    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                      BUILDING BRIDGES, COUNTERING RIVALS:
                     STRENGTHENING U.S.-ASEAN TIES TO COMBAT
                                CHINESE INFLUENCE
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                     OF THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 June 10, 2025

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 119-23

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov,
                           or http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    61-418PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                        BRIAN J. MAST, Florida, Chairman
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York,
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey         Ranking Member
    JOE WILSON,, South Carolina          BRAD SHERMAN, California
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    DARRELL ISSA, California             WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              AMI BERA, California
    MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee             JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  DINA TITUS, Nevada
    RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 TED LIEU, California
    YOUNG KIM, California                SARA JACOBS, California
    MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida        SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
    BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan                  Florida
    AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       GREG STANTON, Arizona
        American Samoa                   JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                JONATHAN L. JACKSON, Illinois
    JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana              SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
    THOMAS H. KEAN, JR, New Jersey       JIM COSTA, California
    MICHAEL LAWLER, New York             GABE AMO, Rhode Island
    CORY MILLS, Florida                  KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
    RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia           PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
    KEITH SELF, Texas                    GEORGE LATIMER, New York
    RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana               JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI Jr, Maryland
    JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
    ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida           SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware
    JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana            BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
    MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington
    RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania

                  James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director
                     Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director
                                     ------

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

                       YOUNG KIM, California, Chairwoman
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             AMI BERA , California, Ranking
    ANDY BARR, Kentucky                      Member
    AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       BRAD SHERMAN, California
        American Samoa                   JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    RYAN ZINKE, Montana                  JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    JAMES MOYLAN, Guam                   GABE AMO, Rhode Island
    SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI, Maryland
    RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania

                     Tom Hill, Subcommittee Staff Director

                            C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                                  ----------

                                REPRESENTATIVES

                                                                       Page
    Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Young Kim.............     1
    Opening Statement of Subcommittee Ranking Member Ami Bera........     2

                                   WITNESSES

    Statement of Gregory Poling, Director and Senior Fellow of The
      Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency
      Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies.....     4
      Prepared Statement.............................................     6
    Statement of Barbara Weisel, Nonresident Scholar, Carnegie
      Endowment for International Peace..............................    13
      Prepared Statement.............................................    15
    Statement of Lynn Kuok, Lee Kuan Yew Chair, Southeast Asia
      Studies, Brookings Institution.................................    23
      Prepared Statement.............................................    25

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    56
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    58
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    59

                            Questions for the Record

    Questions submitted to Dr, Lynn Kuok from Rep. Biggs.............    60
    Questions submitted to Mr. Poling from Rep. Biggs................    63
    Questions submitted to Mrs. Weisel from Rep. Barr................    64

                      BUILDING BRIDGES, COUNTERING RIVALS:
           STRENGTHENING U.S.-ASEAN TIES TO COMBAT CHINESE INFLUENCE

                                  ----------

                             Tuesday, June 10, 2025

                      House of Representatives,
                 Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific,
                                  Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:24 p.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Young Kim (chair
    of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mrs. Kim. of California. The Subcommittee on East Asia and
    the Pacific will come to order. This hearing aims to explore
    strategies for countering China's influence within the
    Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, while enhancing
    the United States' engagement in the region. I now recognize
    myself for opening statement.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN YOUNG KIM

        Again, welcome to the East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee's
    hearing titled Building Bridges, Countering Rivals:
    Strengthening U.S.-ASEAN Ties to Combat Chinese Influence. This
    hearing presents an opportunity for us to examine China's
    growing footprint in ASEAN and to discuss ways the U.S. can
    counter it by strengthening cooperation across economic,
    security, diplomatic, and law enforcement sectors.
        China has long prioritized Southeast Asia in its foreign
    policy, using diplomacy, infrastructure investment, and trade
    to entrench its influence. In contrast, U.S. economic
    engagement has stumbled. Initiatives like the Trans-Pacific
    Partnership and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for
    Prosperity aimed high but failed to deliver meaningful market
    access or address trade imbalances.
        Despite our inability to engage economically, we continue
    to build robust relationship with countries like the
    Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore. But we too often
    underestimate ASEAN's collective weight in our own Indo-Pacific
    strategy.
        We need to ensure the United States has a genuinely
    responsive and effective strategy to remain the partner of
    choice in ASEAN and ask ourselves, where have our past
    strategies in Southeast Asia fallen short? What legislative
    tools can strengthen our regional position? Are our frameworks
    aligned with ASEAN partners' priorities?
        Despite China's reach, the United States is the preferred
    long-term partner of choice for many ASEAN countries. In the
    2025 State of Southeast Asia Survey, 52.3 percent favored the
    United States over China, recognizing our leadership in
    investment, security, innovation, and shared values.
        On security, the United States has made real strides,
    expanding maritime security with the Philippines and partnering
    with other South China Sea nations on law enforcement, maritime
    safety, and capacity-building training, enhancing disaster
    response and maritime governance capabilities.
        Economically, however, we are underleveraged. While China
    remains ASEAN's top trading partner, the region is a $4
    trillion market with enormous potential, especially in critical
    minerals, regional trade, and development financing. The threat
    of Chinese dominance isn't going away. China is aggressively
    pursuing deals, over 100 secured just this April with Vietnam,
    Malaysia, and Cambodia. These efforts reflect Beijing's
    recognition of growing U.S. engagement and its desire to blunt
    it.
        We must show ASEAN partners that China's promises rarely
    deliver lasting benefits. We also need a bold, whole-of-
    government strategy, one that affirms our leadership,
    reinforces our alliances, and upholds the sovereignty and
    rules-based order that underpins a free and open Indo-Pacific.
        So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and
    your expertise will guide us in crafting stronger, smarter U.S.
    policy in Southeast Asia.
        So let me now recognize the ranking member from California,
    Mr. Bera, for your opening statement.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER AMI BERA

        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        I want to thank the witnesses for being here on what is a
    timely conversation in an important region, Southeast Asia.
        Southeast Asia is home to more than 650 million people and
    has some of the fastest-growing economies in the world,
    critical sea lanes, and key partnerships in our interest as we
    look at peace and prosperity and sovereignty in the Indo-
    Pacific. Collectively, the Southeast Asian ASEAN nations
    represent the fifth-largest economy in the world, and it's our
    fourth-largest export market. So what we do here in Congress,
    the choices that we make, the partnerships and deals that we
    put together, matter intensively.
        That is why I really do have some concerns about the Trump
    administration's approach. Obviously, sweeping tariffs have
    created a lot of uncertainty in the region. But hopefully, it
    creates some opportunities.
        Not each country has been looked at equally, and if I think
    about a country like Singapore, this is a country that we have
    a free trade agreement with, we have mechanisms to resolve
    issues, and we have a $2.8 billion trade surplus with
    Singapore. So we are doing quite well with a country like
    Singapore.
        I would also think about the opportunities--in my
    conversations with some of our ASEAN Ambassadors, they don't
    want to be put into a position where they have to make a choice
    between China, which is in their neighborhood, or the United
    States. But the uncertainty that has been created by the Trump
    administration approach has brought into clear focus that they
    don't want the United States leaving their markets either.
        So this is a time to engage in trade negotiations and
    perhaps look for those opportunities where we can reduce those
    trade barriers. As someone who was a supporter of TPP, as much
    as I would love to go back and see if we could join the CPTPP,
    that probably is a ways off. But can we do digital trade? We
    ought to be able to do digital trade. It is in our interests,
    and certainly, it is in their interests.
        Now, if Vietnam is willing to contemplate going to zero
    tariffs, let's engage in what that looks like. Can we work with
    countries in the region like Indonesia to help develop
    redundant supplies of critical minerals and develop their
    geothermal capabilities? We ought to think about that. Can we
    work with places like Vietnam that do have energy resources in
    their EEZ that are being harassed by the PRC? We ought to work
    there.
        And the Philippines, certainly, they have experienced the
    brunt of much of the harassment in South China Sea. How do we
    work with nations like the Philippines and others to continue
    to deepen and return to where we historically have been with
    the Philippines?
        So there is many more opportunities. Again, the Trump
    administration's approach is not how I would go about doing
    this, but we are where we are. We have got to double down on
    our conversations, look for those partnerships, create those
    redundant supply chains, and bring the Southeast Asian nations
    closer together, not as a choice between China and the United
    States but recognizing the unique assets, the unique
    opportunities, the vibrant young population, and the dynamic
    economies of the region.
        So, with that, Madam Chairwoman, let me go ahead and yield
    back. I am going to look forward to hearing the testimony of
    the witnesses.
        Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
        Other members of the committee are reminded that opening
    statements may be submitted for the record. And we are now
    pleased to have distinguished panel member witnesses before us
    today on this very important topic.
        First, Mr. Gregory Poling is Director and Senior Fellow of
    the Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency
    Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International
    Studies. Thank you for joining us.
        Ms. Barbara Weisel, nonresident scholar at Carnegie
    Endowment for International Peace, thank you for being with us.
        And Dr. Lynn Kuok, Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia
    Studies at the Brookings Institution.
        This committee recognizes the importance of the issues
    before us and is grateful to have you here to speak to us
    today. Your full statements will be made part of the record,
    and I will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5
    minutes to allow time for member questions.
        Let me now recognize Mr. Poling for your opening statement.

