
trade deal done.
Maybe we will start with Dr. Kuok and then work to the left
with the region.
Dr. Kuok. Thank you very much. In terms of the importance
of a digital trade agreement, China is embedding its digital
norms in the region through its deals with countries like
Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, et cetera. And once those norms--the
technology and the norms--are embedded, it becomes quite
difficult to reverse.
So, there is very little downsides to moving quickly on
this issue. And the U.S. should be alert to it, lest it be in
the same position as it is now in terms of critical minerals
where it allowed China to invest in Indonesia, since Indonesia
banned the export of nickel and allowed China to invest heavily
in its nickel processing.
The United States was asleep at the wheel in that respect,
and I think it needs to redouble its efforts in terms of
reaching and arriving at a digital trade agreement with
Southeast Asian countries.
Mr. Bera. Right.
Ms. Weisel?
Ms. Weisel. Yes, I would just add that China is active in
this region. They have just recently updated their China-ASEAN
agreement, which now includes additional digital commitments.
And there is active cooperation between the two. So I think
that is something that we really should keep a close eye on.
But I also would note that the EU is engaged with a number
of ASEAN regions, and the EU has a different approach to
digital trade rules than we do. So, absent the U.S. direct
engagement in the region, we are ceding it to others.
Mr. Bera. Mr. Poling?
Mr. Poling. I would just reinforce that last point. We have
325 million people in a world of eight billion and growing. We
can either help set rules in partnership with others, or we can
end up taking the rules.
What we have already seen is almost everybody in Southeast
Asia has now adopted a European-style GDPR regime. They did
that because we had no alternative. And they asked and asked
and asked, and we didn't present it.
Later this year, ASEAN will likely release its own digital
economic framework agreement. We don't know what rules will be
in there, but they won't be rules that the U.S. helped set. And
that will be the story as long as we decide to take our ball
and go home.
Mr. Bera. Great. While IPEF would not have been the
approach that I would have taken. It was an approach that the
Biden administration took. And in our conversations, we looked
at it as a high-standard negotiation, but not each country
could actually meet--whether it was the labor standards,
environmental standards, et cetera.
And I think how I pitched it to the administration--and I
would pitch it to the Trump administration--was in a modular
way, right? It is easy for us to do a trade deal with Singapore
and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea. It is essential for
us to do a trade agreement with Indonesia, Vietnam,
Philippines, Malaysia.
And each of those countries may not, at this particular
moment in time, be able to meet those high standards. But if we
use a carrot approach, if we use--and I agree with you. It is
not really a trade deal without market access because obviously
that is what folks want.
If the Trump administration is listening, I would strongly
urge us to--in a bipartisan way--to try to figure this out. And
if we don't set the norms and the rules, somebody else is, and
we may not like them when we wake up.
I will yield back.
Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
Let me now recognize Representative Moylan of Guam for 5
minutes.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Ms. Chairwoman.
And as Guam often serves as first point of contact with the
U.S. for many ASEAN countries, I am very enthusiastic about
further advancing our relationship with them. In the early
2024, the U.S. surpassed China as ASEAN's largest export
market. This dynamic economic development underscores the
importance of strengthening our economy tie with the regional
group.
However, the potential benefits of ASEAN are not limited to
economics alone. ASEAN also plays a critical role in promoting
regional stability and maritime security, deepening the
cooperation for natural disasters and more.
Given China's growing influence in the region, it is
imperative that we develop a comprehensive strategy to enhance
our engagement with ASEAN, counter China's influence, and
secure our national interests in the region.
As for the economic aspect, the U.S. is the largest source
of cumulative foreign district investments, FDI, in ASEAN and
overtook China as the largest export market this year. Now,
while we need to address unfair trade practice in general, we
also need to consider the potential ramifications of proposed
tariff increase on ASEAN countries since many of them have
export-dependent economies.
To avoid the risks of these countries deepening their
economic dependence to China, we should update our strategic
engagement with them to promote economic prosperity both in the
region and the U.S. and to build a more resilient supply chain.
When it comes to regional security and maritime security,
the most urgent issue is China's aggression in South China Sea.
Many incidents of harassment against Philippine ships by
Chinese Coast Guard vessels have been reported. And although
ASEAN members don't all share the same stance toward China, if
we can encourage them to share a common position on this issue,
it would serve a powerful voice to deter further aggression.
