    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                        AFTER ASSAD: THE FUTURE OF SYRIA

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                     OF THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
                                   AFRICA

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  June 5, 2025

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 119-22

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov
                           or http://www.govinfo.gov

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    61-407PDF                    WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                        BRIAN J. MAST, Florida, Chairman
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York,
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey         Ranking Member
    JOE WILSON,, South Carolina          BRAD SHERMAN, California
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    DARRELL ISSA, California             WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              AMI BERA, California
    MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee             JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  DINA TITUS, Nevada
    RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 TED LIEU, California
    YOUNG KIM, California                SARA JACOBS, California
    MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida        SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
    BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan                  Florida
    AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       GREG STANTON, Arizona
        American Samoa                   JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                JONATHAN L. JACKSON, Illinois
    JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana              SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
    THOMAS H. KEAN, JR, New Jersey       JIM COSTA, California
    MICHAEL LAWLER, New York             GABE AMO, Rhode Island
    CORY MILLS, Florida                  KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
    RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia           PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
    KEITH SELF, Texas                    GEORGE LATIMER, New York
    RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana               JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI Jr, Maryland
    JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
    ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida           SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware
    JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana            BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
    MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington
    RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania

                  James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director
                     Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director
                                     ------

                  SUBCOMMITTEE ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

                      MICHAEL LAWLER, New York, Chairman
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
     DARRELL ISSA, California                Florida, Ranking Member
     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              BRAD SHERMAN, California
     RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
     THOMAS KEAN, JR, New Jersey          WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
     RYAN ZINKE, Montana                  KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
     MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington      GEORGE LATIMER, New York

                   Sarah Miller, Subcommittee Staff Director

                            C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                                  ----------

                                REPRESENTATIVES

                                                                       Page
    Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Michael Lawler........     1
    Opening Statement of Subcommittee Ranking Member Sheila
      Cherfilus-Mccormick............................................     3

                                   WITNESSES

    Statement of David Schenker, Taube Senior Fellow at Washington
      Institute for Near East Policy and Former Assistant Secretary
      of State for The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs................     4
      Prepared Statement.............................................     7
    Statement of Anna Borshchevskaya, Senior Fellow at Washington
      Institute for Near East Policy.................................    16
      Prepared Statement.............................................    18
    Statement of Jon B. Alterman, Brzezinski Chair in Global Security
      and Geostrategy at the Center for Strategic and International
      Studies........................................................    24
      Prepared Statement.............................................    26

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    50
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    51
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    52

                            Material for the Record

    Statement for the Record submitted by Hon. French Hill...........    53

                        AFTER ASSAD: THE FUTURE OF SYRIA

                                  ----------

                             Thursday, June 5, 2025

                      House of Representatives,
           Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa
                                  Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in
    room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Lawler
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Lawler. The Subcommittee on the Middle East and North
    Africa will come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to
    assess U.S. national security interests as relates to Syria and
    discuss potential policy options to further them. I now
    recognize myself to give an opening statement.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL LAWLER

        Syria is at a turning point. The fall of Bashar al-Assad
    this past December following four decades of authoritarian rule
    has created conditions for unprecedented change for Syria and
    for the Middle East. This change comes with significant risk.
        The Syrian war dating back to 2011 has left most of the
    country in ruins, destroyed by years of indiscriminate bombing
    by Assad and his Russian and Iranian backers. The costs of
    reconstructing this broken country will be in the tens of
    billions, even by the most modest assessment, and investors
    face significant hurdles as they work to navigate the complex
    sanctions regime that has emerged after four decades of Assad
    family rule.
        While there are rightfully many who seek to break down
    barriers, advocating for sanctions relief to ensure
    reconstruction can take place, and put Syria on a path of
    success, we must not lose sight of core U.S. interests in this
    rush to embrace Syria's new regime.
        There remain significant questions about Syria's new
    interim authorities led by U.S.-designated foreign terrorist
    organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, HTS, a former Al-Qaeda
    affiliate, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Despite his hardened past, the
    interim president continues to verbally signal a commitment to
    reform, though his ability to deliver remains to be seen, which
    is why we must be explicit with our goals for Syria.
        This includes the counter-ISIS mission, which has been a
    central part of U.S. foreign policy since 2014. We must set
    clear expectations for the interim authorities on what we
    expect from them with respect to counterterrorism cooperation
    to prevent a resurgence and assume responsibility for detention
    centers holding thousands of ISIS members and affiliated
    individuals in the northeast.
        And concerns about extremism are not, by any means, limited
    to ISIS. Iran and its proxies have long used the country as a
    sanctuary space to plan and carry out attacks, including
    against Israel, while Russia sees Syria as a strategic
    launchpad to undermine our interests not just in the Middle
    East but much further afield, from Africa to Europe.
        There must be clear red lines when it comes to Iran and its
    proxies', as well as Russia's, ability to operate in Syria.
    Preventing Syria from being used as a sanctuary space is vital
    not just for the U.S. but also for Syria. This will, no doubt,
    be one of the metrics used as the international community
    measures the success of Syria's transition and by extension for
    the prospects for further economic relief.
        For Syria to succeed and reestablish itself on the
    international world stage, it must take action to prevent
    extremism from thriving once again, including by signaling a
    commitment to inclusive governance by establishing a positive
    working relationship with our Kurdish partners, the Syrian
    Democratic Forces. They have been at the forefront of the
    campaign to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS.
        On that basis, the Trump administration has rightfully
    taken steps to waive U.S. sanctions on a limited and temporary
    basis, giving al-Sharaa sufficient time to demonstrate he is
    able to turn his words into actions. But this is not, I have to
    stress, a full embrace of al-Sharaa or those he continues to
    surround himself with.
        We must use this opportunity to press him on key U.S.
    priorities, notably as relates to counterterrorism, while also
    retaining limitations on U.S. sanctions relief to ensure Iran
    and Russia cannot benefit financially.
        Al-Sharaa has expressed a concerning willingness to embrace
    Moscow, despite Putin's complicity in war crimes against the
    Syrian people. For Russia, their presence in Syria is not just
    about the Middle East; it is a vital staging ground essential
    to everything they do in Africa and Eastern Mediterranean.
        We underestimate the strategic importance Syria holds for
    the Russians at our own peril. Make no mistake: what happens in
    Syria does not stay in Syria. The country has consistently
    demonstrated its ability to impact and shape affairs far
    outside its borders, from Europe's migrant crisis to ISIS to
    the war in Ukraine.
        When Secretary Rubio testified before Congress last month,
    he said, quote, ``There is no guarantee that by outreach and
    working with the transitional authority in Syria, things are
    going to work out. It may work out; it may not work out. But if
    we don't reach out and try, it is a guarantee not to work
    out.''
        And I echo the Secretary's sentiment and just came back,
    along with the ranking member, from a trip to the Middle East,
    including Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Jordan. And that was the
    sentiment shared there as well. We want to give this an
    opportunity to work but are fully cognizant of the consequences
    of failure here.
        During this hearing, we will further examine Syrian
    stability and the vital role Syria and the Syrian people play
    in the Middle East.
        I now yield to the ranking member, Sheila Cherfilus-
    McCormick, for her opening statement.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK

        Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
    convening this important hearing on developments in Syria
    following the fall of the brutal Assad regime.
        I welcome our expert panelists for this afternoon, all of
    whom have robust knowledge of Syria, the broader Middle East,
    and core U.S. interests at this time of immense transition and
    opportunity.
        As Chairman Lawler noted, we recently returned from a
    congressional delegation to Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Jordan.
    In many meetings, developments in Syria were front and center.
    Excitement was palpable among our regional partners over the
    opportunities that changes in Syria and Lebanon present.
        Across the Middle East, U.S. allies and partners have
    welcomed change in leadership in Damascus with the hopes to
    support our robust construction work, investments in critical
    infrastructure, and increased humanitarian assistance to the
    millions of Syrians who require urgent aid as of today.
        I stand and support the Syrian people, who look to a new
    future and a government that does not engage in systemic
    campaigns of violence and repression against its own citizens.
    I welcome the Trump administration's initial engagement with
    the new Government of Syria, including the decision to lift
    certain sanctions through the General License 25 and issuing a
    180-day waiver on the Caesar Act sanctions.
        However, while the President is correct to say that this is
    Syria's moment to shine, helping Syrians musts meet this moment
    requires a clear plan. This is noble. However, I do not believe
    that this can be achieved without providing incentives that
    would allow the new Syrian Government to create and enable an
    environment and a strong institution which is needed.
        Congress has not received any such details on the
    administration's plan to implement sanction relief effectively,
    nor a more coherent strategy that the administration on its
    priorities for U.S.-Syrian relationships.
        I hope the vacuum the executive branch has created brings
    members from both sides of the aisle together to work on
    legislation that establishes clear priorities for further U.S.
    engagement with Syria, including with respect to inclusion and
    fully representative governance, protection of religious and
    ethnic minority groups, continued counterterrorism cooperation,
    and more.
        A conditions-based sanction relief policies with clear time
    lines and matrices is critical for Syria's security, regional
    security, and the United States' national security. I look
    forward to working with my colleagues on legislation to address
    this. Absent such congressional leadership, I fear the U.S.
    Syria policy would be characterized by a haphazard, ill-
    conceived, move-fast, break-things approach that has been a
    characteristic of the Trump administration to date. The stakes
    for Syrian people are too high and a peaceful Syria is too
    critical to our own interests to be reckless and unfocused.
        Incentives for direct deliverables for Syria are critical.
    U.S. policy on Syria must continue to prioritize effective and
    multilateral counterterrorism operations, securing high-value
    ISIS detainees, restoring critical life-saving humanitarian aid
    that contributes to deradicalization, elimination of chemical
    weapons and stores and unexploded ordnances, and capability-
    building for the interim government's security forces.
        It also requires robust engagement with our regional
    partners, including Jordan. At the exact moment when a change
    in Syria requires a full set of foreign policy tools to advance
    U.S. interests, the Trump administration has not only proposed
    a gutting of the State Department, but numerous United States
    stabilization and assistance programs active in Syria and
    within neighboring countries have been cut.
        Today, because of the Trump administration's policies, our
    regional partners in the Middle East are asking whether we keep
    our word, whether our adversaries are betting that we won't. I
    welcome the opportunity to speak with our panelists about the
    policies and strategies we should be working on to ensure this
    moment of cautious optimism for Syria's people is not wasted
    and the United States' interests in the region are protected.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you to the ranking member.
        Other members of the committee are reminded that opening
    statements may be submitted for the record.
        We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
    before us today on this important topic: Hon. David Schenker,
    Taube Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East
    Policy and previously Assistant Secretary of State for the
    Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs under President Trump's first
    administration; Dr. Anna Borshchevskaya, Senior Fellow at the
    Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Jon B. Alterman,
    Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy at the
    Center for Strategic and International Studies.
        This committee recognizes the importance of the issues
    before us and is grateful to have you here to speak with us
    today. Your full statements will be made part of the record,
    and I will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5
    minutes in order to allow time for member questions.
        I now recognize Mr. Schenker for his opening statement.

                      STATEMENT OF DAVID SCHENKER

        Mr. Schenker. Thank you, Chairman Lawler, Representative--
    Ranking Member Cherfilus-McCormick, honorable members. I
    appreciate the opportunity to be here today.
        The future of Syria matters greatly to the United States.
    Under Assad, Syria was a source of regional instability and a
    persistent threat to Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan, among others.
    Assad's fall represents an opportunity for Syria, Washington,
    and its regional partners.
        There has been a lot of perseverating lately about Ahmed
    al-Sharaa. To be certain, he is no panacea. At a minimum, he's
    an Islamist and likely a bourgeoning authoritarian.
    Notwithstanding lingering doubts, though, I believe al-Sharaa
    is much better than Assad.
        He might not succeed in unifying and stabilizing Syria.
    Five months after the fall of Assad, though, al-Sharaa is the
    only game in town. The Trump administration should invest
    diplomatic capital to help him succeed. Time will tell whether
    suspending crippling U.S. sanctions was the right decision. A
    gradual process may have had more success at shaping the new
    government, or perhaps continued U.S. economic pressures would
    have scuttled al-Sharaa's already unlikely attempt to stabilize
    a fractious and scarred Syria.
        As with many U.S. policy decisions, the initiative to
    suspend sanctions was not a choice between good and bad, but
    rather a choice between bad and worse. Washington has no doubt
    ceded some leverage, but I believe Trump made the less bad
    decision; that is, to give al-Sharaa and the new Syria a
    chance.
        Meanwhile, al-Sharaa is meeting some expectations on
    important issues. He is cooperating with the U.S. on
    counterterrorism and undoubtedly will continue to do so. It is
    important that U.S. forces remain in Syria until conditions are
    conducive to withdrawal.
        Foreign fighters constitute an even bigger challenge for
    al-Sharaa. Terrorists, militia men, and foreign Jihadis played
    a key role in toppling Assad. So these men are not going to be
    expelled. Now, at al-Sharaa's request, the administration has
    consented to the integration of some 3,500 of these fighters
    into a unit of the military. While expedient, it is difficult
    to imagine that this decision won't have problematic long-term
    implications for discipline, accountability, and public
    confidence.
        Integration of these Jihadis doesn't solve the problem. It
    defers it. Post-Assad Syria will not be a democracy. Still,
    Washington does have an abiding interest in the protection of
    minorities, a modicum of human rights, and some kind of
    political representation for Syria's ethnic and religious
    communities. I am talking about the Kurds, Druze, Christians
    alike. An inclusive Syria, I believe, will mitigate toward
    stability.
        Going forward, Washington should set and convey
    expectations to al-Sharaa on terrorism, foreign fighters, and
    governance and be prepared to reimplement sanctions if Syria's
    trajectory dictates.
        Al-Sharaa's relations with Israel are also another
    challenge. Since the fall of Assad, Israel has been occupying
    and bombing Syria, at times justifiably. At the same time, the
    government is interdicting Iranian weapons shipments destined
    for Hezbollah.
        Over time, direct discussions between Israel and Syria,
    which are reportedly underway, could help build some trust
    between the parties, stabilize the border, and lead to more
    normal relations between these longtime enemies.
        Another concern is that a weak Syria will invite foreign
    meddling. At present, Iran is unwelcome, but the jury is out on
    Russia. But Turkey and Israel both appear to be working to
    establish military spheres of influence in Syria. Israel
    bordering on Turkey, in my opinion, would be a recipe for
    heightened tensions, and the Trump administration should be
    pressing Israel and Turkey to establish, at a minimum, a
    hotline to preempt unintentional escalation.
        In sum, Syria faces a lot of challenges. The new government
    in Damascus will need U.S. political support and robust
    diplomatic engagement to succeed. The U.S. can help with
    coordinating reconstruction, keeping ISIS at bay, and
    implementing banking sector reforms necessary to reopen Syria
    for business while at the same time encouraging the government
    to be more inclusive.
        It will be difficult for Washington to balance expectations
    and be patient, but the potential benefits for the United
    States and its partners of a stable, benign Syria that rejects
    the so-called axis of resistance are enormous.
        Thank you. I have submitted testimony for the record, and I
    will look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Schenker follows:]
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Schenker.
        I now recognize Dr. Borshchevskaya for her opening
    statement.