                      STATEMENT OF GREGORY POLING

        Mr. Poling. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Kim, Member
    Bera, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am
    honored to share my views before you today on the topic of
    U.S.-ASEAN cooperation to combat China's influence in the
    region.
        Before I begin, I should note that CSIS, my home
    institution, does not take policy positions, so the views
    represented are mine and mine alone.
        In my testimony, I have been asked to address both U.S.
    cooperation with ASEAN in the maritime domain, particularly
    South China Sea, and more broadly on the geopolitical front.
    And I am happy to say that, on the first, I think the U.S. and
    its allies and partners, particularly the Philippines, are
    doing a remarkable job of holding the line in the face of
    Chinese coercion.
        On the second, the broader competition for influence in the
    region, I worry that the U.S. is putting at risk what has
    traditionally been its stronger position over China and most of
    the countries of Southeast Asia. When it comes to the South
    China Sea, China seeks to control all activity, peacetime and
    military, in clear violation of international law. This is a
    direct threat to U.S. national interests, longstanding U.S.
    commitments to freedom of the seas, which has been an abiding
    U.S. interest since the earliest days of the republic.
        It is also a direct threat to our oldest ally in the Indo-
    Pacific, the Philippines. This has been recognized by
    administration after administration, Republican and Democrat.
    And the U.S. has done a remarkable job in both showing its own
    flag, pushing back on Chinese coercion, and helping build the
    maritime capacity of partners and allies in the region to
    maintain their own presence in disputed waters, even in the
    face of what China now has: the largest Navy, the largest Coast
    Guard, the largest missile force in the world.
        Under Xi Jinping's leadership, China, for the last decade
    plus, has engaged in a campaign of coercion in what is often
    called the gray zone, just below the level of military force,
    using Coast Guard vessels and Militia vessels to intentionally
    create risks of collision, to bully and intimidate smaller
    states into giving way in the South China Sea.
        That campaign had a great deal of success for the better
    part of a decade. For the last 3 years, that has not been the
    case. For the last 3 years, starting at the end of the Rodrigo
    Duterte administration in the Philippines but accelerating
    under the current presidency of Ferdinand Marcos Jr., we have
    seen the Philippines stand tall for the first time in quite a
    while.
        The Philippines engaged in a nearly year-and-a-half-long
    standoff with China from 2023 to 2024 in order to resupply and
    repair its facility the BRP Sierra Madre on Second Thomas
    Shoal, an underwater feature, despite the largest presence of
    Chinese Militia and Coast Guard we have ever seen deployed in
    the South China Sea.
        By December 2023, the Philippines were sailing two to three
    ships up against 50 Chinese vessels, didn't blink, managed to
    get through, often with a U.S.-paid overhead and with the
    U.S.'s repeatedly stated commitment to defend the Philippines
    should China use force. And it was China that blinked, not the
    Philippines, in that standoff.
        On the oil and gas front, we have seen Vietnam, for the
    first time in many years, developing new oil and gas fields
    despite a persistent Chinese Coast Guard presence in its
    waters. Malaysia, over the last 2 years, set new records for
    drilling offshore wells in disputed waters. Even Indonesia,
    which has traditionally not viewed itself as a part of this
    dispute, has begun to receive forceful bullying and coercion
    from the China Coast Guard because of new oil and gas fields it
    is developing, and it has done so anyway.
        What we see is a Chinese strategy that is clearly
    floundering. And all the U.S. really needs to do is continue
    course in order to make sure that China continues to flounder.
    Where I am more worried is on our overall influence in the
    region.
        As Chairwoman Kim said, if you look at public opinion
    polling, elite opinion polling, U.N. voting records,
    educational data, the U.S. remains the partner of choice. The
    United States is more trusted. Its leadership is more sought
    after globally. It is more popular in most places in Southeast
    Asia.
        In the Philippines and Vietnam, the U.S. has enormous leads
    over China in every metric you could imagine. In Indonesia, the
    largest country in the region, Indonesians are conflicted, but
    in general they dislike China a great deal more than they
    dislike the U.S., although that did flip last year, and I worry
    that it will remain the case in the future that China may begin
    to edge us out in Indonesia.
        While you have pro-Chinese elites in charge in places like
    the military junta in Burma or in Cambodia, when you look at
    public opinion polling, Cambodia and Burma are the third and
    fourth most pro-American publics in Asia. Even in Laos and
    Thailand, the U.S. holds its own. It is really only in Malaysia
    where we see China making any considerable ground on this issue
    of soft power, of influence, of whose leadership do you
    support.
        And to be clear, the U.S. cannot win a geopolitical
    strategic competition with China with military and economic
    might alone. At the end of the day, it is a competition over
    the rules and institutions of the international order. And that
    requires other countries to agree with us more often than they
    agree with China.
        That means that we need to not forget the power of
    attraction, not just coercion and compulsion, that we have to
    be the preferred partner, not just the partner that one has to
    side with. And so, as we have seen the winding down----
        [Simultaneous speaking.]
        Mrs. Kim. of California. Can you please wrap up? Sorry.
        Mr. Poling. Yes, ma'am--on USAID, VOA and Radio Free Asia,
    as we've seen the pauses on Fulbright and student visa
    interviews, I worry that we are undermining that multi-decade,
    latent advantage we have in being the preferred partner. Thank
    you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Poling follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
        I now recognize Ms. Weisel for your opening statement.