Mr. Poling, could you describe how opinions among ASEAN
members are divided on South China Sea disputes? Also, how can
the U.S. encourage them to adopt a more unified position to
secure freedom of navigation and maritime security?
Mr. Poling. Thank you, Congressman. The Philippines is
obviously the farthest on this spectrum if we were to lay it
out. It has been the most forward-leaning in defending its
rights. It has been the clearest in articulating the legal
nature of its rights and its objections to China's through its
arbitral victory.
Just behind the Philippines have been Vietnam. There is no
country on earth, when you look at polling, that has more
skepticism or anxiety about China or views China more as a
revisionist threat than Vietnam, and that is because of China's
aggression toward Vietnam in the South China Sea.
Vietnam has been quietly supportive of the Philippines'
arbitral victory in 2016. It has forged bilateral--quiet
bilateral--Coast Guard cooperation with Manila. It has engaged
in its own large buildup of its facilities in the Spratly
Islands in order to contest Chinese control.
After that, there is a steep drop-off, I am afraid, of the
other claimants to the waters or islands of the South China
Sea. Indonesia, which hasn't often considered itself a
claimant, has probably been the most forward-leaning in
contesting Chinese activity. And Indonesia has had the clearest
articulation, other than the Philippines, of what is illegal
about China's claims.
Malaysia has tended to bury its head in the sand and try to
ignore the issue, at least at the political level. Of course,
Indonesian Cost Guard personnel and naval personnel are as
frustrated by China as anybody. Of the non-claimants, Singapore
has really been the only one that has taken a firm position on
the illegality of China's claims.
And I think we have to recognize that there will never be a
coherent ASEAN position on the South China Sea. Thailand, Laos,
Cambodia--they are not going to invite Chinese retaliation on
themselves in support of the Philippines or Vietnam. And so
there has to be a claimants' grouping, but not an ASEAN
grouping.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you very much.
Ms. Weisel, based on your experience in the U.S.
Government, including U.S. trade representative, how do you
assess the potential impact of the proposed tariff increase on
ASEAN members? What do you see as the most effective way to
advance our economic interest in the region? Sorry; you have
very little time.
Ms. Weisel. I think that the actions, as I said in my
statement, have really put the U.S. at a disadvantage. The U.S.
is seen as kind of impulsive, unpredictable, unilateral actions
that is causing ASEAN to reflect on what it needs to do to
hedge the risk against the U.S. and is forcing them to lessen
their reluctance to work with China because they have no other
choice.
If they are going to be threatened by the United States,
then they are going to be more open to working with China. And
we have put them in that position.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
Let me now recognize Representative Amo of Rhode Island for
your 5 minutes' questioning.
Mr. Amo. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim.
And thank you to our witnesses for being here. As we have
discussed, ASEAN is just an essential partner to the United
States. It is an opportunity for American power but also for
global collaboration. And I believe the Biden administration
understood this and made ASEAN central to our Indo-Pacific
strategy.
But I am concerned about the Trump administration's foreign
assistance freeze, the chaotic tariffs, and what that has done
to really take an axe to our relationship with ASEAN nations.
And of course, as we have discussed already today, this really
works against our efforts to counter China's influence in the
region. And Trump's chaos and uncertainty has undermined our
credibility as a partner while doing its part to hurt American
businesses.
Even worse, China is already stepping in to fill the void
that we have left behind, and in one particular way I want to
highlight in my time today. I am worried about a potential axe
to the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, as
we all know, the DFC. The DFC provides an enormous return on
investment to the American taxpayer, advancing the United
Sates' foreign policy goals and our economic interests, a true
definition of a win-win.
And the United States private sector is consistently the
largest source of foreign direct investment in the ASEAN
region. The DFC is also a perfect counter to China's Belt and
Road Initiative, providing an alternative to that coercive
financing scheme. In the first three and a half years of the
Biden administration alone, the DFC advanced over $1.4 billion
in private sector investments in the ASEAN countries.
So, Dr. Kuok, as we work on legislation to reauthorize the
DFC, how do you think we can ensure that the DFC continues
working successfully in the ASEAN region to support our allies
and combat China's growing influence?
Dr. Kuok. Thank you very much, Congressman. I think you are
right to point out the strategic damage that the withdrawal of
aid has done to the United States. Two caveats on aid--first,
having aid in and of itself might have hurt, U.S. ability to
engage with some of the regional governments who saw aid as
meddling from the United States, or some forms of aid as
meddling from the United States. And there are some reports
that suggest that the strategic return on U.S. aid was unclear.