                    STATEMENT OF ANNA BORSHCHEVSKAYA

        Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Cherfilus-McCormick,
    honorable members, thank you for the opportunity to testify
    today. With your permission, I am submitting my written
    testimony, and I am going to summarize it.
        We now have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reshape
    the balance of power in the Middle East. Bashar al-Assad's
    dictatorship is over, but the window of opportunity it presents
    is going to close fast.
        Russia seeks to replace our influence and remake the world
    order with itself at the center. Syria is and has been
    essential to that strategy. Nothing about the fall of Assad
    changes Moscow's overall plans and objectives, but it does give
    us a window of opportunity to foil Vladimir Putin's plans.
        As Chairman Lawler said in his opening remarks, what
    happens in Syria tends to not stay in Syria. This is why we
    need to ensure Russia does not reestablish a foothold there.
    Knowing that, my testimony will now focus on several key issues
    of vital importance to the U.S.
        First, the Eastern Mediterranean is crucial to Russia. That
    is why the goal of control there is consistent in centuries old
    for the Russian State. Make no mistake about it: this goal will
    outlast Vladimir Putin. It is part of how Moscow views its
    strategic positioning vis-a-vis the West.
        Second, Assad is gone, and Russia may change tactics but
    not its strategic objectives. These tactics will focus on
    staying in Syria, on leveraging economic influence, and
    positioning Russia as a protector of minorities. Syria has been
    fundamental to Russia's success in leveraging its influence for
    the last decade across the Middle East. Russia retains this
    influence as it seeks to use it to undermine the United States.
    And if Moscow can navigate the new Syrian regime, the Kremlin
    can continue to exert influence.
        Assuming the United States does not want to see its
    position weakened in the region--and I would suggest that that
    would be disastrous--the U.S. must ensure that Russia does not
    reestablish control in Syria.
        To that end, the U.S. could utilize its influence through a
    carrot-and-stick approach to block Russia's ability to leverage
    power. The U.S. can achieve it through the following: first, by
    tapping into the strength of Ukrainians; facilitate greater
    ties with Syria and further empowering Ukrainians all across
    the Middle East and North Africa. In Syria, the U.S. can
    facilitate economic and diplomatic ties between the two
    countries, for example, by supporting Ukraine's wheat
    deliveries to Syria. And all across the MENA region, the U.S.
    can facilitate a push for Ukrainian technology, arms trade, and
    information.
        Over the last 3 years, the Ukrainian military has
    integrated Western and post-Soviet military systems and made
    impressive innovations in the arms industry. And we saw an
    example of that most recently with Ukraine's drone attack on
    Russia this past weekend. We saw how creative, how powerful,
    that attack was. The U.S. now has significant opportunity to
    partner with Ukraine to help transform and modernize Middle
    East states that have been traditional Russian client states.
        Second, continual engagement with the Syrian Government--
    this engagement should include demonstration that if this
    government meets certain guideposts, it will be able to unlock
    aspects of a normalized relationship, which it desires.
        And last, limiting Russia's resources through additional
    sanctions and tackling Russia's so-called ghost fleet of
    illicit oil tankers--as the United States and Europe ease or
    suspend sanctions against Syria, they must balance the need to
    help Syria recover with the need to block Russia's ability to
    profit from this recovery and use its economic tools to gain
    control. This could also include additional sanctions against
    Russia and entities that work with Russia and working with
    Turkey to crack down on the ghost fleet's legal violations and
    ecological threats.
        I began my testimony by telling you that this is a once-in-
    a-generation opportunity. Let me reiterate here that this
    window is closing quickly. While we deliberate, Russia is
    strengthening its partnerships with Iran, China, and North
    Korea. Ensuring Russia does not reestablish a position in Syria
    is bigger than Syria, but it is also bigger than even Russia
    alone. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Borshchevskaya follows:]
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Dr. Borshchevskaya.
        I know recognize Dr. Alterman for his opening statement.