                      STATEMENT OF BARBARA WEISEL

        Ms. Weisel. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera,
    and distinguished members of this subcommittee for the
    invitation to appear before you today. My name is Barbara
    Weisel, and I am currently a nonresident scholar at the
    Carnegie Endowment for International Peace but previously spent
    nearly two decades working on Southeast Asia at USTR and have
    many thoughts on your question on how the U.S. can strengthen
    ties to ASEAN to counter China.
        As well recognized by members of this committee, Southeast
    Asia is an important U.S. economic partner. It is our fourth-
    largest export market and a central player in global supply
    chains. U.S. businesses have long been invested in these
    dynamic markets, and their ties have expanded in recent years
    as businesses, with U.S. Government encouragement, sought to
    diversify away from China.
        ASEAN countries stood to benefit directly from these
    diversification efforts and hoped they would help strengthen
    economic ties to the U.S., commensurate with our expanding
    military relations. But the U.S. imposition of tariffs has
    created anger and confusion in ASEAN regarding their relations
    with the U.S. and resentment about the unilateral nature of
    U.S. actions.
        While ASEAN countries have long been concerned about
    China's dominance in the region, they see the imposition of
    tariffs as a much more immediate threat and direct assault on
    their economies. Facing a five-alarm fire set by the United
    States, they will not only avoid antagonizing China, their
    largest two-way trading partner, but welcome its overtures of
    greater economic cooperation.
        It is also likely that the U.S. will reach bilateral
    agreements with ASEAN in the coming weeks or months. To
    accommodate the U.S., Southeast Asian countries will commit to
    lower their tariffs and address longstanding trade barriers and
    increase purchases of U.S. LNG, agriculture planes, and other
    goods.
        At the same time, they will pursue de-risking strategies
    that lessen their economic dependence on the U.S. and expand
    trade and investment ties to China and other partners. So,
    while the U.S. may see some immediate results from the tariff
    leverage it has exerted over Southeast Asian countries, if
    China is the threat about which the U.S. is most concerned,
    then we need to keep our eye on the ball.
        We need to build an affirmative ASEAN economic strategy
    that relies on carrots, not just sticks. This strategy should
    build trust and certainty and deepen our economic partnership.
    It also should capitalize on ASEAN's interest in keeping the
    U.S. engaged in the region, create room for Southeast Asian
    countries to work with the U.S. on curbing unfair trade
    practices from China, and foster ASEAN integration to promote
    regional stability and security.
        Let me briefly offer five proposals for deepening economic
    ties. First, we should promote development of the Southeast
    Asian critical minerals sector and U.S.-ASEAN critical minimal
    supply chains even as we work to build our own capabilities in
    this sector. These efforts should include negotiation of
    critical minerals agreements with select Southeast Asian
    countries. These agreements should include criteria for trusted
    critical mineral supply chains and guaranteed supplies of
    critical minimal resources for U.S. industry, as the Japanese
    Government has successfully done.
        Second, the U.S. should swiftly pursue a plurilateral
    digital agreement with Southeast Asian countries trying on the
    commitments the U.S. Government is pursuing in its bilateral
    agreements with ASEAN countries. Maintaining U.S. leadership
    and setting digital trade rules is vital, given this sector's
    role in U.S. innovation and economic growth and to ensuring the
    U.S. remains at the forefront of the AI revolution. Doing so
    also would support U.S. efforts to counter China's model of
    digital authoritarianism.
        Third, the U.S. should propose a customs cooperation
    initiative that demonstrates its willingness to work in
    partnership with ASEAN as a group to tackle this priority
    issue. Many Southeast Asian governments already are
    strengthening rules in this area, but a U.S.-ASEAN customs
    cooperation agreement would better position ASEAN to deal
    collectively with transshipment from China.
        Fourth, Congress should fully fund U.S. economic statecraft
    tools, including reauthorization of DFC this year. Similarly,
    to promote U.S. exports, Congress should reauthorize the
    Export-Import Bank next year and ensure adequate funding for
    the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.
        And last, the U.S. should consider regionalizing the trade
    commitments it is negotiating bilaterally with ASEAN countries,
    building out an ASEAN agreement with rules of origin that limit
    nonparties from benefiting and including rules in critical
    areas to U.S. competitiveness.
        In exchange, the U.S. should gradually eliminate tariffs on
    imports from Southeast Asian parties to the agreement. A
    regional agreement with reciprocal commitments would
    incentivize Southeast Asian countries to deepen supply chains
    with the U.S. in ways that can promote U.S. manufacturing and
    exports.
        Again, thank you for this opportunity to share my views,
    and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Weisel follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you, Ms. Weisel.
        Let me now recognize Dr. Kuok for your opening statement.

