[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AFTER ASSAD: THE FUTURE OF SYRIA
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HEARING
OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
June 5, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-22
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov
or http://www.govinfo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-407PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida, Chairman
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York,
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey Ranking Member
JOE WILSON,, South Carolina BRAD SHERMAN, California
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee AMI BERA, California
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
ANDY BARR, Kentucky DINA TITUS, Nevada
RONNY JACKSON, Texas TED LIEU, California
YOUNG KIM, California SARA JACOBS, California
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan Florida
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, GREG STANTON, Arizona
American Samoa JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio JONATHAN L. JACKSON, Illinois
JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
THOMAS H. KEAN, JR, New Jersey JIM COSTA, California
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York GABE AMO, Rhode Island
CORY MILLS, Florida KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
KEITH SELF, Texas GEORGE LATIMER, New York
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI Jr, Maryland
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware
JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington
RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania
James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director
Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
DARRELL ISSA, California Florida, Ranking Member
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee BRAD SHERMAN, California
RONNY JACKSON, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
THOMAS KEAN, JR, New Jersey WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
RYAN ZINKE, Montana KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington GEORGE LATIMER, New York
Sarah Miller, Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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REPRESENTATIVES
Page
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Michael Lawler........ 1
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Ranking Member Sheila
Cherfilus-Mccormick............................................ 3
WITNESSES
Statement of David Schenker, Taube Senior Fellow at Washington
Institute for Near East Policy and Former Assistant Secretary
of State for The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs................ 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Statement of Anna Borshchevskaya, Senior Fellow at Washington
Institute for Near East Policy................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Statement of Jon B. Alterman, Brzezinski Chair in Global Security
and Geostrategy at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies........................................................ 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 26
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 50
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 51
Hearing Attendance............................................... 52
Material for the Record
Statement for the Record submitted by Hon. French Hill........... 53
AFTER ASSAD: THE FUTURE OF SYRIA
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Thursday, June 5, 2025
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in
room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Lawler
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Lawler. The Subcommittee on the Middle East and North
Africa will come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to
assess U.S. national security interests as relates to Syria and
discuss potential policy options to further them. I now
recognize myself to give an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL LAWLER
Syria is at a turning point. The fall of Bashar al-Assad
this past December following four decades of authoritarian rule
has created conditions for unprecedented change for Syria and
for the Middle East. This change comes with significant risk.
The Syrian war dating back to 2011 has left most of the
country in ruins, destroyed by years of indiscriminate bombing
by Assad and his Russian and Iranian backers. The costs of
reconstructing this broken country will be in the tens of
billions, even by the most modest assessment, and investors
face significant hurdles as they work to navigate the complex
sanctions regime that has emerged after four decades of Assad
family rule.
While there are rightfully many who seek to break down
barriers, advocating for sanctions relief to ensure
reconstruction can take place, and put Syria on a path of
success, we must not lose sight of core U.S. interests in this
rush to embrace Syria's new regime.
There remain significant questions about Syria's new
interim authorities led by U.S.-designated foreign terrorist
organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, HTS, a former Al-Qaeda
affiliate, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Despite his hardened past, the
interim president continues to verbally signal a commitment to
reform, though his ability to deliver remains to be seen, which
is why we must be explicit with our goals for Syria.
This includes the counter-ISIS mission, which has been a
central part of U.S. foreign policy since 2014. We must set
clear expectations for the interim authorities on what we
expect from them with respect to counterterrorism cooperation
to prevent a resurgence and assume responsibility for detention
centers holding thousands of ISIS members and affiliated
individuals in the northeast.
And concerns about extremism are not, by any means, limited
to ISIS. Iran and its proxies have long used the country as a
sanctuary space to plan and carry out attacks, including
against Israel, while Russia sees Syria as a strategic
launchpad to undermine our interests not just in the Middle
East but much further afield, from Africa to Europe.
There must be clear red lines when it comes to Iran and its
proxies', as well as Russia's, ability to operate in Syria.
Preventing Syria from being used as a sanctuary space is vital
not just for the U.S. but also for Syria. This will, no doubt,
be one of the metrics used as the international community
measures the success of Syria's transition and by extension for
the prospects for further economic relief.
For Syria to succeed and reestablish itself on the
international world stage, it must take action to prevent
extremism from thriving once again, including by signaling a
commitment to inclusive governance by establishing a positive
working relationship with our Kurdish partners, the Syrian
Democratic Forces. They have been at the forefront of the
campaign to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS.
On that basis, the Trump administration has rightfully
taken steps to waive U.S. sanctions on a limited and temporary
basis, giving al-Sharaa sufficient time to demonstrate he is
able to turn his words into actions. But this is not, I have to
stress, a full embrace of al-Sharaa or those he continues to
surround himself with.
We must use this opportunity to press him on key U.S.
priorities, notably as relates to counterterrorism, while also
retaining limitations on U.S. sanctions relief to ensure Iran
and Russia cannot benefit financially.
Al-Sharaa has expressed a concerning willingness to embrace
Moscow, despite Putin's complicity in war crimes against the
Syrian people. For Russia, their presence in Syria is not just
about the Middle East; it is a vital staging ground essential
to everything they do in Africa and Eastern Mediterranean.
We underestimate the strategic importance Syria holds for
the Russians at our own peril. Make no mistake: what happens in
Syria does not stay in Syria. The country has consistently
demonstrated its ability to impact and shape affairs far
outside its borders, from Europe's migrant crisis to ISIS to
the war in Ukraine.
When Secretary Rubio testified before Congress last month,
he said, quote, ``There is no guarantee that by outreach and
working with the transitional authority in Syria, things are
going to work out. It may work out; it may not work out. But if
we don't reach out and try, it is a guarantee not to work
out.''
And I echo the Secretary's sentiment and just came back,
along with the ranking member, from a trip to the Middle East,
including Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Jordan. And that was the
sentiment shared there as well. We want to give this an
opportunity to work but are fully cognizant of the consequences
of failure here.
During this hearing, we will further examine Syrian
stability and the vital role Syria and the Syrian people play
in the Middle East.
I now yield to the ranking member, Sheila Cherfilus-
McCormick, for her opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
convening this important hearing on developments in Syria
following the fall of the brutal Assad regime.
I welcome our expert panelists for this afternoon, all of
whom have robust knowledge of Syria, the broader Middle East,
and core U.S. interests at this time of immense transition and
opportunity.
As Chairman Lawler noted, we recently returned from a
congressional delegation to Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Jordan.
In many meetings, developments in Syria were front and center.
Excitement was palpable among our regional partners over the
opportunities that changes in Syria and Lebanon present.
Across the Middle East, U.S. allies and partners have
welcomed change in leadership in Damascus with the hopes to
support our robust construction work, investments in critical
infrastructure, and increased humanitarian assistance to the
millions of Syrians who require urgent aid as of today.
I stand and support the Syrian people, who look to a new
future and a government that does not engage in systemic
campaigns of violence and repression against its own citizens.
I welcome the Trump administration's initial engagement with
the new Government of Syria, including the decision to lift
certain sanctions through the General License 25 and issuing a
180-day waiver on the Caesar Act sanctions.
However, while the President is correct to say that this is
Syria's moment to shine, helping Syrians musts meet this moment
requires a clear plan. This is noble. However, I do not believe
that this can be achieved without providing incentives that
would allow the new Syrian Government to create and enable an
environment and a strong institution which is needed.
Congress has not received any such details on the
administration's plan to implement sanction relief effectively,
nor a more coherent strategy that the administration on its
priorities for U.S.-Syrian relationships.