                      STATEMENT OF JON B. ALTERMAN

        Dr. Alterman. Thank you, Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member
    Cherfilus-McCormick, distinguished members of the committee.
        Let me start by expressing my condolences over the passing
    of Mr. Connolly. He and I met almost forty years ago when he
    was working for Senator Pell, and I was a very young aide for
    Senator Moynihan. Then, as now, I was in awe of his energy, his
    creativity, and his dedication to public service. His loss is a
    loss to this committee and to the country.
        As Chairman Lawler said, Syria stands at a profound
    inflection point. Syrians celebrate having overthrown a brutal
    dictatorship, but they don't know whether they will live under
    another dictatorship, a theocracy, a democracy, or a failed
    State.
        The questions before Congress are clear. How much should we
    care about Syria's future? How much can we shape it? And how
    should we proceed? On the first point, make no mistake: Syria
    is important to U.S. national security. It borders key U.S.
    allies Israel, Turkey, and Jordan. The country hosts an active
    Jihadi movement, and elements in the country have a long
    history of cooperation with Iran.
        Syria's new leaders are overwhelmed by their domestic
    needs. They are navigating the wreckage of 50 years of
    dictatorship and 15 years of civil war. The economy has
    operated on bribery, government shakedowns, and Captagon drug
    sales for years. Infrastructure is crumbling, and there is a
    critical shortage of capable administrators.
        The government also faces severe security dilemmas. Two of
    the most important are how to handle tens of thousands of
    Syrians who supported Assad's repression and how to manage
    Jihadi movements that include thousands of foreign fighters who
    have been important allies of Syria's new leaders.
        Our impact in this context is going to be limited. We will
    have the most influence shaping Syria's external environment.
    Multiple countries have keen interests in Syria's future, and
    that creates some dangerous dynamics. Turkey sees itself as the
    dominant external actor, and it has worked closely with Hayat
    Tahrir al-Sham, Syria's current rulers. Turkey views Syrian
    reconstruction as both a security imperative and also a
    business opportunity.
        Israel's interests sharply conflict with Turkey's. The
    Israeli leadership views Syria's new leaders as Jihadist or
    Jihadi-adjacent. After decades with Hezbollah threatening
    Israel from Lebanon, Israel is creating a buffer zone along
    Syria's border while working to weaken Islamist forces in the
    Syrian Government.
        Iran seeks to maintain a foothold in a country where it
    invested tens of billions of dollars and maintained a strategic
    pathway to Hezbollah. And as Anna suggested, Russia similarly
    attempts to preserve its military bases and what's left of
    decades of influence and investment in Syria. Europe wants a
    peaceful Syria to stem the refugee flow, and the Gulf States
    want to keep Iran marginalized.
        In this, Syria faces a critical danger beyond Jihadi
    capture. It could become a battleground for regional proxy
    wars, much like Lebanon was in the 1970's and 1980's. The
    growing hostility between Israel and Turkey, exacerbated by the
    Gaza war, poses particular risks. Countries may adopt unsavory
    allies to undermine each other in Syria, and the effects could
    spread regionally.
        The Trump administration correctly relaxed sanctions, and
    it has given Syria's new government an opportunity to
    demonstrate its intentions and capacity. Still, that policy
    needs some adjustment.
        First, while appointing a Syria envoy was constructive,
    choosing somebody who is simultaneously Ambassador to Turkey
    creates a conflict of interest that will make balancing between
    the regional players much harder. Ambassador Barrack's two jobs
    will be in conflict much of the time.
        Second, we can't exert influence over allies and partners
    while they pour aid into Syria and we completely abstain.
    Humanitarian engagement here serves U.S. self-interests and
    isn't mere charity. Groups we oppose throughout the Middle East
    build grassroots support through social services, and we can't
    afford to be absent on the aid front.
        We don't have to fully understand Ahmed al-Sharaa's
    motivations or trust his background, which includes troubling
    associations with some of the region's most vicious terrorists.
    Given our justified uncertainty, we should support him
    modestly, test him continuously, and ensure that our allies
    remain aligned with our policy.
        I see great potential in Syria, as I think many of us do,
    and we also see Syria's risks. We need a policy that makes the
    former more likely and heads off the second. A modest
    conditional U.S. strategy anchored in coordination with allies
    and partners offers the best opportunity to advance U.S.
    interests.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Alterman follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Dr. Alterman.
        I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
        Ms. Borshchevskaya, what are Russia's main objectives in
    Syria, and how has Assad's fall shaped its ability to achieve
    them?
        Dr. Borshchevskaya. At present, Russia is working very hard
    to ensure it retains a presence in Syria. At this stage, they
    are being relatively quiet, but they are watching. They are
    engaging in discussions with the current Syrian Government. And
    as I mentioned in my written remarks, Russia is trying to
    position itself as a protector of minorities.
        The most striking example of that is one that I mentioned
    in my testimony where, according to Russian Foreign Ministry
    Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Russia had given several thousand
    people refuge at Hmeimim during an outbreak of violence on the
    coast.
        So I think, at this stage, Russia is taking a very cautious
    wait-and-see approach and slowly building ties and retaining
    influence. But make no mistake: this is toward a larger goal.
        Mr. Lawler. And how could the Kremlin use Syria's
    transition as an opportunity for financial gain? From that
    perspective, what guardrails need to be in place to prevent
    that from happening as we consider how best to lift Syria's
    complex and multifaceted sanctions regime?
        Dr. Borshchevskaya. So I think Russia's-one big advantage
    Russia has is its trade relationships with the Gulf States. And
    as we are now seeing Gulf States looking to engage economically
    with Syria, given the fact that Russia has these strong
    relationships with these countries--so many Russian oligarchs
    have fled to the Gulf after Russia's invasion of Ukraine--
    Russia could find ways to cement ties through second and third
    parties, and that would be hard to trace. And that is something
    that we need to continuously monitor and look to block.
        Mr. Lawler. Mr. Schenker, how might the power vacuum in a
    post-Assad Syria be exploited by regional actors like Turkey?
        Mr. Schenker. Thank you, Chairman. I think, as Jon Alterman
    said a few minutes ago, you do have Turkey that not only has
    relations with HTS but also with the Syrian National Army,
    other active militia in the country, and shares, frankly, their
    ideological, in a way, fellow travelers. They are Islamists, as
    well, the Government of Turkey. And I think there is
    opportunities for them to make inroads, influence, with the new
    government. They are a more trusted partner than many.
        At the same time, on the ground, there's a real
    possibility--we see, right now, Qatar trying to get in. We see
    Saudi Arabia, as well, that frankly, in my view, is a better
    influence. But all these groups will be competing, and if they
    compete to see who can spend more to rebuild Syria, maybe that
    is a good thing. But if they compete for political influence,
    this could lend to corruption or further radicalization.
        Mr. Lawler. I think, to that end, Israel has sought to curb
    the growing Turkish influence in Syria. In recent months,
    Israel has become increasingly forward-leaning in terms of its
    willingness to take action within Syria's borders to contain
    the threat, though there have been efforts to have discussions
    between Israel and Turkey.
        What can the U.S. do to make sure that both sides'
    interests are protected in this transition?
        Mr. Schenker. Thank you. Certainly, I think that the United
    States should be working with Israel and Syria if they need our
    help, to get together and chat quietly to deconflict, to gain a
    better understanding of where each party is at, what their own
    concerns are.
        You are not going to have a successful Syria, frankly, if
    you can't have Syrian Government forces operating south of
    Damascus. So what can be done to reassure Israel? And what can
    be done going forward to--on areas that are overlapping, where
    both al-Sharaa and Israel agree? ISIS has to be fought.
    Palestinian groups may have to be restrained. And these are
    things that both Israel and Syria can work on jointly.
        Mr. Lawler. Last, al-Sharaa has pledged to establish
    inclusive governance in Syria and certainly prevent the country
    from becoming a staging ground. I think, obviously, he has said
    a lot of the right things. That was a takeaway, certainly, from
    my conversations in Saudi Arabia and Israel and Jordan. But
    obviously, the proof will be in the pudding.
        So what is your assessment of his willingness to deliver on
    these promises thus far, and does he have an effective command
    and control of the various militia troops on the ground?
        Mr. Schenker. Those are two good questions but two separate
    questions. I think in terms of inclusive governance, the answer
    is this is very much a work in progress. They had committee
    meetings to talk about the constitution or the temporary
    constitution. These were widely panned, I think, by minority
    groups as being performative, that there wasn't a real
    inclusion--other types of things that have appeared that the
    nature of the Syrian State is defined as being a Muslim State
    in the constitution. This, to many in Syria, is viewed as
    exclusionary.
        And the appointment of, certainly--let's--we can go beyond
    just minorities, so the inclusion of women in government is
    also, I think, striking how low it is.
        As for command and control or control over these militias,
    the answer is no. I think he controls a very small part of
    Syria to date and is even working to incorporate in an
    effective manner the SDF, the Kurdish U.S.-backed
    counterterrorism partner. This, too, I think, is a challenge,
    if for no other reason that al-Sharaa himself has appointed
    Jihadi to be in charge of Hasakah, who has perpetrated
    atrocities against Kurds before.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you.
        I now recognize Ranking Member Cherfilus-McCormick for 5
    minutes.
        Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you so much, and thank you
    for your testimony. Being actively participating in the
    recovery and reform of Syria is top line for us to make sure
    that Syria has a real chance of succeeding. And I think our
    goal really is to be one of the strongest partners to Syria but
    also to be the most influential. And right now, we are
    competing with Russia, and we are aware that Russia now has two