Nonetheless, the sudden and abrupt withdrawal of aid from
the United States to some of these countries sends an
unfortunate message of U.S. callousness, especially when it
impacts programs that mean the difference between life and
death in these countries, such as humanitarian assistance,
health programs, and demining, which as you pointed out, China
has already stepped in to fill.
On development finance, this is clearly something that the
United States need to step up on. And I urge greater focus in
this respect. China's Belt and Road Initiative, which you
mentioned, was initiated in 2013. Amendments or revisions to
the Build Act came in 2018, some 5 years after China's Belt and
Road Initiative.
Since then, the United States has had various
infrastructure initiatives, development and infrastructure
initiatives, including the Build Back Better World, which was
then repackaged as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure
Investment. And all of this is all well and good and very much
appreciated in Southeast Asia, but it hasn't yet shown any
concrete development in Southeast Asia.
So urgency is the key here. Otherwise, it starts to feel
like old wine in new bottles. So, certainly, the region is in
urgent need of infrastructure development, and all of this
should have happened yesterday. If not, today or tomorrow would
be great.
And this is not just in the region's interest. It is in the
U.S.'s interest, as well, as it seeks to reduce regional
reliance on China as well as increase U.S. access in the region
as well.
Mr. Amo. Well, thank you.
I see my time is close to expired, so I will yield back.
Thank you.
Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
I would like to now recognize the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Representative Mackenzie, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mackenzie. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I appreciate the testimony today. It is a very important
topic as we seek to combat the rising influence of China. And I
think we all would like to make sure that we have greater bonds
between the U.S. and the ASEAN countries that we are talking
about here today.
So, for Ms. Weisel, we have seen in the trade disputes
between the U.S. and China the restrictions that have been
placed by China on critical minerals coming into the U.S., and
what that means for our economic vibrancy is felt all across
our economy, potentially.
And so are there opportunities that you see for us to build
greater relationships with other countries in the region so
that we could have a diversified supply chain in this area?
Ms. Weisel. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I
think there absolutely are opportunities to build closer ties
and stronger supply chains. We know this from going back to the
first Trump administration when the U.S. was encouraging
companies to build China-plus-one strategies, and ASEAN
understood that they were going to be a beneficiary of that.
Several of the ASEAN countries have important critical
minerals and are looking to develop their supply chains. They
see the United States as an important partner in helping them
build both their--build out their critical mineral supply
chains and that they are quite interested in partnering with
us.
And I think that what we need to show here is consistency.
So some of the signals that we sent, for instance, that we want
to build our own supply chains but we have a 232 investigation
going on in critical minerals--so, if they partner with us, are
they then going to be subjected to 232 tariffs that are going
to undermine the cooperation that we are seeking to build?
If we can overcome some of those kinds of concerns and come
up with the kind of financing that we need to support industry
in building those supply chains, I think we have some very
interested partners in ASEAN.
Mr. Mackenzie. And that is great to hear because I think we
saw that coming out of the trade and tariff disputes back in
2018, 2019, is that countries were willing to take on supply
chain initiatives outside of China, working with the U.S. And I
think that was actually a good benefit from that trade dispute
in 2018/2019.
I think we have the potential again this time with tariffs.
There are two different issues going on. There is certainly the
reciprocity issue that we see across the board being dealt with
in a lot of countries, and then there is China that is unique.
The tariffs that are being placed on China are significantly
higher than in other countries.
And I think we have the same potential ahead of us here
because countries were shaken in 2018/'19, doing business with
China. They started getting out. Those that stayed,
anecdotally, have come to regret that. And they have said,
``You know what? We got the warning shot in 2018/'19. We didn't
fully listen to you. We didn't get out. We didn't move our
supply chains fast enough.'' And I think that that has the
potential to be something that is going to speed up here in
this latest round of tariffs.
So, if you are saying that that willingness is there, then
the potential for that supply chain disruption with the higher
tariffs placed on China, I think, is very real. And I think
ASEAN countries should be ready to take on that American
business. Get away from China. And I think we have the
opportunity to have stronger bonds going forward.
I will close with one other question for you is, when we
look at this disruption in trade going on right now, I would
like to hear from you what other opportunities outside of
critical minerals do you see as the greatest opportunity for
ASEAN countries to take on? Is it medical devices? Is it basic
manufacturing, electronics? What do you see as the biggest
opportunity for those economies to take on?