I hope the vacuum the executive branch has created brings
members from both sides of the aisle together to work on
legislation that establishes clear priorities for further U.S.
engagement with Syria, including with respect to inclusion and
fully representative governance, protection of religious and
ethnic minority groups, continued counterterrorism cooperation,
and more.
A conditions-based sanction relief policies with clear time
lines and matrices is critical for Syria's security, regional
security, and the United States' national security. I look
forward to working with my colleagues on legislation to address
this. Absent such congressional leadership, I fear the U.S.
Syria policy would be characterized by a haphazard, ill-
conceived, move-fast, break-things approach that has been a
characteristic of the Trump administration to date. The stakes
for Syrian people are too high and a peaceful Syria is too
critical to our own interests to be reckless and unfocused.
Incentives for direct deliverables for Syria are critical.
U.S. policy on Syria must continue to prioritize effective and
multilateral counterterrorism operations, securing high-value
ISIS detainees, restoring critical life-saving humanitarian aid
that contributes to deradicalization, elimination of chemical
weapons and stores and unexploded ordnances, and capability-
building for the interim government's security forces.
It also requires robust engagement with our regional
partners, including Jordan. At the exact moment when a change
in Syria requires a full set of foreign policy tools to advance
U.S. interests, the Trump administration has not only proposed
a gutting of the State Department, but numerous United States
stabilization and assistance programs active in Syria and
within neighboring countries have been cut.
Today, because of the Trump administration's policies, our
regional partners in the Middle East are asking whether we keep
our word, whether our adversaries are betting that we won't. I
welcome the opportunity to speak with our panelists about the
policies and strategies we should be working on to ensure this
moment of cautious optimism for Syria's people is not wasted
and the United States' interests in the region are protected.
I yield back.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you to the ranking member.
Other members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
before us today on this important topic: Hon. David Schenker,
Taube Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy and previously Assistant Secretary of State for the
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs under President Trump's first
administration; Dr. Anna Borshchevskaya, Senior Fellow at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Jon B. Alterman,
Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
This committee recognizes the importance of the issues
before us and is grateful to have you here to speak with us
today. Your full statements will be made part of the record,
and I will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5
minutes in order to allow time for member questions.
I now recognize Mr. Schenker for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF DAVID SCHENKER
Mr. Schenker. Thank you, Chairman Lawler, Representative--
Ranking Member Cherfilus-McCormick, honorable members. I
appreciate the opportunity to be here today.
The future of Syria matters greatly to the United States.
Under Assad, Syria was a source of regional instability and a
persistent threat to Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan, among others.
Assad's fall represents an opportunity for Syria, Washington,
and its regional partners.
There has been a lot of perseverating lately about Ahmed
al-Sharaa. To be certain, he is no panacea. At a minimum, he's
an Islamist and likely a bourgeoning authoritarian.
Notwithstanding lingering doubts, though, I believe al-Sharaa
is much better than Assad.
He might not succeed in unifying and stabilizing Syria.
Five months after the fall of Assad, though, al-Sharaa is the
only game in town. The Trump administration should invest
diplomatic capital to help him succeed. Time will tell whether
suspending crippling U.S. sanctions was the right decision. A
gradual process may have had more success at shaping the new
government, or perhaps continued U.S. economic pressures would
have scuttled al-Sharaa's already unlikely attempt to stabilize
a fractious and scarred Syria.
As with many U.S. policy decisions, the initiative to
suspend sanctions was not a choice between good and bad, but
rather a choice between bad and worse. Washington has no doubt
ceded some leverage, but I believe Trump made the less bad
decision; that is, to give al-Sharaa and the new Syria a
chance.
Meanwhile, al-Sharaa is meeting some expectations on
important issues. He is cooperating with the U.S. on
counterterrorism and undoubtedly will continue to do so. It is
important that U.S. forces remain in Syria until conditions are
conducive to withdrawal.
Foreign fighters constitute an even bigger challenge for
al-Sharaa. Terrorists, militia men, and foreign Jihadis played
a key role in toppling Assad. So these men are not going to be
expelled. Now, at al-Sharaa's request, the administration has
consented to the integration of some 3,500 of these fighters
into a unit of the military. While expedient, it is difficult
to imagine that this decision won't have problematic long-term
implications for discipline, accountability, and public
confidence.
Integration of these Jihadis doesn't solve the problem. It
defers it. Post-Assad Syria will not be a democracy. Still,
Washington does have an abiding interest in the protection of
minorities, a modicum of human rights, and some kind of
political representation for Syria's ethnic and religious
communities. I am talking about the Kurds, Druze, Christians
alike. An inclusive Syria, I believe, will mitigate toward
stability.
Going forward, Washington should set and convey
expectations to al-Sharaa on terrorism, foreign fighters, and
governance and be prepared to reimplement sanctions if Syria's
trajectory dictates.
Al-Sharaa's relations with Israel are also another
challenge. Since the fall of Assad, Israel has been occupying
and bombing Syria, at times justifiably. At the same time, the
government is interdicting Iranian weapons shipments destined
for Hezbollah.
Over time, direct discussions between Israel and Syria,
which are reportedly underway, could help build some trust
between the parties, stabilize the border, and lead to more
normal relations between these longtime enemies.
Another concern is that a weak Syria will invite foreign
meddling. At present, Iran is unwelcome, but the jury is out on
Russia. But Turkey and Israel both appear to be working to
establish military spheres of influence in Syria. Israel
bordering on Turkey, in my opinion, would be a recipe for
heightened tensions, and the Trump administration should be
pressing Israel and Turkey to establish, at a minimum, a
hotline to preempt unintentional escalation.
In sum, Syria faces a lot of challenges. The new government
in Damascus will need U.S. political support and robust
diplomatic engagement to succeed. The U.S. can help with
coordinating reconstruction, keeping ISIS at bay, and
implementing banking sector reforms necessary to reopen Syria
for business while at the same time encouraging the government
to be more inclusive.
It will be difficult for Washington to balance expectations
and be patient, but the potential benefits for the United
States and its partners of a stable, benign Syria that rejects
the so-called axis of resistance are enormous.
Thank you. I have submitted testimony for the record, and I
will look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schenker follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Schenker.
I now recognize Dr. Borshchevskaya for her opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF ANNA BORSHCHEVSKAYA
Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Cherfilus-McCormick,
honorable members, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today. With your permission, I am submitting my written
testimony, and I am going to summarize it.
We now have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reshape
the balance of power in the Middle East. Bashar al-Assad's
dictatorship is over, but the window of opportunity it presents
is going to close fast.
Russia seeks to replace our influence and remake the world
order with itself at the center. Syria is and has been
essential to that strategy. Nothing about the fall of Assad
changes Moscow's overall plans and objectives, but it does give
us a window of opportunity to foil Vladimir Putin's plans.
As Chairman Lawler said in his opening remarks, what
happens in Syria tends to not stay in Syria. This is why we
need to ensure Russia does not reestablish a foothold there.
Knowing that, my testimony will now focus on several key issues
of vital importance to the U.S.
First, the Eastern Mediterranean is crucial to Russia. That
is why the goal of control there is consistent in centuries old
for the Russian State. Make no mistake about it: this goal will
outlast Vladimir Putin. It is part of how Moscow views its
strategic positioning vis-a-vis the West.
Second, Assad is gone, and Russia may change tactics but
not its strategic objectives. These tactics will focus on
staying in Syria, on leveraging economic influence, and
positioning Russia as a protector of minorities. Syria has been
fundamental to Russia's success in leveraging its influence for
the last decade across the Middle East. Russia retains this
influence as it seeks to use it to undermine the United States.
And if Moscow can navigate the new Syrian regime, the Kremlin
can continue to exert influence.
Assuming the United States does not want to see its
position weakened in the region--and I would suggest that that
would be disastrous--the U.S. must ensure that Russia does not
reestablish control in Syria.