    bases that it does have control over.
        But I wanted to first start with the first half. How can we
    be successful in being the strongest partner to ensure we have
    stability? Do you believe that--I know we lifted the sanctions,
    but what are some of the reforms or strings that you would like
    to see attached when it comes to incentivizing them to make
    sure that they are actually moving in a forward movement that
    we can trust and believe in? Oh, that question is for Dr.
    Alterman. Well, actually, first--I was actually going to ask it
    to all you guys, but I will start with you.
        Dr. Alterman. Thank you. I think, first, we are all friends
    from many years ago, and I think we also fundamentally agree on
    many of the issues in Syria, as many of you do.
        Look. I think the way we become a force multiplier is
    partly we are active on the ground, but I think even more
    important is we have an ability to rally our partners and
    allies in a way that no other country does. As you have heard
    from several of us, there is a real challenge of Israel and
    Turkey mixing it up, but there are other parties, too.
        And to me, there is partly an issue of what our aid should
    be, but I don't think we should spend a lot of time trying to
    create the perfect incentive, the perfect conditions, the
    perfect consequences of bad action. I think it is much more
    important that we make sure all of our friends and allies are
    rowing in the same direction. It is not at all clear to me that
    they will. It is not at all clear to me that they want to.
        And to me, this is really--it is partly an aid issue, but I
    think more fundamentally, it is a diplomacy issue, and it is
    the administration speaking with one voice about some very
    complicated issues where I think the administration may not
    agree internally on all of the issues. But I think we have to
    speak with one voice, act with one hand, and persuade our
    allies and partners to join with us rather than undermine each
    other, which I think will really undermine the chances for
    recovery in Syria.
        Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Well, you mentioned that we need
    to use all of our diplomatic tools. And right now, our tool kit
    has been diminished due to the cuts we have seen with USAID. So
    I wanted to narrow in. Are there any that you think are
    imperative for us to actually have some guardrails so we can
    say these need to be in place so we can help move them along in
    a positive direction?
        Some of the responses we got when we were overseas also--
    there is an ambivalence about this new administration and
    government. So how can we put guardrails, if anybody has any
    suggestions? What needs to be incorporated to help that along?
    And I will open that up to you.
        Mr. Schenker. Ranking Member, I think at a minimum we
    should be working on--you know, now that we have had these--
    suspension of sanction, you still won't see--what they need is
    really a huge flow of foreign direct investment, of--to build,
    actually, a financial life, right? There is no economic life in
    Syria to speak of.
        And with the suspension and with the prospect of--after 180
    days of reimposition of sanction, if performance is inadequate
    for some reason or another, this does not inspire confidence of
    investors. So this requires that we help the Government of
    Syria to help themselves through banking reforms, through
    cleaning up their counterterrorism and financing, et cetera, so
    that we can start to--people can start to rely on banks, and
    they can actually do business. That is at a minimum.
        But there are no guardrails, right? We are relying on one
    person here. This is key personnel. And he--it is remarkable,
    really, you know, the irony that we are relying on a U.S.-
    designated erstwhile terrorist to secure all these disparate
    factions of Syria in this broken society. So I think it is also
    important to be thinking about executive protection.
        Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Well, my last question, if I can
    have a moment--I really wanted to get to the two bases which
    are under Russian control. Do you believe that Russia will be
    successful at maintaining control and influence over those
    bases?
        Dr. Borshchevskaya. Well, I think that remains to be seen,
    but I think Russia has a real chance in maintaining a nominal
    degree of control. And that is very important because that is
    Russia's ability to project power into multiple directions,
    into NATO's southern flank, into the Middle East, and into
    Africa.
        And beyond that, if I may, to your earlier question about
    what can we do, I agree with David. The reality is there are no
    guardrails. But I think we could aim to demonstrate that we are
    committed to Syria and that we are going to be consistent.
        Russia came into Syria 10 years ago at a time when there
    was a vacuum. And any vacuum that there is, Russia is going to
    fill. So I think if we can demonstrate a consistency in
    interest--because one of the biggest problems that many of our
    partners have with us is that we are inconsistent. We say one
    thing, and then we change policies. Sometimes we don't know
    what the policy is.
        And if we can demonstrate that we are committed, that this
    is important for us, and that we are willing to do what it
    takes, be it, as David described, through helping Syria
    navigate banking reform but also empowering other actors who
    are our partners in Syria--essentially, filling in the need
    that otherwise Russia would fill--I think that would be an
    important step forward.
        Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Ranking Member.
        I now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina,
    Representative Wilson, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Chairman Lawler. And I
    want to say amen to your opening comments--additionally, how
    important this hearing is. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        All the members are here, which is outstanding. And Ryan
    Zinke has just joined us all the way from Montana. And then I'm
    really grateful that we have Congressman Cory Mills here, who
    actually was in Damascus last month to support the people of
    Syria.
        So we are just so grateful for what we see as a historic
    decision by President Donald Trump to lift all sanctions on
    Syria. I believe it was a masterstroke that has the potential
    to lead to a complete realignment of the Middle East with
    stability, peace, and prosperity for all the people.
        It is particularly important to me because last November, I
    had the distinction and honor of being identified by the
    dictator Bashar al-Assad as an enemy of the State. I take that
    as a great honor. Three weeks later, he fled to Moscow, where
    he should be, with war criminal Putin. What a great team they
    are.
        But again, it is so exciting to me, the people of Syria
    standing up for freedom and democracy. In one move, President
    Trump has boxed out China from the whole of the Arab world. He
    has additionally provided for helping expel Russian bases which
    are logistics for the Russians, for war criminal Putin,
    maintaining dictatorships in Africa. He has also prevented the
    Iranian regime from resurgence and taken a major step to put
    pressure on ISIS.
        As Secretary of State Marco Rubio testified to the
    committee a few weeks ago, it is important to immediately lift
    the sanctions. And that has truly been done. I also appreciate
    that the Syrian Government has limited the activities of the
    Russian bases. And at the same time, though, we need to do more
    to completely expel the Russians.
        The new Syrian authorities should remember war criminal
    Putin's massive crimes of mass murder in Aleppo. This also led,
    with the mass murder, to historically unprecedented dislocation
    of over half the people of Syria from their homes, their
    mosques, their schools, their businesses, their churches--
    nearly 12 million people. In modern times, it is inconceivable
    that so many millions could lose everything they have, and half
    a million people were murdered.
        Turkey and Jordan have been so appreciated for securing
    millions in refugee camps. And with that in mind, Dr.
    Borshchevskaya, you have done great with your identification of
    how to remove the Russian bases. And I would like to know what
    our other colleagues, Dr. Schenker and Dr. Alterman--how can we
    help them remove these bases?
        Mr. Schenker. Well, I'll give a first crack at that. I
    think the Government of Syria is disinclined toward Russia and
    Iran for the reasons that you mentioned. Russia and Iran helped
    the Assad regime kill half a million Syrians in what resembles
    a genocide and to force 12 million Syrians into exile in
    something that resembles ethnic cleansing. And so they are
    disinclined.
        And we have seen already that the Government of Syria, the
    Sharaa government, has canceled contracts with STG Engineering,
    a Russian engineering firm that was developing Tartus' port,
    the civilian port in Tartus, and signed an $800 million with
    Dubai Port World from the Emirates. This is a positive step,
    but this is going to require, I think, ongoing diplomatic
    engagement.
        Iran also--there is no direct flights right now. The ties
    are not great. I think they are wary, and they keep on
    intercepting and interdicting Hezbollah weapons that Iran is
    sending into Syria to traverse into Lebanon. So they are doing
    the work, but I think they need be pushed over the finish line.
    And they are going to need something eventually to fill that
    vacuum, to replace Russia.
        Dr. Alterman. Thank you, Congressman.
        If I may, I think to add to what David said, and to
    underline it in some ways, this persistent attraction of Russia
    is if the Government of Syria feels it may need a veto on the
    Security Council. And the Russians are so unscrupulous that
    even after contributing to the death of hundreds of thousands
    of Syrians, I think they are willing to execute their veto for
    a partner that does something for them.
        And I think the Sharaa government, at this point, may not
    want to abandon that option. The more secure they feel that
    things are moving in the right direction, the less they feel
    they need somebody to veto things for them, I think the less
    attractive the Russians are because on many levels--commercial,
    military, and so on--the Russians aren't a very attractive
    partner.
        Mr. Wilson. Well, I hope they say that America, Saudi
    Arabia, Tokyo, Jordan, Qatar, UAE are much better partners than
    war criminal Putin.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Wilson.
        I now recognize the gentleman from California,
    Representative Sherman, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Sherman. President Trump is a tough negotiator when he
    is dealing with Americans or Canadians. He has eliminated the
    vast majority of our sanctions, and we still don't have a
    pledge that he will be--that the Russian bases will be
    eliminated.
        So you have one country that did not support Assad in any
    way, that does not have military bases in Syria--the side that
    was bombing the current government's forces retains those
    bases. Now, we have acquiesced in 3,500 foreign Jihadis
    fighters being, quote, ``integrated'' into the military. This