Ms. Weisel. I think that they are very interested in
working with us on the digital economy and strengthening their
digital trade with the United States but also within each of
these countries. They have large numbers of young people who
are really digitally educated and do see that as the future of
their economies. I think that they see opportunities of working
closely with our digital industries and finding ways to align
our regulatory approaches.
Mr. Mackenzie. All right. Well, I appreciate that. And
thank you again for testifying. I think we have great
opportunities that lie ahead for the U.S. and ASEAN
relationship and look forward to working on those together with
everybody interested.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
And I now recognize the gentleman from Texas,
Representative Castro, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairwoman. Chair Kim, I appreciated
working with you to reintroduce the bipartisan Partner with
ASEAN Act today. This bill would give ASEAN the same diplomatic
privileges and immunities that other major multilateral
institutions already enjoy, a step that I believe would
strengthen ASEAN's centrality and U.S. regional ties.
So I wanted to ask, Mr. Poling, how important is it for the
U.S. to follow through on this legislation and demonstrate that
we treat ASEAN as a strategic partner.
Mr. Poling. I think it is quite important, particularly at
a time when ASEAN questions whether the U.S. will follow
through on a great many commandments it makes. The legislation
has been pending for I think 3 years. It was first introduced 3
years ago. At a time when ASEAN fears that the U.S. will
withdraw from multilateral engagement, at a time when the State
Department has suggested that it will shut down the
Multilateral Affairs Shop within EAP, which is in charge of
ASEAN affairs, this can send an important countervailing
message.
Mr. Castro. Thank you.
And I want to ask Dr. Kuok--recent polling suggests that
public polling in the United States has dipped in majority
Muslim Southeast Asian countries following Israel's war in
Gaza. And so how has the war in Gaza affected the region's
public opinion of the United States?
Dr. Kuok. As mentioned earlier, the drop in support for the
United States since the recent Gaza crisis has been precipitous
in Muslim majority countries, about a 20 percentage point drop
in support for the United States since the Gaza crisis. And
support for China in Muslim majority countries is averaging
about 70 percent amongst Muslim majority countries. And this
was in the most recent poll, as well, the 2025 poll which saw a
slight decrease in support for China and increase in support
for the United States, but still very poor support for the
United States amongst these Muslim majority countries, and even
amongst Singaporean respondents, because Singapore has a
minority Muslim population--sentiment is also quite bleak about
the United States and its either inaction or its active support
of Israel. And so that has hurt perceptions of the United
States.
The poll has most clearly reflected the drop in support for
the United States amongst Muslim majority countries, but it
hasn't been limited to Muslim majority countries or even the
Muslim population. The humanitarian crisis is clear for all to
see.
Mr. Castro. And then I want to ask you, given those things,
what the long-term implications for U.S. credibility and
influence in the region are, particularly the longer this goes
on.
Dr. Kuok. How much it impacts the United States' ability to
influence the region will depend on the situation on the ground
and on the extent to which, humanitarian aid is able to reach
victims of this crisis. So it will wax and wane accordingly.
That said, countries in the region are very pragmatic. So,
regardless of that crisis, I think it will hurt sentiment, but
nonetheless, countries will seek to work with the United
States. And we see that from, say, Malaysia, whose prime
minister has been the loudest and most vocal in terms of
criticizing the United States for its support of Israel.
Before Malaysia took up the chair of ASEAN, it actually
expressed that it would seek, as ASEAN chair, to work with
various important partners, and it mentioned a whole list of
partners but left out the United States. Since then, Malaysia
has sought to clarify that it seeks to continue to work with
the United States. So, even then, it wants to work with the
United States, but the U.S. has to be there to offer up
economic and security options.
Mr. Castro. Well, and speaking of the economic part--I have
45 seconds left. Let me ask you about the effect of the tariffs
on public opinion, as well, because that's another major issue.
Dr. Kuok. It is unclear at the moment what the effect of
the tariffs have been on Southeast Asia. The 2025 poll I
mentioned was conducted from early January to mid-February, so
before the U.S. disengagement from Europe, before the U.S. aid
cuts, as well as before the tariffs.
But I think it cannot but hurt the United States, given the
steep tariffs, as I mentioned, on many of the poorest, some
amounting to almost a 50 percent tariff rate. And these
countries cannot afford these tariff rates. They are not only
going to have an economic impact on the region but, as the
Singapore prime minister pointed out, an impact on the global
trading system, which will then hurt these countries. And it
will hurt the United States as well.