                         STATEMENT OF LYNN KUOK

        Dr. Kuok. Thank you so much, Chairwoman.
        Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera, members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify. It is
    an honor to be able to contribute to this important
    conversation on strengthening U.S. engagement with Southeast
    Asia, a region that is at the geographic as well as the
    strategic heart of the Indo-Pacific.
        You have both outlined why Southeast Asia matters, so let
    me just say that despite its economic and strategic importance,
    the region remains a weak link in U.S. Indo-Pacific engagement.
        U.S. influence in the region is declining, and China is
    gaining ground. Both yourself, Chairwoman, and Greg mentioned
    how the United States is the partner of choice. But in a
    regional survey in 2024, the survey showed for the first time
    the majority of respondents in Southeast Asia actually choosing
    to align with China over the United States if they were forced
    to choose. Now, that margin was slim, overall 50.5 percent
    versus 49.5 percent. But support dropped dramatically in some
    countries, including all three Muslim majority countries by
    about 20 percentage points.
        The 2025 survey you mentioned reflected a modest U.S.
    rebound, but it was conducted very early in the year, from
    early January to mid-February, and preceded several
    developments, most notably the April 2 announcement of tariffs.
    This hit all countries in Southeast Asia, including some of its
    poorest. Cambodia, Laos, and war-torn Myanmar face a 49
    percent, 48 percent, and 44 percent tariff level respectively.
        These Liberation Day tariffs have triggered a strong
    backlash in the region. ASEAN leaders recently expressed deep
    concern over these unilateral tariff measures, and the
    Singapore prime minister warned that they undermine the global
    trading order that the United States helped build and declared
    bluntly that these are not actions that one does to a friend.
        What began as frustration over limited U.S. engagement, or
    limited U.S. economic engagement, in the region is now concern
    over counterproductive policies. Washington is not just missing
    an economic action in Southeast Asia; it is inflicting real
    damage. Tariffs, as well as aid cuts, are hurting Southeast
    Asian countries.
        Now, for years, relatively weak U.S. engagement was offset
    by the important security role it plays. But that, too, is
    increasingly cast in doubt as Washington recalibrates away from
    longstanding allies and partners in Europe and the President
    openly questions defense commitments. Lack of clarity around
    U.S. goals in the Indo-Pacific compounds these concerns as the
    possibility of a grand bargain or even a more limited economic
    detail entailing concessions to Beijing on issues vital to
    allies and partners, such as the South China Sea or the U.S.-
    Philippine Alliance, sows further doubt about American intent,
    consistency, and staying power.
        U.S. standing in the region has also been badly hurt by its
    handling of the Gaza crisis. Now, although a loss for the
    United States doesn't necessarily mean a win for China, Beijing
    has been very proactive about continuing to deepen its regional
    ties through trade, through investment, through infrastructure,
    and through consistent diplomacy.
        And as you mentioned, Chairwoman, in the weeks after the
    April 2 tariffs, Beijing visited Southeast Asia and concluded
    113 deals. And even if few of those materialize, the signal was
    clear that China is a consistent and reliable economic partner,
    while the United States throws a wrecking ball at the global
    trading system.
        Beijing's actions in the South China Sea are a serious
    irritant in its relations with its neighbors, particularly the
    Philippines and Vietnam. But I think China has been remarkably
    adept at containing the fallout both with the use of economic
    incentives as well as quiet diplomacy.
        Southeast Asia does not want to choose between the two
    countries, and they will continue to hedge for as long as
    possible. But China's growing sway hampers Washington's ability
    to engage bilaterally and multilaterally in the region to
    strategic effect.
        I have detailed policy recommendations for the U.S.
    Government and legislative proposals in my written testimony,
    but very broadly, these touch on three areas that the United
    States must act on: first, economic engagement. For the region,
    economics is security, and failing to understand this leaves
    Washington on the back foot. Congress can lead by, first,
    reviewing tariffs; second, advancing targeted trade agreements
    in strategic sectors, like digital infrastructure and critical
    minerals; and third, bolstering funding support for
    infrastructure and development.
        The second main area that the United States needs to work
    on is strengthening its alliances and partnerships in Southeast
    Asia. It has done well with the Philippines, but what is
    necessary at the moment is commitment at the very highest
    levels to treaty commitments and expanding economic and
    strategic engagement with key regional players, including
    Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia.
        And finally, the third area, defending international law
    and maritime rights--international law reduces conflict risks
    and advances concrete U.S. interests. The second Trump
    administration should maintain the strong stance that it
    adopted during its first term, when it made regular lawful
    assertions of passage rights and freedoms of the seas and when
    it affirmed the merits of the 2016 tribunal decision, a step
    that the previous administration had failed to take.
        Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member, and members of the
    subcommittee----
        Mrs. Kim. of California. Well, let's continue the
    conversation during----
        Dr. Kuok. Sure.
        Mrs. Kim. of California.--question and answer period.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Kuok follows:]
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you so much. I appreciate
    all of the witnesses giving your opening testimoneys and for
    the recommendations that you are making. And we can hopefully
    get into that more.
        And let me start with the first round of questioning. As
    you all mentioned, we want to be the partner of choice, and our
    ASEAN partners are waiting for us to show up. And we need to
    provide a clear and consistent economic framework for the Indo-
    Pacific region. But unfortunately, we have--U.S. has struggled
    to regain momentum in economic engagement following its
    withdrawal from TPP.
        So, Ms. Weisel, what elements of the TPP and IPEF prove
    effective and ineffective, and how can future agreements
    demonstrate strong commitment to Southeast Asia's developing
    goals while safeguarding our U.S. interests?
        Ms. Weisel. Thank you for the question. I think, in terms
    of TPP, I mean, TPP is now in force. The U.S. is not a party to
    that agreement. So it was a successful agreement
    notwithstanding the fact that we are no longer a party.
        I think that what was successful about TPP was, first, that
    it was a very high-standard agreement and included a lot of
    issues that had not been part of previous trade agreements that
    advanced rules that were of importance to U.S. economic
    competitiveness, including on things like intellectual
    property, on state-owned enterprises and competition in other
    areas.
        In looking back at what we would want to do were we to
    pursue a free trade agreement with the region, I think there
    are definitely additional areas/updates that you would want to
    consider and things that we learned, for instance, over the
    last couple years about resilience of supply chains, about our
    competition with China, that you would want to add to an
    agreement like that that were not issues then. But as in all
    free trade agreements, there are new generations of agreements,
    new issues that you need to think about and incorporate in
    updated agreements.
        IPAF, I think, was, in my view, more of a political
    agreement than an economic agreement and that the purpose of
    that was to demonstrate to our trading partners that we were
    going to be engaged in the region. We wanted them to commit to
    a range of issues related to areas of mutual concern, including
    related to supply chains.
        But we were not prepared to discuss market access in any
    way, and I think that that really hobbled the effort. I also
    think that our decision not to engage on digital trade was
    problematic and something that we would want to revisit going
    forward.
        Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
        As we strengthen our strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific,
    particularly with ASEAN partners like the Philippines, Subic
    Bay, which I visited, is again emerging as a critical location
    for U.S. logistics and operational planning. And our defense
    cooperation agreement with the Philippines grants us access to
    sites like Subic. But we must balance our military presence
    with Philippines' constitutional limits on foreign bases and
    sensitivities to national ressentiment, which has historically
    complicated our security cooperation.
        Mr. Poling, keeping this delicate balance in mind, what
    specific capabilities or pre-positioned assets would most
    enhance deterrents at Subic?
        Mr. Poling. Thank you, Chairwoman. The most important thing
    for the Philippines--well, I suppose there is two. One, it
    needs asymmetric capabilities, much like Taiwan or anybody else
    facing a giant neighbor. This is not a footrace the Philippines
    can possibly win.
        So seeing more deployments like the NMESIS right now,
    Tomahawks paired with Philippines' own midrange land-based
    capabilities like the BrahMos missiles they bought from India,
    is key. It allows the Philippines to hold Chinese vessels in
    the South China Sea at risk in a situation in which there is no
    number of hauls that they could possibly be sold or loaned that
    would make up for the asymmetry they face.
        The second is presence. At the end of the day, there is no
    military solution to the South China Sea. The Philippines needs
    to be able to show the flag. And they have done a remarkably
    good job with a very limited Coast Guard and Navy. We need to
    see more uncrewed platforms. We need to see more cheap vessels.
    We need to see more support for Philippine basing in the
    islands, and that doesn't mean U.S. boots on the ground, but
    the U.S. could be providing more funding for the Philippines to
    buildup its own facilities, as China and Vietnam do as well.
        Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
        One of the most pressing challenges in the region is
    China's dominant grip on critical mineral supply chains,
    especially for material vital to clean energy and defense