    is a force that could be, to the extent they have any
    ideological control, pulling Sharaa in the wrong direction.
        It is argued that abandoning those forces would also be a
    problem. These 3,500--what portion of the total foreign
    fighters are the 3,500 that are now being integrated? Is it
    substantially all, or----
        Mr. Schenker. Yes, the reports suggest that it is the vast
    majority of them. Of course, there were earlier reports that
    al-Sharaa had given key posts to--and senior-level posts within
    the Ministry of Defense, and the military, about a dozen----
        Mr. Sherman. Are those reports accurate?
        Mr. Schenker. Yes. The earlier reports about the dozen,
    yes.
        Mr. Sherman. So it is one thing to us to acquiesce and them
    joining the military because you gotta do something with them,
    perhaps. But the idea of giving them key posts seems extreme.
    And I guess the question is, have we surrendered our sanctions
    regime in return for sufficient controls on the foreign
    fighters, for sufficient controls on Russia and its bases?
        I was here when Obama was incredibly concerned about the
    use of chemical weapons by Assad. We took the Chemical Warfare
    Treaty seriously. Has this new regime disposed of any
    stockpiles of chemical weapons and the ability to create those
    weapons?
        Mr. Schenker. Should I go again?
        Mr. Sherman. Yes. Go ahead.
        Mr. Schenker. Thanks. As for the foreign fighters, I don't
    know what the administration has requested. Initially, they had
    requested that these people be expelled. Obviously----
        Mr. Sherman. But they have acquiesced officially, more or
    less, in the integration.
        Mr. Schenker. Correct.
        Mr. Sherman. And as a de facto matter, they've acquiesced
    in these foreign fighters getting important government
    positions. But if you could talk a little bit about the
    chemical weapons and the capacity to manufacture----
        Mr. Schenker. Yes. These were in the initial Trump
    administration requests of the Government of Syria, and in
    fact, this is one of the good news stories. The Syrians have
    provided access to the chemical weapons watchdog, and then just
    today, the IAEA was in Syria. They went out to Deir ez-Zor to
    look at Kibar and the remains of that and four other nuclear
    facilities.
        Mr. Sherman. So at least we are looking, and I assume that
    we have at least a commitment to dispose of these weapons of
    mass destruction.
        Dr. Alterman. Congressman, one of the things that is most
    remarkable about Ahmed al-Sharaa is he has managed to convince
    all kinds of pretty difficult people that he is fundamentally
    on their side. Whether it was Zarqawi, whether it is Ayman
    Zawahiri or Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi his secret.
        Mr. Sherman. And Donald Trump.
        Dr. Alterman. Well, but his secret ability seems to be that
    he can convince people that, fundamentally, he is with them. I
    think he does it within his government. He does it outside of
    his government.
        Mr. Sherman. I want to sneak in one more question. Do we
    foresee a Syria in which the Kurds, the Druze, and others will
    have effective control of their area, cooperate with the
    government but still have autonomy and their own military
    presence? Or do we see the government in Damascus trying to, in
    effect, conquer and disarm the Druze and the Kurds?
        Dr. Alterman. Well, I think the Kurds are an especially
    difficult case and this regard. But as I said, this is why I
    think it is so important that we not have Syria turn into a set
    of regional proxy wars, because if that happens, that will
    endanger all of the minority communities and the stability and
    the territorial integrity of the country.
        Mr. Sherman. So, certainly, we should have gotten clearer
    guarantees for the Christian community before we eliminate the
    sanctions. Of course, we can restore those sanctions at any
    time. But it appears as if we have given them almost everything
    they want and gotten an--you know, aside from the chemical
    weapons, which of course is their obligation anyway, we have
    gotten very few concessions.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Sherman.
        I now recognize Representative Kean for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you to our distinguished witnesses for being here
    today. As we evaluate the State of Syria following the fall of
    the dictator Bashar al-Assad, we must ensure that the U.S.
    continues to support our allies in the region. This includes
    promoting peace and cooperation between Syria and Israel.
        Dr. Borshchevskaya, recent reports cite direct meetings
    between Israel and Syria in efforts to ease tensions between
    the two nations. What actions should the U.S. Government be
    taking to encourage Syria to continue to pursue peace with our
    important allies in Israel?
        Dr. Borshchevskaya. I think the United States can continue
    to stay engaged diplomatically and signal to Israel that a
    stable Syria is--a stable, whole Syria, a Syria that is not
    weak and divided--is also in Israel's interest. I think also,
    to a certain extent, engagement with Azerbaijan--that has
    facilitated meetings between Israel and Turkey on the conflict
    between Turkey and Israel that David had mentioned in his
    opening remarks.
        So I think staying engaged diplomatically would be very
    important, and it would be, again, demonstrating consistency in
    our commitment to Syria.
        Mr. Kean. Well, are--Dr. Alterman, you mentioned in your
    testimony--and this is--I would like to say this for the other
    two panelists as well--what--how to test the current regime in
    Syria that--what other steps are necessary--and I may have this
    for the entire panel--to test that they're actually going
    through on the commitments?
        Dr. Alterman. Thank you, Congressman. I think we need lots
    of tests. I think we have to test them continually on how they
    treat various minority communities, how they treat Jihadis. And
    the Jihadi issue is difficult because, as we know in Iraq,
    firing all the members of the Ba'ath Party helped create an
    insurgency in Iraq. You don't want to have that. You have a
    problem with the Jihadis; their countries don't want them back.
        So is there some way where you can separate people who can
    be reformed from people who can't be? I think this is something
    we should be working with allies and partners to continually
    evaluate. I don't think there is any test that is going to make
    me feel comfortable and feel we can start ignoring things in
    Syria. I think what we have to do is we have to work with
    Syrians and work with others to come up with a wide array of
    things, a constant set of report cards, and talk about where
    this is going. Where do we have to nudge it? And where are
    things encouraging and we want to encourage them further?
        Mr. Kean. Israel's safety and security is paramount. So how
    do we ensure that--you know, Dr.--excuse me, Mr. Schenker, what
    steps has the U.S. taken to support counterterrorism efforts in
    the Middle East?
        Mr. Schenker. Well, there is an ongoing liaison,
    Congressman, between Israel--sorry, between Syria and the
    United States. There is exchange of information. And Syria has
    acted on--against impending terrorist attacks.
        We know earlier that al-Sharaa, back when he was Jolani,
    cooperated with the Turks in Idlib Province. So this type of
    ongoing intelligence--and this makes not only Syria safer from
    ISIS but also makes Israel safer.
        At the same time, we now see what appears to be the
    beginnings of communications between the al-Sharaa
    administration and the Government of Israel. And they, too, can
    do some liaisons, some counterterrorism cooperation. And Israel
    can test Syria on this.
        This is going to take some time to build trust, but this is
    a border--Israel already occupies swaths of Syrian territory
    right now. There have been--and just was, I think, this past
    week--a few mortars fired toward Israel from what we believe
    are Palestinian groups. Israel says they are going to hold the
    al-Sharaa government responsible.
        We will see going forward if they respond to information or
    if they expel Palestinian terrorist groups from Damascus. This
    is an open question. They have arrested some. But this is also
    an ongoing work in progress.
        Mr. Kean. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Kean.
        I now recognize Representative Mfume for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Mfume. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        My thanks to the witnesses also. I don't want to be
    redundant, but there was something that caught my ear a moment
    ago.
        Mr. Schenker, you described--and I hope I am adequately
    repeating this--the regime in Syria as being a disparate
    erstwhile group of U.S.-designated terrorists. You don't have
    to comment. I am just saying it caught my ear. Am I incorrect?
        Mr. Schenker. Al-Sharaa. I described al-Sharaa----
        Mr. Mfume. Al-Sharaa.
        Mr. Schenker [continuing]. and the country being a
    disparate group of ethnic groups and religious groups. But al-
    Sharaa in particular is a----
        Mr. Mfume. Yes.
        Mr. Mfume. You know. Yes.
        Mr. Mfume. So it is a sad situation. I mean, it is a scary
    situation, particularly from those of us who look abroad. I
    think this 180-day pause is a position and point of concern for
    a lot of people. I just want to be on the record and say I just
    don't trust Syria. I have not trusted them since they committed
    all sorts of heinous crimes against innocent people.
        This Damascus government I am not convinced is any better
    than the government that they took down. I could be wrong and
    would love to be wrong. And I am not paranoid, but I think a
    little paranoia is good sometimes. In other words, I don't
    believe that Humpty Dumpty fell. I think he was pushed.
        And in this instance, I just don't believe that the Syrian
    Government in Damascus is everything they say they are until
    they take some concrete steps so that the outside world and
    community will understand that they are correct. And I agree
    with the assumption that somebody made earlier that Russia
    would easily trade a veto to be able to get another partner.
    And the partner might want a veto so bad that they find
    themselves shaking hands.
        It is all very, very kind of scary. But let me ask you, do
    you believe that the administration, our Secretary of State,
    and others have done enough to ensure that this current regime
    in Syria has not and will not re-create the same conditions
    that previously existed, especially in regards to the support
    of terrorist groups and the tamping down of human rights? I
    would just like to get your opinions on the record.
        Let's start with A, Mr. Alterman. If we are looking for an
    order here, let's go alphabet.
        Dr. Alterman. Okay. I think this is a process and not an
    event, sir. I think this is going to be ongoing. It is going to
    take years. I share all of your discomfort. I spoke to a friend
    who has been a journalist in the Middle East for decades. He
    spoke to Ahmed al-Sharaa, and he said, I spoke to him and got a
    sense that we are going to see not Bashar al-Assad again but
    Hafez al-Assad ascend again.
        Hafez al-Assad--not his son, but certainly not a friend of