To that end, the U.S. could utilize its influence through a
carrot-and-stick approach to block Russia's ability to leverage
power. The U.S. can achieve it through the following: first, by
tapping into the strength of Ukrainians; facilitate greater
ties with Syria and further empowering Ukrainians all across
the Middle East and North Africa. In Syria, the U.S. can
facilitate economic and diplomatic ties between the two
countries, for example, by supporting Ukraine's wheat
deliveries to Syria. And all across the MENA region, the U.S.
can facilitate a push for Ukrainian technology, arms trade, and
information.
Over the last 3 years, the Ukrainian military has
integrated Western and post-Soviet military systems and made
impressive innovations in the arms industry. And we saw an
example of that most recently with Ukraine's drone attack on
Russia this past weekend. We saw how creative, how powerful,
that attack was. The U.S. now has significant opportunity to
partner with Ukraine to help transform and modernize Middle
East states that have been traditional Russian client states.
Second, continual engagement with the Syrian Government--
this engagement should include demonstration that if this
government meets certain guideposts, it will be able to unlock
aspects of a normalized relationship, which it desires.
And last, limiting Russia's resources through additional
sanctions and tackling Russia's so-called ghost fleet of
illicit oil tankers--as the United States and Europe ease or
suspend sanctions against Syria, they must balance the need to
help Syria recover with the need to block Russia's ability to
profit from this recovery and use its economic tools to gain
control. This could also include additional sanctions against
Russia and entities that work with Russia and working with
Turkey to crack down on the ghost fleet's legal violations and
ecological threats.
I began my testimony by telling you that this is a once-in-
a-generation opportunity. Let me reiterate here that this
window is closing quickly. While we deliberate, Russia is
strengthening its partnerships with Iran, China, and North
Korea. Ensuring Russia does not reestablish a position in Syria
is bigger than Syria, but it is also bigger than even Russia
alone. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Borshchevskaya follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Dr. Borshchevskaya.
I know recognize Dr. Alterman for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JON B. ALTERMAN
Dr. Alterman. Thank you, Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member
Cherfilus-McCormick, distinguished members of the committee.
Let me start by expressing my condolences over the passing
of Mr. Connolly. He and I met almost forty years ago when he
was working for Senator Pell, and I was a very young aide for
Senator Moynihan. Then, as now, I was in awe of his energy, his
creativity, and his dedication to public service. His loss is a
loss to this committee and to the country.
As Chairman Lawler said, Syria stands at a profound
inflection point. Syrians celebrate having overthrown a brutal
dictatorship, but they don't know whether they will live under
another dictatorship, a theocracy, a democracy, or a failed
State.
The questions before Congress are clear. How much should we
care about Syria's future? How much can we shape it? And how
should we proceed? On the first point, make no mistake: Syria
is important to U.S. national security. It borders key U.S.
allies Israel, Turkey, and Jordan. The country hosts an active
Jihadi movement, and elements in the country have a long
history of cooperation with Iran.
Syria's new leaders are overwhelmed by their domestic
needs. They are navigating the wreckage of 50 years of
dictatorship and 15 years of civil war. The economy has
operated on bribery, government shakedowns, and Captagon drug
sales for years. Infrastructure is crumbling, and there is a
critical shortage of capable administrators.
The government also faces severe security dilemmas. Two of
the most important are how to handle tens of thousands of
Syrians who supported Assad's repression and how to manage
Jihadi movements that include thousands of foreign fighters who
have been important allies of Syria's new leaders.
Our impact in this context is going to be limited. We will
have the most influence shaping Syria's external environment.
Multiple countries have keen interests in Syria's future, and
that creates some dangerous dynamics. Turkey sees itself as the
dominant external actor, and it has worked closely with Hayat
Tahrir al-Sham, Syria's current rulers. Turkey views Syrian
reconstruction as both a security imperative and also a
business opportunity.
Israel's interests sharply conflict with Turkey's. The
Israeli leadership views Syria's new leaders as Jihadist or
Jihadi-adjacent. After decades with Hezbollah threatening
Israel from Lebanon, Israel is creating a buffer zone along
Syria's border while working to weaken Islamist forces in the
Syrian Government.
Iran seeks to maintain a foothold in a country where it
invested tens of billions of dollars and maintained a strategic
pathway to Hezbollah. And as Anna suggested, Russia similarly
attempts to preserve its military bases and what's left of
decades of influence and investment in Syria. Europe wants a
peaceful Syria to stem the refugee flow, and the Gulf States
want to keep Iran marginalized.
In this, Syria faces a critical danger beyond Jihadi
capture. It could become a battleground for regional proxy
wars, much like Lebanon was in the 1970's and 1980's. The
growing hostility between Israel and Turkey, exacerbated by the
Gaza war, poses particular risks. Countries may adopt unsavory
allies to undermine each other in Syria, and the effects could
spread regionally.
The Trump administration correctly relaxed sanctions, and
it has given Syria's new government an opportunity to
demonstrate its intentions and capacity. Still, that policy
needs some adjustment.
First, while appointing a Syria envoy was constructive,
choosing somebody who is simultaneously Ambassador to Turkey
creates a conflict of interest that will make balancing between
the regional players much harder. Ambassador Barrack's two jobs
will be in conflict much of the time.
Second, we can't exert influence over allies and partners
while they pour aid into Syria and we completely abstain.
Humanitarian engagement here serves U.S. self-interests and
isn't mere charity. Groups we oppose throughout the Middle East
build grassroots support through social services, and we can't
afford to be absent on the aid front.
We don't have to fully understand Ahmed al-Sharaa's
motivations or trust his background, which includes troubling
associations with some of the region's most vicious terrorists.
Given our justified uncertainty, we should support him
modestly, test him continuously, and ensure that our allies
remain aligned with our policy.
I see great potential in Syria, as I think many of us do,
and we also see Syria's risks. We need a policy that makes the
former more likely and heads off the second. A modest
conditional U.S. strategy anchored in coordination with allies
and partners offers the best opportunity to advance U.S.
interests.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Alterman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Dr. Alterman.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
Ms. Borshchevskaya, what are Russia's main objectives in
Syria, and how has Assad's fall shaped its ability to achieve
them?
Dr. Borshchevskaya. At present, Russia is working very hard
to ensure it retains a presence in Syria. At this stage, they
are being relatively quiet, but they are watching. They are
engaging in discussions with the current Syrian Government. And
as I mentioned in my written remarks, Russia is trying to
position itself as a protector of minorities.
The most striking example of that is one that I mentioned
in my testimony where, according to Russian Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Russia had given several thousand
people refuge at Hmeimim during an outbreak of violence on the
coast.
So I think, at this stage, Russia is taking a very cautious
wait-and-see approach and slowly building ties and retaining
influence. But make no mistake: this is toward a larger goal.
Mr. Lawler. And how could the Kremlin use Syria's
transition as an opportunity for financial gain? From that
perspective, what guardrails need to be in place to prevent
that from happening as we consider how best to lift Syria's
complex and multifaceted sanctions regime?
Dr. Borshchevskaya. So I think Russia's-one big advantage
Russia has is its trade relationships with the Gulf States. And
as we are now seeing Gulf States looking to engage economically
with Syria, given the fact that Russia has these strong
relationships with these countries--so many Russian oligarchs
have fled to the Gulf after Russia's invasion of Ukraine--
Russia could find ways to cement ties through second and third
parties, and that would be hard to trace. And that is something
that we need to continuously monitor and look to block.
Mr. Lawler. Mr. Schenker, how might the power vacuum in a
post-Assad Syria be exploited by regional actors like Turkey?