    technologies. And we mentioned Indonesia is the world's top
    producer of nickel. This is critical for battery technologies.
    But it is alarming that Chinese companies control 75 percent of
    Indonesia's nickel-refining capacity.
        Ms. Weisel, what are the implications of China's choke hold
    on critical mineral supply chains for the U.S. and allied
    nations?
        Ms. Weisel. Well, I think we are seeing the results of that
    choke hold in our industries today where China can limit access
    to critical minerals, and then it also controls these critical
    minerals from other countries. So I think all of this is quite
    disturbing and just reinforces the need for the U.S. to
    establish its own supply chains with the region.
        I think, as I mentioned in my testimony, Japan has had
    quite a good deal of success in trying to limit its reliance on
    Chinese critical minerals by promoting its relationships with
    the region. They have an organization called the Japanese
    Organization for Metals and Energy Security that has the
    purpose of ensuring stable supplies of critical minerals and
    energy for Japan.
        Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you----
        Ms. Weisel. The result of that, and something I think we
    should be looking at, is that they have been able to
    successfully diversify their sources of critical minerals. And
    in the funding that they use for this organization that's known
    as JOGMEC, they have----
        Mrs. Kim. of California. Yes. Sorry, my time is up. So let
    me yield my time to Ranking Member Bera for his questioning.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        And we can stick to the topic of critical minerals. Japan
    built those redundant supplies after facing economic coercion
    and retaliation from China, I think, in terms of choking off
    some of those. And we are certainly at risk and experiencing
    some of that potential risk right now. So there is an
    importance in expedience to not just develop our own domestic
    supplies but also look at, in a strategic way, how we go into--
    you know, whether that is Vietnam, Malaysia, other--Indonesia--
    and build redundant supplies.
        And I would argue, in the Biden administration, the mineral
    security partnership gives us some vehicles by which to work
    with countries like Japan, Korea, and others to help build
    those and perhaps even go into--you know, the Koreans are going
    into Mongolia--perhaps go into other areas.
        But this is--I would agree with you, Ms. Weisel, that I
    think this is a key area where we can deepen our relationship
    in a positive way with Southeast Asian nations, and we should
    do so.
        And, Chairwoman, I think we have a hearing actually coming
    up soon looking at that particular issue.
        Let's go back to digital trade for a second. While I wish
    we could go back to TPP, I clearly thought digital trade was
    something that we would get under the Biden administration, and
    obviously it didn't happen. It is in our interest, certainly in
    the region's interest.
        We can work off some of the existing digital trade models,
    whether that is taking the digital trade chapter out of USMCA
    or looking at some bilateral pieces. But maybe, each of you, if
    you wanted to just touch on the importance of getting a digital
    trade deal done.
        Maybe we will start with Dr. Kuok and then work to the left
    with the region.
        Dr. Kuok. Thank you very much. In terms of the importance
    of a digital trade agreement, China is embedding its digital
    norms in the region through its deals with countries like
    Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, et cetera. And once those norms--the
    technology and the norms--are embedded, it becomes quite
    difficult to reverse.
        So, there is very little downsides to moving quickly on
    this issue. And the U.S. should be alert to it, lest it be in
    the same position as it is now in terms of critical minerals
    where it allowed China to invest in Indonesia, since Indonesia
    banned the export of nickel and allowed China to invest heavily
    in its nickel processing.
        The United States was asleep at the wheel in that respect,
    and I think it needs to redouble its efforts in terms of
    reaching and arriving at a digital trade agreement with
    Southeast Asian countries.
        Mr. Bera. Right.
        Ms. Weisel?
        Ms. Weisel. Yes, I would just add that China is active in
    this region. They have just recently updated their China-ASEAN
    agreement, which now includes additional digital commitments.
    And there is active cooperation between the two. So I think
    that is something that we really should keep a close eye on.
        But I also would note that the EU is engaged with a number
    of ASEAN regions, and the EU has a different approach to
    digital trade rules than we do. So, absent the U.S. direct
    engagement in the region, we are ceding it to others.
        Mr. Bera. Mr. Poling?
        Mr. Poling. I would just reinforce that last point. We have
    325 million people in a world of eight billion and growing. We
    can either help set rules in partnership with others, or we can
    end up taking the rules.
        What we have already seen is almost everybody in Southeast
    Asia has now adopted a European-style GDPR regime. They did
    that because we had no alternative. And they asked and asked
    and asked, and we didn't present it.
        Later this year, ASEAN will likely release its own digital
    economic framework agreement. We don't know what rules will be
    in there, but they won't be rules that the U.S. helped set. And
    that will be the story as long as we decide to take our ball
    and go home.
        Mr. Bera. Great. While IPEF would not have been the
    approach that I would have taken. It was an approach that the
    Biden administration took. And in our conversations, we looked
    at it as a high-standard negotiation, but not each country
    could actually meet--whether it was the labor standards,
    environmental standards, et cetera.
        And I think how I pitched it to the administration--and I
    would pitch it to the Trump administration--was in a modular
    way, right? It is easy for us to do a trade deal with Singapore
    and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea. It is essential for
    us to do a trade agreement with Indonesia, Vietnam,
    Philippines, Malaysia.
        And each of those countries may not, at this particular
    moment in time, be able to meet those high standards. But if we
    use a carrot approach, if we use--and I agree with you. It is
    not really a trade deal without market access because obviously
    that is what folks want.
        If the Trump administration is listening, I would strongly
    urge us to--in a bipartisan way--to try to figure this out. And
    if we don't set the norms and the rules, somebody else is, and
    we may not like them when we wake up.
        I will yield back.
        Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
        Let me now recognize Representative Moylan of Guam for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Ms. Chairwoman.
        And as Guam often serves as first point of contact with the
    U.S. for many ASEAN countries, I am very enthusiastic about
    further advancing our relationship with them. In the early
    2024, the U.S. surpassed China as ASEAN's largest export
    market. This dynamic economic development underscores the
    importance of strengthening our economy tie with the regional
    group.
        However, the potential benefits of ASEAN are not limited to
    economics alone. ASEAN also plays a critical role in promoting
    regional stability and maritime security, deepening the
    cooperation for natural disasters and more.
        Given China's growing influence in the region, it is
    imperative that we develop a comprehensive strategy to enhance
    our engagement with ASEAN, counter China's influence, and
    secure our national interests in the region.
        As for the economic aspect, the U.S. is the largest source
    of cumulative foreign district investments, FDI, in ASEAN and
    overtook China as the largest export market this year. Now,
    while we need to address unfair trade practice in general, we
    also need to consider the potential ramifications of proposed
    tariff increase on ASEAN countries since many of them have
    export-dependent economies.
        To avoid the risks of these countries deepening their
    economic dependence to China, we should update our strategic
    engagement with them to promote economic prosperity both in the
    region and the U.S. and to build a more resilient supply chain.
        When it comes to regional security and maritime security,
    the most urgent issue is China's aggression in South China Sea.
    Many incidents of harassment against Philippine ships by
    Chinese Coast Guard vessels have been reported. And although
    ASEAN members don't all share the same stance toward China, if
    we can encourage them to share a common position on this issue,
    it would serve a powerful voice to deter further aggression.
        Mr. Poling, could you describe how opinions among ASEAN
    members are divided on South China Sea disputes? Also, how can
    the U.S. encourage them to adopt a more unified position to
    secure freedom of navigation and maritime security?
        Mr. Poling. Thank you, Congressman. The Philippines is
    obviously the farthest on this spectrum if we were to lay it
    out. It has been the most forward-leaning in defending its
    rights. It has been the clearest in articulating the legal
    nature of its rights and its objections to China's through its
    arbitral victory.
        Just behind the Philippines have been Vietnam. There is no
    country on earth, when you look at polling, that has more
    skepticism or anxiety about China or views China more as a
    revisionist threat than Vietnam, and that is because of China's
    aggression toward Vietnam in the South China Sea.
        Vietnam has been quietly supportive of the Philippines'
    arbitral victory in 2016. It has forged bilateral--quiet
    bilateral--Coast Guard cooperation with Manila. It has engaged
    in its own large buildup of its facilities in the Spratly
    Islands in order to contest Chinese control.
        After that, there is a steep drop-off, I am afraid, of the
    other claimants to the waters or islands of the South China
    Sea. Indonesia, which hasn't often considered itself a
    claimant, has probably been the most forward-leaning in
    contesting Chinese activity. And Indonesia has had the clearest
    articulation, other than the Philippines, of what is illegal
    about China's claims.
        Malaysia has tended to bury its head in the sand and try to
    ignore the issue, at least at the political level. Of course,
    Indonesian Cost Guard personnel and naval personnel are as
    frustrated by China as anybody. Of the non-claimants, Singapore
    has really been the only one that has taken a firm position on
    the illegality of China's claims.
        And I think we have to recognize that there will never be a