It might win a little bit in terms of gaining an inch, but
it will lose a yard because--in terms of its strategic ability
to influence the region and getting the region to align with it
on issues important to it-- the U.S.
Mr. Castro. I have just run out of time. Thank you.
Dr. Kuok [continuing]. will be on a back foot. Thank you.
Mr. Castro. Thank you.
Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
Let me now recognize the gentlelady from South Carolina,
Representative Biggs, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim.
And thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
So my first question is for Mr. Poling. So, in your
testimony, you emphasized the strategic utility of the U.S.
Coast Guard in Southeast Asia, particularly in countering
China's gray zone tactics through partnerships, capacity-
building, and shipwrighter agreements.
Given the success of China's nonlethal coercion via its
Coast Guard and Maritime Militia, what additional steps would
you recommend the United States take beyond current initiatives
to strengthen and expand the U.S. Coast Guard engagement in the
region? And how can these efforts be better integrated with the
needs of front-line states like the Philippines and Vietnam?
Mr. Poling. Thank you, Congresswoman. I do think that it
has been important to see now a small presence of U.S. Coast
Guard cutters, usually one at a time conducting training
activities in Southeast Asia. The U.S. Coast Guard is stretched
too thin. We have to acknowledge that it is not going to play a
direct role in helping support, say, Philippine activity in the
South China Sea. That is going to remain a Navy role. But the
more the Coast Guard can be funded to forward-deploy to the
Indo-Pacific, engage in shipwrighting in the Pacific Islands,
in training and capacity-building in Southeast Asia, the
better.
The Philippines has done a remarkable job in standing up to
China. And so far, the threat of U.S. intervention under the
Mutual Defense Treaty is what has kept this in the gray zone
where, so far, the Philippines can handle it. The most
important thing, from my perspective, that we can--continue to
reinforce the application of the Mutual Defense Treaty and that
we continue to fund the 10-year security sector assistance road
map that we have promised to help modernize the Philippine
military.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you. So I would like to kind of continue
our discussion. You point out to the Coast Guard's
effectiveness in building regional trust and countering grey-
zone tactics. Given the strategic importance of Southeast Asia,
what political and operational challenges must be overcome to
expand U.S. Coast Guard deployments and agreements, such as the
shipwrighter programs or deployed cutters in the region? And
what specific support should Congress support to achieve this
expansion?
Mr. Poling. I don't think it is possible for the U.S. to
negotiate a shipwrighter agreement for the South China Sea. The
nature of the dispute, its multilateral nature, makes it all
but impossible, and it would be far too politically sensitive
in the Philippines for, I think, even the Philippines, our
closest and oldest ally in the region, to ask.
But more Coast Guard presence to help the Philippines
bolster its own capability would be welcomed, and the key there
is simply funding. The last time we saw significant increases
in Pentagon budgets, there was efforts to cut the Coast Guard's
funding. We need to keep in mind that the Coast Guard is an
important tool of the U.S.'s power and credibility, not just
the Navy.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much for that insight.
So my next question is for Ms. Weisel. Your testimony
emphasizes DFC's role in catalyzing private investment to
advance both development goals and U.S. strategic interest,
particularly in Southeast Asia. In that context, how can the
U.S. interagency better integrate on-the-ground insights to
improve risk mitigation and foster a more stable investment
climate for DFC-supported projects across ASEAN?
Ms. Weisel. Well, I think as we look to restructure the way
that we are supporting companies in the region, there is going
to be an important opportunity to ensure that agencies that are
on the ground in ASEAN are working together and coordinating
closely. So you have the Commerce Department playing a
particular role. You have the State Department having at least
traditionally played another role, and the aid agencies, also,
on the ground in these various countries.
As we are thinking about restructuring all of this, it is
really important that we have input from all of these various
agencies about what the priorities are and the ways that all of
them can contribute to supporting DFC and U.S. business going
forward. We have talked about here how important it is to be
able to rethink the way we are looking at this, given the
competition that we are facing not just from China but from
other countries that are competing in the region.
And so I think we need to have a very serious look at the
way we have been coordinating in the past and what we need to
do going forward.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much for your insight.
And with that, I yield back.
Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
Let me now recognize the gentleman from Maryland,
Representative Olszewski, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Olszewski. Thank you so much, Chair Kim.