Mr. Schenker. Thank you, Chairman. I think, as Jon Alterman
said a few minutes ago, you do have Turkey that not only has
relations with HTS but also with the Syrian National Army,
other active militia in the country, and shares, frankly, their
ideological, in a way, fellow travelers. They are Islamists, as
well, the Government of Turkey. And I think there is
opportunities for them to make inroads, influence, with the new
government. They are a more trusted partner than many.
At the same time, on the ground, there's a real
possibility--we see, right now, Qatar trying to get in. We see
Saudi Arabia, as well, that frankly, in my view, is a better
influence. But all these groups will be competing, and if they
compete to see who can spend more to rebuild Syria, maybe that
is a good thing. But if they compete for political influence,
this could lend to corruption or further radicalization.
Mr. Lawler. I think, to that end, Israel has sought to curb
the growing Turkish influence in Syria. In recent months,
Israel has become increasingly forward-leaning in terms of its
willingness to take action within Syria's borders to contain
the threat, though there have been efforts to have discussions
between Israel and Turkey.
What can the U.S. do to make sure that both sides'
interests are protected in this transition?
Mr. Schenker. Thank you. Certainly, I think that the United
States should be working with Israel and Syria if they need our
help, to get together and chat quietly to deconflict, to gain a
better understanding of where each party is at, what their own
concerns are.
You are not going to have a successful Syria, frankly, if
you can't have Syrian Government forces operating south of
Damascus. So what can be done to reassure Israel? And what can
be done going forward to--on areas that are overlapping, where
both al-Sharaa and Israel agree? ISIS has to be fought.
Palestinian groups may have to be restrained. And these are
things that both Israel and Syria can work on jointly.
Mr. Lawler. Last, al-Sharaa has pledged to establish
inclusive governance in Syria and certainly prevent the country
from becoming a staging ground. I think, obviously, he has said
a lot of the right things. That was a takeaway, certainly, from
my conversations in Saudi Arabia and Israel and Jordan. But
obviously, the proof will be in the pudding.
So what is your assessment of his willingness to deliver on
these promises thus far, and does he have an effective command
and control of the various militia troops on the ground?
Mr. Schenker. Those are two good questions but two separate
questions. I think in terms of inclusive governance, the answer
is this is very much a work in progress. They had committee
meetings to talk about the constitution or the temporary
constitution. These were widely panned, I think, by minority
groups as being performative, that there wasn't a real
inclusion--other types of things that have appeared that the
nature of the Syrian State is defined as being a Muslim State
in the constitution. This, to many in Syria, is viewed as
exclusionary.
And the appointment of, certainly--let's--we can go beyond
just minorities, so the inclusion of women in government is
also, I think, striking how low it is.
As for command and control or control over these militias,
the answer is no. I think he controls a very small part of
Syria to date and is even working to incorporate in an
effective manner the SDF, the Kurdish U.S.-backed
counterterrorism partner. This, too, I think, is a challenge,
if for no other reason that al-Sharaa himself has appointed
Jihadi to be in charge of Hasakah, who has perpetrated
atrocities against Kurds before.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you.
I now recognize Ranking Member Cherfilus-McCormick for 5
minutes.
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you so much, and thank you
for your testimony. Being actively participating in the
recovery and reform of Syria is top line for us to make sure
that Syria has a real chance of succeeding. And I think our
goal really is to be one of the strongest partners to Syria but
also to be the most influential. And right now, we are
competing with Russia, and we are aware that Russia now has two
bases that it does have control over.
But I wanted to first start with the first half. How can we
be successful in being the strongest partner to ensure we have
stability? Do you believe that--I know we lifted the sanctions,
but what are some of the reforms or strings that you would like
to see attached when it comes to incentivizing them to make
sure that they are actually moving in a forward movement that
we can trust and believe in? Oh, that question is for Dr.
Alterman. Well, actually, first--I was actually going to ask it
to all you guys, but I will start with you.
Dr. Alterman. Thank you. I think, first, we are all friends
from many years ago, and I think we also fundamentally agree on
many of the issues in Syria, as many of you do.
Look. I think the way we become a force multiplier is
partly we are active on the ground, but I think even more
important is we have an ability to rally our partners and
allies in a way that no other country does. As you have heard
from several of us, there is a real challenge of Israel and
Turkey mixing it up, but there are other parties, too.
And to me, there is partly an issue of what our aid should
be, but I don't think we should spend a lot of time trying to
create the perfect incentive, the perfect conditions, the
perfect consequences of bad action. I think it is much more
important that we make sure all of our friends and allies are
rowing in the same direction. It is not at all clear to me that
they will. It is not at all clear to me that they want to.
And to me, this is really--it is partly an aid issue, but I
think more fundamentally, it is a diplomacy issue, and it is
the administration speaking with one voice about some very
complicated issues where I think the administration may not
agree internally on all of the issues. But I think we have to
speak with one voice, act with one hand, and persuade our
allies and partners to join with us rather than undermine each
other, which I think will really undermine the chances for
recovery in Syria.
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Well, you mentioned that we need
to use all of our diplomatic tools. And right now, our tool kit
has been diminished due to the cuts we have seen with USAID. So
I wanted to narrow in. Are there any that you think are
imperative for us to actually have some guardrails so we can
say these need to be in place so we can help move them along in
a positive direction?
Some of the responses we got when we were overseas also--
there is an ambivalence about this new administration and
government. So how can we put guardrails, if anybody has any
suggestions? What needs to be incorporated to help that along?
And I will open that up to you.
Mr. Schenker. Ranking Member, I think at a minimum we
should be working on--you know, now that we have had these--
suspension of sanction, you still won't see--what they need is
really a huge flow of foreign direct investment, of--to build,
actually, a financial life, right? There is no economic life in
Syria to speak of.
And with the suspension and with the prospect of--after 180
days of reimposition of sanction, if performance is inadequate
for some reason or another, this does not inspire confidence of
investors. So this requires that we help the Government of
Syria to help themselves through banking reforms, through
cleaning up their counterterrorism and financing, et cetera, so
that we can start to--people can start to rely on banks, and
they can actually do business. That is at a minimum.
But there are no guardrails, right? We are relying on one
person here. This is key personnel. And he--it is remarkable,
really, you know, the irony that we are relying on a U.S.-
designated erstwhile terrorist to secure all these disparate
factions of Syria in this broken society. So I think it is also
important to be thinking about executive protection.
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Well, my last question, if I can
have a moment--I really wanted to get to the two bases which
are under Russian control. Do you believe that Russia will be
successful at maintaining control and influence over those
bases?
Dr. Borshchevskaya. Well, I think that remains to be seen,
but I think Russia has a real chance in maintaining a nominal
degree of control. And that is very important because that is
Russia's ability to project power into multiple directions,
into NATO's southern flank, into the Middle East, and into
Africa.
And beyond that, if I may, to your earlier question about
what can we do, I agree with David. The reality is there are no
guardrails. But I think we could aim to demonstrate that we are
committed to Syria and that we are going to be consistent.
Russia came into Syria 10 years ago at a time when there
was a vacuum. And any vacuum that there is, Russia is going to
fill. So I think if we can demonstrate a consistency in
interest--because one of the biggest problems that many of our
partners have with us is that we are inconsistent. We say one
thing, and then we change policies. Sometimes we don't know
what the policy is.
And if we can demonstrate that we are committed, that this
is important for us, and that we are willing to do what it
takes, be it, as David described, through helping Syria
navigate banking reform but also empowering other actors who
are our partners in Syria--essentially, filling in the need
that otherwise Russia would fill--I think that would be an
important step forward.
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Ranking Member.
I now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina,
Representative Wilson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Chairman Lawler. And I
want to say amen to your opening comments--additionally, how
important this hearing is. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
All the members are here, which is outstanding. And Ryan
Zinke has just joined us all the way from Montana. And then I'm
really grateful that we have Congressman Cory Mills here, who
actually was in Damascus last month to support the people of
Syria.