    coherent ASEAN position on the South China Sea. Thailand, Laos,
    Cambodia--they are not going to invite Chinese retaliation on
    themselves in support of the Philippines or Vietnam. And so
    there has to be a claimants' grouping, but not an ASEAN
    grouping.
        Mr. Moylan. Thank you very much.
        Ms. Weisel, based on your experience in the U.S.
    Government, including U.S. trade representative, how do you
    assess the potential impact of the proposed tariff increase on
    ASEAN members? What do you see as the most effective way to
    advance our economic interest in the region? Sorry; you have
    very little time.
        Ms. Weisel. I think that the actions, as I said in my
    statement, have really put the U.S. at a disadvantage. The U.S.
    is seen as kind of impulsive, unpredictable, unilateral actions
    that is causing ASEAN to reflect on what it needs to do to
    hedge the risk against the U.S. and is forcing them to lessen
    their reluctance to work with China because they have no other
    choice.
        If they are going to be threatened by the United States,
    then they are going to be more open to working with China. And
    we have put them in that position.
        Mr. Moylan. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
        Let me now recognize Representative Amo of Rhode Island for
    your 5 minutes' questioning.
        Mr. Amo. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim.
        And thank you to our witnesses for being here. As we have
    discussed, ASEAN is just an essential partner to the United
    States. It is an opportunity for American power but also for
    global collaboration. And I believe the Biden administration
    understood this and made ASEAN central to our Indo-Pacific
    strategy.
        But I am concerned about the Trump administration's foreign
    assistance freeze, the chaotic tariffs, and what that has done
    to really take an axe to our relationship with ASEAN nations.
    And of course, as we have discussed already today, this really
    works against our efforts to counter China's influence in the
    region. And Trump's chaos and uncertainty has undermined our
    credibility as a partner while doing its part to hurt American
    businesses.
        Even worse, China is already stepping in to fill the void
    that we have left behind, and in one particular way I want to
    highlight in my time today. I am worried about a potential axe
    to the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, as
    we all know, the DFC. The DFC provides an enormous return on
    investment to the American taxpayer, advancing the United
    Sates' foreign policy goals and our economic interests, a true
    definition of a win-win.
        And the United States private sector is consistently the
    largest source of foreign direct investment in the ASEAN
    region. The DFC is also a perfect counter to China's Belt and
    Road Initiative, providing an alternative to that coercive
    financing scheme. In the first three and a half years of the
    Biden administration alone, the DFC advanced over $1.4 billion
    in private sector investments in the ASEAN countries.
        So, Dr. Kuok, as we work on legislation to reauthorize the
    DFC, how do you think we can ensure that the DFC continues
    working successfully in the ASEAN region to support our allies
    and combat China's growing influence?
        Dr. Kuok. Thank you very much, Congressman. I think you are
    right to point out the strategic damage that the withdrawal of
    aid has done to the United States. Two caveats on aid--first,
    having aid in and of itself might have hurt, U.S. ability to
    engage with some of the regional governments who saw aid as
    meddling from the United States, or some forms of aid as
    meddling from the United States. And there are some reports
    that suggest that the strategic return on U.S. aid was unclear.
        Nonetheless, the sudden and abrupt withdrawal of aid from
    the United States to some of these countries sends an
    unfortunate message of U.S. callousness, especially when it
    impacts programs that mean the difference between life and
    death in these countries, such as humanitarian assistance,
    health programs, and demining, which as you pointed out, China
    has already stepped in to fill.
        On development finance, this is clearly something that the
    United States need to step up on. And I urge greater focus in
    this respect. China's Belt and Road Initiative, which you
    mentioned, was initiated in 2013. Amendments or revisions to
    the Build Act came in 2018, some 5 years after China's Belt and
    Road Initiative.
        Since then, the United States has had various
    infrastructure initiatives, development and infrastructure
    initiatives, including the Build Back Better World, which was
    then repackaged as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure
    Investment. And all of this is all well and good and very much
    appreciated in Southeast Asia, but it hasn't yet shown any
    concrete development in Southeast Asia.
        So urgency is the key here. Otherwise, it starts to feel
    like old wine in new bottles. So, certainly, the region is in
    urgent need of infrastructure development, and all of this
    should have happened yesterday. If not, today or tomorrow would
    be great.
        And this is not just in the region's interest. It is in the
    U.S.'s interest, as well, as it seeks to reduce regional
    reliance on China as well as increase U.S. access in the region
    as well.
        Mr. Amo. Well, thank you.
        I see my time is close to expired, so I will yield back.
    Thank you.
        Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
        I would like to now recognize the gentleman from
    Pennsylvania, Representative Mackenzie, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Mackenzie. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I appreciate the testimony today. It is a very important
    topic as we seek to combat the rising influence of China. And I
    think we all would like to make sure that we have greater bonds
    between the U.S. and the ASEAN countries that we are talking
    about here today.
        So, for Ms. Weisel, we have seen in the trade disputes
    between the U.S. and China the restrictions that have been
    placed by China on critical minerals coming into the U.S., and
    what that means for our economic vibrancy is felt all across
    our economy, potentially.
        And so are there opportunities that you see for us to build
    greater relationships with other countries in the region so
    that we could have a diversified supply chain in this area?
        Ms. Weisel. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I
    think there absolutely are opportunities to build closer ties
    and stronger supply chains. We know this from going back to the
    first Trump administration when the U.S. was encouraging
    companies to build China-plus-one strategies, and ASEAN
    understood that they were going to be a beneficiary of that.
        Several of the ASEAN countries have important critical
    minerals and are looking to develop their supply chains. They
    see the United States as an important partner in helping them
    build both their--build out their critical mineral supply
    chains and that they are quite interested in partnering with
    us.
        And I think that what we need to show here is consistency.
    So some of the signals that we sent, for instance, that we want
    to build our own supply chains but we have a 232 investigation
    going on in critical minerals--so, if they partner with us, are
    they then going to be subjected to 232 tariffs that are going
    to undermine the cooperation that we are seeking to build?
        If we can overcome some of those kinds of concerns and come
    up with the kind of financing that we need to support industry
    in building those supply chains, I think we have some very
    interested partners in ASEAN.
        Mr. Mackenzie. And that is great to hear because I think we
    saw that coming out of the trade and tariff disputes back in
    2018, 2019, is that countries were willing to take on supply
    chain initiatives outside of China, working with the U.S. And I
    think that was actually a good benefit from that trade dispute
    in 2018/2019.
        I think we have the potential again this time with tariffs.
    There are two different issues going on. There is certainly the
    reciprocity issue that we see across the board being dealt with
    in a lot of countries, and then there is China that is unique.
    The tariffs that are being placed on China are significantly
    higher than in other countries.
        And I think we have the same potential ahead of us here
    because countries were shaken in 2018/'19, doing business with
    China. They started getting out. Those that stayed,
    anecdotally, have come to regret that. And they have said,
    ``You know what? We got the warning shot in 2018/'19. We didn't
    fully listen to you. We didn't get out. We didn't move our
    supply chains fast enough.'' And I think that that has the
    potential to be something that is going to speed up here in
    this latest round of tariffs.
        So, if you are saying that that willingness is there, then
    the potential for that supply chain disruption with the higher
    tariffs placed on China, I think, is very real. And I think
    ASEAN countries should be ready to take on that American
    business. Get away from China. And I think we have the
    opportunity to have stronger bonds going forward.
        I will close with one other question for you is, when we
    look at this disruption in trade going on right now, I would
    like to hear from you what other opportunities outside of
    critical minerals do you see as the greatest opportunity for
    ASEAN countries to take on? Is it medical devices? Is it basic
    manufacturing, electronics? What do you see as the biggest
    opportunity for those economies to take on?
        Ms. Weisel. I think that they are very interested in
    working with us on the digital economy and strengthening their
    digital trade with the United States but also within each of
    these countries. They have large numbers of young people who
    are really digitally educated and do see that as the future of
    their economies. I think that they see opportunities of working
    closely with our digital industries and finding ways to align
    our regulatory approaches.
        Mr. Mackenzie. All right. Well, I appreciate that. And
    thank you again for testifying. I think we have great
    opportunities that lie ahead for the U.S. and ASEAN
    relationship and look forward to working on those together with
    everybody interested.
        Thank you, and I yield back.
        Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
        And I now recognize the gentleman from Texas,
    Representative Castro, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairwoman. Chair Kim, I appreciated
    working with you to reintroduce the bipartisan Partner with
    ASEAN Act today. This bill would give ASEAN the same diplomatic
    privileges and immunities that other major multilateral