Thank you to Ranking Member Bera and to all of our
witnesses today. I just want to first say how much I completely
agree that the U.S. must strengthen our support for our ASEAN
partners in the Indo-Pacific, so I really appreciate you all
being here and your comments today.
We know this means defending a free and open region in the
face of security threats posed by the PRC and also means
offering a reliable economic alternative in developing
financing for countries like Laos that are saddled with PRC
debt, and it also means supplying the kind of foreign
assistance that USAID and our other development agencies have
delivered to ASEAN and its member states for more than four
decades. So just lifting up our actions and words, and so
appreciate the opportunity for the conversation.
I know there has been a lot of talk--I want to turn a
little bit to solutions through people-to-people ties. And so I
was hoping that we can focus on that. I believe that we should
be building on the friendship shared by our combined one
billion people, and I am proud that Maryland's Johns Hopkins is
leading the way.
In 2023, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies launched the U.S.-ASEAN Institute for Rising Leaders.
However, President Trump's budget request seeks to end this
critical educational and cultural exchange.
Ms. Kuok, perhaps you can speak to--or Dr. Kuok; I am
sorry--could you speak to the importance of engaging with youth
and emerging leaders in ASEAN countries and for the long-term
U.S. relationship with the region? How would ending educational
and cultural exchange programs in the region affect U.S.
influence there and open doors for the PRC to expand its
influence? And if there is time, I invite our other witnesses
to answer as well.
Dr. Kuok. Thank you very much. I have to admit not to have
thought very much about this issue because it almost seems very
obvious that the United States is inflicting a grievous act of
self-harm when it ends educational programs for the young
people of the region, who will tomorrow be the leaders of their
countries.
So, clearly, this is a wrong-footed move, and it will hurt
the United States. I mean, if you look at the youths in the
region today, I think just anecdotally, some of them have been
put off from coming to the United States because of some of
these concerns.
But more broadly, as you know, a couple of weeks ago, the
Shangri-la Dialogue of defense ministers took place in
Singapore. And at that dialog, Defense Secretary, Hegseth
talked about how our futures are tied together--the futures of
the countries of the Indo-Pacific are tied together. Yet it
feels so much like the region is under an onslaught from this
part of the world.
So it doesn't feel very much like a shared future, and I
cannot imagine that it feels very much like a shared future for
the young people whose futures are thrown into uncertainty by
some of the more thoughtless actions of the administration.
Mr. Olszewski. Your thoughts on that particular topic?
Ms. Weisel. I would just add that a good case study of this
is Vietnam, which used to train all of its officials and send
people to Russia for education. And then, the Vietnamese
government started sending students to the US and Europe. They
started going to Europe. And you saw a change in the attitudes
of those people toward improving relations with the United
States and deepening cooperation.
So you do have these case studies that underscore the
importance of these educational links.
Mr. Poling. I would add that there is no country in
Southeast Asia that reports in the ISEAS survey every year that
they want to go study in China. There are several now where
they have to go study in China; the other doors closed.
In general, the U.S., Australia, and the U.K. are the
preferred educational destinations, especially for Vietnam,
which provides the third-largest group of foreign students in
the U.S. and the Philippines. Pausing interviews for student
visas, canceling Fulbright exchanges--this is only going to
harm the U.S. in the long term.
Mr. Olszewski. I appreciate that.
Madam Chair, I think that reinforces the lessons that we
learned when we were all in the Pacific Islands recently
together on the trip that you helped lead. So I appreciate our
witnesses that--and think it sort of speaks to our committee's
obligation to lift up these kinds of programs for--particularly
for--I loved the comment about the leaders of tomorrow and
thinking about our engagement in that way.
And with that, I yield back. Thank you.
Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
I recognize the gentleman from Kansas, Representative Barr,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Barr. Kentucky.
Mrs. Kim. of California. Kentucky. Oh.
Mr. Barr. It is Okay. It is Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair,
for your excellent leadership and holding this hearing.
And let me key in on Dr. Kuok's testimony when she talked
about these ASEAN countries don't--or Southeast Asian
countries--they don't want to be forced to choose. This does
corroborate some of the public comments and some of the
analysis from our embassies when I travel to Thailand,
Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines.
But privately in our meetings with our counterparts, they
do want to choose. They want to choose the United States. That
has not changed from the Biden administration to the Trump
administration. I would argue, especially Indonesia, a vibrant
democracy--they want to choose. They want to choose the United
States, and that hasn't changed from one administration to the
other.