So we are just so grateful for what we see as a historic
decision by President Donald Trump to lift all sanctions on
Syria. I believe it was a masterstroke that has the potential
to lead to a complete realignment of the Middle East with
stability, peace, and prosperity for all the people.
It is particularly important to me because last November, I
had the distinction and honor of being identified by the
dictator Bashar al-Assad as an enemy of the State. I take that
as a great honor. Three weeks later, he fled to Moscow, where
he should be, with war criminal Putin. What a great team they
are.
But again, it is so exciting to me, the people of Syria
standing up for freedom and democracy. In one move, President
Trump has boxed out China from the whole of the Arab world. He
has additionally provided for helping expel Russian bases which
are logistics for the Russians, for war criminal Putin,
maintaining dictatorships in Africa. He has also prevented the
Iranian regime from resurgence and taken a major step to put
pressure on ISIS.
As Secretary of State Marco Rubio testified to the
committee a few weeks ago, it is important to immediately lift
the sanctions. And that has truly been done. I also appreciate
that the Syrian Government has limited the activities of the
Russian bases. And at the same time, though, we need to do more
to completely expel the Russians.
The new Syrian authorities should remember war criminal
Putin's massive crimes of mass murder in Aleppo. This also led,
with the mass murder, to historically unprecedented dislocation
of over half the people of Syria from their homes, their
mosques, their schools, their businesses, their churches--
nearly 12 million people. In modern times, it is inconceivable
that so many millions could lose everything they have, and half
a million people were murdered.
Turkey and Jordan have been so appreciated for securing
millions in refugee camps. And with that in mind, Dr.
Borshchevskaya, you have done great with your identification of
how to remove the Russian bases. And I would like to know what
our other colleagues, Dr. Schenker and Dr. Alterman--how can we
help them remove these bases?
Mr. Schenker. Well, I'll give a first crack at that. I
think the Government of Syria is disinclined toward Russia and
Iran for the reasons that you mentioned. Russia and Iran helped
the Assad regime kill half a million Syrians in what resembles
a genocide and to force 12 million Syrians into exile in
something that resembles ethnic cleansing. And so they are
disinclined.
And we have seen already that the Government of Syria, the
Sharaa government, has canceled contracts with STG Engineering,
a Russian engineering firm that was developing Tartus' port,
the civilian port in Tartus, and signed an $800 million with
Dubai Port World from the Emirates. This is a positive step,
but this is going to require, I think, ongoing diplomatic
engagement.
Iran also--there is no direct flights right now. The ties
are not great. I think they are wary, and they keep on
intercepting and interdicting Hezbollah weapons that Iran is
sending into Syria to traverse into Lebanon. So they are doing
the work, but I think they need be pushed over the finish line.
And they are going to need something eventually to fill that
vacuum, to replace Russia.
Dr. Alterman. Thank you, Congressman.
If I may, I think to add to what David said, and to
underline it in some ways, this persistent attraction of Russia
is if the Government of Syria feels it may need a veto on the
Security Council. And the Russians are so unscrupulous that
even after contributing to the death of hundreds of thousands
of Syrians, I think they are willing to execute their veto for
a partner that does something for them.
And I think the Sharaa government, at this point, may not
want to abandon that option. The more secure they feel that
things are moving in the right direction, the less they feel
they need somebody to veto things for them, I think the less
attractive the Russians are because on many levels--commercial,
military, and so on--the Russians aren't a very attractive
partner.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I hope they say that America, Saudi
Arabia, Tokyo, Jordan, Qatar, UAE are much better partners than
war criminal Putin.
I yield back.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Wilson.
I now recognize the gentleman from California,
Representative Sherman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sherman. President Trump is a tough negotiator when he
is dealing with Americans or Canadians. He has eliminated the
vast majority of our sanctions, and we still don't have a
pledge that he will be--that the Russian bases will be
eliminated.
So you have one country that did not support Assad in any
way, that does not have military bases in Syria--the side that
was bombing the current government's forces retains those
bases. Now, we have acquiesced in 3,500 foreign Jihadis
fighters being, quote, ``integrated'' into the military. This
is a force that could be, to the extent they have any
ideological control, pulling Sharaa in the wrong direction.
It is argued that abandoning those forces would also be a
problem. These 3,500--what portion of the total foreign
fighters are the 3,500 that are now being integrated? Is it
substantially all, or----
Mr. Schenker. Yes, the reports suggest that it is the vast
majority of them. Of course, there were earlier reports that
al-Sharaa had given key posts to--and senior-level posts within
the Ministry of Defense, and the military, about a dozen----
Mr. Sherman. Are those reports accurate?
Mr. Schenker. Yes. The earlier reports about the dozen,
yes.
Mr. Sherman. So it is one thing to us to acquiesce and them
joining the military because you gotta do something with them,
perhaps. But the idea of giving them key posts seems extreme.
And I guess the question is, have we surrendered our sanctions
regime in return for sufficient controls on the foreign
fighters, for sufficient controls on Russia and its bases?
I was here when Obama was incredibly concerned about the
use of chemical weapons by Assad. We took the Chemical Warfare
Treaty seriously. Has this new regime disposed of any
stockpiles of chemical weapons and the ability to create those
weapons?
Mr. Schenker. Should I go again?
Mr. Sherman. Yes. Go ahead.
Mr. Schenker. Thanks. As for the foreign fighters, I don't
know what the administration has requested. Initially, they had
requested that these people be expelled. Obviously----
Mr. Sherman. But they have acquiesced officially, more or
less, in the integration.
Mr. Schenker. Correct.
Mr. Sherman. And as a de facto matter, they've acquiesced
in these foreign fighters getting important government
positions. But if you could talk a little bit about the
chemical weapons and the capacity to manufacture----
Mr. Schenker. Yes. These were in the initial Trump
administration requests of the Government of Syria, and in
fact, this is one of the good news stories. The Syrians have
provided access to the chemical weapons watchdog, and then just
today, the IAEA was in Syria. They went out to Deir ez-Zor to
look at Kibar and the remains of that and four other nuclear
facilities.
Mr. Sherman. So at least we are looking, and I assume that
we have at least a commitment to dispose of these weapons of
mass destruction.
Dr. Alterman. Congressman, one of the things that is most
remarkable about Ahmed al-Sharaa is he has managed to convince
all kinds of pretty difficult people that he is fundamentally
on their side. Whether it was Zarqawi, whether it is Ayman
Zawahiri or Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi his secret.
Mr. Sherman. And Donald Trump.
Dr. Alterman. Well, but his secret ability seems to be that
he can convince people that, fundamentally, he is with them. I
think he does it within his government. He does it outside of
his government.
Mr. Sherman. I want to sneak in one more question. Do we
foresee a Syria in which the Kurds, the Druze, and others will
have effective control of their area, cooperate with the
government but still have autonomy and their own military
presence? Or do we see the government in Damascus trying to, in
effect, conquer and disarm the Druze and the Kurds?
Dr. Alterman. Well, I think the Kurds are an especially
difficult case and this regard. But as I said, this is why I
think it is so important that we not have Syria turn into a set
of regional proxy wars, because if that happens, that will
endanger all of the minority communities and the stability and
the territorial integrity of the country.
Mr. Sherman. So, certainly, we should have gotten clearer
guarantees for the Christian community before we eliminate the
sanctions. Of course, we can restore those sanctions at any
time. But it appears as if we have given them almost everything
they want and gotten an--you know, aside from the chemical
weapons, which of course is their obligation anyway, we have
gotten very few concessions.
I yield back.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Sherman.