    institutions already enjoy, a step that I believe would
    strengthen ASEAN's centrality and U.S. regional ties.
        So I wanted to ask, Mr. Poling, how important is it for the
    U.S. to follow through on this legislation and demonstrate that
    we treat ASEAN as a strategic partner.
        Mr. Poling. I think it is quite important, particularly at
    a time when ASEAN questions whether the U.S. will follow
    through on a great many commandments it makes. The legislation
    has been pending for I think 3 years. It was first introduced 3
    years ago. At a time when ASEAN fears that the U.S. will
    withdraw from multilateral engagement, at a time when the State
    Department has suggested that it will shut down the
    Multilateral Affairs Shop within EAP, which is in charge of
    ASEAN affairs, this can send an important countervailing
    message.
        Mr. Castro. Thank you.
        And I want to ask Dr. Kuok--recent polling suggests that
    public polling in the United States has dipped in majority
    Muslim Southeast Asian countries following Israel's war in
    Gaza. And so how has the war in Gaza affected the region's
    public opinion of the United States?
        Dr. Kuok. As mentioned earlier, the drop in support for the
    United States since the recent Gaza crisis has been precipitous
    in Muslim majority countries, about a 20 percentage point drop
    in support for the United States since the Gaza crisis. And
    support for China in Muslim majority countries is averaging
    about 70 percent amongst Muslim majority countries. And this
    was in the most recent poll, as well, the 2025 poll which saw a
    slight decrease in support for China and increase in support
    for the United States, but still very poor support for the
    United States amongst these Muslim majority countries, and even
    amongst Singaporean respondents, because Singapore has a
    minority Muslim population--sentiment is also quite bleak about
    the United States and its either inaction or its active support
    of Israel. And so that has hurt perceptions of the United
    States.
        The poll has most clearly reflected the drop in support for
    the United States amongst Muslim majority countries, but it
    hasn't been limited to Muslim majority countries or even the
    Muslim population. The humanitarian crisis is clear for all to
    see.
        Mr. Castro. And then I want to ask you, given those things,
    what the long-term implications for U.S. credibility and
    influence in the region are, particularly the longer this goes
    on.
        Dr. Kuok. How much it impacts the United States' ability to
    influence the region will depend on the situation on the ground
    and on the extent to which, humanitarian aid is able to reach
    victims of this crisis. So it will wax and wane accordingly.
        That said, countries in the region are very pragmatic. So,
    regardless of that crisis, I think it will hurt sentiment, but
    nonetheless, countries will seek to work with the United
    States. And we see that from, say, Malaysia, whose prime
    minister has been the loudest and most vocal in terms of
    criticizing the United States for its support of Israel.
        Before Malaysia took up the chair of ASEAN, it actually
    expressed that it would seek, as ASEAN chair, to work with
    various important partners, and it mentioned a whole list of
    partners but left out the United States. Since then, Malaysia
    has sought to clarify that it seeks to continue to work with
    the United States. So, even then, it wants to work with the
    United States, but the U.S. has to be there to offer up
    economic and security options.
        Mr. Castro. Well, and speaking of the economic part--I have
    45 seconds left. Let me ask you about the effect of the tariffs
    on public opinion, as well, because that's another major issue.
        Dr. Kuok. It is unclear at the moment what the effect of
    the tariffs have been on Southeast Asia. The 2025 poll I
    mentioned was conducted from early January to mid-February, so
    before the U.S. disengagement from Europe, before the U.S. aid
    cuts, as well as before the tariffs.
        But I think it cannot but hurt the United States, given the
    steep tariffs, as I mentioned, on many of the poorest, some
    amounting to almost a 50 percent tariff rate. And these
    countries cannot afford these tariff rates. They are not only
    going to have an economic impact on the region but, as the
    Singapore prime minister pointed out, an impact on the global
    trading system, which will then hurt these countries. And it
    will hurt the United States as well.
        It might win a little bit in terms of gaining an inch, but
    it will lose a yard because--in terms of its strategic ability
    to influence the region and getting the region to align with it
    on issues important to it-- the U.S.
        Mr. Castro. I have just run out of time. Thank you.
        Dr. Kuok [continuing]. will be on a back foot. Thank you.
        Mr. Castro. Thank you.
        Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
        Let me now recognize the gentlelady from South Carolina,
    Representative Biggs, for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim.
        And thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
        So my first question is for Mr. Poling. So, in your
    testimony, you emphasized the strategic utility of the U.S.
    Coast Guard in Southeast Asia, particularly in countering
    China's gray zone tactics through partnerships, capacity-
    building, and shipwrighter agreements.
        Given the success of China's nonlethal coercion via its
    Coast Guard and Maritime Militia, what additional steps would
    you recommend the United States take beyond current initiatives
    to strengthen and expand the U.S. Coast Guard engagement in the
    region? And how can these efforts be better integrated with the
    needs of front-line states like the Philippines and Vietnam?
        Mr. Poling. Thank you, Congresswoman. I do think that it
    has been important to see now a small presence of U.S. Coast
    Guard cutters, usually one at a time conducting training
    activities in Southeast Asia. The U.S. Coast Guard is stretched
    too thin. We have to acknowledge that it is not going to play a
    direct role in helping support, say, Philippine activity in the
    South China Sea. That is going to remain a Navy role. But the
    more the Coast Guard can be funded to forward-deploy to the
    Indo-Pacific, engage in shipwrighting in the Pacific Islands,
    in training and capacity-building in Southeast Asia, the
    better.
        The Philippines has done a remarkable job in standing up to
    China. And so far, the threat of U.S. intervention under the
    Mutual Defense Treaty is what has kept this in the gray zone
    where, so far, the Philippines can handle it. The most
    important thing, from my perspective, that we can--continue to
    reinforce the application of the Mutual Defense Treaty and that
    we continue to fund the 10-year security sector assistance road
    map that we have promised to help modernize the Philippine
    military.
        Mrs. Biggs. Thank you. So I would like to kind of continue
    our discussion. You point out to the Coast Guard's
    effectiveness in building regional trust and countering grey-
    zone tactics. Given the strategic importance of Southeast Asia,
    what political and operational challenges must be overcome to
    expand U.S. Coast Guard deployments and agreements, such as the
    shipwrighter programs or deployed cutters in the region? And
    what specific support should Congress support to achieve this
    expansion?
        Mr. Poling. I don't think it is possible for the U.S. to
    negotiate a shipwrighter agreement for the South China Sea. The
    nature of the dispute, its multilateral nature, makes it all
    but impossible, and it would be far too politically sensitive
    in the Philippines for, I think, even the Philippines, our
    closest and oldest ally in the region, to ask.
        But more Coast Guard presence to help the Philippines
    bolster its own capability would be welcomed, and the key there
    is simply funding. The last time we saw significant increases
    in Pentagon budgets, there was efforts to cut the Coast Guard's
    funding. We need to keep in mind that the Coast Guard is an
    important tool of the U.S.'s power and credibility, not just
    the Navy.
        Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much for that insight.
        So my next question is for Ms. Weisel. Your testimony
    emphasizes DFC's role in catalyzing private investment to
    advance both development goals and U.S. strategic interest,
    particularly in Southeast Asia. In that context, how can the
    U.S. interagency better integrate on-the-ground insights to
    improve risk mitigation and foster a more stable investment
    climate for DFC-supported projects across ASEAN?
        Ms. Weisel. Well, I think as we look to restructure the way
    that we are supporting companies in the region, there is going
    to be an important opportunity to ensure that agencies that are
    on the ground in ASEAN are working together and coordinating
    closely. So you have the Commerce Department playing a
    particular role. You have the State Department having at least
    traditionally played another role, and the aid agencies, also,
    on the ground in these various countries.
        As we are thinking about restructuring all of this, it is
    really important that we have input from all of these various
    agencies about what the priorities are and the ways that all of
    them can contribute to supporting DFC and U.S. business going
    forward. We have talked about here how important it is to be
    able to rethink the way we are looking at this, given the
    competition that we are facing not just from China but from
    other countries that are competing in the region.
        And so I think we need to have a very serious look at the
    way we have been coordinating in the past and what we need to
    do going forward.
        Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much for your insight.
        And with that, I yield back.
        Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
        Let me now recognize the gentleman from Maryland,
    Representative Olszewski, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Olszewski. Thank you so much, Chair Kim.
        Thank you to Ranking Member Bera and to all of our
    witnesses today. I just want to first say how much I completely
    agree that the U.S. must strengthen our support for our ASEAN
    partners in the Indo-Pacific, so I really appreciate you all
    being here and your comments today.
        We know this means defending a free and open region in the
    face of security threats posed by the PRC and also means
    offering a reliable economic alternative in developing
    financing for countries like Laos that are saddled with PRC
    debt, and it also means supplying the kind of foreign
    assistance that USAID and our other development agencies have
    delivered to ASEAN and its member states for more than four
    decades. So just lifting up our actions and words, and so