In fact, I remember very vividly, when we were in Jakarta,
hearing a very stern admonition from the foreign minister,
Marsudi, how terribly upset the Indonesians were and other
ASEAN country leaders where that President Biden skipped the
ASEAN conference.
So this sense of a vacuum--it is not unique to now. It
existed before the Trump administration. I think it is not a
change in policy on trade that has given us this challenge of
needing to deepen our ties with them.
In fact, I want to challenge the critics of the Trump
administration's trade strategy a little bit when they claim
that the President's efforts to negotiate more reciprocal deals
are pushing ASEAN nations toward Beijing or making these
nations more vulnerable to Xi Jinping's acts of coercion.
In fact, what is the objective of the Trump trade policy?
It is actually to deepen our economic ties. It is to reduce the
trade barriers to American exporters. And so, if the end goal
of this is more reciprocal trade between the United States and
ASEAN, this has enormous potential to reverse the sentiment
expressed by Foreign Minister Marsudi that the Biden
administration was not paying enough attention to ASEAN.
So, Ms. Weisel, I totally agree with your testimony when
you talk about a regional agreement that should consolidate and
expand ASEAN commitments to eliminate tariff and non-tariff
barriers in goods and services across the region. You say it
also should require new treatments on customs and trade
remedies.
And then you say in exchange, the United States should
gradually eliminate tariffs on imports from Southeast Asian
partners to the agreement. That sounds exactly like the America
First Trade Policy. We are asking them to lower their trade
barriers to American exporters, and in exchange, we will reduce
tariffs on them.
Why does this policy not create an opportunity for greater
economic integration between the United States and ASEAN to the
detriment of the malign influence of Beijing?
Ms. Weisel. Well, as I said at the outset, I think that
they feel that the tariff threat hanging over them is a five-
alarm fire. It has caused potentially tremendous damage to
their economies with all of the uncertainty and the threats.
I think that all of the ASEAN countries do indeed want to
engage more deeply with the United States. They want to have
greater economic cooperation. But they want to do so as equal
partners in this negotiation. So, as we look to see areas where
we can cooperate, a priority for them is reciprocal access.
In other words, they would take on the rules that we are
pushing, and in areas that are important to US like customs,
digital trade and others. But they would like to see concrete
benefits in return.
Mr. Barr. And I am running out of time, but--and I take
your testimony in good faith that you argue that the Trump
policy does have the opportunity to open up U.S. exports to
Southeast Asia, but you still maintain that they will de-risk
from the United States as a result of this. I am not sure that
is necessarily true. If we get better, more integrated economic
deals as a result of the policy, I think they will de-risk from
China.
I don't have much time left, but I would love--maybe in a
second round, Madam Chair--to talk about outbound investment
into China and what is going to replace that if we restrict
outbound investment in China. Does that create opportunities
for more U.S. investment into ASEAN as a way to relocate supply
chains?
Mrs. Kim. of California. My ranking member has just left
for another engagement, and I wasn't planning on doing a second
round, if you don't mind.
Mr. Barr. Okay.
Mrs. Kim. of California. So you can submit your questions,
and hopefully our witnesses may be able to respond in writing.
But I do have some closing comments, if I may. It is really
evident from today's hearing that we need to do more to create
a responsive and effective Southeast Asia focused strategy.
That begins with bolstering and strengthening our bilateral and
multilateral relationship with ASEAN members.
Our witnesses today, you have all trotted out key
suggestions--and thank you so much for that--on how we can
advance our interests diplomatically, economically, and
militarily. So it is imperative moving forward that we are able
to deliver results in a whole-of-the-government manner.
If we are going to be the counterbalance that the region is
counting on us to be, success can be achieved to the extent our
strategies, policies, frameworks align with the needs of our
regional partners.
Additionally, we need results showing that a viable
alternative to the CCP's state-driven economic model is
available. We cannot allow Southeast Asia to be dictated by
Beijing standards, and we must use every available tool to
advance our economic agenda while punishing China's unfair
trade practices.
And now is the time for action. I encourage the
administration and my colleagues across the aisle to work
together to ensure that our policies would put us in a position
to be the trusted partner in the region.
So I want to thank you again for your valuable testimony
and answering our members' questions. The members of the
subcommittee may have some additional questions for the
witness, like Rep. Barr has, and we will ask you to respond to
those in writing. And pursuant to the committee rules, all
members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and
extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length
limitations.
So, without objection, I declare the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
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