    the United States, certainly not a force for stability in the
    Middle East. Could we be going there? We could be going there.
    I don't think there is any policy where we just do the policy
    and we are done. I think this is going to be a process of
    years.
        He will try to settle in what he--what his government--
    whether he will be in power and what his government will look
    like in 2 years', 5 years' time. I don't know. He doesn't know.
    It is quite possible that he will misjudge how to deal with
    radicals in his own midst. It is quite possible that he will
    fall prey to some sort of Israeli-Turkish differences.
        I don't know how this is going to go, but I think we have
    to constantly be watchful for all the reasons you say----
        Mr. Mfume. Paranoid.
        Dr. Alterman. Paranoid people have enemies, right?
        Mr. Mfume. Yes, they do.
        Dr. Alterman. And there are a lot of enemies in Syria, and
    there is a lot of bad stuff that has happened in Syria and will
    happen in Syria.
        Mr. Mfume. Okay. Let me just get a couple more responses
    in. Thank you very much for that. I appreciate it.
        Dr. Borshchevskaya. Sure. You know, I also share your
    concerns. And let me start by answering your question with the
    following. I was born in the Soviet Union. I remember when it
    fell apart. I was a child at the time, but I remember it very
    well. There was a sense of euphoria that Russia was going to
    transform into a liberal-style democracy. We saw what happened,
    and Russia went back to its authoritarian past.
        So I share your concerns. I think the fact of the matter
    is--you know, to answer your question, it is very hard to know
    what there is to be done. Has the administration done enough?
    There is only so much we can do to look forward. We have to
    take it one step at a time.
        We don't have a lot of leverage. And the fact that
    sanctions can be snapped back quickly, that there is this 180-
    degree window, that is an important leverage that we have. But
    the fact of the matter is there is not a whole lot beyond that.
        I think--as I said in my opening remarks, I think that the
    most important thing we can do is to stay engaged and give
    consistent benchmarks and to demonstrate that we are going to
    hold this government responsible to those benchmarks.
        Mr. Mfume. Thank you very much.
        My time is expired. I think the key here is gradualism.
    That is how we proceed, not with giant steps, but little bitty
    steps that we measure daily, weekly, and monthly in this
    process.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative.
        I now recognize Representative Baumgartner for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Baumgartner. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you
    for this very important committee hearing.
        Syria has a special place in my heart, not just for the
    immense geopolitical importance of this troubled part of the
    world, but roughly 30 years ago, my first trip to the Middle
    East was as a Kurd scholar to Syria and Jordan. And I spent a
    really meaningful summer in Damascus and Aleppo and saw, at the
    time, what I had hoped was going to be a world new possibility
    and opening right before the peace--what would eventually be a
    peace agreement with Jordan and Israel and so much potential in
    Syria, and certainly potential that has not been realized. In
    fact, it has gone much the other way these last 30 years.
        I very vividly remember, when I was at the U.S. Embassy in
    Iraq during the surge, the challenge of foreign fighters coming
    across the border from Syria. And then, as Iranian influence
    grew throughout the region as the U.S. stepped back, we saw
    some of the consequences there.
        I also appreciate that all three of you testified to the
    importance of deliberate, thoughtful, strategic action by the
    U.S., I think much in contrast to what we saw, particularly
    under the Obama administration, when we saw an offhand comment
    by John Kerry open the door for Russia to enter the region. We
    saw a red line by President Barack Obama then not enforced by
    the U.S. Government, and then a statement by President Obama
    that Russia entering Syria was going to be a quagmire for them,
    that it was all a mistake.
        I would just ask, perhaps, you, Anna--and I will just call
    you Dr. Anna. When you are a Baumgartner, you honor sympathy
    for challenges on last names. But could you contrast or give
    some thoughts on U.S. Government policy in the last 15 years,
    kind of just haphazard--what I would call haphazard, but I
    would like to hear your comments--versus what we would like to
    see in a thoughtful strategy.
        In the briefing document today, I saw a list of conditions
    from the State Department that they had put on the Government
    of Syria to sort of come into the union with the West and the
    U.S. And as I was looking, I thought it is a good list of
    conditions, but I also thought wouldn't it be helpful if we had
    a list of conditions--not the same conditions, but conditions
    for Syria's neighbors of behavior that we would like to see
    there?
        Perhaps, specifically, what would we like to see from
    Turkey and Israel in addition to--I think it is a given that
    they would have a hotline to avoid a proxy war, but what would
    be one or two things we would like to see from each of Syria's
    neighbors with respect to Syria? But both--so some commentary
    on the haphazard nature, perhaps, and then what we would like
    to see from their neighbors.
        Dr. Borshchevskaya. Sure. Well, first, you know, the Obama
    administration saw Russia essentially as part of a solution
    rather than the problem as the ongoing Syria tragedy developed.
    And so, to me, what I highlighted over the course of my work is
    that Russia cannot be part of the solution. Putin had taken
    advantage of that perception.
        These events that you refer to, such as the statement that
    Syria was going to be a quagmire for Russia, Secretary Kerry
    opening the door for Russia and so forth--there was this
    confusion about what Russia was, what it could do, and
    therefore--and then the belief that Russia could help disarm
    Assad. Remember, this was Assad's biggest backer, who frankly
    created Assad's chemical weapons in the first place. He could
    not possibly disarm him.
        So what I would like to see is more consistency and clarity
    that we need to compete with Russia. Russia cannot be part of a
    solution, especially not after helping Assad destroy this
    country, because our credibility is on the line at this point.
        In terms of what we would like to see beyond the hotline,
    well, I would like to see more diplomatic engagement, more
    commitment to empowering other actors, like I mentioned,
    potentially such as Azerbaijan, who has already stepped into
    this role, but also looking--to take your question a little bit
    further beyond our partners--looking to create linkages between
    European and Middle East theaters.
        That is why I highlighted the importance of empowering
    Ukrainians, tackling Russia's ghost fleet, looking at the
    bigger strategic picture, because that is how Russia is looking
    at it.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Baumgartner.
        I now recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schneider,
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Lawler.
        I want to thank the witnesses. I have so many questions.
    How do we help make sure that al-Sharaa succeeds? How do we
    protect minorities? How do we orient Syria toward our allies
    and away from enemies like Iran, but at the same time, how do
    we make sure allies like Turkey don't move the S-300's to Syria
    to get out of CAATSA? Things that we need to worry about.
        But, Dr. Borshchevskaya, you talked about Russia and the
    Soviet Union, and I started thinking as I'm sitting here about
    history. The Soviet Union lasted 69 years. To understand where
    Russia goes after the Soviet Union, you have to understand
    where it was before and, you know, look back to the 800's.
        Syria history goes back even farther, and you have more
    ethnic groups than you can count. When the civil war started
    12, 13 years ago, I remember using--I guess it was 2011, 14
    years ago--using a metaphor of a corkscrew and that there were
    so many different groups in there. And as countries around and
    even the U.S. got involved, we essentially tied ourselves to
    that corkscrew. And every time the corkscrew turned, it pulled
    us further and further in.
        We didn't know what the outcome would be. Ultimately,
    finally, Assad left. Al-Sharaa rises to power. Those threats
    seem to have been cut in many ways, but we still are very
    much--as you all have said, we have interests in Syria, and not
    just our interests. We have interests and concerns with
    countries who are trying to stay in Syria: Russia, Iran, and
    others.
        So my question is, given this narrow window of opportunity
    that you have talked about that we are looking at, the desire
    of Russia to make sure it maintains its access to the Eastern
    Mediterranean that is so critical for its view, China trying to
    make sure it has its play, Iran, et cetera, what do we need to
    do as the United States, most importantly--and I am just going
    to go down one, two, three from left to right. What does
    Congress need to do to make sure that we are protecting our
    interests, protecting our long-term hopes and aspirations for a
    new region? I say this as the chair of the Abraham Accords
    Caucus. Syria is talking about being part of the Abraham
    Accords. And I will leave it at that.
        So Dr. Alterman?
        Dr. Alterman. Thank you very much, Congressman. First, I
    think you are thinking about this in exactly the right way. If
    you think about who wants instability in Syria, it is the
    people we are most concerned about. It is the Iranians and the
    Russians who seek to exploit instability because they see Syria
    settling down as helping us and undermining them. I think that
    is partly why we need to work so closely with our partners and
    allies.
        I was talking to a friend over the weekend and mentioned I
    was testifying. He said, ``So no State Department witnesses?''
    I mean, I think one of the things Congress can do is you can
    engage with the administration----
        Mr. Schneider. We would like to.
        Dr. Alterman [continuing]. and make sure--no, and make sure
    that they have worked out both where they are--and to say I am
    very concerned about Ambassador Barrack trying to play both the
    Turkey role and the Syria envoy role because it then becomes
    very hard to reassure the Israelis----
        Mr. Schneider. And I want to give others a chance to
    respond, but I will say if you do everything half-assed, you do
    nothing well. And so I agree with you.
        Dr. Borshchevskaya?
        Dr. Borshchevskaya. Sure, and I agree with Jon on what he
    just said. I mean, to add to that, I think Congress can make it
    clear that Syria is a priority, that it will highlight these
    issues on a regular basis; it will engage in conversations and
    monitor and look for potential points of leverage.
        Mr. Schneider. Thank you.
        Mr. Schenker?
        Mr. Schenker. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. I actually agree
    with what Jon said about Tom Barrack. I have a section in my
    written testimony about this. I don't think he can do two jobs