I now recognize Representative Kean for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our distinguished witnesses for being here
today. As we evaluate the State of Syria following the fall of
the dictator Bashar al-Assad, we must ensure that the U.S.
continues to support our allies in the region. This includes
promoting peace and cooperation between Syria and Israel.
Dr. Borshchevskaya, recent reports cite direct meetings
between Israel and Syria in efforts to ease tensions between
the two nations. What actions should the U.S. Government be
taking to encourage Syria to continue to pursue peace with our
important allies in Israel?
Dr. Borshchevskaya. I think the United States can continue
to stay engaged diplomatically and signal to Israel that a
stable Syria is--a stable, whole Syria, a Syria that is not
weak and divided--is also in Israel's interest. I think also,
to a certain extent, engagement with Azerbaijan--that has
facilitated meetings between Israel and Turkey on the conflict
between Turkey and Israel that David had mentioned in his
opening remarks.
So I think staying engaged diplomatically would be very
important, and it would be, again, demonstrating consistency in
our commitment to Syria.
Mr. Kean. Well, are--Dr. Alterman, you mentioned in your
testimony--and this is--I would like to say this for the other
two panelists as well--what--how to test the current regime in
Syria that--what other steps are necessary--and I may have this
for the entire panel--to test that they're actually going
through on the commitments?
Dr. Alterman. Thank you, Congressman. I think we need lots
of tests. I think we have to test them continually on how they
treat various minority communities, how they treat Jihadis. And
the Jihadi issue is difficult because, as we know in Iraq,
firing all the members of the Ba'ath Party helped create an
insurgency in Iraq. You don't want to have that. You have a
problem with the Jihadis; their countries don't want them back.
So is there some way where you can separate people who can
be reformed from people who can't be? I think this is something
we should be working with allies and partners to continually
evaluate. I don't think there is any test that is going to make
me feel comfortable and feel we can start ignoring things in
Syria. I think what we have to do is we have to work with
Syrians and work with others to come up with a wide array of
things, a constant set of report cards, and talk about where
this is going. Where do we have to nudge it? And where are
things encouraging and we want to encourage them further?
Mr. Kean. Israel's safety and security is paramount. So how
do we ensure that--you know, Dr.--excuse me, Mr. Schenker, what
steps has the U.S. taken to support counterterrorism efforts in
the Middle East?
Mr. Schenker. Well, there is an ongoing liaison,
Congressman, between Israel--sorry, between Syria and the
United States. There is exchange of information. And Syria has
acted on--against impending terrorist attacks.
We know earlier that al-Sharaa, back when he was Jolani,
cooperated with the Turks in Idlib Province. So this type of
ongoing intelligence--and this makes not only Syria safer from
ISIS but also makes Israel safer.
At the same time, we now see what appears to be the
beginnings of communications between the al-Sharaa
administration and the Government of Israel. And they, too, can
do some liaisons, some counterterrorism cooperation. And Israel
can test Syria on this.
This is going to take some time to build trust, but this is
a border--Israel already occupies swaths of Syrian territory
right now. There have been--and just was, I think, this past
week--a few mortars fired toward Israel from what we believe
are Palestinian groups. Israel says they are going to hold the
al-Sharaa government responsible.
We will see going forward if they respond to information or
if they expel Palestinian terrorist groups from Damascus. This
is an open question. They have arrested some. But this is also
an ongoing work in progress.
Mr. Kean. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Kean.
I now recognize Representative Mfume for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mfume. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
My thanks to the witnesses also. I don't want to be
redundant, but there was something that caught my ear a moment
ago.
Mr. Schenker, you described--and I hope I am adequately
repeating this--the regime in Syria as being a disparate
erstwhile group of U.S.-designated terrorists. You don't have
to comment. I am just saying it caught my ear. Am I incorrect?
Mr. Schenker. Al-Sharaa. I described al-Sharaa----
Mr. Mfume. Al-Sharaa.
Mr. Schenker [continuing]. and the country being a
disparate group of ethnic groups and religious groups. But al-
Sharaa in particular is a----
Mr. Mfume. Yes.
Mr. Mfume. You know. Yes.
Mr. Mfume. So it is a sad situation. I mean, it is a scary
situation, particularly from those of us who look abroad. I
think this 180-day pause is a position and point of concern for
a lot of people. I just want to be on the record and say I just
don't trust Syria. I have not trusted them since they committed
all sorts of heinous crimes against innocent people.
This Damascus government I am not convinced is any better
than the government that they took down. I could be wrong and
would love to be wrong. And I am not paranoid, but I think a
little paranoia is good sometimes. In other words, I don't
believe that Humpty Dumpty fell. I think he was pushed.
And in this instance, I just don't believe that the Syrian
Government in Damascus is everything they say they are until
they take some concrete steps so that the outside world and
community will understand that they are correct. And I agree
with the assumption that somebody made earlier that Russia
would easily trade a veto to be able to get another partner.
And the partner might want a veto so bad that they find
themselves shaking hands.
It is all very, very kind of scary. But let me ask you, do
you believe that the administration, our Secretary of State,
and others have done enough to ensure that this current regime
in Syria has not and will not re-create the same conditions
that previously existed, especially in regards to the support
of terrorist groups and the tamping down of human rights? I
would just like to get your opinions on the record.
Let's start with A, Mr. Alterman. If we are looking for an
order here, let's go alphabet.
Dr. Alterman. Okay. I think this is a process and not an
event, sir. I think this is going to be ongoing. It is going to
take years. I share all of your discomfort. I spoke to a friend
who has been a journalist in the Middle East for decades. He
spoke to Ahmed al-Sharaa, and he said, I spoke to him and got a
sense that we are going to see not Bashar al-Assad again but
Hafez al-Assad ascend again.
Hafez al-Assad--not his son, but certainly not a friend of
the United States, certainly not a force for stability in the
Middle East. Could we be going there? We could be going there.
I don't think there is any policy where we just do the policy
and we are done. I think this is going to be a process of
years.
He will try to settle in what he--what his government--
whether he will be in power and what his government will look
like in 2 years', 5 years' time. I don't know. He doesn't know.
It is quite possible that he will misjudge how to deal with
radicals in his own midst. It is quite possible that he will
fall prey to some sort of Israeli-Turkish differences.
I don't know how this is going to go, but I think we have
to constantly be watchful for all the reasons you say----
Mr. Mfume. Paranoid.
Dr. Alterman. Paranoid people have enemies, right?
Mr. Mfume. Yes, they do.
Dr. Alterman. And there are a lot of enemies in Syria, and
there is a lot of bad stuff that has happened in Syria and will
happen in Syria.
Mr. Mfume. Okay. Let me just get a couple more responses
in. Thank you very much for that. I appreciate it.
Dr. Borshchevskaya. Sure. You know, I also share your
concerns. And let me start by answering your question with the
following. I was born in the Soviet Union. I remember when it
fell apart. I was a child at the time, but I remember it very
well. There was a sense of euphoria that Russia was going to
transform into a liberal-style democracy. We saw what happened,
and Russia went back to its authoritarian past.
So I share your concerns. I think the fact of the matter
is--you know, to answer your question, it is very hard to know
what there is to be done. Has the administration done enough?
There is only so much we can do to look forward. We have to
take it one step at a time.
We don't have a lot of leverage. And the fact that
sanctions can be snapped back quickly, that there is this 180-
degree window, that is an important leverage that we have. But
the fact of the matter is there is not a whole lot beyond that.
I think--as I said in my opening remarks, I think that the
most important thing we can do is to stay engaged and give
consistent benchmarks and to demonstrate that we are going to
hold this government responsible to those benchmarks.
Mr. Mfume. Thank you very much.
My time is expired. I think the key here is gradualism.