    appreciate the opportunity for the conversation.
        I know there has been a lot of talk--I want to turn a
    little bit to solutions through people-to-people ties. And so I
    was hoping that we can focus on that. I believe that we should
    be building on the friendship shared by our combined one
    billion people, and I am proud that Maryland's Johns Hopkins is
    leading the way.
        In 2023, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
    Studies launched the U.S.-ASEAN Institute for Rising Leaders.
    However, President Trump's budget request seeks to end this
    critical educational and cultural exchange.
        Ms. Kuok, perhaps you can speak to--or Dr. Kuok; I am
    sorry--could you speak to the importance of engaging with youth
    and emerging leaders in ASEAN countries and for the long-term
    U.S. relationship with the region? How would ending educational
    and cultural exchange programs in the region affect U.S.
    influence there and open doors for the PRC to expand its
    influence? And if there is time, I invite our other witnesses
    to answer as well.
        Dr. Kuok. Thank you very much. I have to admit not to have
    thought very much about this issue because it almost seems very
    obvious that the United States is inflicting a grievous act of
    self-harm when it ends educational programs for the young
    people of the region, who will tomorrow be the leaders of their
    countries.
        So, clearly, this is a wrong-footed move, and it will hurt
    the United States. I mean, if you look at the youths in the
    region today, I think just anecdotally, some of them have been
    put off from coming to the United States because of some of
    these concerns.
        But more broadly, as you know, a couple of weeks ago, the
    Shangri-la Dialogue of defense ministers took place in
    Singapore. And at that dialog, Defense Secretary, Hegseth
    talked about how our futures are tied together--the futures of
    the countries of the Indo-Pacific are tied together. Yet it
    feels so much like the region is under an onslaught from this
    part of the world.
        So it doesn't feel very much like a shared future, and I
    cannot imagine that it feels very much like a shared future for
    the young people whose futures are thrown into uncertainty by
    some of the more thoughtless actions of the administration.
        Mr. Olszewski. Your thoughts on that particular topic?
        Ms. Weisel. I would just add that a good case study of this
    is Vietnam, which used to train all of its officials and send
    people to Russia for education. And then, the Vietnamese
    government started sending students to the US and Europe. They
    started going to Europe. And you saw a change in the attitudes
    of those people toward improving relations with the United
    States and deepening cooperation.
        So you do have these case studies that underscore the
    importance of these educational links.
        Mr. Poling. I would add that there is no country in
    Southeast Asia that reports in the ISEAS survey every year that
    they want to go study in China. There are several now where
    they have to go study in China; the other doors closed.
        In general, the U.S., Australia, and the U.K. are the
    preferred educational destinations, especially for Vietnam,
    which provides the third-largest group of foreign students in
    the U.S. and the Philippines. Pausing interviews for student
    visas, canceling Fulbright exchanges--this is only going to
    harm the U.S. in the long term.
        Mr. Olszewski. I appreciate that.
        Madam Chair, I think that reinforces the lessons that we
    learned when we were all in the Pacific Islands recently
    together on the trip that you helped lead. So I appreciate our
    witnesses that--and think it sort of speaks to our committee's
    obligation to lift up these kinds of programs for--particularly
    for--I loved the comment about the leaders of tomorrow and
    thinking about our engagement in that way.
        And with that, I yield back. Thank you.
        Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
        I recognize the gentleman from Kansas, Representative Barr,
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Barr. Kentucky.
        Mrs. Kim. of California. Kentucky. Oh.
        Mr. Barr. It is Okay. It is Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair,
    for your excellent leadership and holding this hearing.
        And let me key in on Dr. Kuok's testimony when she talked
    about these ASEAN countries don't--or Southeast Asian
    countries--they don't want to be forced to choose. This does
    corroborate some of the public comments and some of the
    analysis from our embassies when I travel to Thailand,
    Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines.
        But privately in our meetings with our counterparts, they
    do want to choose. They want to choose the United States. That
    has not changed from the Biden administration to the Trump
    administration. I would argue, especially Indonesia, a vibrant
    democracy--they want to choose. They want to choose the United
    States, and that hasn't changed from one administration to the
    other.
        In fact, I remember very vividly, when we were in Jakarta,
    hearing a very stern admonition from the foreign minister,
    Marsudi, how terribly upset the Indonesians were and other
    ASEAN country leaders where that President Biden skipped the
    ASEAN conference.
        So this sense of a vacuum--it is not unique to now. It
    existed before the Trump administration. I think it is not a
    change in policy on trade that has given us this challenge of
    needing to deepen our ties with them.
        In fact, I want to challenge the critics of the Trump
    administration's trade strategy a little bit when they claim
    that the President's efforts to negotiate more reciprocal deals
    are pushing ASEAN nations toward Beijing or making these
    nations more vulnerable to Xi Jinping's acts of coercion.
        In fact, what is the objective of the Trump trade policy?
    It is actually to deepen our economic ties. It is to reduce the
    trade barriers to American exporters. And so, if the end goal
    of this is more reciprocal trade between the United States and
    ASEAN, this has enormous potential to reverse the sentiment
    expressed by Foreign Minister Marsudi that the Biden
    administration was not paying enough attention to ASEAN.
        So, Ms. Weisel, I totally agree with your testimony when
    you talk about a regional agreement that should consolidate and
    expand ASEAN commitments to eliminate tariff and non-tariff
    barriers in goods and services across the region. You say it
    also should require new treatments on customs and trade
    remedies.
        And then you say in exchange, the United States should
    gradually eliminate tariffs on imports from Southeast Asian
    partners to the agreement. That sounds exactly like the America
    First Trade Policy. We are asking them to lower their trade
    barriers to American exporters, and in exchange, we will reduce
    tariffs on them.
        Why does this policy not create an opportunity for greater
    economic integration between the United States and ASEAN to the
    detriment of the malign influence of Beijing?
        Ms. Weisel. Well, as I said at the outset, I think that
    they feel that the tariff threat hanging over them is a five-
    alarm fire. It has caused potentially tremendous damage to
    their economies with all of the uncertainty and the threats.
        I think that all of the ASEAN countries do indeed want to
    engage more deeply with the United States. They want to have
    greater economic cooperation. But they want to do so as equal
    partners in this negotiation. So, as we look to see areas where
    we can cooperate, a priority for them is reciprocal access.
        In other words, they would take on the rules that we are
    pushing, and in areas that are important to US like customs,
    digital trade and others. But they would like to see concrete
    benefits in return.
        Mr. Barr. And I am running out of time, but--and I take
    your testimony in good faith that you argue that the Trump
    policy does have the opportunity to open up U.S. exports to
    Southeast Asia, but you still maintain that they will de-risk
    from the United States as a result of this. I am not sure that
    is necessarily true. If we get better, more integrated economic
    deals as a result of the policy, I think they will de-risk from
    China.
        I don't have much time left, but I would love--maybe in a
    second round, Madam Chair--to talk about outbound investment
    into China and what is going to replace that if we restrict
    outbound investment in China. Does that create opportunities
    for more U.S. investment into ASEAN as a way to relocate supply
    chains?
        Mrs. Kim. of California. My ranking member has just left
    for another engagement, and I wasn't planning on doing a second
    round, if you don't mind.
        Mr. Barr. Okay.
        Mrs. Kim. of California. So you can submit your questions,
    and hopefully our witnesses may be able to respond in writing.
        But I do have some closing comments, if I may. It is really
    evident from today's hearing that we need to do more to create
    a responsive and effective Southeast Asia focused strategy.
    That begins with bolstering and strengthening our bilateral and
    multilateral relationship with ASEAN members.
        Our witnesses today, you have all trotted out key
    suggestions--and thank you so much for that--on how we can
    advance our interests diplomatically, economically, and
    militarily. So it is imperative moving forward that we are able
    to deliver results in a whole-of-the-government manner.
        If we are going to be the counterbalance that the region is
    counting on us to be, success can be achieved to the extent our
    strategies, policies, frameworks align with the needs of our
    regional partners.
        Additionally, we need results showing that a viable
    alternative to the CCP's state-driven economic model is
    available. We cannot allow Southeast Asia to be dictated by
    Beijing standards, and we must use every available tool to
    advance our economic agenda while punishing China's unfair
    trade practices.
        And now is the time for action. I encourage the
    administration and my colleagues across the aisle to work
    together to ensure that our policies would put us in a position
    to be the trusted partner in the region.
        So I want to thank you again for your valuable testimony
    and answering our members' questions. The members of the
    subcommittee may have some additional questions for the
    witness, like Rep. Barr has, and we will ask you to respond to
    those in writing. And pursuant to the committee rules, all
    members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and
    extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length
    limitations.
        So, without objection, I declare the committee stands
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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