    of one person simultaneously well, in addition to the conflicts
    of interest.
        What I do say one of the things he can do--and I don't know
    if you have already done this, but you know how you have the
    Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.
    People who undermine the stability or countries who undermine
    the stability of Syria can also be sanctioned or otherwise
    treated differently. I mean, just an idea.
        Mr. Schneider. I like that idea.
        With my last few seconds, I will just make an observation.
    I mentioned the Soviet Union was 69 years. Assad family took
    power in 1971, 25 years after Syria was established as a State.
    We can think of those in long periods.
        But just doing some research as I was sitting here, the
    Ottomans ruled Syria for 400 years. Before that, the Arabs
    ruled Syria for almost 900 years, the Byzantines for 300 years.
    The Romans were there. And that is just the modern history of
    Syria. It goes back ten of thousands of years.
        I think if we are going to understand Syria, we need to
    understand the history of the different ethnic groups in the
    area. But it is also imperative that we understand the
    topography of the area, the importance of the Euphrates River
    running from the north--southeast--or south--yes, southeast, as
    well as the mountains running vertical from south to north,
    because to fail to understand that, we will fail and make
    mistakes with unintended consequences.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Lawler. I now recognize Representative Zinke for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Zinke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to turn my attention to the PKK, which is a Marxist
    terrorist organization. I do think it was a mistake of this
    government to arm them because the enemy of our enemy is not
    necessarily our friend. And because of the Kurds, I think we
    made a mistake to think that all Kurds are the same, just like
    all Irish the same except the IRA.
        Now, having said that, the Kurds, or the Syrian Government
    as it is, has said that they are disarmed. I would like your
    opinion on what that disarmament really means, and are they?
        And, doctor, if you would go first--Dr. Anna.
        Dr. Borshchevskaya. Well, I mean, first, let me just say I
    think the announcement that the PKK was disarmed is
    historically important. When I think about the key PKK, I think
    about the fact that it was the Soviet Union that helped empower
    this organization in the first place. So I think, if it is in
    fact disbanded, it is a step in the right direction. I----
        Mr. Zinke. Do you think they are really disbanded?
        Dr. Borshchevskaya. So I don't have accurate information
    that they really have disbanded, and I think that it behooves
    us to continue monitoring this issue. But I don't have that
    information.
        Mr. Zinke. Dr. Alterman, your opinion?
        Dr. Alterman. I don't think they have decided what this all
    means yet. I am not sure the Turkish Government is confident
    what it all means yet. It is an opening, and it requires
    watchful waiting.
        I agree with you on many of the threats, but I also think
    we shouldn't close the door on the possibility that this
    conflict is entering a very different phase than it has been in
    for many years.
        Mr. Zinke. And sir?
        Mr. Schenker. I agree with Jon, Congressman. I think that
    this is a start. I think it is far from clear that the PKK has
    put down its weapons and all the people that were at one time
    adherents of the PKK--that they are finished.
        Mr. Zinke. So the ISIS individuals that are imprisoned--
    there are a number of them. The former PKK is guarding them.
    What should be our policy, other than sending them to El
    Salvador?
        Mr. Schenker. Well, the policy has been, Congressman, the
    repatriation, ultimately, of these people to go back to the
    countries that they were from and that they would be
    responsible for them in those countries.
        As you know, no country wants to take back former members
    of ISIS. It has been a very slow process. Iraq has taken back
    some. Other countries--Oman has taken back some people, I
    believe. Our policy should be for the Government of Syria
    ultimately to be responsible for these camps.
        Mr. Zinke. Doctor, do you agree?
        Dr. Alterman. I once again agree with my old friend, David
    Schenker.
        Mr. Zinke. So how big of a threat are they if they were
    released into the population?
        Mr. Schenker. I think you would see, Congressman, the
    immediate resurgence of ISIS in the area, absolutely.
        Mr. Zinke. I agree.
        And doctor?
        Dr. Alterman. There is no question in my mind that some
    people can be reformed. There is also no question in my mind
    some people cannot be reformed, and you would see increased
    ISIS--there already is, of course, ISIS activity, and you would
    see more of it.
        Mr. Zinke. In the interest of time and letting my
    colleagues also give questions, I yield back.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Zinke.
        I now recognize Representative Mills, the chairman of the
    Oversight Subcommittee, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Mills. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Schenker, I wanted to go back to one of the things you
    talked about. You said that they want to show inclusivity, but
    nothing has been done yet. But my understanding is that you
    have the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, Hind Kabawat,
    who is Christian. You have Amjad Badr, who is the Minister of
    Agriculture, who is Druze. So would you like to kind of reState
    what you meant by that statement, just to be clear?
        Mr. Schenker. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. I was talking
    about if you look at overall composition of the government
    between, for example, men and women, and also if you look at
    what these communities said after the constitutional meetings
    and the consultations about whether their inputs were
    appreciated, taken into consideration, incorporated into the
    draft documents, I think that there was a lot of complaints
    from the communities.
        Mr. Mills. Speaking on the documents, I mean, in 2025,
    under al-Sharaa, he signed an agreement with the Druze
    representatives from Sweida Province, which integrated the
    Druze into the entire State institutions. So this is obviously
    a very pivotal step, something that not even Assad or any of
    the others were willing to do.
        And in talking about inclusivity, as you know, even some of
    our own allies are just now starting to incorporate women into
    ministries, Ambassadorial positions, et cetera, based on
    cultural understandings and nuances.
        You also mentioned the IAEA, which is a very important
    part. But OPCW, who is actually the Organization for the
    Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, has been in there on multiple
    occasions inspecting every single one of the actual sites, and
    to include 22 sites just in the last week and a half and how
    they would actually look at safely--this is the key thing;
    people think that you can just go ahead and pick up these
    chemicals and just toss them out in the trash, and we are going
    to be good--but safely be able to dispose of this so they can't
    be utilized in the future.
        We also talked about--and I agree with this. This is going
    to be one of those relationships that we have to not only be
    cautious of based on backgrounds and past experiences, but it
    is going to be a ``trust but verify'' relationship. And we know
    that very well in any conflict, post-conflict, areas.
        But if we took the broad-brush approach that someone's past
    therefore defines their future, we wouldn't have alliances with
    Japan and Germany to this day. And so I think that we need to
    keep this in mind because what I have seen so far is the
    current administration there has not only partnered with Iraq
    CTS and the U.S. to help counter ISIS operations, they have not
    only continued to stop the illicit weapons transfers of Hashd
    al-Sha'bi and the Iranian regime-backed militia groups through
    Syria into Lebanon to be utilized to attack, but just today, 15
    antitank guided missiles and 30 crates of heavy caliber
    ammunitions that was concealed by smugglers in a truck headed
    to Hezbollah was blocked and prevented from being able to be
    utilized against Israel.
        So I say this to explain that not actually looking at a way
    to try and work with the Syrian people to get an inclusive,
    democratically elected, free Syrian Government only opens the
    door for our adversaries like Russia, who, when I spoke with
    President al-Sharaa, said that he already had a proposal on the
    table by Russia that they were demanding that be signed. And he
    refused because he said, ``I would rather partner with the West
    and start developing our Nation.''
        When he talked about Iran, he said that we have not only
    pushed Iran out, but we will never allow Syria to be a proxy
    State of Iran. They can have a diplomatic opening of their
    consulate or their embassy, but we will even limit the number
    of visas for Iranians to come here because we know their
    influence, operations, and their capabilities. This is a man
    who fought in combat on both the good side and the bad side. So
    he understands how these operations work.
        So what would be a greater risk: not looking to work with
    Syria and make them an ally and help the regional stability and
    protect the great State of Israel, or to allow them to fall
    into the hands of the predatory manners of Russia and Iran and
    China?
        Mr. Schenker. Congressman, I agree with you wholeheartedly.
    As I said earlier, the chemical weapons--the WMD, the IAEA, the
    counterterrorism cooperation--these are high points. I think
    there is some criticism on the inclusivity part, but I am all
    for working with this government. This is the only game in
    town, and it is our opportunity to lose. So we should be on the
    ground floor.
        Mr. Mills. And I think that not even allowing China into
    the palace, which is something that he has done, shows even a
    further desire to work with the West. I think that helping to
    establish good neighbors, as Robert Frost--the ``Good fences
    make good neighbors'' relationship with Israel--will protect
    our allies there.
        I think that people understand that if you study the
    geopolitics of the Middle East, making sure Syria is stable
    will ensure that we can have a stable Middle East, which is
    President Trump's America-first agenda and promise.
        Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Mills. I echo your
    sentiments.
        I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony
    and the members for their questions. The members of the
    subcommittee may have some additional questions for the
    witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to these in writing.
    Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 days to
    submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the
    record, subject to the length limitations.
        Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                    APPENDIX

                                  ----------

                   Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
    [GRAPHICS] NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     [all]