That is how we proceed, not with giant steps, but little bitty
steps that we measure daily, weekly, and monthly in this
process.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative.
I now recognize Representative Baumgartner for 5 minutes.
Mr. Baumgartner. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you
for this very important committee hearing.
Syria has a special place in my heart, not just for the
immense geopolitical importance of this troubled part of the
world, but roughly 30 years ago, my first trip to the Middle
East was as a Kurd scholar to Syria and Jordan. And I spent a
really meaningful summer in Damascus and Aleppo and saw, at the
time, what I had hoped was going to be a world new possibility
and opening right before the peace--what would eventually be a
peace agreement with Jordan and Israel and so much potential in
Syria, and certainly potential that has not been realized. In
fact, it has gone much the other way these last 30 years.
I very vividly remember, when I was at the U.S. Embassy in
Iraq during the surge, the challenge of foreign fighters coming
across the border from Syria. And then, as Iranian influence
grew throughout the region as the U.S. stepped back, we saw
some of the consequences there.
I also appreciate that all three of you testified to the
importance of deliberate, thoughtful, strategic action by the
U.S., I think much in contrast to what we saw, particularly
under the Obama administration, when we saw an offhand comment
by John Kerry open the door for Russia to enter the region. We
saw a red line by President Barack Obama then not enforced by
the U.S. Government, and then a statement by President Obama
that Russia entering Syria was going to be a quagmire for them,
that it was all a mistake.
I would just ask, perhaps, you, Anna--and I will just call
you Dr. Anna. When you are a Baumgartner, you honor sympathy
for challenges on last names. But could you contrast or give
some thoughts on U.S. Government policy in the last 15 years,
kind of just haphazard--what I would call haphazard, but I
would like to hear your comments--versus what we would like to
see in a thoughtful strategy.
In the briefing document today, I saw a list of conditions
from the State Department that they had put on the Government
of Syria to sort of come into the union with the West and the
U.S. And as I was looking, I thought it is a good list of
conditions, but I also thought wouldn't it be helpful if we had
a list of conditions--not the same conditions, but conditions
for Syria's neighbors of behavior that we would like to see
there?
Perhaps, specifically, what would we like to see from
Turkey and Israel in addition to--I think it is a given that
they would have a hotline to avoid a proxy war, but what would
be one or two things we would like to see from each of Syria's
neighbors with respect to Syria? But both--so some commentary
on the haphazard nature, perhaps, and then what we would like
to see from their neighbors.
Dr. Borshchevskaya. Sure. Well, first, you know, the Obama
administration saw Russia essentially as part of a solution
rather than the problem as the ongoing Syria tragedy developed.
And so, to me, what I highlighted over the course of my work is
that Russia cannot be part of the solution. Putin had taken
advantage of that perception.
These events that you refer to, such as the statement that
Syria was going to be a quagmire for Russia, Secretary Kerry
opening the door for Russia and so forth--there was this
confusion about what Russia was, what it could do, and
therefore--and then the belief that Russia could help disarm
Assad. Remember, this was Assad's biggest backer, who frankly
created Assad's chemical weapons in the first place. He could
not possibly disarm him.
So what I would like to see is more consistency and clarity
that we need to compete with Russia. Russia cannot be part of a
solution, especially not after helping Assad destroy this
country, because our credibility is on the line at this point.
In terms of what we would like to see beyond the hotline,
well, I would like to see more diplomatic engagement, more
commitment to empowering other actors, like I mentioned,
potentially such as Azerbaijan, who has already stepped into
this role, but also looking--to take your question a little bit
further beyond our partners--looking to create linkages between
European and Middle East theaters.
That is why I highlighted the importance of empowering
Ukrainians, tackling Russia's ghost fleet, looking at the
bigger strategic picture, because that is how Russia is looking
at it.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Baumgartner.
I now recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schneider,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Lawler.
I want to thank the witnesses. I have so many questions.
How do we help make sure that al-Sharaa succeeds? How do we
protect minorities? How do we orient Syria toward our allies
and away from enemies like Iran, but at the same time, how do
we make sure allies like Turkey don't move the S-300's to Syria
to get out of CAATSA? Things that we need to worry about.
But, Dr. Borshchevskaya, you talked about Russia and the
Soviet Union, and I started thinking as I'm sitting here about
history. The Soviet Union lasted 69 years. To understand where
Russia goes after the Soviet Union, you have to understand
where it was before and, you know, look back to the 800's.
Syria history goes back even farther, and you have more
ethnic groups than you can count. When the civil war started
12, 13 years ago, I remember using--I guess it was 2011, 14
years ago--using a metaphor of a corkscrew and that there were
so many different groups in there. And as countries around and
even the U.S. got involved, we essentially tied ourselves to
that corkscrew. And every time the corkscrew turned, it pulled
us further and further in.
We didn't know what the outcome would be. Ultimately,
finally, Assad left. Al-Sharaa rises to power. Those threats
seem to have been cut in many ways, but we still are very
much--as you all have said, we have interests in Syria, and not
just our interests. We have interests and concerns with
countries who are trying to stay in Syria: Russia, Iran, and
others.
So my question is, given this narrow window of opportunity
that you have talked about that we are looking at, the desire
of Russia to make sure it maintains its access to the Eastern
Mediterranean that is so critical for its view, China trying to
make sure it has its play, Iran, et cetera, what do we need to
do as the United States, most importantly--and I am just going
to go down one, two, three from left to right. What does
Congress need to do to make sure that we are protecting our
interests, protecting our long-term hopes and aspirations for a
new region? I say this as the chair of the Abraham Accords
Caucus. Syria is talking about being part of the Abraham
Accords. And I will leave it at that.
So Dr. Alterman?
Dr. Alterman. Thank you very much, Congressman. First, I
think you are thinking about this in exactly the right way. If
you think about who wants instability in Syria, it is the
people we are most concerned about. It is the Iranians and the
Russians who seek to exploit instability because they see Syria
settling down as helping us and undermining them. I think that
is partly why we need to work so closely with our partners and
allies.
I was talking to a friend over the weekend and mentioned I
was testifying. He said, ``So no State Department witnesses?''
I mean, I think one of the things Congress can do is you can
engage with the administration----
Mr. Schneider. We would like to.
Dr. Alterman [continuing]. and make sure--no, and make sure
that they have worked out both where they are--and to say I am
very concerned about Ambassador Barrack trying to play both the
Turkey role and the Syria envoy role because it then becomes
very hard to reassure the Israelis----
Mr. Schneider. And I want to give others a chance to
respond, but I will say if you do everything half-assed, you do
nothing well. And so I agree with you.
Dr. Borshchevskaya?
Dr. Borshchevskaya. Sure, and I agree with Jon on what he
just said. I mean, to add to that, I think Congress can make it
clear that Syria is a priority, that it will highlight these
issues on a regular basis; it will engage in conversations and
monitor and look for potential points of leverage.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you.
Mr. Schenker?
Mr. Schenker. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. I actually agree
with what Jon said about Tom Barrack. I have a section in my
written testimony about this. I don't think he can do two jobs
of one person simultaneously well, in addition to the conflicts
of interest.
What I do say one of the things he can do--and I don't know
if you have already done this, but you know how you have the
Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.
People who undermine the stability or countries who undermine
the stability of Syria can also be sanctioned or otherwise
treated differently. I mean, just an idea.
Mr. Schneider. I like that idea.
With my last few seconds, I will just make an observation.
I mentioned the Soviet Union was 69 years. Assad family took
power in 1971, 25 years after Syria was established as a State.
We can think of those in long periods.
But just doing some research as I was sitting here, the
Ottomans ruled Syria for 400 years. Before that, the Arabs
ruled Syria for almost 900 years, the Byzantines for 300 years.
The Romans were there. And that is just the modern history of
Syria. It goes back ten of thousands of years.
I think if we are going to understand Syria, we need to
understand the history of the different ethnic groups in the
area. But it is also imperative that we understand the
topography of the area, the importance of the Euphrates River
running from the north--southeast--or south--yes, southeast, as
well as the mountains running vertical from south to north,
because to fail to understand that, we will fail and make
mistakes with unintended consequences.
I yield back.
Mr. Lawler. I now recognize Representative Zinke for 5
minutes.
Mr. Zinke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to turn my attention to the PKK, which is a Marxist
terrorist organization. I do think it was a mistake of this
government to arm them because the enemy of our enemy is not
necessarily our friend. And because of the Kurds, I think we
made a mistake to think that all Kurds are the same, just like
all Irish the same except the IRA.
Now, having said that, the Kurds, or the Syrian Government
as it is, has said that they are disarmed. I would like your
opinion on what that disarmament really means, and are they?
And, doctor, if you would go first--Dr. Anna.
Dr. Borshchevskaya. Well, I mean, first, let me just say I
think the announcement that the PKK was disarmed is
historically important. When I think about the key PKK, I think
about the fact that it was the Soviet Union that helped empower
this organization in the first place. So I think, if it is in
fact disbanded, it is a step in the right direction. I----
Mr. Zinke. Do you think they are really disbanded?
Dr. Borshchevskaya. So I don't have accurate information
that they really have disbanded, and I think that it behooves
us to continue monitoring this issue. But I don't have that
information.
Mr. Zinke. Dr. Alterman, your opinion?
Dr. Alterman. I don't think they have decided what this all
means yet. I am not sure the Turkish Government is confident
what it all means yet. It is an opening, and it requires
watchful waiting.
I agree with you on many of the threats, but I also think
we shouldn't close the door on the possibility that this
conflict is entering a very different phase than it has been in
for many years.
Mr. Zinke. And sir?
Mr. Schenker. I agree with Jon, Congressman. I think that
this is a start. I think it is far from clear that the PKK has
put down its weapons and all the people that were at one time
adherents of the PKK--that they are finished.
Mr. Zinke. So the ISIS individuals that are imprisoned--
there are a number of them. The former PKK is guarding them.
What should be our policy, other than sending them to El
Salvador?
Mr. Schenker. Well, the policy has been, Congressman, the
repatriation, ultimately, of these people to go back to the
countries that they were from and that they would be
responsible for them in those countries.
As you know, no country wants to take back former members
of ISIS. It has been a very slow process. Iraq has taken back
some. Other countries--Oman has taken back some people, I
believe. Our policy should be for the Government of Syria
ultimately to be responsible for these camps.
Mr. Zinke. Doctor, do you agree?
Dr. Alterman. I once again agree with my old friend, David
Schenker.
Mr. Zinke. So how big of a threat are they if they were
released into the population?
Mr. Schenker. I think you would see, Congressman, the
immediate resurgence of ISIS in the area, absolutely.
Mr. Zinke. I agree.
And doctor?
Dr. Alterman. There is no question in my mind that some
people can be reformed. There is also no question in my mind
some people cannot be reformed, and you would see increased
ISIS--there already is, of course, ISIS activity, and you would
see more of it.
Mr. Zinke. In the interest of time and letting my
colleagues also give questions, I yield back.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Zinke.
I now recognize Representative Mills, the chairman of the
Oversight Subcommittee, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mills. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Schenker, I wanted to go back to one of the things you
talked about. You said that they want to show inclusivity, but
nothing has been done yet. But my understanding is that you
have the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, Hind Kabawat,
who is Christian. You have Amjad Badr, who is the Minister of
Agriculture, who is Druze. So would you like to kind of reState
what you meant by that statement, just to be clear?
Mr. Schenker. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. I was talking
about if you look at overall composition of the government
between, for example, men and women, and also if you look at
what these communities said after the constitutional meetings
and the consultations about whether their inputs were
appreciated, taken into consideration, incorporated into the
draft documents, I think that there was a lot of complaints
from the communities.
Mr. Mills. Speaking on the documents, I mean, in 2025,
under al-Sharaa, he signed an agreement with the Druze
representatives from Sweida Province, which integrated the
Druze into the entire State institutions. So this is obviously
a very pivotal step, something that not even Assad or any of
the others were willing to do.
And in talking about inclusivity, as you know, even some of
our own allies are just now starting to incorporate women into
ministries, Ambassadorial positions, et cetera, based on
cultural understandings and nuances.
You also mentioned the IAEA, which is a very important
part. But OPCW, who is actually the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, has been in there on multiple
occasions inspecting every single one of the actual sites, and
to include 22 sites just in the last week and a half and how
they would actually look at safely--this is the key thing;
people think that you can just go ahead and pick up these
chemicals and just toss them out in the trash, and we are going
to be good--but safely be able to dispose of this so they can't
be utilized in the future.
We also talked about--and I agree with this. This is going
to be one of those relationships that we have to not only be
cautious of based on backgrounds and past experiences, but it
is going to be a ``trust but verify'' relationship. And we know
that very well in any conflict, post-conflict, areas.
But if we took the broad-brush approach that someone's past
therefore defines their future, we wouldn't have alliances with
Japan and Germany to this day. And so I think that we need to
keep this in mind because what I have seen so far is the
current administration there has not only partnered with Iraq
CTS and the U.S. to help counter ISIS operations, they have not
only continued to stop the illicit weapons transfers of Hashd
al-Sha'bi and the Iranian regime-backed militia groups through
Syria into Lebanon to be utilized to attack, but just today, 15
antitank guided missiles and 30 crates of heavy caliber
ammunitions that was concealed by smugglers in a truck headed
to Hezbollah was blocked and prevented from being able to be
utilized against Israel.
So I say this to explain that not actually looking at a way
to try and work with the Syrian people to get an inclusive,
democratically elected, free Syrian Government only opens the
door for our adversaries like Russia, who, when I spoke with
President al-Sharaa, said that he already had a proposal on the
table by Russia that they were demanding that be signed. And he
refused because he said, ``I would rather partner with the West
and start developing our Nation.''
When he talked about Iran, he said that we have not only
pushed Iran out, but we will never allow Syria to be a proxy
State of Iran. They can have a diplomatic opening of their
consulate or their embassy, but we will even limit the number
of visas for Iranians to come here because we know their
influence, operations, and their capabilities. This is a man
who fought in combat on both the good side and the bad side. So
he understands how these operations work.
So what would be a greater risk: not looking to work with
Syria and make them an ally and help the regional stability and
protect the great State of Israel, or to allow them to fall
into the hands of the predatory manners of Russia and Iran and
China?
Mr. Schenker. Congressman, I agree with you wholeheartedly.
As I said earlier, the chemical weapons--the WMD, the IAEA, the
counterterrorism cooperation--these are high points. I think
there is some criticism on the inclusivity part, but I am all
for working with this government. This is the only game in
town, and it is our opportunity to lose. So we should be on the
ground floor.
Mr. Mills. And I think that not even allowing China into
the palace, which is something that he has done, shows even a
further desire to work with the West. I think that helping to
establish good neighbors, as Robert Frost--the ``Good fences
make good neighbors'' relationship with Israel--will protect
our allies there.
I think that people understand that if you study the
geopolitics of the Middle East, making sure Syria is stable
will ensure that we can have a stable Middle East, which is
President Trump's America-first agenda and promise.
Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield back.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Mills. I echo your
sentiments.
I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony
and the members for their questions. The members of the
subcommittee may have some additional questions for the
witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to these in writing.
Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 days to
submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the
record, subject to the length limitations.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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